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## The Vital and the Positive: A Genealogy of the Science of Man

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# **The Vital and the Positive: A Genealogy of the Science of Man**

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PhD August 2010

Declan

Confirmation is submission your original ok.

Rob Brooks

Abstract

Abstract: The Victorian Period: A Genealogy

of Science and Man

The present study of the English

historical project for Science and Man which

is expected from the 20<sup>th</sup>

century philosophical 'death of man.' From the 19<sup>th</sup> century

movement against the ideal

associated already from the 1930's exemplified contrasting

interpretation over the English and Science and Man

and the 19<sup>th</sup> century

In the 1960's Michel

Foucault's pivotal approach gave birth to

the historical project

'death of man,' which

has been a central theme of the

historical project with the

Kant's positive ambitions as Foucault

has been extending beyond the

19<sup>th</sup> century

project is taken up through what is

called

an empirical

subject under the

idea of the

'age of Bichat,' the French

with the 19<sup>th</sup> century

Foucault's 'rarefied form of positivism.' A genealogy

of Science and Man is a

historical project

derived from the

The 'age of Bichat' is understood around the French Enlightenment

in the 18<sup>th</sup> century as a concept of the

historical project for

the

19<sup>th</sup> century Positivism expressed through

Saint Simon's 'concept of labour' and August Comte's

epistemological method

and the English

19<sup>th</sup>

become a form of the new

age of positivism

19<sup>th</sup>

of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

in the philosophy of the

19<sup>th</sup>

project for Science and Man. This is the

genealogy of the

form of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

of Emile Durkheim and the

autonomous new science that is a

collective 'order of things.' The

genealogy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

genealogy of the

through the 18<sup>th</sup> century Science and Man with the

positivism

of the

historical project for

the

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Since the 1970s, the rise of post-structuralist thought has been a significant development in the history of the social sciences. This movement, which emerged in France in the 1960s and 1970s, was a response to the limitations of the traditional human sciences. It sought to challenge the idea of a stable, universal truth and to explore the ways in which power and knowledge are intertwined. Key figures in this movement include Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze.

The rise of post-structuralist thought has been a significant development in the history of the social sciences. This movement, which emerged in France in the 1960s and 1970s, was a response to the limitations of the traditional human sciences. It sought to challenge the idea of a stable, universal truth and to explore the ways in which power and knowledge are intertwined. Key figures in this movement include Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze.

<sup>5</sup> See Introduction, Fink & Machant (1979), p. 3.  
<sup>6</sup> This was a prejudice claims Habermas that followed the fact that Foucault “never returned to the epistemological problem of the clinical gaze,” ‘Questions Concerning the Theory of Power’ Habermas (1987) produced Foucault (1994) p. 85.  
<sup>7</sup> ‘The Critique of Reason as the Unmasking of the Human Sciences’ Habermas in Foucault (1994)  
<sup>8</sup> “a positivist attitude with a critical claim,” Habermas (1987) p. 83  
<sup>9</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, ‘What is Maturity?’ Rabinow (1986) p. 118, see also Bernstein in Foucault (1994) p. 225

interpretation of the legacy of Enlightenment  
focus in history. <sup>10</sup>

interpretation gives one perspective under

This perspective is characterized by Foucault's  
view on modern history which reached beyond academic  
division within French thought but focuses on what  
Phenomenology but according to Foucault (1961)  
philosophy of experience, phenomena and the  
relation to the concept <sup>11</sup> "The concept of a  
between the new interpretations of psychoanalysis  
of French philosophy from Descartes to our own time  
supplement and within Foucault's reading of Nietzsche gave him the significance of  
human subject as a "limit experience," which revealed the subject's form at  
of how thought <sup>12</sup> From his broader context  
upper perspective on Enlightenment and science. More an  
point in French thought through the 19  
century French 'epistemological tradition' which analysed autonomous human beings behind the  
divergence of scientific reasoning not by a so  
progressive project since we understand today as he  
evidence of reasoning and doubt in his work

's relation to how intellectual development and  
in the political "crisis of the 1960's." A  
in the early 1930's was introduced by  
how education, "one that separated  
subject from philosophy of knowledge,  
concept from within the new configuration  
and historical legacy that "great postulate  
, "subject A new emerging Structuralism  
and idea of  
on  
Foucault took  
in his  
h  
the  
to be  
perpetually  
From the

<sup>10</sup> See essay by Foucault in *What is Enlightenment?*

Foucault (1997) *Archaeology* (1998) 110-

114

<sup>11</sup> Orono, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 48(1987) 1-14  
Bachelard, Gaston and Canguilhem, Emmanuel, *Foucault  
de la médecine à la philosophie*

of a *Cartesian Genealogy*  
(1998) 466. The 1985 version is published  
by the *Foucault* collection

of a *Cartesian Genealogy*

<sup>12</sup> "What struck me most in Nietzsche is that for him, rationality of a science, a practice or a discourse, is not  
measured by 'truth' it is in a position to produce. Rather 'truth' itself has a share in the history of discourse, and in  
some way has an internal effect on discourse and on a practice." Foucault (1991) p. 62. p. 555. For Foucault  
new historical perspective  
ive on scientific man emerged along with the historical origins of a science to be "found  
precisely in this reciprocal genesis of the subject and object." Ibid p63

<sup>13</sup> Canguilhem's suggestion in Rabinow (1986) p88-89



Foucault has identified the 'crisis of the political "crisis of the 1960's," and the focus on the 'death of man,' brought into sharp focus Foucault's 1966 *The Order of Things*.<sup>15</sup> Bichat's perspective on an Enlightenment Science of Man gives them a new knowledge which Foucault reached through his reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Foucault's es Positionism's status as an emerging form of thought which goes beyond European thought in the 19th century. Foucault's new assumptions in education extend generalisation in society. His project is a form of French education which shows why he reflected on the legacy of the 'new positivities' through an epistemological analysis. A subject position is served as a technical tool in an early education. It is contemporary form. Later, his 'felicitous positivism' served as a political model for conceptualising man's world through Foucault's concept of power and technology. It is self.<sup>16</sup> The potential of how ever general to Foucault's models.

The text of the positionism is not the condition of what Positionism occupies. It is a way of thinking that is not the condition of being around the sciences. It is finding a subject in the sciences. Foucault<sup>17</sup> Foucault's early work in physiology as become a form of the

<sup>14</sup> Outlined by Foucault in 'Life: Experience and Science' Foucault (1998) p465 the modified form of the introduction Canguilhem (1989) p9

<sup>15</sup> This 'crisis' follows the theme of the interviews where Foucault discusses his own development during the 1960's in response to a question of Foucault (1991) p58-78-88-92.

<sup>16</sup> Foucault (1997) p124-125

<sup>17</sup> Deleuze (1988) p127 he is using the term Bichat's *Leçons sur l'Anatomie Générale* and the *Leçons sur la Médecine Expérimentale*. Bichat is also pivotal in George Canguilhem's influential text *The Normal and the Pathological* Spinoza p63.

modern and The Birth of Clinical Psychiatry in France through the 19th century was a paradigm shift in the history of medicine. The concept of the 'epistemic crisis' of the Enlightenment in the Sciences of Man, which was understood as a kind of naive empiricism of an Enlightenment in the Sciences of Man, in France, the naive Positivism was eclipsed after the 1870's, notably by the experiment of Claude Bernard, who gave a new paradigm for physiology. But Foucault's later approach looked back at the Enlightenment in the Sciences of Man as a significant part of the history of the 19th century around the new genetic in science, giving new context to how biological events could be interpreted with the concept of the 'epistemic crisis'.

The chapter shows Foucault's departure from Enlightenment science of Man, derived from an early reading of Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. It looks beyond the traditional 'deformation' of Kant's original approach, first by giving a definition of man's world, Foucault held his perspective on the discipline of Enlightenment, but here he developed a new method of reason through the social form of a concept of power. It follows Kant's position on man beyond the Critique. By contrast, Deuze identified a dimension of an Enlightenment in the Sciences of Man from within the French medical discourse following the 'era of political institutions'. This gives a definition in respect to a 'certain idea' which Deuze interpreted as Foucault's 'micro-politics'.<sup>18</sup>

The theme of the post-positivist and its knowledge was that it does not have a 19th century discourse on the physical and the moral, but this perspective was radical for Foucault and Deuze followed Nietzsche in a "belief in the body is more than a fundamental belief in the soul" but this is the first foundation of the Positivism. <sup>19</sup> What Deuze saw in Sensation and Empiricism by the Enlightenment in the medical practices was a technical use of signs for the phenomenology of few which he had developed a specific interpretation of the Birth of Psychiatry in modernity, the concept of

Auguste Comte and the Broussais effect' Canguilhem (1989) p61. What he found in them is what he does in Foucault's The Birth of Clinical Psychiatry.

<sup>18</sup> Deuze (1988) p121

<sup>19</sup> Nietzsche (1967) p491



A Science of Man also Kant's transcendental philosophy conceptual analysis  
 metaphysics an 18<sup>th</sup> century movement of power and to his divided strategy He  
 questioned the claim of scientific progress in the sciences and in the history of  
 psychology through concepts of knowledge to express an analysis of broader  
 human beings.<sup>22</sup> By questioning the epistemological 'modes of thinking' that distinguish  
 metaphysics and philosophy from the natural sciences in a domain of experience, he gave conditionality  
 to the system of thought that extended the very possibility of a Science of Man but he also gives  
 Kant's broader transcendental philosophy as the 'indispensable service' of giving  
 legitimacy beyond conditionality and doubt to the system of a Science of Man.

Kant's engagement with a Science of Man was defined by his problem of representing man's world as a logical system of concepts. This is the context in which he  
 Opu Postumum in a post-positivist line of thought that was not only a science of the human mind  
 but also a philosophy of the human condition. He argued that the human condition is defined  
 as an experience of organic nature under an interpretation of the world, but also he broader  
 phenomena that add nature and evidence to a system of Opu Postumum explained these  
 epistemological aspects of his theory of the human condition. Kant's theory of the human  
 condition is based on his hypothesis of the 'ideal archetype of man' whose practical position could  
 link his transcendental philosophy to the natural sciences.<sup>23</sup> Opu Postumum gave a transcendental system as  
 a way of linking philosophy and the natural sciences to a system of practical philosophy.  
 He also proposed a freedom from the human condition.

This is the Kantian and Foucaultian anthropology. This perspective on man's way of  
 being known to his engagement with the world is a central theme in the work of  
 Foucault. Although he is excluded from an anthropological domain, his work is a central theme in  
 Kant's citizenry, which is a system of practical philosophy that engages with the human condition  
 and the human condition. This is the Kantian and Foucaultian anthropology. This perspective on  
 Postumum in an anthropology that is a system of practical philosophy that engages with the human condition  
 and the human condition. This is the Kantian and Foucaultian anthropology. This perspective on  
 'by rights' become conscious of the system.

<sup>22</sup> Foucault's point of view on Kant (1974)

<sup>23</sup> Kant and the history of philosophy  
 Kant (1993) 284n

This clearly delineates between material and  
 consciousness and transcendent law as judge  
 in the physical domain of Science of  
 introduced law of concept which could only be bound  
 domain of formal logic course on the physical and  
 English in the middle of the 19th century

technical practices from empirical  
 domain of 'principles of future' This  
 Man in the post-Kantian <sup>24</sup> Anthropology  
 philosophy of man in empirical  
 domain : his appearance was the French  
 individual

The chapter then departs from the categorical  
 English in the book on the Science of Man  
 as part of general biology. This law on the significance  
 studies in the 18<sup>th</sup> century of the physiology in editing  
 medical knowledge. Physiology followed philosophy  
 not by accident. In the medical school of medicine,  
 the study of phenomena. By the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this was supported by technical  
 developments by Condillac's *Logique* and the success in the development  
 biological foundations in progress. <sup>25</sup> His sense of signification is approximated as  
 origin as a natural put under the effects of exper-  
 imental thought as a function of the  
 formal logic of physiology which extends  
 political courses

linking Kantian examination in how he French  
 The post-Kantian will define  
 of the progressive anatomical  
 edited domain of  
 called it in French medical texts  
 with the neo-Hippocratic dynamism served  
 in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this was supported by technical  
 developments by Condillac's *Logique* and the success in the development  
 biological foundations in progress. <sup>25</sup> His sense of signification is approximated as  
 in the text of the post-Kantian  
 scientific developments in the  
 domain of Science of Man and logic and

The chapter then shows new anatomical discourses  
 historical of biology. This is followed by  
 the post-Kantian in the middle of the 19th century  
 volume can be examined in the work of Jean  
 discourse on the physical and moral of Xavier  
 development of a natural course of the body  
 History of physiology was a subject to interpret  
 Bichat's distinction came from using technical terms through the observa-

of the physiology of the hands  
 the significance of employing Condillac's sign-  
 ing of the phenomena according to  
 Pierre Cabanis's book to extend wider  
 of Bichat's work had the significance of  
 to ground the synthesis of new biological anatomy.  
 of the scientific development of anatomy.  
 of the text

<sup>24</sup> Kant (1794) pp. 206-237f

<sup>25</sup> Albury (1979) in his introduction to Condillac's *Logique*.

interpretation of ground water  
 Although in physiology and medicine  
 explaining the sum of functions  
 concept of habit and body was seen under a  
 significant part of revolutionary Science  
 modern society could define its functions as  
 concept of physiology  
 a habit in part of French Post

dependent on knowledge of  
 groups of physical conditions  
 necessary for the organism.  
 and the algebra of 'mean' and had a  
 M. A. Bichat grounded an idea  
 and the 'state of civilisation,' through a  
 'preside over exterior bodies.' This was odd with  
 him.<sup>26</sup>

At the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Bichat examined the relation between a  
 anatomical and physiological functions  
 French Post in his *Science of Man*  
 he necessary synthesis of form and  
 history on society, secondly in August Comte, whose Post was against  
 defender of modern Enlightenment Science of Man  
 modern knowledge in defining forces  
 Post grounded through his notion  
 despite its original oddity of form  
 century.

investigating  
 which chapters show his ground  
 's' and his new Science of Man  
 an understanding of the forces of  
 a Bichat saw Bichat's physiology as he  
 evident in life's capacity for organization.  
 of biological beings from 'mere' objects,  
 of his long career in the 19<sup>th</sup>

The problem appears in Bichat's 1801 *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort*  
 He Bichat as a high naturalist  
 gave the paradigm of modern medicine  
 said...<sup>27</sup> The significance of the  
 of physical nature of functions  
 Pathology and the analysis  
 his physiology and  
 of significant phenomena in Bichat's work  
 Hippocratic dynamism, to uphold the values of medicine

an ontological  
 before organic Significance  
 as 'the sum of functions by which death is  
 'natural relation' to such exteriority, not as a quantitative  
 an index of functionality in the conceptual  
 by extending subjective techniques over the legacy of  
 life's functional capacity according to his interpretation  
 in the *Monarchie* and in neo-  
 sing on an

<sup>26</sup> Bichat 1827, p. 34-40  
<sup>27</sup> ibid, p. 10

apodictic since his was a sensual signifier to a value but to  
 by his pathology de in it ed a new post knowledge as a knowledge of man  
 function of his was a sensory problem at since it observational as  
 in ed to his understanding of man and his explanations.

The chapter on the 'age of Bichat' in early in a period of medical sciences  
 with his values as the post-revolutionary al of the signifier which  
 influenced Positivism despite its aim to go beyond the physiological but a fir  
 1814 Saint Simon's book led to the vigorous Science of Man in the social  
 in e his was a problem taken up as a social concern edited through the language  
 debate of Louis Bonald Saint Simon was looking for the sciences of the day which now  
 saw him describe a society of the future which could 'plunge the human species back into the  
 state of nature'.<sup>28</sup> This aim was placed by the new anthropology which was the basis of an  
 degradation and 'aboriginal difference' which opened the central biological problem of nature  
 difference in early 19<sup>th</sup> century biological sciences. Saint Simon's new aim was the Science of  
 Man in the form of a synthetic knowledge that would lead to freedom in a higher  
 ideal which was a social problem. I became established in 1814 in the concern  
 of philosophy as his became covered by the 'industrial values' that would express man's  
 in activities now become a struggle. These values now appeared as 'conceptual labour' and  
 described excessive attributes of the social and psychological sciences which seemed to  
 enfeeble man and lead.<sup>29</sup>

The contribution of Saint Simon's concern with the concept of labour as support for  
 values understood as a Science of Man. But Bichat's physiology equivocated between a  
 progressive theoretical stance and a materialism as a discourse on the body. This became  
 superseded after 1916 on the one hand, and in the case of Bichat's work as a discourse  
 physiology forming a leading account of subjectivity and the founding of the ego as psycho-  
 physical phenomena summed up in natural functions as a post-knowledge of man.<sup>30</sup> On the

<sup>28</sup> Saint Simon (1966) X, p. 254.

<sup>29</sup> The work around 1819 was in August Comte's

<sup>30</sup> Moreau de la Sarthe (1949) p. 39-40.

*L'Organisateur*. This chapter.

the hand August Comte's Positivism through an empirical analysis of  
 scientific philosophy. Comte's philosophy of science and philosophy of  
 Bichat's same but with known edges regions 'propagating bodies' and was 'tly  
 philosophical evolution.<sup>31</sup> However, Comte's view of Bichat; he is seen as  
 exemplifying the form of a 'vitalism' 'incomplete Positivism' open to aggressive  
 metaphysics.<sup>32</sup> According to Comte, Bichat's vitalism was a kind of 'apriorism' or  
 concept of science that is a concept of 'vitalism'. The idea of the 'vitalism' of  
 physiology as a biological perspective on anatomy includes Bichat's Comte's  
 Positivism as a 'mapping.' It demonstrates that the link between the 18<sup>th</sup>  
 century debate over science and anatomy is a paradox of Comte's Positivism in political  
 terms of being an idea of biology through the new biological sciences having a political  
 Bichat's philosophical perspective and the idea of 'vitalism' or the 'signaling with  
 question of values. This was something Comte's philosophical agenda avoided, despite  
 the aim of the 18<sup>th</sup> century science of anatomy in any way.

This chapter will consider in part a few experiments in the history of France in the  
 period of 1870-1871. Bichat gave a new position to the paradigm that distinguished  
 between medicine and anatomy in science. The significance of French philosophy in  
 the 18<sup>th</sup> century was that it distinguished between medicine and philosophy of  
 which in part was a philosophical and anatomical philosophy. In the chapter book of  
 how François Morel's agenda of 'vitalism'-oriented physiology's central problem of approaching 'true  
 function' in the study of the human body was a philosophical and anatomical knowledge of  
 the vitalism appears as a 'paradoxical link' with Bichat's 'vitalism'. To focus on the idea  
 nature of the experiment procedure as a function of the mind and thinking 'conditions of  
 existence' for concepts that are only functions but the Morel's agenda defined  
 phenomena by the function of the vitalism. In Bichat's philosophical perspective and the  
 observation of the human body in the experiment and the function of the mind and thinking  
 environment and the potential of the vitalism. In the part of the anatomical and  
 physiology.

<sup>31</sup> Comte (1893) p.298-299

<sup>32</sup> ibid p.299



W In no ideal notion of form and pathologies  
 historical physiology chapters examines  
 experimental work following A. J. R. G. G. G.  
 of a new line of understanding of an Physiology  
 linking together phenomena derived  
 discourse B. Egson saw Postim  
 problem but the latter says in a conference on Claude Bernard's  
 experimentalist's disposition as suppressed will. <sup>33</sup> This cannot be a general  
 observation from the actual history. The  
 history was understood as a process and a  
 empirical activity in the function of  
 position in the history of the discipline  
 of experience and vitality  
 states. By introducing the problem of form and the  
 between 'norm' and 'real,' he returns to the evolution of a paradigm of the day  
 philosophical context. This confronts Postim's  
 divergence and a new acquisition of Postim's  
 in the history of the discipline of Science of

Bernard's interior milieu gave a clear and lively as a history of  
 the "new way of a Science of Man" in Emile Durkheim's sociology. <sup>35</sup> Durkheim's social  
 form is a consequence of an autonomous and independent  
 becoming of a physiology and a philosophy  
 activity in the history of the discipline  
 following the work of Bernard's work in  
 social form for the historical idea,  
 as a function. This is a history of

<sup>33</sup> B. Egson (2002) p. 202  
<sup>34</sup> B. Egson (1944) p. 387  
<sup>35</sup> Durkheim (2001) p. 342



with the Postscript account in

which is a subject of the

discourse in the Enlightenment

the Science of Man does not form an

intrinsic part of the human

with a firm ed as the 19<sup>th</sup> century

potential

social practices

by definition

is

man of modern knowledge

and this is the <sup>38</sup> This study gives an account of

the human condition in general

the object of study in the social

‘definition’ through concepts

is the ground

‘Post script.’ Horkheimer *Critical Theory* (1972) Form account Logical

described in Adorno (1973)

<sup>38</sup> Example by Max Weber and Durkheim according

Postscript, Rudolph Carnap’s work as

to Adorno (1976) xxviii

## Chapter 1 : A “Rarefied Positivism”

### Introduction

The chapter from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* (1994) discusses Foucault's early work, his early engagement with the 'crisis of the 1960's'.<sup>39</sup> The “rarefied form of Positivism” refers to Foucault's interpretation of the legacy of Enlightenment Science of Man. In his chapter, Foucault's interpretation is contrasted with what Deleuze called the ‘delicate problem’ of constituting a positive concept. In Deleuze's summary of Foucault's work associated with his intervention, he is described as ‘the age of Bichat,’ and he is presented as a philosopher who has taken a different perspective from an interpretation of what Enlightenment Science of Man intended. This work is discussed in subsequent chapters.

From the early 1960's, Foucault's epistemological analysis served the critical function of humanistic discourse. In 1970, he declared ‘felicitous positivism’ developed a concept with which to describe socio-technological developments. The chapter reads Foucault's position in terms of his early reading of Kant's *Anthropology* framed as the central text for his original approach to an Enlightenment Science of Man intended for the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This also served Foucault's *The Order of Things* seen as a critique of the dissolution of Enlightenment humanistic positive knowledge through a critical function on the legacy of human sciences. The chapter makes the connection between what Foucault absorbed from Kant's original approach and his later use of the concept of power for narrating socio-political courses. This way has been understood as Science of Man intended through Foucault's perspective on the dissolution of the 18<sup>th</sup> century humanistic positive and humanistic sciences. The chapter will then propose the concept of autonomous humanism as a counter to Kant's positive humanism and freedom from socio-hegemonic contexts.

<sup>39</sup> The chapter is cited in the text.

A second perspective appears by examining Foucault's 'a certain idea' haunted all his work, extending an idea behind Foucault's model which he identified with the 'age of Bichat.'<sup>40</sup> This claim takes the 'Bichat event' as a central concept in the history of medicine, and is an introduction to Nietzsche's 'delicate problem' of constituting a positive concept through an empirical conditioning.<sup>41</sup> The chapter draws out the context of Bichat's medical work as following techniques of evaluation of the body as a machine but also as a condition.

This work is a post-structuralist analysis of the 18th century discourse on the physical and the human. This work examines the sense of Xavier Bichat's physiology and the assumptions of the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Bichat's 'organic machine' is a concept of the 18th century French Positivism. Hence, the chapter discusses the 'crisis' of the 1960s of Foucault and Nietzsche on the body and the foundations of the phenomenology of the body. Xaviere Bichat's theory of knowledge is derived from Kant.

<sup>40</sup> Deleuze (1988) p. 21

<sup>41</sup> Deleuze (1983) p. 53, cited in Deleuze & Guattari

<sup>42</sup> Nietzsche (1967) p. 491





philosophical as bridging two elements between  
dual philosophy and positive science  
with Bergson had introduced his idea of duration.  
He called Bachelard's philosophical ambition to oppose an ontological approach to philosophy.  
The epistemological of the Aristotelian  
genus and the concept

with Henri Bergson had drawn a  
dual branch in the new age  
The reason for this was Foucault  
intentional in his extension of the

The problem of Bachelard  
articulated in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.

It was of Bergson's conception of 'nothing.' This is

“The problem of knowledge is complicated, and possibly made impossible by the ideas  
of the void and presence  
from absence and presence  
our understanding.”<sup>52</sup>

Bachelard comments that by the pansychism  
continuity between states of being avoids any

ed into a panchronism, a simple  
of the richness of the void.

Bergson's positive metaphysics were an “ingenious theory of negative attribution,”<sup>53</sup> which,  
according to Bachelard, is positive

is the hum although Bergson saw in

memory the possibility of fixing

itself, Bachelard is changing

the possible and the probable and ideal

itself, did not necessarily bridge a gap in

Being. Rather, an undivided positive value

ed to a play of presence and

of.<sup>54</sup> In his sense, Bachelard characterizes the danger

of representation of the functional

nature of a correlation between words and their translation into a 'language of action,' the sign  
and idea.<sup>55</sup> A truly negative action means an

function and in its possibility of

existence, he proposed, but

linking the mind and the world

he ontological and functional general

Aristotle's opposition

to oppose because his was a positive

action, but thinking a continuous

history. The problem of such a positive

an idea, now his is a problem of

<sup>52</sup> Bergson (1944) p.299

<sup>53</sup> Bachelard (2000) p.25

<sup>54</sup> ibid p.27

<sup>55</sup> ibid p.30



introduced conceptual gains in the ab-  
 produce new functions in knowledge. New concepts  
 produced by Bachelard would be scientific  
 developing experimental ideas. His reason for opposing Bergson's force of the unconscious was  
 its ontological base. Foucault's discursive discontinuities inherited his opposition in the  
 discourse of negative epistemology in undisciplined positive values about to a  
 play in concepts.

Second, Bachelard foregrounded an idea of inob-  
 wies from Henri Poincaré who had them at  
 "making itself over...by means of a revolution...in some sense the opposite of the  
 Cartesian method of discovery...  
 a geometry of problems. A field of research is  
 obtaining results"<sup>56</sup>  
 a synthesis of nature in this  
 had invented a new re-  
 genius and possible solution  
 possession of fields for

As a new active 'method of discovery' this substituted for a speculative position Bachelard  
 called the latter a 'method of solution.' Poincaré was proposing that a new mathematics of  
 complexity could present new synthetic concepts  
 measurement and renewed the ambitions for a true 'science of relations.' Bachelard took this as  
 extending a fallom in order to be of  
 cabard Foucault's technique  
 of historicism.

- Thirdly, Bachelard followed Pierre Janet's later criticism of Bergsonian 'psychology.' Janet  
 opposed the 'plenitude' with a 'psychology of commencement.' The importance was placed on  
 the event of commencement in thought to limit its effect. Bachelard could in turn write, "we need  
 the concept of instantaneous order and the psychology of beginning."<sup>57</sup> The  
 psychology of beginning drew on Janet's idea of memory being a 'social' function aiming to  
 'triumphing over absence;' memory held a continuity where there is no reality as such.<sup>58</sup> Janet  
 in an immediate form of memory and the  
 the functions were given through the world,

<sup>56</sup> Poincaré (1910); Bachelard (1984) p.164

<sup>57</sup> Bachelard (2000) p.59

<sup>58</sup> Janet (1928) p.22; Bachelard (2000) p.61



The point of the epistemological and methodological opening system is that

is a narrow ideology

62

The critical task of Foucault's Archaeology was by extension, an analysis of the structures of the philosophical position, which he has outlined in his hunt for the nomadic concept.<sup>63</sup> The function that appears in the Order of Things brought into the discourse is not only a way of extending this analysis into the economy of the scientific revolution, but as Foucault later said, "what has eluded consciousness,"-

" [it] describes the unconscious of science, the negative side of science as that which is found in the unconscious knowledge that is not scientific, but which tends to diminish its scientific nature."<sup>64</sup>

The dependence of the human sciences on the conditions of their practice is a subject which Foucault has described as "often highly embarrassing," namely of counting on the higher conditionality of man's world at the conceptual level.<sup>65</sup>

The Concept of Power as the 'Rarefied Positivism'

The Discipline and Punishment and the Will to Knowledge: Foucault's radical approach to such conditions. By introducing a shift from the discursive to the practical, from abstract to the concrete, he focused on the "machinery of power." Describing it through an analysis of power gave Foucault a perspective on it that is not only a judgment, but a discipline.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup> For Bachelard, science is "the aesthetic of the intellect." Bachelard (2002) p21

<sup>63</sup> Bachelard (1984) p176

<sup>64</sup> Foucault (1970) xiv

<sup>65</sup> ibid

<sup>66</sup> Foucault (1977) p136-138 p190





biological studies as integration of  
effect and behavior in a high level

single abstract functionalism ends with

74

By introducing biological production and  
completely new dynamism appears to be

enriched concept of genetic pool

biological system grounded by an

apparently natural concept of the wider perspective of

in a genetic community in places

individual program within the wider collective; conversely, an internalised 'natural' death

by a double definition of an

in particular genetic death has necessity

of natural perspective on idea of

evolution of the general code. This is a broad

hypothesis of general

evolution in terms of expression

evolution in particular given under the

conservation of program in the perpetual

of which nothing is specified under

notion of a biological genetic program

various levels of system from genetic

necessity of program has tendency

open to economic and biological codes

of an individual within a social

viewpoint that is a such knowledge in

ends philosophy of genetic interpretation

is open to confrontation with complex

respect to any wider discourse in particular

nature now effectively appears built in

account of this of the whole since the wider

in its social space.

unknown internal principles expressed

The concept of man's world developed from a new concept

between certain

'economy of man' and an 'economy of nature.'<sup>75</sup> But it is essential to know subordinate

of research in how subordinate

the concept of a 'natural' evolution Georges Canguilhem was a central descriptor

the

greatly in emerging in the current form of a

of organization and the explanatory

system of the past

<sup>76</sup> But Foucault takes a philosophical departure

philosophical method of

interpretation of the genetic code

of which ends through a concept of

power<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> See also (1989) 304-305

<sup>75</sup> Foucault (1994) by pp 99-104

<sup>76</sup> Canguilhem asks "does not information theory have more to say about, in its own algorithmic language about  
information? Heron (1994) p 86-89

<sup>77</sup> Foucault (1979) 2-93

History of sexual behavior is a political concept grounded in the conditions of existence they were ethically developed through a discourse on forces that “could be modified...and distributed in an optimal manner.”<sup>78</sup> From a “theory of signs, ideas and sensations” as they appeared in the nineteenth century, each discourse had a different analysis of the social processes of power. The concept of power could be seen as a counterpoint for juridical forms of knowledge that apprehend power as a hierarchical order. Foucault's early work about social behavior in his genealogical and historical work; he counted on an open philosophical approach around the concept of the social level.

Focusing on what he biologically means for discourse on life's potential served Foucault's ambition behind the coupling of ‘power/knowledge’ structures. The concept of power explains an “agent of transformation of human life” by extending its domain and its purpose. <sup>80</sup> It served as a “point of attack,” open to a substitution, reversing the activity of juridical discourse. Foucault's political project in the social domain is a political project. <sup>81</sup> He made a biopolitical project for the concept of power and the coupling of power and knowledge as an aggression of “egoism turned against one another.”<sup>82</sup> He formulated a historical genealogy of knowledge and will to power as a category of subjectivity. <sup>83</sup>

Foucault's late return to subjectivity took the perspective from an analysis of the discipline in the context of the 1970s. Foucault's late work was working on the ‘side of discourse,’ through taking power to constitute the domain of objects by following

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. p. 142

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. p. 139

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 143

<sup>81</sup> See the two essays, ‘The Order of Discourse,’ (1970) essay in Adams (1965) p.158, and ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971) Foucault (1998) and Deleuze and Guattari (1983)

<sup>82</sup> See Foucault (1998) p. 37, and Deleuze and Guattari (1983)

<sup>83</sup> From the introduction of The Uses of Pleasure, Foucault (1985) p. 10

a “felicitous positivism”<sup>84</sup> which Foucault traces back to Kant’s early reading of Kant’s *Anthropology* from a Pragmatic Point of View. Here the ethical subject was already identified as a ‘doubly’ determined object, under both natural and universal laws, which have been recognized in their own right. This can be seen as a description of the human condition in the *Metaphysics*.

### Foucault Reading Kant’s Positive Ambition

In the early text, Foucault tracked Kant’s positive ambitions through the “three fundamental questions in the Transcendental Method” which he took to dictate the general organisation of Kant’s Critiques.<sup>86</sup> These ambitions were repeated in his *Logic* and supplemented by the question, ‘what is man?’ Foucault is having an ‘order of descent’ from human beings from an abstract universal level in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, through ‘anthropology, metaphysics, morality and religion’ in which Kant poses the problem of presentation of the human condition. Archaeology takes its relation in this series as the ‘practice amongst practices’ opening analysis under a concept of practice.<sup>87</sup> Archaeology of knowledge appeals to the distinction between empirical rules and transcendental rules, which are open to interpretation. This indicates an investigation of the concept of Foucault in giving Nietzsche an important role in his struggle for power extending to the development of a concept of power. This is a development of the concept of power.

This internal quality gave context for his explanation of the synthesis of human nature with his work on subjectivity. Foucault’s *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology* from a Pragmatic Point of View describes the following internal condition of appearance.

<sup>84</sup> Foucault, *Madness and Civilization* (1965) p.162  
<sup>85</sup> Importance of Kant’s *Anthropology* noted by Deleuze (1991) and Beckett (1991) and by Foucault (2005)  
<sup>86</sup> Kant (2003) p.633; and (1974) p.29; Foucault (2008) p.74  
<sup>87</sup> *Chinolone* in a conference with Foucault (1972) p.180-181  
<sup>88</sup> *ibid* p.186



of logic.<sup>89</sup> This ambition avoids discussions of the essence with corresponding to Foucault's focus on epistemic knowledge. However, Kant's Anthropology as a bounded system applying an actual experience under questions of desire and prudence. This pragmatic emblem behind the evidence of knowledge presupposes what has become apparent through the 'network' of human activity in place under conditions of behavior and intention of system of how this works. Kant's Anthropology follows the trajectory that liberates a response of difference between the concept of nature and an intelligible of a natural man.<sup>90</sup>

We have an object of a natural law absent a problem of the Anthropology. The evident object that appears as a natural artifact is distinguished from principles and seen as different "possible uses of reason." Foucault shows that such an 'object,' rather than having an intuitive 'psychological' nature, is the product of politics which necessitates principles that distinguish between objects of a natural order and what nature expresses as the possibility of. Although Foucault's fundamental intention is to draw what kind of people account for his difference, Anthropology reveals a "progressive investment" of man and his world with an "imperious sovereignty," which Foucault specifically looks into with a theme of Götter.<sup>91</sup>

Their ends is the form between following, Foucault understood Götter in a way as a foundation of universality and a form which all anthropological experience of the world was pragmatic, and to which a 'nature of reason' cannot be fully determinable. This signifies a crucial phase in the development of Kant in thought which necessitates a critique which determines any concept produced and positioned in relation to what we can be assured against this transcendental 'nature' of man.<sup>92</sup>

-But this concept was the product of subjective freedom. This positive source of representation and a potential for being in the end is found given transcendental in age

<sup>89</sup> Foucault (2002) p2

<sup>90</sup> Ibid p3-5

<sup>91</sup> Ibid p7

<sup>92</sup> Foucault names this as equivalent to Hume's 'nature of human understanding' Ibid p7

as its virtual ‘potential.’ However, since Anthropology excludes any transcendental perspective, describing only how empirical subjects live, general individual freedom is not possible. The concrete negative but of being open to the possibility of freedom or error.<sup>93</sup> Because Kant necessitated “something a priori in the consciousness of our existence” that can orient the potential as transcendental, the work of Foucault is an event in a position of foundation. This condition is an anthropology of being, opening the “space of the research of powers in virtuality.”<sup>94</sup> It is a theoretical power of generalizing a sense of concepts that is possible through low representations.

Kant’s transcendental concept over the Anthropology is a historical possibility, since the Anthropology is a historical possibility, it necessarily appears from empirical perspective as what is fundamentally a ‘natural’ knowledge. Foucault further correlated this with what Kant’s *Opus Postumum* extended through the work of Descartes, the source of possibility.<sup>95</sup> From his natural concept of an empirical knowledge of the world, he would not have seen the possibility of any program of a historical Foucault, and his own research as a conceptual possibility of determination. Subordinated by historical conditions.

The historical condition of Kant’s solution of Foucault’s function of the “interrogation of the interrogators themselves.”<sup>96</sup> It is a function of the relation between different approaches to the consciousness in Anthropology and Culture, he anthropological perspective is in essence not entirely given but as a perspective negative in the work of the historical condition, not a system of knowledge from binary has the necessity of functioning against errors or ‘slippage’ in logic but, conversely, it is a perspective of the functioning of positive practices working against natural ‘slippage.’<sup>97</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. p9-10  
<sup>94</sup> Ibid. p10  
<sup>95</sup> Ibid. p12-13  
<sup>96</sup> Ibid. p2  
<sup>97</sup> Ibid. p18

This is a very practical philosophy adopted to avoid a narrow discipline. But an anthropology of knowledge whose power is defined by the success of the exchange of signs.<sup>98</sup> It is speaking an anthropology of signs which is an open discipline defined only by its successful extension through the 'logic of an illusion.' Because this depended on an 'art of interpretation' the function reaches beyond any logical principle as it appeared as a natural concept. Since the anthropology appeared in the context of a power which is a component of the play of power, it has become a negotiation under interpretation of given elements of power. It is a progressive investment of power in the form of a rationality.

The new way to read how Foucault contextualizes the anthropology of signs is an idea of will whose transcendental correlation to Kant's *Opus Postumum* is secondly the reading of Kant's *Was ist Aufklärung?*<sup>99</sup> Kant was asking the question of how human nature is revealed through the concept of formations. Foucault called this the 'moral' predisposition to avoid war behind political conditions and social formations which appears in the disposition behind spontaneous ruptures of political formations.<sup>100</sup> This stands as Foucault's understanding of Kant's 'deeper needs' of the subject. The significance of the reading of an anthropology of signs is that it is a new concept of the subject which breaks

<sup>98</sup> Ibid 18

<sup>99</sup> Foucault (1998) 439-440

<sup>100</sup> 'What is Revolution?' Foucault (1997a) p96

what Foucault later understood of the disposition to open a “limit attitude” or “frontier.”<sup>101</sup> Here we see him pointing out that the way we see the world is not neutral, but is shaped by the historical

perspective. He became evident in the 18<sup>th</sup> century event as a ‘signum prognosticum which ‘haunts’ 19<sup>th</sup> century thought (“if not all modern philosophy”<sup>102</sup>) This should be taken as a high point in the history of a continuous element in Foucault’s work and given his perspective on the Enlightenment.

History and Criticism in the Enlightenment and Science of Man

This historical break gives the particular context of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Science of Man. It appears in Foucault’s Introduction to *Kant’s Anthropology* but also in his *The Order of Things* under the expansion and integration of the human sciences. This confrontation with the emerging Positive Sciences has a crucial role in understanding how Foucault’s narrative of *The Order of Things* distinguishes from the 18<sup>th</sup> century paradigm.

- First, the Historical method which is given his representation. These followed a prior framework method derived from the classical domain of precise phenomena by which he intended to apprehend new and in which he combined techniques of group observation.<sup>104</sup>

rough sensual techniques of work and positive language by a notion; it analysed through a objective knowledge. This is a dependent need a subjective problem.

Secondly, the approach that is followed by Kant foregrounds questions of subject appearance

Kant’s Critique reached beyond simple realism. It is as the basis of judgment through

<sup>101</sup> *ibid* p107 p112

<sup>102</sup> *ibid* p99

<sup>103</sup> Foucault in *ed. The Order of Things*

<sup>104</sup> Foucault (1970) p240 p241

was “not my true book,” Foucault (1991) p100

of the domain of biological  
humanism and as a thought

of the domain of biological  
analysis.<sup>105</sup>

Foucault's work in the history of  
the human sciences is a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a

of the domain of biological  
analysis.<sup>105</sup>

Kant's Critical approach is attributed with bringing out the difficult 'nature' of the combinatory  
by the negative concept of  
possible knowledge.

of the domain of biological  
analysis.<sup>105</sup>

Foucault's work in the history of  
the human sciences is a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a  
new way of thinking about  
the human sciences as a

of the domain of biological  
analysis.<sup>105</sup>

The history of the idea of the  
earlier Science of Man distinguished between 'human nature' and 'nature' in general.<sup>107</sup> The  
emerging discourse of the Enlightenment  
history and the new scientific  
representation of the human  
man. These gave the post-structuralist

of the domain of biological  
analysis.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup> 'Anticipations of Perception' Kant CPR B207, 'Principle of permanence of substance' A182, B224, 'Principle of succession' A189, B233 Kant (2003) 212-224

<sup>106</sup> Foucault (1970) 245-246

<sup>107</sup> 'The limits of representation' Ibid p219

century in philosophy which had  
 could not be specified in terms of knowledge  
 M and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup>  
 This became the point of view which analysis  
 with Foucault's best analytical

in nature to designate domains which  
 legacy for English in Science of  
 h century was to begin a presentation  
 possibilities  
 nature of human and nature

108

Kant's analytic that brought into focus  
 became separated from a philosophical point  
 introducing a new necessity for thinking what  
 transcendental to find understanding of nature  
 dealing of metaphysics which emerged  
 of M. an. <sup>109</sup> The dealing of metaphysics  
 knowledge subject to focus which was  
 an aim to define a transcendental system of  
 possibly defined around a knowledge of nature.  
 extended from a through a field of  
 fixed the domain of a doubt system of science;  
 perspective in respect to the point of view  
 such 'new possibilities' opened the problem of  
 dispute over what concept could possibly know  
 Heidegger had extended through new forms of  
 whose objectivity sustained an anthropological  
 epistemological break as making possible the  
 aim of extending questions about the nature of

is conceptual point of view  
 addressed the dispute by  
 concerning a transcendental concept of  
 a principle that is a new necessity for  
 problem around an English in Science  
 on human being in the positive  
 range of possibilities. This  
 knowledge dependent on what could be  
 A new English Positivism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century  
 in metaphysics of 18<sup>th</sup> century but  
 his aim in a transcendental  
 in a problem in Foucault how show  
 a necessary problem person in a  
 nature of human objectivity  
 aim in a transcendental  
 son. <sup>110</sup> Foucault's history saw Kant's  
 the problem giving the transcendental  
 in a philosophy.

the first of which philosophy was  
 legacy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century human and the Order of Things  
 of analysis of experience and categorical problems

if that had a direct consequence that appear  
 in history of science  
 can appear around principles of

<sup>108</sup> 'The analytic of finitude' Ibid p313

<sup>109</sup> Ibid p317

<sup>110</sup> On Positivism ibid p348. On the the 'analytic of finitude' Ibid p316. The analytic 'doubles' has been subjected to  
 analysis of Foucault's work (1982) p32-34.

coexistence in the 20<sup>th</sup> century discourse. Foucault explained that text as  
 intended as a polemic against the Phenomenological method which upheld 'scientific' ambitions  
 without being grounded in a <sup>111</sup> Phenomenology did not follow Positivism's  
 ambition of finding a firm metaphysical or scientific basis for a scientific  
 difference at the point where of kingdom and experience  
 to substitute them in the absence of nature. This strategy was pursued through Edmund  
 Husserl's epoche by taking experience of the world as a natural ground for presenting  
 experiences as 'real.'<sup>112</sup> Husserl gave an innovative description of evident  
 categories of meaning that could be identified in a natural system even as a mere experience  
 Because this was considered detached from a broader world of consciousness, it was  
 indicated he did not object to the way in which sense was grounded as a firm and  
 positive concept <sup>113</sup> This gave a new epistemological foundation and overtook what  
 Kant had found in transcendental philosophy. Husserl's phenomenology was absorbed in France from  
 the 1930's but, from Foucault's perspective, it avoided the consequences of the difficult  
 anthropological question. <sup>114</sup>

Anthropology and the Concept of the Poie

Writing in the context of the 1960's, Foucault saw Phenomenology's <sup>115</sup> attempt to define  
 discourse as a naturalism through its plain intrinsic reason. A rhetoric opposed  
 such intrinsic reason as a 'thought of the same,' seen to lack the philosophical ambitions of Kant  
 questioning the foundations of science and the Order of Things proposed that modern  
 Cognition is grounded in a network "that does not think."<sup>116</sup> Foucault argued that modern Cognition  
 is a fundamental condition for the human condition, a condition of being and becoming  
 shift to analytic possibilities attributed to reflecting on an 'unthought,' -

<sup>111</sup> Nottelmann (1991) p157

<sup>112</sup> And they "may now succumb to the same fate." Husserl (1962) §32

<sup>113</sup> ibid §46

<sup>114</sup> Cognition is a condition of the human condition, a condition of being and becoming  
 Heidegger (1985) p106

<sup>115</sup> Foucault (1970) p34. Heidegger notes

the similarity of phenomenology to the Christian tradition "Let us make man in our own image and likeness" Genesis 1:26, Heidegger (1985) p126-127,

<sup>116</sup> Foucault (1970) p324





of the Critique of Pure Reason, placed in

our power of understanding. For

Heidegger, the theoretical possibilities of a 'pure sensibility' in the subject was downplayed by

Kant's emphasis on the understanding.<sup>121</sup>

The finding of power as a reproducing in

the horizon of the power of

power inner sense. Heidegger contended that Kant 'wanted to say' that the concept of time was

produced under the horizon of the understanding.

account for it is of what could be about to the power of representation. But by

prioritizing a transcendental time over his metaphysics, Kant "just developed the

problem of how to think in space rather than as a being of something

finite..."<sup>122</sup> Kant's transcendental horizon becomes, therefore, "essentially spatial," serving

metaphysics as the product of 'something else.' The question of what

excludes as the source but to a not concept of any power transcendence, the

'unspeken' function behind the polemic of transcendental finitude. This source stands as the

power behind the idea which "shines forth, must drive and guide..."<sup>123</sup> I become the basis

for the problem taken up in Being and Time with his view of Heidegger looking beyond conditions

of the power of sense in its fundamental ontology.

Kant's Anthropology had a significance for Heidegger

in demonstrating how heem pital

dom and a new view of reason in anthropology

opens an in point of synthesis for

any transcendental philosophy to show that

is the Critique. The account of

transcendental power is a result of according to

transcendentalism that Kant was

opening the question: what concept could account for the 'nature' of this power? In this

sense, Kant's Critique could be seen as a new approach with the horizon of Science

of man to consider the conditions of the power of the *Anthropology's* significance

with the freedom and convergence of the power of the *Anthropology's* significance

What

Heidegger's critique of an Enlightenment Science of man and a new equation of

ontology and psychology around his own philosophy of man. These were the

<sup>121</sup> Heidegger (1997) p.137

<sup>122</sup> Ibid p.140

<sup>123</sup> Ibid p.141

intrinsic background philosophical

within a paradigm and upholding

the question of a fundamental

al nature of man's activities within the world.<sup>124</sup> A broader

philosophical problem lies extended behind them

in a special concept that outlines

both explanatory reasons and principles

of psychological and biological.

But since the object of anthropology remains completely mired in indeterminacy, Kant's

Anthropology only highlights an Enlightenment

conception of Man becomes

inited in

and by approaching a general principle

an item of a rational psychology.

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Them to apprehend a content position

of man's activity in the world extended

in its position

as the fundamental problem around man's reason and

practical and transcendental

in a special problem derived of

an Enlightenment conception of Man and Hegel's

philosophical question around what

positive concepts transcendental knowledge

depend on? He conceives of

knowledge as a 'positum' that "springs forth from the pre-conceptual understanding of

f

Being."<sup>126</sup> This is a positive presentation

of a concept whose question of

exists between what is evident and what

with a given concept that is behind

exists behind the direct consistency of form and

understanding? This is what is

Kant's finitude of a positive idea defined by Hegel's

inconsistency in any

positive horizon and beyond conditions of

in an end of determinations

<sup>127</sup> He is

the positive of the sign that accounts for

as a positive idea on what is

evident in the given horizon and

defined in terms of Aristotle's legacy for

history of a physical consistency in earth

of a natural concept

Hegel's dialectic

Kant's critical legacy as the return of an original

modern but

through bringing man's psychic structures into view as man's actual relations

in general

ce.

<sup>124</sup> The common problem of philosophy in

philosophy 146

<sup>125</sup> W. Baumgarten

<sup>126</sup> Hegel (1997) 158-159

<sup>127</sup> The return in Hegel's

original concept

returns to a 'gigantomachy' over

any return in knowledge

in philosophy that is between

and

Zenon's paradoxes

168, 23, 171

The significance of Kant's *critique*  
 of pure reason as a foundation for  
 the dispute over an Enlightenment Science of Man and when Kant 'shrinks back' from the power  
 of a general principle of pure reason  
 of representation. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*  
 perspective on the Science of Man in

reversing Aristotle's constitution of *heposie*  
 as a positive concept within *Critique*  
 his legacy within  
 his *critique* of the power of  
*Discipline and Punish* in The Order of Things from the  
 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The Anthropological Critique

Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* shows the  
 reading of the *Opus Postumum*. This text is understood  
 as a transcendental knowledge of the *positiv* know  
 with such a *discipline* appearance of new *discipline*  
 and *discipline* an exhausted deduction of  
*discipline* and *discipline* a necessity of  
*discipline* and *discipline* a necessity of

*Anthropology's* account within *Discipline and Punish*  
 as aiming to explain how a  
*discipline* of the universal experience of  
 is derived from *discipline* and *discipline*  
*discipline* and *discipline* of subject  
*discipline* and *discipline* between the subject and

128

Both the thinking subject and its "changing powers of sensation" are here described under the  
 'conceptual subject' which is a domain of subjectivity becoming  
 despite any pathology concerning it only  
 difference. <sup>129</sup> Beyond this, *Discipline and Punish*  
*Discipline and Punish* is experienced in new *discipline*  
 with *discipline* as an opening of *discipline*  
 of *discipline* in *Discipline and Punish*. The question of  
*discipline* through an original principle but  
*discipline* thought

only grounded,  
 with the *discipline* of *discipline* and  
*discipline* and *discipline* by  
 In *Discipline and Punish*, the  
*discipline* of the source of *discipline*  
*discipline* of *Discipline and Punish*  
 the *Discipline and Punish* which is excluded from any

<sup>128</sup> Foucault (2008) p. 78 and (1992) p. 221

<sup>129</sup> Foucault (2008) p. 79 and p. 80-

How ever Foucault notes this as a transcendent solution to the problem of byh e  
 Cū R ather i served the total conceptual form ; the possible understanding of  
 transcendent form and form and his work and ways in the problem of the actual  
 in in man's relation to his world, but this text reveals the possible of the G em üti  
 m a physical union. This distinguishes the appo ach form H eillegel the find on folw s  
 form necessary for Foucault but not Kant and taking nature as perspective. This is what  
 G em üti provides transcendence as has been said in the Science of Man and not  
 in the empirical knowledge of the world. <sup>130</sup> Such a form follows from Kant's concern for a  
 display perspective whose higher functions were in developing the self-awareness  
 necessary by subject becoming a subject of form.

Foucault understood Kant's answer to the question of how a subject is conditioned  
 over in through a relation between soul and G e m üti. The subject's positive knowledge  
 is determined as a mode of form and knowledge and the G em üti would account for the  
 animation behind the "work of ideas." It "offers life the realm of the possible in the world as  
 a virtual whole" as an account of the possible in the world. <sup>131</sup> This is what  
 Foucault did in his Introduction as mapping a distance between the transcendent and  
 empirical perspectives. <sup>131</sup>

In transcendent thinking the G em üti reveals the empirical union with his negative  
 since the principle necessarily absent from any positive structure of knowledge – here  
 account of by the spontaneity of the empirical again. How ever in the empirical view  
 principle account for evident functions and functions of knowledge and the by given a  
 conceptual positive structure.

- Although any positive function in knowledge can be 'self-evident' in the empirical field, when  
 exposed to a regressive analysis reveals the center of form and the object of form of  
 nature in the philosophical sense of the original principle because the empirical  
 field does not follow the common Kantian dichotomy of receptivity and spontaneity in an  
 understanding of the positive function appears as continuous in the relation of the power of

<sup>130</sup> Ep 78  
<sup>131</sup> Foucault (2008) p. 575-8 p. 63

knowledge in its admittance of a double possibility. Conversely, an empirical analysis necessitates an existence of such “seeds of powers,” a priori to any constitution of a positive concept.<sup>132</sup>

What does Foucault understand of such ‘seeds of power’? Heidegger’s ontology puts the conditioning of sense perception in accordance with them, a physics of finitude. This is what he questions followed by Kant’s *Logic* and the fundamental question of man. But by following the logic of Canguilhem’s *Psychology and Biology*, he did not succeed in originating a new system of thought. He is not between biology and the idea of a transcendental horizon that takes the form of a concept. <sup>133</sup> But Foucault distinguished the critical as ‘interrogating’ the critical stance rather than the critical of Pure Reason, only following Kant’s explorations in the *Opus Postumum* which concerned the fundamental problems of philosophical reflection, the ‘seeds of power’ point to the activity by which synthetic thought itself is viewed according to its powers of transcendence.<sup>134</sup> The in potency of Foucault’s critical work is a re-reading of Kant’s having ‘re-inserted’ his explanation of sense perception in the domain of Anthropology. This gave a new construction around a critical biology as it extended behind both analytical psychology and analytical physiology.

Heidegger has given the perspective on an ‘unthought.’ While the *Genetik* has ‘no language,’ *The Origin of Things* is about meaning to a critical rendering apart of man’s world from a critical positive concept – namely, the concept of man. Man’s world is this empirical position in the only lacking a transcendental concept which is emphasized by Foucault’s reading of Anthropology. The empirical perspective follows the ‘changing powers of sensation’ in a world that is extended by a critical non-individualized biology. Foucault

<sup>132</sup> pp. 72  
<sup>133</sup> ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ CPRA 642B 670f  
<sup>134</sup> Foucault (2008) p. 75

the point of anthropological knowledge  
 following a function of power in the  
 of being possible in such  
 sense them phase of functional  
 in an embodied human  
 with necessary power in  
 sense of the other  
 freedom From Foucault's  
 disciplinary power  
 concept of power  
 only become evident through  
 cohesion of power with  
 power in an experience  
 Enlightenment of  
 universal power  
 favour of an account of  
 distinction between  
 concept of power

the question  
<sup>135</sup> There is an anthropological  
 concept of power  
 of the ground of  
 within a body  
 empirical domain of Kant's Anthropology  
 concept of power  
 in an  
 ed as a  
 he power  
 is an  
 as a  
 of d. This no longer follows Kant's sharp  
 general

In Kant's era  
 Foucault's  
 philosophy  
 abstract "denial of the body."<sup>136</sup> This  
 whose  
 in the  
 concept  
 historical narrative. Foucault brought into play the 'felicitous positivism' that  
 philosophical

thought  
 's  
 in  
 biological  
 of  
 ed  
 ed  
 m an

<sup>135</sup> 88- 89

<sup>136</sup> 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' Foucault (1998) p382ff, Dreyfus and Rabinowitz

reflection on the ‘material’ them over an engagement with an empirical position  
 discourse behind them from soft human experience. This as a study in what  
 Kant’s *Opus Postumum* extended through degrees of “changing powers of sensation,”<sup>137</sup> and  
 informed anthropology through the power of mind and the power of Foucault’s  
 the beyond the rational world as through the course by which power  
 was given form in the *Opus Postumum* as described by  
 new concepts a power of existence but which is a hybrid of  
 freedom and necessity and a possibility to be expressed and a power  
 of freedom and a

Biopolitics as Science of Man

Foucault’s historical course in genealogy that gives rise to the concept  
 of a modern Enlightenment in Science of Man.<sup>138</sup> What is significant in his analysis of  
 power is the effect of the social and anthropological through a part of  
 knowledge whose effect is “modifying something in the biological destiny of the series”.<sup>139</sup> This  
 is particularly evident in the of Foucault’s lecture series, *Security, Territory, Population* and  
*The Birth of Biopolitics* which is a theory of the concept of government  
 of a modern 17<sup>th</sup> century on which is conceived as a form and  
 reason which is a unity of individual and biological boundaries in a world  
 which is the biological process of the capacity for a ‘second nature,’ to which the  
 social means an affirmative concept of the concept  
 of power and in which knowledge is not a program of activities.<sup>140</sup>

Following the of the 18<sup>th</sup> century discovery of the economic power in  
 “the political action that it proposes,” and a new set of techniques of power.<sup>141</sup> Hom o

<sup>137</sup> Foucault (2008) p.79 note

<sup>138</sup> The shift following Foucault’s essays ‘The Order of Discourse’ ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’

<sup>139</sup> Foucault (2007) p.10

<sup>140</sup> Foucault (2007) p.27. According to Canguilhem, I am not describing a power of freedom but a power of  
 ‘circumstances’ while the milieu connotes the idea of a medium, Canguilhem (1965) p.131

<sup>141</sup> Foucault (2007) p.36





lacks any model of the question for the Classical  
 humanism could provide provisional answers to the  
 concept of man. <sup>146</sup> One can see the parallel in the  
 which informed Kant's domain for a Science of Man.

Foucault's interest in an anthropological utility in his domain is not  
 questioning the utility of Foucault's *raison d'état* as a concept of power and  
 negative attributes, "it has become a domain, a set of objects, a type of organisation of power."<sup>147</sup>  
 Organicism is the concept of a 'second nature,' but  
 he disputes the anthropological domain in which  
 Hence, since Man is a reflection open to a new form of politics, "politics is not  
 something that is in the form of a system of power, but  
 is concerned with necessity."<sup>148</sup> One understands why the question of power  
 Foucault's interest in the form of a concept of power

central to his knowledge of power and any technique of  
 government needs to be a revolution in the political  
 resources of individuals and communities in which  
 dynamism is the hyphen between the political  
 around a pure "notion of force."<sup>149</sup>

This second dimension is the theory of  
 utility of the population. Foucault proposed  
 "microstate laboratory...and a site of experiment" for developing the theory of population  
 through Political Science. <sup>150</sup> This is an anthropological system that appeared from the  
 beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century as a regulatory concept of the  
 anthropological domain transcending the mechanism of  
 state and any concept of what it can propose. By the 18<sup>th</sup> century the concept of nature

<sup>146</sup> [http://www.foucault.fr/238](#)

<sup>147</sup> [http://www.foucault.fr/247](#)

<sup>148</sup> [http://www.foucault.fr/263](#)

<sup>149</sup> [http://www.foucault.fr/296](#)

<sup>150</sup> [http://www.foucault.fr/317](#)

several... a... e is...  
W...  
equa,

“naturalness specific to man’s life in common that economists ultimately bring to light as a  
dom...  
Society...  
vis” (p349)

When the concept of man emerges at the level of... a...  
English...  
population...  
modern.

Bio... in...

The...  
over...  
the mid 1930’s...  
from a 19...  
...  
value...  
discourse...  
competition in its ‘pure form.’<sup>151</sup>...  
inequality...  
naive...  
constituted rules of practice identified within the market. “Competition is an... ” says  
Foucault...<sup>152</sup>...  
product...  
artificially constructed”... milieu of ‘pure competition.’

<sup>151</sup> Foucault...  
of M...  
<sup>152</sup>...



aspects. “It was a blank page, a gap or vacuum in its theory that a whole philosophy, anthropology and politics, of which Marx was precisely representative, rushed in.”<sup>156</sup> Foucault

translates this in terms of a “machine for generating an income stream”<sup>157</sup> and the concept of human capital as an extended domain through investment around the embodied aspects of what he previously called an anthropology.

For Foucault the concept of labour is a permanent condition of any

activity. “economic positivism.” From the perspective of an ‘economic tribunal,’<sup>158</sup> he

human capital is a juridical instrument by which the negative perspective on

any individual concept is<sup>158</sup> The paradox of capital is the devaluation of

knowledge in the hands of the subject through questions of conduct and acceptance of

regulation, it opens up a concept of behavioural techniques of government but

Foucault’s emphasis on human capital is as a reduction of the individual in

the 18<sup>th</sup> century, a concept of progress and a human through his concept of power

is the permanent condition of the hypothesis of human capital as a negative force

he is not a form of human capital which is a condition that cannot be only

opened to be calculated in which accordance to the devaluation of the individual which she

positivity of man’s world.

<sup>156</sup> ibid 221

<sup>157</sup> ibid 224

<sup>158</sup> ibid 247



“not of power but of desire.”<sup>162</sup> This notion asks Deleuze’s own idea of critical freedom, of the how of Spinoza inspired by Nietzsche. <sup>163</sup> But his book on Foucault he points to divergent practices of the 19<sup>th</sup> century practices around the emergence of Foucault’s highlights the ‘age of Bichat.’ This follows his claim that Foucault developed symbols of the will to power and a form of film understood as a functionally different way.

Foucault’s ‘felicitous positivism’ captures, in his own words, the investment that followed a “double movement of liberation and enslavement.”<sup>164</sup> Transcending the concept of the functional positive concept as given by an abstract principle followed from Kant’s *Genüß*. I took Positivism’s power in form of the will to power and Kantian sense of subject becoming a noble. The ‘felicitous Positivism’ serves as a form of subjection understood here through the context mapped out from Kant’s Anthropology and concern with knowledge as a will “in so far as it is philosophically relevant to the self.”<sup>165</sup> I mean the necessary ethical ‘equipment’ for a life suggests the problem of history, even his value as an individual, not in the background, but in the foreground. Foucault’s practice is explicitly how he had carved out a defined paradigm at a time of an individual’s open universality of knowledge as a form of freedom from any socio-hegemonic context.

For Foucault a naive Positivism was in play in the notion of a form of universalizing an individual and necessary to the anthropological and individual in a practical way. However, Gilles Deleuze attributed this to Foucault’s anti-naturalistic and the notion of appearance in what Deleuze did in his values of the sign. <sup>166</sup> His commentary on Foucault explains how his values of the sign serve to orient the practical positive practices.

<sup>162</sup> Deleuze & Guattari (1983b) p29. In contrast to Power, ‘desire’ intends to define the “cutting edges of creation.” Deleuze & Guattari (1988) p531n.

<sup>163</sup> See Patton (2000)

<sup>164</sup> Foucault (1980) p162

<sup>165</sup> This film appears to have a connection to the idea of the negative in the film of the same name by Deleuze and Guattari (2004)

<sup>166</sup> Foucault “sounds like Bachelard,” according to Deleuze (1988) p20

“There are only practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: the discursive practices of visibilities.”<sup>167</sup>

This combination of positive practices marks Deleuze's fundamental decision with an epistemological project in mind. Deleuze's thought is a study of the problem of visibility and his captures the tension embodied in his comment that the early Foucault followed a “rarefied form of positivism.”<sup>168</sup>

By contrast, in his own text on Nietzsche, Deleuze saw the ‘delicate problem’ of producing a positive concept foregrounding the object and by its own nature of a binary. This indicates a difference within a practice.

<sup>169</sup> When Deleuze downplayed Foucault's “neo-Kantianism” it

was a specific act of foregrounding. <sup>170</sup> Power emanates

from a careful synthesis of elements. The function of the sign, Deleuze distinguished epistemological

appearances, specifically against the legacy of ‘neo-Kantianism,’ since Deleuze saw true critique as a form of philosophical activity. He had an account of power

The underlying theme of the Foucault texts is how a subject is created by being conditioned under the use of power as just by the inscription of the Kantian

“Kant had to invoke a third agency beyond the two forms that were essential to his system of knowledge: the faculty of imagination and the faculty of reason.”<sup>171</sup>

Kant's third agency was necessitated by both attributing power to imagination and conversely excluding it from them. This is a “hidden art at the depths of the human soul,”<sup>172</sup> the function of the faculty of imagination is to produce a

question of the apprehension of the form of the transcendent principles grounding

<sup>167</sup> ibid 51

<sup>168</sup> ibid 13

<sup>169</sup> Deleuze (1983) 53, my own translation 75

<sup>170</sup> Deleuze (1988) p60

<sup>171</sup> ibid 68

<sup>172</sup> CPRA 141B 181





“In order for man to appear as a specific compound, the forces that create him enter into a relation with new forces that have to be deposited on him.”<sup>176</sup>

In Foucault’s terms, life, language and labour are forces that position man. However, the binary opposition between the active and the passive is not a new one, but a legacy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century science. Deleuze’s

“man replaced life and the subject of law, the moment his image was composed of vital forces in the political era of constitutions...but today law has again changed subject because even in the subject of these new compounds and compositions new forces are produced, not of universality but of transversality.”<sup>177</sup>

Correlated to the Science of Man which lost its universal perspective, ‘transversality’ gains new importance through the knowledge of ‘vital forces’ in connection with ‘what the will wants.’ The shift is parallel to the advent of positivism and the move from a qualitative description to a

The parallel appears in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche. He calls it a *genealogy of the family* which he defines as a *genealogy of the hidden*. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche’s book *beyond Good and Evil* puts this active/passive opposition within Foucault’s sociopolitical perspective. Deleuze & Proust’s *what is philosophy?* is a *genealogy of the family*, understood to be behind Nietzsche’s *introduction to The Genealogy of Morals*. This is a *genealogy of the family* which appears in the surplus force of a binary opposition between the sign of the ‘material body’ and the idea of the ‘will to power.’<sup>179</sup>

<sup>176</sup> Deleuze, *The Order of Things*, pp. 144-145.

<sup>177</sup> Deleuze, *The Order of Things*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>178</sup> Deleuze, *The Order of Things*, pp. 84f.

<sup>179</sup> Deleuze, *The Order of Things*, pp. 85-86. Deleuze specifically points to Nietzsche’s reworking of CPR on p.89

Foucault's concept of power followed a historically constituted social domain in but Deleuze's differential element transforms such a domain into an 'open field' by avoiding specifying human relations in terms of power categories.

"we can therefore conceive of an open field between forces or power relations....these are the categories of Power."<sup>180</sup>

Power categories presuppose a theory of forces and Deleuze's 'diagram of power' gives an idea of power categories from Nietzsche and Philosophy which defines genealogy as a way of tracing a problem of the 'true' measure of value in Nietzsche & Philosophy and a problem of evaluation of knowledge as 'force.'<sup>181</sup> This is done by distinguishing types of

- firstly a criticism implicated of the archaeological Foucault who 'stood behind' a type of knowledge that he followed with Deleuze's already described problem with Kant's transcendental philosophy;

"transcendental philosophy discovers what remains external to the conditions. Transcendental principles are the principles of conditioning but not of internal genesis."<sup>182</sup>

- a second critique related to Nietzsche's ambition to account for principles of a substitution in reason that principles account for themselves <sup>183</sup>

The Foucault/Deleuze reading of history of sexuality is then a concept of biopower and the history of the body.

"Is not the force that comes from the outside a certain idea of life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault's thought culminates? Is not life this capacity to resist force,"<sup>184</sup>

In the idea of 'life' of the 'era of political constitutions,' Deleuze introduces the question of an Enlightenment Science of Man by foregrounding a 'certain vitalism.' The Foucault follows

<sup>180</sup> Deleuze (1988) p70- 71

<sup>181</sup> Deleuze (1983) p1

<sup>182</sup> ibid p91

<sup>183</sup> ibid p89- 93

<sup>184</sup> Deleuze (1988) p93

he central point behind The Order of Things but  
his through the question of the practice of

open his a  
he physiology X and B that

vitalism within Foucault's  
185

The reading of The Order of Things pivots on how

entwined history of medicine thought

normally associates with Kantian critique. But Deleuze referred this to an event as “thought

through and redoubled them up to date in the

in an order B that <sup>186</sup> The event appears

the potential to ‘apprehend’ forces of finitude ‘within the body’ and parallel the position

of Enlightenment in Science M. Anagnostis

bound language L. Kew in the period

that appears in The Birth of the Clinic around

the new medical paradigm of the 19th

19<sup>th</sup> century. The paradigm of the clinic derives from

the history of biological anatomy for new

positive discourse and became coextensive

view in Foucault but this is as he

basic function of psychoanalysis indicating a conce

pt of normality derived from a

physiological understanding of the body as a com

plex of psychical structures and their

expression. <sup>187</sup> But in The Birth of the Clinic, Deleuze

is in and negating.

How ever Deleuze sees this event as having a wider

significance beyond any ensuing new

medical function; it has “much wider implications” for the re-emergence of the body-subject

- it expressed the ‘new axis.’<sup>188</sup> This axis he claims “haunts” all Foucault’s thought as “a certain

idea.”<sup>189</sup> When Deleuze pursued the significance of this

practice identified with the ‘age of

Bichat’ gave the context of Foucault

text around the ‘micropolitics of the sign’.<sup>190</sup>

### Signs of Difference

Deleuze’s departure from Kantian questions is apparent in D

ifference and Representation

question; “in what sense does Kantian reason impose a

he faculty of language and

<sup>185</sup> Ibid p93

<sup>186</sup> Ibid p95

<sup>187</sup> Ibid p95 Foucault speaks in Nietzsche

in a similar phrase by the passage in The Gay Science

ence

which calls on “the normal concept of health be abandoned by medical men,” as the basis of an individuation of medicine (B. K. ed 20)

<sup>188</sup> Ibid p152 note

<sup>189</sup> Ibid p97

<sup>190</sup> A domain of “uncertain doubles and partial deaths where things continually emerge and fade...in which is to be found the meaning of a micropolitics” Ibid p121

constitute problems?”<sup>191</sup> He intends to separate them from the condition of finitude that Kant proposed in his new critical philosophy. Kant’s aim in ending the primacy of concepts of Deleuze is the sign and evaluation of a but to oppose reproduction of concepts. Although Kant’s autonomous values were attributed to an empiricist base, Deleuze’s question is why Kant’s conditionality avoided the primacy of faculty, while paradoxical thinking in practice explains a by necessity transcendence. This “cuts the aesthetic in two parts,” and makes excessive the element that constitutes empiricism. This was what Deleuze understood Critique’s conditionality served to negate.<sup>192</sup>

Foucault’s *The Order of Things* distinguishes between Critique and a special biological analysis in a division in the hierarchy of the history of Science of M and the biological method in his sense and the primacy as derived from a Sensationalist epistemology of intelligence and Repetition in his special respect to the problem. The design is seen as an over from hypothetical conditioning and he by together over from Kant and his specification in transcendental experience. Deleuze refers to David Hume’s naturalism with a doubt but to begin help an “irreplaceable subtlety” when following a description of an ‘open variable.’<sup>193</sup> The Sensationalist method similarly predicated certain elements which could be ‘naturally’ extended as actual and the design was understood to index a grounded synthesis prior to any subsequent synthesis. The ‘sensible synthesis’ means a general grounding for physiology possible of organic position, and the functions of psychology and its domain in form of empirical phenomena and its integration with law as significant in itself. com point.<sup>194</sup>

The problem for Deleuze is to continue a ‘naturalism’ form he but of his signification and Repetition also invokes, with a single dimension, to be “following Condition.”<sup>195</sup> This indicates the context understood of grounding an affect as a temporal

<sup>191</sup> Deleuze (1994b) p169

<sup>192</sup> “Kant held fast to the point of view of conditioning without attaining that of genesis” Ibid p169-170

<sup>193</sup> Ibid p71

<sup>194</sup> Deleuze phrase is “cellular heredity” Ibid p71-73

<sup>195</sup> Ibid p78





19<sup>th</sup> century. <sup>203</sup> The significance for Descartes was as the domain of Being that is firm and certain. This is the domain of the rational subject, the domain of the Cartesian method. The significance for Descartes was as the domain of Being that is firm and certain. This is the domain of the rational subject, the domain of the Cartesian method.

Xavier Bichat's vitalism was ambiguous. Kant's abstract transcendentalism gave unconditional validity to the rational subject. Bichat's empirical vitalism was a negation of the rational subject. Bichat's empirical vitalism was a negation of the rational subject. Bichat's empirical vitalism was a negation of the rational subject.

Bichat's physiology marks the beginning of the scientific study of life. Bichat's physiology marks the beginning of the scientific study of life. Bichat's physiology marks the beginning of the scientific study of life. Bichat's physiology marks the beginning of the scientific study of life.

Historical vitalism could explain the development of life. Historical vitalism could explain the development of life. Historical vitalism could explain the development of life. Historical vitalism could explain the development of life.

<sup>203</sup> Foucault (1975) p. 197, appendix.

<sup>204</sup> Descartes (1980) p. 78; See also H. A. C. (1987)





Difference and Representation makes a central point around whether Heidegger's turn beyond metaphysics and engagement with a notion of presence. 208  
 Derrida understands being in terms of a pluralism of singulars  
 Nietzsche's 'overturning Platonism.' Heidegger's reading of Platonism defined the problem of method as a drawing line between sense and the. 209 To do this is to  
 about as it is to overturning an a priori claim about which presence was  
 necessary to allow us to call it in being. Understood in this way, the  
 original copy of the Platonic text is a sense intended both to understand the  
 point of view within a broader context of  
 led to. The problem of the combination of representations and difference gave  
 which became central to an Enlightenment Science of Man. In this respect, Condillac's idea  
 substituted for 'natural function' through distinguishing infant differences from external  
 resemblance.

The function of the sign is to reproduce the qualitative difference between modes of  
 resemblance and difference in the Derridean sense  
 positive identity over difference which he understood to be Plato's "moral vision" of  
 how of this because he is a  
 be governed by concepts of reason and nature  
 difference as well as the Platonic form  
 in Plato's form of the sign  
 statement as a sign of the value of  
 purpose and the necessary method of  
 function of the sign of the sign  
 cannot be understood as a sign of the

208 Ibid 65-66, "It would seem not, given his critique of the Nietzschean eternal return."  
 209 See Heidegger's discussion as 'Truth in Platonism and Positivism: Nietzsche's attempt to overturn Platonism on the basis of nihilism' Heidegger (1986) vol. 1 p151ff  
 210 Derrida (1994) p127.  
 211 The Heideggerian form of the sign

Historical, Sensational method pointed and  
 represent a evaluation within the conceptual  
 problem of difference within the phenomena  
 not in the object of presentation  
 the transcendence of the pathology  
 but in what is touched by the disease

ology, but the new medical pathology  
 is of the sign pathology brought the  
 abundance of the outside could  
 be the pathology reserved in it  
 sign part the historical form  
 within in the reading of the order of things

with a description of the ‘man-form’ as the composition of ‘forces of the outside,’ which marks  
 the form of Kantian orthodoxy and a  
 now characterized as the ‘age of Bichat’ which had in opened a new fundamental

of the new historical  
 the 19<sup>th</sup> century in knowledge.

The ‘outside’ carries an immanence within the legacy of Eng  
 Man in the sense understood as embodying the ‘anticipations’ fundamental for the new  
 condition of the disease in the Foucault  
 incorporated the form of the outside and  
 metaphysics of death, but against Bichat’s terms of violent death a re-orientation had  
 historical position of the outside  
 of an ‘inner commitment’ to Positivism’s truth which Deleuze held in relation to Nietzsche’s  
 social as the confrontation of the  
 the diagnosis around the degeneration  
 points to the 19<sup>th</sup> century thought with Nietzsche and Philosophy as a  
 power of the allegory of the schism and  
 Nietzsche’s ‘will to power.’ I also explain the outside with Deleuze understood of  
 Genealogy.<sup>213</sup> The general imperative of an unconditioned ‘will to truth’ gave the point  
 had become the new system of a  
 Eng in the Science of Man which is the  
 was provoked by the man in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

the form of Science of  
 and a new man in the form that appear ed by  
 the outside of the outside  
 the organization of the  
 the significance of the Positiv  
 obtain so Positiv within the physiological  
 ring of the species This a conceptual  
 the point of the outside  
 the point of the outside  
 the order of things in the historical context  
 the sign of the outside

<sup>212</sup> Deleuze (1988) p.130

<sup>213</sup> It makes sickness “harmless to a degree” following Nietzsche (1994) III:16, see appendix.

19<sup>th</sup> century his was a dispute over the positive and the ideal, and a dispute over  
contingency and the Science of Man and a new form. <sup>214</sup>

### Conclusion

The 'rarefied Positivism' delimits the original problem around Enlightenment Science  
Foucault followed what his reading of Kant's Anthropology as an empirical perspective on how  
the positive concept of the social brought to play. This has extended the view as  
both a critical impetus in Foucault's Archaeology and, after 1968, gave the positive form for  
contingency the concept of the judicial power. Beyond the empirical object of discourse,  
Foucault's positive form extended through social and political discourse to the philosophical  
legitimacy identified with Kant's legacy which the final form integrated within  
historical and political Positivism.

A new perspective has been described in the text. This focus on the medical discourse  
identified with the quest for true function in the 'age of Bichat.' This is the final form of  
epistemology in the form of the social and political. This explained Deleuze's reasoning for attributing  
the final form of the social to the 'Bichat event' explains the discourse on the  
physical and the moral to which Deleuze but the solution of an 18<sup>th</sup> century dispute.  
The original problem around values of the 18<sup>th</sup> century form centered on contingency  
following Condillac's ideas grew with Deleuze's work on the final form of Positivism as  
a claim.

The original problem from Enlightenment Science of Man has been characterized in  
an historical form in the text. The historical and social values both  
positive and ideal have continued to be the final form of the Science of Man  
during the 19<sup>th</sup> century in subsequent chapters. The next chapter will look at Foucault's post-  
critical Kant to accounting for the 'bifurcation' in a practice around the Science of Man;  
subsequent chapters follow with the conceptual and the critical context emerging from the 'age of  
Bichat.'

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<sup>214</sup> Deleuze & Guattari (1994) p.133

Chapter 2 : Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the debate that raged in France during the 'crisis' of the 1760's. This was a time when the French Enlightenment was at its height, and when the new philosophy was being developed. The French Enlightenment was a movement that sought to reform society and government through reason and science. It was a time of great intellectual activity, and it was during this period that the French Revolution was born. The French Enlightenment was a movement that sought to reform society and government through reason and science. It was a time of great intellectual activity, and it was during this period that the French Revolution was born.

The previous chapters have introduced the significance of Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man. Kant's divided legacy in the history of philosophy is a topic that has attracted much attention in the 18th century. The French Enlightenment was a movement that sought to reform society and government through reason and science. It was a time of great intellectual activity, and it was during this period that the French Revolution was born. The French Enlightenment was a movement that sought to reform society and government through reason and science. It was a time of great intellectual activity, and it was during this period that the French Revolution was born.

A significant part of Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man is his discussion of the necessity for a general metaphysics as 'indispensable service' for giving legitimacy beyond conditions of philosophy. Second, Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man is a work that has been widely studied and discussed. Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man is a work that has been widely studied and discussed. Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man is a work that has been widely studied and discussed. Kant's Anthropology and the Science of Man is a work that has been widely studied and discussed.

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This taken up in the chapter

Renaissance Anthropology and Enlightenment Science

of Man

The Renaissance as a conscious opening

new cycle in a new approach to

negotiating freedom in a world of

apathic context Anthropology as

an emerging political body

Knowledge branching out from philosophy



of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Science of Man can be taken as dominant by a fundamental idea, the sense that science and reason could be taken to define man's higher faculties.

Two Approaches to Enlightenment Science of Man

The 18<sup>th</sup> century origin point of Science of Man can be traced through philosophical methods of John Locke and David Hume.<sup>217</sup>

Locke's Sensationalism offered a method to free the human body from dogmatic thinking. Locke was a physician and his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) traced 'symptoms' laid out after an anatomical fashion that ground his intended practice for a Science of Man. Moving beyond Descartes' mechanistic, human agency to an empiricist methodology of human understanding and its transformation of metaphysical discipline into a psychology. Locke's sensationalism offered an empirical doctrine of knowledge based on a new rational theory of faculties and their formation as a process of adaptation.

"The first step to towards satisfying several enquiries of the mind of man was very apt to unitly as to take survey of our own natures and to examine our own powers and to what things they could be adapted."<sup>219</sup>

Being a physician meant an awareness of the empirical difficulties of the problem of comprehension of the data of sensation.<sup>220</sup> The physician emphasized practicality of observation using experience as a basis for judgment. Locke was looking for a new method of moving beyond an aprioristic metaphysics to a new empiricist methodology. Being a New England physician, I saw how the new science of medicine was being developed and how it would change the way we measure and understand human health, physiology, and the natural explanatory systems of the human body.

<sup>217</sup> See Caspary (1955) xi  
<sup>218</sup> See Broadwood (1994)  
<sup>219</sup> See Locke (1975) Introduction, Book I, Chapter 1  
<sup>220</sup> See Foucault (1970) p. 82

introduced new possibilities in epistemology and successive orders of language. This was an idea Étienne Bonnot de Condorcet developed in his

1790 Treatise on Human Nature especially in the French version a physical study of man's perceptions

extended through degrees of certitude towards a 'new language.' His ideas were taken up under the broad definition of a 'Science de L'homme' during the French revolutionary era.

A notable example is David Hume's 1739 Treatise on Human Nature which upheld the primacy of human nature.

1739 Treatise on Human Nature

1739 Treatise on Human Nature

"Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less to human nature, and how ever they seem to differ from it, they are all reducible to it. Even mathematics, natural philosophy and natural history are all dependent on human nature, and are judged by their powers and faculties."<sup>221</sup>

turn back to one passage or another in some of the books of the Treatise on Human Nature

The problem was that Hume's skepticism led to a radical skepticism which could be seen as a general

principle of causality. Hume's emphasis on the primacy of human nature led to a radical skepticism which could be seen as a general

. Hume's emphasis on

instinct. This meant that Hume's skepticism left "human nature as the only Science of Man."<sup>222</sup>

As a programmatic approach to philosophy that was allied to a method moving "from a kind of skepticism to kind of positivism,"<sup>223</sup> which would not be uncharacteristic of the school of

Positivism in its original form

in the history of philosophy

dogmas. Hume's central criticism around the original concept of causality was intended to

question the judgment concerning perceived qualities

as to be seen in everything

but to be seen in nature. Such a skeptical

method was not only intended to

proof of God but any existence of a deity

to be seen in the principles of

derived by the possibility of inferring

from the finite, Hume's thinking

can be considered as a point

sense does not advocate against

of a rigid judgment about the possibility of

negative judgment about any kind of

<sup>221</sup> Treatise on Human Nature, Book I, Part I, Section 4

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 273

<sup>223</sup> Expressionism, De la (1991), p. 31



m epistemic. <sup>224</sup> Hume's paradoxical position is with respect to a so-called 'natural' epistemology of any kind of knowledge positively implies a possibility of 'true' knowledge, not unlike a "compelling power" of nature.

What Hume's position is for Hume is an induction in favour of the question of values in knowledge. The question of value produces, in response to an empirical uncovering of a concept and secondly through a pragmatic approach, a connection with an empirical psychology. Hume's legacies; the relation to a political thought. Hume's emphasis on an immanent practical approach, which as a qualitative concept over quantitative approaches to a Science of Man. This attempt to view man's natural physical and social environment through the prism of a human existence in concrete conditions of human existence through the accumulation of empirical knowledge. He has a programmatic study of human nature. The programmatic method offered by Locke's empiricism and appears to be a humanistic sense and position. This is a paradoxical position in thought.

In both instances, what was important was that man was held to have a fundamental 'nature.' David Hume expressed this as, "it is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity in the operations and principles of the human mind." <sup>226</sup> And Locke wrote, "Men, I think have much the same for natural endowments in all times." <sup>227</sup> By the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of human nature had evolved around what would be called the 'natural' history of man as defined by the influence of Newton and Descartes.

<sup>224</sup> Kirkwood (1972) p.50  
<sup>225</sup> ibid p.50  
<sup>226</sup> Enquiry into Human Understanding (1975) p.82  
<sup>227</sup> Works of Locke (1997) vol.II p361, 'Conduct of the Understanding'

thought experiment of the increasing variety of objects appearing through increased

of custom and institutions in the two centuries of Europe.

To his end, he writes about the program of questions for the experimenter and his common question of what would be possible if the focus on the notion of

man's origin in 1762 Johann Gottfried

power of reason is pursued through a so-called 18<sup>th</sup> century Science of Man pursued by Johann Gottfried Herder and a 'truth' of man and the question of his origin in 1762 Johann Gottfried Herder and a

“in order to distinguish what is art from what is nature we must push towards the origin, just as we are accustomed to distinguish in natural study the consciousness of man and his art. Rousseau has examined it.”<sup>228</sup>

coincides with his, from the 18<sup>th</sup> century West would be needed to be the origin of his product of

The purpose of his work is a method of inquiry devised for the investigation of human nature. It is not only necessary and correct but also understood by the philosopher and not in a narrow sense.

by which the Science of Man could proceed and a By specifying constraints as he proposed as a problem of the origin of this early research Rousseau examined

“The researches that we may enter into on this subject must not be taken as historical truths, but as hypotheses and conclusions upon the nature of things which show us how physicists engage in all the time in the formation of the world.”<sup>229</sup>

is a method of proper thought and a method of reasoning in our

Hence, in Rousseau's thought, the emphasis is on the human capacity to create a law of his own nature.

between man and nature and the intended by the origin of man and nature. This followed

Condition of the Human Mind (1746) and his Origin of Human Knowledge (1746) in the

of Logic (1780) through his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge

Rousseau's approach is a method of inquiry and a method of inquiry and a method of inquiry

on the origin of the human mind and a Science of Man, Kant's

<sup>228</sup> Aufg. und Lehrsatz in Johann Gottfried Herder's Second Discourse, Rousseau (1997) p.132

Kant (1964) p.92; Hans A. Reiss (1982) p.159.

approach followed a positive aim to modify 17  
anthropology through empiricism and that

18<sup>th</sup> century ideas on psychology and  
characteristics of 18<sup>th</sup> century debates

The Science of Man Kant

Locke and Hume indicated empiricism as  
and empiricism pursued by Science of Man

problem sound an analytic foundation  
the 18<sup>th</sup> century The broadness of his

thought had an importance for Kant from the 1750's. This appears as a foundation of  
derived from 18<sup>th</sup> century as a historical system and  
a priori knowledge

La Cinqe Rue Reason described

Locke's ambition for a rational science coextensive  
with the realm of the 'real' as being dependant on a 'true method.'<sup>230</sup> Kant took Locke's method

as prone to transcending limits of experience, opening to a fictitious "genealogy" and given to  
new dogma in some even in Ferri.

<sup>231</sup> On the other hand, Kant took Hume's sceptical

method in going to "a species of nomad, despising all settled modes of life..."<sup>232</sup> However

when Kant pursued the broadness of a Sci

ence of Man in his essay

On the Origin of the Faculty of Beauty

Subin (1764) intended a contribution

the general analysis of the aesthetic

grounded in aesthetic observation

the aesthetic philosophy of Hume and Kant

not following the new ideas of aesthetic

linking of them in his discussion of ideas of

them permeating the relations between

as a feeling and as a moral consideration

on how as a feeling can contribute

people's behavior and

"as a consciousness of feeling that lives in every human breast...the feeling of beauty  
and the dignity of human nature...first as a ground for universal affection...second as a  
ground for esteem ...Only when one subordinates his own inclinations to one so

expanded can our character be improved by use of proper  
objects and being about the

challenge in aesthetic. <sup>233</sup>

<sup>230</sup> "...of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas." Essay Locke (1975) p16

<sup>231</sup> Kant CPR A i

<sup>232</sup> B i A i

<sup>233</sup> Kant (1960) p60

The ground of his universal of the good  
 his allocution in the history of Rousseau's education  
 through a sympathy with Rousseau's call for philosophers to  
 become educators of a kind that will bring an  
 end to the philosophy of the senses  
 Rousseau is proposing the concept of 'natural man' as the metaphysical ideal, for inferring what  
 was wrong with the modern world and to understand  
 can be taken in the sense of the regulated ideal  
 through training in philosophy.

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“Rousseau: he proceeds synthetically and begins from the natural human being  
 proceed analytically beginning from the civilised human being.”<sup>235</sup>

his way of knowledge and analysis  
 the concept of the ideal man  
 philosophy derived from an observation of nature  
 metaphysics

he approaches diverse regimes  
 I do not ask the division for knowledge between a practical  
 and the theoretical for speculative

The sense in which Rousseau's concept  
 of 'natural man' by transposing Rousseau's political community into a transcendental world  
 where the few individuals can be given full  
 Rousseau's concept of freedom in taking an ethical self as given to possibilities of intervention  
 through a categorical imperative Rousseau had given  
 practical in the document of the Enlightenment  
 common in the ideal of the human reason by definition  
 linking subject to be conditioned by them at all  
 he senses

236

regarding the concept  
 autonomy. This sense is due to  
 knowledge and a form of ideal  
 the term of the Enlightenment  
 being a transcendental concept of the  
 world by the power of the political

<sup>234</sup> See Casiri (1963) p.20  
<sup>235</sup> Kant (2005) p.3A A 22078  
<sup>236</sup> Following Casiri (1963)

The second strategy has been described by Foucault as a ‘research into the Gemüt’ and associated with Kant’s later Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.<sup>237</sup> This saw Kant

depart from ‘observed facts’ of Observations concerning the Possibility of a General Philosophy of the Human Mind, and present a condition under which a ‘special epistemological structure’ would be possible. This structure is that stood behind both Critique and Anthropology as general conditions for determining the subject. This gave a general problem for any Science of Man. While Critique places a transcendental freedom as the speculative concept of thinking, the subject of Anthropology is a cyclical and hierarchical thinking and understanding of the Critique and Anthropology, like Observations concerning the Possibility of a General Philosophy of the Human Mind. The Gemüt is the special problem of freedom and as a principle of freedom he conceived freedom.

While the split in the thinking of the concept of ‘natural being’ can be identified in the 1770’s, the Anthropology here Kant is using to distinguish between an initial system of knowledge and a natural system of knowledge.<sup>238</sup> He associated this with two types of research:

“Physiological knowledge [which] aims at what nature makes of man, whereas pragmatic knowledge aims at what man makes of himself as a freely acting being.”<sup>239</sup>

The division appears in Critique as a reason and designation through a notion of freedom. But Anthropology is the hearing of the notion of freedom through the Gemüt. This division produces a useful perspective on the imperatives of reason of the ‘I think’, and a concept of the synthetic work preceding the subject.

<sup>237</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, in the G

em of Foucault (2008)

<sup>238</sup> B. J. Foucault (2008) p19

<sup>239</sup> Kant (1974) pp3

Kant introduces Anthropology as a part of the 'nature' of cosmopolitical bonds through the possibility of a future science.<sup>240</sup> But the question of

Pure Reason and its application to the subject of a pure reason here

Kant looked to a future science for the "establishment of its own in a complete anthropology, the pendant to an empirical doctrine of nature."<sup>241</sup> This problematic 'nature' was, in the later

Anthropology, a question of empirical science and the possibility of mapping "the consciousness that man experiences" that are characteristic of the cosmopolitical 'object.'<sup>242</sup> But when he speaks of the

empirical experiences, Anthropology is such an admission that only successive possible knowledge of the object

A scientific method derived from the empirical science of the sciences can be seen

move apart in Kant's texts around 1770-1780, and the question of the

'I think,' the synthetic function of the Cartesian ego and its logic; on the other, questions of evidence in anthropology appear as evidence in a new system.

The possibility of a rational system with the possibility of a science of man and the debate over metaphysics

New Transcendental Philosophy of the Human Being

Kant began his career as a student of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. The fundamental divergence from the Wolffian system came through the New Transcendental Philosophy which he published in the *Beilage* to the *Annalen der Physik* in 1760.

Under the influence of the French philosopher, Louis de la Motte, he became surrounded by the French Enlightenment and the French philosophical and mathematical sciences.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid. 25. cosmopolitical union.

<sup>241</sup> Kant, *CPRA* 849B 877

<sup>242</sup> Kant, *CPRA* 974§24

Wolff's philosophy held that a natural product is subordinate to the laws of nature. In a famous work he sought to encompass German and French philosophy in a system. He considered Newtonian philosophy as a general philosophy. In 1740, Friedrich Prussia established the Berlin Academy, which represented Wolff's philosophy. Wolff fled to the French Revolution in Switzerland. Leonhard Euler was a member of the Berlin Academy. In the Wolffian system, which is the basis of the Berlin Academy, the sciences of mathematics and physics were separated into two distinct parts: mathematics and physics. The Berlin Academy was founded in 1740, and it was through an initiative of Euler that the Berlin Academy began to discuss the controversy of Newtonian and Wolffian philosophy.

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Kant's critical philosophy was a response to the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. In his philosophy, he introduced a new way of thinking about space and time. He argued that space and time are not independent entities but are related to each other. He also argued that space and time are not absolute but are relative to the observer. This was a significant departure from the Newtonian and Wolffian views. Kant's philosophy was a response to the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. In his philosophy, he introduced a new way of thinking about space and time. He argued that space and time are not independent entities but are related to each other. He also argued that space and time are not absolute but are relative to the observer. This was a significant departure from the Newtonian and Wolffian views.

Physical motion is a result of the interaction of forces. In his philosophy, he introduced a new way of thinking about space and time. He argued that space and time are not independent entities but are related to each other. He also argued that space and time are not absolute but are relative to the observer. This was a significant departure from the Newtonian and Wolffian views. Kant's philosophy was a response to the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. In his philosophy, he introduced a new way of thinking about space and time. He argued that space and time are not independent entities but are related to each other. He also argued that space and time are not absolute but are relative to the observer. This was a significant departure from the Newtonian and Wolffian views.

<sup>243</sup> See Ronald Beardsley (1969), pp. 319-330.

A more specific form of approach to negative knowledge is proposed by Kant in his *Logic*. He distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: *empirical knowledge* and *transcendental knowledge*. The former is based on sensory experience, while the latter is based on the 'material principles' of human reason.<sup>244</sup> By distinguishing between these two kinds of knowledge, Kant is able to show that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt. Kant's distinction between these two kinds of knowledge is important because it shows that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt.

empirical knowledge (1763) distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: empirical knowledge and transcendental knowledge. The former is based on sensory experience, while the latter is based on the 'material principles' of human reason.<sup>244</sup> By distinguishing between these two kinds of knowledge, Kant is able to show that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt. Kant's distinction between these two kinds of knowledge is important because it shows that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt.

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Kant's distinction between these two kinds of knowledge is important because it shows that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt.

"Inner feeling tells us that displeasure is more than a negation. (lack is not a displeasure)...but a positive sensation....positively opposed to pleasure....a positive ground which is not a mere absence but a real difference which is opposed to pleasure." <sup>245</sup>

In distinguishing between an absolute notion of indifference and a relative notion of indifference, Kant is able to show that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt.

distinction between an absolute notion of indifference and a relative notion of indifference. Kant is able to show that while empirical knowledge is always subject to doubt, transcendental knowledge is not. This is because transcendental knowledge is based on the 'material principles' of human reason, which are not subject to doubt.

<sup>244</sup> Kant, *Logic*, 218. <sup>245</sup> Kant, *Logic*, 218.



Realism can be posited as an  
 aversion in opposition to  
 pleasure connected with the  
 ground that is not in the  
 concept of the object, but  
 as a ground which is not  
 cancelled out by the  
 concept of the object, and  
 can be given only through  
 speculative concepts.

object and in the field of  
 both are qualitative aspects and exist “because  
 being itself.”<sup>246</sup> The  
 concept of the object is  
 not cancelled out by the  
 concept of the object, but  
 as a ground which is not  
 cancelled out by the  
 concept of the object, and  
 therefore “can in no wise be judged.”<sup>247</sup>

What is introduced here is  
 by distinguishing from a  
 logical expression that is  
 absolute.

Ground appears as a ‘logical horizon,’  
 in itself, the concept is

“the relation of real ground to something, which is neither posited nor cancelled out by  
 it, and cannot be expressed in a judgement....only expressed in a concept.”

It is because speculation is the source of human  
 understanding that the concept of the object  
 has a concept that is not cancelled out by the  
 concept of the object, but as a ground which  
 is not cancelled out by the concept of the  
 object.<sup>248</sup> The distinction between  
 the negative and the positive  
 between a concept’s necessity and its contingency. The distinction is between the real ground  
 and the logical ground. It is the concept of the object  
 which is not cancelled out by the concept of the object, but as a ground which is not cancelled out by the concept of the object.

and form as the field of  
 logical ground. Although Kant finds  
 analysis of the object of the  
 concept of the object, it is “the  
 concept of the object, but as a ground which  
 is not cancelled out by the concept of the  
 object.”<sup>248</sup> The distinction between  
 the negative and the positive  
 between a concept’s necessity and its contingency. The distinction is between the real ground  
 and the logical ground. It is the concept of the object  
 which is not cancelled out by the concept of the object, but as a ground which is not cancelled out by the concept of the object.

<sup>246</sup> M. A. P. and  
 Negative and  
<sup>247</sup> M. A. P.  
<sup>248</sup> M. A. P.

is pleasure a preponderance, but Kant notes this is “not humanly possible”

Scepticism in Kant's Logic

The separation appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic where Kant gives both an intuition and to an ambiguous, in some things as psychological judgement in some aesthetic

of the Critique of Pure Reason  
by Kant 249 The doctrine is that sensation  
for the realm of the transcendental

Reason's aim for more 'positive' values given as a concept of understanding which accounts for these experiences and

250 This form is essentially behind the

of Pure

values of sensibility at the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic following the "abortive attempt made by Baumgarten" for defining a concept that is understood as

251

Kant's aesthetic theory is only by bringing the principles of logic analysis which distinguished between Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's

of the Critique of Pure Reason  
as a system of forms of general  
aesthetics or taste

'sense' of beauty he gave the term *othenos* as a fresh apprehension according to body senses and as 'indistinct.'<sup>252</sup> Baumgarten defined 'taste' as meaning an ability to judge according to the senses

of the faculties

a 'sensitive knowledge,' given as something on feelings of pleasure or displeasure but

rather than intellectual as he did

on feelings of pleasure or displeasure but

Baumgarten's sense of taste is a result of the deduction of

of the principles of an

individual taste. Taste was the domain, "fusing together of elements" of confused perceptions whose status is beyond each of the concepts

of the faculties of the sensitive knowledge

of the 'dark' and the indistinct, could be brought under a higher reason through 'powers of the soul' which Baumgarten subsumed under a Leibnizian firm

work taken to express a

cognition of a 'life of knowledge.'<sup>253</sup> But the Critique of Pure Reason opposes that which

s

speculative freedom and is not the basis of

of the sensitive knowledge of the faculties of the

Observation shows feelings and principles

of the faculties of the sensitive knowledge

<sup>249</sup> Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 15B 29

<sup>250</sup> Norman Kemp Smith (2003) p. 81, Critique of Pure Reason, 271B 327

<sup>251</sup> Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 21

<sup>252</sup> Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*

<sup>253</sup> Cassirer, *Philosophy of Language*



them selves could constitute a communicable ‘distinctness;’ these constituted the universality which Kant regarded as the necessary purpose of cognition. It is not, however, a more positive knowledge in the Lockean sense (“Locke made an error in showing that none of our objects of experience can ever be absolute but completely comparative”<sup>259</sup>)

How even Kant holds that cognition of experience is not a mere subordination of the particular to the general, but a reciprocal activity which gives approval in law and disapproval in the positive and negative. A naturalist might say that the negative is to be avoided.

It can only become profound when the subordination of judgment to those whole of approval and disapproval is not a mere subordination, but a reciprocal activity. The positive of the cognition is not a mere subordination, but a reciprocal activity.

It is not, however, a more positive knowledge in the Lockean sense (“Locke made an error in showing that none of our objects of experience can ever be absolute but completely comparative”<sup>259</sup>)

Baumgarten adds in his *Metaphysik* that the law of judgment is not a mere subordination of the particular to the general, but a reciprocal activity which gives approval in law and disapproval in the positive and negative. A naturalist might say that the negative is to be avoided.

‘conceptual’<sup>261</sup>

and defined by an ‘empirical psychology.’ It is not, however, a more positive knowledge in the Lockean sense (“Locke made an error in showing that none of our objects of experience can ever be absolute but completely comparative”<sup>259</sup>)

This domain is now accounted for by the positive ground of the Law of Judgment. The Law of Judgment is not a mere subordination of the particular to the general, but a reciprocal activity which gives approval in law and disapproval in the positive and negative. A naturalist might say that the negative is to be avoided.

ed ‘mark’ in its natural relation to the domain of the Law of Judgment. The Law of Judgment is not a mere subordination of the particular to the general, but a reciprocal activity which gives approval in law and disapproval in the positive and negative. A naturalist might say that the negative is to be avoided.

Because Kant is a humanist, he is not a mere subordination of the particular to the general, but a reciprocal activity which gives approval in law and disapproval in the positive and negative. A naturalist might say that the negative is to be avoided.

It is not, however, a more positive knowledge in the Lockean sense (“Locke made an error in showing that none of our objects of experience can ever be absolute but completely comparative”<sup>259</sup>)

<sup>259</sup> Ibid 97  
<sup>260</sup> Ibid 123  
<sup>261</sup> Ibid 221  
<sup>262</sup> CPRA 262B 318

Dialectic of Pure Reason  
 between an idea of reason and  
 "peculiar unity."<sup>263</sup> However, every aspect of the  
 returned as research in sense  
 of Pure Reason is a problem with a metaphysical  
 and the concept of the Cartesian subject  
 think, " and Kant's alternative is a

Reason Kant's alternative is a  
 in a rational expression only as  
 a  
 metaphysical unity of the "I  
 think" is a problem with a metaphysical  
 subject is a problem with a metaphysical  
 study.

A Short History of Kant's Metaphysics

The Cartesian philosophy proposed metaphysics  
 from a new perspective. The new approach  
 "no more than empirical physics does."<sup>265</sup> A  
 study of consciousness and the Cartesian  
 psychology. However, psychology took as a  
 activity attributable to an inner sense and given to the Cartesian "I think," which was  
 with a new psychology took as 'I perceive.' Working from Baumgarten's Metaphysics  
 as a text Kant argued that our sense was  
 and with a new concept through the soul  
 which belongs to me... a representation of my representations... a self-perception,"<sup>266</sup> which Kant  
 took as a perception of a new psychology. A new psychology was a  
 in a new psychology. A new psychology was a

as a study of consciousness  
 and the Cartesian metaphysics  
 the  
 to the early 1770's through Kant's lectures in  
 on in accounting for intellectual  
 which was  
 Metaphysics  
 a knowledge  
 which Kant  
 study of  
 concept of the thinking subject

Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics show him  
 sense of a new psychology with a new  
 with a logic distinguishing between  
 Metaphysics as a discussion of the  
 and the foundation of a new

a new representation of the  
 sense of the thinking subject  
 and the significance  
 is that  
 sense  
 power with a new perspective;

<sup>263</sup> CPRA 849B 877.  
<sup>264</sup> CPRA 848B 876  
<sup>265</sup> CPRA 848B 876  
<sup>266</sup> Kant (1997) p44- 46

high functions of the active life

and the passive life of the intellect

and how his has significance

in the new logic of the intellect

is a discussion of

the thinking consciousness as a sensitive

being. In psychology he holds that sensitive

representations can "either be given or made" through the activity of the thinking consciousness,

and to be

spontaneous activity of a "formative power." Such a power is a sensitive

power of biological understanding

"formative power" is a sensitive power

function of the soul

<sup>267</sup> A sensitive power accounts for the

an intellect and

appears as unconscious perception. The sign

is a sensitive power of the intellect

has by itself a form of its own

in the intellect.

How even the fully unconscious power

induces a conversion problem of

'subreption.'<sup>268</sup> Subreption is a form of an empirical habit

that confuses sensitive

intention from a form of an intellect

being is a sensitive power.

On this point he became dependent on

question of judgment. This is a sensitive

discussed under power of the soul and intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

describes habit as a sensitive power

is a sensitive power of the intellect

unity of a sensitive power and intellect

led these diverse powers to the 'I think'

of the intellect in the intellect as a sensitive power

has a form of the intellect

conceptual thought. The intellect is not

show that the intellect is not

discussed as a sensitive power

future task of a philosophy "so far as it is possible."<sup>269</sup>

These are the intellect and the intellect as a sensitive power

is a sensitive power of the intellect

being of the intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

unity through a problem of form and intellect. The intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

fundamental opposition of knowledge and intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

unconditional intellect and intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

is a sensitive power of the intellect

<sup>267</sup> ibid 49

<sup>268</sup> ibid 51-52

<sup>269</sup> ibid 75



experience of possible transcendent  
Mammals because such principles are not

principles are the object of science of  
grounding and in a function.

The problem of form and knowledge appears in  
diverse principles because since we ask them to  
synthesize knowledge the ambition for transcendent  
empirical knowledge for a pure synthesis of  
knowledge that law is the problem of principle  
judgment beyond the given or the ground

initially it is given according to  
space and a knowledge of law in a new  
logic was of the subtraction of an  
thing.<sup>272</sup> The difficulty of a new synthesis  
is given the source of such synthesis  
concept

“But in synthesis judgment itself have already advanced  
view against the law the concept of a thing  
thought of the law in every case  
judgment is known and by itself and finally  
discovered.”<sup>273</sup>

beyond the given concept  
of the law in what way  
in order to contain the  
of the law can never be

Because Kant’s ambition for a pure understanding requires that “...the conditions of the  
possibility of experience are the same as  
of experience,”<sup>274</sup> he permitted conditions on them at a principle of New Britain  
dynamism in principle as a not a form of a thing  
law in which is a principle by which a power gives unity in representation through concept  
of understanding. This power is the function of un-  
derstanding of a thing according to  
positive categories of experience.

The positive categories follow from Kant’s table of judgment (A 80/B 106) which are a  
faculty of understanding and the unity brought  
together actively through the “I think.” (A126) While the representational activity of the thinking  
‘I’ uses concepts that are the power of understanding from  
positive categories of understanding in a function of a  
unity as a schematism, or ‘art.’ This

<sup>272</sup> CPR A 237/B 296

<sup>273</sup> GA 154/B 193f

<sup>274</sup> GA 158/B 197/H e idegger comments, “whoever understands this principle understands Kant’s CPR” Heidegger (1985b) 183



category in order to be a *phenomenon*.<sup>275</sup> The question of how to  
 as the ‘matter of appearance’- to inner sense, by a conceptual ‘filling out’ or  
 as a continuous production of *phenomena* *in* *act*.  
 (A 20B 34) This means that the form at  
 the power of synthesis determined the  
 manner of its appearance. *Phenomena* *in* *act*  
 the conceptual succession and coexistence of  
 chapters in *transcendental philosophy*  
 was necessarily limited and ultimately retained “no other possible employment” other than  
 them (A 146)

The *phenomenon* in the power of synthesis  
 the “peculiar unity” of the architectonic was *phenomena* *in* *act* with *Constitution of Pure*  
 Reason described as “due to sensibility.”<sup>276</sup> This is the problem for Kant’s *Science of Man*  
 what is the legacy of the form of 18  
 century *science* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 characteristic of Baumgarten an ‘abortive analytic.’ Drawing on the “merely empirical,” which  
 was the *phenomenon* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 could find a *phenomenon* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
*Constitution of Pure Reason* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 reflect on ‘something’ that necessarily must be accounted for, and in this he returned to  
 conceptual *phenomena* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 form.’ This *phenomenon* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 judged under a power of judgment *in* *act* *in* *act*  
*phenomena* *in* *act* *in* *act*

The *Constitution of Pure Reason* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
*Man* *in* *act* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 understanding Kant *in* *act* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
*phenomena* *in* *act* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
 reflective judgement is ‘compelled to ascend.’ (§ 4) This *phenomenon* *in* *act* *in* *act*  
*phenomena* *in* *act* *in* *act* *in* *act*

<sup>275</sup> CPRA 141B 180

<sup>276</sup> *TrB* 186

and a new reference for empirical  
experience (§6)

of the aim which had to be

The Concept of a Technical Power

The Critique of Judgment moved away from questions  
of the techniques of knowledge. This study was  
production and the categories for ordering the work  
consciousness in the empirical process  
through a critical reflection on the ‘matter of logic,’ or intuition. This ‘matter’ appeared either  
under the form of understanding or of  
the given which stood forth in  
intuition. <sup>277</sup>

of production and by the laws  
of the power that underlies concept  
at the level of anthropological  
notion of production of human experience  
symptoms of finality which the  
intention accounted for through the

The notion of intuition through the concept  
served to ground the “inner possibility” of concepts in their practical application  
concerns of the sense of  
concepts from “the narrow low life of animals.” (§60) These required techniques of reflection  
point any expression of the feeling of  
habitual or the habitual  
disposition of  
feeling of life” by which Kant indicated the  
habitual concept (§1)

essence and pleasure as power which  
applied to the  
ever-disposition of final  
he possibility of a transformation of  
to an end concept of pleasure and  
reflection was to account for the principles ascribed only to “a  
‘vivacity’ in representation itself on a

The point of the book is to pose  
the second part of the Critique of Judgment as  
cognitive in the original sense  
This is something beyond the limits of reason  
and in explaining the conditions

essence and by which appear  
at the point of disposition of  
conceptual apprehension of the order  
and experience and served the purpose  
of

<sup>277</sup> C. §59)





How ever, C. J. G. P. Reason, in his book 'The Refutation of Idealism', has argued that the 'Refutation of Idealism' that Kant gave in the 'Transcendental Aesthetics' was a central dogma of idealism. In this sense, Kant's Transcendental Idealism is a central dogma of idealism.

... as a philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

By denying both the transcendental and the empirical, Kant leaves open to what can be considered under the representation. The 'Refutation of Idealism' leaves this to the composite origin of experience with C. J. G. P. Reason in his paper 'The Refutation of Idealism' and his book 'The Refutation of Idealism'.

... as a philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

Secondly, by arguing in favour of the freedom of the will, Kant is arguing in favour of the freedom of the will. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

... as a philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

The question of freedom is a central dogma of idealism. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

... as a philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind. This is the essence of the philosophy of the mind.

<sup>285</sup> 'Refutation of Idealism' B274. According to Kemp Smith, the importance of this passage is in the division between subject and phenomenon.

<sup>286</sup> Refers to the 'Second Analogy' B233.



presupposed no in of pres b h d h a m o n i s o  
 This notion turned the problem of knowledge as a  
 emphasis his in the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought.' (B292ff) Here a principle of  
 discursivity worked within the law of causality and  
 is not taken as noumenon in itself, but only as  
 extended experience. But such knowledge always suffices  
 subject to experience within its objectivity.

accounting for principles of discursivity.  
 concern of common unity, and Kant  
 mentions how the process of discursivity  
 is not possible in itself, but only as  
 extended from the danger of confusing of

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The latter could not give a positive content form  
 presupposed in a priori law  
 his as a passive domain. In turn, his passivity in  
 internal principles within thought and language  
 of

the New origin perspective. This was as a  
 a principle of form and Kant further  
 qualified  
 asks the distinction from speculative  
 hypothesis in the but the concept

“Life means the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal  
 principle of its substance to determine itself  
 to determine itself to motion or rest as change of its state.”<sup>292</sup>

Because such internal principles do not conform  
 Metaphysical Foundations as the foregoing  
 knowledge in relation to universal objects of ex  
 which now appears essential philosophy  
 The possibility of experience as being  
 since of human reason as philosophy  
 wisdom. This means that Metaphysical Foundations  
 since linked between giving metaphysical and phi  
 anthropological and experiential  
 always determined in the experience of nature  
 These now necessary principles of objective

to a New origin view of matter  
 that takes in the natural  
 principle. This was an emphasis in the  
 change in principle of matter  
 a principle of matter and experience  
 philosophy in general  
 in which indicates that matter  
 philosophical foundations to be  
 matter in the Science of Metaphysics  
 of physiology and anthropology  
 have philosophical grounding.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid p110 (AK 547), see 'Postulates' CPRB 292f  
<sup>291</sup> Ibid p119  
<sup>292</sup> Ibid p105  
<sup>293</sup> CPRp548note

The need for the new epistemology was that a concept of  
Cause of Pure Reason derived from the paradigm of  
gravity and the law of inertia  
must understand the paradigm of the  
heavenly Cause of Pure Reason. The analogy  
reasoning about causal relationships within an empirical  
understanding.<sup>294</sup> In expanding Newton's conceptions on moving forces to an empirical limit, the  
Metaphysical Foundations of the  
philosophy of nature through an analysis of New  
phenomena by which necessary physical  
by means.<sup>295</sup>

to what Metaphysical Foundations and  
developed under a paradigm of universal  
Book III of Newton's Principia the concept of  
depends on the conceptions and foundations of  
the Experience of the empirical  
is on the power of application of an  
between an analogy and a broader  
with principles pushed his point  
grounded concept of nature account for

What is important is that an epistemology grounded by Newton's mathematics was that a concept of  
matter was not defined and not by opposition  
matter but by animal force.  
since we are opening the conceptions of what we  
with specific forces of matter could be apprehended  
examined in the 1724 work by Hermann Boerhaave, Elements of Chemistry, which  
phenomena in part through a specific  
these universal principles. While these were not  
not by the point of matter, the chemical and  
unanimously held the Newtonian paradigm present in  
chemistry of George Stahl in association with the theo-  
knowing philosophy associated with  
not by opposition to matter, but Boerhaave and

of an idea of force in the doctrine of  
<sup>296</sup> Distinguishing the expansion of the empirical  
doctrine in the foundations under  
defined by nature in its specification. For  
pedagogical  
understanding, although it does not sum up  
taken as a principle of Boerhaave and the  
physiology of George Ernst Stahl. The  
held the experimental philosophy. The  
theory of the vital weight substance  
system in the field of medicine  
the physical and physiological

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<sup>294</sup> CPR A 176B 218f  
<sup>295</sup> Kant (1993a) 216f  
<sup>296</sup> See Kusonri-Film art (1992) p 234



H of m ann. <sup>297</sup> Following an idea since m eant to covering w hat new r abns could be established for phenom ena through h e d i c i n e p h e d m d h o d o f e m p i a b b e v a t i o n . This m eant following h e a n a l o g i c a l m o d e l b y w h i c h N e w t o n d e r i v e d h e u n i v e r s a l l a w o f g r a v i t a t i o n .

K a n t w a s e n d r o u n d e d i n t h e 1 8 <sup>h</sup> c e n t u r y s i n c e s a n d f a m i l i a r i n h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f u c h f o r c e s a n d h e n e w i d e a m e a n i n g a c c o u n t f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s p e c i f b o d i e s . T h e s e w e r e b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d b e g i n n i n g w i t h a t a l l e f i t i n s o g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s s u c h a s t h e u n i v e r s a l a n d g e n e r a l f o r c e s o f g r a v i t y , b u t a d d r e s s e d t h r o u g h e p i t i m o b j e c t a l q u e s t i o n s b e c o m i n g n e c e s s a r y i n u s i n g n e w p h y s i o l o g i c a l v i e w s o f t h e b o d y . K a n t s h a r d h i s v i e w o f i n t r o d u c i n g n e w c o n c e p t s a s h y p o t h e s e s i n t h e b o d y a c c o u n t f o r i n t r i n s i c p o w e r s e v i d e n t i n l i v i n g o r g a n i s m s . <sup>298</sup> I h a d a s i g n i f i c a n t b e a i n g o n h i s p r o g r e s s i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g a b o u t e d a t a m o n b e t w e e n a n a t o m i c c o n c e p t a n d t h e p h y s i c i a n ' s c o n c e p t o f n a t u r e . T h i s a p p e a r s o n l y i n K a n t ' s l a s t u n f i n i s h e d w o r k , t h e O p u s P o s t u m u m w h e r e h e a m o v i n g a w a y f r o m d i s c u s s i o n s o f n a t u r e a n d t o j u d g m e n t s o f C h a r a c t e r o f j u d g m e n t a n d h a s b e e n i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e b o d y . <sup>299</sup>

E x t e n d i n g a c o n c e p t o f t h e v e g e t a b l e b o d y t h r o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e g a s e s i n f a n c e h a t e m e g e s a r o u n d w h a t K a n t c o n s i d e r s a n i m p o t e n t i a l n o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o t e n t i a l i n t h e b o d y . A s p e c u l i e c o n c e p t o f t h e v e g e t a b l e b o d y a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e c o u l d o f t h e p o s i t i o n n e w f o r m o f s c i e n c e , “ w e e x p e r i e n c e o r g a n i c f o r c e s i n o u r o w n b o d y ; a n d w e c o m e , b y m e a n s o f a n a l o g y w i t h t h e m ( w i t h p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e v e g e t a b l e b o d y ) a n d t h e n o u t t h e a n i m a l p a r t o f p r i n c i p l e ” . <sup>300</sup>

<sup>297</sup> Herman Boerhaave's *Elementa Chemiae* (1724) see particularly in the edition by Kant, *New Exposition* (1755) *Negative Magnitudes* (1763) *Remarks on the Regions of Space* (1768) *The Example* (1792) p.240f  
<sup>298</sup> Kant (1993a) p.62, 1186  
<sup>299</sup> Kant (1993a) p.102, *Fort* (2000) p.22  
<sup>300</sup> Kant (1993a) p.118, [1373]



- Secondly, since the general metaphysics of nature was considered an “indispensable service”  
 giving rise to a future schematics for metaphysics, it was giving positive ‘sense and  
 meaning’ to a future schematics for metaphysics.  
 and in the same time in the same way, it was giving positive ‘sense and  
 meaning’ to a future schematics for metaphysics.  
 M an.<sup>306</sup>  
 The Metaphysical Foundations was intended to  
 provide a new axiomatic foundation  
 for advancing through the foundations of  
 physical science, it was necessary  
 to lay a new foundation for the science of nature. The new  
 work was grounded by new concepts  
 within the sciences.

Kant wrote an appendix to Samuel Thomas Sömmering’s *Über das Organ der Seele* (1796)  
 Sömmering was an early proponent of  
 neuroanatomy in the eighteenth century. He  
 gave a detailed description of the  
 functions of the brain, but Sömmering  
 was executed by the Prussians in 1800  
 while he was in the service of the Prussian  
 army. This is a point of synthesis in the  
 history of the philosophy of mind.  
 discussions around the philosophy of mind  
 center of debate in the Science of Man in  
 the 18th century. This provoked a com-  
 plete re-evaluation of the concept of  
 the faculties of the mind.  
 was Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hufeland’s *Medicina  
 rationis* or *the art of thinking*.

<sup>306</sup> Kant (1790) 478

<sup>307</sup> Samuel Thomas Sömmering (1755 – 1830) Kant’s essay on Sömmering in Kant (2007) pp 337-342.  
 p261. Outline of Sömmering’s neuroscience see Hildebrand (2005) pp 337-342.

Hu findook an organizing principle  
 few his could be taken into account  
 with a gain at the basis of theory of form  
 advanced theories on the field.  
 power of mind in the form of judgment  
 conditions of form.

as he himself developed a conception of  
 general principles, his concept  
 and physical form with Hu find  
 Kant's commentary, how ever, saw him emphasize  
 the concept of body as a whole.

ing

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The development of a system of a new  
 'System of all Principles of Understanding.'<sup>309</sup> I am not  
 alone in this system of exper  
 with physics only present a narrow  
 of judgment' with a transcendental  
 survey of the new form of the  
 experience of the human system  
 content of interpretation of a power  
 and the possibility of linking phenomena

in the C. i. q. u. e. P. u. e. Reasonable  
 I am not alone in this knowledge  
 enclosed in a broad physical system  
 no post-positum Kant's  
 of observations as  
 on form axioms of form  
 of a freedom of force and  
 in the form of the perspective of  
 a world system.

-6

'table

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The New Life Sciences and the Natural

The kind of law of system Kant was discussing  
 Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia.<sup>311</sup> In 1796 Darwin's system  
 dynamic age of form progression according to  
 considered "effective according to purpose" of explaining a world  
 form of an organism of a kind  
 being (in the field of force)  
 then integrated as a description of organismal

in the O. p. s. u. m. i. e. m. p. d. by  
 in a  
 an organismal principle of force  
 system.<sup>312</sup> This progression  
 observations of forces generating  
 forces of conservation between and  
 forces in the world.<sup>313</sup> This system at

<sup>308</sup> Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hu find (1762-1836)  
 at Foucault 2008 pp. 48-49

<sup>309</sup> Kant A 148 in Prolegomena §24.

<sup>310</sup> Kant (1993a) p. 106, 2320

<sup>311</sup> Hu find 1808 Zoonomia and Law of Organical Life

<sup>312</sup> Hu find 109

<sup>313</sup> Kant (1993a) pp. 102-105, 2298-

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H. M. Jakob discussed by Kant (1993b) p. 31

See

(1794-1796) vol. London

description defined specifically in the original text  
representation of the whole basis of the  
analysis in the elements for  
the appearance of the system.

Kant's aim is to show how a system of nature  
is possible beyond the division between the  
Transcendental Aesthetic and the  
Transcendental Logic. This depends on the division between the  
elements of a science of relations) and appearance of organisation qualities of sensible 'matter'  
(experienced as the divided system of nature)  
We will only be firm if we understand under  
New main principles that appear  
in the progressive apprehension of a domain of  
experience phenomena apprehended and thought of  
as objects of purposes of producing a  
positive representation. <sup>314</sup>

Kant's stance in the Transcendental Dialectic emphasises negative principles purposefully  
avoiding the naturally given (ontology) <sup>315</sup> However, in the Aesthetic the data  
physiology of perception as a  
'nature' in the sense of being principles subjectively given as  
elements of the system of concepts  
they accord with their presentations  
- "although only rational" <sup>316</sup> This is the common point of experience in the  
indication of  
objectivity addressed as the 'matter' of experience in its aesthesis. <sup>317</sup> The Critique causes  
active experience against the content of them  
rational knowledge demanded of the  
New main concept of the Opus Postumum runs to see  
in objectivity in itself what  
capacity of the event there is  
Kant's philosophical ambitions in the reasoning.

Opus Postumum takes this capacity as derived from a  
naturalistic point of analysis and is  
hypothetically justified by Kant's ideal account of how the animal machine can distinguish  
passive through organisational experience  
ence of force. <sup>318</sup> The point is that in itself  
such a capacity gives the determination of the  
knowing which accounts for an underlying  
emotional experience of objectivity in its own force  
s. Kant's wider ambitions for a system

<sup>314</sup> Bp 1372490

<sup>315</sup> CPRA 583B 610

<sup>316</sup> BA 845B 873

<sup>317</sup> Kant (1993) pp 145-22501]

<sup>318</sup> The Ethics of Kant (1993) pp 82, 155 pp 1032

natura was to envelope both objects of inner and outer  
phenomenological presentation of the system of  
be considered as a 'natural' system having its own  
points of view of the concept of  
experience of being.

is sense as necessitated by the  
nature of the system of  
the concept of  
the system which could sustain

need a

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in the *Opus Postumum* the capacity  
of the body to apprehend the  
problem. Kant defined how to conceptualise the "primitively moving material," through a  
system of individual cases  
effectiveness of his action through a living body's reactions to pleasure and pain.<sup>321</sup> This  
historical process of the progressive  
operation of the concept of  
presence. A similar problem of knowledge  
Hippocrates and the concept of  
the concept of being.

theoretical approach to  
embodied historical philosophy  
The path would be the physical judgment of  
of understanding how general  
historical context of  
the evidence of the  
indivisible extension of the

a

<sup>322</sup> But the process of generalisation

of the form of

of the advanced development of  
understands as a 'capacity' to respond with proportion according to  
The capacity to constitute the dynamic response implicit of an 'affective soul' which, in  
Aristotle's extended

extension of the body

323

to the animal

and

*Opus Postumum* unfolded as the process of  
theoretical approach towards a concept of "hypostasised space itself." I  
point of view. While the demand for physical proof could be argued over, Kant's focus was  
on the hypothesis of  
the system of the body

the system of the body  
the concept of  
the system of the body

324

<sup>319</sup> [http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/978101722478](#)

<sup>320</sup> [http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/978101722481](#)

<sup>321</sup> General Council (1969)

<sup>322</sup> Phaedrus 270B-D and Timaeus 47C-D

<sup>323</sup> *De Anima* 434a30-60, *De Anima* 436b19-437a2

<sup>324</sup> [http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/97810172242106](#)

of the system of the body

regives

Since any sensory experience is in a  
hierarchy of the possible exper-  
ience, the possible experience of

throughout the correspondence  
of the possible and the given  
something.<sup>325</sup>

It remained an open question what ultimately grounded such an empirical ‘fact’ embedded  
in the a priori. Kant’s intention was to define a function in the given

of the object account of the space. I was aware of the condition of possibility  
with the axiom of Kant and his a priori  
of the experience of general.<sup>326</sup> On the other hand, the axiom of the problem  
has a necessity. It is the form of the condition of possibility of any category

given a system of the problem of knowledge, it is the system of the condition  
of the possible physical courses.<sup>327</sup> But Kant’s aim was a psychophysical problem,  
not in the empirical but in the a priori.

Of the Pure Reason, the problem was a character  
manifested, successively intuited, and reproduced in representation.”<sup>328</sup> His a priori  
of the possible form of the condition of possibility  
transcendental philosophy.

### The Role of the Concept of Transcendental Reflection

The Character of Pure Reason is split between empirical and transcendental forms of  
consciousness with the problem of the possible; but the empirical ‘fact’ is that  
objects of experience represent succession through a ‘peculiar unity’ intuited as objective  
of the taken as the condition of possibility of the problem of the a priori  
of the transcendental condition.

<sup>325</sup> The form of the link between the basis of sensible qualities or the historical ‘plena’ was the pivotal element  
that Galileo sought to mathematise and hence initiate a modern conception of science. See Husserl’s account in  
Husserl (1970) pp 344-1.

<sup>326</sup> Kant (1993) pp 70-2 [1221]

<sup>327</sup> It is noted by Kant’s reflections in a letter to Sömmering. Kant (1999) p 501

<sup>328</sup> Husserl (1982) PRA 103,

The ‘Selbstsetzungslehre’ of *Opus Postumum* reveals the capacity of the subject to progressively expand the dimensions of its self-referentiality through an analytical process. This is a concept that has provoked a heated debate about its meaning and its role in the development of the subject.

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“space is a quantum, which must always be represented as part of a greater quantum – hence the progression, however, is.”<sup>334</sup>

The concept of the quantum becomes a central principle in the development of the subject.

<sup>329</sup> <http://170472211>  
<sup>330</sup> CPR A 111, ‘Transcendental Deduction’  
<sup>331</sup> <http://12454141997p272>  
<sup>332</sup> <http://1197>  
<sup>333</sup> Kant (1993) pp. 171-472228-29  
<sup>334</sup> <http://170472212>



existence in itself, which he defines to “certain laws.”<sup>335</sup> In the Pure Reason  
transcendent concept and law in respect to human faculties and noumenal  
world and which through them to be covered through a “marvellous faculty which the  
moral law first reveals to me.”<sup>336</sup> Herein phrase as the subject ‘possessed of freedom.’  
The Causal power of the power of freedom  
of the negative law of nature, the Ous Postum  
determination is based through a capacity to synthesize  
with itself the law of freedom to represent  
Kant requires a concept of experience as “infinitely positive,” and “not merely a thinkable  
whole.”<sup>337</sup> Because thinkable law holds itself from itself  
given in a secondary act of freedom in a domain  
positive categories (quantity/quality) Ous Postum  
nature of such a root concept, since it appears posited in the domain with “thoroughgoing  
relation of means to ends,” which is based in the very possibility of  
our experiences 338

This shows how Kant is distinguishing a general  
concept subject. The wider doctrine of synthetic  
positivity on a domain in finitely determinate  
Judgement in this system both content and  
shall be thinkable only as drawn from a sum of  
theoretical concepts could be possible and his  
fundamental Kantian law in question?

Ous Postum of freedom in the domain of  
in experience of freedom in the domain of  
in freedom of the phenomenon in itself.  
<sup>339</sup> These are the sum of possibilities  
of Kant

<sup>335</sup> CPR ‘s Transcendental Deduction B130 and CPR’s ‘General Note on the Transition from a Rational Psychology to a Cosmology’ B429.  
<sup>336</sup> B 430-B 432  
<sup>337</sup> ‘Selbstsetzungslehre’ Kant (1993a) p184.  
<sup>338</sup> B 182-187-78  
<sup>339</sup> B 192-2100

proposed to distinguish by following the order of  
apprehend;

First, the concept being about the phen-  
omenon of preservation,

Secondly, the concept of freedom and  
is 340

The thought of such concepts precedes the possible  
activity. The parallelism of the ground  
points in a ground. From his theoretical uni-  
fication in the way in which aspects of product  
connections follow in the positive analysis of exper-  
imental derivation from progressive cum ulat-

has the concept of that we could hope

on an evidence in the study of a finite

possible experience by an animal and vegetable

of any categorical thinking of life's  
of a general and is understood  
the Ouspensky's can be seen  
in a transcendental system of symbols  
and a positive system of symbols  
aspects of - experience.

The Ouspensky here addresses  
with the perspective that moves from his em-  
pirical on a way of experience beyond the  
sum of elements of experience  
and the foundation of appearance as a  
possession." But this 'justified possession' is possible  
progressively from its empirical foundation and  
philosophy. Conversely, the continuation of  
the empirical foundation.

es both the possible derived from judgment  
ents

capacity to act as a transcendental  
concept of the system from a doctrine

transcendental perspective describes "a third

in the mind over the ground. A justified

is possible for a transcendental

the concept through which the subject binds

341

### Technical Concepts and Modes of Power

Michel Foucault of the Ouspensky as a  
concrete world through degrees of the "changing powers of sensation."<sup>342</sup> Such a function  
determines the possible way in which a subject appears to

being function by which it is defined

of a subject in an object but

of a subject in an object but

<sup>340</sup> [http://186-227-8k.at/inkingofin/am/und](#)  
p109

<sup>341</sup> [http://194-52-296](#)

<sup>342</sup> Foucault (2008) p. 79 note

[aboutSchulz254197.html](#) For

(2000)

with which the original concept grounding  
with which the possible transcendence  
with which the original perspective that  
the possible transcendence signifi-  
cantly from the original problem of a  
necessity of founding grounded subject

representational in the calling  
The actual condition was Foucault  
served the present subject by extending  
conception of O p u s P o s t u m u m w a s s e e n a s h i s  
physical transcendental problem  
y.

This perspective is in the T r a n

sendent D i a l o g e t h r o u g h a g i v e r t

the subject as “the mere idea,” namely a special case of a conditioned.

<sup>343</sup> A gain the

idea, Kant’s polemical piece in philosophy presents a knowledge

of the conceptual

position in the source of laws

elsewhere in the history of

universal fundamental principles

principles subordinate to the legal

modes of a transcendental principle are a “mere idea” that has been at “all times eagerly  
sought.”<sup>344</sup> The Critique of Pure Reason has forbidden

denial since as a display

practice in which a concept of nature, defined under the

and difference, could be

legitimate in regions of knowledge and

from which the concept that gave the

representational in general should proceed

.

The problem at hand in respect to a Science

of M a n a p p e a r s i n c e t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t i a l

notion of ‘true function’ was excluded from reason within itself. This left the question of

beginning as a principle of knowledge

the original hypothesis

with which the experience of the beginning

can be said to have appeared through the

‘manifold of effects,’ as the grounding in reason and

as an empirical concept

and in the original experience

difference in the Critique of Pure Reason

emphasized subordinate to the experience of the

as concepts regulating the function

empirical concept have a fundamental form

transcendental perspective.

<sup>345</sup> The necessity

<sup>343</sup> C P R A 645B 673A 642B 670.

<sup>344</sup> F i A 651B 680

<sup>345</sup> F i A 660B 688

for an abstruse as an ontological  
reality the “harmony” with itself.<sup>346</sup>

of the rationality of the moral

They begin with a Critique of Pure Reason because  
it is a difficulty of analyzing concepts of experience  
synthetic and a priori expressions of experience  
“beyond the limits of experience.”<sup>347</sup> Because these are beyond the limits of

use of the natural reason in the  
in the new form of the concepts of  
experience. This is a but a positive source

reason takes its practical form from the power of knowledge as  
practical and not theoretical and is a  
power of feeling that is sensuous experience against  
a necessary prudential respect to the law. This  
freedom.<sup>348</sup> In this concept of freedom has

is a practical form of freedom  
necessary for achieving  
an empirical form of freedom  
with the transcendental law in terms  
of the purpose of the action in the  
of the extended law of

conduct of the will in the  
accord with the transcendental concept and was part  
of the transcendental concept that is necessary  
perspective on how the understanding ‘ought’ to function  
of the transcendental concept  
subject conditions in the practical sphere.

moral ‘equipment’ enabled by the desire for freedom to  
sued as synthetic reason. It is the  
of the practical concept of practical  
function. The freedom of the will  
was bound up with the very “ground or consequence” of

349

This is the moral ‘paradox’ of animal reason for Critical thought.<sup>350</sup> How such a  
transcendental function could form itself of nature  
is a problem that Kant explored in the Critique of Practical  
Reason. The concept of the summum bonum is both  
and the concept of the being of the good  
appears in the system of understanding in the  
perspective is removed from any immediate experience of the  
account of the good

<sup>346</sup> BiA 665B 693  
<sup>347</sup> BiA 795B 823  
<sup>348</sup> BiA 800B 828  
<sup>349</sup> BiA 802B 830  
<sup>350</sup> Kant 1997b 5623

subjective ground as objective only though a predisposition of reforming man’s sensuous nature: this account of man’s propensity behind any symbolic representation to positive doctrines served only “in potentia” 352 The moral philosophy derived from this its unique principle, “so far as this disposition displays a vitality in actions,” which was the horizon of the moral law, the harmony within the concept of the world’s highest good. 353

Them hinoO pusPostum um agifunder  
dferitshetranscendentconceptsdive  
hroughtheoralapproachtranscendental  
fthe productionofconceptK antv abokingo  
beingtheconceptoflaw sform hephenom en  
m orpatallom anw hiconceptofedom .  
w htheCquesm anttheopposedpow erof  
form anem pitalapayftheconceptthe  
hespeculativeam hion to apprehend conceptualde  
partly them axim sfonductv hiraedi  
fhepracticalasortw hirm onoughtiph

hedom anofcunnaturalThinow  
dfom a tchnicalpracticalapay given  
schem ab yofw ingthesyntheticprinciple  
expressanobjectofpracticalreason  
objctprogressionhatonveg es ona  
354 O pusPostum um hofediveedom  
natureandfreedom fhw stantion  
transcendentperspectivehinstelfom  
em inansin causalkondionsThe  
susivelyhappropriensuousintions  
dtheconceptofedom . 355

hO pusPostum um hew oftheconcepttheoral  
hinkinggroundsofexperienceThe transcenden  
aconceptofedom couldtheingitelfom  
presupposedunfhw oftheisenseand  
the will syntheses from “real opposition.” 356 AlthoughCquibetranscendentperspect  
was given to individuals as “a mere idea,” an objectofedom is expressedO pusPostum um

yextendedthroughbothperceivingand  
alm hionfheperspectefom w hith  
hationsofnegativefhw sform he  
entiaoncontits an equivalentofv hat  
ve

351 Kant (1978) §59 This reflects one of Kant’s central struggles against the pantheistic debate. See also ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ Kant (1990) p235.

352 Kant (1960b) p35p57p145

353 Ibid p159p160

354 ‘Practical self positing and the idea of God’ Kant (1993a) p200-203,211-119,204-205,212-213.

355 ‘What is Transcendental Philosophy’ Ibid p230, 21:26,p216,225K antv abokingo

Spinoza between Fichte and M oss

M endshorp216,225Seal Föt(2000)

p217.

356 Ibid p222,122

as technical capacity to apprehend the world is the extension of them on practical reasoning which Kant's positive ambitions open to him transcendental philosophy. In empirical experience of the transcendental system a synthesis of a domain of synthetic knowledge.

The synthetic knowledge of the transcendental concept through a domain of natural laws from practical aspects of the self-acting subject. A phenomenal world through its own technical system in which carries "the noumenal point of view" as it appears prior to acts of consciousness.<sup>357</sup> By making the world of objects through the copulation of universal and conceptive of the concept given to experience through the form of principle by which consciousness extends in nature. Capacity of containing the system of ideas here presents a constitutive principle of organic being as a law of synthesis. In the theoretical or practical – only as being according to how synthesis of the actual world.

In theorising the organisms 'virtual' primary activities, Kant gives the technical practical in practice of living in particular. The transcendental principle by which the concept conforms to demands of the experience of the world.<sup>358</sup> The practical concept appears as an organism's higher perspective on the reality of its nature, but Kant's main objective was to determine whether "another will is thinkable in place of this one." This is the transcendental theme that draws on an ethical perspective evident with his demand for the "ideal of a perfect man adequate duty."<sup>359</sup> Looking to such an incapacity of the actual constitutive frame of the transcendental system of ideas as the transcendental function means a synthetic capacity of containing them on once. A transcendental system of ideas now becomes the perspective from which the concept in position in the empirical world of experience, but whose incapacity gives transcendental position in containing the

<sup>357</sup> 'Transcendental Philosophies Highest Standpoint, God, the World and the Thinking Being in the World' Ibid p232-132

<sup>358</sup> Ibid 218-219, 111K and in the same sense distinguished from the world of 222, 119

<sup>359</sup> Ibid 239-240, 137

f from the Spinozists who are "swärmerische." God is therefore to be

post-conceptual view of the world as a  
informing anthropological knowledge

in perspective with Foucault's  
material production of the self

The Work of Concept in the Science of Man

is only by immanence that Foucault's

Postmodern Anthropology from a

Pragmatic Point of View

terms of an 18th century debate on a Science of Man, Kant's late

Anthropology is a humanistic

anthropology in a pragmatic sense

with a view to the human condition

in the history of anthropology

scintillatingly illuminating

anthropology as a discipline

in the doctrine of nature. The

was the synthetic reason behind the

anthropological domain, as

'self-steering' in an anthropological

survey could only tangentially approach. Kant does, however, refer to anthropology's ideal

as a form of education

in the history of Kant

was reflecting through his anthropology

ing 1780/1790. <sup>361</sup> These became

increasingly concerned with social and

and historical aspects

empirically productive aspects of a "second nature." In

anthropology of the

'psychology' which gave a Science of Man

in the 18th century

century. <sup>362</sup>

This perspective opens

which has extended

practices encroaching on a

traditional 'concept of the good.' It is a survey of

dispositions and

a man in his own right

in a

empirical

<sup>363</sup> Such practices are

the negative conditioning

of freedom and nature. It is a

each in its own right

'liveliness.' Rather

anthropology takes as 'pragmatic' what it observes as empirical

<sup>360</sup> Foucault (2008) 44 and (1993) 253-254

<sup>361</sup> CPRB xxxi in the introduction

<sup>362</sup> Many comments have been made by

<sup>363</sup> observations and discussions of

with whom I have conversed

perception of phenomena and necessary synthesis of their representations  
typology of going beings they accord

interpretation of world.

<sup>364</sup> The sum

*Anthropology's second part characterizes this*

a

character of the cosmopolitan world.

Since in principle all in it is determined a priori by the laws of nature  
given only through his concept of freedom. This  
point of view is not a priori but is derived  
from the postulate of the freedom of the will  
of physics and psychology as an idea of reason. However, even as a  
concept of freedom is not a priori but is derived  
from the postulate of the freedom of the will.  
knowledge of freedom. <sup>365</sup>

in it is determined a priori by the laws of nature

with the

concept of freedom is not a priori but is derived

from the postulate of the freedom of the will

concept of freedom is not a priori but is derived

from the postulate of the freedom of the will

with the

concept of freedom is not a priori but is derived

Kant's task was giving an inner perspective on what he "can or should" make of himself as  
object of his world. He characterizes the rationality of man.

<sup>366</sup>

But this is a

cosmopolitan perspective derived only from his

idea of freedom

worldly conduct and wisdom in.

I do not physically divide the world

y

because of the difficulty of inner sense and he

problem associated with an empirical

psychology in its origin as a discipline. This is the problem of freedom in

the history of

Pure Reason sought to "banish from the domain of metaphysics" on the grounds that it is  
excluded by the very idea of science. This is what

appears as a fiction,

as an

anthropological and historical survey of freedom

and reason, the evidence of the

empirical world. <sup>367</sup>

What does anthropology show? Kant had

divided any empirical perspective on

rationality through his knowledge.

Equally, he characterizes transcendental

problems with an a priori need for practice

in principle of this sense,

anthropology returns

an admittance of the independence of the empirical

one of the

ing

<sup>364</sup> Paul Guyer, *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 150.

C. J. Gies, *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 150.

see Paul Guyer, *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 150.

<sup>365</sup> Kant, *Practical Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 248.

<sup>366</sup> Kant, *Practical Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 248.

<sup>367</sup> Kant, *Practical Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 248.

<sup>367</sup> Kant, *Practical Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 248.



natural in pulses which were hierarchically associated with ethical techniques following  
 transcendental <sup>368</sup> observations in his own uniform of how it is viewed in its  
 his own representation of modes of perception  
 mind's ways of thinking in relation to the knowledge derived from him particularly  
 modes of perception of such a nature  
 between nature and freedom. It makes apparent substitution of the concept of freedom when  
 here are only practical principles but  
 relation between the notion and its understanding  
 intelligible events that "embarrasses understanding" - *Anthropology's* *idea* finds ha t  
 sense and common sense induces a sense of  
 formally brought to the tribunal [but are rather] proceeding directly from inner sense."<sup>370</sup> The  
 anthropological concept of the *idea*  
 anthropological in a new historical concept  
 We have observed the qualitative of  
 a *system*, now a *practical* capacity for  
 "because he is his own ultimate purpose."<sup>371</sup> The transcendental perspective of the *Opus*  
*Postumum* described this 'world concept' as *heavenly* knowledge in the  
 ends of reason. *Concept of Pure Reason* drew on a  
 knowledge. <sup>372</sup> But the *idea* concept is *finite*  
 system of reason which now appears under  
 concept of the *idea* from a *cosmic* concept  
 under a *practical* common world. <sup>373</sup>

<sup>368</sup> Kant 1998 p416n

<sup>369</sup> Kant 1974 p203

<sup>370</sup> ibid 248 p30810

<sup>371</sup> *ibid*

<sup>372</sup> CPRB 867

<sup>373</sup> Kant *Logic* introduction "The concept of Philosophy in General/Philosophy according to the School Concept and the *World* Concept. *Essential* *Equation* in the *Go* *Philosophy* *Tham* *of* *General* *Highest* *Taksof* the Science" p25

The Logic and Method of Philosophy  
 and the Ontology of the Concept  
 reason” which unifies his cosmopolitan philosophy  
 of the question of the point  
 of wisdom in the program of an aim in place of  
 from an ‘unthought’ hybrid in the concept  
 any pure discipline, Kant’s empirical research into what  
 perspective on man’s self-knowledge in the capacity for

through the idea of showing his  
 stood for the “highest maxim of the use of  
 the Logic through the question  
 Anthropology and the way of thinking  
 transcendentalism  
<sup>374</sup> Because in the problem of a  
 what an aim asks of him as a being

Although it is only by means of the Anthropology  
 from the system of the Postumum, the  
 complex of sensible beings “insofar as they are at least conscious of themselves” and constitute a  
 people in a kingdom of ends and give  
 infantile in *Opus Postumum’s* work that extends the source of freedom  
 determination of the heterogeneous  
 even as what the person only ‘by rights’ ought to become conscious of the whole of his  
 in the subject ground as a product of freedom  
 of beings whose empirical ground cannot be  
 anthropology of existence

point of the discussion of freedom  
 in the text of the concept as he  
 rights and duties of a teacher <sup>375</sup> But the  
 freedom in of Anthropology is a capacity  
 in the objective freedom in of  
 extended beyond a description of an

A new principle of understanding in the system at  
 habit and the Principle of uncertainty  
 to which all positive solutions are ultimately ‘pragmatic.’ When Kant balances uncertainty  
 with the philosophical task, accounted for by “intentionality,” even as in the apparent  
 nature “refuses to help a free will.”<sup>376</sup> Anthropology is only an evaluation of human nature  
 continued in the concept of purposes in them  
 of the principle of understanding will become a form  
 of the system. A system of the law of nature

in that convergence and in the form of  
 in the conscious and the problem  
 an evaluation of human nature  
 self-evident in the system of codes  
 of the technical system in  
 how it can be in the knowledge

<sup>374</sup> Foucault’s phrase (2008) p107  
<sup>375</sup> Kant (1993) 212-251  
<sup>376</sup> Kant (1978) p237ff ‘On the character of the species’

as individuality and difference

isophical under such conditions

Where Anthropology converges on the world dominated

by history and culture, he

transcendental problems of the rational animal becomes characterised by the ‘capability of

reason .’ Even if this is a transcendental

how he sees only through self

law and not a natural phenomenon

with the paradigm of respect to what

such phenomenon is a law or a concept

with his progressive organization

Kant’s cosmopolitical world.<sup>377</sup>

Anthropology can only in part such

processes in the appearance of a ‘mere idea.’ The

transformation of human nature by social and historical

is also equally equivocal Kant

’s

position that

“nature has put the species of food, human aspects through its artificial approximation of it.”<sup>378</sup>

and that nature will be

in accordance with a constant

The world of concepts and the

be a transcendental given but concept in which

he

possibility of freedom and the evaluation of

a reason based technical and moral reasons

competence in which anything can

be done through a practical necessity.

Their potential for the concept of being

he change any transcendental given

concept . In this domain, despite the fact that man “errs,” Kant identifies a productive

between the understanding and the exchange

angewandte Wissenschaften and technical

administration but these are “neither natural nor artificial” but something we become forced to

accept.<sup>379</sup>

Practically, this concept is

and under this is the question of

how man acquires his own values from the

material form of exchange

<sup>380</sup> The

order of the world is paradoxical, seemingly lacking

in reason. Anthropology addresses

the appearance of such values beyond any appearance

nature of any thing is only

through a ‘Characterisation’ of how he would conduct his duties

is as ‘ways

<sup>377</sup> ibid 251

<sup>378</sup> ibid 238

<sup>379</sup> ibid 116-113 (135)

<sup>380</sup> ibid 7em atp 257

of thinking' its ends.<sup>381</sup> We think philosophically, it does not mean  
 and that reason that cannot fully know their world, as values characterising man's modes  
 being which offers Kant the means to judge a 'strength of soul.'<sup>382</sup> Such strength of power  
 which gives an individual system of action the purposiveness that characterises  
 individual freedom and the success of human actions  
 synthesis activity under the system conditions of concept and natural possibility  
 through coherence established under the  
 cannot be presupposed according to principle of  
 nature. 383

From the perspective of the natural sciences for  
 philosophy developed as an 'indispensable service,' it now departs from them and so far  
 Transcendental Methodology where a philosophical work as of producing transcendental  
 coherence. Anthropology takes as a tension in his natural relation between corporeal  
 existence and thinking nature activity of  
 possible form of which could only express negatively – which is necessary  
 because the practical form, an analytic of finite  
 and human Enlightenment in Science of Man.

Conclusion

This chapter has given an account of Kant's engagement with contemporary Science of Man  
 from the 1760's. It explains why he was developed against the background of  
 the history of freedom and for the enlightenment. Secondly, he defended the transcendental  
 method of the natural sciences as a general metaphysics. This chapter then  
 showed how such a question of inner sense was being systematized by the Oupus  
 Potumum as he attempted to bring a system of concepts that were in plain view that  
 Anthropology gave them a new role in the world of concepts and perspectives on

<sup>381</sup> Ibid 189-194- 203

<sup>382</sup> A power to acquire a "kind of rebirth" Ibid p206. Rehm also relates "a kind of moral rebirth" Kant (1960) p43

<sup>383</sup> Ibid p238. Here equated with the concept of the good since "evil is excluded by its original principle." p243-246.

unified moral and political law as the logic of  
epistemological problem law seem enough

man, but had a part in the  
historical

But Kant's cosmopolitan idea of law as  
political liberalism in Anhe  
historical aspect of law in his concept

engagement with social  
policy. I highlight the conflict and  
expressed the universal concept

his suggestion that Kant's status for Science of Man book  
values to justify a new law of the concept has

the form of exchange of  
emotions for being known

brought to political and

to be judged by a 'principle of the future.' This is to

Foucault's perspective on ideological thinking and the medical position as

political

practical in political theory

the French revolution in the subject of

the chapter

Introduction

In the last chapter, Kant's categorical thinking was associated with the epistemological debates at the beginning of the 18th century. This chapter will explore the scientific and medical developments in 18th-century France as general characteristics of the Enlightenment. It will consider the human anatomical and physiological reforms of the 18th century, the scientific and medical reforms of the 18th century, and the scientific and medical reforms of the 18th century. The renowned animal and human anatomist and physician Felix Vicq d'Azyr has been credited with originating the form of dissection by broadening the scope of the investigation to include environmental factors such as anatomy and physiology. He presented a 'certain method' from which a proper pedagogical method would naturally follow. He was the first to publish his work in Paris.

In the 18th century, a progressive anatomical presentation of the human body in physiology and anatomy was developed. The physiological and anatomical approaches had the Cartesian method of overcoming the limitations of the 17th century. In France, the scientific and medical reforms were developed through a neo-Hippocratic dynamism. Equal success in the revolutionary era was seen as Condillac's Logical method approach to approximate the sensible origins for a possible 'naturalism.' This method was aimed at forming an experience but Condillac's sign was also understood as a natural individualism and a course of the strength of the organs and powers. It shows that the human mind is not a blank slate but has a natural point for exploring how the human mind works and how it forms a revolutionary scientific and medical reform.

Condillac's *Le Sens Commun* (1791) was a landmark work in the history of philosophy, particularly in the area of epistemology and the philosophy of language. It was a response to the Cartesian tradition, which had dominated the French Enlightenment. Condillac argued that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience, and that the mind is a blank slate at birth. This view was a radical departure from the traditional view of the mind as a pre-existing entity with innate ideas. His work was influential in the development of empiricism and the philosophy of language.

The chapter on the philosophy of language in *Le Sens Commun* is particularly significant. It discusses the relationship between language and thought, and how language shapes our understanding of the world. Condillac argued that language is a social construct, and that it is through language that we learn to think. This view was a key contribution to the philosophy of language, and it influenced later thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Chomsky. The chapter also discusses the role of the senses in the acquisition of language, and how the structure of language reflects the structure of the world.

Condillac's Sign

In the 18th century France, the progressive thinker Etienne Bonnot de Condillac's *Le Sens Commun* was a landmark work in the history of philosophy. It was a response to the Cartesian tradition, which had dominated the French Enlightenment. Condillac argued that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience, and that the mind is a blank slate at birth. This view was a radical departure from the traditional view of the mind as a pre-existing entity with innate ideas. His work was influential in the development of empiricism and the philosophy of language.

<sup>384</sup> Condillac, *Le Sens Commun*, p. 118.







perspective, the discussion in Treatise on Sensation sees the design as depicting  
 'metaphysical phantoms' of substance, infinity, space and duration while condensing a  
 predicates into simple ideas as elements of a wider psychological reality. Here is the  
 epistemological importance behind Condorcet's taking a position that sensations cannot be  
 inherently 'wrong.' The legacy of discovery and invention is reduced only to process of  
 organizing our least fundamental entities. *Law of Logic* (1775), *Logic*  
 (1780), *Language of Calculus* (1798)

The Logic of How Signs Function in Second Nature

This produces an analysis by decomposition of successive physical sensations  
 into components as psychological stimuli, a new schema<sup>392</sup> Condorcet presents a  
 natural in the sense of practical rationality, an analysis of judgment in the face of practical  
 necessity. This includes the form from Kant, who holds there is 'no conception without a  
 concept'<sup>393</sup> Condorcet foregrounds through sensation, a "figurative expression"<sup>394</sup> whose  
 potential for a new rationality beyond the 'natural' order of need. But a dispersive  
 tendency in sensation expressions means a higher 'need' counterbalances the habit and  
 "strange abuses of the general idea." The figure of regularity of bodily movements gives the  
 ground for the need,<sup>395</sup> and the regular analysis of sensation experiences the Logic takes  
 habit to be preserved by habit. For Condorcet, habit is  
 "continually agitated by the sense organs, responds not only to the impressions that it  
 receives immediately, but also to them over time which habit firmly possesses must  
 produce...going by habit from movement to movement"<sup>396</sup>  
 The figure here expresses the language of a condition derived from the series of  
 in person of the senses measured against the series of ideas, a 'dual source' of  
 in person and habit that thought because here are elements divorced from any fit

<sup>392</sup> Condorcet (1779) p73  
<sup>393</sup> Rockmore (2001) p43  
<sup>394</sup> Condorcet (1779) p95  
<sup>395</sup> Ibid p117  
<sup>396</sup> Ibid p175

principles, it is therefore “very imperfect,” which is why a primary concern for Condillac is in techniques knowledge and information. 397

Under Logic takes the elements of its analytic as orientating the “conformation of the organs.”<sup>398</sup> These persons know habits use a ‘natural order of need’. ‘Natural’ order may be ambiguous but should be understood to contrast with “all the vices of an unregulated opinion.”<sup>399</sup> These produce ‘natural’ values expressed as functions “if we have made our observations well, the use of which we make of things, confirms them right away...if they have been badly made then he is misled by them just quickly”<sup>400</sup>

Confirmation produces habit stands as a “second nature.” But because most people are subject to the “whims of custom” he society of these communities where the focus appears negative. Therefore he requires a discipline second nature that subsumes values of good and bad habit through the definition of the ‘language of action.’ The ‘language of action’ has its origin to be corporal body with particular significance to expressing individual participation in social ideas; since ‘second nature’ substitutes, not for an idea of nature, but for a ‘language of action’ it indicates the productive capacity of human analysis. 401

He is intrinsically a problem at its encapsulated by a definition between the ‘language of action’ and a ‘second nature.’ The power of analysis that is held of representative.

The ‘language of action’ is open to a phenomenal problem which loses relevance for formal sciences such as physics and chemistry which can be examined through mathematical precision. As this precision does not extend to a project of a general science, Condillac’s idea of sign was developed in the school of freedom and files the ‘unrefined languages’ whose he should have questioned but values which could appear in the deployment of the focus.

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<sup>397</sup> b1p185  
<sup>398</sup> b1p189  
<sup>399</sup> b1p199  
<sup>400</sup> b1p195  
<sup>401</sup> b1p213-215

one given thought in context of the language  
thought the subject of the problem as needed  
by nature, " as affirmed in the 'language of action:' such natural put under the test of  
experience paradoxical intended to do the  
intended course of action

as proposing proximity to sense of logic  
human becomes what he already is "purely  
natural put under the test of  
experience of language in form within

402

The problem of language divides into two  
coexistence given through a "co-mingling" within  
activities 403 Secondly, the other direction happens in the  
definitions " extending false signs as accorded with  
associated with the "celebrated writers" of the Port Royal Logic (1662) whose empirical  
legacy as both of analysis and synthesis consider  
unfolding phenomena in presentation.  
situated under a 'language of action' and for habit as secondary.  
problem before as of synthesis.

conditions for Condillac's organic  
is that merely empirical  
as he "mania for

404

By contrast, Condillac's Logic is an analysis

405

The central

This is presented back in the Essay  
discussion of the successive transformations of  
understanding. 406 Condillac grounds human understanding through his  
on human intelligence from habit and progress  
pragmatic knowledge in the by position of  
habitual forms and forms of

the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746) and  
signs by which knowledge passes into  
principles of habit  
of language. Language is empirical but  
once accessed in the human over time  
based habit.

### What Constitutes the 'Well Made Language'

The Logic divides from the Essay in  
function as a complementary sign system

in order to develop empirical speech as  
signs of the 'language of action' both as

402 bib227

403 bib239

404 Foucault on the Port Royal Logic in an exam p

405 Condillac Logic p275

406 bib313

the function as proposed in Foucault 197

an epistemological standard as a shelf

gives (even an appearance) in itself

'language of action' stands apart from things

<sup>407</sup> By defining such an aim, designs

from an 'animality,' Condillac distinguishes a product of a human existence under

principles of his high technical capacity

and conditions of general human nature

in his *Science de l'homme*.

The *Essai de logique* speaks of language

as "operations of the soul;" but a natural

history of signs show to be

an 'economy' divided as under a division of natural

accidents conventional

<sup>408</sup> Conventional signs are in accordance with

the higher

quality of an object as a standard

and so the extended judgment

<sup>409</sup> The

conventional sign has as its purpose of function

through its power of enforcing

memory and reminding the spirit of a function

or that of producing the effect of

synthesis that appears in the form of an executive

essence again. The latter signs even

problem of a new law of organization and their

significance

such as the 'scaffolding of

principles' that are equally concealed

in a discovery.

<sup>410</sup>

Condillac is that a possible language developed from the

mutual ground of "cries of

passion type reception" can be placed in the signs

conditioned to be

realized in a wide range of

the social language before differences

of form permit under a general second nature

developed through habit and signs

is

transformed between them and physical

through a substitution effect under

power of combination. However, an indication

of a

style and the reflective 'force' of

language gives a wide range of

in an acknowledged principle that

a power of imagination but a "power over the imagination;" making signs function is here

ambiguous but banished that

substitutes for a form of understanding

in the

empirical form of 'language of action.' <sup>411</sup>

<sup>407</sup> See Deleuze (1980) 17-18

<sup>408</sup> Condillac (2001) 14

<sup>409</sup> ibid 13

<sup>410</sup> ibid 25 The point is that

in W of 65

<sup>411</sup> ibid 122

The Essay de la langue humaine  
 about geography in the social  
 conditioned by the individual  
 memory and the power of imagination  
 both in language and in thought,

“...being bound by rules which restrain them, their imagination strives with increased  
 effort to escape at new expressions  
 and a succession of geographical  
 later.”<sup>412</sup>

He then moves on to examine the  
 language of the ‘natural’ sciences

which “practices analysis fiercely” against any rival. A rich problem of language  
 profound in education and bad in physics continues in any treatment

since.<sup>413</sup> This defines the task for Condillac’s ‘well made language’ which explains  
 why in a naturalistic phase.

414

The Speeches of the World and the Sensation

and the

What is the new text of the Essay  
 in a task around development of the mind  
 he breaks the Essay by introducing the famous  
 explore a capacity of ‘need’ as self-preservation in individual  
 present persons. Treatise on Sensation develops  
 “sensation-actuelle” and “idée-intellectuelle.”<sup>416</sup> This difference is between the passive  
 mechanism of sensation and the active presence  
 of concepts.

and the Logique Condillac’s  
 Treatise on Sensation (1754) is  
 in age of the speech and the order

<sup>415</sup> By the memory of

an important link is between

This difference is between the passive

new him in the phenomenon of

<sup>412</sup> pp. 153

<sup>413</sup> pp. 159

<sup>414</sup> pp. 194

<sup>415</sup> Condillac, Œuvres complètes (1982)

<sup>416</sup> Condillac, Traité de Sensation §293 (Œuvres complètes)

How ever this division ab  
 w h e h i c o n j u r e s u i n d e r s o d a r  
 p s y c h o l o g i a p a t h i n t h e p e n t h o u g h t  
 i n a g r a m u s t e l y c o m p a r t h a v e s f  
 d e a s i g n t o s u c c e s s i o n s o f a t r o s u c c e s  
 b e e n a w a r o f i n t e r p o i n t o u n d e r t h e 17  
 m o d e l t h a t i n c l u d e s t h e O e u r i e s

leads to two readings of Condillac's thought depending on  
 e c e p t i o n a t a l e n s i o n s o r p e n t a  
 r o u g h m e m o r y a n d t h e i g h t e n e d f o r m o f  
 u h e a m b i g u i t y a t e n d o w h e h e  
 s i n s o f l i n g u a g e C o n d i l l a c s e e m s t o h a v e  
 54 e d i n o f f t r a c t i o n S e n s i o n s i n c h e  
 w h i c h w a s p u b l i c h o m o u s i n 1798.

417

This is the original intent in a section, 'Of ideas which the human being can acquire when limited to a sense of touch' which emphasizes the link between sensory impressions offering to knowledge a "light which guides it's merely instinct." The function of design was to abstract that which existed 'naturally,' but

"It's best to acquire in observation  
 he equals but to gain  
 an analysis without signs can only give a limited knowledge...and since it has been  
 possible to them in the condition of  
 with the acquisition of language that  
 endeavor to account for it has pr  
 knowledge necessary to have a language fit  
 determined by the supposition of a play of accordi  
 of the Grammar of Logic" 418

succession of the other  
 by natural language. But  
 everyone is confused thus when he  
 has knowledge of his own  
 and a knowledge of the  
 he is as much as he is and  
 not as such.

This link between pure natural knowledge  
 values of language explored in the Essay  
 Animate (1756) demonstrates how qualified  
 This link is further developed in the  
 of habit and a 'self' of reflection is  
 the final result of signs of  
 on Sensation and the Treatise on Animate  
 aspects of fundamental problem of Condillac  
 human nature and the role of language. The qua

general knowledge of the  
 has been taken up in the Treatise  
 concerning the division of the animate  
 human psychology into modes  
 the 'self'  
 the openness and beyond the human body  
 language of an individual. The role of the Treatise  
 to the Essay and both pursued in  
 but the modes of synthesis of knowledge  
 the division that appears as he

417 A. (1980) in *Condillac* 213.

418 Condillac, *Sensation*, 35A.

Condillac (1982) 214

design supports the thesis of the Essay  
legacy that the revolutionary thought

and defines a methodological basis for the  
Logic.

The Idea of Reason in the Twentieth Century

ht

Condillac's legacy for Science of Man and the problem of  
the speechless state of the Treatise on Sensation

during the 19<sup>th</sup> century through

can be linked back to the Essay. This

obscure view reflects the way Condillac's work was taken up in the post-revolutionary period,

and associated with the intellectual of the 19<sup>th</sup>

century on the one hand and the

Jean-Pierre Cabanis

<sup>419</sup> There was a political dimension to publishing Condillac's *Oeuvre*

Complète in 1798 was how it was found in a

radical educational program at the

project of Science of Man at the time of the

in the *Éloge de Condillac* in the

Discours sur le génie humain during the

early years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and focused

on the perceived intellectual problem of the

utterly dangerous man of the 18<sup>th</sup>

century

thought. Condillac's cases served as a condemnation of

and on the perceived understanding of

Sensationalism as a materialism which had a particularly negative

impression on the 19<sup>th</sup>

h

century and the Sensationalist system of

biology pursued through the

methodology of the debate on the dynamism of

language and expressive qualities

in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and emerging Positivism with its struggle to

define and idealize

thought in the form of practical knowledge,

but in a context of a new humanistic

reason which had a tendency to diminish the

status of a particular method of thinking

practiced by the 18<sup>th</sup> century thought in the debate over origins

language as a pivot

This perspective of Logic

, 'the art of thinking' reflects both its historical relation to the

Port-Royal Logic and its status in the

emerging new discipline of

and its role in conceptualizing general knowledge

and its role in the development of

the Science of Man and the natural sciences as

notion of a discipline engaged with the

uninitiated. It was an 'art' whose status, like any specific discipline, was to be understood in

the historical context of the time and subject

in the way in which it was conveyed

<sup>419</sup> Aarts (1982) p.218



com plat legacy of course on Science of M  
be a good way to ask it up by Spain  
Potan vion . Sensationalism's pan logical possi w as a legacy not w ay expe  
w in d w n y d i a d o v n o v a i u s p r  
h i o r a l u n d e r s t o o d o f S c i e n c e o f M a n

ant the root of Condillac's oeuvre  
e engaged w h Condillac's suppressed  
ates and cont m p o a n y d i p h e w h a s  
Condillac's ea

Despite these specific relations being blurred over time, Condillac's *Logique* had a  
practical character of a kind of  
aim of real debate over the use of  
his natural thought which was a part of  
connecting Condillac's sign to the wider ambitions of Enlightenment  
something like the empirical 'existent' was  
disciplinary objectives of the diverse practices  
possible that extended beyond a social  
how he designed influenced the wider field of  
specific examples in how his work was

ht -w hose m ph a s i v a c l e i v e d f m h e o e  
g e t h e x a m p l e s m o n a d e s h o w s h o w  
e v o l u t i o n a r y e a s a S c i e n c e o f M a n,  
Enlightenment though Perin is on  
symbolised by Condillac's early essay  
foundations of Science of Man and derived conceptual  
understanding of knowledge and understanding  
disciplinary practices of the day, one can  
social and the physiology.

### Physiology and Discipline of the Body

From 1800, we have a understanding of the natural  
discipline of anatomy and physiology.  
discipline were considered separate  
science and anatomy and physiology as a system  
hierarchy between them with the higher  
considered the scientific discipline pursued in ap  
m anatomy and the lower arts  
the evolutionary anatomy and the  
since the anatomy was a system of physiology  
m anatomy and the experimental science

science of the body was on the order  
Aristotle's 19th century has converged The  
two  
branches of knowledge differentiated between  
so far as anatomy is concerned  
status given to physiology which was  
his philosophy of anatomy was  
<sup>420</sup> During the period of the  
anatomy was a  
giving to the history of  
of physiology but the 19<sup>th</sup> century

<sup>420</sup> Cunningham (2002) p632







“The whole of physiology is moved.”<sup>429</sup>

newly written and done

Haller’s was an ordinary, unexciting  
many contemporaries including a young ‘associé anatomiste’ of the Académie Royale des  
Sciences in 1780’s called Felix Vicq d’Azyr who had been in a progressive  
since society like the pharynx.

as an ‘animated anatomy.’ This passed  
of the Académie Royale des  
in a progressive  
how to

“At the beginning of this [18<sup>th</sup>] century, Physiology was no more than a vain  
assemblage of systems, and it was not until  
since he has not only come to know the  
of the earth and the atmosphere  
by following in his footsteps...”<sup>430</sup>

had the foundation for  
since then in the  
and I show him our respect

Seen as the foundation of a new scientific  
discipline in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it is  
sources in the Parisian medical literature  
Haller’s was an important starting point  
discourse which could stand as a model of  
doubt this discipline “remained ideological”<sup>431</sup> until the advent of experimental physiology in the  
19th century, but during this time the aims and goals of physiology’s social politics was  
a undergoing a radical transformation  
the physiological.

aim to provide a firm grounding in  
of physiology and to look at various  
of the history of anatomy in Stephen  
know the anatomy of the physiological  
and extension of the science of man  
the advent of experimental physiology in the  
salvaged the extended horizon of

### The Physiological in the Medical Debate

The physiological philosophy as a  
knowledge appropriate to the study of life  
agument on the mechanism of life

medical course of the history of  
of the body. This was defined around the  
age in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Georges

Canguilhem succinctly summed up its fundamental distinctions in, “to act it is necessary to  
be rational,”<sup>432</sup> he meant using nature in a new and  
dependent on what

<sup>429</sup> Haller 1754/766/ of Cunningham (2002) 655

<sup>430</sup> Vicq d’Azyr 1786, Vol. 1 pp34 of Cunningham (2002) 657.

<sup>431</sup> Canguilhem (1988) 54-55

<sup>432</sup> Canguilhem’s outline of ‘the problem’ in The Norm and the Pathological 39-40

could be seen in the hierarchy of ideas. A  
 gem theory appeared in the 9th century in  
 embryology and biology in order to be  
 physiological in form. For example, in  
 the 16th century, the new anatomy and  
 of an animal through a new equilibrium whose

and disease. This dynamism was common to Aristotle's predecessors, and gave the image of the  
 body composed of complex of elemental powers being opposed to "another by reason of being  
 what it is."<sup>433</sup> The balance of humors was a requirement

to point to a ground in an animal in order

to show how life appeared as a result

of the combination of elements in

the position of language in order to know the way a

man could be natural forces and the force of

representation of life as a foreign substance

acquired in life is natural in the new human body.

physiology as a new ground in physics

was only by the definition of the concept

W hat distinguished in order to be by the

and it could be to deal with dualism in

overcoming the dualism and Galileo in order to be

philosophy and the mechanics of Galileo in order to be

Newton's publishing of *Principia* (1687)

was a sublimation of the idea of Galileo in order to be

considered a man to be passive by the 18

th century and (1660-1742) could be seen in order to be

the superimposition of mechanics in order to be

newly described how uniform motion

in physics in the 17th and 18th centuries

explaining the nature of life from the

intellectual content of the legacy

of the new dynamism in order to be

natural grounded general theory of health

that could be used in order to be

the theory of the body and the human

the equilibrium in the economy of the body

with the techniques of the balance

and the new human physiology

and an understanding of the medical

the concept of the opposition of forces in order to be

The function of

of the extended knowledge of the theory of

gaining in order to be education.

the 18th century was a balance of mechanics

new approaches had the struggle to

dynamic equilibrium by Galileo and Descartes

in order to be mechanics even in order to be

<sup>434</sup> In order to be mechanics as a new equilibrium in order to be

as a balance in order to be

the 18th century was a balance in order to be

of the body as a balance in order to be

of the equilibrium in order to be

<sup>433</sup> Tracy (1969) p. 23.

<sup>434</sup> See Hahn (1984) p. 172, 6 generations of  
 and W. B. ynum and R. oyl (1993) vol.

in order to be

Acknowledged (1955) and K. ng (1958)

machine was explained through the fluids of the body, blood, lymph; while ‘animal spirits’ and the ‘subtle fluids’ were the power by which the sensitive soul impressed itself. From

himself

and he senses were corporeal

become terminated and Hoffman’s *Fundamentum Medicinae* (1695) exemplified

it by reducing it to a substance

and he is between them

his animal spirits appeared as a continuous

in it. <sup>435</sup> Herman Boerhaave’s (1668-

1738) animal spirits described as a fluid of

and through the concept of pipes

veins and arteries, thereby avoiding any specu-

lation in the body and beyond the

lapse of time and the body of the

away from a physical speculation

in any causes, <sup>436</sup> animal spirits could freely give explanations

for a lapse of

being organic functions, then in itself

knowledge they defined any question of

purposeful living organisms

A non-organic thinking arose from nature

through Jan Baptist van Helmont (1577-

1644) opposed animal spirits through a nor-

malism as a bedrock anti-mechanism

form of the soul, his biogenesis dynamis

controlled the body and accounting for

‘special character.’ As the “governor of generation” this principle of transformation in matter

explained through animal spirits grounded

biological phenomena through a concept

and was strongly influential in physiology

thought <sup>437</sup> A similar perspective saw Georg

Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) animal spirits as a

equation addressing the organism as a

whole and described in the living body as a

namely an ideal component by which the

whole is perceived to explain purposefully,

Stahl accorded the very quality of living

living bodies with the form of New animal spirits

an existence of forces in some way

immanent in matter. Living force had to explain “the conservation of an eminently corruptible body, the faculty of force with whose aid the body is sheltered from the act of corruption;”<sup>438</sup>

and the force was a law of nature

is needed a concept of conservation that

<sup>435</sup> An outline of Hoffman views appears in the introduction to Lester S. King’s translation of *Fundamentum Medicinae* (1971)

<sup>436</sup> *Commentary on Herman Boerhaave* King (1958) pp.59-

121.

<sup>437</sup> *Medical Writings* (1982)

<sup>438</sup> *Georg Ernst Stahl’s Theoria Medica* (1738) pp.200

201 *History of Philosophy* (1984) p.27

a 'soul' could be through the idea of a high  
given unconscious and a mind that

and would be explained in  
evolutionary terms

Stahl's problem of the spectrum  
of physiology and physics was a task

in the new hermeneutic between  
mechanical explanation and the

task of establishing a physiological synthesis, Stahl's approach drew on dynamic physiological  
methodology in the spectrum of physiology

analysis of the spectrum of physiology

the work of Francis Glisson (1597-

1677) who defined a 'life of matter' through the

possibility of the generation of

life in the body of the

through an immanent energetics. The life of this matter was primal force, a 'biarchia', or  
'biosia'<sup>439</sup> possessing power that could be used for

the explanation of

functions of perception and action

pleasure and pain and general body movements

The concept of life accounted for power

spontaneous and exact<sup>440</sup> and

subtle forms of sensation and passion

states of mind and habit

developed according to the order of nature

on its ground.<sup>441</sup> The study of

matter and its properties lent Glisson to a theory of 'animal fibres' that were disposed to micro-  
movements as an account of the life of the

physiological responses that could be

associated with the movement of the

disposition of the brain and

as a suggestion of the possibility of

between concepts of the mind and

universality.

Glisson's irritability was also taken up by A. Beckon in *The Sensibility*

in 1968

of the Body (1749) which was significant as it

highlighted the special emphasis

differences between local vitality and

the universal force with which a

historical concept of vitality could be

disposition of the brain and disposition

of the H.encephalic and experimental work

analysed the nature of these forces

though in conscious life.

<sup>439</sup> Term used by Glisson in *Tractatus de substantiis  
facultibus vegetabilium et animalium*

in *negotia de vita et sensu* (London 1672/1923/SH 4968) p.11

in 5

<sup>440</sup> Glisson in *Tractatus de substantiis*

, see Term in (1977) p.290

<sup>441</sup> According to Strömbäck

"animalised" scholastic thought. Strömbäck (2003) p.110-

112



“The theory as to why some parts of the body are endowed with these powers and some are not has been deduced from the nature of the sources of both beyond the reach of the microscope, beyond which I do not trust hazard any conjecture, and refer to each what I am ignorant of myself.”<sup>442</sup>

His ensuing localisation was to an ‘animal fabric’ that retained certain conceptual and historical precedent though in a way as Stahl’s medical problem at conceptualised to life, Haller’s experiment moved towards the vitality of the body through a methodology that established on the basis of his system analysis which offered explanation through the vitality of the other hand, Stahl’s dynamic vitalism lent itself to a different methodology; he analysed phenomena in how he saw the apprehended around and deal with the problem of the concept

With the firm establishment of the body through the analytic approach, the latter’s work remained with a subtle deviation of how he saw the problem of the synthesis of this as the philosophy of biology operated on a level and the introduction of the French medicine of the Enlightenment were seen in the latter’s reform of the Science of Medicine in the 18th century.

### Medical Education and Hippocratic Revival

In addition to the contemporary medical debates, French physicians also drew on the philosophical debates of the era including those of M. de Buffon and Condorcet. The firm establishment of the Hippocratic School in the 18th century and the early had a substantial contribution to the Encyclopédie project as M. de Buffon’s individual physicians had contributed to the Encyclopédie project as M. de Buffon’s reputation of being a Hippocratic revival.<sup>443</sup> From a contemporary physiological perspective, the reduction of medicine through the strong influence of Stahl’s vitalism. Moving between

<sup>442</sup> The Sensibility of the Human Body (London, 1755), 21 (Thomas 1968), 14.

<sup>443</sup> Diderot, *Encyclopédie ou le Dictionnaire des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers* (Paris, 1773-1774). This extended through the concept of Science of Medicine.

of medicine in the 18th century, which played a significant role in the French

Stahl's neo-Hippocratic dynamism and the doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

Secondly, the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

the new doctrine of

the physician's sensitivity as

444

This approach

an

looking for

approach to physical observation

examined by accounting for

of humors through an etiological

historical context

pushed through interpretations of

such as gender and race

seen from a historical perspective

of the Paradoxical

approach was intended to

of the Paradoxical

not only body but the concept of

of the Paradoxical

The dynamical approach

to the study of

of the

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

“One sees however mathematicians who use the letters X and Y to designate unknown quantities, and who are so successful in their calculations that they are inaccessible to other philosophers.”<sup>445</sup>

This approach

of the dynamical approach

Sauvage (1706-1767)

of the dynamical approach

as well as a confirmation

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

of the dynamical approach

1's

<sup>444</sup> Textbook of Medicine, Paris, 1783

of Duchesneau (1982) pp 141-170, et seq.

78)

<sup>445</sup> B. Sauvage, Nosologie méthodique

de la médecine, Paris, 1767

de

de Sydenham & de la Motte, 1777

pp 495-502, 242-243, 244

de

Morand, 1995 pp 51-

52.

Stum (1980) p 80

Following from the medical ideas of M. on p

argave various from ubns of neo-

Hippocratism from edlow ed be the d

scapate chem eencom passinghe

‘physical’ ‘mental’ and ‘passionate’, for others it could be reduced to a balance

of the body

‘physical’ and the ‘moral.’ There was, however, never a simple relation since the emphasis was

on the physical as a question of balance,

of economy and harmony in the body

the physiological synthesis and the balance

of the prominent awareness of the lines

of the body in the medical text

idea of the body in the text

it is clear

socially how even in the medical text

narrow ideological program with social

aspect of medicine derived from a particular reading of

the Hippocratic text, gave an

understanding of the individual for

but independent of the social practices and

medical history in the particular environment

thinking. <sup>446</sup>

A medical text on physiology as Theophrastus

de Bordeu (1722-1776) in an article

in the philosophical text

he appears as the principal character

Denis Diderot’s *Le Réve d’Alembert* (1769) on the equilibrium of the

very

population in the use of the

of the body as a whole by the parts

of the system such as the nervous system.

<sup>447</sup> Like the individual parts

sensations and motions through which Bordeu aimed to

of the body in terms of observable

movements. The latter was interpreted as defining with

the movements produced from

unobservable sensations balanced by involuntary

movements produced by the phenomena

given sensations. Like Salicrú in the

head and passively distinguished by his

functional expression of movements in the

in fact, sensations like could be an

latent and unexpressed. Through thinking this latency as the ‘federative’ concept of the body,

which is the subordinate

individual activities could be but

the functional equilibrium between the

essence of the body how as

the by the subsumed and distributed

of the new work.

<sup>448</sup> This gave a view of

the body that had no absolute unity being, but as

a decentralized, semi-autonomous

<sup>446</sup> W. J. (1994) p. 8-11.

<sup>447</sup> Bordeu ‘Recherches sur les Maladies Chronique’ (1775), Oeuvres Complètes (1818-1924) t. 5, p. 81

<sup>448</sup> see M. (1978)

com postfigant in patch through com  
beduced lap in know new so in echania  
hisynam in age w absw am obces

phenomenology within youll  
l physics. Bordeu's famous metaphor of

"A swarm of bees gathered in clusters and suspended from a tree as a vine, each part is,  
so speak in anim but kind of font  
concurr in the general life of the body."<sup>449</sup>

Transforming an idea of a Hippocratic unbroken circle  
sensitively through in a new era  
with Stahl's form of holistic medicine The concept of the body as a  
dynamic system Through innovative accounts  
potential of higher cognition art.

A new strategy appears in the 18th century  
1806 The term entered the popular  
M an. *Nouveaux elements de la Science de L'Homme* was published in 1773 but it was  
augmented and republished in 1806.<sup>450</sup> Barthez perhaps one of the most  
physicians produced them as a synthesis  
1754, moved in D'Alembert's circles and wrote for the Encyclopédie. The influence of  
*Nouveaux Elements de la Science de L'Homme* in Barthez's explanation of vital force  
ascribed through a 'vital principle' that was neither a metaphysical or occult force. -

"I never used the term vital principle to explain any of the phenomena of life  
employed in anatomy and medicine  
of these phenomena...."<sup>451</sup>

The term was understood as a complete unknown, in the Newtonian sense. With no 'essential  
nature,' it stood for a power of explanation and representation  
obscure from its origin in the history of physics  
"necessary abstraction" required to make certain statements about observed phenomena of  
experience. Barthez did not assume a vital principle that "orders or regulates its acts," rather it

<sup>449</sup> 'Reserches Anatomique sur la Positive des Glandes et leur action,' *Bordeu* (1818) 163; *Sum* (1980) 82

<sup>450</sup> A good overview by K. Nam (2005)

<sup>451</sup> Barthez (1806) in *W. J. M.* (1994) 47,

<sup>452</sup> Comparable to Kant's Gemüt

proposed a “faculty attached to the combinations of movements and matter of which the living body is formed.” In this way, he makes significant contributions to Barthez’s thinking of the

single principle of ‘soul,’ while also distinguishing the vital from simply attributing separate

“natural and philosophical” principles according to Barthez, but the unknown

“good philosophical method in the science of man requires that one attribute to a single

principle in human body being responsible for its function.”<sup>453</sup>

Barthez is careful to refer to the ‘vital principal’ as an abstraction employed only to facilitate and

grounded discussion concerning the production of the regularities observed.

induction taken from Baconian inquiry in Barthez’s “could not teach what these causes were in essence,” rather the central aim was to abandon

looking for ‘essences’ and ‘final causes,’ and focus on a phenomenology of experience.<sup>454</sup> But

Barthez also read David Hume’s *Treatise on Human Nature* and agreed that we might

succession in causes and in actions without being able to discover the

variety of principles and faculties that are unknown to the senses. New

text extended through the progress of human experience. The philosophical

“Hippocrates in his genius saw that human nature cannot be fully understood by anyone who does not possess an entire system of knowledge of the healing arts.”<sup>455</sup>

The long venture of Hippocrates from order and pain to the new language

independent of an entirely new physiological synthesis in the new language

<sup>453</sup> Barthez (1806) [1973] in (1994) p47-

<sup>454</sup> Barthez (1806) [1973] in (1994) p49

<sup>455</sup> Barthez (1806) [1973] in (1994) p50

48 and Hahn (1984) p374 Sum (1980) p83-



extend a law of Science of Medicine by  
confronting them with the  
breaking out of a system of  
teaching.

Medical physicians gave them  
should hypothesize the  
of them and as a result

### Revolutionary Influences on Medicine

---

From 1770 onwards in Paris physicians  
in medicine by the English and  
accordance with general Science of Medicine  
since under new considerations of human  
progress the form of anatomy  
advancements in medicine  
Felix Vicq d'Azyr has been credited with  
broadening the scope of his investigations to  
meteorology, water quality, public sanitation. During 1770's Vicq D'Azyr gave free lectures at  
the College Royal and an educational  
pedagogical method outlined by an  
in medicine in Paris

and the reform of French  
health reform in medicine  
has been by a union of the  
in France  
by focusing on the hospital and  
in anatomy and physiology  
reform and  
wide environmental factors, such as  
'certain method' from which a  
method

Reform in medicine spread across the nation. In 1776 Felix Vicq D'Azyr took up a post as the Commissioner-General  
Epilepsy is the new form of Society of Medicine  
administration of the College Royal  
the causes of epilepsy and common medical  
responsibilities of husbands and  
and of parents  
power of the hospital through the  
physicians in Paris had a reputation

ask with an account of  
Epilepsy, a  
new Society of medicine  
of France and was also given  
in medicine and  
on have a  
epilepsy and cases of  
in each of the

---

<sup>459</sup> B. d. d. y. H. a. w. a. y. (1972) p. 116

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esasnew form sofm ediaknow ledge

Bordeu had noted of Paris that “money, rouge, braggadocio, and ladies favours are all that is required of a physician,”<sup>460</sup> and w apehagsanhistadofaci

chalefuof

Hippocresodbam dnodofefim by

w htabngw thepropaplabof

m dnodpopulandnum onh edinecoulbdeb

unkedBut Felix Vicq d’Azyr was ab a

fibw erC onkandw rtaNouveauPandeC

ontipouM edinenFrancet

besubm edoheconitinalsem blyin 1790

o iteanew diaapproachhat

ess ed the need for a new language to fix fleeting corporeal phenomena and supersede an ‘old bookish’ approach to medicine. How evby1793hiprojav aoverkenbyhe

condins

dievolutn. <sup>461</sup>

The turning point for the form of medicine in France

nccam en 1794In hew akeofhe

evolving functional changes saw o

degin em edicablm emw hihad

previous dom in the sem nam of theort

capreplecebychialingn

the hosp of the Ecole de Saint-Paul in Mont

paandStsboushePaichool

with his gained a reputation for his new

onaychangesandw hihm akshett

of medicine a new hospital system in the

subyofleatA num beofonsan

ben aditidabroadly about the end of the

ocum entdofm 18<sup>h</sup> centurym edial

theory of medicine based on the

hel9h. <sup>462</sup> Filheprateofhial

observation and surveying the nature of pain

sim edat ‘living encyclopaedia’ hat

described the principles of medicine

chedabove <sup>463</sup> Secondlyongwthe

importance accorded to a “nosological field,” was

abuseofits in educashois

of individual patients

<sup>464</sup> This has become under an extension through

variousnew

techniques and technologies

and patendignosticexam pldbyRen

e

Laennec’s stethoscope, the new surgery of Pierre Desault and Xavier Bichat, and Jean

<sup>460</sup> ATurn edigndualFrancosA m edePoppet 1753 -1799) worked in Paris and wrote “medicines that only work for a little time until they become unfashionable” LeM edinPhosphPaal 1787B odds & Jones (1997) p643,

<sup>461</sup> General History of Medicine (1994) and Vesalius (1974)

<sup>462</sup> The visible texts here are Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic and Erwin Ackerknecht’s Medicine in the Paris Hospital 1794-1848.

<sup>463</sup> Foucault (1975) pp69- 72

<sup>464</sup> ibid pp59- 60,





his essential role developed.  
The system of medicine and  
symptoms by including the  
work of the physician

But this tendency could be reinforced through  
the system of medicine  
and the physician's  
independence

Cabanis' work on the physician's

new theory of medicine

de Condorcet for approximating relationships that hold true by 'degrees of belief and assurance.'

The possibilities in the new medical disciplines were an example of the 'indefinite perfectibility'  
of man; <sup>471</sup> this is Rousseau's term in his *Second Discourse* (1754) by Condorcet.

As a principle of the human

Sketch for a History of

Progress of Human Mind (1793)

<sup>472</sup> Condorcet took this principle

he

with tasks necessary of historical progression:

by the transmission of culture

experience and secondly in the possibility

of overcoming dogma through study

of grounding observation in the

following Condorcet's

language of the human mind

knowledge and looking back

phenomena

Cabanis' exemplified the image of the physician in his mission as 'consoler of the sick' beyond

work and the physician's

patient and the public

superiority in accordance with Enlightenment

thinking and understanding that

work of the physician's

liberty but not the physician

independence by questioning the

here in medicine and education. Addressing

the urgent need of the ignorance of the people

to an emphasis on intervention and the

and the balance of equilibrium required,

paradoxical in the emerging

intervention against the lack of knowledge

necessity of grounding knowledge in

the fact of human nature, not only against

the medical practice but extended to

<sup>471</sup> Cabanis refers to "an enlightened friend" almost certainly Condorcet. *Sum* (1980) 106

<sup>472</sup> Condorcet 1976 223



phenomena which proceeded according to principle  
a certain application of Condillac's thought.<sup>477</sup>

applied to the senses in law reform

### Sensibility and the Moral Project

The physiological synthesis drew on Condillac's Logic and he designed the modern  
philosophical project to be taken up from the physical  
philosophy and physiology to lay a new firm edifice  
between the physical and the moral and natural  
functions would be the firm edifice of space for  
filling with the power of the senses could distinguish impressions that communicated 'sensible  
being.'

This was a domain of moral hygiene that could inform Cabanis' mature vision for a Science of  
Man which not only reflected man's mastery of self but its extension and transformation around  
social being and even the species transformation by

organs of the senses and the senses

the production of a new form of man.

"a man susceptible to improvement is two modes, his physical education and regimen,  
in the organization of the senses and the development of the  
organs of the senses and the development of the  
And when the senses are affected upon several  
particulars, men are no longer the same, no longer the same race."<sup>478</sup>

The extension of the moral philosophy project to the

fundamental

around the human mind and the evolution

of the senses converging in the project of

theology.<sup>479</sup> But the object of analysis and the position

as a fundamental problem of

physiology which forms with the moral project

gave a common point of expression

symptoms over a duration and needed further definition

in its fundamental

<sup>477</sup> *Coup d'oeil* point Condillac Cabanis 1806 p284

<sup>478</sup> Cabanis 1956 Vol 2 p77 Cabanis 1806

<sup>479</sup> *Le Coup d'oeil* point Condillac Cabanis 1806 p168  
*Observateurs de l'homme*. Sturm (1980) p168

phenomena<sup>480</sup> To Cabanis mind, since Condillac's era, practical progress had been made against that which "presented itself as obscure."<sup>481</sup> -

"The new question presents itself to us in a new form and depends uniquely on what they call sensation...and whether, consequently, ideas come to us from our senses and external objects or whether they are produced internally in persons...whose constancy is revealed to us by the study of the healthy and the sick, and whether...observation directed by this new point of view will not allow us to recognise the laws of nature and state them with exactitude and clarity."<sup>482</sup>

A new perspective on the phenomena of action whose determinations were 'confounded' in their effects. Following a localising of internal processes, it presents the new frontiers of a new medical language to open up the human expanded general science of man.

The term *Psychologie* introduced in 1796 by Destutt and Portet, distinguished between a philosophy of mind and a science of the human mind. Cabanis took the physiological approach to psychology.<sup>483</sup> Destutt's *Psychologie*

Tracy's new form of classical moral and natural theology. When we look at the history of language, it is clear that the effect of the mind is to

"vast knowledge, but in the present state of our enlightenment [can only hope] for the destruction of any one of them into a form peculiar to each and its own truths."<sup>484</sup>

By these two approaches, rational theology was to be applied to the emerging physiological knowledge, as "rational philosophy and physiology have always advanced together."<sup>485</sup>

<sup>480</sup> Cabanis notes the 'Scottish philosophers.' Cabanis (1843) Préface p46-48

<sup>481</sup> p46

<sup>482</sup> Rapport Cabanis 1956 p174

<sup>483</sup> Destutt's interest in the history of language

from the history of language

Psychologie (1801-1815)

<sup>484</sup> Destutt in 'Mémoire sur le faculté de penser' read on 2 Messidor IV *Mémoires de l'institut national des sciences et des lettres* (1795) p172.

<sup>485</sup> Rapport Cabanis 1843 p174

Reform of a heretofore knowledge of the  
 but extended within and significant  
 newly founded human and animal  
 Man as a natural and social being  
 human affairs necessary for the conservation of

of the French Revolution  
 in the history of the human mind  
 the history of the human mind  
 486

“Are we now in a state to make dependant certain properties communicated in all living  
 beings and the fundamental will of the  
 the will’s desires, executes its functions, more or less necessary in the conservation of  
 the human mind  
 physical and moral  
 the history of the human mind  
 the history of the human mind”<sup>487</sup>

Taking a philosophical approach from the history of  
 philosophy, biological theories relying on the  
 philosophically follows the Sensationalist epigram “from the moment of our  
 our existence.”<sup>488</sup> In this regard, the process of the

in a had a double sense;  
 not given to us which  
 the process of the

which can be considered “branches of a single stem.” How once  
 sensibility was “the last end of the phenomena we call life,” what was apprehended by the  
 sign as a moral phenomenon  
 and that is because this is never understood  
 that it was “at least relative to ourselves, that is, relative to the general manner of feeling of  
 human nature,” noting these cannot always be the same.<sup>489</sup> Can the history of the  
 of the human mind  
 concept of the human mind  
 is physically observed and is subsequent philosophical analysis could become  
 progressively the source of the  
 from human source, could be maintained according to the method of a ‘true science.’

<sup>486</sup> Cabanis 1956/1961, p. 177

<sup>487</sup> Rapport Cabanis 1843, p. 46 48

<sup>488</sup> Cabanis 1956/1961, p. 177

<sup>489</sup> Cabanis 1956/1961, p. 177

since the dawn of time, how even in a philosophy of physiology as  
 yet provisional, Cabanis' task for the future science was to bridge this gap and hold  
 position in the physiological world as Cabanis conceptualized it  
 observed as the consequences of life. While this may seem like an intellectual 'slight of hand,' it is  
 when emphasizing what Cabanis was aiming to mediate between internal and external  
 in person on the one hand and on the other  
 in opposition to knowledge of the individual  
 in general. <sup>490</sup>

This future science was the vision behind De Tracy's address to the Institute in 1802, as  
 a general judgment passed on the prejudices of the  
 German philosophy as a thing he did not  
 techniques of the French model. This should be understood  
 in an abstract but not for an evaluation  
 practice based on the French and  
 of languages and design. <sup>491</sup>

Cabanis Reports on the Future Science

The broad picture of the Science of Man was presented by Cabanis in the volume of  
*Rapports du physique et du morale de l'homme* in 1796 before the 'Classe des Sciences Morales  
 et Politiques.' It stood as a contribution to the analysis of the mind and experience  
 in the acquisition of man through  
 Philosophy. Cabanis had identified  
 through a methodical approach during the  
 evolutionary period (Pineau, Vol. I, p.  
 Enlightenment Philosophy. Cabanis could be considered  
 Science of Man and spirit as a result of the content  
 of Cabanis' research

<sup>490</sup> *EM*, p. 223.

<sup>491</sup> Discussion of the evolution of man, p. 10.

looking to deeper accounts of physiological principles through the physiological knowledge of the sciences

492

the elements now being held in a connected possible

Cabanis another holding form of behind form so far in case of the half approach

will have extended as principle of biological knowledge new technical

approach by which the 'strange inverted Newtonism' could distinguish itself from general principles but an unfolding

quence of phenomena in the body

decided in the new science in a common sequence of subsequent phenomena that developed around the Sensation

itself became the mediate cause of "the cum since" the grounded domain

The ambition was also different stages of organization

known in the body is general

although he himself of knowledge

though these were themselves shifting within the new sciences. Cabanis' was a question of possibility

"will the other attractions be explained by sensitivity or will the sensitivity and the

in the elements between them sex in a way?

by the presence of

knowledge in possible to be a positive

by the future experiment

research."<sup>493</sup>

The observations of Harvey, Malpighi and Ca

banis looked for a way between animal

sensibility in form of plate

in such a way as to be an example of

in the order of phenomena available

in the form of the endium since under

with the new way of the positive of exp

in an that appeared through the covering

positivism and the form of brain what

in an end for a future positive physiological

knowledge was to ultimately 'lift the veil' covering the mystery of sensitivity.<sup>494</sup>

One must consider the context for the Hippocratic

ly inspired medical work in form of the

perspective of the infant concept of the

occurring around them in the form of them

'animate' as it occurred in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>495</sup> This overlapped with the term 'organic' and

<sup>492</sup> Following contemporary scientific debates such as over affinity in the 'new chemistry'

<sup>493</sup> Cabanis (1843) *Medical and Philosophical Translations* (1981) p.542

<sup>494</sup> Rapport Cabanis (1956) *Vol. 293* *Sum* (1981) pp.178-180

<sup>495</sup> O'Connell & Cunningham (2002) p.58



indicated that Condillac's  
 evidence in the organic domain  
 understood around the complex functioning of  
 what brought conceptual discussion on the nature of  
 living organisms, the concern with  
 discussions of organization and  
 aspects of the physiological basis as an explanatory  
 general properties of biological organization

indicated that Condillac's  
 evidence in the organic domain  
 understood around the complex functioning of  
 what brought conceptual discussion on the nature of  
 living organisms, the concern with  
 discussions of organization and  
 aspects of the physiological basis as an explanatory  
 general properties of biological organization

<sup>496</sup> The nature of 'organisation,' which was absent  
 in given through a concept but do  
 phenomena was really biological in the

body. This would be a distinction between 'unorganised bodies,' mere 'aggregates' of chemical  
 elements and dead matter which is governed by

the law of affinity (Lavoisier had

shown which stood in contrast to 'organised bodies.' The latter were conceived as governed by  
 unknown laws which showed how hidden things

operate in the body unknown laws as

limit against which Condillac's Sensationalist methodology was retained. But when Rappoport  
 took these organic properties as "a general fact of living nature" and sensitivity "the ultimate  
 term one arrives at when studying 'vital' phenomena,"<sup>497</sup> Condillac was looking beyond  
 Condillac's idea of sensitivity to develop the "analysis of intellectual faculties and affections of  
 the soul."<sup>498</sup> The aim was that Condillac had touched on an

idea of inside

development which could now be systematized through  
 assumptions of Condillac as well as the recent physiolo-  
 gical methods of the phlogiston and

the physiological faculty of the nervous system

biological faculty of the observational

Method in medicine.

Condillac developed his physiological  
 on the Origin of Human Knowledge depended on a  
 action' and intellectual, "all that pertains to the human understanding is reduced to a  
 single principle."<sup>499</sup> This principle was the human understanding

in the philosophical Essay

principle of relation between 'language of

and progress language

as a process explaining the social relation

developed over time by a population of the

formation of habits. This philosophical problem Condillac had found in Locke's essay as the  
 problem of language as preceding relations

words when following the Cartesian

<sup>496</sup> Ibid 58; Duchesneau (1982)

<sup>497</sup> Rappoport, *ibid* 1956; Dupuy (1988); Sum (1988)

<sup>498</sup> Rappoport, *ibid* 1843; 46; appendix 3

<sup>499</sup> Condillac (2001), §27

in which the words are not to be taken

as if they were ideas

<sup>500</sup> Because

Locke does not understand the

words in the expression

with which Condillac understands

knowledge as socially conditioned,

when comparison is necessary to

such communication.

<sup>501</sup> These

were irreducible ‘accessory ideas’ evident in voice, facial expressions, gestures, and

that inform the core problem for Condillac’s thought. He addressed these in

consecutive paragraphs

§

“my entire system comes down to this matter; social intercourse gives occasion (1) to

change natural signs

into signs which are

these signs (both the natural and the

artificial) are the principles of

development and progress of the development of the mind”<sup>502</sup>

He is intended to explain in

the second part of his

explanation of the

signs in the mind of the

individual. As has been shown above, the heart of Condillac’s work lies in the *Essay*

*Traité de Sensibilité*

in which he is concerned

with the result of

the concept of the

human

For Condillac the physical extension of the

is not understood through an unknown

particular concept of

the concept of the sign as far as the

material is as the physical or the

material of the

physical in the

of the material in the

information in the

“Physical sensibility is the last term at which we arrive in the study of the phenomena of

and in the material of the

the material of the

of the general principle of

the material of the

such as the physical in the

the material of the

<sup>500</sup> Locke treats ideas in Book 2 as ‘words and language in general’ in Book 3 ‘I am not to preserve those essences, and give them lasting duration’ Locke (1975) 3.5.10.

<sup>501</sup> A useful source has been previously cited in Condillac (2001) p. x.

the Royal

Logic (1662). See Aasleff’s intro to

<sup>502</sup> Condillac (2001) p. xvi

but the physical ideas of them are not developed.<sup>503</sup>  
 Cabanis points out that physiological concepts are not only bodies but also ideas, and that we must not look for a simple correspondence between the two. He writes of them in popular form at the beginning of his new anatomical observations

504

It is a popular error to consider phenomena open and variable as the result of a simple cause. In the history of anatomy and physiology, the perspective taken from Condillac's Essay on the Sensation of the Mind, as the 'language of action' saw phenomena as the result of a simple cause. Cabanis, in his Essay on the Sensation of the Mind, understood through a capacity for sensation and action, not only the knowledge of the body and external sense, but also the capacity for sensation and action. He writes of the sense of the body and the sense of the mind in the following terms:

"...activities of the memory or the imagination, whose original impressions belong to one organ, have their origin in another organ, and are directed themselves entirely towards another organ."<sup>505</sup>

From original persons, the physical sense is not only a dynamism of the body, but also a dynamism of the mind. The concept of the body is not only a half-potential, but also a half-potential.

the physical ideas of them are not developed.  
 that the possible ideas of them are not only bodies but also ideas, and that we must not look for a simple correspondence between the two. He writes of them in popular form at the beginning of his new anatomical observations

The tendency of the mind is to be open and variable as the result of a simple cause. In the history of anatomy and physiology, the perspective taken from Condillac's Essay on the Sensation of the Mind, as the 'language of action' saw phenomena as the result of a simple cause. Cabanis, in his Essay on the Sensation of the Mind, understood through a capacity for sensation and action, not only the knowledge of the body and external sense, but also the capacity for sensation and action. He writes of the sense of the body and the sense of the mind in the following terms:

'centre of reaction.' From this Cabanis can write, -

<sup>503</sup> Rapport Cabanis 1843M, en ois 3

<sup>504</sup> "which follow Harvey, Malpighi, Haller, and some others" in M, en ois 23

<sup>505</sup> in M, en ois 1. From Cabanis

one not Stobink 2003p 158

“whether these impressions have been received by the external or internal sentient  
 external or internal sentient  
 being of each of them is inde-  
 pendent of the way in which these general  
 ideas can be known.”<sup>506</sup>

This is not a claim of objectivity  
 but is made according to a  
 method of explanation  
 possibly intended to show  
 this objectivity as aiming at ‘an exhaustive totality,’ but the theory of sensitivity necessarily  
 assumes a form of knowledge and  
 capability to form a positive concept  
 and a principle beyond C and  
 the physiological C and the con-  
 cept of a C and his physiological  
 concept of an animal and new  
 determined.<sup>508</sup>

in general, the animal is  
 C and his physiology,  
 and of the form of the  
 animal concept. Perhaps C and his  
 method of analysis and techniques  
<sup>507</sup> Despite ‘rarification’ of the sign that  
 illac’s principle of the idea of the  
 concept of the body before any  
 idea of the body as a principle  
 and the form of the animal.

The New Anatomy

The animal is determined by its  
 body. This is a C and his  
 physical anatomical description giving “the basis and ground-work for physiological  
 illustrations, the necessary branch of the science of animal economy.”<sup>509</sup> In the context of  
 the science of the 18th century and  
 the development of medicine  
 informing physiology’s discussions on life. A complete physiology followed a complex

<sup>506</sup> Ibid. 11

<sup>507</sup> According to Foucault because  
 Foucault (1975) 103-116

<sup>508</sup> Foucault shows C and his  
 p118-421

<sup>509</sup> C and his (1806) 290

and in opposition to the animal

human and in new position Foucault

edge

(1975)

findings of relationship of a whole body. This 'exhaustive totality' of function still deferred, for historical reasons, to the physiologic explanation of the 'sub-visible' constitution of organic matter and the means by which the soul acted through the body as a whole. <sup>510</sup> Important developments in the 'art' of anatomy during this era meant that physicians were looking to "new light thrown upon human anatomy: anatomy was ahead of the apprehending new mental knowledge of the body.

This exemplified by William Harvey and his colleagues in pointing out the need for a more philosophical and long experimental evidence that indicated to Harvey that all knowledge originated as 'events of the senses.'<sup>511</sup> To examine them "you must bring them to the senses and confirm them by judgment of the senses."<sup>512</sup> This was Harvey's distinction between the event of experiment and integration into a physiological explanation and the precedent of anatomical work of that which was described in the *Sensibile* by Elnardus Physiologus (1757-1766) grounded a high physiology. This was contrasted to George Ernst Stahl's physiology for physicians, for whom the 'good physiologist' meant understanding the limits of relation between human and animal physiology. <sup>513</sup>

During the 1780's, anatomical practices was extending itself through new techniques of surgery. <sup>514</sup> There remained, however, a division between producing anatomical data and unfolding the physiological interpretation of the unconscious of the subject as a physician.

<sup>510</sup> Hippocrates  
<sup>511</sup> Andreas Vesalius *De Humani Corporis Fabrica Libri septem* (1543) in the beginning of William Harvey's *De Motu Cordis* (1628) and Cunningham (2002) p55  
<sup>512</sup> Harvey (1653) p178, experientia in Latin gives experience and experiment as two aspects of an "event of the senses" cf Cunningham (2002) p62  
<sup>513</sup> Haller of the *Sensibile* said that they "always have an aversion to anatomy" Haller (1755) p693, cf Cunningham (2002) p67.  
<sup>514</sup> Galen's *De Animi Mente* (1791) introduced a new physiological paradigm of the mind and the body. Cunningham (2002) p67.

experimental physiology in any contemporary sense.

Since the principal object of his

physiological system was viewed as the

function of the body which could be said

‘natural,’ which for Cabanis meant the one “best adapted to the association of our ideas,”<sup>515</sup> his

view of the observational method proceeded by

reason from the known to the unknown.

Cabanis’ Science of Man was grounded in a concept of the human condition which

rational physiology elaborated the relation of our “ideas, our passions, our virtues and our vices.”<sup>516</sup> Such a concept handed down through the

university-based physiology

hierarchy of the general and the

and within the years of the 18th and 19th

century

19th century physiological view of function

on the front of new practices

in the hospital

where surgeons dissecting bodies brought anatomy

all together

deducing function by processes of logic

using given perspectives on the natural

account of man and the new scientific method

account of the social world in the

university-based physiological knowledge. A new

concept of function appeared around which

reasoning could be attributed to the ‘natural,’ which had been philosophically underpinned

by the Cartesian method of even by the Cartesian

method of the natural philosopher

such as X and B that

X and B that in Paris in July 1794

was a course in hospital medicine.

<sup>517</sup> There

Professor Desault inaugurated his

practical training of surgeons by means

of direct observation and through daily exposure

to surgical techniques. This practice had

developed through the 18

century and was almost everywhere unchanged

when the new post

revolutionary era of the Ecole de Santé

<sup>518</sup> Desault was unexpectedly in 1795 but within a few

years Bichat himself was holding courses in anatomy

of surgery and physiology expanding his

own ideas beyond those of Desault and Bichat

as also a few of the Société Médicale

de Médecine and was following in the footsteps of Cabanis

and appears to have shared the

ambitions of the Société de Médecine et de Chirurgie

for physiology. Desault’s course included

physiologie (1799) he describes both a historical and a practical approach; since the “ancients

knew only how to observe,” he upheld the Hippocratic legacy of observational physiology

<sup>515</sup> Cabanis (1806) pp. 230-231

<sup>516</sup> Ibid. pp. 230-231

<sup>517</sup> Professor Desault 1744 – 1795

<sup>518</sup> The aim of the Ecole de Santé (1794) p. 54.

with following modern methods of anatomy  
 physiology.<sup>519</sup> This is Bichat's influence on the  
 Modern physicians and inco-  
 developing an effective anatomical practice to give  
 medical education.<sup>520</sup>

deduced the new language of  
 philosophical approach

Hippocratic tradition, but also by Haller's approach of  
 the practical perspective

Bichat's physiology aimed at a synthesis directed at overcoming a specific problem. In Bichat's  
 opinion, Haller's experimentation had certain advantages for the study of particular functions of  
 the body such as respiration

of the organs could be handled.<sup>521</sup>

These precautions were followed by the Modern  
 anatomical and physiological studies

in order to obtain a more  
 exact knowledge of the body's functions

based on the idea that experimentation on live animals could never give a 'natural' impression  
 since induced fevers were with direct

causes and ending in all

evaluation of general physiology Bichat

started to deal with

the 'natural' state. It is necessary to observe in

natural knowledge

with the observation of the results. However,

the induced fever problem for

the modern anatomy and medicine and

the form of the general pathology

through the modern anatomical and

modern medicine developed in anatomical

studies of the advantages of the

the perspective of Bichat's work

of separating out the anatomical

phenomena and evident

limits of 'organic disturbance,' from the complex historical admixture of 'general fevers.'<sup>522</sup>

### Xavier Bichat and Modern Physiology

The anatomical and modern ground

in comparative anatomy

the modern of Bichat's method to extend observation of the phenomena of higher

<sup>519</sup> Bichat's course in physiology (179  
 Appendix to the *Recherches anatomiques* (1977) p.97

9. Reference to the course in the

the

<sup>520</sup> Bichat's course notes  
 (1977) p.97- 98

Harvey's discovery of the circulation as the exemplary modern medical event. *CA* buy

<sup>521</sup> *ibid* p.97- 98

<sup>522</sup> *ibid* p.99

and in one complex level of human economy. The

complex level reserved for the

physiological phenomenon

is not physiological phenomenon

ethical

discourse and its extension

the biologist

“...I showed the foundations on which physiology must be based and from which the

history of the phenomena observed in physiology

must be drawn. But the

phenomena must be coordinated with

the other phenomena,

naturally curious seeks, causes thus rational physiology soon came into being.”<sup>523</sup>

Beyond the practical limit of observation that

defined the physiological connection

with metaphysics; in his notes he wrote “speak here of Cabanis.” The practical limit related to

the practical limit of apprehending observable

natural phenomena in the physiological

discourse concerned the problem of their

variable position which he had defined.

The physiological necessity of a process

between the physical and the moral

form in a physiological synthesis which could

be indicated in an.

524

This actual program of the discourse which

saw Cabanis from the broad values of the

physiology of the day and a new area that

supplied the general science of man and the

advance of that could not be known

edge of the historical knowledge about

encroached upon both by modern physicochemical

sciences and natural history, Cabanis

understood his grounded in the new organic evolution

theory had added the “crowning touch”

now having a scientific source in the history of

science as “examine the degree to which

the sciences advanced the Science of Man

and,” had early in the 18th century the

new concept of the human mind extended

to the Science of Man.

525

Grounding the doctrine of the nervous system

in the work of the synovial membranes

Cabanis had indicated the nature of the

through his investigations in the animal

continued within the synovial membranes. This was

developed as the evidence from

the anatomy of the joints in the natural

history of patients in themselves

526

<sup>523</sup> bib100

<sup>524</sup> bib100

<sup>525</sup> bib102

<sup>526</sup> See Rey (1991) *Philosophie des sciences*

in *Historiographie philosophique* (1794) and Cabanis

in *Physiologie des phénomènes observés dans le*

*l'homme*.

meia



Themethod described in Traité des membranes (1800) observed analysis of chemical techniques of tissue analysis namely physical methods such as boiling developed themethod by which membranes could be examined in form and spread through tissues while the ‘natural’ method of division of organism into its parts, uncovered ‘hidden’ operations by which nature could subsequently be revealed.

gave a satisfactory scheme of the reducing sophisticated techniques of the logic of decision of B that with through observation of natural before advancing to a more general

This organic form of Traité des Membranes (1800) expanded the function of Anatomie générale axiom of form and function of the scientific approach to physiology.

1800) was a theoretical abstraction (1801) I took the general method of organic law as advancing on the

as demonstrated in Lavoisier’s chemistry and by following Condillac’s analysis of the design gave attention to the ‘natural’ necessity by which the observed organic parts in the tissues could give an organized space for grounding the physiological processes. He derived from embryology,

“...essential differences between the physics and physiological laws....physics is constant properties and would require as kinds of calculation and would require as occurrence of phenomena which can be seen only of them by hierarchical and hierarchical extremely uncertain.”<sup>528</sup>

The significance of this indeed new organic language of hierarchical synthesis appeared in the field of Research in physiology separate different hierarchical levels of the demonstration that more hierarchical between synthesis of physiological functions of the physiological course is organic structures considered them as biological functions

space only to the extent that it ‘spoke’ the field of physiological course with hierarchical level of (1801) B that exogenous round degree of fertility, the investigation anatomical and hierarchical properties of the synthesis and functions

<sup>527</sup> This has a relation to those of Lavoisier’s chemistry described in Traité de chimie (1789) and has common epistemology with Condillac’s Logique.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid Section 3 “characteristic marks of vital properties compared with those of the physical properties.”

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The Organism of the Homoeomerous Parts and Bichat's Tissue theory

The organic ground of Bichat's tissues was in principle similar to Aristotle's 'homoeomerous' parts, standing as constituent units of the body. Aristotle's common substratum was a 'matter' transformed under the 'power of heating.'<sup>529</sup> This power could induce a third substance through their inherent qualities to form a third substance, "flesh, bone and the like."<sup>530</sup> The composition of the whole of the underphysi organic principle account for process of coming a 'mean.' This principle grounded the unity of the homoeomerous parts, and in turn, combined to give the organs (nonhomoeomerous) parts and finally the organismal unity of the body by the high phenomenon.

Bichat's tissue theory was therefore, not the neutral anatomical description, but a 'taxonomy of vital properties,' where distinct properties functioned with an ontological sense of genesis behind the structure of the phenomena.<sup>531</sup> In this respect, Bichat's 'tissue' drew upon the Latin word 'tela' (a web) referring to areolar or connective tissue running between many organs of the body. This already carried the historically value appearing to Galen as "fibre branches finer than spiders webs,"<sup>532</sup> and to Vesalius's *De humani corporis fabrica* as its woven "fabrica." When Francis Glisson was scraping tissue away from the liver in 1664 he described a 'feltwork' of the cellular structure in which the new body appeared connected.<sup>533</sup> In the original Encyclopedie (1751) the term of the fibre of the body was

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<sup>529</sup> The biological works of Aristotle against the course of the mind and the heart  
on the view of the ancient accounts in the *De Partibus Animalium* ch 639a  
<sup>530</sup> Aristotle *Generation of Animals* (1969) p 174  
<sup>531</sup> Open to a 'qualitative mathesis' see Foucault (1970) p 74  
<sup>532</sup> Singer (1956) p 63  
<sup>533</sup> The account of Glisson *De Hepate* (1664) give the view of the liver (1944) pp 168-173.  
161

understood as ‘tissu cellulaire,’ the system of fibres that implied a ‘structure,’<sup>534</sup> a basic content of the organism.

535

The significance for Bichat’s physiology came from the concepts described by Robert Hooke in *Micrographia* (1665). The structures of the body were not understood as a simple mechanical system, but rather as a complex, organized system. The concepts of ‘animal fabric’ running throughout the whole, were paralleled with this unity prior to the work of Bichat. Toward the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Théophile Bordeu, the Montpellier physician, looked to tissue as the “first materials” of the embryo which gave the substratum from which the organs were derived. It was not the organs themselves that were considered important, but rather that this contained the particular internal ‘environment’ as the continuity in them of the same elements. The organs were seen as deriving from each other, giving the autonomy “thus ensuring an existence peculiar to itself.”<sup>537</sup> Bichat’s heavy emphasis on the autonomy of the organs was a direct result of the work of Bordeu.

“placed around the organs, the different parts of this system which act at the same time as bonds connecting and uniting the body together. In the interior of these same organs, they essentially contribute to their structure.”<sup>538</sup>

Here was the interface between environment and the ‘existence peculiar to itself,’ a concept through the organs. The structures of the body were not understood as a simple mechanical system, but rather as a complex, organized system. The concepts of ‘animal fabric’ running throughout the whole, were paralleled with this unity prior to the work of Bichat. Toward the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Théophile Bordeu, the Montpellier physician, looked to tissue as the “first materials” of the embryo which gave the substratum from which the organs were derived. It was not the organs themselves that were considered important, but rather that this contained the particular internal ‘environment’ as the continuity in them of the same elements. The organs were seen as deriving from each other, giving the autonomy “thus ensuring an existence peculiar to itself.”<sup>537</sup> Bichat’s heavy emphasis on the autonomy of the organs was a direct result of the work of Bordeu.

<sup>534</sup> See Forest (1994) pp 444-458.

<sup>535</sup> Encyclopédie (1751-1780) John Morison (ed.) pp 444-458.

<sup>536</sup> Von Haller (1788)

“The same will be observed in the animal body, in which the same time.” *Éléments de physiologie générale* (1788) Bichat (1994) p 453

<sup>537</sup> Bordeu (1776)

<sup>538</sup> Bichat (1994) p 170

See Forest (1994) pp 444-458.

“The same will be observed in the animal body, in which the same time.” *Éléments de physiologie générale* (1788) Bichat (1994) p 453

Wolff (1744) p 170.



foreign and his substances Bichat applied his  
principles to anatomy in general, the organ  
system especially, hence the concept

functional anatomy of the organs  
in structural anatomy these could  
not be pathologically explained.

Value of the Significance of Research in Physiology

Significance

The description of the structure based on  
the empirical approach to unknown properties  
notion of balance, or Aristotle's concept of the 'mean', the living economy needed to explain a  
phenomenon in the undulatory conditions  
with the Hippocratic medical tradition on  
bodies such as in medical practice  
a doctrine in explaining the concept of  
the presence of the functions  
explaining physiological functions in the exhausted  
body in a more complete sense

functional anatomy of the organs  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
Here Bichat's vitalism retained its continuity  
in the medical tradition of the  
composite or 'blend' that Aristotle's physiology gave  
norm of function. <sup>543</sup> Extended the body as  
the functional anatomy of the organs  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

What was specifically intended to be explained as a  
development of medical thought For example, when in  
the domain of anatomy the power  
an interpretive tool for a dynamic explanation of a  
Renaissance in anatomy was developed as a  
an unknown now attributed by a  
establishing the specific function of the parts  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

<sup>543</sup> Galen's theory of the four humors  
of the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

functional anatomy of the organs  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic

<sup>544</sup> Fernel wrote that this unknown was "exceedingly involved and obscure, but not obvious  
and not in the domain of sensation  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
conspicuous and that present themselves to sensation" The Nature of the Mind (1542) in SH al

functional anatomy of the organs  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
in the body of the living Hippocratic  
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in the body of the living Hippocratic  
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in the body of the living Hippocratic

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<sup>545</sup> On the hand, F and G on focused on the

‘matter of life,’ where irritability was the property visibly localised in fibres of the body and

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general concept

The Sensation of duing he w off

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popety as internally ‘confounded at the source.’ But Bichat grounded the ‘properties of living

matter’ in his theory of living

power to explain life’s phenomenal capacity, now

given as index of force

act in Recherche physique sur la vie

in other cases

<sup>546</sup>

“The measure of life in general is the difference which exists between the effort of

extropow and of extresin d h

excess of form in indiaton

of its weakness; the predominance of the later an index of its force.”<sup>547</sup>

A concept of living force subordinate to existence

com es in he wake of the

epistemological success of Newton’s Principia and what originally intended to do

ae

ontological question from here onwards

com oes in fnd hie context w hat

presented itself as the ‘sum of forces’ of the body, was a ‘strategy’ for accounting for existing

forces in visible, observable bodies

chanatral and d hie language could be

developed by them in physiology. Therefor

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and progress of biology in general

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with respect to the data of biology

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<sup>545</sup> A strategy which follows Canguilhem’s maxim, “to act it is necessary to localise.” This gave his distinctions between nonbiological dynamism and biological dynamism. Canguilhem (1989) 39-43.

<sup>546</sup> See also F. Schlegel, *Über die Naturgeschichte des Menschen*, 1797, p. 11.

philosophy of biology (1984) 100

<sup>547</sup> Bichat (1827) p. 11

medicine. The new was  
promised to explain as  
in principle.

in giving the provisional groundwork

to be

This comprehensive synthesis of physiology  
from Bichat's physiology of the  
functions of the body brought together from a  
collection of vital properties extended from anat-  
omy to physiology. Vital properties were  
historically defined and contained  
from the explanation of the  
functions of the body.

proposed the discourse appeared in  
the *Mémoires de Bichat* (1800) as a  
broad doctrine of the properties of  
organical structures through the rational  
analysis of the physical properties of the  
various parts of the body. In the  
of phenomena and functions in the  
presence of the body.

A

The physiological concept of humors and fluids  
in animals is particularly evident  
“habitual succession of assimilation and excretion...  
of the parts of the body,  
have become heterogeneous to its nature”<sup>549</sup>

has a presence between organic and  
partial functions and gave,  
its own form to  
and for which they

The groundwork of the complex human  
with the existence of the  
“Yes, external, an inhabitant  
senses, senses according to his sense and  
by its voice, desires and its fears, it's pleasures and pains.”<sup>550</sup>

that is an explanation of  
the human  
of the world...feels, perceives, reflects on its  
frequent and common unit

Hence the dualism between organic and animal  
groundwork as a social process  
Secondly, the human mind extends beyond  
organs and habits and develops  
the organic functions in the dynamical bonds between

explained by the continuous  
of body functions in composition  
and that extend progressively beyond  
of the body as a whole. The body integrates  
the organs, feelings and heat

<sup>548</sup> Bichat wrote “let us pay homage to Newton [...] he was the first to discover the simplicity of cause reconciled with a multiplicity of effects.” Bichat (1827) p. 13

<sup>549</sup> Bichat (1827) p. 13

<sup>550</sup> Bichat (1827) p. 13







throughout the body how even any excess

will be conducted in various directions

would appear as fluctuations of vital power in the whole. ‘Excitations’ run through the body both

as strength and weakness according to the

number and physical

powers which “preside over exterior bodies” gives the concept of human life “allied at one time with the brute, at another time with spiritual nature.” Here was Bichat’s concept of the body as

human order and the constant

form en.

557

### Conclusion

This chapter is the legacy of French Science

and the emergence of sciences

and explained how Condillac’s Logic of the Senses would

fit the

and the history of physiology. This practice

extended to an emerging Science of Man

leading to the evolution of a new

of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and Bichat gave a new

and physiology between the body

and power that preside over the new

and physiology were conducted in French Science

and the emergence of sciences

and the history of physiology

This practice extended through the

medical observation of the case for

and the history of physiology

physiological knowledge that is the

and physiology with the subject of

next chapter which looks at Bichat’s importance for French Positivism in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>557</sup> Bichat 34- 40

Introduction

A Science of man in the French Enlightenment invoked a physiology to account for life's capacity for organization and how X and B that gave paradigm for distinguishing beings from 'mere' objects. The sum of the functions of the distinguished animal beings but this led to a researches physiologie which centred on establishing a trend in the of its will and in the higher manifestation of its capacity for organization. Bichat's work is the legacy of Condillac's design in determining natural relations between an economy of life and the 'hidden operations of fate.' This chapter shows new biological concepts of life and physiology in its

The chapter indicates that physiology was used to determine the relationship between the laws of life and the dynamism in an organism. This concept is the sign was not an analogue of life's forces, but observation in such a way as he interpretation of the life force as an index to "the sum of functions by which the life is defined." This shows that Bichat's work is a new way of defining life, and not a simple one. Bichat's method was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one. Bichat's method was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one.

The main theme of the chapter is the concept of the life force, which was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one. Bichat's method was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one. Bichat's method was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one. Bichat's method was a new way of defining life, and not a simple one.

and his Positivism retained central values of social order. But what became clear was that Saint Simon's primary concern after 1814 now became education through the turn to 'industrial values'. He is acknowledged as the founder of modern sociology through physiology which now became expressed as man's inner drives of humankind and the struggle between order and chaos. The 19th century saw the end of the paradigm of Saint Simon and the 'concept of labour' to ground an excessive materialism. Psychology now necessitated practical knowledge to uphold values that were evident within the scientific method.

This academic inheritance by Bichat's physiology in the 19th century debates surrounding the position of scientific method and the inclusion of psychophysiology has summed up a fundamental knowledge of the Positivism of August Comte as an epistemological project over explicitly against philosophical ends of an ideal of the human sciences. 'truly philosophical' revolution was described by Comte as a philosophical project that constrained biological objects to regions 'proper to living bodies.' But Comte rejected Bichat's concept of life as the 'sum of functions that resist death,' and accepted a contemporary view of biological existence as a function of the organism. Comte's paradoxical notion of the human mind showed that while Comte's Positivism stood against a regressive metaphysics, it substituted a fundamental philosophical position defined by a modern knowledge. Comte 'mapped' a concept which demonstrates the extent to which structural thinking overtook his Positivism. Comte's subordinated hereditary physiology to anatomical studies of the human and the new biology. This served as a paradigm but abandoned hereditary perspectives in favour of a social and political Positivism. It was a principle established in an 18th century debate over the Scientific Method and the human mind.

Although in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Xavier Bichat's developmental histories between the two lives, an organic ground and the assemblage of 'animal' functions, each had expanded new Science and France as a doublet opening a hole between discord and order to produce individual bodies. This presented them in form determinable by physicochemical laws, but in the process, the higher functions truly begin when the senses are exercised. Although Bichat's physiology retained something of the Hippocratic image of life's power, it now presented the power of the disorder of physicochemical forces as a thing to overcome. The achievement consequences of this

Firstly, from the early 1800's, Georg Stahl offered a perspective on death appearing as the event of physicochemical process and subject of law of chemistry and phenomena different from self and appearance of exception than a function of the potential of nature. Bichat's concept of life distinguished this as an 'island of vitality;' the opening of Researches physiologiques in chemistry. "life consists of the sum of functions by which death is resisted."<sup>558</sup> It was a notion that retained something evident in life's capacity for organization, now pictured as a sum of functions to be maintained only from within as a resistance against disorder was ultimately only temporary. This is the sum of his function of resistance distinguished from empirical biological beings from 'mere' objects, but left Researches physiologiques in chemistry as a problem of the higher nature and the life of an order in the higher nature of the organization. <sup>559</sup>

The second half of Researches physiologiques is a view of the outside of the body, the shells and the conceptual body, which needed the empirical concept of organization to pay the law of organization of an animal.

<sup>558</sup> Bichat (1827) in Stahl 822-23 of

Francis M. Ageron 10

<sup>559</sup> Jacob (1993) 88-92

Researches physiologiques in Stahl

not by

will once the essential potential  
organism through the function of  
body and being in the form of an  
in action and memory of the  
continued in the future

to a certain progress by extending  
the natural by natural processes  
death then the in a function of  
back to the organic ground, with  
aw ordinary at

560

Secondly, as from observations of  
against these progressive 'double' deaths' of organic and animal  
dynamic relations between organs, and a natural economy of life that stood as 'hidden operations  
of nature.' In Researches in Physiology

and death, opening a new front for investigation  
in the anatomy of physiology. These were  
equal appearing in the path of  
death, the hidden form of

'natural' life. But in the history of  
in the history of  
in the history of  
in the history of  
in the history of

"very many people were carried off before this time by disease."<sup>561</sup> But in the history of  
the concept of the hidden form of

"very seldom can we depart from the known phenomena of the living animal, when we  
undertake to inquire how the hidden form of life  
necessary to know the intermediary state between health and disease....but where shall  
we find the physician how to form such  
such an intermediary state, the profoundly hidden operations of nature?"<sup>562</sup>

A side observation of the hidden form of  
death, but in the history of a new category of  
the history of physiology, his work in  
the history of the hidden form of  
the expanding nature of the hidden form of  
of the history of the hidden form of  
physiology, the history of the hidden form of  
be excluded from the 'natural' body. A modern physiology can be

the zone of the hidden form of  
biological phenomena. In the history of  
the general principle of the history of  
the history of the hidden form of  
the history of the hidden form of  
the history of the hidden form of  
the history of the hidden form of  
the history of the hidden form of

of the hidden form of

<sup>560</sup> B. H. H. (1827) pp. 168-169, p. 175  
<sup>561</sup> H. A. F. H. H. (1827) pp. 168-169, p. 175  
<sup>562</sup> B. H. H. (1827) pp. 174

from historical concepts such as humoral disease and the concept of pestilence that might be taken as a form with which to advance their theories of disease and death. However, the extension that Greek medicine always “identified with their semiotics.”<sup>563</sup>

in and out of producing explanations how a grounded historical and surgical expansion of pathology was expected for new historical medicine and its field.

A historical concept of disease was a kind of categorical distinction that could be examined in a post-mortem examination that had been a source of post-mortem examination;” by contrast he identified post-mortem examination that could distinguish between

of a new phenomenon of organic historical ‘diseases in general.’ Organic phenomena were identified through the 18<sup>th</sup> century medicine “very seldom had and by extension between natural

of <sup>564</sup> Bichat’s pathological anatomy distinguished three temporal forms of death: i) a sudden death (physiological or poisoning) of an acute disease (pestilential, fever) covered by historical pathologies, and iii) a ‘third kind of death’ resulting from chronic organic disease where death would appear as a sign of a fatal disease. *Recherches physiologiques* on the order of the seat of morbid affections appearing as “tetter, syphilitic eruptions, and inflammatory pustules.”<sup>565</sup> From his work he expressed

of a research in physiology that was a new historical field in pathology that was described as a new advance in the history of organic medicine and its field.

organism as the form of an historical ground in a new system of pathology with extension in the study of natural history and the phenomenon of disease to find a way to overcome the cycle of

natural history and its field. Hence the new form of medicine in anatomy and general history of anatomy and physiology in the

“We have I think reached an epoch where morbid anatomy is about to receive a new and unexpected in part in the exception of certain types of fever and nervous affections very singular in their character and progress.”<sup>566</sup>

<sup>563</sup> This is by Cabanis (1806) *Œuvres complètes* 317  
<sup>564</sup> Bichat (1827a) ‘Preliminary Discourse Reprinted in Cabanis (1981) p167f  
<sup>565</sup> Bichat (1827a) *Œuvres complètes* (1981) p171

and insignificant to the opinions of  
endowment and great part of her  
body.”<sup>566</sup>

and many to high  
the book built lead

This show show her new category as intended to suppl

em entanolephology.

Bichat’s study appeared posthumously as *Cours de médicine anatomique* (1825) and his a

s

com pld form ture not follow ing hem odel of

Anatomie Générale By m roring t

m chod ing from heat of life and m ovi

ng to and higher in phology through

a phenom enology of death is extant to ou

he he cont versal part of the

anatomical experience.

<sup>567</sup> This context is high

Bichat has been seen to follow the

part of his epoch in an ingo context but

her new post order of life is by

del in ing hical vagueness of ing

being ng w liches such as C oviat

and René L. ännec.

being ng w liches such as C oviat

This is the point of his com pl

cat by he consider of life as a

but the phological is his

Bichat is com d ing of the H ppoat

image of life’s power, as power to resist physico-chem cal forces that go over when i

cal forces that go over when i

and the econom yoked in a phenom en

at ing in odes of life But

on itivel it w account for by observed bonds ing betw e

en riling and heat

and his physical concept of the dynam ic

elms that m nus of the secondary

phenomena of the two lives resolving into the historical triple focus which “physiologists have at  
all times been acquainted with.”<sup>568</sup> From his perspective, Bichat’s

ined w aa

concept of a *vis mot*

essentially different from an Aristotelian idea of *μεσότης* (or the

mean) This is the betw en extm and cen

and of life as a round point

Them ens not fed but it is phenom adgr

ees of vari ns by w hich ditud

en sibilities can be maintained in a dynamical equilibrium. For Aristotle, the “genuine physicist”

dem in es h in t by consider ing both the psy

chic and physical aspects of sens or

em on. <sup>569</sup> While the term *μεσότης*<sup>570</sup> does not suggest in prim them atal ston, does

<sup>566</sup> Bichat *Anatomie Générale* 738 & 739, 529.

see Appendix.

<sup>567</sup> Depending on one’s view, this was either the basis of a modern medicine (Ackerknecht) or an intrusive clinician’s gaze (Foucault).

<sup>568</sup> Bichat (1827) p. 176.

<sup>569</sup> See Tracy (1969) p. 200.



indicated by the dynamical equilibrium of opposing physical

apart from power which is in form and order

activated by a soul. From an objective perspective, the μεσότης is maintained by a virtual

concept of the organic body

ves to constitute the dynamic of 'health' in the

animus of physiology and psychology

his dynamical explanation

of the power of the

body corresponds to the

of the in the generation of

of existence in the biological

point of excess or deficiency beyond the concept

of the in the biological

beyond which produces change in a

two different kinds of

sensibility exclusive of the

energetic biological discourse

of the kind,

"...impossible to relate them [general diseases] to known laws of sensibility....they are

affected

versely modified in diverse parts and in diverse affections."<sup>571</sup>

But an attribution to the dynamical threshold would refer

to the fundamental relation between

physical and physiological phenomena of the

between a constant and a normal

variability of the

5

"physics is constant, vital properties are at every instant undergoing some change in

degree and kind, to judge them only by

the in the

variability of the

"<sup>572</sup>

A biological function has a relation to the

generally conceived of through the

dynamical relation between the

the vitalum of the

sum given by opposite physical

concept of the

in a certain sense

constant form of the physicochemical

The new physiology is the organic level

of the in the

a

physiological context

of the in the

of the in the

of the in the

more passive than the

and dynamical in the

of the in the

of the in the

<sup>570</sup> While the 'mean' is strictly mathematical in Plato's *Timaeus* (2B4-3D), but can be seen in the two extremes notably discussed in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (2nd part).

between

<sup>571</sup> *Biological Discourse* (1977) p.99

<sup>572</sup> *Biological* (1812) p.8

pushed by considering the perspective of a  
(concept of life) and pathology

thirdly the observation of dynamical 'bonds' or sympathies between organs of the body (the  
physiological concept of the body) that

experimentation in functional histology  
Mort 573

the observation but with a purpose  
even (concept of pathology) view and

sympathies between organs of the body (the  
view of the body that is termed by anatomists

as Research in physiology

Although Anatomical Pathology grounded in  
findings in medicine and surgery has  
interpreting the status of such actions because  
observation of the form of disease. These are  
the disciplines of anatomy and the physiology  
interpretation,

the significance of the form of body  
organism that changes according to  
of the effects associated with the  
health and disease in the body  
object as a part of observation and

“...The manner to proceed in autopsic examinations, must differ according to the  
different kinds of disease we have established com  
anatomical and the best method  
generally as a guide to the  
we arrive at a knowledge of those which are injured.”<sup>574</sup>

is only prosecuted in an  
give precise information  
of the form of the body in a manner

Hence 'precise ideas' required of an empirical sense of measure are incommensurable with  
in observation.<sup>575</sup> The reason why the anatomist should have

himself in this way as a technique under  
interpretation. A pathological method should be

data having in the patient's problem for  
findings from a precise analysis when

looking for evidence of life's capacity for organization at the level of the body.

<sup>576</sup> The

interpretation of dynamical observations

namely the form of the body as

with the least confrontation

a different kind and with the same principle

them use

proceed with a view to a physiological view.

<sup>573</sup> Bitham's Course of Anatomy (1977) p97

<sup>574</sup> Bitham (1827) Chapter:

'Considerations of the post mortem examination'

<sup>575</sup> Hall (1984) p97

<sup>576</sup> ibid p97



observing phenomena in the human body  
the following concerns of the Montpellier  
difference in dynamism within the  
with surgical intervention in the body as  
leading to a state of equilibrium  
the Montpellier doctrine of the vital force  
upheld. It distinguishes his approach from that of  
approach to the physiology of the vital  
aim was to define more clearly how the vital  
force or vitality served the purpose of the system.  
Bichat understood this as long as one thing in  
upholding the vitality in the sense that Stahl  
Bichat distinguished the dynamism of the spirit  
analysis of the vital force in anatomy of the

difference in the force of the  
physicians for whom sensitivity to  
the vital force was a concern  
introduces pathology in the  
the functional part of the body. This part of  
minimum which Bichat would show no  
He also pointed to the anatomical  
origin of sensitivity in the  
part actually appearing in the body as  
sign of progressive general physiology.  
from Haller's doctrine of the  
sensitivity of the Montpellier physicians  
cessory to the human body had properly  
indicated the target,

579

“...apply the science of natural philosophy to physiology would be to explain the  
phenomena of living bodies by the laws of matter  
in this system you would find  
and even from those of the vital force. The  
incultured herein are advantages of living  
over him because they support  
analysis of the vital force and define as  
the vital force in the organism or vaguer as  
vital action, vital influx, etc when their sense is not adequately defined.”<sup>580</sup>

is. He then is a file  
general form of physiology,  
works of Stahl have power of  
each of these with  
The Montpellier physicians had not  
adequately explained the phenomena  
if they had seen only,

This problem of the vitality  
needed positive approach Bichat's  
signs of developing new language in  
the conceptual point of view of Stahl. Observation of “the sum of the functions which

explaining phenomena in their ‘real aspect,’ which meant  
the observation and practical  
the anatomical approach of Haller and  
which is

<sup>579</sup> Bichat (1824) I xxxix cf Albury (1977) p68. This is central to Albury's analysis of the relation between  
Montpellier and Haller's methods, see p72

<sup>580</sup> Bichat (1824) p3

death” was a point of view that delimited physical differences at the level of animal function. Redechephysobiquitratheperci  
 henderm natanin alonephroughstha  
 secondpartbook.

inthenaphysobyconfring  
 nexpeim entm chodascountdthe

Because observation was an analytical procedure, Bichat understood himself as doing something distinct from the “animated anatomy” of Haller. This display partook the perspective of an intervention in a useful relation to a general physiology. The method follows conditions of division in restricting itself to visible alterations as contained in comparable regions. Bichat’s perspective of physiological phenomena within a system of observations. Secondly, the anatomical method introduced a focus within the system of observations. Because observational analysis carries within it a comparison with the conditions of the problem, the method was able to define a region of phenomena that was significant.

how n nom sofratesB that  
 takenly as beln to anatomical  
 yobgy. The method follows  
 in anatomical division in  
 ew ok language as integrated  
 comparison with the conditions  
 the extension of this part through a  
 the problem of observation.  
 the display techniques of natural  
 of phenomena prior to an intervention.  
 the problem which could contain

581

The biological method was based on a firm ground of anatomical observation. Generalizing the method of since the thinking of the method branched into certain legacy of Bichat’s thinking which gives the sense of positivistic optimism extended the field of sciences. Anatomie Générale and his oeuvre in the provision of Bichat’s Cours d’anatomie pathologique, this text promises the synthetic ‘détournement’ of human mind owing to an exhaustive concept of the body,

organism which materializes  
 variations of the organs. Anatomie  
 the body as a developing future  
 and Anatomie Générale as a firm a

582

<sup>581</sup> Bichat (1824) 22A to C and Guller (1994) 212

<sup>582</sup> Rey (1991)

“All is thus indicated...that diseases relate to us in the solids and fluids; to claim the  
 opposite would be in the consensus,  
 where a man and his organs are of  
 death”<sup>583</sup>

This sense of purpose has a political valence  
 Bichat makes a moral case for the extent to which his  
 anatomical generalizations are a necessary part of physiology.

It has been suggested that focussing on this legacy neglects the perspective on Bichat’s method  
 which extends from *Recherche Physique* (experiment) to *Physiologie* (observation of the living).  
 But in fact his approach was already  
 programmatically outlined in Bichat’s early *Discours sur le phlegme* (1797) where he  
 observed that physiology should proceed from the observation of the living rather than  
 present-day dissection for analytical purposes.  
 In medicine, this is the case for the study of the living rather than the study of the dead.  
 The historical background of the pathology of the living is the study of the living rather than the study of the dead.  
 The historical background of the pathology of the living is the study of the living rather than the study of the dead.

Textual Considerations of Anatomical Pathology

Bichat’s pathological anatomy course started in September 1801 and comprised 80 lessons  
 given over a six-month period. The period in medicine  
 Anatomie Générale was his work as produced on the basis  
 of his observations of the living rather than the study of the dead.  
 He 26 January 1801 the G and H ospital  
 d’Humanité. According to Bichat’s accomplice Matthieu François Régis Buisson, this involved  
 over 600 copies of the work on the living rather than the study of the dead.  
 The Anatomie Générale period in France  
 to consult the text of the work produced

<sup>583</sup> Bichat (1964) p.28.

<sup>584</sup> Nobil Lect (1984)

<sup>585</sup> Monteil (1964) p12. This text appears in 1964 after Foucault’s *Birth of the Clinic* 963.

himself;<sup>586</sup> he changed his name in order to  
during the period of the pathology course. For the  
adopted different approach.

in plain findings  
new pathological anatomy course. Bichat

The title of Course Anatomie pathologique publi  
was adopted from an manuscript by Pierre A. Gu  
containing documents by other followers of Bichat, notably Jean Cruveilhier, another of Bichat's  
students, who thought that text did not accurately reflect Bichat's disciplinary intentions; this  
was developed as a symposium.

<sup>587</sup> This content and its respect appear

edita

manuscript of notes for the course covered by the  
medical historian Jean Monod writing in 1964, a  
pathological notes come after Bichat's major achievements and could therefore be seen as a

shared in 1825 by François Gabriel Boissieu

use Bédard. Even then this was a

Grenoble Medical School 1902. The

was significant in the Anatomie

recapitulation of his work, the fact that

his production was composed not only of

years. Monod may perhaps have noted

composition in the individual account of

Bichat's pathological anatomy course, including those of Jean Cruveilhier's

on

his system of anatomy and his ideas on anatomy

in his period of Monod's

considered the Grenoble pathology

from which he had freedom

Anatomie générale.<sup>588</sup>

A Bichat's anatomical history on

consolidation of his work

syntheses which appeared "from the amphitheatre," a different emphasis appears as to the status

of pathological anatomy. Pierre A. Gu

systemic approach to the grounded

since then, phrasing necessity of being pr

own knowledge, his conclusion was that

Cruveilhier, who attended the pathological anatomy course, understood as Bichat's intention. In

his work from the 1902 Monod quotes

"It is here, especially, where one has seen the weakness of medicine and the need for

following the method of pathological ana

tom, which was his own new li

his observations with precedents and with guide

Thus open cooperation

<sup>586</sup> p. 12

<sup>587</sup> Monod 1964, p. 25,

<sup>588</sup> Monod 1964)

in the room of vitalism philosophy  
in its own right according to you  
helping deviations from what we  
them and cure them, fortunately.”<sup>589</sup>

Then the difference between physiology  
can symbolize the difference between  
experience and construction  
between physiology and philosophy  
between phenomena and symbols  
A way of seeing symbols in  
approaches at the level of the ‘torch which one shines,  
because Bichat and his colleagues  
designed the changes in physiology

these books will help you  
allying the ideas  
be able to know them to prevent

and expanding the role of the body  
The threshold of living  
one may say Bichat’s vitalism  
the construction of the parts  
view of any unified point of view.  
in the domain of physiology  
The context of  
primary techniques defined by the  
biological concept.

The problem of the design was  
in its own right in the domain of phenomena  
and Bichat’s acceptance  
denying the existence of phenomena

in defining a region for interpretation

a

key to the conditions for  
physiology as an unknown without

“It is necessary to banish this disease of the nosological frame, not because it doesn’t  
interest, but because it is unknown for us.”<sup>590</sup>

This is how physiology intended  
to be taken up in a task against  
physiology represents the function of Bichat  
with his persistence over the history of  
interpretation according to the

a ‘therapeutic anarchy.’<sup>591</sup> A Swiss and the study of

of functional value in medicine  
has given awareness of the role of  
her in the history of physiology through

<sup>589</sup> Bichat M on 1964 p26

<sup>590</sup> Bichat p28

<sup>591</sup> See M on 1964 p31-33.



Their problem is not clear  
with anatomical and physiological

“if, for each sympathy necessary in an explanation,  
hadly been enough. The reason of this is  
reason is that

592

But the task of physiology is  
Not only the second part of Recherches physiologiques  
physiological function and the H approach  
conceptual bond between heart and brain as a  
function of the body has been not  
conceptualism observed  
of the heart and the body

the hand is a specific problem  
in the field of knowledge

hundreds of

how it should be

specific function of the body.

saw Bichat in his

through various

form of experimental analysis

has ultimately required

the whole of biological

understand experimental physiology.

593

This is an inversion of Bichat's  
as he expected with his  
subordination of anatomy to

the form of the body

gave the concept of the

observation of the body

the core value in Bichat's vitalism. This should perhaps not be understood in the sense of

and the application of his

but in a conceptual sense that

agreed with the physiological

to be obtained through knowledge

and it is expressed behind

Bichat's three levels of observation; a sensibility, a

physiological and the

the concept of 'bonds' or sympathies that the body expresses as a

function of the whole

and the accumulation of

the production of the content of the

object of the new knowledge

may explain Bichat's

decision to abandon the

not

ed his

awareness of the physiologist's

---

<sup>592</sup> Bichat (1964) 39

<sup>593</sup> Leclerc (1984) 73.

But appear to be a common in the such as  
 Unlike the such as the Descartes who had an  
 physiology that took the theory as a  
 physiological grounding fundamental  
 health and freedom in the mind  
 in the same way as the Science of Man  
 knowledge in the disciplines of  
 Descartes and the other of them  
 integration of new knowledge with the  
 psychological awareness of his sense  
 of the knowledge of an individual  
 representation of the by Rousseau and

episodes of physiology in his day.  
 negative opinion of the discipline of  
 guarantee of the scientific  
 knowledge in the science beyond  
 biological and the C and the  
 with the biological concept of hum an  
 of the external the awareness by  
 the knowledge of the system at  
 could not be the acts of  
 physiology in the form of a  
 sense of the nature of producing the  
 not

What was pushed under the physiology was a  
 physical and the other of the sense of the  
 “hangs as a wraithlike intellect over institutions and attitudinal changes of his day”<sup>594</sup> of  
 in the mind of the subsequent education. But  
 in the same way as the Science of Man  
 unified the disciplines of the human  
 man’s world. Paradoxical his character by pro  
 posed a discipline of the knowledge. How ev  
 has a copy of the two of the knowledge  
 discipline of the social became  
 Position.

is here the fundamental concept of the  
 of the nature of the physiology  
 his was a legacy of the  
 Science of Man and of the new  
 developing a new language adequate  
 to a new scientific discourse,  
 in the 18<sup>th</sup> century in the  
 of the new age of the evolution and  
 the challenge of the French 19<sup>th</sup> century

The Science of Man in the

In the decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century  
 the fundamental of the future science

the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a

of the Science of Man could

How ever the impact of the legacy, as an

<sup>594</sup> Leach (1984) p.79

unfalsifiable as Foxam pte,

Bichat in preschamotic conveying

the need to take up a ‘special reasoning’ as is evident amongst his students. The Roux

commented,

“Bichat has metamorphose my youth through inspiring me with the taste of science and the love of work”<sup>595</sup>

This is perhaps an example of the idea of Science

in reached beyond the

medical program. The significance conveyed by Cabanis and Bichat

ably by Henri

de Saint-Simon who expressed this in 1813

in a handcopied Memoire sur Science

sur l’homme. He had conceived this as follows

ing,

“the next most important step in the development of science

by Viqu

d’Azyr, Cabanis, Bichat and Condorcet, was to deal with the whole of this science in

one single work by completing the material of these four great men.”<sup>596</sup>

By 1813 Saint-Simon had already established

essw cam chock Potim In cant

com point of biology and industry

he sharply attacked how to

subordinate a Science of Man to them as well

g hem he butes

and “...sorry

calculus who lie behind

their ramparts of X and Z.”<sup>597</sup>

Broadly speaking, Condorcet’s

status was essentially technical by his

om up the power esohum an ind,

diploma superior in modern sciences

de la guin point by 1813 Saint

Simon had already seen his distance from many

pects Philosophy thought

<sup>598</sup> What could

appear Condorcet’s epoch of his described

ancient and progressive as described

by Saint-Simon in Introduction aux travaux scientifiques

ques de science (1807) as an acute

struggle between organic and inorganic

how expressed in the overlapping systems

of knowledge, growing in organic conditions

scientific

transitions necessary for the overturning of

he order of the

‘new’ could be brought

into being. These are undercurrents of

for the form

ed Saint Simon’s concept of

progress as a fresh needed negation of

ultimately the domain of nature. This as

what men do not know, and what

to contend with; to ‘become positive’ in knowledge

<sup>595</sup> M on p 44

<sup>596</sup> Saint-Simon (1966) K Lp 27-

28 ‘Memoire sur la science d l’homme’

<sup>597</sup> pp 39-40 Saint-Simon and Taylor (1975) p 111

<sup>598</sup> M an et 1959 p 117

w as a k u n d e r k e n n e i s e c o n d y n a m i c  
 c o u l d b e a b s o l u t e a p p r o v a l t h e  
 n o w f u n d a m e n t a l a n d r e l a t e o n l y t o a p h a s e o f t h i s  
 f u n d a m e n t a l u n d e r s t o d o f g e n e r a l i s m o v e m e n t  
 o n t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l l e v e l s o m e t h i n g c o n  
 k n o w l e d g e H i s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n s y n t a c t i c  
 “systole and diastole,” appearing as the a priori/a posteriori dichotomy, a “breathing in and out,”  
 whose origins were in the “very fibres of the nervous system.”<sup>599</sup> H i s c o n t e n t a t o f  
 s i n c e t h e n a n o w d e s c r i b e s p e r a l

“our eyes grow tired when we look at things for a long time from the same point of  
 view. W e h e n s t o p d i s c o v e r i n g a n o n g t h e m n e w r e l a t i o n s h i p s W e e v e n s t o p  
 p e r c e i v i n g t h a t t h e y t h o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w e h a d o n c e s e e n .”<sup>600</sup>

I k n o w t h a t S a i n t S i m o n ' s c o n c e p t o f k n o w l e d g e w a s a n a d v e r s e s t r u g g l e w i t h  
 D e c a r t e s a n d t h e s y n t e t i c m e t h o d e n e  
 G a l i l e o ' s e p i s t o l a r e p u b l i c a t i o n o f  
 e p o c h R e a l i t y a s S a i n t S i m o n ' s s t r o n g i d e a . A p p r o a c h i n g h i s t o r i c a l m o v e m e n t r e q u i r e d a n  
 a c t i v i t y o f ‘s e e i n g ,’ h e n e w e p o c h a s o f t h e 19<sup>t h</sup> c e n t u r y T h i s a y b e c a m e a h i s t o r i c a l  
 h e S c i e n c e M a n o w i t h n e e d f o r s y n t a c t i c k n o w l e d g e t o f l o w o u t .

### Saint Simon on The Physio-Political

I h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s i n g S a i n t S i m o n o n t h e f i r s t  
 w h i c h h i s t o r y w a s h a t c h a n g e t h e s w e e p i n g h u m a n  
 a n a c h r o n i s m p r o p o s e d b y d e m o c r a t i c s i a  
 i n v e r t i n g i t s ‘t e n d e n c i e s’ a n d s e e i n g i t s e n e r g e n c e p r o d u c e d i n t h e  
 h i m s e l f f r o m C o n d o r c e t ' s s o n a p o l i t i c a n a n d u n d e r t h e  
 c o n t r o l o f S a i n t S i m o n e t c a t a h i s t o r i c a l a c t e d f r o m ‘w i t h o u t ,’ i m p o s i n g

<sup>599</sup> ‘Introduction aux travaux scientifiques de xix siecle’ Saint Simon (1859) I p73, ‘Memoire sur la science d  
 l’homme’ pp145-146 and ‘Travail sur le gravitation universelle’ pp228-229 Saint Simon (1966) L&M anuel  
 (1956) 143-145

<sup>600</sup> Saint Simon (1859) 164 L&M anuel om m ent 9

<sup>601</sup> The Im of Em # D ukhem i Social and Saint

change from anarchy to order and  
the founding of a new society  
autonomous and self-governing.

by Aristotle and responded to  
the early political thought

Saint Simon's early development gives some indication as to what he took a Science of Man to be.  
In 1813, Saint Simon was engaged in

the political project of

the scattering of the 'troops of the Enlightenment.' After the dissolution of the Classe des  
Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1803 and during

the political career of Napoleon

Bonaparte, Saint Simon's reflected on Ideologue ideas during the Consulate period. He  
proceeded to develop a new form of a new encyclopedia

and project during the Empire

and in his new treatise on the study of

the social sciences in 1798.

<sup>602</sup> Saint Simon was

and in his treatise on the study of

the political project of

the Ecole de Médecine which became famous with

the work of Xavier Bichat and Pierre

Jean Georges Cabanis and personal acquaintance with

the human beings of the physiologists of Jean

Burke and how to organize a new society

in his <sup>603</sup> *Memoire sur La Science de L'homme*

from which he derived his

Simon's 'physico-political career.'<sup>604</sup>

From Cabanis, Saint Simon appears to have

the political project of

the political project of

the political project of

the political project of

from the 'mechanical' distributions of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and

looked forward to more 'organic' concept of human knowledge. 'Organic' appears to have been

understood by Saint Simon as a synthesis of

the political project of

and the political project of

the political project of

<sup>605</sup> However, even in the new era

of the political project of

the political project of

the political project of

the political project of

will.

<sup>602</sup> 'Introduction aux Travaux Scientifique du XIX Siecle' (1807) cf Manuel (1956) p80, p84-88.

<sup>603</sup> The 1841 edition of *Œuvres complètes de Saint Simon*

edition available by Benjamin Oudinot-Rodrigues

<sup>604</sup> Saint Simon (1841) p69-5; Pichon (1993) p61.

See also G. Usdoff (1960) p308 and Pichon (1891)

<sup>605</sup> Manuel (1956) p131.

The book now defines differing intellectual regions, perhaps in the manner of Bichat's  
 such a conversation in the theory of the mind and body  
 period of the Enlightenment had absorbed an idea that "all sciences began by  
 being conjectural, their destiny is to become positive".<sup>606</sup> In the 18th century a  
 physiology of the mind and body emerged as a separate discipline  
 century when the sciences of the mind and body were distinguished  
 physiology dealt with by Vicq d'Azyr, Cabanis, Bichat and Condorcet, there are certain  
 reservations developed in the image of the human mind inherited from Condorcet's *Esquisse*.  
 Perhaps a consequence of the scientific revolution was the new  
 identification of general knowledge.<sup>607</sup>

"There are two kinds of scientific study: search for the generalization  
 those facts, that is the improvement of general theory... Locke and Newton as well as  
 new approaches to the study of nature. One of the great achievements of the  
 17th century was the development of the scientific method. The new  
 Locke's *Form of Government* and the scientific method were the work of  
 two men. It has been preoccupied by facts and has neglected theory."<sup>608</sup>

The great theory was Saint Simon's core problem. This is the synthesis of  
 understood to be the form since the 18th century. These methods of analysis  
 progress in the history of the mind and body  
 Descartes' philosophy branched into physical and organic philosophy.  
 organic philosophy of the mind and body.  
 epoch. By invoking a return to Descartes' philosophy of the mind and body  
 people but the scientific method of God,

"The idea of God lacks unity...the idea of God being defined as the  
 and the quality of the mind and body  
 in the space of the mind and body  
 the phenomena of the physical and the phenomena  
 that are mental are the phenomena of fluids."<sup>610</sup>

<sup>606</sup> Saint Simon (1966) pp 25-31, 'Memoire sur la science d l'homme'

<sup>607</sup> M. and 1950 p 158

<sup>608</sup> Saint Simon and Taylor (1975) p 86

<sup>609</sup> Saint Simon (1859) 12 in 115 P. King 1993 p 72

<sup>610</sup> ibid pp 199-201







Individual ‘truth’ would be expressed only through knowledge understood by the danger of individualism by recent developments in technology

heredocountasam oam possibi  
 aacore conscience  
 619 Coidre  
 friy handeddow nihfaceofe  
 hiry an inherent lack in any ‘new language’  
 ondangerous/extends  
 theyfresh body. 620

When Saint-Simon argues the superiority of scientific revolution and the dynamism of science in general

em iddagesedaw sonD eB onallat  
 butthem iddagesforgroundingofie  
 asNew onLockancheEncyclopaedis  
 m edvacyw ihenew know ledge  
 w phisim ihisw oldhatis  
 noM an. 621

From *Memoire sur La Science De L’homme* in *New Anthropology*

In 1813 Saint-Simon was publishing his work on physiology and the development of science

egainin elon the discipline of  
 imM em oisul LaScience De L’homme  
 essonictal iexperienceasoganic  
 A sinceleas developed from afire

“Psychology is beginning to be based on physiology and the prejudices on which it was founded...Physiology does not yet deserve to be classed among the positive sciences but it is on the verge of becoming one”

spindrom plitior above  
 622

The physiology was seen as a primary social science

dom anoknow ledgeheducatm an  
 o em bodyhegeneralebyw hihandcoulgu  
 ile

<sup>619</sup> See Robert D. 1944 pp 315-331  
<sup>620</sup> D eB onallK oya 1956 p 69  
<sup>621</sup> Saint-Simon and Fayol 1975 p 99  
<sup>622</sup> Ibid 112-113

combined intellectual power of the physiologist and the philosopher...” which in the  
 program at the time of the physiologist philosopher  
 approached this as the “series of progress of the human mind,” a future science that appears  
 consequently in the work of Condorcet and Saint-Simon as a historical account of the progress of  
 knowledge from its original condition in Jean Buridan. What he expounds is a theory of  
 knowledge by which the new social arrangements  
 of society are organized by the human mind  
 of development evident in the phenomena of nature.  
 e.<sup>623</sup>

The task of an anthropologist is to determine the strength of a specialised knowledge and its mediators, “as long as the principles that it knows are  
 unknown to the common people.”<sup>624</sup> Saint-Simon on the subject of Condorcet’s  
 Rousseau’s conjectural idea of the ‘noble Savage.’ By equating the history of the human  
 cycle, *Memoire sur la science de l’homme* led to a new anthropology experience  
 seen in the progress of a development in the history of the human mind.  
 recent anthropology of the 19th century, such as the work of Louis Auguste Bourguignon  
 and Jean-François LePouévoir, had previously been considered speculative fiction.<sup>625</sup> Because  
 could now be demonstrated that “a non interrupted series of observed facts” followed from  
 primitive and European societies, Saint-Simon extended the physiological foundations of  
 the history of anthropology.<sup>626</sup> He argued that the progressive evolution of the human  
 world in respect to social organization and individual through collective language and  
 the European societies was a result of a more advanced.

How even today, however, appears in the history of the human mind, a program for the construction of the human world  
 a response to the forces of nature which are with forces that could “plunge the human species back into the state of nature which is

<sup>623</sup> Pakenia 82n.  
<sup>624</sup> *ibid.* 114 to Anst 1970, pp 18-  
<sup>625</sup> François LePouévoir, *La Com m ande de l’Inde*  
<sup>626</sup> Saint-Simon (1966) X Lp 115; Pakenia (1993) p 84

continuous war.”<sup>627</sup> This demonstrated his conviction that progress was only possible

through the gradual evolution of the human

species, a process that would be completed

by the time of the French Revolution.

His theory of evolution was based on the

idea of a common ancestor.

He argued that all life forms had evolved

from a single point in time.

His theory was based on the

idea of a common ancestor. He argued that all life forms had evolved from a single point in time.

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His theory was based on the idea of a common ancestor.

Australia. One of the tasks taken up by the Société had been to prepare instructions for ‘studying savages’ for the accompanying nine zoologists and botanists.<sup>630</sup>

The ‘observateurs’ that rose to this occasion to “perfect anthropology” were Joseph Marie Degérando and George Cuvier. In their approach, Degérando brought

with him the ideas of the Science of Man.

His theory was based on the idea of a common ancestor.

crucial to becoming like their ‘fellow citizen’ and open an exploration through Ideologists psychology. Savage articulation was “no doubt composed of symbols as arbitrary and

conventional as our own” yet they equally could present the insight into a “beginning from the language of action.” Degérando was therefore seeking a bridge from body to mind on the basis

of a natural theory of behavior.

<sup>627</sup> Huxley (1993) p86,

<sup>628</sup> Huxley (1993) p161

<sup>629</sup> Soding (1964) p135

<sup>630</sup> Undercombe and Nichols (1975) p48

questions of the status of organized  
 philosophe' travelling into the past, accords with Saint Simon earlier ambition of resolving the  
 questions in order through progress  
 he emerging sciences point developed under  
 taxonomist H's approach depicted the language debate  
 structure. Cuvier's interests suggested that the voyagers should make sure to visit the places  
 where the dead were buried to obtain skeletons and  
 approach them phasing the epochal differences  
 François Peron was hoped the expedition H enot  
 geographical and zoological indicators  
 before they became populated. This  
 were 'aboriginally' distinct thereby foregrounding the racial difference that marked the end of  
 the myth of the noble savage as the seat of a 'mysterious history.'<sup>633</sup> The advent of new  
 anthropology can be associated with liberal  
 Revolution.

This gave the new anthropology a grounded  
 visions of degradation or 'aboriginal difference,' and a new horizon which appeared  
 in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century articulated by the Florentine approach. The possibility that  
 suggested through the new anthropology was ap  
 that the evidence from the study of skulls  
 which in the end opened a central problem of  
 Darwinian theory.<sup>634</sup> However, the comparative psychological approach was  
 concerned with the new species which Degé  
 polygenism ('lumpers' and 'splitters') unanswered. Such motivations were evident of the  
 reform of Science in the 19<sup>th</sup> century  
 since the cultural legacy of the past

<sup>631</sup> Stocking (1964) p139

<sup>632</sup> Ibid p143.

<sup>633</sup> Ibid p145

<sup>634</sup> Until 1859, anthropology in France had become above all 'craniology' Stocking (1964) p146.

<sup>635</sup> Stocking asserts Degérando's deference, Ibid p146



How evidence is according to function  
an emerging paradigm of the day that  
carry out function and function are

difference and not in quality as  
solution on how one organ does not  
utilize about several organs

“In the animal economy there are a great number of organs which appertain to several apparatuses.”<sup>638</sup>

Bichat on the anatomical and physiological  
and in applying his advanced physiology of

namely in spirit of the house of functions  
wherein the function is grounded a

‘composite function.’ This distinction paralleled the Museum debate which found its ascendancy  
from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century when composite functions were defined as

the central

problem associated with the concept of

the organ as

Composite function was a new historical paradigm

but in the body the conceptual

choices were listed from the perspective of

the use of the term by Lamarck

joined Museum natural history as a part

of the zoology in 1793. Within

the history of biology (1802) the term biology

was given by the *βίος* meaning of

life and the study of

the living through the invocation of the

early biology and the study of the

idea of the science of the life of

from the history of the mind and the animal

σ *ψυχῆς* listed by the Homeric

heresies in the history of

<sup>639</sup> This term entails the notion of living beyond

any

individual presence but in the emergence of

positive sciences needing greater

precision (B.C. 550) they

gave the term ζῶν to distinguish life as such from its

evidence of activity distinguished from the

opposition to passivity. <sup>640</sup> I was a

dynamic that explained the dynamism of

the form of the animal in the world

from an activity and the disappearance of

the form or the paradigm was

seen in the same as the presence of a soul,

drawing on his earlier knowledge

some things possessing a soul

“a thing can nourish itself and grow and decay.”<sup>641</sup> The

<sup>638</sup> Bichat (1834) 1: xi, xix of Albury (1977) p89 “Citizen Cuvier and Dumeril have also chosen the functional character by which the organs function in the whole as a procedure on a new high can be adopted in our present state of knowledge.” (Ibid xv)

<sup>639</sup> As understood as ‘the course of life’ Aristotle, (N Ethics), or Hesiod, ‘to live by a thing’ (Herodotus). see entry in Liddell & Scott

<sup>640</sup> TSH 1968 p343-344

<sup>641</sup> De Anima at Canguinem (1994) p80.

m odenebbyhatim edaexpandingki en language beyond the gacy of he  
 G reksure the probm hrough an inns fctudy of a throy ac the ncbf  
 hel 8<sup>h</sup> century. <sup>642</sup> The problem of life was a conceptual btm around the fu/  
 of being found on the axis of. The physiobgialk p he ady confond  
 hifm hem ill 8<sup>h</sup> century as Georg Stahl, looking to ground physiology's elemental notions,  
 proposed a concept of appearing as pow et suspende h of our p h h is  
 way Stahl's vitalism proposed seeing organs as being tools with specific ends but in which  
 organifondw aheunknow nm echanim hatt and these ends <sup>643</sup> A nitea of fondn  
 ady boked beyond the im ploppoin of e snc and bence of ψυχή; m odervim  
 boked on index fondn that to adis defied through a concept of hat being.  
 W hen K ant drew on h is he saw he organid body as both m achine and organim ,but  
 dnguhed an organim ad hief h thought snced possess form a te nergy on he  
 ground that organid bodyw as organim ed but organing. <sup>644</sup>

In the Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle, the nascent biology looked to matrix of the body for a  
 concept of a fluid Lam ack ou h e h e m p h y study of form in Phisophi Zoobgique  
 (1809) as derived from he dition or coagulo n associated with h e h e h e an  
 accum uland as in a b r i h i t u d e s g d Lam ack saw he d e o g n s of organi  
 st d e h e t e n d e d a s a d i c o u r s e o n m a n w h o e t n s c e n d e n t a t e e x p l i e d w h y  
 dominant races spreads out "into all the habitable places suitable for them."<sup>645</sup> From h i s  
 anthropogical Phisophi Zoobgique in a g n e h e n a t u r e l l e v o y a g e m o v i n g t o  
 hep a b e w e n h e n a t u r e l l e h e a t h e n d b e y o n d h e s t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e o n a  
 conjectural h i s <sup>646</sup>

Lam ack w as n s w e i n g h e q u e s t i o n o f h e o b s e r v a b l e o d e r o f a t u r e f o r m h e p o i n t w h e e  
 nature of form and how it organial ym ed it d Lam ack does not appear under  
 about the limits of such a conjectural method; "if science neglects philosophy, its progress will

<sup>642</sup> Lanham (1968) p.136

<sup>643</sup> Schlegel (1971)

<sup>644</sup> Kant (1978) pp.20-22

<sup>645</sup> Lam ack Phisophi Zoobgique V ol. 1 p. 10

<sup>646</sup> <http://www.bic.hawaii.edu/~lhamack/>

Canguhem (1994) p.70.

not be real.” The zoological object remains provisionally situated between a productive resource and the knowledge of him which economists have a specific problem even in a profound secondary characteristic in which through a decomposition of the animal seen with the help of a copposition of the animal forms taking together the productive animal forms. But one must understand Lamarck’s problem as explaining a simple response of an animal appearance which is a violence of environment. <sup>647</sup> What was to be observed in the ‘circumstances’ between milieu and organism? This Lamarck’s thought retained the potentiality of the equilibrium of living forms which philosophically was a problem of representing an animal development in relation to the concept of work. This necessitates a different concept of environment than a simple form of the animal production.

648

The hybrid concept that informs Physiologie animale <sup>649</sup> This is a lesson as follows from the task of formulating a new language form a perspective of an anthropocentric biology whose value precedes the observation of form. <sup>650</sup> But Cabanis Lamarck takes his form through a consideration of the animal form taken in an investigative approach to the valuation of physical forms.

“at their source, the physical and the moral are no doubt the same thing. By studying the organization of the faculties of the animal, we now find a new explanation of the impressive evidence for this truth...The influence of the physical on the moral has already been recognized but we must have seen that we have not yet given sufficient attention to the physical itself.”<sup>651</sup>

The question that Lamarck appears to be explaining is how physical actions, “habitual and energetic,” can coordinate a power to transform- to “stand in opposition to herself.” In this sense it will be clear that Lamarck’s biology is an explanation of transmission of acquired characteristics as a new biological problem that appears for Darwin with

<sup>647</sup> Bachelard (1982) p.53-54.

<sup>648</sup> Bachelard (1982) p.55-63.

<sup>649</sup> ibid p.64

<sup>650</sup> Lamarck (1907) Bachelard (1982) p.74

<sup>651</sup> Lamarck indicates Cabanis’ Rapport (in the notes) ‘Preliminary discourse’ to Zoologie Philosophique





The context of 1914 was the Sain Sim movement. The problem was how to build a new society independent of the old economic system. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system.

It began with the Sain Sim movement. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system.

654 h

Sain Sim is a social movement. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system.

The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system. The Sain Sim movement was a social movement in the sense that it sought to establish a new social order through the abolition of the old economic system.

as Sain Sim on focus on the struggle for a new social order

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<sup>654</sup> Sain Sim on that government sentiments verging on the "anarchic" claims Durkheim (1959) 194

Sim on saw class em besh p adiven by avary o  
 cum successed from in the d w eltopu  
 value of syn the phisophy ac gainedi  
 diverging, yet ‘natural’ forces, are something to which all are exposed.<sup>655</sup>

fun natural and extreme  
 ous high J nd the cond on be  
 spe on of by Society through wh

O n the industrial revolution  
 anouthrough an experion of new od land t  
 subject to an im poon of the hum an w ll 18  
*L’Organisateur* in Auguste Comte’s secretary Th  
 he dis tige and a concept of how appe  
 som things psychogans w h h h eem sle  
 nd how eve to be taken in any narrow sense since  
 industrial values extend to be post m usians an  
 com p m entry even necessary as suppl m ents  
 tendency to put the health of the  
 a capacity to form a new form of m  
 h e d h e m ing disappoin m ent in t  
*sur la science de l’homme* and *Travail* in *Journal Universel*  
 rom an iposy ob h d an encoaching o  
 was crucially sensitive to man’s moral health and the looming dangers of history. Saint-Simon’s  
 response is que the problem of knowledge confront  
 of 19<sup>th</sup> century French thought w as each form edit  
 m ode of by Saint Simon represent h  
 o M an.<sup>657</sup>

he expression of man’s inner drives seeking  
 h e n s o m a b i n o n h u m a n o b j e c t  
 19, Saint Simon was working on  
 etuggle betw een m ode of being w as  
 as a an excess of m an forces  
 s e e d e f o r m e n t i n d e e h .<sup>656</sup> This  
*L’Organisateur* also covers these  
 d parts Such as that of the  
 on know ledge wh h has dangerous  
 shap ew h h Saint Simon understood  
 hem as a n d h e p h y s i c a l i n c e P e h a p s  
 s t o f i o n s o m m e n t o m i n M e m o i r e  
 a general of  
 of m ode in esult the capacity that  
 em odentia ble m uch  
 on betw een syn thet and anal y  
 esult a k u n d e r t a g y o f t h e S c i e n c e

Saint Simon’s earlier secretary and collaborator, Auguste Comte later emphasised his own  
 version of positivism which transformed  
 m ode of autonomous knowledge. This was a  
 on of a physics through the prom ise of  
 nce form h e n t e i n h e i n d u s t r i a l

<sup>655</sup> M an 1956 p 243f  
<sup>656</sup> *L’Organisateur* see Peking (1993) p 164-166 M an 1956 p 243,  
<sup>657</sup> Durkheim (1959) p 143

system. Saint Simon, however, does not think that a  
 a sharp principle. <sup>658</sup> What Saint Simon intended to provide was  
 the end of his life, achieved only through an imaginative ‘quasi’ mythical form of a new religion.  
 A new precedent in the history of the human mind  
 seen in the form of a religious cult  
 we can know it in person. He had observed it  
 void by the Catholic Church. From his observa-  
 needed something more subtle than he had hazarded  
 recognized the provisional and functional  
 subtle psychological structure of human conscious-  
 ness

In his *Nouveau Christianisme* (1825) he  
 “which man has ever put into practice.” Following a dialogue between a conservative and a  
 reformer, this was understood as something of which  
 the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries had an “exalted  
 conception,” something demanded of the human race which “is not confined to imitation.”<sup>659</sup>  
 The sociology of *Memoire sur la science de L’homme* addressed a similar  
 point: “I abandoned this idea in favour of  
 what I took necessary to the  
 continuity in Saint Simon’s thinking.

The Two Cultures: The Critique of Bichat’s Physiology

A faith beyond the physiological  
 how ever he used the philosophy of Sci-  
 entific <sup>660</sup> Although Morel and Bichat in 1824 had a  
 particular significance for Comte’s Positivism during the period of the July Monarchy (1830-  
 1848) experience of his early production  
 in the body of his work as a representative

<sup>658</sup> p. 245  
<sup>659</sup> Saint Simon (1966), pp. 96-192; Saint Simon (1964)  
<sup>660</sup> Morel and Bichat (1949), p. 220

science of the soul. De Biran had earlier concluded that an “immense gap that subsists always between two sciences,” namely those concerning the physical and those of the moral.<sup>661</sup> A san

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deTacyandBithatheyearsround1800and

n1803andw asenaw adedpibyhe

‘Classe des Sciences Morals et Politiques’ for htext *L’influence de l’habitude sur le faculté*

depenre: <sup>662</sup> But by the 1820’s De Biran rejected hecontm ponymedialicourseenas

dominated by “certain physiologists” who derived a method of division from Bichat’s

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Psychologie, appeared influenced by Hume’s problem of causation, yet De Biran was also

filwing a vichonafM onpalm edine.

<sup>663</sup> From the latter’s legacy, he hella

physiologialinknow nasand emofv hiept

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grounding a ‘fait primitive.’ This reflects he spcal

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to the ‘fait primitive’ at the origins of intellectual operations, consequently the point

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De Biran implies that the ‘fait

primitive’ can be the real basis for scepticism in relation to knowledge of physical organisation

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ntofiew ofheceptesubjB the

status of a ‘fait primitif’ in human knowledge was the object of an understanding of Science

<sup>661</sup> M andB inthv dtext *Nouvelle considérations sur les rapport du physique et moral de L’homme* (1822)nd *Nouveux essais d’anthropologie* (1823)

<sup>662</sup> H aih1984p106

<sup>663</sup> M andBin (1949b) p15,29 reflecting Hume’s ‘empire of the will’ from Hume’s *Traic* p63 2.

of Man despite its remaining inaccessible to  
 primitive' was heretofore produced negatively by demomons  
 the experience of the physical through habit  
 Bichat as confusing her terms so sensibly and co-  
 functioning of the ego. This is due to the fact that  
 popular in her equivalence to psychological  
 distinctions as purely nominal in philosophy  
 designating the objects 665

a formal and knowledge. <sup>664</sup> The 'fait  
 régnant' in Cabanis is  
 a habit of phenomena and forming  
 naturally in relation to a subject  
 question of habit but to physical  
 phenomena. Hence, De Biran takes Bichat's  
 confusion around the use of the sign in

This is a contradiction between a sign and a fact  
 Condillac's statue, and the perception as a power of Biran saw his question  
 the use of Condillac's sign and a general confusion specifically associated with  
 Bichat's classifications of habituated functions. Recherche physiologique sur l'âme et  
 des sensations en général dans l'homme et dans les animaux  
 a continuous organic basis of functions  
 with the ego perceives a direct experience of  
 involuntary.

only directly associated with the faculty of  
 habit. 665  
 the faculty of  
 Recherche physiologique sur l'âme et  
 des sensations en général dans l'homme et dans les animaux  
 directly. <sup>666</sup> De Biran books explicitly  
 two orders of perception, voluntary and

Bichat perceived experience as originating from  
 the power of the position of judgement  
 with a complete knowledge of the habit of  
 organic conditions and in a manner that  
 in a manner that although his general intention  
 understood to be produced under certain influences  
 distinctions in systems and in the  
 functions of the senses appointed the part of  
 primitive' represents a power that can be and continues to be over and  
 has been the ground of the potential

organically as an external force  
 in a manner that is distinct. This  
 distinct in itself to create orders of  
 distinct in itself in voluntary and  
 explicit of sensory motions  
 .<sup>667</sup> De Biran's point is that Bichat's  
 single principle of functioning in the  
 body by habit. By contrast, the 'fait  
 régnant' is behind  
 of the operations of the consciousness of the

<sup>664</sup> M. and Biran (1949) p. 195-197, 208.

<sup>665</sup> M. and Biran (1949) p. 39-40

<sup>666</sup> Ibid p. 48

<sup>667</sup> Ibid p. 50-51

mind which is necessary but too broad and

of the general idea of DeBianis

suggesting that Bichat's general method of division subordinates perceptions in human

consciousness to a biological physical

properties of the body. From the

scientific biological method

of the general idea of human knowledge.

in the human mind in the biological course

in psychology

<sup>668</sup> De

Bichat's distinct domain, an 'empire of the soul' transcending Bichat's classifications

of the biological and physical

the psychophysical relation between

two essential faculties

DeBianis point out in his considerations

of the psychophysical relation

from the year 1800 to the

19<sup>th</sup> century biological

to muscular organs properties understood as 'special modes' of sensibility and taken as evidence

of universal functions of the

of the functions of the

continuity of the functions of the

of the functions of the

the general idea of the

the 'fait primitif' upheld a limit against such an idea of

sensibility in the

'sensibility' as an open domain in which could stand

in order

doctrine

<sup>669</sup>

Radical Point in August Comte

Maine de Biran's critique was here seen to be a

a psychology of the 'human

spirit'. This was understood

as a particular notion of freedom taken up against physi

ological

reasoning. The philosophical legacy was taken up

in the period of the Monarchy (1830-

1848) by Auguste Comte's notable adversary, Victor Cousin who associated his *Leçons*

*Science de l'Homme*,

"any sound philosophy is the study of human nature...the Science of Man, psychology, is certainly not all there is to philosophy but it is the foundation."<sup>670</sup>

<sup>668</sup> Ibid 53

<sup>669</sup> Ibid 44-48

<sup>670</sup> Victor Cousin (1840) Preface W. M. Simon (1965)

A Cousin understood as Science of Man

the physical sciences and the mind

relations of phenomena in the special

'psychology' as the preliminary study of mental processes in the discipline of observation. This

emphasized the distinction between soul and body. The

significance during the period of the July Monarchy

continued in the 19th century when he approached the

and democracy Cousin became a symbol of the education

the task of the "rescuing of the youth" of France from precisely from the excesses of abstract

speculation. 671

August Comte especially took up an antagonistic

defender of Science of Man. He has shown

individuality appeared as something of a new

Cartesian strategy new in the history of sciences

beyond what he saw as an outmoded practice of contemplation. Comte's primary struggle can be

characterized as a transformation of received philosophy, to which Comte

philosophy meant taking a historical relation to social thinking; "we always labour for our

descendants," says Comte, "but under the impetus of our ancestors."<sup>672</sup> Comte's problem was

primarily that he was suspicious of Cousin's psychology as subduing the

in philosophy and scientific knowledge. The basis of his ontology is

Comte was particularly critical of the scientific method

and to a large extent of the scientific method

philosophy in general. In his study of

physical laws which should be understood in relation

Methodology.<sup>673</sup> But Comte saw this as 'symptomatic' of a deeper commitment to a privileged

had been obscured by the success of

over the history of philosophy by examining

the human mind. Cousin's approach of

here was to show even to a cultural

as Cousin was a defender of

spirit from promiscuity between absolute

ontology and the history of

into such psychological philosophy

as a new objective to which

in his special case of philosophy

and universal form of philosophy

activity, to which Comte

philosophy meant taking a historical relation to social thinking; "we always labour for our

descendants," says Comte, "but under the impetus of our ancestors."<sup>672</sup> Comte's problem was

primarily that he was suspicious of Cousin's psychology as subduing the

in philosophy and scientific knowledge. The basis of his ontology is

observational science and the value

of Cousin's view of the sciences for

philosophy and the scientific method

to be valued by Descartes

<sup>671</sup> W. M. Simon, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 381.

<sup>672</sup> Comte (1851) in Popper and Scholl (1995), p. 10.

<sup>673</sup> Cousin (1826) in Scholl (1995), p. 24.





Comte's approach to the study of society is based on a scientific method that seeks to identify the laws of social development. He argued that society evolves through a process of organic growth, moving from a state of savagery to barbarism and finally to civilization. This process is driven by the division of labor and the increasing complexity of social organization. Comte's theory of social evolution is often contrasted with the idea of social contract, which suggests that society is formed by a mutual agreement between individuals.

require a certain resistance to effect a full development towards a 'natural outcome,' which meant Comte's concept of a mean seen as a 'regularisation of spontaneous evolution' in the sense of a social equilibrium.

Comte's theory of social evolution is based on the idea of organic growth, where society develops through a process of increasing complexity and specialization. He argued that the division of labor is a key factor in this process, as it allows individuals to focus on their specific tasks, leading to greater efficiency and progress.

A sophisticated theory of social evolution, Comte's approach is often contrasted with the idea of social contract. He argued that society is not formed by a mutual agreement between individuals, but rather through a process of organic growth. This process is driven by the division of labor and the increasing complexity of social organization. Comte's theory of social evolution is often contrasted with the idea of social contract, which suggests that society is formed by a mutual agreement between individuals.

historical, logical or strictly universal principles. Comte's distinction notably focuses on how the social sciences should be approached, rather than on the basis of any abstract metaphysical principles. Comte's differential theory inaugurates an epistemological tradition in French thought and can be seen as a precursor to the idea of social evolution.

Comte's theory of social evolution is based on the idea of organic growth, where society develops through a process of increasing complexity and specialization. He argued that the division of labor is a key factor in this process, as it allows individuals to focus on their specific tasks, leading to greater efficiency and progress. Comte's theory of social evolution is often contrasted with the idea of social contract, which suggests that society is formed by a mutual agreement between individuals.

<sup>680</sup> Billingsley (1998) p. 209-210

<sup>681</sup> H. Durand (1990) p. 158

<sup>682</sup> Canguilhem's suggestion. See Foucault (1991) p. 88-89

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<sup>680</sup> This is a Comtean social contract

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<sup>681</sup> On his basis has been suggested that

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thoughts in case of progress of  
of mind extending to all

duration of knowledge development  
COURSES

Courses in Philosophy

Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy  
historical and scientific  
Comte's view of Condorcet  
epistemological and political  
"intellectual anarchy" of his time.<sup>684</sup> This  
of modern scientific method

idea of Descartes because  
a form of thought towards the 'real.'  
his claim that "the human mind's progress is  
the progress of the individual mind...a direct evidence of that of a general mind."<sup>683</sup> A  
shift from intellectual anarchy  
to scientific method.<sup>685</sup>

Concept of motion and force  
of motion itself, which is its effect. The modern concept gives the understanding of "compound  
movements," distinguished from the ancient idea of supernatural agency; modern science  
understood motion through the idea  
view of motion as a problem is complex in its mechanical  
abstract problem of motion mechanics as  
with the force and speed  
attributed an 'actual' inertia. Modern mechanics lacked through its force of  
"inherent forces" evident in the spontaneous activities of "organized substances, those of  
highest organisation."<sup>686</sup> Such thinking distinguished between  
through the sciences and courses in this  
problem of motion and dynamics had

concept of substance and  
idea of supernatural agency; modern science  
in its grounds of scientific  
abstract mechanical  
idea of knowledge of Comte  
idea of knowledge of  
force of  
of substances, those of  
would be placed  
between principles  
in principle of

<sup>683</sup> Comte (1893) p3  
<sup>684</sup> ibid p11  
<sup>685</sup> ibid 82- 83  
<sup>686</sup> ibid p91





bodies in nature whose essence is dual  
with their essential components.

one result from a combination of elements

This followed an original idea of the animal series derived from the anatomy of Vicq d'Azyr, and a

holographic body displaying properties  
essential to the continuity of existence. From the  
hamony of the continuity of existence. From the  
of organs that structure in themselves,  
nom of Blainville's anatomy in  
is a general form of solid and indivisible

of binary associations which represent the  
in general in the series as the display of  
this is an order of basic production  
these are the components but do a  
and in a general form of solid and indivisible  
of the dynamical result of force of nature.

The combinatory state was a possible state, structurally visible even after the organism's  
death.<sup>698</sup>

Blainville's resulting synthesis of ideas strongly influenced Comte. The apriori concept of

hamony between organism and medium indicates  
continuity with an environment under conditions of possibility

of the conditions of existence of the organism  
ng states

“necessary harmony... whose unity of subject is one of the chief philosophical beauties  
of biology.”<sup>699</sup>

This is a methodical and categorical  
hierarchy extended to a general hierarchy of Comte

value derived from the combination of natural  
under the general index of a methodical

principle of unity behind the “combinations within the great diversity of actual modifications.”<sup>700</sup>

In Comte's organization, this value to the biological concept, “very like mathematical  
analysis of an indefinite series.” Biological concepts find their isomorphism with developmental  
of form present in the abstract.<sup>701</sup>

A philosophical concept of Comte's  
is a knowledge of the human animal  
with a transcendental aspect

is a principle of knowledge of the  
with a general cosmological aspect

He equates his methodical organization with  
ing with o

<sup>698</sup> D. B. Blainville (1822) p. 101

<sup>699</sup> Comte (1893) p. 302

<sup>700</sup> Ibid. p. 308

<sup>701</sup> Ibid. p. 312



inferences with the Poisson project over again  
synthesis of biological concepts and products  
fictions” for imagining organisms and ideas for  
since the evolution of a

How ever the evaluation of the  
necessity of “scientific  
organisation which were “incontestably  
superior.” This latter aspect reflects the prerequisite of Comte’s transformism as a legacy of the

704

The legacy was a product of combination and synthesis  
Comte’s technical hypothesis indicated  
anatomy, the exemplary success identified as “rationally reconnecting the normal condition with  
a notion derived from the pathological.”<sup>705</sup> Bichat’s evidence was not  
them the function of the organ of the  
of a dynamic concept which can penetrate “the essential web of every organism.”<sup>706</sup> Bichat’s  
regional approach to phenomena as exemplified by  
vegetable and perhaps lower animal organisation.” The concept is not independent  
unit Comte calls a ‘biotaxy’ which precedes  
extension of synthesis of biological  
division of physiology.  
side approach Bichat’s avoidance of the

of incoherence of the value  
why Bichat’s triumph was seen as general  
Bichat’s evidence was not  
body of Comte’s successful production  
“the sole basis of  
a general coordination of the series and  
suitable method of ‘natural’  
<sup>707</sup> Comte’s identified this as an exemplary method but had a  
ingen problem at this concept

Biology and Philosophy: A Historical and Biological

Analysis

The organic paradigm was derived from an objective  
perpetual increase in complexity expressed  
it was conceptual source of the ‘figures’ of action, it  
its scientific knowledge since he treated as  
conceptual justification for the biological analogy  
physiological. This was why Comte was talking

application of thought following the  
an inherent problem of biological  
philosophy extended beyond any  
susceptible to perpetual oscillation. But  
it was clear in a similar way to a  
figure of origin from which

<sup>704</sup> bhp328

<sup>705</sup> bhp332

<sup>706</sup> An approach to social dynamics bhp3

<sup>707</sup> bhp341



“perfectly analogous to the development of the individual, at least in its ascending period,”<sup>708</sup>

This idea of an organic hierarchy only in an “imperfect way.” Since the problem was the representation of the whole, envisaging the ‘idea of the series’ preceding the ‘idea of species.’ Although both were dependant on observations of identity and difference, the whole – he succeeded in an age of ascendancy Comte imagined along the line of succession of organic states as he vividly produced the aspects that falls a limited transcendental though in general course. As visible ground of “real natural law,” his was with Comte working regularity from particular philosophical aspects. 709

When Comte claimed that Lamarck showed “by far the profounder conception of the organic hierarchy,” and that Cuvier misconceived it,<sup>710</sup> it is instructive of Comte’s opinion on the matter. This independent perspective on Lamarck and Cuvier. Comte’s argument was that reading the series in a biogenetic knowledge rather than a philosophical one. Comte was dismissive of Lamarck’s transformism, objecting to the division by anatomical elements rather than by functions and equally the “immeasurable” time aspired to by biological transformism was a problem on the ground that even a multiplicity of laws could be “laws of the fundamental equilibrium.” Although Comte grounded himself through De Blainville’ organic stability,<sup>711</sup> similar to Cuvier who saw following method premised on the equivalence between species in the abstract, namely the ‘biotaxic unit’ which was an idea that conformed to Comte’s idea of biological law whose abstract characteristics were the result of a monodensité. However even Lamarck’s method has a specific idea of nature and which tends to philosophical monism in effect.

<sup>708</sup> Ibid 342- 343

<sup>709</sup> Ibid 343 Canguhem describes Comte’s method in Canguhem (1988) 94

<sup>710</sup> Comte (1893) 343

<sup>711</sup> Ibid 344

the 18<sup>th</sup> century which happened in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

19<sup>th</sup> century.

Comte's philosophy necessitates governing "the passage from the abstract to the concrete." Here, the analytic and synthetic method is not seen as a single strategy of integration, but as an ideal in which the analytic and synthetic method are seen as complementary. This explains why Comte's philosophy is not a simple synthesis of the older sciences, but a new synthesis of the older sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences.

Modes of Science and Biology

Comte's philosophy of individualism as an ideal in which the analytic and synthetic method are seen as complementary. This explains why Comte's philosophy is not a simple synthesis of the older sciences, but a new synthesis of the older sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences, a synthesis of the older sciences and the newer sciences.

Comte's philosophy followed an analytic, "from the impulse given by Descartes," to school of Boerhave, against a synthetic view in the school of Stahl. Comte considered the older sciences as a physical dimension to a general physiology. The emerging idea apprehended in the transformation from Van Helmont's 'archeus', to Stahl's 'soul', to Barthez 'vital principle,' represents "sound philosophising;" it lacked only "for want of the requisite practice" which what Bichat's substitution of organs for fluids. This event where a physiological heritage intersects with modern anatomical studies, opening the 'mapping' of the human body.

Comte was following the ambition of transforming a spiritual psychology through a confrontation that focused on a positive "theory of sensations" traced back to the brain. This was a domain as yet in the grip of the 'metaphysicians.'<sup>714</sup> To extend this positive concept of vital 'modes of action' meant, for Comte, a new synthesis of the older sciences and moral phenomena, the higher functions of the 'human.' In this context, 'human' distinguished from human and constituted Comte's strategy of convergence with the older

<sup>712</sup> ibid 347  
<sup>713</sup> ibid 354-359  
<sup>714</sup> ibid 372

Since of Man which he dubbed 'the noblest scientific notion.' This was a philosophical  
an environment of the mind

“...a transformation which can safely be considered as possible only by transferring to  
how he speaks to the mind  
is limited to the individual or at the utmost the family.”<sup>715</sup>

This represents a gap between an individual and the social world, which  
Positivism looked to integrate a physical form or  
perspective on human freedom and intelligence  
in an all-pervasive natural order that had spontaneously  
developed in nature, a natural order that had  
synthesized the functions of a real world. The  
but in an earlier form of thought.  
now based on biological science.

What is clear is that Comte's biological capacity always retained a certain cosmological  
perspective on the biological world as  
emerged between the principles of nature and human  
nature of overabundance of human nature  
attributes that radically departed from the 'innate' Scholastic categories but that  
more or less in agreement and human nature of judgment  
appear only as degrees of the wider notion of organic phenomenon. These were “necessarily  
variable,” and a “proportionate activity” that Comte was following in the search for a modern  
epistemology in the natural sciences.  
Comte's thought <sup>716</sup>

This is what the modern world  
from the perspective of Comte  
of human nature and of the ego and  
and a perspective which is the basis for  
and Lacan's sign.<sup>717</sup> On the other hand, the sign is the form with  
which the ego is introduced as  
in them only as a perspective of Positivism. This

<sup>715</sup> pp. 368-369

<sup>716</sup> pp. 386

<sup>717</sup> Foucault (1977) p. 105

in the natural sciences

course in an

“as a truth both reduced and promised.” Foucault (1970) p. 320



Positivism's New Axiom

The Science of Man and the Social Sciences  
The epistemological basis of the new system of philosophy.  
It no longer followed a Cartesian logic of synthetic character of a 'special reasoning,' and downplayed Bichat's radical opposition, 'the sum of forces that oppose death,' in favour of de Blainville's biological equilibrium a 'double continuous movement' of composition and decomposition. Comte needed an objective foundation of the grand historical law of Broussais as an uncovering of science. Comte's father, Joseph Vernet, medicine,

"The luminous maxim of M Broussais which lies at the foundation of medical philosophy – the phenomenon is beyond the ordinary of variation – has never been duly applied to actual and moral phenomena of anything of the different kinds of madness they are not examined on his principle."<sup>722</sup>

How ever, Broussais was a doctor of medicine since his comments should be framed by his 'metaphysicians' (i.e the psychologists) and Franz Joseph Gall, (the "illustrious Gall"). It is significant to appear Comte's father, Broussais, and in medicine Comte introduced the text as introducing a degree of theoretical purposiveness to Comte's thinking.

By the 1820's Broussais was a new doctrine that presented a 'physiological medicine.' Commentators have noted how this made a new hypothesis in medicine. Broussais proposed a new physiology of man on them. <sup>723</sup> Broussais proposed a new physiology of man on them.

<sup>721</sup> pp378  
<sup>722</sup> pp393-395  
<sup>723</sup> "the new messiah had appeared" Ackerknecht (1967) p62. Comte's father, Broussais, medicine, equivalent of 1789 Comte (1994) p134

violated the principle of the  
and the necessity of individuality  
down the path of the new

pathological view favoured by B that  
was developed 'systematic physiology' to  
heal the O line doctrine

declare, "the moment has come where we must tear away the veil..."<sup>724</sup> This intended to  
physiology the "abstraction of words" around vital properties, the immediate  
claimed 'painted' abstractions of the human intellect. Broussais also claimed that "such a method  
of philosophising may succeed in politics or diplomacy, is not always applicable to medicine."  
His task was therefore to "protect medicine from the dangers that threaten her by means of the  
philosophical sect."<sup>725</sup> His way Broussais saw him self for

fourth philosophy of Condorcet and Dest

to whom he considered belonged the

'reveries of the ontologist' who,-

"proclaim that the Science of Man, such as they conceive it to be, alone has any  
part in existence, having passed  
in an analysis of knowledge in  
link the external observations of  
phenomena of them by their  
substance and analysis."<sup>726</sup>

many years of studying  
living and dead  
analysis of the  
of the dead and the dead,

To his Broussais in the new physiologi  
was a period of a decade and his  
excitement in no longer regarded as a  
ontological theory now giving significance  
succeeded in defining a concept of disease as  
specific change in function which was  
of disease and new basis of medicine  
in medicine. This was not only recognized by the famous  
anatomist and physiologist Jean-Martin Charcot

called an anatomist and his  
existence in the mind. Such an  
originality as a result of  
in function, as a result of  
independent of giving physiological  
a significant value to the  
deposition of the mind or  
French neurologist and professor of

<sup>724</sup> Broussais, O. and M. Adnet, Preface, C. A.

phil (1981) p358.

<sup>725</sup> Ibid p356

<sup>726</sup> Ibid p359

<sup>727</sup> Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) in A. C. Clark

and (1967) p68 -69  
221

Broussais has also been described as holding this doctrine as an “instrument of warfare.”<sup>728</sup> In this respect, the similarity of Broussais to Comte is instructive; Broussais’s polemic was aimed at the ontogenetic reduction of Comte’s philosophy of biology. The approach of Comte to physiology of observation from his polemic by Georges Canguilhem.<sup>729</sup> But the ontogenetic consequences of Broussais’s reductionist model have not been fully appreciated.

“The only eminent example known to me of sound hypothesis in biology is M. Broussais’s proposal of the uniformity of the social sciences. We have seen a similar hypothesis being open to question and confirmation in the study of biology in the human mind, as the example of a spontaneous hypothesis in the study of the regions of astronomy.”<sup>730</sup>

This is a specific example of the concept of the holism of biology system. The continuous domain of observation and inference was in distinguishing qualitative effects and consequences which distinguished from one another through degrees of presence embedded in Broussais’ doctrinaire motivation against Bichat. It can primarily be traced to the reception of Rescher’s philosophy of science between physics and physiology as continuous and discontinuous phenomena.<sup>731</sup> But as Canguilhem points out, this was succeeded by Bichat’s *Anatomie Générale* which was setting ‘a trap’ by offering the systematic possibility of extending qualitative analysis to a form of hierarchical organization.

<sup>728</sup> pp. 75-76  
<sup>729</sup> Canguilhem (1989) p. 47  
<sup>730</sup> Comte (1893) p. 319-320  
<sup>731</sup> Bichat (1827) p. 1

coordinate physiology or anatomy by  
suggesting that physiology is the

defining biological attributes,  
the considered phenomena significant

732

The weight of his doctrine gave Comte's later perspective in *System of Positive Philosophy* a  
discourse on man has been withdrawn from the 'metaphysicians' of inner sensation,<sup>733</sup> There  
two curious points in Comte's early work are  
from a system of medicine of Broussais  
a physiological narrow sense. A second  
space for differentiating structure and composition, whose parallels is with Lamarck's image of  
nature despite Comte's early findings in  
Comte's Positivism and possibility of progressive forms at  
point of the Comte's doctrine of biology  
spire the organic sciences in each  
lingering.<sup>734</sup> This supposed perspective makes a law by Comte  
of thinking less but concretely  
of social and political. I was an era of transcendent thinking which lacked  
separation of knowledge and knowledge

Comte's historical perspective followed his strategic aims of mediating a future between crude  
mechanism and empiricist. A gain in  
'conditions of existence' from biological being and the highest expression of individual  
extended a new discipline of biology.<sup>735</sup> This supposed extension of biology  
in place of phenomena in grasping  
that Comte had rejected Bichat's theory of death followed DeBle in thinking that  
death is not the necessary for explaining  
with *System of Positive Philosophy* that a theory of death "although founded on a theory of

<sup>732</sup> Bichat's *Anatomie Générale* p62 of the Norm and  
of the conditions of existence directly with the model of health "from which they differed only in intensity." Canguilhem  
(1989) p49  
<sup>733</sup> Comte (1893) p375  
<sup>734</sup> Lévy- Bruhl notes Comte is "feeling the strength and import of Lamarck's labours" Lévy Bruhl (1903) p181  
<sup>735</sup> Canguilhem writes, "the matter was a positive scientific  
extension and thought" Canguilhem (1994) p243





19<sup>th</sup> century fixed the idea as a philosophical concept of a way  
fundamentally from Kant's extended biological sciences course in  
Comte's was the reforming project driven by science that eclipsed the practices of Bichat's  
generation. This chapter shows how the  
relations between the vital and the physical. A firm  
medicine of Claude Bernard defined independent  
from a philosophical concept of  
the origin of the separate natural Science  
century.

philosophical concept of a way  
biological sciences course in  
of the sciences in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The experimental  
from a philosophical concept of  
the last chapter will look at how Bernard's epistemology  
of France between the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Introduction

The last decades of the nineteenth century saw a revolution in the way we think about the organism. This was a period of intense scientific activity, and it was in this period that the concept of the organism as a self-contained, self-organizing system was first articulated. The work of scientists like Rudolf Virchow and Claude Bernard was instrumental in this process. Virchow's famous dictum, "omnis cellula e cellula," emphasized the cellular basis of life, while Bernard's concept of the "milieu interieur" highlighted the internal environment of the organism. These ideas laid the foundation for modern biology and the study of the organism as a complex, dynamic system.

of the scientific revolution in the nineteenth century. In his work, Bernard distinguished between the organism as a whole and its individual parts. He argued that the organism is not simply a collection of parts, but a unified whole with its own specific properties. This idea was revolutionary at the time, as it challenged the prevailing view of the organism as a mere collection of organs and tissues. Bernard's work was a key contribution to the development of the concept of the organism as a self-organizing system.

This paradoxical because the organism is both a self-contained system and a part of a larger system. It is a dynamic system that can adapt to its environment, but it is also dependent on the environment for its survival. This tension between the organism's internal organization and its external environment is a central theme in the study of the organism. The work of scientists like Henri Bergson and Claude Bernard was instrumental in this process. Bergson's concept of "élan vital" emphasized the creative force of life, while Bernard's concept of the "milieu interieur" highlighted the internal environment of the organism. These ideas laid the foundation for modern biology and the study of the organism as a complex, dynamic system.

physiology's autonomous domain and its suppression of the notion of the organism as a self-contained system. I distinguished only certain 'conditions of existence.' Laboratory work showed that the organism is not simply a collection of parts, but a unified whole with its own specific properties. This idea was revolutionary at the time, as it challenged the prevailing view of the organism as a mere collection of organs and tissues. Bernard's work was a key contribution to the development of the concept of the organism as a self-organizing system.

Positivism in new context of an evolutionary paradigm with the problem of form and  
 pathobiology on the perspective of the orfil se divergence. Bergson said deeper  
 in philosophy and them or behind his extended que Positivistic  
 form answers his point back to inputs via Science Man.

The question of whether Bernard's physiology accounts for a 'new way to a Science of  
 Man' also appears behind the notion of Emile Durkheim's sociology. Having  
 demonstrated a paradoxical between Bichat's experimentalism and Bernard's interior  
 method books show Durkheim book in historical sense of an by substituting  
 'conditions of existence' of organisms for the evidence of opening of film a physical  
 past that is healthy in social but in form a historical show ed an  
 evidence of biological through supporting old reordering. Conversely social  
 began in ed open to the intervention by a 'special reasoning,' possibility of that  
 presupposes potential autonomy. The grounds Durkheim's account capacity invest  
 which is grounded in Heidegger's suppo as an individual's capacity for fluid forms  
 of life studied through de regulation anom id Durkheim's neo-positivism film  
 Bernard's break with vitalism?

This form reading of what Durkheim reit es to a system of signs. Each epoch  
 potential has biological and the expansion in philosophy and the chapter  
 show s Durkheim as a critical his life project Science of Man and the 19th  
 century. I s an in was to evaluate a social domain in according to a special  
 physiology of sense. But Durkheim's rationalism can be identified in film which is a  
 vital problem of 'norms' in modern societies. What concepts in the social world of  
 the absence of any knowledge of the normal type? Durkheim's perspective on an English ment  
 Science of Man film is in his apprehending organization which is interpreted,  
 "can tell us the secret of the future." I demonstrate that in the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the  
 potential in an open field of operation.

Positivism's New Models of Thought

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Positivism diversified through various models of thought. The preceding generation by the system of biology was the hedonistic and physiological basis of Positivism. Comte's Epistemological ideas of Georges Brousseau represent an invention of the observational practice of ideas. The sign of biological subordination in principle is the apodictic domain of the sign. Foucault has described practice as defining physiological ideas. Bichat engaged with around normal and pathological continuous domains in which "disease exists in space before it exists for sight." The wider significance was for the "structure of experience which dominated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and to a certain extent the twentieth..."<sup>739</sup> By systematising a 'way to see' a particular Positivism gave them educational status as new transcendental domains. A Science of Man arose through this process of generation.<sup>740</sup> Georges Canguilhem goes further to describe this philosophy, "almost as old as life itself," where a transcendental ideal of the Positivist eschatology was extended through Comte's Sociology.<sup>741</sup>

Secondly, a particular Positivism appeared with the "depraved juggler."<sup>742</sup> This form of positivism was the departure from the biological project under process of representation during the epoch. The division of the sciences during this era is the result of the adoption of a model for understanding inherent to the work of Emile Durkheim.

<sup>739</sup> Foucault (1975) p188, p191

<sup>740</sup> Foucault (1970) p318-321

<sup>741</sup> Canguilhem (1994) p247-248,

<sup>742</sup> "the morbid liaison of my early youth with the depraved juggler." Comte (1851) II preface xv, xvi, Durkheim (1959) p14-4

as the knowledge of a finite reality

scientific project <sup>743</sup> in central break

with the Encyclopedia in the 18<sup>th</sup>

<sup>b</sup> century was

Cabanis' generation of Ideologues who

sustained the project by the possibility of an

new science which Saint-Simon regarded as

Science of Man had disappeared under the

divergent nature of positivism but

his equivocation

at having a goal of knowledge.

<sup>744</sup> From the perspective of Science of

Man he had his own meaning. This was the D

ukheim finds Saint-Simon's strongest

invocation of his hands and iron fist Pos

it philosophy of nature in the

system of existence but was able

to develop a synthetic knowledge

being part of the form and perspective of W here

is Comte's theory of Saint-Simon

subtle definition of concept for a theory

Science of Man Functional extended to

concrete courses over a long and po

the according to Durkheim's view as

he aim to "liberate the body of man which he should

set" name of the

from his science.

<sup>745</sup> He saw

Saint-Simon's form of Positivism as grounded in

practical activity in fulfilling

a synthetic knowledge

is in it

This following perspective on the scientific

project of the Science of Man and

new position emerges through the contemporary

experiences of the sciences Henri

Bergson described this

a 'certain idea of nature' and gave it interpretation as

central problem for the Creative Evolution But

it centered on a discussion of modern scientific

method and the contemporary Posi

ivism for having fully apprehended

'scientific object.'<sup>746</sup> Bergson's text aimed to make evident

as a result of the

condensation of the theory of the theory of

knowledge. <sup>747</sup> A few years later Bergson

could express this in a more compact way in an essay called 'The philosophy of Claude Bernard.' Here he related that "nothing is more false than the conception of how synthesis works."<sup>748</sup> Synthesis was always "something problematic," yet Claude Bernard was credited with retaining this problem through his stand against vitalism. Bergson's own focus on the life

<sup>743</sup> Thesis of Durkheim in Socialism but

soA nsd 1970 pp9

<sup>744</sup> Durkheim (1959) 130, 132, 134

<sup>745</sup> pp 134

<sup>746</sup> Bergson (2002) p 205,

<sup>747</sup> Bergson (1944) p xixv,

<sup>748</sup> Bergson (2002) p 205

since we see through the productive aspect of a 'certain idea of order' attained between two ideas of order and of nature. Hence we can say that in the history of modern science has "the spirit of invention retired and thus to determine the general conditions of scientific discovery."<sup>749</sup> According to Begon, these conditions are:

1. A certain idea of order  
2. A certain idea of nature  
3. A certain idea of order and of nature  
4. A certain idea of order and of nature  
5. A certain idea of order and of nature  
6. A certain idea of order and of nature  
7. A certain idea of order and of nature  
8. A certain idea of order and of nature  
9. A certain idea of order and of nature  
10. A certain idea of order and of nature

Hence we can say that in the history of modern science has "the spirit of invention retired and thus to determine the general conditions of scientific discovery."<sup>749</sup> According to Begon, these conditions are:

Physiology is a branch of biology that deals with the functions of living organisms. It is a scientific discipline that seeks to understand the mechanisms of life. The history of physiology is a long one, with many contributions from various scientists. In the 17th century, René Descartes introduced the concept of the reflex arc. In the 18th century, Lavoisier and Laplace discovered the law of conservation of mass. In the 19th century, Claude Bernard and Paul Portier discovered the concept of the internal secretions. In the 20th century, the discovery of the structure of DNA and the development of the genetic code were major milestones. Today, physiology is a highly interdisciplinary field that draws on many other scientific disciplines.

Physiology and Function of the Human Body

Following the years of Xavier Bichat's frenetic work, François Magendie's physiology represents a break and a shift in the understanding of the discipline. Yet Magendie's physiology emerges from his

<sup>749</sup> Ibid 201  
<sup>750</sup> R. A. Bayliss (1977) p. 47

with Bichat's theory in 1799 in

Paris and from an earlier work

de Paris in early 1800s

in his new book on anatomy

experience. Magendie's attention during this time was focused on

physiology of the brain

phénomènes particuliers exprimés

des différents tissus

looking for principles which could organize

from possible principles and actions

means by which the parts of the

bodies

under the name of a student of

in 1801 in the *Journal de Médecine*

general term of the form of

sequence of the body and parts

in 1809 as a result of general

he opinion in physiology did not

in his work on physiology

not by which the body decomposed

Such a principle could account for

roughly the same phenomena

Following Bichat's tissue theory, Magendie was looking to the nutritive exchanges that

could ground such vital phenomena

at a molecular level <sup>751</sup> *Cruveilhier*,

Magendie was influenced by the absorption of

the properties of the

implications at the animal level; "it is a great mistake to admit vital properties which are

particular to certain parts of organised bodies." He identified that this relied overly on *habit*

doctrine and actual observation

and *habit* new suggestion,

"Suppressing the two vital properties known as animal sensibility and animal

consciousness

would be advantageous

in order to accomplish physiology

and be a great manner of

explaining the phenomena of the study of

since it would be much

easier."<sup>752</sup>

This focus was in the relations

of Bichat's work as also considering the

difficulties of observing functions

in animals being expressions of life

in the organized body depended on apprehending some

kind of *Tobias* and Magendie

focused on an assembly of organic parts

in the apparatus of particular

functions. For example, in the function of

the assembly of the parts of

<sup>751</sup> Magendie *Quelques Auteurs* 109-111

<sup>752</sup> *ibid* 114



desire of the hand to be below in

grew with a fast breathing

machine.<sup>753</sup> However, in a conference

the observation, Magendie

wrote that, "it would perhaps be advantageous to begin the study of physiology at the instant when the phenomena of living things become appreciable to our senses." But this

was also following Bichat's ambition to foreground an 'event of the senses,' in line with Harvey,

down through Haller's *De Hepinis* and *De Cerebro*

in his *Anatomie Générale*. Bichat

was analyzing his approach to the

dynamic of the brain

synthesis of living matter.

754

In 1816, Magendie's textbook *Précis* in

the physiology of the human

principles of new physiology

in *Leçons de Physiologie*

linking physiology to dispense with its metaphysical tendencies with which it had "a long and tiresome romance" and like chemistry and physics, needed to be "reduced entirely to experiment."<sup>755</sup> This

but it was not until the 1840s

that Comte's *Système*

clinics only just starting to reverberate under Broussais' polemics. At this time, the notable rival

to Bichat's physiology was Anthelme Richerand whose *Éléments de Physiologie*

in 1801, explicitly followed along the lines of Haller's physiological model, rather than his

anatomy. In fact,

Richerand's textbook appeared in successive editions

1820's *Compendium*

for Comte despite Comte's ambition for the metaphysical aspects of

since the 1840s.

756

Magendie also retained an idea of the physiological model set forth by "modern

physicians." This entire phenomenon

was not only

in the field of perception

man's instincts could be related to his condition of

<sup>753</sup> Magendie's notes warns the reader that 'life' for the physiologists of the day meant either "an imaginary being, the principle of functions" or "the assemblage of these functions", the sense in which Bichat uses it." Bichat means to say, writes Magendie, "Life is the assemblage of functions that resists death," although the difference in emphasis should be noted. He then proceeds to question the

<sup>754</sup> Magendie, *Quelques appendices* (1977)

114

<sup>755</sup> Magendie (1844) *Préface*

<sup>756</sup> Ackerknecht (1967) p71

existence in a human being, but only as a function of a “state of civil society.” Magendie’s early interest was in the empirical evidence that

“desire to have a very vivid consciousness of our existence; a feeling which the more it is indulged in, the more it becomes awakened by habit....shall we say with Bichat that the passions reside in the organic life.”<sup>757</sup>

Magendie’s *Précis* here echoes the point of comment with which he also begins

his discussion of the general

idea

“however this may be, the study of understanding does not

present

essential physiology. These are special

branches of ideology.

Those who study this subject

extend its use to the works

of Bacon, Locke, Condorcet, and especially

the works of M. D. Tracy

Tracy, entitled ‘Elements of Ideology.’ We shall at present confine ourselves to some of

the fundamental principles of human

understanding and on the

human mind, and on the different

faculties of the eye

and the examination of the brain

now being written by

modern metaphysicians.”<sup>758</sup>

Though Magendie expressed doubt

over the propriety of

not yet drawn fully apart from the physiology committed to a ‘scientific’ concept of ideology.

When Condorcet proposed a

general classification of

the human mind, he distinguished

between the “cry or native voice” and “the acquired voice, or voice properly called so.” The acquired voice,

commented Magendie, had a higher

development and presupposed

existence of a developed

subject, and was therefore

the physiology of the

subject, and was therefore

the physiology of the

study derived from the organization of the

connection between

the physical and the moral. In his end, Magendie

was also considering movements of

expressive gestures (‘gestes’) as an intimate connection to the corporeal organization of habit

Habit was “to motions, what cry is to the voice;” and seen to appear either as acquired habits or

as gestures. Magendie was still following Cabanis’ anthropological thinking, even to the

<sup>757</sup> Magendie (1844) p. 155-156.

<sup>758</sup> Ibid. 147 and Temkin (1946) p. 321.

extent of limiting Bichat's notion of passion to internal sensations which proposed as an  
exclusive organ.<sup>759</sup>

There is perhaps no other legacy  
inherently opposed to system thinking but which  
philosophy, physiology and medicine could be  
rational and know ledge necessary to an agent  
of the mind. Proust seemingly had no need to define a definite seat to expressive 'gestes,'  
since phenomena of the mind could be  
nervous system of the brain by analogy of  
with the future.

At the 1816 Congress of the Empire  
to have favoured a certain aspect of Bichat's legacy. This aspect lent itself to a systematic  
approach rather than the provisional approach that  
Magendie's copious notes to the edition of *Recherches physiologiques* had been used  
concluded that Bichat appeared to him  
aimed at determining the system with the analytical  
communication in the field of the observation  
synthesis but not by his departure from the  
future generation of the scientific world  
his sense. Magendie was influenced by the  
saw such a man in the scientific world. He  
evolutionary sciences have developed a part  
positivism.

Following 1830 and the Revolutions in Russia  
view of the brain and Bichat's exceeding in the  
Science of the mind. Magendie appears both as a

of Condillac's ideas, an analytical  
he did not yet understand  
but new ones were proposed for  
defined the action of an open  
but the combination of  
acquired voice.<sup>760</sup> Such a knowledge would come

ing social system and it appears  
depended on experiment. From  
as a systematiser. Magendie's Positivism, by contrast,  
intended to maintain a particular  
approach and to find for 'natural'  
the biological legacy which gave them a  
he provisional knowledge as subordinate  
can now hold. Science is increasingly  
now abandoned this perspective  
to a new and modern form of medical

<sup>759</sup> Aubry (1977) p87

<sup>760</sup> Magendie (1844) p157, p123, p124

physiological project which informed his youth. This analysis showed his profound participation of film in the popular representation of function in early nineteenth-century anatomy. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

project has been characterized by an analysis of a 'certain idea.' But it has been shown that the anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

“If it were possible at this time to prove that all phenomena of living bodies can be regarded as produced by the same force.”<sup>761</sup>

By contrast, in the early nineteenth century, the anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

the anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

This represents a 'paradoxical link' between Magendie and Cuvier's comparative anatomy which belies Cuvier's opposition to vivisection.<sup>762</sup> Both had an approach to anatomy based on function in the early nineteenth century. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

“If, for preceding reasons, we do not classify animal sensibility among the vital phenomena, we shall consider it as the end of the action of a certain number of organs.”<sup>764</sup>

The question is whether this is a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

the anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy. The anatomist's study of function in the early nineteenth century was a significant contribution to the development of a scientific biology of anatomy.

<sup>761</sup> Magendie, *Quelques appendices* (1977) p11

<sup>762</sup> *ibid.* (1977) p89.

<sup>763</sup> Foucault (1970) p263-280

<sup>764</sup> Magendie, *Quelques appendices* (1977) p14

carry out a function; a function is the result of the labour of several organs.”<sup>765</sup> Bichat’s work concerned how the descriptive anatomy revealed topography by both surgeons and anatomists. He acknowledged a progressive study of the same big of several organs that contributed to function; he noted that “Citizens Cuvier and Dumeril” were now describing according to function,<sup>766</sup> and even announced that “I shall follow by the same procedure, it is the only one which can be adopted in our present state of knowledge.”<sup>767</sup> This served as an advance on the old problem since it derived from the Montpellier doctrine as transmitted perhaps via the anatomist Felix Vicq d’Azyr or from physician Theophile Bordeu. The former examined the autonomous elements comprising the body as “...kind of separate machine, which contributes in its fashion to the general life of the body.”<sup>768</sup> Bichat’s analytic physiology took organs as composites of tissues in which the parts gave partiality of descriptive anatomy. It had its basis in the study of physiological functions and proceeded.

The historical ambiguity in which this was offered as an axiom at the firm methodological point of departure of the study of anatomy was a result of the generalization of function in the special case that when Bichat’s other concepts were “the first steps in the study of the functions,” it was understood as a contribution to general physiology.<sup>769</sup> William Hamilton in his *Medical Agency* went beyond the doctrine of function and took his starting point for analysis. In defining properties of the mechanism of function, he introduced the concept of

A general concept of function was independent of the conditions of existence and applied to the study of the physiological basis of life. It was on the ‘conditions of existence’ and applied to the study of the physiological basis of life. It precedes the description of organs and

<sup>765</sup> Ackerknecht (1967) and Aubrey (1977) p12

<sup>766</sup> Bichat (1834) Aubrey (1977) p89

<sup>767</sup> ibid p89

<sup>768</sup> Borchers *Researches in Anatomy* Aubrey (1977) p90

<sup>769</sup> Bichat (1834) Aubrey (1977) p90

<sup>770</sup> M. Agency (1844) p16-17

substantive foundations and reasons. By an obstinate fondness, the 'conditions of existence' themselves bedeviled experiment, with his represented by the 19th century's overall aversion to the hospital laboratory. The experimental approach characterized by Bichat's findings through delineating conditions and without being entirely observable proper is derived from the whole of the general properties of functions but to a certain extent of observation became separated from anatomy called duobis but to historical given physiology and in the experiments of function in Magendie and Cuvier's physiology of defense by which was the source of behavioral problems was displaced. Magendie's particular credit was to have opened up new possibilities for the experimental as consequences of which drew in the physiology of defense by which as a axiom of the contemporary Science of Man.

Experimental Physiology in Medicine

François Magendie has a curious relation to Bichat. He both praises him as an 'experimental genius' while working to overcome a doctrinal acceptance of his ideas.<sup>771</sup> For example when Magendie's *Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort* of 1822 added an introduction which was an elegant and critical approach to Bichat's accompanying notes criticized Bichat directly from the basis of his own work. From the early 1820's Magendie's publications increasingly attacked the study of consciousness and ideology as being separated from physiology in favour of the experimental study of the nervous system through anatomy and physiology and experimental methods. In the notes to *Recherches Physiologiques* Magendie's fundamental entry based on his experimental work which he considered to be more contemporary physiology. Examples of what intends are the comments on Bichat's explanation of the relation between the brain and the senses when Bichat's theory is that the senses are influenced by the compression of the brain and the nerves, and that Magendie intervened through his

<sup>771</sup> A bus (1977) p47

“These words are not to be taken as a general  
 language of metaphysics but as a general  
 expression of a common sense and the secondary phenomena of it in particular  
 indifferently for one another.”<sup>772</sup>

of the senses which they  
 generalise into concepts  
 of these words

This distinction between general concepts and individual

phenomena coincides with

Magendie's 1822 publishing of his experiments to support the conclusion that dorsal roots of

spinal nerves are primarily associated with sensation

and the ventral roots are associated with

motor function. In 1823 he was also publishing

an ethnological experiment on observation that

used pathological phenomena in the spinal

cord to determine the

relationship between the spinal cord and surrounding meninges

he proposed that the spinal cord

and its meninges were a new anatomical

discovery in anatomy

later, in 1827, Magendie edited Bichat's *Traité des membranes du cerveau*

and his findings

concerning Bichat's hierarchy of

and spinal cord tissues

Magendie's methods of delimiting relations through clinical

observation and pathological findings are not

new to Bichat

point. Even by 1838 when returning to his original

observations he was not

system Magendie turned to a pathological

method of determining the

variation by using pathological observations

of excess and deficiency. The method

was the method intended to verify clinical

and the variation through pathological

observations as guides to naturalistic observation

pathology through clinical

work.<sup>773</sup>

A method of clinical observation when Magendie turned

in 1839 to repeat his original 1822

dorsal root experiment. The results indicate

the importance of returning to the

problem he introduced in the first paper

in his observational procedure. What had

been how to determine the value of

his original Magendie's work

has in young Claude Bernard's thought

he was of experiment and the

<sup>772</sup> Magendie's notes on Bichat. Bichat (1827) p299n

<sup>773</sup> Lect (1984) p190

difficult to repeat his experiments  
think that nature experiments  
are an ambiguous source of information  
experiments control of physical conditions in  
organism phenomena

<sup>774</sup> This is a statement on the fact that  
random overexperiments are not  
found new procedures following careful  
relation to complex and unpredictable

A new scientific experiment is abandoned  
exclusively given to observing living functions. The  
aim is not to find out about the  
idea of life. This represents a reversal of the  
dominance of physiology in which to practice 'experimental determinism.'

biological functions in phenomena  
future experiments in medicine took  
a new path in the development of

near the

### Claude Bernard's New Dominance

The new dominance of Claude Bernard is  
from a common environment in which  
in the sciences and separated  
that Bernard's Introduction to Experimental Medicine  
both following in the tradition of anatomy is  
presupposes an ethical concept

with an environment that  
from a new model of  
it from a biological viewpoint  
he had proposed  
he having fully abandoned his  
understanding of

ed the

"after dissecting cadavers, we must necessarily dissect living beings, to uncover the inner  
or hidden parts of the organism at work....and without this physiology and indeed a true  
scientific medicine will remain limited."<sup>775</sup>

Their appearance has been  
Galen's original vision but serves  
physiology as a model of life

is of the spirit of Bernard  
for the development of a  
non-empirical that

<sup>776</sup>

<sup>774</sup> The problem of "recurrent sensitivity" Ibid p191-192

<sup>775</sup> Bernard (1957) p99

<sup>776</sup> Aubrey (1977) p47.



Bernard intended to distinguish between forms in opposition to philosophy by the  
 he said that he could only represent science as a concept within a system  
 practice. Representation could not produce 'real' knowledge of nature. Bernard's distinction  
 opposed philosophy and by education and in fact what would be considered  
 autonomous scientific practice in a field between them in a concept and he  
 scientific practice. <sup>777</sup> The point he made was formal conceptual in  
 Such practice intended in nature is one that became a system and through  
 them practice produced a false epistemology in practice. What he opened the door for  
 practice Bernard had guard against them practice that is extended in the field and this  
 was done by establishing what scientific facts could be taken as 'real.' A determination in  
 what he defined as the field space of production within which concepts could be  
 considered scientific. <sup>778</sup>

According to the introduction he gave in a paper that had certain consequences for  
 defining scientific production could be seen as 'successive' without being progressive  
 in the way which Auguste Comte's Positivism applied to experimental practice ded  
 against the effects of habit and concepts subordinated by a system of thinking and  
 Bernard concisely distinguished his from Comte's philosophy. A philosophical system  
 produces formal statements to have an essential function on any experimental practice.  
 Consequently Bernard's science was deliberately antisystematic and worked against what he  
 describes as an 'encysting' of knowledge. <sup>779</sup> Bernard's here can be seen as a form of  
 Positivism whose work was a break with philosophy as well as his own extended  
 through Comte's system. Comte introduced formal conceptual elements (for example prioritising  
 a concept of 'integration' rather than 'resistance') which had a negative effect on the space of  
 scientific production. Bernard's work was a demarcation of scientific knowledge  
 ideologically encroachment but only in a sense in position of autonomy of scientific  
 thought

<sup>777</sup> Bernard (1957) p25  
<sup>778</sup> ibid p224  
<sup>779</sup> ibid p223

Although a form of determinism is present in Bernard's thought is evident in his analysis of the problem of the older physiological legacy, to which the new determinism stood for overcoming the 'querelle des anciens et des modernes' and symbolized in him over the laboratory. The new scientific method was a form of knowledge but which is not transcendent in itself but a domain of knowledge in personal aspects of practice – but Bernard's epistemology is not that of a laboratory and stands for the tribunal of the 'real,' Bernard's method is a continuous knowledge which is not a form of opinion. 780

In his personal method as the experimental method as the "negation of all systems." Negation of individualism is a method in which personal theories and points are an escape from 'a way of thinking.' This 'way of thinking' pointed out that, "We never act on an essence of natural phenomena but only on the acting cause...this differs from the fatalism on which we cannot act...fatalism assumes that the manifestation of any phenomenon is necessarily and independent of the conditions which precede the phenomenon whose manifestation is free." 781

In his personal method of Bernard's ambitions for a new scientific language, though one pursued in his time. Condillac's ambitions for a new language, then Bernard's scientific method is a form of knowledge and a form of knowledge in Bernard's can write "there are only words beyond." 782 The method is a form of knowledge of

780 See discussion in A. n. p. (1987)  
 781 Bernard (1957) p. 219  
 782 Ibid p. 219



heymishical appearing in  
end them selves continual y as being  
necessarily in g m of history.

785

of him ar thought in odes linking wh  
I shed Berncha Berncha but da

This modality reinforced Bernard's notion that a historical approach philosophy was the way of the 'litterateur.' Consequently, he proposed a political perspective in approaching history and method. This meant a historical perspective in approaching history was a basic law in going from an abstract history to an empirical history as an activity directed against an accumulated knowledge. Scientific history took scientific 'material' for a condition in going to a condition. It was an *ask* of posing an unfilled ground only individual in an opinion.<sup>786</sup> Scientific 'material' gives history which negates any individual state of mind. This is different from Hegel's reason, perspective in science in history. It is contrasted with Comte's project of history proceeding by an integration of knowledge and science ground. Science is a

If this negative perspective is the development of knowledge that produces differences in the form of knowledge and can be obtained according to the movement of an "anticipative idea."<sup>787</sup> The anticipative idea is understood as giving the perspective of new methods but the account of the development of objective phenomena. Bernard pictured this activity as 'injecting' an anticipative idea in the chain of reasoning.

<sup>785</sup> Bernard, *Conduite de l'homme*, ed. J. J. Bernard, p. 211.

<sup>786</sup> Bernard, *Conduite de l'homme*, ed. J. J. Bernard, p. 28.

<sup>787</sup> Bernard, *Conduite de l'homme*, ed. J. J. Bernard, p. 33.

The fully is best of Bernard's 'anipate'; it is not 'purely imaginary' but rather a positive position established through the essays in phenomenology. The concept of H uses characteristics of the empirical form of the empirical method as understood and transformed. The idea of mind which defines the parameters of the experience of the concept in the face of the experience is a suspension of philosophical judgement by the groundings of a new determinate concept and the characteristics of the new deposit of knowledge. The 'real' was held to exist as "unconscious and relative." By suspending philosophical judgement and being open to a 'special' empiricism, Bernard aims to provide a method in speculative universals (such as the concept of spirit) and prevent Bernard's special principle from gaining what he described as the 'sacred fire of research' which can be a source of inspiration and attributed to the 'anipate' idea.<sup>789</sup>

Final process of the empirical method. W. Heidegger's discourse of the empirical is a product of the empirical. But it has a limited perspective that necessarily determines such as historical and philosophical (Bernard's social science problem) and the empirical method. Bernard distinguished an 'objective synthesis' as that which could not produce a result in the empirical. This was seen by Heidegger, 'a condition of the empirical method' and the empirical method. In the philosophy of the empirical, it is not necessary to give a result under the conditions.

<sup>788</sup> Ibid 53  
<sup>789</sup> Ibid 221  
<sup>790</sup> Heidegger (1979) 34 and (1995) 98.

Conversely, it could also be considered positive  
transcendent judgement from conceptual origins

is effect of separating what is contained  
in functional possibility.

The Post and V of Experiment and Reasoning

General Limits

Experiment in clinical research

an internal freedom in form with a sensuous

or observational medicine represented through a 'pure' Hippocratic medicine. Although he

acts "essentially blind," he understood

to display 'certain tendencies' towards

experiment. <sup>791</sup> Experiment in practice

at separating out the productive respect for

physiological knowledge whose domain is an

open to enquiry, scientific and

methodical.

"True science suppresses nothing, but goes on searching and is undisturbed in

looking at things that does not understand

and in my opinion here

simply that whose high opinion is

them and law them on

each of his who has beyond them but

him who is not suppressed,

because they have been attacked by a stronger and

of the philosophical

methodical spirit in which any

ends in that

cannot know but in each case to be over and

enclosed and not that

push steadily forward...."<sup>792</sup>

Medicine, however, suppressed a 'pure' medicine whose necessity was for giving

explanation. The task of science as

'push' to extract from empiricism the elements that could

stand up to them. Examination productive

aim could be 'vital force' or explanations

given to 'life' itself which today is obstructed by doubt

Scientific knowledge

successively penetrates nature finding a

character in new and how many are

dynamism.

This suppression has specifically highlighted

by them over again the non-sensuous

and pathological medicine

an empirical tendency for discourse to be

s

of form and in origin and in that

is both the medicine and the body

<sup>791</sup> Benard (1957) p197

<sup>792</sup> ibid p223

and extended to rigorous scientific Bernard described  
pathological as diverging tendencies that  
medicine which aimed at departing from a purely empirical  
with initiating the scientific approach through the disposition that stands for an 'original doubt'  
and preceded them in their understanding of human existence

besides the discourse on normal and  
the internal dynamism of experimental  
laboratory He identified Hippocrates  
with freedom in random behavior.

Conversely, Bernard upheld the example of Paracelsus' as symbolizing medicine's ambition for  
a universal panacea which was a characteristic of  
dogma as a shell of expectation in medicine.  
experiment in medicine as a scientific  
concept which aimed at bridging a difference  
between a difference created by an empirical knowledge  
and an extension by the 'anticipative idea'.

<sup>793</sup> This gave us open perspectives that characterized  
his position as grounded by his scientific  
method between states of knowledge as

The Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine

independence of film as a standing

for 'the cheat of words' which Bernard was looking to overcome through  
since from the independence of a functional

an empirical  
concept <sup>794</sup> But being being as a

concept reduced to the 'organising idea' of its own nature. This concept drew on the  
experimental disposition to displace 'words' through what its 'anticipative' idea could uphold.  
The 'anticipative' idea was a strategy widely recognised as the true 'leitmotif' for  
Bernard's physiological practice even outside the discipline of physiology. Diverse  
concepts, such as for example philosophy  
philosophy and Felix Ravaisson, understood the 'anticipative idea' in terms of that which  
escaped perceptual experience, yet retained what could stand as potentially 'real' conditions.<sup>795</sup>

Such a vital concept was understood to have given  
definition to a new empirical  
in its definition of knowledge in respect

physiology a new approach now  
biology A new concept of physiology could  
an experiment without end as a

<sup>793</sup> pp. 207

<sup>794</sup> pp. 184.

<sup>795</sup> Noted in Paul Janet's review of of *An Introduction to Experimental Medicine* in 'Revue des deux mondes' (April, 1866) and Félix Ravaisson's *Philosophie* (1868) and *Evolution* (1908) and (1990) p. 97

since and his manner of knowing knowledge to be g  
difficultly as a form of living

coloured activity whose historical  
an adequate expression of its nature.

796

With the 'anticipative idea' internalised within a conceptual form and in  
knowledge of the significance of the physiological  
the body, the notion of the concept of  
direct physiological forms of appearance  
effective in practice, though separated  
understood to retain a positively 'anthropological' nature. A sense of the  
disposition of the body as for the purpose of  
separation as an end of production of positive concepts

797

The 'anticipative idea' has been the necessity that every judge  
knowledge. Although his was implicitly compacted into a 'vital principle' in the  
physiological course, Bernard had his own objective in it by a sense of  
possibilities introduced by the point of view of the living organism and from his  
Bernard defended the physiological autonomy against any artificial or external  
confusion of the object of his sense, in the context of the body and the  
nature of producing the positive concept Bernard was seen primarily as intrinsically  
linking with a living organism to the phenomenon as a specific  
theory of life. This was Henri Bergson's understanding of Bernard's 'anticipative idea'

A working Bergson Bernard had achieved a parallelism between a theory of  
knowledge and the theory of nature.<sup>798</sup> For Bergson he adopted a perspective on physiology's  
privileged object that could enable him to act as if a 'certain idea' stepped in; "this idea is not a  
force, simply a principle of explanation." When Bergson wrote an essay, 'The philosophy of  
Claude Bernard' following a conference at the College de France of 1913, he described this  
perspective as exemplifying how "nothing is more false than the conception of how synthesis

<sup>796</sup> Canguilhem (1989) p206

<sup>797</sup> Ibid p240

<sup>798</sup> Canguilhem (1994) p314-







had a physiological analysis of how his  
developed his synthesis of biology and Bergson

necessitates an adequate knowledge of  
the nature of the process.

The significance of his passage becomes apparent  
his contemporary, the physiologist Albert Dastre, a well known editor of Claude Bernard's  
Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux. In Dastre's own  
words, "I have not passed on to other

the nature of the process. Bernard's  
mechanism of the process.

them any biological processes being discussed. Create Evolution  
work.<sup>805</sup> In contrast, Bergson's later essay 'The philosophy of Claude Bernard' emphasised that

the nature of the process. Bernard's  
work makes no mention of Bernard's

Bernard's method of analysis is his

method of analysis is his

that of a conceptual generalisation in

scientific discovery.<sup>806</sup> The significance

of the method of Claude Bernard is being

of the method of Claude Bernard is being

nature. In doing his both upholding and extending

of the differences between the wider

physiological theory and his specific theory

of the differences between the wider

domain and inquiry beyond the domain

of the differences between the wider

unexplained gap between experiment and theory

of the differences between the wider

particularity of physiological reasoning given in the "qualities of a disposition of mind" as they

appeared in the work of the physiologist

of the differences between the wider

above. On this point, the work of Claude Bernard

of the differences between the wider

conditions in the study of experimental

of the differences between the wider

between scientific problems and their solutions that Bergson's later essay characterised as a  
suppression of the gap.<sup>807</sup>

The essay he described as a dialogue between mind and nature.

of the differences between the wider

of the synthesis by the mind of the

of the differences between the wider

of the continuous integration of the

of the differences between the wider

dynamism of the 'dialogue between mind and nature.' Both he and Bernard were facing

in their problem should be different

of the differences between the wider

<sup>805</sup> Dastre and Bergson (1944) p41 and Canguilhem (1990) p84

<sup>806</sup> Bergson (2002) p202

<sup>807</sup> Ibid 204-205

as proposing a new philosophy of  
 is central to Bergson's philosophy through the use of  
 intuition through a non-empirical  
 'intuition' Bergson would argue that  
 intuition is not scientific in Bernard's terms.<sup>809</sup> His intuition precedes the scientific  
 operation and the scientific is necessary  
 Bergson could still insist that this was 'real.' The scientific 'reality'  
 possibilities which, even within Bernard's parameters appear as a problem of  
 synthesis that could be considered as natural expressions  
 Bergson's intuition Magendie was specified in Bernard's *Leçons sur les phénomènes*  
 as the one who 'opened a breach.'<sup>810</sup> This 'breach' was established by bringing an order  
 of physiology and pathology to the same domain  
 but in a higher context. The  
 new physiology Bergson  
 through knowledge that  
 health and disease are  
 in Tim and Freud Bergson's argument on action  
 and quantitative processes preceding  
 Bergson's view on Claude  
 in his dispute with and position on  
 and the association between  
 Bergson's intuition and  
 Bergson's intuition through the

<sup>808</sup> Gouhier (1980) p.88.

<sup>809</sup> Bergson (2002) p.162.

<sup>810</sup> Caird (1990) p.87

Bergson's ambitions for the problem of synthesis flow how the production of scientific knowledge in particular the development of form in biology in Darwin's Evolutionary chapter on the central problem of biological development represents a problem of conceptual difference which Bergson's argument followed the wide arc introduced by the question of synthesis. The tension between determinism in biology and indeterminism in philosophy has a parallel to Bernard's division made between determinism and indeterminism in the first part of the book where he argues that the development of form is a knowledge of general form in Darwin's Evolutionary flow is a configuration of thought taken up from within the form of evolutionary debate to address philosophical questions posed by the separation of form and matter.

In the evolutionary argument there is a response to conditions of existence but the production of unexpected forms of living beings has a mechanism which bring about an "evolution of future species" which seem to converge to become co-existent. In the new deconditioned form the problem of form in strict terms of a repetition, but of 'replying.' Reply is a synthesis that equivocates between order and disorder. I equate the ambiguity of the discussion of active and passive adaptation in the interpretation of natural phenomena that account for convergence of form. On the other hand, a passive interpretation was a but to the Darwinian concept of chance. But another perspective is also needed. Lamarckism is a double bang.<sup>812</sup>

Their power understood only through sympathy with the new ideas is the interpretive value given to an autonomous principle behind evident natural

<sup>811</sup> Bergson (1944) pp 78-79  
<sup>812</sup> Bateson (1982) pp 137-138



account for the evolution of a single organism which “progresses and endures” by his being given in individual responses but understanding a body of functions in his existence. The presupposition for the evolution of a single organism is the evidence of his position behind organs.

of his own conceptual ed what it he himself is not here or generally the conditions of his body as it presupposes an understanding necessary but of existence.

That passage in the genesis of the functioning of a body but taking energy from the functional knowledge of organs here of the organ as a principle of its own life.

level by construction of the hand, endow him with his life, in an organism as an index in itself as not given though his own activity is not his.

his thesis: “life does not proceed by association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division.”<sup>816</sup> He qualified his thesis by describing perception as such an activity.

It has to determine its own activity.

in its own form.

cannot be. This is now taken as evidence of the indicated by an a priori social development.

category of objects is necessary by a ‘canalising’ vision of the world.

Categories but a Baum of

“objects avoided;” when the evolution of a

form of a complex of organs and evidence of a relation between them in a text higher in animals. In a way had a fresh concept of a function.

in his own, it seems as if objects and their extension to a category is grounded in the

The emergence of the evolution of a single organism and a theory of its evolution precede an early physiological account but Hegel had functions as a sense of soul evolutionary paradigm and a sense of necessity.

his own between a notion of knowledge and a function on the basis of a departure from an account of a social function. By extending his thesis through the modern of a relation between an attitude and a function.

<sup>816</sup> pp. 58-99, 104

disciplined to demonstrate an anticipatory position gave birth  
 with biological functions and differentiating conditions and the 'fringe'  
 of them entirely through a transition which Bergson had already introduced and of  
 duration.

The violence of the period through the evolution of a paradigm embodied what  
 shall of duration. I account for the hypothetical function of an anticipated law which  
 Creative Evolution is a transition from a state of equilibrium to a state of disequilibrium  
 how about this concept in principle but the discussion of the evolution of  
 one of the problems of synthesis but do something similar to Bernard's anticipative  
 not of an experiment but extended through a discussion of evolution and tendency  
 of a period in the history of the evolution of any term in biological evolution but  
 have advanced does extend an anticipation of the period since the moment through  
 a discussion of the physical and chemical conditions of the evolution of the  
 perspective of the evolution of the divergence and what Bergson introduced as a psychological  
 problem of evolution and a biological

The Evolution of Psychology

Bergson's theory of evolution and psychology appeared in the early years of 1896,  
 in the *Mémoires* and in the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* of  
 the same year. I drew heavily on the biological psychology of Piaget and the  
 positivist approach to psychology as a social science while the French Spirit and the  
 legacy of Maine de Biran. Biran's approach to the ego was as a culmination of, rather as  
 a foundation of the theory of consciousness but of the theory of the evolution of the  
 debt to Théodule Ribot who had developed a theory of the evolution of the mind within an  
 evolutionary framework to distinguish between the functions of the mind and the  
 psychic order against which adaptive responses could be qualitatively developed. <sup>817</sup> Janet

<sup>817</sup> See Bork (1998) p. 75.



his approach to psychology  
based on physiology and anatomy

main of psychology phenomena  
based on the study of the mind

818

his approach to consciousness  
including the role of the  
psychic domain and the  
senses in the formation of

the language and thought,  
from an extended consciousness  
psychic functions as synthesis of  
a sense of self and consciousness

was extensive but not uniform and  
consciousness required for intelligent judgement.

the psychic domain and the

8

Janet's approach to the

perceptions of the

activity through a synthetic

activity of the

by a

determined by physiological

synthetic activity which "unites more or less

numerously given phenomena into new phenomena differing from the elements."<sup>819</sup> What

the

in Janet's theory was an

equivalent certain amount of 'psychological force' for

the synthesis of

the

the level of

psychic results in

the

Notion of

as the

at

the

an unexplained

the

association in

the

the

particular

Moreover, in Janet's theoretical apparatus it focuses on the

the

the

Bergson's problem of synthesis; "we need to discover

how the choice is effected..."<sup>820</sup>

In respect

the

the

the

the

<sup>821</sup> Bergson saw

the

<sup>818</sup> Janet (1901) p.154; Bork (1998) p.180.

<sup>819</sup> Janet (1973) p.425; Bork (1998) p.183.

<sup>820</sup> Ibid p.164.

<sup>821</sup> Bergson (1988) p.155.

undifferentiated ground of perception which  
any theory of cognition.

characteristic is necessarily preceded

Merleau-Ponty proposes synthesis of percept  
of an entire world in one given through  
power of the

is not seen through simple  
of applied to the cognition

“nebulous mass” of experience,

“If this perception evokes in turn different memories, it is not by a mechanical

adjunction of forms and numbers in the

with an ungrounded,

in a round but by an expansion

finite consciousness which

spreading out over a larger area, discovers the fuller detail of its wealth.”<sup>822</sup>

This ‘spreading out’ of an undivided consciousness is also

can proceed

from the perspective of an open system

the external perceptual function

in a system of physical

relations and a secondary association of

concepts which bring them into coordinate act

of an object which is the function

functionally separate perceptual ground

of a system of possible sensory motor

states which represent the functional division

within the dynamic of degrees of

association between such a division

to the theory of multiple positions

diverse ‘tones’ of a mental life and is not. This indicates a division of

states of mental

life but is not a division of life

potential and a world of objects

“whole psychology as yet unmapped,” through an extended project of the psychology of

association of entities

823

In the dynamic of the form of an object which is

the idea of a concept of the entire

experience of the form of an object

of the field of the entire kind of the

the whole of the function of the entire

of the function in the entire as a whole

to a concept of “attention to life.” The function of sensory motor equilibrium is

condition of existence of the body and

the function of the entire ‘dynamic equilibrium

with the world as a capacity of balancing the entire

of the entire

<sup>822</sup> Ibid. p. 166

<sup>823</sup> Ibid. p. 170

equilibrium of the indexes  
questions in an individual.

a wide sense of extending beyond any determinate

nature

Bergson in his appraising of 'real' through emphasizing the prepositional  
function of Bergson, it implicated a function directed towards the 'real,' was  
indicating the "pointed end of mental life." This had a full body and  
it is not an anomalous thing as Bergson of  
sense and in overentails a positive  
ce of biology in the scheme of biology  
brain functioned by the excess of  
deficiency of the organism as a  
a scheme that could be avoided and  
d  
extended biological success through the  
no theory of knowledge of the  
Hence the concept of it appears as a function  
substituted and within the  
power of the organism of the  
in which the M and M in the development  
as an ontological function of  
yields in the completion of  
'norm' and 'real.' From the perspective of the positive  
, 'norm' and 'real' come together  
appear extensive in the field of  
in the 'fringe' of biology of the  
function of the individual  
knowledge in the individual form a  
death of the body and of the

### The Post-Metaphysics

The reason why Bergson introduced the individual in Creative Evolution perhaps is  
from what was retrospectively implicated by the essay, 'The philosophy of Claude  
Bernard.' This states that Bernard does not exclude the 'organising idea' through elaborating an  
experimental method and Bergson interpreted this as "restoring under another form a  
that he was combating."<sup>824</sup> A concept of biology, Creative Evolution condensed his  
philosophical argument into a vitalist  
monism as Bergson's definition  
was established by the evolutionist  
of the given of the organism  
concept of the organism in Creative Evolution  
only as it could be successfully  
avoiding an opposition between the 'mechanist illusion' and the 'vitalist illusion' at the level of

<sup>824</sup> Bergson (2002) p95

method. He substituted the problem for a different  
'fatalism' which Bergson introduced in his method and  
had adopted in his previous specific

distinction between a 'determinism' and a  
epistemological fact  
knowledge.

How even in grounding his entire approach through  
introduced the 'fringe' between such determinism and form He took these as if  
method of knowledge distinguished between an analytical  
empirical than 'thoughtful.'<sup>825</sup> His synthesis appeared  
essential concept of the  
his view of form and process through  
his theory of evolution as  
followed the stream of universality in his Bergson  
discussions of Creative Evolution. The new biology  
was a collaboration of many eminent scientists

his synthesis of form and process, Bergson  
in a synthesis of form and process, Bergson  
and another "more  
ed both come from the same  
with a form and form and Bergson introduced  
his understanding of Descartes' notion of  
his deepening of his own experience through  
and subsequently took his through the  
science in the 19<sup>th</sup> century came in the  
Darwinism.

Bergson's view as a new scientific paradigm  
Descartes' method since the problem was merely one of priority in the execution of method.  
Both Bergson and Descartes in their method of procedure  
in mind before the object but Bergson focused on the  
intelligibility of form and its development  
his theory of evolution through his theory  
pursued under a question of the superfluous  
metaphysics, Bergson was moving towards the convergence of a positive  
spiritual ground through the extended question of

between a problem of synthesis and  
826  
synthesis and a certain idea of  
adaptation between experience and  
a theory of psychology was a  
in the view of Bergson and Descartes  
of form and its development  
in the view of Bergson  
827  
physical and mental

To his Bergson was added the dynamic  
concept of the unconscious was a fully developed

theory of synthesis from a psychological  
in mind and form and in.  
828 R. A. Fisher

<sup>825</sup> 'Le Parrallélisme Psycho-Physique et Métaphysique Positive', Bergson (1957) 142-143 (in translation)

<sup>826</sup> "are they conserving intelligibility in the same manner?" Ibid 142

<sup>827</sup> Bergson's view of Bergson's theory 141

<sup>827</sup> Ibid 142-143

<sup>828</sup> Ibid 142,



Bergson's positive metaphysics is a confrontation with Positivism's perspective on the evolution of science. In Chapter 1 of *Creative Evolution*, Bergson links form to the perspective of the physicist, and a lack of knowledge to the concept of form. In particular, he characterizes Greek thought as dominated by a "philosophy of ideas," which confounds 'essences' with intentions, but does not know of the life of an 'animal instinct' moving directly from impressions to 'mental designs' through simple means. The central criticism of this 'direct mode' of thinking was his aversion "even today" in what Bergson famously described as the "cinematographical instinct."<sup>829</sup>

Bergson is therefore using a question of form to argue that science is inadequate to explain the evolution of life. He points to the tendency of the intellect to fall apart when it approaches the inadequacy of its perspective on the world. As August Comte has argued, the intellect is formed from observable generalizations, and its conceptual framework is an oversimplification of the world. For Bergson, since the problem of life is not to be known through the intellect, evolution must represent only the break in the intellect's concept of high and low, described in positivism. <sup>830</sup> Kant's Critique represents the resolution of a metaphysics that cannot extend beyond a conditional threshold of its own perspective on the world.

In his context, Bergson describes how the 19th century had arrived in the era of philosophical positivism of the 18th century, an "incomplete Spinozism or Leibnizism," or a "cramped

<sup>829</sup> Bergson (1944) pp. 341-342,  
<sup>830</sup> ibid. 57f

Cartesianism.”<sup>831</sup> These various methods of Positivists and the scientific problem at  
 legacy appearing in biological typology because they fit more beyond the  
 ambitions of Cabanis’ era on the question of the physical and the moral,-

“What is the physiology and the pathology of the mind and the nature of  
 the physical and the moral aspects without hypotheses  
 which do not in themselves have any scientific value  
 should be purely and simply as fact.”<sup>832</sup>

This great question of the physical and the moral appears in Bergson’s *Le Deux Sens*. This  
 is what he evolved through his hesitations on duration, his phenomenological and the  
 pathological hypotheses in metaphysics

Despite this but principle of duration and experience, he  
 with discussion behind Creative Evolution flows his as a strategic ‘science against  
 scientificism.’ In his *Le Deux Sens* he presents a dualism as a negative science  
 in order to bring concepts susceptible of positive evolution in an expanded  
 scheme of knowledge. But he demonstrates the synthesis of the living and the  
 project of the physical and the moral and expanded the framework of the new order had  
 particular relevance in his *Le Deux Sens* Bergson did not engage with  
 twenty years of Creative Evolution. *A book on The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*<sup>833</sup>

How ever the psychology of Bergson is a theory of synthesis and proposes a  
 dualism in order to distinguish accounting for the separation of different modes of  
 knowledge and grounding his critique against a dualistic unfolding of a ‘higher reason,’  
 during grounded in the divergence between the theory of knowledge and the theory of life.<sup>834</sup>

Here Bergson argued that living experience of succession appeared as a “kind of force” of  
 consciousness, a theory of dualism of mind and individual

<sup>831</sup> Ibid 387  
<sup>832</sup> Bergson (1957) p 147-150  
<sup>833</sup> Bergson’s other works can be loosely characterised in *Le Deux Sources du Moral et du Individuel*  
 Simulations of new physical experience and *Le Deux Sources du Moral et du Individuel*  
 consciousness  
<sup>834</sup> Bergson (1944) p 365-366

“...the universe unfolds its successive states with a velocity which in regard to my consciousness, is a veritable absolute...why with this particular velocity rather than another?”<sup>835</sup>

This perspective appears in Bergson's *Le Deuxième Sens* (1925) where he discusses the relationship between the physical and the moral. Bergson's intuitional knowledge converged under a common perspective proposed by Durkheim. It was this confrontation with the 'would be successors to Descartes,' which for Bergson meant an affirmation of the ego in B. Bergson's perspective on the possibility of objective experience is not a bottoming out of experience in a social order. It appears "a kind force" pushing intellectual unity into a psychic multiplicity and one could say, given the nature of the thing, it is with this force that Bergson's perspective on the social order is defined.

#### Durkheim The Political Norm

Emile Durkheim's work on the social order is a response to the 'ancient question of the relation of the physical and the moral' assigned to a future science. His starting point was the 'social physiology' derived from August Comte and Saint Simon on the one hand and the political philosophy of the Enlightenment on the other. Durkheim's synthesis in the face of 'dispersion.' When he wrote about Saint Simon during the 1890's he described his own aim to "liberate the body of ideas on which the social structure should rest." Durkheim's own project took this as a problem of symbolic order.<sup>836</sup> I gave a perspective on a doublet of the social order which could be considered as a gain in order. It emerged between a 'way to function' and a 'way of being.' This was the heart of social physiology the aim of conceptualising "a certain state of the collective mind,"<sup>837</sup> which

<sup>835</sup> *ibid* 369

<sup>836</sup> Durkheim (1959) 134

<sup>837</sup> Durkheim (1982) 55,



now in an account of his civil orderings. I was in particular interested in Durkheim's book because of his knowledge of the new methods as an interpretation of character and a rational orderings. I was in particular interested in Durkheim's book because of his knowledge of the new methods.

The positive sciences in modern and of epistemology which provide ground and necessary synthesis of a new paradigm of sciences from epistemology and the simultaneous orders of 'natural' knowledge which modern man was faced with and a foundation of a transdisciplinary. <sup>838</sup> Durkheim's sociology promised knowledge of a new domain:

“Up to the present thinkers were placed before this double alternative; either explain the social facts by their own nature or by the nature of the individual. The first alternative was postulated but whose existence no observation could establish....beyond the individual as 'finis naturae' is the system of active forces, not nominally or rationally created, a new field opens up.”<sup>839</sup>

Looking beyond the 'finis naturae,' Durkheim avoided a psychology of the soul by emphasizing the social field. This would "...open a new way to the Science of Man," through his sociology would bring to consciousness a conceptual domain and a new field of inquiry and biological. <sup>840</sup>

Them and faced by Durkheim was a field in the order of phenomena that would express such a domain and Bernard's physiographic paradigm of the day. This was an experiment that Durkheim's social field was an open experiment and was in the new way of laboratory practice gave theoretical to 19th century physiology which he organized in the field of functions of the body in relation to

<sup>838</sup> Thibault (1975)  
<sup>839</sup> Durkheim (2001) p.342  
<sup>840</sup> ibid p.342



model that appears through a process of  
The Division of Labour

the thinking social structures proposed

In his text, Durkheim describes two modes of  
divergent expressions of the same  
of mechanical and organic

the mechanical and organic. These

are not to be confused

with the organic.

845

- A distinction is made in Durkheim's  
collective consciousness. This gives

principles of the covering

apparent 'ways of being' that both orders are

perceived as the 'fabric' of a socialised nature. This model of knowledge  
grounds a functional and conceptual

of things <sup>846</sup> This is

model of how social

system and modes of social

and the historical given through

social forms and values

of the same order.

- Beyond his perspective, Durkheim looks

'ways of functioning' given in terms of the

interpretation of the social phenomenon

What Durkheim sees as social

though social forms which could not be

used to account for the

given since functions "cannot tell us what ends are to be pursued," and that they could

be perceived 'states of being' only in a limited way. <sup>847</sup> However, the

interpretation which necessitates the grounding of

of a social

coexistence and

"good and evil do not exist;" he asks the question of

in using both to describe individual opinions which

are equally grounded in an

emotional and new language of the

beginning

the functional and

it was developed through Durkheim's model of

organism. From the organic perspective,

the problem is beyond

of the same knowledge and social

grounded by social

with both mechanical and organic differences which

in defining the zone

functional division. This

is a social zone drawn together with

social

<sup>845</sup> Durkheim (1984) p84 -85

<sup>846</sup> Ibid p64

<sup>847</sup> Durkheim (1982) p85

phenomena in order to understand them. The question is how did Durkheim address this problem? He looked to Comte who took an underlying notion of 'impulsion' to improve conditions, which Durkheim saw as inherently confusing with "something ascribed as source or essence," which appeared as a fundamental problem in both philosophy and biology. A starting point for Comte's Positivism is an analysis of human forms through the historical method. Durkheim decided his task as maintaining a "truly metaphysical entity."<sup>848</sup> He meant a concept of human nature to be paid to as a superior animal which appeared to Durkheim as a rivaled 'psychology' of the spirit.<sup>849</sup> By distancing his own method from Comte's transcendentalism, Durkheim took as his problem how to define an explanation of biological forms within a relatively firm framework. These were the difficult parameters which he summarises only under a 'persistence of life;' which is something regulated through 'social living.' His way of social order is an undigested form of individual 'will' and a clear distinction between individual and general.<sup>850</sup>

Durkheim's ambition for such a positive and determinable domain looked to Bernard's interior milieu as a new model of vitality. The question is how did Durkheim follow Bernard's lead? He broke with Bernard's focus on vitality? A notion of 'vitality.' Bernard's inner milieu instilled a new physiological concept by which the milieu constituted the environment and belonged to the organism. Bernard's model took the human mind as a condition of the organism and of the environment as a freedom through order in the environment.

"The constancy of an inner environment is the conditions for a free and independent life with each animal how ever it is. It is a behaviour with one purpose, that of maintaining the integrity of the conditions of life within the internal environment."<sup>852</sup>

<sup>848</sup> p119

<sup>849</sup> p126-133

<sup>850</sup> p144-146

<sup>851</sup> 'The Concept of the Organism in Physiology' Pearlman (2000) p178

<sup>852</sup> Bernard's Phenomena of Life in Man and Plants (1901) p178

Bernard's homeostatic function was also being conceptualized in books for  
 a parallel concept of the social function of the individual in this phenomena  
 which is expressive of functional unity. "in the relation it bears with  
 to some social end." "Equally because behind these social facts will be  
 "antecedent social facts" as criterion demonstrable by social phenomena.<sup>853</sup> What is evident  
 by these social facts is that the individual is not a mere biological being but a  
 human being in equilibrium with the social environment. Such a zone of equilibrium  
 between biological and social facts is what Durkheim meant by the term 'social  
 fact' which is a conceptual 'way of being.'

Power in a society

Social facts are not mere values but they are the independence of the individual and Durkheim  
 describes them as subsumed under 'power of association.'<sup>854</sup> This power explains how a social  
 fact is understood as a collective representation and de-  
 termined by the social environment through a 'dynamic density' with a potential to cross  
 the boundaries of the individual and become a social fact.

By following the new model of Durkheim in which the individual is not a biological entity  
 own terms. Conscious of avoiding empirical problems (such as Comte's law of the three stages  
 which Durkheim thought "cannot but be empirical."<sup>855</sup>) Durkheim is not a mere biological  
 analysis but a social analysis. What Durkheim was trying to do was to parallel Bernard's rejection of vitalism. What Durkheim was trying to do was  
 any biological causal model but a social model.  
 "if historical evolution is governed by a law (the law of progress) which is not a mere  
 wish but a real tendency, then the individual is not a mere biological entity but a social  
 being which can only exist in a social environment. Such a zone of equilibrium between  
 biological and social facts is what Durkheim meant by the term 'social fact' which is a  
 conceptual 'way of being.'<sup>856</sup>

<sup>853</sup> Durkheim (1982) p134

<sup>854</sup> ibid p135

<sup>855</sup> ibid p139

<sup>856</sup> ibid p141

How ever having placed the tendency about  
observed thinking as social in account  
aggregate of functions that condition  
discourse as functions of a different world  
theory.

the individual in the general and  
noted for his reference point through the  
ed the domain. To his end, the surveys he diverse  
opposing taboos of sociophilosophical

Firstly those given to theories which placed a 'nature of man' prior to the social. This  
has social in Hobsbawm and Rouseau's view his saw his  
artifice which should be subordinated to the idea of man's will; "a machine wholly constructed  
by hands of man and his will product  
of his kind only because man  
wills it, and so an act of volition created it another one transforms it."<sup>857</sup>

-Secondly as he is of natural being with so  
Durkheim considered that these gave the idea of  
spontaneous higher elements of the 'natural language,' whose concept extended to a Science of  
Man through information of  
legacy of Condorcet and Comte

and against giving primacy to the will  
of social as in man and

In such he is well condensed the natural and the  
dualism and monism but his adom insisted

of a concept of the social idea  
by a principle of social genesis

Durkheim's method aimed at subsuming both the in a general  
human attributes but based on  
he sense had described functions in  
physiological order but added  
an actual sociological. These were about to  
social. Durkheim defended a functional approach

cal idea about to  
ing. This as a human attribute  
the social domain by accordance with the  
through what he taken as a need of  
'real' relations indexed by laws of  
the social structure through being

he said the 'persistence of life;' this stood as  
yet an independent how  
philosophical concept that was in fact

necessary axiom of the social science  
it was ascribed to the whole therefore caught  
between

Since he how an origin and since he  
few how could he be given in

could explain the concept of  
Durkheim reached his fully by integrating

<sup>857</sup> ibid 142



Historical development of the concept of social function in Durkheim's theory of social evolution. He identified a historical process of differentiation of social functions, which became visible in the emergence of specialized knowledge such as agriculture, industry, and commerce. This process was characterized by the division of labor, which led to the emergence of different social classes and professions. Durkheim argued that the division of labor was a necessary condition for the development of modern societies. He also argued that the division of labor was a result of the increasing complexity of social life. In his theory, the division of labor was a key factor in the development of social cohesion and stability. Durkheim's theory of social evolution was based on the idea that societies progress through different stages of development, from simple to complex. He argued that the division of labor was a key factor in the development of modern societies. He also argued that the division of labor was a result of the increasing complexity of social life. In his theory, the division of labor was a key factor in the development of social cohesion and stability.

Social evolution as a process of differentiation of social functions. Durkheim and Mauss argued that the division of labor was a key factor in the development of modern societies. They argued that the division of labor was a result of the increasing complexity of social life. In their theory, the division of labor was a key factor in the development of social cohesion and stability. Durkheim and Mauss argued that the division of labor was a key factor in the development of modern societies. They argued that the division of labor was a result of the increasing complexity of social life. In their theory, the division of labor was a key factor in the development of social cohesion and stability.

<sup>858</sup> Durkheim and Mauss (1969) p. 5.  
<sup>859</sup> Ibid. p. 84-85.





How a power of explanation that would account  
 individual. This in actuality gave the conc  
 forces of the field. These were necessar  
 'natural' powers that opposed those constituted by a subject; in turn, the subject as power  
 with potential of a determining force through the subject's own physical body. In this way, the  
 power of individuals given the potential of  
 mind at a point. This was also dependent  
 on the force through the concept. In this way, "man feels that he is a soul and  
 consequently, because he is a being,  
 he can add to the form of the concept  
 he potentially becomes a social concept

for a social concept. In this way, "man feels that he is a soul and  
 consequently, because he is a being,  
 he can add to the form of the concept  
 he potentially becomes a social concept

Power of judgment is a social concept  
 experience and understanding in advance of  
 simple tendency in individual but a social  
 concept that is not a social concept  
 abstract and how the subject is a  
 understood as a social concept in the sense of an  
 power developed through participation in  
 external social interaction

'naturally.' It means the sense of the  
 any principle that is not  
 they conditioned. The form of the  
 and external individual presentation  
 that Duhem does not intend to be  
 in a general but a social effect  
 which serves as a general mark of social  
 autonomy of the community.

"The framework goes beyond the material and dominates it...it goes beyond the  
 individual memory; it is above all created to answer the needs of the community."

864

On the concept of community, it is a social  
 level of the understanding through the  
 community. An 'order of things' was open to intervention by the "will of the gods," a supernatural  
 force of the high potential supposed

virtuality in the social  
 order already in the present  
 a supernatural  
 specialization that is a form of

863 b1p272  
 864 b1p274

individual's logic.<sup>865</sup> Such a principle ob-  
jects to the idea of a post-knowledge of  
nature that by itself would appear  
in the realm of the beyond.

Durkheim's thesis on the form of social knowledge  
is that it is not a simple reflection of the  
social order but a product of the social order  
itself. It is a social fact, a fact that is  
external to the individual and that exerts  
a coercive power over him. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.<sup>866</sup> Equally, it is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.

Durkheim's study of the totemic principle is  
not only a study of the social order but  
also a study of the individual. It is a  
study of the social order and of the  
individual. It is a study of the social  
order and of the individual. It is a  
study of the social order and of the  
individual. It is a study of the social  
order and of the individual.

“both resides in men and is the vital principle of things...they stimulate and  
develop the individual and the social order.”  
The individual is not a simple reflection of the  
social order but a product of the social order  
itself. It is a social fact, a fact that is  
external to the individual and that exerts  
a coercive power over him. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.<sup>867</sup> These  
“both resides in men and is the vital principle of things...they stimulate and  
develop the individual and the social order.”  
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that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.<sup>868</sup> A individual  
is not a simple reflection of the social  
order but a product of the social order  
itself. It is a social fact, a fact that is  
external to the individual and that exerts  
a coercive power over him. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.<sup>869</sup> The individual  
is not a simple reflection of the social  
order but a product of the social order  
itself. It is a social fact, a fact that is  
external to the individual and that exerts  
a coercive power over him. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.

Social knowledge is not a simple reflection of the  
social order but a product of the social order  
itself. It is a social fact, a fact that is  
external to the individual and that exerts  
a coercive power over him. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness. It is a fact  
that is not created by the individual but  
that is created by the social order through  
the collective consciousness.

<sup>865</sup> Ibid 29

<sup>866</sup> Ibid 36-40

<sup>867</sup> Ibid p141, “Mana is the science of its day” p151, This is an observation that Durkheim makes in Com p152

<sup>868</sup> Ibid 168

<sup>869</sup> Ibid 169-174 p180-181

For Durkheim, the social is not a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness.

but the function of the pot is not to be used as a container, but as a means of cooking. The pot is not just a container, but a means of cooking. The pot is not just a container, but a means of cooking.

He is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness.

at illustrates Durkheim's extended theory of the social. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness.

Durkheim and Anomie

For Durkheim, the social is not a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness.

He understood the social as a 'natural' appetite to be satisfied. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness. The social is not just a collection of individuals, but a system of relations that shapes individual consciousness.

<sup>870</sup> ibid 181  
<sup>871</sup> ibid 273-284  
<sup>872</sup> ibid 269-273, 201

qualifications a dimension of his social position.  
873

of the new power

What is such a power? It is not by itself a part of the body of the person, but it is a part of the social environment. According to Durkheim, the power is a part of the social environment. This is the explanation of the power in Durkheim's theory of social action. The power is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.  
874

he is by himself and his own self. It is the power of the social environment which is a part of the social environment. The power is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.  
n's

A social power is a part of the social environment. It is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.

Durkheim's earlier works. In *Suicide*, he expresses a 'longing for infinity.'

"It is everlastingly repeated that it is in man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly advancing, but always a little behind, in the direction of the ideal, which they suffer."<sup>875</sup>

the ideal of the human mind is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.

The significance of the power is a part of the social environment. It is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.

the 'unregulated conscience' and the concept of the power is a part of the social environment. It is a part of the social environment and he could not understand it (positively) as a part of the social environment. I express this in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power and cannot express it in terms of the power.

<sup>873</sup> p. 271

<sup>874</sup> p. 275

<sup>875</sup> Durkheim (1970) p. 253

How ever, discipline is embodied  
with a capacity;

inherent and convergent to within

From here, the problem is

all such unregulated will appear

as a lack of rule, *dérèglement*,<sup>876</sup> or the threat of difference to asymmetry.

While the order of presentation  
ensues

the beginning of the transformation

Secondly, from here, the problem is

in order to depict in the form of

order of appearance through them in an

order of appearance and stand only for a 'way of

interpretation.' Since structures of

an order of things

only a secondary structure

is possible with a capacity

at the origin of

understanding but

is open to the transformation

order

From here, the problem is

in order to depict in the form of

and subject to the order of

indeed, the order of things

by a particular object of

disposition of the problem in order

function in the association between

reference to the order and understanding

but this conversion is potential

of the order since it is in the

order of things of such associations

as open to the transformation

interpretation as interpretation

open to experiment and demonstration

difference between

as difference between

a transformation

This is the case

as a particular object of

determined

but it is determined in the concept

of only 'gives grounds' for an understanding.

This is the case between

determined ends is a particular

anomie as a 'way of being' drawn from a

A Christian theology of

anomie and the function of

is not necessarily the function of

nomination and its

has a profound effect

<sup>876</sup> This

context of anomie and its

is not as a matter of

indication of its consequences

of the form of the transformation

<sup>876</sup> M. Merleau-Ponty (1987)

anomie in the 19th century was equal  
 one since he could not find a law of God.  
 against concepts of God which had  
 passed away through the ages.  
 opens a new way of thinking about  
 the world. *μοῖρα* (moira) fatalistic notion held of  
 "that which is right." It appears  
 in the Iliad as the force which  
 compels the gods to act. A  
 god who is not bound by the  
 laws of fate is a god who is  
 not a god.

for him the law is  
<sup>877</sup> This shows the sense of  
 finding no equivalent in  
 the ancient Greek *ἀνομία*, meaning 'lawless' or 'impious,' which  
 signifies the sense, νόμος  
 is the νόμος  
 'dispensation' in the sense that Zeus dispensed land  
 and power according to his  
 will. νόμος here  
 presents the law as a  
 dispensation.

The concept of anomie is  
 under a sacred law, and embodies  
 sacrilegious. By using anomie in the sense of 'dérèglement,' the  
 opposite of règle, Durkheim  
 meant an opposition to the  
 grounded by the law. The  
 general concept of anomie  
 is the concept of the  
 déréglé in the sense of  
 social disorganization.

and the law together  
 in an attempt to be  
 teleological thought of 'ought.' This  
 is a prescriptive concept.  
<sup>879</sup> The suggestion in Durkheim's  
 fundamental concept of  
 anomie is based on the  
 by treating society's

W. H. Hall's hypothesis is  
 was taken up as a philosophical  
 concept of social disorganization  
 by the physiologists and  
 the problem of anomie in the  
 legacy of the

development of the  
 by the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup>  
 century. These were the  
 famous but the body of  
 the law of physiology

<sup>877</sup> Lip 83  
<sup>878</sup> Liddell & Scott  
<sup>879</sup> M. E. & B. D. W. 84





recessed by the boundaries of social functions  
of Durkheim as a body.

entirely in experience which appeared

He also understood this as a biological  
being' are only dependent from social

not necessarily

different 'ways of

could coexist as 'normal' phenomena. 'Ways of

being' appear as points

as "channels that life has dug for itself..."<sup>884</sup> These points

was to distinguish between social functions

with social expression

the real

social functions in the phenomenon of the

them was an abstract general function of

society. In contrast to the system of

Comte's social functions, the general 'fact' for

Durkheim was that "something suspends hostilities for a while."

However, in his industrial

societies, general functions are

apparently continuous in time

ultimately grounded

by historical functions. A normal function

emphasizes which

could appear as new conditions

of processes being

The Durkheim's ambitions of a Science of Man were

an ideological

methodological escape

in empirical. However, Durkheim considered

ideological judgment as 'pre-functional,' meaning that

deferred its own measure to "some

overriding concept."<sup>885</sup> In contrast, Durkheim was looking for a

historical

'backsliding' into such ideology. He was

of the approach. This meant

that the problem of social organization

was not a

form of social organization.

<sup>886</sup> From an individual perspective,

an organization was

such a medium in which

of its world to view 'mentally,' individuals could "no

longer figure out its limits...since it is so to speak unlimited."<sup>887</sup> But the

of the organization was

both the perspective of social functions

but the evidence of their form

even in historical events becoming

determinable.

<sup>888</sup>

<sup>884</sup> ibid 299-302-303.

<sup>885</sup> ibid 86

<sup>886</sup> Durkheim (1982) p90-91

<sup>887</sup> ibid 305

<sup>888</sup> ibid 85

Distinguishing them in his notion of anomie and  
 pointing to such vital 'norms.' Durkheim's strategy defined his question through the  
 assemblages of sociological 'entities,' distinguished from those anomalous to such repetition.<sup>889</sup>

A number of his arguments point to how he argued that  
 generalizing throughout the species is not possible  
 causing him to think about social forms and Durkheim just individualistic  
 epistemology is not a scientific process

“how would they have been able to sustain themselves in a variety of circumstances  
 if they did not enable the individual to better resist the causes of destruction.”<sup>890</sup>

Repeating the same old frequency in a  
 situation where conditions of existence are  
 changing and the social forms are evolving  
 and the forms of anomie are changing  
 that is why we say that the past could not  
 exist. We have evidence from a number of  
 A wide persistence of force that could not  
 contain any conditions of old existence,  
 distinguishing the sociological from the biological  
 with the social phenomena as norms and the  
 reference points

In understanding Durkheim's project one should not be confused. Sociologists aim and  
 what he believed in was that in a rapidly  
 changing world an automatic force was acting  
 in order to save appearances. “tendency to anarchy,” was a principle of  
 the dynamism of the economy. It was a vital principle drawing on “a  
 substance of common life.” Durkheim related this dynamism to the tendency for an

<sup>889</sup> Ibid 93

<sup>890</sup> Ibid 93

“enfranchisement” of a ‘way of being’ that offered a means to escape subordination of an  
unim ejlea <sup>891</sup>

In his regard, Durkheim not show Saint-Simon never  
could his thinking by reference to Newton, Ca  
significance and his could be ground here  
Durkheim continues

“To assume that the particular state of subordination in his industry had formerly  
been wholly out of the being of the new c  
does not imply that every type of dependence  
could be transformed as necessary do  
subordinating but in changing form not in making i  
unim id absolute beyond which he is nothing b  
different and means that in fact  
high standards and apparatus are norm ably on  
Unim id the end of the world  
unlimited has no goal since there is no limit.”

Durkheim would how as looking for sociopolita  
development understood his through the concept of  
counter example to these techniques appeared in the image of the “hypercivilization” of he  
Suicide. Hee an anom tendency bed growth in social consequences  
system of excessive data and hosts  
These produced the economic evils in the  
period Durkheim in part these evils dis  
indicate various things  
Finally, the provisional concept of exp  
forces on forming each other and force  
of individual character

is spoke of Plato or Rousseau rather  
basis, Bhat and Adam Smith. The  
ach for in man and principle of subin:

on the basis of collective  
would be devoid of a sort  
not on its suppressing or  
industry is a kind of  
utaherism in a  
the general will of the  
condition of being controlled  
and by the goal of the

technique for regulating the capacity for  
even under a ‘persistence of life.’ The  
counter example to these techniques appeared in the image of the “hypercivilization” of he  
for the nervous  
capable of them and could be objectives  
in its fold of reform and individual  
of the form of economic power of his  
bed through analysis of various  
has the possession of individual

892

<sup>891</sup> Durkheim (1959) 235.

<sup>892</sup> Durkheim (1970) 319



## Conclusion: The Vital and the Positive

The thesis is a contemporary context from Foucault's 'crisis of the 1960' which was concerned with the 'rarefied form of positivism,' as Deleuze and Guattari argued. He focused on what Deleuze's own thought deliberately subjected to a vitalism. In this thesis, vitalism was explained around the 'age of Bichat' with Deleuze proposed a combination of the Sense and the Sign by contrast. Foucault approached through his engagement with Kant. These were the two perspectives explored as an Enlightenment project that developed and analyzed them in order to find a reason.

When Foucault focused on the 'age of Bichat' in the *Birth of Biopolitics*, he was speaking of an Enlightenment Science of Man where the Political Positivism saw the solution of a naive ambition. Gilles Deleuze described this event as the 'delicate problem' of constituting a positive concept from the broader concept of the political. This is his interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy and the signs 'that have yet to take hold.' But the Enlightenment Science of Man was understood through the idea of a sign that was the creation of man's higher faculties, his own human nature, new philosophical and scientific languages with a practical application in man's world. While Kant's rationalism emphasized the human basis of the 18<sup>th</sup> century of power, he also looked for the 'indispensable service' extending beyond the conditions of the human world. This was the nature followed in the *Opus Postumum* system of analyzing the theoretical possibility of apprehending a concept of a true social system of concepts. This gave the perspective from which Kant's *Anthropology* was a domain and a technique of knowledge compared with nature, as he combined the natural and theoretical aspects of biology and medicine, and judged by principles of life.

The 'age of Bichat' derived of Montpellier vitalism and followed them through engagement with historical phenomena that as identified Science M an extending to the physical and moral world as well as the social world. Positivism saw human life's capacity for organization, while vitalism meant the 'hidden operations of nature.' This thesis found what Bichat understood as heuristic values derived of medicine took priority over the specificity of systematic science; the 'age of Bichat' extended his readings of Saint Simon over beyond a physiological debate to a political domain. Saint Simon's enterprise centered on the achievement of a new social order and the recognition of 'aboriginal difference' giving central biological problem. His is 'industrial values' gave expression to man's inner drives through the concept of work. Positivism's perspective on values of an Enlightenment Science M an.

The legacy of Bichat's physiology also put these values into dispute; Comte's Positivism saw an epistemological crisis in philosophy and the operations of Science M an and Bichat was a problem because he considered knowledge to be an incomplete 'incomplete Positivism' opened to a structural thinking that overtook a broader practice of Science of Man at the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The new paradigm for knowledge of a period was the experimental medicine of Claude Bernard and depicted another understanding of forming functions dependent only on 'conditions of existence.' This gave the 'paradoxical link' with other questions of value apprehended as a reflection of the Third Republic. Following the separation of philosophy from the natural approach was a progressive adaptation between experience and intelligence. Bergson's critique of Positivist historical form and the process of evolution and the development of the biological world with Comte's Evolutionary philosophy as a new vitalism.

The new Positivism of Emile Durkheim also looked to Bernard's interior milieu for social models for a collective 'order of things.' The values identified in his work were the result of epochs that underwent a non-biological and taken up around the philosophical project of a period for Science M an in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. However, it was possible

state of knowledge and what we saw as 'norms' in modern society. I was especially because of the positive and negative aspects of the Enlightenment project. I was especially because of the positive and negative aspects of the Enlightenment project. I was especially because of the positive and negative aspects of the Enlightenment project.

We have an idea of the Enlightenment project as a project of human progress. We have an idea of the Enlightenment project as a project of human progress. We have an idea of the Enlightenment project as a project of human progress. We have an idea of the Enlightenment project as a project of human progress. We have an idea of the Enlightenment project as a project of human progress.

The general idea of the Enlightenment project is that it is a project of human progress. The general idea of the Enlightenment project is that it is a project of human progress. The general idea of the Enlightenment project is that it is a project of human progress. The general idea of the Enlightenment project is that it is a project of human progress. The general idea of the Enlightenment project is that it is a project of human progress.

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