

**A case of community safety:
displacing complex ‘social’ problems
in Fortitude Valley**

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Abstract

Public dialogue regarding the high concentration of drug use and crime in inner city locations is frequently legitimised through visibility of drug-using populations and a perception of high crime rates. The public space known as the Brunswick Street Mall (Valley mall), located in the inner city Brisbane suburb of Fortitude Valley, has long provided the focal point for discussions regarding the problem of illicit drug use and antisocial behaviour in Brisbane. During the late 1990s a range of stakeholders in Fortitude Valley became mobilised to tackle crime and illicit drugs. In particular they wanted to dismantle popular perceptions of the area as representing the dark and unsafe side of Brisbane. The aim of this campaign was to instil a sense of safety in the area and dislodge Fortitude Valley from its reputation as a ‘symbolic location of danger’.

This thesis is a case study about an urban site that became contested by the diverse aims of a range of stakeholders who were invested in an urban renewal program and community safety project. This case study makes visible a number of actors that were lured from their existing roles in an indeterminable number of heterogeneous networks in order to create a community safety network. The following analysis of the community safety network emphasises some specific actors: history, ideas, technologies, materialities and displacements.

The case study relies on the work of Foucault, Latour, Callon and Law to draw out the rationalities, background contingencies and the attempts to impose order and translate a number of entities into the community safety project in Fortitude Valley. The results of this research show that the community safety project is a case of ontological politics. Specifically the data indicates that both the (reality) problem of safety and the (knowledge) solution to safety were created simultaneously. This thesis explores the idea that while violence continues to occur in the Valley, evidence that community safety got done is located through mapping its displacement and eventual disappearance. As such, this thesis argues that community safety is a ‘collateral reality’.

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
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Acronyms

BCC	Brisbane City Council
DSAS	Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee
FVBSG	Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group
FVCCC	Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee
FVCSG	Fortitude Valley Community Safety Group
FVSC	Fortitude Valley Steering Committee
ICPMP	Inner City Place Management Project
ICPP	Inner City Place Project
QPS	Queensland Police Service
URTF	Urban Renewal Task Force

Statement of original authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Khadija', written over a horizontal line.

Signature

A handwritten date '18.1.2012' written over a horizontal line.

Date

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Chapter 1: Introduction

I was invited to participate in the process that also formed the basis of the case under investigation. Since 1998 I had been involved in a research project that mapped illicit drug trends and patterns in South-east Queensland and was employed on contract at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT). Through my involvement in this project, I was asked if I would be interested in participating in Drug Safety Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) because of my role in interpreting illicit drug-use trends in Brisbane. As the sub-committee was producing a report on drugs and related issues in an inner urban Brisbane suburb - Fortitude Valley. It was felt that my input on illicit drug use would be beneficial to the group. My involvement and participation on the sub-committee was four-fold: as a drug researcher, a doctoral student investigating the process, a Director of Brisbane Youth Service located in Fortitude Valley and as a local resident.

According to Spradley (1980) this multi-tiered involvement is called 'complete participation' and demands the highest level of participation. This level of involvement is a particular challenge as 'the more you know about a situation as an ordinary participant, the more difficult it is to study it as an ethnographer' (Spradley 1980, p. 61). This level of participation provided one of the main justifications for the use of documents as the primary data source rather than participant interviews. Therefore some of the interpretive work undertaken in this project should be considered against this disclosure.

A number of devices were utilised to maintain a localised view and methodological integrity of a sociology of translation. These were a lack of judgement regarding the positions taken by the actors, a non privileging of contrasting viewpoints and a commitment to breaking down contrived boundaries between the actants (including material, spatial and social). This included the barrier that is heuristically constructed between the other (the researcher) and everyone/thing else. There will be a more comprehensive discussion on devices utilised to shape the tone of the story in Chapter 3. Going beyond STS and ANT another device was used to point to episodes where the synthesis of patterns created tensions and contradictions. These complications were often strategically avoided by the participants and in order to

maintain the integrity of the methodology the researcher, drawing from Rorty, imposed irony on the interpretation of the data. The application of this methodological device assisted the researcher to be loyal to the analytic principles set out by STS and ANT, at the same time as enabling the researcher to highlight crucial moments of instability against the backdrop of time consuming and repetitive re-orientations to make visible a consensual and stable object.

This thesis will follow the development and operationalisation of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley. It specifically asks what this project is a case of.

1.1 Background story

One ought to begin an analysis of power from the ground up, at the level of tiny local events where battles are unwittingly enacted by players who don't know what they are doing (Hacking 2002a, p. 74).

In 2000 a man was murdered in Fortitude Valley public mall on a busy Saturday afternoon market day. The murder reinforced problems related to the intersection of the old Valley and aspirations of the new Valley as a safe place to live, work and play. The renewal rhetoric was not yet firmly embedded enough to shrug off the murder as an anomaly. This was because the historical perceptions of the area as a dangerous place was so entrenched that it was going to take a concerted campaign to dislodge long held perceptions of the area as unsafe. The campaign to dislodge perceptions of unsafety that evolved post the murder in 2000 forms the basis of this case study.

Fortitude Valley is a suburb in the inner city of Brisbane, the capital city of Queensland, Australia. Saturday is one of the busiest days in the Valley, with market stalls snaking through the entire public space that separates two busy arterial roads. The stalls create a transitory state that is reinforced by the permanent structures that shroud them.

Photograph 1: Saturday markets, Fortitude Valley



© QLD Tourism

The permanent structures include shops and businesses of all kinds — nine-to-five businesses, strip clubs, restaurants, bars and nightclubs, sex stores and venues, a large train station and new residential apartments developed from old warehouse cavities.

A massive urban renewal program was initiated in Fortitude Valley in 1992. The mall became contested by a number of stakeholders, as the Valley was transitioning between old and new. This is typical during regeneration projects of inner city areas in large Western cities. Against the backdrop of urban renewal programs, crime and those who commit crime generate contrasting images to the ones being idealised by ever-growing numbers of stakeholders. The trouble with crime is that in the context of urban renewal programs, it can prompt ambitious political and popular responses.

The article below represents common and long-held beliefs about Fortitude Valley, whose image is quite well known to Australians living on the east coast. Condon (2003) wrote this article for the Melbourne *Age*, published two states away from Queensland.

‘People get murdered here. That’s the Valley’:

A newly trendy suburb is again gripped by fear.

From the streets of Fortitude Valley in Brisbane you can see the thunderclouds gathering. In this sub-tropical city they arrive at this time of year, at this time of day, like clockwork. Towering black and grey pylons of cloud, hurrying in from Moreton Bay, turn mid-afternoon into night in the city.

Over in Brunswick Street, opposite The Peep strip club (‘\$1 Live Show – Dancers Wanted’) five street kids take shelter under an awning. As the rain falls, they talk incessantly about The Schizo.

‘I’ve heard it’s one of the Asian gang members around the Valley,’ says Sophie. ‘That’s the word on the street.’ Her friend, Jan, interrupts: ‘The Schizo is a cop. I’ve heard it from three different people.’ A teenage boy in track pants and jacket folds his hands behind his head and rests on the bitumen. ‘That’s the Valley,’ he says. ‘People get murdered next-door to where you live. People will always get killed. It’s the same old place.’

Murder is in the air. On February 26, the body of street prostitute Julie McColl, 42, was found bound with multiple stab wounds in a car park. Last August street worker Jasmine Crathern was murdered in a similar fashion. Police are investigating possible links to another prostitute murder in 1998. All women plied their trade in Fortitude Valley. Immediately after McColl’s murder it was business as usual in the Valley. That’s the Valley. People get murdered.

For decades this small cross-hatching of streets just a kilometre north of the city centre has been the home to Brisbane’s darker side – prostitution, strip clubs, drugs, police corruption, illegal casinos and murder.

But when the press hinted that the murders might have been the work of a serial killer, dubbed The Schizo by street workers, the locals started looking over their shoulders.

‘There’s lots of whispers,’ says Brad Reuter, health educator for Self Health for Queensland Workers in the Sex Industry. ‘We thought the death of Jasmine was a one-off. Now that the word ‘serial’ is being used, it’s freaking people out. It’s sustaining this fear.’

For a small place, the Valley has cast a long and disproportionately dark shadow. In reality it is no more than a handful of streets and an open-air mall. The precinct is carved by two arterial roads feeding traffic in and out of the northern CBD.

To its immediate east, the trendy suburb of New Farm, with its arts centres, apartments, converted warehouses and renovated Queenslanders is muscling in on the Valley. This is Brisbane’s Darlinghurst or St Kilda, where the grit and sleaze of

its history are chafing against the trends of young inner-city professionals, fine diners and a thriving gay culture.

The mall, the heart of the Valley, is the perfect illustration of this conflict. On one side workers finished for the day are ordering beer by the jug and drinking outside O’Kelly’s Irish pub. Directly opposite, two young women are picking at pancakes at the Coffee Societe. At either end of the mall resplendent hotels with wrap-around latticework have been refurbished. Locals will tell you that not a decade ago both were late-night bloodhouses.

The Valley was a starring landscape in the Fitzgerald inquiry into vice and police corruption that ultimately led to the collapse of the Bjelke-Petersen government in the late 1980s. Dozens of brothels flourished: Top of the Valley, Bodymates, Bubbles Bath-House, Brett’s Boys.

You could get a cheap Italian meal at Lucky’s, and perhaps see one-time identity Hector ‘The Protector’ Hapeta strolling past, or try your hand at one of several illegal casinos.

At the moment, though, The Schizo has a grip on the Valley.

‘Most of the girls aren’t going out at night anymore,’ says Mr Reuter. ‘They’re working in the afternoons instead. A few of them are risking it. It all depends on their addictions.

‘What happens when they get a client? This is sex in a back alley, in the back seat of a car. They ultimately have no protection. It’s the bottom end of the system.’

What occurred through the duration of this research project was a reduction in the type of rhetoric, used above, to describe crime and violence in the Valley. Murders continue to be committed in the Valley. However, as will be discussed in the next section, they now tend to be described quite differently. The discursive backdrop is reordered by a community safety project that was linked to the Saturday morning murder.

The case study under investigation explores a community safety project that was rolled out in Fortitude Valley between 2000 and 2004–05. This thesis asks questions about what happened when a complex jumble of associations were drawn together in a community safety project. The project under examination was designed to address ‘complex social problems’ in Fortitude Valley. These so-called social problems were, according to the project literature, more visible as a result of the urban renewal program initiated in the Valley and surrounding areas in 1992.

1.2 Contesting the space

Discourse of fear: the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of everyday life. The discourse of fear has important consequences for social policy, public perceptions of social issues [and] the demise of public space (Altheide 2003, p. 10).

Public dialogue regarding the high concentration of drug use and crime in inner city locations is often legitimised because of the visibility of drug-using populations and a perception of high crime rates. The public space known as the Valley mall, located in the inner city Brisbane suburb of Fortitude Valley, provides the focal point for discussions regarding the problem of illicit drug use and antisocial behaviour in Brisbane. During the late 1990s a range of key stakeholders in Fortitude Valley became mobilised to tackle crime and illicit drugs as well as wanting to dismantle popular perceptions of the area that operated recursively in relation to these issues.

The aim of this campaign was to instil a sense of safety in and dislodge Fortitude Valley from its reputation as a ‘symbolic location of danger’ (Criminology Research Council 1998b, p. 3).

The safety project was commenced alongside the Brisbane City Council’s Urban Renewal Project. The City Council’s instigation of and dominance in the Fortitude Valley renewal project was not inconsistent with participation levels by government agencies in other Australian capital city jurisdictions. Badcock’s (2001) research indicated that there was a marked level of involvement by government agencies in the revitalisation of Adelaide, South Australia. He argued that

what stands out from the study of inner Adelaide’s revitalisation over a 30-year period is the continuous involvement of government agencies with the aim of

creating favourable investment conditions for the property development and home improvement industries (Badcock 2001, p. 1561).

With similar goals in mind, the Brisbane City Council had initiated its urban renewal program in 1992. This program aimed primarily to restructure and renew the civil and architectural make-up of Fortitude Valley and surrounding areas. Its aim was the revitalisation of 'Fortitude Valley as a major commercial centre, an exciting place to visit and a safe place to life' (sic) (BCC 1993, p. 2). Hence, by default this project brought into sharp focus populations in the area that were displaying antisocial behaviour. The tension created between the opposition of the past and present heightened the visibility of the 'undesirables' who had frequented the area for many decades. The oppositional space was occupied by 'complex social problems' and urban revitalisation.

The legitimacy of popular portrayals of Fortitude Valley as a 'symbolic location of danger' was exemplified in early 2000 at the height of the revitalisation project. The 'reality' of the danger of frequenting Fortitude Valley was represented in this article in the *Sunday Mail* (Haberfield 2000, p. 3) regarding a drug-related murder on a busy Saturday afternoon in Fortitude Valley.

ATTACK: ambulance officers battle to revive the stabbing victim

A MAN was stabbed to death in front of horrified onlookers in a daytime attack in Brisbane's crowded Fortitude Valley yesterday. The man was stabbed repeatedly as he tried to flee a group of assailants in what one witness described as like a scene from a mafia movie. The attack began outside a car yard in McLachlan St about 1pm when the victim was stabbed in the chest with a butcher's knife. He then ran from his attackers, one of whom was wielding the knife, up McLachlan St against the traffic. He ran past the California Café and staggered across Brunswick St Mall where hundreds of families were dining and attending the market ... His killer, still brandishing the bloody butcher's knife, coolly walked off through the mall ... Police hoped cameras in the Brunswick St Mall would help identify the man ...

This event created a collision between urban renewal objectives and popular perceptions of the Valley as an unsafe place. This murder presented evidence in the public domain that validated the need to take action on safety in the Valley. This action would function to counteract the negative stereotypes of the Valley that were legitimised by the recent murder. The media's enthusiasm regarding the portrayal of this murder is symptomatic of the vital role the media play in the representation of crime (Altheide 2009; Kohm 2009). Pointing to the centrality of the relationship

between crime reportage and fear of crime, Dowler, Fleming and Muzzatti (2006) argue that:

there is little doubt that the media have become central in the production and filtering of crime ideas. The selective nature of crime news, for example, with its emphasis on violence and sensationalism –essentially crime as a product, playing to the fears, both imagined and real, of viewers and readers – has produced a distorted picture of the world of crime and criminality (Dowler, Fleming & Muzzatti 2006, p. 839).

In relation to the murder in the Valley in 2000, which received substantial media attention in the vein mentioned above, the outrage appeared to lie in the ‘risk’ it posed to Saturday morning market-goers ‘where hundreds of families were dining and attending the market’ (Haberfield 2000, p. 3). As this murder happened within its own subgroup—drug dealers murdering other drug dealers—it reinforced the relationship between ‘bad people’ doing ‘bad things’ in the Valley. However, ‘while outrage is a potentially mobilising force for community action, because of its emotional valency and potential to exaggerate risks, it can also be a source of punitive attitudes and restrictive policy demands’ (Criminology Research Council 1998a, p. 14). As will be revealed, the tension created between mobilising community action and the promotion of restrictive policy demands plays itself out in the formation of a new community safety network in Fortitude Valley.

The media also performed a crucial role in publicising the mobilisation of community safety action in Fortitude Valley. In the weeks after the murder a number of strategies aimed at damage control, disarming public fear and reassuring potential investors in urban renewal were circulated by a number of the key stakeholders. Some of these were reported in the *Courier-Mail* and the *Sunday Mail*. The *Courier-Mail* ran a feature article (Milliner 2000, p. 26) on the stabbing and related it to some of the issues that were confronting the urban renewal program. It also outlined a number of strategies that developed as a response to, and for the management of, crime in the area. The article was significant in that it publicly crystallised the factors that justified and gave direction to the management of crime and antisocial behaviour in Fortitude Valley mall. For the purpose of this research project, the coalescence of ‘symbolic and real danger’ in Fortitude Valley created the justification for problematising the reform process and thus characterising it as an ‘event’. The following, rather lengthy quote is a condensed version of this untitled feature article.

Yet David Hinchliffe, the Brisbane City councillor who has represented the area for 12 years, is keen that the Valley not be stereotyped as some sort of drug haven. 'The Valley is a cauldron, a melting pot, a frying pan, whatever you want to call it, everything is on the boil here,' he says. 'But that's what makes it so attractive and exciting. Anywhere with real character and colour often has an edge to it, a certain amount of bad with the good.'

'The Valley is not like Kings Cross [in Sydney] which has severe problems with drugs and alcohol. There has always been drug usage in the Valley. We don't condone it, we don't turn a blind eye to it, but it has to be put into perspective'. While police, under subtle if not overt pressure to 'clean up' the Valley, pursue a 'zero tolerance' attitude towards the violence and crime that is inextricably linked with the drug scene, they also realise that drugs are a social and public health problem. Wilson [Police Inspector, Valley Police] was instrumental in setting up a Consultative Committee of the Valley's stakeholders, including Government authorities, the Business community and the area's multiplicity of Welfare agencies, to help identify the district's problems and join together to help solve some of them. He is particularly proud of the initiative. 'We've been able to break down a lot of the barriers that existed,' he says. Heaton [Manager, Queensland Intravenous AIDS Assoc] agrees that there now exists a greater sense of co-operation and 'good neighbouring' within the Valley, and an understanding that partnership is the only way to achieve balance between the continuing gentrification, the demands of new tenants and the needs and rights of traditional constituents. 'The problems are complex,' Heaton says. 'The scene changes so much from day through to night and there are lot of issues to deal with, like the homelessness and street prostitution and drugs. Drug issues, especially, can provoke responses that are emotive and judgmental. I would say people are open to different solutions now, whereas, before, they weren't. The feedback we'd get was the attitude 'Get the riff-raff off the street, get them out of here, get rid of them'. But that's changing.

'We've been very pro-active in educating businesses about what we do and about things like safe disposal of syringes. From a situation of people nearly spitting on us three months ago, we've now got people welcoming our input.' Valley businesses have also initiated their own committee to work with welfare agencies on a variety of issues, including drug rehabilitation programmes.

'There are inevitable changes in the economics of an area when you get urban renewal,' says newsagency owner Geoff Dick, a member of the Valley Business Association. 'When you get an increase in property values and people are paying higher rates they want higher returns. 'Business is part of the general community and when business prospers the community prospers, whether people are rich or whether they're poor, and we certainly have both the haves and the have-nots here. 'We don't want to change the Valley's unique diversity or throw out its characters. But we do want to work with groups to get a better outcome, to get rid of the tarnished image that the Valley is unsafe or unclean.' ... 'The Valley is a special place, but approach it with caution, it's not all things for all people.' ... 'I think these projects may be a proving ground of how the partnering process we've started will work,' says Hinchliffe.

As this article pointed out, the murder in Fortitude Valley provided the impetus for the development of a number of community committees to devise strategies to combat the potential for 'complex social problems' to undermine the desired urban

renewal of the area. One such committee, referred to in the above article, was the Valley Consultative Committee, which set up a subcommittee called the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) to specifically address these issues. This committee was made up of stakeholders such as police, business, Brisbane City Council, government representatives from health and welfare agencies along with drug and alcohol specialists, including an academic representative (myself).

1.3 A change event

The program of community safety that was mobilised in the year 2000 in Fortitude Valley initiated a comprehensive campaign to enrol numerous heterogeneous entities. A such Community safety was transformed into a political entity, and therefore examinable.

It seems ... important to investigate the emergence of *new* political spaces as a consequence of government strategy (and the wider growth of an almost self-organizing regeneration business). There is a creation of multiple urban publics through the state-led process of incorporating local civil society into design-led regeneration. These publics make recourse to, but are not reducible to, their presence in their city centre space. This is an emergent process which requires detailed analysis (Holden & Iveson 2003, p. 68).

The safety agenda positioned state and local government bureaucracy, local businesses and local community welfare services side by side in the Valley in order to advance this as a 'legitimate' form of action targeting community safety. As the project developed it was promoted as owned and managed by the community (Inner City Place Management Cross Sector Project Team 2001b). The community safety project drew on the time and energy of at least 50 visible people, untold invisible people, networks and materialities in Fortitude Valley over a period of approximately 5 years.

Accordingly Callon and Law (1982, p. 616) contend one way of exploring this type of complexity of interests within the same case is to interpret the actors through problematising their 'interests'. This style of analysis is understood as 'networking' theory.

'Enrolment' or 'networking' theory approach notes that actors attempt to enlist one another in a variety of different ways, including the transformation of imputed interests ... [I]t is suggested that interests should not be imputed to actors as background causes of action, but rather that they should be seen as

attempts to define and enforce contingent forms of social order on the part of actors themselves (Callon & Law 1982, p. 615).

The community safety project was built on the widely held assumption that there is a social order 'out there' that can be imposed upon, altered and reordered according to the interests of the assembled actors. Networking theory conversely proposes that (social) order is not pre-existing but is enacted in and by the interests of the actors simultaneously. Callon and Law explain:

The theory of enrolment is concerned with the ways in which provisional order is proposed, and sometimes achieved. One, but only one, of the ways in which such enrolment is attempted is via the category of interests. Actors great and small try to persuade by telling one another that 'it is in your interests to ...'. They seek to define their own position in relation to others by noting that 'it is in our interests to ...'. What are they doing when they so attempt to map and transform interests? Our view is that they are trying to impose order on a part of the social world. They are trying to build a version of social structure. On this view interests (and other categories such as desires, motives and wishes) are not to be seen as background factors to be imputed by the analyst. Rather they are attempts to define (and, most importantly, to enforce) the institutions, groups or organizations that exist from time to time in the social world (Callon & Law 1982, p. 622).

The networking style of reasoning does not seek out background reasonings or underlying causes, but operates directly within the network. It attends to the roles that the participants accord themselves and within this context the researcher reports on the interests and strategies employed by the actors in their perseverance to impose a certain type of (social) order. Network theory does 'not [wish to] establish a general set of rhetorical rules for the construction of imputed interests, but to discover how it is that actors enrol one another, and why it is that some succeed whereas others do not' (Callon & Law 1982, p. 621). As such, network theory offered an innovative means by which the analysis of the change event that occurred in the Valley could be investigated.

This thesis is a case study about an urban site that underwent significant reorganisation as a result of an urban renewal program and a murder that happened in the year 2000. The site that provides the basis of the case study had a long-held association with vice and corruption, which was being interrupted by a program of urban renewal. This case study makes visible a number of actors that were lured from existing roles in an indeterminable number of heterogeneous networks in order to create a community safety network.. The following is an analysis of the

community safety network. This research is about relationships—monogamous, polygamous, honeymoon periods and post coital pats on the back—but it is also about betrayal. Fundamentally the case study explores the coordination of what can broadly be interpreted as a change event.

Simply, this is a thesis about a community safety project that was enacted in the area. There are now only a few remnants of the massive community safety effort that was activated between 2000 and 2005. The visible remnants mainly take the form of lighting, pedestrian barriers and some architectural and landscaping nips and tucks. Nonetheless, the most significant change is discerned through changes in the style of rhetoric used in the media (and institutionally) to portray violent episodes that persist in Fortitude Valley. Murder in the Valley reported in the newspapers post the community safety project, compared to the articles published previously, display a marked absence of community outrage.

Additionally there appears to no longer be a necessity to mobilise a community safety project in Fortitude Valley. The outrage portrayed (below) is vastly different from the articles above in that it is completely absent. For example:

Fortitude Valley strip club in murder probe

A Fortitude Valley strip club is at the centre of a murder inquiry, following the disappearance of a club regular in February.

Detectives from the Homicide Squad have set up a major incident room with police from the Fortitude Valley Criminal Investigation Bureau following the disappearance of Spring Hill man Kevin Stanley Brack, nicknamed Orca.

Their investigations will centre on the Flickerz Foto and Dance Studio on Brunswick Street, which was frequented by Mr Brack, 47. He was last seen in Fortitude Valley February 17. It is believed he last resided at a house in Wickham Terrace, in nearby Spring Hill.

‘We hold grave concerns for Mr Brack and believe he has been murdered,’ Detective Inspector Tony Duncan said yesterday. ‘Investigations are at this stage centred around the Fortitude Valley area, including the Flickerz Foto and Dance Studio which was located on Brunswick Street.’

Operation Hotel Static has been established to probe the suspected murder. Police have appealed for anyone with information to contact Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000. (Kellett 2009)

Another murder within the ‘deviant’ subgroup in the Valley, but no evidence of community outrage or defaming statements, and no community being called to arms, no appropriation of adjectives to embellish the relationship between the act and the

place where the act took place. More recently this article appeared in the *Courier-Mail* (Ironside & Orreal 2010):

A MAN charged over the stabbing of a teenager at Fortitude Valley train station walked free from court nine days ago, after pleading guilty to an identical attack on Roma Street station.

The 26-year-old from Brighton on Brisbane's northside was sentenced to six months jail for stabbing a 34-year-old at Roma Street station but was allowed to go free because he had already served 156 days in pre-sentence custody.

Last night, he allegedly stabbed an 18-year-old man waiting on the platform at Brunswick Street, before turning himself into police.

The teenager was in a critical condition when he was taken to the Royal Brisbane and Women's Hospital.

His condition improved overnight to serious but stable, but this morning he is again listed as critical.

The alleged offender has been charged with attempted murder and this morning was remanded in custody for a committal hearing on September 13. He did not appear in Brisbane Magistrates Court.

Photograph 2: An 18-year-old youth is taken by ambulance officers from the platform of Fortitude Valley Station after being stabbed in the stomach.



Marc Robertson

This article, compared to those published earlier in the decade, depicted the incident with a much more clinical tone. The Valley is no longer described as unsafe or as a haven for 'complex social problems', in spite of the apparent continuation of violent episodes in 2010.

It is an example of the shift that has taken place in the characterisation of violence in the area. As there is evidence that violence continues in the Valley, this investigation asks how Fortitude Valley was changed through the community safety project.

Fortitude Valley's causal role in the way violent events are interpreted has been reorganised since the community safety project. This change event is not explored through conventional techniques such as an evaluation and achievement-focused analysis. Moreover, it charts the change event through translations and displacements.

The following analysis does not intend to argue against the success or otherwise of the community safety project. Nor does it attempt to empirically measure the 'actual' safety levels prior and post the community safety project. Specifically, this project aims to tell the story of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley from a different point of view than the other versions that have been told, in particular those provided by the academic evaluators and government bureaucrats. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8, most reports about this project relied heavily on outcomes and process as their points of reference for review and analysis. In contrast, the following relies on tracing the strategies and logics employed by the participating actors to form the community network and to do the work of safety. In addition the study attends to techniques utilised by the participants to stabilise the network. From this perspective a different version of events can be added to the community safety project story. One that does not wish to neatly fold complexity into predetermined order/s, but capture the ways in which complex social problems get translated and ordered into an object that could be interpreted as community safety. This project teases out the ways in which knowledge and reality get performed through a process of "self-vindication" (Hacking, 1992) and use "reflexive logics" as a technology for ordering complexity (Law, 2010). Further this project highlights some of the logic displacements that happen in order to accommodate the numerous difficulties experienced by the participating actors. Finally this project challenges the idea that a problem/reality such as community safety can be divided up and tackled through various aspects of itself with the hope of attending to the 'whole' problem/reality of community safety. Moreover the following findings contribute to the Science Technology Studies (STS) contention

that: problems of co-ordination and the disappointment of innovation often relates to the way performances of reality happen in multiple; complexity is perceived as aberrant; and that ‘the social’ is a priori and operates in opposition to and is distinct from the natural and the scientific.

1.4 Study aims

In the initial phase of the case study, the analysis aims to explore how community safety *became* a reform priority in the year 2000. Specifically focusing on the way this community safety project was discursively constituted—who and what got caught up in it—paying particular attention to how it was played out by the participants. The case study aims are as follows:

- (1) To examine the imperative for reform in Fortitude Valley.
- (2) To unpack the rationalities that have developed and produced the current reform agenda.
- (3) To explore, describe and explain how community safety was operationalised.
- (4) To describe some of what was left over after the project was dismantled.

Aim 1 of the case study will gather together some of the historical prerequisites that set up the ‘conditions of possibility’ for the initiation of the reform agenda in the Valley. It will also provide and outline entrenched beliefs about the area as the vice and corruption capital of Queensland. As such, this long-held depiction of the area acts as the point of departure for the urban renewal program. This phase of the analysis will draw broadly from Foucault’s work, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, and concept of historical contingencies (1972; 1980b).

Aim 2 of the case study builds on aim 1. It draws together a range of rationalities that influenced and set the discursive tone for the way in which Fortitude Valley and the problems therein came to be understood. This phase utilises governmentality as an analytic tool, again drawing from *Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume 1* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. The exploration of this aim will examine who is doing the governing, the logic and techniques employed, and with what goals in mind utilising the work of Rose, O’Malley and Valverde (2006, p. 85).

While the previous two aims set out a number of background contingencies and rationalities that get drawn into the operationalisation of the community safety project, aim 3 follows a number of the contingencies and rationalities through their translation into a community safety network and draws on the work of Callon (1986b), ‘Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay’. Through the application of a sociology of translation to the data, this phase of the analysis follows a number of entities through translation moments which can be characterised as attempts to stabilise the object: community safety.

The purpose of aim 4 is to explore what was left behind after the community safety network had dispersed. This phase of the case study shifts the gaze of the research to look for ‘collateral realities’ (Law 2009b) that get done coincidentally to the main agenda. Collateral realities are ‘all those realities that get done along the way, unintentionally’ (Law 2009b, p. 14). This project observes that community safety got done, in that it disappeared both structurally and discursively. The argument here is that if community safety actually got done in reality, it got done collaterally.

Each of these aims will be addressed specifically by paying attention to historic and discursive events and through the application of network theory to a case of community safety in Fortitude Valley. A number of the threads that become embroiled in the community safety project are extrapolated to provide an overall understanding of some of the complex interests that contend in the project. It is worth noting that these threads overlap and are caught up in numerous other agendas simultaneously. As well there are a multitude of other threads not depicted here.




Figure 1: Visual breakdown of the key threads that make up this case study

Each of these various components contribute to the community safety network in Fortitude Valley. In summary and drawing from Foucault (1977), I wedged open a ‘space of research’ that drew its legitimacy from a specific change event that occurred in an urban site.

1.5 Outline of chapters

Chapter 2 overviews a range of theories that describe the machinations and complexities of ‘the urban’. The discussion reviews some of the key developments in urban theory and points to a range of limitations in theoretical attempts to account for the complexity of culture and the spatial and make them visible. The theoretical review argues that the adoption of the material, relational and the technological offers the researcher the opportunity to depart from examining the urban as derivative of a macro system that exists elsewhere and to localise the examination of the site in situ. The chapter defends the use of a case study approach through the methods ascribed by Science Technology Studies (STS) and Actor Network Theory (ANT). This approach offers the researcher as a means by which a change event in an urban site can be interpreted as a complex network of actants, human and non-human, that are dynamically translated into what resembles, in an historical moment, a community safety project in Fortitude Valley.

Chapter 3 builds on the assertions made in Chapter 2. The contention is that in order to explore the formation and application of a community safety project in Fortitude Valley one must chart the translation of a range of diverse actors into a community safety project. The method chapter argues that the point of difference in drawing ideas from STS and ANT is that it offers the researcher the opportunity to expose some of the mishaps, coincidences, complexities and devices that are at play in the organisation of a diverse set of actors into a stable entity rather than a pre-determined theory that informs the researcher, what to look for and the parameters for interpretation. The argument in Chapter 3 highlights the point that what becomes visible as an object, is the exertion of multiple players into a performance of community safety. From this perspective the urban site is an active player, not a passive site that exists a priori. As a point of departure from traditional ideas this is a story of how community safety in Fortitude Valley came to be and what doing safety in the Valley looked like at a local level. The methodology put forward here suggests that any resemblance to a coherent structure formed around community safety is because it was made that way. The discussion in Chapter 3 contends that object that became known as community safety became a visible entity as the result of much hard work, that included strategies of negotiation, collusion, mediation, enticements and commitment to what initially seemed to be one aim 'community safety'. Chapter 3 justifies the use of methods that affords the researcher a local and internal view of the complex mechanisms that are often vicariously held together to stabilise an object. The methodology enables the researcher to document the numerous and diverse pathways that the participants take to enrol in a network. Once a number of the key actors and pathways have been identified the next stage is to tell the story of how community safety gets done. The method also enables the researcher with analytic strategies that reveal attempts to contain and stabilise community safety against the numerous confounding variables that act to resist attempts toward homogenising community safety.

Chapter 4 and 5 bring to the forefront some of the important historical and discursive 'conditions of possibility' that were fundamental to the realisation of the community safety project at this location, in this moment in history. Chapter 4 provides an overview of some of the trends in attempts at characterising the urban and describes the evolution of 'urban renewal' as a strategy to undermine the deterioration and

dereliction that was occurring in many inner urban areas in large cities. Through the use of media reports and local planning reports about Fortitude Valley the chapter draws together the points of intersection between representations of the Valley in the public domain as ‘bad place’ and a number of unsuccessful attempts at reforming the area. Finally the chapter reveals the circumstances that became essential for the Fortitude Valley renewal program under investigation to be actualised and were contingent upon. Building on Chapter 4, Chapter 5 outlines in some detail the discursive and governmental contingencies that characterised the problem of community safety in a way that fitted well with the historical contingencies. In addition Chapter 5 discusses a range of discursive systems that, as is typical of liberal governmental strategies, developed reflexive relationships between the problem and the solution of safety. This reflexive space was a key not only in the realisation of the project but the attributes of it.

Chapter 6 captures the moments when the ‘conditions of possibility’ outlined in the two previous chapters were translated into object broadly defined as a community safety project in Fortitude Valley. Through the use of methodological techniques that creates the sense of pausing moments in the development of the community safety project, the researcher is able to describe a number of the pivotal moments in the translation retrospectively, which offers the opportunity to discuss local machinations in a detailed way thus providing a very different view of the project that would not be visible through the use of more traditional methodologies. While this thesis is not an evaluation of the project it does point to struggles and successes. However it does this in a very different way from more traditional accounts of why a project achieves what it achieves and what those outcomes look like in relation to the stated objectives of the project. This chapter discloses the way in which issues such as “complex social problems” are dealt with and the strategies and means by which issues characterised as such are reflected in complicated organisational structures; the breaking down of social problems into bits and pieces that taken altogether apparently represent the ‘whole’ complexity of the problems; and some of the unlikely sites and locations where un-safety is located.

Chapter 7 charts the dissolution of the project and the gradual dispersal of characterisations of the Valley as unsafe. Evidence of this in particular was located in

the change in media depictions of violence in the Valley as they portray a very different tone than the examples given in this thesis up to and in relation to the 2000 murder. The main argument made in Chapter 7 is that quantifiably community safety probably hasn't improved or changed much at all, but that changes in the perception of safety in the Valley is a collateral reality relative to devolution of the community safety project and the dispersing of 'complex social problems' into other networks, including geographical. Community safety got done in the Valley and in the enacting of the project, and regardless of whether it became safer or not (which is difficult to quantify apart from crime statistics which as Hacking reminds us are not necessarily or reliably and politically innocent), the argument here is that community safety is present in its absence. Further, the contention is that in the change of shape and dispersal of the community safety object it is in fact a collateral reality. This is not to say that the community safety project and all the energy of a multitude of participants did not achieve anything. But that viewing the project through a different lens changes the way of interpreting the outcomes of the project, and that this interpretation views community safety as a collateral reality that is only visible in the reflection and artefacts that it leaves in its absence.

Chapter 8: The main points made in the final reflections are that traditional means of evaluating the outcomes of a project articulate a very limited view. That in spite of the evaluators' disclosure that the pre-fabricated method 'place management' was not consistent with desired precursors for the use of this strategy. However they were not able to fully determine or describe local instances of resistance that would have highlighted the nature the barriers to success. Finally, and perhaps most importantly the final chapter reflects on policy makers' tradition of characterising problems other than those that easily defined, and often what is left over when every other type of problem gets 'fixed', is the consistent categorising and characterising of these assorted bits and pieces as 'complex social problems'. Opposed to resolving to fix them the goal is often to disperse and displace the complex and to carve up the social into a range of categories that often reflect government siloed based institutions. These strategies have the appearance of de-centralising the social and dispersing complexity across a range of domains. The Place Management strategy was supposed to de-silo the institutional capacity therefore tackling the whole social in all its complexity, however this strategy was ineffective and at a local level reflected the

same siloed organisational structure that place management was supposed to be a departure from. Ultimately, I reflect on the limitations of continually characterising problems that get in the way of the full realisation of reform programs such as the Fortitude Valley urban renewal program as social and complex. Current strategies aimed at dispersing complexity have no real impact addressing the complexity but merely disguises it. Complex social problems are artefacts of a liberal system of government that reflexively re-creates them. It is time to re-think that the dispersal of complexity comes anywhere close to addressing the social problems that are characterised as such. A reassembling of the ‘complex social problems’ that does not include merely changing its shape is what is required, as it is clear that the effort and energy that many people invested over the duration of this project had minimal impact on reducing ‘complex social problems’ and the associated fallout from them.

Chapter 2: Constructing an approach: where does this project fit theoretically?

Case Study: phase 1

2.1 Introduction

The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein (Foucault 1986b, p. 22).

This chapter describes the characteristics and relevance of the approach that will inform the analytics adopted in this project. The first half of the discussion examines a number of attempts to interpret urban space, what it represents, what it is a manifestation of, how it relates to broader structural trends and draws culture (and its messiness) into the frame. The justification for prioritising discussions about urban space over the city relates to the site under investigation in this study. Fortitude Valley is a small inner urban suburb with an infamous public mall; a wide-ranging theoretical discussion about the city is not deemed relevant here.

The chapter begins with a discussion about the type of work that has been done in the late Twentieth century at a point that Thrift (1993) describes as an impasse where traditional methods of understanding ‘the urban’ had reached saturation point. Attention then shifts to an overview of work on ‘the spatial’. Contemporary interpretations of Lefebvre in the work of Soja and Marcuse are represented as important in this shift toward the spatial. Dissatisfaction regarding the hybridisation of modernism and post-modernism in these interpretations of urban space is then briefly discussed. The work of Osborne and Rose (1999) is outlined to provide an example of a post-structuralist approach to diagramming the types of governmental technologies at work in urban cities.

This chapter then turns its attention to trends in contemporary urban studies. Lefebvre continues to be drawn into recent attempts at interpreting space. Schmid and his colleagues, who characterise their work as ‘third wave’ Lefebvre, try to remedy what they interpret as incorrect and problematic applications of his work. In

addition Soja and Marcuse, who also continue to draw on Lefebvre, have published recent works about the importance of locating social inequality through analysing spatial injustices. As the work of Lefebvre inevitably relies on 'the social' in some form or another as an 'always already' reality default position for the explanation of things, the discussion explores alternate propositions that contest the reality of the social. Literature from Science Technology Studies (STS) that includes the work of Law, Callon and Latour is examined as a way of departing from a reliance on abstractions, such as the social.

The second half of this discussion provides a brief overview of developments with STS, including Actor Network Theory, translation, performativity, and destabilising the epistemological and ontological divide. This part of the discussion shifts attention away from urban space per se, as its relevance becomes less important in the context of understanding it as a site that is less special than any other site for the purpose of analysis. The relevance of the latter part of this discussion is to point out that urban space becomes known to be urban space through a network of heterogeneous materiality that is ordering it as such.

2.2 Urban space: recent trends

Structuralist approaches to urban studies since the 1970s continue to be the dominant perspective (Fariás 2010b, p. 1). According to Thrift,

the literature on urban studies seems to have reached something of an impasse. It is not that there is nothing more to say on the contemporary Western city. It is rather that the conventional ways of saying it are exhausted. We are left with recycled critiques, endlessly circulating the same messages about modernity and postmodernity. The city has become a dead letter zone (Thrift 1993, p. 229).

Thrift further elaborates his point by stating that he does not

want to make too much of this impasse. I am not suggesting that the city has become so complex that it can no longer be understood at all. Neither do I want to suggest that increasing liminality has made the city terminally enigmatic. Nor am I suggesting that the city's landscape has become the focus of such a flurry of competing interpretations that it is no longer legible. What I do want to suggest is that the analyses of the contemporary Western city have become familiar, even predictable, circling around and worrying [about] the same issues to increasingly little effect (Thrift 1993, p. 229).

Thrift's position regarding an urban impasse can be located at the nexus of modernist, post-structural and post-modern attempts to interpret the city.

Accordingly,

the city is often thought of as a material (lived) and imagined (ideological) space that came into being as a result of a consolidation of power (social, cultural, economic, political). It is hence often represented as an economic node or hub, a centrifugal point for the collection of resources, a crucible of ideas and innovation, the locus of imagined communities, and a source of identity and security. Cities are privileged sites of consolidation, power and dwelling (Yeoh 2006, p. 150).

Urban space is often perceived as derivative of and generated through interpretations such as Yeoh's in regard to the complexity of ideas that make up the city. The co-joining of space and urban as a site deserving of specific theoretical attention coincided with what has been described as a 'spatial turn' that occurred during the previous two decades (Thrift 2006).

Space has historically been perceived as 'a limited area: a site, zone or place characterised by specific social activities with a culturally given identity (name) and image' (Shields 1997, p. 188). The idea of space as a static container for activities manifested somewhere else has been superseded and shifted into a conceptual framework known as *spatiality*. Through this shift space became transformed from 'a non-politicised axis for the catchment of social outcomes', to lying

at the center of social explanation. It [has] thus [become] something constitutive rather than reflective, building rather than storing, active rather than passive. Space, then, is taken out of the realm of a 'separate sphere', dislodged from its inert and passive mooring and injected into the evolving flux of humanly produced time, scale, and matter. It is in the end, constitutive of the very nature of what objects and relations are (Wilson & Moss 1997, p. 3).

In the context of urban space, Shields (1997) has argued that social spatialisation was a more successful tool than the somewhat inert idea of space at incorporating the ongoing production and construction of the spatial in terms of both the mythologies and the landscape or built environment of the space. For Shields (1997) social spatialisation incorporated the 'cultural logic' and the 'concrete actions, constructions and institutional arrangements' of the space (Shields, 1997, p. 188). Shields (1997) believed that classification systems *produce* space and that these systems were encoded with ideological divisions that marked out 'good' and 'bad' areas (Shields 1997, p. 192). Further Shields (1997) contended that social

spatialisations were rich with complexities that included ideological and cultural logics as well as being a field of resistance and transformation that ‘must become an area of critical, strategic focus’ (Shields 1997, p. 198). These theoretical reframings taking place at the turn of the 21st century were distinctly post-modern and were linked to insights regarding the diversity of local manifestations of the socio-spatial dynamic, in that the argument was that capitalism materialised itself differently in diverse geographical and cultural locations.

The concept of spatiality has been used by researchers in the exploration of a variety of urban phenomenon such as: the social and spatial ghettoisation of the mentally ill (Dear 1981), insight into a changing and fragmented Los Angeles (Soja 1989), the actual and metaphoric use of walls to reaffirm hierarchies in urban areas (Marcuse 1995), and to draw out the power of design professionals in influencing local social settings. These perspectives all provided a humanistic account of the points of intersection between space and social processes as well as adopting the post-modern aspects of this conceptualisation through a prioritising of local contingencies peculiar to certain spatial sites (Wilson & Moss 1997). Post-modern theoretical perspectives and methodological developments arising from same attempted to disrupt this historical dominating theoretical impasse and release urban space from the confines of macro and restrictive materialist and humanistic conceptualisations.

For example, Soja (1995) argued that ‘crisis born restructuring’ of urbanisation processes that began in the 1960s has led to post-modern urbanisation processes.

Soja (1995) defines the move toward post-modern urbanisation as

something less than a total transformation, a complete urban revolution, an unequivocal break with the past; but also [a shift] to something more than continuous piecemeal reform without significant redirection. As such there is not only change but continuity as well, a persistence of past trends and established forms of (modern) urbanism amidst an increasing intrusion of postmodernization. In the postmodern city the modern city has not disappeared. Its presence may be diminished, but it continues to articulate with both older and newer forms of urbanization and to maintain its own dynamic of change, making the normal adjustments and reformation of the modern city and the distinctive processes of postmodern restructuring difficult to disentangle (Soja 1995, p. 126).

To promote these ideas Soja (1995) presented evidence for the above interpretation by analysing a body of research that examined these restructuring/s in Los Angeles.

This evidence has been summarised by Soja into six geographies (restructurings). Crudely, the six geographies were: the restructuring of the economic base of urbanisation; globalisation; a proliferation of the use of neologisms to describe urban restructurings; means of ‘dealing’ new trends in social fragmentation, segregation and polarisation; the inability of local government to govern these preceding complexities through established techniques and new modes of regulation (Soja 1995, pp. 129–36). These restructurings according to Soja (1995) were both internal and external to the city at the same time as being relational. Soja’s interpretation can be understood as an attempt to maintain his loyalty to Lefebvre, who adopted Marx’s dialectical materialism and applied it to everyday life in the city, at the same time conceding to the limitations of such an approach.

Soja takes urban space from being another structural site imbued by the logic of capitalism that reflects and transmits this system, to a site that should be included within all social analyses. In other words any investigation of the social should always consider the spatial. Rather than space being reflective of social processes, Soja argues that spatiality and the social were ontologically linked and ‘dialectically’ embedded within each other (Wilson & Moss 1997, p. 10). In a non-Marxist sense, Foucault promoted space as a site where power relations manifest through the transformation of discourses of power and knowledge (Soja 1985). Soja takes Lefebvre and Foucault together to reconceptualise space by way of combining power and knowledge with a socio-spatial and historic-geographical dialectic, thus interweaving both the ontological and the epistemological domains (Soja 1985). Foucault argued that space is part of the ‘technology of power’. Thus, ‘space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Foucault 1986a, p. 252). He conceived the term ‘heterotopias’ to describe spaces within social spaces that operate in contrast to and distinct from the surrounding space/s (Foucault 1986a, p. 252). The idea of heterotopias is interpreted by some as not able to stand up to critical philosophical scrutiny (see Genocchio 1995), however Soja believed that ‘Foucault’s heterotopology provides a brilliant guidebook to unmasking the “other spaces” concealed in this modernist landscape of hidden signifiers’ (Soja 1995, p. 31). In summary, according to Soja (2000), ‘Henri Lefebvre suggests that power survives by producing space [and] Michel Foucault suggests that power survives by disciplining space’ (Soja 2000, p. 361).

Another example of the deployment of a post-modern critique of 'the city' was provided by Marcuse (1995). He argued that the construction of walls (boundaries, partitions, borders, transitions) both embodied and provided a metaphor for the social divisions and economic hierarchies that pervade the city (Marcuse 1995, p. 244). Marcuse (1995) used a post-modern approach to his analysis to reinforce the 'dynamism' rather than the 'rigidity' of the walls/boundaries, as well as to point to the ambivalence of such structures (Marcuse 1995, p. 249). In summary, Marcuse (1995) argued that

in its rejection of rigid grand theories, of the effort to impose rational patterns on all human activity, in its revelation of the complexities of urban life and the insufficiency of any attempt to find single solutions to multiple problems, its attention to the namely layers that constitute social and economic relationships, its emphasis on the cultural components of the activities that go on in cities, its reflections on the ambiguities of the concept of progress and its doubts as to any unilinear or inevitable progression, postmodernist theory has made significant contributions to dealing with the problems of partitioned cities and the walls within them (Marcuse 1995, p. 250).

Marcuse justified the use of post-modern theory to examine broad structural characteristics that were derived from class and social status. However, in the final analysis both Marcuse and Soja, and those who adopted socio-spatial theory, were uninterested in completely dislodging local and micro developments from broader and overarching historical, economic and social trends. Soja and Marcuse successfully transported spatiality from its modernist hinges but did not depart from interpretations that were rooted in a totalising Marxist theoretical framework (Wilson & Moss 1997). Their work attempted to analyse and activate urban space at a local level while continuing to embroil it in broader economic, social and global forces. Soja's and Marcuse's work reflected some of the difficulties so-called post theorists were experiencing by activating the space in the analysis of urban sites. Shields (1997) criticised this style of analysis and argued that social spatialisations and the "re-functioning" of urban public spaces' could not be understood through totalising social or class theories (Shields 1997, p. 198). Specifically, Wilson and Moss (1997) contended that this style of post-modern analysis was in contradiction with itself as 'its ontology ... was "postmodern" and embracing of diversity and fluidity while its theoretical center [was still] "modern" and grounded in one dimension' (Wilson & Moss 1997, p. 12). They further contended that 'discerning theorizing need[ed] to be done to operationalize the concept [of spatiality and that] it is only after the concept's

“hollow core” is filled with appropriate theory ... (i.e., after anchoring spatiality in perspective-specific categories and objects) that substantial research along these fronts can proceed’ (Wilson & Moss 1997, p. 21).

At the turn of the century Osborne and Rose (1999) adopted an approach to dislodge this inherently conflicting dualism. Their approach was to ‘represent a series of speculations concerning the imagination of the city as a space of government, authority, and “the conduct of conduct”’ (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 737). They adopted a framework about urban space that provided the methodological tools to explore and explain the technologies that govern specific urban sites. Strategies of governance under investigation were neither interpreted through grand overarching theories nor distinguished or privileged through their location in and characterisation as being social.

Their investigation was an ‘interrogation of the series of means through which the city has been “diagrammed” as a space of power, regulation, ethics and citizenship’ ... ‘Use [of] the term “diagram” ... capture[s] the different ways in which government has been territorialised in an urban form’ (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 737). They argued that their aim was not to ‘found yet another theory of spatialisation or to advance a Foucaultian urban sociology but to gauge the parameters which have bequeathed us the contemporary city as a governed and ethically saturated space’ (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 737). Nonetheless, they appear to have utilised a range of tenets central to the Foucaultian method, in particular, investigating acts of governance in specific sites in their historicity for the purpose of separating governmental technologies (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 758). In this sense they appropriated the notion of spatiality and explored it historically, politically, technologically and materially. Their work attended to a number of the aforementioned deficits of spatiality theory drawn out by Wilson and Moss (1997). For example, they began from the premise that urban space was a ‘milieu of liberal government’ and that in that context the city ‘becomes a sort of laboratory of conduct’ (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 740). This was a distinct departure, although some may argue it was a reordering of the macro influences from capitalism to liberal and neo-liberal techniques of government, although they did diagram other versions of the city. They contended that the ordering of urban space was ‘always

already' recursively related to the broader project of government. Another example of their loyalty to post-structural accounts of urban space, both ontologically and at its theoretical centre, was the development of the concept of diagramming. This concept opened up the potential to 'individuate the regularities that are giving form to the multitude of local, fluid, fleeting endeavours, stratagems, and tactics that characterise the forces seeking to govern this or that aspect of urban existence' (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 758). This conceptual method allowed them to account for a range of complex influences that were both local and observable, at the same time as being contingent and systematic. Osborne and Rose's conceptual approach overcame a number of the aforementioned limitations.

It has so far been argued that to thoroughly interpret urban space, complex economic, social and cultural elements need to be spatialised to become 'real' and that in their spatialisation they can be interpreted. It was pointed out that there was a need to depart from applying methods that were informed by the limits of predetermined theoretical dualisms, such as economy and culture, macro and micro, modernism and post-modernism. Wilson and Ross also argued that the theoretical core of post-modern investigations needed to be replaced by strategies that would not represent space through points of coherence and centralisation. Nonetheless, the cited attempts have revealed the recognition that urban space is a complex place and that examining evidence made visible through predetermined theoretical concepts does not necessarily get us much closer to interpreting or understanding the space.

2.3 Urban space: the next wave

A recent publication titled *Space, difference, everyday life: reading Henri Lefebvre* (2008), introduces the 'third wave' of Lefebvre as a means of promoting his theoretical relevance and rejecting some previous interpretations, including Soja's above. To interpret the 'third wave' one must briefly return to Lefebvre's original writings on urban space throughout the Twentieth century. For Lefebvre urban space is *produced* and it is *social*.

The theory of social space encompasses on the one hand the critical analysis of urban reality and on the other that of everyday life (Lefebvre 1996, p. 185).

Lefebvre separated spheres of analysis within urban space—that of the everyday and that of ‘reality’. Further, he argued that

everyday life and the urban, [are] indissolubly linked, at one and the same time products and production, occupy a social space generated through them and inversely. The analysis is concerned with the whole of the practico-social activities, as they are entangled in a reproduction of relations of production (that is, social relations). The global synthesis is realized through this actual space, its critique and its knowledge (Lefebvre 1996, p. 185).

For Lefebvre space was not an already predetermined location, but existed as a site manifest through the ‘reproduction of the relations of production’ and that the ‘social reality’ accorded to these relations both makes the space and reproduces the space. Therefore according to this theoretical proposition, there is no empty space, there is only space that becomes evident through its derivative/generative/productive *socialness*.

Soja’s interpretation of Lefebvre’s work was that

all social relations, whether they are linked to class, family, community, market or state power, remain abstract and ungrounded until they are specifically spatialized, that is made into material and symbolic spatial relations (Soja 2000, p. 9).

Accordingly, the reproduction of the relations of production becomes spatialised in geographic locations. Soja argued that space is where Lefebvre located urban reality and specifically that Lefebvre’s ‘urban problematic derives from the complex interaction between macro- and micro-geographical configurations of cityspace’ (Soja 2000, p. 10). Soja then went on to explain that he has extended Lefebvre’s work into three separate but interdependent cityspaces. Firstspace, Soja described as a ‘set of materialized “spatial practices” that work together to produce and reproduce the concrete forms and specific patternings of urbanism as a way of life’ (Soja 2000, p. 10). This space attends to ‘form and process’. Secondspace is a ‘conceived space’. Together Soja (2000, p. 11) summarises first and secondspaces as ‘things in space’ and ‘thoughts about space’ respectively. The extension of Lefebvre’s work, for Soja, is particularly apparent in what he terms the thirdspace, which is the ‘lived space’. Arising from what he perceived as the limitations of the first two spaces, the thirdspace is ‘a simultaneously real-and-imagined, actual-and-virtual, locus of structured individual and collective experience and agency’ (Soja 2000, p. 11).

Through this complexity, he contends that there is much that is ‘unknown and perhaps unknowable’ and that ‘the best we can do is selectively explore, in the most insightful ways we can find, the infinite complexity of life through its intrinsic spatial, social, and historical dimensions, its interrelated spatiality, sociality, and historicity’ (Soja 2000, p. 12). However, Schmid (2008, p. 42) contends that Soja’s interpretations of Lefebvre have been highly influential on the one hand and problematic on the other. Schmid (2008, p. 42) points to Soja’s revelations that there are three autonomous spaces, requiring specific epistemologies for their investigation. Schmid states that Soja’s approach bears little resemblance to Lefebvre’s work. Specifically, Schmid argues:

Although such a conception may seem interesting, it does not have much in common with Lefebvre’s theory. According to Lefebvre, there cannot be a ‘third space,’ nor a first or second space ... Lefebvre never proceeds from three independent spaces but from three dialectically interconnected processes of production. Although Soja repeatedly cites Lefebvre, his spatial theory is, in the last analysis, fundamentally different from Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space (Schmid 2008, p. 42).

In this ‘third wave’ of Lefebvre the authors malign much that has gone before as missing many of the key components of Lefebvre’s theory of space. ‘Third wave’ Lefebvre adherents

link ... urban-spatial debates more persistently and substantively with an open-minded appropriation of his metaphilosophical epistemology shaped by continental philosophy and Western Marxism. In so doing, it also rejects the debilitating dualism between ‘political economy’ and ‘cultural studies’ that in effect marked the distinction between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ waves of Lefebvre studies, making it impossible for us to return to a simply updated or expanded earlier school of thought on Lefebvre. Indeed, one of the legacies of the debates within and on ‘post’ theory of the 1980s and early 1990s was an often acute bifurcation of theoretical debate that identifies Marxism with studies of material social relations, class, and political economy while relegating considerations of subjectivity, identity, difference, and culture to poststructuralist versions of cultural studies (Goonewardena 2008, p. 3).

As a means of avoiding the ‘debilitating dualism’, also referred to in the previous section, ‘third wave’ authors have gone back to his original theory to correct (1) what has been left out, and (2) address confusion borne out through retrieving culture from the margins (Schmid 2008). For Lefebvre, Schmid (2008, p. 28) asserts that ‘(social) space is a (social) product’. That

in order to understand this fundamental thesis it is necessary, first of all, to break with the widespread understanding of space imagined as an independent

material reality existing ‘in itself.’ Against such a view, Lefebvre, using the concept of the *production of space*, posits a theory that understands *space* as fundamentally bound up with social reality. It follows that space ‘in itself’ can never serve as an epistemological starting position. Space does not exist ‘in itself’; it is produced (Schmid 2008, p. 28).

Within this determination of Lefebvre’s work, Schmid argues that rather than there being a duelling dialectic, the dialectic is formulated through a triad. Therefore the question needs to be ‘how (social) space is produced’ (Schmid 2008, p. 29). Key to Lefebvre’s proposition

is the view that the production of space can be divided into three dialectically interconnected dimensions or processes. Lefebvre also calls them formants or moments of the production of space. They are doubly determined and correspondingly doubly designated. On the one hand, they refer to the triad of ‘spatial practice,’ ‘representations of space,’ and ‘spaces of representation.’ On the other, they refer to ‘perceived,’ ‘conceived’ and ‘lived’ space. This parallel series points to a twofold approach to space: one phenomenological and the other linguistic or semiotic (Schmid 2008, p. 29).

Therefore according to this reading of Lefebvre, space does not exist in and of itself somewhere ‘out there’—it is produced recursively through another reality, that of the social. For Schmid (2008) space (and time) are both relational and historical and an analysis of same needs to attend to the ‘social constellations, power relations, and conflicts relevant in each situation’ (Schmid 2008, p. 29).

In competition with the third-wavers, Soja and his colleagues continue against the sentiments voiced above to attempt another extension of Lefebvre. The recent scientific journal *Justice spatiale | spatial justice* is based on the rationale that

the conviction that space is a fundamental dimension of human societies and that social justice is embedded in space. The understanding of interactions between space and societies is essential to understand social injustices and to reflect on the planning policies that aim to reduce them ... *Justice spatiale | spatial justice* is an international electronic journal whose concept was born in Nanterre, France, precisely where Henri Lefebvre taught, and this is in no way a coincidence as we acknowledge here the strong relation between the concept of spatial justice and the Lefebvrian concepts of production of space (‘production de l’espace’) and right to the city (‘droit à la ville’) (Dufaux et al. 2009, p. 1).

Spatial Justice reintroduces Lefebvre’s theory of space and embroils it in notions of justice and injustice, as well as incorporating planning policy to the already laden layers of influences that become spatialised in urban sites. Justice and its binary opposition in this context ‘injustice’ is an extension of the Marxist argument that the

capitalist system is innately unjust and that these injustices manifest themselves and can be located in spatial inequalities (Marcuse 2009). Therefore spatial injustice needs to be (1) observed, (2) acknowledged in urban policy and by planners, and (3) that urban planning needs to be adjusted accordingly. Change for Marcuse (2009) can be undertaken at a local level, but there will be limitations based on the understanding that spatial injustice is contingent upon an overarching system that is inherently unequal—politically, socially and economically.

Remedying spatial injustice can be a major contribution to social justice, but it will always have limits unless the social injustice which underlies the creation of spatial injustice is also addressed. You will not have spatial justice in a system, political, economic, social, that is itself unjust. That is no reason not to address spatial injustices as such – only a reason to keep them in context (Marcuse 2009, p. 53).

For Marcuse (2009, p. 55) ‘gentrification’ is an example par excellence of the need for both spatial and non-spatial remedies. Soja’s (2009) discussion on spatial injustice, in the same publication, mirrors many of the above points made by Marcuse. The endless search for the ‘underlying processes’ that cause the space to be unjust is what Soja points to as the difficult aspect of the proposition of spatial justice. For Soja ‘it is relatively easy to discover examples of spatial injustice descriptively’ (Soja 2009, p. 33) but linking them to and disseminating them from the ‘system’ that generates them is the tricky part. This does not appear to be a great leap within the Lefebvre tradition, but an elaboration on the existing aspects of Soja’s previous work outlined above.

What both accounts of Lefebvre have in common is an interpretation about space in general terms. Specifically, both proponents of Lefebvre subscribe to a way of knowing space through his predetermined theory, even if there are different understandings. Soja and Marcuse search for evidence of manifesting social inequalities in spatial injustice and Schmid and his colleagues begin from the premise that the starting place for understanding space is in social reality. The next section provides an overview of approaches to urban space, that interprets the social and reality from different logics than the ones presented above. In contrast the following approaches pay attention to the internal machinations that produce (perform) urban space, the social as well as reality.

If the city, and in particular the interaction between a bounded geographic urban location and other circulating elements, is released from the framework of a predetermined theory, what is left? Viewing urban space through the gaze of a predetermined theory will of course reveal evidence that is consistent with and indicative of the theory and produce a relativist and deterministic argument. The limits of this type of derivative reflexivity is obvious through its very logic. When this framework is kicked to the curb a range of opportunities arise to see something differently. Because, as Thrift (2006) reminds us and as was evident in the above discussion,

the literature is still replete with notions of space as a place in which everything comes together, if only for a little while, in a centred space in which things are co-located in such a way that presentations can come into alignment, thereby producing a sense of well-being which also confirms certain values (Thrift 2006, p. 141).

2.4 What happens to urban space if the social is ‘reassembled’?

So, I am very positive for sociology, but it cannot remain stuck in the 1950s or in the deconstructed ruins of Marxism. It cannot continue to use the destitute repertoire which, while important at the beginning of the twentieth century, between the wars and for reconstruction after the war, has now used itself up (Latour 2004, p. 89).

It’s true that in most situations resorting to the sociology of the social is not only reasonable but also indispensable, since it offers convenient shorthand to designate all the ingredients already accepted in the collective real (Latour 2005, p. 11).

Farías (2010b, p. 1) notes that ‘the last significant theoretical quantum leap in urban studies occurred in the 1970s with the Marxist political economy’. Farías believes that utilising well-worn paradigms is prone to risk, in that deciphering urban life falls prey to interpreting it through meta-narratives, minimising complexity and of losing opportunities of making use of more current theoretical developments in social science (2010b, p. 1). In light of these observations, Farías (2010b) poses the question: ‘How Actor-Network-Theory (and post-ANT developments and discussions) might change urban studies’ (Farías 2010b, p. 2).

ANT’s reshaping of our view of urban infrastructures, built environments, ecologies, urbanites, practices, spaces, economies and other central issues of urban studies ultimately involves an empirical and philosophical investigation into the ontological status of cities (Farías 2010b, p. 7).

Actor Network Theory (ANT) promotes the idea and provides case-study evidence that there are networks within the world that are composed of ‘ontologically undecided elements’ and it constitutes the world as ‘actors as networks and networks as actors, since actor-networks are associating associated (i.e. heterogeneous) elements’. Therefore the starting point of any exploration, whether it is urban space or a laboratory experiment is from the premise of an undecided ontology—the aim is to ‘follow the actor-networks and how they bring humans and things into existence by assembling heterogeneity’ (Schillmeier 2010, p. 231). For example ‘the local is an achievement in which a place is localised by other places and accepts “localisation” itself’ (Callon & Law 2004, p. 4). Our job then becomes one of understanding how the place becomes local and accepts localisation.

Actor Network Theory is not another interpretation of agency/structure and or macro/micro processes and linkages; it is a way of bypassing the duality inherent in most social analyses (Latour 1999, p. 16). The next question is: what happens when the social is liberated in the study of urban life?

When social scientists add the adjective ‘social’ to some phenomenon, they designate a stabilized state of affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be mobilized to account for some other phenomenon (Latour 2005, p. 1).

The departure point from entrenched, and taken-for-granted, beliefs about ‘the social’ as a catch-all is, according to Albertsen and Diken (2003, p. 2), related to three central notions: ‘unity, purity and order’. Much of the ANT research tells us that we should take these notions as points of departure, because

the social has been dissolved as an explanatory and foundational category. If the social exists separately at all within the web of heterogeneous relations detected by the toolkit of actor-network theory and its successor projects ... then it is a temporarily stabilised effect of those webs in which particular parts of that web are generated and treated as ‘social’ (Law 2008, p. 634).

Importantly ‘the “social” has disappeared as a basic analytical category’ (Law, 2008, p. 634). For Callon and Law (2004), ‘The argument is that social life is sequenced just like the internal calculations of a computer’ (Callon & Law 2004, p. 6). If the social retracts and becomes disassembled and folded into a relational heterogeneous network, then the key position for reflection relates to working out how ‘undecided ontologies’ get done in urban space and anywhere/everywhere else.

In the realm of urban studies, ANT would propose that there needs to be a shift from the socio-spatial to the socio-technological. The shift in terminology is deceptive in its simplicity, as it hides the multitude of entities that become conjured up in the socio-technological web.

Transporting these ideas into the area of urban studies has only been recently taken up broadly in a publication titled *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*. This publication asks questions about how one studies urban reality (Fariás & Bender 2010, p. 226). Schillmeier (2010, p. 232) suggests that urban reality should be studied ‘empirically and conceptually – in multiple ways following the trajectories of how urban actor-networks emerge, relate, cut into, stabilise, get disrupted and change other actor-networks’. The next section provides an overview of the development of Science Technology Studies (STS), of which ANT is derivative, as a means of exploring points of difference from traditional sociological investigations. Additionally, the following discussion presents evidence for the justification of the use of this method for analysing a community safety project in an urban space/place.

2.5 Science Technology Studies (STS): points of departure

Our job as social scientists is to generate recalcitrant hard facts and passionate objectors that resist social explanations (Latour 2005, p. 101).

Science Technology Studies (STS) developed during the 1960s in the United Kingdom and was concerned with ‘emphasising its interdisciplinary roots, and comparing and contrasting them with the concerns of Sociology’ (Law 2008, p. 623). According to Law (2008, p. 624) STS has drawn from a wide range of disciplines that include: ‘anthropology, education, geography, history and history of science, organisational analysis, philosophy of science and sociology’. In its early form it grew from the interface between a Marxist-informed critique and sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Drawing from non-normative sociological domains, STS looked to authors, in particular Kuhn, who undertook a (philosophical) history of science. Building on Kuhn’s premise: ‘The man who takes historic fact seriously must suspect that science does not tend toward the ideal that our image of its cumulativeness has suggested’. Kuhn (1962) accorded STS with the possibility of interpreting science as outside of a special realm of truth, examining the informal and

practical aspects of science and studying them through case studies (Law 2008, p. 626).

In terms of analysing science, STS was able to put aside the validity or otherwise of scientific knowledge and was freed up to describe ‘the shaping of scientific culture at the hands of practitioners as the intersection of natural phenomena, social interests, and prior cultural resources’ (Law 2008, p. 627). In this context, links to class, socioeconomic status or gender, among others, were located by chance and not already embedded. Rather than undertaking a critique of styles or examples of scientific knowledge, STS provided explanations. Linking sociological theories of practice and symbolic interactionism with Kuhn’s separation of scientific laws with the application of those laws (formal versus informal) drew STS into the realm of scientific practice (Law 2008, p. 628). Finally, according to Law, STS learnt much from Kuhn’s approach of making theoretical points through historical moments in practice (Law 2008, p. 627). ‘Theory ... cannot be detached from its instances’ (Kuhn, cited in Law 2008, p. 629). In this context case studies were used to counter abstract determinations.

STS case studies began to pay attention to material practices or technologies operating in the laboratory and came to the conclusion that these things mattered to such an extent that there was a trend toward thinking in terms of the ‘social construction of technology’. Hughes’ work titled *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930* was also influential in interpreting technology enterprises as systems of relations. Hughes believed that

Man’s making of the complex modern world is an appropriate subject for the twentieth-century historian. Creation of the material environment shaped by—and shaping—mankind is not a peripheral subject that can be left to narrow specialists. To direct attention today to technological affairs is to focus on a concern that is as central now as nation building and constitution making were a century ago. Technological affairs contain a rich texture of technical matters, scientific laws, economic principles, political forces, and social concerns. The historian must take the broad perspective to get to the root of things and to see the patterns (Hughes 1983, p. 1).

Taking from Hughes the system metaphor, empirical evidence provided through STS case studies suggested that in terms of the production of scientific logic, if ‘elements in a system are significant – and indeed achieve their form and character – [they do

this] *only in relation to one another*' (Law 2008, p. 631, emphasis in original). The significance of these findings is related to the legitimacy of 'the social' as a fallback position for all that was not technical, as it too was made up in and relative to the system, not something exceptional that existed independently of scientific logic. Two issues were now in query: the truth and specialness of scientific knowledge and the idea that 'the social' was also technical and in need of explanation (Law 2008). However STS proponents became aware that in terms of being able to understand the social outside of a reductionist framework there were methodological deficiencies both in science studies and in sociology (Law 2008). Again mirroring Hughes, some STS work departed from the reductionist approach, by starting

with a system logic because it traces how elements in a web or a network take the form that they do in more or less precarious interaction with one another. People, technologies, 'natural' phenomena, documents, non-human life forms, knowledges, social facts, collectivities and phenomena – all of these are relational effects, materials, being done in interaction. Actors, then, are also networks that hold together for long enough to act in relation to something else (Law 2008, p. 632).

The point is that actors and networks are not different. 'Everything in the web is revisable. Everything is uncertain. Everything is relational. And nothing is foundational' (Law 2008, p. 632). The development of STS to this point brings us up to the 1980s and the emergence of Actor Network Theory (a term devised by Michel Callon in the early 1980s). As such,

Actor-network theory is what resulted when a non-humanist and post-structuralist sensibility to relationality, materiality, process, enactment and the possibility of alternative epistemic framings bumped into the theoretically informed, materially-grounded, practice-oriented empirical case-study tradition of English language STS (Law 2008, p. 632).

Within this space, the social joined forces with the technological. Law (1999, p. 4, emphasis in original) notes that ANT 'may be understood as a *semiotics of materiality*. It takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all materials – not simply to those that are linguistic'. This (re)unification, was based on the dilemma that what was missing from most sociological accounts of the social, even those stemming from the 'post' generation, was the technological (Law 1991). Law (1991) contended that what is understood as the social is 'always already' technical and vice versa. Adding to this is an almost paradoxical position within STS, and

ANT, that ‘the social has never explained anything: the social has to be explained instead’ (Latour 2005, p. 97). Thus ANT believes that ‘to the extent that “society is held together at all, *this is achieved by heterogeneous means* ... that the social is not purely social at all”’ (Law 1991, p. 7, emphasis in original). In a similar vein to post-structuralism, ANT departs from why questions to asking how questions and thus

asks *how* they occur. *How* they arrange themselves. *How* the materials of the world (social, technical, documentary, natural, human, animal) get themselves done in particular locations for a moment in all their heterogeneity. And *how* they go on shifting and relating themselves in the processes that enact realities, knowledges and all the rest (Law 2008, p. 232, emphasis in original).

The type of *network* embroiled in the socio-technological is not enacted to describe a linear transmission of various types of knowledge in an age of information technology, it is ‘the *summing up* of interactions through various kinds of devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae, into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus’ (Latour 1999, p. 17, emphasis in original). Actor Network Theory is not just another or a different way of ‘explain[ing] the behaviour of social actors’ or what ‘the social is made of’ (Latour 1999, p. 19). Accordingly, ‘ANT does not tell anyone the shape that is to be drawn ... but only how to go about systematically recording the world-building abilities of the sites to be documented and registered’ (Latour 1999, p. 21).

This perspective allowed for the incorporation of the natural (nature), the technological (material) and the social (humans and institutions), without creating an analytical hierarchy (Kendall & Wickham 1999). According to Kendall and Michael (2001), Latour directs us to pay attention to ‘the fact that we never see human beings in purely human/social settings. Humans are always enmeshed in a network with other actants, many of who are non humans ... Our 21st century human being is clearly simultaneously human, natural, social [and] technological’ (Kendall & Michael 2001, p. 10).

In terms of applying these ideas, the following quote by Law points us in this direction by stressing the need to depart from the use of overarching grand theories to *describe* the organisational technologies of a given site. He argues:

If we want to understand the mechanics of power and organisation it is important not to start out assuming whatever we wish to explain. For instance, it is a good idea not to take it for granted that there is a macrosocial system on the one hand, and bits and pieces of derivative microsocial detail on the other. If we

do this we close off most of the interesting questions about the origins of power and organisation. Instead we should start with a clean slate. For instance, we might start with interaction and assume that interaction is all that there is. Then we might ask how some kinds of interactions more or less succeed in stabilising and reproducing themselves: how it is that they overcome resistance and seem to become ‘macrosocial’; how it is that they seem to generate the effects such [as] power, fame, size, scope or organisation with which we are all familiar. This, then, is the one of the core assumptions of actor-network theory (Law 1992, p. 2).

This elucidates a key component of Actor Network Theory: that ‘all social life’ is made up of ‘heterogeneous networks’, simply that ‘the social is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous materials’ (Law 1992, p. 2). Putting all the elements on the same playing field, including the sociological default position, ‘the social’ opens up the analytic domain to an unyielding complexity rather than the neatness of causal linear explanations.

In a study about Portuguese trade dominance and their journey to India, Law (1986) drew together two narratives that are usually viewed through a hierarchical analysis of influences that distinguish and isolate the narratives. He found that Lisbon was a central passage and that the ships were able to hold their shape (immutable mobiles) as they circulated ‘to and fro in space’ (Law 2009a, p. 146). Law contended that there was a web of ‘precarious’ factors that included ships, sails, mariners, navigators, stores, spices, winds, currents, astrolabes, stars, guns, ephemeredes, gifts and merchants’ drafts holding its relational form of associations for 150 years (Law 2009a, p. 146). For Law:

This study displays all the ingredients of actor-network theory [up to] 1990. There is semiotic relationality (it’s a network whose elements define and shape one another), heterogeneity (there are different kinds of actors, human and otherwise), and materiality (stuff is there a-plenty, not just ‘the social’). There is an insistence on process and its precariousness (all elements need to play their part moment by moment or it all comes unstuck). There is attention to power as an effect (it is a function of network configuration and in particular the creation of immutable mobiles), to space and to scale (how it is that networks extend themselves and translate distant actors). New for actor-network theory, there is an interest in large scale political history. And, crucially, it is a study of how the Portuguese network worked; how it held together; how it shaped its components; how it made a centre and peripheries; in short, of how differences were generated in a semiotic relational logic. (Law 2009a, p. 146).

To follow the heterogeneous elements through threads of associations into their unwieldiness can according to ANT provide revelations regarding what is holding a network in place, whether stable or not.

2.6 Translation

Law and his colleagues started from the premise that ‘society, organisation, agents and machines are all effects generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply human) materials’ and therefore ‘the task of sociology is to characterise these networks in their heterogeneity, and explore how it is that they come to be patterned to generate effects like organisations, inequality and power’ (Law 1992, pp. 2–3). Actor Network Theory is otherwise known as ‘sociology of translation’ (Latour 2005, p. 106). The term ‘translation’ in this context ‘takes on a somewhat specialized meaning: a relation that does not transport causality but induces two mediators into coexisting’ (Latour 2005, p. 108). Latour (2007, p. 108, emphasis in original) states ‘there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, *but there exist translations between mediators that may generate traceable associations*’. Schillmeier (2010), drawing from Latour, notes:

Actor-networks ‘give voice’ to third elements (like money, technologies, etc.) that configure, for example, humans and non-humans as subjects and objects. These third elements ANT calls intermediaries and mediators. An intermediary ‘transports meaning or force without transformation’, whereas mediators ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry’ (Schillmeier 2010, p. 240).

Thus if one shifts from the notion of transformation into one of associations and translation, then the picture being painted comes to be composed of quite diverse components and images and whatever is being represented also contrives a different story. The next question along this road is what takes place when ‘strings of mediators get deployed’ (Latour 2005, pp. 108–9). Once ‘society’ and ‘nature’ are not the starting points for reality and understood as *two collectors*, that were invented simultaneously in the 17th century, then ‘to our great surprise, once the artificial boundary between social and natural was removed, non-human entities were able to appear under an unexpected guise’ (Latour 2005, p. 111). For example, in Callon’s (1986b) exploration of the domestication of scallops, under the dominant analytic formulas it would be unexpected to bring into one frame scallops, fishermen and

researchers as a symmetrical starting point and then use tides, nets and data as mediators in a process of translating an experiment that hoped to find out why there was a declining number of scallops in St-Brieuc Bay. Significantly, in this instance the mediators railroaded the project.

ANT offered the researcher the opportunity to shift out of linking local processes to macro causes and legitimised investigations into the internal locus of orderings through following the translation of knowledge logics through actors associations. Additionally, there were shifts away from constructionist approaches in ANT with the dismantling of the idea that once ‘things’ were constructed, embedded and stabilised, they stayed formed and stable. ANT also assisted greatly with countering the necessity to retrieve understanding about what is going on through agency and micro levels from the apparent omnipotent, all-consuming structural or macro level where there has been unending reliance in social science on abstract ideas of culture, norms, and social context (Latour 1999, p. 16). However according to Latour (1999) there was also ‘dissatisfaction’ to be found within the limits of ANT at the micro level. In this light, ANT’s job was to emphasise the ‘dissatisfaction’ inherent in the social scientist’s dependence on duality, not to resolve it. Instead, ANT follows the macro/micro duality ‘elsewhere and to try to explore the very conditions that make these two opposite disappointments possible’ (Latour 1999, p. 17).

Latour (2007, p. 111) argues that ‘everywhere, the empirical multiplicity of former “natural” agencies overflows the narrow boundary of matters of fact. There exists no direct relation between being real and being indisputable’. If heterogeneous elements are deployed and translated into associations that resemble something that can be both known and interpreted as real, then the definitiveness of ontology is also contestable. This type of work is often referred to as material semiotics because of the heterogeneity of the elements (human and non-human, social and technological, big and small) (Law 2009a) and relationality of meaning/s that builds privileged ordering/s (Akrich & Latour 1992).

The idea of translation will be further elaborated upon in the method discussion in the following chapter.

2.7 Translation is one thing—performances are another

Thus far there we have seen that STS and ANT have enabled an analytic shift, offering up an analytic terrain that produced a way of seeing ‘events’, experiments and organisations as a set of colluding elements (elements that were previously theoretically separate) drawing together and translating into something that manifests spatially and is empirically visible. Initially ANT produced single narratives regarding the translation of a particular network through a range of phases that were successful or not. The heterogeneity of elements embroiled in the network decentred humans, grand narratives, nature, technology and the social as isolated explanations for anything unless it was the network that privileged them.

Following heterogeneous elements through the bumps and grinds of a process of translation may be understood as generating ‘a little-narrative, thoroughly empirically-grounded, very material, small-scale’ (Law 2008, p. 632). Beyond ANT (and translation), STS has developed into speaking about performance. ANT scholars have tended towards undertaking studies that produce revelations about the enactment of and performative precariousness of reality (Law 2007, p. 11). ANT shows us that sets of practices are enacted by materially heterogeneous actors and translated into being, that ‘knowledge practices are performative’ (Law 2010, p. 3). Therefore, ‘if reality *appears* (as it usually does) to be independent, prior, definite, singular or coherent then this is because it is being done that way’ (Law 2009b, p. 1, emphasis in original). The argument is that ‘since the real is relationally enacted in practices, if those practices were to change *the real would also be done differently*’ (Law 2008, p. 635, emphasis in original). The issue then becomes how is reality done and where is it in relation to other realities. The answer is that other realities are not out there—importantly they are everywhere—not out there but in here. That difference and otherness lies within the order, not external to it (Law 2008).

If reality is both heterogeneous and contestable therein lies the possibility that ‘reality itself is [also] multiple’ (Mol 1999, p. 74). Mol’s (1999) study on anaemia found that there were not different perspectives on anaemia that were based on different aspects of the same reality, but that there were several performances of anaemia operating simultaneously in the here and now and in different locations. The

proposition being made by Mol and derived from evidence on the study of anaemia is that anaemia is performed in at least three ways: clinical, statistical and pathophysiological (Mol 1999, p. 78). Importantly, Mol argued that plural realities of anaemia don't just exist alongside each other but that they are also embroiled in one another (Mol 1999, p. 85). Simply, she argued that 'if reality is done, if it is historically, culturally and materially *located*, than it is also *multiple*' (Mol 1999, p. 75, emphasis in original).

Law and Singleton (2000) asserted that in a study on the treatment of alcoholic liver disease (ALD) in a hospital in the United Kingdom, the differences between a realist approach and pragmatist approach to reality were limited to the context performing the reality of ALD. They argue that a textbook about alcoholic liver disease provides a representation of reality at the same time as making that reality (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 2). According to realism and pragmatism, the assumptive foundations of the textbook would rely on the idea that

there is a reality out there. The realist would argue that knowledge, critically tested and corroborated across a wide range of instances, can begin to approximate to that reality. Whereas the pragmatist would argue that knowledge is better understood as a tool for handling complex reality (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 2).

However, while Law and Singleton (2000, p. 2) argue that realism and pragmatism are both important, these perspectives do not 'share the performative assumption that reality is brought into being in the process of knowing'. They maintain specifically that

neither would assume that the object that is known and the subject that does the knowing are co-produced in the same performance, that the epistemological problem (what is true) and the ontological question (what is) are both resolved (or not) in the same moment (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 2).

Thus if the epistemological problem and the ontological question get resolved, the resolution happens in the same performance (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 2). Further to this is that performances of knowledge and reality could be both unsuccessful and/or multiple (Law & Singleton 2000; Law 2008). In their study they found that

in tracing the performances of alcoholic liver disease and its treatments, we have found that there is continual slippage between performing ALD on the one hand, and the *treatment* of ALD on the other, ALD is, in some locations, performed as not any thing. ... that ALD and its treatment is sometimes

performed superordinate, sometimes it is performed in a politics of equal time, but that more often it is subordinate to other regions, other realities (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 12, emphasis in original).

In terms of the success or otherwise of the performative turn, Law and Singleton (2000), referring to the dilemma of enacting alcoholic liver disease consistently across a range of different people in diverse locations, argue that their study comes up against the ‘*limits of performance*’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 3, emphasis in original). Importantly, ‘it’s the character of those limits – or what it takes to organise a successful performance’ as ‘*not all performances are successful ... because not all performances manage to line up the objects and the subjects needed to make them work*’, that some are ‘more or less epistemologically and ontologically “unrealistic”’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 3). They offer up STS as a way of interpreting the problem: ‘It is to treat knowledge-and-its-objects (in the performative mode they are all chained together) as a network of elements that are brought into being and given shape in a particular performance’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 3).

Accordingly, associations of elements can be traced in and through networks as they assemble into a *reality*. Thus it is also argued that reality is not a pre-existing thing that provides the foundation upon which networks can be examined and related to, but a thing that also gets performed. Through the performative turn it became apparent that other orderings were going on within the same network and that there were differences between them. This observation was made through the scrutiny of the object under investigation. Drawing from Foucault’s heterotopias, Law (2008) argues that ‘other spaces’ are not isolated here and there in the distance, but that they are everywhere. What does this mean in terms of undertaking a standard critique of the object under investigation, as would be usual in the post theoretical era?

2.8 What now: beyond critique

Taking the question of ontology into the political realm requires another leap of faith into the world of hybrid destabilisation. Mol (1999) argues that

ontological politics is a composite term. It talks of ontology—which in standard philosophical parlance defines what belongs to the real, the conditions of possibility we live with. If the term ‘ontology’ is combined with that of ‘politics’ then this suggests that the conditions of possibility are not given. That

reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within these practices' (Mol 1999, pp. 74–5).

Retracting the certainty out of reality and focusing on the performativity of ontology leaves us with the idea that 'reality is not destiny' (Law 2008, p. 637). This prepares us for the idea that the ontological is not only multiple but also political (contestable) and not always inevitable.

From this perspective 'there are different realities being enacted in more or less power-saturated practices. The question then becomes: how to interfere in the diffract realities in particular locations to generate more respectful and less dominatory alternatives', how 'to strengthen desirable realities that would otherwise be weak' (Law 2008 p. 637). Therefore, in contrast to more traditional forms of critique that formulate arguments about the goodness or otherwise of a power/knowledge complex at the site of its evolution and at points along the way, an analytic that is more interested in the internal performances of logic shifts the focus from one of critique to one of emphasising differences and the subtle (or not so subtle) implications of such differences. As such, while *everything* continues to be epistemologically complex, the ontological enters the political (Law 2008, p. 637). Political manipulation of ontology/s is the site that also renders the researcher visible and therefore accountable.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter provided an outline of some of the theoretical trends in urban space in the late Twentieth century. The work of Soja and Marcuse was used as exemplars of attempts to capture the messiness of culture and incorporate it into discussions about urban space. Efforts to activate the space in its relationship to other historic, economic, global and social realities fell short in terms of actually freeing it up. Reflections by Shields and others noted the limitations of being loyal to modernism/post-modernism simultaneously.

Osborne and Rose's work, which approached an analysis of authorities of government through diagramming, was overviewed to provide an example of localising a spatial analysis. While this offered an alternative technique it still

approached the space through the predetermined grid that was seeking to locate governmental technologies at work.

The chapter then explored more recent socio-spatial ideas. Theorists characterising themselves as 'third wave' and 'next wave' Lefebvre continued to rely on social reality and/or the reality of the social as the cornerstone of their interpretations. It was argued that these socio-spatial propositions were inadequate on the basis of this reliance. STS was put forward as a means of not just decentring the social, but dismantling it.

A number of the multidisciplinary threads that have been taken up in STS were outlined. This indicated that not only was the social an unreasonable default position for anything (unless it was put forward as such), but that the separation between human/non-human, macro/micro, science and other disciplines was also contrived in the abstract. Crucially, when things become visible, it is because they were made visible through a series of performances that are produced through a material semiotics of heterogeneous elements. The key aim of this chapter was to justify the use of STS as a point of departure from more traditional ways of understanding the world in general and urban space in particular. This is justified on the basis that STS interprets the ontological as political as well as multiple. Specifically, a number of STS proponents argue that the epistemological and ontological are productive of each other. These ideas are consistent with the aim of this investigation, in that it promotes an approach that enables the investigator to account for the heterogeneous elements that make the community safety network in Fortitude Valley agnostically. The adoption of this style of analytics provides the researcher with the capacity to describe a range of actors that may reveal themselves within local processes in situ. This discussion has informed the interpretive context for the methodology that will be summarised in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Developing a method

3.1 Introduction

What type of analysis would be capable of producing the kind of open-ended inventory of spatial practices that we envisage? We do not think it would base itself on the suggestion that our contemporary world demands some grand theory of spatiality for its intelligibility. Rather, it would be a more modest endeavour, which would try to draw up a discontinuous inventory of the different styles of spatialisation employed in different spheres of conduct and at different times in history. And, for us, it would be best informed by a spirit of methodological pluralism, drawing upon different disciplines and approaches (Osborne & Rose 2004, p. 212).

The previous chapter provided an overview of some of the recent developments in urban space theory. The exploration of attempts to include the complexity of culture and the relevance of local activities through what can be interpreted as a spatial turn (Callon & Law 2004). It was then argued that if one challenges the credibility of the social as a relativist and deterministic device, then dominant thinking in the area of urban space is left with reality as an object of coherence and reassurance. The discussion laid out a number of turns in the study of urban space, in particular a continued reliance on dualisms. This style of reasoning promoted the idea that places being studied in the urban space are representative of something other—something out there that is manifesting itself through a process of spatialisation.

The latter section of the previous chapter queried the very notion, through revelations made in STS and ANT, that there is ‘something out there’ representing itself in a way that can be pinned down, observed and related back to that something a priori. STS and ANT provided evidence that support a reconfiguration of the social, thus undermining the ontology of same. At the same time as dislodging this historical given; they broke down the barricades that have historically entrenched a separation of the natural from the non-natural world, and in doing so, science from social science.

Fundamental concerns within STS ‘have to do with epistemology (the theory of knowledge), and (more recently) ontology, the character of the real’; ‘its practitioners predominantly *think* through materials. They extend their ideas and conduct their controversies through cases, which act as empirical (but not straightforwardly empiricist) stimulus and irritant’ (Law 2008, p. 629, emphasis in

original). In terms of theory, ‘STS practitioners have usually been cautious about theory in the form of grand narrative ... They tend to speak somewhat austerely, to want to know what large scale generalisations or theories mean in practice, and about *where* they apply ... They ... tend to avoid buying into a theory/data distinction’. This is because in STS, theory is not first created and then applied empirically. Theory and data are created together. However empirical it may be, everything is already theorised. (Law 2008, pp. 629–30). STS is not theory but it is not atheoretical either. Theory is both producing and productive in the data and the data is both producing and productive of the theory. Theoretical instances are only evident in relation to the data.

Taking this as a starting point for problematising the community safety project in Fortitude Valley in Brisbane allowed the researcher to open up the case of community safety in situ. It is however worth noting Ignacio Fariás’s interview with Thrift (2010a) about the city, in which Thrift argues that there can be no absolute breaks between traditional and contemporary attempts to understand the city. He explains,

that I don’t think anyone thinks that you can just think anew. It doesn’t happen. It’s ridiculous. Everyone starts somewhere and there are all kinds of connections backwards. But I’m still convinced that one of the big things we probably do need to do is think about the methodologies we use to actually make these kinds of maps of understanding. And one of the problems we face is that the methodologies we use have been too pedestrian and it is possible to be much more interesting in choosing methodologies we are working with (Fariás 2010a, p. 111).

Latour and Hermant’s work *Paris: Invisible City* (2006) is held up by Thrift and Fariás (2010a) as a stellar example of a methodological departure from the pedestrian. In highlighting the point of difference between their examination of Paris and ‘other’ interpretations of the city, Latour and Hermant (2006) argue that

to take it all in at once, to ‘dominate it at a glance’, to calculate the flows, Paris first has to become small.

In this sociological opera we’re going to move over from the cold and real Society to warm and virtual plasma: from the entire Paris set in one view to the multiple Parises within Paris, which together comprise all Paris and which nothing ever resembles. The proliferation of computer technology makes this invisible Paris describable at last. Our work explores the properties of this plasma which are no longer exactly those of social life as traditionally conceived. People say that Society today is so fragmented, fractured, de-structured, atomized, anomic, that it would be vain to want to theorize it

globally. Impressions, juxtapositions, fragmentations, but no more structure and, above all, no more unity. Or, conversely, everything levelled down, uniform, global, standardized, liberalized, rationalized, Americanized, monitored, and the social world has disappeared, surviving in ghettos under the name of sociability. In that case all we could do would be to hang on to the last traces of the old world, museums of the social: little cafés, little shops, little roads, little people. Sociology would be finished. In any case, the time of the social sciences would be over. Enough indeed to die of suffocation.

Here we argue just the opposite. The twofold impression of fragmentation and monotony, of de-structuring and uniformity, could stem from the point of view chosen like it could stem from the temperature selected. Something else orders and locates, gathers and situates, binds and distinguishes, sets the pace and the rhythm, but that something no longer has the shape of a Society and must be followed, step by step, by other methods—through photography, perhaps, or rather through series of photographs that we would need to learn to read continuously—even if our ways of thinking interrupt and disperse them. What we call the social, the ‘slipping token’ of the social, passed around, will become visible if we manage to link up, one by one, the very particular traces running through it, traces that move rapidly – like sticks reddened in the fire, tracing shapes in the summer night only because of the way we, as children, waved them around. These traces, trajectories, wanderings, partial illuminations, phosphorescences: Paris, the City of Light, is weaved by them; Paris, the invisible city, consists of them (Latour & Hermant 2006, pp. 4–5).

The lesson learnt from this case study by Latour and Hermant (2006) is that it is possible to study ‘circulations’ rather than the city as a whole; not to interpret the city as an object per se but enactments that circulate within and throughout Paris and thus gives us a different view (Farias 2010a, p. 114).

In summary, ‘theory is done in the form of case studies’ (Law 2008, p. 630). So this is the starting point for the methodological direction of this research project. In this instance this type of case-study method enables the researcher to explore the community safety network in retrospect as both a theory for managing safety and through the data that translated it.

Based on the premises proposed by STS and ANT, this chapter will detail the methodological tools that will be applied to the initiation of a community safety project in Fortitude Valley in the year 2000.

3.2 Devising a case

Contrasts between the lived and the represented, the experienced and the conceptualised, the abstract and the concrete miss the point. The spaces with which we are concerned are experienced as much as conceptualised, lived as

much as represented. These spaces have a materiality which is not merely imagined but is realised (Osborne & Rose 2004, p. 212).

Empirical case-studies, at least in principle are important because they articulate and re-work theory (Law 2008, p. 630).

The methodological direction of this research project will be informed by Foucault, STS and Actor Network Theory (Law, Latour and Callon). Similar to Foucault, STS is concerned with ordering/s (or dis-ordering) of and the make-up of a particular knowledge set (power/truths) (Law 2008). However, where Foucault is interested in a general history of a knowledge transition for a given event, Latour and his colleagues are interested in the internal technologies or networks of a knowledge transition (translation) at a given point in its potentially evolving history (Kendall & Wickham 1999). These two approaches can build upon each other to provide a detailed examination of the heterogeneous factors that make up the issues under investigation, that is, a community safety project in Fortitude Valley mall. It is on this basis that a case-study approach is the best method of undertaking a history of the present or a contemporary history that incorporates multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1988).

The most useful way of investigating the various factors that come together at a moment in time through the community safety project in Fortitude Valley mall is in a single case study. Silverman (2009) provides three key aspects of a case study: (1) boundaries identified at an early stage, (2) unit of analysis must be defined from the outset to clarify the research strategy, and importantly, (3) the case development must preserve the integrity of the case. This focus should be defined by a limited research problem developed in relation to the specifics of the case (Silverman 2009, p. 138).

The community safety project in Fortitude Valley is bounded both geographically and more importantly in terms of the project being borne out of the controversy of a murder. It has a range of dynamic and colluding elements that became mobilised in the year 2000 to address the *problem* of safety. The unit of analysis is the program of community safety, and the elements that get caught up in the project are the specific relationships and associations that circulate throughout it. The research problem centres around four aspects of the safety project: (1) what are the specifics of the

community safety controversy; (2) what are some of the ‘conditions of possibility’ of the safety project; (3) what are the heterogeneous elements that emanate, collude, conspire and cohere (or not) to make up the safety project; and (4) how do they translate and perform community safety.

The methodological framework for this thesis has been developed through the theoretical discussion above and in the previous chapter, and as such it represents phase one of the case study. This chapter will now describe the next phase of the case study.

3.3 Historical prerequisites

Case Study: phase 2 (Chapter 4)

Aim 1. To examine the imperative for reform in Fortitude Valley

The linking of texts, observation and physical artefacts is significant, because as we are reminded by Foucault, ‘it is always at the level of materiality that [discursive events] take effect’ (Foucault 1981, p. 69).

This research project does not attempt a grand history of the narrative of community safety since the beginning of time as a means of contemplating in a profound way the historical turns and junctures that signify moments of its transformation. Nor is it a grandiose attempt at tracking the discursive roots of community safety through an all-encompassing genealogy in the performance of an archaeology. This project is much more local in its orientation. It does however draw greatly from Foucault’s idea of undertaking a ‘history of the present’.

In contrast to a total history, the investigative frame for this project is much more locally determined (Latour 1996) and open-ended (Wuthnow et al. 1984, p. 141). This analysis does not undertake a historical investigation that produces a ‘narrative of origins’ (Latour 1996, p. 18) of community safety or antisocial behaviour in Fortitude Valley. To do so for a modern Western city, one would need to follow a predetermined formula similar to the one outlined here by Latour (1996).

Of course, a historian ... ought to work back toward that origin and replace it with groups, interests, intentions, events, opinions. She would go to America, to Germany, to Japan. She would visit the [relevant place]; she would work out the entire history of couplings and uncouplings. She would rummage through the archives. She would sketch the enormous fresco of [the topic under investigation]. She would reposition [the subject/object investigation] 'in its historical framework'; she would determine its place in the entire history of [the subject/object investigation]. She would go further and further back in time (Latour 1996, p. 19).

The distinction between the investigation of the origins of community safety in the *world* and this much more modest endeavour is that this project is about detailing the various manifestations of community safety at a specific time and place. The distinction exists in a departure from focusing on 'the times or the individuals themselves' to focusing on 'individuals within their times' (Wuthnow 1984, p. 142), and to follow Foucault's method of attempting 'to locate new meaning at a "particular site defined by the exteriority of its vicinity"' (Wuthnow 1984, p. 148). Foucault's description of the research method (archaeology) is important here:

I try not to study the beginning in the sense of the first origin, of a starting from which the rest would be possible. I am not searching for the first solemn moment beginning from which all of Western mathematics becomes possible, for example. I don't go back to Euclid or Pythagoras. It's always the relative beginnings that I am searching for, more the institutionalizations or the transformations than the foundings or foundations ... What I'm looking for are not relations that are secret, hidden, more silent or deeper than the consciousness of men. I try on the contrary to define the relations on the very surface of discourse; I attempt to make visible what is invisible only because it's too much on the surface of things (Foucault 1996, p. 46).

The application of these propositions to the data puts the researcher in a better position to capture the 'small bifurcations that will turn out to explain the project' and that frequently become subjugated in historical investigations that attempt to reveal the 'vast background common to all projects' (Latour 1996, p. 19). Additionally, the employment of this method aims to free the object under investigation from a position of passivity that has change imposed upon it, to one of active participant and at times conscientious objector (Latour 1996). In other words, the Fortitude Valley mall is elevated to that of all other players, in that it is the experimental (bricks and mortar) site upon which the community safety experiment was undertaken.

Within this frame, this project initially seeks to respond to questions about the discursive constitution of community safety in Fortitude Valley. The Valley brings a long-held association with vice, drugs and homelessness. It became the symbol of one of the largest political, police and corruption scandals in Australia: the Fitzgerald Inquiry. It has a mythology that is central to and mobilises a number of interrelated networks, some still active—homelessness and public drug use—and some not so active—‘gangsters’ and organised crime. There are new networks actively operating in the area, the most relevant to this discussion is that of new businesses, gentrification and urban renewal. It is in this context that Fortitude Valley is being enticed into a new network of actors to be an active participant in its own rehabilitation. Through this frame the reform of antisocial behaviour and a move toward a community safety project (targeted at illicit drug use, crime and homelessness) in Fortitude Valley has an important role in this investigation. A problematisation requires, according to Foucault, an examination of the ‘set of discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and false, [these practices] constitute ... it as an object for thought’ (Foucault 1989, p. 296). In this instance the research aims to explore how the governance of antisocial behaviour *became* a reform priority at this historical moment and how the ‘problem’ of community safety was discursively constituted. The taken-for-granted nature of the need for reform in Fortitude Valley, which got taken up discursively at the beginning of this decade, was queried and reflected back upon as a means of examining its ‘make-up’.

In order to interrogate the history pertaining to this project (in its discursive rather than linear sense) at textual, discursive and material levels, documentary analysis will be applied systematically. This systematic examination is drawn from Foucault’s 1980 work *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*. In order to probe the economy of discourses that make up the reform strategies for Fortitude Valley, documents will be analysed with a view to establishing: ‘Who is doing the speaking? From which institutions? How do these institutions store and distribute the things said? and What forms of power are involved?’ (Silverman 1985, p. 85). In this instance these questions will be put to numerous government reports and policy documents or ‘texts without authors’ (Prior 1997), as a means through which the discourses of reform and community safety, which exist at an invisible arms length from the day-to-day

meanderings in Fortitude Valley, can be made visible. Because, as Callon and Law (2004) remind us, ‘Technologies and material arrangements distribute action and actors. The local is never local. A site is a place where something happens and actions unfold because it mobilises distant actants that are both absent and present’ (Callon & Law 2004, p. 6).

In undertaking a history of the imperative to reform the Valley, it is vital to gain a sense of how the site became endowed with its unerring reputation as the vice capital of Brisbane. The community safety project aimed to transform the Valley’s well-worn reputation as an unsafe place into a place that could/would be perceived as safe. Therefore the program was devised within and was contingent upon this reputation. In this context the ‘truth’ about the Valley that is manifest in its reputation as an unsafe place needs to be examined. The limitations of an examination of the history of this imperative is bound up in a dearth of sources and a lack of access to council and government documents relating to a history of the area from the 1900s onwards, as well as the rapid transformation of the area through an urban renewal program since 1992. In lieu of these limitations an examination of the contingencies and ‘conditions of possibility’ of the community safety project relies heavily on newspaper accounts, public documents, and accounts of urban trends locally, nationally and internationally. This data will allow the researcher to weave together a story of the Valley where the sources rarely divert themselves from a reinforcing dichotomous given—that is, that the Valley is a ‘bad’ place that is frequented by ‘bad’ people. It would be negligent to underestimate the presence of this ‘power/truth’ relationship in the interpretations regarding the problem of safety in the area. The mythology of the area as a site riddled with unsafety, which becomes evident in the development of the historical story, is crucial to the turn toward safety in the year 2000.

3.4 Discursive developments

Case Study: phase 3 (Chapter 5)

Aim 2. To unpack the rationalities that have developed and produced the current reform agenda

The next phase of the study also relies predominantly on documentary evidence produced by anonymous bureaucrats who operated deep within the system of government. Through a range of documents I will establish what kinds of devices bring different precursor objects and speech acts regarding the reform of Fortitude Valley into play. The justification for using documents at this level is based on the interpretation that ‘iterability encourages the development of critical and scientific thought. Writing also bolsters the development of rational systems of accounting and monitoring, and encourages close scrutiny of the ways in which we list and classify things’ (Prior 2003, p. 172). Or as Silverman suggests, ‘internal analysis must seek to establish and deconstruct the realities the text sets into play’ (Silverman 1985, p. 152). As such, governmental strategic plans and reports provide an important insight into the ‘realities that these texts set into play’. Documents produced by the Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drugs Taskforce (1998–1999); Urban Renewal Task Force (1992–2005); Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy 2000; and the Department of Families Strategic Plan 1999–2002 were drawn on for this phase of the case study. These documents have been selected on the basis that they put forward the arguments for place-based approaches to managing disadvantage and community safety in locations deemed to meet the criteria.

They map and outline the justification and ideas that become embroiled in the community safety network, not so much at a textual level but at the level of ideas, strategies, discursive production, and they locate where the Valley and the problem of safety get transported from, dissected and reorganised in situ. As Callon and Law (1997) state, ‘texts also reflect, are produced by, and help to create, a teeming world of entities’ (Callon et al., cited in Callon & Law 1997, p. 168). Together with the historical insights drawn together in phase 2 of the case study, these documents reveal the linkages necessary to undertake a general history of the reform process. In concert, they provide the starting point for investigating how the community safety program became an imperative and who and what were the key players. The analyses of documents in this research project are consistent with Prior’s ideas, that documents can be perceived as dynamic objects that operate beyond their apparent immanence. In *Using Documents in Social Research*, Prior (2003) states that

if we are to get to grips with the nature of documents then we have to move away from a consideration of them as stable, static and pre-defined artefacts.

Instead we must consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action. In fact, the status of things as ‘documents’ depends precisely on the ways in which such objects are integrated into fields of action, and documents can only be defined in terms of such fields (Prior 2003, p. 2).

Principally, the interrogation of documents is based on an understanding of them as a technology. Because ‘looking at documents as technology encourages us to think about how the technology is linked into productive relationships’ (Prior 2003, p. 172). As documents are

fields or networks of action, of course, [they] engage and involve creators (agents, writers, publishers and publicists and so on), users (readers or receivers) and settings. All three realms are implicated in the emergence of documentation (Prior 2003, p. 3).

The initial task will be to identify key words (buzz words) and to identify how roles and responsibilities are defined and positioned in the documents under analysis. A key component of this search will be to locate combinations of experts, combinations of knowledge and classification systems embedded in the discourse/s that are manifest in the documents. Simply, this research project will ‘chart the relationship between the sayable and the visible’ (Kendall & Wickham 1999, p. 26). This investigation will describe the technical organisational processes by which the documents were produced; under what conditions they were produced; according to the type of rule systems by which they were ordered and to identify the *kinds* of foreground and background actors involved (Kendall & Wickham 1999). Once these *orders* have been established, I will then endeavour to ascertain at which points certain ‘classificatory frameworks appear ... and disappear’ (Prior 1997, p. 68). Simply, this analysis will explain the knowledge/power relations that form the basis of a semblance of coherence for this particular community safety venture.

As such this commentary aims to ‘say for the first time [some of] what had, nonetheless, already been said’ (Foucault 1981, p. 58) by retracing the (dis)order and uncovering a number of subjugated discourses. This documentary analysis is not a search for deeper meaning, nor is it an attempt to situate the new speech acts in an overarching grand theory; it is rather an examination of the rule systems, discursive formations and discursive practices (Foucault 1972) that make up the Fortitude Valley urban reform rhetoric. In this way the method of analysis is distinct from an evaluation of the success or otherwise of the project.

While Foucault's method can illuminate discursive 'modes of ordering', according to Law (1994) in his book *Organizing Modernity*, this is not the full story. Law (1994) argues that modes of ordering are important, however 'we can't be very sure about what will happen when ordering modes butt up together, until we see how they perform themselves in practice' (Law 1994, p. 22). For Law this is the space between post-structuralism and symbolic interactionism, and it is 'an interesting place ... to tell stories about how agents or other effects dodge between and combine orderings modes, being both multiply constituted and multiply resourced' (Law 1994, p. 22). Law proposes that discourses should be utilised but reduced to residuals, for example:

we should treat it as a set of patterns that might be imputed to the networks of the social; ... we should look for discourses in the plural, not discourses in the singular; ... we should treat discourses as *ordering* attempts, not orders; ... we should explore how they are performed, embodied and told in different materials; and ... we should consider the ways in which they interact, change, or indeed face extinction" (Law 1994, p. 95, emphasis in original).

As Law states here, a discursive interrogation of the community safety project is an important component of the process of understanding attempts to create an ordered safe space from which strategies and ideas can be drawn and be actioned against the binary oppositional starting place - that of a place of un-safety.

This will be achieved through a documentary analysis that sees *documents as technology*. As Prior, in comparing document analysis to a libretto, states:

Taken on its own libretto rarely adds up to much. Text as narrative is often disjointed, repetitive and lacking in depth. I cannot think of a single one that would hold a person's attention as a gripping tale. Yet, a libretto is not intended to be analysed in isolation. It demands to be analysed in action. How it is integrated into the dramatic action on stage, how it relates to the melody and rhythm of the music, how it is called upon (recruited) and manipulated by the singers, how it is *performed* – all of these are of primary importance. Its substance as displayed on the inert page is of only secondary concern" (Prior 2003, p. 173).

Drawing from Prior's (2003) ideas that documentary analysis offers up a rich and active field of investigation, this phase of the investigation will focus predominantly on the historical and discursive actors that are being enticed into the local community safety project.

3.5 Translating community safety

Case Study: phase 4 (Chapter 6)

Aim 3. To explore, describe and explain how the community safety was operationalised

Once we have covered the domain of discursive formations and statements, once we have outlined their general theory, we can proceed to possible domains of application (Foucault 1972, p. 135).

The previous phase of the case study examined the background processes that uncovered the ‘conditions of possibility’ that are the knowledge and historical threads (Kendall & Wickham 1999, p. 37), that are prerequisite to the community safety project. This phase of the case study investigates: how community safety gets *done*; what does it take to make up this community safety project; and how does it become *translated* into an object that is capable of performing its prescribed role/s; that is, the way in which community safety became operationalised and fixed—or not. Attempts to translate the variants caught up in the community safety project occurred textually and materially, and operated interdependently and interrelationally.

The documentary evidence accessed throughout this phase of the case study was drawn from a range of sources, some of which are public documents, most of which were privileged to committee participants, of which I was one. It is prudent at this point to disclose my role in this process: as an alcohol and drug researcher working at a University; a member of the Board of Directors of Brisbane Youth Service, a large multifaceted youth service that was located in Fortitude Valley that works with homeless and disadvantaged young people; a local resident and a PhD candidate who was undertaking research about the process of community safety. My multifaceted role—that of a participant and of an observer/researcher—was disclosed at all levels of my participation as a member of the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee and as a representative of that committee in other forums.. I therefore had access to a broad set of documentation that covered the depth and breadth of resources produced throughout the community safety project.

Documentary evidence was sought from: working documents, reports and minutes from meetings and workshop proceedings of the three central committees in the community safety program. The data was produced by the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee, the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Committee, and the Place Management Committee (Inner City Place Team), which are described here:

Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) (2000–2004): A subcommittee of the Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC); initiated because of concerns arising from a perception that crime, homelessness and drug use in the area was escalating in Fortitude Valley. The subcommittee was tasked with responding to this problem through the gathering together of a range of stakeholders. The point of difference for this committee relative to the other players in the community safety project was that not only did it include local Council representatives, police and local business representatives, but also developers and welfare agencies, both government and non-government. Those individuals who presented the human face of the problem of community safety were characterised according to DSAS as marginalised and at-risk individuals who needed greater access to better coordinated support services. In this sense the participants in this group were advocating (not necessarily with consent) for the individuals that symbolised the collective community safety concern.

Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) (2000–2005): The aim of this group was based on enticing new consumers to businesses in the area. They strongly believed that the issue of safety was a deterrent for visitors to the area, in that for them Fortitude Valley's history of vice and corruption had left a deep impression in the minds of potential consumers. They believed that challenging popular perceptions of the Valley as an unsafe or risky place frequented by undesirables would have a positive outcome in this regard. The group existed only in relation to the problem of safety within this location.

Place Management Committee (became Inner City Place Committee – ICPMC) (2000–2005): The Queensland Government's contribution to locational disadvantage in the Valley. The formation of this committee represented the state's investment in local issues. The driving force for this committee came from the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care Queensland (eventually known as the Department of Communities). Policy and governance strategies promoted by this committee were drawn from the United Kingdom government's Third Way political agenda and will be discussed Chapter 5.

This phase of the case study attends to a weaving together of bits and pieces that in combination develop into a community safety project. Added to this fabric will be insights gleaned from documents regarding attempts at translating them into and stitching them into a network. Additionally this phase will highlight any apparent obstacles that may hinder the translation.

Translation principles

The analysis of the translation of community safety actors into an actual community safety object applies three basic methodological principles to the data. These methodological principles are drawn from the ‘sociology of translation’ (Callon 1986b) and provide an opportunity for the researcher to depart from already contrived theoretical interpretations, privileging of entities’ (or the researcher’s) point of view and boundary abstractions that have been built between analytic worlds. The principles are:

Agnosticism: the researcher must abstain from judging the way in which the actors analyse society and no point of view is privileged or censored;

Generalised Symmetry: a commitment to explain conflicting viewpoints in the same terms;

Free Association: must break down the heuristic barriers between natural and social events (Callon 1986b, pp. 196, 200–201).

Drawing from Callon (1986b) and Latour (2007), Farías (2010b) summarises the methodological principles of ANT, and in particular generalised symmetry, by stating that

generalized symmetry ... pleads for the use of a common conceptual repertoire to describe and analyse the relations between humans and non-humans ... This unveiling of hybrid chains of actants partaking of the social does not aim at deconstructing the social, but at understanding the associations that make up the social. The social is thus not a thing, but a type of relation or, better associations between things which are not social by themselves (Farías 2010b, p. 3).

Local associations are found at the points at which associations become momentarily fixed and where the associations must be interpreted in the same conceptual frame. Law (1994, p. 10) believes that symmetry is important because ‘you don’t want to start any investigation by privileging anything or anyone. And, in particular, you don’t want to start by assuming that there are certain classes of phenomena that don’t need to be explained at all.’ As well as adopting a negative-sum judgement regarding the superiority of some actors views relative to others, the researcher should stay

clear of judgements about their ‘truth or falsity’, because, ‘if you start off *assuming* that some knowledge is true and some false, then you never get to analyse how the distinction is constructed and used’ (Law 1994, p. 10, emphasis in original). Thus this style of interpretation ‘show[s] that one can question society at the same time as the actors and explain how they define their respective identities, their mutual margins of manoeuvre and the range of choices which are open to them’ (Callon 1986b, p. 201) in the same terms.

In summary, these principles allow the researcher to follow the ‘establishment and evolution of power relationships’ and to explain how compliance or dissent between a ‘complex web’ of actors, institutions and materialities is achieved (Callon 1986b, p. 201).

An additional device has been deployed alongside the above, to point to the contingency of moments of stability that are purported to be real, true and final. The activation of the literary device of irony reinforces the limits of a researcher’s final descriptions by notifying the reader that something other than what has been presented is, could and probably is not the final or definitive characterisation of the matter (Rorty, 1989). Additionally, it is a mechanism by which the researcher can point to the inherent contradictions and multi-faceted nature of power relationships participating in what has been reported.

“Irony reveals the limitation of a given Symbolic language, and thus makes possible the saying of that which exceeds it” (Miller 2009, p. 69).

Thus, as an alternative to undertaking traditional forms of critique of one thing or another; or, of one thing contrasted against another, the use of irony is a semiotic signpost for the reader to be suspicious of the truth claims made in the re-description (Rorty, 1989). The space that is opened up through the application of these principles to the data creates the rich field of study and interpretive work.

The operationalisation of the community safety project depended largely on the players’ commitment to simplifying the enormous complexities within which inner urban antisocial behaviour and community safety in Fortitude Valley was taking place. These complexities included homelessness, government welfare, Indigenous Australians’ dislocation and cultural alienation, gentrification, urban renewal, police,

licensing laws, the sex industry, a history of political and police corruption, mental health and needle and syringe programs, HIV and Hepatitis C among others. All of the above-mentioned objects are also only made tangible and visible within their own complex networks and multiple performances.

Latour's notion of a 'black box' or 'black boxing' is important here. Central to the successful translation of a network is the capacity of the actants to transport ideas about 'community' and 'safety' wholeheartedly without too much slippage and displacement (Law & Singleton 2000; Callon 1986b). 'A black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference the more elements one can place in black boxes—modes of thoughts, habits, forces and objects—the broader the construction one can raise' (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 285). In summary, it is argued that

a network which is relatively stabilised also tends to become an entity, a black box, a black box that translates the various materials that make it up. It translates them by co-ordinating them, by fronting for them, and by standing for them in a simple and coherent form. This means that for the moment the fronted network acts as a single unit. It does not fall apart. And (again for the moment) that it can be distinguished from its environment, distinguished as an object with its own consistent identity (Callon & Law 1997, p. 169).

If these coherences or black boxes become 'leaky' (Kendall & Wickham 1999, p. 74), then some or all of the building blocks (black boxes) that contain the reformation of safety in Fortitude Valley may start to erode and demolish the entire project. This can challenge the integrity of the object of community safety, which can unintentionally shift the project into an alternate agenda.

The local socio-technical actants who get embroiled in the community safety project can be captured at the site of their occasioning through the application of methodological tools designed to explore their passage. Akrich, Callon and Latour (2002) explain that socio-technical analysis starts from

where [the] innovation is situated, in this hard-to-grasp middle-ground where technology and the social environment which adopts it simultaneously shape each other. Since the outcome of a project depends on the alliances which it allows for and the interests which it mobilises, no criteria, no algorithm, can ensure success a priori. Rather than speak of the rationality of decisions, we need to speak of the aggregation of interests which decisions are capable or incapable of producing. Innovation is the art of interesting an increasing number

of allies who will make you stronger and stronger (Akrich, Callon & Latour 2002, p. 205).

The operationalisation of the Fortitude Valley reform process was captured through four interrelated moments in its translation. Through suspending the translation in these moments, one can explore the ‘tactics of translation’ (Law 1994, p. 101). These are outlined here, however it is important to note that the separation of these moments is an analytical device because ‘in reality’ these moments overlap (Callon 1986b).

Problematization

A problematisation generally comes from a set of documented formulated ideas that broadly outline the issues and define, in general terms, the intended goal/s. The authors of these types of proposals generally write themselves into the prescribed network of relationships necessary to the task/s, and therefore inevitably become crucial to the generation of a solution. This is understood as a double movement (Callon 1986b).

The problematisation under investigation here—that of community safety—rose to prominence through political and technical manoeuvrings that happened somewhere else. The result of the problematisation under scrutiny here was that the key protagonist, the Inner City Place Planning Team, rendered themselves ‘indispensable to the network’ (Callon 1986b, p. 204). This was achieved through continued refinement of the problem and the roles of the participants, which included key community groups—DSAS and FVBSG—as well as other actors. The Inner City Place Team, their agenda, process and program, came to be positioned as the ‘obligatory point of passage’ for the apparent achievement of mutual goals. The two aspects of the problematisation include (1) defining roles and identities, and (2) positioning roles within a structure that situated, in this case, the Place Team as the point of passage through which all must pass to achieve the joined-up goals (Callon 1986b, pp. 203–5).

Interessement

Callon (1986b) defines interessement as ‘the group of actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization’ (Callon 1986b, pp. 207–8). Devices (of varying forms, such as supporting literature and evidence from experts) are put in place to disrupt the potential luring of players into conflicting or alternate networks, put forward by competing actants. Akrich, Callon and Latour (2002) describe interessement this way:

The model of interessement sets out all of the actors who seize the object or turn away from it and it highlights the points of articulation between the object and the more or less organised interests which it gives rise to. The result of such a description is a socio-technical diagram which combines two categories which we are prone to separating: the technological analysis which limits itself to a description of the object *per se* and its intrinsic properties; the sociological analysis of the object, i.e. the environments within which it spreads and effects. If we want to distinguish between these two lines of analysis, we refrain from understanding the reasons behind the failure or success of an innovation (Akrich, Callon & Latour 2002, p. 205).

Interessement devices try to limit the network participants seeking out evidence that may diminish the validity of the goals of the proposer of the problematisation, in this case the Place Team. The aim of this process is to ‘interrupt all potential competing associations and to construct a system of alliances’ (Callon 1986b, p. 211). The interessement is analogous to a dance of seduction, which emulates a dynamic process of enticement and possible identity reorientation. It can involve brute force or be subtly instructive; the main indication of a successful interessement in this community safety project would be if the Valley—community, homeless people, DSAS, and the FVBSG—surrender all other enticements and agree to assume a role dedicated to them by the place team. It is worth noting that the ‘Valley’, which is the colloquial term for Fortitude Valley, has a well-publicised history of being corrupt and coveting enticements simultaneously from a number of players with competing agendas.

Enrolment

If the interessement is successful, enrolment is generally also achieved. The enrolment process ‘defines and distributes’ the interrelated roles that make up the

network and are the ‘result of multilateral negotiations during which the identity of the actors is determined and tested’ (Callon 1986b, p. 214). It is therefore the process of overcoming any forms of initial resistance and an acceptance of prescribed roles (Callon 1986b). For this project, the question is: can the Place Team distribute the roles and can the roles become embodied and activated in more durable entities (Law 1992)? For example, did the devised roles in the organisational structure of the Place program become active beyond merely its construction? Of course these are simultaneous processes and not always clearly discernable in separated moments. Evidence of the successful enrolment of the actants in the community safety project in the Valley would indicate that, for example, DSAS had been convinced to give up not only its previously devised and already activated agenda, but its so-called independence, and to enter into an ‘other’ role or version of it.

Mobilisation

Mobilisation transforms the enrolment into ‘active support’ (Callon 1986b, p. 218). In other words, the participants (selected to represent heterogeneous constituencies including materialities) commit to engage in the negotiations, agreeing, sometimes through passively not disagreeing, to speak through one voice that is likely to be someone else’s.

Accordingly, a network of relationships has been built (Callon 1986b), and an order has emerged from the disorder (Law 1992). It is important to note here that this is not the end of the translation, but merely signifies that the process has begun. It can however be disrupted (corrupted) at any stage beyond mobilisation.

Simply, the story of translation process entails following the threads of interactions and negotiations between humans and non-humans. These interactions are entered into and have the effect of creating mutual and common definitions and ‘margins of manoeuvres’ (Callon 1986b, p. 201). The ultimate success of the translation and the durability of the actor-network are related to the depth of and authenticity of the support for the alliance, evidenced through the orderliness in the new order/s.

The application of this analytic schema will allow the researcher to follow the Valley reform and community safety process beyond what was possible in the second and third phases of this case study. It will allow for an investigation of the internal mechanics of the reform process, without relating the findings to an already predetermined theoretical framework. An important component of this approach is that it does not dictate hierarchies between the social and the natural (material and/or technological) or between points of view presented by the actors. This is a key issue in the Valley mall, as disruption to the complete and successful endorsement and implementation of the reform packages may come from unexpected sources. An example of this was the introduction of blue fluorescent lights in café and public toilets in the Valley mall. These have been installed to deter injecting drug use. Far from being just another method of surveillance, the blue lights are as salient to the success of the reform process as the police, the drug user and the space. If the blue lights are deemed to be dissident in their duties and the injecting drug users negotiate a *way through* this technology, their enrolment and therefore the mobilisation may require re-evaluation. There is much riding on the successful translation of the blue lights, as a situational crime prevention strategy, and the currency given to this technology is indicative of the necessity for the social and the material (technological) to cooperate in the resolution of a variety of controversies.

Phase 4 of the case study has shifted the analysis into exploring attempts to cohere the key elements of the community safety project on the back of and in relation to the historic and discursive developments drawn out in phases 2 and 3. This part of the analysis will take account of the actors' journey into a 'new order'. This will be achieved by paying attention to the ways in which the ideas and goals become formalised, the roles get prescribed, the imperatives, the enticements, and the associations get made or not. Simply, the goal of this phase of the study will be to tell the story of how and under what circumstances the actors became embroiled in the community safety project. The next part of this phase will attend to the idea of *performance*: how community safety gets performed.

3.6 Performances: in for one, in for all ...

Case Study: phase 5 (Chapter 7)

Aim 4. To describe some of what was left over after the project was dismantled

This phase of the case study takes as a point of departure ‘the assumption ... that while we may live in multiple social worlds, we live in a single natural or material reality’ (Law 2007, p. 600). As was discussed in the previous chapter and in the section above, if everything becomes flattened out and the heuristic devices that separate the various worlds methodologically are removed, then what is left is knowledge and reality, epistemology and ontology. ‘Knowledge, a solution to the problem of epistemology, grows out of and helps to perform the material realities with which it interacts’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 7). The contention by STS adherents is that both what we know and what is real are performed in the same moments, and that within this space there are both presences and absences. To speak about performances of ‘reality’ is different from speaking about perspectivism and constructivism (Mol 1999). In the domain of perspectivism, many eyes see ‘a singular reality’ from diverse standpoints, and the battle lies in the argument about whose perspective is more valid or of more value than the *others* (Mol 1999, pp. 75–6). The constructionist approach dedicates its efforts to revealing how ‘what is’ came to be; that ‘what is’ is only thus because of often less obvious and non-intentional contingencies rather than a well-ordered execution (Mol 1999, pp. 76–7). Distinctively when one thinks in terms of performance—it is reality that gets performed. The STS contention is that

practices are *detectable and somewhat ordered sets of material-semiotic relations*. To study practices is therefore to undertake the analytical and empirical task of exploring possible patterns of relations, and how it is that these get assembled in particular locations. It is to treat the real as whatever it is that is being assembled, materially and semiotically in a scene of analytical interest. Realities, objects, subjects, materials and meanings, whatever form they take, these are all explored as an effect of the relations that are assembling and doing them. Practices then, are assemblages of relations. Those assemblages *do* realities. Realities, including the incidental collateral realities, *are inseparable from the patterning juxtapositions of practices* (Law 2009b, pp. 2–3, emphasis in original).

The eloquence of Law’s arguments is in contrast to how difficult it is to put on a performance of reality, in that ‘realities and knowledge cannot capriciously be

performed into being’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 4) as it ‘is not possible to perform anything into being: the performances of reality have limits, that not all performances are successful’ (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 5). This is because performances are ‘difficult to put on unless they build on the networks that are already in place ... for if different realities are being performed into being – and especially if those realities are about the ‘the same’ object, then we are likely to find that there are endless problems of co-ordination’ (Law & Singleton 2000, pp. 4–6).

Law and Singleton’s research examined the coordination, or lack thereof, of alcoholic liver disease (ALD) in a number of settings. It was through the analytic schema of performance that they were able to make some sense of the way ALD was administered (performed) both in a large hospital setting and within community settings. They interpreted attempts at coordination and ordering within large and complex institutions, in different locations, supposedly treating the same health concern. Importantly, they revealed that the problem of coordination was related to slippage and displacement regarding the type of alcoholic liver disease that was being performed in different settings.

In general, this does not however imply that realities are operating independently of each other, but that a multiplicity of realities ‘may clash at some points, elsewhere the various performance of an object may *collaborate* and even *depend* on one another’ (Mol 1999, p. 83, emphasis in original). It gets performed differently in different performances; different performances operate simultaneously in absences and in presence—there are ‘different *versions* of the object’ (Mol 1999, p. 77).

Similarly, the community safety project under investigation is concerned with order, coordination and performance. The community safety project in the Valley attempts in a very deliberate, planned and coordinated way to bring all of the things that fit under the umbrella of ‘unsafe’ into one overarching categorisation. Community safety needs to be performed, in its totality, to deal with the problem of unsafety (complex social problems). From a commonsense perspective—it is not unrealistic to infer that community safety is by its very conceptualisation attending to disorder, messiness, deviance, unpredictability and *otherness* operating in opposition to what the dominant view of responsible citizenship is deemed to be. So the task of the

community safety project was to bring into order a way of knowing the problem of unsafety that could be coherent, consumed administratively and in reality.

Community safety in Fortitude Valley gets institutionally and materially dispersed throughout a network. Therefore the relevance of employing analytic methods that start from the premise that not only is the problem of ‘safety’ unlikely to be one thing but that possibly it may be many things—not just different perspectives related to a single object. To illuminate the performance/s of community safety in Fortitude Valley, the project will employ strategies suggested by Law (2009b) in his paper titled ‘Collateral Realities’. He recommends that in order to perceive the various performances, one must:

First attend to *practices*. Look to see what is being done. In particular, attend empirically to how it is being done: how the relations are being assembled and ordered to produce objects, subjects and appropriate locations. Second, wash away the assumption that there is a reality out there beyond practice that is independent, definite, singular, coherent, and prior to that practice. Ask, instead, how it is that such a world is *done* in practice, and how it manages to hold steady. Third, ask how this process works to *delete* the way in which this sense of a definite exterior world is being done, to wash away the practices and turn representations into windows on the world. Four, remember that wherever you look whether this is a meeting hall, a talk, a laboratory, or a survey, there is *no escape from practice*. It is practices all the way down, contested or otherwise. Five, look for the gaps, the aporias and the tensions between the practices and their realities – for if you go looking for *differences* you will discover them’ (Law 2009b, p. 12).

Therefore, as was mentioned above, the first elucidation of a network analysis is to deploy methods that expose associations that get drawn together and ‘translated’ into the object of community safety. This phase of the case study asks questions of the data about how the community safety project gets performed. The object of community safety is a contested space (Law 2009b), thus it is a political space. It is also a space where reality gets performed, and perhaps multiple versions of reality. Indeed there will also by extension likely be ‘collateral realities’ (Law 2009b). As Mol (1999, p. 86) states, “‘Ontological politics’ suggests a link between the real, the conditions of possibility we live with, and the political’.

This analysis of the community safety project operates simultaneously with the evolution of the project under investigation. As such it creates another version of the story that is not more or less real than the other one.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodological direction of this research project. This chapter builds on the issues raised in the previous chapter regarding the limitations of much of the research on urban space and its reliance on both modernist and post-modern interpretations of the world. It was proposed that an understanding of the world that overcomes some of these obstacles may be more relevant to the development of the object under investigation here.

Phase 2 of the case study emphasises bringing to front of stage a number of the historical developments regarding Fortitude Valley and the various reform agendas and controversies that it became embroiled in over many decades. The aim of this phase of the case study is to paint a picture of some of the historical contingencies that preceded and set the tone for the way in which the reform agenda became realised.

Phase 3 of the case study undertakes an interrogation of key government agendas that set up knowledge sequences that make their way into the community safety project. This section of the analysis examines the way in which social problems become orientated through a discursive regime that picks up some of the historical threads mentioned in the previous phase.

Phase 4 follows the community safety project through moments of its translation into a network. This phase of the case study focuses attention on the ways and means by which a protagonist sets in train a series of strategies to entice a number of previously dispersed elements into one frame according to a problematisation about the problem of safety and the solution to the problem of safety.

Phase 5 moves beyond the translation phase to sites of performance. Following the object, community safety, into modes of performance is the central story of this part of the analysis. At this level community safety becomes a case of political ontology/s, in that it draws out the contested nature of the object and pays attention to the idea that it might also be multiple.

This chapter discussed the contention that in the merging of a power/truth discursive association there are a range of background/s, contingencies or existing networks that are built on to derive the community safety project; as such it attends to some of the ‘conditions of possibility’ of the community safety project through exploring an understanding of the present, historically and discursively and through orders, associations and performances.

The next chapter attends to phase 2 of the case study. The historical version of the story concentrates on the development of an agenda of reform that had been attempted on numerous previous occasions and only became realised on the back of a state-wide political controversy that had as its symbolic centre Fortitude Valley. The history brings the story to the point where the issue of reform cohered into the community safety project in the year 2000.

Chapter 4: Producing another historical truth for Fortitude Valley

Case Study: phase 2

4.1 Introduction

As a means of locating one of the main narratives that is crucial to the web of elements circulating through Fortitude Valley, this chapter explores some of the historical instances that formulated into the necessity for reform in the area. The desire for reform in Fortitude Valley had been indicated by a number of stakeholders, which included developers at points along the historical trajectory, however in most instances almost nothing manifested. A network of reform established stability in the area after Fortitude Valley got caught up in a political controversy that resulted in the exposure of corruption on a large scale and the incarceration of a number of high-level politicians and high-ranking police. The area had been a centre of vice in Brisbane and stereotypically drugs, money, dealers, pimps, sex workers, mugs and corruption became the stabilising core and the justification for the necessity of reform in the 1990s. In addition, the area had been struggling to retrieve its previously bad reputation as a consumer alternative to the central business district. The beginning of the reform process centered on closing off arterial roads and creating a public mall (Fortitude Valley mall) and the next major action related to a massive ‘urban renewal’ program. The urban reform program’s main strategy was to redevelop the industrial sites and ‘run down’ residences into modern living, shopping and eating domains. The aim was to incite a different demographic, both residents and consumers, into this revamped inner city location.

The data used for this chapter is predominantly drawn from the commercial print media’s portrayal of the issues and day-to-day goings-on in the Valley. In addition, academic and government sources (local and international) that discuss trends in urban life that were being mirrored or replicated in Fortitude Valley where also drawn upon.

4.2 A history of the Valley: an accumulated truth

Kings Cross is both a real place and a state of mind (Sayer & Nowra 2000, p. xv).

The truth is that Fortitude Valley is nothing like Beirut. It is not even very much like Kings Cross, merely Brisbane's closest equivalent. It is not even really a valley, either—more the side of a hill (Dickie 1989, p. 8).

Producing a history of a place revered as a booming commercial district and mythologised through its dark side is a venture that contains both some facts and some fiction. Fortitude Valley appears to be a site of hope, anguish and something that may be awkwardly understood as an urban maturation indicator, in as much as its mere existence is evidence that Brisbane is a city mature enough to *produce* a dark or another side. Sentiments such as the following give credibility to this view.

Clearly, Greater Brisbane is well on the way to becoming a metropolis in its own right and the city will have to face up to the problems that go hand in hand with metropolitan status (Toms, c. 1972, p. 1).

Accordingly, there was a tendency in some of the literature produced in the 1960s and 1970s to exaggerate the slum-like and degenerative qualities of 'the Valley' in accordance with other more-established Australian cities, such as Sydney and Melbourne. It is possible to draw from these exaggerations a desire to promote the seedy side of Brisbane to accord its maturity as a 'booming' metropolis with that of other more-populated cities.

Seeley (1967), while producing an argument that is largely a political economy of the slum, draws out a number of the points that I am alluding to here. Seeley believes that for the 'elites', an inner urban slum (in the American context) is as much a 'social necessity' as an 'adequate, centralized, and appropriately located medical center' (Seeley 1967, p. 109). Seeley explicitly presents a supply/demand argument in that 'vice' that is often seen as concomitant with slums is generally only affordable to the 'middle classes' and that 'to the degree that these services are highly specialized ... there seems no economically appropriate locus for them too far from the core of the central city proper' (Seeley 1967, p. 109). While 'wiping out' the slum and therefore the vice may well, on the authority of urban planners, be in the 'public interest', this ideal Seeley argues does not account for the fact that 'slum dwellers' themselves have also heavily invested in the area (Seeley 1967, pp. 109–

10). Taking the basic tenets of Seeley's ideas, one can easily reposition them and elucidate a different type of discussion on the *productive* value of the slum, one that theoretically aligns itself within post-structuralism. Consequently, the application of a different perspective could draw out the tensions between the dark side (the *otherness*) as a point of departure from the 'other side' of Brisbane. This enables Fortitude Valley to be analysed as a dynamic site of *otherness* that is productively related to the rest of Brisbane, rather than a static site that has historically and continues to be mundanely tasked with being an inner urban 'crime hot spot'. This post-structuralist analysis of the area affords an historical discussion of Fortitude Valley that explores its so-called seediness through a more positive and productive frame.

An unexpected outcome of researching a history of the Valley has been that there are few comprehensive academic accounts of developments in the area since the arrival of white settlers in 1849. Along with there being very few sources that offered an overview of the early history of the area, there is a dearth of academic reference material on the area, in particular from the 1900s onward. Newspapers, in particular the *Courier-Mail*, Brisbane's only daily newspaper, and a small number of issue-specific publicly available reports have therefore provided the bulk of the data sources for the following section. Notwithstanding these limitations, a brief historic examination of the area reveals some of the origins of a current reform agenda. Thus the reform network that developed throughout the 1990s provided a stable grid through which other logics such as community safety could be cleaved.

4.3 Bad people, bad places

Urban blight involves land, buildings and people (Parsons 1967, p. 101).

Controversy surrounded the process of recruiting and subsequent arrival of Rev. Dr Dunmore Lang's Protestant migrants, who arrived from Britain on the ship the SS *Fortitude* in 1849. Upon the arrival of these hand-picked white settlers the then secretary for the colonies, Earl Grey, denied Lang and his migrants the previously declared assistance, which included rations and accommodation. As a concession the government allowed the settlers to camp in the Yorks Hollow close to what is now Gregory Terrace. In time some of them moved to Bell's Valley, which was located

between New Farm and Newstead. The migrants became synonymous with the area and it soon became known as Fortitude Valley (Holthouse 1978). These settlers, together with subsequent arrivals to the area, were 'chosen well' (Holthouse 1978, p. 102). They were

industrious, capable, and used to making their own way in the world, they quickly established themselves in the community by their own efforts and brought to it a spirit of self sufficiency and enterprise which was to be felt for many years to come (Holthouse 1978, p. 102).

Within thirty years of the settlement of new arrivals, Fortitude Valley and surrounding areas were well populated and a rail link between the city and Fortitude Valley was operational by 1891. The Valley started to be transformed from the farming community of Lang's settlers to a place that became increasingly bound up in commerce and trade. Indications of the demographic diversity that existed in the area was evident in the zone designation that was bestowed on Fortitude Valley towards the end of the 19th century. According to the zoning models applied in the late 1800s, Fortitude Valley fell within Zone II (Lawson 1973). Characterised as a 'zone in transition',

the section between the city centre and the river was the most notorious part of Brisbane ... Beyond Elizabeth Street lay 'the worst part of the city ... the Chinese quarter and that of an even more undesirable class of people' (Brisbane *Courier*, 29 March 1900, cited in Lawson 1973, p. 108), the centre of prostitution and illegal gambling. Many of the buildings here were run down and unsanitary; for example, during the cleaning campaign which accompanied the plague scare of 1900 an inspector ordered that 5 tenements be destroyed where there was great stench emanating from the drains blocked for years (Lawson 1973, p. 108).

In spite of and in contrast to the apparently negative features of the area, Lang's settlers continued to be historically revered for the impact they had on establishing Fortitude Valley as a successful business district in its own right. In 1968 a published speech delivered by the president of the Valley Business Council stated:

One hundred and nineteen years ago a little company of English migrants arrived by ship 'Fortitude' and established their own little settlement in what is now 'THE VALLEY', and they lived to see the day when they were numbered among the most honoured and respected of Brisbane's citizens ... Today this important centre – aptly named Fortitude Valley – is monument to the courage, initiative, foresight and enterprise of the pioneers who first dwelt here and those who built well and truly upon the foundations they laid (Valley Business Council 1968).

The president, Lambert, is referring to the massive growth that took part in the area in the thirty years since the arrival of Lang's migrants.

Photograph 3: Queensland Card Collectors Society, Edco Series No.1246 printed postcard (c. 1890).



Flooding on the southside enhanced the Valley's growth and its recognition as a viable business district. The Fortitude Valley shopping centre developed significantly during the 1890s and it became the largest retail centre outside of the central business district during the ensuing decade. Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1967) who belonged to the Chicago School produced significant work on the City in 1925 and developed a means for studying the processes of organization and expansion in the city. Park et al (1967) developed a method of concentric circles that marked out zones within cities and sites of expansion. Within these zones they marked out typical 'types' of inhabitants relative to the different zones, such as; industry clusters residential areas and slums and ghettos. Lawson (1973) drawing largely from this work described expansion from the CBD and the development of transitional zones which in the Park et al (1967) model included slums and ghettos.

In Brisbane while the CBD maintained its distinctiveness from residential areas during the 1890s, Fortitude Valley and surrounding areas remained densely

residential (Lawson 1973). Even as aspects of the residential areas in Fortitude Valley displayed some of the traits of a slum, Brisbane's relative immaturity as a city, compared to Sydney and Melbourne, precluded 'zones in transition' from this type of classification (Lawson 1973). Fortitude Valley was described by Lawson (1973) as a 'deteriorating area', which exhibited the manifest juxtaposition of rival inhabitants that included industrial, retail and working-class residential (Lawson 1973, p. 108) and by the 1960s its popularity as a thriving commercial district began to decline (BCC 2002).

The negative portrayal of inner urban characteristics and their realisation in the public domain, predominantly through the media, were bolstered by the arrival from other industrialised cities of the image of the 'larrikin'. The larrikin was broadly defined as 'an inner urban working class "youth" or more specifically a member of a street gang' (Lawson 1973, p. 237). They lived in 'inner city working class cottages and perceived the street as their playground' (Lawson 1973, p. 237). As with Brisbane's relative infancy with regard to the issue of urban degradation, the necessary foundation for the full realisation of the 'larrikin push' was also trivial in comparison to Sydney and Melbourne. This did not however dampen the desire of the media to build on these early foundations. Lawson sums up this tendency:

While there is ample evidence that Brisbane possessed the true type [of larrikin], the prevalence of larrikins and larrikinism was exaggerated by the local newspapers and the public, who had been oversensitive by the publicity the phenomenon had received in the south. Very often the term was applied loosely to refer to any group of working-class youths walking the streets. Furthermore, exaggerated rumours and reports of the activities of the true larrikins quickly earned them a notorious reputation which they did not entirely deserve (Lawson 1973, p. 237).

Despite these 'exaggerations', concern over the public visibility of the 'larrikin gangs' in 'almost every vacant spot in the city' (Brisbane *Courier* 1901, cited in Lawson 1973, p. 238) is an early example of the contested nature of Fortitude Valley. Even though the larrikins were only involved in 'petty thieving', infighting and gambling, by the 'end of the decade larrikinism began to receive publicity as a serious social problem' (Lawson 1973, p. 238). Thus during the last decade of the 19th century the larrikin provided the public face of deviance for inner urban areas of Brisbane that were categorised as 'zones in transition', such as Fortitude Valley. In contrast to the apparent seriousness of this 'social problem', Finucan, (c. 1996)

reflecting on her 'daily life' as a resident in Fortitude Valley during the 1930s, indicated that 'security had no place in the average householder's scheme of things ... No unpleasant experiences occurred to any of us in the Valley' (Finucan c. 1996, pp. 3–4).

The case of Fortitude Valley and the sedimentation of its identity as an urban site in need of 'reform' is arguably underpinned by the coalescence of at least two dominant and imported discourses. On the one hand, the development of a localised version of the larrikin. The 'larrikin' replete with criminal associations and romantic characterisations, seems to have been originally imported from the United Kingdom. On the other hand, beliefs about the dangers associated with inner urban decay. Immersing oneself in the social milieu of inner urban sites had the capacity to unduly influence the moral fortitude of an individual and therefore *society* at large. These ideas are synonymous with conservative reformers from the United States (Lubove 1967, p. 21). They argued that 'slums impair social values by causing crime and delinquency, ill health, or exorbitant municipal expenditures' (Dean 1967, p. 26).

An example of the link between human danger and environmental decay in inner urban sites is presented by Rainwater (1967). He argued that the 'lower class who live in inner urban slum dwellings ... experience dangers from two sources, human and non-human' (Rainwater 1967, p. 443-444). Rainwater presents a taxonomy of dangers in the lower class home and environs. Accordingly, each of these can involve physical, interpersonal and moral consequences' and at a human level they can provide 'attractive alternatives that wean oneself or valued others away from a stable life' (Rainwater 1967, p. 444). Previously Parsons reflected that the literature was rife with attempts to link 'urban blight with crime, mental ill health, land economics and architecture'. Despite this he argued that 'the causal relationships between blight and these problems [had] not yet clarified mainly because of the complexity of the subjects' (Parsons 1967, p.95).

By 1976, this type of argument was being presented from a different angle. Relph, in his book *Place and Placelessness*, argued 'that there are profound psychological links between people and the places they live in and experience' (Relph 1976). Even though Relph presented a semi-romantic position implicitly informed by

anthropological/psychological theory, it still promoted, perhaps ironically, a type of thinking that lends itself to sustaining the link between ‘bad places and bad people’.

In spite of attempts to reframe the associations, there continued to be reliance upon a seemingly productive recursive relationship between ‘bad people and bad places’.

An example related to Fortitude Valley is provided by the *Sunday Mail*:

‘Valley becomes a danger spot’

Fortitude Valley has become a miniature Kings Cross, with liquor, music and girls until 3 a.m. daily – and serious bashings several times a week ... Inspector Foley [of the Valley CIB] said many more muggings occurred than were reported to the police. ‘If you were married and out on the town unknown to your wife, full of grog, and you got rolled [in the Valley], would you go to the police?’ he asked ... ‘These blokes visit a reputable place until 1 a.m., get a skinfull and when the place closes they head for the Valley ... [W]hen you get grog, girls and music invariably there will be an undesirable element,’ Inspector Foley added. (*Sunday Mail* 1979)

This example promoted the link between physical (environmental) decay (Fortitude Valley represented as a deteriorating place) and social/moral decay (negative influence of vice on ‘outsiders’ who frequent the Valley). In blunter terms, the duality ‘bad places and bad people’ is synonymous, contagious and alive and well in Fortitude Valley. The contrast between the seedy characteristics (real and/or exaggerated) of some of the residential enclaves, the prevalence of vice and associated activities (real and/or exaggerated) and a once-held eminence as a commercial district has seemingly laid the historical and rhetorical foundation that reinforced a certain truth about Fortitude Valley.

4.4 Reform, rehabilitate and revitalise: constructing new truths or reinforcing old ones

Beautification schemes are at present being developed for the area and it is interesting to record that in a recent analysis upwards of 40% of total retail sales in the inner city of Brisbane are made in “THE VALLEY” (Valley Business Council 1968).

The perception of Fortitude Valley as a sleazy, lower-class suburb known best for its gambling dens and brothels may be just a memory if the Remm Group Ltd has its way (Smith 1988, p. 12).

A \$70 million redevelopment of the old McWhirters building in the Valley should be ready in time for a Christmas opening ... Recently Brisbane City Council approved in principle a \$62 million Valley development, incorporating a 400-room hotel (Dibben 1989, p. 4).

Social and economic changes associated with the post World War II period ‘were influencing peoples views regarding the inner city, and these areas increasingly became considered “undesirable” by sections within the community’ (Boarding House Action Group 1997, p. 3). By the 1970s it was widely recognised that the Valley’s status as a commercial hub had dramatically declined. Suburbanisation lured families away from inner urban residences through the realisation of the ‘great Australian dream’ (Boarding House Action Group 2000, p. 15), and inner city areas became characterised as ‘low cost rental housing areas’ (Boarding House Action Group 1997, p. 3). De-institutionalisation during the 1970s, which prompted the relocation of residents formerly housed in government-run psychiatric institutions, contributed to the changing demographics of inner city areas such as Fortitude Valley. ‘The demographic changes occurring both within the inner city community and the local boarding house population were contributing to an increase in stigma and the social marginalisation of many people living within the suburbs of inner city Brisbane’ (Boarding House Action Group 1997, p. 3). At the same time Fortitude Valley was cementing its identity as ‘vice central’.

A review of the print media’s reportage and depiction of Fortitude Valley over the last 30 to 40 years reveals themes and predictions about the area. One prominent theme is that of the need for and desire to ‘reform’ the area. And reform seemed to be generally characterised by tensions related to what Fortitude Valley ‘was’, what it ‘is’ and what some stakeholders ‘want it to be’. A dominant theme present in these tensions is a desire to return Fortitude Valley to the booming commercial centre that rivalled the central business district for three-quarters of a century up until the 1960s (BCC 2002). For example, assorted headlines in the *Courier-Mail* read: ‘Real estate interest in Valley high: MASSIVE re-development of the Valley business centre has been forecast for the next 10 years’ (*Courier-Mail* 1972); ‘\$100 million plan for new-look Valley: A \$100 million real estate development, one of the biggest ever in Queensland is planned for Brisbane’s Fortitude Valley’ (*Sunday Sun* 1977).

The Valley Business Council, in its promotion of the idea for a plaza over the Brunswick Street railway station, argues that ‘the Valley has been, and will be a vital part of Brisbane City life’ (*Courier-Mail* 1979, p. 22).

These proposals and promises about the future characterise the reform rhetoric that was circulating about Fortitude Valley from the late 1960s onward. The proposals promised progress and a lucrative future for Fortitude Valley. The promises are imbued with a nostalgia that seems to have been partially constructed through a moral history of the area and a competitiveness set up between the Valley and the central business district. In the first instance the subtext of many of the proposals and reportage suggest that the Valley *used to be great* before the ‘lower-classes’ became a visually dominant aspect of life in Fortitude Valley. The lower classes, according to this reading, were clearly synonymous with the degradation of the area economically and socially, as well as morally. However, in spite of the promises of redevelopment throughout the 1970s, the agenda to revitalise the area was not taken up in the broader public or political arenas. A decade on, stories appearing in the print media regarding the undesirability of the area took a much blunter tone. For example:

In more recent years the Valley’s image has succumbed to the 80’s look. It has been described as the ‘King’s Cross’ of Brisbane, the home of illegal casinos, prostitutes and a high crime rate (*Courier-Mail* 1982).

Beattie seeks facelift for sleazy Valley ... He wants the Valley rid of ‘sleazy peep shows’ and for the area to be made safe for people to take their families (*Sun* 1989, p. 10).

Revamp for sex and sleaze Valley: REDEVELOPMENT of Brisbane’s red-light area, Fortitude Valley, will begin next month with the closure of Brunswick Street to traffic (Rankin 1989, p. 51).

In a style that appears to incorporate the above sentiments as well as setting the tone of a reform agenda for the future, the Remm Group (McWhirters Marketplace redevelopment) called on the government ‘to assist in returning Brisbane’s “Kings Cross” to the “splendour” of 30 years ago, when almost 40c of every dollar spent in Brisbane was spent in the Valley’ (Hudson 1989).

Mr Dennis Lee, marketing manager of the Remm Group, while presenting at a seminar on the future of Fortitude Valley is reported as saying that ‘the area was an embarrassment, with sometimes more drunks than public seating could cater for and, according to recent reports, “more used syringes in Valley planter boxes than there are plants”’ (Hudson 1989). Further, Lee describes the public spaces in Fortitude Valley as a ‘combat zone’, nonetheless believing that ‘the Valley’s proximity to the

CBD made it ideal not only for retail and residential redevelopment but also for office redevelopment or refurbishment' (Hudson 1989).

In the same article, a representative from the Brisbane City Council's Development and Planning Department, believed that 'the amount of vacant and unoccupied land [available in the Valley] offered a special *window of opportunity* to stimulate the *recovery* of the Valley, affected by a "crisis of confidence" which had a *psychological effect* on development and investment' (Hudson 1989, emphasis added). In other words 'rehabilitation' was required to restimulate interest in and *progress* for the area. The reform rhetoric in Fortitude Valley continued to be maintained through the competitive consumer dynamic that had been set up decades earlier between it and the central business district, as well as through their geographical proximity. Simply, the identity of Fortitude Valley seems to be historically produced and reproduced and recursively maintained during the 1970s and 1980s via unending proposals aimed at reformation. These sustained attempts at promoting rehabilitation, which received reinforcement in the public domain, cemented an easily identifiable discourse about Fortitude Valley that was ordered through the relational semiotics of the badness of the people and the contagion in the space/place. By the end of the 1980s Fortitude Valley's reputation for 'badness' could no longer be separated from the human and non-human elements that 'made it up'.

Regardless of, or perhaps because of, an inability to retrieve the heterogeneous elements that had become historically cohered into a stable network, the reform agenda started to gather momentum. Reformers with one eye on the past and one on the future managed to produce a power/knowledge complex in the form of a Valley revitalisation strategy that was not necessarily new but was gaining legitimacy and coalescing into a network. The reformers, the Valley Business Council, Brisbane City Council and Remm, were enthused and motivated by the idea that 'The Valley' was imbued with *untapped potential* and it was the aim of the reformers to locate it, develop it and market it.

What had been missing in the past was a state-based political agenda that enabled the revitalisation and reform process to be actualised.

4.5 Trends in urban renewal

Once upon a time ... we thought that if we could only get our problem families out of those dreadful slums then Papa would stop taking dope, Mama would stop chasing around, and Junior would stop carrying a knife. Well, we've got them in a nice new apartment with modern kitchens, and a recreation centre. And they're the same bunch of bastards they always were (Seligman, cited in Parsons 1967, p. 102).

Virtually uncontrolled decisions by private investors govern most of the development of Australia's urban areas. In deciding where to build factories, shopping centres and housing estates, private investors need take into account neither the capital cost of those services which public authorities provide nor the social cost which communities incur as a consequence of accumulated urban blight and unplanned urban sprawl (Whitlam 1969, p. 7).

The pace of change is five years ahead of schedule – initial estimates suggested it would take the city about 20 years to deliver \$4 billion [sic] of urban renewal projects (Marx 2001, p. 46).

Historically, urban 'blight' and 'redevelopment' underpinned all discussions on urban development in Australia (Troy 1967, p. xv). In the latter half of the 1960s, Gough Whitlam and others recognised that 'Australia was the most urban of nations' (Whitlam 1969, p. 4), and as such were attempting to put urban redevelopment and planning on the Commonwealth Government's agenda. Using the rhetoric of the director of the Canadian Institute of Urban Research as exemplary, Whitlam supported the belief that 'building cities is by far the most difficult, complex and majestic thing that men do. In this we come nearest in scale to what God does in creating the stars, the hills and the forests' (Whitlam 1969, p. 5). Following from this, Whitlam argued that 'Australians must learn to appreciate the direct and intimate relevance of [the Canadian Institute's] vision [of the city] to their daily lives' (Whitlam 1969, p. 5). He argued that in Australia the post-war period was marked by a lost opportunity to 'reshape our existing cities' (Whitlam 1969, p. 4). He believed this lost opportunity resulted in 'Australia's cities increasingly coming to exhibit all the problems of America's cities except the overtly racial problem' (Whitlam 1969, p. 4). According to Bellush and Hausknecht (1967) 'the American city grew in a more or less uncontrolled fashion, for it developed in a political and social climate of *laissez-faire* liberalism' (Bellush & Hausknecht 1967, p. xiii). This gave rise to

a catalogue of problems that are among the stable clichés of the society: substandard and deteriorating housing; air and water pollution; urban sprawl; monstrous traffic jams. But the city is also a community, and it too has been affected by a history of, as it were, absentminded growth. Waving through the

preoccupations with the physical problems of the city is a consciousness of the social ills besetting the community: crime, delinquency, addiction, racial conflict, the flight of the middle classes (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1967, p. xiii).

The response to these urban dilemmas was a universal cry that ‘something must be done’; one response has been urban renewal (Bellush & Hausknecht 1967, p. xiv). By 1954 the United States had set up an Advisory Committee on Housing to facilitate a ‘broad and comprehensive’ approach to address ‘urban decay’. This committee introduced a new term: *urban renewal*. This model shifted the direction of addressing urban decay from the ‘bulldozer’ to the ‘rehabilitation of houses’ and ‘conservation of neighbourhoods’ (Bellush & Hausknecht 1967, p. 15). Jacobs writing about cities in 1962 describes urban renewal projects in the American cities. Jacobs (1962) contends that in terms of the outcomes of urban renewal programs they

At best, [] merely shifts slums from here to there, adding its own tincture of extra hardship and disruption, At worst, [they] destroy[] neighbourhoods where constructive and improving communities exist and where the situation calls for encouragement rather than destruction (Jacobs, 1962, p. 284).

In 1966, the Australian National University held a Joint Urban Seminar on Urban Redevelopment in Australia. Parsons, a participant in the seminar, warned of a lack of rigour in the adoption of urban renewal as an isolated planning strategy to address urban blight in Australia. He argued:

Urban renewal consists of the manipulation of clearance and redevelopment, rehabilitation, and conservation techniques. Its contribution to human use and enjoyment depends upon the efficiency of its integration into the ecology of the city. It is an important sector in community planning, but cannot succeed in the vacuum of its own immediacy. The renewal of our cities has not really commenced. There is time for vigorous and dedicated study, to avoid the costly errors of the first fumbling attempts at urban renewal (Parsons 1967, p. 94).

Parsons believed that the relationship between ‘disease’ and ‘cure’ in the urban setting was substantively and theoretically deficient, and that an underdeveloped definition of ‘urban blight’ would contribute to the implementation of an ineffective ‘treatment’ for urban blight. Additionally, he stated that an uncoordinated approach by a group of heterogeneous professionals further undermined a program of effective urban renewal. He argued that ‘the preoccupation of the various disciplines with their separate, beloved areas of study, has provided major barriers in the consideration of the problem of urban blight’ (Parsons 1967, p. 101). In summary he contended that

‘the major work of the next few decades in the field of human ecology must surely be to seek accommodation and communication on blight, in whichever novel systems of research and action they are to be found’ (Parsons 1967, p. 108). By 1978, the Commonwealth Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development in Australia produced its first report on four local urban renewal demonstration research projects run by the Urban Renewal Task Force. In an attempt to define urban renewal, the department reported:

The urban renewal concept is usually applied to situations of environmental decline which offer potential for improvement. In the past this potential has been seen mainly in terms of physical improvement, with an emphasis on redevelopment ... There is now a greater awareness of the more intricate social and economic relationships of urban change that can determine the cause and effect of decline, and which introduce additional elements in the consideration of urban renewal processes (Department of Environment 1978, p. vii).

Urban renewal through this schema was defined as a planning process that highlighted considering the intricacies of the physical, social and economic *relationships* of an area. While the above program reported on urban renewal demonstration projects that were undertaken during the late 1970s, more widespread urban renewal or ‘inner city renaissance’ programs have taken place in Australia since the late 1980s (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 7). Stimson et al. (2000) reported that the current trend toward inner city renaissance, which mirrored international experience, ‘is characterised by significant changes to inner-city landscapes, both physical and socioeconomic’ (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 7). Significantly, the realisation about the limitations of urban development that singled out economic growth that took effect in the late 1970s has been consolidated throughout the 1980s and 1990s. There has more recently been a shift from inner urban policies that prioritise economic redevelopment to a ‘softer’ policy focus that elevates social and cultural functions to that of economic ones (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 12). This period is also recognised as a period when ‘governments at all levels’ became increasingly involved in stimulating and promoting this change (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 7). Accordingly, ‘the changes in inner-city areas of Brisbane – especially those occurring since the mid 1980s – have been driven by a subtle mixture of both market forces and deliberate public policy’ (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 16).

The conditions of possibility for a reform agenda to materialise were beginning to be formulated, that is: the increasing concern and media portrayals of the badness of Fortitude Valley, the arrival (by boat, plane and bureaucrat) of an urban renewal agenda in Australia, governmental reorganisation of urban policy emphasis of and ‘changes’ in inner city areas of Brisbane, including Fortitude Valley. However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, not all performances can be realised. Opportunistically, for those proponents of Valley reform a Queensland corruption scandal which was transformed into the Fitzgerald Inquiry put the spotlight firmly on the Valley., where Fortitude Valley became signalled out as its symbolic (and visible) centre, proved to be the perfect vehicle upon which a broad urban reform agenda could attach to and hitch a ride on.

4.6 Fitzgerald Inquiry

‘Valley image makers shuffle eclectic mix’

FORTITUDE VALLEY is notorious as the place where the sex clubs merge with Brisbane's best nightclubs while derros look for cigarette butts in the streets.

It made its "name" in the mid-1980s as the origin of Queensland's Fitzgerald Inquiry and the playground of crime bosses who ran prostitution, gaming and drug rackets at night, while paying hush money to police. Tony Fitzgerald, QC, put an end to that 20 years ago. The sex clubs and peep shows remain and still no one in their right mind believes it is now the safest community in Australia. (Moore, 2009, p. 23)

As vice in Brisbane increased and became more organised denial of the presence and effects of crime and corruption in Queensland became more difficult to ignore.

Tony’s Niteclub (Photograph 4), owned by Tony Ranieri, located at 198 Wickham Street, Fortitude Valley existed in pre-Fitzgerald days, two decades on Tony's Niteclub continues to operate. Phil Dickie (ex-journalist from the Courier Mail) describes Tonys Nightclub:

‘Tour the sordid valley of yesteryear’

“As [far as] strip clubs go it's a fairly sad little enterprise but I did used to meet a lot of people here. You could come here and have a drink and talk to the girls and so forth. A lot of them knew the gossip. And it was a good place to meet undercover cops. My (police) tailing squad used to sit across the road." (Barrett, 2009)

Photograph 4: Tony's Niteclub. Fitzgerald Inquiry hot spot, Fortitude Valley.



Politicians and Police were being accused of involvement (in the enabling sense) with crime syndicates, many of which operated out of Fortitude Valley. As a result of this growth, in 1985 journalist Phil Dickie¹ toured Fortitude Valley with a government backbencher in an attempt to draw political attention to the expansion of vice in the area. Dickie describes the tour as follows:

As we toured the Valley I pointed out to her the thriving casino at 142 Wickham Street and I also took her to a strip club and a sex shop ... In no uncertain terms I told her that the operation of vice in the Valley brought ridicule at the very least on the police force and lent credence to the persistent stories of graft and corruption (Dickie 1989, p. 111).

Fortitude Valley provided the symbolic and material space for the Fitzgerald Inquiry, as evidence of political and police corruption was reported in the media as being associated with the growth of vice in the area through the 1980s. In May 1987 the ABC broadcast the *Four Corners* documentary the 'Moonlight State', exposed

¹ Phil Dickie, journalist for the *Courier-Mail*, along with Chris Masters, journalist for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), provided the impetus for the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (1987–1989).

structurally entrenched police corruption related to prostitution and illegal gambling that had developed throughout Queensland over a period of at least four decades (Dickie 1989). Brisbane based journalist Phil Dickie was key protagonist for the Inquiry because of the revelations exposed through his investigative work. The response to these allegations came in the form of a corruption inquiry named after the head Queen's Counsel who governed it. The magnitude of the response was related to Dickie's pronouncements regarding the breadth and depth of the corruption, which implicated police and politicians at the highest levels. A number of which were ultimately imprisoned.

In the ordinary course of events, Queenslanders would have remained complacent, largely unaware of the activities of a greedy minority, and the debilitating effects of those activities on society (Fitzgerald Inquiry 1989, p. 2).

By way of response, the acting Premier of Queensland at the time, Wayne Goss MLA, announced that there would be an Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct in Queensland that would be headed by Tony Fitzgerald, QC. In summary:

The Inquiry, which was initially intended to last for only a few weeks, ran for over two years, much of it in the glare of widespread media publicity. The inquiry hearings and the report that followed revealed to Queenslanders that corruption and bribery had become so pervasive in the Police Service that it had developed into an organised protection scheme called 'the Joke'. The corruption reached all the way to the Commissioner of Police. The Inquiry also explored allegations of bribery and corruption involving sections of government, particularly at ministerial level (Butler 2001, p. 1).

Many of Brisbane's most notorious Fitzgerald Inquiry identities and witnesses ran massage parlours, strip clubs and illegal gaming rooms located in the Valley. They had considerable criminal histories (criminal records), and were involved in activities such as illicit drug distribution, violence, extortion and arson. The Inquiry created a climate of reform that had deep resonance in the political and public domains in a way that had not been experienced previously in Queensland. The mood for reform in Fortitude Valley created by the Fitzgerald Inquiry provided the 'conditions of possibility' for the previously unsuccessful attempts at reform to become realised. The Inquiry derivative discursive configurations, high levels of media coverage, the staining of police and politicians reputations strongly aided in the actualisation and shape of the reform program that was initiated in Fortitude Valley. In spite of repeated efforts, plans and willing champions the Valley reform agenda had

struggled to get off the ground for several decades. Through the wide-spread influence of the Inquiry political allies were easily recruited resulting in the transformation of reform ideas into a reform ‘reality’. The Fitzgerald Inquiry represented reform on a grand scale and arguably opened the door to the necessary prerequisites for reform to be realised in the Valley.

4.7 Valley mall: the spatialisation of reform

The question that interests me now is: how creative can we be in developing new modes of governance and new forms of community in Queensland in the post Fitzgerald era? How big is the Queensland political imagination? (Botsman 1999, p. 2).

By the late 1980s the Brisbane City Council had started to set in train the response to the above question posed by Botsman. The Council, led by Liberal Lord Mayor Sallyanne Atkinson, began to develop a ‘strategic interest’ in the inner north (Stimson et al. 2000, p. 83).

A major development in the ‘revitalisation’ of the area was the decision to close off Brunswick Street, between Anne and Wickham streets, and make the area into a pedestrian public mall.

Photograph 5: Fortitude Valley Mall



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It was perceived that ‘the Brunswick Street Mall [would] be a major step forward in revitalising the Valley ... [and that it would] provide a safe and attractive place for people to meet, talk, rest and generally enjoy being in the Valley’ (*Sun* 1989, p. 29). The realisation of the mall grew from an Inner Suburbs Action project initiated by the Brisbane City Council and supported by local residents and businesses (Stimson et al. 2000; *Sun* 1989, p. 29). The Inner Suburbs Action Plan, with its inner city focus, was situated within a broader project titled the Brisbane Plan. However by the time these plans were made available for public comment, elections were held and the Atkinson administration lost office to the Soorley-led Labor administration. These two projects were eventually sidelined and the Soorley administration developed their own projects (Stimson et al. 2000, pp. 83–6), most significantly, urban renewal.

Urban transformation in Brisbane’s inner north has been instrumentalised through the Brisbane City Council’s Urban Renewal Task Force (URTF) established in 1991. The URTF was an initiative of the Commonwealth, state and local governments’ Better Cities Program devised in 1991 (Stimson et al. 2000; Boarding House Action Group 1997). The Better Cities program ‘broadly aimed to encourage a more integrated planning approach to urban development’ (Boarding House Action Group 1997, p. 5). The Commonwealth Government through the Better Cities Program committed \$31 million and the Brisbane City Council committed \$6 million towards the Urban Renewal Task Force and the urban renewal program. The two objectives outlined in the Task Force’s first report were to ‘focus on the inner north-eastern suburbs including Fortitude Valley, New Farm, Newstead, Teneriffe and Bowen Hills as a pilot for revitalization of inner-city areas’ and to ‘deliver a master plan, development strategies and procedures for implementation, based on practical solutions and viable investments to achieve a population of 30,000 people over the next 20 years.’ (BCC 1991, p. 5).

Photograph 6: Urban renewal: Fortitude Valley



© Hassell Architects

The prerequisites for urban renewal in the inner north were listed in the report, as follows:

- High population growth in south-east Queensland,
- Population decline or stagnation in inner city areas,
- Changing social patterns, Obsolete land usage,
- Recognition of the costs of urban sprawl,
- Underutilised physical and social infrastructure,
- Ill defined development directions, and,
- Non viable commercial investments (BCC 1991, p. 5).

The problems in the area were identified as:

- Chaotic heavy traffic, visual pollution,
- Extensive industrial obsolescence,
- Poor social image,
- Inadequate public transport,
- Limited sewerage infrastructure, and,
- Inaccessible river frontages (BCC 1991, p. 5).

Accordingly, the ‘vision for redevelopment’ was to increase residential population, improve traffic arrangements and social infrastructure, as well as to ‘create attractive living environments and enhance the quality of life’ (BCC 1991, p. 5). For the Fortitude Valley Precinct in particular, the strategies for development championed a major revitalisation of the area for commercial, tourist and residential accommodation; residential accommodation in the ‘Valley heart’ to focus on the central business district workforce and tourists; residential accommodation in the ‘Valley fringe’ to include low income housing, housing for the aged and affordable accommodation for tourists; encourage commercial development including secondary office space, entertainment and restaurants; improve pedestrian amenity; encourage legal and socially acceptable forms of entertainment with less socially acceptable forms of adult entertainment being discouraged from ground floor locations in the business heart; and the development of a master plan for the area (BCC 1991, p. 13). The report suggested that social issues should be addressed ‘by making the Valley an exciting place to visit and a safe place to live by an emphasis on maximising community activity with mixed use development and relaxed trading and licensing laws’ (BCC 1991, p. 13).

These strategies laid down the tone and direction of reform and redevelopment in the area from the early 1990s onward. The marketing of Fortitude Valley’s ‘specialness’ was a key component of the Task Force agenda. The goal being to ‘develop a major cosmopolitan, commercial centre with a bohemian character’ (URTF, c. 1993, p. 1) and to put a positive spin on a ‘poor social image’ by repositioning its image as one of ‘great social diversity’ (URTF, c. 1993, p. 3). The aim of the Fortitude Valley urban renewal project was to ‘completely revitalise’ the Valley and surrounding areas. By ‘creating vibrant communities with a strong sense of identity [and to] provide housing, employment and recreational opportunities, improved traffic conditions, efficient public transport and social infrastructure to make the area attractive for residents and investors’ (BCC 2001c).

Coleman (2000) believed that the attempt to turn around what was a version of the Valley as negative and dangerous, had become a promotion of the Valley as an area with ‘an attractively diverse inner city community’ (Coleman 2000, p. 88). Through this selective marketing or re-creation of the Valley’s ‘imageability’, ‘the entrenched

and identified problems of Fortitude Valley have over time been reduced to the unwanted presence of a few groups or individuals' (Coleman 2000, p. 88). This re-marketing or appropriation of the 'problems' in Fortitude Valley by the Task Force highlighted some of the discursive shifts associated with redevelopment of the area and drew attention to the complexities involved in the 'politics of reform'. The Urban Renewal Task Force were criticised for not adequately dealing with the tension that was being created between existing frequenters and residents of the area and the new players. The Task Force steering committee's lack of attention to 'social' matters and marginalised populations created an environment of concern. The Urban Renewal Task Force were accused by some community service providers in the area of disingenuous treatment of long-term inhabitants of the Valley who were living their daily lives in apparent contrast to the one propagated by the reform movement.

Two decades prior to this reform program, Toms (c. 1972) noted that politics is always part of planning:

In essence [city planning] is an activity concerned with the formulation of proposals for the ordering of human behaviour in the future. The process is thus a dynamic one. Long-range schemes of action will seek to regulate the behaviour of present and even unborn generations in the long term. Immediate planning action will constrain and guide the life decisions of the existing community today and tomorrow. In between the two ends of this time scale a diversity of planning actions will become operative. Some will uphold the staged decisions of the original plan, others will come about as the result of change generated by the 'feed-back' facilities of the planning process. Planning then, will involve a large number of actors playing out a multitude of roles. Since planning will advance the interests of some of these actors and restrain the aims of others it is clear that politics must be inherent in the process (Toms c. 1972, p. 29).

Although politics in planning is still evident contemporaneously, the question no longer becomes whose politics does the planning reflect but how the politics is done and what type of strategies will be employed to advance and restrain the numerous actors that become embroiled, willingly or otherwise, in the making of a reform network in Fortitude Valley. These questions provide some of the analytic terrain for the remainder of this case study.

4.8 Make-up of the Valley mall: public/private space

Since the initial phase of the reform agenda had been implemented, the Valley mall became bounded at either end by two major arterial roads, Ann Street at the top end and Wickham Street at the bottom end. Its official title is the Brunswick Street Mall, however, colloquially the mall is referred to as ‘the Valley’ or ‘the Mall’. Brunswick Street still runs through Ann and Wickham Streets, but the mall is closed to traffic.

Cafés, bars, restaurants, offices and a TAB occupy both sides of the mall.

McWhirters, a large building that occupies the entire bottom right-hand corner of the Mall and the central focus of the reform throughout the early 1990s, transitioned the area from a solely commercial environment (food and retail shopping) to a mixed, newly developed residential/commercial complex. The mall is also now home to a police beat established in 1999. In keeping with the inner city trend toward outdoor dining, the top end of the mall in particular has witnessed the proliferation of outdoor bars, restaurants and cafés. There is a rotunda/stage positioned at the middle top end of the mall. Running through the centre of the mall is public space, which is wider in some areas than others. Its form is for the most part dictated by outdoor dining facilities, through the use of planter boxes that separate privately leased dining facilities from the public space. The public space is interspersed with public amenities, including a small number of park-style seats, public telephones and a number of indigenous murals. On Saturday the mall is taken over by market stalls. These stalls weave their way into every available nook and cranny that is not already taken up by non-transient tenants. Figure 2 shows the internal configuration of the mall and outlines the strip of public space that acts as a pedestrian thoroughfare through the centre of the mall.




Figure 2: Internal configuration of Valley mall

The Valley mall can be understood as a space that has been marked out and carved up by a range of stakeholders. These stakeholders have diverse relationships with the space but these relationships are what contribute to rendering the space a place. A range of complex and interrelated factors determine the marking out of space and the meaning given to the Valley mall. Arguably, there are various spaces in the mall that are places for some and not for others. Further, the private/public divide makes the issue of space and place in the Valley mall even more complex. Zukin (1996) while specifically discussing concerns related to architecture, points to a range of factors that contribute to the politics of the private/public space/place dilemma.

Power over the landscape has always determined what will be seen and not seen, who will occupy certain spaces, and what – or who – will be relegated to the margins. In these terms, it is clear that framing is not controlled by those who design or even by those who build, but by social groups and institutions that compete to appropriate space ... They [architects] have to deal with developers, builders, landlords, local officials, corporate tenants, neighbourhood groups, and ordinary people who turn into surly complainers when their space is threatened (Zukin 1996, p. 144).

Similarly in the Valley mall, determination over the private/public space and what ‘goes on’ in it is attributable to a range of players who have various stakes in the place. This ‘network’ of players produces a push-and-shove dynamic that circulates throughout the space; this dynamic—with its historical resonance attached to the so-called seediness of the area—is what perpetuates tensions in the Valley. Importantly the space is not, as Relph (1976) so long ago suggested, innocent. Urban renewal and reform in the Valley increasingly extended an onus of responsibility to the public geographically bound space to actively (not passively) participate in the process. This was not limited to a reorganisation of the space with regard to architectural change but included playing its part in managing safety in the area.

4.9 Reforming safety in the Valley mall

Manipulation of the environment as a strategic form of crime prevention emerged in the 1960s when the idea surfaced that an active ‘street life’ could hinder crime potential (Geason & Wilson 1989). Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and the notion of defensible space surged in popularity in the 1970s, through the work of Jeffery (1971) and Newman (1972). The theory of CPTED advocates that attention to design in urban spaces can deter situational crime. The

theory promotes the concept that architects, planners and residents should consider issues such as territoriality, surveillance, image and milieu and space management (Geason & Wilson 1989, pp. 5–6).

These ideas continue to be hailed as an effective means of reducing and managing crime and delinquency in public spaces (Walsh 1999). The urban renewal program in Fortitude Valley supported the opening of a police beat office in the Mall and the installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) as key safety measures. According to Brisbane City Council, CCTV was introduced to the Valley mall in 1994 and is ‘a component of a community safety strategy to reduce personal and property crimes, and to improve the perception of safety in these busy retail areas’; as such ‘Police and Council believe that CCTV is a valid and sound deterrence to crime’ (BCC 2001a). This surveillance system’s objectives operate through five categories: Preventative System, Safeguards, Deterrent, Public Service and To Identify and Remove. This strategy was linked to the broader strategy known as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). The City Council summarised CPTED as a ‘strategy that considered other design contributions to safety such as good levels of lighting, reducing obstructing vegetation, opening up spaces, and considering where best to locate public furniture and infrastructure’ (BCC 2001a).

Another recent example of the implementation of CPTED in the Valley is the use of fluorescent blue lights in cafés and public toilets aimed at deterring the injection of illicit drugs. The blue lights supposedly blur injecting drug users’ visibility and thus their ability to locate veins, distort the image of blood in the syringe (a necessary first step in the injecting process) and properly negotiate the injection process. Yet Parkin and Coomber’s (2010) study of the impact of fluorescent blue lights describes them as negligible as a deterrent and creating greater risks for injecting drug users with regard to injecting behaviours, such as groin and neck injecting. However, as will become apparent through building the story of safety in the Valley throughout this thesis: safety is materially relational, political and ontologically unstable. Building the technology of safety into the site and thus embedding an association between safety as an idea to one that can be created in the place is based on a strategy built on the logic of un-safety in the area.

A public perception of rising crime rates and increases in the public and visible use of illicit drugs, particularly in urban settings, coincides with broader sentiments prominent in the mid 1990s regarding a decline of civility. According to Whyte (1988) actions taken to address an obsessive fear about undesirable populations create a defensive space and this becomes more of a problem than the undesirable populations in and of themselves. Whyte suggested that ‘places that are designed primarily for security worsen it ... the idea is to keep out bad people’ (Whyte 1988, p. 159). Whyte’s (1988) research indicates that these types of design strategies can have a paradoxical effect. Zukin (1996) argues that the use of public space design as a behaviour modification strategy has proliferated in the absence of ‘critical others’ (Zukin 1996, p. 147). Davis (1998) mirrors these sentiments and argues that

contemporary urban theory, whether debating the role of electronic technologies in precipitating ‘postmodern space’, or discussing the dispersion of urban functions across poly-centered metropolitan ‘galaxies’, has been strangely silent about the militarisation of city life so grimly visible at the street level (Davis 1998, p. 223).

While the strategic use of public-space design and architecture in general to encourage a ‘sense of security’ is not a recent phenomenon (Zukin 1996; Rabinow 1989), ‘a concern with visual order as a pragmatic means of fighting social problems makes fear into a new aesthetic category’ (Zukin 1996, p. 147). ‘In cities like Los Angeles, on the bad edge of post-modernity, one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single comprehensive security effort’ (Davis 1998, pp. 223–4). Zukin (1996) believes that ‘when security, like fear, becomes an aesthetic category, the manipulation of visual symbols [and material objects] reproduces a kind of civility that used to be produced by “social exclusion”’ (Zukin 1996, p. 147).

The appropriation of the term ‘social exclusion’, in its paradoxical sense, by Third Way adherents promotes these types of trends through urban renewal and place management projects and will be taken up in the next chapter. The program of urban renewal that began in the early 1990s in Fortitude Valley created the necessary background for defending public and private space with security and surveillance systems that were/are aesthetically complicit and operate by manipulating the safety of ‘everyday life’ in the Valley.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter provided an account of the historical influences that had the effect of entrenching the relationship between the Valley and the darker/deviant aspects of city life.. At some point the location and ideas about what happens there and who goes there seem to merge. In addition, this chapter pointed to the fact that reform was considered a priority in the area, since at least the 1970s, but did not come into being until the early 1990s. The elements that coalesced: urban renewal policy manifested in Australia, media portrayals of the area's 'badness', a desire by Fortitude Valley stakeholders to compete with the central business district and a residential and consumption Mecca, the controversy bought about through the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and increased involvement by local and state governments in projects of reform. By 1991 the Fortitude Valley urban renewal program, managed by a Task Force, was initiated. While the program was dedicated to 'improvement' in a range of domains, including residential, traffic and diversifying the social life of the area, safety also became caught up in and began to get built into the area with the implementation of CPTED strategies such as closed-circuit television and fluorescent blue lights in public and venue toilets. The boundaries between communities and residential areas, industrial and commercial zones, and public space started to become contested in the context of Fortitude Valley's urban renewal program.

The next chapter will bring into focus the dominant discursive machinations that collude with the historically informed interpretation of the area as bad and the urban renewal program. Now that the reform agenda has been operationalised and a 'social' void in the strategy has been identified, a space opens up for willing contenders to deal with the 'social'. The next chapter follows the reform agenda through to its intersection with a new technique of government. This technique is shown to have deep roots in the third way agenda in the United Kingdom and appropriates ideas drawn from a major policy framework aimed at the socially excluded. On face value Fortitude Valley appeared to be an ideal location to experiment with 'the social' through the application a new policy framework. This new policy framework titled 'place management' was discursively derivative of the decline of civil society debates which were becoming prominent in Australian

governmental attempts to address exclusion and the associated anti-social behaviour that symbolised it.

Chapter 5: The rationalities driving the order

Case Study: phase 3

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter exposed some of the historical elements that gathered momentum from the 1970s in Fortitude Valley, cohering into a program of reform and urban renewal in the early 1990s. The first point made in the previous chapter was that Fortitude Valley was perceived to be a site that was in *decay*. This perception was consistent with trends in a range of urban sites in Western cities. The second point, and tied to the first, related to Fortitude Valley's relationship with vice and corruption. The convergence between decay and vice became an established truth about the area. The urban renewal agenda was operationalised in opposition to but more importantly existed through its relationship to the 'badness' of the area. However, there was scant regard for the tension that formed the basis of the relationship, and was expanding between the old and the new Valley. The urban renewal task force's apparent disregard for the 'social' effects being generated by the renewal agenda was the location where this tension was most visible. It is against this backdrop that the discussion now turns to the types of rationalities that get taken up in the Fortitude Valley reform agenda, and eventually set the tone for the community safety project. As a means of positioning reform and community safety in Fortitude Valley in a broader framework, this chapter will explore some of the precursors that informed them.

Many of the strategies that circulated throughout the Fortitude Valley reform agenda were indicative of liberal techniques of governance. Liberalism as a form of government plays a leading role in the type of rationalities that operate front and centre in the events under analysis in this thesis. Discursive strategies such as civil decline, social exclusion and place management form a substantive part of the recent operational arm of the social democratic agenda in modern Western cities. In particular, the agenda from the United Kingdom manifested in the second half of the 1990s. As well, these strategies are by design recursive, in that the problem and solution are conceived in the same terms. As is indicative of liberal strategies of government they can be interpreted as internally contingent. Accordingly, the

following discussion situates trends in Fortitude Valley in a wider governmental and discursive context. Foucault provided a means by which the analysis of the ‘art of government’ could be undertaken. This way of viewing governmental strategies challenged traditional knowledge about political power.

Governmentality views

such power as always operating in terms of specific rationalizations and directed toward certain ends that arise within them. An analysis of governmentality then, is one that seeks to identify these different styles of thought, their conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges that they borrow from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out, their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing. From such a perspective, it becomes apparent that each formulation of an art of governing embodies, explicitly or implicitly, an answer to the following questions: Who or what is to be governed? Why should they be governed? How should they be governed? To what ends should they be governed? Thus, the governed are, variously, members of a flock to be nurtured or culled, juridical subjects whose conduct is to be limited by law, individuals to be disciplined, or, indeed, people to be freed (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, p. 84).

From the perspective of governmentality, the analytic focus is on the justifications responsible for raising the profile of the problem, what authorities are involved, the strategies employed, types of knowledge formulated within the strategies and the expected outcome. This style of analysis ‘recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives’ (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, p. 85). In summary this section queries the following: ‘Who governs what? According to what logics? With what techniques? Toward what ends?’ (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, p. 85). Governmentality, ‘as an analytical perspective ... is far from a theory of power, authority, or even of governance. Rather, it asks particular questions of the phenomena that it seeks to understand, questions amenable to precise answers through empirical inquiry’ (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, p. 85).

In an advanced liberal era the analytic terrain that should occupy the investigators gaze is not the ‘dominating state’ but the governmentalisation of the state and its various manifest techniques of governance (Miller & Rose 2008).

Rationalities were styles of thinking, ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it was amenable to calculation and programming (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 16). Technologies were assemblages of persons, techniques,

institutions, instruments for the conducting of conduct (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 16).

The rationalities and techniques that are embedded in and assemble around the strategies aimed at managing community safety in Fortitude Valley through place management strategies form the site where the researcher is able to locate and trace these discursive developments. As Miller and Rose (2008) contend:

Government is the historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their environment. It is in relation to this grid of government that specifically political forms of rule in the modern West define, delimit and relate themselves (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 54).

The ‘problem of safety’ in Fortitude Valley is situated within and is an outcome of the ‘historically constituted matrix’ of liberal techniques of government. There is no inference that in terms of managing antisocial behaviour in Fortitude Valley the state is adopting subtle mechanisms of ‘social control’ (Rose 2000a). Rather by the state divesting itself of full and direct responsibility for managing local social problems in Fortitude Valley through shifting responsibility to community committees, the state can reconfigure a new site for governing: the social (Miller & Rose 2008). The uncovering of discourses that are, for example, liberated in the state-based crime prevention agenda, is the first means by which rationalities related to this new site can be located.

To do this one needs to examine how certain projects of ‘government [are]... linked to activities of expertise’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 55). To view the reform strategies in Fortitude Valley as one example of the way in which government is about ‘enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 55). The specific location of these rationalities is in

the changing fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors ... [Additionally the] problematics of government should ... be analyzed in terms of their *governmental technologies*, the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and

procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 55).

It is within the heterogeneous components of the Fortitude Valley reform network that the investigator is able to uncover these rationalities. Furthermore, it is ‘through an analysis of the intricate inter-dependencies between political rationalities and governmental technologies, that we can begin to understand the multiple and delicate networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and organisations to the aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the present’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 55). In other words the previously fused space between rationalities and technologies or strategies is reopened in order to disentangle the by now taken-for-granted and inevitable reform responses. The momentum is briefly paused as a means of exposing the relationship between the ‘sayable and the visible’ (Kendall & Wickham 1999).

These questions form the basis of analysis for this chapter, because as Foucault proposes, knowledge and power cannot be separated and it is in the point of intersection that new truths become *powerful*. In this instance the formulation of power/knowledge discourses about complex social problems in Fortitude Valley produce certain truths about the problem of community safety (and how it should be managed) at a local level. Based on these ideas the problem of community safety needs to be discursively interrogated against the background of reform drawn out in the previous chapter. This discussion aims to locate the rule systems, discursive formations and discursive practices (Foucault 1972) and the production of truth (Foucault 1980) about the principles that get taken up in the community safety project. As well, this commentary aims to ‘say for the first time [some of] what had, nonetheless, already been said’ (Foucault 1981, p. 58).

Consequently, this chapter explores the dominant political reasonings from a number of documentary sources that get drawn into the local community safety strategy in Fortitude Valley. The following discussion asks the how, why and what of community safety at an historical moment (Foucault 1981).

It begins with an overview of the political agenda of the Third Way and goes on to outline social exclusion, designed as a policy to undermine unequal access to

opportunities and resources in society. Attention then turns to the uptake of these ideas by the Queensland Government and Brisbane City Council in strategies such as place management and locational disadvantage. Finally, the way community safety became problematised will be explored.

5.2 Recent governmental artefacts

Between economy and society: there is a 'Third Way'

During the second half of the 1990s the Third Way model of government was gaining momentum and international recognition (Giddens 1998). Many of the policies proposed by the Third Way agenda informed the conceptual framework that got taken up in the Fortitude Valley community safety project. Therefore an outline of this political agenda is relevant here.

During the mid 1990s and at the turn of the 21st century, English sociologist Anthony Giddens played a key role in developing the Third Way governmental agenda in the United Kingdom. He characterised the aim as an 'effort to combine social inclusiveness with economic dynamism' (Giddens 2005, p. 104). He argued that for social democrats

Freedom ... should mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the involvement of the wider social community. Having abandoned collectivism, third way politics looks for a new relationship between the individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and obligations (Giddens 1998, p. 65).

A range of attempts at introducing this style of government by social democrats in Western democracies was modelled significantly on Giddens' ideas and the Blair government's adoption of them.

Throughout the late 1990s centre left politicians wished to redefine their central tenets against: the failure of socialism, an unquestioning belief in and an apparent surrender to globalisation, individualism versus collectivism, the influence of special interest groups and issue-based politics including the environment (Giddens 1998). In Australia, Mark Latham (2001), a Labor Party contender for prime minister in Australia in 2005, asserted that:

For social democrats, the Third Way is particularly important. It is our best chance of closing the gap between the practices of the new economy and the ideals of a good society. It has a clear commitment – some would say an obsession – with the value of lifelong learning, welfare reform, social capital, international economic governance and the reinvention of democracy (Latham 2001, p. 17).

According to Third Way proponents, balancing a commitment to an open economy and to social equality required a redefining of priorities or a reshaping of traditional left-wing principles in response to rapid and unyielding social change (Giddens 1998; Latham 2001). The Third Way had a preference for ‘policy proposals that focus on governance models and civic relationships over structural causes of inequality’ (Hammer 2004, p. 144). Latham (2001) suggested:

The Third Way is neither anti-state, nor anti-market; it sees both sides of the old politics as a positive force for progress. It simply seeks to balance them against the virtues of social capital. It is, uniquely in the politics of our time, pro-market, pro-state and pro-society (Latham 2001, p. 19).

And that, ‘in this era of unlimited change ... [i]n terms of new policies and new ideas [the Third Way] is the only game in town (Latham 2001, p. 17). Giddens (1998) proposed that the values that inform the Third Way political agenda should be: equality, protection of the vulnerable, freedom as autonomy, no rights without responsibilities, no authority without democracy, cosmopolitan pluralism and philosophic conservatism. These values are a clear merging of what Latham identified as ‘the synthesis of left-wing and right-wing ideology’ (Latham 2001, p. 16). Notwithstanding this apparent ideological convergence, the Third Way promoted a ‘reconstruction of government’ to avoid the more state intervention/less state intervention divide (Giddens 1998, p. 70) that has historically characterised right- and left-wing political debates.

Giddens conceded that communitarianism had similar tenets to those of the Third Way, in that communitarianism called for a restoration of ‘civic virtues’ (Giddens 2000, p. 63). By way of avoiding the problems associated with communitarianism, such as laying the foundation for the proliferation of ‘identity politics’, which had the potential to divide communities or at the extreme cause ‘disintegration’, Giddens (2000) contended that our attention should be drawn toward ‘civil society’. Civil society in the form of communities should provide the locus for ‘constraining the power of both markets and government’ (Giddens 2000, p. 64).

One main concern that was consistent with both conservative politics and the new Third Way agenda was the assumption that in ‘society’ there was a declining civility (Giddens 1998, p. 78). Both sides of the political divide relied on an argument that was based on the assumption that civil society was in ‘crisis’ because of a breakdown in traditional institutions such as the ‘family’. Latham (2001) sketched out what he believed to be the key social changes that Third Way governments needed to address in order to re-create the virtues of a civil society. They were:

- The breakdown in the traditional institutions of family and community;
- The problems of street crime, drug addiction and mental illness;
- The rise of social poverty, as more people become income rich but also time poor;
- The growing distance between the rich and poor in Australia: at one extreme, the geographic concentration of poverty; and at the other, the growth of walled housing estates and gated communities (Latham 2001, p. 18).

Simply, the civic decline argument was posited against rapid structural changes that were simultaneously and interdependently economic, global and technological; the outcome of which meant that ‘society’ itself had suffered to the point that necessitated a state response. This response was required in order to rebuild a strong civil society (Latham 2001).

Building on this belief the agenda of Third Way politics was one of reflexive inclusivity. This was based on an acceptance of the importance of global markets and free trade while conceding that collateral damage was manifested in the form of social inequality. This argument provided the foundation for justifying a commitment by the state to attend to civility within the bounds of the nation state. In the context of a globalising economy, political parties that were taking up Third Way principles were writing themselves back into relevance, by promoting themselves as key players in the process of re-civilising society. Giddens (1998) believed that ‘we can’t blame the erosion of civility on the welfare state, or suppose that it can be reversed by leaving civil society to its own devices. Government can and must play a major part in renewing civic culture’ (Giddens 1998, p. 79). The argument that civility and traditional values were in decay appeared to be taken for granted by both sides of politics, reinforcing the legitimacy of this apparent truth. Accordingly,

Giddens (1998) argued that ‘civic decline is real and visible in many sectors of contemporary societies, not just an invention of conservative politicians.

It is seen in the weakening sense of solidarity in some local communities and urban neighbourhoods, high levels of crime, and the break-up of marriages and families’ (Giddens 1998, p. 78). Correspondingly, both sides of politics bolstered the notion that the social fabric of society needed to be rewoven, the variation between conservatives and social democrats existed in how these concerns would be translated into policy responses. In Britain, the Third Way aimed, according to Prime Minister Blair, to restore the decline in civic order by ‘promot[ing] and reconcil[ing] the four values which are essential to a just society [and therefore maximising] the freedom and potential of all our people—equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility and community’ (Blair, cited in Rose 2000a, p. 1397). These values are typical of liberal techniques of governing the social (Rose 2004). Rose (2000a) argued that

Blair’s vision of the Third Way similarly includes conventional objects of social-liberal programs, such as revitalizing the economy through investment in education and infrastructure, supporting families, moving away from big government through decentralization and partnership with other sectors, and stricter targeting of welfare resources on those who most need them (Rose 2000a, p. 1397).

Decentralisation and partnership were championed as the way old concerns of ‘social government’ would be addressed anew. The program for the renewal of civil society adopted by Third Way proponents contended that

state and civil society should act in partnership, each to facilitate, but also to act as a control upon each other. The theme of community is fundamental to the new politics, but not just as an abstract slogan ... ‘Community’ doesn’t imply trying to recapture lost forms of local solidarity; it refers to practical means of furthering the social and material refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns and larger local areas. There are no permanent boundaries between government and civil society. Depending on context, government needs sometimes to be drawn further into the civil arena, sometimes to retreat ... [I]t is particularly in poorer communities that the fostering of local initiative and involvement can generate the highest return (Giddens 1998, pp. 77–8).

There was a proliferation of the language of community within Third Way rhetoric as well as a dismantling of boundaries that separated the state from communities. Against this backdrop social government or ‘governing the social’ (Rose 2004) was prioritised. Underpinning social government was ‘the implicit assumption that more

“engaged” or “inclusive” policy making and service delivery will enable more sites of participatory democracy and deliver improved outcomes for local communities, particularly those disadvantaged or “excluded” from traditional political and policy systems’ (Reddel 2006, p. 1). Rather than targeting social policies at the whole of society, the site of government became secluded in local communities. The role of the state was to be one of enabling and increasing rates of participation as a way of disabling complex social mechanisms that result in inequalities. Within this context the state had the task of facilitating this participation (Reddel 2006).

To facilitate social government it was proposed that there needed to be a reliance ‘on diverse networks and strong partnerships encompassing the public, private and civil society sectors’ (Reddel 2006, p. 3). This was undertaken with a challenge based on the ‘local engagement of these diverse networks together with less organised and traditionally disengaged groups’ and ‘is supported by effective pathways to more centralised political and policy institutions of the state’ (Reddell 2006, p. 3). The contention here was that better access to resources would be achieved by concentrating efforts locally. This was to be achieved through building partnerships within diverse community networks.

The policy approach that characterised the mainstay of this partnership approach was: social exclusion. The rhetoric of social exclusion included: partnership, community, local, place management, access, social capital, social entrepreneurship, mutual obligation, responsibility, renewal and reform, exclusion and inclusion. These terminologies, and the connotations inherent in them, shaped the social policy agenda that was adopted by the Blair Government in the United Kingdom. The premise was that ‘government can act in partnership with agencies in civil society to foster community renewal and development’ (Giddens 1998, p. 69). Policies and terminologies emanating from the Third Way were starting to weave their way into federal, state and local Australian Labor Party social policies by the year 2000 (see Botsman & Latham 2001; Fincher 2001; Fincher & Saunders 2001 and Stewart-Weeks 2000). By way of a precursor to the localisation of ideas emanating from Third Way social policies in Fortitude Valley, the following section turns to the political strategy of social exclusion as a means of setting the scene.

5.3 Governing the excluded: techniques of inclusion

In Europe, the aim of area-based policies has been to address the complex causes of social exclusion at the local or neighbourhood level, and thereby generate more inclusive communities and neighbourhoods where disadvantaged households are better able to access the mainstream resources and opportunities available to the bulk of the population. Policies that aim to generate social inclusion therefore need to reflect the complex nature of the problems (Randolph 2004, p. 64).

Social exclusion 'is a shorthand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown' (Levitas 1998). The term 'social exclusion' emerged from France in the 1970s and has since become widely used in the European Union and beyond (Levitas 1998). The Social Exclusion Unit was set up in the United Kingdom in 1997 in the Office of Cabinet with the challenge of tackling people and locations that are socially excluded (Bradshaw 2003, p. 4). Social exclusion referred to a range of processes 'through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society they live'. Social exclusion stems 'not only [from] low material means but the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life, and, in some characterisations, alienation and distance from mainstream society' (Jones & Smyth 1999, p. 15).

Levitas (2006) has noted that a lack of clarity and consensus about the operational capacity of social exclusion policy stemmed from a lack of clarity about its definition (Levitas 2006). The confusion relates to its historical (Giddens 2000; Levitas 1998; Silver 1994), theoretical (Room 1995; Levitas 1998; Silver 1994), and discursive roots (Silver 1994; Levitas 1998); and in terms of its operationalisation and implications (Jones & Smyth 1999; Botsman & Latham 2001) and, that social exclusion is a contested field (Levitas 2006).

Levitas (2006) points to three distinct discursive fields that operate within the domain of social exclusion. First is the moral underclass discourse (MUD) that focuses on 'the imputed behavioural or moral deficiencies of the "problem" group'. Second is the social integrationist model (SID) that prioritises rights and responsibilities, evident in the United Kingdom's welfare-to-work programs. The

other is the redistributive discourse (RED); while poverty is at the core of this problem, the issue relates to a lack of access to resources (Levitas 2006, p. 125).

Levitas (2006) argues that in terms of the indicators used to locate social exclusion, it is difficult to separate poverty and social exclusion, in particular social exclusion indicators have been regularly used to ‘capture the consequence of poverty’ (Levitas 2006, p. 125). In the United Kingdom, it was originally used to emphasise the social marginalisation of those who experienced ‘absolute and relative poverty’ (Levitas 1998, p. 7). According to Giddens (2000), Third Way political interpretations of ‘social exclusion at the bottom is not the same as poverty’.

The majority of those who are poor at any one time would not be ranked among the excluded. Exclusion contrasts with being ‘poor’, ‘deprived’, or ‘on a low income’ in several ways. It is not a matter of differing from others in degree – having fewer resources – but of not sharing in opportunities that the majority have (Giddens 2000, p. 105).

The dominant interpretation of the term ‘social exclusion’ was related to inequality, paid work and transformation in traditional notions of welfare support (Whiteford 2001; Botsman & Latham 2001). Social exclusion in this sense became a fluid term that promoted emancipation of the welfare-dependent citizen through increasing access to resources and opportunities of paid employment. Levitas (2006, p. 5) argues that ‘employability embodies a particular *performative* idea of inclusion, in which inclusion becomes a responsibility rather than a right, and in which moral and moralising arguments have a high profile’. A social contract of mutual obligation encourages the inactive citizen to engage in paid employment (Giddens 2000; Botsman & Latham 2001). The various discursive fields that define social exclusion—social, moral and fiscal—taken together make up the terrain that is usually characterised as poverty (Levitas 2006).

Social exclusion as a strategy relied on social contracts and human capital investment. As such, these strategies raised the profile of its subjugated ties with neo-liberal and conservative ideals (MacLeavy 2008). This link is clearly visible in that the basis of success of this policy lies in the belief that social integration is dependent upon active, responsible citizenship, which includes participating in paid employment. At its core, social exclusion from its inception in the United Kingdom was about participation, responsabilisation, opportunity, integration, and civilising

those who live with the cumulative impact of social marginalisation, or in old fashioned terms, poverty.

The first section of this chapter outlined the emergence of the Third Way in the United Kingdom. Its emergence evolved from the creation of a political space somewhere between the global, economic and the social worlds. By problematising the unyielding consequences of a globalising economy, rapid technological change and civil decline, the Third Way political agenda carved out a site for governmental attention. The major policy conceived to attend to those who have been untowardly affected by these trends was social exclusion.

At the time of the emerging reform and community safety project in Fortitude Valley, social exclusion had not yet been formally incorporated into government policy in Australia. Nonetheless, its central tenets were becoming clearly visible in the rhetoric of new place management strategies that were developing alongside and in relation to Fortitude Valley's social problems.

5.4 Sites of exclusion: place management

Australian governments have never really gone down the path of designating local areas as disadvantaged, as much as have governments in Europe ... This has had advantages and disadvantages ... one disadvantage is that we in Australia have not had wide-ranging discussions of spatial policy at the sub-State level.

I think we should be careful, if now adopting policy approaches from overseas, that we are aware of their political overtones ... Can an approach to social inclusion avoid too overt an expectation of a possibly assimilationist social cohesion? I think we need to avoid adopting approaches that seem to suggest the presence of an underclass in a place. Australian social scientists have generally avoided this idea, fearing the blame-the-victim overtones with which it has been associated in other countries (Fincher 2001, p. 19).

Drawn from provisions provided by social exclusion, place management was a strategy devised to directly attend to disadvantage at the site where it was present. According to Stewart-Weeks (2000), by the year 2000 interest in place management was mounting at a government level in Australia. In Queensland the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care wholeheartedly embraced place management as a strategy to undermine disadvantage in bounded geographical sites from 2000 until 2005.

Despite the initial enthusiasm surrounding place management, it has now virtually disappeared from state-based policy rhetoric. As place management was the cornerstone of the state-based initiative that was played out in the Valley to fill the void being generated by the urban renewal program, an overview of it is relevant here.

Place management was the strategy and locational disadvantage was the problem. Place management was a shorthand term for aspiring Third Way adherents and social exclusion contenders to address locational disadvantage in Queensland. It had been absent from policy rhetoric since the Whitlam government of the 1970s (Fincher 2001), but during the late 1990s it re-entered Australian Labor Party policy discourse (see Department of Families 1999: *Strategic Plan: Department of Families, Youth and Community Care*). Locational disadvantage could be found

where people live in areas where there are deficiencies in physical and social infrastructure and inadequate access to jobs, training and educational opportunities and recreational facilities, thereby reducing the standard of living of those affected and exacerbating other disadvantages they may face (Government of Australia 1990, cited in Beirne 2000, p. 14).

Strategies devised to address locational disadvantage linked access to resources and opportunities to the place where people live. According to Fincher, some branches of the Australian government seemed to view the place management approach ‘primarily to be about managing the lives of disadvantaged people in a space, where space is a container to bound people administratively and therefore to place them under central control’ (Fincher 2001, p. 15). Botsman (2001) summarised place management as follows:

The idea of place management is to pool the government resources and funding involved in health, housing, education, training and employment in regions and to place them under the control of the regional community professionals. The idea of place management is to enhance the quality and responsiveness of services to regional needs and to challenge bureaucratic decision making and procedures (Botsman 2001a, p. 69).

Botsman, who is a Queensland academic and a keen advocate for place management, argued that ‘by refocusing government resources around place, much can be achieved by simply reorganising the ways in which governments invest in communities’ (Botsman 2001b, p. 173). The underlying belief that led to a prioritisation of ‘place’ over existing forms of governance was that a ‘one size fits

all' approach to 'social provision' is in these uncertain economic times ineffectual and henceforth out of date (Latham 1998, p. xxxix). And its utility is justified because it 'emphasises outcomes and results', thus replacing existing government approaches that 'focus on the means by which services are provided' (Fincher 2001, p. 13). Further, because place management was a 'spatially sensitive public polic[y]' (Reddel 2000, p. 1), it would demolish the 'silo-like, bounded consideration of only certain matters, by government departments' that generally only dealt with single aspects of the individual or community. It was argued that the current system that focused on, for example, education or mental health exclusively would be 'replaced by a cross-portfolio system of management that stressed the efficiencies [of] integrating the many services to a particular location' (Fincher 2001, pp. 13–14). Fundamentally place-based approaches have a 'stated emphasis on community-building' (Fincher 2001, p. 14).

Latham's model of place management positioned a centralised place manager within the bureaucracy, but at a level above the traditional silos, health, housing, education, and so on (in Queensland the place manager was situated in the Premier's Department). The model proposed that the place manager would operate through the departments or service providers to a central local case manager who would customise the delivery of services to the citizen. The service recipient would be contracted to the case manager and the relationship would function through a process of 'reciprocal obligation' (Latham 1998; Fincher 2001).

An inclusive, collaborative or 'partnership' (Botsman 2001b, p. 176) approach was an integral component of the place management model. Stewart-Weeks (2000) suggested that place management would require local governments to develop strategies for reform of a particular site through a bottom-up process. This translated into the idea that reform needed to be conceptualised through the 'eyes of the community'. This apparently progressive move by government to proclaim the importance of community consultation and collaboration was not an atypical trend. The ever-increasing value of the community in the language of government could be conceptualised as a strategy that has been operationalised against the critiques of neo-liberal individualism. The term 'community' of course is not distinctly new. The significance of community, in this form, is that it has been instrumentalised, and in a

sense dis-embedded from its traditional conception. The community in the context of strategies such as place management becomes a technical or instrumental device that can be utilised as a strategic governmental strategy against the rising critiques against individualism and a lack of inclusion (responsibility) in decision-making processes. Place management extends the administrative viability of community by situating it in a bonded geographic locale.

Fincher (2001) contends that ‘in some accounts the place is not a liberating, community-building source of inspiration for local people, but rather a container that limits what they can get as welfare consumers’ (Fincher 2001, pp. 15–16). Place management contends to be neither about repression nor interventionism, but about ‘responsibilisation’ of the citizen.

In short, place management was a new technique of government that stemmed from the discursive domain legitimised through social exclusion. This new style of governance changed the way in which the social was to be problematised and organised, through the embodiment of a new type of political language (Miller & Rose 2008).

So far, the chapter has provided an overview of a number of the key aspects of the Third Way political agenda and policy and strategies derived from same, such as social exclusion and place management. This chapter has also pointed to the contested discursive space in which it operates. Next, an overview of place management was provided as an example of the way in which social exclusion policy was to become operationalised in Queensland state governmental strategies. In summary, the Third Way was explained as opening up new space for governing social exclusion. Social exclusion was derived to address problems related to lack of opportunities to access paid work and social resources. The goal of social exclusion was that individuals would be better integrated into mainstream society. This would be achieved, at least in Australia, through a reorganisation of governmental strategies toward locations deemed to be disadvantaged. In Queensland this strategy was called place management.

The next section reveals how all of these ideas that were originally related to disadvantage were turned into a strategy targeting community safety—and how a coherent logic formed around the problem of community safety in Fortitude Valley (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006).

5.5 Challenges today are bigger, harder and more complex

A key theme which is often highlighted across the public and private sectors, and in the media, is the major impact of change on our lives. (Department of Families 1999, p. 11).

In the context of policy threads generated through Third Way and social exclusion there were three dominant local institutional influences in the development of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley. Documents produced by Brisbane City Council, Department of the Premier and Cabinet and the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care were the embodiment of ideas produced through Third Way, social exclusion and place-based initiatives. Relevant documents produced by state and local government institutions will be explored as a means of exposing the rationalities that shaped the next frontier of the reform movement in Fortitude Valley.

The key documents that produce the ‘how, what and why’ of community safety in Queensland between 1999 and 2002 were: the *Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drug Taskforce Report 1999*; the *Department of Families, Youth and Community Care Queensland Strategic Plan 1999–2002* and the *Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy 1999*. These documents all posed ‘today’s social problems’ as a greater challenge compared to the challenges presented by previous social problems. Clearly operating from the Third Way agenda, the complexity of contemporary social problems in Queensland was posited against unending social change. These social problems were perceived as more complex than ever before and were blamed for undermining civility. In these documents modern society was frequently characterised as a ‘complex and changing world’ (Department of the Premier & Cabinet 1999a, p. 1). Thus the challenge for government departments arose from the effort and skill required to develop solutions that would be able to keep up with ‘the ways in which our society is changing—and [to continually evaluate] whether responses are keeping

pace with the impact of that change on Queensland individuals and families’ (Department of Families 1999, p. 11).

Against this backdrop ‘social issues’, such as crime and in particular the use of illicit drugs, were posed as ‘one of the most difficult and challenging problems we face today’ (Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drug Taskforce 1999). Crime was deemed to result in ‘terrible consequences ... broken lives, community fear, a fracturing of respect and care for others as well as the ever rising costs in insurance, policing, prisons and public safety’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 1). Consistent with the complexity of the problems the responses were also characterised as difficult. The crime prevention strategy stated that ‘there are no quick and simple solutions to the problems and complex causes of crime’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 6). Similarly, the lord mayor made the assessment that ‘the problem [of illicit drug use] is getting worse’ and that ‘the issue of illicit drugs is highly complex and [that] there is no single solution or “magic bullet” cure for the problem’ (Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drug Taskforce 1999). The documentation inferred that social problems of the time were always a step ahead of government; that they were moving so fast and were so complex that it was difficult for governments to keep pace. As such they could not be tackled single-handedly. This view was consistent across both state and local governments in Queensland.

Proposals put forward to ‘tackle’ the problem of illicit drug use and associated issues were centered in a partnership approach. The Department of Families, Youth and Community Care believed that they alone could not achieve the desired goals effectively. Successful outcomes could only be achieved through working alongside partners (Department of Families 1999). According to the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care Queensland, the term ‘partnership’ meant ‘sharing our work, supporting or undertaking planning and business processes with stakeholders’ (Department of Families 1999, p. 6). Similarly, the ‘Crime Prevention Strategy’ proposed that ‘a partnership between the community and the Government provides a real opportunity to build some real solutions to prevent a spiral of crime’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 1). In the same vein the ‘Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drug Taskforce: Drug Action Plan’ for Brisbane proposed ‘an integrated strategy of actions and partnerships for council and other key agencies to

implement now and over the next two to three years' (Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce 1999, p. 2). Commensurate with this partnership approach, disadvantaged areas were marked out for particular departmental attention. The new terminology for this was as mentioned above 'locational disadvantage'. At the same time as place and disadvantage were being linked up, another important but less-contrived merger was taking place. The convergence of disadvantage and crime were becoming discursively embroiled. These two conceptual devices were being substituted for each other within the departmental literature. The frequency of shifting between the two devices eventually appeared to break down any barriers that once existed between them. This subtle, but nonetheless powerful move eventually had consequences for the application of the place management strategy in Fortitude Valley. The battle between participants in identifying the 'real' problem in Fortitude Valley was a hurdle that was never really reconciled. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

The idea of place-based strategies targeting locational disadvantage made its way into the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care strategic plan. The plan identified place as the site 'where our clients are located (social boundaries, region, town, community, suburb, household, residential facility)' (Department of Families 1999, p. 6). Place became incorporated into the department's strategic plan,

in recognition of the fact that the community in which people live can significantly impact upon their life chances. Locational disadvantage can have a major impact on individuals, families and community wellbeing. For us, the concept of 'place' involves areas which have natural, social or geographic boundaries (Department of Families 1999, p. 20).

Identifying issues within disadvantaged locations signified a departure from the use of historically dominant descriptions of suburbs or regions that characterised them as *experiencing* high levels of poverty. There was a notable shift away from identifying areas that were inhabited by socioeconomically marginalised people to producing a reflexive relationship between the place and the disadvantage. As mentioned above this move away from concentrating on poverty as the problem was consistent with trends in the United Kingdom. This approach can be seen to recast the issues from a purely humanistic perspective to one that activates the location.

Shifting the site of the problem transferred the onus for and manifestation of disadvantage from being located within the individual to being located in the relationship between the individual and the place. This shift implied a hopefulness regarding the area's aspirations and potentiality as an active participant in creating the sought-after advantage. Positive change in a place became possible through the manipulation of a range of means that functioned to influence the area's disadvantage. The term 'locational disadvantage' tacitly suggested that disadvantage was a less chronic condition than the historically derived connotations attached to 'poor' neighbourhoods, 'slums' or areas inhabited by residents who were generally described as living in abject poverty. The index followed by the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care in *locating disadvantage* was developed through the use of Australian Bureau of Statistics data. The bureau's index 'derived [disadvantage] from attributes such as low income, low educational attainment, high unemployment and jobs in relatively unskilled occupations' (Department of Families 1999, p. 12). These attributes suggested that, in spite of the language shift, *disadvantage* was still to be determined by the attributes of its residents rather than less humanistic measures such as appropriate levels of affordable housing or access to education institutions in the place where they live.

The term 'locational disadvantage' was also consistent with other terminological shifts noted by Rose (1996) during this period. He suggested that there had been a proliferation in the 'language of empowerment' within neo-liberal techniques of government. According to this idiomatic style the unemployed became job seekers and the homeless became rough sleepers (Rose 1996, p. 59). These citizens were now to be active and productive choice makers and shifted from a 'state of being' to 'being in a state' (Rose 1996). The language of locational disadvantage was indicative of this positivity. In that it decentred human disadvantage and promoted an attitude of choice, hope and change and centered disadvantage in another site, the location. Situating locational disadvantage within this more productive realm enabled one to position disadvantage on a continuum from mild to severe with each stage of the continuum requiring different approaches, and with each approach promising a step toward 'advantage'. These new ways of conceptualising excluded and marginalised members of society, their experiences of disadvantage and more recently the places they inhabit set the scene for experimenting with new techniques

of government. These shifts are indicative of neo-liberal governmental styles. In that they display traits that are consistent with the necessity to be reflexive to change through an unyielding belief in the potential to amend previous inadequacies in the system it created (Rose, O'Malley & Valverde 2006).

5.6 Responsibilising the community

Another discursive theme apparent in the documentation was linked to the government's responsibility in building the capacity of the community to become an integral part of the process of solving the local manifestation of complex social problems. The utility of the community in working toward local solutions was driven by the idea that 'the community in which people live can significantly impact upon their lives' (Department of Families 1999, p. 19) and that 'complex problems require local solutions'. Consistent with this notion, the government's crime prevention program aimed to 'facilitate communities to work with government to reduce and prevent crime' (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 3). Through a process of consultation 'the Government has heard a clear message that the community wants to be involved in crime prevention' (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 3). Ownership of the 'problem' is at the core of the community safety perspective, evident here:

All Queenslanders have a vested interest in creating and maintaining safe neighbourhoods. We – the community and Government – need to work together in partnerships and combine our resources to make our communities stronger and more resilient to crime (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 3).

According to the state, localisation, consultation and participation were deemed to be the key to success in addressing complex social issues such as crime. The Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce also promoted community ownership of the problem. The taskforce believed that 'the key to reducing the harms that drug use causes to the community lies in a coordinated effort across the whole drugs field and in community ownership of the problem and willingness to embrace a new approach' (Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce 1999, p. 3).

The following breakdown depicts the commonalities apparent in the three foundational documents:

Society	Different than before and rapid change State unable to stem global influences locally
Social problems	Disadvantage and Crime Fear of crime Illicit drug use Getting worse Very challenging Very complex
Assumption	State can't solve problems on its own must engage partners Community members want to participate Community members want to own the problem Mobilise the community in order to devise and implement effective solutions Crime and Disadvantage are seen in similar terms
Target	Areas deemed to be experiencing 'locational disadvantage'
Solution	Promote community ownership of problem Build capacity of community to solve its own problems Government and community partnerships Grassroots approach

Through the above breakdown one can interpret the emergence of links between communitarianism, Third Way political ideologies and liberal techniques of government. The belief that if the state provides the means, in the form of skills and capacity, subjects (through a broader attachment to their community) can become experts in the 'conduct of conduct' (Gordon 1991, p. 2), not only their own but for those in their community who deviate and threaten the norms of civil society. The appropriation of a model of community action that had its roots in local resistance groups and community activism was marked out as a distinct administrative and technical territory (Miller & Rose 2008). Miller and Rose (2008) argued that

within a rather short period, what began as a language of resistance and critique was transformed, no doubt for the best of motive, into an expert discourse and a professional vocation – community is now something to be programmed by

Community Development Programmes developed by Community Development Officers, policed by Community Police, guarded by Community Safety Programmes and rendered knowable by sociologists pursuing ‘community studies’. Communities became zones to be investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted ... individual conduct is now to be made intelligible in terms of the beliefs and values of ‘their community’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 89).

The idea of governing through community lay in the assumption that individuals were bonded to their community and that the personal meaning derived from this makes *community* a priority in their lives. Miller and Rose (2008) observed:

No doubt a whole range of other local shifts in vocabulary in diverse sites contributed to the emergence of community as a valorised alternative, antidote or even cure to the ills that the social had not been able to address – even to the ills of the social itself. What began to take shape here was a new way of demarcating a sector for government, a sector whose vectors and forces could be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which operated through the instrumentalisation of personal allegiances and active responsibilities: *government through community*. (Miller & Rose 2008, pp. 89–90, emphasis in original)

The community became activated and operationalised, at least discursively, as a major player in the governance of complex social problems. There are two spaces of governance that have been identified through this discussion: locations of disadvantage and the community. According to this model, a location would be identified as disadvantaged, the community would partner with government and solutions would be derived through the process of collaboration. The next section will explore in more detail some of the rationalities that turn the problem of crime and disadvantage into a technical and therefore governable form.

5.7 Rationalities and technologies of government

Miller and Rose (2008) suggest that there are three components to political rationalities. First, the rationalities take on a moral form in that they ‘consider ideals or principles to which government should be directed – freedom, justice, equality, mutual responsibility, citizenship, common sense, economic efficiency, prosperity, growth, fairness, rationality and the like’. Second, rationalities have an ‘epistemological character’ (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 58). This component highlights the necessity of the state to make claims regarding the ‘nature of the objects to be governed ... [and] embody some account of the persons over whom government is to

be exercised' (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 58). The third aspect of political rationalities is the 'distinctive idiom' (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 59) or 'styles of reasoning' (Rose 1996, p. 42). This last component points to the 'intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations' (Miller & Rose 2008, p. 59). These three aspects of political rationalities provide the basis for the analysis that follows. A fourth, drawn from Callon, Latour and Law, should be added to Miller and Rose's components. That is performativity, in that the claiming and making of knowledge about the nature of things recursively generates the ontology of those things and that the nature of things and the reality of things are borne out in the same performance.

The Premier of the Queensland Government noted, 'The first duty of any government is to ensure the safety of its citizens' (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 1). In stating this Premier Beattie was setting both the moral tone and the strategic direction of government. According to this model, citizen safety is the basis upon which good active government and hence good citizenry can be built. Setting up citizen safety as an important goal for government was also the means by which the issues that operate in opposition to safety can be justifiably targeted. The safety of citizens can be undermined by *crime*. Crime becomes a morally justifiable target because it threatens citizen safety and freedom.

The government, responding to 'community demands', prioritises its focus on three aspects of crime. These aspects are deterrence, penalties and causes (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 1). The responsibility for addressing these aspects of crime is nonetheless not government's alone. The 'community' is explicitly positioned as a joint partner in the fight against crime. By elevating the responsibility of the community in the fight against crime, government divests itself of full responsibility for the problem of crime. This partnership approach is achieved through promoting mutual responsibility. There is an implicit contradiction at work here. On the one hand government states clearly its 'first duty as ensuring safety of its citizens' on the other hand it argues that this duty can only be achieved through sharing, partnering and distributing responsibility to others. The Premier stated:

Building Safer Communities is the Queensland Government's crime prevention strategy. This strategy has been built upon **grassroots community**

input because we know the only really effective measures in today's complex and changing world, are those which reflect the needs and practical ideas of its people

The foundation of our strategy is a **partnership with communities** right across Queensland to make our workplaces, public areas and homes safer and more secure. For the past year we have been talking with and most importantly, listening to a wide range of Queenslanders.

... We need a whole new attitude based on **shared responsibility**.

Building Safer Communities will support Queensland Communities to develop crime prevention action plans in their own suburbs, towns and neighbourhoods.

... A partnership between the community and the Government provides a real opportunity to build some real solutions to prevent a spiral of crime instead of always dealing with the damaging, expensive and tragic results.

Together we can make a difference (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 1, emphasis in original).

The issues of citizen safety and community engagement are crammed full of moral obligation. Typically 'programmes of crime control have always had less to do with control of crime than they have to do with more general concerns with the government of the moral order' (Rose 2000b, p. 321). A number of these are based on the principles of freedom, mutual responsibility, community participation and commonsense. These concepts form the foundation of the community safety strategy for Queensland. The problem of crime is undermined through politicising safety. In this case the three components of this schema are crime, partnerships, and localisation. Underpinning this schema is a number of simple dichotomous equations. These are state rule/community engagement, crime/safety and complex global problems/real local solutions.

Crime and safety become 'objects of authority' and are rationalised through these inherently modernist equations (Rose 1993). The other essential components for making crime and safety technical are through distinctive justifications of what the problem is. This is achieved by positioning the problem in a legitimatising epistemological and distinctive idiomatic frame that sets the scene for the recruitment of devices and an 'authority of rule' specific to the management of safety (Rose 1993, 1996). This process has the important role of reflexively reinforcing the political necessity to pursue the 'problem of safety' in Queensland through the establishment of technologies aimed at managing crime. The problem of safety

becomes legitimised only in relation to the moral, idiomatic and technical devices that elevate it.

There appear to be two mutually constituted aspects of the episteme at work here. Both aspects are significant and both must operate in parallel with and in relation to the other. One relates to the issue of crime, the other is the positioning of citizens in terms of their relationship to the effect of crime and in terms of the authority given to them (in the form of community) relative to the issue. The assumptions relating to concerns about the effect of crime on individuals and the willingness to take up their authority in the role of crime prevention are somewhat more implicit. This is typical of the subtle forms of power attributed to and necessary for political rationalities to give life and legitimacy to techniques of government. The conduct of the citizens that presumably make up the community and therefore the explanation attached to the 'nature of them' are integral to the problematisation of safety. From this perspective the epistemological characterisation of *community* is more of a political imperative for the realisation of the crime prevention agenda than individual citizen concern about crime.

Predictably the first step was to legitimate the 'problem of safety'. This was done through putting forward a government crime prevention agenda that committed itself to being 'tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime' (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 3). It was important at this point for the agenda to promote the 'intellectual machinery' that would carry the problematisation through to its potential actualisation in the 'real world'. The agenda was promoted through a governmental vision 'to build safer and more supportive communities in Queensland through targeted, coordinated and consultative initiatives that reduce and prevent crime' (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a, p. 3). This bricks and mortar approach to preventing and reducing crime shifts the focus from historically dominant forms of institutionalised crime management strategies such as policing and embeds the previously mentioned epistemological characterisations of community and responsibility. It is an epistemological characterisation that outlines how the 'community' should understand themselves as well as coming to terms with an appreciation of their responsibility for attending to any barriers that may impede the full evolution of this account of themselves.

The next means by which this legitimising process becomes stabilised as a ‘reality’ is through the use of statistics. The crime prevention strategy produced a document titled *Crime Prevention Strategy: Statistical Profile (December 1999)*. The document is an ‘all you need to know’ about crime statistics. As well as presenting an overview of available crime statistics and related data, it also provides the reader with some guidelines of the ‘do’s [sic] and don’t’s [sic]’ with particular warnings directed at over-interpreting or misinterpreting the data. The necessity to present the nature of the problem of safety through an entrenched intellectual belief in the validity of scientific data is a way of cementing the bureaucratically devised crime prevention strategic terrain. Indications of the necessity of the use of scientific data in this process are evident here. The document states that ‘it is critical that the debate about crime is conducted in the context of accurate information’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999b, p. 2). Further it asserts that ‘credible crime statistics help to identify the problem’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999b, p. 3).

The importance of statistics as an objective measure for defining social facts and as a means for setting standards with regard to social and moral success, rather than merely economic prosperity, has its roots in the moral sciences of the mid nineteenth century (Hacking 1991). According to Hacking ‘the fundamental principle of the original moral sciences was the Benthamite one: the greatest happiness to the greatest number. It was necessary to count men and women and to measure not so much their happiness as their unhappiness: their morality, their criminality, their prostitution, their divorces, their hygiene, their rate of conviction in the courts’ (Hacking 1991, p. 194). Crime statistics in this contemporary context are used as a bureaucratic mechanism not just to measure ‘crime’ but to justify action aimed at countering it. The statistics outlined in the prevention strategy tell us: where crime is happening, who are the victims, who are the offenders, the impacts of crime, criminal justice system responses, the costs of crime and the social context of crime (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999b). The provision of a cost-benefit analysis directed at the cost affectivity of crime prevention is also included in this document. As such, promoting the economic benefits of preventing crime in turn reinforces the moral justification for problematising safety.

The use of statistics as a part of the process of legitimising an ‘object of authority’ provides a further insight into the ways in which political rationalities become rendered as legitimate. This legitimacy takes place within a complex web of discursive knowledge threads all agitating toward techniques of power, which like an oxygen mask sustains their sometimes short-lived dominance. As Hacking has stated:

Statistics has helped determine the form of laws about society and the character of social facts. It has engendered concepts and classifications within the human sciences. Moreover the collection of statistics has created, at the least, a great bureaucratic machinery. It may think of itself as providing only information, but it is itself part of the technology of power in a modern state (Hacking 1991, p. 181).

Statistics have been used as part of the intellectual machinery to objectively justify the problematisation of safety and as a way of reinforcing the ‘object of rule’ in relation to it. This reinforcing role also has the dual purpose of engaging with the ‘moral form’ of the rationality through laying the groundwork for the ‘authority of rule’, that is, a partnership between government and community.

While the statistical profile of crime in Queensland has partially defined the ‘nature of the objects to be governed’, as was stated earlier, the important factor in the realisation of the epistemological aspect of the political rationality surrounding ‘safety’ is whether or not the community accept their role. What is critical is whether or not the intellectual machinery designed to carry the reasonings into the public domain have what it takes to sustain the problematisation in action. On face value the community may perceive their role as one of empowerment given that they are being ‘skilled up’ to manage the issues of crime and safety in their suburb or region. Nevertheless citizens (in the form of community) will also have to become another object of government. In this regard they must align themselves with the conception of community put forward by the state and be prepared to operate within it. The success and sustainability of this power/knowledge complex depends upon the total realisation of the rationalities in and by the community.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a number of the precursors in the formulation of a community safety agenda in Queensland. Initially, Third Way was discussed. This

was done to expose the space that the Third Way agenda emancipated, which was at the nexus of economy, society and civil decline. The policy of social exclusion was then discussed to preview the trend toward place-based policies designed to address inequality. Problems with the stability of social exclusion was briefly explored, and a determination was drawn that suggested social exclusion was operating in a contested field because of a lack of definitional and strategic clarity. Place management, drawn from the logic of social exclusion, was devised to undermine locational disadvantage in Queensland.

Documents published by state-based institutions were then examined to expose some of the ways in which the problem of safety was realised. The problem of safety became legitimised through a number of rationalities and technologies. This was achieved through legitimising the need to respond to crime through the use of statistical data and a partnership approach operating in the form of community. Terms such as ‘empowerment’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘ownership’ were utilised in a positive rather than burdensome sense. Somewhere between nominating disadvantage and crime as the key problems something got lost. However what prevailed was the idea of community safety. At some point community safety embodied all the aspects of both crime and disadvantage. Community safety became the discursive derivative of crime and disadvantage and as such became the catch-all for the complex social problems that were the initial basis of concern. The assumption was that addressing community safety would somehow attend to the complex range of issues that underpin crime and disadvantage. This was a subtle but important shift that drew an enormous amount of time and energy from the participants who were tasked with describing, locating and stabilising community safety according to the place management methods proved to be a challenging task.

The next chapter examines the operationalisation of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley, bearing in mind these background events. Specifically the next phase of the case study focuses on how community safety was played out in the Valley and the tactics used to bring it into being.

Chapter 6: Translating a community safety project: tugging at threads

Case Study: phase 4

6.1 Introduction

The story so far tells us that in the year 2000 in Fortitude Valley a man was murdered in a drug-related attack on a busy Saturday market day. This murder took place at the nexus of an urban renewal program and a change in governmental policy regarding locational disadvantage. The next point made in Chapters 2 and 3 was that preordained theory provided an inadequate means of understanding the local manoeuvrings and complexities that may or may not reorder a network as it happens in the context that it is evolving in. Then Chapter 4 provided an historical overview of Fortitude Valley, outlining a number of the historical trends related to urban sites in Australia, Brisbane and Fortitude Valley. The discussion highlighted the image of the area as one synonymous with decay as a key driver for reform. This image gained a large-scale public profile through the Fitzgerald Inquiry. This controversy created a space through which the reform agenda emerged. Through the application of methods drawn from the field of governmentality, Chapter 5 exposed some of the tactics, devices and reasoning that were drawn together to promote community safety as a justifiable and legitimate governmental strategy to undermine crime and disadvantage through the language of responsibility, partnerships and community. It was argued that these techniques were consistent with governmental trends of the Third Way political agenda and social exclusion policies that were dominating the social democratic landscape in the United Kingdom. With this as a building block, that chapter provided an insight into the background manoeuvrings that provided some of the ‘conditions of possibility’ for how the community safety project in Fortitude Valley came into being.

The next part of the story explores how community safety became problematised and translated into a *real* object. This discussion works backwards from the inception of the project as a way of suspending the trajectory of the project for the purpose of tracing moments in the translation.

6.2 The sum of all parts does not make a whole: translating the Valley

Our job is a cinch. We just follow the players (Latour 1996, p. 10).

There is something unsettling about space. Whether it is existential or historical, our spatiality seems to generate a persistent sense of unknowing that animates repetitive projects of abstraction. Space has to be marked, framed, mapped, subject to boundaries (Osborne & Rose 2004, p. 209).

So far this thesis has explored a number of the ‘conditions of possibility’ that have contributed to Fortitude Valley’s credentials as a site of reform and as a ‘crime hot spot’. A number of diverse political and historical factors have been discussed in order to shine a light on how some of the issues linked to social problems and safety, particularly in inner urban areas and public space, have emerged and become the focus of so much, including governmental, attention at this point in history.

An important aspect of the community safety project is for it to realise its full potential through its application at a local level. This realisation, as has already been explored, was bought into play by the well-publicised murder of a man in Fortitude Valley in April 2000. As has already been discussed, the convergence of factors (historical and governmental) gives some indication of conditions under which a particular regime of practices regarding urban reform emerged. It is now pertinent to turn to the attempts at translating these various elements into a network in an urban mall, Fortitude Valley.

As was explained in the method chapter, the translation of the local reform system into a network will be explored through four interrelated moments. They are the problematisation², which is the process of recruiting a ‘heterogeneity of elements’ (Callon 1986b, p. 28) into a specific system with an agenda set by an entity that is unable to achieve its goals in isolation; the intersement: which is a process of identity imposition and stabilisation stemming from the goals of the protagonist. The third moment, of translation, is the enrolment that arises from a successful intersement. It operates to define and distribute the roles of the participants and overcome or shield any forms of initial resistance. The fourth moment is the

² Problematisation as it is used here is distinct from earlier discussions, which have understood a problematisation as it specifically relates to a broader shift in the ‘conduct of conduct’.

mobilisation. It is the point at which the enrolment is translated into active support and the actors commit to being engaged in the network.

This phase of the case study follows a number of the threads related to the inner city community safety experiment through a number of translation hurdles. This includes exploring the range of mechanisms employed by an outsider to operationalise the community safety network according to the new state-based strategy of place management (discussed in the previous chapter). The outsider, the Inner City Place Team, attempted to impose a predetermined theory—that of place management—into a site that had already called a range of local stakeholders to arms in the name of community safety in Fortitude Valley. Local stakeholders were already coming together to devise a community safety strategy based on local concerns; this committee was called the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS). The Inner City Place Team wanted to engage a community group that was itself in an embryonic state. It attempted to do this through integrating the identified issues and reorienting them to fit with the theory of place. Place management, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, was designed to attend to disadvantage in a specific location. But, as was also indicated, locational disadvantage was already accumulating baggage in the form of safety and crime.

In telling this story of translation the researcher's job was to retrospectively trace the key moments according to the model used by Michel Callon (1986b) in 'Some elements in the sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Briec Bay'. The first moment captured here is that of problematisation. This was the attempt by the Inner City Place Team to draw the nominated entities into their frame and assemble a network with shared expectations defined by mutual hopes and dreams. Callon (1986b) defines the problematisation as a double movement that acts to set up the problem, as well as positioning the protagonist in relation to it. These two movements are initially secured, but not yet stabilised, through the recruitment of actors who ascribe to the issue/s on the table and, at least in the first instance, are falling in behind the leader. Some slippage (Law & Singleton 2000) and displacement (Callon 1986b) happen along the way, as do obfuscation, consummation, information overload and special relationships. The

relative awareness or effect of which frequently went unnoticed or was overridden by the forward-moving momentum of a few and the hope of many.

In a sense Fortitude Valley was auditioning for a role as a 'location of disadvantage' and trying it on for size. The state is testing its place management methodology in this demonstration project. Thus the solution *place management* to the problem of *locational disadvantage* is recursively drawn from and is embedded in the original characterisation of the problem: *crime and safety*.

6.3 Actualising reform: the players

The main entities that provide the analytic terrain for this study are the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS), a subcommittee of the Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC); Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) and the Inner City Place Management Cross Sector Project Team, the Valley mall, and unsafe individuals. They therefore make up discursive, political and geographic terrain (the heterogeneous materiality) that pertains to this 'history of the present'. The above committees are the most salient groups in terms of this project because they represent the most recent institutionalisation of the strategies of reform and were key players in the community safety project. These committees have in some form or another tasked themselves with devising a range of strategies that broadly target crime, antisocial behaviour and issues such as illicit drug use. This is not to minimise the influence of the more established committees that operate in the area like the Urban Renewal Task Force (set up in 1991 and referred to in Chapter 3) or the Malls Advisory Committee (set up originally as the China Town Mall Advisory Committee in 1984 and eventually incorporated Queen Street Mall and the Valley Mall into its remit), but merely to bring to the foreground the committees that were addressing community safety in the Valley as a core objective. The analysis that follows will also trace links to other committees and influential documents where relevant. The analysis of these various entities and the purposeful exposure of a number of subjugated discourses and associations being generated by and within them will therefore inform a commentary on the translation of the community safety problem into an object in Fortitude Valley. The following is an overview of the key actors:

Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC) and Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS), The Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC), originally the Fortitude Valley Steering Committee (FVSC), was formed in 1996.

The then police commissioner, Russell Cooper, chaired the initial meeting which was attended by senior Queensland police from the Metropolitan North Region and concerned others who represented a range of groups in the area, including welfare organisations. The committee was established via a concern with problems associated with crime and was tasked with identifying and researching these issues (FVSC 1997, p. 8). A report produced by the FVSC stated that the

committee's role was to not only identify problems that lead to crime and the fear of crime held by the community but also to develop appropriate strategies to alleviate continuation of these problems (FVSC 1997, p. 8).

The committee was set up to be proactive in community safety and crime prevention and produced a report that made five key recommendations. These recommendations included the implementation of a Multi-Agency Ministerial Advisory Council, the provision of diversion centres, assistance to already established diversion agencies, a review of prostitution legislation and an overview of prostitution and drug-related health issues. They proposed that the recommendations would 'address the causes of anti-social behaviour' (FVSC 1997, p. 5). Through the development of a structure and the adoption of the recommendations, the committee proposed that it would fulfil the aim of 'enhanc[ing] the perception of safety for members of the community in the Fortitude Valley area' (FVSC 1997, p. 5). The FVSC believed that this aim could only be achieved above and beyond a law enforcement framework. The committee proposed that a 'structure' made up by a police/welfare sector partnership be adopted as a means of ensuring a collaborative, coordinated and accountable approach. Through these recommendations the Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC) was formed and held its first meeting on 16 October 1997. The Fortitude Valley Police (Queensland Police Service, QPS) auspiced the FVCCC and would maintain responsibility for the coordination and facilitation of the committee. The rationale for the committee was legitimised through five institutional mechanisms: Fitzgerald Recommendations 6a and 6b from 1989; sections 2.3 (g) and 2.4 (2) of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* and

Section 7.1 of the QPS Code of Conduct. The common attributes of these statements are that community participation, community partnerships and community consultation are integral aspects of crime prevention in particular and effective policing more generally. The incorporation of recommendations made by the Fitzgerald Inquiry at an institutional and local level in Fortitude Valley provides additional evidence of the importance of this controversial inquiry in the reformation of the Valley.

The stated aims and objectives of the FVCCC from the initial meeting are as follows:

1. To provide a forum for discussing matters of concern relating to the policing of our community.
2. To arrive at decisions resulting from those discussions and, where necessary, act upon such decisions.
3. To promote and develop a genuine partnership between police and our community.
4. To act as a facilitating agent through which representations can be made at local level for the purpose of improving the service provided by police.
5. To make our community aware of Police Service policies, ideas and directions.
6. For those unable to voice their concerns directly to a Police Officer, to provide access to any member of the community requiring police information or assistance.

Additionally, the document stated that Community Consultative Committees are *not* intended:

1. To be used as a forum for official complaints.
2. To be used by Police or anyone else as a political pressure group.
3. To afford any bias towards any particular group or groups within the community.

These statements mark out the institutional framework of the FVCCC and strategic terrain for the development of the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS).

The Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) was formed in August 1999 as a subcommittee of the FVCCC. Initially the 'purpose [of the subcommittee] was to look at gaps in local services regarding drug usage and duplication of services' and to 'increase community safety and awareness in relation to drug and

alcohol usage in the Fortitude Valley area' (DSAS 1999). The subcommittee was made up of a range of stakeholders that included community based organisations (CBOs), church and welfare groups, state and local government departments and researchers. This is the committee that I had membership in and an official role as a 'drug researcher from QUT. A number of the stakeholders provided direct service provision (health, housing, welfare, education and support) to drug users and homeless people who frequented the area. State government representatives included the QPS, Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS), Department of Families, Youth and Community Care (Department of Communities) and Centrelink (social security).

DSAS stated in their principal report, *Drug Use and Safety in Fortitude Valley: A Community Response*, produced in July 2000, that their aim was: 'To engender a community response to drug and alcohol issues in Fortitude Valley by developing a whole-community approach' and 'To present a holistic picture of the issues and responses to unmet need in Fortitude Valley and surrounding areas' (DSAS 2000a, p. 2). The role of the subcommittee was to 'explore strategies that would respond to community concern about the impacts of drug use and community safety on the community' (DSAS 2000a, p. 10). The report cites a number of key influences that informed the direction of the DSAS project³.

As a result of research reviewed for the production of the report, the subcommittee identified twelve critical issues that related to drug use and related problems in Fortitude Valley. They were: lack of coordination and accessibility across existing services; increase in injecting drug use in public places and its impacts on users and the broader community in the Fortitude Valley area; limited availability of detoxification programs and rehabilitation programs in Brisbane; gaps in services and programs available to people in need of detoxification and rehabilitation; real and perceived safety issues in and around Fortitude Valley; lack of affordable facilities and activities for young people in Fortitude Valley; high levels of alcohol

³ 'A study of community issues within the Fortitude Valley area', 1997; the *Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce Report 1999*; *National Drug Strategic Framework 1998–1999 to 2002–2003*, 1998; *Beyond a Quick Fix: Queensland Drug Strategic Framework 1999–2000 to 2003–2004*, 1999; 'Valley Malls market research: Safety issues, 1997–1999'; 'Out and About: In or Out? Better outcomes for young people's use of public and community space in the city of Brisbane', 1998; *Boarding House Blues: Boarding House Project Report*, 1998; 'Implementation Plan to Address Public Drunkenness in Inner Brisbane', 1997; *Review of the Cabramatta Place Management Project*, Nexus 1999a.

consumption in Fortitude Valley; contested public space, including parks, malls and major centres; homelessness; prostitution (street and opportunistic sex work); lack of social impact assessment and mitigation in new development within the urban renewal area; issues needing further research, such as street-level drug use and recreational drug use including alcohol (DSAS 2000a, p. 8). The subcommittee prioritised these issues as a means of managing drug use, crime and safety in the area and noted that these issues were consistent with the state government's *Crime Prevention Strategy* (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 1999a).

Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG)

The Safety Group formed in April 2000 with a mission to 'foster a community that is conducive to successful growth' (Fortitude Valley Business Crime Prevention Committee 2000). Initial strategic direction of the committee was informed by the publication of three reports: the *Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce Report*, the *Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy* and *Queensland Fire Prevention Report*. As well, a *Sixty Minutes* report on international drug crime and regulation was cited as providing some background information for committee members (Fortitude Valley Business Crime Prevention Committee 2000). The committee was made up of business representatives and members of the Fortitude Valley Police, such as the police community liaison officer. The Safety Group's priorities would be directed toward three committees, the Malls Advisory Board, the Valley Business Association (VBA) and the FVCCC. In other words the Safety Group was to provide a coordinated avenue for the safety concerns of local businesses to be placed on the agenda of a range of other committees.

The Safety Group's charter was: to make the Valley safe and comfortable; bring business back to the Valley; improve perception in the public eye; create an atmosphere that is conducive to successful growth; set minimum standards for traders; cleanliness and tidiness, and to be proactive in projecting a positive image and a safe and clean Valley (Fortitude Valley Business Crime Prevention Committee 2000). Additionally the mission of the committee was to: improve cleanliness dramatically, reduce fear of crime, change perception and media comparison, address traffic issues, deal with drug problems, education and awareness (sharps disposal),

secure government and community support, provide information and advice and to liaise with established community groups.

Inner City Place Project

There was a range of factors that informed the development of and contributed to the formation and direction of the Inner City Place Project. According to project documentation, it was informed by two major state-based projects: the SEQ (South-East Queensland) 2021 Regional Planning Project and the Community Renewal Program. Joint research and a needs analysis for the Inner City Place Project was undertaken by the Brisbane City Council and the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care, which identified three priority locations of disadvantage areas in Brisbane:

- Inner City (Fortitude Valley and surrounds)
- Zillmere–Stafford
- Darra–Inala–Carole Park

The focus of this research was the ‘inner city’ component of the Place program. The Place Team was initially made up of government bureaucrats, state and local. The state representatives came from the Department of Families (later known as the Department of Communities) and the local government representatives were drawn from community development team representatives and some head office bureaucrats.

The inner city was characterised by the Inner City Place Project Team as a place that had ‘undergone significant change over the past few years’ (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001, p. 1). The reasons given for this were ‘urban development, evolving public space usage, increasing population diversity, and its function as a hub in the heart of a capital city’ (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001, p. 1). The geographic area covered by the project was Fortitude Valley, New Farm, Newstead, Bowen Hills, Teneriffè, Spring Hill, the central business district and South Brisbane (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001, p. 5). The Australian Bureau of Statistics located these suburbs in the Central Ward.

The place planning model was characterised in the documentation as being:

locality based, with a suburban/subregional focus; concentrating on areas of multiple disadvantage and social exclusion; challenging traditional government structures and processes by encouraging: community ownership; bottom-up processes and local decision making; focusing on action and outcomes; breaking down government's program silos and encouraging flexible resource allocation; and re-examining and re-focusing existing programs, funding and services (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001, p. 5).

The Valley mall

As was laid out in Chapter 4, the Valley mall has from its inception been about reform with the closing off of streets to create it. It has been the location of choice for sex clubs, strip joints, organised crime and police corruption up until and some would say beyond the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 1987. There has been much rhetoric about reforming the area in light of its degeneration since its much-extolled boom time. Finally in 1993 a massive urban renewal project was initiated in the area. With reform to the landscape, and a massive shift and broadening of demographics from new residents and consumers in the area, came an escalating tension and heightened demands to do something about the problem of safety in the Valley. In particular the Urban Renewal Task Force were criticised for not taking account of the social problems in the area. A new police beat was opened, CCTV cameras were installed throughout the mall, fluorescent blue lights were installed in toilets and the new residents living in the mall were sheltered behind layers of security. While their vista was obtained at quite a high price their vulnerability was obscured by swipe cards and security codes.

Unsafe individuals

This group was loosely and stereotypically defined as people who 'hang out' in the Valley and who are homeless, welfare dependent and dually diagnosed with mental health and drug and/or alcohol dependency. They therefore provided the human representation of the threat to safety in the area. This threat was legitimised through episodes of violence, such as the murder by a 'drug addict' in 2000, discarded syringes and empty beer and wine bottles strewn about within the mall, homeless people sleeping in the area, all made more visible against the backdrop of the urban renewal program. These people's *antisocialness* is made real through the use of

antidotes, personal stories, statistics on homelessness, crime and drug use, data gathered together from welfare and community services in the area, and needle and syringe exchange data. Loiterers in the area provide symbolic images and are the embodiment of unsafety in the Valley. Members of the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee took up the cause of speaking on behalf of these 'unsafe' individuals. As is often the case, consent to represent these people was not explicitly sought nor given. Therefore the committee participants took on the role of advocating for those who are unable, unwilling or uninterested in advocating for themselves.

6.4 The problematisation: with a double movement and a sleight of hand, all things seem possible

Based on the findings of a range of reports, it is proposed that the major focus of the Fortitude Valley project will be on youth at risk, homelessness, the use of public open space, drugs and crime (ICPMP 2000a).

Drawn from a long history of the city as a site for a 'generalised urban governmentality' (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 744), the background has been set for the application of a certain set of rationalities within sites deemed to be locations of disadvantage. The state believed that the answer to addressing previously determined social problems, i.e. crime and socioeconomic inequality in society, was to manifestly break the problems down into bounded geographic locations, mobilise the community and, through building partnerships enhance capacity to increase the competence of a suburb/s to boost its yet-to-be or once-had potential.

The place management approach has been drawn from a range of well-utilised governmental rationalities such as 'less government more community', risk management, urban planning, social control and surveillance trends and justified through the continued restatement of the opinions of experts and research⁴ via discussions and documentation. As was pointed to in the previous chapter, the place strategy argued that community empowerment was going to be the panacea for resolving everything from global alienation to acts of graffiti in Fortitude Valley, and

⁴ The Kit for Working Groups (Inner City Place Project 2001, p. 10) supplies a reference list of further reading on the place management approach, as well as historical background, foundational literature, definitions, graphs, etc. (Inner City Place Project 2001, pp. 11–22).

everywhere else. The selling point was that place management could be the umbrella under which all things could be grouped and all sorts of social dilemmas could be resolved. This included tackling crime, promoting consumerism, increasing employment, creating affordable housing and so on. The establishment of the Inner City Place Demonstration Project was the government of Queensland's attempt to actualise this strategy in inner city Brisbane. This Place Project was being trialled as a demonstration project: 'The merits of place management will be tested in a Queensland context [Fortitude Valley] and will be evaluated in order to better inform the possible wider application of this process throughout the State' (ICPMP 2000a). The goal of the experiment was to perform a number of interrelated and simultaneous translations of new networks that would reproduce disadvantaged landscapes into *managed and advantageous places* throughout the state of Queensland, starting with the Valley.

The first aim of the project team was to establish place management and the various analytic devices it subscribed to as the dominant technique for understanding and managing the area. The first strategy was to promote place management as the dominant and mutually accepted device for understanding the problem of disadvantage in the Valley. Initially two important obstacles needed to be overcome: (1) will the already formed Fortitude Valley community groups be sold on the idea of place management and sign up to it? and (2) will these groups be convinced to give themselves up to an alternate process? Victory here would represent a successful enactment of the problematisation and would indicate that the first moment in the translation had been successful (Callon 1986b). A key question that emerges through this discussion is what happens when a policy designed to address locational disadvantage becomes a community safety project; specifically whether or not drug use, crime and safety qualify and comfortably translate into ideas of locational disadvantage. Issues raised by these questions become central to the reasons why this project experienced difficulties related to coordination.

The next section will reveal how hard the Inner City Place Management Project Team worked to line up and construct a broadly supported vision for Fortitude Valley that reflected an agenda that they were progressing. At first this was not such a tough task, as on face value the agenda put forward by the place model appeared

not to be inconsistent with what was being espoused by some of the more hardened concerned citizens in the Valley. It was essential that the Inner City Place Project recruit the 'community' into its structure in order to be true to its prescribed strategy and for it to become a legitimate proposition. This seemed like a realistic proposition given that the 'community' was already activated into tangible groups. This phase of the problematisation was an important first step, as the Inner City Place representatives needed to convince everyone that their involvement would be crucial to achieving their stated goals. In other words, there needed to be general agreement by all the key players that the project of safety in Fortitude Valley (in its broadest sense) would be best served if the 'place team' (who were made up in the initial phase by government bureaucrats representing a 'whole of government' approach) were at the helm. This was the first attempt by the Place Team to position themselves as 'indispensable in the network' (Callon 1986b, p. 204). This can be characterised as the acting out of the problematisation double movement by proposing both the problem and the solution in ways that collude with all the other players' agendas (Callon 1986b). Just like a sleight of hand, this double movement appears subtle in its persuasion, difficult to discern in the moment, but significant in its effect. As will be shown, the Place Team was given latitude by a number of already assembled players to lay out their agenda.

6.5 Inner City Place Project: forging the links

Thus far we have learned that responsible individuals in Fortitude Valley have expanded their profile since the Saturday morning murder, evidenced through the manifestation of a number of 'community groups' with safety in the name. The *community* appear to have stepped up to the plate in terms of their obligations as responsible citizens. Based on the strategy of collaboration and partnerships, it was essential that the Inner City Place Project recruit the 'community' into its structure in order for it to reach its desired goals. As such, and in spite of these groups rolling out their own agenda, the already existing community groups Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-committee (DSAS) and the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) seemed to be awash with the prerequisite qualities needed to fulfil the place demonstration project goals.

The following are excerpts from the *Draft Project Plan for an Inner City/Fortitude Valley Place Management Demonstration Project* (ICPMP 2000a) that were presented both in person and on paper by representatives of the Place Team to the pre-existing valley community groups, DSAS, FVCCC and FV Chamber of Commerce.

The Draft Project Plan for an Inner City/Fortitude Valley Place Management Demonstration Project, August 2000 proposed that the:

Scope of the Inner City/Fortitude Valley Place Management Demonstration Project;

- focus primarily on Fortitude Valley ... and surrounding suburbs;
- engage the full cross-section of government and community agencies ... the involvement of the community and private sector stakeholders will be actively sought in all phases of the project; and;
- Based on the findings of a range of reports, it is proposed that the major focus of the Fortitude Valley project will be on youth at risk, homelessness, the use of public open space, drugs and crime.

Context of project: In the past 2–3 years a wide range of reports and consultation processes have comprehensively detailed community needs in Inner City Brisbane. A number of clear recommendations and actions designed to address those needs have been articulated in the already published community reports, including DSAS's. From this, the community clearly expects to be actively involved in any proposed future action which government may seek to initiate (ICPMP 2000a).

The Place literature gave broad recognition to the community regarding the work that had already been done. Additionally, they let it be known that they understood the desire by the community to participate and that this was not only essential but would be built into the Place plan at every level. For example:

General Place Objective 4. The local community is better informed about and more understanding of itself and its constituent members and is empowered to influence its own development;

Inner City Place Objective 1. Active community involvement is achieved in the design, development and management of service delivery processes/responses to agreed high priority needs (ICPMP 2000a).

The necessity of community both as theory and method is clearly an integral aspect of the project plan. All of the ingredients for success were proposed in the draft plan; this included the why, the what, the how, and the risks involved. The draft plan gave an impression of a cohesive, well-researched and thought-through plan. The issues related to the process, outcomes and perceived risks involved.

The Process: 1. The operationalisation of the project will require a diverse range of stakeholders to agree about a logical framework to guide the project's development ...

2. Working party of stakeholder representatives needs to be established to implement the project;

Deliverables: 3. A comprehensive consultation process designed to inform and engage the widest cross section of stakeholders, including elected State, Commonwealth and Local Government representatives, Commonwealth and State Government departments, Local Government staff, community sector agencies and individuals, private sector interests and clients;

Benefits: 1. Government and community sector stakeholders will develop a clearer understanding of their organization's operations at 'place' and of the interconnected nature of their service delivery systems; 2. Co-ordinated, cross-government action to respond to the high priority community needs identified in a number of recent reports on inner city service delivery needs ... 5. Positive working relationships will be developed with local commercial traders and representative business associations/chambers of commerce, based on joint venture activities/actions undertaken to address problems/issues of mutual concern; 6. Community capacity/social capital will be strengthened;

Risks: 1. Key government and/or community sector stakeholders may be unwilling to appropriately support the project and/or the priority actions(s) which the project undertakes ... 3. Community expectations may be unrealistically heightened, particularly in relation to the possible allocation of new funding/resources ... 6. The operationalisation of the project may be too 'top down' and limit long term community benefit by disenfranchising local stakeholders; (ICPMP 2000a).

A key theme drawn from the above draft project plan was the imperative of community partnerships, cross-collaboration and consultation. This is consistent with the strategies outlined in the previous chapter in the *Department of Families Strategic Plan*, the *Crime Prevention Strategy* and *Lord Mayor's Illicit Drug Taskforce Report*. Their salience was outlined at a governmental level and now it appears that any wrong footing in these areas could make or break the project locally. The above-stated significance of community partnerships as providing the heartbeat of the project can be further inferred through the endorsement of community involvement as both a mechanism for the internal working of the project and a primary outcome of the Place Project. Here was the road map—a reasoned sense of the problem and a strategy to fix it. Even the risks appeared surmountable given their clarity. All contingencies had been considered.

This formulated plan had a level of sophistication beyond what the community was able to propose in their own analyses of the problem of Fortitude Valley. The proposal in general seemed grand and beyond the capacity of what the community

groups could achieve in isolation. The documentation produced by the Place Management Team was starting to reshape the ‘problem of Fortitude Valley’ in its own terms. Similarly at this stage it was shaping something that was already in play into a form that was consistent with the place management strategy. In this regard the first turn of the problematisation had been set in play.

6.6 Flirtations, aspirations and cross-collaboration: the honeymoon period

Members of the Place Demonstration Project Team were nominated to contact and negotiate attendance at each one of the community committee meetings and to introduce themselves and discuss the Place Project. One by one representatives attended all the community group meetings and put a human face to the Place Project. One by one the Place Demonstration Project introduction was inserted onto the agendas of various Valley community groups including DSAS (DSAS 2000c) and FVCSG. In an important act of reciprocity, some members of DSAS were asked to present findings from the newly published report, *Drug Use and Safety in Fortitude Valley: A Community Response* (DSAS 2000a) to high-level bureaucrats involved in the Place Demonstration Project at their city headquarters. This was interpreted by members of DSAS as our big opportunity to have our community concerns heard and legitimated by members of the state-based bureaucracy. The feeling among DSAS members was one of excitement and nervous anticipation, even among the local council representatives who were members of DSAS. A number of DSAS community participants were selected to present the findings in the report. It was scanned for the important bits, they were generalised, summarised into PowerPoint presentations and presenters were matched to their area of expertise for the performance. This reaction was underscored by the belief that DSAS could not achieve their goals without state backing and resources.

This process of consultation and collaboration started to roll itself out like a well-oiled machine. The Place Team’s documentation was crammed full of information about the Place Project, its rationale and its promise. The absolute optimism provided by the bureaucrats and embedded in the documentation gave this new perspective legitimacy. There was a sense of sheer coincidence in the timing and synchronicity

of purpose between what was being espoused by the Place proponents and the community groups.

One of the first steps in translating entities into a new network was to build everything into an organisational structure and represent it textually and figuratively. The second was to align the groups' goals and third was to get agreement to the structure and goals—through some kind of participation/representation beyond the documented proposals (Callon 1986b; Michael 1996). The organisational structure was proposed to the potential participants through two key methods. First, through reciprocity that took the form of key place representatives attending the local community committee meetings (DSAS 2000b) and representatives from the local committees attending Place Management meetings (e.g. CAPT 2000; ICPMP 2000c). Second, through conducting a community workshop, where all of the prospective participants could gather and see and hear the credentials of the new guys.

The type of community engagement that was being proposed by the Inner City Place process could not apparently happen magically, which was counter to and in stark and paradoxical contrast to apparent naturalness of the existence of community. And as we will see, a range of means were employed to construct, entice, convince and manoeuvre the community to perform according to the model put forward by the Inner City Place Project. The community could not be left to their own devices. This phase of the process was also dedicated to securing the Place Team's role as gatekeeper. The gatekeeper role, in the context of the translation model, is interpreted by Callon (1986b) as the 'obligatory point of passage'. It was crucial for the Place Management project to galvanise their position as the critical driving force for the realisation of everyone's goals, in that they needed to convince all concerned that the only way to obtain the goal of the community safety projects in the Valley was for all to sign up to the Place strategy. Triumph over this hurdle was an important signal that would reflect the successful second movement in the problematisation. A number of tactics were activated to achieve the above goals, as failure at this point would have signaled the complete deflation of the Inner City Place Team's Fortitude Valley project.

As we will see, the Place Team profiled their credentials to as broad an audience as possible. In doing so they consolidated their capital among the community in terms of their ability to be the driver of reform in the Valley. The subtext of the tactics were based on the principle that ‘this time it will be different’, this time we (the government) will be different and, significantly, this time we need you more than you need us.

Tactic 1: **Facilitate a *Community Workshop***

Title: Fortitude Valley Community Workshop

Purpose: To discuss major social and economic issues currently facing the Fortitude Valley community;

To seek business and community involvement in the ongoing development and management of a proposed place management project in Fortitude Valley and the Inner City.

Participants: Community networks

Business Representatives

State Government Representatives

Local Government Representatives (Smith & Munro 2000)

More detail about the process is found in the accompanying covering letter:

As you are aware, Brisbane’s inner city area has witnessed enormous, physical, social and economic change over the past decade and if anything, such trends will escalate during the next decade. This change has brought with it substantial benefits, as well as growing community concern about issues such as drugs, crime, homelessness, the use of public open space and the dislocation of some of the area’s more established resident population (Smith and Munro 2000).

The letter taps into a popular narrative that links fears about social and economic alienation and unprecedented and inexorable social change stemming from globalisation to insecurities about social order and lack of safety. Simply, the narrative slips into well-worn pathways of the global problems/local solutions dichotomy. Outlining the issues like this also has the effect of simplifying them. As well, the letter infers that this workshop is being organised because you the

community want ‘us’ to do something about the problems you yourselves have identified—‘you told us what the issues are and “we” agree that those issues are legitimate’—having based them on research and consultation with already operational Valley community committees. The letter indicated that the government has developed not so much a solution but a response, implying a synchronistic process rather than a contrived one.

The workshop on 11 December will inform you about a significant government initiative – a Place Management project – being undertaken in an effort to *respond* to the above issues (Smith and Munro 2000, emphasis added).

The letter went on to separate out the response from the opportunity to become engaged.

Just as importantly, the workshop will provide you with an opportunity to discuss ways in which you can be more actively engaged and can partner with government in the development and management of this initiative (Smith and Munro, 2000).

As has already been expressed, the response does not exist outside of the presupposition of the existence of a community out there, and necessity to engage it in the project of Place. The fact is that without community engagement the response is merely a governmental response and therefore not a response borne out through the application of the place methodology. The letter also takes the opportunity to reinforce the necessitation of a combined effort in tackling the issues that ‘face us’—the government and the community together standing as one.

Your participation in the workshop and to the project’s ongoing development would contribute significantly to its success and to our longer-term efforts to respond positively to the opportunities and challenges which *face us* in the Fortitude Valley and Inner City areas. (Smith and Munro, 2000, emphasis added).

The invitations are sent, a facilitator employed, a venue in Fortitude Valley is secured, the experts are primed and an agenda is set. The experts included an academic, a private businessperson who is the chairperson of the Urban Renewal Task Force (URTF) in Fortitude Valley and two bureaucrats from the two tiers of government (state and local) who were driving the Place Project. As is characteristic of this type of process of recruitment, the experts are positioned first on the agenda to explain the approach, justify its eminence relative to other approaches and

discriminate against alternate propositions. This is typically done through citing research that backs up the assertions (Callon 1986b), and this case is no exception.

The titles of the expert presentations were: 'Place, People, Participation: A Future Vision' (Botsman 2000); 'Social, Economic and Environmental Change in Fortitude Valley' (Bourke & Crawford 2000); and 'Place Management in the Inner City: Structure, Process, Opportunities for Action' (Francis 2000). As can be interpreted easily from the titles of the presentations, the experts were making the pitch utilising key words that were bursting with place and community rhetoric. The version of reality being put forward by the protagonists appeared to be reinforced in and through the titles of the presentations. It has the effect of unifying the relationships between the place (Fortitude Valley), people and participation (community) against the external reinforcer, social change. Change is characterised as the all-powerful intruder to social stasis—change, and more typically, complex change driven by global forces, demands a local solution. Place management is almost evangelistically put forward as the means by which all things local, spatial and human can be formalised and mobilised against the enemy, at the same time the strategy tries to wipe out competing options.

The Valley is variously described by the presenters as: part of, but distinct, from the City Centre (Bourke & Crawford 2000); locally diverse (Botsman 2000); having contrasting and changing demographics (Bourke & Crawford 2000); housing a wide range of business and governmental interests (Botsman 2000); disadvantaged and marginalised groups in the area are experiencing more isolation associated with the above changes (Botsman 2000) and in terms of managing the needs of marginalised groups, there is a lack of coordinated community services and facilities (DSAS 2000a).

In summary, the experts who presented at the Community Workshop proposed that changes being experienced locally 'mirror ... the global experience of inner city areas' in terms of 'development and change' (Botsman 2000, p. 1). With regard to the urban renewal program, 'the challenge is to develop responses to this level of change that preserve diversity and involve all the different interests present locally' (Botsman 2000, p. 1). The proposed means for developing those responses was

predictably: place management. According to Botsman (2000) place management ‘is about creating a cycle of prosperity through the coordination and mustering of all resources locally. It has been variously named: community capacity building and community development ... This approach implies a focus first on community’ (Botsman 2000, p. 1).

The following quote was used by both the academic and the state government bureaucrat at the workshop with regard to the diversity of issues facing the community and the necessity for a more coordinated effort. Both Botsman (2000) and Francis (2000) separately stated that ‘the challenge currently facing government is how to draw those common threads together and initiate positive concrete action to address them’. Further, Botsman (2000, p. 1) argued for ‘a need to develop joined up solutions and find ways of pooling resources (existing and new investments) to implement solutions that can successfully achieve the identified community outcomes locally’. The idea was that drawing together disparate resources would make a ‘whole’. It was assumed that this universal approach would by its very definition be better positioned to devise solutions that would fit local problems.

On 7 December 2000, the Project Team of the Inner City Place Project ‘endorsed the recommendation to establish the primary outcome of the place management project to secure “community and business engagement in the development and management of the project”’ (ICPMP 2000b). Officially ‘community and business engagement’ emerged as an outcome of the project.

No longer was it possible for the community to be left to their own devices in terms of involvement in the project. Their engagement was to be secured in a way that was measurable as an outcome and would stand up to scrutiny (ICPMP 2000b). The recruitment of the community in the Place program became a technical device in the administration of the Place strategy; nonetheless there was still no clear definition of *community*. This oversight could well produce endless problems in the coordination of this rapidly expanding network.

The Inner City Place Project attempted to inspire some form of reciprocity, declaring that “we need you to help us help you” in order to achieve both your aims and ours’.

The goals of both the community and Place Project were already aligning in the text. The sentiment was that the Place Team was already across all of the issues in the Valley. This type of community consultation process relied heavily upon the fact that there was already momentum surrounding the issues. The Place Project was working hard to capture and direct this enthusiasm toward their agenda. The *Draft project plan for the Inner City/Fortitude Valley Place Management Demonstration Project* stated:

It is clear from the level and range of community sector involvement in the development of the documents – that the community expects to be actively involved in any proposed future action with government might seek to initiate – evidence of this is from the initiation of a community meeting on 22.8.2000 – to discuss the DSAS Report – awaiting formal State and Local Government responses (ICPMP 2000a, p. 1).

And, building on this, a General Place Objective proposed that: ‘4. the local community is better informed about and more understanding of itself and its constituent members and is empowered to influence its own development’ (ICPMP 2000a, p. 2).

The state offered up a democratically inspired opportunity for individuals to join together and display civic responsibility in action. Ironically in this instance the individuals were already gathered and attending to their civic duty prior to the state and local governments’ workshop. There were simultaneous processes at work here. In order for the Inner City Place Project to recruit the necessary actors and stabilise their view of not only the problem/s in Fortitude Valley but also the methods for dealing with them (community partnerships), they must attempt to intervene and sideline other systems or processes that may be operating counter to, or in competition with, their goals (Callon 1986b). This process is called the *interessement* and the aim of it is to ‘interrupt all potential competing associations and to construct a system of alliances’ (Callon 1986b, p. 211).

More traditional *interessement* strategies involve carving off the players from alternate suitors and closing off opportunities to be enticed into alternate associations. The Place Team seemed to devise an alternate means of imposing *interessement*. That was to be all inclusive to the point where in their proposal no-one would be outside of the frame and therefore no competing agendas were on the

sidelines. The Place Team operationalised a strategy that appeared to be based on the belief that if everyone and everything was included then there would be nothing and no-one of any significance operating outside of their proposed frame. Nonetheless this approach came with its own set of challenges, as will be revealed; one can never account for everything.

6.7 Success at the first hurdle: speaking with one voice

To build a network of actors to implement a particular flavour of change in Fortitude Valley, the Place representatives created a sense of having reliable knowledge of the reality of the problem and put forward their credentials and authority regarding their capacity to drive the program. The outcome of drawing these threads together was that the recruits signed up to participate in the Place process. At this stage the community groups appeared to have been convinced that the only way to achieve their goals was through participating in the Place program. Therefore there was initial agreement that the Inner City Place Team would become the gatekeepers or the ‘obligatory point of passage’, through which all other participants must pass in order to realise what was developing into mutually agreed upon goals.




Figure 3: Obligatory Points of Passage

Inner City Place could only achieve their program with the participation of the community groups, the Valley and the unsafe people. The Inner City Place Project ‘determined a set of actors and [re]defined their identities in such a way as to establish themselves as an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships they were building (Callon 1986b, p. 204).

DSAS believed that they could only achieve additional services that would promote better-coordinated welfare support for marginalised or disadvantaged people with the resources and political will offered by the Inner City Place program. While there was concern among DSAS participants that getting involved with the Place Project could risk displacement of marginalised people, at this stage this was a risk that DSAS was willing to take based on trust built through the Place Team's use of the language that was steeped in social justice rhetoric. The Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) believed that increasing local consumerism through promoting safety in the area could be achieved with the methods proposed by the Place Team. FVBSG were keen to eliminate any impediments to the full realisation of the urban renewal program. The consensus among FVBSG committee members was that if Fortitude Valley could not shake off its long-held association with deviance and unsafe behaviour, the urban renewal agenda would be jeopardised. Committing to an approach that was designed to undermine locational disadvantage appeared to be consistent with this ideal.

The dominant view that began to circulate among all throughout the Fortitude Valley players was that safety could ultimately be achieved only through the propositions being put forward by the Inner City Place Team. The belief from the community groups was that it would be difficult to achieve the desired outcomes without resources and support now being offered by the state. So when Place representatives began to put forward an alternate (integrated) model, DSAS and FVBSG were propositioned to formalise the relationships. DSAS was informed by the Place Team that the Place committee was at this stage only made up of representatives from Brisbane City Council and the Department of Families. Some of the enticements being offered to the community groups were: (a) an opportunity in the near future to have one or two DSAS representatives in the Place structure, and (b) that Brisbane City Council and the Department of Families would commit resources, staff and dollars to the Place Project (DSAS 2000b). The momentum was definitely shifting in the direction of the Place Project. At the 15 December 2000 meeting of the FVBSG, the group 'agreed to register interest about place management with Dept of Families' (FVBSG 2000b). In hindsight, perhaps what was interpreted as faith in the Place program, was merely child-like excitement borne out of hope regarding the recognition of the local issues by the state. The local groups' tireless efforts seemed

to be finally recognised. The next necessity for the Place Team was to build on this faith and turn it into formal commitment. In other words, it was time to get everyone to give up their autonomy and take the next step.

6.8 Negotiating the common ground: everyone must give up something

After the Community Workshop in December 2000 the Place representatives devised a new organisational structure (see figure 4), which was outlined to DSAS (DSAS 2001a) and FVBSG (FVBSG 2001a).




Figure 4: Proposed organisational structure, Place Project (Proceedings of the Inner City Place Management Cross Sector Project Team Planning Workshop, 29 March (2001))

Figure 4 shows the proposed organisational structure for the project put forward by the Place Management Cross Sector committee, who had been tasked to present the government’s de-siloed approach to the existing committees. The Place committee, as mentioned above, was driven by the Brisbane City Council and the Department of Families, who had already been tasked at a government level to operationalise the place methodology. In terms of the organisational structure, the minutes of the Cross

Governmental Committee stated that ‘a key concern [in the Place process was] how to empower the community and get its views on the project’s management structure’ (CAPT 2000, p. 2). The initial proposal for the Place structure had devised outcome-based areas including: harm minimisation, planning and coordination, community capacity building and skills development (CAPT 2000). The proposition put to DSAS and FVBSG was that while the names of the groups had changed, the consultation process had provided the Place Team with enough background to summarise and generalise (i.e. repackage) the issues into outcome areas. However this initial structure was rejected and a new version was speedily devised (see figure 5). The committee was to be called the Inner City Place Project Steering Committee and working groups and sub-working groups were to be centralised around it.




Figure 5: Place Project organisational structure (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee, 20 December 2001)

The new structure was also viewed by some with scepticism. This related to whether existing group outcomes and objectives would fit into the areas being carved out for them by the Place Team. For example the FVBSG was being transformed into the Crime Prevention and Safety and Wellbeing working group and committee members queried the fit (FVBSG 2001a).

This was the first blatant indication that what was being proposed was different from what was already in train, in spite of the pitch. In terms of the moments of

translation, this change in names can be interpreted as an extension of the problematisation phase shifting into interessement through the utilisation of subtle changes that ‘trap’ the actors into their new roles; reflexively, the actors let go of their previous roles and alternate attachments. These identity shifts also make it more difficult to return to their previous roles. It was becoming clear that what had begun as a community safety project initiated through a groundswell of local stakeholder concern—from two perspectives: business or social welfare—was swiftly becoming something else. In spite of the convincing rhetoric the thing that was being created was also seemingly more difficult to define.

It has already been established that DSAS and FVBSG had developed prior to and separate from the Inner City Place Project. In the proposed new structure, the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) would become the Health and Wellbeing Support Services sub-working group and the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) was to become the Crime Prevention and Community Safety sub-working group. Their status had been demoted to that of a sub-working group, which was two steps down from the Inner City Place Project Steering Committee. For a methodology that stipulated community involvement in decision making as fundamental, the community groups’ position in the structure two levels down from the decision-making hierarchy was a contradiction in this regard.

On paper the existing committees had been re-imagined and written into the new ‘project structure chart’. In the previous versions of the Inner City Place Project structure there was no mention of crime and/or safety in the title of any of the outcome-based working groups. The Crime Prevention Community Safety and Wellbeing sub-working group was originally called the Harm Minimisation working group (CAPT 2000) but had been amended to reflect the charter of the existing community groups. For example DSAS had previously defined its job as an ‘explor[ation of] strategies that would respond to community concern about the impacts of drug use and community safety on the community’ (DSAS 2000a, p. 10). The Business Safety Group stated that its mission was to ‘foster a community that is conducive to successful growth’ (Fortitude Valley Business Crime Prevention Committee 2000), drawing together crime prevention and successful growth into the same realm. Indicative of the salience of recruiting existing community groups, the

names of the Place sub-working groups now deliberately reflected the issues and goals identified by both DSAS and FVBSG. While community and safety were being embraced, locational disadvantage was being dispersed into these other categories.

The sub-working group categories were now:

Crime and Community Safety (FVBSG)

Health and Wellbeing and Support Services (DSAS)

Homelessness and Affordable Housing

Culture, Recreation and Leisure

Crime, safety and community were becoming the containers for locational disadvantage. Whether or not locational disadvantage could sustain itself as a legitimate diagnostic tool based on this evolution was yet to be determined. The Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee now had the key role in the 'health and wellbeing' subgroup and the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group had their role redefined to 'crime and community safety' issues. The other two committees—Homelessness and Affordable Housing and Culture, Recreation and Leisure—were newly formed and indicative of the strategy to broaden the network beyond the point of competing agendas that would potentially railroad the Place program. All the main groups, DSAS, FVBSG and ICPMP, had to give up some ground in order to secure consensus for the adoption of the Place organisational structure. These shifts may appear inconsequential, but they were an important aspect of the dynamics of refining and redefining the issues and goals of the project so that the commitment of 'necessary others' could be secured (Callon 1986b). Additionally, it is probably important here to note that every time the state shifted toward the community's reality of the problem of safety as a means of supporting the imperative of community involvement, they were also losing something in terms of their own agenda of place management and perpetuating issues related to coordination.

Even though these groups were separated in the project structure, there was to be substantial membership crossover within the four sub-working groups. The Inner City Place Project's list of nominated members for each sub-working group totaled approximately ten (Crime Prevention, Safety and Wellbeing Outcome Area Working Group 2001). This made up just under half of the total membership of each sub-

working group. A number of participants were on numerous committees, for example two members were on all four sub-working groups, two were on three, and at least five members were participating in two of the sub-working groups (Crime Prevention, Safety and Wellbeing Outcome Area Working Group 2001). So while there was a large number of stakeholders participating in the Crime Prevention, Safety and Wellbeing outcome area these numbers were blurred by the crossover at all levels—governmental (state and local), community and private sector. The take-up of these roles within the structure was indicative of a successful enrolment in that the interestment had been successful. The organisational structure operated to define and distribute the roles of the participants and functioned to isolate any forms of initial resistance.

Ironing out and reconciling the idiomatic complexities and consolidating the number of participants into easily identifiable categorisations was an important strategy for the enrolment of the actors into a functioning and bounded network that would be committed to community safety in Fortitude Valley, bundled together through the template developed by the Inner City Place Project. On paper all participants had become incorporated into a complicated version of themselves put forward by the state.

The point at which the Valley program transformed itself from a community project to a higher level technocratic strategy offered up a range of opportunities for the application of administrative, technical and evaluative devices to be incorporated into Fortitude Valley. Not necessarily to measure the outputs delivered by the participation, but to tick the internal project boxes by stating that real community participation was in fact occurring. These types of techniques can be seen as useful precursor strategies for mapping out the enrolment phase of the translation of this set of relationships into something other than ideas. The visual, verbal and documented evidence of how it all has been thought through is a perfect fit. The model promoted the idea that it is just commonsense to all work together.

Drawing from Law and Singleton (2000, p. 5) the Inner City Place Project had ‘drawn on and mobilise[d] the knowledge/s and the realities’ of locational disadvantage, crime and safety and positioned them within the established

community. The assumption was that community, safety and crime existed in reality in Fortitude Valley and could be readily appropriated, reconfigured and dispersed across an ever-broadening and increasingly complicated space. However there was also a sense from the inside that the complication of the problem of safety was also having the effect of simultaneously diluting it.

6.9 Working from the same page: the scuffle around disadvantage

6.9.1 Overcoming the complexity of the issues: safety in numbers

Bureaucrats are the Einsteins of society. They make incommensurable frames of reference once again commensurable and translatable.

The protocol of agreement, red-penciled and ratified, starts moving again, going from one reference body to another, tracing a path along the way, a succession of fragile catwalks that make the agreement harder to break each time, because it is now weighted down with the word of the State (Latour 1996, p. 181).

The Inner City Place Project needed to attach themselves to an existing community network because its knowledge position was based upon the idea of community partnerships. The imperative was for the Place Management team to attach themselves to existing community groups and take up the community issues as a means of staying alive, or risk oblivion.

So far the above discussion has outlined a number of efforts by the Inner City Place Team to translate and stabilise a network based on place management strategy. An exploration of the data revealed a number of translation moments. The translation moments are summarised as follows:

- (1) Set out and align the problem—an inner city location suffering the effects of rapid global change represented the first movement in the problematisation;
- (2) Set out the solution to the problem—the introduction of an evidence-based, locational-based strategy that relies on and empowers the local community to operationalise at the site of the problems represented the second movement in the double movement of problematisation;
- (3) Position themselves strategically in relation to the other actors—for the realisation of the mutually defined goals, the Place Project became the obligatory point of passage;

- (4) **Interessement and enrolment**—In order to provide evidence of this renewed image of collaboration and partnership, the Place Project reworked the organisational structure to reflect the community groups' agenda and broadened the agenda as a means of overriding alternate agendas; the Place Project carved off the network from potential attacks from outside in a sign of successful interessement and enrolment.

Thus far, according to the ANT model of network translation, some of the crucial moments have been accomplished. However, two years later an evaluation of the Inner City Place Project stated that 'the Inner City place project's development and operation has been (negatively) impacted upon by *the complexity of issues* (such as community safety, homelessness and illicit drugs) and the *number of stakeholders* from government, community agencies and the local business sector located in this area' (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 8, emphasis in original). The following discussion draws attention to some of the attempts made to impose order on the complexities.

6.9.2 Sharing the vision: the repackaging of social problems

As we saw in the previous chapter, social problems or social issues in inner Brisbane were characterised in the literature as complex; this was no different to characterisations expressed in the evaluation of the Inner City Place Project (Thompson et al. 2003). The difficulty experienced by the Place Project in undermining of the complexity of social problems in Fortitude Valley was one way of evaluating the success or otherwise of the Place Project. However, there was also another way of viewing this complexity.

Observation through an alternate frame revealed that apart from 'complexity' there were at least three separate but interdependent discourses shaping the alternate characterisations of social problems in Fortitude Valley. First, as was established in Chapter 5, 'locational disadvantage' was the new terminology that replaced more traditional ways of characterising social problems. Targeting disadvantage through promoting local ownership of the problems and collaborating with local communities in order to realise the full potential of a location provided an opportunity to circumvent direct engagement with the complexity normally associated with social problems. Through casting a new net over the site where disadvantage was manifest

there was also an opportunity to restrain the complexity. The containment of disadvantage was another useful and stabilising technique that may be interpreted as an interestment device and another means of locking down the problematisation (Callon 1986b) at a governmental level. As well, this new way of looking at social problems created a chance to generate a different analytic pathway that bypassed the cause-and-effect dichotomy; i.e. that 'social problems' are the effect, wholly or partially, of inequitable policy decisions. The application of these types of bureaucratic techniques to 'complex social problems' rendered them definable and governmentally compatible (Rose 2000b).

It also shifts traditional areas of state responsibility back onto the community at the same time as positively reinforcing a community empowerment model.

In contrast, the FVBSG regarded social problems in Fortitude Valley as one of safety (Fortitude Valley Business Crime Prevention Committee 2000). For the business safety group, targeting safety also provided an alternate to directly having to negotiate the 'complexity of social problems' or their causes. Focusing on safety was legitimatised through the rhetoric of risk management that has pervaded almost all areas of life in advanced liberal societies. The issue of safety for FVBSG was most frequently linked to environmental variants that could be activated to promote and manage safety in the area. Finally, from the perspective of DSAS, social problems in Fortitude Valley were broken down to specific categorisations related to behaviour (illicit drug use and crime) or circumstance (low income or homelessness). DSAS proposed that the prevalence of these issues in Fortitude Valley related to the lack of appropriate drug and alcohol support and rehabilitation, welfare, allied health and housing services. As well, DSAS pointed to new standards in the management of and limited access to 'safe public spaces' as the reason for an increased visibility of and concerns with these problems (DSAS 2000a).

The breaking down of social problems, for all participants, into distinct, locational, behavioural and circumstantial categories was another useful strategy that provided everyone with the opportunity to target discrete issues outside of the realm of complexity. Within this model, social problems could be intervened on and administratively detached from the messiness usually associated with more broadly

defined and institutionally entrenched social problems. Apparently no one wanted to deal with social problems through a discourse that characterised them as complex. Nonetheless when assessing the progress of the Inner City Place Project, Thompson et al. (2003, p. 8) ultimately resorted to blaming the complexity of the social problems and the diversity of stakeholders as a key impediment.

6.9.3 Slippage: homogenising the issues / what gets left out

The following is a breakdown of the three committees' perspectives. According to this breakdown, above and beyond the core business of the groups, the two issues that have survived the reordering and were now common to all was that of 'community' and 'safety', not locational disadvantage, not social problems, and not a lack of services. The cohering concern for Fortitude Valley was now officially community safety.

Committee	Problem	Vision
Inner City Place Project	disadvantage	vibrant, inclusive, diverse and <i>safer</i> inner city <i>community</i> (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001)
FVBSG (Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group)	unsafe	<i>safe</i> and comfortable <i>community</i> (FVBSG 2000a)
DSAS (Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee)	lack of support services	engender <i>community</i> response drug use and safety (DSAS 2000a)

The obvious inclusion of safety and absence of disadvantage in the vision of the Inner City Place Project implied that disadvantage could conversely be equated with safety. In fact, as will be shown, the term 'locational disadvantage' almost disappears entirely from view throughout the progression of the project.

The task was for the Place Project to achieve two interdependent goals, engage existing community groups and align perceptions of the problem of Fortitude Valley, into a shared vision that incorporated the theoretical proposition of the Place perspective: locational disadvantage. Place management is defined as a strategy that ‘concentrates on areas of multiple disadvantage and social exclusion’ (Inner City Place Management Cross Sector Project Team 2001, p. 14). After all of the negotiations the ultimate goal of the inner city place became ‘to create a vibrant, inclusive, diverse and safer inner-city community’ (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001, p. 2). Somewhere, somehow and at some time in the development of the Inner City Place vision, between early 2000 and December 2001, disadvantage had slipped from view and in its place was vibrancy, inclusivity, diversity and community safety. Needless to say the Inner City Place Project seemed to have taken up the community safety mantle in lieu of disadvantage. The community’s priority of safety was becoming Place’s shorthand for disadvantage. Disadvantage seemed to be being pushed aside for community safety. There appeared to be an unspoken assumption that they were the same thing/s. No-one was asking if they were the same thing, or even if they were the same thing here but something different over there. Disadvantage departed from centre stage quietly and without resistance. Place theory did not appear to be as invested in its central device as was initially thought. This may have seemed like a diminutive moment, but the Place Project was dislodging locational disadvantage to somewhere else, ipso facto the ‘problem’ for Fortitude Valley was community safety. The Inner City Place Project was, so it seemed not particularly loyal to ‘locational disadvantage’ and with the promise of community commitment they seemed to be quite willing to abandon it altogether. The displacement between locational disadvantage and community safety took place during 2000 and 2001. An interim evaluation (Thompson et al. 2003) that was undertaken on the Inner City Place Project in 2003 provides some insight into the means and significance of these discursive slippages.

To understand some of what got lost, or gained, in displacing locational disadvantage, it is relevant to spend some time exploring what locational disadvantage in the Valley looked like. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, place management was trumpeting locational disadvantage as a key point of departure from previous social policies. On this basis there was an expectation that

with regards to a vision statement one might expect to see terms like ‘advantage’ or ‘prosperous’. This absence propelled the investigator to look further to find out what the disadvantage that the Place Project had initially located in the Valley looked like. According to Thompson et al. (2003) the Place Project’s original justification for targeting disadvantage in Fortitude Valley was stated as:

- A concentration of general indicators of multiple disadvantage;
- Contrasting socio-economic characteristics and changing demographics;
- The identification of common issues/needs and identified solutions;
- The co-location of major government, private and community sector interests;
- The status of the inner city as a focus of regional and state activities; as well as,
- A dramatic escalation in illicit drug use and visible homelessness in the CBD and Fortitude Valley;
- Increase in opportunistic prostitution, petty crime and violence;
- Difficulty in increasing client demand with services in the Inner City;
- Gentrification and loss of affordable housing;
- Changing nature of Inner City;
- Lack of resources for a number of target groups in the Inner City that include: young people at risk, homeless Indigenous people, people with drug and alcohol issues, and people with mental health and psychiatric disorders; and
- Increasing tension over the use of public space (Thompson et al. 2003, pp. 31–32).

So we can see that there were ‘multiple factors’ of disadvantage; some were consistent with global criteria used for interpreting disadvantage and others were more idiosyncratic. Thompson et al. (2003) looked more closely at the data used to measure multiple factors of disadvantage as part of their evaluation of the Inner City Place Project. Their conclusion, based on results of an analysis of the data pertaining to the Inner City area, and in particular Fortitude Valley, showed indicators were uncharacteristic of a locality of ‘significant disadvantage’ (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 38). They did however state that ‘its position as a hub of commercial and social activity attracts a significant range of social problems that constantly impact on both the commercial and resident communities’ (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 38). It was, according to this report, the presence of ‘major social problems’: illicit drug use, homelessness, opportunistic prostitution, petty crime, violence, and so on that provided the basis for the development of this project. They concluded that ‘the impetus for [the] Inner City place project would appear to have been derived from these social and community issues and from quite noticeable changes in the

demography of the local area over the past five years' (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 38), rather than disadvantage per se. At a closer examination of the data, one is still no closer to pinpointing locational disadvantage in the Fortitude Valley area. The authors of the evaluation fell into using well-worn discursive patterns similar to the ones they were accusing the Place Team of, i.e. displacing locational disadvantage and re-placing the problem of Fortitude Valley as being complex and social rather than locational and disadvantaged.

A breakdown of the two dominant versions of reality being portrayed in the evaluation report can be represented in the following form:

Inner City Place Project <i>version of reality</i> :	Fortitude Valley = location of disadvantage
Thompson et al:	Data indicated that Fortitude Valley was uncharacteristic of a location of disadvantage
Thompson et al.'s <i>version of reality</i> :	Fortitude Valley = significant (complex) social problems

Two competing versions of the problem of Fortitude Valley have been highlighted. Place management started its work in the Valley as a strategy driven to resolve locational disadvantage, and as was mentioned in Chapter 5 had picked up crime and all the associated deviances along the way. Locational disadvantage had now been completely displaced by community safety. Justification for the selection of Fortitude Valley as a location of disadvantage pertained to 'the nature and extent of social problems such as illicit drug use, homelessness, gentrification and mental health issues within this locality' (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 47). And as we have seen, Fortitude Valley was not really indicative of a disadvantaged location anyway, so perhaps the strategy was the wrong fit from the start.

This process is understood as slippage (Law & Singleton 2000), where participants have to give up some ground regarding their interpretation of the problem and, by association, strategies for managing it. The price paid for not paying enough attention to these apparent subtleties can prove problematic in the coordination of a newly orientating network (Law & Singleton 2000). Nonetheless, the momentum generated by the hype of having 'your' local issues taken up by the state was analogous to the idea of a small child being reunited with the long-lost parent who

abandoned her so long ago. In spite of a generalised sentiment of cynicism toward the state bureaucracy there was a tangible feeling of hope for the future. There was documented evidence supporting an real commitment by the state. Fear of past experiences of let downs and abandonment was overridden by the Place Team's statement over and over again that they needed the community to achieve success in their project. Additionally, the generated benefit of the relationship was to manifest itself locally. On this basis it was perceived to be a win-win situation for the community groups. As has already been stated, a crucial moment in a successful translation is the locking in of recruits within the network boundary. They needed to be trusted by the Place Team to let go or marginalise any other parallel agendas that they may be holding on to. Place thought they had attended to this by broadening the net to its full capacity. The Place Team seemed so blinded by the goal of engaging the community that the fact that the agendas did not necessarily align and that the strategy of locational disadvantage was not a suitable match for the area seem to slip from view.

The dilemma exposed here is best explained by Law and Singleton (2000). If one argues that versions of reality are performances then 'making a successful performance is difficult (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 4). For Law and Singleton (2000) 'the argument ... is that performances are difficult to put on unless they build on the networks that are already in place' (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 5) and that they can't magically happen. Therefore some discursive variations must transpire as a means of linking into and riding on the back of existing networks if initial attempts at associations are unsuccessful (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 5). In particular, as has been discussed earlier, Fortitude Valley and social problems have a long history of mutual re-enforcement and it will be a struggle to dislodge this binarism to establish a new truth about the area. Seemingly 'social problems' were not going to make room for another truth related to locational disadvantage.

6.10 Conclusion

This chapter has taken up the discourse threads that were brought into focus in the previous chapter and showed how they got taken up and embroiled in the community safety project in Fortitude Valley. The key players in the community safety project

were outlined: the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS), Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG), Inner City Place Management Project (ICPMP), Fortitude Valley and unsafe individuals.

This discussion highlighted a number of moments in the translation including:

Inner City Place Project's incorporation of the community's agenda of safety into their vision statement. This move enabled them to align their agenda with those of DSAS and FVBSG. The alignment and recruitment of these two community groups into the organisational structure of the project can in the first instance be deemed to represent a successful enactment of the problematisation. The Inner City Place Project then became the obligatory point of passage through which all other groups must pass in order to realise their goals.

The discussion also explored the idea that the translation had not been a completely straightforward alignment. For the groups to operate within the same network, the Inner City Place Project has had to become idiomatically and structurally accommodating. All groups appear to have given up some important ground. The Inner City Place Project has already experienced some slippage, in that there was displacement between the 'place management' solution and the 'locational disadvantage' problem.

Safety has now been accorded a dual role as both the problem and the solution, and rather than disadvantage, community and safety have become the network unifiers. This subjugated displacement has generated a number of questions that will be taken up in the discussion to follow. Generally the next chapter asks questions of the data about how community safety gets performed within this newly devised (but not particularly stable) network. Specifically, it will explore whether the actors see the problem of and solution to community safety in the same terms and examine if the coordination of the community safety project is affected by same. The next chapter will follow this translation (performance) through its next phase.

Chapter 7: Performing community safety

Case Study: phase 5

7.1 Introduction

The model of intersement sets out all of the actors who seize the object or turn away from it and it highlights the points of articulation between the object and the more or less organised interests which it gives rise to (Akrich, Callon & Latour 2002, p. 205).

If different realities are being performed into being – and especially if those realities are about ‘the same object’, then we are likely to find that there are endless *problems of co-ordination* (Law & Singleton 2000, p. 8, emphasis in original).

Up until this point, the story of Fortitude Valley outlined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 has indicated that it is an historically and politically complex object. Even so it is worth simplifying this complexity by way of a summary to highlight some key moments in this story. Fortitude Valley was promoted as a successful business and retail centre, however vice industries established and proliferated in the area by the 1970s. The area became synonymous with a reflexively reinforcing dichotomy: bad place/bad people. This self-reinforcing discourse framed the geographic location and has endured over decades. On the back of this entrenched discourse another was being generated, that of reform. The reform agenda began to gather momentum from the 1960s onwards, however while there were big ideas, they rarely translated into an actual strategy of reform. In 1987 a controversial corruption inquiry played out in the state of Queensland: the Fitzgerald Inquiry, named after the head of the inquiry, Tony Fitzgerald, QC. The inquiry embroiled many of the Fortitude Valley police, crime and vice figures, as well as high-level state politicians in a major Australian controversy. The actual and symbolic centre of this controversy was Fortitude Valley and the organised crime networks that were located and circulated through it were targeted. Police corruption was exposed as pivotal to the ascendancy of these deviant networks. As part of the fallout from the inquiry, Fortitude Valley was reformed into a mall. By 1991, state and local governments initiated a major program of urban renewal in the area. An Urban Renewal Task Force was set up to steer the reform program, but was judged from the outside for not attending to the ‘social’ fallout that was occurring as a result of changing demographics, decreased availability of affordable housing and putting increased pressure on socially marginalised

populations that were accessing health, welfare and government services located in the Valley. There was pressure in particular for them to 'behave' less antisocially and therefore become less visible. By 1996, a committee called the Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC) was initiated by Fortitude Valley police and local business representatives. The FVCCC developed out of increased pressure on authorities from the new residents and local government to act on crime, homelessness, public drunkenness and drug use in the area. This committee formed separate to and operated independently to the Urban Renewal Task Force. Within the limits of the FVCCC a subcommittee was formed in July 1999, the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS). It was formed to directly address concerns about increased drug use and risk behaviours in the area. This committee operated from a social justice and harm-reduction perspective rather than one of crime and punishment. This linked in with pressure on Queensland Police to include community policing and harm reduction in their remit.

On 1 April 2000, a daylight murder in the Valley markets on a busy Saturday morning ramped up the momentum of the community groups and local politicians as the media were keen to reinforce the links between drug use and crime in the Valley. This event highlighted the tension between the old Valley and hopes and dreams for a new Valley, as well as reminding all the stakeholders how entrenched the historical perceptions about the area were and how difficult they might be to dislodge. In April 2000, the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG) formed and tasked themselves with undermining negative perceptions of the area as being unsafe. This committee believed that poor perceptions of the area would deter new consumers from patronising local businesses despite the renewal program. In this context they decided to take matters into their own hands, as they believed the Urban Renewal Task Force, the FVCCC and DSAS were not directly taking up the local businesses' concerns.

At a state government level the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care adopted place management as a strategy to address locational disadvantage throughout Queensland. This policy shift followed the apparent success of this strategy in New South Wales, the appointment of a high-level bureaucrat from NSW as the director general of the Department of Families in Queensland and local

government support from Brisbane City Council. Additionally a number of high-profile academics nationally and in Queensland were advocating for the introduction of place management, which helped to secure its profile. As a result Fortitude Valley was chosen as a 'pilot project' site. This coincided with the publication of a 71-page report, *Drug Use and Safety in Fortitude Valley: A Community Response* (DSAS 2000a), outlining drug-use trends, crime statistics, service issues and demographic changes in the area. The report distilled a large volume of information into 12 critical issues that DSAS believed would positively impact on 'drug-use safety' in the Valley.

As stated previously the committee membership was made up of non-government organisation representatives from needle and syringe programs, youth, health and welfare, indigenous services, police, academics, emergency service representatives, business representatives and governmental welfare institutions. In short a broad number of individuals that worked with the people who represented the 'problem of safety' in the Valley came together within this group. At this time (August 2000) the loosely termed 'Cross Sector Place Management Team' (later becoming the Inner City Place Team) introduced itself to and attempted to promote the Place strategy to DSAS and FVBSG. The major strategy undertaken by the Place Team was to hold a community workshop to rally interested parties and draw them into the place management framework. Community participation was formalised into a new vision statement and a worked and reworked organisational structure. By this time the initial phases of the translation process had been successful. The relative success of the problematisation, interestment and enrolment was evident through the Place Team's instalment as the obligatory point of passage and the preliminary provision of roles. However, nothing is certain and networks that begin with promise may not always stabilise and secure success in the prescribed manner. The previous chapter pointed to some of the areas of slippage and displacement that were taking place through the translation. This was indicated through the uptake of community safety by the Place program, the disappearance of locational disadvantage in the Place rhetoric and the survival of complex social problems as the underlying cause of the problem in the Valley.

Against this backdrop a holistic and spatially based approach to community safety may have been a vision too far because as was pointed out in Chapter 1, murders continue to happen in the Valley. There is however no doubt that something occurred during the rollout of the Place Project because as was also noted in Chapter 1, the pre-2000 discursive depiction of the Valley as synonymous with corruption, crime, vice and drug use has subsequently disappeared. These long-held depictions of the Valley have not just vanished from media reports of murders in the Valley, but from state and local government plans relating to the area. In addition there is no residue of the Place-based approach to locational disadvantage in the Department of Communities (as the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care is now known) *Annual Report 2008–09* and community safety hardly rates a mention in local government publications about the Valley in spite of the development of a new Valley Neighbourhood Plan (BCC 2010).

This chapter reviews documentation that cohered a version of events that map the operationalisation of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley, focusing in particular on the role of DSAS and the FVBSG. This chapter asks how community safety was performed within, and without, the Place program. This was undertaken with a view of highlighting the disappearance of community safety from centre stage and its successful, but unconventional, spatial distribution.

7.2 Would the real community safety problem please stand up

The Inner City Place Project devised and set in place a structure that was formulated around and justified through championing the benefits of a community partnership approach. It was to be the definitive cross-sector approach to the ‘management’ of ‘disadvantage’ (safety) in that it was cross-governmental (de-siloed), cross-institutional (state and local) and encouraged participation by the private sector, community and welfare-based organisations and the community in general (i.e. residents).

The two assumptions were (1) that there are certain geographic locations that when compared to other locations and according to a range of statistical measures can be classified as disadvantaged and (2) that there are communities that exist ‘out there’

(Law & Singleton 2000, p. 2) that could be called upon to participate as required by the state.

Already it has been shown that with regard to the first assumption, in Fortitude Valley complex social problems did not equate with the criteria accorded to locational disadvantage. The second assumption seemed thus far to be bearing itself out.

But place management can also be interpreted as a type of knowledge devised upon a perceived reality. According to Law and Singleton (2000) the knowledge (episteme) and the reality (ontology) were being performed in the same translation. The argument is based on Law and Singleton's (2000, p. 2) contention that certain performances make present a representation of reality at the same time as making that reality. The remainder of this chapter will follow the various attempts to perform community safety.

The point here was not to discern which type of community safety was more legitimate than others. But rather to explore the idea that all things are not always possible and that some of the performances of community safety won't survive in the contested terrain within which the strategies were being performed. Diversity and partnership may be the cornerstone of community development approaches but in terms of performing a coordinated response to community safety in Fortitude Valley it may have limitations. However, for the state, working outside of this model of community was not an option.

This chapter follows community safety through its ascendancy from within the initial organisational structure set out by the community groups (figure 6) in the year 2000 through to the version produced by the Place Management Steering Committee in 2002 (figure 7) and beyond.




Figure 6: Fortitude Valley community committees as at 2000




Figure 7: Inner City Place Project organisational structure (Beirne 2002, p. 85)

The outcome themes were given form through the creation of working groups. These themes were derived from information gathered during the community consultation held by the Inner City Place Team (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 57) that was referred to in the previous chapter. The organisational structure has expanded exponentially from the one invented by the community groups' initial attempt and from the second structure presented by the Place Team (figure 5, Chapter 6). Within the Inner City Place Project, community safety had become linked up and broadened. It was now a very large and complex object.

Given the number of state and local government stakeholders it was not surprising that the working group and sub-working group titles came to resemble a micro version of state government departments such as the Queensland Health, Department of Education, Department of Employment and Training, and the Department of Housing. The structure was made up of community representatives, police and business stakeholders. Accordingly, the make-up of the stakeholders was described as local residents, local business representatives and community representatives, the latter who had no clear definition at all. What could be inferred from this list of stakeholders was that 'community' must be what was left over from the space taken up by residents and business owners. In this frame, community applied to the social welfare and health services that were mostly non-government organisations (NGOs), funded by the state to work with the homeless, illicit drug users and socially marginalised people who frequented in the area.

Through the realisation of the organisational structure the Inner City Place Project had already achieved its primary goal. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the key to the Place strategy was the engagement of the local stakeholders and securing their commitment in the process. Securing the participation of community and business was the only clear measure of the strategy's success, as all the other outcomes were related to and dependent upon the community becoming legitimatised in their role.

In the final version of the structure, DSAS was offered Health and Wellbeing (at the bottom of the organisational structure) but did not give up the name DSAS to take up Place's version of them, another gesture that slipped by unnoticed. The FVBSG were offered Crime Prevention and Community Safety in the middle of the organisational

structure. A couple of members of each group took up membership on the Steering Committee at the top of the structure. The strategy of including DSAS and FVBSG (and others) at the Steering Committee, or decision-making, level was so they could participate in the structure at a leadership level. Governance of the Place process was another struggle to be overcome. A discussion paper produced by the Place Team, 'The Need to Establish New Governance Arrangements to Guide 'Place' Process in Brisbane' (2001), stated:

The principles of place management clearly support the devolution of decision-making responsibility and control to the local level. 'Place' is proclaimed to be not just about improving the machinery of government, it is about changing key aspects of our system of governance. 'Place' based outcomes, demand 'place' based decisions.

But while local/place control over decision-making may be good in theory, it's fair to question if it can really be achieved in practice. One of the practical difficulties facing the transition from theory to practice is that ... there is such a diverse range of stakeholders needing to be engaged in [the] place projects, it quickly becomes unwieldily [sic] trying to appropriately include them all (ICPMP 2001, p. 2).

To address this governance challenge of turning theory into practice the Place Team proposed that the focus must not only be on cross-government engagement but

by seeking to cement business and community membership in formal structures at the 'place' ... levels. These proposed governance arrangements encourage business and community representatives to adopt key leadership roles in the management of place projects and in the interface between 'place' and the complementary strategic initiatives with which it is connected. In so doing, tangible support would be displayed for the development of practical, cross sector partnerships designed to achieve high priority community outcomes (ICPMP 2001, p. 2).

The key strategy put forward to cement commitment into the Place structure was via community group members' formal inclusion into leadership roles. The second strategy was to rely on goodwill, while simultaneously acknowledging that the elasticity of goodwill would only extend so far.

To date, the governance arrangements that have guided Brisbane's place projects have been loosely formed, but as they stand, they strongly support the principle of joint stakeholder leadership in project management. This has assisted the development of a significant level of trust and confidence among project stakeholders. In the past, any debate that has occurred on contentious issues has been managed in a manner that has relied on the goodwill built up between stakeholders over the place projects initial six to nine month strategic planning phase. But while a system based largely on goodwill may have proven to be satisfactory in the initial stages of a particular place project's development, it is unlikely that it will continue to be so when potentially

competing stakeholder interests/priorities are contested during the project's operational phase. It is hoped that the maintenance of substantial goodwill between stakeholders will remain a hallmark of place processes, however more formal governance arrangements necessarily need to be established (ICPMP 2001, p. 4).

The initial phase of the project was built on goodwill and trust. Cement was added to secure groups into the structure and bind them into the decision-making structure. However, this cement and goodwill was already displaying early signs of fragmentation and may be an indication of the point made above: within a contested space goodwill, metaphorical and actual cement will only extend so far.

While DSAS members agreed to participate in the Steering Committee as well as incorporate the Health and Wellbeing subcommittee into their existing frame (not the other way round and retract into Place's version of them), their concern about being diverted from their primary role was evident in the need to reinforce to themselves that 'we need to stay representative of Fortitude Valley' (DSAS 2001b). This represented a sign that DSAS was may not be willing to give up all of their established ground to be wholeheartedly integrated into the Place structure and that they were particularly not willing to give up their name. This was a sign that the stability of the interest and enrolment was being threatened.

As a way of giving up some ground the FVBSG agreed to 'become part of the subgroup' because for them it was 'important to reinforce community participation' by FVBSG taking on the 'management of the subcommittee' so that 'we can define projects and issues for the main Place Planning Board to consider and implement' (FVBSG 2001b). The FVBSG agreed that

as a joint initiative between the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group and Place Planning, this group will now be called the Fortitude Valley Community Safety Group. The Chair of the FVBSG will be the chair of the FVCSG (FVBSG 2001c).

The gesture was that business would be removed from the title of the committee and community would be inserted to symbolise that the committee was representative of a community that was broader than just business representatives. This change reinforced the crucial alliance between community and the Place Project; 'We are community because we say we are'. However, it was apparent that the Inner City

Place Project did not exist outside of the organisational structure, but DSAS and FVBSG (FVCSG), in spite of a name change, continued to operate within and outside of the organisational structure.

In 2000, the membership of the FVBSG was made up of 12 business, two police, two local council representatives and one community representative from a non-government organisation. By September 2001, the newly named FVCSG meetings were attended by six local business, one police, two government, two local council, and one community representatives (FVCSG 2001). The make-up of the safety group was both retracting and evolving, in that there were less business representatives, more government participants but no real evidence of an increase in community participants. This is probably not such a revelation as no-one seemed clear about who the community participants actually were. Within this model, 'community' mostly seemed to be just out of reach and always somewhere other than where the Place Project was. As from the start the Place program put forward an imagined community that would organically cohere around the opportunity to participate with government to address the 'problem of disadvantage' in Fortitude Valley. To an extent this magical coherence was taking place, but there continued to be a sense of dissatisfaction with the level of community participation. Community seemed to be interpreted from the premise that one would see it when a collective of individuals appropriated it—either as a label or as a target. Community that once existed out there had now been locked in and was in part operating from within the organisational structure of ICPP. The view was that the community were involved in the Place Project because the word (and therefore all of the romantic connotations that get dragged along with it) was woven into every aspect of it, from the vision to the problem to the solution and everywhere in between. However, given the level of dispersion of community created by the size and scope of the organisational structure it was hardly surprising that it was becoming difficult to grasp the extent and volume of community involvement. The glue, cement and goodwill used to secure the community did, as was predicted by the Place Team, have limits.

John Beirne, the Place coordinator working out of the Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet, published a paper 'Walking the Tightrope: the Challenge of Place Planning in Metropolitan Brisbane' (2002), the title of which was indicative of

the difficulties that high-level bureaucrats were experiencing rolling out this program.

He stated that, in discussing the work of place management, he

would rather share some reflections about walking the tightrope ... about how we're trying to manage the risk, to maintain the balance; and in doing so, about how we're trying to avoid plunging to our bureaucratic deaths (Beirne 2002, p. 83).

As a way of highlighting some of the progress that the Place Project had made thus far in providing a safety net below the tightrope, Beirne (2002) listed eight funding allocations that had been made since the program's initiation. Some of these included \$70,000 for crime prevention, \$100,000 for DSAS to hire a dedicated worker, \$200,000 for employment projects for homeless and at-risk young people, a community services website and \$55,000 for accommodation brokerage. Funding for these projects came from state and local government, a gaming machine fund and from non-governmental organisations. Beirne then reflected:

While this might appear impressive after only 9–12 months of operation of the inner city place project – it is only a small start. But believe it or not, in spite of all these good outcomes, in spite of the value of the structure that we've put in place and in spite of the increasing number of people who are being positively engaged – some people (maybe a lot) remain sceptical. They continue to struggle with the notion that our vision is appropriate and that we're from the government and we're really trying to help and we're trying to help in a slightly different, more 'engaging' way than we have in the past (Beirne 2002, p. 87).

This scepticism was operating in opposition to the goodwill noted above. Some of the scepticism may have related to one of the ongoing issues that the state was having in terms of allocating and prioritising resources for the Inner City Place Project. In 2001, it was acknowledged that 'place' was 'not yet formally linked into the State Government's budgetary processes and as a result, it does not have access to a necessary resource base ... there is little if any capacity to support innovative crime prevention, employment, or community capacity building activities which 'place' stakeholders agree are high priorities . Accordingly 'there is a critical need to establish such a resource capacity for place initiatives' (ICPMP 2001, pp. 4–5).

DSAS was already deciding to have one foot in each camp. DSAS acknowledged that there were benefits of being involved in the Place Project but that links also

needed to be made with other agencies such as Corrective Services who were not embroiled in the ICPP structure (DSAS 2000b). At the DSAS strategic planning day, it was agreed that they would continue to participate in the Place structure but wanted to maintain independence (DSAS 2002a). Interpreting DSAS's 'foot in each camp' approach through the translation template indicated that there were threats to the stabilisation of the interestment and enrolment, that the trapping devices didn't offer enough incentives (or trust) to convince DSAS to give up their own ground (Callon 1986b). References to possible future funding opportunities were also not eventuating. DSAS displayed ongoing scepticism by continually reaffirming its autonomy. DSAS stated that they were 'willing to work in collaboration with the Place project and to keep place informed of its intentions' (DSAS 2002b); the emphasis of their intention was a reversal of what the Place Team had in mind.

Time would tell whether the state was able to create a funding stream to the Place Project that would suggest to the Fortitude Valley community groups that they and their issues were being taken seriously. As such, tentativeness (that manifested as scepticism) continued to flow through many aspects of the organisational structure.

7.3 Locating community safety: audits and data collection

In 1997, a private research company, AC Nielsen McNair, undertook research about Fortitude Valley to provide input into planning in the area. Published results indicate that 55% of respondents (n = not indicated) rated safety in the Valley mall as good or excellent, with 29% believing it to be satisfactory. A high proportion of respondents (79%) indicated that visiting the Valley in the four-week period post interview was unlikely. The main reason for this was that they had no interest or reason to visit there (32%), it was too distant (24%), or they preferred other places (10%). Safety was cited as a concern by 9% of respondents and 6% stated that the area had a poor image or reputation. In fact 'concerns about safety and the Valley's reputation made up less than one in five of [the] reasons for not making a visit' to the Valley (FVBSG 2000a, p. 11). This data was reported in the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group's Business Plan published in September 2000. The group that formed in April 2000 was initiated through concerns raised by Valley traders that 'the Valley was perceived by the general public as having a poor safety standard, particularly in view

of a recent fatal attack in the area' (FVBSG 2000a, p. 4). This concern appears to exist in contrast to the perceptions about safety cited in the report. Now there were two foundational conceptual devices that were contested by the data, locational disadvantage and safety. These two devices were being borne out 'in reality'. If locational disadvantage and safety was not borne out in the data then it must be assumed that if the project is to survive, both disadvantage and safety must become epistemologically and ontologically synonymous and relational. Thus suggesting that knowledge about reality and that reality get performed together, that one is not evident before or manifest after, but rather they coalesce in tandem.

If the plan was to adopt an already stated methodology based on locational disadvantage and appropriate community to attend to the problem of safety, then this network was turning out to be epistemologically and ontologically confounding. One could predict unending problems of coordination on this basis (Law & Singleton 2000). Regardless of these background and foreground discrepancies, the FVBSG were determined to locate un-safety and task themselves with attending to it.

The Business Safety Group stated that

to reduce crime, not only are law enforcement methods required, but that the environment in which those crimes take place must change before crime can be effectively dealt with. Therefore the group's scope of activities includes addressing both the image and perceptions of the Valley, in addition to tackling specific problem areas (FVBSG 2000a, p. 4).

Image and perception are predictably hard to materially pin down as they exist in people's minds, and according to the data, not so much in the respondents' minds but in the minds of the FVBSG members. In spite of this and in response to a daylight murder in the Valley in 2000, the FVBSG were committed to making safety a reality in the Valley. The group of local business people believed that tackling the environment would be crucial to undermining un-safety.

The other committee, the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee was formed to devise strategies that would 'respond to community concern about the impacts of drug use and community safety on the community' of Fortitude Valley (DSAS 2000a, p. 10). The DSAS report also included data about a range of issues including demographics, drug use, and crime in the area to consolidate their position in relation

to un-safety. Specifically the report quoted data from Queensland Police that compared crime in Fortitude Valley to the Brisbane central business district. Fortitude Valley had increased rates of drug- and prostitution-related crime but smaller rates of assaults, robbery and disorderly related crimes.

Table 1: Fortitude Valley and Brisbane City Police Divisions crime offences from 1 January 2000 to 26 April 2000 (Total numbers and percentage across Divisions) (DSAS 2000a, p. 24)

Offence	Fortitude Valley Division	Brisbane Division
Drug Related	409 (56.2%)	319 (43.8%)
Prostitution Related	170 (99.4%)	1 (0.6%)
Assault Related	134 (39.3%)	207 (60.7%)
Robbery/Stealing Related	66 (34.7%)	124 (65.3%)
Disorderly Related	130 (25.9%)	372 (74.1%)

Consistent with the crime statistics related to drug use, DSAS identified 12 ‘Critical Issues’ that needed to be addressed to target drug-use safety concerns in the Valley.

Table 2: DSAS twelve critical issues (DSAS 2000a, p. 8)

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lack of coordination and accessibility across existing services. 2. Increase in injecting drug use in public places and its impacts on users and the broader community in the Fortitude Valley area. 3. Limited availability of Detoxification Programs and Rehabilitation Programs in Brisbane. |
|---|

4. There are gaps in services and programs offered for people between detoxification and rehabilitation.
5. Real and perceived safety issues in and around Fortitude Valley.
6. Lack of affordable facilities and activities for young people in Fortitude Valley.
7. High levels of alcohol consumption in Fortitude Valley.
8. Contested public space, including parks, malls and major centres.
9. Homelessness.
10. Prostitution – street and opportunistic sex work.
11. Lack of social impact assessment and mitigation in new development within the urban renewal area.
12. Issues needing further research such as street level drug use and recreational drug use including alcohol.

DSAS had a number of big-ticket items on their agenda that would clearly require resources that were not reasonably obtainable to a group of stakeholders who were locally organised. This was in spite of the fact that a number of the members were employed by government and academic institutions. Similarly, FVBSG would need to have local and state government support to bolster the legitimacy of their aims. This is where the Inner City Place Management Project utility lay and it is within this space that they were able to insert themselves as the obligatory point of passage to achieve for all a project of community safety. There was however never any real or direct promises made by the members of the ICPP about the provision of resources but there were strong inferences with regard to this and their involvement provided a sense of hope that issues in the Valley would be taken seriously. In spite of this hope, in 2002 there was still a struggle ‘to achieve a link between “place” and mainstream program/budget processes’ (Beirne 2002, p. 88). In spite of the fact that resources were filtering through to Valley initiatives, the inability of the state to create a direct resource allocation was indeed a symbolic gesture that promoted various degrees of distrust and was dismantling the goodwill that had been previously built in the minds of some of the participants.

DSAS located un-safety in service coordination problems specifically in institutional and social spheres. A lack of attention to the social fallout from the urban renewal program was noted as a critical issue. According to DSAS some of critical issues were specifically relative to the bounded geographical area and others were broader but had an impact on Fortitude Valley.

DSAS and the FVCSG, with some membership overlap, identified the main components of the problem of safety as something that could be perceived, was organised, existed in the environment (and beyond) and was related to crime, specifically, illicit drug use (including prostitution and homelessness). These issues taken together made up 'un-safety' for these two groups. So far we can see that safety is considered to be many things and located in various domains, the mind, the space, in behaviour and institutionally. The responsibility for targeting these diverse aspects of safety lay with members of the community who were taking it upon themselves to attend to a growing momentum of concern, theirs and others. The apparent assumption was that un-safety could be carved up and aspects of it could be tackled interdependently to create safety in Fortitude Valley. Therefore addressing concerns about un-safety could translate into a reality that would equate to safety.

Community safety was further broken down through the Place Project working group topic areas (figure 7). Community safety according to this structure became:

Planning and coordination, crime prevention safety and community well being, sustainable economic development, community leadership and social capital – these were then broken down into data collection and evaluation, service delivery co-ordination, crime and community safety, homelessness and affordable housing, training and skills development, nature of unemployment, community capacity leadership, social and cultural diversity, communication and information, links to government strategic initiatives, health and wellbeing support services, and culture, recreation and leisure (ICPMP 2001, p. 2).

In a matter of one year, community safety went from being located in the mind, the place, in behaviour, and in the poor coordination of support services to being located in *every* space. Community safety was now everywhere: health, training, the nature of unemployment, social and cultural diversity, and beyond. Through the intersement and enrolment phases the translation 'community safety' became mobilised as an object that coincidentally mirrored a mini state.

7.4 Performing community safety

While the Place Team was attempting to translate community safety issues on a grand scale, the FVCSG was getting on with the business of discovering it and making it visible. As steering and working group members, that held a multiplicity of roles, were scrambling from meeting to meeting to meeting, and devising goals, actions plans, communication strategies, timelines, governance plans, project values and budgets, the FVCSG were rolling out safety audits. FVCSG were attempting to find community safety in the material make-up of the area by facilitating ‘safety audits’ in the mall and surrounding areas. The FVCSG believed that:

Safety audits are an important first step in identifying and remedying defects in the physical environment that give a community concern. They also enable the community to consider safety from a number of different perspectives and in so doing provide an opportunity for greater understanding about the dimensions of safety within a community (FVCSG 2002).

The safety group already had runs on the board with a safety audit that was undertaken in 2000. They believed that this safety audit had ‘led to a number of improvements in the area’ (FVCSG 2002, p. 1). Further, the FVCSG stated that ‘it has been pleasing to note [that] the general level of cleanliness and safety in the area is a testament to the many stakeholders who have a vested interest in a vibrant and safe Valley ... [but] more needs to be done’ (FVCSG 2002, p. 1). For this group the belief was that the ‘safety audit is the first step in the journey of improvement’ (FVCSG 2002, p. 1). The group circulated a document titled ‘What is a safety audit?’, developed by a private security firm as a ‘basis of the FVCSG monitoring process over the next two years’ (FVCSG 2002, p. 1). This group’s agenda was not being diverted by the expansive structure that they were now embroiled in, no matter who was attending the meetings and what they were named. The FVCSG were firmly committed to manicuring the area into safety by locating un-safety in things such as lighting, alleyways, graffiti, beautification and landscaping (FVCSG 2002).

The FVCSG made preparation for a second safety audit using the format of the one undertaken in 2000 as a guide. A daylight and evening audit were scheduled for 26 July 2002. Advertisements to recruit audit participants were taken out in local media sources and via leaflet distribution. The recruited participants made contact at the central meeting place in the Glad Tidings Church car park in the Valley. ‘Members

of the Police, Steering Committee and Community members who attended were provided with detailed briefings, divided into teams and allocated areas of responsibility to conduct the safety audit' (FVCSG 2002, p. 2). Teams were given specific locations and safety got divided up into domains such as lighting, signage, graffiti and vandalism, private property management issues, public streetscape issues/people management and behaviour. These domains were divided up into three subsections: location, problem and ownership.

Under the heading of lighting, 24 issues were identified, signage and graffiti ended up with 12 identified issues each, property management had 27 issues and under the heading public streetscape issues/people management and behaviour there were 89 identified issues. Of those 89 issues, two homeless people sleeping in two separate doorways were spotted, but for the most part the problems related to non-human concerns, for example; 'very uneven footpaths', litter, 'stairwell in poor state of repair', 'broken railings and fences', 'broken glass', some used needles and syringes found in 3 locations, unattended city buses, no traffic controls for pedestrians, foliage and bushes covering security cameras and public phone boxes, 'unsecured laneways', 'hiding places', 'high pedestrian traffic' and inappropriately disposed of beer bottles. By this account of community safety, the materiality of the space has precedence over humans in terms of a threat to safety. What is now evident is that community safety is a 'materially heterogeneous' object that was chock full of responsibility. The site had been drawn into the network with a moral obligation to step up to an apparent benchmark of safety, that existed in the theory and methodology of the safety audit and therefore in the minds and hopes of the audit participants. Safety or specifically its binary opposition un-safety was to be found in every nook and cranny of the Valley from broken footpaths, high pedestrian traffic and lack of traffic controls, foliage, unattended buses, hiding places and poor lighting. All of these 'innocents' were about to become embroiled in a safety (place) network, no more so than the apparent threat to safety attributed to three public phone boxes located outside the Fortitude Valley train station.

7.4.1 Business as usual

In another vein and apparently in spite of DSAS's and FVCSG's commitment to engage in the Place process, the Place representatives continued to restate their role,

agenda and espouse the benefits of becoming an enabled community. The rhetoric inferred that the community would only be enabled in relation to its involvement to the Place Project. The ongoing sales pitch of the advantages of being involved in the process was symbolic of the level of tentativeness being experienced throughout the structure, which is not to underestimate the power of goodwill in holding any network together, but there was always a sense that the goodwill was just about to run out. At the DSAS strategic planning day the roles accorded through the place organisational structure were explained by Place Project representatives thus:

The task of working parties and steering committees is to assist people in a specified geographical area. This involves creating and/or strengthening networks and organisations, re-allocating existing funds and services to priority areas, developing leadership of local people, organising access to professional knowledge and skills and developing a sense of 'inclusion'. This develops a local capacity to identify, plan, seek assistance from and network with other groups, thus enabling the community to identify, plan and react to their own problems on an ongoing basis (DSAS 2002a).

The irony of course was that while the Place Project representative was continuing to offer 'local' people the opportunity to 'identify, plan, seek assistance from and network with other groups [through the Place structure that would enable] the community to identify, plan and react to their own problems' (DSAS 2002a), DSAS and FVBSG had already identified, planned and were reacting to their own problems in 2000. And for the most part they were getting on with the job.

FVCSG had ideas about safety that were ideologically opposed to that of DSAS. In spite of the 'governance guidelines' devised by the Place Project team when conflict arose, the winners were the ones who were still standing in the end. In this instance it was the FVCSG who outlasted everyone and continues to exist in some form at writing of this thesis. Their determination to impose safety on/in the area, as will be explored in the following discussion, overcame a multiplicity of obstacles that included local and state government, a corporate telephone company, drug users association, DSAS and, as it turned out, three public phone boxes and the people that used them. These public phones were embedded in the cement footpath at the entrance to the railway station, which was encapsulated in a private mall. Their decline was slow, the space was contested but in the end the phones were *de-materialised* through their decent.

7.4.2 The trusty phone box: a very dangerous device

What follows is a timeline that tracks the fate of three public telephone boxes.

October 2002

On 17 October 2002, a conference was held at the Fortitude Valley Police and Citizens Youth Club. The conference was put on by the Fortitude Valley & Districts Chamber of Commerce and the Fortitude Valley Community Safety Group because concerns had been expressed about safety and other issues occurring in the part of Brunswick Street between Wickham Street and St Pauls Terrace. The conference was attended by 28 people (Fortitude Valley & Districts Chamber of Commerce, 17 October 2002). The following lengthy excerpt from the conference synopsis is provided to give the reader an indication of how and why three public phone boxes in Brunswick Street West came to be embroiled in the Fortitude Valley community safety project.

Context: Preliminary surveys undertaken by the Chamber and the Safety Group identified a number of issues: Antisocial and criminal behaviour; economic and employment impacts associated with poor streetscape; the concentration of service providers in a small area and the consequences arising there from; the long-term impacts of urban renewal and the potential for social and cultural disharmony arising out of a contest for public space.

The situation in the area is extremely complex. A number of different groups frequent it and indeed rely on its central location and close proximity to essential services. Many of these are socially, culturally or economically marginalised.

Brunswick Street West is also a major pedestrian thoroughfare with many commuters moving to and from the railway station under Valley Centre Plaza, the taxi rank in Alfred Street, and the bus stops in the street and those adjoining.

Issues:

Antisocial and criminal behaviour – Harassment, intimidation, begging and abuse of pedestrians had increased significantly over recent months. This was particularly evident around the entrance to Valley Centre Plaza.

Streetscaping – What the URTF had done with regard to the streetscape upgrade completed in 2001. The wider issue of the state of the railway station and the street was complex and as yet unresolved with discussions between URTF, property owners and the State Government ongoing. The community needs to be aware that structural change in an area takes a long time.

Social, Cultural and Contextual aspects – a number of participants indicated that many of the behavioural issues were a consequence of:

- the loss of affordable housing in the Fortitude Valley area

- the increasing number of homeless people generally
- the importance of the Valley as a major public transport hub
- the importance of the Valley for the supply and distribution of illicit drugs
- the rapid increase in ‘chroming’, particularly amongst young people
- the Valley being a major dropping off point for those released from correctional institutions

Impact: pedestrians feel uncomfortable to the point of feeling threatened as they use the street; businesses suffer from loss of patronage as customers decline to use their facilities; property owners suffer from loss of income as properties become unlettable and rents fall; the image of the Valley as an unsafe destination is reinforced; excessive calls for police service by pedestrians and business owners; and, increased burden on BCC cleaning services.

Solutions:

Standards of Behaviour – There was general consensus that minimum standards of behaviour were expected of all those who use a public space and that breaches of those standards was unacceptable.

Relocation of Public Phones – The conference concluded that the location of the public phones immediately outside the entrance to Valley Centre Plaza was an incentive for people to congregate there. Councillor Hinchliffe offered his formal support for the relocation of the phones provided there was no overall reduction in the number of public phones in the vicinity.

Outreach and Engagement – At the suggestion of [a representative from] BCC a small group of interested and involved agencies agreed to convene a meeting to generate a strategy to engage with groups using the street and to provide the Community Safety Group with recommendations about how to resolve some of the behavioural problems.

Long-term Outcomes – A number of participants spoke of the size and complexity of underlying causes that made achieving sustainable solutions problematic. Others, while confirming the need for sustainable outcomes, were equally concerned about overcoming immediate problems (Fortitude Valley & Districts Chamber of Commerce, 17 October 2002).

The FVCSG and their partners the Fortitude Valley & Districts Chamber of Commerce divided the safety concerns in Brunswick Street West into an ordered trajectory. These categorical devices, context, issues, impact and solutions provided a procedural tone to issues that generally defied administration. In the context of a situation characterised as ‘extremely complex’ the relocation of public phones probably seemed like a practical and realistic solution to disincentivise the congregation of people.

November 2002

Excerpt from correspondence to the Fortitude Valley Community Safety Group from the Crime Prevention Unit of the Queensland Police Service (13 November 2002).

The group requested that the Queensland Police Service, Crime Prevention Unit in conjunction with the Crime Prevention Officer, Fortitude Valley Police, survey the site and provide comment and recommendations regarding the current location and possible relocation of the three public telephones.

Subsequently, on Wednesday October 30, 2002 Crime Prevention Officers ... conducted a survey of the site. This survey was guided and measured by Situational Crime Prevention practices and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles. A clear demonstration of 'loitering', that is purposeless behaviour, was observed at and within the immediate vicinity of these public telephones. The observed behaviour could also be considered intimidating.

As a result of the survey, it is recommended that consideration be given to removing and relocating the three public telephones from the current site to a site where the abovementioned behaviour is less likely to occur. This would ameliorate both the 'loitering' behaviour and address the concerns being raised by relevant stakeholders. These stakeholders are, on a daily basis, directly affected by described behaviour. The relocation of the three public telephones will also benefit members of the public transiting through the space (Crime Prevention Unit 2002).

Additionally three relocation sites were proposed that would 'provide a range of environmental (CPTED) "cues" that will "positively" influence people's behaviour at and around the public telephones' (Crime Prevention Unit 2002).

Leading up to the beginning of 2003 the proposal put forward by FVCSG and the Fortitude Valley & Districts Chamber of Commerce for the removal of the three public phones had support from Councillor David Hinchliffe from Brisbane City Council (BCC) and the Crime Prevention Unit of the Queensland Police Service.

May 2003

The 'space' being occupied by DSAS and FVCSG in regard to community safety had always been contested. However, with the proposal to relocate the phones, there was a discernable shift in this contested space—from ideological to material. There had always been an argument put forward by some members of DSAS that merely dispersing 'complex social problems' would result in displacement and discrimination against already marginalised people. This fear was realised by DSAS

members when the FVCSG became committed to moving the three public phone boxes from the Brunswick Street West entrance to the retail centre and train station at the Valley Centre Plaza.

The West Brunswick street issue continues to occupy the attention of the Community Safety Group. In response to this issue, two public meetings are to take place on the 7th and 21st May. The first is to consult with people using the public space. Hopefully a range of stakeholders will be present at the meeting (negotiations for a barbeque at City Care are underway). The second meeting will be a public forum to take place at the old "Bingo Hall" location in the Valley plaza. It is hoped these meetings will develop a suitable response from the community to this issue (DSAS 2003a).

Brunswick Street West 'issues' had moved into the gaze of the safety group. Public meetings were to be held to devise a 'community' response to the problem of safety manifesting in this site.

There has been increased discussion in the community about the 'perceived' inappropriate behaviour of people using public space particularly the West Brunswick Street precinct ... the Fortitude Valley Community Safety Group has been leading discussion on how the community might respond to this issue (FVCSG 2003b).

The ideas were to consult and survey public space users, consult and survey businesses in the area and have a public forum where *all* stakeholders could participate in developing a response.

There were 42 businesses surveyed by DSAS and BCC representatives regarding concerns about the activities of people 'hanging around' Brunswick Street West. All survey participants (n = 37) except five considered safety to be a concern. Those who didn't feel concern, felt unconcerned or just accepted the situation. Out of 42 suggestions to how their safety concerns could be addressed, one person thought that 'getting rid of the phones' would be a good idea. There were a range of other solutions; ten people thought improved, increased and longer hours for community services would help. One businessperson blamed welfare services for the problem and suggested 'moving service providers out of the area'. Only four businesses out of the 42 surveyed were aware or had any contact with the FVCSG, but mostly people made contact with police in regard to their safety concerns.

Fifty 'public space users' were also surveyed between February and March 2003; 28% of respondents were under 30 years of age. The reasons given for being in

Brunswick Street West were because it was a central meeting place, provided access to transport, shopping, having just finished work, meeting with family, always 'come here', living in the area and to connect with drug dealers. The site was identified by 42% of 17–30 year olds as a meeting place for drug dealers, this equated to approximately five people; 10% of all respondents.

What was evident in the above data was that safety concerns were a priority for business people in Brunswick Street West. Welfare service issues were nominated as the primary Brunswick Street West solution. However, service access was nominated by no public space users as a reason for being in Brunswick Street West. Removal of the public phone boxes was nominated by one person.

An update of the situation in Brunswick Street West was provided by a BCC City Centre Place Project Team representative to the public forum on 21 May 2003:

The Valley Safety Group and the Chamber of Commerce held a community meeting on 7 November 2002 to discuss Brunswick Street West and people using the public space around the Valley Centre Plaza. In particular, safety issues such as drug dealing at the public phones, drinking in public, violence and general behaviour amongst space users were discussed.

There was a shared understanding that 'moving people on' was not supported to address Brunswick St West issues and people using the space needed to be included in any discussions taking place. 'Moving people on' would only create similar issues elsewhere. Community, business and government would continue to discuss the issues and work towards strategies and actions with support for better communication between the sectors.

An agreement at the meeting was that a number of immediate actions could progress, some of these included:

1. Council and Community Services agreed to work together to engage with people using the area and coordinate their visits/outreach to gain a better understanding of the issues and involve the space users in developing solutions.
2. The Inner City Place Project stakeholders would explore options to support and resource Meeanjin Treatment Association, a drug and alcohol referral service for Indigenous people (located in Brunswick St) to increase services and facilities for Indigenous people in the area.
3. Urban Renewal Taskforce would explore options to move the telephones outside the Valley Centre Plaza to an alternative location to reduce inappropriate use of the phones (Fabre 2003).

The first two actions gained general support. The Brisbane City Council was teaming up with three welfare and support services to engage with public space users. Increasing resources for Meeanjin was supported across all groups. The Urban

Renewal Task Force (URTF) did not support the relocation of the public phones and did not have the resource allocation to pay for it.

Update from the URTF indicates that they are not convinced that relocating the phone would assist in solving problems in the street. However they would support relocation to across the road (opposite Valley Centre Plaza) if the Community Safety Group believes that this should occur and funding sources for the costs (\$16,500) are identified (FVCSG 2003b, p. 6).

In summary it was purported that

issues being experienced in Brunswick Street West are not occurring in isolation. Rather, they are underpinned by a number of underlying issues. These issues have given rise to the increasing incidence of homelessness and contest over public place. They include: gentrification and redevelopment of the inner city; closures of boarding houses and squats; the difficulty in responding to the complexity of issues around mental illness, substance abuse and homelessness; and a reduction in public provision of housing and support services (Fabre in FVCSG 2003b, p. 6).

The determination being made about the phone boxes related to an association between the people who used the phones, what they used them for and the location of the phones. None of these associations amounted to much in isolation whereas taken together they were something else and were now spatially implicated in the safety network. However this perception was only taken up by the FVCSG. Compared to increasing access to services, which was tied to resource allocation through the Place Project, moving the phone boxes appeared to be a more tangible solution to the problem of safety. In lieu of any sustainable strategy or major resource allocation being taken up to attend to mental illness, drug use and homelessness in general and in the Valley in particular, the moving of the phone boxes took on heroic status in the cause of safety. The phone boxes and the deviant use of them were situated at the boundary between order and disorder, safety and un-safety (Law 2007) and human and non-human.

Photograph 7: Entrance to Valley Centre Plaza with the three public phones at Brunswick Street West.



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July 2003

Excerpt from FVCSG meeting minutes (24 July 2003):

[The Manager of Valley Centre Plaza] has unwittingly been given a lead role [in regard to the relocation of the phones] and as a result she will shortly be meeting with [a member of the URTF] regarding this matter. [She] questioned whether the relocation was necessary at all – and felt that removal might be a viable option. She explained that there is a commercial impetus on Telstra’s part for wanting to increase the number of phones available. [She] proposed that one phone outside the plaza might be enough.

[The Manager of Valley Centre Plaza] tabled an article about the removal of phones in Kings Cross Station (Sydney) on police orders. She also raised the issue of consultation with businesses at the proposed relocation site – this has not occurred. In addition to these matters, the costs of relocation are significant and keep increasing ... The Plaza proposes to liaise with Telstra about relocating inside (currently being run by a competitor) and seeing what they want to do with the phones on the street... [DSAS Community Liaison Officer] reiterated that the phones are a service which need to be accessible at all times. He queried whether the CSG or business has the right to determine that phones should be shut down in response to their being used for illegal activity (FVCSG 2003c).

Excerpt from correspondence to the Assistant Police Commissioner Metropolitan North from Councillor Hinchliffe (29 July 2003):

The Council has been asked to move the public phone outside the Valley Plaza in Brunswick Street because of the regular drug deals are done in this location.

The alternatives are to:

1. Take out the phones
2. Re-locate the phones
3. Carry out a more sustained policing of this area and take appropriate action [sic].

Obviously the latter is our preferred option. This relies on a commitment by Police Services. I know Valley Police have made a great effort but I would ask if this extra emphasis could be given to help resolve what has become a major safety issue in the Valley (Hinchliffe 2003).

The public phones and their relational association with loitering and a perceived threat to safety has been transformed into public phone boxes + drug dealing = 'a major safety issue'.

August 2003

Excerpt from FVCSG meeting minutes (7 August 2003):

[Manager Valley Centre Plaza] suggested community groups install more payphones

Motion: That CSG requests that the phones be removed from outside VSP [sic] as a matter of urgency provided that an appropriate number of phones within VSP [sic] remain or are installed and that appropriate signage to key services be positioned as part of a landscaping project that will arise following the removal of the phones.

Carried with dissent (DSAS Community Liaison Officer) (FVCSG 2003d).

Excerpt from DSAS meeting minutes (11 August 2003):

after discussion [DSAS] decided to send a letter to the Fortitude Valley Community safety group listing objections to be attached to the minutes of the motion passed at the last meeting of the CSG. A copy of the letter would also be sent to the Place Steering Committee for discussion at the next Place steering Committee meeting. This action would inform the Place project of different points of view in the two groups, which are both active working parties in the Place project. DSAS objections would include:

The importance of the public booths in public space for public safety on a 24 hour a day basis; That there has been inadequate consultation on this issue with stakeholders; That this action will simply move public space users to a different location and not address the problem; That this action is not a suitable response given Brisbane City Council's 'inclusive city' vision; And that it would be

helpful to assess the outcomes of the new Meeanjin 'safe place' project and its effect on street based activities; It was also believed that some specific quantitative data around 'incidents' related to the phone area, might be useful to assess the impact of this behaviour; and, A solution needed to be developed that reflected the needs of all stakeholders in the community (DSAS 2003b).

DSAS was attempting to utilise the Place structure to interrupt the momentum that was building up regarding the phone removal/relocation. DSAS was also appealing to the public safety agenda, the inclusive city agenda of the city council and a community partnership approach to the problem of 'public space users'. The Place Steering Committee energy was being somewhat diverted. While they were keeping one eye on the ground (community group activities), the other eye was on devising strategies for a merger with URTF. 'It was noted that the Steering Committee and Working Group Chairs would meet on the 6th August ... to discuss issues associated with the social impact of development; the links between Place and the URTF; and potential future new governance arrangements ... There will be a number of outputs from this process' (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2003a). On 6 August 2003 it was 'agreed that the Urban Renewal Program should be linked with the Inner City Place Project including the Steering Committee' (URTF 2003).

Excerpt from communication between Brisbane City Council Manager, City Malls and Payphone Provisioning Manager, Telstra Payphone Services (Qld) (11 August 2003):

As discussed I have been asked to Investigate and seek from organisations their thoughts regarding the public telephones in Brunswick St outside the Valley Plaza. As a consequence of todays meeting could you please supply me with your position on the public telephones. I do not wish to sound pushy but ... I would really appreciate it if you could get back to me by the end of the week (City Malls 2003).

Excerpt from communication between Payphone Provisioning Manager, Telstra Payphone Services (Qld) and Brisbane City Council Manager, City Malls (14 August 2003):

These services have been installed in highly visible and accessible site where they best service the needs of the community. The present payphone location does not restrict or interfere with the general pedestrian traffic flow, on this wide footpath (Crown land).

In addition the high visibility of these services is a major benefit in case of an emergency. An emergency call (000) may be accessed from any of these payphones, 24 hours per day.

Telstra has been requested by the Federal Government not to remove, but ensure these essential services are maintained from the general public, visitors and commuters alike.

The concerns raised at our meeting, regarding the issues of people congregating outside the Shopping Centre and causing a nuisance cannot be attributed to these services. Our investigation has confirmed that people use this site as a general congregation area, they are able to sit on the low garden wall under the awning shelter, and use it as a meeting place. This congregation would occur at this site regardless of whether the payphones were located there or not the position of a number of agencies for the under-privileged associations and multi-cultural groups [near the payphones] are not the responsibility of the public payphone.

Telstra receives a number of requests for the relocation of public payphones across the nation and each request is investigated and considered on its merits by using a variety of criteria including, but not limited to:

Evident community demand; Telstra's obligation under the Universal Service Plan; Financial viability; and Operational standards ...

The Payphone services outside the Valley Plaza have been in that location for a number of years and provide a valuable community service. We have no plans to relocate these Payphone services at this time however ... Telstra has a continuing review process for its entire Payphone network (Telstra Payphone Services 2003).

Telstra were not supportive of the relocation/removal of the phones because of a range of regulatory and financial reasons. Additionally they disputed the contention any responsibility for services for the 'underprivileged' could be attributed to the public phones. The City Malls Manager who was not directly involved in the Place Project was however functioning as a mediator between the FVCSG, BCC, Telstra and the phones.

September 2003

Excerpt from correspondence between Tony McGrady, Minister for Police and Corrective Services and The Honourable Peter Beattie MP, Premier and Minister for Trade (and Member for Brisbane Central) (2 September 2003):

Thank you for your letter of 15 August 2003 concerning representations made to you by Councillor David Hinchliffe in relation to concerns raised by Valley Plaza traders about drug dealing in the area of public telephones outside the plaza.

The Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan North Police Region informs me that on 11 August 2003 he wrote to Councillor Hinchliffe expressing support for the option of relocating telephones away from the major pedestrian thoroughfare outside the Plaza in Brunswick Street.

It is considered this relocation of the telephones would reduce the problem of discouraging people from congregating in the area. Police believe that the relocation of the telephones from the entrance to another area within the complex, together with appropriate landscaping, would discourage illegal activities.

I am also advised that a number of people have been arrested as a result of police operations in the relevant area. However, these operations have not resolved the problems associated with the current location of the telephones.

The Assistant Commissioner considers that the other existing public telephone within the Valley Plaza complex, together with the relocated telephones, would be sufficient to provide reasonable public access to telephones in this locality.

I trust this information is of assistance (McGrady 2003).

Excerpt from correspondence between Manager of Valley Centre Plaza (also a member of FVCSG) and Payphone Provisioning Manager, Telstra Payphone Services (Qld) (2 September 2003):

On behalf of the Valley Centre Plaza we would like to offer Telstra for their consideration and investigation the opportunity to have a formal long term lease agreement for payphones with the Valley Centre Plaza Shopping Centre.

As you know, we are just beginning the long awaited refurbishment of the shopping centre and although we currently have five Tri tel payphones located on the wall adjacent to the railway station, ... we may be able to offer you in our new food court configuration and opportunity for some back to back or free standing units in prominent positions (Valley Centre Plaza 2003).

Excerpt from correspondence between DSAS and FVCSG (3 September 2003).

DSAS listed eight objections regarding the removal/relocation of the public phones.

Three of these were:

- The removal of the public telephones in this area constitutes a safety risk for members of the general public, particularly when the Valley Centre Plaza is closed.
- The Brisbane City Council as a significant stakeholder in this issue has indicated the desire not to reduce the number of telephone boxes in the public space. Public telephones are a resource for the general public – yet the decision to progress the removal of the phone boxes has been made by a group that may not be representative of users of the public telephones.
- The Brisbane City Council has stated guiding values: ‘We actively promote a diverse and inclusive city’ and ‘we strive to foster Brisbane as a sustainable prosperous, socially just and diverse community’, DSAS believes that removal of the telephones or relocation inside the Valley centre Plaza directly rebuffs these guiding values (DSAS 2003c).

Excerpt from correspondence between FVCSG and DSAS (4 September 2003):

Thank you for your letter ... setting out the views of DSAS in relation to a motion passed at the meeting of the Safety group on August 7.

I do not wish to reopen the debate as many of the issues, and opinions, were adequately considered by the group before voting. However, you will recall the negative impact caused by the misuse of the phones and the inappropriate conduct of persons in and around the phones has been discussed and considered at public forums – Oct 2002 and May 2003.

A resolution of the October 2002 forum, which was unanimous, was to “arrange” for their relocation. The process of their relocation has been tedious with input required from Telstra, QPS and URTF. Telstra have been procrastinating because of the possible revenue reductions if they are moved.

In any event there has been and continues to be genuine support from all parties to ‘do’ something about the phones. We have responded to that community support and with an open agenda have undertaken steps to arrange for the phones to be relocated.

This particular issue however has to be placed within its context. That context involves the safety, redevelopment, dilapidation, concentration of service providers, railway station, history and culture of Brunswick Street West.

I object to your statement that the Group is ‘unrepresentative of users of the public phones’. The fact is that the Safety Group has never claimed to be representative of the users [sic]. The Group is however as representative as any other in our community (FVCSG 2003e).

At this point of the negotiations all that was really left was the where, the when and the cost. There was high-level ministerial and council support for the relocation of the phones. There was hostility building between DSAS and FVCSG and their relationship had broken down. Just who was representing who anymore was in dispute. Telstra were being offered all types of incentives to come on board. None of these manoeuvrings were particularly extraordinary except that three public phones became embroiled in the most contested community safety event in the Place Project. Given the imposing organisational structure that they became embroiled in—it would have been difficult to imagine when the Place strategists were devising a program for locational disadvantage that the space between community safety and business safety would be taken up by three public phone boxes. More interesting was the fact that in spite of FVCSG’s willingness to be integrated into the Place structure, in terms of the phones, they operated outside of it. Paradoxically, DSAS attempted to rely on the ‘power’ of the Place Steering Committee to deter the FVCSG from relocating the phones and bring them back into the partnership fold. Ultimately, with regard to the phones, the Place Team was rendered powerless to impede the process. There was also contestation within the Brisbane City Council. Considerable office space and a large number of employees located in the Valley (City Centre Place Team) were dedicated to participating in the Place Project, but there was however another section

of the Council, city malls and Councillor Hinchliffe who were operating independently and sidelining the Place agenda.

Predictably, by November 2003, an email communication was sent to all the key public phone relocation project stakeholders that reported: ‘Finally ... a light at the end of the tunnel!!!!!!!!!!!!!’; the three phones at the front of the Valley Centre Plaza were to be removed from their current location (City Centre Place Team 2003). Ironically, the City Centre Project Team was, in the end the team that was undertaking all of the final ‘hard yard’ negotiations. Ultimately, the phones were brought on board and accepted by many key participants as a crucial un-safety unifier. According to the Minister for Police not even arrests in the area had the power to break the relational association that had been built between loiterers (who in the correspondence were transposed into drug dealers) and the public phones (McGrady 2003). It was nonetheless a long, hard struggle for them to become legitimised as an object of safety and for their influence to be recognised by the highest level of the Queensland Government. Their immutability was not a hindrance to their mobility and as a result they became both mutable and mobile.

At the Inner City Place Project’s Working Group Chairs meeting in October 2003 it was noted: ‘Brunswick St West – phone relocation completed’ (ICPP 2003). At the same time DSAS was ‘winding up’ (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2003b) and being amalgamated into the Homelessness working group. The Inner City Place structure was starting to fragment and bits and pieces were being transported all over.

The URTF were ultimately convinced that adopting a social agenda was an important part of the reform of the area. By 2005 an urban renewal document indicated that the ‘social’ had made its way onto the Task Force’s agenda.

With a focus on social issues through the Urban Renewal Community Liaison Committee, the Task Force is committed to ensuring the inner north-east remains home to all sectors of the population and that people needing to be close to inner-city services aren’t displaced to the suburbs (BCC 2005).

The Place Project had been dispersed, transported, translated and depleted. Its life force—‘complex social problems’—had become embroiled and embedded in

numerous other networks. Complex social problems were being enacted in a diversity of locations compared to where they were being enacted at the commencement of the project in the year 2000. The uptake of 'social issues' by the URTF brings this research project back to where it began, in as much as the basis for the problem of safety in Fortitude Valley (in terms of its realisation) owed a great deal to the lack of attention paid by the Urban Renewal Task Force to the social impacts of their reform agenda. Their inclusion of 'social' into their discursive reality legitimised their attention to the 'social' in reality.

7.5 Many stakeholders: multiple stories

It is clear that there are many stories that can be told about place management. There are the normative approaches to reflecting on a project, in particular the expectation is that one would review the achievements as a means of quantifying the results of an effort to the participants. This is akin to a cost/benefit analysis by attributing inputs to outputs. For example, as at November 2004, the Inner City Place Project achievements were listed as follows:

- More effective responses to homelessness,
- More effective responses to drug use,
- More effective responses to issues: young people; unemployment and economic development; community safety; and indigenous community capacity,
- More accessible, better coordinated government services,
- Stronger community and business networks,
- Community, business and government partnerships (City Centre Place Project Team 2004, pp. 4–5).

This was one story about the achievements of the Place Project. Another story reported in the final evaluation report undertaken by the University of Queensland related to reflections about the Place Project process. Thompson et al. (2003) consolidated a range of reflections from the stakeholders who participated in the project and concluded:

While local and state government initiated the approach, it has been a constant challenge to balance the need to lead, the need to provide direction to the place projects, the need to clarify and define what was meant by a place based approach with the requirement to 'develop' the approach through networking, collaboration, and ongoing dialogue among the full range of stakeholders. This

was, and is, the constant challenge not only for the leading agencies but also for all stakeholders in the implementation of the Brisbane Place Project.

Many of the issues raised during stakeholder interviews in relation to the implementation of the place projects reflect the limits to the developmental or 'evolving' nature of the place based approach. Indeed many of the more strident criticisms or frustrations of the Brisbane Place Project expressed by a number of stakeholders during the interviews would reflect a lack of clarity as a result of the developmental nature of the project. One State Government stakeholder [involved in a] Place Project commented that:

'they were not wanting to impose anything and so there was no structure ... but underneath there were these preconceived ideas ... they were not up front and informing the process ... people were just floundering, floating, there was no direction no cohesion to what was happening'.

Another Inner City stakeholder from a community agency had difficulty distinguishing the place based approach from traditional methods of service delivery (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 86).

This story highlights some of the challenges experienced by stakeholders involved in the Place Project. The basis of the challenges is related to a lack of clarity about 'what was meant by a place-based approach'.

These traditional approaches to assessing both the process and the outcomes of any given project are of course reasonable and draw the project into mainstream doctrines. Conversely, this discussion aimed to distinguish itself from these traditional forms of storytelling.

This other version of the story suggests that community safety only existed within the relationality of the network. Community safety became reality through its material semiotic enactment; once the network started to disperse, so did community safety. Not that Fortitude Valley was a place where unsafe things no longer happened, but that the network that was holding (not very stably) community safety in place (as a knowledge and as a practice) got taken up and diluted in other performances and like the phone boxes has been *moved on*.

Counterintuitively, community safety is what was left after all the work of community safety work was done. In its absence it had a presence. Not necessarily because the work that *everyone* and *everything* did was extraordinarily effective, although this may have been the case, as no-one would ever really be able to measure the 'total' impact of the Place Project in a positive sense. More likely, as this story purports, after everyone had practised multiple performances of community safety in

phone boxes, on homeless people, on lighting, on drug users, in governance, in working parties and action plans, on the street and in the Premier's Department, Brisbane City Council and the Queensland Police Service, it became depleted. It was in its very depletion and consequential demise that its very necessity diminished.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed documentation that mapped a number of operational aspects of the community safety project in Fortitude Valley. Specifically this discussion focused on the role of DSAS and the FVBSG. The data was explored to interpret some of the ways community safety was known and performed in accordance with the Place Project and apart from it.

Community safety became caught up in space that existed within and between two community groups, DSAS and FVBSG, in the year 2000. DSAS and the FVBSG then got swept up in the Place Project structure. They both then took on roles within the structure and members of the groups participated at numerous levels in the Place Project from the Steering Committee at the top of the structure through to the sub-working groups at the base. As much as they were engaged in the Place Project they continued to be committed to their original agendas. In the context of Place's necessity to recruit 'community' into the project, it was the Place agenda that was displaced to incentivise community participation. It was assumed that the community's agenda was legitimate on the basis that 'local people know what is best for their community'. The community were held in the structure by cement and goodwill, but it was nonetheless acknowledged that both of these had limitations.

The Place coordinator described the challenge of implementing the Place Project as synonymous to 'walking a tightrope'. He contended that regardless of the successes many participants remained sceptical. Some of the scepticism related to the lack of commitment by the state to secure a funding stream into the Inner City Place Project. Projects were being funded here and there but there was no apparent consistency or discernable logic in regard to why some projects were prioritised for funding over others.

DSAS and the FVCSG had prioritised their safety agendas through the rationalisation of data and audits undertaken in the area. DSAS located the problem of safety in service coordination and FVCSG looked to the materiality of the space as the crucial aspect of un-safety in the Valley. The two groups were targeting their respective community safety agendas toward the mind, the space, behaviour and poor coordination of services. As it was transported through the Place structure, and based on feedback received through community consultation, community safety became something that could be located in every place. In 2002, three public phone boxes began to fill the symbolic and material space that existed between DSAS and FVCSG. This space had been apparent but up until this point it was mostly silent. Consultation and public forums formed around the problem of safety at Brunswick Street West. Brunswick Street West took on a life of its own and centralised the efforts of the FVCSG for three years.

While the Place Project, at a state government level, was being dismantled and dispersing into other things such as URTF and the BCC, the FVCSG and DSAS were debating who represented who regarding the phone boxes. DSAS argued that the phone boxes represented safety and their removal would discriminate against both the general public and the *others* who used them. In addition, DSAS questioned the validity of the breadth of FVCSG's representation. The FVCSG believed the phones to be at the centre of the problem of unsafety in Brunswick Street West and were determined to destabilise their worth in this regard. The FVCSG argued that they were as representative as any other group in the Valley and that they had never purported to be all things to all people. In terms of the relocation of the phones the FVCSG mostly operated outside of the Place Project. They received high-level political support for their relocation from Councillor Hinchliffe. In correspondence produced at the highest government ministerial level, the phone boxes were deemed to be a causal factor in drug dealing. In 'lower level' government correspondence the phone boxes were associated with loitering and 'hanging around' and by association a threat to good conduct.

The phone boxes occupied the most contested space within the Place Project and became the symbol of complex social problems in Fortitude Valley. Their removal proved to be a victory for the FVCSG but at the time their demise, DSAS was also

‘unwinding’, and the URTF were incorporating a social agenda into the urban renewal program. Simultaneously, community safety was now, through its realisation in reality, redundant. The network that had formed relational to it was also fragmenting.

A number of stories of the Place Project have been told. There is the evaluation story that focused on the experience of rolling out the project in the inner city. There was the achievement story that was a self-reflective reassurance about effort made for outcomes achieved. Then there is another story that is something altogether less traditional. The argument proposed through this story is based on the premise that there is evidence that suggests community safety got done in the knowing, and in fact community safety is the residue that was left over after all the knowing got done. Its disappearance as a contested object indicates that the work of community safety was done and done and done to the point where the discursive energy and the entities holding it in space/place were dispersed into other networks and/or deleted. This was not necessarily related to the redundancy of the object, because as has been pointed out previously ‘murders still happen in the Valley’. More likely through its dispersion, it became something else. It may have gotten caught up in the ‘social impact of reform’ network that by 2004 was squarely on the agenda of URTF. Coincidentally it was via the reform story that the story of community safety began.

Chapter 8: Conclusion and final reflections

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide a summary of the main findings of this case study according to the four aims outlined in Chapter 1. This summary is followed by a discussion about the application of a ‘sociology of associations’ to the community safety project. Finally, a reflective note is provided.

8.2 Four study aims

8.2.1 To examine the imperative for reform in Fortitude Valley

This first aim of the case study illuminated some of the historical elements that cohered into an urban renewal and reform program in Fortitude Valley in 1993. After almost 20 years of rhetoric in Fortitude Valley that was based upon the relationship that had developed between controversy and reform, elements did not translate into a network of reform until then. The environment, architecture and demographics of the area were to be reconfigured through an urban renewal program that would initiate transformation in the area on a large scale.

The boom period that Fortitude Valley experienced in the 1950s was used as a benchmark of success and a driving force for reform in the area. This boom period was proof for many that the Valley had potential and this provided the incentive to reignite it through reform. Throughout the decades that followed the area fell into disrepute and followed similar trends to other inner city areas in many Western countries, including Australia. Within this context vice flourished. There were two parallel reflexive interpretations of the area that were frequently drawn upon. First, that consumption rates in the Valley had at one time matched those in the central business district. Second, that Fortitude Valley was to Brisbane as Kings Cross was to Sydney. It was noted by one journalist that in relation to Kings Cross, Fortitude Valley was fighting beyond its weight. Simply put, Fortitude Valley was nothing like Kings Cross and it wasn't even a valley. There was something important for Brisbane in relation to its competitiveness with Sydney about being able to claim an inner urban vice capital like Kings Cross. This comparative endeavour by Brisbane

was not specifically under scrutiny in this study but was routinely pointed to as a reference point for the characterisation of Fortitude Valley by journalists and others.

After many failed attempts at rallying for reform a major Australian political controversy shifted the reform momentum. By 1987 the Fitzgerald Inquiry was initiated in Queensland to investigate large-scale state government and police corruption. The Inquiry brought the issue of vice and corruption in Fortitude Valley to centre stage. The reform agenda, which had been circulating around the Valley for many years, now had a network to surf in on. After the Fitzgerald Inquiry, local government took a lead role in the preliminary phases of reforming the area. The first step was to close off vehicle access between two arterial roads to create a public mall, the Brunswick Street Mall, popularly referred to as the Valley mall.

On the back of this first step in 1993 a large urban renewal program was initiated in the area. Brisbane City Council was the lead player in the revitalisation program. The program was steered by the Urban Renewal Task Force (URTF), which was made up of developers, architects, public servants and other stakeholders. As the reform program progressed there was some criticism by welfare services; specifically, that the renewal program had no social agenda and that redevelopment was impacting on the 'way of life' of long term residents and marginalised people who frequented the area. These individuals symbolised what was left over from what the reform agenda was attempting to depart from. This problem formulated itself into statements that then turned into facts. These facts were that there was an increase in illicit drug use, an increase in homelessness, an increase in prostitution and there was an increase in crime, in particular violent crime. Then data was found to support these facts.

8.2.2 To unpack the rationalities that have developed and produced the current reform agenda

In 1999 the Drug Safety and Awareness Sub-Committee (DSAS) established itself as an arm of the Fortitude Valley Community Consultative Committee (FVCCC), which was operated by the local branch of the Queensland Police Service. At the same time the Queensland Government began to appropriate ideas based on the Third Way political agenda. This agenda was aligned to concerns regarding civil decline, issues related to globalisation, the demise of family, the dismantling of

community, soaring crime rates and increasing displays of antisocial behaviour. In short it characterised these problems as both social and complex. It was proposed that these deviances were having more of a detrimental effect on those in society who were excluded. The policy devised to undermine this effect was paradoxically called social exclusion. Its aim was to devise locally devised practical strategies that would have the outcome of promoting opportunities for societal re-engagement. The sentiments of this so-called social agenda were taken up by Queensland academics and policy makers alike. Within the Queensland Government the strategy that was borne out of social exclusion was called place management. It was formulated as the new approach to dealing with disadvantage at the location where it manifested. It was argued by its supporters that place-based approaches would be a departure from traditional state-based policies directed at poverty. The conceptual frame was locational disadvantage and it was sold as a way of seeing the world, not through the frame of poverty, but through a new frame that acted on disadvantage. Nonetheless, the criterion for attributing disadvantage to a location was not dissimilar to that used to measure poverty.

Place management and locational disadvantage were about promoting opportunity at a local level through a whole-of-government approach, which would function as an alternate to the usual independent departmental response by the state government to individual issues. Proponents of locational disadvantage glibly drew upon selling points such as ‘local solutions to local problems’, bottom-up processes, and the community wants to take ownership of its own problems. Even the Premier of Queensland put forward the argument that ‘we have listened to you and you have told us that you want to take ownership of your problems in your community’. However, the rhetoric was snappy and convincing and the approach became the cornerstone of the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care in Queensland. The new director general for this state government department in Queensland had recently arrived from New South Wales and had runs on the board with this strategy in Kings Cross. In another—but not very far away—place, Brisbane City Council was getting involved in the illicit drug problem. The Lord Mayor’s Illicit Drug Taskforce developed a strategy that made use of similar rhetoric about community partnerships, local solutions to local problems and also characterised social problems as complex.

These machinations set up some of the conditions of possibility for the community safety project and bring the time line of this case study up to the year 2000. What shifted the reform agenda to branch out into the realm of community safety was a Saturday afternoon murder on a busy market day in Fortitude Valley. This murder inspired media reports about the Valley that signified the clashing of the old Valley with the dreams and wishes of the new one. Local businesses were inspired to set up the Fortitude Valley Business Safety Group (FVBSG). Some members of this group were coincidentally involved in the recently established drug safety group. The murder revitalised two familiar discourses about the Valley: (1) the business potential in the area and (2) Fortitude Valley's resemblance to Kings Cross. The FVBSG perceived that they would achieve the first by undermining the second. At the same time the Department of Families, Youth and Community Care and the Brisbane City Council were seeking out opportunities to experiment with the place management strategy. It was opportune that the major ingredient of 'community' was already configuring itself into a coherent form around an object (safety) that was interpreted as not dissimilar from their agenda (disadvantage).

8.2.3 To explore, describe and explain how the community safety was operationalised

The Department of Families and the Brisbane City Council devoted the next twelve months to convincing DSAS, FVBSG and many others that coming on line with the Place process would be the best way of having their goals realised. After many workshops, consultations, proposals, agendas, vision statements and meetings (a lot of meetings), an organisational structure came into being. After a couple of proposals had been rejected there was finally agreement about the vision, the structure and the process in 2001. The Place Project became the Inner City Place Project and its vision statement was: 'Community, business and government working together to create a vibrant, inclusive, diverse and safer inner city community' (Inner City Place Project Steering Committee 2001).

The unifier for DSAS and FVBSG was safety, as they both had it in their title and Place had now incorporated it into the vision statement. The Place Team appeared to be willing to give up some ground to incorporate the community agenda into their structure. But for the Place Team there was a dilemma that was never clearly

articulated. On the one hand they could continue their commitment to the theory of place management that centred on locational disadvantage, or on the other hand, they could partner with an already formed community that had rallied around the problem of safety. It was obvious that the place management proponents would have to take up safety as their central issue if they also wanted the community, which existed only in relationship with and to safety. An important moment in the roll out of the Place program seemed to pass almost unnoticed. Disadvantage became synonymous with safety and for the Inner City Place Team the problem object became community rather than that of location, as there was no strategy without community. The lack of definition of community, idealistic determinations of community capacity and a belief that it can be relied upon because it is a pre-existing reality proved to consume the energies of the Place Team for much of the duration of the project. The Place Steering Committee, which also included members of DSAS and FVBSG, spent a lot of time defining and redefining the problem, organising governance, reporting and accountability mechanisms and attending meetings, lots and lots of meetings. The fact that disadvantage was so easily displaced was not extraordinary in light of the findings from the evaluation of the Place Project by the University of Queensland. These findings suggested that Fortitude Valley did not meet the criterion of a location of disadvantage; rather, the nominated issues were more directly related to complex social problems.

In a half-hearted commitment to the Place Project, DSAS agreed to be involved but were determined to maintain both their local integrity and their original agenda. FVBSG thought positively about being involved in the Place process and as a goodwill gesture deleted business from their name and inserted community. There was a belief that state government involvement would bring resources with it. However the Inner City Place Project was ultimately unable to secure a funding stream. Funding opportunities were always ad hoc and it was difficult for outsiders to ascertain why some things were funded and others were not. The Brisbane City Council was unable to fund direct service provision as part of their remit, so their resourcing efforts manifested internally. They built an entire City Centre Place Team into their Fortitude Valley offices, which were staffed by community development workers, public space coordinators and many others.

The DSAS agenda was primarily related to service provision. DSAS argued that better coordinated services and increased resources would address the drug problem safely without marginalising the marginalised any further. The DSAS report gathered together data that cohered around their agenda. The FVCSG agenda was drawn from a belief that potential consumers were deterred from coming to the Valley because they perceived the area as unsafe. Survey data gathered to explore the relationship of consumption patterns and safety did not necessarily support this version of truth. However, these findings did not deter the FVCSG from pursuing their agenda. In contrast to where DSAS located safety, in behaviours, service coordination inadequacies and social inequities, the FVCSG located safety in the materiality and image of the place, in graffiti, uneven footpaths, bad lighting, and in design flaws that promoted opportunities for antisocial behaviour.

While DSAS, who had been funded by the Gaming Fund to employ a community liaison officer, spent most of their time advocating for improved services, FVCSG were undertaking safety audits of the area. The space between these two agendas is where complex social problems became both visible and political. Between DSAS and FVCSG there were multiple unspoken assumptions operating in contest with each other. There had been much background strategising throughout the project, but by 2002 the strategising could no longer be marginalised in the background and began to complicate surface developments.

Some of the assumptions that underpinned the conceptions of community in the Place Project included: the belief that somehow the community in its broadest sense would know how to solve 'complex social problems', that people would act ethically and respect diversity of opinion, community groups would meet in the middle ground, that negotiated consensus was possible within the organisational structure of the Place Project, and finally that you could divide one big problem into numerous components (housing, employment, social capital, training). The largest assumption was based on the idea that the coherence of these components at the end of the project would yield a solution to the whole problem of locational disadvantage, complex social problems and/or community safety. But as Law reminds us 'coherence is simply as aspiration' (Law 2009b, p. 15). At the top end of the organisational structure it was patently clear that community safety as a coherent

object was held together only in relation to the structure and at best could be interpreted as murky and unstable. It seemed that the only group that was able to make the community safety object stable was the FVCSG.

Momentary stability came in the form of three public phone boxes outside of the Valley Centre Plaza in Brunswick Street West. The phone boxes became the contested space for the community safety project; they were attributed with both the cause and effect of safety for some and un-safety and deviance for others. The phone boxes existed in the material space that they took up on the footpath, they were conceived as devices that promoted loitering, they were used as a communication pathway to organise drug deals, they facilitated commercial transactions for the phone company, and they were a safety device for late-night train commuters. In addition their removal was interpreted by DSAS as a display of discrimination and became the site where the community safety object became momentarily stabilised through the network that rallied around and made it visible.

In spite of views to the contrary, particularly from DSAS and initially from the URTF, the FVCSG's determination enabled them to secure support at the highest levels of the state, including the Premier, the Police Minister and the local member for the area, and the local Council. Support for the removal of the phone boxes was secured through correspondence that as it went up the political chain transformed the phones into a potent community safety threat. The different levels of correspondence turned loitering and hanging around the phone boxes into facilitating drug deals that operated at a level that not even arrests could impede. These propositions were put forward in spite of data that indicated that the people who cohered around the phone boxes were mostly homeless, indigenous and transients. The significance of the phone boxes in their deterministic relationship to safety and un-safety did not operate within the Place organisational structure but was run in parallel and opposition to and legitimised by its relationship to it.

In the first instance the phone company Telstra were reluctant to support the negative characterisations of the phones but were incentivised by the Valley Centre Plaza management to take a different view. There was a lot of manoeuvring that occurred in regard to the relocation and removal of the phones. Importantly, most of the phone

relocation strategising took place independent of the Place organisational structure. At the time when DSAS was winding up, and Place was seeking out alternative opportunities for the uptake of the social agenda in the Valley, the FVCSG finally in 2004 had the phones moved.

8.2.4 To describe some of what was left over after the project was dismantled

The successful reform program that was being undertaken in the area on a grand scale laid out the network that supported, not in principle but in practice, a performance of community safety by the FVCSG to be undertaken in terms of messing with and attending to the materiality of the space. This is in contrast to the other community safety targets of the working groups such as institutional changes and service access issues. These ideas are based on Law and Singleton's (2000) argument that performances are difficult to put on, and that sometimes they are unsuccessful. For them to be successful 'they build on the networks that are already in place' (2000, p. 4). Law and Singleton (2000, p. 4) contend that 'that realities and knowledges cannot capriciously be performed into being' and that 'performances mostly make realities and our knowledge of those realities by surfing on existing networks'. The argument here is that in performing community safety, knowledge of community safety and the reality of community safety get performed simultaneously. What is more, their success is relative to and dependent upon existing networks. While other committees were attempting to house, employ, empower and rehabilitate the humans that frequent the public spaces in the Valley, the FVCSG were instituting non-human change to change humans. They located their community safety allies in different places (spaces) to all the other groups. In addition they mobilised their action outside of the Place structure. DSAS, who were adamant about maintaining their autonomy, were by necessity beholden to the Place structure because of the need for resources to achieve their community safety agenda. Paradoxically, the FVCSG, who integrated well into the ICPP structure, continued to perform community safety within the frame and on the back of the urban renewal network. In this way the Safety Group was undertaking other performances such as reform and consumerism, which operated outside of the ICPP agenda as they had not much to do with disadvantage. In this regard they had not been victim to the exclusion/inclusion principle that was supposed to hold the network intact and were free to organise themselves both from within and outside of the network. This is what Law and

Singleton (2000) describe as a 'double performance'. The FVCSG were mobilising two dominant networks: that of place management and urban reform. As these two networks were stable both within and outside of the Valley they were able to subordinate other performances. The performances that other members of the ICPP were attempting to put on, such as those aimed at creating a broader welfare base and better outcomes for marginalised people in the area found it difficult to compete for social space, as it was taken up by all of the other working groups in the organisational structure.

At the time of my departure from the field in 2004 the URTF had agreed to set up a subcommittee tasked with considering the social impact of the reform program. According to a version of this story that is what made the community safety problem visible in the first instance. The issue of 'complex social problems' in Fortitude Valley was displaced to the next suburb. They were placed under the tenure of the New Farm Neighbourhood Centre and the Community Action Network. The BCC City Centre Place team operated until 2004, when a change of political parties in government reorganised the Valley agenda and departed from the Place model altogether. Place management methodology stated that it should create and participate in a bottom-up process, however from this position they were only ever able to enact projects at the margins and around the edges of what they had determined as the community safety problem in the literature. In the final analysis the Place project was unable to dis-embed itself from the traditional ways in which the state attends to social 'problems', that is through the departmental silo that apparently reflects the various aspects of society.

There may be another reason why the Place Project was not able to fully realise its potential. It relates to the fundamental premise of STS, which is that conceiving anything as belonging to the social is only such through its conception as such. If, as STS suggests, we should depart from dichotomous characterisations of the world as natural and social, then we are trapped in abstractions that only exist in the minds and tools of scientists and social scientists. The committees often attributed things and objects with a range of powerful attributes that had the capacity to change/enable/limit or deter a range of deviant behaviours. This community safety project gave the impression that it was a legitimate option to rely on the power of

things to restrict antisocial behaviour. For example a light post was given a range of roles in the fight for community safety: to light the path or laneway, deter injecting drugs within its vicinity, enable an innocent member of the public to feel safe through the visibility of dark corners and more easily identify potential and imminent threats and deter robbery, drug dealing and violence. Within the Place process humans found it difficult to act on other humans and left the job to the immanent objects—or mutable immobiles.

The ontological positions of each of the committees was different; instead of promoting productive and generative tensions this difference created slippage, obstruction and time-consuming insurmountables. Community safety was multiple and contested; within the frame of STS it is a case of political ontology. Many of the community groups' operating positions were ontologically irreconcilable, not merely diverse.

Shifting from disadvantage to safety may have seemed like an insignificant shift—but the ramifications of this led to no end of slippage. The Place Project was not able to provide evidence that gathering together a number of different people with diverse professions and backgrounds was a productive means of tackling complex social problems or community safety, which ended up as one thing and many things simultaneously. The findings of this case study suggest that a range of perspectives about safety did not in fact add up to a whole problem of safety. The Place Project just created a space where bits and pieces of something that existed somewhere else become visible here and there. The actants were working on the edges of too many other networks that were circulating within the scope of the visible. The Place Project was not internally stable or resilient enough to sustain the network (Law & Singleton 2000). It became a game of ontological politics, where no-one could win because no-one was ever clear on what the real problem was. As the network started to break down the relations that held and constituted the community safety object could not continue to hold the object's shape or keep it in place (Law & Singleton 2005, p. 337).

This case study did not concern itself with the effectiveness of the varieties of community safety that got done throughout this project, but with the different types

of community safety that got done and how they did or didn't add up to one thing or much of anything. They may overlap, intersect and slam up against each other and they may even draw on language from the same discursive pool. However this version of the community safety story showed that there was never one big un-safety operating 'out there' a priori in the Valley, just as there was not one big reform agenda creating a new set of social problems. There were reform practices that created tension with other practices. These tensions created visibilities that got interpreted as un-safety. Un-safety in the year 2000 was interpreted only in relation to a version of history of the area, a political controversy and a gun-wielding 'drug addict' who murdered someone on a busy sunny Saturday. The preconditions (conditions of possibility) were such that a safety network, in its various bits and pieces, slipped into the Valley from somewhere else and in the end became something other. Community safety was done, it was displaced and it was dispersed, and now it is gone. There is no sign of it in any of the current literature on the Valley produced by BCC or URTF. There is no evidence that crime in the Valley has decreased as a result of the community safety project (Place Project) and it is probably as 'unsafe' as it ever was. There is no shortage of reports on attacks and murders in the area. Like the people who were displaced to the New Farm Neighbourhood Centre, community safety is somewhere (something) else and is likely to reappear in some form or another in the future. The community safety project did however produce 'collateral realities'. The most obvious is the dislodging of the belief that the Valley is the vice and corruption capital of Brisbane like Kings Cross is to Sydney. Like the issue of crime, this change in sentiment is not related to the departure of strip clubs and sex shops in the area. More likely, with all of the displacements and slippage that have taken place over the last decade, the tension that kept the Valley and Kings Cross discursively linked got broken to make room for something else. The problem object in the Valley currently relates to the use of alcohol and has been made visible in the Valley Alcohol Management Plan (VAMP). This however does not sit comfortably within existing frames of *othering*, as did crime, illicit drug use, prostitution and homelessness. To *other* those who drink in the Valley would create an altogether different type of problem. From the quote below there is a new network that is only retrospectively discernable as a derivative of the community safety project.

Welcome to the relaunch of the Valley Liquor Accord (VLA Mark II) and our new publication *The Valley Liquor Accord Toolbox* produced with the financial assistance of the Brisbane City Council. The VLA is a voluntary collaboration between local licensees, Local Government, various State Government departments, community organisations, the Fortitude Valley Chamber of Commerce and the Queensland Police Service. The VLA strives to proactively address issues associated with the consumption of alcohol and illicit substances within the Valley Entertainment Precinct (VEP). With over 150 bars, clubs, restaurants and cafes operating day and night, safety and the projection of positive perceptions of our precinct are paramount. From its inception in 2004 the VLA (or VAMP as it was in those days) has been instrumental in the introduction of many successful initiatives within the VEP. The development of our latest action plan – addressing key issues such as patron education, transport, the impact of illicit drugs and the impact of off-premise consumption of alcohol – is an example of our proactive mindset (Valley Chamber of Commerce 2009, p. 3).

The Valley is now the Valley Entertainment Precinct, illicit drugs have become illicit substances and there is no sign of homelessness or prostitution. There is/are different reality/s being practised around what appears to be proposed above as anti-problems (issues) related to entertainment and alcohol. The negativity associated with the problem of community safety (un-safety) has been turned into an action plan based on a proactive mindset about issues and impacts. In its dispersal and displacement, community safety got done in the Valley. The demise of the Place Project and thus the community safety network signified an end to the community safety problem. In its absence Fortitude Valley can be interpreted as safe. From this standpoint community safety in Fortitude Valley can be understood as a ‘collateral reality’, it is what happened ‘along the way, quietly and incidentally’ (Law 2009b, p. 13).

8.3 Methodological implications

The application of ideas drawn from STS and ANT have provided the researcher with an innovative but nonetheless empirically sound approach to telling the story of a major government project about community safety at a specific site. Traditional means of analysing this project were undertaken by others. The evaluation of the process of the Place Project determined that there was a disharmony between the characterisation of the Valley as a location of disadvantage and the Valley being an actual location of disadvantage. The evaluators described the problems in the Valley as being complex and social. The evaluators, utilising a standard formative approach to the data, were able to pick up that the project would be assisted by ‘developing a clearer understanding and definition of the goals, approach and implementation

strategies of the Brisbane Place Project; and addressing the level and targeting of human and financial resources across the Project' (Thompson et al. 2003, p. 11). In commonsense parlance these findings indicate that some things about the project were unclear; these included the goals, the approach and the strategies. As well there were a lot of people and resources that were expending untargeted energies.

Alternatively, the analytic approach applied throughout this case study was able to make visible and provide instances of much of this lack of clarity. By approaching the data with an attitude of agnosticism and viewing associations through a generalised symmetry, the researcher was able to promote a thoroughly inductive approach. This allowed the project of community safety to be the central character of the story rather than a predetermined approach informed by neo-Marxist/post-modern urban sociology. This is not to argue that the story has not been changed by the version of events provided here. Rather there is no hiding from the fact that this research project is generative of, exists within and operates beyond the Fortitude Valley community safety network.

Beyond the freedom to explore the data as it manifests in and circulates through a network, STS highlights the contentious issue of characterising types of problems as being social. In this context the social was the space that existed between the urban renewal program and everything that was left over and working counter to that project. If one rejects these problems as not natural, economic nor scientific, the interpretive space that ends up being the container for all that is 'complex' and exists beyond these apparently more straightforward domains is the social. If one departs from the view that the social is a homogenous thing and conceives it to be instead an assemblage of heterogeneous associations, then the social is freed up to be a 'type of connection' (Latour 2005, p. 5). It only becomes evident through the associations that the associations or the heterogeneous elements are not inherently social (Latour 2005). As Albertsen and Diken (2003) argue, there is nothing particularly pure or orderly about 'the social'.


This challenges Lefebvre's notion that urban theorists should be preoccupied with everyday life, the urban and 'social space' as relationally and reflexively existing as a site for the reproduction of the relations of production. STS replaces this with the

notion of networks are layered within territories (whether a laboratory, an urban mall or a lecture theatre), with no preconception about one being more special than the other in terms of locating everyday life and reality. Sites are understood as social because they have been performatively generated as such, and this study has supported this premise by inferring that an urban mall is no more or no less significant place to understand the reality of everyday life. Additionally, this study has not attempted to neatly insert the findings into a grand theory. As such the findings are somewhat meagre and non-generalisable, but nonetheless continue to expand on the ideas borne out of ANT and STS into broader realms.

Those who frequently preface social problems with the word complex are aware that there may be something unclear about trying to understand what exactly these problems are. In this project complex social problems became the a priori container for everything from crime, homelessness, prostitution, consumption patterns, disadvantage and community safety. Rather, the complexity was related to the heterogeneity of the associations, which made various types of connections visible and drove an indefinable number of performances within this space (some of which were described throughout this thesis). From this viewpoint it is not surprising that the elements that got caught up in this project were characterised as complex and that the evaluator picked up the lack of clarity that existed within the project.

In summary, this research pointed to the heterogeneous associations and the non-coherent practices against which the Place Project tried to have a tangible, ordering and colonising effect. The application of a sociology of associations (STS) revealed that the Place community safety project did have an effect, but that it was mostly collateral (Law 2009b) and now only apparent through its absence. Against this backdrop the social becomes contestable and therefore ontologically political (Law 2009b).

Photograph 8: Graffiti



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8.4 Final reflections

There continue to be frequent violent displays depicted in the media in the Valley and at the publication of this thesis there is no sign that they are decreasing. This study has shown that there is a range of limitations in understanding messy and complex things if they are characterised as ‘social’. Further, commonsense and unspoken assumptions are not always the most useful method of trying to order mess (Law & Singleton 2005).

This approach to analysis has also highlighted the limitations of traditional forms of evaluation techniques. On the one hand the government highlighted the outcomes of the project but does not celebrate them against the struggles, the losses, and the effort. On the other hand the academic evaluation was able to point to the fact that there was a disconnect between perception of the problem in Fortitude Valley and the actual issues in Fortitude Valley and the approach taken by the Place project. What both the above evaluative techniques avoid to infer - is complexity. If one is to continue characterising social problems as complex it is imperative to utilise methods that at least make it visible for the non-invested observer/outsider.

If one wishes to devise policies and strategies to attend to ‘complex social problems’ then perhaps it is time to reinterpret the ‘social’ aspect of the problem. Construing all problems that exist for the state outside of the realm of material, technical, financial or scientific (i.e. all that is left over) ends up in the complex (too hard) social (too hard to know) basket. Within this context it is not surprising that a community group

was willing to put at least three years effort into moving three phone boxes. This may have been because everything else seemed just too complex and therefore too hard. At the very least conceptualising homelessness, mental illness, public use of drugs and alcohol by socio-economically marginalised populations as ‘complex social problems’ is patronising or at best it is defeatist. If you begin by thinking that the problem is social and complex, then in reality it will be difficult to stabilise. This is a ‘logical fallacy’ that will not be resolved unless ‘the social is reassembled’ (Latour 2005).

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