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Chapter 9

Iran: Internal Security Threats and Challenges


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1. Political System

Introduction

The purpose of this and the next chapter about Iran is to highlight the convergence of Iran's policy towards PG security from 1962 to 1997. Although Iran's political regime's pre-revolution and post-revolution differed, there remained fixed factors which concerned Iran as a country. These included the geopolitics of Iran, the countries' geostrategic situation and the significance of stability and security of the PG as a subsystem of international system for the country's process of development. Its foreign policy towards the PG shows Iran's continuing aim and need to establish stability and security within the region and cooperate with its neighbours. Particularly emphasising the necessity that PG security should be provided by the regional countries implying a desire to see the removal of all foreign presence in the region.

In regard to Iranian pronouncements on the issue of PG security, which expose Iran's deep-rooted sense of its own strategic importance, there were two key concerns for Iran: the first was its economic dependence on the Hormuz Strait as its only means of exporting oil. Iranians sought to ensure free passage of oil while preventing others gaining control of the PG. The second is that Iran sees itself as playing a central role in PG security.



07 OCT 2008

The main reason for choosing 1962 as the starting year of this study is the significant effect the successes and failures in Iran's foreign policy towards the PG have had on the stability and security of the region. A further, and important, reason is that at that time the ME was acquiring a new role in international relations, especially due to the great decrease of intensity of the bipolar system manifested in the Cold War, and that Iran was becoming a major power in the ME. According to the international system there was more possibility for smaller countries to manoeuvre. The evolution of Iran's role for the US and the USSR combined with its intentions and the opportunity to play a greater role on a regional and international level meant that it placed greater attention to the PG, in line with its own interests of security.¹ During this period up until 1997 this thesis will study Iran's failures and successes in its policy towards the PG in three different phases of; 1962-1979 under the Muhammad Reza Shah's rule and within the Cold War as a successful period; two periods of 1979-1989 and 1989-1997 in post-revolution within the bi-polar and also uni-polar system of international system. While the first phase in post-revolution was a failure in the second phase Iran could regain much of its regional and international legitimacy, which included the adoption of a pragmatic and active policy in the PG to manage affairs in this region.

Drawing upon the level of analysis framework in international relations, the task of this chapter is also twofold: first, to study the power-structure and decision-making process with relation to security in the pre and post-Revolutionary Iran; second, to examine the internal threats during the study period of 1962-1997 including socio-political issues and also economic and military development. Also, the task of the next chapter is to present an empirical analysis of external threats and Iran's trends in its foreign relations concerning security of the PG with key countries including the Great Powers and its PG neighbours from the 1960s to 1990s.

Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy

Iranians are known as “proud nationalists, seeking independence, equality and a greater role, voice and status internationally”² and there is a possibility that Iran intends “to return to its pre-Islamic revolution stage of regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf (...) [while it] continues to see itself as a powerful Middle Eastern state which has the right to manage affairs in the Persian Gulf”.³ Therefore, “religion, nationalism, ethnicity, economics, and geopolitics all are important in explaining Iran’s goals and tactics in its relationship with the outside world, as are the agendas of key security institutions and the ambitions of their leaders (...) [Hence], politics and even basic structure of government are in flux.”⁴ In this regard, there have been a rigid linkages between domestic, foreign, and security policies in all part of political history of Iran. As Ramazani in 1975 observed, “there is little doubt that the twin goals of autonomy abroad and authority at home are the most salient features of interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics in Iran (...) [In other words] every major foreign policy objective and decision of Iran has its domestic counterpart.

⁵ Also as Chubin and Zabih remarked in 1974,

Because the security of the Shah’s regime and the state as a whole were equated, foreign policy was expected to strengthen the internal and external requirements for stability and survival of the regime. This meant a concerted search for external sources of military support from those powers which accepted this equation of regime security and were able and willing to support it. ⁶

Iran’s post-revolutionary major policies also included “a complex calculus of Iran’s overall vulnerability, its need to ensure the regime stays in power, and its commitment to revolutionary ideals. Iran’s leaders weigh all these factors when making their

decisions.”⁷ Hence, notions, perceptions, attitudes, and individual characteristic of every policy-makers are influential in Iran’s foreign policy as much as in other developing countries which unlike developed countries with different foreign policy making institutions, are dependent on direct decisions of the states’ leaders.⁸ In this respect, while some Iranian policies seem difficult to comprehend and unpredictable to the outside world, this paper gives consideration to the different systemic sources of input into Tehran’s foreign policy decision-making. It studies internal elements as well as the global and regional variables and their interaction, and treats them as contributors to Iranian foreign policy.

The theoretical basis is established by acknowledging the policies of a small power, and also the linkage between national and international systems. In other word, a state’s foreign policy, within a system of international politics, can be analysed by comparative foreign policy, and its public policy formation and political structure can be analysed with particular attention to the link between domestic and foreign policy decision-making. In this regard, James Rosenau’s theory is concerned with two factors, the political link between national and international structures, and the penetration of domestic policies of political systems that are affected by external affairs.⁹ Also, if we focus on the policies of a small power and the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy there is a question about how to survive during the Cold War when situated next to a superpower reputed for its aggressive behaviour and expansionist attitude, in an area with entrenched power struggles.¹⁰ Under such circumstances, Iran’s long term security depends largely on the persistence of those external and internal political factors which can contribute to successful Iranian diplomacy.

Power-Structure

Imperial Iran

For a more clear understanding of Iran's policy, the impact of the type of decision-making system and leadership factor on the policy process is essential. The major theme of this part of the study deals with domestic sources of Iran's foreign policy, which explains the impact of domestic elements' priority over international variables on foreign policy, as well as domestic uses of foreign policy.

The decision-making system of the pre-revolution era was a hierarchical structure, with the Shah's at the top, with his decisions and orders being imposed from above.

As Chubin and Zabih note,

It is recognized that the Shah is the sole and ultimate source of decisions affecting foreign policy, in all its manifestations (...) the penetration of Iran's political system and the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign alignment have diminished in the course of the decade, although the influence of the West, and particularly the United States, remains pervasive in Iran's politics.¹¹

As Ramazani also mentions, after the fall of the Mosadegh government, the Shah's personal control became supreme and unchallenged. He was the central player in foreign policies even more than domestic, as evidenced by his influence in establishing and implementing all major decisions from oil agreements and the Baghdad Pact to the Irano-Soviet negotiations and the Bahrain dispute, climaxed by his frequent foreign goodwill visits to countries in both political blocs as well as the superpowers. These visits were also made by the royal family and even the prime minister to direct and support the Shah's decision when the Shah himself preferred not to get directly involved; this was also the role of Parliament.¹² The impacts of the

type of decision-making system on Iran's foreign policy during the Shah's rule as Chubin and Zabih observe were the following.

- 1- Iran's foreign policy in broad terms was remarkably stable, where foreign policy was personal it reflected the leader's wish to demonstrate his stability and consistency. In this regard, the foreign policy was formulated by pragmatism rather than ideological attentions.
- 2- This type of state would have been both less and more adaptable. In the first instance the prestige of the leader would be at stake and in the second the Shah's acknowledged, almost total control would provide an immeasurably strong negotiating hand and decisiveness that comes from the lack of serious economic, political or social constraints; e.g. between 1970-71 the dropping of the Bahrain claim and the pursuing of the claim to PG islands.
- 3- Foreign policy controlled by one person manifests a person's temperament. The world is viewed from their viewpoint and sees other government's as equally personal; for example an insult to the state is a personal slight and government's views are represented by its newspapers. Iran's evidenced this hypothesis in its insistence that Nasser "apologise", especially regarding its confronting the Iranian government in the PG politics, before diplomatic relations could be resumed. The emphasis on personality is a dangerous feature in a state's foreign policy that can cause misunderstanding and confusion.
- 4- The temptation arises, when personal control of foreign policy aligns with the domination of internal affairs, to enhance the leadership's prestige internationally to legitimise and strengthen the regime. Such domestic uses of

foreign policy can be seen in the celebration of 2500 of monarchy, emphasising military sophistication, the sensitivity to the naming of the Gulf, the regular discussions on Iranian responsibility in the PG, and encouragement of sloganeering to mobilise the populace on regional issues. However it cannot be a substitute for policy. It can be seen in Iran's hurriedly prepared and aborted 1965 continental shelf agreement with Saudi Arabia, its short-run issues in international politics, and its reluctance to establish long-range policies are characteristic of the diplomacy of a small state.

- 5- This type of system would have retarded the professionalism of foreign policy. Although this theory has not really been tested, the absence of continuous policy direction, the unavailability of diplomats who can authoritatively state Iran's position, the absence of expertise evident in Iran's regional relations particularly with the Arab world, its personalised and improvised decisions, and hesitation reflected in its failure to prepare for Britain's withdrawal with no active initiative suggested until the leadership returns to the issue demonstrates this danger and the potential of a bottleneck arising at times of great foreign affairs activity.
- 6- The merger of pure diplomacy and pure coercion, with a greater reliance on the latter, tends to occur wherever the same individual dominates both foreign and military affairs. In dealing with the superpowers Iran relied on diplomacy while in local relations it preferred to emphasise its might, e.g. the Arvand Roud dispute. Its reaction to Jamal Nasser's campaign in Yemen was to increase arms purchases. When Britain withdrew it emphasised military preparation rather than seeking complementary diplomatic options. However, it had not been proven that Iran's reliance on military solutions or its

underestimation of diplomacy in its foreign policy aroused from the decision making structure. Although it can be seen that military inputs into foreign policy were considered more significant than those of its diplomatic equivalent.

- 7- The only learning process that could take place was a personal one, requiring a change in the decision-makers' own attitudes, as there was no formalised foreign policy process. This brought with it inherent long-term disadvantages including an increase in the strain on the Iranian leadership, particularly considering the increasing diversification of Iran's foreign relations, the many technical features of diplomacy at that time and Iran's desire for a wider regional role.¹³

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran's post-revolutionary complex political system combines elements of a modern Islamic theocracy with democracy. Its decision-making system is a compromise of a kind. Its vital decisions are usually made by consensus rather than decree.

Despite constitutional law detailing the different institutions of government, their makeup and their duties, individuals still substantially influence the final decisions, attempting to use the institutions as merely instruments to implement them. Despite the existence of different councils and institutions, there is no formal or routine policy process; instead, a complex system of compromises between institutions and individuals has been accepted. Hooshang Amirahmadi praises the decentralising process of Iran's power structure, suggesting it is a step towards greater pluralism, and goes on to explain that the structure of "the Iranian government is not pyramid-

like [but] (...) it is a structure of power comprised of many inter-connected and autonomous rings." The central ring is made of a group of elite individuals, mostly clergymen of great influence that rarely hold official government positions because who they are is more important than the positions they occupy. The second ring contains those elite with senior posts, composed of clergymen and civilians, and then beyond that the forces that manage the various elements of the system described as the "roots of power", including revolutionary foundations and religious security forces.¹⁴ Under such circumstances, it is not unusual to see many senior posts exclusively given to close relatives of those in power who, as Amirahmadi also remarks, in turn appoint their own relatives and friends to sensitive positions.¹⁵ As Nourbakhsh comments, this complex network of patronage, both personal and patrimonial, established and controlled everything, including the government.¹⁶

With regard to this, the foreign policy decision-making process in Iran is extremely complex, involving interfacing between many official and unofficial forces. Policy outcomes are difficult to predict owing to the varied and varying composition of these institutions, the personal influence of their members and the manoeuvrability of pressure groups associated with them. Although there is general agreement that observers know most of the significant players the actual process of decision-making remains vague,¹⁷ uncertainty surrounds the rules by which the state and non-state players decide objectives and more importantly reach final decisions.¹⁸ The chaotic impression this system gives to external observers hides what is described by Daniel Byman [et al] as a "highly stylised and ritualised mode of interaction." According to the authors, this interaction is based on the impromptu trading of support, information and unspoken approval, preserving solidarity and consensus. However, the consequence of such a system is that decisions are subject to a back-and-forth process,


with individuals withholding support and the differing objectives and enthusiasm of institutions result in inconsistent policy, policy slippage and policy setbacks, all leading to mixed signals in Iran's foreign policy, Byman [et al] add.¹⁹ Byman [et al] however observe that the institutions and organisations in Iran play important political and military roles with many duties, beliefs and aims overlapping considerably. Although they do acknowledge that most institutions are weak while the personal networks of leaders are strong and thus power shifts according to the fortunes of the individual leaders rather than by the scope of the institution. Decision-making is characterised by both seemingly chaotic complexity and consensus; no one institution or individual has complete control so a majority of institutional and non-institutional actors, family ties, personal relationships, overlapping institutional authority and the mixture of religion and politics must be gained to reach one's end, Byman [et al] conclude.²⁰

Nourbakhsh attempts to describe the process of decision making as follows: an opportunity or threat is discovered; the message passes through all the different institutional sources to the president, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the *Majlis* (Parliament), the Guardian Council (GC), the Expediency Council (EC) and the Supreme Leader. (See, figure 9-1) Even though, he explains, the ultimate decision may be the Leader's choice, through official and unofficial means, all the institutions and individuals would be able to influence it to a certain extent. Also, the Leader may choose to delegate or simply be influenced by the victor of a factional debate; in this regard it is not always the Leader who is the final decision-maker.²¹ Despite the explanation of Kamal Kharrazi, the head of the new Strategic Council for Foreign Relations (*Shora-yi Rahbordi-yi Ravabet-i Khareji*) which was created by a June 25 decree from Supreme Leader, that such a lack of coherence in foreign relations

strategy was the reason for the foundation of this council,²² this council does not seem to be able to offer a more coherent and organised foreign policy decision-making process. The reasons for this analysis are that, on the one hand there are some uncertainties regarding the new council's purpose given that there are various political bodies oriented toward foreign policy decision-making. On the other hand, despite Kharrazi's emphasis on the consultancy dimension of the council's purpose and the impossibility of its interference in other foreign policy organisations, according to his explanation of the obligation laid on executive organs to obey the approved strategy presented to Ayatollah Khamenei, such a situation would provide a more tangible influence for the Supreme Leader in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Figure 9-1

Islamic Republic of Iran's Power Chart



Source: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php#top

According to Byman [et al] when it comes to decisions about Iran's security policy formally the Supreme Leader simply oversees while the President handles the daily decision-making, however informally the Leader manages considerable control over day-to-day implementations. Also, concerning Iran's security policy several

institutions are of particular significance, including the intelligence services, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh (regular armed forces). The first two organisations are concerned with the defence of the revolution against domestic enemies while the Artesh concentrates its efforts on potential attacks from the outside or other traditional threats. Hence, the sharing of responsibilities and overlap of duties and beliefs often creates duplication and rivalry.²³

Iran's strategies and its foreign policy's orientation and goals have been not only a reaction of the revolution to the Shah's regime, but these have been influenced by the revolutionary leaders too. Houshan Sadri categorises Iran's revolutionary leaders in two groups of idealists and realists. As he explains, the revolutionary idealists believe that in time the revolution would spread everywhere. They desired to focus resources in support of movements abroad, they held on to an anti-status quo belief, and used their revolutionary values in foreign relations, all of which seemed to pose a threat to the national security of other states, especially its PG neighbours, and consequently would lead to the isolation of Iran. This is evidenced by the support of Arab states in the PG given to Iraq for its invasion of Iran a year after the revolution. Although, he continues, the revolutionary realists had the same aim as the idealists — to export the revolution — their methodology differed. The realists dealt with problems of national rather than international concern, prioritising the building of a model revolutionary state in their own country. However, they understood real politics, the limits of their country's revolutionary powers, the country's need for external assistance for modernisation, and concerned themselves with the reaction the revolution had on the international stage. They were also pragmatic enough to realise the importance of good diplomatic relations and that internationally isolating the country would not pay off. As Sadri also mentions, an example of a revolutionary realist is Ali Akbar

Hashemi Rafsanjani, who worked against the isolationist tendencies within the new leadership. Despite such differences a common belief on both sides was that the new regime needed a fresh approach to foreign relations.²⁴

After 1989, the evolution of Iran's foreign relations was implemented by Hashemi Rafsanjani. He began confidence building, established *détente* policy and strengthened Iran's regional position. Also, by managing PG relations and by adopting a pragmatic and active regional policy, he began rebuilding a lot of Iran's international credibility. Despite the tendency of revolutionary states towards a close-knit relationship between domestic and foreign policies, when its state security was at risk ideological Iran managed to temper its ideology with pragmatism.²⁵ However, the primacy of foreign policy in Iran's scheme continued, even during the Hashemi Rafsanjani period, who preferred to deal with national rather than international concerns, maintaining the same problems as in the period of the Shah. It was not until 1997 that this policy was altered. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, as Chubin also observes, the clear urgency of domestic issues brought with it the realisation that foreign policy could no longer replace domestic performance and the needs of internal crisis could not be met by foreign-policy activism. However, they also realised that by ending isolation and increasing access to external resources, Iran could alleviate some of the pressures on the regime through foreign policy.²⁶

As Byman [et al] mention, Iran's security policy is seen as a combination of Islamic and nationalist objectives. However, in recent years the necessity of preserving regional stability and improving Iran's economy has dictated the influence of geopolitics, economics and even ethnicity in shaping Iran's security policy.²⁷ Also, from 1997 the presidency of Khatami added to the elements of the regime's security policy a clearer superiority and urgency of domestic issues. These additional

influences lead to developing better relations with regional neighbours as Byman [et al] describe, at the expense of revolutionary principles and follows more cautious policies than its Islamic and nationalist ethos might otherwise dictate.²⁸ However, since the presidency of Ahmadinejad, the IRI once again has returned to its previous radical priorities.

Conclusion: In sum, Iran's foreign policy is infused with the desire for autonomy as well as for influence on its regional and even on the international stage. Therefore, the concept of 'national interests' as a guide for foreign policy has been missing from Iran's policies, whether under the Shah's regime or the IRI.²⁹ Iran's relation to the international environment is described by Chubin as follows, "like those of other small states Iran's security and ability to manoeuvre largely depends on an international environment which it can little affect."³⁰ Both national interests and the international environment have, from the period of the Shah, continued to present a real challenge to Iran's foreign policy.

2. Imperial Iran's Security Challenges

Introduction

The modern Iranian State is the product of many very complex and long-term social relations, deep-rooted political interactions and socio-economic processes.

A. Ehteshami (2000)³¹

Domestic, foreign and security policies are not divided issues. It must be recognised that the major threat to Iranian society comes from within, which is evidenced by the revolution. However the Iranian political regimes' endeavour has been characterised mainly by two factors; either by ignoring or being unaware of national interests, and

laying blame on other internal or external events. An examination of the real domestic threats, particularly during the study period of 1962-1997, will involve consideration of the major socio-political issues and the economic and military development both pre and post-revolution.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Regime

There are two specific analyses about the internal threats to the security of the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime (1941-1979), which was ended by the Islamic revolution, as Abrahamian explains:

One interpretation — accepted by supporters of the Pahlavi regime — claims that the revolution occurred because the shah modernized [1963-1977] too much and too quickly for his traditional-minded and backward-looking people. The other — favoured by opponents of the regime — argues that the revolution occurred because the shah did not modernize fast enough and thoroughly enough to overcome his initial handicap of being a CIA-installed monarch in an age of nationalism, neutralism, and republicanism.³²

However, according to Abrahamian both interpretations are only half right. The revolution began because the Shah modernised the socio-economic level, increasing both the middle and industrial working classes, but he did not modernise the political level. This unbalance created strained links and blocked communications between the political system and the general population. The few bridges that had connected the traditional social forces, particularly the bazaars and the religious authorities, collapsed. By 1977, the widening gulf between the two levels meant that an economic crisis was able to pull the whole regime down. The revolution took place not because

of over or underdevelopment but because of uneven development.³³ Subsequently, under the Shah's rule, Iranian society was plagued by the following four major crises:

1) The crisis of justice which was rooted in social relations, the living conditions of the people, the unjust distribution of wealth, social discriminations and the gap between the poor and the rich. The gap was created by the modernisation plan and social development, which was made possible by increasing oil revenues. It was also true, as Abrahamian remarks, that substantial amounts of money were wasted on royal extravagances, bureaucratic consumption, outright corruption, nuclear installation and ultra-sophisticated weapons. However, greater amounts were channelled into the economy and into the government-subsidised Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran too.³⁴

2) The participation crisis emerged because of the Shah's own fear of the people demanding to play a more active role in determining their own fate, which went completely against his totalitarian and autocratic regime. Consequently, although he modernised the structure of socioeconomics, he made little effort to develop the political system, thus preventing the formation of pressure groups and other social forces.

3) A moral and spiritual crisis shook the legitimacy of the regime to its foundations in the public opinion and conscience. The prevailing notion that 'modernisation brings secularity', or 'modernisation is a fundamental break of spirituality', together with the Shah's efforts to foster a Western-oriented culture, his glorification of pre-Islamic Persia (like the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, which was held at the site of Persepolis in 1971, or the imposition a new calendar dating from the pre-Islamic monarch Cyrus the Great instead of from the prophet of Islam's *higra*),

the presence of thousands of Westerners in Iran, the increasing number of cinemas showing 'decadent' Western films, as well as discos, bars and casinos for gambling (all against *Sharia* law), represented an ascending perfidious culture. These developments were against the beliefs of most Iranians and were construed by *Ulema* as destructive to Shiism. Such circumstances were perceived by many as an effort on the Shah's part to destroy Islam and they seemed inextricably bound to a decline in Islamic practices.³⁵

4) The prevailing security atmosphere that controlled the opposition groups and the media was mainly led by a new secret police named *Sazman- e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar* (National Security and Information Organisation, SAVAK). This organisation was set up by the Shah who, after the Mosadegh experience, wanted an effective internal security service. However, he also maintained additional intelligence services partly to check on each other.

The regime's modernisation was unlike what was successfully experienced in other societies. The Shah's main motivation was his dream of developing Iran into a 'Great Civilization' and making it one of the most powerful nations of the world: not only secure, but self-sufficient via oil money. However, by late 1974 the oil boom brought a completely different result than the 'Great Civilization' promised by the Shah. The moderate decline of oil revenues in 1974-1975, which was followed by a sharp decline in the final year of the Shah's regime, brought an alarming increase in inflation and a widening gap between the rich and poor. By mid-1977, an economic recession, with high government deficits and high inflation, urban overcrowding, government policies that damaged the bazaar classes, and the lack of political

freedom contributed to the widespread perception that the 'Great Civilization' was just a hollow dream without firm buttresses.³⁶

Howsoever, his modernisation had three shortcomings: The modernisation of Iran was forced upon the people from above, without allowing them to participate because of the lack of political development, creating expansive dualism between the traditional beliefs and the modern secular ideas. This dualism was seen in the economy, in the culture, in the forms of thinking and particularly with regard to religious beliefs. The lack of an overarching ideology meant that the Shah failed to attract the population to the process of modernisation. The second problem was the uneven development of the economic and political systems as explained above. The third shortcoming was the lack of one unique ideology to reconcile the people's beliefs and the Shah's modernisation. This absence was partly because the modernisation package was designed by America enabling the introduction of American capitalism into Iranian society, which encouraged secular ideas.³⁷

Political Policy

The far-reaching political, social, and economic reforms, known as the Shah's White Revolution (1963), were encouraged by the US, who desired to support the Shah placing great emphasis on reinforcing Iran's internal security. Consideration of the Shah's agricultural and oil policies, which can be found in Appendix-8-A, demonstrates how the regime politically alienated the population and increased its dependency on the West to survive, which ultimately destabilised the regime.³⁸ The consequences of his economic strategy, especially in these two major areas of development may, as Keddie notes, be seen as:

(...) contributing to a capitalist type of agricultural and industrial growth, with a natural emphasis on state capitalism, given the autocratic nature of the regime and its monopoly control of the ever-growing oil income. (...) The years 1962-77 may be seen as a unit in this building up of a predominant state capitalism, undermining of semifeudal forms of landownership seen as a bar both to development and to central government control of the countryside, and encouragement and subsidy to private capitalists.³⁹

In the decade after the 1953 *coup d'état*, the Shah worked to consolidate his power and became increasingly interested in modernising the Iranian economy and society in a Western manner and developing its military strength. In this regard he carried to the extreme displays of ultra-sophisticated and expensive weaponry, which combined with his economic policy that had turned Iran into a huge consumer of Western goods, made Iran substantially dependent on the West; specifically the US. So to achieve his goals the Shah needed financial aid, which he received from America. He was able to solve his oil dispute with Britain and form a contract with a British consortium, which resulted in an increase in oil revenues. All these events assisted the Shah in gaining control of most of Iran's economy and the state itself. The additional revenues also increased Iran's military strength, which was necessary for the regime's survival.⁴⁰

Economic Development: There were two different views about the Shah's socio-economic policies. Some, especially those outside Iran, thought that they were a great success for Iran as evidenced by the increase in Iran's GNP, the impressive industrial, agricultural, and infrastructural projects, and the number of social welfare activities. However, opponents of the regime saw the policies as artificial and fraudulent as the development had only benefited the regime and its Western supports. The opponents also proclaimed that there were no structural changes, and that the social and

economic projects undertaken by the Shah's regime were only contributing to a capitalist type of agriculture and of industrial growth emphasising state capitalism, as evidenced by the autocratic character of the regime and the monopoly it held on the oil income.⁴¹

The increased oil revenues simply increased the disparity between the rich and the poor because the Shah's over ambitious fantasy led to association with multinational corporations, which left the day-to-day needs of most Iranians unfulfilled. The government did not even try to use taxation to its advantage, as this would more justly have distributed income and implied that the people should have had a role in the government they paid for.⁴²

Although the Shah's first major programme of modernisation ended because of economic difficulties, his later plan resulted in major transformations in the Iranian society and economy such as economic expansion, unequal distribution of wealth, profound changes in the class structure, and a decline in the agriculture sector. These transformations were the result of the focus on an industrialisation programme that depended heavily on Western technology and managerial skills.⁴³

As Milani explains, when the Shah introduced the Land Reforms in 1963 as a part of his White Revolution, the coalition, which was made up of landlords, rich merchants, some top clergy, armed forces and the US that overthrew Mosadegh in 1953, began to disintegrate. (Details in Appendix-8-A) The subsequent establishment of the Triangle of Fortune or Triple Alliance, which was made up of the combined forces of the Iranian State, the industrial bourgeoisie, and foreign capitalists, particularly the US, was necessary to ensure the survival of the Pahlavi regime and its modernisation plan

for Iran. The drive behind each group was the desire for the speedy development of Iran's economy and an "open-door" policy, especially towards the West.⁴⁴

However, a major pernicious consequence of such economic expansion which was not seriously considered was the shifting of Iran's focus from agriculture to industry, which resulted in an increased labour force, with all its disadvantages such as rapid urban migration as well as excessive inflation. However this massive movement of mainly young people, from a very religious and political culture in the country, actually assisted the ultimate downfall of the regime. This was because in the end the strength of the revolution came from the urban areas where the political culture of the masses was Islamic so they could easily lend their support to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini.⁴⁵

Such a significant change from landownership for agricultural production to investment in commercial and industrial projects also resulted in the allocation of a considerable amount of the state's resources for the development of industries, as well as encouraging involvement in the private sector. Official records show that in 1980, out of 5,288 industrial units, more than 89 percent were owned by the private sectors while only 409 (around 7 percent) were state controlled.⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly, the Pahlavi family benefited the most from the economic boom and by the early 1970s they had established a huge financial empire and were controlling nearly everything. They invested great amount of funds, borrowed from state banks and often on very favourable terms, in various commercial and industrial businesses. Their other source of wealth was the oil income. According to *Washington Post*, in the last few years of the Shah's regime significant amounts (possibly about \$2 billion), with no trace in the state treasury, were transferred directly from the state's oil income into the royal

family's secret foreign bank accounts.⁴⁷ As long as the royal family remained in control the strength of the private sector increased, due to extravagant financial incentives and the fact that Iran was introduced to foreign capital, the foreign banking industry, and various economic agreements between Iran and the West, specifically the US.⁴⁸ The consequence of all this, as Milani notes, was that:

As the role of the state and indigenous industrialists increased, so did that of foreign capital. (...) The foreign role in the banking industry also increased. (...) Concomitant with increased foreign involvement was the deepening of Iran's dependence on the West. The imports of capital and intermediate goods rose from \$89 million in 1963 to \$886 million in 1977. The dependent industrialists of Iran had become the junior partners of elites in the metropolis countries. They identified with and emulated the West to such an extent that they became alienated from their own culture. This created a ubiquitous cultural gap between his small portion of the population and the bulk of Iranians.⁴⁹

The Shah's power was based on the three pillars of the armed forces, the court patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy, which enabled the state's control to expand into the day-to-day lives of its citizens. In the towns they hired 50% of the full time employees giving the state control of a vast percentage of the populations' salaries and benefits. Although this network did not yet include the *bazaaries* it did penetrate the countryside. It managed to supplant the local *khans* (landowners), demolishing the barrier that had once prevented absolute government authority over the rural population. Now the government could reorganise the whole countryside.⁵⁰

As the final step, in 1975, the Shah established the additional and fateful fourth pillar of the one-party state. Giving way in the late 1950s to growing pressure for more democracy, the Shah created two parties: the Melliyun (Nationalist) party and the

Mardom (People) party. However both parties were simply for appearances' sake and with little difference between them they remained under the control of their creator. It was not until over 15 years later that the Shah dissolved these existing two parties and created the Resurgence party (*Hizb-i Rastakhiz*) — headed by Amirabbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister — whose main aim, as Abrahamian expresses, was to turn the old fashioned dictatorship into a modern totalitarian state.⁵¹

Military Development: another part of the Shah's effort to consolidate his power was his efforts to increase his regime's military strength. His ambition was for Iran to become a leading military power, which would also provide the means to subdue domestic political opposition. To achieve his goal the Shah obtained US aid. The military relationship between the US and Iran began in the late 1940s. However the real increase in Iran's dependency on the US occurred after the 1953 restoration of the Shah to power. This dependency was not only military but also financial, and lasted up until 1967 when Iran's oil revenues increased. The consequent increase in wealth, as well as the US's political agenda and the Shah's eagerness to buy sophisticated weapons, resulted in the US ignoring previous attempts to prevent domestic or regional instability through the build up of Iranian arms. Instead it established a new interdependent partnership.

After the British withdrawal from the region, the US was reluctant to involve itself directly. Consequently it needed a powerful and friendly state to protect US interests in the PG. Hence US strategic interests led to the creation of a regional security system and a strong Iran that remain independent of the USSR which was increasing its military potential. Therefore, in May 1972, as a result of the Nixon-Kissinger decision, Washington allowed the Shah to buy any conventional (non-nuclear) arms.

This evidences that the US-Iran relationship was beneficial to both countries and did not require a direct US military role or great American expense. However it did mean that the US had changed from being what Chubin described as a “restraining patron to acquiescent partner.” This bound the US interests to the fate of the Shah’s regime — even the Carter administration continued the US agreements with Iran.⁵² Even from 1973, when the price of oil began to rise, the West found it convenient to recycle Iran’s petrodollars and thus allowed the Shah to purchase large amounts of up-to-date and sophisticated military equipment which led to Iran’s role as the policeman of the PG.⁵³

The one main strain on the relationship was the Shah’s desire for more and newer military equipment, which led the US to forcibly encourage greater economic reforms to ensure stability and prevent upheaval or revolution. However, this was unbalanced by the Shah’s insistence on spending more of Iran’s growing oil revenues on weaponry rather than on Iran’s economy.

Dimensions of Iran-US Military Ties

Advantages: Iran’s military build-up, Chubin remarks, “held the potential for a regional equilibrium less susceptible to disturbance by outside powers.” This, as he explains, was because Iran’s arms were supplied by the US and thus the US ability to react quickly in this area was improved because of the compatibility between the US military equipment and that of Iran. In addition, the relationship meant that the US could use Iranian territory to gather intelligence and monitor Soviet missile testing.⁵⁴

Although the Shah’s ambition was for Iran to gain influence and become a leading military power, not just in the PG but also all of the ME and the Indian sub continent,

the deployments of its ground forces had the character of being almost solely concerned with defence and internal security. In this regard, as Canby remarks, a full three-fifths of its army was deployed near the borders with Iraq, and half of the remainder was located in the capital. The air force was made up of only one brigade that could provide domestic reinforcement or be of use in the rest of the PG region. This meant that the Shah would only really have been effective in intervening in areas near his own borders. This concentration of forces near the borders, particularly the Iraqi frontier, with nearly all the Iranian army's armour oriented towards Iraq, reflected both the obvious need to face the Iraqi threat and the American belief that such forces would be able to contain and delay any Soviet threat until the arrival of US reinforcements. Forces were not placed any closer to the Soviet border because they would only be lost early on, and may have appeared confrontational during times of peace.⁵⁵

So a relative political stability was brought to the PG for about ten years due to the intensification of the US-Iran military relationship. The closeness of this relationship was promoted by Iran's desire to assume the responsibility neither the UK nor the US wanted, combined with the increase in the significance of the political developments of this region, especially in the context of the Cold War.⁵⁶ Moreover, as there were no other states besides Iran that could ensure the region's security, a close military relationship was essential.⁵⁷

Disadvantages: The close military ties between the US and Iran had some disadvantages for both the Shah's regime and Washington, such as:

- An unwelcome number of foreign technical advisers, instructors and their families, who contributed to inflation and often caused justified indignation among Iranians. By

1976 there were some 25,000 military-related personnel (and their dependents) in Iran, and it was estimated that by 1980 there would be 50,000 to 60,000. One rise led to another and in industry the lack of training in Iran meant that the Iranian population lost out again as more foreigners were brought in to deal with the bigger, more technical and complex projects. This further contributed to overcrowding, shortages, inflation, and an anti-American feeling.⁵⁸

- The aid and technical assistance given by the US, together with Israel, to the SAVAK, which was the most dreaded internal security agency, increased popular resentment toward the countries that helped the SAVAK.

- The socio-economic consequences of the Shah's insistence on spending more of Iran's growing oil revenues on weaponry rather than on Iran's economy.

- During Iran's revolutionary period, the close military ties between the two countries become a disadvantage for the Shah while it was a domestic advantage for his regime's stability in a peaceful era. Moreover, during this period of crisis a demonstrative use of US force as a deterrent against external intervention in Iran could have backfired, as it could have been construed as an indication of opposition to the revolution.⁵⁹

- Regarding the possibility that purchasing arms from the US were among the causes of the revolution, Chubin remarks that it is uncertain whether the purchases of arms actually contributed to the economic problems which led to the revolution. However, if the Shah had been refused the weapons it would have weakened the Iranian-US relationship. This in turn would have created a weaker, unstable Iran, which was eventually the case after 1976. It became clear that a weaker Iran was a greater destabilising regional force as well as a threat to the US interests.

Opposition Groups

The Shah, with its dictatorial character and no tolerance, which had alienated all different social groups and classes, with the possible exception of the upper layer of bourgeoisie, perceived the opposition groups as a threat to its regime. Their demands of expecting the regime to observe the constitution, free political prisoners, and respect freedom and human rights were ignored and they were even severely oppressed by the regime, especially in the post-1953 *coup d'état*.

SAVAK had the main responsibility for identifying and destroying all who opposed the Shah's dictatorship in any way. It had headquarters in London, Geneva and Washington and developed ties with the intelligence agencies from America, Britain and Israel. They were particularly suspicious of groups of intellectuals, students and religious clerics both at home and abroad. Under such circumstances and despite the activities of the opposition groups, the Shah's regime was stable and was able to control the discontent for a time. However it could not last long; via a strong revolutionary movement started in 1978 the regime was overthrown within months and the Shah had to face the real impact of his oppressive policy.

The first problem for the regime was the problem of legitimacy, which for Iran was linked to the form and nature of governance of a Muslim society. The regime had alienated the masses. The growth of the discontent increased when the promised decentralisation of the political and economic systems failed to be realised. However, rather than destroy the roots of the dissention the regime's oppressive policies actually resulted in the radicalisation of the opposing groups. The response to the regime's oppression varied greatly from passive to violent. Many remained silent, not in support of the regime but because of the benefits to the economic developments of

country, regardless of the negative impacts of rapid changes. Susan Siavashi explains other reasons, including the pessimistic and hopelessness of the National Front's traditional leaders' ability to confront the regime, combined with the massive losses of the 1963 uprising, which exposed the Shah's greater power, as well as the lack of opportunity for mobilising people and forming political gatherings. All this paved the way for militia activities and the establishment of small secret groups, ranging from Nationalist to Marxist to Islamist, to carry on the struggle against the regime politicising a generation of Iranians both at home and abroad to shake the foundations of the Pahlavi rule.⁶⁰

In order to understand the Islamic led revolution in Iran the tactics and aims of the opposition groups needs to be studied and a discussion of this can be found in the Appendix-8-B of the thesis. However, generally speaking several groups were opposed to the regime, including both secular and religious entities. Those that held Islamic ideology desired to replace the Pahlavi regime with an Islamic system through political and cultural activities. In contrast those from secular backgrounds only rebelled, with the aim of opposing the political participation crisis. They believed that an armed struggle was the path to political freedom. The opposition groups, with secular backgrounds, included the National Front, the Tudeh and the Fadaiyan-e Khalq. These groups were not interested in replacing the regime with an Islamic system.⁶¹ Even the Mujahedin-e Khalq with religious backgrounds and demand for overthrowing the regime was not looking for an Islamic system. However, the regime had alienated these groups by centralising power and ceasing to act in accordance with the institutionalised rules, which resulted in parties being replaced by movements as an alternative form of political organisation.⁶² Lack of influence and communication with the majority of people whose political culture was Islamic, and

also the adoption of strategies of leftist leaders in Latin-America which focused on armed action and ignored the potential or exploration of non-violent political channels, resulted in the failure of these leftist guerrilla movements.⁶³ This strategy brought them in direct conflict with the regime, which damaged their networks and organisations.

Therefore, a growing number of oppositionists voiced their views in Islamic terms and many opposition groups had ties with the Islamic opposition. This was because the Islamic ideology was linked to the political culture of the masses in such a way that the Shah could not easily contain them. The clergy had significant influence on the masses and had been a political voice, for example in 1964 Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition against capitulation or diplomatic immunity granted by the Shah to American military personnel.

In addition, the failure of the Fadaïyan-e Islam, the major Islamic armed opposition, led the Islamic groups to recognise the need for cultural and political tactics rather than military ones when mobilising the people against the Shah's regime. Although there were some other secret groups led by Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah Taleghani, the major work and communications were taking place within religious places. Using the religious places like Mosques (there existed 100,000 Mosques and 200,000 clerics) guaranteed more chance to mobilise the masses without the interference of the security forces. Consequently, there were many reasons for a new coalition which included almost all different social classes and political forces, whether related to the Islamists or around a non-religious leadership outside the control of the regime. Among the most important ones were: a prevailing ideology, Islam, the continuing political-cultural activity to mobilise the masses and a

charismatic, unique and popular leader in the form of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini for all the different groups, especially “emerging before the Shah was overthrown”.⁶⁴ In addition, as Abrahamian notes, the new leader’s promise to bring social justice in contrast with the regime’s inability to satisfy the people’s increasing expectations, also his “timely statements to woo the secular opposition and to assure all that the autocracy would not be superseded by a theocracy” were important elements of forming the new coalition against the shah’s regime.⁶⁵

Although it was obvious that the regime would end sooner or later, the human-rights policy enunciated by President Carter, in hopes of making US foreign policy more benevolent post-Vietnam, helped to bring the downfall about sooner. Under some domestic and international pressures the Shah began to make gestures in favour of public opinion, although they were late and less than what people expected. He eased the pressure on political prisoners, cancelled the censorship of the writings of Dr. Ali Shariati, an influential modernist Islamist leader, and in 1977, after the economic crisis became great, replaced the Prime Minister. His new choice, Jamshid Amuzegar, was meant to be the solution to Iran’s growing economic problems with his background in economics and oil. However, the economic crisis continued and the discontents increased.⁶⁶ In 1978 the opposition continued to grow, with widespread street protests, and the Shah was confronted by an unexpected opposition leader. The revolution was spontaneous but was not led by the armed opposition of the 1970s or by a political organisation backed by the Soviet Union, both of which were under the eye of the SAVAK. The revolutionaries were led by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled religious leader who lived for 14 years in Iraq and later in France, who could gather a unique coalition of opposition against the Pahlavi monarchy.

Conclusion: In sum, the significance of the Shah's regime was that it was economically and politically stable both internally and externally, particularly in its regional and international position. However, because this security was achieved through a system of oppression and fear the regime was ultimately undermined from within. The Shah's regime was not considered a threat to regional security of the PG because it had the same political orientation towards the West, which it lost after the revolution ignited the anti-*status quo* rhetoric and policies. Revolutionary Iran's problem was seen as a security matter for its neighbours. Although the post-revolution system, especially through the first decade, had more political legitimacy it was faced with many different problems which resulted in the political and economic instability of Iran.

3. The Islamic Republic's Security Challenges

Introduction

A revolution by its very nature as a significant change in a relatively short period of time, causes instability which within a political system appears as insecurity. In this regard the focus of the new regime in Iran, despite its efforts to manage the revolutionary fever, was on the struggle for survival against both external and internal causes of opposition. Similarly, such insecurity was felt by the neighbouring countries and also the ultra regional players because of the new regime's anti *status quo* and revolutionary policies.

The main factors of internal threats as the cause of instability after the revolution were the political and economic unsteadiness. These encouraged both internal and external threats because the regime was considered at its weakest position and as such the

opposition saw a way to achieve their goals, e.g. the Mujahedin-e-Khalq armed struggle and Iraq invasion. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), despite suffering many losses, has more or less been able to overcome all those threats.

However, despite the general stability of the regime since the revolution, the IRI has been strategically and structurally quite vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities will be investigated in this section, through the study of Iran's most significant internal challenges during the first two decades of the revolution: 1979-1988 and 1989-1997, and both will be considered from a political, economic and military point of view.

The First Decade of the Islamic Revolution; 1979-1988

Political Issues

In the first decade of the revolution the IRI followed the 'neither East nor West' policy. It was an independent power and had significant regional influence, particularly politically, affecting from the East to the West of Iran, including the Arab world. The revolution was widely popular and there was no real domestic threat nor has there been any serious opposition since. However this does not mean that none existed; many of those who once supported the political system ultimately came to oppose it but it was not enough to amount an effective offensive.⁶⁷

According to many observers it is incredible that the IRI has survived so many attempts, both Iranian and foreign, to destroy it. This survival has been credited to a mixture of social elements, economic control, and fear. There was a social base that supported the regime and its Islamic programme. This support was motivated partly by a feeling of insecurity in the supporters, which arose from the belief that the US was particularly committed to the elimination of the Islamic Republic, a strong

ideological commitment powered the continuation of the revolution. An element which promoted resistance to any foreign-inspired change or interference was a strong undercurrent of nationalistic feeling amongst Iranians.⁶⁸

The economic system was the other foundation for the regime, as it enabled direct control of employment. This control mechanism was strengthened by an increasing dependency on government subsidies. This was made possible by recruiting new supporters of the revolution into the government administration for civilian and military purposes, and also by using the oil revenues to influence Iran's economy. Finally it is supposed that the regimes' survival was also owed to fear because of the ideological confrontation against dissent. The combination of all three elements prevented the expression of open political opposition, and narrowed the options of resistance to either internal exile or armed action.⁶⁹

The most serious internal threat to the regime in this period was the Mujahedin-e-Khalq group. This organisation started an armed uprising in June 1981, which later attracted several small leftist parties. Although immediately after the revolution they were widely popular with Shiite youth, eventually they lost their popularity and were known as traitors to the Iranian people as a result of their support for Iraq in its war against Iran. Masoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin, failed in his attempt to achieve the sharing of political power through the pressure of street demonstrations. So he joined forces with Bani Sadr, who was then president, and declared war on the Islamic regime, initiating a three-step strategy: destabilisation of the Islamic leadership; pressuring the government through street demonstrations; and finally creating a mass uprising.⁷⁰ The Mujahedin spread wide terror throughout the population, from officials to the ordinary people. Even six of the seven well-respected

elderly religious deputies Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had put in charge of different regions of the country were killed or seriously wounded. The Mujahedin claimed in the summer of 1982 that they had killed over 1,000 members of the state security forces. Rajavi claimed that the organisation had assassinated over 2,000 top political and religious leaders in 1981 the year before they went underground. However, these tactics proved to be counter-productive and, by 1982, too many members had been killed or imprisoned, which enabled the regime to easily tear down the group.⁷¹ Apart from the underground activities they left the country and began cooperating with Saddam in 1986, and in 1988 accompanied Iraqi forces on their offensives into Iran. In July 1988 after IRI had announced its acceptance of UN Resolution 598, several hundred of the Mujahedin remained behind to occupy the town of Islamabad in Bakhtaran (Kermanshah) province, however Iranian forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in an operation named *Mersad* destroyed a significant number of them. Hooglund alludes to the fact that the local population assisted IRGC in defeating the Mujahedin and concludes from this action that:

Most Iranians, whether they are fanatical supporters of the Islamic Republic, indifferent to politics or even opposed to the regime, including monarchists and leftists, consider the actions of the Mojahedin [Mujahedin] as unforgivable treason.⁷²

The regime faced other opposition including Kurdish resistance, who supported the Mujahedin forces in the western mountains until the regimes' biggest attack in 1982. There were also some plots that attempted to overthrow the regime, for example former Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotb-zadeh, was accused and executed for plotting a *coup* and working for the US. The other opposition came from the leftwing. After the rise of Hojjatieh, an extreme secret organisation which opposed Communism and

Bahatism, the leftwing forces that supported the regime appeared to lose their influence. Tudeh members were removed from the civilian and security forces, even though left wing support continued for the regime's anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist policies. However with the exception of Bazargan, the former Prime Minister, no prominent personality spoke out against the regime.⁷³

After the regime consolidated itself it was facing other emerging issues. These issues, according to Halliday, included the absence of any political parties because of the resistance against establishing representation for the people.⁷⁴ Even the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), established by Ayatollah Beheshti and some other official members, never served as a cohesive ruling party and was disbanded by its prominent members and at the consent of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in 1987.⁷⁵

Another problem that emerged was the result of the continuation of previous political institutions, including the parliament, ministries and armed forces. Even the titles of the main newspapers remained the same, although with different orientations. Furthermore only certain issues of specific interest to Islamist ideology were addressed, such as the status of women, who were asked to wear religious clothing in public and the harmonisation of the judicial system with Islam by removing all secular laws. Little attention was spared for other pressing matters, specifically civil rights. According to Halliday this was mainly an attempt to win back support from the middle classes. These policies were criticised by Bazargan who attacked the corruption, inefficiency, demagoguery and violations of human rights in Iran.⁷⁶

However, despite these problems the regime, according to Halliday, was working because it attracted new workers to the old administration, and used the system of Friday prayer leaders, the IRGC and the Basij mobilisation forces. This network was

to all intents and purposes fulfilling the role of a ruling party and it was through mosques and associated institutions that forms of popular mobilisation and ideological strategy were being carried out.⁷⁷ Although the regime was not facing any internal threat to its power and the Kurdish and Mujahedin-e-Khalq opposition were weaker than before, other problems were arising.

Economic Problems

The Islamic regime had little to show for its monopoly of power; there were major unemployment figures, the urban population was increasing, the rate of literacy was decreasing and the non-oil sectors of the economy were stagnating. Also corruption within the regime was growing. All these factors were combined with the difficulties of Iran's foreign policy.⁷⁸ These internal issues significantly affected the survival of the regime.

Furthermore, people's frustration about the continuation of war with no major conqueror, no successful international peace delegations, mounting casualties on both sides, and growing anti-war sentiment particularly among the young combined with addition to the 1988 attack of the USS Vincennes against an Iranian civilian passenger plane in the PG (which killed all 290 people on board) persuaded Iranian authorities to look more towards the domestic affects of the war and a political solution. By 1988 most of the top leaders believed that continuation of the war posed a serious threat to the stability, even survival, of the IRI. So suddenly on July 18, 1988, Iran notified UN's Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar that it accepted the Security Council's document of Resolution 598 for cease fire without reservations.⁷⁹ As such to enable Tehran to respond to the demands of the people, ease the international situation and to escape from isolation it had to start economic and social reforms.

The consequences of the eight-year war, which started immediately after the revolution, had resulted in the deceleration of some major economic plans. The economic situation and people's expectations of the revolutionary leaders to do what they had promised pushed Iran to turn its energies to the enormous task of rebuilding the agricultural, commercial, cultural, industrial and social infrastructure destroyed during eight years of war. Iran's economy was a key issue in this reconstruction. The government desired to release the economy from the hold of foreigners, especially the West, however it realised that whilst Iran's economy relies on its oil supply this goal will continue to be just a dream. Also the Iranian goal to build an Islamic model by increasing the standard of living, helping the poor and increasing the agricultural system presented a dilemma to the regime and still remains unfulfilled.⁸⁰

Over the first decade IRI was confronted with several major economic difficulties, the details of which can be found in Appendix-8-D. However, since everything depended on the balance of internal forces the post revolution reforms were by no means smooth or organised. This weakness and the continuing internal debate meant that Iran was so occupied with its own problems that it could not possibly have been perceived to be a regional threat.

The Second Decade of the Islamic Revolution; 1989-1997

As the regime entered its second decade it did not face any serious threats, just the challenges of reconstructing the war damaged industrial and social infrastructures and keeping the promises made before the revolution, particularly those concerning greater economic and social justice. However, there was enormous disagreement within the country over Iran's domestic and foreign policy. The two major events of the second decade were the end of the 8-year war with Iraq and the death of Grand

Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder and dominant personality within the IR, in 1989.

Both events disturbed the balance of the existing social, political and economic order:

Economic Problems

The economic problems ranged from high inflation, unemployment, mass migration to the cities, growing corruption within the administration, underproduction, too inefficient utilisation of industrial capacity, and lack of basic foods (especially wheat and rice). Also the fall in oil prices and decrease in oil exports from the pre-revolutionary level resulted in low foreign exchange earnings. These problems were only made worse by the dramatic population increase. However it was believed that the greatest challenge was the ad hoc management of the wartime economy and the regime's inability to decide on a method for the development of economic and social policy and whether the policy should be centralised and state-run, or left to the decision of the private sector, or to both. However, the major issue was the level of integration of Iran into the international economy. Long-term survival of the regime hinged upon its success in rationalising the economy and improving living standards. After the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini a new team was quickly put in place led by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei, which enacted several constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening the executive to the detriment of a multitude of competing centres of power. They also eventually formulated an economic agenda in the form of a five-year (1989-1993) development plan. These reforms marked a new phase in the revolution called the Second Republic, which according to Kaveh Ehsani abandoned the dream of an Islamic development model.⁸¹

The discussion about rebuilding Iran and the roles of both the government and the private sector was really a continuation of the ideological struggle between

interventionists and the *laissez-faire* proponents from the IRI's early days. However the current debate had more to do with political decisions of the future concerning the economic role of the government. Another key factor in the debate, from as early as September 1988, was the inclusion of foreign involvement offered from both Eastern and Western Europe and also Asia.

Moreover, this debate was closely bound to the discussion over national reconciliation, where some believed an offer should be made to the Iranian opponents of the regime not just other countries, in order to encourage them to contribute their talents to rebuilding Iran. The most important issue was the financing of reconstruction and whether it should be done by the government, the private sector or both. As the private sector did not have sufficient resources the government relied heavily upon oil revenues. But as other OPEC members were over producing this lowered oil prices, which meant that Iran's oil revenues averaged less than \$10 billion for the year, which was where 90% of the state budget came from.⁸² The solution was for Iran to align its foreign policy with its economic needs. This meant it had to gain influence over the limiting of output in OPEC, which would increase oil prices. To achieve this it was necessary to re-establish relations with the GCC and particularly Saudi Arabia.

A long-term industrialisation strategy was needed to reduce this dependency as was the persistent need to court the private sector for its resources, to enable reconstruction and reduce the size of the public and services sectors, as well as to expand the productive sectors, especially industry. To achieve a real structural transformation it was necessary to embark on comprehensive political and legal reforms that would allow Iran to replace oil as the income generating basis of the

national economy. Hence, as well as importing technology and hardware, building a social consensus necessary to mobilise available resources was important. This would have required the establishment of greater pluralism, national reconciliation, and some form of participatory democracy.⁸³ However as Ehsani also observes, in the early 1990s Iran had no luck applying a long-term strategy; the resulting economic crisis is confirmation of this view. The economic crisis was the result of applying a selective version of a 'mixed' economy on the basis of the Five Year Plan and the policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund. This version rhetorically stresses the leading role of the private sector but did not include any real economic reform especially regarding tax system and privatisation process.⁸⁴

Iran's torpid economic performance has continued up to the present. Even despite reemphasising the importance of privatisation by the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (2005-2010), it has only been since 2007, and by the Supreme Leader's request, that government officials have begun to speed up the implementation of the policies outlined in the amendment of Article 44, though there have been some efforts to apply privatisation more widely.

Also, the 'Second Republic' did not hesitate to seek international loans and direct foreign investments, however these international efforts in the early 1990s were counteracted by the negative image of Iran held abroad for assassinating its oppositions, countenancing the death sentence of Salman Rushdie and continued support given to certain movements e.g. Hizballah in Lebanon.⁸⁵

Other economic features of the 'Second Republic' were, a) the significant effect of favourable international circumstances on Iran's economic performances (e.g. access to capital and technology for growth and development during 1988-1991 as an

effective element in achieving many targets of the Plan, and, in contrast, Iran's failure to gain access to such facilities in the years 1991 to around 1997), b) the lack of social reforms and poor management after 1991 resulted in massive foreign debt, inflation and economic stagnation. After 1992 this resulted in urban riots, anti government demonstrations and vocal criticism of the development policies. Also, while the trade deficit and foreign debt shot up, oil revenues remained lower than forecast. This all exposed Iran's seriously neglected internal structural problems and the lack of knowledge of the global economic situation, as well as the extent of Iran's international isolation.⁸⁶

The whole situation which had divided Iranian society was far from providing national reconciliation, but led to the acceleration of the delegitimisation of the regime, whose major slogan was eliminating the gap between poor and rich. All these misreading, which as Ehsani notes were the result of "a development strategy that emphasised growth over employment and export-oriented, government-owned industry over a privately-owned, grass roots national industrial base", neutralised Iran's industrialisation efforts. Besides the US pressure on its allies not to reschedule Iran's debt or issue new credit, foreign investors were deterred by both the unstable economy and insecurity of an unreformed political system.⁸⁷

Therefore, since 1993 Iran experienced even more economic chaos due to poor political and economic leadership, the lack of government interest to apply real political and structural reforms and also the lack of a long-term development strategy. The alternative Islamic model of development was not realised but in its place was created a model that, although generating popular and local initiative, lacked the basic foundations of political and legal reforms.⁸⁸

Socio-Political Issues

As was mentioned earlier, the debate over reconstruction was closely bound to the discussion over national reconciliation. Therefore, two major events in the 'Second Republic' provided the regime an appropriate situation to overcome its strategic problems. A major socio-political result of the end of the war and the new political atmosphere after the death of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, according to many observers, was a new era of the civil society discourse. Such evolution in the new era not only resulted in increasing awareness among the various social forces but also contributed to the competition among the political elites and the formation of new political groupings. It also caused the diffusion of social and political powers into multiple centres with the opportunity of sharing power through various efforts, bargains and pacts.⁸⁹

However, despite the advantages of the new political environment, the regime could not achieve its domestic or foreign policy goals. Domestically, this was due to the inability of the government to address sensible and controversial internal debates, especially regarding demands from secular Iranians, for more cultural freedom, which were in contrast with the demands of the lower classes, or received criticism from religious sides asking for greater political tolerance.

Also for internal issues some solutions like the "China model," were discussed and implemented during Rafsanjani's presidency, 1989-1997. This model aimed to liberalise the economy and improve people's livelihood, while maintaining sole control of political power. This was to be achieved by preoccupying the people with either the threat of foreign enemies or the promise of economic welfare. However this model failed, just as on similar occasions in 1925-1941 under Reza Shah and in 1941-

1979 under Muhammad Reza Shah, and is unlikely to work in Iran at anytime. According to Abbas Milani, the reasons for these failures were because on the one hand, China has a strong industrial basis for its export sector and an impressive ability of attracting foreign investment, in comparison Iran has failed to export much more than oil and has a poor record of attracting foreign investments. On the other hand economic needs are not the only principle of people's lives, especially in an era in which democracy has become an essential part of every nation's basic rights and demands. Milani goes on to support his argument by the historical evidence that economic riches lead not only to greater political demands but also provide the new affluent classes with the political, social and economic means to see their demands are met. This includes Iran's vibrant civil society, which is far from dead.⁹⁰

Hence, at the latter end of the second decade of the revolution, despite Iran's tactical stability, it was confronting serious strategic challenges, including: Rafsanjani's failure to develop a civil society based on social justice, to include a great middle class with political knowledge and to form a free market economy system. Such failure prevented Iran from establishing a democratic society with the ability to attract the essential investments needed to solve Iran's economic difficulties and endemic unemployment problems. It also resulted in the absence of the rule of law in the government's policy, which led to a system of regular corruption, economic incompetence, ideological impoverishment, interference in the private lives of citizens, socio-political intolerance, oppressive policy against dissidents,⁹¹ millions of unemployed youth, and the growth of the women's movement. All especially the last two issues resulted in the 2nd Khordad event when the populace rejected existing policy and emphasised the necessity of real social, economic and specifically political reforms. This event ended with extraordinary support for Khatami's reforms in 1997.

It was only after 1997, that discussions of civil society expanded from a small hesitant circle of intellectuals and assumed its current importance at the level of national politics in Iran.

Regarding Iran's foreign policy in the second decade of the revolution, there was a general wish to face domestic issues and economic problems by improving relations with the outside world and to change Iran's international relations. However the multiplicity of power centres, the lack of a single centre for designing foreign policy, and the great dependency of external relations on politics within Iran dominated by rivalries and the significant disagreements between left and right wings (latter reformist and conservatives forces) over domestic and foreign policies, all meant that vigorous debate among the factions prevented a clear foreign policy being formulated. As a result Iran was not able to establish constructive and cooperative relations with the West, especially regarding its negative international image.⁹²

In sum, all internal and external challenges during the first two decades of IRI decreased the regime's legitimacy, added imperativeness and motivated the democratic movement. But what helped strengthen the tactical stability of IRI was the continuance of Western, especially the US, antagonistic policy, including long-term embargoes. This helped the regime to justify its failure of not implementing the revolutions' promises because the IRI's strength was that it opposed the US and could still count on the support of some part of the population. With greater foreign threats strong Iranian nationalism was added to the equation, which strangled Iran's reforms and democratic movement. The embargo placed on Iran imposed heavy costs on the population. Meanwhile, according to Abbas Milani, domestic right-wing allies, particularly the *bonyads* and the IRGC, gained much benefit. They attained their

power, privilege and illicit gains through “import licenses” for embargoed goods. However, without embargoes, Iran, which was looking to solve its economic problems, could integrate into the global economy. This would result in more legal and economic transparencies and the emergence of a more vibrant middle class which would strengthen the private sector and civil society.⁹³

Domestic Military; the Role of Military Forces on Iran’s Society

Socio-Politically

Historically the Iranian military has always played a significant role in Iran’s society, however it is impossible to separate their security role from their role in domestic politics. As well as using the military to secure the national sovereignty they have also been used to control the masses and strengthen the government. However IRI has tried to limit the amount of influence the military has on society and has purposefully excluded them from everyday politics, like previous regimes.⁹⁴

This study will first describe the military’s role in IRI’s politics and then go on to explore the question of whether the armed forces would be a threat to the regime or a threat to the people. It also will consider their role in Iran’s policy with respect to its difficulties in the PG. Particular consideration will be given to the increase of political strife and the surrounding ideological issues.

After the revolution one of the most important steps to institutionalise the regime was the establishment of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), who gained a permanent position in the security of the regime. The IRGC offset the distrusted regular military at the beginning of the revolution and became a popular force during the diplomatic hostage crisis, which threatened a possible US invasion.⁹⁵ Also a huge

number of volunteers (of the Basij) were trained by the IRGC and were established to fight Iraq as an auxiliary to the front-line operations. In addition, they were used to confront the revolution's domestic threats and uphold Islamic norms in society.⁹⁶

The division of Iran's armed forces affected the unity of command, resulting in rivalry and decreased the military's effectiveness. There were distinct differences in the methodology of the two branches regarding their preparation for war. The regular military focused on hardware, technology, and the human component while the IRGC concentrated on the human element, particularly ideological commitment and morale beliefs. However the regime could develop a more balanced understanding of these various elements of the military.⁹⁷

The second decade of the revolution saw some success in the structural reform of the security system. This included the integration between the visions and values of the regular army and those of the IRGC, allowing there to be more of a balance of power between the two forces. For example, establishing the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), under which both the IRGC and the regular army were to operate,⁹⁸ or choosing commanders from each side for the other organisation.⁹⁹

In the first decade of the revolution, the military forces were all engaged with Iraq's invasion. Since the end of the war, the military forces have been making preparations for the eventuality of a foreign attack and procuring and developing new armaments following the war damages to their arsenals. In particular, they have also been re-engaged with civilian plans.

The Artesh has done the latter both in strategic and practical term. Strategically, it has operated by emphasising its ability to defend Iran against its external enemies, and by

giving the impression that it is staying above the factional politics of the regime only for the good of the nation, and not because it is unable to engage in national politics. Practically, by assisting civilian projects with the manpower and expert technical knowledge required, by playing a central role in the reconstruction of those areas of the country that were damaged by the war and by generally opening up access to its assets.¹⁰⁰

The IRGC, as well as having a massive involvement in civil society plans, perceives itself as the vanguard of the revolutionary regime and feels that it has a right to intervene in internal politics. However, it has its own interpretation regarding what socio-political reforms are necessary. It has also reacted to political issues according to the makeup of the political leadership and the scale of the violence. For instance despite massive popular support many among the IRGC and the Basij interpreted President Khatami's reforms "as challenges to the interests of those who have been loyal supporters of the Islamic Republic and defenders of the *Faqih*".¹⁰¹ Such interpretations and even taking a stance by criticising the president's reforms are often encouraged by Conservative political forces who encourage radical groups like *Ansar-e Hezbollah* and the Basij to get politically involved.¹⁰² Both of these factors have raised serious concerns to Iranian society as well as the defence system:

A) President Khatami's reform process became contentious within the defence establishment and its constituent parts in the *Entezamat* (the law and security enforcement agencies). Inaction towards it on the part of the political establishment could threaten the complex defence structure that had been so carefully created. In this regard for example, the IRGC had different responses to the 1994 Qazvin riots and the July 1999 Tehran student riots. In the Qazvin riots of 1994, some IRGC

officers refused to carry out orders that they thought were unnecessarily against the people, believing that the IRGC should not dogmatically always defend the existing political regime when it is attacked by domestic pressure or criticism. The IRGC's response to the 1999 student riots was different. Its commanders publicly criticised President Khatami and his reforms, believing that his reforms were the cause of the riots and were endangering the regime.¹⁰³

B) From the social perspective, the IRGC's self-interpretations about the socio-political issues have been criticised by the Artesh, the intelligentsia and the reformists who have maintained that the defence establishment should not have a view on political matters. They also voiced concern over the military's determining the fate of the country, fearing that a gap between Iranian society and its political leaders is likely to get wider as the IRGC becomes more involved in socio-political matters and Iran's youth grow in numbers and in culturally diversity. This factor may contribute to the country's tendency to secularise. As a result the regime's reliance on coercion as a mean of control may well increase. Iran's intelligentsia, however, prefers to avoid direct confrontation and will take any conciliatory means possible towards opposition.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, since the advent of Ahmadinejad's presidency and a concomitant increase in the IRGC's involvement in all the affairs of state, the problem has become all the more salient.

There are no signs that the armed forces are lacking in loyalty towards the regime, despite some differences of opinion and disputes between them. Traditionally, the armed forces have always had close ideological affinities to the conservative elements of the regime, and have far from presented a threat to them.¹⁰⁵ Historically, Artesh has always been dependent on a political master, and the political establishment has

deliberately deprived it of having one. It would thus only interfere in internal politics in a situation of social chaos or where the government was facing near-collapse, (as Daniel Byman [et al] mention).¹⁰⁶ The IRGC leadership is closely allied to the regime, and is unlikely to become politically active against it. Furthermore, both Artesh and the IRGC consider the stability of the regime to be the red line, though if the IRGC perceives a danger to the Islamic or revolutionary values it may feel compelled to intervene. Although there is no serious dispute between them, the IRGC's leaders have different points of view regarding Iran's socio-political issues. According to Byman [et al], "some believe that this can be done only through reform and openness, while others believe that such reforms pose a mortal threat to the character and nature of the Islamic Republic."¹⁰⁷

As Byman [et al] also remark, there are concerns about the IRGC's inaction or slow response to social crises, which may be due to the large numbers in the IRGC's rank and file who are less ideological, more sympathetic to calls for reform, and are likely to prefer political discourse to the use of force. In addition, there has been a large presence of IRGC (and other pillars of the revolution) members' children at anti-establishment demonstrations, for instance at the July 1999 student demonstrations in Tehran. This is of special concern because it is unclear how the IRGC would respond to the elite's splitting, particularly if those who currently support the Supreme Leader were divided. According to Byman [et al] what is most unclear, however, is how the IRGC would react to an extensive reform movement that was popularly supported by Iranians claiming to be upholding an Islamic system. It is hard to predict how the IRGC would react in the event of further riots like those in Qazvin in 1994 and Tehran in 1999. Whether or not it would support the official response would largely depend on the makeup of the political leadership and the scale of the violence.¹⁰⁸

According to Byman [et al], in an effort to respond to the concern regarding the IRGC's inaction or slow response to civil strife, the political leadership have formed special units (the Ashura, Zahra, Sayid-ul Shohoda battalions) specifically designed to handle problems of popular unrest.

Although there is consensus in Iran, the possibility of military intervention in Iranian politics has not been ruled out by analysts if certain red lines are crossed. These red lines include threats to the rule of the *Vali-e Faqih*, open disrespect of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and his legacy, overly dramatic social reforms, and relations with the US and Israel.¹⁰⁹ In the context of a process of socio-political and economic reform, these red lines are beginning to fade, however. In addition, as Byman [et al] argue, despite the intervention that would ensue were these red lines to be crossed, Iran's military apparatus is likely to be a force for the stability of the country.¹¹⁰

In addition, it is much harder to arrive at consensus on economic and social policies than on security policy, since there are more interests and revolutionary sensitive issues involved in the former.¹¹¹ However, arriving at consensus on Iran's security policy is getting harder. This is due to the military and security organisations' (especially the IRGC, Basij and Police) greatly increased involvement in various political and economic projects in the country as well as the impact of their emphasis on cultural and religious issues.

However, provided that Iranian politics remain stable and avoid widespread strife, "the IRGC leadership would prefer to devote its attention to improving its military standards and competing more effectively with the Artesh."¹¹² Yet, the recent experience of "unified governance" after 2005 under the control of the conservatives has shown that the IRGC is not content with developing its military capabilities in

times of their perceived political stability, but will also seek to secure for itself a wider and more influential role in Iranian society.

The IRGC already has a very influential economic network as a result of the privatisation of the economy in the 1990s. Its strong military-economic role was given a political dimension by the majority of its members and the conservatives, secured at the seventh parliamentary election, and by Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2005 presidential election.

According to Byman [et al], the probability of military intervention on the part of the major military forces (i.e. the IRGC and Artesh) is likely to increase if Iran's elite become increasingly divisive and political factionalism turns into widespread violence. If this view is correct, then such a scenario would in turn culminate in the armed forces' (especially IRGS, Basij and police) increased interference in Iranian society. But such a reaction (including more interference in a direct way, less tolerance, and the closure of the political space) would pave the way for more opposition, an increased tendency towards secularisation and even more direct public confrontation with the regime as well as with the military forces. However, the IRGC should recognise that aggressively opposing any reform to conservative policies would result in further aggravating its existing internal ruptures, galvanise its external opposition and lead to further marginalisation of its position.¹¹³

Economically

One of the major regional and domestic impacts of the Iran-Iraq war was the growth and empowerment of Iran's military forces' manpower. What was to be done with it during peace time proved to be a major dilemma. Iraq used its surplus troops to wage

another war against Kuwait. However, Iran used the privatisation of its economy in the 1990s as a way to occupy a great number its soldiers during peacetime, in order to prevent them from becoming embroiled in any anti-government activities such as *coups*.¹¹⁴

The soldiers were given several opportunities, including buying shares or working at local (as well as international) industrial, commercial and housing companies.¹¹⁵ This was achieved on a large scale, for example, by 2007 *Khatam-ol-Anbia* Headquarters (known in English as Ghorb Khatam) had already completed over 1,200 projects and had been contracted to work on 250 others.¹¹⁶ This process gave the IRGC a strong economic network, which, especially since Ahmadinejad's presidency, it continues to enjoy. The conservative forces have thus been able to take advantage of IRGC's economic influence in the struggle for absolute power. However, according to a former general manager of one of Iran's largest steel factories, this solution has created another problem: namely, involving troops in economic affairs risks abandoning in them the idea that the state is worth sacrificing oneself for.¹¹⁷ Whilst this has indeed been a problem, it is also true that military men tend to prefer military solutions and to that extent a sense of selflessness has remained.

Although the new situation benefited the IRGC's high ranks, many of its lower ranks, especially in the Basij, were left marginalised in the post-war reconstruction period. Ahmadinejad addressed this issue, which together with his militant view of politics, re-enfranchised those feeling marginalised and ensured the IRGC's support during the presidential election. Today, this translates into the IRGC and the Presidency's continued relationship of mutual reinforcement and support.¹¹⁸

This relationship has meant that the IRGC has gained control of huge assets in the country and heightened its economic role, which began during Rafsanjani's administration. It has profited more than anyone by Ahmadinejad's election in 2005. For example, the government has awarded the IRGC (and its associate companies) in excess of \$3.4 billion to pursue engineering projects in the oil and gas industry, and in one case alone was given \$1.3 billion to pursue a civilian services project.¹¹⁹

The IRGC has been criticised by reformists for its lack of accountability and for its monopoly on contracts that no outside party can bid for and for which the IRGC does not necessarily have any expertise.¹²⁰ Although this enormous economic role can partly be accounted for by the official distrust of foreign and private sector companies, these factors have, in recent years, fed speculation that the government's vast generosity in handing out contracts to the IRGC is fuelled by its increasing dependence on the IRGC and the need to pay back its dues incurred by the IRGC's support during Ahmadinejad's election.¹²¹ The international embargoes imposed upon Iran have also helped ensure the IRGC's economic domination, including in the energy sector. They have put obstacles in the way of international financing which have given state-run companies the upper hand in their battle with private companies.¹²² According to Abbas Milani, they have also made it possible for IRGC's domestic allies, such as the right wing and the *bonyads*, to profit from the illegal trade of goods that because of the embargo have become hard-to-find commodities. Ending the embargo, as he suggests, would thus have a number of positive effects: it would reduce the power of radical right wing groups, it would challenge the IRGC's economic monopoly by encouraging international companies to do business in Iran, and taking away IRGC's concessions. As Milani concludes, this would thereby assist the development of an emerging middle class closely allied to the presently restrained

democratic movement. If the international community would like to give Iran's process of democratisation a chance, it should end its sanctions upon it.¹²³

Military Development

Policies: Having been engaged in a revolution, a war, and having faced embargoes, Iran's military has been somewhat depleted. Its main focus since 1988 has not therefore been on expansion due to an increased willingness to use force but, rather, on the rebuilding and replacement of its forces in an effort to remedy its deficiencies, particularly with regard to technological advancement. Its arms programmes are designed to deter attacks from those parties whom it consider it is under potential military threat, such as the US, Israel and, until 2003, Iraq.¹²⁴

The official line following the revolution was that Iran no longer serves American interests in the PG and would discontinue all military agreements with the US. However, despite this and its handling of the war with Iraq, it has continually displayed a pragmatic side to itself with regard to its defence strategy, visible in both military procurements and domestic defence production. Soon after the end of the war, the government made it clear that the country's rearmament strategy was one of its main priorities, and increased the governmental budget for military expenditure.¹²⁵

As was explained earlier, Iran, since the Second Republic, has been attempting to replace, rationalise, and modernise its military structures as well as to accelerate the development of its defence industries, partly engendered by a review of its rearmament strategy. A pragmatist led move towards 'moderation' in foreign policy properly began in the mid-1980s when President Rafsanjani himself made diplomatic visits to China and North Korea. The President's support enabled the pragmatists to

begin to take fuller control of the country's military affairs, and between 1988 and 1992 they had managed to assure that about a quarter to one-third of overall government expenditure was due to defence and defence-related matters.¹²⁶ These factors raise the general consideration of how and when Iran intends to use its growing military strength: is it becoming the source of regional concern, or does its military strategy merely reflect local realities and the regional arms race?

Rearmament: Under the Shah, most of Iran's weapons were imported from the West and Iran's military industry was limited to the assembly of such foreign weapons.¹²⁷ After the Islamic revolution, Iran faced growing isolation and a weapons embargo imposed upon it by the West. This meant that Iran was subsequently dependent on a domestic arms industry lacking in technological expertise and thus had to also rely on military imports from various Eastern countries as well as its existing western weaponry.¹²⁸

Iran has the lowest military budget in the PG and due to continuing sanctions and economic problems cannot compete in the region's arm race. Moreover, not only are its military imports overly disparate and of questionable quality, they are also not guaranteed the long-term after-sales service required for aircraft sales, since importers such as Russia, China and North Korea are susceptible to US pressure. Furthermore, it has had to abandon the idea that domestic arms production will provide a significant solution to these problems and has decreased its expenditure since the end of the Iran-Iraq war to less than one half of what it was spending. Although, according to certain sources, it continued to spend \$4 billion a year on its military,¹²⁹ in 1989, according to Michael Eisenstadt, the *majlis* allocated \$10 billion over a five year-period for arms imports in support of its conventional arms build-up, for instance. It has sought to

increase its role in the market of technology (for which domestic arms production can serve as a medium) and powerful arms transfer, also is using missiles and fast attack boats in order to become less dependent on problematic aircraft imports.¹³⁰

Although Iran's rearmament since the end of the war in 1988 has been comprehensive, it has been limited due to the Western embargo and Iran's resultant inability to acquire exactly what they might have done had they not been in place. As Terrence Taylor of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) puts it, "There is certainly an attempt to increase the capabilities of the Iranian military, although the full extent of it is not clear."¹³¹

The Iranian military is one of the largest in the region. It totals about 545,000 personnel, 420,000 of whom serve for the regular armed forces and 125,000 for the IRGC. It also includes a paramilitary volunteer force called the Basij which is made up of 90,000 full time uniformed members, up to 300,000 reservists, and a further 11 million men and women who could be mobilised. Despite its size, the Iranian military also spends less as a percentage of gross national product than any other PG nation, except the UAE. Nevertheless, it has been described as the most powerful force in the ME by the US commander in the region, for example.¹³²

Aside from the different problems regarding Iran's military which were outlined above, there is a general concern regarding Iran's attempt to develop its unconventional weapons. Despite the fact that Iran has publicly and internationally condemned the use of chemical weapons, from whose use it greatly suffered during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, many worry about its intentions regarding unconventional weapons. As Chubin remarks,

Iran's policies are a product of various factors including its recent experience, its world view, its capabilities, the global and regional opportunities and its other values. Its intentions are thus variable although its inclination is fairly steady.

He then concludes that Iran's strategic inclinations towards developing unconventional weapons are predictable.¹³³ Like Chubin, most Western analysts assume Iran's strategic weapons programme to be its top priority. However, some such as Eisenstadt believe that in trying to develop its strategic weapons programme, Iran is displaying its wish to become the dominant power in the PG, as well as expressing how vulnerable it is feeling.¹³⁴ Others, Barry Rubin for instance, believe that Iran is pursuing the development of missiles and perhaps nuclear weapons as a cheaper substitute to fully addressing the needs of its run-down conventional military.¹³⁵

Together with these assumptions, the lack of transparency in Iran's military statistics has further compounded suspicions, despite Tehran's denial of developing unconventional weapons. Iran's military capabilities are kept largely secret. Only in recent years have official announcements highlighted the development of weapons such as a large arsenal of missiles as well as its own tanks, armoured personnel carriers, submarines and a fighter plane (it is known that the IRGC is responsible for the development of Iran's military industry and for making procurements such as those listed above).¹³⁶ However, despite allegations made by US officials, in its February 2006 report on Iran's nuclear programme the IAEA found no evidence to support the claim that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

As Jerrold Green remarks, some Middle Eastern strategic analysts, such as Ahmed Hashim, have highlighted the fact that regional actors Israel and Pakistan have nuclear

weapons, that some of Iran's northern neighbour states may be littered with stray former Soviet weapons, that the Arab states in the PG are protected by the US, and that the US as a consequence is militarily active all along the PG's coastline. According to such analysts, not only do these factors make Iran's nuclear ambitions likely, they also make them understandable. However, although Iran may well have the intention to develop WMDs, it has limited possibilities available to achieve this, rendering "reports of secret nuclear sites being built unsubstantiated." A major difficulty facing Iran's putative unconventional weapons program has been acquiring the requisite technological expertise. While Russia and China have not altogether towed the US line, most countries, partly down to US pressure, have been unwilling to provide Iran with the assistance it needs in order to properly develop its nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities, as Green mentions. Iran is also likely to be mindful of Iraq's ill-destined putative nuclear program which caused an Israeli air attack on its Osirak nuclear reactor and, having been subjected to years of UN inspections, culminated in its eventual invasion by the US and its allies. This has meant that while most Middle Eastern strategic analysts agree that Iran could potentially become a nuclear power, they are uncertain as to how and when such a capability could surface.¹³⁷ This is specifically true following the release of a report of the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in December 2007, which acknowledged that Iran has no weapons program.

Defence Role in the Persian Gulf

In general, particularly because Iran's economy is centred on the PG's natural resources, the continual presence of foreign forces in the region has made Tehran feel very threatened. This has led it to the conclusion that it should adopt a policy of

strengthening its military capabilities dovetailed with a foreign policy that will deal with external threats (especially from the US) to change the regime, prevent another experience such as the unexpected 8-year war from occurring again, and will, as Brigadier General Rahim Safavi puts it, “better defend Islamic ideals and safeguard territorial integrity”.¹³⁸

As Chubin remarks, Iran’s military weakness, which was in part due to US sanctions, as well as poor relations between the US and Iran, paved the way for an Iraqi invasion. Iraq perceived these as ideal conditions for it to attempt to change the balance of power in the PG and dominate the region. Iran’s military weakness thus proved to be a destabilising force in the PG threatening instability for all interested parties. It is no surprise then that Iran felt the need to strengthen its military power after the revolution.¹³⁹

The US strategy also appears premised on a faulty analysis of Iranian politics. The US argument has been that putting pressure on the regime will expedite a change in Iranian policy as well as restoring the respect in the US necessary for a more balanced dialogue to take place.¹⁴⁰ US strategy has thus been to increase its military presence in the PG, place embargoes on Iran and hint at intensions towards regime change all in an effort to prove to Iran that it means business. However, such a strategy is more likely to retard than accelerate an Iranian policy change; all it has achieved is to make Iran feel under threat and that it must engage in escalating its own military agenda as well as adopting a more radical and sceptical policy towards the US. The same goes for the policy of exaggerating Iran’s military threat to its neighbours in the PG, which has had the added disadvantage of increasing the destabilisation of the region by encouraging an arms race in the GCC. GCC countries have felt compelled to purchase

expensive, and sometimes unnecessary, weapons¹⁴¹ and the recent emphasis on Iran's nuclear ambitions (albeit denied by Tehran) have led many states to consider undertaking their own nuclear projects (though they have announced plans for achieving nuclear energy, they have not announced any intention to develop nuclear weapons). Such a potential arms race in the ME is highly unlikely to lead to regional security and only benefits Western arms companies.

As has been discussed, although Iran's military growth has been fairly extensive, it is built upon foreign and sometimes incompatible weapons system imports and still has a long way to go. It is also questionable whether Iran's unhealthy economy is capable of enabling it to compete with its wealthy neighbours in the region. For instance, in 1996 Saudi Arabia's defence budget was \$ 13.9 billion; Israel's was \$ 7 billion, while Iran's was only \$3.4 billion. This has led many analysts to believe that Iran's displays of military strength are merely cases of diplomatic posturing born out of a sense of its own weakness in the face of overwhelming US military strength.¹⁴²

A confrontational US policy also has some internal impacts. Under heavy pressure from the US, Iranian nationalist and radical anti-foreigners sentiments as well as government support are likely to increase. As a result, the government would come under decreasing criticism and would be able present domestic failures as the effect of such external threats, thereby assuring that the domestic process of democracy continues to be in trammels. In the words of a prominent reformist:

Those who threaten and pressure from the outside forget that we still think in traditional ways about national sovereignty. If we have to choose between individual freedom and national sovereignty, we will choose the latter. We hope we don't have to choose.¹⁴³

Iran's perception, as articulated by Ayatollah Khamenei that the US will not be satisfied until it goes back to the same patron-client relationship it enjoyed during the Shah's regime, is shaping some of its foreign policy.¹⁴⁴ In particular, it has allowed the armed forces and intelligence services to influence many of its decisions, especially in regard to its security challenges.¹⁴⁵

Much of Iran's use of the armed forces in pursuing its foreign policy goal in the PG is really just 'diplomatic posturing' on the part of Tehran. As Rathmell observes, the intensification of Iran's military exercises and procurement (constituting part of the aim of becoming the dominant power in the region, as mentioned in the 20-year development plan) are attempts to assert Iran's right to the PG. Or, as Chubin argues, they are there for the dual purpose of reminding the Arab states that Iran is a major power, and reminding the Americans that an attack on Iran would be against their interests.¹⁴⁶

Iran, by developing relations with its neighbours in the PG, has sought to encourage them to enter into collective security arrangements that exclude outside powers. It has also assured them that "as long as the territorial integrity of Iran is not threatened, the military and defence power of Iran will not be a threat to any country," (Mohsen Rezaei) while at the same time warning them of its slogan 'security for all or for none'.¹⁴⁷

As Eisenstadt observes, Iran's military build-up is motivated by a number of factors: firstly, by its perception that it faces threats from regional and non-regional potential enemies. Secondly, by its religious and nationalistic desire to become a regional power. IRI believes that it ought to play a major role in world affairs and as the defender of the interests of all Muslims and the guardian of Iran's national interests

should be treated as a beacon for revolutionary Islam throughout the world. Finally, by its leadership's belief that Iran is geographically optimally situated to become the dominant power in the PG. After all, it has the largest coastline of any PG state and has vital interests in the region.¹⁴⁸

Iran has pursued a dual policy of economic and political engagement with its non-Arab neighbours and a sceptical, instable attitude towards the GCC. This, together with an inability to estimate Iran's true military capabilities due to a lack of transparency, has fuelled concerns and uncertainties on the part of the GCC and the West.¹⁴⁹ Added to these concerns are Iran's desire to dominate the PG, in order to have a more powerful position regarding outstanding border and territorial disputes with its Arab PG neighbours, and its willingness to have considerable influence over oil production levels and prices, having the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil flows.¹⁵⁰ However, all of these analysts believe that the Iranian army does not seem to be in a position where it could successfully carry out any meaningful invasion. It could pose a limited threat to GCC targets with the use of its missiles and the laying of mines by submarines.

Also in the event of a US attack, Iran has announced its reservation to attack US interests around the world as a means to defend itself. Ayatollah Khamenei, for instance, on different occasions in 2007 stated that a US invasion on Iran would cause it to target US interests all over the world. Iran has portrayed the current situation as a win-win case for itself, as Ayatollah Khamenei has stated: "if the US doesn't attack us we will become stronger. And if it does attack us, we will become more united and find a lot of friends throughout the world" and that the US "is the main loser because it boycotts Iran."¹⁵¹ From the US perspective increases in Iran's military activity as

well as the potential use of terrorism as a means of hitting its targets around the world constitute a great threat. Meanwhile, Iran sees its current foreign policy as vital to the prevention of any threat to its sovereignty, even if it is political posturing. The result is an escalating security chain which threatens to worsen regional stability and assures neither regional nor global security.

In sum, disturbance in the military balance of power in the PG has been followed by an unstable situation which has consequently proved to be a threat to all internal and external players. Such instability has also attracted foreign forces to the region in order to protect their interests. This has been the cause of complaints from some regional states as well as a rise in anti-Western sentiments among people in the whole region. It has isolated the weaker player, and compelled it to implement a more radical policy, which has in turn encouraged all sides to build-up their military capabilities, and has engendered a new arms race. Although such a situation has set the scene perfectly for arms suppliers, it has created a more unstable climate by causing regional players to have increasingly antagonistic and sceptical attitudes towards one another. Under such circumstances, a violent reaction from the internal or external players is inevitable. These parties may use invasion or terrorist attacks as a way implementing their foreign policy objectives, both of which would affect the regional, as well as the international community.

The prevailing view on US foreign policy is solely coloured by security and military concerns. Thus, only those who place more emphasis on their security and military capabilities can follow their foreign policy goals in such a situation. So the US could only enter into dialogue with those who have power in these two fields, as Akbar Ganji argues.¹⁵²

Facing such an attitude, the empowerment of military forces, especially the IRGC, in the decision-making system of Iran looks like an inevitable solution to its survival. Even though Iran has not announced an intention to seek nuclear weapons, the current situation, together with the US continued threats of regime change, makes it reasonable for it to do so in an effort to defend itself in a region where some of its neighbours have, or may subsequently develop, nuclear capabilities and the support of the US.

The IRI is also partly responsible for the current tense political situation. It has failed to establish a stable relationship with its neighbours as well as with the West (especially the US), and acknowledge Western interests in this geopolitical region. It has also failed to reconcile its differences with the West and assure it of its vital interests in the PG. This has meant that Iran's goal of establishing collective regional security arrangements excluding foreign powers has not been achieved, and has therefore contributed to the wider presence of foreign forces.

Nevertheless, the question is: what is the reason for the US strategy in this region especially its antagonistic policy towards Iran? Particularly considering the negative impact US embargoes have had towards the security and stability of the region as a sub-system of the ME, significant to the international community. This is a question that featured prominently in the old discussion between the EU and the US regarding Iran, with the EU taking the opinion that threatening, or indeed using, force against Iran would only make the situation deteriorate, since crises work like chains: one instance generates several more.

Perhaps there are two lines of response to this question. The first is that the US decision makers are ignorant of regional sensitivities and issues. If this is true, which

is unlikely, the US should discontinue its insistence on pursuing the dream of global leadership. The second is that they are aware of the negative consequences an antagonistic policy would harbour, but that they are motivated by some hidden political or economic agenda. For instance, perhaps the secret US agenda is to turn Iran into the domestic ME enemy in an effort to solve the problem of Israel's regional recognition. This would not only deflect attention away from Israel, but in maintaining a regional enemy, would create a scenario suitable for the continuation of a 'divide and rule' strategy to implement US foreign policy objectives, including its desired effects on oil prices and increasing arms sales.

If something like this is the case, which looks more likely than the first response, then all the US allegations concerning ME states' military ambitions drastically begin to lose credibility, particularly since its antagonistic policy and also its foreign policy's prevailing view on security and military concerns has created a haven for undemocratic governments as well as strengthening the military forces' role in the whole socio-political life of ME nations. The US should thus stop pretending that it is trying to instigate democracy in the ME.

Conclusion: Despite all the foreign threats and antagonistic policies against the IRI since the revolution, the major challenges of its survival have been internal issues. In particular, the IRI should be very worried about political and economic instability as well as the social pressures in people's lives. Tension in foreign relations (especially with its neighbours in the PG and also the West, particularly the US), as well as international isolation and sanctions which have resulted in Iran's failure to integrate in the global economy (e.g. not becoming a member of WTO) could constitute a threat to bring the regime down. If the uneven economic and political development in

Iranian society forced the Shah's regime to be overthrown, the threat to the new regime cannot be ignored or underestimated.

Therefore, the regime's survival depends upon opening up the political system to more democratic participation and economic reforms in order to address its most strategic weakness. As Abbas Milani remarks, the IRI is relatively stable despite serious problems such as: having millions of unemployed youths; peoples' exclusive dependence on patronage and subsidies of the regime whose transparency and ability in economic policies have been criticised and are under question even by statesmen; its failure to curb growing poverty, despite the wide wealth sources in Iran; the existence of women's and democratic movements that are a response to unanswered demands. Despite existing tensions and disagreements between political groups, such as the regime's divine legitimacy in contrast to popular sovereignty, a popular uprising, or less violent government change, seems very unlikely at the moment, as Abbas Milani like other observers believe.¹⁵³

However, the regime's failure to establish a government based on the rule of law, or to deliver on the revolution's reform promises, as well as temporary and unsuccessful policies like the "China model" will not help it displace the political demands made upon it. As Abbas Milani also observes, the new regime's supposed stability is comparable to that which the Shah enjoyed in the mid-1970s when none of the major Western powers (nor the Shah and his powerful secret service, SAVAK) had any suspicion at all that there was a revolution to follow. Therefore, because of the revolution in particular, democracy is a necessity not a luxury matter for Iran more than for any other state in the ME. Democracy, and its promise to attract the investments it needs to put an end to high numbers of unemployment, is the only

solution to its huge economic problems. External pressures and antagonistic policies, such as the threat of invasion and the imposition of sanctions, risk further postponing the advent of such democracy and the integration of Iran in the global economy.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the IRI's authorities should not, as Mohsen Milani also mentions, assume they have more time than the previous Iranian leaders actually had to implement their promises.¹⁵⁵

Domestic issues are the pivotal problems facing Iranian society. Hence, as long as satisfying its people, the provision of wealth (as a major element to the success of a society¹⁵⁶, as well as a significant element of power and influence), and preparations towards democracy (giving the government soft and hard power as well as political legitimacy) are not the top priority of the IRI, Iran cannot become a stable regional power. This is especially the case if Iran fails to reduce tension in its relations with its neighbours in the PG and the West, particularly the US. Military strength together with the support of the masses alone (assuming that Iran's foreign policy is supported by the people of other countries) cannot help in this regard without the administrative lever of the governments with whom it is in tension with.

Democracy is indispensable to Iranian society with its long history of independent thought. However, implementing democracy takes time and requires patience and sustained effort. It faces three major challenges in Iran: firstly, in overcoming people's impatience, especially on the part of the youth, secondly, in overcoming the anti-Western sentiments the conservative and more religious factions of society wish to instil, and finally, in the reconciliation it must attain with *Sharia* law. Facing up to the last two challenges means facing up to the perennial social tension between the

demands of the traditionalists and modernists, an issue that the reformist government of President Khatami also had to address.

The US use of military force to attain its foreign policy objectives in the ME has helped to ensure the empowerment of deep-rooted security and intelligence organisations in the whole socio-political life of Iran, as well as other countries in the region. This has in turn slowed down and encumbered Iran's domestic process of democratisation whose potential impact should not be underestimated as has been evidenced since the presidency of Khatami.

Thus, like any other country, a shift in Iran's political climate, in particular can only be achieved if it is initiated within the framework of domestic debate. Attempts to impose it from outside will only stifle the process of change; however the international community could support democratisation by encouraging an atmosphere that is germane to such a process (for instance, by ending the current embargoes and thereby help Iran solve its economic problems and actively participate in the global system). This means that the internal challenges facing Iran could translate into security concerns. These issues, together with the IRI's relative political immaturity show, by considering two completely different results from the elections of Khatami in 1997 and Ahmadinejad in 2005, that Iranian society needs time to educate itself about its rights, needs, and the methods (such as establishing powerful parties) it can use to achieve its goals.¹⁵⁷

As Bernard Hourcade mentions, "Today we are facing a new political landscape with the emergence of a new generation of leaders and political actors [who have] (...) a new political history, originating from the Islamic Revolution and not from the imperial regime."¹⁵⁸ This new generation of leaders should be given a chance to

develop the kinds of reform that are needed, especially since they will only work if they are sensitive to local cultural and religious norms, such as being consistent with *Sharia* law.

Notes

¹ Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974).

² Shahram Chubin, *Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 36.

³ Among many see, Keith McLachlan (1992, November), 'Iran and the continuing crisis in the Persian Gulf', *Geo Journal*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 357-363. [http://www.springerlink.com/\(qqfbyz55iaoskcq4qpcrzfiw\)/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,6,11;journal,123,239;linkingpublicationresults,1:102895,1](http://www.springerlink.com/(qqfbyz55iaoskcq4qpcrzfiw)/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,6,11;journal,123,239;linkingpublicationresults,1:102895,1) (20 August 2006)

⁴ Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Jerrold Green, *Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era* (The USA: National Defense Research Institute (RAND), 2001), pp. xi, 1.

⁵ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973; A study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (The USA: The University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 442, 444.

⁶ Chubin and Zabih, op. cit., p. 4.

⁷ Daniel Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 2.

⁸ For details see, Ramazani, op. cit., p. 439; also Ahmad Ashraf, (1990) 'Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran'. *International Journal of Politics and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 43-52. Also, see Dilip Hiro, *Iran Under the Ayatollahs* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). On other Third World leaders, see Philip Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); also Robert S. Elegant, *Mao's Great Revolution* (New York: World Publishing, 1971), all cited in Houman A. Sadri (April 1998) 'Trends in the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Iran', *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1. <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sadri.htm> (23 August 2006)

⁹ James N. Rosenau, Introduction: Political science in a shrinking world. In James N. Rosenau (ed.) *Linkage Politics, Essay on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 1-17; also James N. Rosenau, Toward the study of national-international linkages. In *ibid.*, pp. 44-63.

¹⁰ Chubin and Zabih, op. cit.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹² Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 452-3.

¹³ Chubin and Zabih, op. cit., pp. 300-304.

¹⁴ Hooshang Amirahmadi, 'Iran's Power Structure', *Internet Concepts*. <http://www.iranian.com/Mar96/Opinion/AmirIran.html> (24 August 2006)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Amir Ali Nourbakhsh (July-August 2004), 'Who calls the shots in Iran's foreign policy offensive?', *Iran Focus*, [a political-economic monthly publication].
<http://216.109.125.130/search/cache?p=iran+domestic+sources+of+foreign+policy&fr=FP-tab-web-t500&toggle=1&ei=UTF-8&u=www.iranexpert.com/2004/foreignpolicy1august.htm&w=iran+domestic+sources+foreign+policy&d=fOZZByQ8NRGN&icp=1&.intl=us> (28 August, 2006)

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. xiii.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. xiii- xii.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Nourbakhsh, op. cit.

²² IRNA (*Iran News Agency*), 27 June 2006.

²³ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. xii.

²⁴ Sadri, op. cit.

²⁵ Among many see, Chubin, *Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security*, op. cit., pp. 17, 18.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. xi.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 453-454.

³⁰ Chubin and Zabih, op. cit. p. 296.

³¹ Cited in the foreword section of Ali Ansari, *Iran, Islam and democracy: the politics of managing change* (Imprint London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. vii.

³² Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 426-7.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 427.

³⁵ Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 240-24; also Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 64.

³⁶ See, Keddie, op. cit., p. 181; also M. Milani, op. cit., p. 98; and some sites such as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution and <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,945047,00.html>

³⁷ See, M. Milani, op. cit., p. 70; and Asaf Hussain, *Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter* (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1985), pp. 44-45.

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- ³⁸ The Department of State (1999, November 18) *Foreign Relations of the United States, (1964-1968), Volume XXII, Iran*. http://www.parstimes.com/history/relations_64-68.html (21 November 2006); also Hussain, op. cit., P. 45.
- ³⁹ Keddie, op. cit., p. 160.
- ⁴⁰ See, Keddie, op. cit., pp. 143-4; also Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 419-420.
- ⁴¹ Keddie, op. cit., p. 160.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 170.
- ⁴³ M. Milani, op. cit., pp. 50, 60.
- ⁴⁴ Statistical details in ibid, p. 60.
- ⁴⁵ Hussain, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
- ⁴⁶ Iran, Islamic Republic, Plan and Budget Organisation, *Amar-e Kargahha-ye Bozorg-e San'ati (Statistic on the Large Industrial Units)* (Tehran, 1981), p. 14, cited in M. Milani, op. cit., p. 61.
- ⁴⁷ Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 437, cited from, W. Branigin, (17 January 1979) 'Pahlavi Fortune: A Staggering Sum,' *Washington Post*.
- ⁴⁸ Details in M. Milani, op. cit., p. 61.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ See, Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 435-8; also Hussain, op. cit., pp. 42-44.
- ⁵¹ See, Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 440-441; also Keddie, op. cit., p. 150.
- ⁵² See, Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4: The Role of Outside Powers* (UK: Gower, 1982), pp. 10, 13-14.
- ⁵³ Keddie, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
- ⁵⁴ Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4*, op. cit., p.11.
- ⁵⁵ See, Steven L. Canby, The Iranian military: political symbolism versus military usefulness. In Husein Amirsadeghi (ed.), *The Security of the Persian Gulf* (London: Croom Helm London, 1981), pp. 101-102.
- ⁵⁶ The Shah's role enhanced PG stability, evidenced by Chubin "by containing Iraq, pacifying the Dhofari rebellion which had been abetted by South Yemen and the USSR and establishing working relations with Saudi Arabia. Further afield, Iran's diplomatic initiatives in Egypt and in the Indian subcontinent also worked in favour of diminishing conflict and strengthening peace." See Chubin, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 34.
- ⁵⁸ For details see, Keddie, op. cit., pp. 176-177; also Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4*, op. cit., p.11; and Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 152, cited in Hussain, op. cit., p. 49.
- ⁵⁹ Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

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- ⁶⁰ See, M. Milani, op. cit., pp. 75-76; also Hussain, op. cit., p. 54; and Keddie, op. cit., p. 231; and Susan Siavashi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran* (no date, no place or publication), p. 125, cited in Mohammad Reza Tajik, *Tajrob-e Bazi-e Siasi dar mian-e Iranian [The Experience of Political Game among Iranians]* (Tehran: Nashreney, 1382 Solar Calendar [2003], pp. 164-166.
- ⁶¹ Hussain, op. cit., p. 118.
- ⁶² Adam Przeworski, (March 1975) 'Institutionalisation of Voting Patterns and Mobilisation', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 69, p. 67, cited in Hussain, op. cit., p. 119.
- ⁶³ Hussain, op. cit., p. 121.
- ⁶⁴ M. Milani, op. cit., p. 246.
- ⁶⁵ Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 533, 535.
- ⁶⁶ See, Keddie, op. cit., pp. 231-5; also *Wikipedia*; and Maziar Behrooz (February 22 2001) 'Surprise, nobody saw the revolution coming', *The Iranian*. <http://www.iranian.com/Books/2001/February/Behrooz/index.html> (20 December 2006)
- ⁶⁷ See, Fred Halliday, 'The revolution's first decade', *Middle East Report*, no. 156, Iran's Revolution Turns Ten. (Jan.-Feb., 1989), p. 19; also Jerrold D. Green, Iran and Gulf security. In David E. Long and Christian Koch (eds.), *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), p. 17.
- ⁶⁸ Fred Halliday, 'Year IV of the Islamic Republic', *MERIP Reports*, no. 113, Iran since the Revolution. (Mar.-Apr., 1983), p. 7; also Eric Hooglund, 'The Islamic Republic at war and peace', *Middle East Report*, no. 156, Iran's Revolution Turns Ten. (Jan.-Feb., 1989), p. 4; and Andrzej Kapiszewski, 'Iran's 2005 presidential elections and their impact on the Republic's politics', in Walter Posch (ed.) Iranian challenges, *Chaillot Paper*, no. 89, (May 2006), p. 26; and Green, Iran and Gulf security, op. cit., p. 18.
- ⁶⁹ See, Halliday, Year IV of the Islamic Republic, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
- ⁷⁰ Asaf Hussain, op. cit., p. 121.
- ⁷¹ See, Halliday, Year IV of the Islamic Republic, op. cit., p. 6. Many different death tolls have been given in this regard. The group usually exaggerates the figures and the regime is not transparent enough to provide an accurate.
- ⁷² Hooglund, op. cit., p. 12.
- ⁷³ See, Halliday, Year IV of the Islamic Republic, op. cit., p. 7.
- ⁷⁴ Halliday, The revolution's first decade, op. cit., p. 20.
- ⁷⁵ According to some sources the debate over the power distribution and economic policy in Iran, which began in 1986, sufficiently stalled the IRP party enough for members to disband for political expediency. See, Helen Chapin Metz, (ed.) *Iran: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987) <http://countrystudies.us/iran/95.htm> (2 March 2006)
- ⁷⁶ See, Halliday, The revolution's first decade, op. cit., p. 20; also Halliday, Year IV of the Islamic Republic, op. cit., p. 4.
- ⁷⁷ Halliday, The revolution's first decade, op. cit., p. 20.
- ⁷⁸ Fred Halliday, 'Iran's new grand strategy', *MERIP Middle East Report*, no. 144, The Middle East: Living by the Sword. (Jan.- Feb., 1987), p. 7.

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- ⁷⁹ Hooglund, op. cit., pp. 4-7.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 4,8; also R. K. Ramazani, 'Iran's revolution: patterns, problems and prospects', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1994)*, vol. 56, no. 3. (Summer 1980), p. 449.
- ⁸¹ See, Halliday, *The revolution's first decade*, op. cit., p. 19; also Kaveh Ehsani, (Nov.-Dec., 1994), 'Tilt but don't spill: Iran's development and reconstruction dilemma', *Middle East Report*, no. 191, pp. 16-17.
- ⁸² Ibid, p. 11-12.
- ⁸³ Ehsani, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Ehsani, op. cit., p. 18.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 19-20.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 20.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 16, 18, 20.
- ⁸⁹ Mehran Kamrava, 'The civil society discourse in Iran', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 28, no. 2 (Nov., 2001), pp. 169-170, cited from Majid Mohammadi, [Barnameha-ye Siyasi: Hokumat-e Jame'h Madani] (Political Programme: Rule of Civil Society) *Salem*, vol. 8, no. 40, (1377 Solar system [1998]), p. 15.
- ⁹⁰ Abbas Milani (summer 2005), 'US foreign policy and the future of democracy in Iran', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 47.
- ⁹¹ Such as the series of assassinations known as 'Serial Killing,' which eliminated dissident political and intellectual figures.
- ⁹² Fred Halliday (Autumn 2001), 'Iran and the Middle East: foreign policy and domestic change', *Middle East Report*, no. 220, p. 42.
- ⁹³ For details see Abbas Milani, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
- ⁹⁴ Daniel Byman [et al], op. cit., pp. 53-54.
- ⁹⁵ Halliday, *Year IV of the Islamic Republic*, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
- ⁹⁶ Byman [et al], op. cit., pp. 38-39.
- ⁹⁷ Michael Eisenstadt, DÉJÀ VU all over again? An assessment of Iran's military buildup. In Patrick Clawson (ed.) *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Institute For National Strategic Studies- National Defense University, 1994), pp. 120-121.
- ⁹⁸ Daniel Byman [et al], op. cit., pp. 36-37.
- ⁹⁹ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini: the Iranian Second Republic* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.173, cited from *Kayhan Havai* 29 January 1992.
- ¹⁰⁰ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 46.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.

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- ¹⁰² David Menashri, Whither Iranian politics? The Khatami factor. In Patrick Clawson (ed.) *Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic and Military Assessment* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), pp. 13-51, cited in Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 46.
- ¹⁰³ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 46.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 47-48.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 48.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 49.
- ¹⁰⁷ According to Byman [et al] such a difference, was indicated in a poll in 1997. "Reportedly, 73 percent of the IRGC and 70 percent of the Basij voted for Khatami." Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁸ See, ibid., pp. 50-51.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 52.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² ibid.
- ¹¹³ Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 52.
- ¹¹⁴ For details see, *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, 'Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad's Tumultuous Presidency', (Tehran/Brussels), no. 21, 6 February 2007, ICG interviews in Iran, Tehran, 2006.
- ¹¹⁵ Bernard Hourcade (2006, May), Iran's internal security challenges. In Walter Posch (ed.) *Iranian Challenges. Chaillot Paper (Institute for Security Studies-EU)* no. 89, p.45. <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai89.pdf> (13 June 2006)
- ¹¹⁶ According to Brigadier-General Abdolreza Abed, deputy commander of IRGC and head of Ghorb, cited in *ICG*, op. cit., p. 13.
- ¹¹⁷ *ICG* interview, Tehran, 9 July 2006, op. cit., quoted from a former general manager of one of Iran's largest steel factories.
- ¹¹⁸ *ICG* interview, former senior diplomat, Tehran, 6 August 2006, op. cit, p. 13.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 12.
- ¹²⁰ Interview of Behzad Nabavi; *E'temad Melli*, 1 July 2006, cited in ibid.
- ¹²¹ Maziar Bahari (24 November 2006), 'An Iranian dissects US-Iran talks', *Post Global*. http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/maziar_bahari/2006/11/an_iranian_dissects_usiran_talks.html (20 March 2007); also *ICG*, op. cit.
- ¹²² Bahari, op. cit.
- ¹²³ For more details see, Abbas Milani, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
- ¹²⁴ Shahram Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities. In Patrick Clawson (ed.) *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities*, op. cit., pp. 73-75; also Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 118.

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- ¹²⁵ Ehteshami, *After Khomeini: the Iranian Second Republic*, op. cit., pp. 168-169.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid.
- ¹²⁷ Between 1971 and 1975, the Shah continued buying huge amount of arms, ordering \$8 billion in weapons from the US alone, see *Wikipedia*.
- ¹²⁸ For details among many see, Shahram Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4*, op. cit, p. 29; also Darius Bazargan (September 1997), 'Iran: politics, the military and Gulf security', *MERIA Journal*, vol. 1, no. 3.
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- ¹³⁰ For more details see, Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 99; also Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities, op. cit., pp. 72-73; and Bazargan, op. cit.
- ¹³¹ Bazargan, op. cit.
- ¹³² General John Abizaid, chief of the US Central Command in an interview with *AFP* in Washington on 19 September 2006, was cited in *Wikipedia*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_military#_note-24 (1 May 2007)
- ¹³³ Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities, op. cit., p. 66.
- ¹³⁴ Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 101.
- ¹³⁵ Barry Rubin (1999, June), 'The Persian Gulf after the Cold War: old pattern; new era', *MERIA Journal*, vol. 3, no. 2. <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1999/issue2/jv3n2a6.html> (23 September 2004)
- ¹³⁶ *Wikipedia* cited from, *Fox News* (10 May 2005) <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,156160,00.html>; also Iran's Defense Industries Organisation (D.I.O) <http://www.diomil.ir/en/home.aspx>
- ¹³⁷ More details in Green, 'Iran and Gulf security', op. cit., pp. 22-24.
- ¹³⁸ Bazargan, op. cit., cited from the Iranian news agency *IRNA* quoting the Revolutionary Guards' Deputy Commander, Rahim Safavi.
- ¹³⁹ See, Chubin, *Security in the Persian Gulf 4*, op. cit., pp. 30, 35; also Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1999), pp. 22-23.
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- ¹⁴¹ Bazargan, op. cit.
- ¹⁴² See, *ibid*.
- ¹⁴³ *ICG*, op. cit., p. 25, interview with Behzad Nabavi, former minister of industries and deputy speaker, Tehran, 1 August 2006.
- ¹⁴⁴ *ICG*, op. cit, p. 25, interview with a former Iranian official in Paris, 19 January 2007.
- ¹⁴⁵ See, Byman [et al], op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁴⁶ See, Bazargan, op. cit., for citations.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., cited from an *IRNA* report on 21 April, regarding announcement of the Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Major General Mohsen Rezaei.

¹⁴⁸ Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

¹⁴⁹ Green, 'Iran and Gulf security', op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁵⁰ See, Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 95.

¹⁵¹ *ICG*, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁵² Akbar Ganji, speaking in the Council on Foreign Relations of the US, in 2007. *BBC Persian.com*, (2 March 2007).

¹⁵³ Among many see, Abbas Milani, op. cit., pp. 45-46, 49; also Andrzej Kapiszewski (May 2006), 'Iran's 2005 presidential elections and their impact on the Republic's politics', in Walter Posch (ed.) *Iranian Challenges. Chaillot Paper (Institute for Security Studies-EU)* no. 89, pp.26-27. <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai89.pdf> (13 June 2006)

¹⁵⁴ Abbas Milani, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁵⁵ Mohsen M. Milani, op. cit., p. 65.

¹⁵⁶ For example, Adam Smith argues in his *The Wealth of Nations* that the notion of justice is inextricably allied to that of wealth, so that a government cannot provide justice to its people without eliminating their poverty and evenly distributing its revenues. He also argues that a political economy should make it possible for both the people and the sovereign to enrich themselves and criticises those groups who use their political influence to manipulate the government in order to gain economic advantage for themselves. This analysis seems relevant to the situation vis-à-vis Iran's economic problems, and suggests a factor for why Iran's economic policy is not working.

¹⁵⁷ See, Bernard Hourcade, op. cit, pp. 41-42.; also Abbas Milani, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁵⁸ Hourcade, op. cit., pp. 42, 57-58.

Chapter 10

Iran: External Security Threats and Challenges

Introduction

Iran has legitimate security concerns and a history that helps explain much of its current ambitions, rhetoric, and hostility toward the West.

A. Cordesman (1999)¹

Like those of other small states Iran's security and ability to manoeuvre largely depends on an international environment which it can little affect.

S. Chubin (1974)²

Iran's domestic history during most of the latter part of the nineteenth century consisted of efforts to defend itself against British and Russian attempts to dominate the country as part of the 'Great Game'. Russia, Britain and later the US helped end Iran's democratic revolutions with a series of occupations, by supporting undemocratic, totalitarian regimes, intervening when such regimes were under internal threat and by overthrowing the nationalist and democratic governments in Iran. Based on their geopolitical world-picture, not only did they have a political vested interest in doing so, they also gained economically from it. Although all of these factors contributed towards a growing antipathy towards the West, Iran continued to serve Western interests under pro-Western regimes like the Shah's.³ However, after the Islamic revolution in 1979, when Tehran discontinued such a pro-Western policy, the West re-engaged its old policy of interference in Iran's internal

affairs and has since made numerous attempts to depose the existing regime through war, isolation, sanctions and threats of direct invasion.

Regionally, one of Iran's most prominent threats has been the state of Iraq,⁴ a hostile state immediately to the west of Iran with insufficient borders outlet to the PG. Iraq's border arrangements which were deliberately designed by a Britain keen to control the ME to limit Iraq's regional influence have not only been the cause of much instability, but have also triggered Iraqi claims on Iran's oil-rich Southwest and culminated in a major Iranian-Iraqi arms race and border wars.

Another major threat resulted from the new political situation with various security problems in the southern littoral of the PG that the departure of the British created. Once the British left authority was to be passed to the Sheikdoms, however the British left the PG before the territorial and border disputes between the Sheikdoms and with other PG neighbours had a chance to be resolved.⁵ This created a broader issue of security in the PG that continues to the present day, for example it resulted in the longest and most damaging war in the ME, the Iraq-Iran war.

Imperial Iran during 1960s-1970s

The improvement of relations between superpowers, Iran's '*de facto* nonalignment' policy as well as its attempts to attain a more balanced and stable relationship with the superpowers led to a more harmonious relationship with them in 1962. In order to hold the USSR's potential threat at arms length, it sought to give its northern neighbour a vested interest in a flourishing Iran with a number of peaceful negotiations, and largely succeeded. This enabled Iran to improve its security and leverage with the US and enabled it to anticipate events relevant to the US-USSR

détente to prevent any risks to Iran's interests. Iran also pursued a progressively less pro-American posture in the international arena to both internal and external positive effects. This meant that Iran could begin to gradually reduce its dependence on direct US military and financial aid.⁶

The PG, since the early 1960s had increasingly become on the top of Iran's economic and strategic agenda. This had mainly been due to the PG's growing role in the world's oil economy that, together with the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 aggravating oil dependence on the PG, as well as the conflicting interests and aspirations of non-littoral states in the region, had turned it into a vital sea-lane. Its growing interest here forced Iran to deal with differing PG states perspectives and priorities. Unlike more distant ME countries whose foreign policy focused on Israel or on an 'Arab Cold War', for Iran, like Turkey, the Cold War took priority over and shaped regional politics. It also had to deal with the effects of the British departure from the PG in 1971 without the resolution of a number of outstanding territorial disputes. The issues regarding the transfer of authority to the Sheikdoms and status of foreign military stations in the PG created a new political situation connected with the broader concern of regional security.⁷

Iran's Challenges after Britain's Departure from the PG

The complex new situation which emerged in the wake of Britain's departure from the PG forced Iran to take a particular course in order to achieve its long and short term objectives. Its priorities were, as Zabih remarks:

- 1) To solve its territorial disputes with regard to new Sheikdoms regardless of their own territorial disputes or the impacts of regional conflicts, e.g. the Arab-Israeli war.

Hence, besides attempts to establish relations with them in a way that would be compatible with its overall regional policy, Iran chose Bahrain's case to display a willingness to deal with these issues in a peaceful way. Iran also expected its acquisition of the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, in 1971 to be accepted. Its diplomatic and military leverages as well as an appropriate regional and international environment, which can be found in Appendix-8-C, helped Iran in this acquisition. The policy of using diplomatic means backed up with economic leverage to solve disputes helped Iran in resolving its other disputes such as those regarding the Iran-Iraq border (1975 Algiers Accord), the Dhoffar communist rebellion, and the 1969 Saudi Arabian – Iranian dispute regarding the demarcation the Median line.⁸

2) To prevent an extra-regional power from filling the vacuum of power that Britain's departure would create. Therefore, Iran sought a bipartite objective: both to make sure that the power vacuum was filled by neither the USSR nor the US and to make sure that filling it would seem politically and militarily otiose.⁹

3) To place the security responsibility mainly in the hands of littoral states; however this policy faced a number of problems. Iran faced certain regional security issues, particularly as regards oil and the territorial and political *status quo* of neighbouring PG states. As Zabih points out, however, these issues had broader political implications due to the increasing significance of the PG's becoming a vital maritime route. The security issues thereby included the defence of those sea-lanes that extend into and beyond the Indian Ocean. In theory, a solution to these issues could have been to arrange mutual defence arrangements with regional allies, or, if that proves impossible, building up Iran's army and navy so that it could assume the role of sole guardian. In practice, the notion of collective PG defense measures proved

unattainable due to the continuous hostilities among many of the littoral states and the lack of agreement about what security is necessary, not to mention the lack of enthusiasm they evoked towards the proposal. From the point of view of many of the smaller PG states, accepting this proposal was equivalent to accepting the political dominance of Iran and its military hegemony over the region. Furthermore, due to the absence of a direct and immediate danger to PG security, such states were likely to view the proposed arrangement from the narrow point of view of their own national interests. Thus, sensing these problems, Iran followed the option of building up its army and navy and in doing so had to become aware of the constraints imposed by the international environment, as was evidenced by its tolerance of the American naval presence in Bahrain and its seeking Chinese support for its PG policies.¹⁰

4) The entanglement of Sheikhdoms in non-PG political issues was viewed by Iran as a threat, and it was necessary to ensure that their involvement would not become destabilising to the southern littoral states.¹¹ A major problem was presented by the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of progress in resolving this conflict and the continuation of a 'no-war, no-peace' attitude towards it both increased the prospect of radicalisation in the ME as a whole, and gave PG countries in particular an influential role in negotiating an outcome to the conflict.¹² However, Nasser's defeat in the 1967 war had further relieved Iran of a regional rival and removed another limitation to Iran's relationship with Arab states.¹³ Iran's regional relations also benefited from other advantageous circumstances. The many rivalries and the lack of a homogenous mind-set on the part of the Arab states and particularly the wide distrust of Iraq among the sheikhdoms turned out to be beneficial in that relations with Iran were valued by the smaller PG states, partly due to its role as balancer, though also partly due to the states leaders' ambivalence to whom to commit themselves to.¹⁴

As Chubin also points out, Iran's policy was to engender as much as it possibly could an environment that was conducive to stability and moderation. Recognising the relationship between regional rivalries and outside powers' intervention, it did so firstly by balancing between India and Pakistan in the East and by trying to play-up the benefits of dealing with a moderate PG to the West. Secondly, it did so by isolating the PG region from external rivalries also separating issues of regional security from issues regarding central strategic balance and then attempting to make itself militarily autonomous. The latter was carried out in an effort to be able to deal unilaterally with a regional threat, though it would not have been able to do so under a fully fledged attack from the USSR and so was still partly dependent on the West.¹⁵ The divergence between Iran and the US notion of regional security that was evident between 1965 and 1969 (in particular regarding Washington's policy of seeking good relations with radical governments in Iraq and Yemen) was brought to an end by the advent of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine. This signaled a change in US policy towards one that placed more importance to a geopolitical perspective, keeping the USSR's regional allies in check and denying it from having an increasing influence in the Third World in general, a strategy which was to help Iran achieve its major foreign policy objectives.¹⁶ To this end, Iran expanded its relations with Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and was thereby able to further reduce its political and economic dependence on the US.¹⁷

Consequently, during the period between the 1960s and the end of the 1970s, a suitable international environment made it possible for Iran to achieve its foreign policy goals. It solved its major territorial and boundary disputes with its PG neighbours and prevented any extra-regional power from filling the power vacuum that was left in the wake of Britain's departure. Furthermore, the PG states' reluctance

to establish a collective security arrangement, as well as Nixon's Twin-Pillar doctrine, meant that Iran steadily built up its military and naval capabilities and was thus able to stabilise itself as a regional power. Iran's naval and military build-up as well as its *détente* and realistic policy was to a level that made it possible to convince both regional and extra-regional players of Iran's new role as the sole guardian of PG security. This resulted in security and stability in the PG being assured without the presence of foreign forces.

Islamic Republic of Iran during 1980s-1990s

The foreign policy of Iran's post revolutionary regime was mostly a response to the interacting contemporary regional and international security environments. Therefore, in order to understand Iran's foreign policy at the time, the overall security environment to which it was a response must be examined.

The establishment of the IRI resulting from the overthrow of Iran's Pahlavi monarchy in 1979 was a cause of concern to the Arab states whose rulers worried that their own political instability and people's raised awareness of political Islam would threaten their regimes. Thus, despite the masses' support in the Arab World their rulers attacked the Islamic revolution by casting it as a Shiite-Sunni dichotomy. The potential rise of political Islam also concerned the US and the USSR, already wary of Iran's new 'Neither East nor West' foreign policy, and as a result their interests in the region converged. Both now felt that their aims and objectives in the region were compromised by an Islamic Iran and so both attempted to destabilise it, especially the US who had now lost its most powerful ally in the PG. The USSR was particularly concerned with the IRI's support of the Afghan Mujahedin both because it did not want Iran to have control over its new colony and because it feared the effects this

would have on its own internal stability due to its Muslim population. The Soviets were also unhappy that on the 22nd of January 1980, the Islamic Revolutionary Council revoked Articles V and VI of the 1921 treaty with the USSR. They refused to accept the revocation, and thought that this would give them a permanent pretext to intervene in Iran. However, both superpowers failed to take into account the new Iranian leadership's steadfastness in the face of outside aggression and all their attempts to destabilise the regime, including supporting Iraq in its war against Iran, resulted in failure. However, the strategy of bleeding Iran's economy had some serious repercussions on the IRI's economic development plans.¹⁸

The 1979 revolution had not only been a vote of no confidence in the existing monarchy, it had also been an expression of anti-US sentiments, particularly as regards the superpower's involvement in Iran. Right from its inception, the IRI declared that it would no longer honour any military agreement with the US, and that it would no longer serve American interests in the PG. Nevertheless, Iran still feared that the US would attempt to re-instate the Shah, as it had done in 1953, particularly since Washington had allowed him into the US. None of the other Western countries had done the latter in the knowledge that such an action would greatly anger the new regime, and that supporting the deposed Shah would no longer be useful to securing their national and vested interests in the PG.

Thus when the Shah was granted entrance to the US in October 1979, a group of Iranian students took over the US Embassy in Tehran and held 66 Americans hostage, of which 13 women and African-Americans were soon released. The US response was to freeze Iranian assets held by US banks and to impose a trade embargo on the IRI. It was announced, to the approval of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, that the

remaining hostages would not be released until the US had given up the exiled Shah along with the vast sums of money he was said to have secretly kept in banks abroad. The ensuing crisis culminated, a few days after the event, in the resignation of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan along with his cabinet and in the lasting total breakdown of a relationship between the US and Iran. The US' rescue operation, 'Eagle Claw' in the Tabas Desert in the East of Iran, had failed suffering from 8 casualties, 5 USAF Airmen and 3 US Marines. The crisis was settled with the return of the hostages to America nearly 15 months later through the help of Algeria's mediation.

Although Iran's policy of not engaging with the USSR seemed positive to the US at first, the hostage crisis made Washington confident that Iran would not get along with the US either. Washington, who had hitherto thought it had a free hand to do what it liked in the ME, was also now very concerned that similar actions might be carried out by other non-Western countries. Iran's actions were thus successful in somewhat emasculating the US without suffering retaliation from it.¹⁹

The US saw the creation of the IRI as a threat to its vital interests in the PG. It was also concerned about the USSR invasion of Afghanistan which had disturbed US strategies, also some American policy makers perceived that the new threat in the ME derived from Communism. However, as Asaf Hussain points out, the invasion was mostly thought to be a Soviet response to the rising threat from Iran. Nevertheless, all US policy makers agreed on the establishment of a Rapid Development Force (RDF) to be deployed in the region. Such a force was meant to address the effective absence of a regional security apparatus which had resulted from the creation of the IRI and the ensuing abandonment of Nixon's twin-pillar security system. It was thought that

the RDF would be able to combat any force that threatened to destabilise security in the PG.²⁰

Iran's major counterrevolutionary threat, however, came from Iraq whose leader was intent on securing power in the Arab world. In 1980 Saddam had perceived Iran's situation as ripe for attack. As he saw it, Iran was unprepared to engage in major military operations, had become internationally isolated because of the hostage crisis, and, following the revolution, full of internal political tensions which an Iraqi invasion could turn into a counterrevolutionary uprising. Saddam thus thought that his invasion of Iran would be a short campaign that would end with Iraqi hegemony in the PG, and restore allegedly usurped lands (such as the Arvand Roud, the Three Islands, and the province of Khuzistan) back to Arab control.

Iraq's invasion of Iran was fortuitous to a US who was worried about losing the balance of power in the PG. The US gave full support to Saudi Arabia and Iraq to ensure that the war would continue and thereby weaken the key regional players and increase Saudi and other Arab countries' dependence on Washington. America's other strategy in restoring its balance of power in the PG was to extend the RDF to the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in collaboration with the Arab countries. The ostensive purpose of creating the GCC was to provide regional security, especially against potential attacks from the USSR, Israel, and Iran. However, it greatly depended on US support and played into the hands of a US PG policy aimed at creating an association of client-states for whom it would be the major supplier. In any case, the result of forming the GCC was an increase in the presence of US troops in the ME (for example, 31 US Navy Warships were dispersed around the PG) and the formation of stronger military ties against Iran.²¹

While the collapse of the USSR in 1991 relieved Iran of the threat of communism and Soviet military power, the end of the Cold war presented Iran with another threat. After the Islamic revolution the West's security umbrella which was given to Iran for free despite Iran's lack of tendency to play any role in the superpowers' rivalry was removed. During the USSR's invasion and war in Afghanistan, Iran's stance which was on the same side as the US (a reflection of strategic realities) was very important for the US in its rivalry with the USSR. However, the Iraq-Iran war showed that a new atmosphere was developing regarding the Cold War and that a convergence of interests between the two superpowers was beginning to form. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War meant that the superpowers' focus could now be turned towards regional conflicts in the PG. Both of these factors were contrary to the interests and security of Iran, since the superpowers now made an unofficial agreement to help Iraq to defeat the IRI.²²

During the 1980s and 1990s the US policy was to prevent Iranian hegemony by shifting the balance of power towards pro-Western countries, by supporting Iraq in its attempt to overthrow the Iranian regime and encouraging other allies to do the same. Although the US arms sales to Iran during the war were apparently meant to help Iran secure the release of US hostages in Lebanon, they were also carried out in order for the war to be continued, congruously with the US 'fun wars'²³ strategy. The US also pressured all its PG allies to buy its weapons, and treated them as clients. However, this strategy allowed countries such as Iraq to build up large military arsenals which only compounded the existing security dilemma. In supporting countries like Iraq and in doing so also turning a blind eye to Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Iran (among other human-rights transgressions), the Iranian people's hostility and distrust towards the US was aggravated and fueled growing sentiments towards Iranian

nationalism. The strategy also engendered an increase in fear and distrust between regional states which have in turn intensified the regional arms race. The US was ready to bring down the Iranian regime at all costs, and was even ready to intervene militarily itself were Iraq to fail.²⁴ Its strategy of encouraging Iraq to target Iran's oil tankers and terminals (which will be explained in more details in chapter eleven), further paved the way for the US and its allies to have a direct presence in the PG.

The Challenges of Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy

Iran's foreign policy in the 1980s was in large part a response to a number of inter-related problems it faced during this period. The sanctions imposed on it together with the repercussions of a long war with Iraq caused it considerable economic debilitation as well as increasing regional and international isolation. Furthermore, the continuation of a strong US military presence in the area, not to mention American support of Saddam during the war, which had prolonged the war, fuelled Iranian feelings of insecurity and anger.²⁵ Several other episodes made Iran suspicious of the US, for instance the July 3rd 1988 USS Vincennes' shooting down of an Iranian civilian plane, claiming that it was mistaken it for an attacking jet and killing all of its 290 passengers. All of these factors, as well as Tehran's recognition that foreign capital and expertise were required for a successful reconstruction program (despite success in securing political and economic needs by improving its relations with developing and under-developed countries), led to its realisation that it needed to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy towards the West. The 1980s ended with Iran's acknowledgement that if it is under siege, it is because, as Chubin observes, "pursuing independent policies"²⁶ comes with a dilemma significantly related to the survival of the Islamic Republic.

In the 1990s, the US continued to threaten Iran in various ways. The friction between Iran and some of its neighbours, such as the GCC and Turkey, was largely due to US hostility towards Iran. The US, no longer willing to support Saddam, began a policy of 'dual containment' aimed at preventing both Iraq and Iran from having an influential role in the region and continuing its strategic interest in maintaining access to oil. It allocated millions of dollars to secret service initiatives to destabilise the Iranian regime and intensified its economic sanctions against it putting pressure on China and Russia to follow suit. The end of the Cold War and the ensuing dissipation of a bi-polar global atmosphere, together with the growing eminence of the US as the world's most influential superpower were problematic to the IRI. This was particularly due to the fact that Iran had now lost the ability to capitalise on the superpowers' strategic rivalries. It was further due to the fact that the US was carrying out massive arms sales with Iran's Arab neighbours as well as cultivating secular Turkey. These factors made a military operation against Iran possible. These factors, together with an increase of US direct military involvement in the PG ensured that Iran's leaders continued to be suspicious of American intentions throughout the 1990s and pushed it towards pursuing more independent solutions to their military and technological concerns. Similarly, the US was wary that Iran was harboring regional ambitions, was developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting international terrorism. However, as well as forging strategic alliances with Russia and China, Iran was able to capitalise on the friction that existed between it and the US by expanding its relationships with Canada, Japan and European Union countries.²⁷

Iran had several national security concerns in the 1990s. The new geopolitical situation of the region, consisting of an unstable northern frontier zone to the north of

Iran behind which lay a weak, though still assertive, Russia, and a weakened Iraq on the west, could cause problems, like the encouragement of secessionist movements and could give the West a pretext to intervene in the region. The new geopolitical atmosphere had increased Iran's isolation since it could not count on the support of nonalignment and third world countries who were mostly concerned with their national interests. In particular, the impact of Iraq's return to regional politics was worrisome due to the uncertainties about its political regime and its effect on regional oil prices, as was the increasingly open reliance the Arab states now had on the US. Furthermore, the impact of the previous decade's crises had heightened sectarian/national tensions.²⁸ Although during the 80s and 90s sectarian, cultural and national rifts were merely a concern, the continuation of US aggressive and interventionist policy in the ME, for instance the invasion of Iraq in 2003, has worsened the problematic sectarian issue and has greatly contributed to the creation of a crisis for the whole region.

Tehran was also concerned about the US policy to contain Iran from engaging with states on both its southern and northern borders. Its main security concerns were thus local; it primarily sought to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states, for instance to protect the unstable borders that were in an arc from Iraq in the west to the Kurdish areas of Turkey, to Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan in the east. Its foreign policy priorities were to eliminate the US's presence in the PG and to develop its relations with other countries such as the PG states and Turkey in order to have a more harmonised oil policy and to prevent further US interventions into the region. Another Iranian foreign policy priority was to develop its ties with China, India and Pakistan as potential strategic partners and in particular with Russia to stabilise the northern border.²⁹

However, the effects of the end of the Cold War in the 1990s provided Iran with some opportunities to overcome and frustrate the major threats from the US. Iran was now feeling more secure, American and Russian nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced and the fall of the USSR had removed nearly two centuries of direct and indirect threats to Iran's national security. The IRI was now able to broker a new strategic alliance with Russia and to sign different economic agreements with the newly formed Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Although the end of the bipolar structure had threatened to turn into US unipolarity, a multi-polar structure in the international system was beginning to emerge, particularly in the form of three major global economic spheres: the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the EU, and the AP (Asian Pacific region). This meant that Iran was in a position where it could exploit competition between these economic areas in an effort to secure its political and economic independence.³⁰

Thus Iran continued to pursue its nonalignment foreign policy. Some scholars, such as Chubin, regard this as merely a continuation of Cold War policy and as a reflection of the IRI's inability to adapt to the emerging new world order. A nonalignment foreign policy does not make sense, according to them, in a world with only one superpower, and by continuing its hostility towards the US the IRI was unable to forge stable relations with its GCC neighbours and made Israel begin to regard Iran as a strategic threat.³¹ However, other scholars, such as Sadri, think that such a strategy well served Iran's interests. Although the US was the world's only superpower, this did not prevent Tehran from being able to take advantage of the economic and political rivalry among the emerging global economic spheres. The IRI was thereby able to withstand US efforts to isolate it (via the imposition of embargoes among other means): it diversified its trade partners, sources of technology and investment and

increased its political maneuverability, acquiring supporters at the UN along the way. Iran's new geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era made Iran become more important than it had been in decades in the eyes of the EU who has geo-economic interests in the Central Asia and has refused to capitulate to US pressure to cut its ties with Iran.³² Furthermore, as Green points out, in order to counterbalance the cold and unstable ties with the GCC, the IRI improved its relations with its non-Arab neighbours, such as Turkey, Pakistan and the Central Asian states north of the Caspian Sea.³³ It should also be noticed, as does Chubin, that despite its revisionist foreign policy (it sought to amend the existing world order) and its clear antipathy towards the US, the IRI always undertook its attempts to achieve its foreign policy aims through indirect means and was careful not to provoke confrontation, since attempting to shift the hierarchy of nations would be likely to be in opposition to the US and its regional client's interests.³⁴

Conclusion

Iran's foreign policy, and its ability to achieve its objectives as well as its political orientations, has mainly depended on its security environment which is influenced by the international system. In a cooperative international environment and with the use of a *détente* policy, the Imperial Iran was able to build CBM with the PG states and assured the extra-regional powers that their interests in the PG were being maintained. This meant that the presence of foreign forces in the region was prevented. However, the emergence of the IRI was not welcomed by the superpowers who found that the IRI was disturbing their influence and the balance of power in the ME. The new republic, with its commitment to political Islam and revolutionary rhetoric, was perceived to be a threat to the Arab PG states (the CBM with whom were thereby in

decline) and was unable to assure the maintenance of the extra-regional powers' interests in the region. These factors as well as policies that ranged from a revolutionary stance to pragmatism evidenced in the three decades of the IRI's existence provided a good pretext for extra-regional direct interference in PG states' affairs and regional military presence.

As Mohsen Milani observes, this was especially the case for the US, for whom the demise of the USSR had threatened the conceptualisation of the world as consisting of the two rival camps of good and evil. The demise of the USSR had also created a geopolitical crisis for the US and some of its allies in the ME, since some of the latter had lost their strategic value that could only be regained if they became influential in dealing with a new threat.³⁵ Thus, during the bipolar system, the threat posed by Iran was greatly exaggerated in order to replace that posed in the eyes of Arabs by Israel. After the end of the Cold War the Iranian and Islamic ideological threat was played-up to replace that posed by Soviet Communism, much to the benefit of US-PG states' arms sales which were now given a reason to continue.³⁶

There is a sense in which both Iran and the US were in a dilemma; both sides needed each other but realised that positively engaging with one another came at a price. As Abbas Milani remarks, the IRI needed US approval in order to secure the flow of capital necessary for Iran's economic problems to subside, as well as a guarantee that the US will not seek to overthrow the regime; however, much of the regime's legitimacy rested on its opposition to the US. Similarly, the US needed to engage with Iran, qua influential PG power, in order to secure regional stability and thereby US interests; however, Washington feared that engaging with Iran would strengthen a regime it opposed. The US has been unable to develop an effective and permanent

strategy towards Iran; its policies have been reactionary and have thus only lasted until the next crisis.³⁷ The IRI did make some attempts to improve US-Iranian relations, for instance it supported the liberation of Kuwait after Iraq invasion, and it had a positive role in Afghanistan. Also, in order to face its greatest challenges (reconstruction and economic problems), and although the rise of the IRI was considered to have 'subdued those voices in favour of pursuing an accommodation with the US',³⁸ a pragmatic Iran was prepared to forge such relations. However, in doing so, it faced two problems: firstly, it was not willing to give up its policy regarding independence and secondly, the conservative forces who, in a climate of relative internal instability, wanted to be seen as the ones who rebuilt relations with the US; they did not want a rival camp, especially the leftists/reformists, to have this accolade.

The US, however, did not display an intention to reciprocate such conciliatory gestures and mend its frustrated relationship with Iran. This meant that the bilateral relationship between them remained stagnant.³⁹ It also meant that the Arab PG states were being persuaded to take up a similarly isolationist stance towards Iran. The corollary of all this has been that the IRI has had to operate in a difficult international environment which has pushed it towards more independent policies and has delayed its better and closer integration with the West.

Three decades of such a policy has caused many crises in the ME and a growing fear on the part of Arab PG rulers regarding their political stability. It has also caused an increase in anti-Western (especially US) sentiments which have highlighted that, firstly, the ME/Arab PG states are tired of the economic and socio-political impacts of regional crises and that even though the instability of the situation has been

exaggerated by the US, they prefer a peaceful atmosphere. Secondly, the importance of Iran's role in the security and stability of the region has been stressed and that by ignoring and diminishing its role the security of both regional and extra-regional states is threatened, as well as affects oil the supply and market. Due to Iran's geopolitical situation all its political regimes, despite their differing political orientations, including those both before and after the revolution, have converged on what Iran's general security policy should be. This is that Iran should develop its natural role in the PG's security.

The regional importance of Iran makes it vital for there to be relations between it and those extra-regional powers with interests in the region. The attempts to circumvent this necessity, such as the US strategy to place the GCC instead of Iran as the region's most influential player, have not been successful. The IRI perceives Iran's value in this respect, as well as the US need to cooperate with it in order to solve its crisis in Iraq, for instance. The IRI has, in this recognition, shown a diminishing tendency to accept US pressure, for instance regarding its nuclear program. The lesson to be learned from the experience of the most geopolitical region in the world, the PG, is that in order to attain regional security it is imperative that the major regional and external players have suitable relations. No other alternative strategy would be able to fulfill regional and ultra regional interests and meet security concerns.

However, what Iran needs is coalition-building with the West to feature in its foreign policy. As Sariolghalam observes, "Iran's unique political ideology and foreign policy objectives prevents it from entering into meaningful coalition with other countries in its neighbourhood as well as in the entire Muslim World." Thus, the main way it can acquire technology, wealth, science and power in the contemporary world is via the

West.⁴⁰ This is why, as Sariolghalam continues, the IRI needs to reach a consensus on the issue of relation with the West. Only by doing so can Iran grow and develop economically, improve its global image, secure its national interests⁴¹; a matter that can pave the way for a stable CBM with the PG states too.

The antagonistic relationship of Iran and the West has provided the GCC with the opportunity to take advantage of Tehran's political isolation to sort the issue out in a way that benefited its members. For example, even Iran's territorial disputes became a leverage for the GCC in different political occasions. Before the revolution, the PG Arab states placed little emphasis on the islands dispute because of their similar Western orientation and the fear of the Shah who was supported by the US.⁴² After the revolution, however, the advent of the IRI's revolutionary rhetoric made them more frightened of Iran and so they increased their claims regarding the islands on different occasions as a leverage against Iran.

Hence, the lack of US-Iranian relations as the major regional and ultra regional powers in the PG has been a major obstacle to the establishment of a stable regional security system. This has resulted in more international pressure being put on Iran. This international pressure has helped the IRI to justify its domestic failure and to keep the country unified. Due to its geostrategic position, its Islamic political ideology, its energy resources and its nuclear program, Iran is currently at the forefront of international concerns. However, as Hourcade observes, being the focus of such attentions has made Iran work towards independence; its perception of the balance of power has made Iran become more confident that it will not be attacked by external players. This has also united the country against the West, making it harder for it to integrate with the rest of the world, the opposite of what the international

community would have liked. Iran is now protected from the imposition of heavy sanctions due to its building strong and efficient ties with several different countries, organisations and economic and oil lobbies.⁴³ In the interest and security of all, the need to have CBM between Iran and the West (especially the US) should therefore now be understood.

By applying the outcome of the previous chapters dealing with the different security concerns and different perceptions of regional and ultra-regional players of what constitutes a threat to regional security, in the next and the final chapter of the second part of this thesis, I will study the future shape of security arrangements in the PG that will address the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships that provide security.

Notes

¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1999), p. 21.

² Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974), p. 296.

³ Cordesman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-21.

⁴ Among many see, *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵ Sepehr Zabih (Jul., 1976), 'Iran policy toward the Persian Gulf', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 346.

⁶ Among many see, Shahram Chubin, 'Iran', in Avi Shlaim, Yezid Sayigh (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 226.

⁷ Zabih, Iran policy toward the Persian Gulf, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 347-349.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-352.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

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- ¹² Shahram Chubin (winter 1978), 'Iran's security in the 1980s', *International Security*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 53-54.
- ¹³ Chubin and Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Chubin, Iran's security in the 1980s, op. cit., pp.53-54.
- ¹⁶ Chubin, Iran, op. cit., pp. 228, 229.
- ¹⁷ Among many see, Adam Tarock (May, 1999), 'Iran-Western Europe relations on the mend', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 41.
- ¹⁸ Asaf Hussain, *Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter* (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1985), pp. 183-185.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 173.
- ²⁰ Among many see, ibid., pp. 176-179, 183.
- ²¹ See, ibid., pp. 179-191-193.
- ²² Among many see, ibid., pp. 196-197; also John Calabrese, *Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 7; and Chubin, 'Iran', op. cit., pp. 245, 247.
- ²³ 'Fun wars' was one of the US strategies which were in line with a policy statement spelled out by Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence, on 28 November 1984. According to this strategy, Washington would only engage militarily when absolutely necessary, and would fight its 'fun wars' through proxies. In consequence, the Gulf State Rapid Deployment Force was created. Hussain, op. cit., p. 179, cited from, Weinberger, 'Statement on the Gulf War', *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 1984.
- ²⁴ Fred Halliday (Mar. - Apr., 1983), 'Year IV of the Islamic Republic', *MERIP Reports*, no. 113, in Iran since the Revolution, p. 6, mentions, "Some of the infrastructure for the Rapid Deployment Force, such as new base facilities in eastern Turkey, (...) [were] clearly designed for possible intervention or covert activity in the event of civil war in Iran."
- ²⁵ For details see, Eric Hooglund (Jan.-Feb., 1989), 'The Islamic Republic at war and peace', *Middle East Report*, no. 156, Iran's Revolution Turns Ten, pp. 6-7.
- ²⁶ Shahram Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities. In Patrick Clawson (ed.) *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Institute For National Strategic Studies-National Defense University, 1994), p. 69.
- ²⁷ Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities, op. cit., pp. 65-71; also Calabrese, op. cit., p. 8.
- ²⁸ See, Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities, op. cit., p.67.
- ²⁹ See, ibid.; also Chubin, Iran, op. cit, p. 248.
- ³⁰ Tarock, op. cit, pp. 41-43; also Houman A. Sadri (April 1998) 'Trends in the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Iran', *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1. <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sadri.htm> (23 August 2006)
- ³¹ Chubin, Iran, op. cit., p. 247.
- ³² Sadri, op. cit.

³³ Jerrold D. Green, Iran and Gulf security. In David E. Long and Christian Koch (eds.), *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), p. 20.

³⁴ Chubin, Iran's military intentions and capabilities, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

³⁵ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 243.

³⁶ See, *ibid.*, also Asaf Hussain, op. cit., p. 194.

³⁷ Abbas Milani (2005, summer), 'US foreign policy and the future of democracy in Iran', *The Washington Quarterly* vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 41, 55.

³⁸ Analysts like Calabrese, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁹ Abbas Milani, op. cit., p.55.

⁴⁰ Mahmood Sariolghalam (2002, spring), 'Theoretical renewal in Iranian foreign policy (part II)', *Discourse; an Iranian Quarterly* vol. 3, no. 4, pp. II, 58.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Many documents in Iranian Foreign Ministry archive.

⁴³ Bernard Hourcade (May 2006), 'Iran's internal security challenges', in Walter Posch (ed.) *Iranian Challenges. Chaillot Paper (Institute for Security Studies-EU)* no. 89, p.45. <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai89.pdf> (13 June 2006)

Chapter 11

Shape of Security Arrangements in the PG

Introduction

The intention in this chapter is to provide a conceptual and analytical foundation for a discussion about the future shape of security arrangements in the PG in order to address the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships that provides security for all individual littoral states, as well as assuring the interests of the external powers. To this end, three fundamental schools of thought in international security will be briefly examined in order to explain the major strategic choices available to both the PG and the external powers' decision makers in a different international atmosphere. The schools of thought that will be explored are: the realist school, the neo-liberalism or the cooperative-security school, and the hegemonic or counterproliferation school.

By a historical and theoretical study of the security systems in the PG during the 1960s-1990s, the aim in this chapter is to identify the different models' elements of success and failure and suggest a more durable and pervasive system. Some key, intimate factors, such as inclusiveness (for all regional players), legitimacy and authority, will be investigated in order to cast light on the issues involved in creating a regional security regime.

The goal of the suggested system is that of any security system, namely to "be able to reduce, prevent, or meet potential threats"¹, or as Kraig expresses "to create a stable

and peaceful structure of relationships that allows every state to meet its minimum security needs and develop its economy and political institutions without at the same time increasing the level of threat toward its neighbors.”²

This chapter will also include a study of the failure of the existing security situation as well as a look at scholars’ diverging solutions to it. The objective is that doing so will make it possible to assess what a more ideal endpoint could be. Once the latter is achieved, it will be possible to suggest better future security arrangements, for instance one whose agenda is to manage relations between states, or whose grand strategy is the management and regulation of power.

The perception of what constitutes a threat to regional security varies among the Arabs, Iranians and the ultra regional powers, and all accordingly have different solutions to what they perceive is the problem. The West sees the potential use of force by regional players armed with WMDs, domestic instability, social and economic decline and terrorism as cause for grave concern. The regional PG states, on the other hand, are worried that their national sovereignty is under threat, via domestic problems and the danger of political instability which contributes to socio-political turmoil, or via external pressure. All the PG states are in different ways victims of non-regional states’ interventionist policies. Some have experienced invasions, others sanctions and some states have endured the presence of foreign forces, all of which have resulted in regional crises. Nevertheless, regardless of the relevant parties’ difference of opinion, all these issues along with three decades of crises in the PG illustrate how urgent it is for the problem regarding regional security to be resolved.

Thus to be able to analyse the determinant factors of a security system this study has drawn upon the level of analysis framework in international relations. As Steven

Spiegel also notes, a state's foreign policy, within a system of international politics, can be analysed on three levels. Doing so makes it possible to identify the forces that affect policy at each level. The implications of such identification can then be used to suggest ways in which innovative methods for attaining more stable regional relations can be developed. The first level, or the 'systemic' level, concerns the interaction between different states. At this level the nation-state is the central unit of analysis, which is driven by national interests, defined in terms of power. This means that the sovereign nation-state is the main factor to consider when an outline for security and stability is being drafted. This also means that national security is essentially "a relationship between the state and its external environment", according to Maoz,³ and thus that states' behaviour will partly depend on the international security system's structure.⁴ In the second and third levels, the 'domestic' and 'individual (leaders)' levels respectively, the domestic dimensions of stability are recognised. Indeed, based on the outcomes of previous chapters also according to many analysts the greatest dangers in the PG are the potential internal socioeconomic and political changes more than any other regional or non-regional aggression.⁵

All three levels of the PG states' foreign policies and the forces that affected them especially the debate that occurs at the domestic and individual levels, was studied in the previous chapters. However, using the level of analysis framework, it will be argued, as does Spiegel, that the best solution to the regional security problems in the ME, including its sub-region the PG, is through dialogue. That is, to promote unofficial, informal contacts and negotiations in creating a functional regional security arrangement,⁶ a matter that puts emphasis on soft, as opposed to sole, hard, power. Some analysts such as Kraig believe that such a strategy presents a good model for defence and economic policy. According to him, the proposal recommends

“a situation in which the financial and human capital of nations is used primarily for social, political, economic and spiritual development, rather than for military and security/police forces.” The proposed framework also addresses the question of legitimacy and authority, and sees them as inextricably linked to those of sustainability. It acknowledges that it needs regional states not to believe that the security framework is purposely disadvantageous to them and that if it is to last it must be supported by most, if not all, of those players involved. This is only possible if all parties concerned consider the security framework’s aims to be the attainment of mutually beneficial results.⁷

Security Theories

When faced with perceived threats from other states, the reactionary choices nation-states make (as units of international politics) determine the structure and the various institutions of the security system which will, in turn, define the options available to such states. To understand nation-states’ choices concerning the use of their power, whether political or military, to attain national security in response to threats from other states in various international systems (see table 11-1), three fundamental, competing schools of thought regarding the practice of international security will be examined here. The following study will attempt to define these schools of thought as well as evaluate some of their strengths and weaknesses.

Table 11-1

Security Models					
Unit Level: National Security Strategies					
	Unilateral Action		Multilateral Action		
Military means	Security-through-Strength		Alignment		Collective security "Humanitarian Intervention"
	Offensive Strength	Defensive Strength	Against power	Against threats	
Military means	Diplomacy Neutrality, Accommodation		Containment Trade		Arbitration
Systems Level: Structure and Institutions					
	Anarchy		International Society	World Order	
Military means	Balance-of Power		Alliances Confidence-building Arms control Security regimes	Collective security Peacekeeping	
	Parity	Mutual Defensive Superiority			
Military means	Common security		Cooperative Security Institutionalization	International Law "Democratic Peace" Integration	

Source: Bjørn Møller

Realpolitik/Realist school

The main assumption of (neo) realists is that states naturally prefer conflict rather than cooperation in their relationship. In such an atmosphere of anarchy, their behaviour is motivated by a desire for power and security, influenced by the key political players in the system with regard to their relative strength. As Møller notes, a system of international relations entirely based on either 'national self-help' [unilateral action] or 'collective self-help', where states create alliances against one another will unavoidably result in anarchy. Realists believe the main principle of order in such an anarchical environment is the balance of power, limited by how polarised the system is. This is especially dependent upon the number of factions within it and how closely integrated these camps or blocs are. Although realists will regard unipolarity to be at best a transitory stage, they will regard the distinction between bipolarity and multipolarity as central in a debate as to how best to achieve a balance of power. Whether the system becomes bipolar or multipolar will depend mainly on whether the

states attempt to achieve balance against absolute strength or against strength combined with hostile goals. Also, the level of conflict produced by the system will largely depend on which security approach is chosen.⁸

Realpolitik as a guideline for foreign policy is related to realism and can be considered as one of the foundations of realism. Realpolitik is the pragmatic notion that politics or diplomacy is based principally on practical considerations rather than ideological thoughts. It was, for example, a policy that Henry Kissinger introduced to the Nixon White House and was used to develop a new relationship with communist China.

Due to the emphasis in realpolitik on securing national interests via the most practical means, pursuing its directives can sometimes mean violating ideological principles. For instance, the US under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations supported authoritarian regimes in the ME/PG that violated human rights, such as the Shah in Iran and Saddam in Iraq; so that the US' national interest in the stability of this region was secured.

While supporters of realpolitik would consider actions such as these defensible under the restrictions of practical reality rather than a fixed set of rules, political ideologues describe such attitude as amoral. According to the latter group, realpolitik is a selfish search of national interest in a well calculated play of power to which ethical norms are inappropriate. The political ideologues which prefer principled action over all other considerations usually reject any compromises and accept failing to achieve their short-term political gains in favour of adhering to principles.⁹

As mentioned earlier, *realpolitik* can be regarded as one of the foundations of realism because they both implicate power politics and concentrate on the balance of power among nation-states. They act in one direction with two different tasks. Realism acts like a theoretical paradigm which provides a description and prediction of international relations, while *realpolitik* is a normative outline for policy-making. As Kraig notes, *realpolitik* prescribes diplomacy on the basis of military threats but it never ignores other sovereign states' core national interests or security concerns. It also recognises commonalities as well as areas of competition for all nation-states and rejects any definition of allies and enemies on a permanent basis. Such kinds of *realpolitik* diplomacy were developed during 1648-1789, the years of nation-state development in Europe, prior to the French Revolution. During this period, most competition was centred round expansion and the reinforcement of the state with little connection with people. National expansion was not ideologically motivated but mainly pragmatic. However, traditional *realpolitik* started to dissipate as radically diverse ideologies and value systems between nation-states began to emerge in Western Europe, with a wide range of mutual misperceptions about security. This worsened when those states that wanted to secure some relative advantage over their rivals were able to guarantee security via traditional methods of weakening or eliminating the rivals, while as Kraig notes, "the conflicting value systems made cooperative efforts look too costly and even immoral." In addition, in the nineteenth century, the activities of the growing number of sub-national or trans-national actors (many of whom were part of ethnic nationalist movements and terrorist groups), subverted the strong sovereign control that is essential for a security system based on principles of balance of power to be rational. When this occurred during WWI it

resulted in greater interstate competition between the Great Powers and eventually undermined the use of power balancing as a conflict-management mechanism.¹⁰

While in general a balance of power signifies parity or stability between competing forces, as a term in international law it also expresses intention to prevent any one nation from becoming strong enough to compel the others to obey its political agenda.¹¹ According to the traditional balance of power logic, Conflict management operates best under some particular circumstances. According to Kraig, nation-states should define national security and stability in kind (according to their common values and interests) and should rely on their rivals to respect the system and the independence of all other states more than their interest in spreading their doctrine or ideologies. The central role of the sovereign states is not undermined because of the existence of the trans-national or intra-national movements. Eventually, by applying stable domestic and foreign policies states will be able to prevent radical changes in ideology from effecting foreign policy. This is a major element that allows mutual trust to build up and to pave the way for stable confidence building measures.¹²

With these considerations in mind, as well as the different political ideologies and foreign policy objectives of the PG states, the major factor of balance of power cannot be ignored in any PG security system.

Hegemonic or Counterproliferation School

Another strategy for regional security is provided by the hegemonic or counterproliferation school. This school justifies the operational use of military and economic instruments to achieve the interests of one state or one set of states over the others, through compliance and deterrence. This is a strategy the US is pursuing,

based on a network of friends and allies who greatly share the US' foreign policy goals. In this regard, confronting new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the US seeks to further strengthen and adapt its Cold War security relationship with its allies to establish new security relationships.

Different tools for implementing this kind of strategy have been introduced, such as export control (especially the denial of technology to the developing world), methods of deterrence including high technology and powerful military equipment (e.g. nuclear arsenal), and proactive techniques of defence based on pre-emptive strikes and reactive measures. The main aim of Washington national security planning has been to improve the implementation of this strategy by applying such methods.¹³

As Kraig remarks, there is some similarity between the hegemonic strategy and the mercantilism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, based on the belief that traditional alliances would guarantee the collective security for them and their friends and allies. According to this vision of international politics, a selective globalisation of the free market was necessary while developing countries were being denied dual-use commercial advances with military applications with the intention of gaining political or military power. Therefore, security was only seen in terms of cooperation of allies in their joint military and economic relations against their enemies, who were perceived stubborn and impossible to integrate within the hegemonic security framework. To summarise, in the hegemonic or counterproliferation theory, diplomatic relations is defined largely in terms of bilateral and selectively multilateral relationships between friends and allies. For the US, for instance, such relationships in the ME have been formed with Israel and the GCC. Similarly with the balance of power principle, this theory depends on both the explicit and implicit use of threats.

However, unlike traditional realpolitik, as Kraig notes, “the goal of these threats is not to establish a roughly equal balance among all sovereign actors but rather to consolidate economic and military supremacy among friends and allies.” Under this framework also there is no attempt to build conceptual bridges between their ideologies and those of their enemies but rather an explicit attempt to make their interests and those of their allies predominant.¹⁴

Cooperative School

The last and most relevant school of thought to be considered regarding the output of this study is neo-liberalism or cooperative theory. According to this school of thought cooperation is possible and will occur when states calculate that it is in their best interest. There is no argument between neo-realists and neo-liberalists that the state is a rational, unitary actor driven by its interests; however their disagreement is centred round the nature of states and their interests.¹⁵ The neo-liberal’s reason for feasibility of cooperation among states is that they believe states are motivated by their interest in wealth and are concerned with absolute and not relative gains.¹⁶

Moreover, while the liberals emphasise the significant role institutions can play in negotiations, the realists see them as an extension of a state’s interest. Hence, according to Spiegel, neo-realism seems to have the best conceptual resources to explain modern ME history. However, while in neo-realism much of the focus for achieving security is on predicting conflict rather than cooperation, neo-liberalism suggests the theoretical possibility of the prospect of cooperation through institutions as a way that the creation and acceptance of cooperative norms will influence states’ interests. The various approaches discussed here emphasise the importance of

providing solutions for security concerns, and at the same time, an attempt is needed to create an environment encouraging cooperation.¹⁷

The main hypothesis of the cooperative-security school of thought is that it is not only a nation-state's friends and allies who should participate in security arrangements. This school's fundamental tenet is that, "all nation-states will find greater relative security through mutual obligations to limit their military capabilities rather than through unilateral or allied attempts to gain dominance." The thesis works via some assumptions such as, all nation-states (friends and foes alike), despite the existence of considerable mutual mistrust, will accept the terms of these proposed mutual obligations, and also, that such obligations will be mutually advantageous and verifiable. Therefore, according to this school of thought, security can be obtained only through the outlawing of policies that aim to achieve inter-state dominance.¹⁸

The most important strategic problem facing the theory, according to the Brookings study group, is reassurance and not deterrence as in the Cold War. In order to achieve the reassurance between sovereign states to address their national security, cooperation must first be instigated and then maintained. Therefore, the key to reassurance is a reliable normative and institutional structure. Achieving such kind of cooperation depends variously on economic incentives and inducements, political legitimacy, threats against bad behaviour such as the imposition of sanctions, and a sort of inclusiveness that rewards nation-states for their involvement and continued compliance.¹⁹ To summarise, according to the cooperative-security framework, due to the globalisation of social and economic trends, security is increasingly clarified as a collective good. Therefore, nation-states can not be divided into the categories of 'friends' and 'enemies' but, rather should all be treated as mutual partners struggling

to achieve mutual security, even when different states are ideologically radically different.²⁰

The differences and similarities of these theories has been summarised by Kraig as follows: proponents of traditional realpolitik consider international security to be a balance of interests based on a rough balance of power, whereas the more recent US strategic model is based on an imbalance of power and interests (hegemony) and on the use of both offensive and defensive threats. According to neo-liberals however the cooperative model can be considered as a balance of interests based upon mutual reassurance. Nonetheless, despite the similarity of realpolitik and cooperative in that both strategies advocate the importance of brokering a balance of interests, they differ in their preferred model of guaranteeing this balance. The realpolitik relies to a great extent on implicit military and economic threats (and temporary alliances to build up power), while the cooperative theory relies on promises and reassurances as firm and impenetrable factors. Nevertheless, both of these schools are quite different to the evolving US hegemony strategy which is increasingly focused on establishing a unitary and dominant value system based on a network of friends and allies in keeping with US foreign policy objectives. The hegemonic approach assumes no possibility for competitors with different goals and values, while the realpolitik and cooperative security models believe that each nation-states' national interests should be guaranteed at some minimal level. In addition, the cooperative school of thought shares some of its theoretical assumptions with realism, e.g. requiring a set of geopolitical circumstances. For instance, they both assume that the primary actor is the sovereign state and that such states will be domestically stable, immune from the sort of domestic turmoil evident in Iran's 1979 revolution, and therefore the mutual agreements ordering relations would remain stable.²¹

Thus in order to achieve durable security it is necessary to design a security model that will be able to give such basic assurances to all its members. The security model should construe the gains it aims to achieve as mutual gains for all participants, not as gains for one particular player, or set of players, and thereby be able to assure that remaining in the system will be in all the relevant parties' interests. The model should also be immune to any internal turmoil or changes (in this particular case) to the littoral states. With these constraints in mind, as well as the results of the previous study of security theories and those of a forthcoming study in these models' history in the PG, an attempt will be made to suggest and develop an appropriate model for security in the region.

Persian Gulf's Security Systems

The present aim of this study is to attempt to create a comprehensive strategy for peace and stability in the PG. In order to do this the relative strengths and weaknesses of the three theories as well as the various historical challenges in applying the frameworks to the PG security environment need to be assessed.

In the period between the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's departure from the ME, the security system in the PG was founded on realpolitik's balance-of-power principle. The security system at this time worked due to a number of factors. First, the complex policies pursued by Britain included the application of the policy which stated that 'to dominate a region it is necessary to weaken regional powers'. As explained earlier (chapter six, also Appendix-2), for this reason Iran's efforts to establish power in the PG were totally unacceptable to and annulled by Britain. Britain severely vetoed every action, measure, or proposal by Iran to establish a navy for security in the PG. Second, Britain combined consolidating its military superiority

in the region by placing troops in well chosen bases, supported by offshore naval forces and the secondment of officers in key areas, with the installation of proxy regimes, which thus created and supported friendly governments in this region. Third, the Sheikhs were at this time ready to welcome the help and support of Britain in making the political changes that led towards the establishment of their new countries, despite London's action in keeping competition among them within limits.²²

Following Britain's departure, the PG region, particularly because of its huge oil reserves, became a platform on which the feuding Cold War powers could compete. Competing for control over this geopolitical region, the US assumed the role of regional security guarantor from the British, and could thereby take over the role of security manager of the region. Nevertheless, numerous attempts to find an effective regional security arrangement after the British departure were ended ineffectually. At first the US followed its containment policy against the USSR by supporting the Baghdad Pact (1955-58); however the 1958 military coup in Iraq converted such formal alignment to bilateral ties and agreements between the US and every state in the region. From the late 1960s through the late 1970s, seeking to maintain regional stability, the US persisted in a realpolitik strategy of attempting to support a rough balance of military power between the most dominant powers in the region, Iran and Iraq. Iran as the military pillar of Nixon's doctrine was supported by the US against the socialist, anti-Western Iraq. Nixon's 'Twin-Pillar' or the strategy of local hegemony with US dependence on local powers did not work; however, this was mainly due to the US' underestimation of the domestic side of security. The lack of the US' regional allies' political legitimacy due to their carelessness about domestic developments and political reforms was in large part responsible for security failure in this region. Hence, as Kraig notes, the strategy of local hegemony which eventually

led to Iran's revolution in 1979 and later to the terrorist attacks of Saudi citizens on the US in September 11th, 2001 also failed. Consequently, the factor of legitimacy is essential for establishing any new PG security order, as is the awareness that a strategy based on structures of power, particularly when one relies on local military powers that are prone to fail or change, is bound to be unsuccessful.²³

Following the Iranian revolution of 1979 which effectively removed one of the 'pillars' of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine, and also the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, US policy for PG security became based on what was to become known as the 'Carter doctrine'. According to this strategy, Washington would resist any outside forces' attempts to gain control over the PG and its oil flow.

During the 1980s, the US aim was to achieve, as Kraig remarks, 'a pure balance of power' in order to keep the peace, by limiting both Iran and Iraq from growing too powerful. This included the support of Baghdad in its war with Tehran in order to prevent the emergence of revolutionary Iran as the local hegemony, also providing immediate security to the newly established GCC. Simultaneously, because of the military weakness of the GCC states and its ideological opposition with socialist, anti-Western Iraq (and hence the lack of a strong pro-West pillar fill the place of the Shah), the US was convinced to be drawn more directly into the region. Therefore, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established and Washington invested in regional military bases. Regarding the RDF, in 1983, a new US Central Command (US CENTCOM) was established by the Reagan administration to project power and command, particularly regarding the US who were ill-prepared to project power in the PG. RDF, as its central base, was extended from East Mediterranean to Pakistan and from the shared Turkish and Iraq borders (NATO frontiers) in the North to the

African Horn region in the South with Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. Besides the US most major nuclear facilities in Western Europe under NATO command, these weapons were also deployed to the ME and the PG region (South West Asia) under US central command. As Nassar adds to this issue, “these weapons had been deployed with the full consent and approval of European countries, whereas these weapons can be deployed at any time in South West Asia (...) without any agreement concluded with the countries concerned.”²⁴ Regarding the regional military bases, though the GCC states that while US military help in the event of absolute emergencies was highly esteemed, they were not interested in institutionalising a US military role, preferring whenever possible to take advantage of diplomatic manoeuvring, including providing financial aid to thwart any potential threats. Being aware of their military weakness and comparatively small population, the GCC (with the exception of Oman) was pleased that the RDF was located ‘over the horizon’, believing that a direct US military presence in the region could provoke the anger of Iran, Iraq and several other Arab states as well as arguably the USSR. Therefore, none of the GCC members took part in any official agreement with the US over defence until two events which resulted in volatility of the region in the period between the early 1980s and 1990s, viz. the war on tankers and the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait. The US, which had little physical or institutional involvement in regional defence schemes, responded to the former with a reflagging operation and embarked on direct military activity by escorting GCC tankers carrying a US flag. Nevertheless, the operation, which was an escalation in terms of intervention and was sanctioned by the UN Security Council and the participation of other Western states, convinced both the US and Kuwait (which had initiated the idea) to take steps to characterise the operation as merely an international policing activity rather than US defence of GCC

stases. Therefore, the reflagging operation with a wide international dimensions and a very limited GCC states' assistance was not a new kind of US-GCC alliance but rather a limited US military operation.²⁵

Disadvantages of US Strategy in 1980s: There were several disadvantages to the US' use of the balance-of-power strategy in the PG. First, ignoring Iran's security concerns and national interests as the major regional player resulted in not only the failure of the US PG security system but also compelled Iran to take a more radical approach to a foreign policy that placed more emphasis on military empowerment. Second, as Kraig also notes, the strategy authorised Iraq to proliferate offensive military power and entailed ignoring Iraqi human-rights transgressions, including the replacement of WMDs.

Until 1990 the US had stuck to a strategy of maintaining a low cost security system in the PG. Until then it had relied merely on a naval presence and on its regional allies, mainly the GCC and, to some extent, Iraq. However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 indicated the failure of this policy. In contrast to previous situations, in a direct reaction to Iraq's invasion and the growing threat to Saudi Arabia, the US assumed its new role as main military defender in the region. This security approach was not welcomed by the GCC and included extensive forward basing and regular military engagements of US forces that sometimes turned into significant deployments. However, it was the GCC's best choice since none of its allies in the Arab World could offer help.

As mentioned earlier the additional factor resulting in Washington changing its strategy and causing the US' reflagging operation was the war on tankers that was initiated by Iraq²⁶ and resulted in Iran's escalating its attacks on shipping serving

Arab ports in the PG. Furthermore, according to some sources,²⁷ the invasion of Kuwait was the consequence of the US green light to Iraq to do so. Arguably then, both of the 'reasons' for an increased US military role had been part of a US premeditated and engineered scheme. In any case, regardless of whether these speculations seem logical and consistent, by the end of the 'Desert Storm' operation, the US was practically the major military force in the region.²⁸

Shortly after 'Desert Storm', the 1991 'Damascus Declaration' (an US encouraged treaty which entrusted GCC land defences to Syrian and Egyptian infantry and armoured divisions) was signed to show that the US did not seek to be the dominant force in all the PG defences. However, the GCC states were not eager to accept the declaration, since they did not trust Egypt and Syria, politically and militarily. This meant that Washington was able to sign several different military agreements with GCC states and looked enthusiastic to accept its new role of offering security and selling arms. These military treaties were different, there was not any US-GCC pact, and Washington had to deal with each state separately and with varying success. However, for instance, while Saudi Arabia decided not to make an official agreement with the US (because of some technical problems with Washington as well as fear of the consequences of angering Iran and Syria), Kuwait did (following it up with pacts with Britain and France), as did Bahrain.²⁹

Despite stationing several thousand infantry and armoured forces in the PG, US forces mainly relied on air power. However, although this strategy had been successful in operation 'Desert Storm', the use of such air power demonstrated major deficiencies that US military power in the region was faced with. The importance of physical occupation was realised, whether for a conclusive victory in battles or to bring about

the political change Washington saw as necessary to prevent future threats in the region. This shortcoming, however, was overcome later by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, shortly after operation 'Desert Storm', the new strategy of 'Dual Containment' marked US distance from reliance on regional allies via the balance-of-power doctrine, and moving towards its more muscular regional attendance. Washington's strategy of 'Dual Containment', to some extent a response to the deficiencies that were made evident during the Kuwait crisis, sought during the Clinton administration to replace Saddam Hussein, establish a new government in Iraq and to force Iran to change its foreign policy through military and economic sanctions. It also included the new military agreements with the GCC states (despite their inability to operate their previous less sophisticated arms which were bought) with whom the US now entered into increased arm sales to equip some pro-US local military, to use them as supplemental weaponries to US forces. Since 1991 in particular, due to the removal of Soviet threats to Europe and East Asia the PG region has become the centre stage in terms of US strategic thinking and force planning. Therefore, the new strategy of both Iran and Iraq containment also indicated that a large portion of total US military operating, force-structure, and investment costs were devoted to military issues in the PG. Consequently, these developments signified a growing interdependent US-GCC relationship which before 1990 had largely been a potential alliance, but since then has been implemented as a very real and strategically crucial one for both sides.³⁰

After 'Desert Storm', besides military protection, the GCC's other expectation concerning its military pacts with Washington was that the US would make some efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order that the PLO and Syria would not be angered by this newly implemented alliance or seek retribution against the GCC

states. In response to this, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had initiated a multilateral security approach known as the 'Madrid process', which included producing a practical Israeli-Palestinian peace process among its goals.

However, in the second half of the 1990s, by the fading of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the US bombing raids in response to Saddam's not completely cooperative attitude towards the UN inspection regime, the new US security approach failed to achieve its major objectives. In particular, the cooperative mode of GCC with the US evolved to a more critical position. This was especially due to Egyptian and Syrian anger with Washington which inspired the GCC states to seek additional security (in the events of a new crisis with Iraq) cooperation with these two countries and Iran. The other reason was that the US bombing raids, which were very unpopular in the whole Arab world, caused great sympathy in both Iraqis' and other Arab states' public opinion, who felt for the Iraqi people's suffering because of UN sanctions. Moreover, there was a growing criticism and voiced concerns from many regional intellectuals, journalists and others who felt that in addition to the costly US presence for the GCC states, the crisis in Iraq was only helping to establish US dominance in the PG. These factors convinced the GCC states to seek Washington military intervention only in times of need, believing that by seeking supplemental security cooperation with the assistance of Egypt, Syria and Iran, and led by President Khatami tensions in the region would dissipate.³¹

Disadvantages of US Security Strategy in the 1990s: During the 1990s, the occurrence of some intra-regional developments undermined the US security system in the PG. In the case of the GCC, Qatar emerged as an independent player. This shook up the kaleidoscope of relationships within the GCC six-member grouping. More

importantly, Iran gradually moved towards receiving a more moderate security approach, although still with the stipulation of Tehran's expectation that Iran was to be recognised as the natural regional hegemony. Iran's regional policy of *détente* was accompanied by some of its domestic democratic developments, including its democratic elections. Consequently, the dual containment policy began to look futile as on the one hand, Iran's moderation brought hopes that at least cooperative measures such as CBM could be established between the GCC and Iran, and on the other Washington failed to contain Iraq, the immediate threat to the region.³²

In the post-Cold War world, the security arrangement under the desired US unipolar system did not work for a number of reasons. While Europe was mostly hospitable to American forces after WWII and during the Cold War, the PG was not.³³ Neither was the PG as hospitable to American forces as it was to Britain before its departure in 1971. It was also a mistake to exclude key players, viz. Iran and Iraq, from security arrangements in the most geopolitical significant region in the world. In order to attain peace in such circumstances one needs good relations between the strongest global and regional players, in particular Iran. Moreover, the US military presence was costly,³⁴ dysfunctional and shifted from being reliant on regional allies to a more immediate presence. The dual containment policy which was designed to strangle Iran via economic sanctions was largely unfeasible, as some GCC members as well as European and Asian countries continued and even extended their economic ties with Iran in the absence of the American companies. In addition, many security problems of the GCC were internal and mostly connected to potential foreign threats or to a local reaction to their governments' cooperation with the US. Thereby, since 'Desert Storm' these states have been harassed by local opposition and terrorism, in particular from religious extremists. Furthermore, GCC states which suffered from inter-state

disputes and differences (especially regarding non-demarcated borderlines and security cooperation with Iran) also had serious concerns about the backlash of dissatisfaction from Arab states such as Egypt and Syria regarding their alliance with the US, or that they would be left unsupported in times of need. Washington was unable and also was not asked by GCC governments to deal with their domestic issues, while Egypt, Syria and Iran's contribution to make domestic and inter-group problems easier and to cooperate for the sake of regional security, in particular as a way to counter Iraq, was welcomed. Hence, there was a great divergence in the threat perceptions of the GCC and the US, as among GCC states themselves. These were some important diversities and variations which were not considered in the simplistic dual containment strategy.³⁵

Furthermore, as Kraig explains, the Madrid process had various structural problems and so was unable to tackle any of these concerns. It too was founded on a selectively multilateral approach of collective security relying on friends and allies to provide security for the whole region; thus it suffered from the systematic exclusion of key regional players, viz. Iran and Syria. Furthermore, it was part of a US foreign policy that was overly focused on military strategy and tactics rather than on a consistent political scheme for the PG as a ME's sub-region. The Madrid process' only political objective was to broker peace between the Israelis and Palestinians as the answer to all problems in the ME, including the PG. However, such assumption left the political and security questions in the PG unanswered and no political structure for a contained Iraq and Iran was drawn, except the continuance of relying on military tools as well as economic strangulation as the strong option to bring down regimes in Tehran and Baghdad. It was a quite different manner to regional security in Europe during and after the Cold War, in which security was brokered by a combination of military

means in the form of NATO, and extremely strong and inclusive political and economic frameworks to create a system based upon common norms, institutions and the rule of law.

Similarly, despite the successful experience of applying the Marshall Plan for Europe after WWII, the defeat of Iraq in 1991 only resulted in bilateral defence pacts. This process weakened any potential regional security interdependency and in contrast increased the security dependence of the GCC on the US. Moreover, domestic issues of the GCC, as the rulers' major security problem, were neglected with no consideration. From the military point of view too, the US security strategy in the ME had structural problems. From the three major goals of the US Pentagon for security in this region, namely: improving the capabilities of the RDF through bilateral defence-cooperation agreements, strengthening the local defence capabilities of GCC states, and promoting intra-GCC cooperation, only the first easy goal was accomplished. These failures in US strategy have had several repercussions. Besides the inherent regional geopolitical dynamics, they too have been responsible for the maintenance of traditional notions of realpolitik to form the political agenda among the littoral states. Consecutively, these states have stuck to the security calculus of a rough balance of power and thus continue to rely on external powers (e.g. the US, China and Russia), sometimes by proxy like via the importation of weapons technology and in some other cases via actual US military deployments, to defend their sovereignty, regimes' permanence and domestic identity.³⁶ In addition, it is very likely, if not definite, that the surge in active US military deployments since the early 1990s has radicalised many against the US and thus indirectly contributed to the attacks of 9/11.

Present Security Problems of the Key Players in the Persian Gulf

The United States: The US approach of hegemony to security is increasingly focused on ensuring a stable and pro-Western system via the establishment of a commanding value system which includes promoting regional political change. So the start of the twenty first century has seen the US attempting to broker security in the PG by putting in place an extensive, growing military presence. On the one hand, this presence was motivated by the US understanding that over-the horizon intervention had failed to be a strong enough deterrent. On the other hand, it was motivated by its national interests and its foreign policy goals. Economically speaking, the US arms market profits from this stance. Furthermore, the US needs a well integrated world economy and the latter depends on stable oil supplies, and suppliers, including via impeding the development of WMDs by those regimes that may threaten PG oil flow. Politically speaking, the stance helps bring about its hegemony in the international system and assures its own domestic security.³⁷

Despite the failure of its security policy, the US is still trying to convince the GCC to continue to be reliant on the US security umbrella and to purchase US arms. However, as in the inter-World-War period in Europe, the absence of an inclusive security arrangement has only made the possibility of insecurity and warfare look more likely. This means that the Arabs have been made dependent on a security arrangement they consider increasingly unreliable.³⁸

However, Washington faces a strategic dilemma: it wants to secure its national interests and its need for a well integrated world economy; however, in doing so it has not chosen the best options; a combination of a costly and dangerous military strategy and supporting the weakest and politically least stable of the three regional powers in

the PG. Further political discontent and radicalism within the GCC also pose a direct threat to US national security. Both are fuelled by US support for Israel and regional dictatorial regimes as well as by the socioeconomic woes that grip the region. The current US military presence in the PG only fans the flames of such discontent and since September 2001 it has become obvious that, as well as being very expensive, the US strategy in the PG has caused dangers to its homeland security to have become very real and immediate.³⁹

It also puts into danger whatever remaining regional allies the US has left, especially Saudi Arabia. Hence, although as Rathmell [et al] argue, “the United States does not have the option of withdrawing from the Gulf as the British did 30 years ago,” Washington does have some alternative options available, and which it should take. For instance, it could pursue a comprehensive political strategy to broker CBM with Iran (with whom it is the only nation in the PG not to have relations). Iran is a key regional player with direct interests and security concerns in both its very long western and eastern borders with Iraq and Afghanistan, and so having CBM with it could help engender a situation where the US could more easily withdraw from the region. Such a political process between two adversary countries is likely to take time; however, not pursuing this option would have far greater long-term negative consequences for the US. This is especially true for a number of reasons:

Firstly, Iran’s influence is rising due to the US removal of its local enemies, namely Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, an influence which was always large due to its advantageous geopolitical position. It is thus unlikely that Iran will easily surrender when it feels under threat. Secondly, although the Arab PG states feel under threat by Iran, the latter is unlikely to present a real threat, particularly if it is included in a

comprehensive regional security apparatus. Thirdly, the Arab PG states are unenthusiastic about putting their security solely in the hands of the US and their leaders have recently supported the idea of a collective security arrangement for the region that includes Iran (as voiced, for instance, by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in Bahrain) and are growing more and more frustrated with US reluctance to have any dealing whatsoever with the Iranians. Furthermore, the recent US invasion of Iraq has led to much regional anti-US sentiment that has put Arab leaders under a great deal of domestic pressure to discontinue their US security alliance. In addition, there is a great fear of a US-Iran battle which would overflow into the Arab countries.

Finally, Iraq's internal crisis has had a considerable impact on the GCC who now face the serious possibility of a shift in the political balance of power between the Sunnis and Shiites by losing the Eastern flank of the Arab world through Iraq's conversion to a Shiite state and becoming Iran's ally. Due to its geopolitical features, Iraq will always be both politically ambitious and a major player in the Arab world as well as the PG, regardless of who rules it. This fact, together with the deep insecurities felt by Iraq about its geopolitical restriction in the PG and the fact that actual and potential enemies sit astride its oil export routes, all encourage the GCC to deal with Iran in a more peaceful manner in the interests of maintaining a balance of power.

Therefore, Washington does not really have a choice as to whether to postpone or deny its need to enter into positive dialogue with Tehran. The US also needs to invest in a less expensive and more sustainable PG security system that promotes, rather than resists, political change. It is uncertain how political change is best achieved;

however, it is clear that the worst way to decrease tension and radicalism is the US strategy of putting pressure on the region's rulers to develop domestically.

Iran: Iran desires to be recognised as a regional power (a position it feels has been ignored) and to play its role accordingly. It has the capability of posing a sea-denial threat in the PG and could develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, despite the US confrontational policy, the West's concern regarding Tehran's threat to regional stability by, for instance, spreading its revolution, and the GCC's fear of Iranian ambitions is unfounded; some analysts, such as Rathmell [et al] feel it is unlikely to present a threat at all, depending on its role in the security system. This is because the PG is the major lifeline of Iran's economy and so requires its stability. Also, the future of US security policy in the PG looks uncertain, both to Iran and the Arabs in the southern peninsula who along with the Arab World in general question the US role and intentions in the region.

The GCC: The GCC's concerns are: its weakness to defend itself, what the impacts of a direct US presence will be, and what Iran's ambitions are (i.e. will it pursue a policy of expansionism, or develop nuclear weapons?) and what the impact of Iraq's internal crisis will be on its political as well as socio-economic situation, especially as regards terrorism. The GCC also fears the introduction of a rival democratic system and the shift in the political balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites. Finally, it questions the competence of foreign powers in their dealing in the region, including the US, with whom it originally wanted to keep an "over the horizon" relationship and who is still the *de facto* partner in the PG security arrangements.⁴⁰

Strategic Conditions of the Persian Gulf

The PG has some strategic properties which affect how successful a security system will be, and which have not been effectively dealt with in the attempt to construct a new and viable multilateral PG framework for security. These properties are as follows:

First of all, the PG is made up of three poles, namely Saudi Arabia with the GCC, Iran, and Iraq, which all need to be taken into account when designing a lasting security system. None of these countries, including Saudi Arabia, is happy with the existing balance of power which is kept in check by the threat of American intervention. The relationship between the three poles is asymmetric, with Iran's geography and population giving it a naturally dominant position and strategic depth. Though Iraq was able to compete with Iran in the 1970s and 1980s, this was only via an unsustainable and oppressive militarisation of its people and economy as well as through help from the GCC and the great powers during its eight-year war with Iran. The GCC is powerful from a financial point of view (largely acquired from oil revenues), but it has been unable to turn this strength into the strategic leverage necessary to balance Iran or Iraq. The asymmetrical dynamic that exists in the PG has meant that it has been along the lines of *realpolitik*. However this has been done in a situation where it is impossible to find balance and a general acceptance of the *status quo*, and this has meant that the region has remained insecure and dangerous to its people and the rest of the world.⁴¹

Secondly, the new global security thinking of cooperation which indicates the decline of traditional realist perceptions of international relations and an end to zero-sum notion of national security is difficult to implement in the PG. This security thinking

was initiated by the USSR President Gorbachev for arms control in the late 1980s and coincided with some Western definitions of security, evidenced in cooperative security theories with an emphasis on economic and political legitimacy. Cooperative security system succeeded in Europe, East Asia and Latin America during the 1990s mainly because these systems were supported with political transformation, meaningful reform and, thus, stability, a necessary political element which is missing in the PG. This has meant that despite some debates regarding a regional cooperative security system in the mid-1990s, it was not taken seriously. Therefore, the balance of power in the PG has remained unstable. None of the three major PG players, including the GCC (as a cooperative organisation), have displayed a functional interest in cooperating with the other two. So, while the US was able to depend more on an organic regional progress in lieu of mere military force in its security manners in Europe, East Asia and Latin America, the contextual aspects of the PG have made this impossible.⁴²

Despite these issues, as well as those regarding potential American unwillingness to do so, there are some good reasons in favour of establishing a regional multilateral security arrangement. These reasons include, as Kraig observes, the comprehensive failure of different unilateral or selective bilateral or multilateral security frameworks in the PG via the foreign power intervention, as well as the systematic exclusion, economic and military, of major state and non-state actors from the prevailing security mandate. Furthermore, it is conceptually impossible to have a system that is considered to legitimately be in all the involved parties' interests when its strategy is to create a coalition whose existence is defined in terms of being opposed to one or more of those involved parties.

However, Kraig also has similar views to those of Sariolghalam, who has serious misgivings about the possibility of Iran entering into coalition (cooperative)-building with the GCC, because of different cultural, ideological and political differences. As Kraig also mentions, it seems that the preferred form of achieving stability and security is not via a multilateral coalition in the PG, but via a two-party coalition across regions' bilateral agreements with an outside power (based on the hegemonic principles or on traditional *realpolitik*).⁴³ Hence, regional multilateralism only plays a secondary role in PG security. For instance, the GCC, qua multilateral organisation, does not have the necessary expansion potential via its membership or the organisation's authorisation to be able to be the basis for a new PG security arrangement. Firstly, its too exclusionist character does not allow for easy expansion (to include Iraq, Iran and Turkey, for instance), unlike analogous European organisations. The GCC is limited to Arab monarchies with mostly similar domestic structures and foreign policies who share similar interactions with the US. Other similarities among the GCC members is that they all see Islamic fundamentalism a threat, widely agree about the intra-GCC trade expansion, and share similar political alignments both with other PG and non-PG countries. However, despite their similarities, GCC states have often been engaged in arms buying as a means to deter and balance one another or as a way to obtain leverage within the organisation. Unlike NATO in Europe during the Cold War, which was able to harmonise and conduct its different countries' military capabilities towards a collective and overarching political objective, such integration in the case of the GCC states looks to have limited potential. While GCC states may have established viable deterrents against each other and Iran, they have not done so with regard to other potential foes and remain a net consumer, as opposed to net producer, of security.⁴⁴ Under such conditions, it is hard

to accept that the GCC can have a serious role in a regional collective cooperation model for the PG.

Secondly, reconciling the GCC's relatively new nation-states for a greater authorisation of this organisation is debatable. Consensus on such strong multilateral security organisation requires conceding some of their sovereignty over diplomatic, economic and military affairs. It also requires much liberalisation and transparency and GCC states are less than enthusiastic to join a wide cooperative effort that would give every member the power to oversee and influence the domestic issues of other members, and thereby lose control over information, finance and defence choices. Generally speaking, it is GCC states' fragile political base along with an emerging sense of each state's national identity that have thus far alleviated attempts to cooperate more productively in different fields of foreign policy. Thereby, economic and military levers have thus remained largely under these states' sovereign control rather than applying them through a joint plan for action. Moreover, the reliance of each member of the GCC (instead of the whole organisation) on outside powers has been to the benefit of cooperating partners, especially the smaller ones, at the regional level when dealing with large nation-states. Accordingly, due to the relative deficiency of technology and industry and in some cases population among many ME countries, it would be impossible to deal with crises without considerable contributions from external powers.⁴⁵

Other studies, such as the Bertelsmann group, also highlight the importance of foreign actors' contribution to ensure security in the PG, due to the enormous amount of mutual suspicion in the region. However, the Bertelsmann group, while emphasising a positive contribution of foreign actors, stresses the necessity of reducing the foreign

military presence in the region where the main responsibility for establishing a new approach to PG security should be on regional states. However the problem as this study explains is that:

Regional actors do not share a common threat perception, let alone a joint approach to regional security. They have tended to view interaction as a zero-sum game, and their relations have almost exclusively been conducted on a bilateral basis. A shared approach to regional security has never emerged and multilateral designs have never been seriously considered.⁴⁶

US hegemonic power in the region, Kraig notes, significantly contributes to such a network of merely bilateral relationships. It signifies that in any future PG security plan, US actions should be taken into account, a matter that could easily become a prohibitive factor and de-motivate the spending of large amounts of political or financial capital in constructing a security model when Washington gets what it wants through bilateral regardless. In addition, there is not any certainty about the US trend for multilateral local cooperation in the economic fields; evidently it is in its interests to sustain oil prices as low as possible. Cooperation in the PG would result in its attaining more economic power, particularly if an independent regional energy organisation was established. Such regional cooperation has been successfully experienced in Europe, where the US goals have been to promote a strong side by side EU and NATO for concurrent growth of economic and military power. Yet, there is not any resemblance between US goals in Europe and its goals in the PG. However, without greater economic cooperations between littoral states, a basis for stronger security interactions in the PG does not seem to be approaching. In order for there to be regional security, the US has to prepare for higher oil prices; a question which examines Washington's security strategy in the PG.⁴⁷

Furthermore, from a political point of view, the US doesn't support any kind of coalition or regional cooperation of the GCC with Iran. This can be perceived from debates of analysts such as Bill, who notes,

The US seeks to prevent the rise of independent-minded regional hegemons [such as Iran] (...) [and] seeks to control the behaviour of regional hegemons in regions rich in geostrategic significance and natural resources. (...) [Hence], as part of its policy of containment and control, the US enlists the support of regional allies. In the Middle East, this role is played by the GCC countries and Israel.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, Kraig provides some reasons why the multilateral policy options should be at least tested alongside traditional bilateral ties: stating for example that the reliance on bilateral coalition with external powers has had so many negative consequences which contribute to domestic instability by showing the lack of government's ability to defend the country and thus give the impression of the state's dependence on 'neo-imperial powers'. The role of external powers arguably prevents any consideration of the regional states in creating their own defence frameworks. It contributes to the current policy inertia that favours bilateral, and not multilateral, agreements for defence. Such outside contributions may also remove the need for greater regional cooperation in general, and may bring with them the particular ideological value systems and associated foreign policy goals of the outside players. The latter includes the effects of systemic competition between external powers, such as the US, China and Russia. Aid to ME/PG countries with antipathy towards the US, especially Iran, is seen, for instance, as a way of uncooperative practice of China and Russia against the US. It may also embrace the domestic, political and economic objectives of the non-regional powers, i.e. the fact that the US, Europe, Russia, and

China need to keep their arms industries at high levels to satisfy domestic lobbies and facilitate unemployment.

Most importantly, external powers' interference, particularly the US preferred strategy of bilateralism, may in the end overwhelm the stabilising aspects of the balance of power in the region; in such a context, actions such as the purchase of weaponry and the forging of alliances would have completely different meanings for competitors; what one side might see as a deterrent action the other side might perceive as an offensive action.. The latter can evidently be perceived as regards the differing perceptions of Arabs and Iran with regard to whether the Israeli nuclear weapons are there only as a deterrent. After all, there is a fundamental security dilemma in the region which is the lack of systematic interregional relationships, specifically in respect to political and military affairs. Consequently, there is no specific interaction between the large and small regional states, neither between the three PG poles (Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) or a systematic way for Iraq and Iran to interact with the GCC states. Moreover, no serious process or forum exists for this interaction to take place.

To sum up the results: different policies of selective multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism have been ineffective and even disastrous in bringing about security in the PG. The reason for such a failure is simply because the most prominent states support inextricably exclusionary types of coalition. The outcome of all of the mentioned policies, besides a general political isolation, is the systematic exclusion, economically or militarily, of a major state and of non-state actors in the security order. If the major idea of a coalition is being opposed to someone else, then it is in

principle impossible for that coalition to be seen as legitimate to all, and therefore it would be unable to assimilate all the regional actors' major interests.⁴⁹

Alternatives

Various changes in the global political landscape, most especially those that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, have provided a fresh opportunity to develop a new approach to international security. This new approach is one which places particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation. One viable path towards a more sustainable security situation in any region would be to stress the growing importance of economic developments and the role of regional and international organisations in increasing security. Examples of this would be the EU (European Union) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), which increase security by fostering interdependency with other regions through increased cooperation; or the UN, which affects regional security affairs by means of its different peacekeeping missions. Not only have the changes in the global political landscape enabled the development of a new general approach to international security, they also offer an opportunity to develop a sustainable form of security in the PG, which is the most geopolitical region of the world. This can be achieved by a close analysis and evaluation of various successful cooperation models that are to be found in other regions of the globe.

Given the new global landscape, the best proposal for a new security framework for the PG would be one that relied on fostering cooperative relationships among national military establishments, rather than confrontational relationships. The justification for this is that according to many theorists, such as Nolan, traditional security methods that are based on massive military confrontation are no longer particularly effective or even acceptable to global public opinion.⁵⁰

Furthermore, as Ehteshami, Russell and Kraig observe, in any appropriate alternative strategy for security in the PG that aims to ensure sustainability it is crucial to maintain a clear distinction between short-term requirements and long-term goals or expectations.⁵¹ *Apropos* of this distinction, see the argument of the previous chapter on Iran. There it was argued that in addition to the need to construct comprehensive multilateral coalitions, it is important to recognise the significance of the relationship between major regional and non-regional powers to achieve a durable and long term security situation in any region.

In addition to these conditions, the situation since 2003 and the downfall of Saddam's regime (which was the greatest obstacle to developing lasting security in the PG), has also created a greater and unprecedented opportunity for regional cooperation. Moreover, in doing so, they have inadvertently provided the conditions for the creation of new security arrangements in this region.

One possible approach to the issue of security in the PG is to study security models applied in other regions of the world and consider whether they may be profitably applied to the PG. Among the various alternatives, the Asian model in the form of trade, financial, and political arrangements among countries of East Asia has been proposed as that most suitable for developing a better partnership between Iran, the GCC and the EU. The types of arrangements of the new Asian regional architecture include bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), regional trade pacts, currency and monetary arrangements, and political and security arrangements. The East Asian regional architecture is supported by two distinct pillars. The economic pillar is strong and growing more intense through developing a web of bilateral and regional bilateral free trade agreements — like an East Asian Economic Community (with 13 nations),

an East Asian FTA (with 16 nations), and an Asia Pacific FTA (with 21 nations) — where the political and security pillar has remained relatively underdeveloped. Regarding security, the most progress has been made with the Association of South East Asian Nations acting as convener and has taken the form of the ASEAN Security Community (10 Southeast Asian nations) and ASEAN Regional Forum (25 nations, including the United States).⁵² As Bertelsmann's group and others, such as Jones, remark, as a starting point this model is likely to be the most appropriate one for the PG, because it offers a set of arrangements that in the repletion of time could be extended to the rest of the ME too. This model is supported by a set of overlapping bilateral and multilateral dialogue structures which have, in turn, been built around several general principles of regional conduct.

However, in this study the EU will be looked at as an interesting framework for PG security, as it is itself a successful model using the supporting method of dialogue structures. In any case, an alternative approach would be to encourage the involvement of Asian-Pacific countries, such as China, India and Japan, whose growing dependence on energy supplies from the PG has increased their desire to have a greater geopolitical role in maintaining security in the PG independent from the US. This may be a key to promoting regional stability.⁵³

In general, what the discussion thus far has shown is that the important, interlocking elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and authoritative security model in the PG can be categorised as follows: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three regional key players; domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states, such as those suggested by different authors including Rathmell [et al].⁵⁴ However, this thesis

would propose that these would be adding to an appropriate international political environment with a proper international security system's structure. The details of the major elements of such a security approach are as follows:

To address the issues of legitimacy and authority there should be a comprehensive understanding of security by all parties, one that includes a consensus on security goals and economic and socio-political reforms. It should also include all PG states' security concerns, especially the aim of shaping a multilateral framework and a real sense of mutual gain. Despite contradictory national interests and the existence of disagreements over sovereignty, the role of dialogue and diplomatic engagement within the region for developing a cooperative, comprehensive and multilateral security framework that is based on reassurance as well as deterrence and coercion is significant. In this regard, as Kraig notes, to achieve a concerted multilateral approach "a new cooperative framework need not compete with existing bilateral relationships, and that the framework could be built incrementally over many years, even decades."⁵⁵

The deterrent system is an important consideration for any PG security model. As Holsti argues, it is one of the requirements for constructing a comprehensive multilateral coalition. According to Holsti, a deterrent system is necessary to prevent aggression or antagonistic actions that would undermine the new system. Referring to Kraig, Holsti's systemic conception differs in particular from the US' global and regional strategies; according to his conception, "deterrence should ideally be seen as an integral part of the multilateral order, not as the policy of one state against another on a bilateral basis."⁵⁶

There is a consensus among observers regarding the impact and destabilising effects of the presence of foreign forces in the region on the domestic issues of the GCC states. Foreign military presence, especially since 1990, has also had an impact on the GCC states' relations with their two large neighbours and consequently any security system in the PG. As Ehteshami and the Bertelsmann group note, in the long term the presence of all the foreign forces, including those from the US, should be significantly reduced and there should also be a reduction in the reliance of the collective security system on ultra regional powers. One alternative that has been suggested is a low-profile presence, along the lines of what Russell has described as "lily-pad" or "warm bases" in various PG host states, which can be used to prevent a massive military presence in the ME. This would limit the vulnerability of American forces in the region. However, such ready-to-activate bases would be counter-productive, especially regarding Iran, which does not welcome any foreign forces presence especially the US.⁵⁷ However, others such as Kraig have stressed the need for an external contribution to improve the security situation within the region, owing to the fragility of domestic politics and interstate relations.⁵⁸

Therefore, the US needs to address two major issues: the first involves improving its relations with Iran as the major regional power; the second involves supporting a collective regional security system which is able to guarantee regional and ultra regional countries' interests. Addressing these two issues would create an opportunity to achieve the long term goal of complete military withdrawal from the region, such as that achieved by Britain more than thirty years ago with a lower financial and military cost but nonetheless greater stability. However, in order to achieve such a level of CBM given the existing long history of mistrust and mutual suspicion between all littoral states, the passage of time, good will and cooperation and an

appropriate and workable security mode are all vitally important. In the next section, a model for workable security will be suggested.

The key issue for achieving a durable collective security approach will remain Iran-US relations. However, it is possible to create a counterbalance to the US hegemony through dialogue within the region, as well as dialogue with the non-regional powers with interests in this region. By building partnerships with major international powers, such as China and the EU, so that they take a greater role in the PG security matters, the US hegemony could be reduced.

Lessons from the Establishment of the European Union

The issue in this section is whether the lessons learned during the transformation of Europe from an area of conflict into a security community could be validly applied in the PG region. If the lessons are applicable to the PG region, then studying the EU's security framework will be instructive and useful. Bjørn Møller's study of security models and their applicability to the PG is one of the best and most comprehensive studies of the European transformation. Consequently, the discussion here will mainly follow his.

Bjørn Møller

During the Cold War, realists argued that the West's political strategy of containment, with its purpose of maintaining the *status quo* and preventing the USSR from expanding towards the Western Europe, would result in stability. This was subsequently shown to be mistaken. As a defence strategy, containment soon became militarised and even nuclearised. It was perceived as a matter of impeding or deterring a military attack by military tools. The result was the necessity of a military alliance

similar to NATO, which resulted in a rough and disproportionate balance of power between the Eastern and Western pacts of NATO and Warsaw. Another consequence was a permanent arms race. However, there was little support in the West for alternative security models, such as 'defensive,' non-provocative' or 'confidence-building defense' models, which place more burden on the balance of 'mutual defensive superiority' rather than military strength to deter an attack from the other parties. Anyhow, Europe's military security problem was only solved when in the late 1980s the USSR President Gorbachev's initiative for arms control was suggested.⁵⁹

In discussing the concept of 'mutual defensive superiority' as an integrated issue with the political strategy of common security, Møller argues that it was perceived as a way of obtaining the most advantage from the military stand-off. This is because of the implication that there would be no absolute winner from conflicts but mutual losses, particularly in respect of the use of nuclear weaponry. Hence, despite constraints on security concerns that arose from national interest and also in spite of divergent conceptions of common security, collaboration — even between opponents — was the more reasonable course. Trade was the major factor of the European security approach that engendered peaceful interaction, a real interdependency, and led to integration. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the EU, which evolved from the "European Coal and Steel Community", is the most successful of all European security models.⁶⁰

This model of developing security through interdependency, which offers a completely non-military path to security and peace, may nonetheless, as Møller remarks, be combined with such military safeguards through collective security arrangements. Hence, even after the Cold War and in spite of the dissolution of the

Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991 respectively, NATO is still active and even seeks out new activities in other parts of the world. Among the new activities its role was limited to being a peacekeeping force within its traditional geographical bounds and to providing so-called 'training' for former Eastern bloc member states on the civil-military relations befitting a democracy. However, it has recently extended its ventures beyond such geographical limits with the new role of military interventionism. As Møller notes, however, despite some humanitarian interventions, "suggestions to the effect that for NATO this was the logical behavior of an alliance that had simply abandoned its geopolitical self-definition in favour of seeing itself as a "community of values" ring rather hollow."⁶¹

However, the task of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), one of the most important European organisations after the EU, which during the Cold War had a major role in maintaining regional peace, has since been kept in low-profile. This is an organisation with a long-history during the Cold War of supporting and encouraging the signing of agreements on CBMs, as well as confidence and security-building measures. Even some attempts, such as those pursued by Moscow, to raise the OSCE's role by developing this organisation into a major institution in Europe tasked with maintaining collective security have effectively been made redundant by NATO. Møller however, observes that despite this barrier the OSCE can still play an important role in fostering peace and security in the region via democratisation.⁶²

Hence, Møller, in a review of the old theory of "democratic peace" (which has its origins in Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" of 1795) by authors like Bruce Russett, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Havard Hagre, concludes that this theory has experienced a

significant renaissance since 1990. Møller finds the 'monadic' version of this theory implausible on account of its claim that democratic countries are inherently peaceful: the pre-emptive military actions of the US and Israel are cases in point. The 'dyadic' version, despite involving the less radical claim that democracies do not go to war against each other, also comes under criticism. It is unable to give a clear definition of war or an adequate answer to the question of how high to determine the standards for democracy (e.g. NATO's war against Serbia).

Møller also rejects the third version of "democratic peace", the 'strong systemic' version, as unrealistic insofar as "it envisages a democratic structure for the world." Møller himself suggests a 'weak systemic' version according to which, as he explains, "the system would be more democratic the more its constituent parts are so. The number of state dyads, between which war would be possible, would simply decline with the spread of democracy." He concludes that if the "democratic peace" theory is correct then, it would be rational for states, including democracies, to democratise their neighbours, not just peacefully but using force if needed. The EU, being an organisation which offers various economic and security advantages, is a unique community of which every European state would like to be a part of. Therefore, the EU has the power and influence to require them to meet demanding standards of reforms before they are permitted to join the organisation.⁶³

To explore whether European security models are applicable to the PG region, Møller examines the fact that the PG states interact on security issues more than they do with other countries (except the US). For this, Møller employs Barry Buzan's concept of a regional security complex (RSC), which places emphasis on the undividable relationship between the common primary security concerns of a group of states and

their individual national security concerns. As a means of understanding regional dynamics from both inside states and beyond states to international organisations, Møller places his emphasis on the interaction among states. The assumption of stable regional dynamics is that states have “socio-political cohesion based on a well-defined ‘idea’ of the state, as well as the appropriate physical basis and institutional expression.” This is a stable base for preventing states from being driven by domestic political agendas to cause regional instability.⁶⁴

However, the PG states are categorised as ‘weak states’ because of their domestic and regional problems, such as religious or ethnic minority issues, lack of democracy, unresolved border disputes with each other, and what Møller calls ‘procedural legitimacy’. They also suffer from a low amount of “maturity,” where mutual recognition of sovereignty is still an unsolved issue among neighbours and there is the risk of conflicts and war forming between neighbours as well as with ultra-regional states. In sum, such domestic political instability with its impact on inter-state relations would result in regional instability as a whole. Despite the lack of common threat perception among the PG states, such fragile interstate relations and the absence of experience in coordinating a collective security approach, Møller notes that “the region does exhibit certain patterns of restraint, based on a shared commitment to important values and a certain commitment among states to the survival of all as well as an embryonic institutional framework.”⁶⁵

However, especially in reference to the present situation, Møller concludes that there definitely is not a unipolar system; neither is there any possibility of fostering a new form of bipolarity or a stable security approach of balance of power in the PG. In this regard he notes that the new definitions, like Huntington’s, which divide the globe

between the West and the rest of the world, might even work as a unifying agent for the region. Regarding the region's lack of a major divisive issue over which there could develop bipolarity among neighbouring states, and further encourage clashes between them, Møller notes that despite the great divergence between Shiite and Sunni groups the division is not strong enough to serve as the basis for entrenched polarisation and conflict between and within the PG states. Given the existence of the three major poles of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (GCC), Møller believes that a tripolar structure is likely. However, the problem is that the balance of power between these three is delicate and very asymmetrical; (see Table 11-2) also temporary alignments of the classical kind of two against the third pillar have proved fragile. The other problem is that, in comparison with Europe, institutionalisation in this region is far more promising; there are no inclusive regional arrangements or institutions dealing with the various issues facing the PG. Most regional problems get discussed bilaterally. The GCC is the only form of institutionalised security cooperation, but, as Møller points out, "rather than seeking to involve Iran and Iraq, the GCC has (so far) merely sought to deter them, mainly by serving as a vehicle for ensuring US support." Another problem is that despite the significance of indirect means to achieve security, such as establishing a network of economic and other ties for promoting peace and stability via interdependency as did the EU, the PG states have not been able to take advantage of such methods.⁶⁶

Table 11-2
The Balance of Power between the Three Regional Powers

Rank Order	Population	Wealth	Military Power	Friends
Iraq	2	3	<i>2/3</i>	<i>3/1</i>
Iran	1	2	1	<i>2/3</i>
Saudi Arabia	3	1	<i>3/2</i>	<i>1/2</i>

Legend: Normal: prior to 2003, italics: after 2003

Source: Bjørn Møller

Consequently, as Møller also recognises, the security situation up to 2003 was the best opportunity to provide a stable security approach in the PG. Iraq was weak, Iran's military threat was much weaker than it is today, with Tehran's more pragmatic foreign policy looking for normalisation with the GCC, especially under the presidency of Khatami and his dynamic *détente* foreign policy. The weak GCC, which was taking advantage of the US security umbrella, instead of making war against Iraq had the opportunity to stabilise the situation via diplomatic means as well as arms control negotiations. (See Table 11-3) However, by electing to pursue a dual containment strategy against Iran and Iraq Washington missed this great opportunity.⁶⁷

Table 11-3
Possible Stabilisation Measures (-2003)

Dual Containment Alternative	Iraq	Iran	GCC
	Phase 1	Roll Back (Military, economically)	Contain (Economically, militarily)
Phase 2	Contain (Militarily)	Normalize (Integrate)	Support (Militarily, defensively)
Phase 3	Normalize (Integrate)	Support (Security guarantee)	Support (Security guarantees)
Phase 4	Support (Security guarantee)	Support (Security guarantees)	Support (Security guarantees)
	(Security community, collective security, general security guarantees)		

Source: Bjørn Møller

Other Studies of Security Models

Other analysts like Richard Russell also believe that for stable security architecture in the volatile region of the PG (even in the post-Saddam era) there is no alternative to balance of power politics, nor can Iran be excluded from any regional security arrangements. As Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky and Andrew Winner argue, “the region needs regularized multilateral connections on security and related issues

that encompass all the key players in the region namely, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia.”⁶⁸

Such multilateral connections will promote transparency and build trust that will enable the development of a new security network with more formal security institutions, similar to those used in Europe during the Cold War. As Pollack, Takeyh, Cook and Ehteshami for instance, have detailed in various ways, the PG needs a gradual approach, which would begin with the establishment of a regional-security forum for debates, the exchange of information and even for the formulation of agreements. This could be a move towards confidence building measures, such as exchanges of views, information and even observers, or also building links for multilateralism with the final intention of developing arms-control pacts. Eventually, these would lead to a full security system similar to institutions such as OSCE.⁶⁹

Hence, Russell praises the flexibility of a balance-of-power strategy for the PG and argues that this would be a very good thing for the US. He emphasises that if this strategy is employed alongside over-the-horizon military capabilities, it would be beneficial to the mutual interests of both the US and the regional-security partners.⁷⁰

Moreover, analysts and scholars, as well as policy-makers, have drawn similar conclusions concerning the two dominant contending frameworks for PG security: US hegemony and principled multilateralism. These conclusions are viewed as even more valid in the post-Saddam era.

Rathmell [et al], for instance, argue that in the post-Saddam era none of the US alternative models of security, either to unilaterally attempt to enforce a democratic system or to act merely as external balancer in the traditional balance-of-power

approach, will work. They emphasise the disadvantages of the US hegemony strategy and the heavy dependence on a forward US military presence to provide the region's security. Instead, Rathmell [et al] suggest that because of a wide range of national, regional and international issues related to developments in the PG, the US and Europe need to work together to construct a more sustainable PG security system based on a combination of balance of military power between Iran, Iraq and the GCC, and broad political and economic reforms to tackle the political and socio-economic problems causing reasons for discontent and extremism in the region. Besides Europe's strategic interest in the PG such as its greater dependency than the US on PG energy supplies, close ties with the region by a network of economic and political linkages and deep concerns regarding US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG, as Rathmell [et al] remark, EU's perception that it needs military power to back up its soft power and prove its ability to be a more effective partner to the US in this region is understandable.⁷¹

However, what makes the European Union's role in the PG security especially valuable is its less confrontational policy towards the region than that of the US. Also, it has the power and influence to foster practical reforms. Its policy of 'critical dialogue' with Tehran in 1990s, despite US discontent, and its demanding standards of reform before expanding its economic ties with the GCC are some examples of when it has used its considerable economic and institutional ties to make a real contribution to moderation and stability in the region. Moreover, as was mentioned in previous chapters, since 2004 the EU decision to create a rapid reaction force (RRF) independently of NATO, in spite of its small and limited forces, could be a starting point for the EU to take a more significant geopolitical role in the strategic region of

the PG. Hence, there is a long list of reasons for not only the US, but also the littoral states, to involve the Europe/EU more in any future PG security system.

Kraig is another writer who has also questioned the continuing strategy of US hegemony.⁷² He suggests, an alternative, quite different security approach would be a 'principled multilateral' approach, which is distinguished by its inclusiveness and basic recognition of the inherent rights of all PG states, especially those regarding legitimate measures for self-defence and regime survival. It also includes a rule-based system in which international law is applicable to all actors in the PG, including the US. The major hypothesis of principled multilateralism is that "security is sought with other states, rather than against them, and that domestic developments in the Gulf will follow a more beneficial course if all states are gradually intertwined in a web of military and economic agreements that create strong interdependence."⁷³

An Alternative; PG Security Model of Pyramid

In designing a model that addresses the need for collective security architecture for the PG region, this thesis has come up with a model of developing security through the feelings of attachment and interdependency which should occur when the littoral states have a single geopolitical vision. The following factors with some new mechanisms are its major principles:

- Geopolitics, which, being the most fixed and firm feature of the region, will provide the basis for discussion. Geopolitics is the major convergent element among the PG states: it shows that every state, as a part of this geopolitical region, has a unique and non-ignorable place in the security system. Irrespective of their size, all states have a similar, though unequal, weight. It

also shows that how important is for regional states to take advantage of geopolitical significance of the PG as a power/knowledge which would enable them to play a major role in the balance of power politics in the international system and be able to take advantage of various opportunities resulting from geopolitical developments, to their best interests as well as the region's security and stability. Urging littoral states to have global and not merely regional geopolitical perspectives would result in a single geopolitical vision as a power/knowledge for all the regional states in the PG. Only by addressing this fragile region as a whole, not as divided states and groups of individuals ranged against the other states or groups, would it be possible to prevent further geopolitical problems in this region and change the traditional disruptive role of geopolitical significance of the PG in the region's security to enable it to become a convergent element. Under such circumstances, geopolitics would work as an element for encouraging cooperation among all beneficiary parties instead of being an expansion lever of the external powers.

- The need to include all littoral states. The attitude of all PG states should be that of mutual partners attempting to achieve global and regional security, irrespective of a diversity of dissimilar state ideologies.
- The balance of military power between the region's three major players: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (GCC). This balance should not be of the classical kind of two against the third, but should preferably be maintained through arms control negotiations.
- The need to assure the interests of all regional and non-regional players.

- Acknowledging the necessity of a proper and positive relationship between the strongest regional actor and the non-regional player (with great influence and interest in that region), as a general and certain principle to attain regional security in any region, including in the PG. Based on the single successful occurrence of the twin-pillar security model in the PG, as well as the need to construct comprehensive multilateral coalitions, the key factor in achieving a durable collective security approach in the PG will remain Iran-US relations.
- The need for there to be no foreign military presence (in the long-term) or dominance (in the short-term) in the region, as this affects the regional balance of power and is a source of instability. It is also a cause of radicalism and a major obstacle to reform.
- Introducing a fourth element to previous categories of the important, interlocking elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and authoritative security model in the PG. An appropriate international political environment with a proper international security system's structure is added to other three elements of: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three regional key players; and domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states.
- The last and most important element of integration is people's communication/interconnections. Developing and capitalising on these will increase a nation-state's soft power and also strengthen the regional security situation.

The importance of this model stems not just from the role that states have in its architecture and their effect on its functionality, but also that some consideration is given to the role of people (even sub-national groups), their interactions, as well as their satisfaction. The reasons for this emphasis are as follows:

a) As the fundamental part of any nation-state, people have a significant role in the success of any cooperation model. Therefore, in the process of reform in the PG states' national governments will be obliged to consider their role more seriously, which in the current century should be a compulsory requirement.

b) Interpersonal communication is important to prevent an escalation of confrontational feelings between Arabs and Persians, or the further development of political theories that specify the clashes between civilisations as a reason for the differences in cultural and religious identities (according to the Huntington's theory). At present (the 21st century) this is a major challenge that all littoral states are confronted with.

c) President Khatami's theory of dialogue among civilisations in international relations should be acknowledged within the PG to be significant. The theory has been recognised internationally to correctly emphasise the importance of dialogue, despite cultural diversities. However, its particular applicability to the PG is owing to the experience of peaceful coexistence of the people in this region long before foreigners' dominance over the PG, which began in the 15th century, and the policy by foreigners to 'divide and rule' to increase ethnic confrontational feeling among people in this region. Hence emphasising this theory at the present is specifically important because of current regional ethnic disputes, which have greatly increased since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In other words, the emphasis of this model on the role of people is supported by the modern world's wider and more complex set of interactions, in addition to the growing capacity and importance of and emphasis on reforms which encourages nations and groups to have more influence on world affairs. Even expansionist geopoliticians such as Huntington acknowledge the growing influence of people (individuals and groups) where he downplays the continuing major power of the nation-states, and assumes 'cultures' of people as the dominant source of conflicts in the future global politics. It is in such a world that Huntington's post-Cold War strategic debate, with its aim of maintaining the US as the premier global power, is based on, stressing the importance of "renewing its Western civilization from within and actively containing, dividing and playing off other civilizations against each other"⁷⁴ PG states should be aware of such a divide and rule policy and overcome their domestic and regional problems. This argument is supported by the efforts made to spread the concept of the new war against terrorism, and ideas like Huntington's perception of the potentially rough conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations as a defining feature of an evolving world order.

Moreover, the new political climate after Saddam, which has caused a growing sectarian issue in the region, would urge the PG states (especially the GCC who have discriminated and oppressed Shiites who form a large segment of several of their populations, and the growing anti-government religious militancy, specifically Sunni radical Muslims) to overcome their domestic and regional problems. It is important to include Yemen in the pyramid security model, since it is a major state in the vicinity, and a source of radicalism.

As was studied in previous chapters on internal threats, the GCC states are aware of the need for domestic reform to make their regimes more stable and their economies more vibrant, however their domestic socioeconomic and political problems confront them with rigorous restrictions in their attempts to carry out real reforms. Despite this fact, the GCC states are advised to implement real reforms sooner rather than later. For instance, as Malik and Niblock note, the reforms undertaken by the Saudi regime so far suffer from two problems:

First, they have mostly been implemented slowly and partially. There is the danger, already apparent in the country, that economic reform may become more difficult the longer it is left. Rising unemployment and deteriorating social conditions, fed by one of the highest rates of population growth in the world (...), will intensify political unrest and social disruption. Second, the reforms are still inadequate. The wider reforms that are needed are in many ways the most difficult, and will require a greater social and political transformation than has so far been envisaged. Greater transparency and accountability will be needed, and the educational and social facilities offered to Saudis must enable Saudi labour to be as productive as migrant/expatriate labour.⁷⁵

Moreover, as Turki Al-Hamad states, due to issues, especially the consequence of very high corruption and uncountable government spending levels, "The unconditional social agreement of loyalty in return for free social services between the rulers and the ruled in the GCC states has been shaken."⁷⁶ Also, due to potential reductions in oil revenues (which have worked as legitimate factor for all regional states) unrest may increase as government resources diminish in the future; this will probably contribute towards further socio-political instability. Any decline in socio-economic opportunities, e.g. imposing a tax system, may motivate requests for

political reforms and deliver greater political participation to citizens. However, the reform process needs time and a specific education of the people (especially in this region with a combination of traditional values and modern culture and other current socio-political issues which has increased radicalism) to prevent social unrest or any possible confrontation with citizens, especially the large and restless younger generation who are unemployed and have high expectations.

Domestic issues are pivotal problems facing Iranian society too. As the uneven economic and political development in Iranian society forced the Shah's regime to be overthrown, the threat to the new regime cannot be ignored or underestimated. Because of the revolution in particular, democracy is a necessity not a luxury for Iran more than for any other state in the ME. Democracy, and its promise to attract the investments it needs to put an end to high numbers of unemployment, is the only solution to its huge economic problems. Hence, as long as satisfying its people, the provision of wealth (as a major element to the success of a society, as well as a significant element of power and influence), and preparations towards democracy (giving the government soft and hard power as well as political legitimacy) are not the top priority of the IRI, Iran cannot become a stable regional power. This is particularly the case if Iran fails to reduce the tension in its relations with its neighbours in the PG and the West, particularly the US. Therefore, the regime's survival depends upon opening up the political system to more democratic participation and economic reforms in order to address its most strategic weakness.

In sum, wider economic reforms and creating a regional economic interdependency would be a solution to the difficulties that all the PG states are facing. In the pyramid model, NGOs, private sectors and people's communications/interrelations are

employed to help shape dialogue as the basic step towards any CBM and interdependency.

Nevertheless the orientation of the future global politics is important to whether they serve the interest of a premier global power or serve the benefit of a world which appreciates diversity and contains different nations and civilizations. This is where the thesis has come up with a fourth element to the previous categories of the interlocking elements needed to establish a functional security model in the PG, 'an appropriate international political environment with a proper international security system's structure'. Therefore, it has stressed the necessity of considering more seriously President Khatami's theory of dialogue among civilizations in international relations. This theory, which was mainly provided in response to Huntington's, emphasises the importance of dialogue, despite cultural diversities, in a time where all nations and the globe itself need the most cooperation and harmony; some major examples of present day threats being the global warming, environmental degradation and resource depletion.

Geometrical Functionality of a Pyramid Model

I have designed this model as a pyramid, (see, figure 11-1) with three sides consisting of:

A) The policies of the littoral Arab states.

B) The policies of ultra-regional powers.

C) Iran's Policies - As the most powerful regional player, with its geopolitical features, it has strategic depth and a naturally dominant position in the PG. One side of the pyramid is dedicated to Iran because as was mentioned earlier, to establish any

long term multilateral security approach a coalition of the strongest regional and global powers is needed to guarantee peace and stability.

In addition to the three sides, the base of the pyramid, which interacts with all three sides, is the geopolitics of the PG. The reasons for taking geopolitics as the base are:


A) The geopolitics of the PG should be treated as the determining factor of all regional and ultra regional interactions and relations: as geopolitics has an impact on every single nation-state's interests and national security and hence must always be the base of pyramid. It is the major axis of the security model.

B) In any instance of an attempt by any of the three regional and non regional elements to change the base of the pyramid in its favour, the model will be destabilised and regional instability will be the result. In other words, in a balance of power based on geopolitics (including military power, arms races, or cultural/nationalist issues) if any party tries to ruin the balance (i.e., if there is too much movement of the vertex which means the picture of vertex will not be seen on the base 'geopolitics' any more) history will repeat itself. If one of the countries involved gains too much weight, the other two would feel threatened and try to compensate.

C) Every one of the three sides of the pyramid interacts with geopolitics as the regional axis, but also each member any pair of sides has some interaction with each other. In other words, there is bilateral as well as multilateral interaction between the sides. Also, at the vertex of this pyramid, triple interactions come together as the basis of the models' balancer. So long as the vertex of the pyramid is projected onto the geopolitics base, the stability of the region is guaranteed.

Figure 11-1

The Pyramid Model



Some Factors Influencing the Functionality of the Model

I believe this model can work on the basis of the mixed approaches of a cooperative-security (liberalism) framework and Realpolitik (realism). What is needed is a balance of interests between the three sides of the pyramid. Without interaction and cooperation between these three sides, such that there is interdependency between them, this balance will not be achieved. Also, according to the cooperative model, the factor of equality and prosperity for all will mitigate any humiliations and weakness, and consequently reduce radical behavior. This will also give all states and nations opportunities to improve their own opportunities for peace, security and prosperity, to lower hostility and increase cooperation and a healthy interdependency. This can be achieved by decreasing investment in military capabilities and investing more in social wealth and prosperity.

In this model the primary actor is the sovereign state, which will enter into verifiable agreements with other states, however a wide role is allocated to the people. Since the interactions of the nation-states, people and the governments, are important to

strengthen the cooperation model there should be a greater emphasis on promoting the convergence elements and eliminating the divergence elements. The stability of the pyramid arises from the interaction of nation-states through the axis of convergence elements existing between them. So, to prevent instability and preserve the authority of this model in the PG we should bear the following points in mind:

A) We must pay attention to all major strategic elements of the PG (in the long-term), including the concerns of all states, which affect any regional security system. In insisting on this as a requirement of any new and viable multilateral PG framework, it would increase the possibility of all the littoral nation-states defining their national security in terms of their common values and interests, such as Islam, rather than their differences, such as the Shiite and Sunni division, or energy as the major economic source of all PG states.

B) This model, with its emphasis on a balance of power by means of negotiations for arms control, along with its CBM, also aims to establish and encourage a broad understanding of security that includes its economic and social dimensions. This would also include making issues such as political reform, economic diversification and educational reform the key pillars of any sustainable framework. This argument is supported by the prevailing global atmosphere which since the end of the Cold War has placed particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation, as well as on real domestic reforms, a pre-eminent global security issue in the post-9/11 world. Added to this is the fact that, due to growing political discontent and radicalism within the GCC and also the spread and growing process of terrorism from the radical religious militants in the whole region which has intensified since 2003, the issue of applying domestic reforms is not simply construed as political prestige but as a necessity.

Moreover, recent regional developments support this argument that littoral states, both Iran and Arabs, have shown more serious interest in supporting the idea of an inclusive collective security arrangement for the region.⁷⁷ Each state, by increasing its stability via improving its social-economic standards and values, can upgrade its weight in this security framework, so social-economic dimensions will gradually become the most important geopolitical features of each state, irrespective of the size of the country. In such circumstances (i.e. a broader understanding of security), communication will become increasingly important for a more stable region.

C) Construing geopolitics as the basis of this model could work as a deterrent system, due to its mentioned role as a convergent element among the PG states and as a shape of power/knowledge resulting from a single geopolitical vision. As was mentioned earlier, only by addressing this fragile region as a whole, would it be possible to prevent further geopolitical problems in this region. However, the littoral states would be able to take advantage of a single geopolitical vision in the international system if they make efforts to solve their domestic problems as well as their long-standing regional disputes, e.g. territorial and boundary disputes. This could be done through the improvement of the political conditions via extending confidence-building measurements and regional cooperation, especially by having greater economic interaction, and in particular by establishing various organisations to promote cooperation and the rule of law. Such a process, one that puts emphasis on soft, as opposed to exclusively hard, power would pave the way for the creation of a functional regional security arrangement. It also may effectively deter aggression or hostile actions that would otherwise undermine the pyramid. One of the organisations for promoting the rule of law should be an organisation tasked with preventing aggression or antagonistic actions that would undermine the new system.

By emphasising the geopolitical elements, especially socio-political and economic power, rather than military power it is possible to maximize domestic stability and political legitimacy while at the same time minimising the strength of the fear of bigger states by smaller states. The pyramid model connects the issues of legitimacy and authority closely with the issue of sustainability. This is primarily because the model construes the gains it aims to achieve as mutual gains for all participants, not as gains for one particular actor, or set of actors. It can thereby more plausibly make the assurance that remaining in the system will be in the interests of all the relevant parties. This would in turn lessen the possibility of any states withdrawing from the model because of any sudden ideological or political changes.

Some Details and Suggestions

A) The role of people and the private sector: among the various possible socio-economic interactions, trade is a particularly significant element for creating interdependency, which would in turn be peace-promoting.

B) Europe and the key Asian Pacific region's states would also need to play a greater security role. However, the best security role can be obtained through increasing the interdependency of these regions with the PG states. Continuing efforts to strengthen the cooperation axis and interdependence between EU-AP and the PG may result in the following corollaries for the region: encouraging domestic developments in the PG; encouraging greater CBM among PG states as well as regulating regional and non-regional powers' relations and in some cases, such as US-Iran, to establish a new relations; cooperating with all relevant parties to control insurgencies and terrorist attacks in the region. This could assist the PG states to stabilise this model of cooperation until their CBMs have been sufficiently developed and they have been

assured of the functionality of this model. After this the over-the-horizon presence can even be reduced to nil.

C) Given the considerable effect Iran can have on the security of the PG; its domestic stability as well as its permanent and stable foreign policy is very significant for the security and steadiness of this region. *Détente* foreign policy with an emphasis on the convergent elements with its neighbors is needed to assure regional and non regional parties of Tehran's peaceful goals. These can pave the way for guaranteeing the long term security which could result in foreign forces withdrawing from the region.

D) Arab states will need to understand that the idea of multilateral security structures and the improvement of relations between Iran and the US are in their interests. Furthermore, they need not be concerned about a devaluation of their political weight and of being excluded from future decision-making in this region. To assuage the Arab states, especially the smaller or weaker countries, of their fear of Iran they would need to be assured that the establishment of regionally based security structures will not result in a reduced US military umbrella with a reciprocal Iranian move. Moreover, they would need to know that even if Iran had such ambitions Iran should, within the Pyramid model's regulation, first develop bases like CBM to assure its neighbours of its peaceful goals.

E) Since integration in the PG has not been welcomed by the West and any multilateralism in this region might face some resistance, it is especially important to emphasise that stability in this geopolitical and geostrategic region has been proven to be essential to global peace and prosperity. So despite any possible resistances, forming such integration would be in the interests of everyone, rather than just flattering to the concerns of the great powers with huge interests in this region.

F) A further reason in favour of regional integration is that any regional cooperation and integrity within Islamic countries would be to the advantage of the Islamic world. Given that no unity can happen at once, it must occur region by region. This is an idea that is no doubt not particularly welcomed by the great powers, especially as they are spreading ideas like Huntington's or the concept of the new war against terrorism, which places great emphasis on reactions rather than its true causes. This can be addressed by considering and confronting real causes and problems, which is an approach that has been effective in other places, such as the recent IRA peace process in Northern Ireland. If there is any true willingness for peace in the ME there are many examples to follow: a plan like the Marshal Plan could easily work in this region.

Some Practical Solutions

The pyramid model can avoid the typical problems that arise for models based on a competition for power between states with conflicting national interests and agendas, like Russell's,⁷⁸ as it does not base a balance of power on such confrontational bases. The other tools for achieving the balance, like political-military contacts, confidence-building measures and arms control, can be provided via:

- Forums, used as initiatives for CBM in different fields. These forums could be the beginning of the establishment of different regional institutions in various fields (i.e., arms control, counter-terrorism, economic/trade, security, cultural/educational, etc.)
- Continuing current bilateral agreements and starting new multilateral agreements until there is real reassurance. New ties and agreements between

Iran-US and with the GCC should be explored, especially over geopolitical issues, like oil and gas, transportation networks, goods transition, etc.

- To increase the geopolitical position of the PG and decrease the security threat to the *status quo*, Yemen should be included as a member of this region.

Conclusion

Various developments in the modern world have generated greater interconnectedness and interdependency between nation-states. Traditional security approaches based on military confrontation rather than cooperative relations have become increasingly untenable and are unlikely to succeed at all, especially in a significant geopolitical region like the PG, where issues of security have wide local, regional and global effects.

The existence of such diverging opinions about the threats to regional security held by relevant parties in the PG, together with three decades of crises in this region, illustrate how urgent it is for the problem of regional security to be solved. Throughout this chapter, by studying possible conceptual and analytical foundations for the future shape of security arrangements in the PG, several major needs for security were identified. The important, interlocking elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and authoritative security model were categorised as follows: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three regional key players; domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states, and an appropriate international political environment with a proper international security system's structure.

It was observed that this security model would be able to manage relations between states and create a regulation of power, which would mean the rule of 'law' and not 'the powers'. It would be a system with legitimacy and authority, as none of the actors would perceive itself to be outside the prevailing order. It would also create interdependence among the regional states themselves which would promote security, instead of reliance on the security umbrella of non-regional powers. Such a security model can also assure the gains it aims to achieve are mutual gains for all participants, and is thereby able to assure that it would be in the interests of all relevant parties' to remain in the system.

It was noted that there is a general consensus among different authors and analysts that dialogue between states and organisations is the best tool for building confidence, settling disputes and deterring conflict in the PG. It was emphasised that engaging in dialogue is the only way to promote transparency, build trust and create a new security network with more formal security institutions. A starting point for formalising the security system would be the establishment of various organisations for promoting cooperation and promoting the rule of law. In addition to developing internal political dialogue to decrease the risk of extremist views, developing a network of military and economic agreements that create considerable interdependence among the PG states should also leave less room for discontent and extremism. This would further assist the process of domestic reform in the region. Rathmell [et al] and Kraig argue that this would be especially true of the newly formed cooperative arrangements, in which the financial and human capital of nation-states will be expended on civil, rather than military, development.⁷⁹

The result of such processes would be similar to the consistent political strategy (Marshal Plan) employed alongside a military strategy (NATO) in Europe during and after the Cold War. The PG states are wealthy enough that if they develop regional collective cooperation they will not need international financial aid to implement this strategy; they would mainly need the political and technological support of ultra-regional powers for a multilateral security approach.

However, despite all the disadvantages of a selective security approach in the PG, Washington still prefers and employs bilateral defence arrangements and military tools rather than a political framework by offering to sell more arms to its regional allies against Iran.

This is evidenced by the recent trip (August 2007) of the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Defence Secretary Robert Gates to the region with the aim of launching Washington's new ME strategy of containment against Iran, arming its allies, obtaining support for an Iraq Shiite-led government and arranging a new conference for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.⁸⁰ The arming of US Arab allies was announced as a response to the growth of the threat of Iran, with the aim of reassuring them of continuing US support in the long term, especially after Washington and Tehran appeared to be entrenched their stances on Iran's nuclear programme. In this regard Gates remarked during this trip that, having been in the PG for some 60 years, the US has "every intention of being here for a lot longer". Moreover, Iran's unstable and unwise foreign policy, especially towards its PG neighbours, has paved the way for the US to continue its hegemonic regional security strategy. Its policy, especially regarding its nuclear programme, has served as an opportunity for the US to make a wider front in the ME against Iran. It has also paved

the way for closer ties between old enemies, Arab-Israeli, as they both see Iran as a common threat.

However, US direct military involvement in the PG has not just been an expensive exercise for Washington, but has resulted in competing reactions from other parties with interests in this region, viz., China, the EU and Russia. It has also stimulated popular discontent in the host countries, particularly against Arab regimes. This situation has resulted in increasing militarism, whether in the form of extending the military presence and power of different regional and non-regional parties, directly or indirectly, or in the form of terrorist attacks. Therefore, a big question remains to be answered: what are the US real foreign policy goals in the ME/PG? Is there any willingness to build peace and security in this region or does Washington need at least one permanent enemy in the region to achieve its hidden hegemonic intentions, including arms sales? However, when giving any answer to these questions, the GCC as well as the US should be aware that although ME issues are highly interconnected the PG's problems, and the dilemmas facing the ME in particular, cannot be solved without the positive and cooperative role of Iran.

However, the major role the littoral states themselves have in the establishment of durable security in the PG cannot be ignored; it remains a particularly glaring omission from the GCC's considerations. According to one high ranking diplomat of Bahrain, for instance, the major reason of their reliance on a US security umbrella is the GCC's fear of Iran. However, in response to the author's question about the existence of plans for a short or long term agenda to develop CBMs with Iran to overcome such fear, his response was completely negative. The point is that if the GCC has been able to continue to exist and overcome its members' differences and

disputes to work as a group, an inclusive, multilateral cooperation model that is to the advantage of all involved should be able to work.

Besides the regional perception of the importance of cooperation models, the key issue will remain the US-Iran relationship, being the two major regional and non-regional powers. In addition, the role of other ultra regional players, especially those emerging powers like the EU and some key states in the AP (viz. China, India, Japan), in building a durable security framework is significant. Their strategic interest in the PG, such as their growing dependency on PG energy supplies which exceeds the US's, their close ties with the region by a network of economic and political linkages and their deep concerns over US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG have resulted in their recognition of a need for military power to back up their soft power. This military power is needed if they are to adopt a greater geopolitical role independently of Washington and if they are to counterbalance the balance of power controlled by the US in the PG.

All the distrust, confrontational policies and preferred strategies for assuring each parties' interests in the PG have brought about continued threat to regional, as well as global, stability. Consequently, to prevent wider militarism in this narrow and volatile geostrategic waterway, and promote a real and substantial process of development in the PG states, it is necessary to encourage all parties to work together to construct a more durable security system which would be in the interests of all, via increasing global economic integration. By this process, the fourth interlocking element of the PG security system, which was described as an appropriate international political environment, would also be achieved.

This thesis holds that the Pyramid security model could be a solution to the very volatile situation in the PG, because in addressing major security issues this model is based on the geopolitical realities, as well as the political and economic concerns, of all regional and ultra-regional parties. In the modern world, with its wider and more complex sets of interactions and interdependencies, this model also appreciates the role of peoples' communication. Its emphasis on reforms will encourage positive competition among all littoral states to upgrade their weight in this security framework via greater civil development, rather than military power or territorial size. This is true for ultra-regional players too; in particular, by contributing towards the region's development they can upgrade their role in this region.

Notes

¹ Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, (2003), 'A new Persian Gulf security system', *RAND issue paper*.

² Michael Kraig (Fall 2004), 'Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks for the Persian Gulf', *Middle East Policy*, Washington: vol.11, issue 3, cited in the site of *Gulf2000* of Columbia University, NY, USA.

³ Zeev Maoz, Domestic politics of regional security: theoretical perspectives and Middle East patterns. *Journal of Strategic Studies (Frank Cass & Company Ltd)* Building Regional Security in the ME, pp. 20-21. <http://www.jstor.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/>

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.73, was cited by, Steven L. Spiegel, 'Regional security and the levels of analysis problem', *Journal of Strategic Studies (Frank Cass & Company Ltd)*, Building Regional Security in the ME, pp. 75-98. <http://www.jstor.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/>

⁵ For details see, Spiegel, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kraig, op. cit.

⁸ See, Bjørn Møller, Security models and their applicability to the Gulf: the potential of European lessons applied. In Christian Koch and Felix Neugart (eds.) *A Window of Opportunity Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War* (Dubai, UAE: Gulf Research Center, 2005), pp. 56-57; also Spiegel cites from: Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge UP 1981); John J. Mearsheimer. 'Offensive Realism', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Atlanta, 2-5 September 1999); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf 1973); and Kenneth Waltz, op. cit.

⁹ See, *Wikipedia*. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realpolitik> (10 June 2007)

¹⁰ Kraig, op. cit.

¹¹ *Wikipedia*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_in_international_relations (6 June 2007)

¹² Kraig, op. cit.

¹³ See, Kraig, op. cit.; also 'Program Details' of the Stanley Foundation's Strategies for National Security Program, which is cited by Michael Kraig, op. cit.; and *US Strategies for National Security*. <http://sns.stanleyfoundation.org/details.html> (10 June 2007); also *US Department of Defense*. http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_1.html (10 June 2007)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Spiegel cites from, Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984); Charles Lipson (October 1984), 'International Cooperation in Economic Security Affairs', *World Politics* vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 1-23.

¹⁶ Spiegel cites from: David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (NY: Columbia UP, 1993); Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen (eds.) *Theory and Structure in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

¹⁷ Spiegel, op. cit., pp.76-77.

¹⁸ See, Kraig, op. cit.

¹⁹ Kraig, op. cit, cited from, Janne Nolan, (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Brookings Institution Press, 1994). <http://www.brook.edu/press/books/GLOBalen.htm>

²⁰ Kraig, op. cit.

²¹ Ibid.

²² J. E. Peterson, *Defending Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), was cited by Andrew Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

²³ Among many see, Kraig, op. cit.; also the Stanley Foundation, op. cit.; also Rathmell [et al], op. cit.; also Joseph Moynihan, *The Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States: common and uncommon security interests*. In David E. Long and Christian Koch (eds.), *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), pp. 57-74.

²⁴ Bahig Nassar (n.d.), 'US global strategy to maintain world order, the new role of NATO and the US Central Command', *International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation*. <http://www.inesap.org/bulletin15/bul15art17.htm> (6 November 2007); also for details about the US Central Command among many see, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/centcom.htm>

²⁵ For more details see, Moynihan, op. cit.; also Kraig, op. cit.; also Rathmell [et al], op. cit.; also 'Conference Report' (Fall 2004), *Journal of Middle East Policy Council*, vol. XI, no. 3. http://www.mepec.org/public.asp/journal_vol11/0409_confrep.asp (8 August 2005); also Joseph Kostiner (November 1998), 'The United States and the Gulf states: alliance in need', *MERIA Journal*, vol. 2, no. 4. <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a6.html> (10 May 2007)

²⁶ For details regarding the US strategy encouraging Iraq to target Iran's oil tankers and terminals see, John Calabrese, *Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 7; also Kraig, op. cit., and Asaf Hussain, *Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter* (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1985), p. 197.

²⁷ As Wikipedia notes from Robert Parry and Henry Liu the words of Alexander Haig, secretary of state in 1981, “It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd.” However, Wikipedia mentions that Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor does not support this assertion. **See**, *Wikipedia*. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War#The Tanker War and Direct U.S. Support for Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War#The_Tanker_War_and_Direct_U.S._Support_for_Iraq) (25 June 2007); **also** was cited in *Wikipedia*: Robert Parry, ‘Saddam’s “Green Light”’ <http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/xfile5.html>; and Henry C K Liu , ‘Iraq & geopolitics’, <http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-list/2004w37/msg00030.htm>; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981*. (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), pp. 451-454, 504.

²⁸ Kostiner, op. cit.; **also** Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

²⁹ Kostiner, op. cit.

³⁰ Ibid, **also** Rathmell [et al], op. cit.


³¹ Kraig, op. cit.; **also** Kostiner, op. cit.

³² Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

³³ Richard L. Russell (2005, Winter), ‘The Persian Gulf’s collective-security mirage’, *Middle East Policy Council*, vol. XII, no. 4, pp. 82-83.

³⁴ According to a report by Democrats in the US Congress on November 13, 2007, the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ‘hidden costs’ have pushed the total to about \$1.5 trillion — nearly twice the requested \$804bn. The report which was written by Democratic members of Congress’s Joint Economic Committee (JEC) estimates that both wars could cost a total of \$3.5 trillion over the next decade. The Democrats calculate that between 2002 and 2008 the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan will have cost the average US family of four about \$20,900, and could increase to \$46,400 over the next decade; a matter that according to the chairman of the JEC, Senator Chuck Schumer, “the ‘backbreaking cost’ of the war was becoming an unbearable burden for American families”. (See Figure 11-2) **See**, Hidden costs raise’ US war price. *BBC News* <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7092053.stm> (13 November 2007)

Figure 11-2



³⁵ Among many see, Kostiner, op. cit.

³⁶ Kraig, op. cit.

³⁷ For military and economic explanations see, Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

³⁸ Trita Parsi (7 Jun 2006), ‘Gulf widens between US and sheikhdoms’, *Asian Times*. [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle East/HF07Ak04.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF07Ak04.html) (8 June 2007)

³⁹ Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

⁴⁰ Kostiner, op. cit.; also 'Conference Report', *Journal of Middle East Policy Council*, op. cit.; also Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green 'The enigma of political stability in the Persian Gulf monarchies', in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf*. (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 97.

⁴¹ Among many see, Rathmell [et al], op. cit

⁴² Rathmell [et al], op. cit., cited from: B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); J. Chipman (1992), 'The Future of Strategic Studies', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 109-131.

⁴³ See, Kraig, op. cit.; also Mahmood Sariolghalam (Spring 2002), 'Theoretical renewal in Iranian foreign policy (part II)', *Discourse; an Iranian Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. II, 58.

⁴⁴ Charles Tripp, *Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East*. In Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organizations and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 301-307; also The Stanley Foundation, op. cit., were cited by Kraig, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Sean Foley, What wealth cannot buy: UAE security at the turn of the twenty-first century? In Barry Rubin (ed.), *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 33-74, cited by Kraig, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research Center for Applied Policy Research, 'Europe and the Middle East: new ways and solutions for old problems and challenges?', (Munich, Felix Neugart, September 2006), p. 24.

⁴⁷ Kraig, op. cit.

⁴⁸ James A. Bill (2001, September), 'The politics of hegemony: the United States and Iran', *Middle East Policy*, vol. VIII, no. 3, p. 92.

⁴⁹ Kraig, op. cit.

⁵⁰ Nolan, op. cit., cited in Kraig, op. cit.

⁵¹ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran, the GCC and Europe: alternative strategies. In Christian Koch and Felix Neugart (eds.) *A Window of Opportunity Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War*, op. cit., p. 45; also Russell, op. cit; and Kraig, op. cit.

⁵² Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 'East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy' (Dick K. Nanto, January 4, 2008). <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf> (19 June 2008)

⁵³ See, Peter Jones, *Towards a Regional Security Regime in the Middle East: Issues and Options* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1998) which was cited in Ehteshami, op. cit., pp. 48-49; also Bertelsmann Group, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Rathmell [et al], op. cit.

⁵⁵ Bertelsmann Group, op. cit., p. 24; also Kraig, op. cit.

⁵⁶ See, Kraig, op. cit., who cites from Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁵⁷ Ehteshami, op. cit., p. 45; also Bertelsmann Group, op. cit.; also Russell, op. cit.

⁵⁸ Details in Kraig, op. cit.

⁵⁹ Møller, op. cit., pp. 58-61.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 61-63.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 64-66.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 66-67.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 69-70.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 71-73.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 73-76.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

⁶⁸ Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew C. Winner, 'Toward a New Regional Security Architecture' (Summer 2003), *The Washington Quarterly*, vol., 26, no. 3 p. 167, was cited in Russell, op. cit.

⁶⁹ Russell, op. cit., pp. 78-79, also Ehteshami, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

⁷⁰ Russell, op. cit., p. 85.

⁷¹ Rathmell [et al], op. cit., pp. 1, 2, 7, 10.

⁷² Details in Kraig, op. cit.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Tuathail, Samuel Huntington and the 'civilizing' of global space', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Introduction; thinking critically about geopolitics. In Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (US and Canada: Routledge, 1998), p. 174.

⁷⁵ Monica Malik and Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia's Economy: the Challenge of Reform. In Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds.), *Saudi Arabia in the Balance* (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), pp. 103-104.

⁷⁶ Turki Al-Hamad, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

⁷⁷ For instance, statement of Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in Bahrain, or President Ahmadinejad's proposals for collective economic and security cooperation which was addressed to the GCC summit in the Doha in December 2007. See respectively, Trita Parsi (7 Jun 2006), 'Gulf widens between US and sheikhdoms', *Asian Times* http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF07Ak04.html (8 June 2007), and *IRNA*, 13 December 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0712129462102751.htm>

⁷⁸ Russell, op. cit., p. 81.

⁷⁹ Rathmell [et al], op. cit.; also Kraig, op. cit.

⁸⁰ According to the agreements achieved in these trips with increasing Israel and Egypt's military aid for another 10 years, totally \$30 billion and \$13 billion respectively, Washington's arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states could amount to deals worth \$20 billion and will include the new smart weapons for the Saudis in addition to ships for the Saudi navy. See, *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2138849,00.html> (1 August 2007)

Final Conclusion

The PG is one of the most significant geopolitical regions in the world as well as the main dominant energy source and gateway for global energy. These two elements, strategic and economic, which strengthened the region's vital significance to all littoral states, as well as the entire world economy and political life, have caused the PG to be a worthy rival to outside powers, particularly the West, as well being the most unstable and chaotic of any world region.

The perceptions of what constitutes a threat to regional security varies among the Arabs, Iranians and the ultra regional powers, and all accordingly have different solutions to what they perceive as the problem. Nevertheless, regardless of the relevant parties' difference of opinion, all the consequent issues along with three decades of crises in the PG illustrate how urgent it is for the problem regarding regional security to be resolved.

Therefore the objective of this thesis has been to provide a conceptual and analytical foundation for a discussion about the future shape of security arrangements in the PG that addresses the need for a stable and peaceful structure of relationships which will provide security for all individual littoral states, as well as assuring the interests of the external powers.

Using the level of analysis framework as well as three fundamental, competing schools of thought regarding the practice of international security, it has been argued that cooperation is the best solution to the regional security problems in the ME, including its sub-region the PG. These arguments have been supported by the new

global political landscape, most especially those that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, in addition to various successful cooperation models that are to be found in other regions of the globe, e.g. the EU.

To this end, this study has analysed various security models in this significant geopolitical region in the world since 1962, with special reference to Iran's foreign policy. Particular reference was made to Iran because of its geostrategic and geopolitical situation and as the hegemonic power in the PG, which regardless of its political regimes, has great national and security concerns and plays a determinant role in peace and security of the region. The main reason for choosing 1962 as the starting year of this study was the significant effect the successes and failures in Iran's foreign policy towards the PG have had on the stability and security of the region. Therefore, Iran's failures and successes in its policy towards the PG have been studied in the pre and post-revolutionary periods during 1962-1979.

As it was shown, in order to attain regional security, besides the importance of considering the security concerns and national interests of both regional and non-regional players, it is imperative that the major regional and external players have suitable relations. No other alternative strategy would be able to fulfill regional and ultra regional interests and meet security concerns. In this regard, one of my major topics of analysis has been the behaviour of Iran and the US. Therefore, I have developed a cooperative model for a security system, the pyramid model, whereby which one of its major mechanism is such relationship.

The issue of security has been studied from a combination of different perspectives, political, social, economic, geopolitical and international, all of which affect security in this region. Thereby this research has tried to study relations between these factors

as different variables relevant to modelling security in this region. Hence, in order to achieve a durable security of the PG this thesis has been designed in two parts to study the important geopolitical elements and security concerns and systems in this region.

Geopolitical Discourses

Focus on debates surrounding geopolitics has been applied to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical significance of the PG as a subsystem of the ME and its impact on the politics of the region, as well as on power struggles in international politics, besides concerns over access to its massive energy resources. It was shown, because of the geopolitical situation of the PG, particularly regarding its energy resources, how the rivalries and foreign policy goals of great powers were formed to have a greater geopolitical role in this region to further their strategic interests at the expense of the regional states, e.g. applying policy of 'divide and rule', where regional states, especially major players, have not been able to act according to their best interests and assure their security concerns. Hence one of the thesis' emphases has been the necessity of having global and not merely regional geopolitical perspectives. This would result in a single geopolitical vision as a power/knowledge for all the regional states in the PG, which would enable them to understand their significant situation in the balance of power politics and be able to take advantage of various opportunities resulting from geopolitical developments, to their best interests as well as the region's security and stability. Moreover, other reasons for the littoral states for having a regional geopolitical perspective have been highlighted by studying their domestic, regional and external threats they are faced with.

It was concluded that only by addressing this fragile region as a whole, not as divided states and groups of individuals ranged against the other states or groups, would it be possible to prevent further geopolitical problems in this region and change the traditional disruptive role of geopolitical significance of the PG in the region's security to enable it to become a convergent element. Under such circumstances, geopolitics would work as an element for encouraging cooperation among all beneficiary parties instead of being an expansion lever of the external powers. However, by studying Iran-US relations since 1979 as an element of failure in the region's security arrangements, it was shown that having a geopolitical perspective would require understanding and recognise the geopolitical significance of this region from the non-regional players' views too.

My other intention of focusing on debates surrounding geopolitics has been applied to build a security model based on the geopolitical realities of the region. Geopolitics is the most fixed and firm feature of the region and the major convergent element among the PG states, especially regarding their various long-standing divisions and traditional contentions, with an impact on every single nation-state's interests and national security. Emphasising on the region's geopolitics shows that every state, as a part of this geopolitical region, has a unique place in the security system. Irrespective of their size, all states have a similar, though unequal, weight. By increasing the geopolitical position of the region every member state will benefit. By emphasising the geopolitical elements, especially socio-political and economic power, rather than military power it is possible to minimise the significance of the fear of bigger states by smaller states. This would in turn lessen the possibility of any states withdrawing from the model because of any sudden ideological or political changes. This is one of the reasons for choosing the region's geopolitics as the base of my security model of

the pyramid as an important element for preventing littoral states' dependency on external powers for their security and instead on their own regional potentials.

The other intention of the geopolitical discourses of this thesis has been the importance of the role of humans in any security equations. This is a significant geopolitical reality of the region which has been sorely neglected in all previous security arrangements. This thesis' security model appreciates the role of peoples' communication and interconnection.

In addition, the geopolitical elements, especially oil and gas, and their impact on all littoral states as well as the entire world economy and political life has been studied to get a clearer understanding of different security models in this region in respect of all regional and more specifically ultra-regional powers' politics and security concerns. Here arguments are developed regarding the strategic position of oil and gas on the geopolitical importance of the region. This has caused a development of the new concept of 'energy security' since 1970s, due to the severe and rapidly increasing competition among great powers to secure the principal production areas and transportation routes of oil and gas via various military or diplomacy means.

The growing presence of American troops in the region has increased the militarism process, e.g. the attempts of the European Union and the countries in the Asian and Pacific region to create their own military forces to protect energy security from the ME/PG, together with the belief that for political survival and to ensure strategic interest, e.g. Iran's, a back up military power is a necessity. The US military presence has also stimulated popular discontent in the host countries, particularly against Arab regimes. This situation has resulted in increasing militarism, whether in the form of extending the military presence and power of different regional and non-regional

parties, directly or indirectly, or in the form of terrorist attacks. However, the role of other ultra regional players, especially those emerging powers with their growing dependency on PG energy supplies, is significant as a counterbalance to the US hegemonic position in particular, and for building a durable regional security framework. However as it was observed in Part I, energy security in the PG will be very heavily influenced by how the regional and ultra-regional powers understand each others' perceptions of threat as well as their national security issues. Energy security can be assured more effectively by establishing good relations, particularly through economic interdependency. The PG energy security is composed of multivariable components, requiring the responsibility and cooperation of the regional and international community. However, throughout the whole study it was observed that it is the policies of Iran and the US towards each other which will remain the most important factors in the security approaches of the PG.

However, this has been the weakest factor of PG security arrangements since 1979. On the one hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has failed to establish a stable relationship with its neighbours as well as with the West, especially the US, and acknowledge Western interests in this geopolitical region. It has also failed to reconcile its differences with the West and assure it of its vital interests in the PG. This has meant that Iran's goal of establishing collective regional security arrangements that exclude foreign powers has not been achieved, and has therefore contributed to the wider presence of foreign forces; a major success of the Imperial rule of the Pahlavi regime which IRI has not been able to achieve.

On the other hand, the complex foreign policy goals of the US in the region, especially regarding its antagonistic policy towards IRI, have prevented such an

opportunity for peace and security. The US approach of hegemony to security is increasingly focused on ensuring a stable and pro-Western system via the establishment of a commanding value system which includes promoting regional political change. So the region, especially since the start of the twenty first century, has seen the US attempting to broker security in the PG by putting in place an extensive, forward military presence. On one side, this presence was motivated by the US understanding that over-the horizon intervention had failed to be a strong enough deterrent. On the other side, it was motivated by its national interests and its foreign policy goals. Economically speaking, the US arms market profits from this stance. This is evidenced by the recent trip (August 2007) of the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Defense Secretary Robert Gates to the region with the aim of launching Washington's new ME strategy of specifically containment against Iran and arming its allies.¹ Furthermore, the US needs a well integrated world economy and the latter depends on stable oil supplies and suppliers, which involves impeding the development of WMD by those regimes that may threaten the PG oil flow. Politically speaking, this stance helps bring about its hegemony in the international system and assures its own domestic security.²

However, since the US' interests have been guaranteed in both peace and crisis situations in this region, some major questions are raised, and answered, especially with respect to the two most important traditional objectives of Washington's policy in the ME: a) preservation of the oil flow at an affordable price b) the security of Israel. This causes some questions to arise: is there any real US willingness to build peace and security in this region or does Washington need at least one permanent enemy in the region to achieve its hidden hegemonic intentions? Or, does the US support any kind of collective regional arrangements in the PG, whether security or

economic cooperation arrangements which would create assurance of commitment to a common interest? This kind of idea seems very much unwelcome to Washington — as well as other non-regional powers — because its long-term interests would be in contrast with the existence of a single voice of a powerful regional energy organisation in the PG. Also, greater economic interaction and cooperation would result in a basis for stronger security interactions among littoral states of the PG. Therefore, there would be no reason for US military presence or a flourishing US arms market in the region; a very dangerous and concerning fact to US foreign policy concerns.

Under such circumstances the continuity of the West's expansionist geopolitical debates and the US' drive for control over the states and strategic resources and wealth of the world, with a determining influence on foreign policy and global strategy, becomes dependent on a description of the world map similar to that of the Cold War period, one of ideological identity and difference; such as foes or allies, 'with us or against us', etc. Therefore, the recent model of emerging world order by Samuel Huntington, namely the 'clash of civilizations', as a dominant factor in the future global politics for the continuance of dividing the world into good and evil has been highly welcomed. In his opinion the most fundamental of such clashes is the conflict between the West and the Rest of the world,³ where in his new post-Cold War geopolitical world-picture, the major principal American strategic interest is to perpetuate the primacy of the US as the global power.⁴ The continuity of this geopolitical debate and how US statesmen have conceptualised the role of their state in world affairs, which intensified since September 11th, 2001, can be seen via the US terminology whereas instead of "the evil empire," used by Ronald Reagan to describe the USSR, George W. Bush's terminology for the official enemies of the US in 2002

is the “axis of evil,” including, Iraq, Iran and North Korea,⁵ or his use of terms like “Islamic fascists” is to link the actions of violent Muslims to their religion to strengthen arguments about the clash of civilisations between Islam and the West.⁶ Such definitions of a divided world is being propagandised where cooperation, most especially since the end of the Cold War, is the prevailing global atmosphere and is increasingly practiced within and by the West, but there is not any meaningful process or global support for collective cooperation and unity within the rest of world, viz. non-Western, developing and underdeveloped countries and more specifically the ME/PG.

Nation-states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran have a special place in these geopolitical debates addressing the new confrontation of Islam and the West. The major reasons regarding Iran, besides its significant geopolitical situation, are its Islamic political ideology, its antipathy against the US, and its growing influence in the ME with its intention of collective regional security arrangements which would increase its regional role and simultaneously would exclude foreign powers’ presence. Under such circumstances states such as Iran, whose foreign policies have great impact against US hegemonic unilateralism, specifically in the ME/PG, are meant to be disrupted and isolated, politically, militarily and economically. However, as was argued earlier, without a proper relationship between Iran and the US as the two major regional and non-regional powers, establishing peace and security would be impossible. This study is necessary owing to the failure of all security models in the PG during the time period of this study. Also due to the vast and extended regional and global consequences of regional crises, combined with the increasing complexity of methods of competition, specifically the more frequent resort to military solutions with more sophisticated weapons rather than to diplomacy or socio-economic

cooperation. Hence, under such circumstances achieving even remotely stable security is increasingly difficult. Therefore, I argue that as long as the foreign policy goals of the US as the hegemonic power in the present international system is based on preventing a natural development of regional powers' roles, especially Iran's, none of the security arrangements can work. The consequences of the US political strategy of containment in the PG could be similar to the defence strategy during the Cold War which soon became militarised and even nuclearised.

Such external threats and interferences is one of the reasons why the PG states have regional geopolitical perspectives rather than global views. Other reasons which involve their domestic and regional threats and problems have been studied (chapters seven through ten) to explain why the PG states, especially the three major players, viz. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have not been able to take advantage of their geopolitical priorities with a great global impact. Adding the geopolitical significance of the PG to these factors, the littoral states of the PG have not been able to approach a single geopolitical perspective but have been compelled to rely on the security umbrella of non-regional powers. This is the reason why the intention of this study regarding security approach has been to direct PG states' attention towards the important element of geopolitics in their strategies.

In order to analyse the determinant factors of a security system this study has drawn upon the level of analysis framework in international relations. This contribution has examined the issues involved in creating a regional security model so as to turn threats into opportunities for regional cooperation and sustainability, especially through the ability to identify casual factors of international politics. Hence, to investigate the future shape of collective security arrangements in the region this

study has investigated major insecurity components in the PG, viz. territorial, boundary and maritime disputes and specifically the heterogeneity of the political systems within the eight littoral states, specifically Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as the major regional powers and their domestic instabilities as well as their different security perspectives within Part II.

Boundary disputes, as a great divergent element in the littoral states' interaction, as well as for the regional stability and security, have contributed the other divergent factors to prevent the littoral states from creating a collective regional security arrangement. Hence, as was learned from chapter six, diplomatic means and regional solutions are the most lasting and practical answer to the different territorial and boundary disputes in this region. The necessity of such solutions is the improvement of the political conditions, with all regional actors including the US, in the case of Iran, esteeming previous agreements and avoiding any expansionist notions, respecting the sovereign existence and independence of all actors, states comprehending the significance of collaborative relationships in favour of all littoral members, efforts made to extend confidence-building measurements, and thereby finally achieving a collective security arrangement.

Also as the different political position of the PG states (e.g. political structure, political history, interaction with the world's powers, national interests, etc.) has significantly affected the regional security, focus has been on domestic, foreign and security policies which are not divided issues for the PG states. Security, as the most important issue of the PG region, has been influenced by the eight littoral states' interaction condition, as well as by the increasingly intense great non-regional powers' rivalry with its effect on PG states' domestic and foreign policies, and the

impact of their internal and external security threat on PG regional security as a whole. Hence, this study has discussed all three levels of the PG state's foreign policies and the forces that affected them, including the systemic level (the interaction between states) and the debate that occurs on the domestic and individual levels.

Besides issues of particular importance to other countries, this thesis makes a special effort to evoke the perspective from which the PG states themselves view their problems and choose their domestic and foreign policy priorities in respect to certain legitimate strategic concerns which arise from their geographic, social, and historical context. This is a fundamental factor which motivates states' political behaviour to ensure the state's security, territorial integrity, national cohesion and approach to the sources of wealth essential to develop their economy and political institutions effectively and independently. A significant point that is usually absent from many analyses in the West, specifically in Washington, is that security in the PG will be very heavily influenced by how they understand the regional states' perceptions of threat, as well as their national security issues. Therefore, the major outlines of chapters seven through to ten were dedicated to the study of the littoral states, addressing their political history and political system as well as internal and external threats to their stability.

However, using the level of analysis framework, it has been argued that the best solution to the regional security problems in the ME, including its sub-region the PG, is through dialogue. Regionally, it is only through confidence building measures (CBM) and by intensified and sustained diplomacy in a peaceful and non-confrontational atmosphere promoting unofficial, informal contacts and negotiations that a functional regional security arrangement can be created, a process that puts

emphasis on soft, as opposed to exclusively hard, power. Despite the fact that the region is a long way from establishing a solid foundation that could build confidence, settle disputes and deter conflict, this would be a starting point for formalising a security system which would establish various organisations for promoting cooperation and promoting the rule of law. Given examples of recent developments support this argument; e.g. the Arab PG states are unenthusiastic about putting their security solely in the hands of the US and their leaders have recently supported the idea of a collective security arrangement for the region that includes Iran (as voiced, for instance, by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the 2004 Gulf Dialogue in Bahrain) and are growing more and more frustrated with US reluctance to have any dealing with the Iranians.⁷ In addition, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has welcomed the idea of a joint organisation between Iran and member states of the GCC in his recent trip to Qatar. In his address to the GCC summit which was held in the Doha in December 2007, Ahmadinejad made a string of proposals for collective economic and security cooperation.⁸ Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki after this summit announced that in meetings with Saudi and other GCC's officials, Tehran's proposal for cooperation with the GCC in the different political, economic and security grounds and within a collective defence treaty, has received the positive attention of regional states. Mottaki put the emphasis on the importance of the establishment of security in the PG through the collective and joint cooperation of regional states as the most crucial factor contributing to the growth, development and progress of the region, which will also influence the trend of world developments.⁹

Domestically, as was learned from chapters seven through to ten the major threat to regional states' society comes from within; therefore, the regimes' survival depends upon opening up the political systems to more democratic participation and economic

reforms in order to address their most strategic weakness. An inclusive national/inter-sectarian dialogue, encouraging tolerance and diversity, alongside political reforms, and in some cases like Saudi Arabia in particular, religious reforms, are necessary for preparations towards democracy. However, since the internal challenges facing littoral states could translate into security concerns for the whole region, domestic reform is a necessity from the regional perspective too. In addition to developing internal political dialogue to decrease the risk of extremist views, developing a network of military and economic agreements that create considerable interdependence among the PG states should also leave less room for discontent and extremism. This would further assist the process of domestic reform in the region. Rathmell [et al] and Kraig argue that this would be especially true of the newly formed cooperative arrangements, in which the financial and human capital of nation-states will be expended on civil, rather than military, development.¹⁰

Domestic reform is a discourse whose necessity for the sake of stability in the region has been acknowledged even by the Bush administration. George W. Bush in a speech delivered in London on the 19th of November 2007, by criticising the inter-state bargain between the West and its authoritarian elites said that, “we must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East (...) in the past [we] have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold”.¹¹

However, implementing democracy takes time and requires patience and sustained effort, and can only be achieved if it is initiated within the framework of domestic

debate. Attempts to impose it from outside will only stifle the process of change; however the international community could support democratisation by encouraging an atmosphere that is germane to such a process.

Various changes in the global political landscape, most especially those that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, have provided a fresh opportunity to develop a new approach to international security. This new approach is one which places particular emphasis on patterns of cooperation. Traditional security methods that are based on massive military confrontation are no longer particularly effective or even acceptable to global public opinion. In addition to various successful cooperation models that are to be found in other regions of the globe, e.g. the EU, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with all its consequences is the latest example which highlights the need for cooperation.

Security Debates

To lay the groundwork for developing a better and more comprehensive future security arrangement, this thesis appeals to empirical data and observation, as well as theoretical framework and critical analysis, to articulate the reasons for the failure of security models in the PG. The arguments are supported by detailed evidence for each model, during the time period 1962-1997. Regional security is examined in order to explain the major strategic choices available to both the PG and the external powers' decision makers in a different international atmosphere in this regard. Looking for a comprehensive strategy for peace and stability in the PG this study has been conducted through the prism of three fundamental, competing schools of thought regarding the practice of international security realism, neo-liberalism or the cooperative-security school, and the hegemonic or counterproliferation. Studying the

strengths and weaknesses of the three theories it was shown how the policies of selective multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism have been unsuccessful in bringing about security in the PG. It was shown that this is because the most prominent states favour inextricably exclusionary types of coalition. All of the above policies result in the systematic exclusion, economically or militarily, of a major state and of non-state actors in the security order. Regarding strategic properties of the PG which affect how successful a security system in it will be and the fragility of temporary alignments of the classical kind of two against the third pillar, there is an emphasis on a combination of two synergistic components of balance of power between the three key regional players, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and meaningful reform in the littoral states for the future PG security system, where the region lacks both. Therefore, analysts and scholars, as well as policy-makers, have drawn similar conclusions concerning the two dominant contending frameworks for PG security: US hegemony and its dominant military presence and principled multilateralism. These conclusions are viewed as even more valid in the post-Saddam era. Accordingly by studying the analysis of Michael Kraig, Steven Spiegel, Richard Russell, Andrew Rathmell and Bjørn Møller, who with regard to strategic properties of the PG all emphasise the need for a new approach and policy options for security in the PG regional and external powers security policies towards the region, however from various angles and different solutions, this study has tried to come up with a more practicable approach to the security of this region.

Besides the regional perception of the importance of cooperation models, this study has tried to show the significance of the US-Iran relationship as well as the role of other ultra regional players; especially those emerging powers like the EU and some key states in the AP (viz. China, India, and Japan) in constructing a more sustainable

PG security system. By using their strategic interest in the PG, especially their growing dependency on PG energy supplies which exceeds the US', their close ties with the region by a network of economic and political linkages and their deep concerns over US permanent hegemony in the ME/PG, which have resulted in their recognition of a need to adopt a greater geopolitical role independently of Washington, it is possible to create a counterbalance to the US hegemony in the PG to benefit the development of a multilateral security regime.

Consequently a number of key research gaps have been highlighted regarding security which has resulted in an alternative security model in the PG. This study has come up with a model on the basis of the mixed approaches of a cooperative-security (liberalism) framework and Realpolitik (realism). This model has been designed as a pyramid, with three sides consisting of 'the policies of the littoral Arab states', 'the policies of ultra-regional powers' and 'Iran's policies', and the base of the pyramid which interacts with all three sides is the 'geopolitics of the PG'. It emphasises the need for interaction and cooperation as well as a balance of interests between the three sides of the pyramid, and geometrically reacts so that in any instance of an attempt by any of the three regional and/or non regional elements to change the base of the pyramid in its favour, the model will be destabilised and regional instability will be the result. In other words, in a balance of power based on geopolitics (including military power, arms races, or cultural/nationalist issues) if any party tries to ruin the balance (i.e., if there is too much movement of the vertex which means the picture of vertex will not be seen on the base 'geopolitics' any more) history will repeat itself. If one of the countries involved gains too much weight, the other two would feel threatened and try to compensate.

The Pyramid security model could be a solution to the very volatile situation in the PG, because in addressing major security issues this model is based on the geopolitical realities, as well as the political and economic concerns, of all regional and ultra-regional parties. It is also able to avoid the typical problems that arise for models based on a competition for power between states with conflicting national interests and agendas, like Russell's,¹² as it does not base a balance of power on such confrontational bases. It was observed that this security model would be able to manage relations between states and create a regulation of power, which would mean the rule of 'law' and not 'the powers'. It would be a system with legitimacy and authority, as none of the actors would perceive itself to be outside the prevailing order. It would also create interdependence among the regional states themselves which would promote security, instead of reliance on the security umbrella of non-regional powers. Such a security model can also assure that the gains it aims to achieve are mutual gains for all participants, and is thereby able to assure that it would be in the interests of all relevant parties to remain in the system. Therefore, the model is also immune to any significant internal changes to the littoral states. The importance of this model stems not just from the role that states have in its architecture and their effect on its functionality, but also that some consideration is given to the role of people (even sub-national groups), their interactions, as well as their satisfaction. Its emphasis on reforms will encourage positive competition among all littoral states to upgrade their weight in this security framework via greater civil development, rather than military power or territorial size. This is true for ultra-regional players too; in particular, by contributing towards the region's development they can upgrade their role in this region.

Learning from international political system's behaviour towards the PG states like Iran's pre and post-revolution regimes and more specifically Iraq during its two invasions of its neighbours in the 1980s and 1990s, one significant result is the recognition of the important impact of the international system and the necessity of achieving a fair political system in international relations to assure security and stability in any region in the world, including the PG. The international communities' behaviour exposed a double standard attitude; for instance in case of Iraq, from offering aid to open hostility with a great effect on the regional security for the whole of the PG. There appears no basis for such a shift in attitude, just the unfortunate fact that one single and unique standard does not apply to every country because there is not a fair international system. This is why this study introduces a fourth element to previous categories of the important, interlocking elements needed to establish a workable, legitimate and authoritative security model in the PG. An appropriate international political environment with a proper international security system's structure (which is given in the pyramid model by emphasising the relationship of the non-regional powers' with the littoral states) was added to other three elements of: an inclusive and multilateral approach; a balance of power, preferably through arms control negotiations among all three regional key players; and domestic developments and reforms in the littoral states. Such stress is also important because many scholars such as Kraig perceive an external contribution to improve the security situation within the region important, owing to the fragility of domestic politics and interregional relations in the PG.¹³

The final conclusion of this study is that the entire situation with its suspicions and mistrust among all regional and ultra-regional states, combined with neglecting other parties' interests and security concerns, has resulted in a daily escalation of the crises

in this most geostrategic region in the world. The people of the region in particular are the greatest losers in such an unstable and critical situation. The littoral states' regimes do not benefit from such circumstances either. All these factors, combined with the global loss of energy security and increases in the price of energy, and the more recent issue of the spread and growing process of terrorism from the radical religious militants, should press all the different parties, both regional and non-regional, to support and assist the establishment of comprehensive security cooperation in this narrow but vital waterway for global peace, security and prosperity. As long as security rather than diplomacy is the priority in foreign policy of external as well as internal players of the PG and the general aim is for maximum security and political regimes' survival, security tools (especially military capabilities) are the major necessity for following their foreign policy goals, stability and prosperity will not occur in this region.

Notes

¹ For details among many see, *American Forces Press Service*, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46882>; also *The Guardian*, 1 August 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2138849,00.html>

² For military and economic explanations see, Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, & David Gompert, (2003), 'A new Persian Gulf security system', *RAND issue paper*.

³ Samuel Huntington (1993, Summer), 'The clash of civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 22-49.

⁴ See, Gearóid Tuathail, Samuel Huntington and the 'civilizing' of global space. In Gearóid Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (US and Canada: Routledge, 1998), pp. 171, 173.

⁵ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'General introduction; thinking critically about geopolitics', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (US and Canada: Routledge, 2006), second edition, p. 3; also Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'Introduction; thinking critically about geopolitics', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail [et al] (1998), op. cit., p. 6.

⁶ Richard Allen Greene, 'Bush's language angers US Muslims' (12 August 2006). *BBC News*, Washington, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4785065.stm>

⁷ Trita Parsi (7 Jun 2006), 'Gulf widens between US and sheikhdoms', *Asian Times* http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF07Ak04.html (8 June 2007)

⁸ IRNA, 13 December 2007, <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0712129462102751.htm>

⁹ *Fars News Agency*, Mottaki, Iranian Foreign Minister, speaking to reporters in Tehran on 14 December 2007, <http://www.farsnews.com/English/newstext.php?nn=8604110558>

¹⁰ Andrew Rathmell [et al], op. cit.; also Michael Kraig (Fall 2004), 'Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks for the Persian Gulf', *Middle East Policy*, Washington: vol.11, issue 3, cited in the site of *Gulf2000* of Columbia University, NY, USA.

¹¹ 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London', Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 November 2003, cited in Anoush Ehteshami, '9/11 as a cause of paradigm shift?' (June 2007), *SGIA Research Working Papers Series-Durham University*.

¹² Richard L. Russell (Winter 2005), 'The Persian Gulf's collective-security mirage', *Middle East Policy Council*, vol. XII, no. 4, p. 81.

¹³ Kraig, op. cit.

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Appendices

Appendix-1

Geographical features of the Persian Gulf

The PG is a semi-enclosed sea in the inferior folds of southern Zagros Mountains that is situated between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. It is approximately 90,000 square nautical miles (233,100 square km) in size, and has 97 percent of its periphery occupied by land. This waterway is joined to the Gulf of Oman, the northernmost arm of the Indian Ocean, by the Strait of Hormuz. The length of the PG from the Arvand Rud to the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 600 nautical miles (970 km); its maximum width is about 136 nautical miles (220 km). The narrowest part of the Gulf is in the Strait of Hormuz, the only outlet to the Indian Ocean, which measures 49 nautical miles (80 km) in width.

The Gulf is a relatively shallow basin with an average depth of less than 40 meters and a maximum depth of 90 meters. The deeper waters run along the Iranian coast and off the Musandam peninsula. Scattered throughout the Gulf, particularly along the Arabian shore, are numerous islands. These islands contribute to the irregular configuration of the coastline and complicate efforts at establishing offshore boundaries. Three of these islands, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, are of strategic importance because of their position relative to the shipping lanes within the PG at the approach to the Strait of Hormuz.

The PG has seven littoral states: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. There is one island state in the waterway: Bahrain. Coastline measurements within the Gulf vary from 635 nautical miles (1027 km) for Iran, approximately 371 nautical miles (600 km) for United Arab of Emirates and 269 nautical miles (435 km) for Saudi Arabia to 10 nautical miles (16 km) for Iraq. Oman's only gulf coastline is on the Musandam Peninsula, which borders the Strait of Hormuz on the south.¹

There are two large islands in the PG, these being Jazire-ye Qeshm, off the Iranian coast, on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, and Bahrain, on the western side of Qatar, a large projection in the south-western corner of the Gulf. Those islands of the Persian littoral are rocky, volcanic origin and steep slope, same as the coast of which they are formed from; those near the Arabian littoral are merely sand islets and shoal islands, though some are geologically similar to Hormuz.

The head of the Gulf is the low alluvial land of the deltas of the Tigris, Euphrates, Karun and other rivers. The north-western end of the Gulf is probably silting up, owing to the large amount of alluvium deposited by the great rivers debouching there. The depths in the Gulf of Oman and in the PG are generally great off the high coast, but less off the low coasts.

Apart from its physical dimensions, the PG has been important for its unique historical and geographic location. It has been a valuable waterway since the beginning of history and as the venue of the collision of great civilizations of the ancient east; it has a background of several millenniums.² Sir Arnold T. Wilson (1928) also expressed the PG as the greatest interest arm of the sea to the scientists in different fields, the merchants and the statesmen and appreciated its significances as:

The Persian Gulf, [...] following the custom of master mariners for three centuries, has a place in the written history of mankind older than that of any other inland sea; its story can be traced, though not continuously, from the very earliest historic times; its central position on one of the main highways between East and West has from the dawn of civilization invested it with peculiar importance: it was the scene of great events, which determined the trend of development of the human race, while the Mediterranean was probably still unfurrowed by the keels of ships. The mass of literature on the subject in half a score of languages, of which a proportion only is included in our bibliography, bears eloquent testimony to the continuous interest of Europe in the subject from the earliest times.³

Throughout history the PG that enroute the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, has been viewed as an old and important crossroads of trade and communication. The PG is an area with the richest and longest running seafaring tradition of any world region, c. 5,000 years in age.⁴

Notes

¹ Different measures about geographic size of the Persian Gulf are quoted in various texts. The quoted scales are chose from the most frequented.

² *Institute of political and international studies*, 'Selected Persian Gulf documents', vol. 1, p.5.

³ Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p.1.

⁴ CAIS, 'In search of ancient seafarers in the Persian Gulf'. http://home.btconnect.com/CAIS/Geography/persian.gulf/pg_seafarers.htm (14 February 2004)

Appendix-2

Historical Position of the Persian Gulf in World Politics; British Dominance

(A)

Increasing British involvement in India beginning in the late eighteenth century quickened British interest in the PG region as a means of protecting the sea routes to India. British primary commercial interests in the PG merged with political interests in restraining the PG due to Napoleon's European conquests and his expedition to Egypt, and also the possibility of another invasion of northern India by Afghanistan in 1798.

In the nineteenth century the PG remained strategically vital for defence of India and the British Eastern Empire, a situation that continued until the WWII. With the eviction of the Dutch and the French from the area, as well as the decline of the influence of Iran, the British became the unchallenged power in the PG, which had become one of the most important geopolitical arenas.

When combining the significant and outstanding position of the PG in world politics, with the geostrategic situation of Iran, especially as the southern and western neighbour to two prominent powers, Russia and the British (Indian Empire) respectively, as well as Iran's traditional territorial domination in the south of the PG through obscure political and administrative formation until the end of nineteenth century, conditions appears ideal for Britain's domination over Iran and the PG.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany and Russia, too, in their turn, had begun to take an interest in gaining access to the PG. Early in the twentieth century, shortly before the beginning of the WWI, upon the confirmation of the existence of oil on the coasts of the PG, the major powers' interests in the region heightened, and Britain became even more determined to broaden her influence in Iran and the PG.

Britain's policy towards Iran in nineteenth century is described by Kelly (1968) with the words of John Malcolm, 1807, as:

Persia and Turkey may both be considered as barrier Powers to British India, and the destruction of either by a European Power would endanger India so far that it would expose it to the early invasion of such Power; and consequently is the policy of England to aid and support those states, or to endeavour to create and strengthen others to effect the same object.¹

After the Treaty of Turkmanchai, Kelly alleges that Sir John Malcolm in 1826, on the eve of the denouement of the Russia and Persian war, stated "that the establishment of a Russian ascendancy at Tehran would have an unsettling effect upon British rule in India." Kelly adds that "Sea power alone, in Malcolm's view, would not suffice to protect India from invasion. India's front line of defence lay in Persia. It was imperative that Britain should preserve Persia's independence against Russia".²

To dominate the region it was necessary to weaken regional powers, therefore, Britain started defining territories and boundaries within the Arab tribes, giving them territorial statehood. This was applied along with a policy of disconnecting the traditional ties in the region. This policy caused great harm to the sovereignty of Iran by separating as many islands and coastal districts from her as were possible. (Details of relevant documents in Appendix-2-B) So the British moved forces in to the PG under the guise of fighting the slave trade and maritime piracy engaged in by the tribes of the lower Gulf.³ According to Drysdale and Blake, Britain's interest during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a dominant power in India affirm that "Britain also signed treaties with the small shaykhdoms on the Indian Ocean and Gulf coasts of Arabia excluding rival power and agreeing to the suppression of slavery and piracy."⁴

Britain gradually brought the southern half of the PG under her control and by the mid-nineteenth century entered into various forms of treaties and agreements with the coastal Arab tribes. In 1853, Britain signed the Perpetual Maritime Truce, formalising the temporary truces of 1820 and 1835. The sheikhs agreed to stop disrupting British shipping and to recognise Britain as the dominant power in the PG which meant an acceptance of Britain's protection that was to last until 1967. These sheikhdoms thus became known as the *Trucial States*.

Thereby as Ellahi notes, Britain extended her authority over the region's trade and shipping routes too; an opportunity for the Eastern-India Company to extirpate the native competitor's fleets that caused dissolution of economic system of the PG as well as developing public poverty.⁵

Accordingly by the diplomacy of *protégé treaties*, *military power*, and *interference in internal affairs* of Iran as the only nation state existing in the PG during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain could effectively eliminate the opportunity for any regional or non regional powers or states to dominate this strategic waterway.

Napoleon's plan for a vast eastern empire in India was frustrated by the closing of the PG to the French naval forces during his wars in the late eighteenth century and his further diplomatic efforts through the subsequent century were annihilated; Russia was prevented from access to the warm waters of the PG via her 1907 agreement with Britain at the expense of Iran. In the second half of the nineteenth century fear of the Ottoman Empire expansion against Europe led to European and British policies that operated at Iran's expense, keeping it in various disputes.

From the evidence of all existing official documents and texts in the West and East, Iran's efforts at establishing power in the PG were totally unacceptable to and annulled by Britain. Nashat has referred to Lurans Lugheart in his *Political History of the Persian Gulf*, stating that, "Britain to weaken Iran authority in the Persian Gulf was encouraging Arab Sheikhs apparently or inapparently, e.g. Bahrain, to anarchy and disobey Iran government for independence. In this regard Britain sorely used to refuse every action, measure even proposal of Iran for establishing navy in sake of security in the Gulf."⁶ Nashat also notes that:

Britain was not able to develop her influence towards Sheikhdoms of the southern coast of the Persian Gulf unless to deficiency the great powers from interference in their affairs. By 1820 Britain could defeat every great state in this connection except Iran. Lack of Iran navy in the Persian Gulf was a perfect pretext for Britain to abandon her, even temporary, from lordship of the Gulf. This goal was achieved by various political scenes that were made by Britain for involving Iran in the Gulf region or her neighbourhood states problems.⁷

As Ramazani remarks, one final attempt came in 1865 when Nasereddin Shah Qajar tried to form a navy and asked British help, but the plan was rejected due to suspicions regarding Iran's intentions.⁸

Early in the twentieth century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of independent local schools and nationalisms, together with the confirmation of the existence of oil on the coasts of the PG, resulted in extra attention paid by Britain to the regions, and an increased desire to broaden her influence in the PG. In this regard the first oil exploration concession of any lasting significance in the region was obtained by William Knox D'Arcy from the Iranian government on the 21st of May 1901. It covered the entire country, excluding the five northern Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan and Khorasan on behalf of Russian reservation that was to last for 60 years. Iranian oil production remained surely and exclusively in control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, eventually British Petroleum, until 1951.

Britain by establishing the colonial force called the '*South Persian Rifles*' in southern Iran, was preparing to exploit the vast oil reserves in the area with her figurehead governments in Arab territories and the islands of the PG. To protect her influence in the region Britain, through the unsuccessful treaty of 1919 or via various conspiracies which later become disclosed, conserved her influence in the PG until a few years after WWII, when Iranian oil was nationalised.⁹ Thereby once again the British became the unchallenged power in the PG and according to Drysdale and Blake "oil exploration and monopoly control placed the oil companies in a strong position vis-à-vis individual Middle Eastern government [...] The Iranian crisis of 1951-54 illustrated the weakness of individual governments in the face of a united front of companies."¹⁰ Although by the nationalisation of Iranian oil under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh caused Britain's hand of influence to be cut off from Iran oil sources for a period as it is explained and added by Drysdale and Blake,

The crisis was resolved after a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)- supported *coup d'état* brought a more compliant Iranian government to power. Although Iran retained ownership of all oil fields and refineries, after 1954 the oil was produced by a new joint production company called the Consortium. Significantly, the Consortium included all the seven majors for the first time [includes British oil companies].¹¹

Since WWII a serious fraying of the British hold on the PG began to emerge. Three main reasons caused the decline of the British influence in the PG:

- The rising movement of nationalism and anti-imperialism in the ME that was started with the nationalisation of Iranian oil subject to the leadership of the Prime Minister Mosadegh in 1951.
- The rapid decline of the British Empire.
- The new international political situation and Britain's new general policy for not getting involved directly in the international political scene.

Britain sensed that her presence in the PG could only stimulate further anti-Western emotions, and so to prevent any local or international movements or activities against the *status quo*, it decided to leave voluntarily.

Since the mid nineteenth century Britain could manage security and stability in the PG via her military forces. In January 1968, Britain announced her intentions of withdrawing from the region in the next three years. By 1971, some countries in the PG had gained independence, including the United Arab Emirates. Britain was looking for the settlement of various territorial and maritime boundary disputes within littoral states of the region to guarantee the *status quo* of the PG after her departure.

Unlike the Portuguese and other Europeans, Britain was following a long term policy of attendance and dominance towards the PG. The Portuguese had the worst kind of colonialism as Wilson, referring this case also to their rule in Bahrain mentions "the Portuguese factor was tortured and crucified."¹² Although the British advent in the PG was initially for trade reasons, their purpose of domination on this waterway latter was exactly planned as a clever policy.¹³

The continuity of Britain's incomparable and forcible position in the PG was due to the intelligent and cunning policy of manipulative exploitation that was implemented with maximum economic and security consequences. The most important components of this policy were:

- Knowledge about international current issues and complexities to display the object of colonialism as justifiable, e.g. eradicating acts of piracy and slave trading.
- Awareness, recognition and apprising the difficulties and dissensions within states and groups of inhabitants in the region in order to 'divide and rule'.
- To misuse the weak and divergent elements of the littoral states for separating as many islands and coastal districts as possible from them, specifically Iran.
- Exploitation of regional crises and simultaneously defeating foreign forces in a united front with regional rulers to further Britain's interests.
- Dividing the region into many small states, with many border disputes; under this situation they could remain dependent on Britain, and eventually establishment of any further influential and united forces through these states against their creative power would be impossible.

From 1600 to 1971, Britain could continue her direct interference in the geostrategic region of the PG and since then, however indirectly, has been playing a significant role in the Arab states' policies. Because of Britain's long-term policy and agenda in her dominant states, the regional networks that were established during her presence in those countries have been very strong.

(B)

One important document in Iran's Foreign Ministry, dated 1968, confirmed Britain's underplot to obtain, by theft or bribery, a very important report about different records of Iran's sovereignty over the PG islands and even some areas in the southern shore. In a 'very confidential and important' letter of Mohammad Reza Amir Teimour [from Iran Embassy in London] to Ardeshir Zahedi, Foreign Minister on 30 Shahrivar 1347 (21 September 1968) is mentioned that,

This report which was written more than 80 years ago by Brigadier Haji Ahmad Khan Kababi, the then ruler of Lengah Port (Bandar Lengah) is very significant because there were documentary evidence signed by Arab sheikhs confirming Iran sovereignty right over the four islands. (...) while these sorts of documents were against Britain's policy and interest, is very likely that the originals and appendixes were stolen.

In the letter of Amir Teimour it is also mentioned that,

Documents in British Foreign Ministry show that the authorities in the British Embassy in Tehran, by different tricks have stolen or obtained the report by bribery then sent it to London. But this report is not among released documents in the British archive (it seems they have hidden the report).¹⁴

During 1904-1971 Britain's emphasis on appertaining the islands to the sheikhdoms more than the sheikhdoms themselves¹⁵ was aimed not just at deterring any Russian influence in the region or restricting Iran's influence as a regional power, but also "with the islands under the influence of Britain's Trucial protectorates, Britain exercised more control over them."¹⁶

Moreover, it seems that Britain, as the guardian of the PG sheikhdoms, was not disposed towards a clear, documented and permanent solution between Iran and the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, and so the dossier of disputes were left open. For instance, records of separate meetings between the Shah and Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Foreign Minister with Sheikh Saghar Ben Mohammad al Ghasemi the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Khater, his councillor in December 1969 in Tehran, illustrates Britain's reluctance and unclear policy in this regard.¹⁷ According to these documents, sheikh Saghar and Abu Khater confirmed to Abbas Aram after this meeting that Britain had given no formula but asked the sheik himself to solve this problem with Iran.¹⁸ Whilst, as Iran's Court Minister Alam indicates in his confidential diary for 18 February 1969:

British Ambassador (Sir Denis Wright) ...told me very confidentially that the case of Tunb Island is practically settled and will definitely be given to Iran, for we have told the Shaikh of Ras al-Kheimah that if you don't come to some sort of arrangement with Iran — as these islands are situated above the median line (of the Persian Gulf) — Iran will lawfully, and if that was not possible, will forcefully take these islands, and the Shaikh agreed to make a deal over them.¹⁹

Other documents in the Iranian Foreign Ministry show that in Sheikh Saghar's meeting with Aram and Ardeshir Zahedi in Hesarak, Tehran, in 5 January 1970 (the next day after Saghar's negotiation with the Shah) he submitted a list of the Sheikhdom's economic and armament needs from Iran.²⁰ As it is mentioned in these documents, in this meeting they studied sheikh Saghar's major concerns and possible solutions for the political pressures of the other Arabs over any agreement with Iran, in return for the islands seizure.²¹ However, eventually after the islands were seized, Ras al-Khaimah announced its disagreement with Iran's action.

Although, some months later, as Mojtahed-Zadeh mentioned regarding Iran's chief negotiator, Amir Khosro Afshar (then Iran's ambassador in London), the Saudi Arabians intervened and requested him to meet sheikh Saghar and ask his financial requirements. Amir Khosro Afshar who had unsuccessful meetings with the sheikh and also his successor before the islands were repossessed by Iran, explained:

I met Shaikh Saqar in the Iranian Embassy in London and told him that we were prepared to extend financial assistance to Ras al-Kheima provided that he officially renounced his opposition to the reassertion of Iranian sovereignty on the two Tunbs. He said he saw no sense in not doing so, but such an official declaration would put his life in jeopardy with the fanatics.²²

In general, the British policy in the whole process was implemented despite London's being complete awareness of Iran's assertion about its historical right to the three islands, as well as its national and regional security concerns;²³ also the political pressures of the other Arab countries over any agreement of the sheikhs with Iran about the islands in return of financial supports from Tehran.²⁴

However, on one hand, in spite of Britain's trend of attaching islands to the Sheikhdom of emirates, London was not much deprecated of Iran's possession over them. Iran was acting as a barrier to any possible regional disputes after Britain's departure from the PG which could be of the Soviet Union's interest. Besides, the Shah policy had indicated that by possessing the islands, Iran was not looking to make problems for the West (because of the strategic location of islands in the PG regarding oil supply to world markets), but it had proved its will and military power to stand against the spread of Communism in the region with the newly independent Arab states.²⁵

On the other hand, Britain's main objectives in the PG before its departure — creating the states of Bahrain and Qatar and also the UAE via uniting the seven of the Trucial sheikhdoms — were dependent on dealing with

Tehran.²⁶ Hence, during 1968 to 1971, Iran and Britain successfully negotiated a set of deals, of Iran giving up its claims to Bahrain and recognising it as a dependent state as well as the dependent states of Qatar and the UAE, in return for the repossession of the Tunbs islands and signing the MOU about Abu Musa. Despite the importance of the Iran-Sharjah understanding, as a result of long negotiations between Iran and Britain, the general issue of sovereignty of Abu Musa was left unclear, and they left no evidence of such package agreements between Iran and Britain. Consequently, another Iran-Arab potential dispute was left for after Britain's departure from the region.²⁷

Notes

- ¹ J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 260.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 262.
- ³ The same policy was followed by other Europeans as Drysdale and Blake also mention, "The French conquest of Algeria began in 1830, ostensibly to curb the activities of the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean but in practice to secure trading rights and territorial aggrandizement." See, Alasdair Drysdale & Gerald H. Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa: A political geography* (New York: Oxford Press, 1985), p. 50.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-54.
- ⁵ Homayoon Elahi, *Khalige- Fars va masaele- a'n [The Persian Gulf and its Problems]* (Tehran: n.d), pp. 69-70.
- ⁶ Sadegh Nashat, *Tarikhe- siasie- Khalije- Fars [Political History of the Persian Gulf]* (Place unknown: Sherkat Nesbi Kanoon Ketab, 1965), pp.340-342.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 245-246.
- ⁸ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1972), p.18.
- ⁹ For more details among many, Author unknown, *Geographical maps and historical documents on the Persian Gulf* (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), 1989), p.157.
- ¹⁰ Drysdale & Blake, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-323.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 245.
- ¹³ For more details see, Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 1; also Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1970), p. 79.
- ¹⁴ The archive of Iranian Foreign Ministry.
- ¹⁵ As Hooshang Amirahmadi says, "For example in 1934, the Sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah decided to surrender possession of the Tonbs to Iran, as he thought that the islands were legitimate Iranian territory. The British intervened to disallow the move, forcing the sheikhdom to keep its flag on the islands." See, Hooshang Amirahmadi, The colonial-political dimension of the Iran-UAE dispute. In Hooshang Amirahmadi (ed.), *Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 6.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ Iranian Foreign Ministry: The minuets of the Shah meeting with Sheikh Soghor in in Niavaran castle on 30 Azar 1348 (21 December 1969); and the minuets of Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran Foreign Minister and Abbas Aram with Sheikh Soghor in Hesarak, Tehran on 1 Day 1348 (22 December 1969).
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Security and territoriality in the Persian Gulf* (Richmond Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 207-208.

²⁰ Iranian Foreign Ministry: The minutes of Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran Foreign Minister and Abbas Aram with Sheikh Soghor in Hesarak, Tehran on 1 Day 1348 (22 December 1969).

²¹ Ibid. Also Iranian Foreign Ministry: the report of Zandfard, Chief of Ninth Political Department Iran Foreign Ministry to A. Zahedi, op. cit., of *Economist* article about political difficulty of sheikhs of emirates who did not want to actuate Shah's anger by disagreement over Tunbs, but were afraid of being introduced as traitor among Arabs too.

²² Mojtahed-Zadeh, op. cit., p. 210.

²³ According to the Shah in a meeting with the General Secretary of the UN in 1969, in terms of strategic point of view after Britain's departure occupation of these islands by others would be a danger to Iran. See, Iranian Foreign Ministry: Telegraph of Iran Foreign Minister from New York about the minutes of the Shah meeting with General Secretary of the UN in 1969, no. 218, 28 Mehr 1348 (20 October 1969); also Iranian Foreign Ministry archive: the report of 14 Esfand 1349 (5 March 1971) of Zandfard, Chief of Ninth Political Department Iran Foreign Ministry to A. Zahedi about the feedback of Sir Douglas Hume Britain Foreign Secretary's speech in House of Commons about Britain's future foreign policy. In this report with referencing Denis Walter, Conservative MP and the secretary of Foreign Relations Committee is stated that, "As Iran has decided to apply its sovereignty over the islands it is not to Britain and the sheikhs best interest to dispute seriously with Iran about this matter; since solving many difficulties would be accessible by attracting Iran cooperation."

²⁴ The Shah's position was that the interest of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah is not in preventing Iran's sovereignty over these unpopulated islands, while under such circumstances the sheikhdoms could enjoy Iran's ability of preserving security by holding back the opposition [groups] from their territories as well as Iran's significant economic aids. See, Document in Iranian Foreign Ministry archive, n.d. about *Times* interview with the Shah on 12 April, 1970.

²⁵ In 1973, the Shah forces helped repress a Marxist rebellion in Oman's Dhoffar region.

²⁶ See, Mojtahed-Zadeh, op. cit., p. 207.

²⁷ For details see, Ibid.

Appendix-3

The Major Powers and Oil-Consumers; A History of Anglo-American Presence in the Persian Gulf

Britain

In the early twentieth century the strategic importance of the PG became increasingly apparent as oil was discovered in Iran and the oil industry developed. The dominant position of Britain in the world's coal industry and their control of a world wide logistic infrastructure based on coal was overthrown by oil and its rapid improvements in the technology of transportation. As Paul says,

During World War I (...) strategists for all the major powers increasingly perceived oil as a key military asset, (...) [and] that oil would assume a rapidly-growing importance in the civilian economy, making it a vital element in national and imperial economic strength and a source of untold wealth to those who controlled it.¹

Hence after WWI oil as an influential factor from geopolitics point of view persuaded main powers including Britain and the US to obtain oil concessions in the ME especially in Iran. Iran during post war years enjoyed a position of increased strategic importance regarding Britain as the British adopted the mandate for Mesopotamia (now Iraq). WWI also elevated Britain's dependence on the oil reserves of the area; therefore its Middle Eastern policy was restated. During the post war years, British national defence was a great concern, since a country very much dependent on its sea power must guarantee its future supplies of oil. Britain who had become increasingly dependent upon the US for all supplies required by the British Navy and by military and commercial enterprises, at that time realised the necessity of ensuring its own permanent reserves.² Through the oil quest in the ME and particularly in Iran, Britain tried for exclusive control over oil fields.

Besides the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, after WWI, the British government, in order to secure its oil and other commercial benefits and preferential rights in Iran attempted to sign the Anglo-Persian Agreement in August of 1919, which was refused by Iranian parliament (*Majlis*). As Chubin and Zabih affirm, "During the immediate postwar years to 1953, the major objective of Iran's foreign policy was to liquidate the consequences of wartime occupation by the Soviet Union and Great Britain."³ The Iranian government, wishing to put an end to the Anglo-Russian economic domination of Iran sought to involve American oil interests as a way of enlisting US support for Iran's security and stability.

British policy in Iran consisted of political, commercial and financial concerns. All the different methods the British government used in Iran were aimed at keeping the Iranian government radically dependent upon British assistance, thereby enabling Britain to block all other parties interested in that part of the ME.

A century-long hatred of British and Russian occupants of Iranian territory and the emergence of the US as the major creditor nation in the world at the end of WWI, with a substantial amount of capital available for investment abroad, gave hope to Iranians that close cooperation with such an "altruistic power" would guarantee independent sources of capital and enable Iran to exercise full sovereignty over its territory.

Beside the withdrawal of Russia from a controlling position in the five Northern provinces of Iran, two other major factors contributed to the concentration on oil in post war Iran-American relations: the rise of giant American oil companies with the capital and inclination to expand into the ME, and the production levels achieved by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in southern Iran, indicating untapped oil reserves in the remainder of Iran.

In the early 1920s, the American oil industry concerns were about an imminent domestic oil shortage and the possibility that the major sources of petroleum outside North America would soon be locked up by foreign interests, primarily by British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell. This fear was associated with anger over the behaviour of the British appeared to be unbeatable due to America's wartime effort

and seemed to be doing everything in their power to consolidate their foreign petroleum supply positions at the expense of US nationals.

Between 1919 and 1924 the US 'Open Door' policy was once more active, and directed towards the expansion of American interests abroad with a minimum amount of political and military commitment.⁴ The major US oil companies, who believed critical global oil shortages were impending and sought access to new non domestic sources, were persuaded by the American government to enter the Iranian oil market.

Also as Drysdale and Blake affirm, "the concession in neighbouring Iraq was more significant. It was here that the pattern of creating joint production companies to save costs, reduce mutually destructive competition, and orchestrate supplies was first established."⁵ These US companies as they add, with the support of the US State Department persuaded the British to expand the Turkish Petroleum Company TPC's⁶ membership, which in 1928 allowed the admittance of several US companies, e.g. Exxon, Mobil, and Gulf. Official reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, in 1975 indicate that:

In 1943, the British controlled 81% of ME oil production as compared with 14% under American control. Roughly the same disparity existed in Middle East refinery capacity, where the giant Abadan refinery in Iran helped to give the United Kingdom 85% of the region's refinery capacity as compared with 8% under American control.⁷

After the end of WWII, the Anglo-American relationship changed; the US was rising as a superpower and the British Empire was beginning to fall. After six years of global war, Britain, economically exhausted, withdrew from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the cause of Britain's participation in Iran and the PG.

In spite of the post war displacement of British by the US in the leadership of world politics, because of mutual interests, America and Britain utilised a "special relationship", in Cold War politics. As Andrew Dorman affirms about British security policy in Europe after 1945 until 1989,

Within this transformation four inter-linked assumptions remained consistent throughout the period and revolved around maintaining the balance of power in Europe. These were the hostility of the Soviet Union, the maintenance of the 'special relationship' with the United States, the preservation of NATO and the creation and maintenance of an independent strategic nuclear deterrent.⁸

As he adds,

Despite (...) concentration upon the Soviet threat since 1945 Britain's management of the problem has continuously been undermined by financial insecurity. With a requirement to deter the Soviet Union the support of the United States was a paramount consideration for Britain as America remained the single power capable of matching the Soviet Union. As a result, the British Government sought to foster its relations with the United States by advancing the idea of an Anglo-American Alliance.⁹

Britain accepted its role as a junior partner of the US, instead of being the owner of a world empire. As James Gump reviews the Saki Dockrill's book, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World*, "Britain tried to maintain its power and influence in the post war world while facing escalating economic and diplomatic pressures." Regarding the decision to withdraw from East of Suez in the late 1960s, he mentions that Dockrill wrote that, "The East of Suez decision epitomised Britain's changing relations with the world between 1945 and 1968, (...) so that their country could find a "new place on the world stage" (...) and marked the beginning of Britain's transformation into a modern, medium-sized world power."¹⁰

The connected foreign policies of two countries were very obvious in the PG. In the first period of the middle of the twentieth century, Britain's goal was containing Iran and the Arab Sheikdoms of the PG as a safety area between rival Russia and the British India. Meanwhile, by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 Britain could keep Russia out of this region and guaranteed Indian trade by sea and Indian Territory from any Russian invasion by sending British soldiers from eastern side of the PG.

Furthermore, Iran was an important case for the US and Britain's mutual interests, especially as Chubin affirms, "Iran was located at the very core of the Cold War in the Middle East."¹¹, and Britain had a long presence in the Iranian oil industry.

With Eisenhower's Cold War policies (particularly containing USSR from Iran, PG and US oil holdings in Arab countries in this region), also America's "special relationship" with Britain and the US' need to involve American oil companies in Iran, Britain experienced her new role as a '*Shadow Global Power*'.

The downfall of the Iranian Prime Minister Mosadegh, who nationalised the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1953 by the British idea and US action, was a good example of this new position.

The US policy coordination with Britain resulted in the 1954 Consortium Agreement which founded the International Consortium and enabled the AIOC to return to Iran. As Chubin and Zabih express, "the American takeover of nearly 40 percent of the former British petroleum operation in Iran meant that American economic and commercial interests had begun to be entrenched in the country."¹²

Following the indication of the post war displacement of British by US interests and presence in the ME, Britain's military withdrawal from the region in 1971 provided the opportunity for the US, who had important strategic interests but a limited role in the PG, to fill the vacuum in this geopolitical waterway.

The United States of America

Since the first American expedition in the PG in 1943-4 which resulted with an estimated minimum of 25 billion barrels of available oil in this region, from the US administration and American associations' point of view the world supply of oil was switched from America, as the biggest oil producer in the world in the first half of the twentieth century, to the ME.

Although the US government had helped the oil industry in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and was involved in other countries oil affairs, by the 1950s, the only area in the PG that American oil companies did not have a major influence in was Iran.

On the other hand the US officials were concerned that the loss of Iranian oil would harm the European Recovery Program as outlined in the Marshall Plan, which was also used by Washington to take control of European energy markets and to open access to raw materials in Europe's colonial holdings. In addition to this was the fact that as a result of post-war recovery and changing their energy source from coal to oil countries in Western Europe also Japan as American's Allies were requiring much more oil.

In 1951, the Iranian parliament passed an oil nationalisation bill proposed by Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh, the Prime Minister, as a symbol of freedom from foreign influence. Mosadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves. But British Petroleum accused Mosadegh of violating the company's legal rights and leded a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil that threw the country into financial crisis.

The Mosadegh government hoped that the US would continue to deal with Iran and prevent economic collapse, but the President Truman administration put its relations with Britain first and participated in an international boycott of Iranian oil. Nonetheless, Truman refused a secret plan proposed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to overthrow Mosadegh, fearful that such actions would open the door to new Soviet influence, but his successor, Dwight Eisenhower put a similar plan into effect.

The crisis was resolved after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) orchestrated a *coup d'etat* that toppled the democratically elected government of Mosadegh and brought a more obedient Iranian government to power.¹³

It is believed that WWII to wide extent, was a conflict between the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union and about oil in the ME.¹⁴ Since America's involvement in the attempt to return the Shah to the throne is mostly comprehended in the framework of oil and the Cold War, Chubin's affirmation is noticeable that,

A major restatement of US policy after the restoration of the Shah in 1954 reiterated the priorities: to keep Iran independent and free from Soviet domination and 'communist control'. Because of its location and resources, it was assumed that Iran was a target of Soviet pressure; the US objective therefore became the establishment of 'A strong stable government in Iran capable of maintaining internal security and providing some resistance to external aggression'.¹⁵

According to a statement of policy by the National Security Council (NSC) about the US policy toward Iran, from the 2nd of January, 1954 Iran was regarded as a "continuing objective of Soviet expansion". The implications of the loss of Iran, particularly by subversion, were mentioned would,

a. Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, as well as Pakistan and India. b. Increase the Soviet Union's oil resources for war (...). c. Damage United States prestige in nearby countries (...) [where Pakistan and Turkey too would eventually fall under Soviet control]. d. Permit the communists to deny Iranian oil to the free world, or alternatively to use Iranian oil as a weapon of economic warfare. e. Have serious psychological impact elsewhere in the free world.¹⁶

To implement this policy and prevent any Soviet aggression towards Iran, Eisenhower urged Iran's invigoration by economic and military aid. To the NSC the most effective instrument for maintaining Iran's orientation toward the West was the Shah and the Army was his only real source of power.¹⁷ Washington, by granting only short term emergency assistance to the government successor of Mosadegh from September 1953, put pressure for an early oil settlement dispute favourable to the US and Britain.¹⁸

After the resumption of diplomatic relations of Iran with Britain under the US pressure and the London request, an oil agreement was signed in August 1954.¹⁹ So Iran oil was produced by a new joint production company known as the Consortium, despite the Iran ownership of all her oil fields and installations. Noticeably, the Consortium contained all the seven sisters for the first time; and American and British oil interests regained their concessions after the change of government. Therefore as Etaat notes, "oil as an effective element in geopolitics could play a negative role for Iran to give up from its long struggle for nationalization."²⁰ Ramazani in this regard also remarks that:

The deal, anyway, gave the United States 'a new and malleable form of influence over the Iranian government and over the Middle Eastern politics in general. (...) Several years [later] the Shah said that 'its most important result was the termination, once and for all, of the British monopolistic hold over Iran's oil industry.'²¹

The US policy to prevent Soviet Union aggression towards Iran facilitated the oil flowing to the West once more. This was also aided by British involvement in the consortium, and by offering American oil companies special privileges to prevent any effective prosecution of the antitrust suit of the Justice Department, the reluctant American oil companies were induced to sign on to the consortium agreement. Such increased American presence in Iran limited Soviet ambitions for interfering in Iran's affairs, kept Russia out of this region and guaranteed the security of oil flows from the PG.

In addition to the increasing commercial role of America, Arab nationalist challenges during 1950s posed a threat to the complex mechanism of British control over the tribal-dynastic sheikhdoms of the PG, and the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula contributed in the 1960s to the gradual erosion of the British position. Therefore, by the mid 1960s, the US had the control of ME oil, and US oil corporations dominated the world economic stage. The US strategy in the ME to protect its interests as a unique award from the WWII has been successively enlarged by all heads of US administrations since then.²²

British withdrawal from the region, growing Western dependence on PG and ME imported oil, and as Richman affirms, "US policy toward the Middle East (...) to ultimately control the oil; to strengthen, where possible, key allies to do the United States' bidding; and to keep other powers — not just the Soviet Union but also Great Britain and France — away, if not dependent on the United States"²³ made the three most important traditional objectives of US policy in the ME possible.

These objectives were as follows: guarding stable access by the industrialised world to the region's vast oil resources, containing the Soviet and any other powers influence and access to those sources and defending Israel's security have been followed by various American political leaders conforming to US interests in different international situations. Along with the growing Western dependence on the region's oil, there have been three major turning points of US security and military policy in the PG to safeguard US interests during the last three decades and each has been more aggressive than the previous one.

US Energy Security Policy: America Moves in the Persian Gulf

The Nixon Doctrine

Although the emerging power vacuum in the PG provided the opportunity for the US to follow her strategic interests, but Washington was not keen to play a bigger and direct role for regional security there.

The US limited military presence until 1968 and difficulties of defending the PG because of its long distance from the United States, also Washington's preoccupation with the Vietnam War were good reasons of implementing the Nixon Doctrine. As well in the US regional strategy against the Soviet Union, according to General Hussein Fardust, a special friend of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who reorganised and modernised Shah's secret service (SAVAK),

Iran's oil resources, its strategic importance in the Persian Gulf as well as its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union were the main reasons for its vital role in the US regional strategy (...) Iran was close enough to be used as a base from where the Americans could conduct espionage activities in attempts to weaken the Soviet Union.²⁴

The Shah of Iran objection with non-region states to fill the power vacuum in the PG and his long-standing wish to play a more active role in the region, also the old rivalry between the two major oil countries of the ME — Iran and Saudi Arabia — coincided with Britain policy and the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine in this region. Britain tried to solve many disputes of littoral states in the PG before her military withdraw, to leave the region security responsibility to them. The Nixon Doctrine called for regional powers with financial potentials to act as representatives of Washington, which could decrease US expenditures for preservation of its strategic interests in the region including Indian Ocean.

The combination of Iran's raising military power with the wealth of Saudi Arabia as the richest oil-bearing region, enhanced by rising oil prices, was realised as a valuable means for Britain and American policy in the region.

As stated by the Nixon Doctrine, this policy which was coordinated with British government, counted on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the bases for regional stability and defenders of Western interests.²⁵ The US strategy which was referred to as the 'twin-pillar' policy, warranted within the President Richard Nixon visit to Tehran in May 1972, where Iran was the cornerstone.²⁶

So Iran as the PG's policeman became the military pillar and Saudi Arabia became the financial pillar; both that were assisted by the US in the modernisation of their armed forces, shared American anxieties regarding future Soviet expansion in the region as well as Iraqi activity especially after the *coup d'etat* of the Ba'th Party and its growing ties to the Soviet Union. The US Navy also preserved an 'over the horizon' presence, to support these countries in essential situation.

Like Timothy Lomperis observation, "even in the Cold War regional balances of power were important to the global balance of power"²⁷, in the Nixon Doctrine "it was imperative that the regional balance of power be maintained."²⁸ Therefore the US sought to balance between two competing rivalries for dominance in the PG.

As Daniel Yergin states both, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the two largest exporters of crude oil in the 1960s and 1970s wanted to be the leader both in the region and among oil producers:

The global battle of production intensified the long-standing rivalry between the two key oil countries of the Middle East— Iran and Saudi Arabia. The swell of output around the world

put the major companies in a political quandary. They had to try to balance supply against demand, (...). Thus, the Persian Gulf became the stabilizer; the control mechanism for balancing supply and demand (...). Their competition over levels of oil production underscored the fundamental jealousy and suspicion between the two countries. For output translated into wealth; and wealth in turn meant power, influence, and respect.²⁹

Since the American oil companies were afraid of losing their concessions in either country, the US did not want to appear to favour one side over the other. As Yergin notes, "The question of how to allocate production between Saudi Arabia and Iran was not, (...) a matter of economics (...). Rather, it was a strategic and political decision". Although the leaders of the two countries had their own advantage to overcome this riddle, but as he marks, "Iran was potentially the dominant power in the region, and the Shah did have to be placated, if not always satisfied."³⁰

During 1970s some events in the region cracked the Nixon Doctrine and US administration implemented a more aggressive policy towards the PG. The 1973 oil embargo of Arab members of OPEC, as a direct result of the Arab-Israeli war,³¹ on one hand underscored the strategic importance of the region and its oil reserves; on the other hand it caused serious re-evaluation of US policy precedence in the PG.

Western Europe (except Britain) and Japan economic vulnerability to OPEC oil production caused great effort to strengthen their relations with the PG states which possess strategic resources of oil. The 1973 oil crisis³² affected Western Europe and Japan— industrial countries without energy resources— but not Britain and the US which even profited out of it.³³ They benefited especially from armament transactions with the region and faced a great opportunity for oil production in both countries.³⁴

As oil revenues grew, arms sales became the major help of recycling the profits of petrodollars back to the main arms sellers³⁵ and it conformed to US and Britain policy to strengthen the regional powers for preserving PG security.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war on the other hand came to US reassessment of its strategy in the Indian Ocean and deduced that it could not rely much on allied support. Furthermore as Randy Bell expresses "the [1973] oil embargo underscored the strategic importance of the region. Oil and economic matters were placed on an equal footing with strategic interests."³⁶

The US naval escalation with enhanced suspicions of a raising Soviet military presence in the region began since 1971, when decreasing activities in Vietnam paved the way to send modern ships into the Indian Ocean. Hence, US armed forces by an agreement with Britain were to expand massively their base on a British territory in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia. The 1973 oil embargo illustrated the vulnerability of the sea-routes and how easily oil shipments and constant access to it might be obstructed in some other crisis. Therefore the US implemented intense plans of its navy to expand base support facilities on the island of Diego Garcia (near the Strait of Hormuz), also as a base for possible air strikes against regional hostiles. As Paul Rogers states, "Diego Garcia was to become one of the US's most powerful overseas bases, full of supplies for use in a future conflict in the Middle East."³⁷ Under such circumstances the US was even prepared to invade Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the state of Abu Dhabi to seize their oilfields following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.³⁸

The 1973 Arab oil embargo was comprehended additional proof of the value of Iran as an American regional ally. However, in 1979 along with other incidents in the region, the Nixon Doctrine came to its end and a more hostile and forceful US policy towards the PG was taken.

The Carter Doctrine

With the fall of the Shah in February 1979, the US could not anymore count on allies in the region. While the broader Northern Tier concept³⁹ was broken-down, and the military-political Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO),⁴⁰ as a small branch of NATO, with withdraw announcement of Iran and similar action of Pakistan in March 1979, became extinct. Therefore a more active and visible US policy was implemented by replacing the Carter Doctrine with the Nixon Doctrine, which the former one relied on US military power to protect its so called 'vital interests' in the PG area.

Situations in 1979 justified the more aggressive formulation of the Carter Doctrine to safeguard US interests in the PG. The second oil crisis of 1979 that occurred in response to the Camp David Accords of Egypt-Israel and mainly due to the Iranian revolution heightened the importance of oil in the foreign policy place. In December 1979, the USSR invasion to Afghanistan, also turbulence in Saudi Arabia almost the same time, and Iraq invasion to Iran in September 1980 terrified the US administration of the threat of tumble into the whole PG. Therefore with the evolution in the region's geopolitics, the Carter Doctrine of January 1980 warned that, "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States," and pledged to defend that interest by "any means necessary, including military force."

The security weak points of the Nixon policy for protecting US strategic interests in the ME were:

- 1- The general vulnerability of the US economy and foreign policy from two oil shocks of the 1970s;
- 2- Lack of knowledge of US allies' society's issues, circumstances and sensitivities also their domestic policies to focus foresight plan to deter any national crisis; as well the absence of effective leverage for any outside aggressions, especially from the USSR to control the PG;
- 3- Lack of knowledge of the limits of ultra regional powers' capacities to dominate the region, e.g., occurrence of Iran Revolution and the Soviet's forces withdrawal from Afghanistan later in 1989.⁴¹

The oil crisis of 1970s that caused recessions, high rates of inflation and reduced growth rates in oil importing countries, expanded the scope of national security to include non-military issues like resources and international economics. The 1970s oil shocks developed the concept of 'energy security'.⁴² Since the geopolitical importance of oil became obvious the US tried to, as Judd Peak expresses, "tie oil market security to geopolitical circumstances. Thus, began a strengthening of economic and political ties with oil exporters. In addition, it began a reassessment of the Nixon Doctrine."⁴³

From security point of view, under Carter Administration a new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed with a potentiality to interfere directly in the area. This was Washington's policy during 1980s to protect US historical strategic interests in the ME concentrated upon two enduring issues, the security of Israel and the preservation of a promising relationship with PG oil-exporting countries. However, as Moynihan also notes the US dilemma was how to balance its two incompatible goals of assuring Israel's security and at the same time securing its interest in maintaining access to ME, particularly PG oil supplies; an Arab-Israeli peace offer was the US' solution.⁴⁴ In addition, the US aid to Tel Aviv doubled in 1980 to reinforce Israel, and great amounts of armament were sent to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the PG to make a joint deployment against Islamic Iran. They were advised to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The Reagan Administration

When the Reagan administration took office, consolidated the security framework designed by Carter but blamed its fluctuating foreign policy and debilitated defence capability, therefore stressed on the need to balance change. As MacDonald states Reagan, who from beginning of his entrance to the White House was facing,

a continuing window of vulnerability with the Soviet Union, a Camp David peace process that was losing momentum, and a US credibility problem in the Gulf that had worsened since the abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages, (...) moved strongly to rebuild the United States' conventional and nuclear strength to improve the global strategic balance. In the Middle East, the United States moved to improve its credibility by identifying the Soviet Union as the greatest threat, projecting a strong commitment to friendly governments, and taking a hard line on terrorism. The thrust of the new policy became known as 'strategic consensus'. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained, the emphasis on the Soviet Union as the "common threat" was directed at the strengthening of security partnerships throughout the Middle East, from Israel and Egypt to the Gulf states, presumably, stronger partnerships would enable the United States to increase its military presence throughout the region.⁴⁵

However, the idea of 'strategic consensus' was not acceptable to the Arab states of the PG, as domestic and regional concerns especially the threats of Israel was more important to them than external Soviets threats. As well the consolidation of the GCC had more priority to them as a common front against Iran and an institution for maximising security cooperation and dealing with region's problems in political and economic aspects. The GCC states reluctance to accept more uncover alignment with Washington was also thru the great resistance of their traditional societies.

The main challenges to US interests were the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, instability caused by the Iran-Iraq war in the region with its resultant attacks on oil shipping and possibility of invigorating Islamic revolution by Iran through the PG. Reagan responses to these challenges were strengthening the RDJTF, providing security assistance to US friends in the area, reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers and deploying a major force of warships in the PG.

The Reagan decision to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and increase the American naval force during Iran-Iraq war was implemented with the pretext to protect the tankers and defend free navigation and to prevent the Soviet Union which was hiring tankers to Kuwait, from its powerful presence in the PG. But in reality the US intention of its reflagging policy — as was explained by Alexander Haig — was to increase US military presence throughout the region. Meanwhile, as some analysts like Richman believe, provoking the Iranians to respond by military means to the US reflagging and escorting oil tankers of one of it's enemies, could pave the way for more intensive military presence of the US by flaming the war with justified intervention of US forces in the region of main global oil reserves.⁴⁶ Some others like Barry Rubin state that,

The US policy aimed at avoiding direct involvement in the Gulf was based both on the desire to avoid entanglement in the Iran-Iraq war and the fact that the local Arab states rejected—and might be damaged— by an increased US presence.⁴⁷

Despite emphasises of the Reagan administration on necessity of a US military presence in the PG to protect the free flow of oil but there was no sever evidence for such concerning danger. As Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated, "The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing significantly new has happened. (...) The best evidence that there is no new threat is that ship insurance rates for the Gulf have not changed appreciably in 1987." Yet despite this lack of urgency, "America thus risks being drawn into an expanded military role that cannot be decisive."⁴⁸ As well according to Rubin,

Despite the numerous attacks, mainly by Iraqi planes most often against Iranian-flag boats, oil prices generally fell and there was still so much petroleum available that OPEC was hard-pressed to hold down production. (...) A bloody Iran-Iraq war remained indecisive but showed no sign of spreading or endangering the Persian Gulf's oil exports.⁴⁹

The US reflagging Kuwaiti tankers policy did not greatly contribute to provide such suitable circumstances for oil flow and market since US warships ignored attacks on non-US flag ships.⁵⁰ But as Richman affirms,

Although the Reagan policy appears pro-Iraq at first glance, Iran stands to gain the most from keeping the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz open. Iran (...) sends its oil through the gulf and needs oil revenues to fight the war. Iraq does neither.⁵¹

Reagan administration concerns were an exaggerated fear of a Soviet domination, an interest in establishing ties to Iran because of its strategic importance especially in regard to the risk of Soviet intervention in the region, and possibility of Iran triumph in war with Iraq as a chance of spreading Islamic revolution. Washington found particularly discomfit its incapacity to release seven US citizens held hostage by members of Hezbollah group in Lebanon that had links with Iran. Eventually Reagan administration came to arms transfer as a solution to start relation with Iran and release the hostages.

US arms sales to Iran as well the opportunity of dismissing other countries from selling arms to Iran, that could overset the military balance between Iran and Iraq, was comprehended by the Arab states of the PG as a possible threat from Iran to intimidate their monarchies, as well a shifted policy of the US in favour of Iran so not anymore reliable for the Arabs.

The partial arms sale to Iran by Washington during 1985-1986 compare to extensive covert arms, technology and intelligence help of the US to Iraq within the eight year imposed war, benefited the West by arms sales to all countries in the region. This process encouraged growth of militarism in the region by seeking security through more arms purchases via non-fighter Arab states in the PG.⁵² While the military and economic capability of the two major regional power — Iran and Iraq — was gradually diminish. Therefore by increasing US military presence in the PG and weakening the regional powers' potentialities, Washington supposed could guarantee the access to its two most important traditional objectives of her policy in the ME, preserve oil flow with affordable price and security of Israel.

Iran victories in regaining nearly all the territory lost to Iraq after its invasion and even holding some Iraqi territory, worried the pro-Iraq tilt Reagan administration as well the littoral Arab states wishing to enlist the superpowers' help in finalising the war.

The necessity to end the war, the need to preserve US reliability with friendly Arab states in the PG because of the 'Iran-Contra' issue and the risk of destabilising situation in this region for long-term interests of the West resulted in the US reflagging policy and the US leading peace efforts in the UN.

Reagan, who believed in military force as the only way to bring things under control in the PG, completed the aggressive process of previous turning points of US security policy in this region. This process was started after WWII from encouraging Britain to keep its forces in the region to develop the US military forces as a dominant power.

As even after Iran's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 and official end of the Iran-Iraq War — despite the expectation of withdrawal of all foreign forces — the US comprehended this waterway as a region of the US 'vital interest' and decided to keep some of its naval forces. Saghafi-Ameri observes this policy as a reflection of US long-term strategy for a permanent presence of American naval force to stabilise itself as the premier power in the world. According to him this policy was not taken to prevent the Soviet threats anymore but to preserve security of the southern littoral states of the PG that were all dependent on the West military support.⁵³

The Bush and Clinton Administrations

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and *glasnost*, end of the Cold War because of deletion a rivalry superpower from international scene also the crisis of Iraq invasion to Kuwait in 1990, the US security policy found the great opportunity to be stabilised in the region.

Under such great geopolitical changes of region security, the George H.W. Bush administration originated a multinational military coalition that included Western allies and most ME states and a large-scale deployment of troops and materiel began entering the region. In early 1991, the allied forces succeeded in pushing Iraq back beyond its border with Operation Desert Storm. Such circumstances paved the way for the "Bush doctrine" and his "new world order" on the basis of the US hegemony; and provided the possibility of US control and access to oil reserves of the southern littoral states of the PG. Whilst with industrial countries' growing dependence on imported oil from this region, Washington with applying a unipolar security system in the PG could enjoy a powerful leverage to control its rivalries through its leading role on oil distribution.

Therefore the US continued its military superiority in the region to prevent any other countries gaining control over the region and its mass energy resources; also to maintain its military access to the geo-strategic region of the PG to be able to control events in many other significant regions of the world. It could also impart geopolitical consequences of growing demand for abundant and low price oil and natural gas of the PG as a critical prerequisite for Japan and Western industrial growth and increasingly for the industrial growth of Asia and much of the developing world.

The continuance of US military presence, as well, could encourage the GCC countries of their external security concerns as well as their developing economic cooperation with the US. The development of economic cooperation of the US with the GCC states was mainly designed to guarantee Washington's traditional interests — the protection of the flow of oil and the security of Israel — as a new method in changing geopolitical circumstances of the post-Cold War.

Although the US military presence in the PG was intended to protect southern littoral monarchies security from Iran and Iraq, many of these countries were mainly afraid from each other. They also faced serious internal problems, including the fall of oil revenues as the high level of oil price fluctuation with impact on the region's cradle-to-grave welfare states, also internal security concerns with mostly a firm anti-American motivation.

Consequently for most of the GCC countries blessed with oil riches, viz. Bahrain, Oman, Dubai within the UAE, and Qatar, how to sustain a high standard of living at a time of declining oil revenue would create serious internal security threats. Budget deficiency because of reducing these countries oil reserves within the next 20 to 30 years — like much of the Middle Eastern and North African countries — growing populations, and high expectations of an increasingly educated public are among their significant concerns. For the survival of the current governments and their domestic stability as the West's overriding strategic interest and the regional stability, the economic diversification of the GCC took shape at the end of the twentieth century.

Preserving promising political and economic ties with the GCC is the main technique of the US to control the flow of oil from the PG, while oil has dominated the economies of the GCC and formed their political systems. This objective was reached through increasing bilateral investment and trade between the GCC and the US with the intent to foster economic diversification; since from Washington point of view “national security is increasingly defined by economic security.”⁵⁴

But the GCC states that lacked the managerial and technical potentiality and ability for operating different manufacturing industries will remain mere consumer of Western products. The major economic activities are concerned on trade and investment and their prerequisites, so at a time of declining oil revenue they will be depend on the West even more than before. A dilemma that raises internal security threats however in favour of the US. Washington would not welcome any domestic security dangers although it seems this has been missed from the US estimation.

Both the US and the GCC noted that as these economic initiatives become more expanded and deeply rooted, the economic ties between them should become more stabilised and such stable economic relations will lead to stable political relations. According to Kemp and Harkavy,

As the GCC countries become richer, and as they diversify and enlarge their economies, they will not only become more important to the world economy, but also more interdependent with it. GCC capital will increasingly fund development schemes in the West as well as the ME itself. The GCC will have a major incentive to invest in the stability of the world markets and economy.⁵⁵

Such political and economic interaction and interdependence of the GCC with the world as they reveal,

may also ultimately embrace political values closer to those of the United States and the West. At that point a relationship more akin to relationships between the United States and the countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Israel may emerge, in which case the relationship between the West and the GCC will become even closer than it is today.⁵⁶

Clinton's regional foreign policy for reducing threats to PG oil was supporting a regional balance of power by sustaining Saudi Arabia, and continuing to follow a dual containment policy aimed at Iran and Iraq as the two regional powers. To guarantee regional stability in the ME, along with relying on regional security alliances, Clinton decreased US military presence in the region.

This policy — with relying on Saudi Arabia and the GCC in the PG and Egypt and Turkey as the regional powers near to Israel with emphasising on the peace process — as Peak explains did “allow the United States to take a less visible role in Middle East affairs (...) also guarantee the authority of Saudi Arabia as the new regional stabilizer.” While as he explains,

the authority of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC nations would be enhanced through increased economic ties with the region (...); the US (...) [was] able to maintain a low-key position in Middle East affairs while at the same time influencing regional geopolitics. Contrastingly, the security of Israel will be maintained through reliance on the peace process.⁵⁷

In general this policy has eventuated to the Greater Middle East (GME)⁵⁸ (12*) initiative by the US which its main goal is recognition of Israel by region's countries. Whilst by creating economic adherences between the countries in this region, including and with Israel, their economic security as a necessity of national security would depend on each others situation. According to this plan under such circumstances some countries, like Iran, that do not recognise Israel would get isolated from the region's economic net working, and consequently regional political cooperation.

On the other hand for the era after oil, control of the most likely energy source would be a significant element in the US energy security policy. Since nuclear energy seems to be the best replacement for oil in the next century,⁵⁹ the West prefers to have its exclusivity. The US contrariness with obtaining nuclear technology, including mastering the fuel cycle of especially independent countries and antipathetic to US unilateralism, e.g. Iran relies on this matter too. Access to uranium enrichment specifically within native technology is not just the fear of contingency of obtaining nuclear weapons by these countries but lack of knowledge of the West from their progress in fuel cycling and independency from the West in the future.

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- ²⁷ Timothy J. Lomperis (n.d.), 'Flawed realism: Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz on Vietnam-the case for a regional level-of-analysis', *Flawed Realism*.
<http://www.townhall.com/phillysoc/lomperisflawed%20realism.htm> (5 September 2004)
- ²⁸ Randy B. Bell (1990), 'Expansion of American Persian Gulf Policy by three Presidents', *Global Security*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/BRB.htm> (7 September 2004)
- ²⁹ Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (London: Pocket Books, 1993), pp. 532-533.
- ³⁰ Ibid., pp. 533-534.
- ³¹ In October 1973 the Arab nations, because of Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, decided to slash oil production, and ascend prices, while imposing a complete embargo on the Americans and the Netherlands for their pro-Israeli position.
- ³² This oil shock raised the price of oil from \$2.90 in June 1973 to over \$11 per barrel in just a few months.

³³ Stephen R. Shalom (1990), 'The United States and the Iran-Iraq war', *consumercide*. http://power.consumercide.com/us_iran_iraq.html (23 September 2004)

³⁴ The price increases of the 1970s justified the cost of oil discoveries and exploitation operations in the North Sea and Alaska –as well as in Mexico. See, Alasdair Drysdale & Gerald H. Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa: A political geography* (New York: Oxford Press, 1985), p. 336.

³⁵ According to different sources in the decade following the 1973 Arab- Israeli war, 40% of the world's arms exports went to the ME. Only the US delivered more than \$65 billion in military equipment and services to this region in this period. The arms sales also became the main leverage by which the US and other suppliers were able to maintain access to the region's energy supplies and to keep further prices low in benefit of the world economy.

³⁶ Bell, op. cit.

³⁷ Paul Rogers (October 1992), 'Crazy for oil', *new internationalist*. (20 September 2004) <http://www.newint.org/issue236/crazy.htm>

³⁸ For more details see, *ABC News Online* (1 January 2004) British spy chiefs feared US invasion of Middle East in 197. (<http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http%3A//www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1018971.htm> (20 September 2004)

³⁹ Northern Tier: The idea of some kind of a Middle East defence pact, in which Britain and the United States and one or more of the Middle East states would take part, was considered by Britain after the WWII. The concept of a regional defence pact which would involve Britain in multilateral arrangements with local states was a new idea. In the early 1950s, along with Britain consideration of withdrawal from the region a broader regional defence arrangement in the Middle East's "northern tier" states was encouraged by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Following Britain's departure President Dwight Eisenhower in 1957 declared the Eisenhower Doctrine to serve notice that the United States would defend the Middle East against any sense of Soviet threat. The Eisenhower Doctrine extended the containment policy from the northern tier states to the Middle East in general, as Baghdad Pact and CENTO.

⁴⁰ The military-political Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO): CENTO that was set up after the WWII, replaced the Baghdad Pact Organisation (established in 1955) after the withdrawal of Iraq in March 1959. The alliance was included Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain and an Associate Member, the United States. The aim of CENTO was providing mutual security and defence for member countries against Communist offensive and subversion. Of course the alliance did little to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence to non-member states in the area, and other states in the Middle East felt excluded from CENTO and turned to the Soviets, including Egypt and Syria. Looking for the peaceful economic development of the region through cooperative efforts was other aim of CENTO. The CENTO headquarters officially closed 26 September 1979.

⁴¹ More details about security weakness of Nixon policy in Bruce R. Kuniholm (n.d.), 'September 11: A campus Reflects', *DUKE, News & Communications*. <http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/911site/kuniholm.html> (30 September 2004)

⁴² Energy Security: The 1970s oil shocks developed the concept of 'energy security' for major oil consumers. However, the concept apparently was started with the decision by Winston Churchill before the start of WWI to convert the British navy power source from coal to oil. His decision took the British government's demand for a stable supply of oil to interference in Iran.

⁴³ W. Judd Peak, (spring 995), 'A reassessment of US strategic: interests in the post-Gulf War Middle East', *Modus Vivendi*, <http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Modus/95/Peak.html> (5 September 2004)

⁴⁴ Joseph Moynihan, The Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States: common and uncommon security interests. In David E. Long and Christian Koch (eds.), *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), p. 61.

⁴⁵ Charles G. MacDonald, US Policy and Gulf security. In Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos, II, Ralph H. Magnus (eds.), *Gulf Security in To the 1980s* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 102.

⁴⁶ Sheldon L. Richman, (1987, September 9), 'Where angels fear to tread: the United States and the Persian Gulf conflict', *Policy Analysis*. <http://www.cato.org/cgi-bin/scripts/printtech.cgi/pubs/pas/pa090.html> (18 April 2004)

⁴⁷ Barry Rubin (1991), 'U.S. policy and the Middle East, 1985-1988', *Meria*. <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/us-policy/data1985.html> (7 October 2004)

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ The Reagan administration earned support from West European allies. Britain, France, Italy, and other countries followed the US example by sending naval forces to escort tankers.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² The GCC countries spent more than \$100 billion on defence during eight years of war between Iran and Iraq.

⁵³ Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, *Estrategy va Tahavvolat-e Geopolitic pas az Doran-e Jang-e Sard [Strategy & geopolitical changes in the aftermath of the Cold War era]* (Tehran: Foreign Ministry Printing and Publication, 1373 Solar Calendar [1994]), pp.37-38.

⁵⁴ See, Peak, op. cit.

⁵⁵ Kemp & Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 129.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Peak, op. cit.

⁵⁸ The "Greater Middle East", according to the American formulation, includes the region from Mauritania to Pakistan. The initial thought has been followed and developed with the intent to U.S. hegemony and Israel eminency as a social and political model in the region. It was prompted by President Bush after 9/11 event, also as an effort to deviate the criticism for the systematic problems in Afghanistan and Iraq and to show the Republicans support of democracy and human rights. This initiative focuses on political, economic and educational reforms in the Middle East and the methods of interaction of the Middle East countries together and with the world economy. U.S. motives as a promoter of democracy in the region remain suspect because of its unilateralism and the bad record on subverting democracy and democratic forces in the region; e.g. its attempt to downfall the Iranian Prime Minister, Mosadegh. The fear of intervention and undermining the sovereignty of states- like the U.S. invasion to Iraq- focusing on the sustain of Israel and lack of willing to solve Palestinian-Israeli problem as the core conflict in the region, are other reasons behind distrusting of the Middle East people and governments to Washington's wills. For more details among many others see, Matn-e Kamel-e Joziat-e Tarh-e Amricaii "Khavar-e Miane Bozorg va Shomal-e Afrigha [Complete text of American initiative of "Great Middle East and North Africa"]. *Mehr News Agency* (2004, 14th June) Tehran; also Nasim Zehra (2004), 'Washington's Greater Middle East Initiative', *The International News*. (<http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2004-daily/12-03-2004/oped/o5.htm>) (25 October 2004).

⁵⁹ Fred E. Foldvary (2004), 'Energy Problem: Solved!', *The Progress Report*. <http://www.progress.org/2004/fold373.htm> (28 October 2004)

Appendix-4

Persian Gulf Oil and Gas

Introduction

The PG, a 600-mile-long body of water which separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula, is one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world oil and natural gas reserves and transportation.

The Energy Information Administration's *International Energy Outlook 2003 (IEO2003)* shows continuing strong growth for worldwide energy demand over the next 24 years. Total world energy consumption is expected to expand by 58 percent between 2001 and 2025, from 404 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2001 to 640 quadrillion Btu in 2025. (See Table Appendix-4-1 and Figure Appendix-4-1)¹

Accordingly the consumption of every primary energy source will increase over the next quarter of century forecast horizon. (See Figure Appendix-4-2) Much of the enlargement in future energy demand in the reference case is projected to be for fossil fuels, viz. oil, natural gas, and coal, as it is prospected that fossil fuel prices will remain comparatively low, and that the cost of producing energy from other fuels will not be competitive.²

World oil demand is projected to grow to 119 million barrels per day by 2025 in the *IEO2003* reference case. Over the forecast period, oil remains the fuel of choice in the transportation sector worldwide, and almost three-quarters of the projected increase in oil demand from 2001 to 2025 comes from the transportation sector, particularly in developing countries that currently have a lower proportion of transportation fuels in their energy mix.

Table Appendix-4-1

World Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region, 1990-2025

Region	Energy Consumption (Quadrillion Btu)				Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric Tons Carbon Equivalent)			
	1990	2001	2010	2025	1990	2001	2010	2025
Industrialized Countries	182.8	211.5	240.1	288.3	2,844	3,179	3,572	4,346
EE/FSU	76.3	53.3	65.9	82.3	1,337	856	1,038	1,267
Developing Countries	89.3	139.2	174.7	269.6	1,691	2,487	3,075	4,749
Asia	52.5	85.0	110.1	174.6	1,089	1,640	2,075	3,263
Middle East	13.1	20.8	25.0	36.0	231	354	420	601
Africa	9.3	12.4	14.4	20.0	179	230	261	361
Central and South America	14.4	20.9	25.2	39.0	192	263	319	523
Total World	348.4	403.9	480.6	640.1	5,872	6,522	7,685	10,361

Sources: 1990 and 2001: Energy Information Administration (EIA), *International Energy Annual 2001*, DOE/EIA-0219(2001) (Washington, DC, February 2003), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea/. 2010 and 2025: EIA, *System for the Analysis of Global Energy Markets* (2003).

Figure Appendix-4-1





Figure Appendix-4-2




Oil and natural gas are the world's most important commodities of today's industrial society, i.e. the fuel for the engine of modern capitalism. Oil and gas make up 65 to 70 percent of all the energy consumed by the three largest economies in the world, viz. the U.S.A, Japan, and the European Union. And many of the industrialising countries of the Developing World, such as South Korea, China³, Brazil, and Mexico, have faced rising their oil and gas consumption rapidly.

According to Al-e Aqa (2001) the Director of Petroleum Engineering and Development Co. (PEDEC) one of the subsidiaries of the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), "The basic reference forecasts for world oil demand are all indicative of an increasing trend in the next 20 years. This is much pronounced in some of the developing countries, particularly China, the Southeast Asian countries and the OPEC

[Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries'] member nations themselves (...)",⁴ where demand for energy is expected to more than double over the next quarter century. (See Figure Appendix-4-3)

Figure Appendix-4-3



In the developing world, oil consumption is projected to increase for all end uses. Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing primary energy source worldwide, maintaining growth of 2.8 percent annually over the 2001-2025 periods, nearly twice the rate of growth for coal use. Natural gas consumption is projected to rise from 90 trillion cubic feet in 2001 to 176 trillion cubic feet in 2025, primarily to fuel electricity generation.⁵ Oil and gas are not just the source of 62 percent of the energy used in the world, they are the source of the production of many goods and products, e.g. all military arsenals, rely on oil to carry on their terror, political violence or defending reasons.⁶ Beside, its importance to the global economy is growing as Pierre Shammass (2001), the president of APS Energy Group stresses:

The Middle East is by far the biggest oil reservoir in the world and its importance to the global economy is growing. This regions capacity to meet world oil demand will be crucial to the global economy for as long as energy remains the main engine for growth (...) the Middle East today accounts for more than 65 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, compared with less than 56 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. Its reserves to production (R/P) ratio averages more than 87 years. The world's R/P ratio for oil has declined to about 40 years (...) the importance of the Middle East will have grown considerably by 2005. It will account for 39 percent of the world's output capacity.⁷

Oil and Gas Reserves, Production and Capacity

In 2002, the eight PG countries, viz. Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab of Emirates, produced about one-quarter of the world's oil, while holding nearly two-thirds (674 billion barrels) of the world's crude oil reserves.⁸ Besides oil, the PG region also has huge reserves (1,923 trillion cubic feet Tcf) of natural gas, accounting for 41% of total proven world gas reserves.⁹

According to EIA (Energy Information Administration's) *International Energy Outlook 2002*, at the end of 2002, PG countries maintained about 22.3 million bbl/d of oil production capacity, or 32% of the world total. And more significantly, they normally maintain an overwhelming share (around 90%)

of the world's *excess* oil production capacity; that means in the event of an oil supply disruption this oil can be brought online to compensate the world market.¹⁰

In 2002, PG countries had estimated net oil exports of 15.5 million bbl/d of oil (See Figure Appendix-4-4). Saudi Arabia exported the most oil of any PG country in 2002, with an estimated 7.0 million bbl/d (45% of the total), Iran around 2.3 million bbl/d (15%), followed by the United Arab Emirates (2.1 million bbl/d — 13%), Kuwait (1.7 million bbl/d — 11%), Iraq (1.6 million bbl/d — 10%), Qatar (0.8 million bbl/d — 5%), and Bahrain (0.01 million bbl/d — 0/1%). Figure Appendix-4-5 also determines small changes of oil exports from the PG during 1997 relating to 2002 estimates. According to the Energy Information Administration's *International Energy Outlook 2002*, PG oil production is expected to reach about 30.7 million bbl/d by 2010, and 42.9 million bbl/d by 2020, compared to about 21.7 million bbl/d in 2000. This would increase PG oil production capacity to 35% of the world total by 2020, up from 28% in 2000.¹¹ (See Figure Appendix-4-6)

Persian Gulf Exports by Country -- 2002





Figure Appendix-4-4



Figures Appendix-4-5

Persian Gulf as a Percent of World (2002)




Figure Appendix-4-6

There are different plans extensive development of existing offshore fields of littoral states of the PG for raising offshore production capacity. Main offshore PG oil fields, viz. Khafji and Hout, both that are linked to Saudi Arabia's Safaniyah, the world's largest offshore oilfield, with estimated reserves of 19 billion barrels. The Doroud 1&2, Salman, Abuzar, Foroozan, and Sirri fields contain the mass of Iran's offshore output, all of which is exported.¹²

Iran and Qatar are containing the world's second and third-largest natural gas (see Figure Appendix-4-7) reserves (behind Russia), respectively. Saudi Arabia since 2000 has worked out an age long offshore PG border dispute with Kuwait. This scheme eventuated development of the huge (13-Tcf) Dorra gas field, which lies in waters standing Iranian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti territories. Most of Qatar's gas is placed in the North Dome Field that contains 380 Tcf of in-place and 239 Tcf of recoverable reserves, making it the largest known non-associated gas field in the world.¹³

Another major PG offshore gas project is Iran's huge South Pars field. The South Pars gas field is the world largest and is jointly shared with Qatar. Available estimates show that South Pars contains 280 to 500 Tcf of gas, of which a large fraction will be recoverable, and by lower estimate over 17 billion barrels of liquids.¹⁴ According to Iran Petroleum sources "about 50 percent of Iran's natural gas fields have not been developed yet which points out the fact that Iran has the potential to produce even more natural gas."¹⁵ Of course Iran faces a dilemma for exploration and exporting its natural gas. Iran's oil industry is old and need major investment for modernisation as well as of its existing gas pipelines. Beside, the demand for energy and also replacing petroleum with gas for domestic consumption in Iran is growing. Far distance location of gas fields in the south of Iran with major natural gas consumers in the north of the country, also the Unites States' threat to impose sanction on foreign companies that deal with Iran's energy industry, have made Iran's dilemma in its gas projects.¹⁶

Oil Flows

Roughly 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the PG, a figure still expected to increase rather than decrease in the future. Most crude oil is transported by tankers along a few well-defined ocean routes. Start point of about 80 percent of all tanker passages are in the ME, mainly in the PG.


From more than 100 inter oceanic straits and waterways in the whole world with less than 25 miles (40 kilometres) wide and various and vital global activities, there are only four extraordinary important ones, viz. Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, Gibraltar, and Bosphorus and Dardanelles, that act as natural gateways in to the ME and North Africa. With concerning the Suez Canal five out of six of the world's main strategic straits are located in the ME with important geopolitical effects on local, regional and global scales.¹⁷

The importance of these waterways are related to the basis of volume of oil cargoes, numbers of ships, alternative routes, intensity of military use, and geographic vulnerability, i.e. length, width, and depth. These oil shipment routes are long, vulnerable lifelines to both producers and consumers of oil and gas. The importance of accessibility and dependability of the vital oil transportation routes that link producing and consuming regions together is such that it bulks large in the great powers' global strategies and plans.

Pipelines are very important for oil transportation too. Regardless their advantages, e.g. shorter tanker journey and cross strategic bottlenecks, they are expensive to build, inflexible, and extremely vulnerable to subversion. Numerous closures, especially as a result of complex payments of transit fees, political disagreements or the misfortune to pass through a major war zone, have underscored their unreliability and reduced their usefulness.

Figure Appendix-4-7


Oil and Gas Map of the Persian Gulf ¹⁸



Source: *Petroleum Economist*, 1993

Although the Arab oil producers in the PG have been trying to diversify their export routes and expand their own ports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but still international waterways specifically the Hormuz, look more reliable. (See Figure D)

Figure D (Repeated)



Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the PG to the Indian Ocean, bounded by Iran to the north and Oman's Musundam peninsula to the south, is about 100 nautical miles (182 km) long and 49 nautical miles (80 km) at its smallest width. The narrowest part of the strait — 21 nautical miles (34 km) — lies between the Iranian island of Larak and the Omani islet of Greater Quoin.¹⁹

After the British withdrawal in 1971 Iran found herself the best choice in the region to protect the Strait of Hormuz against any foreign threats as well as guaranteeing the safety of shipping through this strait. This was mainly because of Iran possession several strategic islands at the entrance of the PG, viz. the islands of Hormuz, Larak, Qeshm, Hengam, Greater Tunb and Abu-Musa.²⁰

The shortest route of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz was between the Little Quoin and the Musandam Peninsula until 1979. Since then Oman because of security reasons asked for shipping lanes beyond the Quoin. The new shipping lanes with one mile wide each and keep by a protective zone of same mileage are also within Oman's territorial waters. Oman therefore accepted the responsibility for the safety of shipping via these lanes.

According to EIA in 2002,²¹ the great majority (about 88 percent) of oil exported from the PG transited by tanker via the Strait of Hormuz. As yet the world's most important oil 'chokepoint', accounting for transit of about two-fifths of all world traded oil, the 13.6 million bbl/d of oil that transit the Strait of Hormuz goes all over the world, eastwards to Asia (especially Japan, China, and India) and westwards (via the Suez Canal, the Egypt's Sumed pipeline, or around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa) to Western Europe and the United States. (See Figures Appendix-4-8 & E) In the late 1970s, more than half of the oil involved in international trade and two thirds of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil transferred from Hormuz at the rate of nearly 18 million barrels per day.²²

Although there are some beliefs that for some reasons the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not be as upheaval as sometimes described, but such situation would require use of longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation costs.

Figure Appendix-4-8

Flow Map of World Crude Oil, Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, 1994





Figure E (Repeated)



This flow map of world crude oil illustrates well the global importance of the PG region for petroleum. And it shows the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a chokepoint. US/DOE - EIA (Energy Information Administration)²³

Bab al-Mandab

The oil traffic heading westwards by tanker from the PG towards the Suez Canal or Sumed pipeline complex in Egypt should pass through the Bab al-Mandab.²⁴ To the extent, therefore, that the Suez Canal is important, so is Bab al-Mandab. Located between Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa, and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab al-Mandab links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Although Bab al-Mandab is too wide and deep to be physically blocked, but as Drysdale and Blake (1985) have noted “Bab al-Mandab is located in a region of political turmoil (...) the combination of superpower and local rivalries in the vicinity raises the remote but real possibility that shipping could be deterred from using the strait during some future conflict because of the risk of being

caught up in a war zone.”²⁵ Any closure of the Bab al-Mandab “could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa. This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and effectively tie up spare tanker capacity.”²⁶

Other Export Routes

Other export routes of oil from the PG besides the Strait of Hormuz are mostly the Saudi 4.8 million-bbl/d capacity East-West pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, Iraq’s Kirkuk oil region to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, Syria to a variety of destinations, and by truck to Jordan. In 2002, only 1.9-2.2 million bbl/d (12%-14%) of oil was exported via these routes.

Notes

¹ *Energy Information Administration (EIA)*, International Energy Outlook 2003 World Energy Consumption. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html> (2 April 2004)

² It is possible, however, that as environmental programs or government policies — particularly those designed to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions — are implemented, the outlook might change, and non-fossil fuels (including nuclear power and renewable energy sources such as hydroelectricity, geothermal, biomass, solar, and wind power) might become more attractive. The IEO2003 projections assume that government policies or programs in place as of October 1st, 2002 will remain constant over the forecast horizon. Ibid

³ By 2015, China alone may have to import over 5 million barrels per day. Much of that oil will come from the PG.

⁴ Farhad Mohammadi and Homayoun Nassimi (Spring 2001), ‘The impact of Middle East/Caspian oil on global energy markets’, *Discourse An Iranian Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 163.

⁵ Gas is increasingly seen as the desired option for electric power, given the efficiency of combined-cycle gas turbines relative to coal- or oil-fired generation, and the fact that it burns more cleanly than either coal or oil, making it a more attractive choice for countries interested in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. *EIA*, op. cit., <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html>

⁶ Saman Sepehri (Nov.-Dec. 2002), ‘Geopolitics of oil’, *International Socialist Review*. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/Geopolitics_Oil.html (20 October 2005). According to him, “The US Department of Defence is the consumer of over 80 percent of all the energy used by the US government.”

⁷ Mohammadi and Nassimi, op. cit., p. 164.

⁸ Remarkable, 9 of the world’s 10 largest oil fields and 28 of its immense fields (original receptacle at least 5 billion barrels) are located in the ME. Most of these lie in the PG within the area between Iran and Arabs’ oil provinces, a region measuring no more than 800 by 500 miles (1280 by 800 kilometres). See, Alasdair Drysdale & Gerald H. Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa: A political geography* (New York: Oxford Press, 1985), p.314.

⁹ *Energy Information Administration (EIA)*, International Energy Outlook 2003 World Energy Consumption. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html> (24 October 2005)

¹⁰ Ibid., <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html> (2 April 2004)

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Iran plans extensive development of existing offshore fields and hopes to raise its offshore production capacity sharply. Iran’s national oil company (NIOC) has expressed interest in developing five oil and gas fields in the Hormuz region (Henjam A — HA, HB, HC, HD, and HE), which,

according to NIOC, hold an estimated 400 million barrels of liquids (oil, natural gas condensates, etc.) and have production potential of 80,000 bbl/d. Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Development of South Pars is Iran's largest energy project, and already has attracted around \$20 billion in investment. Natural gas from South Pars largely is slated to be shipped north via the planned 56-inch, \$500 million, IGAT-3 pipeline (a section of which is now being built by Russian and local contractors), as well as a possible IGAT-4 line, and then reinjected to boost oil output at the mature Aghajari field (output peaked at 1 million bbl/d in 1974, but has since fallen to 200,000 bbl/d), and possibly the Ahwaz and Mansouri fields (which make up part of the huge Bangestan reservoir in the southwest Khuzestan region). South Pars natural gas also could be exported, both by pipeline and possibly by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker. [There are several proposals to build more pipelines, especially for natural gas, including one from southern Iran to Pakistan and India.]. Ibid.

¹⁵ *Iranian Oil Company*, 'A brief history of Iran oil and petroleum industry'. <http://www.nioc.org/> (11 April 2004)

¹⁶ Also as Kemp and Harkavy mention the economics, infrastructure logistics, marketing, and geopolitics of oil and gas are very different. Oil is an eminently fungible commodity that the high risks of investment in its industry occur only during the exploration phase. It can be moved by a variety of means to dozens of markets, by pipeline, truck, train, ships of all sizes, or even aircraft. Albeit natural gas deposits are more geographically dispersed than oil deposits, but its market is regionally priced, i.e. the difficulty of transporting gas to distant markets, and there are large differences between different markets. There are only two basic ways to transport gas by pipeline to dedicated markets or by liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. They explain the oil and natural gas market abilities in their profitability of exports and add, "Oil is virtually guaranteed an export market, and therefore it has high priority for most countries as a foreign exchange earner. Gas, on the other hand, being much more market specific than oil, will not necessarily be a profitable item for export, if the alternative is a boom in domestic demand. This reality has significant implications for energy geopolitics in the Caspian-Gulf region. Consider the dilemma that faces Iran." See, Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 120-121.

¹⁷ It has been a good reason for many wars in the past and the US military aid concentration in countries bordering or close to strategic waterways.

¹⁸ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 122, from Energy Map of the Gulf, *Petroleum Economist*, 1993.

¹⁹ Iran and Oman assert 12 nautical miles of territorial waters there, that overlap by a length of 15 miles, and have agreed to a defined median line.

²⁰ From Iran point of view possessing the strongest military of the region and her vital dependence on secure trade via the PG were also very strong reasons for her decision.

²¹ *EIA*, *op. cit.*

²² About 38 percent of US', 60 percent of Western European's, and 75 percent of Japanese oil imports were shipped via the Strait of Hormuz, *op. cit.*

²³ Cited in Kemp and Harkavy, *op. cit.* p. 118, from Energy Map of the Gulf, *Petroleum Economist*, 1993.

²⁴ Over 3 million bbl/d of PG oil exports transit the Suez Canal/Sumed complex, destined mainly for Europe and the United States. *EIA*, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Drysdale & Blake, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

²⁶ *The Encyclopedia of Earth*. http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bab_el-Mandeb (October 2005)

Appendix-5

OPEC

Before WWII, as Drysdale and Blake point out,

Control of the region's oil by a cartel of foreign companies was complete and encompassed every phase of operations. (...) Consequently, they were able to create an economic world almost divorced from geographic realities. Working together, they orchestrated production regionally, adjusting output in the individual countries in accordance with their global needs. The only map that really mattered to them was the concession map because they could so easily ignore boundary lines on the political map.¹

Challenges by the oil-producing countries to own and control their all oil, and the activities of US private enterprise which acquired an interest in the region's oil during the 1950s, undermined the major companies' absolute control over the region's oil resources in the early 1970s. During the 1950s one of the two ME crises that were accelerated over the control of oil and its distribution was the Iranian government decision of oil nationalisation.² The Iranian tension demonstrated the vulnerable position of individual Middle Eastern governments confronting a united front of giant companies who had exclusive control on all stages of oil operations including optional set of the oil price.³ Establishment of OPEC in 1960 was one of devices responded to the attempts by the oil-importers industrial countries.

The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),⁴ which had started life as a group of five oil-producing, developing countries, sought to assert its member countries' legitimate rights in an international oil market dominated by the 'Seven Sisters' multinational companies. The need for cooperation between these countries became apparent when, in 1959, the oil companies unilaterally reduced the posted price for the ME and Venezuela crude and in August 1960 posted another reduction for the ME crude.

OPEC is an international organisation of eleven developing countries which are heavily reliant on oil revenues as their main source of income. According to the official Web site of OPEC, "OPEC's objective is to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry." It stresses "Since oil revenues are so vital for the economic development of these nations, they aim to bring stability and harmony to the oil market by adjusting their oil output to help ensure a balance between supply and demand."⁵

OPEC rose to international prominence during 1960, as its member countries took control of their domestic petroleum industries and acquired a major say in the pricing of crude oil in world markets. They started to learn, as Drysdale and Blake express, that "singly they were weak, [and] together they might be strong...in the 1970s did OPEC emerge as a quasi-cartel with control over pricing and output."⁶

The evolution of energy during 1970s fundamentally affected the nature of the world politics. Almost 70 years after oil was discovered in the ME, OPEC members, as the principal oil-exporting countries, for a brief few years appeared to show their power in international scene and effecting world oil market. Some developments in the early 1980s undermined their power however as OPEC faced a surplus in world market and agreed for the first time ever to limit oil production, reducing official prices, and establishing production quotas. After that, production, price and oil marketing have been unstable in the oil market and control of the market continued to slip from their hand.

The fluctuation of oil prices, specifically its continuance increase, has triggered concerns in many countries about the potential risk to global growth and has had negative impact on financial and goods markets too. In such circumstances demand for oil decreased and caused a drop in prices.

The experiences of the price increases of the 1970s and 1980s had demonstrated some major consequences among the main energy consumers, viz. reducing oil consumption, using energy more efficiently, endeavouring to diversify energy sources and investment for explore and exploit the new oil

resources. Although such process could reduce the major energy consumers' dependency on OPEC exports and consequently cause a shake out in world oil prices, the world's major oil consumers have remained dependent on the ME for their oil. Kemp and Harkavy (1997) state the growth of world demand for energy especially oil by the year 2010 and conclude that,

The exact quantity of oil that will have to come from the Persian Gulf will depend on the rate of world economic growth, the availability of alternative sources, capacity constraints on further production, and price. Low-price oil and high-growth but inefficient economies will lead to increased demands for Persian Gulf oil because, at the margin. Low prices make Gulf supplies more cost effective than the more expensive oil from other regions. Whatever the final numbers, two dramatic points stand out in all the authoritative projections: There is no realistic alternative to Persian Gulf oil to meet increased world supply in this period. [And] The Asian countries will require increasing quantities of oil from the Persian Gulf. (...).⁷

The primary obstacles to increased access to oil in different part of the world are mentioned by them as "political, economic, and logistical rather than geological, and (...) to questions of sovereignty and regional stability."⁸ Krapels in response to the question of "will OPEC be OPEC in the 1990s?" mentions the oil policies of all countries as "political security veto" and explains that:

When an oil-exporting or – importing state is under an imminent security threat, oil policy is totally subordinated to foreign policy. This was true for OECD [the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries in the 1970s as it has been for Persian Gulf OPEC members in the 1980s. In the case of the crisis in the Gulf, US foreign policy was being driven by US need for oil. Under more tranquil national security conditions, however, OPEC oil policy has been dominated by members' financial conditions: When all OPEC members are rich beyond their expectations (as occurred in 1973-1975 and again in 1979-1981), their willingness to cut production jointly to support prices goes up; and when all OPEC countries are poor beyond their expectations or face a calamitous price decline, as they did in 1986, they again may all be willing to cut production to restore higher prices.⁹

However, the control of oil prices is not just in OPEC's hands. There are many factors beyond the prices as OPEC President Purnomo Yusgiantoro described of the high cost of oil as a "burning issue". He said in a statement released after the Amsterdam meeting of OPEC oil ministers on May 22, 2004 that the price rises were the result of a combination of factors, including "geopolitical tensions in some regions".¹⁰ OPEC believes that any price fall would be limited by other factors beyond OPEC's control, notably strong demand from the fast-growing economies of China and the US, the storage of oil by major petroleum importers like the US, heightened tensions in Iraq and elsewhere in the ME, and bottlenecks in US refineries.¹¹

OPEC has not acted completely coordinated as a powerful cartel but as Drysdale and Blake affirm "despite major differences and tensions among its members, (...) [and] the inherent contradictions within OPEC (...) by political tensions, the organization's longevity is in itself a major achievement." As they have observed, "As long as the world's demand for oil was growing or stable and the OPEC countries' revenues were generally adequate for their needs, OPEC functioned reasonably well, (...) when demand began to fall, the divergent interests of its members threatened to destroy it. [As] the OPEC countries' needs differ radically."¹²

Iran and OPEC

The economy of Iran as one of the four main establisher of OPEC and the second largest oil producer of this organisation relies heavily on oil export revenues.¹³ The oil income covers about 80% of Iran's total export earnings and 40%-50% of government budget, therefore, the oil factor is very influential on the Iranian domestic and foreign policy.

While during the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry under the Prime Minister Mosadegh's leadership the opposition was looking for Iran's political dependence, and the Shah intended to gain additional oil income mainly for the military modernisation as a means of strengthening his power. Hence, oil strikes against the Shah's regime as a significant tool worked very effectively and paved the way for the collapse of his power in 1979.¹⁴ The oil factor after the Islamic Revolution also has played a significant role on the Tehran domestic and especially foreign policy. Revolutionary Iran has turned

her traditional main energy interaction with the West to the East mainly as a response to dismiss the US hostile policy of Iran's containment.

Despite the different strategies of oil policy of Iran's current and previous regimes in the interest of enhancing the national security from their unique point of views, since the establishment of OPEC Iran has tried to cooperate with the OPEC members to gain the most advantages from it. According to Ramazani Iran before and after revolution has always "sought to occupy a leading place in the international oil market"¹⁵, but even its participation in different groups in the OPEC to achieve its goals of production level and price, specifically most often in battle with Saudi Arabia has not made Tehran act unilaterally. Moreover Tehran oil policies in OPEC have mostly been economic rather than security based. In this respect OPEC decisions in 1971 and 1982-83 are good examples of such commitment.

In 1971 the leading role of Iran out of the other OPEC oil producers in the region against main Western oil companies, along with an agreement with the other two major oil producers in the PG, viz. Saudi Arabia and Iraq, to increase the price of PG crude oil, resulted in an annual raise of 2.5% to offset inflation in the West. Also the OPEC decisions of 1982 and 1983 to fix a formal limit on the level of all its members' oil production and to decrease oil prices from \$34 to \$29 per barrel could control worldwide surplus of oil, achieving the real cost of oil and so stabilise the demand for oil.¹⁶

As Ramazani also remarks, despite the concerns of the GCC especially Saudi Arabia about Iran's revolution impact on their domestic political situations as well as OPEC policies, Iran never posed any threat to the GCC states. In addition, despite various problems and crises, OPEC members managed to cooperate, regardless of the form of government, differences over price and production levels, or ideological antagonism, "as oil states they had to sink or swim together. Dependent for survival on their oil revenues, the Gulf states had no other alternative but to compromise, even when they did not seem to be doing so."¹⁷ In this regard President Khatami, while addressing the 135th OPEC oil ministers gathering in Isfahan on March 2005, emphasised the most important concerns of Iran as keeping OPEC strong, cooperative and responsible to its commitments to the energy world market and the security of both consumers and producers from Iran's point of view:

Today, no country, international or regional organization, is entitled to heed its own interests alone (...) The important goal is boosting harmony and cooperation, keeping in mind OPEC's status regulating the international oil market. [other] necessity is heeding OPEC's responsibility in meeting the international oil market's demands. OPEC is constantly responsible for safeguarding the security of the oil market and for adopting effective policies aimed at strengthening the relations among OPEC member states, while safeguarding the interests of the producers and the consumers alike, (...) through holding constant dialogues. (...) Yet, security for energy market does not simply mean security for the consumers, (...) The security and political stability of the producer countries and their easy access to modern technology at reasonable cost can rationalize the international market, (...) In recent months we have witnessed critical conditions of the international oil markets and under such conditions, OPEC, aware of the current worrying conditions, spotting the roots of the problem as the US presence in the region, and not necessarily purely economic reasons, has managed to cool down and stabilize the market resorting to logical and timely policy making. OPEC has once again proved that it has a global approach beyond any other concern and adopts its policies keeping in mind the international community's interests, rather than the oil producers', or its own concerns. [While] certain major world powers that are the main consumers of "this vital substance" regard oil as one of the major involved factors in their military, political, and economic calculations against the producer nations.¹⁸

Notes

¹ Drysdale Alasdair Drysdale & Gerald Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa: A political geography* (New York: Oxford Press, 1985), p. 322.

² The second crisis was the Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasser decision about nationalization the Suez Canal in 1956.

³ Until the early 1970s, the united seven sisters (giant companies) i.e. five American, one British, and one Anglo-Dutch, produced more than 80 percent of the ME and North Africa's oil.

⁴ OPEC is a permanent, intergovernmental Organisation, created at the Baghdad Conference on September 10–14, 1960. The five Founding Members were later joined by eight other Members: Qatar (1961); Indonesia (1962); Libya (1962); United Arab Emirates (1967); Algeria (1969); Nigeria (1971); Ecuador (1973–1992) and Gabon (1975–1994).

⁵ *About OPEC* (2000). <http://www.opec.org/> (18 May 2004)

⁶ OPEC's eleven members collectively supply about 40 per cent of the world's oil output, and possess more than three-quarters of the world's total proven crude oil reserves. *Ibid.* Also see, Drysdale, Blake, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

⁷ Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 110.

⁸ According to Kemp and Harkavy "Cost-effective alternatives to *greater* Middle East oil could reduce the importance of the region's energy reserves and its strategic significance to the industrialized powers. There are two ways in which this could happen: a sizable increase in developed oil reserves outside the region or the expanded use of new fuel technologies that replace oil and reduce its centrality to the world economy." But since none of these ways have not happened PG oil resources will remain essential to the world economy and the region remains the prevailing intense geopolitical rivalries. Details in *ibid.*, pp. 109-110, 355.

⁹ Edward N. Krapels, US energy interests in the Gulf in the 1990s. In Charles F. Doran and Stephen W. Buck (ed.) *The Gulf, Energy, & Global Security*, (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991), p. 18.

¹⁰ *BBC News*, OPEC defers oil output decision (22 May 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3738405.stm>

¹¹ As figures in 2004 showed OPEC nations were already over-producing by as much as 2 million barrels a day. *Ibid.*

¹² "Some, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have vast financial reserves and can withstand production cutbacks without too much difficulty. Others, like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have extremely high production in relation to their small populations. Iran and Algeria (and outside the region Nigeria and Indonesia) have large populations in relations to their production levels and revenues." *Ibid.* For more information see, Drysdale and Blake, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-342; and Edward N. Krapels, US energy interests in the Gulf in the 1990s. In Charles Doran and Stephen Buck (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 17-24.

¹³ In 1974 Iran produced 6 million bbl/d of crude oil, but since 1978-79 has not exceeded 3.9 million bbl/d on an annual basis; which about 2.6 million bbl/d of this amount is for export.

¹⁴ Among many for more details see, Ramazani, R., *Revolutionary Iran, Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, (US: The Johns Hopkins University Press; London: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., 1986), pp. 199-213.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

¹⁶ For more details see, *ibid.*, pp. 202-211.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.213.

¹⁸ *ISNA*, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami addressing 135th OPEC oil ministers gathering in Isfahan on 16 March 2005.

Appendix-6

Saudi Arabia

(A)

Geography

Saudi Arabia as the largest country amongst the PG states occupies eighty percent of the Arabian Peninsula and has borders with all other Arab states in the PG region. (See Figure Appendix-6-1) Its area is about 2,000,000 square kilometres while most of the country's boundaries with the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen are undefined, so the exact size of the country remains unknown. Almost half of the total country is uninhabitable desert.

Figure Appendix-6-1

Map of Saudi Arabia



<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html>

The modern Saudi state was founded by King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud in 1902 by capturing Riyadh and later extending the country's territory to Al-Hasa, Al-Qatif, the rest of Najd, and the Hijaz during 1913 and 1926. This expansion which was led by religious fighters, engaged different military and political activities against local powers as well as the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in 1927 took the title, King of Najd, and signed the Treaty of Jeddah with the United Kingdom. By this treaty Britain recognised the independence of Abdul Aziz's domain and his Kingdom, whilst in 1915, Saudi Arabia was established as an official protectorate of the British government according to a treaty between Ibn Saud and the United Kingdom.¹

Political Ideology

Saudi Arabia is a tribal monarchy, and its constitutional organisation is established on Salafi or Wahhabi Islamic law. The leading members of the royal family choose the king from among themselves with the subsequent approval of the *Ulema* (religious leaders).

The Saudi political ideology strongly bears the imprint of the eighteenth-century Muslim reformer, Mohammad Abdul-Wahhab, who followed ultra strict and conservative Hanbali School of (Sunni) Islamic jurisprudence. The adaptation of Wahhabism doctrine by the Saudi family since 1745 not just created a new political entity, but empowered both, to expand their control beyond their original bases in Najd region and to strengthen their influence of leadership and political ideology over other bedouin tribes from the PG to the Red Sea.

The ultra conservative interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia has been with the Wahhabis from their beginning and it is still very much alive; the major element appearing often as the most conservative state amongst the GCC. In this regard as David Long explains,

The Saudi regime was initially quite militant, waging war against its neighbors in the pursuit of good against evil. Over the years, it has lost some of its revolutionary fervor, but not its fundamentalist principles. Ironically, they are the same principles espoused by contemporary Sunni Muslim fundamentalist revolutionaries seeking to justify violent opposition to secular governments of Muslim and non-Muslim states alike. For the latter, the act of political violence and terrorism is raised to a religious obligation, *jihad*.²

However as Long notes, Wahhabism as a movement was to some extent a nation-building one and played a significant role in Saudi Arabia's political geographical evolution. It has also served as ideological glue, with the capacity to keep the state of Saudi Arabia from collapsing during the near 250 years of its history.³

Besides, the role of Islam and the geographic situation of the Muslims' most holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia as important legitimating elements for Saudi family to rule the country, according to Drysdale and Blake the Saudi family itself has been a major instrument of national integration. The Al-Saud has strength national integration by kinship with potentially troublesome clans, who were co-opted or neutralised via a coordinated system of marriage and patronage connections.⁴

The Koran and the *Sunna* are the Saudis' constitution which is interpreted by the *Ulama* and as Ghassan Salamé explains, "Islam is (...) the Saudi political system [which] (...) determines domestic legislation as well as foreign policy."⁵ The political process for taking major decisions in Saudi Arabia is not election but consultation of the king with traditionally significant groups such as important members of the royal family who occupy the key posts in the Council of Ministers,⁶ the *Ulama* and also tribal sheikhs and elites. The king must preserve a consensus of these groups and also other important elements in Saudi society, although the final decisions are usually taken by the king. An informal traditional gathering '*majlis*' or public audience is for people to meet the authorities and royal family members, to petition them directly, raise and discuss issues but it doesn't relate to the decision-making process of the state.⁷

However, rentier system and modernisation process in Saudi Arabia has led to the formation of a new middle class of mainly newly-educated technocrats who are developing their own independent interests and looking for an influential role in major constitutional decisions via reforms in this country.⁸

(B)

Limited Reforms; a Strategic Solution for Saudi Regime

The debilitating influence on the monarchy of pressures for political changes and reforms, along with development, has actually entered a period of turbulence in Saudi Arabia. Despite massive social changes since the mid-1960s which took place particularly due to the pressure of the Free Princes group, political developments only occurred after the late 1980s and early 1990s Islamic activists' wide criticism of the regime.⁹ In general, regional and international events during the 1990s had great political and economic impact on Saudi Arabia as well as on the other GCC countries.

From an economic outlook, besides Saudi's serious challenges, it had to pay for the Operation Desert Storm of Western troops for Kuwait freedom from the Iraqi invasion. But this operation had major political costs for the regime, viz. citizens' demands for political participation in return for removing the social financial cushion and pressure for socio-political changes, while as Ehteshami remarks, the conservatives were asking for "an end to what they perceived to be Westernisation and an emphatic endorsement of the traditions of the Kingdom" and the liberal forces were requiring "more openness in the political and social life of the country."¹⁰

The end of the Cold War, which was accompanied by new regional and international challenges, including the Kuwait crisis, enforced the Riyadh-Washington relationship much further and in a bold manner. It also justified the massive American military build up inside Saudi Arabia with the high expenses of Desert Storm where more than 500,000 US military members were deployed to the PG. However, in addition to political demands, it was simultaneously concomitant with the massive criticism from the people. Moynihan notes that many GCC people were sensitive to being grateful for US security umbrella while as they believe, "the US actually made a financial profit on Desert Storm, and that Gulf treasuries pay the bill for Operation Southern Watch and for the modernization of Gulf military establishments."¹¹ According to Bronson, Saudi fighters like Usama bin Ladin, who returned home from Afghanistan, were aggravated by the Saudi government's policy of asking foreign forces rather than their own citizens and soldiers, especially those who were well-trained and experienced. This anger as he also mentions, "led to roiling domestic dissent inside Saudi Arabia, which targeted both the Saudi royal family and their American supporters."¹²

However, Saudi Arabia like other ME and GCC countries was affected by the 1990s' developments which came after the end of the Cold War, viz. the collapse of the Soviet Union, the eastern European political developments, the intensified global concerns in democratic actions and human rights, plus the IT revolution and the influence of mass communication systems as principle tools of spreading the idea for changes.

Regionally, demands for socio-political developments in the kingdom were reinforced by the political reform plans in not just several GCC countries, e.g. Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, but also in revolutionary Islamic Iran. Due to the importance of Islam as the official religion of the kingdom and the only source of legislation, also a major element of political development for reformists and opposition groups, Iran's exercise of its own kind of social pluralism with public free debates — so-called religious democracy — since the 1990s was quite attractive and effective on the Saudi traditional society with its autocratic system.

Undeniably, as Nonneman argues, the legitimacy of the GCC regimes from traditional sources and the distribution of rent have given rulers enough leverage to 'open up' without too much risk. This is caused by the fact that as he explains,

The ruling families have not imposed an overarching ideological model on their societies but merely maintained a principle of social pluralism, 'Opening up', therefore does not mean the dissolution of an entire system which is intricately linked to a regime and its revolutionary project.¹³

Therefore the Al-Saud realised that the slow opening up and the reform process which displaying a move away from authoritarian rule and transition towards democracy could not be harmful but would also extend the rulers' legitimacy. In this respect, to respond to demands for socio-economic changes regarding extending the domain of Islamic law, economic reforms in a series of limited reforms have been announced by King Fahd since the 1990s. However, as Nonneman remarked, those countries which have merely selectively appropriated democratic features without further democratisation, will end up in a 'grey zone'. The argument of Daniel Bromberg that was referenced by Nonneman that, "liberalisation may not bring democratisation but rather a state of liberalised autocracy."¹⁴

Consequently the traditional autocracy of Saudi has remained basically intact despite rapid development and economic difficulties as well as a disregard for fundamental political reforms in the kingdom. However, under new regional circumstances, especially in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam's regime, and also the global trends for democracy, it is impossible for Al-Saud to rely much on its traditional strategies to keep social peace in an area of turbulence. As it is true about all the members of the GCC, parallel to modernisation and development process two major threats have

confronted the kingdom; the traditionally discriminated and oppressed Shiites who form about 10 percent of the population, and the growing anti-government religious militancy, specifically Sunni radical Muslims, in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi Arabia Shiite minority, mostly concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province, formerly al-Hasa, were involved in several anti-regime violent riots in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, in the 1980s against the backdrop of the eight-year Iran- Iraq War, during 1990-1991 of the Kuwait crisis and the uprising of the Iraqi Shiites against Saddam Hussein.

In a Saudi society that is a mosaic of religious faiths with 90 percent Sunnis (mainly *Hanbali muwahhidun -Wahhabis* or *Salafis-*, and *Hanafi* and *Shafei*), the regime's divide-and rule policy has been successful to isolate Shiites. Since 1979 and especially after the Kuwait crisis the regime tried to neutralise the Shiite threat by reconciling with them through 'political concessions' in return for the cessation of anti-Saudi propaganda.¹⁵ This policy was perceived by Saudi political opposition groups as "a 'masterly stroke' by King Fahd to ease pressure on the regime at a time of increasing calls for reform from the Sunni mainstream."¹⁶ This was confirmed when all political opposition groups inside and outside the kingdom by 1997 were suppressed whether by government repression or via different kinds of pressure in collusion with Western governments and institutions, respectively.¹⁷

In general, the goal of Shiite opposition movements in Saudi Arabia has not been to overthrow the Al-Saud and the system of government, but the removal of all different kinds of discrimination against them. Hence, since 1988 the Saudi Shiites have chosen democratic ways to achieve their socio-political demands. The Shiite community does not seem to pose the internal security threat that was a concern in the early 1980s, although, by new developments in Iraq after Saddam and greater sectarian tensions in the region, the Saudi regime is under more pressure for greater tolerance. However, in the case of a great succession of Shiites power in Iraq, and also Al-Saud delaying in producing a proper reaction to the Shiites demands for reforms, they might become a serious threat to the regime. In this light, something which came as surprising news to the Western media, in 2005 Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi Ambassador to the US, and, for 25 years, formerly head of the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, for the first time acknowledged publicly that the Shiites in Saudi Arabia "have suffered social and political alienation and discrimination." He also challenged the two most alarmist arguments that have been made by Arab leaders concerning the prospects of a Shiite resurgence in the ME after the fall of Saddam's regime. King Abdullah of Jordan's statement of concern about the emergence of an ominous 'Shiite crescent', dominated by Iran, and also Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak's statement that the real problem is that many Shiites owe their loyalties to Iran rather than to their own countries. According to Prince Turki, Riyadh has recognised the problem and is trying to resolve it; thus, "King Abdullah has extended his hand to them (the Shiites) and brought them more into the fold. The effort will continue and may take some time. Things like that often do."¹⁸

However, since the opposition in Saudi Arabia has always been fragmented and there is serious doubt about any changes in the foreseeable future,¹⁹ analysts mainly consider religious militancy the most dangerous threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.

Notes

¹ For more details see, *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia ; also Nozar Alaolmolki, *The Persian Gulf in the Twenty First Century, Stability and Change* (Maryland, US and London, UK: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 122-123; also Simon Murden, *Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988-1991* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), pp. 151-152; also S. H. Amin, *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf* (Glasgow: Royston Limited: 1984), p. 7.

² David E. Long, Saudi Arabia in the 1990s: plus ca change. In Charles F. Doran and Stephen W. Buck (ed.) *The Gulf, Energy, & Global Security*, (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991), p. 92.

³ Long, *ibid.*

⁴ See, A. Drysdale, G. H. Blake, *The Middle East and North Africa, A political geography* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 211-212.



⁵ Ghassan Salamé (Summer 1987), 'Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 3, , p. 307, cited in Murden, op. cit., p. 152.

⁶ Since 1953, the Council of Ministers has been gradually shaped as a central government's body. Its members are appointed by the king and leads by a prime minister. Legislation is by resolution of the Council of Ministers, approved by royal decree, and must be congruous with the *Sharia* or Islamic law.

⁷ Daryl Champion, Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability within Stability. In Barry Rubin (ed.), *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf* (London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 141.

⁸ For more details among many see, Murden, op. cit., pp. 152-153; also Long, op. cit., pp. 92-93; and Gerd Nonneman, Political Reform in the Gulf & Arabian Peninsula, Lecture in Sir William Luce Memorial Fund, (Durham University: 21 June 2005).

⁹ For details see, Gregory Gause III, 'The Gulf conundrum: economic change, population growth, and political stability in the GCC States', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997); also Simon Murden, *Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988-1991* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), p.156.

¹⁰ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, (Spring-Summer 2002), 'Political reform in the Persian Gulf monarchies', *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. XIV, no. 1 & 2. p. 2.

¹¹ Joseph Moynihan, The Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States: common and uncommon security interests. In David E. Long and Christian Koch (eds.) *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), p.70.

¹² Rachel Bronson, Understanding US-Saudi relations. In Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds.), *Saudi Arabia in the Balance* (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), p. 386.

¹³ Gerd Nonneman, 'Political Reform in the Gulf & Arabian Peninsula', lecture in Sir William Luce Memorial Fund, (UK: Durham University, 21 June 2005).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See, Daryl Champion, Saudi Arabia: elements of instability within stability. In Barry Rubin, *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf*, (London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 140.

¹⁶ Muhammad al-Mas`ari as one of the two major figures of the CDLR (Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights-established in London in 1994) Saudi political opposition group, *ibid.*

¹⁷ For more details see, *ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁸ Prince Turki Al-Faisal in a question-and-answer session at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. 4 October 2005. http://www.jafariyanews.com/2k6_news/oct/6Saudi_anti-Shiite_discrimination.htm (11 September 2007)

¹⁹ Champion, op. cit., p. 138.

Appendix-7

Iraq

(A)

Geography

The Republic of Iraq is located on the ancient land of Mesopotamia, the north western end of the Zagros mountain range and the eastern part of the Syrian Desert. It covers an estimated area of 437,072 square kilometres with the capital of Baghdad.

Iraq inherited 1,472 kilometres of the old Ottoman-Persian frontier, which extended some 1888 kilometres from the PG to Mount Ararat. Approximately 700 of the 1472 kilometres pass through the region known as Kurdistan.¹

It is bounded by Turkey to the north and north-east, Iran to the east, Syria and the Arabian Desert to the west, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the south and south-east, and Jordan to the west. Large parts of country consist of desert, but the domain between the two major rivers of Tigris and Euphrates is fertile. In terms of access to sea, Iraq is the most geographically disadvantaged state in the PG because its only access to free waters is a short 19 km coastline at the northern end of this waterway guarded by Iran and Kuwait.² (See figure 8-2)

Population

With a population of almost 27 million in 2006, Iraq has the second largest population amongst the PG States (after Iran which has a population of about 70 million); a high proportion of Iraqis live in extreme poverty.

According to demographic information from the 2006 edition of the CIA's *The World Factbook*, ethnic groups in Iraq are Arab, with 75-80% of population; Kurdish with 15-20%; and Turkoman, Assyrian, Persians or other makin up the remaining 5%.

Islam is the religion of 97% of the population (Shi'ite, 70-75%; Sunni 22-27%) and Christianity or other religions make up remaining 3%. The Shiite sect encompass (60-65%), mostly Arab, while the Sunni sect (32 - 37%) is composed of both Arabs and Kurds.

Arabic is the official language and is spoken by 75 percent of Iraq's population, while Kurdish, Turkish, and Farsi are spoken among the rest of population.

Economy

Iraq's economy has been based on oil and gas, agriculture, animal husbandry and manufacturing. Since the 1950s, the state-controlled economy was dominated by the oil sector, which provides around 95 percent of foreign exchanges earnings. Prior to the war with Iran, Iraq had a diverse economy, sound economic development policies, a well developed middle class, strong socio-economic links between the rural and urban communities, good resources other than petroleum, e.g. water, mineral resources and agriculture, and was perceived by other Arab states as a potential important regional actor.³

Iraq was a predominantly agricultural country with half of the population being occupied on the land. However, since 1980 its economic foundation, the agriculture sector combined with oil and oil-related industries, has been devastated as a result of its invasions of Iran and Kuwait and later by the US invasion in 2003. Iraq has the world's second-largest proven oil reserves (112.5bn barrels end-1997) after Saudi Arabia, and with Iran, was formerly the second-largest OPEC producer. Its share of OPEC oil export revenues in 1980 with 3.740 million bpd, made it second place after Saudi Arabia, while in 1970 it was placed in the eighth position. (Figure 7-4)

In the 1980s the financial problems arising from the 8-year war with Iran, especially damage to its oil export facilities and its loss of at least \$100 billion, billions of dollars of war debts, along with the costs of reconstruction, led the government to follow a stringent economic policy. This serious financial crisis along with low oil prices motivated Baghdad, from an economic point of view, to invade Kuwait.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was followed by international economic boycotts and that vast damage from the military action of the US-led Coalition forces, from January 1991 seriously diminished the economic foundations and activity of the country. By 1999, its per capita output and living standards were among the lowest in the world. The sanctions continued as a part of US strategy to force a collapse of Saddam's regime, and in 2003 another invasion of the US-led Coalition resulted in the termination of much of the country's major economic administrative structures. Attacks on fundamental economic resources, specifically oil pipelines and infrastructure, have postponed Iraq's export plans.⁴

Political History

Baghdad, the metropolis of the Abbasid Caliphate, was the cultural and commercial hub of the Arab and Islamic world for five centuries. On February 10, 1258, Baghdad was demolished by the Mongols and was later occupied by the Ottoman Turks in 1534. Until 1918, Iraq was the part of the Ottoman Empire known as the provinces of Baghdad (Arab Sunni dominated), Mosul (Kurdish dominated) and Basra (Arab Shiite dominated). With the defeat of Turkey, the World War I Iraq was captured by Britain, like many other areas during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920, Iraq was declared a League of Nations mandate under the United Kingdom administration. In 1921, Britain imported a constitutional monarchy into Iraq and placed Amir Faisal ibn Hussain (a member of the Arab Hashemite dynasty) as the King of Iraq.

Since the *Uqair* Conference in 1922 which was held by Sir Percy Cox of the British Political Resident in the PG to settle borders disputes between the territories under the British occupation, the modern Iraq has been displeased with its insufficient borders outlet to the PG by comparison with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The new border arrangements, which were designed on purpose in order for Britain to control the ME and to limit Iraq's power in the region, remained a source of instability and anti-British sentiments in Iraq. Moreover, the state structure and imposed borders which had ignored affiliations and ethnicity of the people who lived in the regions of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, presented successive the Iraqi governments with internal conflicts and difficulties unifying effective political control and institutionalising the legitimacy of a central government.⁵

In 1932, Iraq became formally independent; however, it suffered great instability during 1936 to 1941, including seven coups and could not evolve as a completely developed nation-state. In 1941, the British invaded Iraq in response to an anti-British and pro-Nazi coup by former Prime Minister Rashid Ali. This caused the Anglo-Iraqi War and subsequent military occupation until 1947. The reinstatement of the Hashemite monarchy, which was "increasingly remote from popular sentiments"⁶ as "its association with the British and its non-Mesopotamian and Sunni origins"⁷ lasted until the bloody revolution of 1958. The basic causes for the revolt as Majid Khadduri has described them,

were the impatience of the young generation with the slowness of reform; the disenchantment with the way the country was being ruled; the growth of Arab nationalism as a radical ideology; and the opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the Arab union between Jordan and Iraq were seen as deterrents to Arab unity.⁸

Following the 1958 military coup by Brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassim, known as the 14 July Revolution, a republic system was announced; however, Iraqis had been ruled by different military successors since then, ending with Saddam Hussein. (See, Table Appendix-7-1)

Table Appendix-7-1

Presidents of Republic of Iraq 1958-2003

Name	Born-Died	Took Office	Left Office	Party	Notes
<u>Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba'i</u>	1904 - ?	<u>July 14, 1958</u>	<u>February 8, 1963</u>	Military	deposed
<u>Abdul Salam Arif</u>	1921 - 1966	<u>February 8, 1963</u>	<u>April 13, 1966</u>	Military / <u>Arab Socialist Union</u>	died in shower
<u>Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz (acting)</u>	1913 - 1973	<u>April 13, 1966</u>	<u>April 16, 1966</u>	Military	
<u>Abdul Rahman Arif</u>	1916 -	<u>April 16, 1966</u>	<u>July 17, 1968</u>	Military / <u>Arab Socialist Union</u>	deposed
<u>Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr</u>	1914 - 1982	<u>July 17, 1968</u>	<u>July 16, 1979</u>	Military / <u>Ba'ath</u>	resigned
<u>Saddam Hussein</u>	1937 - 2006	<u>July 16, 1979</u>	<u>April 9, 2003</u>	<u>Ba'ath</u>	deposed

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Iraq

The Iraqi revolutionary ideology with anti-monarchical sentiments had an intimidating message for the conservative monarchical systems of the PG, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia. Qassim withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 with Iran, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan. He established friendly relations with the Soviet Union until 1963, when he was overthrown by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and some Ba'thist officers led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. As Amin remarks,

Between 1963 and 1968, attempts were made to moderate and stabilise Iraqi politics; the appointment of a civilian as prime minister was one indication of this policy. Others were a search for accommodation with the Kurds, and the normalisation of relations with Iran and Turkey. But the lack of organised civilian support exposed the regime to pressure from the military, and in July 1968 a group of Ba'thist officers and Republican guards, led by Hassan al-Bakr, overthrew the government.⁹

After the coup, the government and administration of Iraq were composed entirely of members of the Ba'th party. The government was led by Major-General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr (a former prime minister) and supreme authority was vested in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The vice-president of the RCC, Saddam Hussein, replaced Al-Bakr after his resignation as president in the

alleged coup attempt of 1979. Saddam took over leadership of the RCC and executed many prominent Ba'athist opponents in the process.

Iraq had never accepted the division of the border imposed by Britain;¹⁰ an excuse for invading its neighbours Iran and Kuwait within a decade. Such dissatisfaction for its insufficient borders outlet to the PG, besides extensive and devastating casualties and losses of the two wars within these three countries and Iraq's isolation from the world community,¹¹ it ultimately ended with the occupation of Iraq by the US and British forces in 2003.¹²

Political system

The secular system of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party of Iraq was a republic based on the interim constitution of 1968. The government was under one party rule and the absolute personal authority of Saddam Hussein. Saddam was president, prime minister, secretary general of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was aided by cadres in his party, the military and political elite and by the tribal group Takritis. Islam was the state religion, and the political economy of the state was based on socialism.

Despite the presence of an elected body, the 'National Consultative Assembly' with 250 members of the legislation process, the RCC had the final decision concerning its draft legislation. However, in the last elections which were held on 24 March 1996, the first since 1989, all 689 candidates, including 'independents' had to be approved by a government screening committee and had to be proclaimed patrons of the July 1968 coup which brought the Ba'ath Socialist Party to power. No opposition movements or expressions were permitted; the ethnic parties and the Communists continued to be barred in this election.

This election was supposed to include some democratic ideals, viz. the right of Iraqis to freedom of speech, association and movement, institutionalisation of the power of the President via every eight-year election, cancellation of the RCC and foundation of a new *Shura* Council with fifty members as the highest body of consultation — half were to be appointed by the President and the other half to be elected — but in practice this was an exercise in 'democracy' to establish Saddam as President with unlimited powers.¹³

Sources of Political Behaviour

Besides the major influence of the ideological and political goals and concerns of the Ba'ath party — as the single dominant political organisation during 1968-2003 — and the significant role of Saddam on all governmental decisions, Iraq's domestic circumstances also affected this country's political behaviour. To understand Iraq's domestic and foreign policy priorities, some elements that influence the policy of the Iraqi governments regardless of the ideological position of the ruling elite must be acknowledged. As Tim Niblock mentions, "The historical record shows Iraq (...) to have been a difficult country to govern. Over the 150 years there have been few prolonged periods when conditions of internal order and external relations have provided reassurance for those in authority."¹⁴ These elements that influence the Iraqi political behaviour had a continuous impact on the Ba'ath government assessment of the vulnerabilities of the state as well. These can be listed as:¹⁵

- a) Geographic features and remarkable resources in Iraq as a permanent and significant influence on patterns of settlement and human interchange within the state and between Iraq and its immediate neighbouring countries.
- b) Pluralism, a result of Iraq's geographic location and human pattern of ethnic and sectarian division embodied in various cultural, religious, and linguistic groups with the favour of having distinct regional, economic and social dimensions.
- c) The economy's dependence on water and oil
- d) Economical vulnerability, as it is virtually land-locked by two strong non-Arab powers, Iran and Turkey. Oil shipments and the distribution rights of the water resources of the Tigris-

Euphrates procedure are perhaps the two most important issues, and will continue to remain conditional on Iraq's positive relations with its neighbours.

- e) Iraq's geographic and strategic location on the fringe of the Arab world bordering non-Arab regional powers (a situation perceived to be fundamental to the strategic depth of the Arab nation) and a communication route within the ME and between Europe and Asia — an objective of continuous invasions and the home of different indigenous cultures. As Moss Helms remarks, "Much of Iraqi political behaviour can be understood and anticipated because Iraq is the eastern flank of the Arab world and occupies a frontier position that has aroused strategic concerns and invited human interchange for centuries."¹⁶

On the international scene, Iraq's perception of its internal dynamics and strategic vulnerabilities has featured a tendency to minimise them. This has always impacted on its foreign relations. On the domestic scene, the most important challenges for government were the constant attempts for political legitimacy, via forging internal consolidation of a nation-state arising from Iraq's pluralism into a national identity, and the establishment of a stable central governing authority. In this respect, besides the successive governments' attempt to establish economic and political coordination and integration of the three dominant Iraqi cities — Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra — and increasing the links between rural and urban areas, it was concerned mostly with the vulnerability of their domestic affairs to external interference.

As Moss Helms also illustrates, the sense of vulnerability arising from being land-locked, along with the strategic importance of the security of its oil and trade routes through the PG and the Arvand Roud, had often convinced Iraqis to opt for aggressive solutions, even though they knew that good relations between them and their neighbours were "valuable if not imperative."¹⁷ In this respect, securing water supplies from the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates¹⁸ in the Arvand Roud was a vital feature of Iraq's economy developed by Saddam Hussein. His unsatisfactory settlement of the Algiers Declaration of 1975, in which Iraq accepted the *thalweg* —the midpoint of the main navigational channel — of the Arvand Roud as the boundary between itself and Iran, and the situation of the three islands of Tunbs and Abu-Musa in the Strait of Hormuz under Iran domination, made one of his bases for invading Iran in 1980. Furthermore, the desire for Iraq's broader access to PG waters without any barriers once again raised this country's claim over Kuwait in 1990.

Iraqis' concern about the vulnerability of their oil resources aroused from two major external and internal problems. Iraq's dependency on the Hormuz strait for shipping its oil and other products¹⁹ despite constructing pipelines through Syria and Turkey, and domestically locating the state's main oil fields and refineries in Mosul and Kirkuk in the Kurdish Autonomous Region and Basra province with Shiite domination; regions vulnerable to both internal political unrest and external threat. (See figure 8-2)²⁰

In sum, regarding all these factors, opinions such as Moss Helm's about the definite failure of any policy or treaty of Iraq with any foreign country without addressing these enduring Iraqi concerns, are understandable; a requirement for preventing the risk of further disputes and cold or antagonistic relations of Iraq with the outside world.²¹

Political Ideology; the Ba'th Party

To understand Iraq's policy in general and particularly in the PG, it is important to consider some basic ideological objectives of the Ba'th party. In developing the biggest military force in the Arab world, and introducing a new brand of pan-Arabism, Iraq was looking forward optimistically to its role as a regional power and leader of the Arab world. The high expectation of the Iraqi regime regardless of the reality of Iraq's potentialities and position set the regime on a course of wars, boycotts, international isolation and finally the overthrowing of the regime in 2003.

Basic Ideological Goals

Supporting Arab consensus, which means Arab unity (regardless of the symbols of personal identity such as religion, ethnicity, and language) or Arab nationalism with the idea of unifying the Arab states

into one great and boundless state was central to Ba'thist ideology. The party encouraged the idea that the Arab nation extends from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Arabian Peninsula of the PG in the east, and its fundamental goal was the abandonment of national boundaries in the ME imposed by the Europeans, in favour of a Pan-Arabism and reunite the Arab nation. According to the party's belief the boundaries among Arabs were artificial and could disappear with the 'awakening of Arab consciousness.'²² Therefore, various unsuccessful formulas for unity between Iraq and Syria, for instance, were offered from the early 1940s until the 1970s. The reason for such attempts beyond common political ideologies was mutual strategic and economic interests with the main purpose of unity as a substitute to superpowers' superiority. However, as Moss Helms mentions, some of the difficulties facing the practical implementation of the philosophy of unity are, "unequal geographic distribution of resources, competition among leading Arab politicians and their political ideologies, and the presence of diverse cultural groups ensure disagreement."²³ The advantage to Iraq of such a union with Syria was stated by Saddam during his last attempt in 1973-1979:

As in the past, geographical, political, and strategic requisites continue to push Iraq toward unity with Syria. Indeed, the neighbouring territories and close relations established as a result; the common river; the complementary economics; the internal strength in the face of foreign threats; and the need for sea outlets, particularly in this age of oil—Iraq being one of the most important oil exporting states—all these requisites make Iraq feel the need to establish a binding relationship with Syria. Naturally, the best, most useful and guaranteed relationship would be that of unity. Indeed, Iraq would benefit from unity at a time when it is offering sacrifices for it. Therefore, the sacrifices which Iraq might have to offer for such a unity would not diminish the importance of the benefits which such unity would bring.²⁴

In addition, the party itself quickly divided between supporters of two theories of Arab nationalism represented by Aref, a Pan-Arabist, and a more pragmatic parochial nationalism represented by his successor al-Bakr, who immediately rejected any kind of Arab unity for the sake of Iraq's national interest.

Beyond the impact of such divisions on the internal politics of Iraq, which was used by Saddam's regime to justify the use of extraordinary acts of violence and militarism, it had a great external impact as well. Further to Iraq emphasising its superiority and special place in Arab destiny it lost its relations with the ruling Pan-Arabist Ba'th party of Syria; this provides a partial explanation of Syria's support of Iran during the Iraq-Iran war, as Alaolmolki observes.²⁵ The new pan-Arabism of Iraq was developed under Saddam, with its main message that "due to its heroic and rich history starting with ancient Sumer and Babylon and ending with Saddam, Iraq is the natural leader of the Arabs. As a result, everything that benefits Iraq will eventually benefit all the Arabs."²⁶ As Baram observes,

This message sought to legitimize political maneuvers that clearly contradicted Arab solidarity or seemed to detach Iraq from the struggle against Israel. The invasions of Iran and of Kuwait are two examples of such maneuvers. It is quite possible that this ideological argumentation made it easier for Ba'th party members to stomach the regime's policies, which deviated from traditional pan-Arab values.²⁷

In this regard, Murden also remarks that the strategy of Saddam for his regime's very survival was his exacting and effective ideological arguments, even more so than his sustaining a sense of crisis to justify his extreme practices of violence and dictatorship, as well as employing the security apparatus. As he explains, "Saddam, (...), represented a parochial and pragmatic strain in Iraqi Ba'thism in which the imperatives of the Iraqi state would become paramount." Therefore, the Iran-Iraq war paved the way for the most practical dictatorship. "Within Iraq, the concentration on power required a direct approach to society's resources. Within the region, the regime sought to project its power (...) [without any regard for the Arabs who were] too passive and timid, [from Saddam's point of view]."²⁸

Domestically, Saddam's new nationalism employed more than just Islamic rhetoric, he took advantage of rich pre-Arab/Islamic historical myths and icons which as Murden notes,

involved a crude manipulation of history and of an entire culture, and produced absurd forms of art, architecture and archaeology. The cult of Saddam Hussein linked all the themes of ideology, and his image dominated Iraqi life (...) He was portrayed as the symbol of Iraqi pride, the war leader; the historic warrior hero.²⁹

Murden's perception of Saddam's extraordinary influence on Iraqis' life was proven after his regime was overthrown in 2003. As he mentioned in 1995, regardless of people's hatred and fear, his sudden disappearance could cause "a gap in the identity, of every Iraqi, and twenty years of state-building and ideology would almost immediately collapse." Consequently, Saddam was the major axis of the nation-state process and as Murden affirms, "The new Iraqi nationalism was harnessed to the power of the Iraq state. The era of Saddam was presented as one of the re-emergence of Iraqi and, therefore, of Arab greatness."³⁰

By the end of the Iran-Iraq war the interest in state power, and in fighting Iran, had persuaded the Ba'th regime to pursue a pragmatist policy. Saddam shaped Iraq's leading role in the region using an aggressive ideology but less revolutionary rhetoric and even establishing relations with the US.³¹

Secularism was another ideal proclaimed but not observed by the Ba'th regime. The Ba'th regime faced those in the ME, particularly Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who believed that Islam was a more binding and widely shared foundation for unity than Arabism. During the Iraq-Iran war they were compelled to introduce some important adjustments by respecting Islam and involving it in politics. To demonstrate that the Ba'th regime were not, as was emphasised by Iran, anti-Islamic atheists, Saddam changed much of their rhetoric during the Iran-Iraq war, introducing some Islamic principles into the Iraqi legal system suddenly before invading Kuwait, and just a day before the Allied bombing began Operation Desert Storm, Saddam added the phrase of 'Allah-o Akbar' [God is greater] to the Iraqi national flag.³² As Amatzia Baram explains, besides increasingly harsh punishments in the name of Islamic law which assisted the Ba'th authorities to stay in power by "more effectively legitimizing them", Islamisation helped the regime to stay afloat by responding to the growing public trend — specifically within the Sunni Arab population — in turning to religion.³³

Another effective tool which Saddam took advantage of to maintain power at home was the selective return to tribal values and affinities. Tribal policies contrary to the Ba'th ideological commitment to socialism, modernity and anti-tribalism were applied soon after the Ba'th dominancy in 1968. Since the early 1970s, it helped Saddam strengthen his position by recruiting young men from his hometown to shape his own preferred kind of internal security system. During the Iraq-Iran War, Saddam realised the number of his own tribal men from Tikrit were too small, so he started recruiting young men from neighbouring and friendly tribes, mostly Sunni-Arab ones who live mostly north and west of Baghdad.³⁴

By applying all these mechanisms, the Ba'th party dominated the political life of Iraq for 35 years and in attempting to face Iraq's challenges, similar to earlier governments, deviated from its ideological principles and adopted a pragmatic posture. Although, the Ba'th were not successful in bringing stability to Iraq, establishing a system that had few institutional checks on executive power insured an unprecedented continuity for more than three decades. The rise of Saddam to power, as Bulloch and Morris remark "was based on political cunning, but above all, on an unparalleled ruthlessness. He had spent the decade before he ousted Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr eliminating anyone who might be a rival, even those who had been lifelong friends".³⁵ However, two major problems facing every Iraqi government were still unsolved during the Ba'th authority; domestically, how to achieve political legitimacy by the population and regionally, how to secure good relations with neighbouring countries.

(B)

Iran

Iran was always a serious impediment to Iraq's ambitions in its regional foreign policy, especially in the PG. Basically, as Chubin and Zabih explain,

Iraq had resorted to three types of techniques in its competitive rivalry with Iran in the PG: 1) it has sought to undermine Iran by *accusations* regarding its intentions; 2) it has *pressured* all the Arab states, including those bordering the Gulf, to support its positions on Gulf issues, [including Iran's claim to Bahrain and its conceding of the islands of Tumb [Tomb] and Abu Musa to the UAE and Iran's military presence to support Oman in its fight against the Dhofar Liberation Front,]; and 3) it has appealed to all the Arab states in the name of the Gulf's 'Arabism' to work together against Iran.³⁶

From Iraq's point of view, Iran's role as the cornerstone of the twin-pillar security system of the US policy in the PG, Iran's repossession of the PG Islands with the tacit full knowledge of the British which tacitly acknowledged Iranian hegemony, Iran's attempts to annex Bahrain and its desire to create a regional pact with the Arab littoral states excluding Iraq, reinforced the Iraqi fear of isolation and ultimately lead it to reject the security arrangements dominated by Iran.

The Shah attempted to portray Iraq as the "rapacious black ship in the Gulf family", and "an anti-religious regime pursuing an anti-Arab policy, deeply involved in subversion and agitation in the region." Frequent accusations which were made were supported by Iraq's alleged failure to aid the Arab cause against Israel, its associations with external powers and constant feuding with other Arab states.³⁷

In different periods of time each country would wait for an opportunity when the balance of power in political and military terms was in their favour to solve their border issues by ignoring previous agreements. This can be seen when the 1937 Shatt-al-Arab (Iranian call it 'Arvand Roud') treaty was unilaterally abrogated by the Shah of Iran in 1969. Iraq had threatened Iran with the forced closure of this river, if their instructions — that Iran's vessels should lower flags and carry no navy personnel when entering the river — were not met. When it declared the 1937 treaty 'null and void', Tehran announced Baghdad had violated its provisions and the 'change of circumstances' allowed it to abrogate and declare '*thalweg*', the principle of dividing the river into two equal parts between Iran and Iraq. Similarly, after the revolution the resultant internal turmoil in Iran and the support of Arab states in the PG encouraged Saddam to abrogate the Algiers Accord of 1975.

Expecting hostilities from each other, Iran and Iraq searched for and exploited opportunities to act against the other. Conflict was usually fuelled by the support of opposition groups on both sides which could act as a suitable and effectual leverage for further hostile actions or even for improving mutual relations of the two countries:

a) Until 1975 Algiers accord, Iraq accused Iran of supporting opponents of the regime, including Communist and Kurdish groups, and of financing and arming *al-Da'wah* Islamic Party to assist them in committing acts of sabotage and assassinations in Iraq. Iran supported Kurdish rebels in their anti-regime struggles of February 1969 which were led by Mulla Mustata al-Barzani. The Kurdish question offered a real opportunity to Iran so, together with the US and Israel, Iran offered aid to the Kurds. As Chubin and Zabih observe,

The Kurds, like the Iraqi shi'a [Shiite], opposed any move by the Iraqi government towards an Arab union; their attitude thus coincided with Iran's. Secondly, the Kurdish war, by weakening the Iraqi government and by preoccupying it, reduced its military and political capacity to effectively deal with other issues.³⁸

To solve these issues and others, particularly those relating to its isolation, Saddam activated several initiatives, including the fifteen-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union that consolidating ties with the socialist block. Saddam went on to attempt to solve the thorny Kurdish problem by offering the 11 March 1970 Manifesto to the Kurds. By offering limited autonomy (but much more than Kurds have previously been offered anywhere in the ME), Iraq would gain the backing of both Arabs and Kurds in the wider region and the approval of the Soviet Union. Also, eliminating the Iranian pressure on Iraq made it possible to turn the tables on Iran, in particular to gain leverage in the dispute over the Arvand Roud and a freer hand to seek an active role in PG politics.³⁹ However, the attempt to come to an agreement with the Kurdish leader using the March 1970 Manifesto, which offered limited

autonomy, a form of self ruling government, cultural and national rights to the Kurds, failed. Despite Iraq's effort the Kurds rejected the offered agreement, pushing Baghdad to act forcefully.

The Kurdish and Shiite populations were always the victims of the tactical manoeuvres of these two countries, through both support and pressure. At greatest risk were those of Iranian origins living in Iraq, as seen when Saddam expelled thousands of Iranians. This happened on three separate occasions: in 1969, when Iran unilaterally abrogated the 1937 agreement; between October and December 1970, when Saddam failed to establish an anti-Iranian front against the dispute over the three PG Islands; and in 1980, after the attempted assassination of Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on 1 April by an Iraqi of Iranian origin.⁴⁰

b) In turn, Iran accused Iraq of supporting and aiding Kurdish, Arab and anti-regime Persian groups in Iran, while after the revolution Iraq's support was mainly given to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. Saddam's advantage in using this ill-concealed Marxist Iranian nationalist group was that it had no real chance of seizing power in Iran, which according to Cordesman, meant it was an almost perfect "sacrifice pawn", "if Iraq wanted to improve its relations with Iran," and "just as expendable in the future as the Shah found the Iraqi Kurds to be in 1975".⁴¹

Therefore, the opposition groups all had significant variable roles in the relations between Iran and Iraq, and consequently had both an impact and were affected by the bilateral and regional circumstances. The use of such groups and the inconsistencies of the two countries had made it hard to achieve any lasting rapprochement.

(C)

Opposition Groups

By late 1980, some of Iraqi opposition groups merged under Syrian patronage in Damascus to form the Democratic National and Patriotic Front with three main factions of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Iraqi Communist party and the Unified Socialist party of Kurdistan. Many covert opposition movements within Iraq were largely Shiite in orientation. Among them, the most distinguished Party of the Islamic Call (*Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiya*), or *Al-Da'wa* had financial links to Iranian pre- and post-revolutionary governments and close ties with the Iranian clergy. *Al-Da'wa*, which was formed in the late 1950s, had made several attacks against leading members of the Ba'th party. After the Islamic revolution in Iran, *Al-Da'wa*, — which had refused to work with the front in Syria because of the inclusion of the Iraqi Communist party and what it termed nationalistic trends in the front — continued its activities with leadership of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. He was the spokesman in Iran for the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) which was set up in November 1982 to mount an Islamic revolution against the Iraqi Ba'th government.⁴²

However, a wide range of Iraqi opposition groups were receiving support from Iran e.g., Islamic Movement of the Iraqi Kurdistan led by Sheik Ali Abdel Aziz, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani and Sunni group of the *Umma*. Even after Saddam's regime collapsed, although all of the groups had agreed to work with the US, as *The New York Times* reported on December 13, 2003, key opposition figures, including Barzani of the KDP and Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) [based in London and backed by the US], were forging ties with Iran, Iraq's neighbour and a longtime foe of the United States.

(D)

Methods of Achieving Iraq's Foreign Policy

The previous sections of this study have shown that in achieving its foreign policy goals Iraq had benefited from various elements, such as ideology, diplomacy, military and propaganda methods, as well as aiding undeveloped countries, establishing economic partnerships and internal developments. Iraq's methods of pursuing its foreign policy objectives can be categorised as follows:

- 1- Iraq used radical ideology to persuade other countries to follow its policy in a bid to change the setup of power, expand its ideology and achieve domination of the PG.
- 2- Iraq's aggressive and offensive policies achieved security through the insecurity of others. The combination of hostile relations with its neighbours and the increased build-up of arms exposed Iraq's desire to play a significant role in the region.
- 3- The evolution of Iraq's political ideology from radical to pragmatic was seen as a short-term tactical advantage increasing Iraq's political manoeuvrability, but its ambitious diplomacy still simmered just below the surface. Frustration would increase hostility towards the West and the regime would make a radical change in policy. This periodic fluxing meant relationships with both regional and international powers were constantly changing leaving Iraq with an unstable policy. This can be seen in Iraq's use of a policy of *rapprochement* and *détente* in 1975 towards its PG neighbours that by 1980 was no longer applied.⁴³ Initially Iraq established a very anti-Western policy to achieve a more distinctive political position and gain a popular following in the Arab world, but the period of reconstruction required cooperative and measured diplomacy with the West. After the Iran-Iraq war, the US was one of Iraq's biggest trading partners. The Iraqi regime had developed a strong sense of self-belief in its role as the shield against all Arab enemies and formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC),⁴⁴ although its invasion of Kuwait, a divergent point of Arab interest, meant that Iraq, with its false slogans, was no longer trusted by the Arab world.
- 4- In 1978 the increase of military strength, improvement of relations with its neighbours and internal reconciliation and democratisation projects resulted in Iraq's emergence from isolation into the role of regional power.
- 5- Iraq's sectarian policy was used in retaliation against unfavourable internal or external events. Methods employed included expulsion of Shiites with Iranian origins and use of chemical weapons against Kurds.
- 6- Supporting the opposition groups of regional neighbours as well as exploiting their internal problems.
- 7- Iraq's self-reliant nature was opposed to the influence of any superpower in the PG calling for commercial and economic cooperation and bilateral military agreements among Arab states.
- 8- Exploitation of the international political system, particularly through the divisions on issues regarding the treatment of Iraq.
- 9- Attempts to establish a link between economic cooperation and political interests through ties with non-aligned countries, Russia and the EU. For instance, in an effort to remove the sanctions on it, Iraq sought to take advantage of the division between the UN's real power brokers using a two-tiered strategy: Steadfastness and Diplomatic Activity. In the latter part of strategy Iraq's aim was to influence France, Russia and China into lifting the sanctions. These countries were all permanent members of the UN Security Council, all had a significant and long-standing interest in Iraq's economy and all opposed the seeming Anglo-American domination of the Security Council.⁴⁵ For instance, France, which was seeking its own influence in the PG, had found Iraq an important solution. Before the revolution, Iran was an American domain and the smaller PG states were still influenced by Britain. From 1974-1990, by advancing good relations politically, economically and militarily, France, which did not see Iraq as a USSR puppet, lessened Iraq's dependence on Moscow. Also, France preferred "Iraq as a secular bulwark against the religious fanaticism of the Iranian revolution which threatened to engulf the ME."⁴⁶ Although it was cooperating with the coalition for setting up sanctions, France was looking for its own role within the region and was opposed to any decisions that threatened the territorial integrity of Iraq. Also, during the 1970s Moscow, in addition to its substantial political, economic and commercial interest in Iraq, established good relations with the Ba'th regime as a result of Iraq's regional isolation and its opposition to US policy. The high point of this relation was a 20-year treaty of friendship in 1972; however, the increased oil revenues and Baghdad's attempt since 1975 to diversify its purchases of Western arms, goods and technology lessened Iraq's dependence on the

USSR. Although there was cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad, seen when Moscow secured the cooperation of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party, they still held differing views concerning the military aid given to Ethiopia, the Soviet policies in Afghanistan and the ME conflict, however the two countries still maintained a good relationship.⁴⁷ In addition, during the Kuwait crisis, the USSR was careful not to join the coalition forces and even with the end of Gorbachev's rule Moscow started to distance itself from Washington's policies regarding Iraq. Saddam's strategy of forming a gap between the two camps in the UN's Security Council was very successful, as three out of five permanent members with the veto in this council were against pressing for Iraq's compliance. China never supported the military operation against Iraq, and by the mid-1990s, France took a different position from the other two permanent members, the US and Britain, who wanted to ensure compliance. In the mid-1990s, these three permanent members of the Security Council resisted any military action against Iraq and favoured the removal of sanctions, even when it meant abandoning the UN inspection system.⁴⁸

10- By providing more economic aid to developing countries, Iraq hoped to encourage them towards its pan-Arab policy and persuade them of Iraq's credibility as the regional power.

11- Iraq attributed blame for its failures to other countries. For example, the application of sanctions provided Iraq with a scapegoat in the form of the Western powers.

12- Diplomacy provided Iraq with the means to undermine agreements, international decisions and regional issues whenever possible. Saddam took advantage of the economic potentiality of the country, the internal issues and the humanitarian conditions of Iraq in this regard. For instance, since the ceasefire in 1991 the main goal of Iraqi diplomatic efforts was to effect the removal of the sanctions. It attempted this not by complying with the terms of the ceasefire but by attracting the interest of its Western friends with economic incentives, by attempting to persuade the outside world of the non-existence of Iraqi WMDs and by capitalising on the increasing division of the international community. Iraq had some success achieving this with some Arab states, China, France, and Russia. Also it sought to build-up support from the Arab masses, propagandising the threat of a Western-dominated 'new world order'.⁴⁹

13- The importunate foreign policy continued Iraqi challenges and threats ignoring both regional and international agreements and promises, which for Iraq were considered tactical solutions. This attitude affected the security of the region. For example, even after the new UN borders, Kuwait was still under threat and even after eight years of war so was Iran.

Notes

¹ Christine Moss Helms, *Iraq Eastern Flank of the Arab World* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1984), pp. 37-39.

² About 30 mile coastline with two major ports, Basra in the Arvand Roud and Umm Qasr on the PG.

³ For more details see, Moss Helms, op. cit., pp. 198-199, 118-119.

⁴ Along with the West attempts to loosen the economic crisis for Iraq, e.g. agreement of the Paris Club to write off 80% (\$33 billion) of Iraq's \$42 billion debt to Club members, (*Reuters*, Berlin, 20 November 2004, <http://web.archive.org/web/20041121210518/http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=6874713>), the US and British efforts to attract foreign investment on the Iraq's oil infrastructure, have been limited as the result of the insurgency campaign and regular attacks on the oil infrastructure; embracing a major economic impact on Iraq.

⁵ See, Hassan A El-Najjar, *The Gulf War: Overreaction & Excessiveness* (Amazon Press, 2001) from: <http://www.gulfwar1991.com/Gulf%20War%20Complete/Chapter%202,%20The%20Saudi%20Big%200Brother,%20By%20Hassan%20A%20El-Najjar.htm> (21 July 2006); also Nozar Alaolmolki, *The Persian Gulf in the Twenty First Century, Stability and Change* (Maryland, US and London, UK: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 90-91; and Moss Helms op. cit., p. 3.

⁶ Moss Helms op. cit., p. 40.

⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

⁸ Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969), p. 2, cited in Edmund Ghareeb, Iraq: emergent Gulf power. In Husein Amirsadeghi (ed.), *The Security of the Persian Gulf* (London: Croom Helm London, 1981), p. 199.

⁹ S. H. Amin, *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf* (Glasgow: Royston Limited: 1984), p. 6.

¹⁰ Iraq did not accept the new borders, neither the first time in 1961 — when the British granted Kuwait independence — or the second time in 1973. Although, because of the build up of troops on the border of Kuwait, of British dispatched forces in 1961 and the demands from the Arab League in its second attempt of unity, Iraq's troops were forced to withdraw.

¹¹ For instance, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which resulted in the United Nations economic sanctions, according to some estimates, left the death of between 400,000 and 800,000 Iraqi children.

¹² The US and allies who established a Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq, transferred the government authority to an Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. At the time of this writing, despite the elections in 2005 for the permanent government, the US and allied, including British, troops have remained in this country; a source of xenophobia and instability.

¹³ See, Simon Murden, *Emergent Regional Powers and International Relations in the Gulf: 1988-1991* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995), p.104.

¹⁴ Tim Niblock, *Iraq: The Contemporary State* (ed.) (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p.1.

¹⁵ For details see Moss Helms, op. cit.; and Niblock, op. cit.

¹⁶ Moss Helms, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁷ Ibid., 202.

¹⁸ Almost three-fourths of the whole Tigris-Euphrates system locates within Iraq territory, although more than 80 percent of the country's assessable measurable water supply comes from its neighbouring countries, Turkey and Syria. Since the 1960s there have been various claims of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to the water of the Euphrates with annual flow of almost 29 billion cubic meters.

¹⁹ Until 1980 about 70 percent of Iraq's oil and other products were exported through the Strait of Hormuz.

²⁰ Figure is cited in Moss Helms, op. cit., p. 26.

²¹ Ibid., p. 202.

²² The Constitution of the Ba'th Party, 1947, cited in Husein Amirsadeghi (ed.), op. cit., p. 202.

²³ As Baram explains, "When the Ba'th party came to power in Iraq in July 1968 it was committed to a few ideological goals, first among which came Arab unity — the ideal of unifying the Arab states into one super state. Very soon, however, it became clear that the only candidates for immediate unification, Syria and Egypt, both governed by regimes not unlike the new regime in Baghdad, posed a grave

danger to the fledgling Ba'th rule. Both Gamal Abd al-Nasir and Hafiz al-Asad — who was the *de facto* ruler of Damascus since March 1969 and *de jure* ruler since November 1970 — enjoyed much greater prestige in the Arab world, and even inside Iraq, than the inexperienced Baghdad leadership, which had already lost power once in 1963. Thus, rather than striving toward unification, the new regime turned against Syria and Egypt, accusing them of betraying the most cherished Arab values by failing to defeat Israel in 1967, and of sabotaging Arab unity in a variety of other ways. With very small fluctuations — mainly in 1978-79 — this has remained Saddam Hussein's policy since he became Vice President of Iraq in 1969 and President in 1979." See, Amatzia Baram, Saddam's state, Iraq's politics and foreign policy. In Barry Rubin (ed.), *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf* (London and Portland: Frank Cass Publisher, 2002), pp. 200-201; also, for details about the Ba'th Party's ideological objectives, among many see, *ibid.*; also Alaolmolki, *op. cit.*; Ghareeb, *op. cit.*; Moss Helms, *op. cit.*

²⁴ FBIS, Daily Report: MEA, September 17, 1980, text of message by Saddam Hussein to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Watan, pp. E2-E4, cited in Moss Helms, *op. cit.*, p.55.

²⁵ Alaolmolki, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

²⁶ Baram, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Simon Murden, *op. cit.*, pp.106, 108.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.107.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 108.

³² Amatzia Baram, Saddam's state, Iraq's politics and foreign policy, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

³³ Baram assumes that the regime's estimation about the public trend to religion which was caused by deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Iraq was resulted from information of the internal security apparatus of Saddam — as the most efficient element of his survival. See, *ibid.*, p. 203.

³⁴ See, *ibid.*, 203-205, also Amatzia Baram (Feb., 1997), 'Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1 pp. 1-31.

³⁵ John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The daring and aggressive knight. In John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *Saddam's War: The origins of the Kuwait conflict and the international response* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 28, cited in Murden, *op. cit.*, p.101.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³⁷ This is illustrated in *Ettelaat* (air ed.) editorials of August 8, and October 18 and 19, 1970; *Ettelaat*, July 16, 1970; *Keyhan International* (weekly) editorials of June 2, 1970, and November 6, 1971; *Peygham-e Imruz*, July 28, 1970, cited in Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974), P.190.

³⁸ Chubin and Zabih, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

³⁹ Ghareeb, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 215; also Chubin and Zabih, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁴¹ Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, *Iraq, Sanctions and Beyond* (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 193.

⁴² Among many see, *ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

⁴³ Ghareeb, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁴⁴ ACC, that consisted of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen.

⁴⁵ Cordesman and Hashim, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁴⁷ Ghareeb, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-221.

⁴⁸ Amatzia Baram, (December, 2000) 'Saddam Husayn between his power base and the international community', *MERIA Journal*, vol. 4, no. 4.

⁴⁹ Cordesman and Hashim, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

Appendix-8

Iran

(A)

Imperial Iran *Political Policy*

Agricultural Policies: The Shah claimed that the Land Reforms, part of the Shah's White Revolution, were for the benefit of the working class to liberate them. However Land Reform, as well as nationalisation of forests and pasturelands, as many observers including Keddie comment may not have initially had economic goals; the specific aim was to abolish feudalism and so reduce landlord power and secure direct control over peasants and nomads by the government.¹

The Shah's plan also was to persuade the landowners to put money into industry rather than agriculture. This was because the economic crisis and military expenditures meant that the Shah needed more money and had to borrow it from the US. The money was gained for the benefit of the regime while the Land Reforms were implemented to answer the pressure from America. The Shah did not want to anger the landowners and so the reforms did not affect their social status except in the case of the *Ulema*, who controlled large amounts of *waqf* (religious endowment) land. These were used to maintain religious institutions, help the needy and provide an income for the *Ulema*. Through his reforms the Shah was able to restrict the religious leaders' financial independence, although it caused acrimony between the *Ulema* and the regime.²

Also the land reform caused a drastic decline in agricultural production during the 1960s and 1970s. This was because the land reform did not supply essential capital for the peasants who had obtained lands. This increased the need to import goods and consequently also Iran's dependence on Western nations. According to Abrahamian, as the result of such process, "Iran, which in the early 1960s had been a net exporter of food, by the mid 1970s, was spending as much as \$1 billion a year on imported agricultural products."³

The growth of agricultural output was slower than population growth, despite the official statistics on an annual rise of 4 percent a year in agricultural growth. As Keddie argues, a more plausible estimate would be 2-2.5 percent per year, with the rate of population 3 percent, and the growth in food consumption about 12 percent.⁴ This situation, together with Iran's declining oil revenues could have had a great socio-economic impact during an economic recession. There were other major effects of the Land Reforms such as: an increase in mechanisation, rising unemployment and very low income for agricultural labourers. In addition, alongside the rise in rural population, there was the enforced migration of millions of landless peasants from rural areas into the cities, especially Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Mashhad — cities without the housing, amenities, or even jobs to cope with them. As Hussain notes,

In 1967-8, out of a population of 26.8m., 62 per cent lived in rural areas. In 1972/3, when the population had increased to 31m., 57 per cent lived in rural areas, and within the same five years the active agricultural population had gone down from 49 to 40 per cent. Despite a government forecast of a considerable increase in farm employment a decline in fact took place. In 1972-3 approximately 16 per cent of the whole population moved from one place to another, and over half of that percentage moved from rural to urban areas.⁵

However this massive movement of mainly young people, from a very religious and political culture in the country, actually assisted the ultimate down fall of the regime. This was because in the end the strength of the revolution came from the urban areas where the political culture of the masses was Islamic so they could easily lend their support to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini.⁶

Oil Policy: Oil was one of the most significant components in the Shah's political and economic policies. Through it he was able to manage domestic problems, finance his plans of rapid modernisation and support development particularly in the military sector, and so develop Iran into a regional, economic and military power during 1970s. However the way the increasing oil income was dealt with in his strategy resulted in losing the opportunity of continued and systematic development, emphasising the economic and cultural differences between the rich Westernised social classes and the poorer traditional bazaar classes. The policies favoured the big, rich industries and urban populations over the smaller, poor agricultural populations, which led to rapid urban migration as well as excessive inflation, profits and corruption, while the government and a few private hands held the majority of the wealth. The evidence for such an analysis is the following:

The general economic strategy of the Shah was dependent largely on oil income. Therefore, by emphasising the necessity of increasing oil prices in the OPEC since 1973 and his arrogant declarations that Iran would quickly become one of the world's five great powers with high income, he persistently insisted on an accelerated rate for achieving the original goals of the Five Year Development Plan (1973-1978). His ambitious plans were pursued, despite warnings by some economic planners about the limitation of Iran's absorptive capacity and the pernicious consequences of a sudden economic expansion which could have serious results regarding inflation, shortages and overheating the economy. As Keddie observes,

Governmental strategy towards the economy since the 1960s included rapid development of import substitution industries, especially large enterprises that used much modern and labor-saving technology. Despite a few showy 'crackdowns,' mainly on retailers or vulnerable targets, extremely large profits were encouraged for both domestic and foreign companies, while less was done for those on the bottom rungs of the economic scale. (...) The regime's race for greater size, military strength, and modernity, with its concomitants of unemployment, waste, corruption, and poverty, affected both agriculture and industry. In both spheres heavy inputs of foreign capital, personnel, and imports were favored by official policies.⁷

The other consequence of the Shah's economic strategy which emphasised the importance of big industry and agriculture was excessive migration to the big cities. This resulted in a deficiency of day-to-day needs and made life extremely difficult. Also, offering low-interest loans to the private sectors resulted in an increase in investments and thereby rises in aggregate demand and demand for labour. The migration process of hundreds of thousands of workers accelerated to fill the gap in unskilled labour. Skilled labour came from the Western countries, especially the US, receiving higher payments than their Iranian counterparts. This was a matter that intensified the cultural tensions between Westerners and Iranians.

Since the aggregate demand was exceeded supply, a sum of imports rose from 2.57 billion in 1972 to \$14.2 billion in 1977.⁸ Another consequence of the Shah's economic strategy, such receiving imports specifically from the West, not just increased Iran's dependence on the West, but also caused further inflation.

However, oil wealth worked as a rentier system (similar to the GCC) for the Shah's regime (and latter to the IRI), to gain support from people. However, owing to a decline in oil revenues the regime failed to keep such support. Of course, according to many such as Mohsen Milani, this was not the reason for the revolution but, as he explains, "All available data substantiate the claim that a majority of the population benefited from the oil boom, though not equally". His argument is that:

The economic expansion, which increased expectations, followed by a period of economic contraction, intensified discontent among many groups. The Shah's regime pursued policies that created a rift between the state and the industrialists and the bazaar merchants and shopkeepers. Despite this situation, had it not been for the coincidence of the economic crisis with the looming political crisis ahead, the Shah's regime would have been financially capable of weathering the storm.⁹

The increased oil revenues meant that the Shah had turned Iran into a consumer market for America who could take economic advantage of and would benefit from Iran in three main areas; armaments, oil

and the banking system. Americans justified the phenomenal prices they charged for goods by comparing them with the prices Iran charged for oil. Iran effectively bailed out several American arms manufacturers by placing huge advance orders. They were also offered the sale of some light bombers from America, which were not even off the drawing board yet. Also the dozen major US banks in Iran practically led the foreign banking system and by charging 10 per cent interest received an income of \$220m per year. Other income was accelerated through money transfers and loan arrangements. America benefited from these arrangements however, after the Shah led the rise in OPEC oil prices the major US business interests became more closely tied and even dependent on the Shah's regime.¹⁰

The transformation of Iran into a consumer society did not lead to equal income distribution, for while Americans were making profit the Iranian bureaucrats, military officials and members of the royal family were becoming more corrupt. Furthermore, the new class of exploiter and consumer increased Iranian imports but left the Iranian industries idle. Such economic development within a capitalist framework led to profits being concentrated in a tiny minority of the population and wages, even for the best-paid workers, rapidly eroded via unchecked inflation, which coincided with the creation of industrial elite.¹¹

A major part of the oil revenues were allocated to the Shah's ambition to strengthen his armed forces; an appropriate method to recycle petrodollars to the Western countries which were facing the economic drain/lost caused by the OPEC price rise. After the British withdrawal from the PG, Washington and London both were happy to see Iran become the policeman of the PG. By choosing Iran as the military pillar of Nixon's security arrangement in the PG, Western countries were able to sell billions of dollars of military equipment to Iran each year.

The Shah's modernisation was unlike what was successfully experienced in other societies. In England the process was mostly peaceful and gradual because there was already some democracy ingrained into the culture. In contrast, in France the bloody revolution was the prelude to the creation of democratic institutions. However, in both countries the old and new classes shared the political power and modernisation enjoyed the support of the business class and was reinforced by the democratic ideology that calmed the disagreeable effects of such a transformation.¹²

While in places, such as Russia and China, where democracy had been absent or not fully developed modernisation was launched with relative success through socialist revolution. However in both these countries, as well as in Iran, modernisation was brought about by the state not the social/middle classes. However in comparison the Pahlavi state was not creative enough to develop a legitimising ideology that would support modernisation and the intense changes it brought about. Instead it ignored or took control of the existing democratic institutions (such as *Majles* and the labour unions) and as the regime estranged more social forces, particularly the *Bazaaries* (the traditional middle class of bazaar), the *Ulema* (clergy) and the landed upper class, the state sunk deeper into isolation, which forced it to depend on repression and foreign help to survive.¹³

(B)

Opposition Groups

The Shah, with its dictatorial character and no tolerance which had alienated all different social groups and classes with the possible exception of the upper layer of bourgeoisie, perceived the opposition groups as a threat to its regime. Their demands of expecting the regime to observe the constitution, free political prisoners, and respect freedom and human rights were ignored and they were even severely oppressed by the regime, especially in the post-1953 *coup d'etat*.

SAVAK had the main responsibility for identifying and destroying all who opposed the Shah's dictatorship in any way. It had headquarters in London, Geneva and Washington and developed ties with the intelligence agencies from America, Britain and Israel. They were particularly suspicious of groups of intellectuals, students and religious clerics both at home and abroad.¹⁴ Under such circumstances and despite the activities of the opposition groups, the Shah's regime was stable and was able to control the discontent for a time. However it could not last long; via a strong revolutionary movement started in 1978 the regime was overthrown within months and the Shah had to face the real impact of his oppressive policy. As Ervand Abrahamian's notes,

The 1953 *coup* brought down an iron curtain on Iranian politics. It cut the opposition leaders from their followers, the militants from the general public, and the political parties from their social bases (...) The iron curtain may have hidden the social tensions and the organized oppositions, but it certainly did not succeed in eliminating them. On the contrary, (...) the twenty-five-year repression produced a new intelligentsia that formulated ideas far more radical than those of the Tudeh and the National Front. Moreover, the new generation helped shape the uncompromising character of the revolution that eventually destroyed the monarchy.¹⁵

In order to understand the Islamic led revolution in Iran the tactics and aims of the opposition must be studied.

Armed Opposition Fadaiyan-e Islam

The only significant Islamic armed group struggling the Shah's regime was Fadaiyan-e Islam (devotees of Islam). It was founded in 1946 by Navab Safavi who believed that Iran had to be ruled by laws based on the Koran and the *Sharia*, so Western civilisation was considered to have corrupted Iran. They believed that the only solution to Iran's problems was militant opposition of the government. The group was an effective political power with a strong military element and was capable of challenging the authorities.

The aim of the Fadaiyan-e Islam in general was to purge Iran of Western influences by attacking those who were developing the ideas of imperialism. This led to the assassination of some political figures, such as, General Razmara, Prime Minister Abdolhosein Hajzhir, Hossein Ala (who survived the attempt) and Major General Bakhtiar as well as a number of intellectuals like the historian Ahmad Kasravi. The support base for the Fadaiyan-e Islam was found among the masses and lower classes.¹⁶

On 18th December 1955, after the government banning of the Fadaiyan-e Islam, Navab Safavi was sentenced to death and the group went underground. However it returned in 1965 when Hassan Ali Mansour was assassinated but this time the SAVAK were successful in brutally eliminating the organisation. It is believed that the adoption of a military strategy rather than a cultural and political one was the cause of the Fadaiyan-e Islam failure.¹⁷

After the assassination of Mansour and the unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Shah the strict militant atmosphere was intensified, particularly in regard to restricting the freedom of citizens. This focus was aimed at controlling the discontents however other secular groups carried on the armed struggle against the regime.

The opposition groups, with secular backgrounds, included the National Front, the Tudeh and the Fadaiyan-e Khalq. These groups simply wanted a more liberal form of government that would allow them to participate in the political system; they were not interested in replacing it with an Islamic system.¹⁸ Even the Mujahedin-e Khalq with religious backgrounds and demand for overthrowing the regime was not looking for an Islamic system. However, the regime had alienated these groups by centralising power and ceasing to act in accordance with the institutionalised rules, which resulted in parties being replaced by movements as an alternative form of political organisation.¹⁹

The National Front

The National Front was the major secular nationalist organisation. It is believed that because of its devotion to Iranian nationalism and the legacy of Mosadegh the SAVAK considered it a threat to the Shah's regime. The most damaging event for the National Front was when Mehdi Bazargan and his associates split from the National Front in 1961 to form *Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran* (the Liberation Movement of Iran) because of this the National Front lost many of its ties to the cleric community. However among the many groups affiliated with the National Front, the Liberation Movement was to have the most important part in the Islamic revolution. According to Abrahamian this was because of its close relations established mainly with Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and partly because of Bazargan's

and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani's abilities to recruit young professionals and technocrats into the opposition. The group was well-known in the liberal opposition, which was based in the urban middle class, held fairly secular views and who wanted the Shah to obey the Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than have the Islamic clerics rule.²⁰

As a result of the 1961 split the National Front retained membership from a small fraction of the middle class and became a harmless, reformist group under the watchful eye of the SAVAK. This continued during the 60s and the 70s and they remained loyal to the 1906 Constitution until 1978 near the end of the revolution.

The National Front in exile was also split into rival Islamic and secular groups. Both organisations claimed that they represented the line of Mosadegh and both were ideologically more radical than their Iranian counterparts. Both groups also helped to establish the Confederation of Iranian Students, in the US and Western Europe, through connections with Bazargan and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in Iraq and the distribution of revolutionary literature in the US and Europe. This also served as a link between the guerrillas and the radical groups in the ME.²¹

The clergy were divided, some followed the liberal secularists and many allied themselves also with the Marxists and Communists. However Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile, could unite all the opposition groups under his leadership (with the exception of the 'atheistic Marxists'); including the clerical and secular, the liberal and the radical. According to Abrahamian he achieved this by avoiding mention of any specifics that separated the various groups.²²

The Tudeh Party

Although the Persian Social Democratic Party was created in 1904 it was not until 1917, following Bolsheviks victory in Russia that Marxist ideology spread to Iran and was popularised by the Tudeh party. However soon after its establishment in 1930 Reza Shah declared the party illegal and most of its founders were either jailed or killed.²³

After the *coup d'etat* 1953 many Tudeh members were killed or jailed by the Mohammad Reza Shah's regime. Also the party's strength declined dramatically after the Tudeh's attempted military coup in 1953 when the party's secret network within the armed forces was discovered and dismantled. By the late 1950s the party was but a shadow of its former self. The popularity of the Tudeh party declined during the 1960s and 1970s. This is because of its occasional engagement with the Shah's regime and the SAVAK's infiltration of two high-ranking positions in the party. However, despite these issues the Tudeh party was recognised as a pioneer of Marxism and remained a powerful force in the leftist movement and the lefts main agenda coordinator. Inside Iran, after the 1953 coup and the crushing of the June Uprising in 1963 questions were raised about the visibility of peaceful coexistence with the Shah. This notion led to a division in its members into two underground organisations of Marxists. Both groups experimented with guerrilla warfare, inspired by the guerrilla movement in Latin America.²⁴

Owing to a lack of influence and communication with the majority of people particularly in the rural places the Tudeh party failed to influence the revolution. In 1978 they attempted to create an alliance with the *Ulema* because they believed that the Islamic revolution was fulfilling their own goals; with talk of the "oppressed" compared to the "exploited." However, Nouredin Kianouri, the party's leader, was simply paying lip-service to the revolution while the Tudeh party continued their ideological aims and subversive activities against the Islamic Republic.²⁵

The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq

The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq mostly came from the Tudeh party and from the Marxist National Front. Militant students had formed small groups in secret. Three of these groups whose major theorists were Bijan Jazani, Hamid Ashraf and Mas'ud Ahmadizadeh, merged in 1970-71 and became the Fadaiyan-e-Khalq.

The Fadaiyan-e-Khalq members were children of secular-minded teachers, civil servants, professionals, and other groups of the modern middle class. They relied on guerrilla tactics, as Abrahamian expresses,

because the regime's bloody suppression of the uprising in 1963 had taught them that violence was the only way to oppose the regime. They hoped to create a central armed struggle based on the model of Che Guevara and Regis Debray.²⁶

The group's hasty first guerrilla operation in February 1971, of attacking the gendarmerie post in Siahkal village, marked the beginning of the urban guerrilla war against the Pahlavi regime. In response the government arrested oppositionists and outlawed the Confederation of Iranian Students abroad, followed by assassinations and bombings. The heavy toll of this period led some members to conclude that the losses of such activities far out weighed the gains. In the meantime, ideological conflicts which had arisen within the Fadaiyan-e Khalq in the late 1976 caused the minority turned toward the Tudeh party. This revelation caused an ideological and strategic split within the organisation one faction focused on the education of the masses and the building of a secret party while the other faction continued to rely on guerrilla warfare. This split resulted in less effective opposition of the regime. By 1977 most of its members had been killed or jailed and its constituency was limited to only a small percentage of the young. However both factions kept their weapons, which was useful during the Revolution. The main cause of the group's failure, according to Asaf Hussain, was that they lacked "grass roots influence." This is because most of its members were middle class and as such could not communicate with the masses whose political culture was Islamic. When Islamic forces organised the masses for revolution, the Fadaiyan-e-Khalq focused on isolated targets in different cities.²⁷

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq came mostly from the religious arm of the National Front, especially the Liberation Movement, which had been led by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani since 1961. Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saied Mohsen and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, from Tehran University founded the People's Mujahedin Organisation of Iran in 1965. Most of the Mujahedin were children of religious-minded *bazaaris*, *Ulema*, merchants and other members of the traditional middle class and came mainly from the physical sciences. The Mujahedin were also influenced by the writings of Ali Shariati, however they combined their new interpretation of Marxism with Shiism. The interpretation of the leaders of this group was that, true Shiism opposed not only dictatorship but also capitalism, imperialism, and conservative clericalism.²⁸ In addition, the Mujahedin were inspired by Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959, which led them to rely on armed methods to oppose the regime, which they considered was corrupt and oppressive.²⁹ Furthermore since they had lost their hope for political participation they believed armed struggle was the only way to change the regime and would encourage the people to oppose the Shah.³⁰

Similarly to the Fadaiyan-e-Khalq, the Mujahedin set up secret discussion groups in reaction to the government's brutality in 1963. Following the events in Siahkal in 1971, the Mujahedin publicly declared its existence and pledged open war against the regime. The Mujahedin's activities included the production of radical literature, the bombing of government buildings, the robbing of banks and the assassination of prominent members of the regime as well as some Americans. They also conducted anti-Western attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Following several acts of violence from 1971 the Mujahedin suffered heavy losses because of arrests and executions. Although, they received some support from the pro-Khomeini clerics in the early 1970s, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini never explicitly supported the group. He said "it [was] not time for armed struggle, and you...will lose much of your resources and will not...accomplish much."³¹

In 1975, at the climax of its popularity, the Mujahedin suffered a split in its ranks marking the beginning of the end. In 1978 the Marxist faction re-named itself Peykar and the Muslim members, who believed they needed Shiism to gain support from the masses, regained the leadership of the Mujahedin. By 1978 both factions had either been jailed or killed, neither of the two Mujahedin organisations posed a serious threat to the Shah's regime.³²

Since the political culture was Islamic the Mujahedin lacked grass-roots influence of the masses. This was combined with leadership derived from secularised middle-class intellectuals with no relationship with mass-based political parties. Also, the adoption of strategies of leftist leaders in Latin-America focused on armed action and ignored the potential or exploration of non-violent political channels. All these factors resulted in the failure of this leftist guerrilla movement.³³

Before any military operation could be carried out against the Shah's regime the SAVAK arrested the entire leadership and 90 percent of its cadres in a raid. All but one of its leaders was executed. Other members were imprisoned for many years, with the last group, including Masoud Rajavi, being released just before Grand Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran in January 1979.³⁴

Both Marxist Fadaiyan-e-Khalq and Mujahedin-e-Khalq were admired by the strongest oppositional group abroad; the Confederation of Iranian Students, which was influenced greatly by leftist views and the Tudeh party.

Unarmed Opposition

A growing number of oppositionists voiced their views in Islamic terms and many opposition groups had ties with the Islamic opposition.

Mehdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, and Jalal Al-Ahmad were the most important intellectuals who effected the development of Shiite political thought from the 1960s onwards. They all shared the one belief that Shiism was capable of neutralising the Western influences in Iran via a liberating and progressive ideology. Their idea was a combination of Iranian nationalism, Shiism and some Western ideas, which won over many of the educated people. It also convinced many that Shiism is a progressive religion and managed to establish peace between Shiism and the secular intelligentsia.³⁵ Most importantly since early 1970 Grand Ayatollah Khomeini by a series of lectures in Najaf and later in his publications could develop and spread belief that Islam required an Islamic government.

There were two major groups in the religious opposition: The first was made up of those with traditional religious educations and functions and included Ayatollahs Khomeini, Shariatmadari, and Taleqani. The second group had, had Western or Western-style educations and attempted to combine traditional and the modern ideas under an Islamic banner. Bazargan, Shariati, and Bani Sadr were among the members of the second group.³⁶

Meanwhile the communication network of liberal members, e.g. Hassan Habibi, Hassan Ayat, H. Payman, K. Sami, organised the mobilisation of the Islamic orientated intelligentsia.³⁷

In addition, some of the groups, which were more ignored by the regime, actually played a specific role in the process of the revolution. These groups included the *bazaaries*, women, the sub-proletariat and the students abroad.

Even after the significant shift of economic power to the modern sector the *bazaaries* were neither cowed nor reduced in number. The participation of women in the revolution in various ways exceeded anything before seen in Iran. The Muslim Students Association was the major active group abroad. They honoured both Mosadegh and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and were in contact with the National Front and other Islamic groups. They were led by Islamic oriented lay leaders. Sub-proletariat's were immigrants to cities living in the slums they had been literally and culturally uprooted. They had closer ties to the bazaar than the modern parts of society and believed their only solution for a better life was forceful action against the regime.³⁸

(C)

Imperial Iran during 1960s-1970s

Iran's Challenges after Britain's Departure from the PG

The complex new situation which emerged in the wake of Britain's departure from the PG forced Iran to take a particular course in order to achieve its long and short term objectives. Its priorities were, as Sepehr Zabih remarks: to solve its territorial disputes with regard to new Sheikhdoms; to prevent an extra-regional power to fill the vacuum of power that Britain's departure would create; to place the security responsibility mainly in the hands of littoral states; and also to recognise the entanglement of Sheikhdoms in non-PG political issues should not become destabilising to the southern littoral states.³⁹

Iran's PG Security Policy

Problems:

In order for a feasible collective security arrangement to be possible, Iran felt that security should be provided by the littoral states regardless of the impacts of regional politics in the PG. However, this policy faced a number of problems. The littoral states are a very diverse group of countries who are rarely in agreement with, and sometimes feared, one another; Iran thus had different policies depending on which littoral state it was dealing with. Its policy towards other PG states had also been very varied; one of the reasons for this was the impact of Iraq and Egypt's socio-political issues on the PG states' society and policy.⁴⁰

Following the assumption of the Arab sheikdoms' sovereignty and the ensuing territorial disputes, Iran was also forced to take different policies on each dispute and thus found it difficult to normalise its relations with them. Further, the PG states' different stances towards the Cold War had a propensity to intensify regional rivalries, for instance between Iran and Egypt and possibly Iran and Iraq. Iran determined its regional policies according to its interests and its preoccupation with the Soviet threat and mostly chose moderate, conservative and pro-Western countries as its allies cooperating with Turkey, Pakistan and even Iraq as a result. However, by the late 1950s, after the revolution in Iraq and the rise of Arab nationalism Iran became concerned to what it saw as a worrying spread of radicalism spearheaded by ambitious countries in the region and feared that the US might not intervene. The US's attitude between 1958-1963 towards Iraq and Yemen with whom good relations were sought, displayed a sense of preferring a tolerant to an interventionist approach in dealing with extremism. Thus US regional policies diverged from those of Iran between 1965-1969, since the Shah's regional policies in this period were clearly conservative, vehemently against change and strongly opposed to radicalism.⁴¹

Another problem was presented by the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The lack of progress in resolving this conflict and the continuation of a 'no-war, no-peace' attitude towards it both increased the prospect of radicalisation in the ME as a whole, and gave PG countries in particular an influential role in negotiating an outcome to the conflict. While the latter may have been positive to such countries, in that it may have given them a hand in shaping a peaceful settlement, the lack of any progress towards it threatened to undermine their regimes and provide incentives for extremism at home. As Chubin remarks, Iran saw "a greater danger to its security resulting from no progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict than from any putative threat a settlement acceptable to both sides may have."⁴²

However, the most important problem from Iran's point of view was that presented by Iraq. Iraq's short 19km coastline always provided it with a source of insecurity and gave it a permanently hostile stance towards its neighbours. Of concern was also its mostly pro-Soviet attitude which together with disputes over Arvand Roud, the Kurdish insurgency, and their differing views about the disputed three islands and the Arab-Israeli conflict, meant that Iraq-Iran relations were tense and precarious with both sides accusing one another of bringing the superpowers into the regional dispute. Further, because both sides were pessimistic about the prospects of a peaceful reconciliation between them, they both pursued policies of strategic self-reliance and military autonomy made possible by revenues incurred from oil exports.⁴³

Solutions:

Addressing the divergence between Iran and the US' regional security concerns and that between CENTO and the threats from regional sources, Iran devised two responses. The first of these was to strengthen relations with its non-Arab neighbours by offering them military assistance and by institutionalising cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey in the Regional Cooperation for Development organisation (RCD). The second was to improve its relation with Saudi Arabia based upon Islamic solidarity to contain Nasser in Yemen.⁴⁴

As to the Iraq threat, Iran learnt that on the one hand it could not count much on Arab disunity and disharmony and on the other the risk of Iraq's total isolation may increase Baghdad's dependence on its superpower protector. However, these issues did not have the intended consequences until late winter 1975 when the Algiers accord meant that Iraq had accepted the median line *thalweg* in the Arvand Roud and that Iran would end its support to the Kurdish insurgency, thereby effectively ending it. As Zabih remarks, the Iran-Iraq rapprochement was perhaps beneficial to the West, including Israel, in that

it robbed the USSR of its influence in the Ba'thist regime. It also perhaps purposefully prevented India, whose geo-strategic influence was a growing cause for concern, from having a foothold in Iraq.⁴⁵

Regarding the southern littoral states, once the territorial disputes regarding Bahrain and the three islands were resolved, Iran attempted to establish relations with them in a way that would be compatible with its overall regional policy. Iran's policy towards inter-Arab disputes involving one or the other major Arab littoral state was unflinchingly opposed to the use of force. It displayed this in its attitude towards the Kuwait-Iraq quarrel.⁴⁶ However, regarding the Dhoffar rebellion in Oman, Iran offered the Sultan military assistance, (since it had become apparent that the Arabs were not going to get involved in the issue) in an effort to contain an internal upheaval that threatened regional security. In short, Iran's policy at this time was to maintain the PG's security at all costs, despite recognising that it should not provoke its Arab neighbours or their superpower allies.⁴⁷

Despite Chubin's earlier emphasis on Iran's security concerns regarding Arab-Israeli no-war, no-peace situation, he remarks that Iran also benefited from the Arab-Israeli conflict in that it assumed a primary diplomatic role for Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The conflict also occupied these countries' attention to such an extent that Iran was able to carry on with its agenda in the PG pretty much unfettered – Nasser's defeat in the 1967 war had further relieved Iran of a regional rival and removed another limitation to Iran's relationship with Arab states.⁴⁸ Iran's regional relations also benefited from other advantageous circumstances. The many rivalries and the lack of a homogenous mind-set on the part of the Arab states and particularly the wide distrust of Iraq among the sheikhdoms turned out to be beneficial in that relations with Iran were valued by the smaller PG states, partly due to its role as balancer, though also partly due to the states leaders' ambivalence to whom to commit themselves to.⁴⁹

As Chubin also points out, Iran's policy was to engender as much as it possibly could an environment that was conducive to stability and moderation. Recognising the relationship between regional rivalries and outside powers' intervention, it did so firstly by balancing between India and Pakistan in the East and by trying to play-up the benefits of dealing with a moderate PG to the West. Secondly, it did so by isolating the PG region from external rivalries also separating issues of regional security from issues regarding central strategic balance and then attempting to make it self militarily autonomous. The latter was carried out in an effort to be able to deal unilaterally with a regional threat, though it would not have been able to do so under a fully fledged attack from the USSR and so was still partly dependent on the West.⁵⁰

The divergence between Iran and the US' notion of regional security that was evident between 1965 and 1969 was brought to an end by the advent of Nixon's twin-pillar doctrine. This signaled a change in US policy towards one that placed more importance to a geopolitical perspective, keeping the USSR's regional allies in check and deny it from having an increasing influence in the Third World in general, a strategy which was to help Iran achieve its major foreign policy objectives.⁵¹ To this end, Iran expanded its relations with Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and was thereby able to further reduce its political and economic dependence of the US.⁵²

Consequently, during the period between the 1960s and the end of the 1970s, a suitable international environment made it possible for Iran to achieve its foreign policy goals. It solved its major territorial and boundary disputes with its PG neighbours and prevented any extra-regional power from filling the power vacuum that was left in the wake of Britain's departure. Further, the PG states' reluctance to establish a collective security arrangement, as well as Nixon's Twin-Pillar doctrine, meant that Iran steadily built up its military and naval capabilities and was thus able to stabilise itself as a regional power. Iran's naval and military build-up as well as its *détente* and realistic policy was to a level that made it possible to convince both regional and extra-regional players of Iran's new role as the sole guardian of PG security. This resulted in security and stability in the PG being assured without the presence of foreign forces.

(D)

Islamic Republic Iran's Economic Problems

Over the first decade after the revolution IRI was confronted with several major economic difficulties:

- (a) According to various sources the human cost of the war was estimated at about a million casualties including both lives and injuries. The government had to pay disabled veterans, widows and orphans, look after the numerous homeless citizens and between 3 and 6 million refugees from Iranian cities, Afghanistan and Iraq. The cost also stretched to the complete devastation of numerous parts of the infrastructure estimated between \$450 and \$650 billion in damages.
- (b) There were millions unemployed and domestic production had collapsed, in particular the productive capacity of the non-oil industry, which was significantly reduced. Unemployment ranged from 14 to 40% and income per capita declined by half.
- (c) Although, the state held a sense of achievement and independence for a while, for unlike Iraq they had fought the war with their own resources, ultimately the economy was in a mess and the population, which had almost doubled in the last decade,⁵³ was exhausted. Furthermore 70% of Iran's revenues were going directly into the war and Iran was extremely vulnerable to international sanctions because of the necessity to import 60% of its needs from abroad because of the pre-revolutionary structure of Iranian industry. In 1988, the industrial sector was operating at barely 40% of its capacity.
- d) The private sector declined but the public sector nearly tripled with the monopolisation of foreign trade, full nationalisation of the oil industry, disintegration of private agro industries, and the seizure of some former elite properties. In consequence of this decline a trend of capital flight and brain drain occurred as the rich took their money out of the state and the many elite skilled people left entirely.
- e) The government's non-military expenses were four times the amount directed into capital formation and development projects. The private capital had been repelled away from the productive sectors and towards the more profitable speculative activities because of the political insecurity and the legal system's unpredictability.
- f) Reliance on oil revenues became greater as the productive sector declined and the war's expenses increased. However at this time both the Iranian production of oil and international prices of oil fell. So the state had to resort to deficit spending, but to protect the poor and avoid a backlash from the population the government started rationing, subsidising and price controlling.
- g) The regime implemented an austerity plan to control imports and consumption. In 1986 it had cut the budget and foreign expenditures by one-third. The regime used a series of improvised strategies to regain economic control and resist Western pressure by diversifying sources of trade and getting around the international sanctions.⁵⁴

Notes

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- ¹ Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1981), p.168.
- ² See, Asaf Hussain, *Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter* (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1985), PP. 45-46; also Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 421-422; also Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 47.
- ³ Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 447.
- ⁴ Keddie, op. cit., p. 167.
- ⁵ Hussain, op. cit., p. 46.
- ⁶ Ibid., pp. 46-47.
- ⁷ Keddie, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

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- ⁸ According to *Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran: Annual Report and Balance Sheet* (Tehran, 1978), p. 155, cited in Milani, op. cit., p. 96.
- ⁹ Milani, op. cit., p. 100.
- ¹⁰ See, Hussain, op. cit., pp. 47-49; also Keddie, op. cit., p. 177.
- ¹¹ Hussain, op. cit., p. 50.
- ¹² Milani, op. cit., p. 71.
- ¹³ Ibid., pp. 71-72.
- ¹⁴ The full-time workforce of the SAVAK was estimated somewhere between 30,000 and 60,000 and its part-time network of informants both in Iran and abroad was estimated at about three million. The SAVAK had unlimited funds at its disposal, which increased from \$255m. to \$31,000m. in budget estimates of 1972-3 and 1973-4 respectively. For details see, Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 81, cited in Hussain, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
- ¹⁵ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., pp. 450-451.
- ¹⁶ As Hussain explains the *Fadaiyan-e Islam's* core group was made up of 40-50 members, while its whole membership numbered 'a few thousand' spread throughout Iran: 20,000 to 25,000 members were in Tehran and 12,000 to 15,000 were in various Iranian cities, particularly Mashad. See, Hussain, op. cit., p. 88.
- ¹⁷ Another point Hussain mentions is that the *Fadaiyan-e Islam* was significant because of its close ties with the anti-British Ikhwan al-Muslimun of Egypt, just like Safavi was anti-American. This relationship showed that the differences between 'Iranian' and 'Arab' or 'Shiite' and 'Sunni' were superficial and that their views were the same despite differing backgrounds. Ibid., p. 89.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 118.
- ¹⁹ Adam Przeworski (March 1975), 'Institutionalisation of Voting Patterns and Mobilisation', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 69, p. 67, cited in Hussain, op. cit., p. 119.
- ²⁰ See, Milani, op. cit., pp. 78-79; also Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 462; also Wikipedia
- ²¹ See, Milani, op. cit., pp. 78-79; also Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., pp. 457, 462; also Hussain, op. cit., p. 65.
- ²² Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 479, 533.
- ²³ Milani, op. cit., p. 76.
- ²⁴ See, Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., pp. 451- 453; also Hussain, op. cit., p. 21.
- ²⁵ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., pp. 451- 453; also Hussain, op. cit., pp. 21, 168.
- ²⁶ See, Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit. p. 492; also E. Abrahamian, (Mar.-Apr. 1980), 'The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977,' *MERIP Reports*, vol. 86, pp. 3-21, cited in Keddie, op. cit., pp. 236-237.
- ²⁷ See, Keddie, op. cit., pp. 236-237; also Milani, op. cit., p. 77; and Hussain, op. cit., pp. 121-123.

²⁸ Keddie, op. cit., p. 238.

²⁹ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 492.

³⁰ Hussain, op. cit., p. 121.

³¹ Milani, op. cit., p. 84.

³² Ibid.

³³ Hussain, op. cit., p. 121.

³⁴ According to Abrahamian "In the period between the Siahkal incident and October 1977, when the Islamic revolution began to unfold in the streets of Tehran, 341 guerrillas and members of armed political groups lost their lives. Of these, 177 died in gun battles; 91 were executed, some without trial, others after secret military tribunals; 42 died under torture; 15 were arrested and never seen again; 7 committed suicide to avoid capture; and 9 were shot "trying to escape"... Moreover, some 200 others suspected of being guerrillas were sentenced to terms ranging from fifteen years to life imprisonment." Abrahamian in a table under beneath (Appendix-8-1) separates members of different guerrilla groups in this regard. See, Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit. p. 480.

Appendix-8-1

Dead Guerrillas

	<i>Feda'-i</i>	<i>Islamic Mujahedin</i>	<i>Marxist Mujahedin</i>	<i>Other Marxist</i>	<i>Other Islamic</i>	<i>Total</i>
Killed fighting	106	36	16	11	8	177
Executed	38	15	10	12	16	91
Tortured to death	10	18	1	9	4	42
Missing	6	1	2	6		15
Suicide	5	1	1			7
Murdered in prison	7	2	.			9
Total	172	73	30	38	28	341

³⁵ Milani, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

³⁶ Keddie, op. cit., p. 240.

³⁷ "Their active organizations included the Movement of the Militant Muslims, the Revolutionary Movement of the Muslim People (Jama), the Islamic Movement of Councils, etc." See, Hussain, op. cit., p 130.

³⁸ See, *ibid.*, p. 247; also Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 535.

³⁹ Sepehr Zabih (Jul., 1976), 'Iran policy toward the Persian Gulf', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 347.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 352, 356; also Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974), p. 299.

⁴¹ Shahram Chubin, 'Iran', in Avi Shlaim, Yezid Sayigh (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 228-229.

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- ⁴² Shahram Chubin, 'Iran's security in the 1980s', *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter, 1978), pp. 53-54.
- ⁴³ Sepehr Zabih, 'Iran policy toward the Persian Gulf', op. cit, p. 353.
- ⁴⁴ Shahram Chubin, 'Iran', op. cit, p. 228.
- ⁴⁵ Sepehr Zabih, 'Iran policy toward the Persian Gulf', op. cit, p. 356.
- ⁴⁶ As Zabih mentions, "In such cases as the Kuwait-Iraq quarrel, where a stronger Iraq could measurably enhance its power at the price of a weaker Kuwait, Iran's attitude fits well in her overall policy toward Iraq.", *ibid*, p. 357.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid*.
- ⁴⁸ Chubin and Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran; A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict*, op. cit, pp. 298-299.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid*.
- ⁵⁰ Chubin, 'Iran's security in the 1980s', op. cit, pp. 53-54.
- ⁵¹ Chubin, 'Iran', op. cit, p. 228.
- ⁵² Among many see, Adam Tarock, 'Iran-Western Europe relations on the mend', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (May, 1999), p. 41.
- ⁵³ The demographic explosion in Iran was caused by a population increase from 10 million in 1900 to 28 million in 1966 to 47 million in 1986 and to an estimated 65-70 million in 2000. See, Fred Halliday, 'The revolution's first decade', *Middle East Report*, no. 156, Iran's Revolution Turns Ten. (Jan.-Feb., 1989), p. 19.
- ⁵⁴ See, Fred Halliday, 'Year IV of the Islamic Republic', *MERIP Reports*, no. 113, Iran since the Revolution. (Mar.-Apr., 1983), p. 4; also Eric Hooglund (Jan.-Feb., 1989), 'The Islamic Republic at war and peace', *Middle East Report*, no. 156, Iran's Revolution Turns Ten, pp. 4, 9; and Kaveh Ehsani, (Nov.-Dec., 1994), 'Tilt but don't spill: Iran's development and reconstruction dilemma', *Middle East Report*, no. 191, pp. 16-17.