QUT Digital Repository:
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/

QUT

This is the post-print, accepted version of this article. Published as:

Tait, Gordon (1993) *Youth, personhood and 'practices of the self'*. Journal of Sociology, 29(1). pp. 40-54.

YOUTH, PERSONHOOD AND `PRACTICES OF THE SELF': SOME NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH RESEARCH

Gordon Tait, QUT

ABSTRACT

In contrast to most previous research in the field, this paper argues that the concept of 'youth' is best understood as an example of the governmental formation of a specific type of person. It is constructed at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations, being produced by the processes of individuation/ normalisation and the regulation of relations of time. Within programs such as those pertinent to the management of sex, an array of technologies structure the practices by which individuals pattern their own conduct - thereby fashioning a kind of habitus. This forms part of a general strategy of enrolling the objects of these programs in their own self-reformation. Consequently, `youth' can be understood as `the doing of specific types of work on the self'. By utilising this framework, the paper not only seeks to identify and better understand some of the sexual subjectivities associated with the construction of youth, it also seeks to offer some new directions for research in the area.

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1970's, the dominant paradigm in youth research has been the sub-culture theory espoused by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham (CCCS). This position, utilising a series of ethnographies, is built upon notion of counter-hegemonic struggle and the attempts by post-war youth to magically resolve the social problems and contradictions created by their material conditions (Hall and Jefferson, 1976). Consequently, current moral panics over the young have resulted in the concerned being able to find some degree of causation and interpretation within the well-grounded tenets of a tried-and-tested

paradigm (Tait, 1992). Just as mods and skinheads were understood in prescribed ethnographic terms, so the young and homeless have also found themselves distilled into a sub-culture - good examples being Wilson and Arnold's *Streetkids* (1986) and the Burdekin Report, *Our Homeless Children* (1989). Within this model, a diverse group of individuals are positioned as a discreet entity, seemingly with specific codes of behaviour and ways of relating to the outside world. That is, in spite of an often stated theoretical awareness that `youth' is both piecemeal and historically contingent, this seems to have few implications for the degree to which it is still used in research as a stable, descriptive classification.

However, such a totalising tendency is only one of the problems that this paper seeks to avoid. The sub-cultural approach to `youth' is also essentially normative, since it is through the construction and demarcation of pathologies (such as `streetkids') that social, legal, psychological and medical norms can be reinforced. This process is especially evident when addressing the young.

> It is around pathological children - the troublesome, the recalcitrant, the delinquent -
>> that conceptions of normality have taken shape. … expert notions of normality are extrapolated from our attention to those children who worry the courts, teachers, doctors and parents. Normality is not an observation but a valuation (Rose, 1990, 131)

As such, the focus on delinquent youth, and the categorisation of some of them into sub-cultures, is part of the process by which individuals are constantly measured and judged against a set of social norms. Irrespective of the intentions behind CCCS ethnographies, the very production of these cultural categories is necessarily normative - thereby adding to the catalogue of depictions of the delinquent, through which the desirability of the norm is augmented. Likewise, the construction of `street kids' creates yet one more scale, against which `normal youth' can be counterpoised, measured and assessed. This is not a new

phenomenon. These ethnographies can be placed alongside much older forms of observation and policing. For example, between 1850 and 1880, the `masturbating child' was constructed as an archetypal object of knowledge within the sexual domain. This object not only acted as the benchmark against which the normal child could be measured, it also legitimated the intervention of a growing network of specialist knowledges. Similarly, the `adolescent' took shape in 1904 with the publication of G. Stanley Hall's massive text on the subject. This concept quickly became axiomatic to the way young people were understood and governed, and although it has been largely abandoned by the social sciences, `adolescence' still retains some currency within psychological and physiological discourses. Indeed, it currently forms one of the central categories within the Queensland Human Relationship Education. Within this logic, the `adolescent' - a coherent individual and active subject - is directed towards uncovering, understanding and expressing the `hidden truth' of their sexuality.

A final tendency in research into `youth' is that it has repeatedly supported its position by the use of global oppositions. In the case of the CCCS, this has involved the construction of familiar dichotomies, such as domination versus subordination, resistance versus conformity and young versus old. Not only has this pre-determined the conclusions of much of youth research, it has also often masked the complexity of any given field of debate. Likewise, research into the youth/sex nexus have often revolved around the simple political dichotomy of right verses left, regulation verses expression. The conservative stance stresses the importance of parents and doctors in regulating access to knowledge about sex, as part of a developmental understanding of childhood. This is contrasted against arguments focusing upon the inevitability of childhood sexuality, their `natural curiosity' about sex and the belief that, in the words of the Ahern Report (1979): `if sex education does not take place in the classroom it will inevitably take place in the playground'.

Consequently, the intention of this paper is to describe ways of avoiding the normalising, globalising and dichotomising tenor of previous research into `youth'. Instead, it will be

argued that the concept of `youth' is best understood as an example of the governmental formation of specific types of person. That is, `youth' constructed as an object of knowledge at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations - one such location being the concern over sexual conduct. Furthermore, `youth' can also be formulated in terms of `the doing of certain kinds of work on the self'. However, in order to arrive at these conclusions, it is necessary to take a few theoretical detours.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSON

By demonstrating that the person is an historically variable collection of attributes, it becomes possible to re-assess the manner in which social institutions are implicated in the construction of the `self'. In order to argue that being an individual does not necessitate being a person, it is first essential to show that these two concepts have not always been linked. This task is not as obscure as it might seem.

One direction is offered in an essay by Marcell Mauss (1985) concerning the historical development of the category of person. Mauss provides a wealth of disparate examples in defence of the proposal that the category of person has a technical basis. He argues that the contours of personhood are dependent at any given moment upon the social and historical contexts of their formation. The `person' does not have its genesis in some unrefined biological and psychological essence of the individual. Nor is it the inevitable outcome of simply being human. Rather, access to the category of person has at times been restricted along clan and fraternal lines. Personhood should be regarded as a potential; a position and a status which may be allocated under certain circumstances. The `self' - the internal acquisition of personhood - is the result of identifiable historical events.

Mauss suggests that the melding of the person and the individual came about as the result of two central changes in the institutions of law and morality. The first change centred on the

belief that the status of person should be available to all eligible individuals. The advent of Roman law resulted in a more general distribution of personhood than had been available through pre-existing clan structures. The second change involved the moral practices of an elite group of Stoics. The Stoics attempted to construct a philosophical system based upon individuals becoming responsible for their own conduct. Instead of the attributes of the person being acquired at public ceremonies and rituals, they were now seen as being attached to an inner principle which regulated social behaviour. The Stoics still employed rituals, but these had become private and internal, taking the form of self-fashioning and testing (the Stoic tests of dietary self-mastery will be discussed later). This self-monitoring formed the basis for `the moral conscience' (Hunter, 1990).

In spite of the changes initiated by the Stoics, it was the Christians who made a metaphysical entity of the `moral person', thereby completing the fusion of personhood into the self. The belief that the body was host to a singular entity - the soul - set the agenda for identifying the fate of this soul with the moral conduct of autonomous human beings. Christians became responsible for their own salvation, to be accomplished through rituals of prayer and inner watchfulness. That is, individuals now cultivated personhood by doing work upon themselves.

The contingent nature of the construction of the person is also addressed by Michel Foucault. He states that his central objective is to create a history of the various ways in which individuals are made into subjects. In doing so, he too rejects the familiar domain assumption of the transcendental subject which, a priori, possesses identical parameters throughout history. Instead, he posits the self as developing as part of the myriad practices by which the human subject is formed (Foucault, 1979; 1980).

Foucault supports this contention by focusing upon the dual and complimentary strategies by which individuals are subjected to, and made the object of, a lattice of governmental

technologies. These technologies not only map out types of individual as objects of knowledge, but they also pattern the conduct of those individuals. That is, through the processes of `governmentality', various groups within the population are identified (Foucault deals with the `criminal' and the `lunatic' in detail). Then, as a result of specific management strategies, their conduct is targeted and directed. It is as a consequence of this intervention that Foucault can delineate specific modalities of self-formation, such as a certain `consciousness of criminality', centring around the way criminals relate to themselves (Foucault, 1987). Thus, a specific group of persons (`criminals') are identified as the target population, and then various sets of knowledges (within sciences such as criminology, psychology, education and medicine) are brought to bear upon this object, with the intention of both modifying its conduct and recruiting individuals into their own self-modification. The `self' of these individuals is thereby partially constructed in these terms, and consequently it is this process which correlates to the internal acquisition of personhood.

… the individual has become an object of knowledge, both to himself and to others,
an object who tells the truth about himself in order to know himself and be
known, an object who learns to effect changes on himself. These are the
techniques which are tied to the scientific discourse in the technologies of the
self (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, 174-175).

In summary, the source and foundation of personhood is external to the individual. Individuals take on specific personages because they are ascribed bundles of rights and obligations, not simply because they are human beings. The melding of the person into the individual is the result of identifiable historical events. Consequently, the formation of various types of person is probably best understood as being related, first and foremost, to the government of populations. Relevant personages are assembled within individuals and, through them, a `self' is constructed. `Youth' exemplifies this process.

FORMULATING THE PROBLEM AROUND `YOUTH'

Whilst the most important consideration is now to focus upon the ways in which youth can be understood in terms of `work on the self', or `self-government', it is first necessary to be more explicit in specifying the parameters by which youth is locatable as an historically contingent construct. It follows from the logic of the preceding section that, not only should youth be positioned in terms of the development of particular types of person, but also that it should be situated as the piecemeal product of particular governmental strategies that evolved out of earlier personages and debates.

In characterising youth in these terms, there is the implicit recognition that it does not constitute a unitary object. The concept of youth has been discontinuously constructed across a profusion of terrains and as such, it has neither a linear history nor a clearly demarcated present. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that, as a consequence, youth is therefore limitless in its scope. Rather, it has been produced as a governmental object at the intersection of certain legal, educational, medical and psychological problematisations. These would include, for instance, debates over legal definitions of consent and criminal liability, changes in strategies regarding juvenile delinquency and concerns over venereal disease and public morality.

However, regardless of these issues, probably the most useful way of approaching youth is to recognise that it has emerged as a by-product of the growth of a society characterised by what Foucault refers to as `governmentality'. That is, youth is generated within interrelated strategies which manage the relations of `time, bodies and forces' (Foucault, 1977, 157), and also sort, differentiate and categorise individuals.

Regulating time and classifying individuals

Addressing these in turn: Foucault argues that contemporary society is, in part, characterised by techniques for taking charge of the time of individual existences. This does not simply extend to the rigorous demarcation of the working day. Rather, it is positioning individuals in relation to the pervasive division of time - the organisation of time into successive or parallel segments; the arrangement these segments into a graded, cumulative series of increasing complexity; and the connecting of these series into an overall, developmental plan. This is especially evident within contemporary schooling. As Foucault (1977) points out:

> … disciplinary time … was gradually imposed upon pedagogic practice - specialising the time of training and detaching it from adult time, from the time of mastery, arranging different stages … drawing up programmes … qualifying individuals according to the way they pass through these series (Foucault, 1977, 159).

Although Foucault uses an example from eighteenth century France concerning the subdivision of the processes involved in learning to read, the same logic forms the basis for all modern curricula, regardless of subject matter. Indeed, it is even evident in those programs directed at the sexual behaviour of youth. In the recent guidelines for the implementation of Human Relation Education in Queensland schools (1988), a ranked set of evolutive categories have been developed, such that individuals are ranked within one of four classifications: early childhood, middle childhood, adolescence and young adulthood. Specific capacities are then allocated in relation to these categories - capacities against which knowledge about sex can be graded. Individuals in `Early Childhood' display a 'natural curiosity' about sex and development, whereas individuals in `Middle Childhood' are 'more consciously aware of their own uniqueness in their relationships with others'. Young people undergoing `Adolescence' are `developmentally ready for a formal study of their physiological and emotional changes', and those demarcated within `Young Adulthood' develop a `personal responsibility for relationships'. Thus, youth can be understood as part of the process of sub-

dividing and ranking time within a segmented (but linear and teleological) model. It becomes an artefact of disciplinary methods which characterise and utilise individuals according to the stage in the series they are moving through - the intention of these techniques being to produce an adults who can read, and adults who can manage their own sex.

However, in addition to the embedding/accumulation of time within the body, the implementation of disciplinary technologies also involves the sorting and classifying of individuals themselves. Primarily, this consists of the combined processes of normalisation/differentiation. For example, the `child' initially came to be constructed as the object of knowledge within the institution of the school. Central to these mechanisms were the dual strategies of hierarchical observation and normalising judgement - procedures still axiomatic within contemporary education. These involve the pre-requisite assumption of formal equality between individuals (reinforced by the architectural and spatial arrangement), which results in a homogeneity through which norms can be compiled. The augmentation of these norms then permit an ever more rigorous web of governmental intelligibility by which individuals become increasingly differentiated. Consequently, with `youth', it is now possible (within a plethora of contexts, which do not necessarily specify the same object) to 'measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them to one another' (Foucault, 1977, 184).

As stated, the strategies by which individuals come to be constructed as object are numerous. Importantly, Nikolas Rose (1985) suggests that by increasing the complexity of the grid of norms against which young people were measured, it became possible to construct a scientifically legitimated correlation between two increasingly recognisable personages: the `maladjusted schoolchild' and the `juvenile delinquent'. It was from the various strategic concerns over objects such as these (also including the `adolescent'), that `youth' finally emerged in its own right.

Abnormal behaviour, antisocial conduct, neuroses, eccentricities, making friendships

too easily or not at all, quarrelling or being withdrawn, grieving or fearing

too much or too little - all these departures from the norm could be linked

together as maladjustments, and as predictors of troubles to come (Rose,

1985, 179).

Operating in conjunction with these two prominent characterisations was a newfound vocabulary of normative disturbances and disorders - a vocabulary which still underpins those aspects of contemporary psychology directed at youth. Such problems, left untreated or unrecognised, are still regarded as preliminary indicators of future, more serious trouble. However, implicit within the structures of the modern family and school are the assumptions that these illnesses can almost always be avoided by acceding to the plethora of governmental practices and interventions designed as promoting the correct training of young people.

Forming a 'youthful' habitus

As previously mentioned, governmental technologies such as these not only map out various types of individual as objects of knowledge - such as youth - they also pattern the conduct of those individuals. The diverse processes of governmentality are productive in that they enlist individuals as allies. This is accomplished by structuring their personal and professional capacities. These are then translated into the values, decisions and judgements made by those individuals as part of their `self-steering' mechanisms (Miller & Rose, 1988). That is, the government of populations directly translates into the way in which individuals fashion a `self'; or rather, the various problematisations which specify the object 'youth', also have parallel implications for subject-formation.

For example, young people are defined as `normal' by modelling their relationships, both to themselves and others, against a complex grid of available governmental manuals. These manuals would include directions on acceptable approaches to the values, decisions and

judgements which these individuals make including those concerning the management of their sex. Therefore, as a result of these governmental directives, young people are co-opted into doing work upon themselves. By performing various rituals of person-formation, an acceptable `youthful' self is continually fashioned and re-fashioned. This is precisely what Foucault is referring to when he designates technologies of the self as permitting …

… individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality (Foucault, 1988, 18).

These technologies constitute a crucial element in the establishment of a recognisable 'habitus' - such as that associated with the production of governmental objects, like `youth'. Bourdieu (1977) characterises habitus as being a `matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions' engendered by objective conditions. This represents an internalised method of understanding and interacting that is grounded in the body itself. Thus the programmes which constitute `youth' as a governmental object, inculcate the competencies and needs constitutive of a `youthful' habitus. As Bourdieu points out, these dispositions are the result of programmes which are by no means always obvious or overtly relevant, since …

… nothing seems more ineffable … and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as `stand up straight' as `don't hold your knife in your left hand' (Bourdieu, 1977, 94).

Such interventions into conduct are part of the general strategy of enrolling individuals in their own self-reformation. This tactic has been especially evident when addressing children. Since `youth' is a reformulation of existing concerns over the child and the adolescent, the same logic applies. In his book on the history of manners, Elias (1978) traces some of the mechanisms by which the young have been induced into a self-regulative habitus, as part of the `civilising' of societies. He suggests that contemporary social regulation operates by constructing a `socially patterned constellation of habits', through which it is possible to `cultivate the socially required control over (the) behaviour of young people'. By placing the emphasis on self-government, restraint …

… is enforced less and less by direct physical force. It is cultivated in the individual
from an early age as habitual self-restraint by the structure of social life, by
the pressure of social institutions in general, and by certain executive organs
of society (above all, the family) in particular. Thereby the social commands
and prohibitions become increasingly a part of the self… (Elias, 1978, 188).

Consequently, habitus is not a measure of resistance or cultural expressivity - as exemplified by Hebdige (1979) - rather it is constituted by practices of self-management related to the government of populations.

To summarise: `youth' exists as a governmental object at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations. It is formulated as part of the processes of individuation/normalisation and as a result of finely regulating the relations of time. Within these programs, such as those pertinent to the regulation of sex, governmental technologies structure the practices by which individuals pattern their own conduct, thereby fashioning a kind of habitus. This forms part of a general strategy of enrolling the object of these programs - youth - in its own self-reformation. Thus, youth can be understood as `the doing of specific types of work on the self'.

YOUTH, SEX AND `PRACTICES OF THE SELF'

It is now pertinent to delineate some of the central practices relevant to the sexual self-management of 'youth'. Several points are of note: Firstly, these practices do not operate as discreet exercises, but are rather an interrelated and somewhat nebulous set of private rituals of self-formation. There is no necessary coherence or underpinning logic in the manner of their implementation. Secondly, it is also important to re-emphasise the contingent nature of these rituals, in that they are no more grounded in any essential notion of the individual than are the external rituals of person-acquisition associated with clan-based societies. Finally, these techniques are all essentially normative.

Self-interrogation

In ancient Greece, individuals made specific choices about how to care for themselves. In choosing one possibility over another, this gave their lives a certain value and tenor. Thus, life was understood as a work of art to be constructed through self-government and self-mastery (Foucault, 1984). This contrasts directly with the contemporary attempts to discover the `real self' hidden inside all individuals - the `truth' of this essence only being revealed and deciphered as a result of constant self-analysis and self-interrogation. It is this process which constitutes an important practice of the self.

The need to foster various practices of self-interrogation in young people is dealt with in the participants manual for the 1990 `Youth Sector Training Program', issued to youth workers in Queensland. This text suggests that adolescence is characterised by attempts to answer the fundamental question: `Who am I?' Youth workers are charged with the responsibility of facilitating the development of the techniques necessary to undertake this self-interrogation. As such, the `adolescent' is targeted into taking `responsibility for developing their identity', `gaining information on themselves' and also `exploring and questioning values, attitudes,

identity '. This also includes the self-analysis necessary to `define their sexuality'. Likewise, in a manual on sex education entitled `Strategies', the Clarity Collective (1983) outline `specific techniques' for achieving satisfactory sexual self-management. These involve various methods of self-interrogation, including values clarification, problem solving/decision making, brainstorming and role plays. These techniques are used (primarily via the construction of sexual dilemma's) as mechanisms for honing skills in exploring and scrutinising the private self. Furthermore, the development of these routines of introspection is important for the construction of particular types of person, since the questions asked of any given `self' change with context.

> Deciding for oneself who one is sexually, how one will relate to the same and other gender, what specific sexual activities are on and off limits, when one expresses oneself sexually and why, is a lifelong process. But decision making and choices about personal values and life-style are especially crucial in late adolescence and early maturity (Morrison et al., 1980, 195).

Through continual self-interrogation (which generally consists of asking familiar questions within familiar domains), governmental objects like `youth' are funnelled into certain codes of sexual conduct. This argument is also pertinent to the next practice of the self to be addressed, in that continual attempts to uncover the hidden truth about the self prompt the telling of the truth.

Incitations to Speak

Foucault (1977) suggests that contemporary western society is unique in its understanding of sex. Whereas most other societies are endowed with an `ars erotica' (in which truth is drawn from pleasure itself), modern civilisation has developed a `scientia sexualis', which locates sex within a network of power relations aimed at finding out the truth. The central mechanism for this investigation is the confession. As Foucault points out, ever since the middle ages the confession has been one of the main rituals for producing truth. However, its influence now extends far beyond the church and the torture chamber. Indeed, the belief that

truth can be revealed through the dual strategies of self-interrogation leading to the confession of desires, thoughts and actions, is fundamental to most of the knowledges clustered around sex.

The logic of `scientia sexualis' is that by enlisting the help of confessionary experts, it becomes possible to know and speak the truth. That is, having posited 'sexuality' as the very essence of the individual, various experts in subjectivity offer access to, and knowledge of, the truth of that essence. Human Relationships Education is based upon this procedure: it attempts to uncover the `truth' about the self by valorising self-analysis and open communication. It incites `youth' to speak about itself. Indeed, one of the fundamental tasks of the youth worker is to facilitate the learning of the techniques whereby young people can `identify and articulate their needs'. This coupling is necessary since the deployment of sexuality requires confession as well as self-interrogation.

The emphasis on confession can be seen most clearly within those manuals directed at trying to `get youth to come to terms with themselves'. In *Why Am I Afraid to Tell You Who I Am?*, a text which informs youth workers, John Powell (1978) outlines different levels of communication, progressing from bad to good. This model culminates in the state of `peak communication', in which young people have been given the ability to speak freely about their true selves. It is by `affirming each other's experience' through speaking candidly and openly about the self, that truth is acquired. Moreover, this is deemed necessary since `the ability of the child to express such feelings is crucial for healthy development'. This statement contains an important rationale for programs of sexual self-management: not only is it desirable to speak about the self, it is now dangerous not to speak.

> In clinical practice we see over and over the distorted and sad lives of those whose love and hate has not been able to be dealt with by another human being who accepts and affirms the intensity of their feelings … Thwarting the verbalising of such feelings compounds and magnifies the problem (Powell, 1978, 3.1).

However, in spite of the centrality of self-interrogation and incitations to speak as practices of ethical self-management, not all techniques of the self constitutive of a `youthful' habitus are directed at mental or spiritual development.

Techniques of the Body

Mauss suggests that `habitus' should not be understood as `merely the soul and its repetitive faculties', but rather as the techniques of `collective and individual practical reason'. Such techniques are not limited to the most general of `cultural practices', nor simply to the techniques of self-modification already mentioned. They also include certain socially determined ways of using the body itself, such as walking, sitting, sleeping and eating. They vary between societies, educations, fashions, prestiges and the sexes. Crucially, there are also differences in techniques by age.

In his paper, *Techniques of the Body*(1973), Mauss briefly addresses the issue of (bodily) `techniques of adolescence'. Irrespective of differences over the essentially pivotal position allocated by Mauss to adolescence (and also some of the domain psychological and ethnological assumptions held), a similar point is being made. That is, the techniques common to specific groups are part of the context-bound processes of person-formation. This is an important contention, since it proposes that a `habitus of youth' is, in part, the product of the programs of person-formation associated with acquiring specific techniques of the body. For example, Mauss describes how young girls learn a characteristic way of walking (onioni) as part of forming the habitus constitutive of a Maori personage.

These gendered bodily techniques are important aspects of constructing an acceptable sexual self. An 1896 manual entitled *The Glory of Woman* draw a direct correlation between deportment and sexual self-management.

The arms hang naturally from the shoulders, the hands are in some quiet position, the fingers curve gracefully, with slight parting between the first and second, the third and fourth. There is no stiffness, no uneasy shifting and fidgeting, no moving of fingers of features, but all is rounded and graceful as a statue. It is worth some pains to be a lady of good standing in society (Allen & McGregor, 1890, 447).

Other advice to women on techniques to be `rendered habitual' include developing a walking style which will not cause the dress to lift, and never sitting with the legs apart. In contrast, men are directed towards the bearing of `a soldier', because `the external becomes the internal, and a man becomes really what he endeavours to appear'. *This is precisely the point.* Inculcating specific bodily techniques comprises an important part of the governmental mechanisms involved in the formulation of specific types of personage (and the concomitant regulation of their sex). These techniques are not limited to posture. Work on the body relevant to sexual self-management is also done through various forms of exercise, such as regimes of body-building or dieting (the centrality of these techniques in forming a habitus again being dependent upon certain social variables - age, sex, and so on).

CONCLUSION

To summarise: `youth' is best understood as an example of the formation of a specific type of person. It exists as a governmental object at the intersection of a variety of diverse problematisations, and it is formulated as part of the processes of individuation/ normalisation and as a result of finely regulating the relations of time. Within these programs, governmental technologies structure the practices by which individuals pattern their own conduct, thereby fashioning a kind of habitus. This forms part of a general strategy of enrolling the object of these programs - youth - in its own self-reformation. Thus, youth can be understood as `the doing of specific types of work on the self'.

The central aim of this paper has been to relocate `youth' for future research. Sub-culture theory, and its derivatives, have constituted the dominant theoretical paradigm for the last

fifteen years. However, there are convincing arguments to suggest that the CCCS approach is normative, totalising, and based upon essentialist notions of the subject. By rejecting most of its domain assumptions, and by understanding `youth' in the terms suggested by the work of Mauss and Foucault, it is possible to re-invigorate what has otherwise become a rather stale field of research.

REFERENCES

Allen, M. and McGregor, A. (1894). *The Glory of Woman: or Love, Marriage and Maternity,* Hayes: Maternity.

Burdekin Report. (1989). *Our Homeless Children*, Inquiry into Youth Homelessness.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Clarity Collective. (1983). `Strategies' in W. McCarthy (ed.), *Teaching About Sex: The Australian Experience,* George Allen & Unwin: Sydney.

Crane, P., Embelton, G., Harris, S. and Stokes, M. (1990). *Paricipant Manual,* YouthSector Training Program, Division of Youth: Queensland.

Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (1982). *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* Harvester: Brighton.

Elias, N. (1978). *The Civilising Process, Volume 1: The History of Manners*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Foucault, M. (1976). *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. London: Allan Lane.

Foucault, M. (1979). `Governmentality', *Ideology and Consciousness,* 6, 5-21.

Foucault, M. (1980). `Truth and Power', *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,* Pantheon Books: New York.

Foucault, M. (1984). `Space, Knowledge, Power', in P. Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, New York: Penguin Books.

Foucault, M. (1987). *The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Uses of Pleasure,* Penguin: Harmondsworth.

Foucault, M. (1988). `Technologies of the Self' in L. Martin, H. Gutman and P. Hutton, (eds.), *Technologies of the Self,* University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst.

Freud, S. (1949). *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Norton: New York.

Frow, J. (1987). `The Subject of Law' in G. Wickham (ed.), *Social Theory and Legal Politics*, Local Consumption: Sydney.

Hall, G. (1904). *Adolescence: Its Psychology, and its relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex Crimes, Religion and Education,* 2 Volumes, Appleton and Co.: New York.

Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (1976). *Resistance through Rituals*, Hutchinson: London.

Hartmen, H. (1956). `The Development of the Ego Concept in Freud's Work', in *Essays in Ego Psychology*, International Universities Press: New York, 268-296.

Hebdige, D. (1979). *Subculture: the Meaning of Style*, Methuen: London.

Hirst, P. and Wooley, P. (1982). *Social Relations and Human Attributes*, Tavistock: London.

Hutton, P. (1988). `Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self', in L. Martin, H. Gutman and P. Hutton (eds.), *Technologies of the Self,* University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst.

Hunter, I. (1990). `Body Building and Self-Shaping: Mauss's Exemplary Sociology of Human Attributes.' paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature, University of California, Irvine.

Mauss, M. (1973). `Techniques of the Body', *Economy and Society*, 2, 1, 70-87.

Mauss, M. (1985). `A Category of Human Mind: the Notion of the Person; the Notion of the Self.' in M. Carrithers, S. Collins and S. Lukes (eds.), *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1988). `Political Rationalities and Technologies of Government', Paper presented at Colloquium on Language and Politics, University of Helsinki.

Morrison, E., Starks, K., Hyndman, C. and Ronzio, N. (1980). *Growing Up Sexual,* D. Van Nostrand: New York.

Queensland Department of Education, (1988). *Human Relationships Education for Queensland State Schools: Interim Policy and Guidelines Statement*.

Queensland Legislative Assembly, (1979). *Fourth Interim Report of the Select Committe on Education in Queensland (Ahern Report). Human Relationships.*

Powell, J. (1978). *Why Am I Afraid to Tell You Who I Am?* Argus: Miles.

Rose, N. (1985). *The Psychological Complex.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Rose, N. (1990). *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self,* Routledge: London.

Tait, G. (1992). `Re-assessing Street Kids: a critique of subculture theory', *Youth Studies Australia,* Winter, 12-17.

Wickham, G. (1990). `Sport and the Formation of Manners', Paper presented at the 1990 TASA conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane.

Wilson, P, and Arnold, J. (1986). *Street Kids: Australia's alienated young*. Collins Dove: Victoria.

Winnicott, D. (1958). *Collected Papers*, Basic Books: New York.