

Issues of Gender and Palestinian Citizenship: Women's Activism from National Liberation to Interim Self-Government*

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The article explores ways in which the Palestinian women's movement has mobilized around the recent transition from national liberation to interim self-government. I discuss the gendered mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion which characterize emergent processes of citizenship and legal reform, and analyse the terms in which women are currently renegotiating their membership in the process of statebuilding. I conclude by looking at how recent shifts in political authority have problematized women's struggles, and discuss how organised women are presently working through these dilemmas by articulating gender-sensitive positions on citizenship that are distinct from the nationalist agenda.

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A growing body of literature on Palestinian women has worked to revise conventional perceptions of the relationship between women and nationalism in the Middle East. This scholarship has demonstrated the centrality of Palestinian women in sustaining both the national liberation movement since the turn of the century, and the popular uprising (*Intifada*) against Israeli Occupation since 1987. These writings refer to the female Palestinian nationalist as an active and varied political subject, with prominent images ranging from honourable virgin, dedicated mother, weeping martyr - to popular leader, cheap labourer, political prisoner and guerrilla warrior. Scholarship on women in Middle Eastern nationalist movements has had the dual effect of challenging neo-colonialist and orientalist perceptions of women as passive “Other”¹, but also restricting inquiry into the complex mechanisms of patriarchal domination *within* the movements themselves. In the Palestinian context, national liberation made women’s political mobilization indispensable, but it also created and exacerbated profound contradictions in gender relations. The *Intifada* provided public space for the political mobilization of women in support for the *national* struggle, but also circumscribed *women’s* struggle for social liberation to areas considered appropriate to traditional “feminine” concerns (for example, childbearing, childrearing and social services). As a result, nationalism was both inclusionary and exclusionary, providing Palestinian women with an essential, yet problematic, framework through which to negotiate equal terms of inclusion in the current process of statebuilding.

Since the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Palestinian nationalism has been mobilized largely at the informal and grass-roots level. However, with the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)² since 1993, prospects for statehood have been set in motion through official and diplomatic channels. This paper begins with the assumption that legal reform is an important arena of political struggle that potentially complements other spheres in societies struggling against colonial or neocolonial rule. With limited authority, the PNA has, to a significant degree, usurped the momentum of popular struggle through political and judicial activity. To what extent has the focus of popular struggle shifted as a result and what are its implications? The institutional changes accompanying state building, for example, the centralization of political authority in diplomatic negotiations and national institutions such as the Legislative Council, the Palestinian police force, and the civil service, have affected the boundaries of gender activism. The strengths and weaknesses of these institutions play an important role in empowering or disempowering social forces through their participation in political conflict

(both inside and outside the PNA). They influence social practice through the legislation and administration of public policy, thus impacting both the scope and space available for women's activism in Palestinian society. As such, citizenship, statehood and the law are considered central subjects for inquiry in my work on Palestinian women.

Looking at the transition phase to Palestinian "self-rule" from a gender-sensitive perspective, I argue that the shift in power away from the popular arena where women were prominent leaders has problematized gender activism. The focus of power, particularly as envisioned in the Oslo Accords, has been redirected through more subtle, yet centralized and highly exclusionary, struggles on the part of diplomatic representatives over terms of peace, citizenship and rights legislation. The transition period has marginalized opposition groups as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O) has sought to consolidate its hegemony through monopoly over PNA affairs. Competition over political authority is also reflected in the struggle between the P.L.O leadership in Tunis ("outside leadership") and the local political elite ("inside leadership"). In both groupings, the transfer of authority has been marked by the consolidation in power of the Palestinian elite male, i.e., the politician/businessman/patriarchal head of wealthy household. Struggles between "inside" and "outside" leadership therefore, are profoundly gendered and class-based. These struggles take place within institutions where women are underrepresented. As a result, public and foreign policy are legislated largely without questioning the gendered impact on men and women. Seen in this way, women's struggles for political equality in statebuilding are seen as an endemic part of the larger struggle for democratization and social liberation in Palestinian statehood.

This paper explores the ways in which institutional changes accompanying the transformative period from nationalism to interim self-government impact Palestinian women and their political struggles. The intention is to distinguish between categories of "woman" and "nationalist" in discussions about citizenship during the transition to "self-rule". The main question I address is, what are the gendered implications of statebuilding and citizenship in Palestinian society? To answer this question, I rely predominantly upon issues and debates from material published by grassroots women's organisations, including independent study centres and advocacy groups, along with interviews of organised women. Recent changes have had a differential impact on Palestinian men and women because of the penetration of long-standing networks of patriarchal power in the

statebuilding process. They have also had a differential impact on Palestinian women depending upon their location on the political spectrum, i.e. as independents or as members of groups which support or oppose the PNA. The construction of citizenship is informed by experiences and discourses of national liberation, so I will begin by exploring the concept of gender in Palestinian nationalism, and then proceed to a discussion of women, statebuilding and citizenship in the Palestinian context.

Gendered Nationalism:

In her discussion of “third world”³ women, Deniz Kandiyoti argues that nationalism has been the leading idiom through which issues pertaining to women’s position in society have been articulated.⁴ Initial space for gender activism in non-western societies often develops through conflict around national liberation/anti-colonialism. This is the general starting point for distinguishing “third world” or middle eastern feminisms from the historical conditions of their western counterparts. As opposed to women who experience colonialism from the position of the dominant power, women in national liberation movements tend to become politically active through the struggle of colonized men to overcome their subjection and regain their virility. This framework of inclusion in the struggles of dominated men can be problematic for women struggling against indigenous forms of gender oppression. Brackette Williams presents this problematic for nationalist women of having to “...struggle against sexual domination without appearing to undermine the quest for masculine redemption”⁵. The liberation of these women is formulated as a sort of “double movement”: the first is directed against colonial patriarchy and so is tolerated and even revered, but because the second movement is directed against indigenous patriarchy, it is often seen as detrimental to national unity. What then are the implications of a gender-activism that develops through militarized conflict against colonialism? What are the opportunities and limitations of articulating feminism through war? What is the nature of an indigenous Palestinian feminism?⁶ I will address these issues by exploring the concept of nationalism and accompanying constructions of citizenship in the Palestinian context.

According to Benedict Anderson’s construct of an “imagined community”, nations strive to be both inherently limited and sovereign.⁷ Nations, he claims, are repositories of a selective incorporation of cultural artifacts, traditions and rituals from a sacred past based on manipulating processes of memory and invention in political group formation. In this light,

nations are seen to develop in a constant state of historical flux, and so their boundaries require continuous engineering to be molded and remolded, produced and reproduced according to the dictates of political interest.⁸ The act of *remembering* the past is often reinforced by *forgetting* those aspects which are unpalatable for national unity, for example, the gendered processes which serve to build, over long spans of time, constructions of “masculinity” and “femininity” upon which the notion of nationalism is based. Therefore, the process of nation-building is arbitrary and yet it corresponds to concrete power relations. The ultimate purpose of nationalism is to establish a nation-state, i.e. a permanent and compulsory organisation which attempts to govern through control over the means of coercion and ideological reproduction in a given territory.⁹ This process seeks to institutionalize, transform and channel a selective array of authentic symbols and shared histories into a stable foundation for legitimate authority. As such, the boundaries of a state are expected to become predictable and determinate. Indeed, the ability of a state to govern depends upon creating a fixed membership based on spaces of “inside” and “outside”, upon which are established routinized patterns of policy, ideology and identity. As a product of political conflict, therefore, a state is a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, whose particular form is reinforced and justified ideologically by the underlying configuration of power in a given society. As we will see, patriarchal power is sought as one of the most stable, yet problematic, sources of political authority, and one of the most exclusive forms of political identity.

Nationalism is, in general, a profoundly gendered process formulated around normative and exclusive constructs of “male” and “female” political participation. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias articulate the ideological terms in which women have participated in nationalist movements. Firstly, they claim, women tend to be transformed into symbolic markers of the boundaries of an ethnic-national group by virtue of their biological role as virgin/wife/mother in reproducing and educating future generations of the group.¹⁰ This primary role, assumed to correspond with nature and to complement men’s role as father/fighter/economic provider, is accompanied by women’s participation themselves in national, political and military struggles. The role of the “*woman warrior*” is a central position in times of conflict, yet it is often excused as a temporary “national emergency” rather than emulated as a model for transformative politics.

Valentine Moghadam explores women's roles in reflection on Benedict Anderson's work on nationalism. According to Moghadam, Anderson explains the assignment of women to the role of bearers of cultural values, carriers of traditions, and symbols of the community, by defining nationalism as akin to kinship and religion. As Moghadam argues,

If the nation is an extended family writ large, then women's role is to carry out the tasks of nurturance and reproduction. If the nation is defined as a religious entity, then the appropriate models of womanhood are to be found in scripture.¹¹

Both models of womanhood are highly problematic. Despite women's actual and varied practice, their role is *imagined* through symbols of nationalist discourse in accordance with the perceived logic of social custom, tradition, and religious belief. The expectation that women will conform to their roles is considered to be a crucial ingredient for the development and unity of the nation, and because nationalism is an essentially open concept, it is often manipulated in gendered ways and used as justification for control over the actual lives of women.

Prior to the *Intifada* beginning December 1987, it was generally assumed that women's liberation was either to be subordinated to nationalism, subsumed within nationalism, or postponed until after the revolution. In times of war, gender activism was seen as superfluous in relation to the more immediate exigencies of occupation and survival. The bulk of the literature on Palestinian women in the *Intifada* seeks not to oppose this claim, but rather to challenge traditional images of women as supportive, passive or secondary by demonstrating how the national liberation struggle was *dependent* upon women's contributions outside the public arena in areas of familial and communal work. For example, Yvonne Haddad documents the activities of urban and upper-class Palestinian nationalist women in the period of the British Mandate (1918-1948) in areas of female education, charitable work, literacy campaigns and training in sewing and embroidery.¹² These social service and welfare activities reflected women's traditional work but were enacted on the basis of a larger nationalist and anti-colonialist agenda.¹³ This period of struggle was one in which the female Palestinian nationalist endeavored to "liberate the entire community from oppression, poverty, and alienation which meant not a license to live independently, but rather the ability to live up to communal expectations".¹⁴

During the *Intifada*, the four women's committees established in the mid-1970s and affiliated to different segments of the P.L.O¹⁵, engaged in women-run production

cooperatives of foodstuffs, clothing, embroidery and other items for sale on the local market, and participated in running food collection and storage facilities. Women took up popular leadership positions in neighborhood committees, and participated with the *shabab* (Palestinian youth) in guard units and direct confrontations (stone throwing and tire burning) with the Israeli military.¹⁶ This activity not only helped the community to overcome food shortages and boycott the influx of Israeli products, but also worked to alleviate the economic dependence of women on the family, and offset the burdens of an increasing number of female-headed households as a result of male death, imprisonment or deportation. In reflection on these altered gender roles during the *Intifada*, current debate in the Palestinian women's movement revolves around the potential compatibility of nationalism with women's rights. It is recognized that national liberation was articulated as a predominantly militarized and masculine act of political struggle. In response, women are attempting to articulate their interests in citizenship as distinct from conflated agendas of Palestinian men and national liberation.

Writing on the gendered discourses of Palestinian nationalism, Joseph Massad articulates the struggle as “a masculinizing act enabling the concrete pairing of nationalist agency and masculinity”. This act, he argues, is reinforced through gendered narratives constructed in the founding texts of the national liberation movement.¹⁷ In communiqués of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), for example, Massad presents analogies of women as “the soil upon which a man is to redeem his glory, manhood and honour”.¹⁸ The territory of Palestine is articulated in these documents as the object of a man's heterosexual love, whose earth demands fertilization and whose liberation is seen as the ultimate birth of the *Intifada*'s pregnancy.¹⁹ In communiqué no. 29 of the UNLU, Massad finds the Palestinian woman saluted in her biological role as,

the mother of the martyr and her celebratory ululations, for she has ululated twice, the day her son went to fight and was martyred, and the day the state was declared.²⁰

As well, the Declaration of Independence conjures a static image of women in their courageous role as “the guardian of our survival and our lives, the guardian of our perennial flame”.²¹ With reference to Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms, Sheila Hanna Katz describes the discursive act of “feminizing the land” as a means of creating symbols of women as the passive object of men's sacrifice, thus depriving women of their agency as historical subjects in charge of their own destiny.²² Writing on Palestinian and Israeli women, Simona Sharoni discusses the terms of inclusion of women in nationalist

discourse. National liberation, she argues, is discursively organised around the potency and unity of the nation, and perceptions of national independence are based on the privileging of territorial sovereignty over alternative claims to political authority.²³ The coupling of territorial acquisition with national identity has tended to perpetuate dichotomized images of “protector” and “protected” within Palestinian society, whereby men protect women by seeking control over the land. Territorial acquisition however, is often used to justify control over women’s bodies.²⁴

The sexual division of labour in Palestinian nationalism, built around notions of complementarity, protection and respect between men and women, is seen to protect the nation from perceived external threat.²⁵ Men and the nation are supported by the female contribution through her prescribed biological and traditional roles in sustaining reproduction of the community. The centrality of a communal identity, as dependent upon the ways in which women act and comport themselves, has tended to place indigenous struggles for sexual liberation outside the nationalist framework. Perceived in this way, feminism is transformed into a western social norm. Feminist struggles are stereotyped as threats to the unity of the Palestinian nation due to their perceived privileging of individuality and equality *over* the community, and their focus on competition between the sexes.²⁶ This privileging of community over individual has tended to reproduce internal patterns of patriarchal domination of the male over the female in nationalist movements. Eric Hobsbawm suggests that nationalism is about representing a common interest against particular interests, the common good against privilege.²⁷ Where a common good does not exist therefore, nation building creates one by masking the internal realities of power, and *forgetting* those hierarchies responsible for oppression. Gender oppression is, of course, a predominant hierarchy naturalized by nationalism.

This construct of women’s maintenance by men affirms the normative boundaries between public and private spheres, a central division highlighted by feminist theory. Women tend to be referred to only in their biological capacities in connection with the household and their interests are constructed as sectional. Men, on the other hand, tend to be separated from their role in reproduction and their interests are universalized as a form of abstract citizenship in public policy and political conflict.²⁸ In their public roles, men are supposed to “protect” a distinct private sphere in which women are to be “maintained”. Men’s act of making war and power politics is discursively separated from the feminine role of mothering

and providing social and personal support. Therefore, the “political” is defined by nationalizing masculinity²⁹ and by both relying upon, but devaluing, activities with which women are traditionally engaged. Spike Peterson’s suggestion that patriarchal thought and practice is traditionally founded upon fundamental dichotomies which constitute, and then privilege, the “masculine” over the “feminine” is instructive.³⁰ Peterson explains this notion of a “gender hierarchy” or “colonizing dualism” as foundational in the metaphysical development of western philosophy, whereby the masculine is identified with objectivity, reason, freedom, and control, against feminine subjectivity, feeling, necessity, contingency and disorder.³¹ Rather than escape these foundational themes of colonial and western civilization, Palestinian nationalism embraces patriarchal norms and transforms them into a rationale for struggle *against* “western” domination. Joseph Massad claims,

Although anti-colonialist nationalist agency defines itself in opposition to European nationalism, it does not escape implication in that same narrative.³²

Nationalism, Islam and women:

A gendered aspect of national liberation unique to the Middle East is located in the intersections of religion, conflict and political authority. Current influences of religion on politics in the region have been formed, in part, by the rise of politically motivated Islamic movements. Since the late 1960s, Arab nationalism has been increasingly constructed on the basis of religious symbols.³³ The rise of political Islam has been oriented towards the normative goal of harnessing national institutions in order to recreate the perceived indivisible dominion of God through a fusion of religion and statehood.³⁴ According to Islamic movements, the transformation of secular society depends on their struggle to establish an Islamic state run according to the precepts of the *Sharia* (Islamic canon law) and revival of the *caliphate*³⁵. The resolution of social conflict is based on an attempt to make a historical connection with a glorified image of life in 7th Century Arabia. Islamists claim they are “returning to the sources of Islam to regain a purified vision, long lost in the mire of wordly governments”.³⁶ This social transformation is profoundly gendered as it tends to depend upon molding the ways in which women “act, dress, and comport themselves” in order to conform to the perceived gender harmony of the united *umma* (nation) led by the Prophet Mohammed.³⁷ The Islamist model of governance is generally informed by an orthodox and literal interpretation of the *Quran* and the *Sunna*³⁸, both highly patriarchal texts, which are to be transformed into practical guidelines for human conduct and legitimate political authority. Therefore, the relationship between secular and Islamic

politics holds crucial implications for gender relations and the boundaries of struggle against patriarchal domination.

In the context of statebuilding in the Middle East, Islamist influence over political authority is contingent upon the access and control by Islamist groups over the process of legislation. Their degree of influence reflects either a conflictual or cooperative engagement with secular leadership. I would argue that despite power struggles and conflict between secular nationalists and Islamists over religious freedom and cultural authenticity, they tend to converge over certain issues pertaining to women. Valentine Moghadam explains this phenomenon in the Middle East as an effort by Arab states to quell social division and prevent harbouring of internal unrest. She argues,

many secular Arab states have sought to accommodate Islamists and retain their own political power by acquiescing to Islamist demands and passing legislation unfavourable to women.³⁹

Secular nationalist organisations have often used their alliances with Islamist movements for example, to prevent the rise of socialist and communist groups. Both secular states and Islamic movements have tended to favour continued unity of the patriarchal family for purposes of social control, thus agreeing upon the relegation of women to the private sphere and by extension, problematizing women's position in statebuilding. The "enduring alliance"⁴⁰ between secular nationalism and Islamism is particularly significant in limiting women's progressivist struggles when religiously sanctioned inequalities become legislated into state law. This is seen particularly in the area of personal status law based on the *Sharia* which tends to provide women with security, but only in terms of a disciplined maintenance and protection by men, as opposed to equality, freedom and control over decision-making. The trade-off between "special treatment" of women in Islam as opposed to their equal status as citizens is an important issue to consider when studying the choices made by women in Middle Eastern state building processes.

With the moral vacuum engendered by the experience of war and occupation, and due to the weakness of secular leadership, political Islam became an increasingly popular form of struggle in the Palestinian context.⁴¹ As a result, discussions about Palestinian statelessness have tended to revolve around conflicts between secular and religious groups over the authority to interpret Islamic jurisprudence and holy scripture.⁴² The increased salience of Islam as a backlash contender for political power in the Palestinian nationalist movement accompanied the growing public presence of women in the *Intifada*,

and reflected growing contradictions in gender relations necessitated by popular struggle. The two main Islamist groups in the Palestinian autonomy areas are the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)⁴³ (represented in part by its front organisation, *Hamas*), and the Islamic Jihad.⁴⁴ The *Intifada* marked a crucial turning point in political Islam as both the MB and the Islamic Jihad converged on issues of nationalism and became important actors in the national liberation movement. This was witnessed in particular by the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood towards a more militant character and its usurpation of the popular momentum of the uprising. Its role in national struggle was increasingly condoned by large segments of Palestinian society with the establishment, by Ahmed Yasin and his colleagues, of *Hamas* (*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*) on December 9, 1987 as a resistance wing, along with a special militant body, Regiments of *'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam* (*'Kata'ib 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam*). *Hamas* constructed an alternative Islamic civil society as a model for Palestinian nationalism based on a vast network of social services, communal activities and political struggle.

The evolution of Islamism in the *Intifada* however, was an increasingly violent form of activism directed against both external and internal enemies. In a sense, political Islam can be explained as a form of “militarized religion” which was inherently gendered and often directed violently against secular Palestinian women. For this reason, it is important to look at the relationship between militarization in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and militarization as a form of internal repression, both of which can be religiously sanctioned. The *Hijab* (headcovering) campaign is an instructive example of this trend. Partly in reaction to the bankruptcy of secular nationalism, and partly a response to the relaxing of gender codes during the *Intifada*, this campaign involved an effort by certain groups within the Islamic movement to impose the *Hijab* by force on all Palestinian women. Najah Manasra describes the role of Islam as a means to resolve the contradictions concerning the status of women in Palestinian nationalism by sending them back to the traditional “feminine” roles of wife and mother.⁴⁵ Due to the existential nature of debates around Islam, the refusal on the part of secular and other women to wear the *Hijab* was interpreted by the Islamic groups, not only as a protest against their political leadership, but also as a form of religious heresy, legitimizing a punishment of violent retribution. As such, the imposition of the *Hijab* and other religiously-sanctioned modes of behaviour on women during the *Intifada* constituted violence and intimidation. It removed the voluntary choice of women to self-identify religiously and served as a definite means of political coercion, denial, and gender-

repression.⁴⁶ Therefore, it is important to distinguish between violent practices of some politically motivated Islamic movements from the teachings of Islam in general as a form of spiritual inspiration and source of humanitarian values.⁴⁷

Islam and nationalism have tended to stand in a close, albeit uneasy, relationship. Islamic feminists have reiterated restrictions on women's freedom of dress and movement as an expression of authentic nationalism, blurring the distinctions between Islam as a source of spiritual faith and political Islam as a model of political struggle. Islamic women point to the liberating qualities of Islam as a protest against the failure of western feminism to carve out an appropriate model for female liberation. In order to affirm their "authenticity", Islamists point to the allegedly exploitative nature of gender-relations in the West where they argue, western-style feminist struggles have liberated women only to the extent that they are prepared to become sex objects and market their sexuality as an advertising tool to benefit patriarchal capitalism.⁴⁸

Secular Palestinian women are seen to embody this "import" of western society despite evidence of indigenous forms of secularism and feminism.⁴⁹ In contrast, the roles of Islamic men and women are seen to be complementary and harmonious, parallel to images fostered by secular nationalism, and opposed to perceived images of gender relations in the West as divisive of family values. In this light, donning the *Hijab* asserts cultural pride against orientalism and western cultural imperialism, and stands as a symbol of national struggle, or as a sign of religious piety, and devotion to the family. For Islamists, respect for women is based on their fulfillment of codes of modesty, chastity, and honour. These features of the "pious woman" were perceived as symbolic of the continued survival of the family structure in Palestinian society through turbulent times.⁵⁰

The second issue relating to Islam and women during the *Intifada* is subsumed within the wider configuration of political forces in the national liberation movement. Rema Hammami points to the ambiguous relationship formed between Islamic groups and *Fatah*, the dominant secular, nationalist grouping in the P.L.O (led by Yasir Arafat). She criticizes *Fatah* for its poor record on women's rights and for being the only faction whose affiliated women's committee (Women's Committee for Social Work) concentrates on traditional charitable work.⁵¹ In particular, Hammami accuses *Fatah* of deliberately forming an alliance with Islamic groups during the *Intifada*, and that certain elements of the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) actually supported the *Hijab* Campaign.⁵² Ziad Abu-Amr describes the cooperative elements of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and *Fatah*

as characteristic of pragmatic interest. For example, despite the PNA's disciplining of *Hamas* as a result of the latter's attempts to destabilize the peace process through terrorism, and in so doing undermine the authority of the secular leadership in the eyes of international negotiating partners, *Fatah* has cultivated ties with political Islam in order to gain popular support and offset the power of groups in the PLO such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Communists.⁵³ These shifting alliances between secular nationalism and Islamic movements shape the prospects for women to struggle for emancipation within the confines of the national liberation movement. Despite the subsequent decline in power of Islamic groups since the onset of political negotiations with Israel, the complex relationship between religion, statebuilding and gender has yet to be worked out in the present period of legislation.

Palestinian “self-rule” and gender:

In response to those who have abandoned analysis of the state in the Middle East in favour of focusing on transnational social movements and civil societies, Suad Joseph has argued, the nation-state remains of strategic importance to women because of its centrality as an arena where social groups gain or lose crucial legal and political protections.⁵⁴

Although grassroots organising has been an important element of Palestinian politics in the absence of statehood, interim self-government has undeniably brought about real structural changes. Therefore, present engagements in legal reform will have a lasting structural impact on the environment in which social groups will operate in the future. The elements of compulsion and monopoly in state building - sanctioned by law - are crucial for determining the gendered terms for women's inclusion in national processes. When sexual roles are legislated and encoded into law, they become politically sovereign and so the state is a central contender in struggles over the meaning of gender in society. State-sanctioned gender relations are the ultimate institutionalization of the product of social conflict over sexual space. This process is never complete, but rather dependent upon women's capacity to question, organise, and defend their rights through struggle. Nationalism, gender and the PNA influence each other as relatively autonomous, but often conflicting, systems of value and normative action.

These features of statebuilding figure in discussions about gender in the Middle East in general, and in Palestinian society in particular. The Palestinian National Authority has

become a legal entity since 1993, resembling a state, although lacking the requisite tools with which to govern effectively. What does this mean for Palestinian women? To acknowledge the centrality of the PNA as an actor in Palestinian society, means also to recognize its incapacity to live up to societal expectations. The roots of its weakness stem from various elements of its development. The informal impetus for Palestinian national self determination came about in response to over a century of popular struggle against occupation by foreign powers, and culminating in the *Intifada*. The *actual* establishment of the Palestinian National Authority and prospects for statehood however, were mediated through a slew of diplomatic agreements with external actors.⁵⁵ Therefore, the statebuilding process has been regulated and controlled through stages of negotiation between representatives at the national level whose power is grossly asymmetrical. This process has also developed with limited input from the popular arena. At this stage then, the process of Palestinian statebuilding has created a distorted political context in which sovereignty is absent, but there is significant investment in legislative activity as the Legislative Council presently embarks upon first time legislation.

The PNA's capacity to legislate is constrained by a variety of mutually reinforcing factors. For example, the PNA is limited in resources, fraught with clientalism, highly militarized (police forces), and submerged within a sophisticated civil society manifested by alternative power centres which developed out of years of protracted warfare and occupation. The PNA lacks the elements of contract, monopoly, authority, and sovereignty which traditionally define a state. As such, the PNA is said to operate with relative powerlessness under official protections of the international community and international law. Through negotiations over terms for the transfer of power, the PNA has acquired jurisdiction over education, taxation, tourism, health and social welfare, but not in the crucial areas of law, water, land, and refugees, which are to be worked out in the Final Status Negotiations with Israel in the near, but indefinite, future.⁵⁶ The PNA's bureaucratic weaknesses are contingent upon certain internal structures, for example, the absence of a Basic Law and an ambiguous separation between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches.⁵⁷ This situation inhibits the check and balance of arbitrary and corrupt elements against administrative privilege. There is evidence of excessive reliance upon the monopoly over means of coercion as a source of social control, for example, in the arrest and interrogation of journalists, political activists, teachers and arguably, anyone expressing dissent. In the absence of legitimate authority, current agreements bolster the security functions of the

strong Palestinian police force as a foundation of political power.⁵⁸ As well, the PNA's tendency to rule through patronage and factionalism reflects its dependence upon long-standing networks of traditional clan and family authority.⁵⁹ This leaves the PNA with a problematic set of resources with which to implement its policies and provide social protection. There is widespread complaint about the limited possibilities for citizen's input in public policy making,⁶⁰ as well as uncertainty about what constitutes citizenship in the transitional period. Finally, the PNA is itself highly unrepresentative of women, starting out in 1994 with one woman, Intisar Al-Wazir, Minister of Social Affairs, out of a total of nineteen ministers. Presently, there are two women ministers, Al-Wazir and Hannan Ashrawi, Minister of Higher Education, out of a total of twenty-four ministers. As to the elections for the Presidency and the Legislative Council held on January 21, 1996, the number of women candidates reached twenty-eight, a mere 4% of the total number of candidates. Out of eighty-eight of the Legislative Council seats, only five were won by women. An analysis of the PNA as a gendered institution takes into account the ways in which it formulates political boundaries on the basis of sexual difference. A crucial boundary studied by feminists is the public/private divide. J. Ann Tickner considers this division as an underlying component of relations of domination based on gender. She conceptualizes,

the boundary between a public domestic space protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law and the private space of the family where, in many cases, no such legal protection exists.⁶¹

These boundaries mold, not only relations of domination and access to power, but also realms of appropriate and socially valued activity in areas ranging from governance, to labour, to social welfare. The legal boundaries which constitute what is considered to be "public" and "private" in Palestinian society are embodied in the notion of citizenship and legal rights.

Citizenship:

I have presented four aspects of Palestinian nationalism which impinge upon the formulation of citizenship: (1) the central, yet contradictory, role of women in the *Intifada*, (2) patriarchal discourses underlying the Palestinian national liberation movement, (3) the rise of political Islam, and (4) structural limitations of the PNA as a framework for legal struggle. These issues and relationships serve to articulate the terms in which women negotiate their position in statebuilding and influence the construction of citizenship. Citizenship is generally defined as a contractual agreement between the state and its

populace as a basis for following a predictable and agreed upon arrangement of rights and obligations. It is perceived as a normative relationship between the individual (native or naturalized person) and political authority, regulated by an exchange of allegiance in return for membership and protections. Rights and obligations are institutionalized through the juridical sphere as a result of conflict over the boundaries of political, economic, social, cultural, religious and familial space. What are the meanings and implications of discussions about citizenship in the case of the PNA, considering its lack of attributes of statehood and its general context of instability?

With the transfer of authority, significant debate is taking shape within the Palestinian women's movement regarding the gendered nature of rights in areas of labour, religion, personal status and public representation. I would urge that gender-sensitive perspectives on citizenship approach the issue of rights and obligations in both the public and private spheres. Because women are largely underrepresented in public arenas of power, such as in government and wage-labour markets, their recourse to legal action must extend beyond the public sphere. Women's needs are related to broader issues of personal status and labour law, and social welfare entitlements. The PNA plays a central role in empowering or disempowering the different contenders for political power over these issues through its formulation of membership in the community. Women expect to be compensated by law for their contribution to national liberation in the form of equal rights and obligations, but they want their citizenship to conform to their traditional needs in mothering and social welfare. Despite its lack of sovereignty, the PNA has become a central address for grievances about social protections. Considering the underlying gendered dynamics of nationalism, the PNA can be seen as both a potential threat as well as a potential haven for women.

Eileen Kuttab from the Women's Studies Program at Birzeit University, and long-time activist in the Palestinian women's and cooperative movement, argues that the subordination of a social agenda to that of the national program in the women's movement problematized women's ability to combine their increased activism with more input in decision-making at the national level.⁶² As the focus of national struggle presently shifts from the grassroots level (family and street) to the level of international diplomacy, women are wary of further marginalization.⁶³ The issue is not only women's lack of power in relation to stronger, malestream forces in the PNA, but the fact that women's struggles take place

within structures which are *themselves* weak and precarious. One may ask whether the PNA is indeed the proper strategic address for women's struggles considering that civil society has traditionally offered the women's movement a certain extra-judicial freedom of maneuver. Or does the need for political resources and legal protections override the benefits of independence? Also, if the legislative arena is itself weakened by its inseparation from the executive power, to what extent is legal reform a potentially successful form of activism? These questions are met with divergent responses in the women's movement.

A concern about neo-colonialism has been voiced strongly by women opposed to the Oslo agreement who would not as yet abandon revolutionary agendas, and who are cautious about participation in legislative activity in the PNA. Despite the official terminology of "peace negotiations", they point to the continued asymmetrical influence by Israel, the United States and other external actors over the internal Palestinian political process.⁶⁴ The PNA's lack of sovereignty, they claim, creates a problematic context for women's agency in a continued conflictual climate. In the area of legal reform, one of the main strategic questions facing the women's movement is whether to continue with sectarian politics or to form a united women's platform.⁶⁵ On this issue, Rita Giacaman has argued that the weakness of the women's movement stems from continued disunity.⁶⁶ There are problems of competition, lack of independent representation, and marginalization within mainstream political parties and national institutions.⁶⁷ In Giacaman's opinion, organised women from all sectors need to unite with independent women - academics and professionals, in order to forge a common agenda. On the other hand, one may argue it is the very diversity in the women's movement that allows for vibrant discussion about citizenship. These are some of the important questions being asked about gender, statebuilding and Palestinian citizenship.

Lobbying around legislation and citizenship has required that women's groups build a close, yet critical, working relationship with the Palestinian Legislative Council. Lobbying efforts and campaigns to scrutinize the legislative process while establishing means to empower women through the law have been led mostly by non-governmental or quasi-governmental organisations.⁶⁸ Contemporary discussions about the relationship between women and the PNA are informed by the Document of Principles of Women's Rights, written under the auspices of the General Union of Palestinian Women, and representing all four streams of

the women's movement, plus independent activists. The document distinguishes between three elements of citizenship (1) civil rights, (2) political rights, and (3) social, economic and cultural rights, each of which I will analyse in turn.

Civil rights relate to the most basic formulation of terms upon which individuals attain membership in the national community, and through which members are afforded rights and obligations. As in most European continental countries and all Arab countries, Palestinians acquire citizenship through the principle of *jus sanguine* (Law of Blood/Right of the Blood), by which a child obtains the citizenship of his/her parents.⁶⁹ The more particular requirement of citizenship however, is that a child must be born of a father who has Palestinian citizenship provided that the father resides in the Palestinian territories and holds an Israeli identification card.⁷⁰ Therefore, despite the discursive construction of women as reproducers of the nation, Palestinian citizenship is passed on through paternity rather than maternity, either from father to child or from husband to wife. Women cannot pass their citizenship to their husband or children. This is not only an issue of political exclusion, but also a practical dilemma for women living in the diaspora who have married non-Palestinians but want to share their national identity with their offspring.⁷¹ Palestinian women lose their citizenship upon marriage of a "foreigner". In the Document, the section on civil rights makes the following demands:

To grant the woman her right to acquire, preserve or change her nationality. Legislation must also guarantee that her marriage to a non-Palestinian, or a change in her husband's nationality, while married, will not necessarily change the citizenship of the wife. This includes her freedom from the imposition of her husband's citizenship. Women should also be granted the right to give citizenship to her husband and children, be guaranteed the full freedom to move, travel, and choose her place of residency.⁷²

Despite the inability to remove women's dependent terms of citizenship, women's groups were successful in pressing for freedom of mobility, making obsolete the requirement that women have permission of a male guardian in order to obtain a Palestinian travel document.⁷³

Political citizenship represents issues such as equal rights to vote and acquire representation in public life as affirmed in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November, 1988.

Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights on grounds of race, religion, color, sex, under

the aegis of a constitution that ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary.⁷⁴

In the area of political rights, the Document suggests the following aims:

To guarantee the right of women in voting, running for office, involvement in public referendums, and the ability to hold political and public judicial posts on all levels.⁷⁵

Campaigns for women's political rights revolved around preparation for the 1996 elections to the Presidency and Legislative Council. Women's groups lobbied for a women's quota of 30% in the Legislative Council, (which was ignored by the leadership). Secondly, they have protested the multi-district electoral system which by providing limited seats in some districts, they claim, discriminates against women. As well, they have pointed to contraventions and breaches in the electoral process against the rights of women, for example, the right to vote of a large number of illiterate women was confiscated by relatives who voted on their behalf or dictated to them how to vote.⁷⁶ Numerous non-governmental organisations offered training programs for women leaders and courses on voting and elections in order to increase women's awareness of their political rights. Obviously, the formal rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence do not necessarily provide for women's equality in political practice since actual political equality stems from underlying processes of social and economic equalities encompassed in the area of social citizenship.

Social citizenship pertains to more complex questions of social security (such as old age benefits, public housing, maternity, unemployment insurance and welfare) as embodied in a welfare state (a model that is globally on the wane).⁷⁷ One of the most contemporary debates about women's rights and the state in the Middle East however, revolves around the issue of whether social citizenship will be formulated around individual or communal entitlements. Suad Joseph has argued that Middle Eastern states tend to acknowledge the citizen as a member of family units, religious sects, ethnic, tribal or other subnational groupings.⁷⁸ In turn, these groups mediate access to scarce resources and social support through the state on behalf of their members. As a result of the privileging of the patriarchal family as the basic unit of social life in the Middle East, women are recognized as citizens only through their family ties with men. They are brought into the nation/state as appendages of husbands and fathers and tend to be depicted in their familial roles as wives and mothers.⁷⁹ In a communally-based notion of citizenship, women's legal entitlements and relationship to the state are predicated upon fulfillment of their reproductive roles in the

family. Here we recognize that discursively constructed gendered nationalism becomes legalized through processes of statehood.

Rita Giacaman, Islah Jad and Penny Johnson discuss issues of social citizenship in Palestinian society through their analysis of the PLO's General Program for National Economic Development. They argue that existing social support in Palestinian autonomy areas functions predominantly *outside* the realm of national institutions such as in familial, kinship and other informal networks, non-governmental organisations and political parties.⁸⁰ They recognize the positive, albeit problematic, relationship between women and their networks of support. Giacaman and her colleagues demonstrate that when women are referred to in the Document, (as in the chapter on Women in Special Circumstances), they are reduced to the category of "destitute", requiring assistance, or in relation to "workers", "martyrs", and "prisoners" assumed always to be in the masculine.⁸¹ Provision of social service to women is formulated as an issue of charity and maintenance, to be taken care of by charitable societies, women's groups or the household, the latter of which is assumed to be led by a male member, disregarding female heads of household who are either divorced, abandoned or who choose to be single.⁸² The Report on the Status of Palestinian Women presented at the 39th Session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women affirms that the number of female-headed households in the West Bank is as high as 36.6% and 17.9% in Gaza.⁸³

A second, albeit related, discussion about social citizenship revolves around whether social welfare will be constructed on the basis of demonstrable and abject need, universal rights of citizenship, or market oriented entitlements based on work performance.⁸⁴ This question cuts to the root of the reproduction versus production debate in feminist theory and questions what constitutes valuable labour in Palestinian society. In the section on economic, social and cultural rights, the Document focuses on women's rights in the wage-labour force,

The Constitution and Palestinian legislation must guarantee the equality of women at work, ensuring equal pay with men working in the same work, providing equal opportunities in promotion, training, compensation, rewards, health insurance and maternity rights....We also affirm the importance of equality in social welfare, health benefits, education, and training services, and the guarantee of her full equality regarding issues pertaining to personal status.⁸⁵

However, Palestinian women's groups are concerned about the predominant linking of rights and social services to remunerated labour. The dilemma for women is that their under-representation in the wage-labour force potentially undermines their access to social security in a model of citizenship based on performance in the market. Women's groups are interested, not only in women's equal rights in the wage-labour force, but also in articulating social rights as a means of de-commodifying individuals in relation to the market. With reference to western welfare states, G. Esping Anderson explains the term,

De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.⁸⁶

Rita Giacaman *et al*, argue that the PLO's economic agenda is based on a program of relatively short term economic development through stimulating private investment and creating temporary, and primarily unskilled, labour markets. This strategy tends to intensify divisions in society between employed and unemployed, and between skilled and unskilled labour, both of which are highly gendered since women are predominantly unemployed, unskilled and working in the informal economy. Women's groups have argued that the emphasis on paid labour and market productivity discriminates against women, whose non-market contributions to society, in terms of broad and complex processes of reproduction, nurturance and socialization in the household and extended family, are undervalued.⁸⁷ To rectify this situation, the Document demands that,

Motherhood should be looked upon as a social post. House chores should be regarded as a task of social and economic value.⁸⁸

This demand is problematic considering that while it reflects women's traditional needs, it also potentially restricts women's struggles within areas subsumed by motherhood.

Through a series of workshops held in Ramallah in 1994 through the auspices of the Jerusalem Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, women's groups discussed the nature of labour in Palestinian society.⁸⁹ Under Article 15(1) of the Labour Law, a labour contract is recognized as

any oral or written agreement whether explicit or implicit by which the worker undertakes to work for an employer and under his supervision and direction in return for a wage.⁹⁰

Three elements of work were recognized as necessary for the signing of a labour contract: (1) work, (2) supervision, and (3) payment. They concluded that these conditions deny legal protection for the weaker members of society, particularly women, who engage in domestic service, employment in small or family-run industries, or agricultural projects.⁹¹ Women are

predominantly involved therefore, in unorganised and unprotected labour. This has ramifications for their ability to acquire independent income and rally the government as a strong and organised pressure group.

The last, and perhaps most contentious, issue pertaining to women and social citizenship is the area of personal status law governing marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody. Personal status law is an influential and controversial arena of legal power as it shapes the contours of the Palestinian community towards the outside, and directly impinges upon relationships within the family, where women are at times most vulnerable. Along with increasing attention to the issue of domestic violence, the Palestinian women's movement has directed its efforts towards debating reform of personal status law. It is interesting to note that secular laws apply in all legal matters pertaining to contract, criminal law, civil wrongs, and commercial law⁹², except in the area of personal status which is governed by the *Sharia* (Islamic canon law). *Sharia* law is the legal area where religion and statebuilding is most closely intertwined.⁹³ Personal status law is formulated through a literal interpretation of sacred texts which are themselves highly ambiguous. This has created problems since the selective nature of Islamic legal code provides room for manipulation against women, particularly since those authorized to interpret the *Quran* (a basis of *Sharia*) are mostly male. The predominance of male judges sitting on *Sharia* courts raises the question about women's equal rights in domestic litigation since interpretation is based on the experiences and perspectives of men. The enduring penetration of religion in the state in the area of personal status law has both positive and negative consequences for women. *Sharia* provides women with the right to inheritance, equal rights in contract, rights to enterprise, maintenance, and to earn and possess property independently of men.⁹⁴ However, through the *Sharia*, women are secured through dependence upon men. Passages in the *Quran* such as those providing for polygamy, for women's inferiority and obedience to the husband, for women's seclusion, and a lower non-alterable percentage of transferable property granted to women, can be used to deny women equal rights.

Women's organisations are presently debating strategies to address discrimination against women in personal status law. They seem to be divided between those who support the dictates of the *Sharia*, those who attempt to reinterpret the *Sharia* in favour of indigenous forms of gender-activism, and secular feminists who see women's emancipation and Islamic law as contradictory, and thus wish to extricate religion from state law altogether.⁹⁵

Some have argued for a more “progressive” interpretation of *Sharia* since all women’s rights are considered to be contained in Islam.⁹⁶ The latter strategy could be strengthened with additional tools such as the marriage contract which would solidify women’s rights in the *Sharia* through secular contract.⁹⁷ Others have argued for replacing *Sharia* altogether with a civil code. The latter has proven to be a highly unpopular strategy considering the deep roots of Islam in Palestinian popular culture and nationalism. The leadership continues to respond favourably to legal reforms so long as they do not “contradict the *Sharia*”, thus closing off the realm of debate from the beginning. Changes to *Sharia* laws will depend to a large extent on the type of resistance put forth by political Islam, as well as on long-term efforts to re-articulate the cultural norms of honour and shame which stigmatize women who air their private problems in public venues.⁹⁸ It will also depend upon continuing relationships forged through the Israeli-Palestinian political process. A more stable and satisfactory peace agreement may one day provide space for a more critical internal assessment of Palestinian society by women and other progressive forces intent upon change.

Concluding Remarks:

I will make two concluding remarks about the nature of women’s activism in reference to both the Document of Principles of Women’s Rights, and to the relationship between the women’s movement and the PNA. The Document is concerned with the notion of pursuing a common agenda for women across factional lines, thus articulating women’s concerns separately from nationalist concerns. It offers an extensive articulation of the need for women’s equality in all matters pertaining to citizenship and legal rights in the public and private spheres, reflecting the unique approach of the Palestinian women’s movement to citizenship in contrast to western models. There is significant reference in the Document to the woman’s “...vital role in the preservation of the unity of the Palestinian family as a social base to support individuals in the absence of a Palestinian national authority”.⁹⁹ In addition to the demand for equality in work, pay and benefits, the Document’s demand for recognition of motherhood as a social chore, strays from the model of liberal feminism which tends to devalue differences between men and women in their struggles in the public sphere. By contrast, gender differences are regarded as structural in both the public and private spheres. Therefore, citizenship is formulated in an attempt to accommodate both the changing nature of gender relations in work, politics and public representation, as well as traditional elements of Palestinian society and culture based on the centrality of the

family. However, consideration of the changes in Palestinian society must take into account the changing nature of the family unit as well. This emphasis on family unity may be problematic for example, for those individuals deprived of access to a patriarchal family.

A second issue is the extensive focus of the women's movement on transformation through legal reform. This is a crucial area of struggle as the PNA embarks upon constructing new laws which will impact future possibilities for gender activism. Discussions about gender and citizenship have reflected a growing realization that because woman's liberation in Palestinian society is distinct from national liberation, women must unite as a group to pressure for legal reform. However, there are always potential discrepancies between legal rights and the actual implementation of those rights. The legal sphere is limited in the face of broader processes of patriarchal domination. An example is in cases where the judiciary, occupied by a predominant number of male judges, might interpret laws in ways unaccommodating to women. This discrepancy between practical, as opposed to legal, rights arises as well in cases where women refrain from claiming their inheritance in favour of upholding their familial right to maintenance through dependence upon a husband or brother. Indeed, women's abandonment of claims to inheritance as provided for by law, or cases of disinheritance through manipulation of wills, can result from cultural or social customs, protection of lineage property, or familial expectations, rather than legal discrimination.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, projects for legal reform must consider not only the pervasiveness of cultural and traditional norms, but also, ways in which these processes are reconstructed and manipulated for purposes of political interest.

Finally, the power of the PNA in implementing legal verdicts and ensuring compliance is tempered by continued lack of authority and a general context of instability. Successful legal reform will be affected by the absence of an independent judiciary and judicial review. This is both an issue of internal weakness and continued external control. Empowerment through the law will remain therefore, an important, yet problematic, arena for gender activism. The transition from nationalism to interim self-government has erected contradictory boundaries around women's struggles. Whether or not women will succeed in securing their rights will depend upon elements of democracy and citizenship in the evolution of statebuilding and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the nature of Palestinian civil society, the struggle between contenders for political authority, and the influence of the

organised women's movement over the decision making process in public, private and foreign policy.

Notes

1. For discussion of the term “Other”, see Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, Vintage Books: New York (originally published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., in 1953), PP. 22-23.
2. The Palestinian National Authority has yet to acquire the official status of “state” although it has institutionalized certain attributes of statehood through negotiations in the transition process from national liberation to interim self government. For reference to transfer of authority see particularly, Section on Powers and Responsibilities for Civil Affairs, PP. 135-177 in *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Jerusalem, 1995.
3. I use the term “third world” cautiously considering its eurocentric and ethnocentric implications.
4. Deniz Kandiyoti cited in Maria Holt, *Women in Contemporary Palestine*, PASSIA, Jerusalem, 1996, P. 41.
5. Brackette F. Williams, “Introduction: Mannish Women and Gender After the Act”, *Women out of Place*, Brackette F. Williams (ed.), Routledge: New York, London, 1996, P. 23.
6. I use the term “feminism” loosely recognizing its “Western baggage” and considering that in their self-representation, Palestinian women may or may not label their struggles as “feminist”, preferring the term “gender-activist”.
7. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso: London and New York, 1983, P. 15.
8. Anderson, P. 13.
9. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1978, P. 54. Weber focuses on the monopoly over the means of coercion to describe a state; to this I add ideological reproduction in the Gramscian sense of “hegemony” to buttress the definitive meaning of governance in statehood.
10. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, *Women- Nation- State*, Macmillan: London, 1989, P. 7.
11. Valentine M. Moghadam, *Gender and National Identity*, Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.), Zed Books: London and New Jersey, 1994, P. 4.
12. Yvonne Haddad, “Palestinian Women: Patterns of Legitimation and Domination”, *The Sociology of the Palestinians*, Khalil Nakhleh and Elia Zureik (eds.), Croom Helm: London, 1980, P. 160.
13. Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, “Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers”, *Bridges of Power: Women’s Multicultural Alliances*, Lisa Albrecht and Rose M. Brewer (eds.), New Society: Philadelphia, 1990, P. 132.
14. Yvonne Haddad, P. 166.
15. The Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees (associated with the DFLP) was the first to break off from the Palestinian Union of Women’s Work Committees in 1978 in Ramallah, followed by the breakaway of three more autonomous organisations: Union of Working Women’s Committees (Communist Party, renamed the People’s Party) in 1980, Union of Palestinian Women’s

Committees (PFLP) in 1981, and Union of Women's Committees for Social Work (*Fatah*) in 1981. All four committees are represented in the Higher Women's Council (16. Souad Dajani, "Between National Liberation and Social Liberation: The Palestinian Women's Movement in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip", *Women and the Israeli Occupation*, Tamar Mayer (ed), Routledge: London, 1994, P. 43.

17. Joseph Massad, "Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer, 1995, P. 480.

18. Massad, P. 474.

19. Massad, P. 477.

20. Massad, P. 474. "Ululate" can be defined as to howl or wail.

21. Massad, P. 474.

22. Sheila Hannah Katz, "Adam and Adama, Ird and Ard: En-gendering Political Conflict and Identity in Early Jewish and Palestinian Nationalisms", *Gendering the Middle East*, Syracuse University Press: New York, 1996, PP. 88-89.

23. Simona Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Syracuse University Press: New York, 1995, P. 36.

24. Sharoni, P. 36.

25. Mervat Hatem, "Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: the case of modern Egypt", *Feminist Issues*, 6(1), Spring, 1986, P. 35.

26. Hatem, P. 35.

27. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990, P. 20.

28. Georgina Waylen, "Analysing Women in the Politics of the Third World", *Women and Politics in the Third World*, Haleh Afshar (ed), Routledge: London and New York, 1996, P. 8.

29. Massad, P. 489.

30. Spike Peterson, *Gendered States*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder and London, 1992, P. 12.

31. Peterson, P. 13.

32. Massad, P. 467.

33. The rise of political Islam has been explained in accordance with a variety of changing factors in the Middle East. The defeat of the united Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent loss of holy sites sacred to Islam, followed an already declining popularity of Pan-Arabist ideology with the failed merger of the *Bathist* regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and represented symbolically with the death of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. These events intensified growing disillusionment with secular Arab

nationalism, both in its liberal constitutional form and in its more radical socialist form. See James Piscatori, "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Wake of the Six Day War", *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective*, Laurence J. Silberstein (ed), New York University Press, New York and London, 1993.

34. James Davison Hunter, "Fundamentalism: An Introduction to a General Theory", *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective*, Laurence J. Silberstein (ed), New York University Press: New York and London, 1993, P. 36.

35. *Caliphate* refers to the period of Islamic government led by the successors (caliphs) to the Prophet Mohammed.

36. Haleh Afshar, Islam and Feminism: An Analysis of Political Strategies, *Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives*, Mai Yamani (ed), New York University Press: New York, 1996, P. 198.

37. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, "Women in Islam: the Mother of all Battles", *Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint*, P. 137.

38. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Westview Press: Boulder, 1996, P. 6. The *Sunna* are details of the normative behaviour of the Prophet Mohammed.

39. Valentine M. Moghadam, *Gender and National Identity*, P. 5.

40. Term "enduring alliance" coined by Mervat Hatem, "Enduring Alliance of Nationalism and Patriarchy in Muslim Personal Status Laws: the case of modern Egypt", *Feminist Issues*, 6(1), Spring, 1986.

41. I would caution however, that the potency of political Islam has waned to some degree since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, as some Islamic groups have made pragmatic decisions to split and run in the elections to the Legislative Council, thereby watering down their more dogmatic goals.

42. The Islamic secular/religious split is only one of the main cleavages in Palestinian politics. Other significant cleavages such as the urban and rural divide, and conflict between the PLO leadership in Tunis and the political elite of the Occupied Territories, are dealt with elsewhere.

43. The roots of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) are traced to the initial resurgence of Islam in Egypt and the formation of the Society of Muslim Brothers in *Isma'iliyyaa* by Hasan al-Banna in 1928.

44. For background on the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad see, Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994.

45. Najah Manasra, "Palestinian Women: Between Tradition and Revolution", *Palestinian Women: Identity and Experience*, Ebba Augustin (ed), Zed Books: London, 1993, P. 19.

46. Rema Hammami, "Women, the Hijab and the Intifada", *Middle East Report*, May/August, 1990, P. 26.
47. Interview with Ifa J'bari, Hebron Young Women's Centre, on December 21, 1996.
48. Haleh Afshar, Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran, *Women and Politics in the Third World*, Haleh Afshar (ed), Routledge: London and New York, 1996, P. 123.
49. See Kumari Jayawardena. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, Zed Books: London and New Jersey, 1986. P.2.
50. The Islamist view of womanhood is outlined in the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Hamas*) of Palestine where women are referred to in their "important role in taking care of the home and raising children of ethical character and understanding that comes from Islam" and their necessary work in educating "the Muslim girl to become a righteous mother aware of her role in the battle of liberation". See "Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22(4), 1993, PP. 127-128.
51. Hammami, P. 28.
52. Hammami, P. 28.
53. Abu-Amr, P. 28. A similar ambiguous and contradictory relationship exists between *Fatah* and the Islamic Jihad. Although critical of each other's position on Islam, Ziad Abu-Amr claims that *Fatah* has attempted to gain international credibility through usurping the media attention of Islamic Jihad's terrorist attacks, and conversely, it is rumoured that the Islamic Jihad received military and logistical support from *Fatah*. See Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, PP. 110-111.
54. Suad Joseph, "Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States", *Middle East Report*, January/March, 1996, P. 4.
55. The Oslo Accord of August 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, the Cairo Accord signed on February 4, 1994 and the Interim Autonomy Agreement (Oslo II) for transfer of authority and Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian cities signed on September 28, 1995 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) are the formal building blocks for Palestinian statehood.
56. Israel continues to exert incredible control over the PNA's internal affairs and negotiations, particularly through means of closure and Jewish settlement policy.
57. See Muhammed S. Dajani, The Palestinian Authority and Citizenship in the Palestinian Territories, conference paper for Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, University of Oslo, November, 1996, P. 17.
58. Christopher Heltveit Parker, PA Power and Palestinian Citizenship between Oslo and a Final Status: The Contours of Social Mobilization and State Building "from Above", conference paper for Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, University of Oslo, November, 1996, P. 12.

59. The official revival of clan-based leadership was witnessed in part by the presidential appointment of a consultant for clan affairs, and the promotion of clan associations for political representation in municipal and other governmental bodies. For reference see Rita Giacaman, Islah Jad and Penny Johnson, "For the Common Good? Gender and Social Citizenship in Palestine", *Middle East Report*, January/March, 1996, PP. 11-12. An example of this trend was witnessed in the revived influence of specific families in the election process in the Al-Bireh municipality.

61. J. Ann Tickner, *Gender and International Relations*, Columbia University Press: New York, 1992, P. 57.

62. Interview with Eileen Kuttab, Women's Studies, Birzeit University, on December 23, 1996.

63. Sharoni, P. 85.

64. This influence is both implicit (for example, cheap Palestinian labour markets in Israel) and explicit (for example, Israeli closures).

65. Rita Giacaman, "The Women's Movement on the West Bank", *Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint*, Olive Branch Press: New York, 1996. P. 131.

66. Giacaman, PP. 131-132.

67. "The Women's Document: A Tool for Women's Empowerment and Struggle: An Interview with Eileen Kuttab", *Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint*, P. 126.

68. Interview with Randa Siniora, head of Women's Division, *Al-Haq* (Law in the Service of Man), December 31, 1996. The campaigns are run by the Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, Women's Affairs Technical Committee, the Women's Studies Program at Birzeit University, the Woman's Division of *Al-Haq*, among others and along with participation from independent academic and professional women

69. Mohammed S. Dajani, P. 11.

70. Mohammed S. Dajani, P. 11.

71. Suha Sabbagh, The Declaration of Principles of Palestinian Women's Rights: An Analysis, *Arab Women : Between Defiance and Restraint*, P. 119.

72. General Union of Palestinian Women, Jerusalem-Palestine: Draft Document of Principles of Women's Rights (Third Draft), *Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint*, Suha Sabbagh (ed), Olive Branch Press: New York, 1996, P. 261.

73. *Women's Affairs Technical Committee newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn, 1996, P. 1.

74. Palestinian Declaration of Independence, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18(2), 1989, P. 215.

75. General Union of Palestinian Women, Jerusalem-Palestine: Draft Document of Principles of Women's Rights (Third Draft), *Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint*, Suha Sabbagh (ed), Olive Branch Press: New York, 1996, P. 260.

76. Women's Affairs Technical Committee Press Release, *Palestinian Women and the Legislative Council Elections*, January, 1996.
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