



## Durham E-Theses

---

*Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council neighbours : a study in international boundary management.*

Alshaikh, Abdullatif A.

### How to cite:

---

Alshaikh, Abdullatif A. (2001) *Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council neighbours : a study in international boundary management.*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1605/>

### Use policy

---

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

---

Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP  
e-mail: [e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk](mailto:e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk) Tel: +44 0191 334 6107  
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk>


**Saudi Arabia  
and its Gulf Co-operation Council Neighbours:  
A Study in International Boundary Management**

**Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Abdullatif A. Alshaikh**

**University of Durham: Department of Geography**

**January 2001**



In the Name of God, the Most Merciful the Most Gracious



# **Abstract**

**Abdullatif A. Alshaikh**

## **Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Co-operation Council Neighbours: A Study in International Boundary Management**

The most important challenge to a demarcated boundary is the management of the boundary itself. After establishing the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in May 1981 with the aim of achieving 'unity' between the Member States, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait, the management practices along the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours offer evidence as to the extent to which the aims of the GCC have been achieved, and to assess the degree of openness along the boundary. Four aspects of boundary management have been explored in this thesis: political and legal management; management of access for people; management of access for goods; and security management. Regarding political and legal management, the major findings were that Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards its GCC neighbours generally characterised as a cooperative policy, and the major objective in this policy is to achieve security in the Gulf region. The boundary lines themselves are generally clear and demarcated and are the basis for peaceful cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries. Regarding the management of access for people the major findings were that time consumed at the three Saudi check-points selected for study, Alkhafji (with Kuwait), KFC (with Bahrain), and Albateha (with UAE), for departures from the Saudi side the majority of travellers spent 20 minutes or less to finish their formalities. The results of examining the management of access for goods showed that the majority of arrival trucks spent two hours or more, some of them spent up to 24 hours, to finish the necessary regulations. Concerning security management at the three Saudi borders, illegal crossings at the open border are less in terms of numbers compared to other Saudi boundaries. Regarding smuggling, the study found that seized smuggling incidents at the check-points with the GCC represent a serious problem. By analysing the four aspects of management, the study showed that a well developed management strategies which still allow reasonable access and control operates along the Saudi boundaries with its GCC. Because of security concerns and differences in legislation and laws between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, the Saudi boundaries are likely to continue to function as a barrier to the movement of goods in particular.

# Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	8
List of Maps and Figures .....	10
List of Plates .....	13
Declaration, Copyright and Dedication.....	14
Acknowledgements .....	15
<b>Chapter One: Introduction.....</b>	<b>16</b>
1.1 Introduction.....	17
1.2 The significance of the study .....	18
1.3 Literature review .....	18
1.3.1 General studies on boundaries.....	19
1.3.2 Studies on Saudi Arabia’s land boundaries.....	26
1.4 Research objectives and questions .....	30
1.5 Study methodology.....	33
1.5.1 Fieldwork .....	33
1.5.2 Questionnaires .....	34
1.5.3 Interviews.....	34
1.6 Data analysis .....	35
1.7 Research difficulties and constraints .....	35
References.....	37
<b>Chapter Two: Theoretical Studies on International Boundaries .....</b>	<b>41</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	42
2.2 Theories on state territoriality .....	42
2.2.1 Intrinsic value of territory .....	43
2.2.2 Relational value of territory .....	44
2.3 Theories on boundary conflict .....	47
2.3.1 Conflicts associated with international politics.....	49
2.3.2 Conflicts associated with ethnic and religious factors.....	52
2.3.3 Conflicts associated with historical legacy .....	53
2.4 Theoretical models of trans-boundary interaction.....	54
2.4.1 House’s model.....	54
2.4.2 Soffer’s model .....	57
2.4.3 Martinez’s model.....	59

2.5 Conclusion .....	62
References.....	65
<b>Chapter Three: Geographical Settings and Historical Background .....</b>	<b>68</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	69
3.2 Geographical settings.....	69
3.2.1 Climate.....	71
3.2.2 Topography .....	75
3.2.3 Population and settlement .....	75
3.3 Historical background.....	78
3.3.1 Creation of Saudi Arabia.....	80
3.3.2 The 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention .....	82
3.3.3 The 1915 Darin Anglo-Saudi Treaty .....	85
3.3.4 Development of the Kuwait-Saudi boundaries .....	86
3.3.5 Development of the Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary .....	88
3.3.6 Development of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary .....	90
3.4 Conclusion .....	95
References.....	97
<b>Chapter Four: Political and Legal Management .....</b>	<b>99</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	100
4.2 Saudi foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours .....	102
4.3 The Saudi boundary treaties.....	104
4.3.1 The Kuwait-Saudi boundary agreements.....	107
4.3.2 The Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary agreement.....	113
4.3.3 The Saudi-U.A.E. boundary agreement.....	115
4.4 Demarcation of the Saudi boundaries.....	122
4.4.1 Demarcation of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary.....	126
4.4.2 Demarcation of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary .....	127
4.5 Cartographic records of the Saudi boundaries .....	127
4.6 Conclusion .....	132
References.....	134
<b>Chapter Five: Management of Access for People.....</b>	<b>136</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	137
5.2 The Unified Economic Agreement.....	137
5.3 Access for people .....	142

5.3.1 General characteristics of the travellers.....	143
5.3.2 Check-Points infrastructures .....	152
5.3.3 Monthly movement of people .....	156
5.3.4 Travellers' frequency of crossing the border .....	159
5.3.5 People's purpose of travelling.....	160
5.3.6 Travellers' trip origin and destination.....	165
5.3.7 Time consumed at the check-points .....	172
5.4 Conclusion .....	179
References.....	180
<b>Chapter Six: Management of Access for Goods.....</b>	<b>181</b>
6.1 Introduction.....	182
6.2 Truck drivers' characteristics.....	189
6.3 Types of goods.....	194
6.4 Frequency of crossings by truck drivers.....	194
6.5 Time consumed at the check-points .....	195
6.6 Conclusion .....	202
References.....	204
<b>Chapter Seven: Security of Saudi Arabia's Borders.....</b>	<b>205</b>
7.1 Introduction.....	206
7.2 Threats to Saudi security.....	208
7.2.1 External threats.....	210
7.2.2 Internal threats.....	213
7.3 Methods of border security management.....	214
7.3.1 Security Agreements.....	214
7.3.2 The Border Guard.....	216
7.3.3 Customs Department .....	218
7.4 Illegal crossing .....	223
7.5 Smuggling .....	231
7.5.1 Smuggling along the borderline .....	231
7.5.2 Smuggling at land check-points .....	236
7.6 Conclusion .....	247
References.....	249
<b>Chapter Eight: Conclusion .....</b>	<b>252</b>
8.1 Introduction.....	253



8.2 Study Conclusions .....	253
8.3 Recommendations .....	259
8.3.1 Provision of better facilities at border crossing points .....	261
8.3.2 Adoption of high-technology surveillance systems.....	262
8.3.3 Tracking illegal migrants .....	262
8.3.4 Borderland development .....	263
8.3.5 Institutional arrangements.....	263
References.....	265
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>266</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>279</b>
Appendix I	
Questionnaire form (departures).....	280
Appendix II	
Questionnaire form (arrivals).....	284
Appendix III	
Questionnaire form (truck drivers).....	288
Appendix IV	
The Gulf Co-operation Council Charter.....	291
Appendix V	
The Unified Economic Agreement .....	296
Appendix VI	
Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention (1922) .....	301
Appendix VII	
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to Partition the Neutral Zone (1965) .....	302
Appendix VIII	
Annexed Agreement Delimiting the Boundary Line of the NZ (1969) .....	306
Appendix IX	
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement Demarcating Offshore Boundary (2000).....	309
Appendix X	
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement (1958) .....	312
Appendix XI	
Saudi Arabia-UAE Boundary Agreement (1974).....	315
Appendix XII	
Sample size selecting method .....	320
Appendix XIII	
Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transport (arrivals)....	321
Appendix XIV	
Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transport (departures)	322

Appendix XV	
Other types of travellers' purposes .....	323
Appendix XVI	
Simplified family tree of Al-Saud families .....	324

## List of Tables

1.1: Some characteristics of the selected boundaries .....	32
2.1: 'Borderlands' and 'border regions' .....	63
2.2: The connection between Martinez's model and management activities .....	64
3.1: Population in Saudi Arabia's main provinces in 1992 .....	77
3.2: Border cities and towns in the eastern province in 1992 .....	77
4.1: A sample from Schedule I of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty.....	106
4.2: A sample from Schedule II of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty.....	106
4.3: Significant figures in co-ordinates of latitude and longitude.....	107
5.1: The sample size for each check-point.....	143
5.2: Sex groups according to the travellers' answers .....	144
5.3: Travellers' companions.....	146
5.4: Nationalities of travellers.....	146
5.5: National and non-national population in Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours.....	148
5.6: Amenities available at every check-point.....	154
5.7: Travellers' frequency of crossing the border .....	159
5.8: The purpose of travelling.....	161
5.9: Travellers' origin of departure .....	169
5.10: Travellers' trip destination.....	170
5.11: Time consumed for departures at Saudi and GCC check-points .....	174
5.12: Time consumed for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points.....	174
6.1: Saudi Trade of national products with its GCC neighbours .....	184
6.2: Age groups of truck drivers .....	191
6.3: Truck drivers' employment details structure .....	191
6.4: Nationality of truck drivers .....	194
6.5: Types of goods transported by trucks.....	194
6.6: Type and number of trucks passing through KFC .....	197
6.7: Time consumed by trucks at the check-points .....	200
7.1: Military balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iraq and Israel.....	211
7.2: Total arrivals at all entry points in 1996.....	219
7.3: Total amount of cleared goods entered the Kingdom in 1995 .....	219
7.4: Captured illegal crossings at all Saudi land boundaries 1982-1997.....	225
7.5: Nationality of captured illegal crossing at the Saudi eastern boundaries with the GCCs in 1998 .....	226
7.6: Major smuggled materials seized at the borders with the GCC.....	234
7.7: Caught smuggled materials at the Saudi border sections in 1982.....	235
7.8: Nationality of caught smugglers at the borders with the GCC 1998.....	236
7.9: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995.....	237

7.10: Total cases of caught smuggling at each check-point .....241  
7.11: Types of illegal materials caught at all the three check-points 1997 .....242  
7.12: Cases of smuggling illegal materials caught at the three  
check-points 1997.....246

## List of Maps and Figures

1.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries with its GCC neighbours.....	31
2.1: Process of conflict development .....	48
2.2: House's model .....	55
2.3: Soffer's model.....	58
2.4: Martinez's model .....	60
3.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries and major cities .....	70
3.2: Temperature in selected Saudi and GCC cities.....	72
3.3: Rainfall in selected Saudi and GCC cities.....	73
3.4: Topographic map for eastern Saudi Arabia .....	76
3.5: Kuwait limits according to the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention .....	83
3.6: Territorial claims in south eastern Arabia 1913-1955.....	92
4.1: Major government bodies responsible for boundary management in Saudi Arabia.....	101
4.2: Kuwait-Saudi boundary .....	108
4.3: Sketch map for Kuwait-Saudi new maritime boundary June 2000.....	109
4.4: Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary 1958.....	114
4.5: Sketch map for the Bahrain-Saudi checkpoint services area.....	116
4.6: Saudi-UAE 1974 boundary and oilfields.....	118
4.7: The Saudi-UAE major boundary turning points .....	119
4.8: The Saudi-Qatar maritime boundary .....	121
4.9: The Iraq-Kuwait boundary 1992 .....	123
4.10: Boundary points of sections of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary .....	124
4.11: A sample record of Pillar 106 of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary .....	125
4.12: The Saudi-UAE 1974 Boundary Agreement .....	131
5.1: Saudi departures to GCC states 1982-1996 .....	140
5.2: GCC nationals arrivals to Saudi Arabia 1982-1996.....	141
5.3: Travellers' companions .....	145
5.4: Travellers' age groups.....	149
5.5: Travellers' occupations .....	150
5.6: Travellers' mode of transportation.....	151
5.7: King Fahad Causeway .....	155
5.8: Monthly Saudi departures at Al Khafji 1997-1998 .....	157
5.9: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Al Khafji 1997-1998 .....	157
5.10: Monthly Saudi departures at KFC 1997-1998 .....	157

5.11: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at KFC 1997-1998.....	157
5.12: Monthly Saudi departures at Albateha 1997-1998.....	158
5.13: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Albateha 1997-1998 .....	158
5.14: Frequency of crossings .....	162
5.15: Purpose of travelling.....	163,164
5.16: Major cities and towns in Kuwait.....	166
5.17: Major cities and towns in Bahrain.....	167
5.18: Major cities and towns in UAE .....	171
5.19: Time consumed at the checkpoints.....	175,176
5.20: Time consumed at the checkpoints.....	177
6.1: Saudi Arabia exports of national products 1985-1996.....	185
6.2: Saudi Arabia imports of national products 1985-1996.....	185
6.3: Saudi exports of national products to Kuwait 1985-1996 .....	187
6.4: Saudi imports of national products from Kuwait 1985-1996 .....	187
6.5: Saudi exports of national products to Bahrain 1985-1996 .....	187
6.6: Saudi imports of national products from Bahrain 1985-1996.....	187
6.7: Saudi exports of national products to UAE 1985-1996.....	188
6.8: Saudi imports of national products from UAE 1985-1996.....	188
6.9: Truck drivers' age groups.....	190
6.10: Truck drivers' employment status .....	192
6.11: Truck drivers' nationality .....	193
6.12: Frequency of crossings by truck drivers' .....	196
6.13: Time consumed at KFC .....	198
6.14: Peterson's view of the relationship between legal sovereignty and Balassa's classification of economic co-operation.....	201
7.1: Saudi Arabia's main military facilities.....	209
7.2: The sand bank and the steel pipe built by Saudi border guards along the Kuwait-Saudi boundary .....	221
7.3: The sand bank and the steel pipe built by Saudi border guards along the Saudi-UAE boundary.....	222
7.4: Apprehended illegal crossings at all the Saudi border 1982-1997.....	224
7.5: Illegal crossings along the Saudi boundaries 1997 .....	227
7.6: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia 1982-1998.....	228
7.7: Nationality of captured illegal crossers to/from the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia 1997-1998.....	229
7.8: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern border sections 1998.....	230

7.9: Smuggled alcohol seized at the borderline 1984-1996.....	233
7.10: Smuggled livestock seized at the borderline 1984-1996 .....	233
7.11: Smuggled foodstuffs seized at the borderline 1984-1996 .....	233
7.12: Nationality of apprehended smugglers at the borders with the GCC in 1998 .....	238
7.13: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995.....	239
7.14: Types of illegal materials seized at all three checkpoints 1997 .....	240
7.15: Materials smuggled at each checkpoint 1997 .....	243
7.16: Types of illegal materials seized at each checkpoint 1988-1997 .....	244
7.17: Smugglers' nationality at the checkpoints 1997 .....	245
8.1: A model of the Saudi boundary management.....	260

## List of Plates

4.1: Point D-3 of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line.....	128
4.2: Point D-3 of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line.....	128
4.3: Point A of the Saudi-UAE boundary line .....	129
4.4: Point B of the Saudi-UAE boundary line .....	129
4.5: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line .....	130
4.6: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line .....	130
7.1: The border guards' sand bank along the Saudi-UAE boundary line .....	220
7.2: The border guards' pipe along the southern section of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line .....	220



## **Declaration**

No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institution of learning.

It does not exceed 100,000 words in length.

Signed: *Abdullatif A. Alshaikh*

Abdullatif A. Alshaikh  
Durham  
January 2001

## **Copyright**

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without prior written consent from the author, and information derived from it should be acknowledged formally, giving full bibliographical details.

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this work to my country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

## **Acknowledgements**

All praise be to Allah Almighty, the Most Generous and the Most Kind for enabling me to accomplish this study. Without His help and grace this study could not have been undertaken and completed.

I should like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my supervisors Professor Gerald Blake and Dr Jonathan Rigg for their expert guidance, support and consistent encouragement. Their critical review and constructive criticism are greatly appreciated - without them this study would not have been completed.

Thanks are also due to General Talal Anqawi, General Director of the Saudi Border Guards; Dr Mohammed Aljabor, General Director of the Saudi Customs Department; Brigadier Faisal at the Border Guards headquarters in Riyadh; General Muraie Alshahrani, General Director of Military Survey who gave me some excellent maps; and Mr Abdullatif H. Alshaikh at the Border Guards headquarters (who died in September 2000, may Allah have mercy on him).

Brigadier Mutlaq Abuthneen, Director of the Border Guards at the Eastern Province, gave me a great deal of assistance during my fieldwork along the Eastern borders, as did Colonel Salih Alharbi from the Border Guards at Salwa.

Much of my work would have been impossible without the co-operation of managers of the Customs Departments at all of the check-points: Mr Salih Alamro (Alkhafji); Mr Sulaiman Attwaijeri (KFC); and Mr Abdulaziz Alhamad (Assistant Manager, Albateha). I would also like to thank the managers of Passport Control at the check-points: Major Mohammed Alassaf (Alkhafji); Major Saad Aljeberie (KFC); Captain Abdulaziz Thagfan (Albateha). I am grateful to all their staff for advice and help.

I would also like to thank Mr Hamood Alghahtani and Mr Mohammed Alghamdi from the Customs Department headquarters in Riyadh; Mr Mohammed Almotairy from the Ministry of Interior; Mr Hamad Alfaris and Mr Abdullah Alaifan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided me with enormously useful information. I am also grateful to Mrs Karen Atkinson of the Geology Department, University of Durham for drawing the maps in this thesis, and Mr Peter Hughes for his editorial assistance. I am also very grateful to the staff of the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), University of Durham, for their help and enabling me to use their library.

Finally, a very special thanks go to my family; my mother, full sister, wife and children for their sincere supplications, support, and patience for being a way from them during my study in Durham. I would like also to thank the rest of my brothers and sisters for their encouragement and support.

To those I have been unable to mention but who gave help and support in one form or another I send my sincere thanks.

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

## 1.1 Introduction

The subject of international boundaries has attracted scholarly attention for many decades. Much research has been undertaken on the subject, but most of this is focused on the practical aspects of international boundaries, such as their allocation, delimitation, demarcation, and dispute resolution between states. However, the most challenging problem facing a settled boundary is the management of the boundary line itself. Unfortunately, little systematic effort has been directed towards studying boundary management.

It is appropriate first to define 'boundary management'. The difficulty is that international boundaries have wide dimensions and they are changeable in nature. They are not just restricted to land or maritime boundaries, which mark the limits of state sovereignty (Prescott 1987), but they encompass airports, seaports, cyberspace (e.g. the internet) and even outer space. Boundaries may also extend to encompass cultural and social boundaries between different groups (Falah and Newman 1995; Passi 1999).

The word 'management' has several meanings. For example, according to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (1999), the verb 'manage' means:

*"1 be in charge of; run. 2 supervise (staff). 3 be the manager of (a sports team or a performer). 4 administer and regulate (resources under one's control). 5 maintain control or influence over (a person or animal). 6 control the use or exploitation of (land)..."* (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1999, p.864).

The first two definitions cited above are specifically related to the science of management, but the other definitions are more general. What is generally implied international boundary 'management' is based largely on definitions 4, 5 and 6: 'administer', 'regulate', 'control' and 'influence'. Therefore, in the world of boundary studies, management embraces all the activities which ensure the peaceful operation of the boundary so that it remains stable and accessible which offering citizens of the state a sense of security. These activities include notably surveillance, maintenance of border demarcation and crossing points, control of access, and provision for collaboration.

This thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap in geographical studies of boundary management. Its main focus is Saudi land boundaries with its Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) neighbours. The leaders of U.A.E., Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait established the GCC in May 1981. The aim of this organisation is

“to effect co-ordination, integration and inter-connection between Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them” (GCC Secretariat General 1992, p.4.)

The main aim of this study is to describe and analyse the contemporary management of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours. Boundary ‘management’ in this context includes the measures undertaken by the Saudi government along its boundary that are designed to preserve territorial sovereignty while allowing a growing level of cross-border interaction. Four aspects of boundary management have been chosen: political and legal management, management of access for people, management of access for goods, and security management. Other aspects of management such as transboundary resources management, environmental management, and crisis management are not included, as will be explained below.

## **1.2 The significance of the study**

The analysis of the management of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours is important for a number of reasons. First, this study is the first that tackles the issue of boundary management in the area. Second, the study will explore the extent to which the aims of the GCC towards more open borders as implied by drive to unity have been achieved. After almost two decades of operation, it is worth investigating how far the general policies and agreements undertaken by this organisation have affected boundary management under the aegis of the GCC.

It is to be hoped that the findings of this study will help decision-makers, especially on the Saudi side, to evaluate policy and to make any necessary improvements to practices and procedures at the borders.

## **1.3 Literature review**

During the past century, studies on international boundaries have developed significantly in terms of concepts, focus and methodology. This development has helped to enhance understanding of international boundaries, especially their nature and functions in the contemporary world, where dramatic changes have occurred in the traditional international political systems. The collapse of the USSR, the emergence of supranational organisations such as the European Union, the emergence of new states

such as the Central Asian States, and devolution processes which have been taking place in some longstanding states, such as the United Kingdom, are a few examples of those changes.

Below is a brief review of some major studies on international boundaries categorised in two main areas. First, general studies on boundaries will be brought up in a chronological way. The author adopted this method to see how concepts and focus on boundaries have developed through time. This approach also helps to indicate where to place this study within the totality of work to date. Second, major studies accomplished on Saudi Arabia's land boundaries will be reviewed.

### **1.3.1 General studies on boundaries**

Boundary studies, during the past century, can be classified into three periods, each of which has focused on certain theme(s) or concept(s). The first period, from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of the Second World War in early 1940s, is characterised by studies that focus on the nature of boundaries, and how to evaluate them from different points of view, especially military. The second period, from the Second World War to the early 1980s, witnessed a distinct shift from focusing on the nature of boundaries to the functions of boundaries. Finally, from the early 1980s to the present, new concepts have been introduced to boundary studies as well as new methodologies derived from disciplines other than geography, such as international relations, political science and the like. These three periods will be discussed more thoroughly below.

During the first period, two boundary concepts can be distinguished; the concept of the *organic state*, and the concept of the *scientific* boundary. At the end of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Ratzel, the German geographer, proposed the concept of the *organic state*, where the state is like a living organism which has different stages of growth. Each state, according to Ratzel has "an idea of the possible limit of its territorial dominion" (Prescott 1987, p.8), what he called 'space conception'. Consequently, states and their boundaries are dynamic features and when they were become fixed in position they are simply witnessing a temporary halt in the process of political expansion (Prescott 1987). This view derived largely from Ratzel, whatever its merits, was manifested to an extreme a few decades later during the age of Nazi expansionism.

In the early twentieth century, two opposing concepts emerged, those of Thomas Holdich and L. W. Lyde. Holdich believed that the best boundary, to maintain peace between two neighbours, must be 'a strong and as definite a physical fence as can be found' (Johnson 1917, p.208). Thus, the *good* boundary, according to Holdich, must be a 'formidable barrier' that divides and separates countries. The natural boundary, or as he called it the *scientific* boundary, is the best type, and mountains are the best natural boundary that serves as a barrier. This view reflects the military background of Holdich and also of his era, when the strategic value of the boundary was so important. On the other hand, Lyde suggested a completely different view of the boundary. For Lyde, the ideal political boundary is not a barrier, rather it is 'a feature which actually encourages peaceful international intercourse' (Johnson 1917, p.210). Rivers, as Lyde suggested, were the best boundary for they draw the inhabitants on both banks together and offer an opportunity for peaceful interactions. These two opposing concepts held sway for a quite long time.

However, Holdich's view was criticised by scholars like Albert Brigham, Stephen Visher, and Richard Hartshorne (Brigham 1919; Visher 1932; Hartshorne 1936, 1937). Brigham supported Lyde's view and at the same time introduced a new concept of *economic equilibrium*. Brigham suggested that the ideal stage of civilisation is when states can peacefully live together and share mutual profit, and he asserted that societies should be working towards the time when:

*"national limits are to be set for equal welfare on both sides of the line, when considerations of defence and aggression fall out of sight, and justice is the only goal."*

(Brigham 1919, p.202).

Visher criticised the concept of *natural* boundaries because, among other reasons, they act as a barrier to peace, and he favoured *artificial* boundaries because they encourage interaction between people (Visher 1932, p.295). Hartshorne also rejected the distinction between the *natural* and *artificial* boundary and stated that all boundaries are man-made. He classified boundaries according to their relationship with the cultural landscape as *antecedent* boundaries, *subsequent* boundaries, and *superimposed* boundaries (Hartshorne 1936). He also emphasised differences in the cultural character of the population at the border areas as a main factor in boundary problems (Hartshorne 1937).

During the second period, three scholars, Whittmore Boggs, Stephen Jones, and G. Percy (Boggs 1940; Jones 1945; Percy 1965), emphasised the concept of boundary *functions*. In his famous book *International Boundaries*, Boggs (1940) saw boundaries as barriers to economic intercourse, and their functions as generally negative rather positive, but at the same time he stated that:

*"Any boundary is permeable to some extent, and consequently a sort of osmosis takes place."* (Boggs 1940, p.10).

Boggs also thought that boundary functions might cause problems and friction between the two neighbours, which may present a need for diplomatic negotiation (Boggs 1940, p.11). He classified boundary functions into two main categories, *in respect to persons* and *in respect to things*. As to the first category, a government may have some reason to impose restrictions upon the movement of people entering or leaving its territory. As to the second category, a government may impose restrictions upon the movement of goods incoming to or outgoing from its territory.

Jones followed Boggs in stressing the importance of boundary *functions*, and added that the general political situation of the two neighbouring states is of great importance in determining the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a boundary function. He gave an example of the US-Canada boundary, when USA imposed the liquor laws (in 1920) and how this matter created some tension at the border:

*"Of recent memory are the tension and increased policing, minor but not insignificant, that arose from differences in the liquor laws of the two countries, laws aimed at internal, not international, problems, but changing the general situation of the boundary."* (Jones 1945, p. 3).

Jones suggested that one solution to problems arising between two neighbouring states might be to reduce the functions of their boundary to some degree to those of internal boundaries. He also suggested that in order to increase the interaction between states and to promote free trade movement 'changes in the concept of national sovereignty and the evolution of effective international control seem necessary' (Jones 1945, p.17). In fact, this view is strongly related to the subject of this study, as the discussion in the following chapters will reveal.

Percy described what he called the *normal functions* of the boundary (Percy 1965), when a state tries to maintain a degree of isolation and a degree of interchange. Abnormalities to the normal functions are either towards *minimum* restrictions on the



movement of people and goods or towards *maximum* restrictions and tight control over the movement of people and goods.

Some other concepts, also emerged during this period such as Spykman's *power balance* (Spykman 1942), Reeves's *boundary of justice* (Reeves 1944), and Pounds' *ideological boundary* (Pounds 1972). However, Pounds in particular emphasised the importance of supranational organisation in affecting boundary functions and stated that:

*"International organizations, some of them calling for complete freedom of trade between their members, others requiring greater liberty of movement of both people and goods, have deprived boundaries of some of their function."* (Pounds 1972, p.97).

During the third period from the early 1980s, the focus was on the changing nature of the meaning and significance of international boundaries over space and time (Anderson and Dowd 1999), as clearly reflected in the changes in Western Europe and Northern America in the past two decades. These changes have redirected boundary studies towards new emphases towards *borderlands*, *transborder interaction*, *cross-border co-operation*, *cross-border regions*, and *boundary management*. In respect of borderland, however, some efforts had emerged earlier than this period such as House's study (1959) on the effect of boundary shift in the Alpes Maritimes when in 1947 France had been awarded the upper valleys of the Roya, Vésubie, and Tinée (Minghi 1963). House explored those areas adjacent to the boundary between France and Italy which had been held by Italy before the boundary shift in 1947. All these new emphases on boundary studies have attracted not only geographers, but also scholars from other social sciences (Blake 1999).

The discussion by some geographers (Prescott 1987; Minghi 1991) of the concept of the *borderland* focuses largely upon how the boundary creates its own distinctive region (Minghi 1991) and how these regions are affected by state policies and regulations (Prescott 1987). Moreover, Minghi argued that the borderland region creates a type of barometer of the changes in the relations between the states divided (Minghi 1991, p.15).

In a book edited by Martinez (1986), the contributors discussed a wide range of *transborder interaction* aspects. Most of their papers tackled issues of transborder interaction along the Canada-US and Mexico-US borders, however some papers discussed those issues along some African and European borders. For example,

Duchacek (1986) showed that the interaction could be established through the activities of subnational governments, especially those located alongside the international boundary (e.g. Michigan State in U.S.A.), and he pointed out how these activities affect the foreign policy of central governments. Moreover, Duchacek argued, that subnational governments may create their own foreign relations with their neighbours or even with their neighbours' neighbours (Duchacek 1986, p.13).

Hansen (1986) discussed border region development and cooperation by comparing some borderlands in Western Europe and the Mexico-US borderland. He pointed out that international conflicts tend to inhibit the economic development of border regions, and showed how peaceful political relations and international economic integration have removed border barriers and encouraged borderland development (Hansen 1986, p.42).

Stoddard (1986) suggested that joint border structures or binational organisations are the best way to solve border problems. He stressed, however, that:

*"The mere existence of a joint structure or binational organization does little for problem solving, unless the essential powers of problem resolution are also included in its mandate by both nations involved."* (Stoddard 1986, p.65).

Another collection of works, the proceedings of the IGU symposium held in Basle, Switzerland in 1994 (Gallusser *et al* 1994), consisted of a wide range of papers discussing a variety of topics but all focusing upon two main concepts, *cross-border co-operation* and *cross-border regions*. In this volume, topics were classified into three main areas: new border situations, motivations of transborder co-operation, and theory and methodology. The most interesting paper is by Koter (1994), who examined what is called 'Euroregions' along Poland's borders with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine and Belorussia, where several border regions, from opposite sides of the boundaries, joined together to form a unique regional setting along the border. Several papers revealed that there is a wide range of factors which motivates transborder co-operation. Among them is the geographical location of the state. For example, landlocked states invariably try to attain access to the sea through their neighbours. In this respect Geisse and Arenas (1994) examined the economic agreement between Bolivia, as a landlocked state, and Chile, and Zaidi (1994) also examined the transborder co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There are other factors which motivate states or border regions to seek co-operation such as complex human geographic factors, urban settings, migrations, transportation, and economic factors (Newman 1994; Zalad 1994; Mladek and Simko 1994; Meir *et al* 1994; Palomaki 1994; Chanda 1994; Lezzi 1994).

Blake (1994a) discussed international transboundary collaborative ventures as forms of transborder co-operation. He focused on bilateral agreements between states to achieve certain objectives such as 'transfrontier protected natural areas', 'marine parks', 'joint offshore zones' and the like.

Unfortunately, *boundary management* has still not been given much attention by scholars. However, two works deserve to be mentioned in this review. The first is the proceedings of the conference on *the peaceful management of transboundary resources* organised by the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) at Durham University in April 1994 (Blake *et al* 1995). Most of the papers addressed issues related to the problems emerging from unequal distribution of natural resources. Since 'most international boundaries have been delimited without taking into account the location of natural resources' (Blake *et al* 1995, p.xiii), conflicts between states are likely to arise unless suitable arrangements are designed to solve these problems. Collaborative arrangements are held to be the best way to manage those resources. Based on this theme, the papers are organised into four main areas: hydrocarbons and minerals; water resources; environment and conservation, and fisheries. Some examples of each area are given below.

Robson (1995) revealed that the 'effective and efficient exploitation of a single petroleum reservoir which straddles an international boundary requires cooperation between the states concerned' (Robson 1995, p.3). He also discussed the legal issues raised by transboundary petroleum resources and he classified them into two main types. First, issues raised when the delimitation of the international boundary is carried out at a time when significant resources have not been identified. Second, issues raised when a specific potential petroleum resource has been identified (Robson 1995).

Caponera (1995) discussed the legal bases of transboundary water resources whether they are rivers or underground resources. He showed the available sources of international law to regulate water resources usage and management. The point he made is that there is no one law applies to manage such resources.

Hearns and Tyedmers (1995) clarified how the creation of a marine protected area would not just enhance and promote a substantial fishery, but could also help to reduce the potential for conflict, for example in the South China Sea.

Hayashi (1995) discussed the problems of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the role of the United Nation in managing those stocks.

The second work is a paper on *the objectives of land boundary management* (Blake 1998). In fact, this paper represents the first attempt to tackle the issue of boundary 'management' as such on a systematic typological basis. Blake suggested a model of peaceful boundary management, and discussed the factors that affect boundary management: boundary history, legal status, type of boundary line, physical geography, human geography, and access. He also suggested that any good boundary management should achieve the following goals: 'international peace, local and national security, borderland prosperity, and effective local government' (Blake 1998, p.56). Blake also discussed different types of boundary management which are management of the boundary line, access management, security management, transboundary resource management, environmental management, and crisis management. Blake's paper is important to this thesis, and was the inspiration for its basic structure.

In spite of the new emphasis on management of boundaries, the old fundamental questions of *delimitation* and *demarkation* have not gone away. As territorial changes continue to emerge in the world today, such as the new states formed from the break-up of USSR, and as states are still competing for territory especially where there are valuable resources at stake (see Chapter 2), some longstanding aspects of international boundaries remain of interest to scholars.

From the above review of all the general works, one might suggest the following. First, concepts relating to, and the significance of, boundaries have changed through time. Second, current studies on boundaries focus more upon issues of boundary functioning and of transborder co-operation, whether between local authorities or national governments, and this co-operation is perceived to be a means toward maintaining peace and stability between neighbours. Third, there is a surprising scarcity of studies on boundary management despite the fact that boundary management affects interaction across borders either positively or negatively. Nevertheless, this study benefited from some earlier authors, especially Boggs (1940), Jones (1945), Percy (1965) and Blake (1998) who have helped to construct the theoretical background of

this thesis. The following section reviews studies undertaken of Saudi Arabia's land boundaries in particular.

### **1.3.2 Studies on Saudi Arabia's land boundaries**

Several studies have been produced on the boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Below some of these works will be reviewed and grouped according to the main topic or issue they tackled. They have been arranged into the following three main groups: neutral and shared zones, boundary disputes, and boundary functions. This study being limited to land boundaries of Saudi Arabia, only works that deal with land boundaries have been included.

The first group of studies, are those examining the former neutral and shared zones of the Saudi boundaries. Melamid (1955) discussed the Saudi neutral zones with Kuwait, Iraq and the U.A.E before their dissolution. For example, the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had a unique situation prior to the 1965 agreement partitioning the zone. The two governments, the Saudi government and the British government on behalf of the Sheikh of Kuwait, reached several agreements to manage this neutral area. They agreed on regulating the movement of the Bedouin, the movement of goods, and the administration of justice, while natural resources were not raised until 1950s when a considerable amount of oil was discovered as will be shown in Chapter four. The study showed how the sovereignty of the two states over this area was affected by these agreements.

Brown (1963) discussed in more details the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone. He showed how the Neutral Zone was established in Uqair Convention in December 1922 and how this zone was imposed by the British High Commissioner in Iraq Sir Percy Cox as a solution to the dispute between Ibn Saud and the Shaikhdom of Kuwait. More importantly, he pointed out that Cox insisted to impose a defined boundary which was not known to the people in Arabia and he succeeded despite the strong opposition by Ibn Saud to this idea. He also discussed the blockade imposed on Kuwait by Ibn Saud from 1920 until 1942 when both the Saudis and Kuwaitis signed three agreements of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations, Trade Agreement, and Agreement for the Extradition of Offenders which have ended the blockade and contributed to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Oil

concessions in the Neutral Zone and how different oil companies won contracts from the Saudis and the Kuwaitis were described in more details.

Blake revealed in three separate papers (Blake 1991; 1992; 1994b) how the neutral zones between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq, as well as the shared maritime zones with Sudan and Bahrain, were peacefully resolved, concluding that neutral and shared zones 'represent peaceful solutions to potentially serious boundary conflict' (Blake 1991, p.163). For the seabed formerly disputed between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over the two islands of Qaru and Umm al Maradim which formerly lay within the realm of partitioned zone, Blake suggested, as a peaceful solution to the dispute, to share any revenues from the exploitation of hydrocarbons resources found within this area (Blake 1992).

The second group of studies are those considering boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. Many of the studies were concerned with the Buraimi dispute. Melamid (1965), after giving a brief description the dispute, showed how the ethnographic composition of the population affected the definition of Saudi international boundaries.

Kelly (1967) also discussed this dispute in a more detailed way. After describing the disputed area in terms of its geographical, historical, economic, and social structures, he examined the development of the dispute during all its stages from 1949-1954, when the negotiations were held. This study, despite the useful information it provided on this dispute, depended largely on British government memoranda on this issue. This study was described by one scholar as biased, representing British interests in the Gulf region (Alshamlan 1987, p.16).

Two studies have addressed the Buraimi issue from a less prejudiced viewpoint: those of Alshamlan (1987) and Wilkinson (1991). Alshamlan historically analysed the Saudi south-eastern boundaries, and discussed the development of the Buraimi dispute. He successfully demonstrated, with admirable fairness, the views of both the Saudis and the British. Wilkinson (1991) also addressed the issue of Buraimi, and clarified the role of Britain in delimiting most Arabian Gulf\* states' territories. He concluded that

---

\* There has been a very long debate over whether 'Persian' or 'Arabian' Gulf is the correct term. Historically, the name 'Persian Gulf' dates back as early as 150 AD. The ancient Greek and Roman geographers used two terms. 'Arabian Gulf' which refers to the modern Red Sea, and 'Persian Gulf' which refers to the modern Persian/Arabian Gulf (Al-Qasimi 1999). Moreover, Arab historians used the term 'Bahr Faris' which means 'Sea of Persia' in reference to the Persian/Arabian Gulf. The Ottomans, after occupying Iraq and Eastern Arabia in the 1540s, used different terms for the Gulf

international law could not give an answer as to how to draw the limits in the desert, or what is called *res nullius* areas. Thus, territorial disputes in the southern and south-eastern parts of Arabia faced several problems in this respect.

The third group of studies are those concerned with boundary functions, as shown in Abu-Doowd's (1984) study. He first examined the evolution of Saudi boundaries, and then analysed the functions of all the land boundaries of Saudi Arabia. He meant by the function, the boundary as a barrier to human movement. In order to determine this function, he studied patterns of human movement across the official check-points along the land boundaries in terms of their volume and some characteristics of travellers such as nationality, age, education, income, purpose of travelling, and frequency of travelling. Moreover, he interviewed travellers to determine their perceptions of the boundary. He concluded that 60% of travellers across the Saudi land boundaries perceived the boundary as a barrier to human movement, and by using regression analysis, he found that difficulty and distance were the most important factors that affected the perception of the travellers. In addition, he discovered that the size of population of the travellers' origin countries and distance influenced the number of travellers.

Al-Ghamdi (1999) also studied some functional aspects of the Saudi boundary with Yemen. Although the aim of his study was mainly to suggest a logical boundary line as a solution to the former boundary dispute between the two countries, he analysed the interaction between the borderlanders along the boundary on both sides. He found from a sample of travellers at Alkhadra Saudi check-point along the western section of the boundary, which is adjacent to the Taif Treaty line (see figure 3.6), that the main purpose of travellers is visiting relatives followed by visiting their properties and shopping. He also discovered that most of the Saudis crossing the border weekly, while the Yemenis crossing on a monthly basis. But along the middle section of the

---

such as 'Gulf of Basrah', 'the Gulf of Qatif', and 'the Gulf of Arabia'. In the same period, some Italian cartographers called the Gulf 'Golfo de Persia', but influenced by the Ottomans they added the term 'Mare Elcatif' thus becoming 'Mare Elcatif Golfo di Persia'. From 1712 onwards, English cartographers started to use the term 'Persian Gulf' and all other names disappeared (Al-Qasimi 1999). However, some English politicians and travellers used the term 'Arabian Gulf' such as Charles Belgrave in his book *The Pirate Gulf* (Amin 1981).

In 1958, Iraq started to use the term 'Arabian Gulf' in its media and was followed by other Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. Amin writes: "By 1968, all Arab States, including the Gulf Emirates, passed laws and issued decrees making the use of the term 'Arabian Gulf' compulsory in all communications with the outside world." (Amin 1981, p.37). The author has thus opted to use the term 'Arabian Gulf' in his thesis bearing in mind that it is a contemporary and not historic study.

boundary he found that there was no interaction because there was no check-point as a result of the tense relations between Saudi Arabia and the former South Yemen. However, the eastern section of the boundary has an informal Saudi check-point called Alkirkeer, which he studied the interaction of people along it. He found that at this check-point most of the crossings are made by the Emirats because they are from certain tribes and do visit their folks in Yemen, so this check-point is closer to them when they come from the U.A.E. Al-Ghamdi also studied the time consumed by travellers at the two previous check-points. He discovered that at Alkhadra check-point the time ranged from 10-30 minutes for people travelling alone. But those who are accompanied by their families or friends spent from 1-2 hours. At Alkirkeer informal check-point he found that travellers are spent less time than the first one which is from 5-10 minutes for people travelling by themselves, and from 15-30 minutes for people accompanied with families. The previous time ranges were undertaken for travellers from the Saudi side to the Yemeni side.

From the foregoing review of the materials on the Saudi boundaries, several points can be concluded. First, the majority of those studies focused on boundary disputes, especially on the Buraimi case. Second, studies which tackled neutral and shared zones focused on those forms of territorial arrangement as solutions to boundary disputes in Arabia. These two groups are important in understanding the evolution of the Saudi boundaries up to their present shape. Third, Abu-Daood's study focused on the function of the boundary as travellers perceived it as a human barrier, but he did not examine the functions applied by the Saudi government at international boundaries. Neither did he investigate the time spent by travellers at the check-points which is an important factor in evaluating those functions. While Al-Ghamdi was focusing on interaction between population on both sides of the border as evidence to be used for proposing a logical boundary as a solution to the dispute between the two sides, and he did not examine other aspects of management such as security management or management of access for goods. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to bridge the gaps found in empirical studies about the Saudi boundaries, and it is hoped by studying the management practices at the Saudi boundaries a better understanding of the functions of the boundary can be reached.



## 1.4 Research objectives and questions


There are two main objectives of this study. First, to describe and analyse the Saudi government's management practices. Second, to see how these practices are affected by the GCC's policies and objectives, and how in turn these practices affect the degree of openness at the borders. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the following questions will be addressed:

1. Are the selected Saudi boundaries managed in ways that are consistent with the GCC's long-term objectives of political unity? (Chapters five, six, and seven).
2. To what degree are the selected Saudi boundaries 'open'? Is there a trend towards more openness, and what are the differences between them in this respect? (Chapters five, six, and seven).
3. What types of factors account for differences in openness? Are the influences local or national or both? (Chapters five and six).
4. How are illegal movements of people and goods monitored and controlled, and with what success? (Chapter seven).
5. How successful is the management of these boundaries in allowing access and maintaining peace and security along the borderline? (Chapters five, six, and seven).

There are four obvious limitations of this study. First, only three boundaries have been selected from five Saudi-GCC boundaries. Those chosen are the boundaries between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. Each of these boundaries has characteristics that distinguish it from the others. They differ in length, number of crossing points, and geographical environment (see table 1.1). Furthermore, along those chosen boundaries, only three crossing points were selected for analysis. As seen in figure 1, they are Alkhafji (with Kuwait), King Fahad Causeway (with Bahrain) and Albateha (with the U.A.E.). The reason for choosing these three crossings is because the number of people entering and leaving is greater at the selected points than at other crossing points.

Second, the author is a Saudi national and can be expected to obtain better data from the Saudi side than from the neighbouring countries. Thus, the material collected is liable to be biased, in terms of quantity and substance, in favour of Saudi Arabia.

**Figure 1.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries with its GCC neighbours**



Source: Farsi (no date).

**Table 1.1: Some characteristics of the selected boundaries.**

<b>Saudi Arabia /</b>	<b>Boundary Length (km)</b>	<b>Crossing Points</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Kuwait	220	3	2 formal + 1 informal *
Bahrain	174	1	1 formal
U.A.E.	456	3	1 formal +2 informal

\* Those informal crossing points are used for Bedouin movements and have special regulations.

Third, management practices along maritime boundaries clearly differ from those along land boundaries, which include marine operations such as fisheries management, safety of ships and, pollution control. This type of management is not included, rather the focus here is on management along land boundaries not least because the movement of people and goods between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours are more salient and dense on land boundaries than on maritime boundaries. Although the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is a maritime boundary, it has been chosen because the construction of King Fahad Causeway (KFC) in 1987 has created a type of land boundary management along the Causeway. In addition, management practices at airports and seaports are not included in this thesis despite the fact that a rather large number of people travel through airports and a large amount of goods are checked through seaports. The author believes that these are important areas of research which deserve separate studies.

Finally, because of obvious limitations of time and word-length this study covers only four aspects of boundary management. These are: political and legal management, management of access for people, management of access for goods, and security management. Other important aspects, such as transboundary resources management, environmental management and crisis management have been excluded because of limitation of time and word length.

Notwithstanding the limitations noted above, it will be shown that the selected cases are sufficient to reveal marked regional contrasts in the four aspects of boundary management between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours.

## 1.5 Study methodology

It is important to assert that because of the lack of general theories in boundary management studies, as revealed by the foregoing literature review, this study is an empirical one. Therefore, the inductive approach was used to answer the basic research questions. The author used different methods to collect and analyse the data for this study. In respect of data collection, there were three main sources of information. First, primary sources that include treaties and agreements between the Saudi government and its neighbours. Secondly, secondary sources that include maps, statistics, and official material – published and unpublished. In addition, library sources in the form of books, articles, and reports, were used to develop theoretical and regional background for this study. Finally, fieldwork was conducted to collect data unavailable from other sources. More details of the fieldwork are given below.

### 1.5.1 Fieldwork

Different types of information were gathered from the field, using a variety of techniques. First, there is the data regarding the physical features of the boundary area and its topography. For this type of information the author used the simple technique of direct observation with the assistance of topographic maps of three scales, 1:4,000,000, 1:500,000 and 1:250,000. Larger scale maps, such as 1:50,000, are available for officials use only, for example the Border Guards officials, and the author did not have access to this type of map. Key reference books about the geography of the Arabian Peninsula were used as supplementary sources such as *The Atlas of Saudi Arabia* (Bindagji 1978) and *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (Bindagji 1981). Moreover, some official statistical books also have been used, as will be shown in Chapter three. Second, the physical situation of the boundary markers and posts, their position and distances between them were observed and recorded. In addition to that, the man-made features such as trenches, sandbanks, barbed wire fences and the like, were also observed.

Third, information about the movement of people and goods through the selected Saudi check-points was gathered from official statistics and a questionnaire designed for this purpose. Finally, official views regarding policies and regulations applied at the crossing points were gathered through interviews with senior officials. The following sections provide more details about the questionnaire and interviews.

### **1.5.2 Questionnaire**

To collect information from the people crossing the borderlines it was necessary to design and administer a relatively short questionnaire. People travelling across the border do not favour a long wait at crossing points. For this reason, the author designed a questionnaire to be handed out to the travellers, arrivals and departures, at the three selected Saudi crossing points with Kuwait, Bahrain and the U.A.E. This questionnaire contained the necessary questions to obtain the information needed for this research. For example, the traveller's reason for travel, his/her frequency of crossing the border, the time consumed at the check-points and the like, as can be seen from Appendices I, II, III at the end of this thesis. It is worth mentioning here that there were few female responses to the questionnaire, as discussed in Chapter five.

Three forms of questionnaires were designed, one for the arrivals (Appendix I), one for the departures (Appendix II), and one for truck drivers (Appendix III). Samples from both travellers and truck drivers were drawn, as discussed in greater detail in Chapters five and six. The questionnaire forms were given to respondents to fill in by themselves, except in a few cases where the selected respondent was unable to read and write. In such instances, the author undertook to complete the questionnaires.

As traveller numbers crossing the borders vary from day to day and thus there was no framework for the research population (i.e. travellers), on advice, the author opted to use the table in appendix XII which is designed to determine the sample size for any population (Krejcie and Morgan 1970). In addition, the author decided to select samples based on the total numbers of travellers crossing on a specific day at each check-point (see Chapter 5). The total the sample size at the three selected check-points was 597 travellers of which 90% (remarkably) responded to questionnaires. This figure is regarded as ample in statistical terms; the larger the number of sample the more accurate the generalisation derived from it to the research population will be (Kitchen and Tate 2000).

### **1.5.3 Interviews**

Two categories of official personnel were interviewed using open-ended questions. The first category was those senior officials who are responsible for supervising and controlling border matters according to the overall policy adopted by the government. For example, the General Director of the Border Guards and the General Director of

Customs Department were interviewed, except from the General Director of Passport Control, as will be explained below.

The second category was those officials at the crossing points who are directly controlling the border activity on a day-by-day basis, e.g. Border Guards, Passport Officers, and Customs Department Managers. The author had a different response from each group of officials mentioned above.

The Border Guards and the Customs Department officials were very helpful and co-operative, whether in interviews or in supplying the requested data to the author. Unfortunately, some of the officials from the Passport Department were not very co-operative in interviews and providing the requested data. The General Director of the Passport Department refused to be interviewed, and instead he referred the author to his adviser to answer the questions. However, most of the Passport officers at the border check-points were very helpful and co-operative.

## **1.6 Data analysis**

After collecting all the data required for the study, the author has applied different analytical techniques. First, the data collected from the questionnaire forms have been coded and inputted on to a personal computer by using Excel Software (MS Office97 version). Following that, the data have been analysed and frequencies and percentages were calculated and used in this analysis.

Second, by the use of different techniques, such as maps, graphs and tables, the author analysed results from his survey and fieldwork. Cross-tabulation was also employed wherever necessary to see if there is any apparent association between different variables. Third, qualitative technique has been employed to analyse the interviews with the Saudi officials.

## **1.7 Study difficulties and constraints**

The author faced a number of difficulties during data collection. The most important difficulty, as the search on theoretical materials concerning boundary management shows, was that there is a great lack of research on this subject. The dearth of research makes this study a pioneering one. Some comment on the theoretical background for

boundary management may be added to the vitally important field of international boundary studies.

Among the other difficulties that deserve to be mentioned here, is the confidential nature of the information needed for this research. In addition to that, some officials were hesitant about co-operating with the author. The harshness of the terrain and the remoteness of most of the parts of the boundary line with the U.A.E., which hindered the author from observing those parts, was another difficulty.

Some further constraints were encountered in this study. First, some departments, such as the Border Guard, provided only limited statistics and there are no other sources that can be accessed. For example, the information regarding illegal crossing and smuggling are not detailed in terms of all the Saudi boundaries with the GCC neighbours, where the figures of some boundaries, such as the one with the U.A.E., have been added to the figures for the boundary with Qatar and Oman (except from the years 1997 and 1998 where those figures have been individually detailed for the boundary with the Emirates). This constraint makes the temporal trend for illegal crossing and smuggling hard to follow. Second, some of the respondents (lesser than 5%) from the people selected for the questionnaire did not answer all the questions on the form, leaving some answers blank. However, the proportion of those respondents is not large enough to affect the result significantly.

In spite of the difficulties discussed above and the limitations mentioned on pages 30 and 32, the author hopes he achieved some significant research which will be of real practical and academic value.

## References

- Abu-Dawood, A. (1984), *Political Boundaries of Saudi Arabia: Their Evolution and Functions*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, U.S.A.
- Al-Qasimi, S. (1999), *Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf*, Forest Row, Exeter.
- Al-Shamlan, A. (1987), *The Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula: 1934-1955*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan.
- Amin, S. (1981), *International and Legal Problems of the Gulf*, Menas Press Ltd, London.
- Anderson, J. and Dowd, L. (1999), "Border, Border regions and territoriality: contradictory meanings, changing significance", *Regional Studies*, Vol. 37, 7, pp.593-604.
- Bindagji, H. (1978), *Atlas of Saudi Arabia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bindagji, H. (1981), *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (Arabic), H.H. Bindagji, Jeddah.
- Blake, Gerald (1991), "The International boundaries of Arabia: The peaceful resolution of disputes" in N. Kliot & S. Waterman, *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, Belhaven Press, London, pp.153-65.
- Blake, G. (1992), "International boundaries and territorial stability in the Middle East: an assessment", *GeoJournal*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.200-10.
- Blake, G. (1994a), "International transboundary collaborative ventures" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.359-364.
- Blake, G. (1994b), "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States" in R. Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp.200-10.
- Blake, G. (1995), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London.
- Blake, G. (1998), "The objectives of land boundary management", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, IBRU, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1998, pp.55-59.
- Blake, G. (1999), "Geographers and international boundaries", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp.55-62.
- Boggs, S. (1940), *International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Brigham, A. (1919), "Principles in the determination of boundaries", *The Geographical Review*, Vol.52, No., pp.201-19.
- Brown, E. (1963), *The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone*, The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut.
- Caponera, D. (1995), "Shared waters and international law" in G. Blake *et al* (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp.121-126.
- Chanda, R. (1994), "SADCC/SADC as an instrument for coexistence in Southern Africa" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.287-298.
- Duchacek, I. (1986), "International competence of subnational governments: borderlands and beyond" in O. Martinez (ed.), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp.11-28.



- Falah, G. and Newman, D. (1995), "The spatial manifestation of threat: Israelis and Palestinians seek a 'good' border", *Political Geography*, Vol. 14, No.8, pp. 689-706.
- Farsi, Z. (no date), *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia National Road Atlas and Touring Guide*, Z. Farsi, Jeddah.
- Gallusser, W. (ed.) (1994), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Proceedings of the IGU-Symposium, Basel/Switzerland, 24-27 May 1994, Peter Lang, Berne.
- G.C.C. Secretariat General (1992), *The Cooperation Council's Charter*, G.C.C. Printing Press, Riyadh.
- Geisse, M. and Arenas, H. (1994), "An economic agreement between Chile and Bolivia as solution for a landlocked country" in W. Gallusser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.144-150.
- Hamadi, A. (1981), *Saudi Arabia's Territorial Limits: A Study in Law and Politics*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University.
- Hansen, N. (1986), "Border region development and cooperation: Western Europe and the US-Mexico borderlands in comparative perspective" in O. Martinez (ed.), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp.31-44.
- Hartshorne, R. (1936), "Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries", abstract, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 26, (March), pp.56-57.
- Hartshorne, R. (1937), "A survey of the boundary problems of Europe", in C. C. Colby (ed.), *Geographic Aspects of International Relations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.163-181.
- Hayashi, M. (1995), "The role of the United Nations in managing the world's fisheries" in G. Blake *et al* (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp.373-393.
- Hearns, G. and Tyedmers, P. (1995), "Poseidon's Trident: biological diversity preservation, resource conservation and conflict avoidance in the South China Sea" in G. Blake *et al* (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp.289-300.
- House, J. (1959), "The Franco-Italian boundary in the Alpes Maritimes" *Institute of British Geographers, Transactions and Papers*, No. 26, pp. 107-31.
- Johnson, D. (1917), "The role of political boundaries", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 4, pp.208-13.
- Jones, S. (1945), *Boundary-Making: A Handbook For Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners*, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington.
- Kelly, J. (1967), *Eastern Boundaries of Arabia*, (Arabic translation from *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, Faber and Faber, London, 1964), Al Amal Library, Kuwait.
- Kitchin, R. and Tate, N. (2000), *Conducting Research into Human Geography*, Prentice Hall, London.
- Krejcie, R. and Morgan, D. (1970), "Determining sample size for research activities", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 30,1, pp. 607-10.
- Koter, M. (1994), "Transborder Euroregions round Polish border zones as an example of a new form of political coexistence" in W. Gallusser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.77-87.

- Lezzi, M. (1994), "Competetion- cooperation: a creative interplay of border regions economic development planning and transborder institutions" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.322-332.
- Martinez, O. (ed.) (1986), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso.
- Melamid, A. (1955), "Political boundaries and nomadic grazing", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp.287-90.
- Melamid, A. (1965), "The economic geography of neutral territories", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 45 pp.359-374.
- Meir, A. *et al* (1994), "Bedouin pastoral nomads and transborder grazing: the impact of the Israeli-Egyptian border" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.235-237.
- Military Survey (1987), *Arabian Peninsula Map 1:2,000,000*, Riyadh.
- Minghi, J. (1963), "Review article: boundary studies in political geography", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 53, pp.407-28.
- Minghi, J. (1991), "From conflict to harmony", in D. Rumley and J. Minghi (eds.), *The Geography of Border Landscape*, Routledge, London, pp.15-30.
- Mladek, J. and Simko, D. (1994), "Development of transborder cooperation between Bratislava and Vienna" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.219-223.
- Newman, D. (1994), "Demarcating a boundary of peace between Israel and the West Bank" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.171-181.
- Newman, D. (1999), "Into the Millennium: the study of international boundaries in an era of global technological change", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, IBRU, Vol.7, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp.63-71.
- Palomaki, M. (1994), "Transborder cooperation over Quarken strait between Finland and Sweden" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.238-246.
- Passi, A. (1999), "Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows" in D. Newman (ed.), *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*, Frank Cass, London, pp. 69-88.
- Pearcy, G. (1965), "Boundary functions", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 64, Part 8, pp.346-49.
- Pounds, N. (1972), *Political Geography*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Prescott, J. (1987), *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, Unwin Hyman Inc., London.
- Reeves, J. (1944), "International boundaries", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 38, pp.533-545.
- Robson, C. (1995), "Transboundary petroleum reservoirs: legal issues and solutions" in G. Blake *et al* (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp.3-21.
- Russell, I. (1903), "Geography and international boundaries", *Bulletin of American Geographical Society*, Vol.35, No.2, pp.147-59.
- Spykman, N. (1942), "Frontiers, security, and international organization", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32, pp.436-47.
- Stoddard, E. (1986), "Problem solving along the US-Mexico border: a United States view" in O. Martinez, *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp.57-79.
- Visher, S. (1932), "What sort of international boundary is best?", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol.31, October, pp.288-96.

- Wilkinson, J.(1991), *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., London.
- Zaidi, I. (1994), "On the forms of transborder cooperation between a landlocked state and neighbouring coastal state: the case of Pak-Afghan relationship" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.162-167.
- Zalad, K. (1994), "Border regions in West-Central Europe: common historical and cultural attitudes and centripetal effect of the Nation State" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.197-206.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Theoretical Studies on International Boundaries**

## 2.1 Introduction

Studies in political geography in general and those on international boundaries in particular are characterised by two distinct approaches. On one hand, there is the traditional trend, which is more concerned with practical rather theoretical aspects of politics. The (post)modern trend, on the other hand, is more interested in constructing theories and models about political phenomena which are suitable for generalisation and prediction (Prescott 1988; Newman and Passi 1998).

Many attempts have been made by scholars from different disciplines to produce theories and models to explain variously: territoriality, the behaviour of states, and human interactions across international boundaries. Such theories can be categorised as: theories about state territoriality, theories about boundary conflicts, and theoretical models of trans-boundary interaction. These three main areas are of great importance and are of course closely related to each other. Some of the most significant theories and models will be discussed below.

## 2.2 Theories on state territoriality

The link between the state and its territory is obvious because the state is generally regarded as a territorial organisation (Spykman 1942). However, what makes a territory so important to a state needs more exploration and analysis. Several scholars have tried to explain the significance of territory in different ways. Ratzel explained the state's territorial growth by two laws. The first is what he called the law of the evolution of boundaries which "can be defined as a striving towards simplification and in this simplification is contained a shortening of borders" (Prescott 1987, p.9). The second law is "the borders of the larger areas embrace the borders of the smaller one" (Prescott 1987, p.9). Later, the German Karl Haushofer adapted Ratzel's theory and added the two concepts of *cultural boundary* and *military boundary*. By the first concept of cultural boundary, Haushofer meant any territory that encompasses ethnically and culturally homogeneous people. He claimed, that this territory of homogeneous people needs a military boundary to extending beyond the cultural boundary to protect it from any attack or threat (Prescott 1987).

Unfortunately, these views led to disastrous consequences, for instance when the Nazis used these theories as a pretext to expand and occupy more territory, which precipitated the Second World War. Besides, these perspectives are deterministic in nature and do not take into account the role of human behaviour as an influential factor. More recent studies (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Forsberg 1995), however, suggest that the significance of territories to states lies in two other characteristics: the *intrinsic* value of the territory, and the *relational* value of the territory.

### 2.2.1 Intrinsic value of territory

Any territory possesses certain embedded characteristics that make it valuable. Those characteristics include natural resources, land productivity, and the population (Goertz and Diehl 1992). In respect to the first aspect, the availability of natural resources such as hydrocarbon resources, minerals and water resources, make states try vigorously, often violently, to gain control over territory that contains these resources. Oil resources in the Arabian Gulf region have made the region very important, not just to the Gulf's states but to the major industrial nations around the world as well. The hydrocarbon resources in the Arabian Gulf have been a catalyst for many affairs, including territorial disputes, that have taken place in the region over the past six decades. Some lands are important not just as a source of certain resources, but also as a market for industrial and agricultural production (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Some argue, however, that this economic value of territory is decreasing in the contemporary world of interdependent economies and free trade markets (Forsberg 1995).

The second aspect is land productivity, which concerns land fertility and how far it is suitable for agricultural production, and this in turn:

*“could greatly enhance the food production or export capacity of the state that rules it.”* (Goertz and Diehl 1992, p.16).

Moreover, land can provide not just food production, but also additional space for economic development in general.

Thirdly, a territory can be intrinsically important because of the people who live there. If the population is large, and the people are skilled and well educated, this may improve the ability of the state to manage its economy, defence and the like. A state will be the

weaker if its population is small, and the people are unskilled and poorly educated (Goertz and Diehl 1992). States may vary in their perceptions of the value of a territory, for a varied reasons and this is what is called the relational value of territories, which is discussed next.

### **2.2.2 Relational value of territory**

This aspect is more subjective than the concept of intrinsic value of territory discussed above. Different states may have different evaluations for the same territory, because a complex set of factors moulds these differences, such as religion, culture, ideology, geography, and history. Goertz and Diehl identified three groups of the relational significance of territory: the geographical location of territory, ethnic composition of a territory's population, and historical importance of territory (Goertz and Diehl 1992). A fourth type may be identified which is the psychological or emotional value of territory.

As to the first relational value, which concerns the geographical location of territory, the closer a territory is to a state's main land the more significant it lands to be especially in terms of security. Goertz gave the example of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the Communist regime in Afghanistan was threatened by the Afghan rebels. The Soviet response was swift and dramatic, Goertz argued. In contrast, the Soviets did not respond in the same way when the Marxist government in Chile was overthrown in 1973. Goertz maintained that a state is likely to be more eager to fight for a territory in close proximity than for a distant territory (Goertz and Diehl 1992).

The ethnic composition of a territory's population may encourage a bordering state, with the same ethnic group, to claim that territory and seek control over it. It goes without saying that too many boundaries in the world have divided ethnically homogeneous people between different states (Goertz and Diehl 1992). This situation was and still is a major source of conflict between states as will be shown below.

A state may also seek control over a territory because of its historical importance. A good example is Palestine, which has a great historical value to the Muslims and Jews beside its value as a homeland for its Arab people. The historical importance has been often used by states, as Alexander Murphy argued, as an argument to justify their claims of a territory although there may be underlying motives:

*“Government leaders rarely make speeches declaring that they are seeking to incorporate a neighbouring territory into their domain because there is a valuable bauxite deposit in the area or because the territory would provide better access to the sea or because the state is too small to compete effectively with its neighbour. Rather, the public discourse of territorial expansionism is essentially a call for restitution of that which was improperly taken away.”* (Murphy 1990, p.533).

Finally, the psychological value of territories and boundaries and how people perceive them is still of great importance today. Palestine, as mentioned above, is of great religious and cultural value not just to the Muslims and Jews live in Palestine but also to the Muslims and Jews all around the world. The two holy cities in Saudi Arabia, Makkah and Medinah, are also of great religious and cultural value to all Muslims. Another celebrated example is Australia where the land has great religious and emotional value to the aboriginal Australian people.

Territories and boundaries have been perceived in different ways by different groups of people. Although boundaries are losing some of their importance in parts of the world today, they are still perceived as an important symbol of nationalism as well as an important source of security from external threats. For local people they may be perceived as a source of anxiety and insecurity. Falah and Newman (1995) showed how Palestinians and Israelis perceived the boundary of their states in diasporas. The pre-state Zionists perceived that “such boundaries could territorially extend up to the biblical boundaries of a Greater Israel (*Eritz Ysrael*) from the Euphrates to the Nile...” (Falah and Newman 1995, p. 692). On the other hand the Palestinians’ perception of Palestine:

*“consists of the whole of Palestine, including all the area within which Palestinian villages were to be found prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and the exodus of Palestinians refugees”* (Falah and Newman 1995, p. 692).

They also pointed out how these perceptions changed after the establishment of the Israeli State and how they became related to security issues more than any thing else. Passi (1996) in his study to the Russo-Finnish border showed how after the Finns gained independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1920 they considered the boundary as an essential element in social integration of their country. Passi demonstrated how the Finns



perceived the task of the border area and how it was “interpreted as a crucial one: to stand as a ‘defensive wall’ against armed attack and spiritual plague” (Passi 1996, p.176). Interestingly enough, Passi demonstrated how the perception of the borders differed between the local people who live near the border, and those who live in different parts of the country. For instance, the people from western or southern Finland perceived the border zone as “a mysterious place” throughout the period of the existence of the Soviet Union (Passi 1996, p. 274). Whereas local people perceived it differently. One of them expressed the view that “we live in ‘Western Russia’” and another one said “I do not regard this boundary as a boundary between east and west...” (Passi 1996, p.274).

Miles (1998) showed how some archipelago people perceive their territory and gave an example of West Indies where the people there “do not view themselves as belonging to a territorial whole or unifying archipelago but rather to separate island nations and cultures...” (Miles 1998, p. 11).

In Arabia, despite the people sharing the same religion, language and culture they still perceive boundaries to be barriers. Abu-Daood (1984) revealed that 60% of the people he interviewed at the Saudi borders of different nationalities perceived the Saudi boundary as barrier to human movement. He pointed out that the most important factor which influenced the peoples’ attitude was difficulty at check-points (including visa acquisition, time of travel, and treatment at the check-point). He also cited other factors including distance between point of origin and the nearest boundary crossing-point, and frequency of travelling. Al-Ghamdi (1999) also studied peoples’ perception of the boundary at the Saudi-Yemeni border. For example, he found that 83% of the people crossing at Al-Khadra check-point felt that they had reached the Saudi border when they saw the road which is being used by Saudi Border Guards’ patrols. Only 17% recognised the border area when they saw the Al-Khadra check-point. On the Yemeni side, 50% of travellers recognised the border when they saw Abbassa Yemeni check-point, and about 70% recognised it when they saw Mount Al-Buq’a .


The previously mentioned values of territory have played a key role in causing many territorial and boundary disputes between states. Some of the major theories regarding boundary conflict are discussed below.

### 2.3 Theories on boundary conflict

Before discussing 'boundary conflict', it is worth considering some of the important general causes of conflict between states, and the likelihood of development into diplomatic or military conflict. Holsti (1995) pointed out that when there are parties (which are normally governments) seeking to achieve some or other objectives, taking incompatible positions over certain issues, holding hostile attitudes toward each other, and conducting diplomatic or military action, then conflict is likely to occur. This general statement requires explanation. A government may be involved in attempting to achieve specific objectives, such as gaining additional or more secure territory, control of valuable resources, access to markets, and unification with a neighbouring ethnic group. In its endeavour to achieve these objectives, a government may encounter the interests and objectives of another government. Then both parties may take incompatible positions over certain issues. At this point, any move by one party is explained by the other as at their expense, or what is called "a *zero-sum* situation: one's gain is the other's loss" (Holsti 1995, p. 328). Hostile attitudes, such as suspicion and distrust, may develop. Finally, one party takes an action, diplomatic or military, which results in conflict between the two sides. Figure 2.1 may illustrate this process more clearly.

Boundary conflict, in its broader sense, means that there are incompatible demands of two states regarding their boundary's location, its significance or regarding the value of the territory encompassed by the boundary (Tagil *et al* 1977), or they use the boundary to symbolise aggression. Several theories have been developed to explain these conflicts in terms of the 'causes' that generate them, and in terms of their 'genesis' or why they develop into diplomatic or military confrontations (Tagil *et al* 1977; Prescott 1987; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Huth 1996). Generally speaking, two main types of boundary conflict theory can be distinguished. First, there are theories concerned with conflicts between states where boundaries are used as a pretext and there are underlying motives other than the boundary itself. The second type comprises theories concerned with conflicts between actors where the boundary's location, significance or the value of the territory is the main cause of the conflict.

**Figure 2.1 Process of conflict development**



**Source:** Based on Holsti (1995).

It is often stated that boundaries may be used as a pretext by one state to engage in a conflict situation with its neighbours, and this takes place when political relations between two states deteriorate and they fail to reach a common understanding. The Iran-Iraq conflict over *Shatt el-Arab* is a good example of this situation. Longstanding animosity and rivalry between the two countries played a major role in this dispute (Prescott 1987).

A number of scholars have affirmed that a conflict or dispute between two neighbours may arise over the exact location of the boundary line that separates their territories. Prescott (1987) called them 'positional' disputes, pointing out that this type of dispute often arises "because of incomplete boundary evolution" (Prescott 1987, p.115). He added that most positional disputes arise during the demarcation process when the demarcation commission finds it difficult to match the definition of the borderline in the treaty text to the landscape. Jones (1943) also asserted that most of the serious cases of positional boundary disputes have been caused by "unintentional ambiguities in the description of boundaries in formal documents" (Jones 1943, p.99). In addition, Adler (1995) suggested some general principles to be followed in treaty making which might help avoiding conflicts between states, as will be discussed in Chapter four. Tagil (Tagil *et al* 1977) also mentioned that E. Luard studied boundary conflicts over a fifty year

period and found out that usually those conflicts took place where no demarcated boundary has existed.

Boundary functions may also be a source of conflict between neighbours. It should be stated here that the major function of international boundaries is to mark the limit of state sovereignty (Prescott 1987). Thus, 'functions' here refer to government practices at the boundary. Prescott suggested that disputes over state functions arise:

*“when one government believes that it has been adversely and unfairly affected by the functions of a neighbouring government along the boundary.”* (Prescott 1987, p.122).

This type of dispute is common, and can be easily resolved without any change in the boundary location (Prescott 1987). For example, in 1999 Georgian Customs officers refused to allow the duty-free importation of potatoes into Georgia from Armenia because the Armenian government decided to tax the import of Georgian citrus (IBRU Database 1999). Another example is trade dispute between Mexico and USA over tariffs imposed by both countries on certain goods such as citrus fruit from Arizona, California, and Florida, and over US embargo of tuna. However, the two sides reached an agreement in 1997, during President Bill Clinton's state visit to Mexico, to solve some of those pending problems (IBRU Database 1997).

Conflicts over the value of the territory seem to be more serious than the two previous types. Rivalry between states over strategic territories or over valuable resources are still influencing international politics today. Hence, more efforts have been made by scholars to understand those conflicts and predict their development into diplomatic or military conflicts. This type of conflict is more evident in three main areas. There are conflicts associated with international politics, conflicts associated with ethnic and religious factors, and conflicts associated with historical legacy. Each of these areas will be explored below in more detail.

### **2.3.1 Conflicts associated with international politics**

Two recent studies of conflicts (Goertz and Diehl 1992 and Huth 1996) attempted to draw generalisations based on empirical cases to explain territorial conflicts between states. First, Huth (1996) argued that the realist model, which explains international

conflicts as a result of clashing interests of states, and considers the military strength of states as “the critical determinant of their relative influence and power” (Huth 1996, p.15), is not enough to explain conflicts between states. This is because, according to Huth, this model does not take account of domestic political factors and their impact on foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Huth proposed a model which: •

*“incorporates in a coherent and generalizable way the impact of both domestic and international level variables on the foreign policy decisions.”* (Huth 1996, p. 16).

To apply his model, he studied 129 cases of territorial conflicts from 1950-1990 and used statistical measures to test his results. The major finding of his study was that, regarding the issues at stake, there is a high tendency for states to become involved themselves in disputes over strategically located territory. Yet, this issue accounted for about 20% of the territorial dispute cases he investigated. He found also that there is a high probability of a state's involvement in a dispute over the economic value of territory and over the ethnic and cultural association between the population of the challenger and the claimed territory. Huth discovered that the military strength of the challenger was a poor predictor of whether a state would become involved in a dispute, which the realist model regards as a major factor.

Regarding domestic factors, Huth suggested that domestic politics played a major role in many cases of dispute he studied. For example, the decision to contest a territory could be linked to:

*“political benefits of increased popular support and legitimacy when claims were directed to achieving national unification, the recovery of lost national territory or gaining access to valuable economic resources.”* (Huth 1996, p.183).

Goertz and Diehl (1992) studied territorial conflicts at two levels. First they studied state formation, and attempted to explain how conflicts arise at this level, and secondly, conflicts between two or more established states, which is of greater concern here. They criticised the realist model and proposed another model for explaining conflicts between states. They examined 160 cases of exchanges of homeland territories between states for two periods, before 1914 and after 1914. They statistically tested the relationship between the outbreak of military conflict and three main sets of variables, which are the relative

capabilities of states (i.e. the ratio of iron/steel production and energy consumption), the relative importance of territory (the size of contested territory), and the expansionist pressures within states (population growth, economic growth, and prior territorial expansion). They discovered that for many conflicts which occurred before 1914, the relative capabilities of states (the ratio of their iron/steel production and energy consumption), and the expansionist pressures (here population size and economic growth) played a major role in the outbreak of conflicts between states during this era. In the post-1914 period, however, they found that two factors are significant in causing conflicts: the expansionist pressure (here population pressure and prior territorial expansion), and the importance of territorial size.

From the previous two studies, we can summarise the most important factors that may influence states to dispute territory. First, *strategic location* of the contested territory. States are still concerned about their national security, therefore the more important a territory is from the strategic point of view the more likely a state will be involved in a dispute or conflict with its neighbour over that territory. For example, Iran's occupation of the *Tumbs* and *Abu-Musa* islands in 1971 was allegedly for purposes of national security.

Second, disputes can occur when *valuable resources* are available in the contested territory, such as hydrocarbons, water, and fisheries. These resources have played a prominent role in many current disputes. For instance, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the *Fasht Abu-Safah* hexagon (settled in 1958). The Hawar Islands dispute between Bahrain and Qatar is another example of dispute over what is sometime believe to be economically valuable seabed (Anderson 1993). Third, *domestic factors* within a state, such as seeking internal political support, play an important role, especially when there is a prior dispute over a specific territory or when the challenger has lost territory to another party. Several disputes that have arisen in South America, as Huth (1996) concluded, support this argument. The territorial disputes between Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Bolivia and Chile are prime examples. All had a prolonged period of dispute inspired in part by domestic politics:

*“The failure to maintain a claim to territory would have been portrayed by political opposition as a major foreign policy setback for the current regime in power.”*  
(Huth 1992, p.95).

As to the loss of territory by a challenger state, a good example is Argentina's dispute with Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982. Island disputes often serve as symbolic of national or regional rivalries. Conflicts may arise not just from the above factors but from other factors, such as the ethnic and religious compositions of the population of the claimed territory and their link to the population of the challenger state.

### **2.3.2 Conflicts associated with ethnic and religious factors**

Hartshorne's classification of boundaries (Hartshorne 1936) into *antecedent*, *subsequent*, and *superimposed* boundaries, represents a good framework to explain territorial conflicts that relate to ethnic and religious divisions of a population. With a *superimposed* boundary, the boundary line is laid down on an existing population and divides them between two political entities. In this case, conflicts may arise between the two neighbouring states over the territory that encompasses such a population. In fact, since the Second World War, most international boundaries have been created “in spite of ethnic distributions” (Pounds 1972, p.96). Some scholars suggested that as a solution to boundary disputes involving ethnic groups, states should co-operate and reduce the significance of their boundaries (Tagil *et al* 1977, p. 166).

In the world today, many examples can be found of disputes involving ethnic factors. Most states south the Sahara in Africa, although freed from colonial rule, had their boundaries laid down by imperial powers without precise knowledge of the geographical and cultural features of those areas. Consequently, once the imperial powers had withdrawn from the area conflicts arose, even though the African Heads of States had declared their willingness to accept the boundaries and territories they had inherited at the time of independence (Griffiths 1995). One of many examples is the Horn of Africa (Allcock *et al* 1992). Irredentist movements represent a good example of ethnic conflicts, when a group of people “trying to unite under one flag all districts where any particular language is spoken” (Griffiths 1995, p.136). Somalia is a clear example of this

movement. Conflicts associated with religion also exacerbate many territorial struggles today as in Kashmir, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland (Anderson 1993).

### **2.3.3 Conflicts associated with historical legacy**

In some parts of the world, colonial powers have withdrawn leaving behind boundaries in areas amply endowed with natural resources. The former neutral zones between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait represent a good example. Both zones were created between the Saudi government and the British government on behalf of the Iraqis and Kuwaitis in 1922. As to the former neutral zone with Iraq, a diamond shaped area was created between the two sides. The Uqair Convention stated that the two parties will enjoy equal rights in that area for all purposes except using water resources for military purposes (Melamid 1955). After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, “the question of the delimitation of the neutral zone remained a potential source of dispute between the two states” (Allcock *et al* 1992, p. 392). Later, in December 1981, the two governments signed an agreement in Baghdad, defining and fixing the boundary line, and at the same time providing for the equal division of the neutral zone (Allcock *et al* 1992) following a 1975 treaty to partition the neutral zone.

The second neutral zone, between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was also created in 1922 by the Uqair Convention. This zone remained neutral for a period shorter than the first one due to reports of oil discoveries in Khor Maqtah. This led the two sides to agree in 1965 to partition the zone equally. Each state’s sovereignty was divided by an international boundary over land territory only, while natural resources discovered in the land territory of the former neutral zone were shared equally. In July 2000, the two sides agreed to settle the disputed offshore territory of the former neutral zone. The previous two example shows how these inherited boundaries were settled peacefully between the two sides and, in fact, they may represent a model for solving disputes over territories with similar characteristics: territories rich in natural resources and a scarce population.

One of the prime objectives of studying border conflicts is to explore the best practice for resolving them peacefully. Scholars have therefore made almost as much effort to understand the nature of peaceful interaction between neighbouring countries. Anything which might enhance co-operation between adjacent countries may help prevent potential



conflicts or resolve existing ones. In the following section, some theoretical models about interactions between states are discussed, with particular focus on what they have to tell us (if anything) about management objectives.

## **2.4 Theoretical models of trans-boundary interaction**


Trans-boundary interaction is affected by various factors: geographical, political, social, economic, and even psychological. The interaction also may take place at different scales such as national government, local government, and individuals. Different types of interaction have been studied by scholars to produce generalisations, but arguably the three most prominent studies undertaken are: House's study of cross-frontier interaction (1982), Soffer's study of interaction in hostile areas (1994), and Martinez's study of the dynamics of the border interaction (1994). Each is examined below.

### **2.4.1 House's model**

In an effort to explain cross-frontier interaction, John House produced an operational model derived from approaches in international relations studies such as conflict in power interaction, social communication, and systems analysis and linkages (House 1981, 1982). The model is empirical in nature and House attempted to apply it on the US-Mexican border on the Rio Grande. This border is a unique case study of great economic and social gradients across the border.

The main aim of this model is to understand how asymmetrical relationships between two neighbouring countries affect all forms of interaction across the international boundary. Therefore, this model is based on a thorough analysis of a wide range of transactional flows of people, goods, services, capital, ideas, and policies across the Rio Grande. These flows are aggregated and integrated in terms of structure, space, and time. At the same time, House used a framework of perceptions, attitudes, policies and politics to interpret the resulting flow patterns. Figure 2.2a illustrates the structural and temporal dimensions of the model. The model starts with the evolution of the US-Mexican boundary during different periods and how this evolution affected the characteristics of

Figure 2.2: House's model



a): Structure

b): Spatial

Source: House (1982).

the land, people and economy. The differences in perceptions and attitudes of the three major ethnic groups of people (Americans, Mexicans, Mexican-Americans or Chicanos) who live on both sides of the border have been analysed. As House maintained, these differences:

*“affect the ways people think, act, identify with or against one another, and provide the ground swell of continuity which politicians and policy-makers must take into account.”* (House 1982, p.11).

The major patterns of transaction flows are thoroughly discussed, such as water management of the Rio Grande in terms of water allocation and pollution control. Moreover, migration of people whether they are daily, weekly or seasonally and whether they are legal or illegal have also been analysed. In his discussion of each pattern, House explained how government policies and plans on each side of the border affected the resulting patterns of transaction flows. He argued that all these transactions and policies must be set within the political system of each country at all scales: federal, state and local. The total interactions between all the elements of the model can be set within a form of tension management which can have two behavioural results, conflict or co-operation between the two countries involved. This result in turn has spatial and structural impacts that may feed back into each element of the model as figure 2.2a clearly illustrates.

The spatial dimension of this model, as shown in figure 2.2b, demonstrates the spatial interaction of all the elements of the model at three levels: national or federal (A, B), regional or provincial (Ai, Bi), and frontier or local (Az, Bz). For example, House analysed the trade patterns first at the national level, then at the regional and local levels (House 1982, pp. 199-208).

House's ingenious model, however, has a limited application to our study of the Saudi boundary management for three obvious reasons. First, the model is based on the principle of asymmetry between two adjacent states as House stated himself (House 1981, p. 296; 1982, pp.8-9). This asymmetry is reflected in different fields: political, economic, social and cultural, whereas the Saudi-GCC relationships, despite some differences, share a high degree of symmetry. Second, the model is based on a frontier

with a high-density population on either side, but the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours are characterised by a low-density population. Finally, this model is more comprehensive in nature taking into account all transactional flows at all the scales of federal (national), regional (provincial), and local (frontier), while this study is mainly concerned about the forms of management practices that take place at the boundary line itself.

#### **2.4.2 Soffer's model**


In his paper, Soffer (1994) has examined the connections along the border between adjacent states with a history of conflict between them. He used House's model as a tool for examination, but he did not follow him in including all aspects of transaction flows for there was insufficient data about those flows for his study area on the Israel-Lebanon border. However, he selected the Israeli *de facto* border with Lebanon including the then Israeli-occupied 'Security Zone', as the focus of his study. He also briefly examined the Israeli *de facto* borders with Jordan and Syria. Soffer discussed the interaction of people, trade, the use of infrastructure, and the government contacts across the border. The main concept in his model is:

*"Where there is a minority living on both sides of the border, ties should be expected even if the border is sealed and hostile."* (Soffer 1994, p.188).

By this concept, he challenged Minghi (1991) who stated that interaction does not exist along boundaries under threat of conflict or under stress of confrontation (Soffer 1994). Soffer also explained that the connection along the hostile border is mainly based on family ties and local trade. Moreover, he maintained that governments on both sides may establish connections between them even if the situation at the border was violent, and eventually this will prepare the ground for peace. He concluded in his paper that there is:

*"a correlation between the strength of the transborder connections and the size of the minority population which lives on both sides of the border."* (Soffer 1994, p.190).

Figure 2.3: Soffer's model



Source: Soffer (1994).

As figure 2.3 (a,b) illustrates, the interaction at the border with Syria within the occupied Golan Heights as well as with Lebanon is limited because the size of the Golan Druze minority group and the size of the Lebanese minority groups (i.e. Christians, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze) are relatively small on both sides. At the border with Jordan, Soffer claimed that the connection there is greater because the size of minority groups, which includes 1.5 million Palestinians on the West Bank and 1.5 million Palestinians on the East Bank, is bigger (see figure 2.3c). Finally, Soffer also maintained that if a Palestinian state is established in future, the connection between the Palestinians on the Israeli side, which he estimated as one million, and the Palestinians in the future state, which he estimated as one and a half million, would be greater than the previous three cases (see figure 2.3d).


Soffer's model is difficult to apply to the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours for it is based on hostile relations between the two neighbours, with substantial minorities on either side, which is not the case here.

### 2.4.3 Martinez's model


Martinez (1994) argued that environmental and human conditions existing on both sides of the border of any state either promote or inhibit cross-border ties. Based on this premise, Martinez categorised borderland interactions into four progressive scenarios: alienated borderlands, coexistent borderlands, interdependent borderlands, and integrated borderlands (see figure 2.4). In the first scenario, *alienated* borderlands, the general conditions of both neighbouring states are characterised, among other things, by political disputes, ideological animosity, intense nationalism or even warfare, and thus this tense atmosphere leads both countries to "militarisation and the establishment of rigid controls over cross-border traffic." (Martinez 1994, p.2). The outcome of this condition makes cross-border interactions of people and goods very difficult (see figure 2.4a). As an example, Martinez mentioned the US-Mexico border during the nineteenth century.

In the second scenario, *co-existent* borderlands, the two antagonist neighbours reduce the tension between them to a degree that allows a minimum level of border interaction to take place (see figure 2.4b). Domestic conditions, such as regional fragmentation, may


**Figure 2.4: Martinez's model**




**a) Alienated borderlands**



**b) Co-existent borderlands**




**c) Interdependent borderlands**



**d) Integrated borderlands**

Source: Martinez (1994).



**e) Eliminated borderlands**

also limit the cross-border interactions. In this situation, Martinez maintained, a state will be involved in a unification process for all its territory, thus it will not encourage substantive interactions at the border to occur until the unification process is completed. He gave examples of this borderland model as Ecuador-Peru, and the former USSR-China. Both cases significantly reached peace agreements in recent time Ecuador-Peru in 1998 and China-Russia in 1999.

In the third scenario, the *interdependent* borderlands, the two states maintain good and stable relationships to a degree that the economies of their respective borderlands are 'symbiotically' linked (see figure 2.4c). In this situation the two states will allow more interactions and flow of people, capital, and goods across their borders and:

*"the greater the flow of economic and human resources across the border, the more the two economies will be structurally bonded to each other."* (Martinez 1994, p.4).

The ideal situation is when the two states are symmetrical in their social, political, and economic systems, so they both get equal benefits from each other. US-Mexico borderland perhaps represents a good example of this model.

In the fourth scenario, the *integrated* borderlands, the two neighbouring countries:

*"eliminate all major political differences between them and existing barriers to trade and human movement across their mutual boundaries."* (Martinez 1994, p.5).

Cross-border interaction increases and the two economies become integrated. This stage cannot be reached, as stressed by Martinez, until both states willingly relinquish a significant degree of their sovereignty (see figure 2.4d). Martinez pointed out that for lack of data it is difficult to give a good example of this model, but he suggested that Western Europe is most likely to represent such a situation.

A fifth scenario may be proposed, which Martinez did not mention, which is the *eliminated* border. At this stage, two or more neighbouring countries find themselves sharing common objectives, cultures, and national aspirations and decide to join together in a form of political unity. Therefore, they diminish their common international boundaries and the two states become one political unit (see figure 2.4e). Of course, new



borderlands may emerge at the fringes of this new state with its neighbours. Arguably some states in the European Union are heading in this direction.

Other authors have similarly identified progression from closed to integrated borderlands, although their terminology differs from Martinez, including Momoh (1989), Suarez-Villa *et al* (1992), and Goonerate and Mosselman (1996). All share the view that it is most desirable to achieve integrated borderlands (see table 2.1), and the assumption is made that management is primarily designed to move boundaries towards this status (Hocknell 1998). Beyond this, no theories appear to have been formulated concerning boundary management. This is primarily because this subject is new and unexplored, and requires more empirical study in order to make some generalisations about management practices. This study is a step along this long road.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Although conflicts may arise between neighbouring states for a variety of reasons, there is still a great opportunity for co-operation between countries, provided good will is existed, and the interactions across international boundaries represent not just a good example but a desirable one. Martinez's model is probably the most useful in relations to boundary management. It suggests that there is a clear connection between each of the four scenarios he proposed and the most important management activities discussed in this thesis (see table 2.2).

An interesting question is how far the requirements of good management can be used to bring states from the alienated borderland scenario to the integrated borderland scenario. Most boundaries seem to be making the journey slowly and painfully from one to the other, and the more they progress the more the management tasks will multiply.

Table 2.1: 'Borderlands' and 'border regions': a comparison of conceptual frameworks based on an integration continuum

Integration Continuum	Borderlands	Borderlands	Barrier networks in border regions - Suarez-Villa	Border regions
<i>Non-Integration</i>	<p><i>alienated</i></p> <p>Martinez Tension; border functionally closed; interaction totally or nearly absent.</p> <p><i>co-existent</i></p> <p>Stability 'on/off'; border slightly open, limited binational interaction; borderlanders develop relationships.</p> <p><i>inter-dependent</i></p> <p>Stability prevails; socio-economic complementarity prompts increased cross-border interaction; borderlanders carry on cooperative relationships.</p> <p><i>integrated</i></p> <p>Stability; functionally merged economies; unrestricted movement of people and goods; common social system perceived.</p>	<p><i>zero borderland</i></p> <p>Momoh Borderland coterminous with boundary, but sides' ideologically or religiously opposed.</p> <p><i>minimum borderland</i></p> <p>No cultural or ethnic affinity, and borderland space is minimal.</p> <p><i>maximum borderland</i></p> <p>Citizens on both sides have ancestral ethnic and linguistic affinities and links spanning millennia.</p>	<p><i>isolated</i></p> <p>Total boundary closure, although informal linkages may exist.</p> <p><i>inter-connected</i></p> <p>'gateway node' exists, functional advantage of which in any border region is inversely related to number and size of 'competing boundary nodes'.</p> <p><i>jointly controlled</i></p> <p>The network need not be official, but merely functional. Contiguity diseconomies are greatly reduced.</p>	<p>Goonerate and Mossleman</p> <p><i>resource based</i></p> <p>Presence of a key resource necessitates cooperative exploitation and management.</p> <p><i>active</i></p> <p>Economically and socially integrated, offering a 'high potential' for coordinated regional development.</p> <p><i>development</i></p> <p>Combination of 'active and 'resource based'; linkages and complementarities strengthened.</p>
<i>Complete Integration</i>				

Source: Hocknell (1998, p. 56).

**Table 2.2: The connection between Martinez’s model and management activities**

<b>Management Tasks</b>	<b>Alienated</b>	<b>Co-existed</b>	<b>Interdependent</b>	<b>Integrated</b>	<b>Eliminated</b>
<b>Political and legal management</b>	×	✓	✓	✓	×
<b>Access for people and goods</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
<b>Security management</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
<b>Resources management*</b>	×	×	✓	✓	×
<b>Environment management*</b>	×	×	✓	✓	×
<b>Crisis management*</b>	×	×	×	✓	×

\* Not studied in this thesis.

Source: The author.

## References

- Abu-Dawood, A. (1984), *Political Boundaries of Saudi Arabia: Their Evolution and Functions*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, U.S.A.
- Adler, R. (1995), *Positioning and Mapping International Boundaries*, Boundary and Territory Briefing, Vol. 2 No. 1, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, Durham.
- Al-Ghamdi, A. (1999), *The Case of Saudi Arabia-Yemen Boundary: Towards Settlement*, (Arabic), Almadinah Almonawarah Company for Printing and Publishing, Jeddah.
- Allcock, J. *et al* (1992), *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Longman Current Affairs, Harlow, England.
- Anderson, E. (1993), *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crisis*, Pinter Reference, London.
- Forsberg, T. (1995), "Theories on territorial disputes" in T. Forsberg (ed.), *Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Union*, Edward Elgar, Hants, England, pp.23-41.
- Goertz, G. and Diehl, P. (1992), *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, Routledge, London.
- Goonerate, W. and Mossleman, E.E. (1996), "Planing across borders: border regions in Eastern and Southern Africa", *Regional Development Dialogue*, Vol. 17, No.2, Autumn, pp. 136-155.
- Griffiths, I. (1995), *The African Inheritance*, Routledge, London.
- Hartshorne, R. (1936), "Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries", abstract, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 26, (March), pp.56-57.
- Hartshorne, R. (1937), "A survey of the boundary problems of Europe", in C. C. Colby (ed.), *Geographic Aspects of International Relations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.163-181.
- Hocknell, P. (1998), *Post-partition Management of Transboundary Resources: The Case of Cyprus*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, Durham.

- Holsti, K. (1995), *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- House, J. (1981), "Frontier studies: an applied approach" in A. Burnett and P. Taylor (eds.), *Political Studies From Spatial Perspectives*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp.291-312.
- House, J. (1982), *Frontier on the Rio Grande: A Political Geography of Development and Social Deprivation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Huth, P. (1996), *Standing your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflicts*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
- IBRU Database (1997), "08/06/1997, Mexico-United States: Clinton-Zedillo Summit", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>
- IBRU Database (1999), "04/03/1999, Armenia-Georgia: Trade Dispute", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>
- Jones, S. (1943), "The description of international boundaries", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 33, no. 2, pp.99-117.
- Martinez, O. (1994), "the dynamics of border interaction: new approaches to border analysis" in C. Schofield (ed.), *Global Boundaries: World Boundaries*, Vol.1, Routledge, London, pp.1-15.
- Melamid, A. (1955), "Political boundaries and nomadic grazing", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 287-90.
- Miles, W. (1998), *Bridging Mental Boundaries in a Postcolonial Microcosm: Identity Development in Vanuatu*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Minghi, J. (1991), "From conflict to harmony", in D. Rumley and J. Minghi (eds.), *The Geography of Border Landscape*, Routledge, London, pp.15-30.
- Momoh, C.S. (1989), "A critique of borderland theories", in A. I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi (eds.) *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa*, University of Lagos Press, Nigeria, pp. 51-61.

- Murphy, A. (1990), "Historical justifications for territorial claims", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 531-548.
- Newman, D. and Passi, A. (1998), "Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 186-207.
- Passi, A. (1996), *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
- Pounds, N. (1972), *Political Geography*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Prescott, J. (1987), *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- Prescott, J. (1988), "Political geography", *Australian Geographical Studies*, Vol. 26, no. 1, April, pp. 149-156.
- Suarez-Villa, L. *et al* (1992), "Territorial and border barriers in information and communication networks: a conceptual exploration", *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 93-104.
- Soffer, A. (1994), "Forms of coexistence and transborder cooperation in a hostile area: the Israeli case" in W. Galluser *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.182-191.
- Spykman, J. (1942), "Frontiers, security, and international organization", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32, pp. 436-47.
- Tagil, S. *et al* (1977), *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework*, Esselte Studium, Stockholm.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Geographical Setting and Historical Background**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter identifies first the significant geographical features of eastern Saudi Arabia, such as climate, topography and population. Such factors are of fundamental importance to boundary definition and management. Then the chapter examines the major historical events of the earlier decades of the twentieth century that are pertinent to the shaping of the present Saudi state and its boundaries with its GCC neighbours.

Saudi Arabia is a vast country with an approximate area of 2.5 million square kilometres (772,200 square miles), which represents about 80% of the total area of the Arabian Peninsula. At its furthest extents, the country lies between the latitudes 32° N and 18° N, and between the longitudes 35° E and 55° E (approximately 1800 km (1100 miles) North-South; and 2100 km (1300 miles) East-West). In terms of climate, the Kingdom is located within the tropical dry region, as can be seen in figure 3.1, the Tropic of Cancer (23.5° N) passes approximately through the middle of the country. Indeed this location has a conspicuous effect on climate, soil and vegetation.


On the other hand, the relative location of Saudi Arabia has given it a great importance in the past as well as at present. The Arabian Gulf to the East was important in the past as it is today, for it was a main route for trade from India to the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey. Today, of course, its importance mainly lies in the hydrocarbon resources embedded on the two sides of the Gulf. The Red Sea to the West was, and still serves as, a main route for international trade via the Suez Canal. This location has affected the political, economic and social positions of Saudi Arabia for over 60 years from its creation in 1932 until present.

### **3.2 Geographical setting**

As mentioned above geographical features have a prominent impact on land boundary definition process as well as their management. Classic boundary experts, such as Holdich (see Chapter 2), preferred boundaries that follow physical features such as mountains and rivers. This view seems to have been agreed by the British Commissioners in the Arabian Gulf area who were responsible for drawing most of its boundaries in the



Figure 3.1: Saudi Arabia's boundaries and major cities



Source: Farsi (no date).

early twentieth century. However, the only boundary that can be regarded as a *natural* boundary is that section between Iraq and Kuwait which follows *Wadi Al-Batin* bed (see figure 3.5). Another shorter boundary section which is the western sector of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary which follows a shallow depression called *Al-Shaq*. The Iraq-Saudi boundary line, although it does not follow physical features like wadis or mountains, was defined as straight lines linking some prominent physical features such as wadis and rocky hills (Schofield 1994,p. 16). Most other boundaries in Arabia are in fact artificial, and due largely to the topographic character of the region which mainly consists of sand dunes and low lands.


It is not just topography that affects boundary making but also climate, population and settlement can have a clear impact on boundaries, as will be shown in more details below.

### **3.2.1 Climate**

The location of Saudi Arabia on the Tropic of Cancer has sharply affected its climatic conditions, which is generally characterised as a hot and dry climate. An examination of temperatures in some selected cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia (see figure 3.2a), shows that the average maximum temperature during the summer (from May-August) exceeds 40°C in Hafar Albatin, Dhahran and Al Hasa. The temperature in Dhahran tends to be lower than in the other two cities due to maritime effects.


During winter (December-March), the average maximum temperature in the three cities ranges between 19°C and 27°C. The lowest temperature is in Hafar Albatin which is 19° C, because it lies at a higher latitude than the other two cities, besides its inland location and distance from maritime effects (see figure 3.1). Comparison of these temperature patterns with the temperature patterns in some selected GCC cities (see figure 3.2b), shows that almost the same pattern prevails in Kuwait City, Manama, Abu Dhabi and Al-Ain, except in Manama where the average maximum temperature during the summer is below 40°C. This can be attributed to maritime effects, for Bahrain is an island and its total area is very small (about 700 square km = 270 square mile.).

Figure 3.2: Temperature in selected Saudi and GCC cities



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Planning, *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.  
 The Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, *Annual Statistical Abstract 1998*.  
 Bahrain Central Statistics Organisation, *Statistical Abstract 1991*.  
 Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Department of Planning, *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.

**Figure 3.3: Rainfall in selected Saudi and GCC cities**



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Planning, *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.  
 The Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, *Annual Statistical Abstract 1998*.  
 Bahrain Central Statistics Organisation, *Statistical Abstract 1991*.  
 Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Department of Planning, *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.

This overall pattern of temperature has its effects on human activities in the Gulf area. For example, it has affected agricultural activity in terms of types of crops suitable for cultivation. Historically, dates have been the most suitable crop. However, developments in agricultural technology have made it possible to overcome climate constraints and plant a number of other crops such as vegetables, some grains, and fodder, especially in Saudi Arabia.

In respect to rainfall, the eastern part of Saudi Arabia receives much of its rain from January to April. This can be attributed to the effect of a Mediterranean regime of rains, which prevails during the winter and affects most of the northern and eastern parts of Saudi Arabia (Bindagji 1981). The amount of rain can reach as high as 53 mm in Hafar Albatin in April (see figure 3.3a). Scattered rainfall in November and December in Hafar Albatin does not exceed 24 mm. However, the rainfall pattern is not constant every year, and periods of drought occur from time to time (Bindagji 1981). The rainfall pattern in the selected GCC cities is almost the same with a few exceptions (see figure 3.3b). Most of the rainfall occurs from January to March, and the amount reaches as high as almost 80 mm in Al-Ain city in U.A.E in April. In the same city, little rain falls between June and August, not exceeding 12 mm. The average annual rainfall in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia is about 85 mm in Dhahran and about 105 mm in the interior parts of the eastern Saudi Arabia (Bindagji 1981). The average annual rainfall in Kuwait is about 130 mm, in Bahrain about 22 mm and in U.A.E is about 70 mm (KMP 1998; BCSO 1991; ADP 1996).

A result of this pattern of rainfall is that there are no permanent surface streams in any GCC country, which impacts significantly on water resources. Demand for water for all purposes are met from two main sources: underground water and desalinated seawater. Another effect of this pattern is on grazing activities in the area. Bedouin have long depended on rain for pasturing their livestock, moving their flocks considerable distances to where there is grazing. Thus, several arrangements between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E have been undertaken to regulate the movements of Bedouin across the international boundaries. The Oman-Saudi 1990 treaty was regarded as somewhat of a landmark for the way in which boundary movement for watering and pasturage were facilitated (The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990). Accordingly, following the

rainy season when there is plenty of natural grass in Saudi Arabia, Bedouin from Kuwait, Oman and the U.A.E. are allowed to cross the border to pasture their animals. Specific check-points have been designated for this purpose, as shown in Chapter seven.

Moreover, as a result of this pattern of rains, ephemeral flows of wadis became a feature of this arid region. Thus, any constructions of dams on those wadis, especially if they are near the borders, could have a great effect on ground water aquifers which straddle the boundary between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, and on surface water resources further downstream.

### **3.2.2 Topography**


The western littoral of the Arabian Gulf is generally low altitude land: 0-300 metres (see figure 3.4). The relief consists mainly of sand dunes, such as *Al-Jafurah*, which lies west of Salwa, and some marsh lands such as *Sabkhat Matti* which lies east of the northern sector of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary. Security management at the border is powerfully influenced by topography. As interviews revealed with some Saudi Border Guards officials, they regarded sand dunes as a negative factor that affecting their patrols and operations along the borders (see Chapter 7 for more details).

### **3.2.3 Population and settlement**

Although the population of Saudi Arabia is dispersed, a large proportion is concentrated in the main urban centres such as Riyadh, the capital, Jeddah and Makkah in the western part, and Dammam in the eastern region (see table 3.1). The total population of Saudi Arabia estimated at the last census in September 1992 was about 16,900,000 people, of whom about 4,600,000 (27%) are non-Saudi (see table 3.1). The population of the eastern part of Saudi Arabia is estimated at about 2,600,000 people, 15% of the total population in 1992, which ranked third among the provinces. Most of them are concentrated in the northern part of the eastern province, north of Salwa Gulf (see figure 3.1).

The following border cities rank amongst the highest in terms of population ( $\geq 100,000$ ): Dammam (19%) of eastern province population, Al-Khubar (6%), Hafar Albatin (5%), as shown in table 3.2. The remaining Saudi border towns and cities have populations smaller than 100,000. Those cities are as follows from the north at the border

Figure 3.4: Topographic map for eastern Saudi Arabia



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals Resources (1972).

with Kuwait to the south near the border with U.A.E.: Al-Rigai, Alkhafji, Dhahran, and Salwa (see figure 3.1 and table 3.2). These figures indicate that although the border areas tend to be less populated, especially the border with the U.A.E., the border cities with Bahrain are the most populous, the major cities Dammam and Al-Khubar having populations greater than 100,000.

**Table 3.1: Population in Saudi Arabia's main provinces in 1992**

Provinces	Saudi	Non-Saudi	Total
<b>Makkah</b>	2,780,458	1,683,676	<b>4,464,134</b>
<b>Riyadh</b>	2,613,228	1,217,694	<b>3,830,922</b>
<b>Eastern</b>	1,898,462	670,094	<b>2,568,556</b>
<b>Other Provinces</b>	5,013,743	1,053,270	<b>6,067,013</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,305,891</b>	<b>4,624,734</b>	<b>16,930,625</b>

*Source: The Saudi Ministry of finance and National Economy, The Preliminary Results of Population Census in 1992.*

**Table 3.2: Border cities and towns in the eastern province in 1992**

City	Saudi	Non-Saudi	Total
<b>Dammam</b>	303,535	178,786	<b>482,321</b>
<b>Al-Khubar</b>	55,838	85,845	<b>141,683</b>
<b>Hafar Albatin</b>	102,539	35,254	<b>137,793</b>
<b>Dhahran</b>	52,523	21,168	<b>73,691</b>
<b>Alkhafji</b>	40,872	8,857	<b>49,729</b>
<b>Salwa</b>	3,334	903	<b>4,237</b>
<b>Al-riqai</b>	2,480	254	<b>2,734</b>

*Source: The Saudi Ministry of finance and National Economy, The Preliminary Results of Population Census in 1992.*

Dammam alone has a population of about half a million, most of them Saudi nationals. This is because Dammam is the capital of the Eastern Province, and most businesses and services are concentrated there. Together, the population of Dammam, Al-Khubar and



Dhahran totals approximately 700,000, which represents about 27% of the population of the Eastern Province.

### 3.3 Historical background

From the ninth century through to the middle of the eighteenth century, the Arabian Peninsula was politically unstable. Despite the fact that the Ottomans were able to gain control over the western and eastern fringes of the Peninsula from the fifteenth century onwards (Goldberg 1986), the inner part of the Peninsula, which is *Najd*, was largely autonomous except from some nominal allegiance to the Ottomans from time to time (Leatherdale 1983). During the early eighteenth century, the general situation in *Najd* was characterised by a disintegrated tribalism, hostility and antagonism prevailing in the relationships between tribes. Moreover, poverty, illiteracy and superstition determined and dominated the lives that people led, not just in *Najd*, but throughout most of Arabia (Bindagji 1981). In a small town in *Najd* called Uyainah, a man called Shaikh Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab (1703-92), a religious reformer, was resentful to the situation and started to preach to his people the teachings of Islam as revealed from its original sources, such as the Koran and the Hadith. In the beginning, his townspeople confronted him with displeasure, and in 1745 he was compelled to leave the town and headed to Dariyah, south of Uyainah (see figure 3.1), where its emir Mohammed Bin Saud welcomed him and offered him hospitality. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab was able to convince Mohammed Bin Saud about his mission, and the latter made a covenant with the Shaikh to support him and to carry out his mission. This alliance between the two men marked the creation of the first Saudi state in 1745 (Al-Othaimen 1995). This new state started to expand gradually, and by the end of eighteenth century, it was able to control almost all Arabia, and for the first time for centuries, the Arabian Peninsula was again under one central authority.

The Ottomans were unhappy about the Saudi control and saw it as a threat to their empire, especially when this control extended beyond central Arabia and reached territories under their control such as Iraq, Syria and Hijaz. Therefore, they started to fight against it, and :

*“Accordingly, Sultan Mahmud II requested Muhammed Ali, the newly rising viceroy of Egypt, to undertake the expulsion of the Wahhabi invaders from Hejaz. The first expedition left Egypt for Arabia in 1811 under the command of Tuson, Muhammed Ali’s son. In October 1812 the Egyptian force astonished the Wahhabis by conquering Medina and killing more than 1500 people. Three months later, Mecca, Jidda, and Taif were also recovered...”* (Goldberg 1986, p.14).

The Ottomans continued their efforts to demolish the Saudi state and in 1818, Ibrahim Pasha, another son of Mohammed Ali, reached Dariya and after a six-month siege he destroyed it completely using artillery. At the same time, he captured Abdullah Bin Saud, the Saudi leader and a grand son of Mohammed Bin Saud, and sent him to Constantinople where he was beheaded (Goldberg 1986). The fall of Dariyah marked the end of the first Saudi state.

Six years later, in 1828 Abdullah’s cousin Turki Bin Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud (see Appendix XVI) regained control over Najd, and his son Faisal succeeded him after a few confrontations with Mohammed Ali. By 1843 he had gained control over most of the peninsula. After Faisal’s death in 1865, his son Abdullah succeeded him. However, Abdullah’s rule did not last for long, because his brother Saud contested his authority. The quarrels between the two brothers led to the disintegration of the second Saudi state. Another son of Faisal, Abdulrahman, ruled after the death of his brother Saud for a short period. Under his rule, in 1891, Riyadh the Saudi capital fell into the hands of Mohammed Bin Rasheed, a leader of the Shmmar tribe in Hail, and this marked the end of Al Saud’s reign again. Bin Rasheed appointed a man called Ajlan to govern Riyadh in his name. Abdulrahman chose voluntarily to leave Riyadh with a number of his family among whom was his son AbdulAziz (Ibn Saud) who was ten years old. They went first to Bahrain and Qatar, before settling in Kuwait, where its Emir Shaikh Mubarak Al Subah welcomed his guests and offered them a safe refuge in Kuwait (Almana 1980).

It should be noted that during the first and second Saudi states the Islamic concept of state predominated the expansionist process of those states. Unlike the Western concept of state, the concept of state in Islam does not entail a defined territorial limit. However, the two Saudi states could not expand any further because, among other factors, they

were confronted by foreign powers, such as the Ottomans, which blocked their progress. The third Saudi state confronted almost the same situation, as will be discussed below.

### 3.3.1 Creation of Saudi Arabia

The aim of this section is not to give a full account of historical events, but rather to shed some light on how the territory of Saudi Arabia expanded gradually until it reached its present shape and size. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Arabian peninsula was ruled in its western part or *Hijaz* by the Sherif Husain, while the eastern part, or Al Hasa, was under direct Ottoman control. Najd and northern Arabia were under the rule of the Al Rasheed family. The south-western parts of Arabia, or *Asir* and *Jizan*, were under the rule of two families called Al Aidh and Al Adarisah respectively. Abdulaziz Bin Abdulrahman (Ibn Saud) decided to leave Kuwait in 1902, telling nobody except his father about his objective. Accompanied by sixty men on whose loyalty he could trust, he headed towards Riyadh. His objective was to recapture the capital of his ancestors' state from the Al Rasheed family. In mid January 1902, Ibn Saud was able to gain control of Riyadh and killed Ajlan its Emir (Almana 1980; McLoughlin 1993). The capture of Riyadh was so important because of its strategic location in the centre of *Najd*, and also for its historical importance to Ibn Saud himself, as it was the capital of the second Saudi state. The area of Riyadh at the time was not more than 650 metres by 650 metres (700 yards by 700 yards) (McLoughlin 1993).

Ibn Saud used Riyadh as his base and started to expand the territory under his control. First he headed south of Riyadh and seized control over Al-kharj, Al-hotah and Wadi Addawasir (see figure 3.1). In 1903, Ibn Saud with the assistance of the emir of Kuwait, Shaikh Mubarak, started an expedition to Al-Qasim region north of Riyadh, a region rich because of its agricultural resources. By the summer of 1904, Ibn Saud controlled most of Al-Qasim. Between 1904 and 1913, Ibn Saud fought several battles, amongst which the battle of Rawdat Al-Muhanna against his adversary Abdulaziz Al Rasheed is the most important, and which ended in victory for Ibn Saud and the killing of Bin Rasheed in the spring of 1906 (McLoughlin 1993). During this period, Ibn Saud was able to control most of the *Najd* region except Hail, which lies north of Al-Qasim (Almana 1980).

On 8 May 1913, Ibn Saud with a force of about 300 men, most of them from Ikhwan, attacked Al Hufuf (centre of Al Hasa region) which had a Turkish garrison with 1200 men. The attack was sudden and at night, and the Turks surrendered without resistance. The fall of Al Hufuf led to the fall of all Al Hasa region and left territory “from south of Kuwait right down to the north of Qatar” (Almana 1980, p. 56) under Ibn Saud's control. In fact, seizing Al Hasa gave Ibn Saud access to the Arabian Gulf for the first time, and the *Najd* was no longer landlocked. Moreover, this victory drew the attention of Britain to Ibn Saud (McLoughlin 1993).

The period from 1913 to 1919 witnessed several important events such as World War I, the Anglo-Ottoman convention in 1913, and the Anglo-Saudi treaty in 1915. However, Ibn Saud gained no more territory until 1921 when he conquered Hail after a bloodless siege. In the following year, Ibn Saud was able to capture Al-Jawf, which lies north to Hail, and by 1922, Ibn Saud's territory reached north as far as Wadi Sirhan (the southern fringes of Transjordan), north east to Iraq and Kuwait, and south down to the northern fringes of Rub Al-khali. After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, Britain gained control over most of the Gulf from Kuwait down to the Trucial coast, as well as over Iraq, Jordan and Palestine. This new geopolitical setting of the region was crucial in defining the territorial limits of Saudi Arabia with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and U.A.E..

Between 1920 and 1932, Hejaz, Asir, Jazan, and Najran all fell under Saudi sovereignty. In September 1932, the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared, and Ibn Saud was announced as its King. In 1934, King Abdulaziz signed the Taif boundary agreement with Yemen, the third boundary agreement that he reached with his neighbours. The first boundary agreement was in 1922 between him and Britain on behalf of Iraq and Kuwait, as will be discussed in the following section, and the second was in 1925, which partially defined the Kingdom's northern limits with Transjordan.

The following sections will discuss the development of the three Saudi boundaries with Kuwait, Bahrain, and U.A.E, but before proceeding, two important treaties need a brief discussion. These two treaties, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention in 1913, and the Anglo-Saudi Treaty in 1915, were important in the Saudi eastern frontier disputes with its GCC neighbours, especially the one with U.A.E.


### 3.3.2 The 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention

Before World War I, Turkey controlled Mesopotamia, Palestine, Kuwait, Al Hasa region in the eastern Saudi Arabia, and Hejaz region on the west and Yemen. At that time, Turkey was also discussing with Germany the idea of establishing a railway line from Basra to Berlin, which was known as the “Baghdad Railway”. This matter was a source of much concern to Britain, which was worried about two main issues, her trade interests, and her strategic position in the Gulf area which it wanted to protect as a “British Lake” in Curzon’s famous words. Therefore, the British government engaged in a series of negotiations from 1911 to 1913 with the Ottomans to settle various outstanding problems between them (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia 1955; Schofield and Blake 1988; Wilkinson 1991). On 29 July 1913, they reached a final agreement, when the two parties signed three draft conventions accompanied by several declarations. The three drafts concerned three main questions: the Baghdad Railway, the situation in the Arabian Gulf, and navigation on the Shatt al-Arab (Wilkinson 1991). Although the three issues were interrelated, the second one, which is related to the situation in the Arabian Gulf, is the most important one to our study.

In the draft convention related to the Arabian Gulf, the two sides agreed to 17 articles on three main areas. They defined territorial limits for Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain as well as some other issues pertinent to these three entities. Second, they agreed on measures concerning navigation, maritime police, and quarantine measures in the Arabian Gulf. Third, they agreed on the provision of a committee for the settlement of boundaries.

In Part I of the Convention, which is concerned with Kuwait, the two sides agreed to define the territorial limits for Kuwait as stated in Articles 5, and 7. In Article 5, they first defined a territory where the Shaikh of Kuwait exercised direct control within a semi-circle with the town of Kuwait in the centre, and called the *Red Line* (see figure 3.5). The northern extremity of this limit is Khur al-Zubair, and at the southern extremity is al-Qurayyin. The Article also included the islands of Warbah, Failkah, Awhah, al-Kubr, al-Magta, Qaru and Umm al-Maradim together with the adjacent islets and waters within the previous limit.

**Figure 3.5: Kuwait limits according to the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention**



**Source:** After Schofield (1993), with some modifications.

In Article 7, they defined an outer limit to the previous one, which was recognised as within the dependence of the Shaikh of Kuwait who could collect *zakat* or tribute from the tribes lying within this limit which starts from Khur al-Zubair in the northwest and ends at a point on the Gulf. This line was marked on the map as the *Green Line* (see figure 3.5). The course of the line as stated in Article 7:

*“Article 7: The limits of the territory referred to in the preceding article are fixed as follows: The demarcation line begins on the coast at the mouth of Khur-al-Zubair in the north west and crosses immediately south of Umm-Qasr, Safwan and Jabal Sanam, in such a way as to leave to the vilayet of Basrah these locations and their wells, arriving at the al-Batin, it follows it towards the south west until Hafr-al-Batin which it leaves on the same side as Kuwait, from that point on the line in question goes south east leaving to the wells of al-Safah, al-Garaa, al-Haba, al-Warbah and Antaa, reaching the sea near Jabal Munifa.”* (from Schofield and Blake 1988, p.390).

In fact, the *Green Line* was to become a source of dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as will be shown below.

Part II of the Convention was dedicated to Al-Qatar (Qatar) and discussed, among other matters, the limit of what was called the Ottoman *Sanjak* of Najd. In Article 11, the two sides agreed that the northern limit of the Sanjak is indicated by the defined line in the previous Article 7, and it ends in the south on the Gulf at a point facing al-Zakhnunia Island. A straight line beginning from this point runs directly southwards until it reaches Rub Al-Khali (see figure 3.6). This line, which was called the *Blue Line* would:

*“separate the Najd from the peninsula of al- Qatar. The limits of the Najd are indicated by a blue line on the map annexed to the present convention.”* (from Schofield and Blake 1988, p. 391).

The Blue line was later (1934-1955) used as a legal argument by the British in the territorial disputes between Saudi Arabia and Britain on behalf of the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, as will be discussed in more detail below.

In Part III of the Convention, the two sides agreed matters on Bahrain Islands, important among which was the renouncing of the Ottomans of their claims to the islands of Bahrain, including the two islands of *Lubaynat al-Aliya* (al-Kabirah) and *Lubaynah al-*

*Safliya* (al-Saghirah). It is notable that no maritime limit was defined precisely at this time between Bahrain and the said Sanjak of Najd.

It is worth mentioning here, that this convention, as well as the remaining two conventions, were never ratified as agreed. This non-ratification affected the legal soundness of the convention. Also, as revealed in the previous section, Ibn Saud in May 1913, three months before the signing of the convention, was able to evict the Turks from Al Hasa region and created, a new *de facto* situation which affected the British attitude towards Ibn Saud and made them adopt a new policy towards him (Wilkinson 1991). Ibn Saud was anxious that the Turks might take revenge and attack him from the sea. He was, therefore, eager for a treaty with the British offering him the protection he desired. Equally, Britain needed the assistance of Ibn Saud to participate in the war efforts against the Ottomans (Troeller 1976). These factors, among others, contributed to the signing of the first Anglo-Saudi Treaty at Darin in December 1915.

### **3.3.3 The 1915 Darin Anglo-Saudi Treaty**

In an oasis called Darin, south of Al Hasa region, on 26 December 1915, Ibn Saud and Sir Percy Cox signed a treaty with seven articles. In Article I of the treaty, Britain recognised the sovereignty of Ibn Saud over Najd, Al Hasa, Qatif, and Jubail and their dependencies as follows:

*“The British Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, El Hassa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed later and determined hereafter, and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the countries of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him, and do hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the independent Ruler thereof and absolute Chief of their tribes...”* (from Troeller 1976, p. 254).

The above Article was the most important one in the treaty. The remaining articles are also important but they covered issues such as defending Ibn Saud from any aggression, alienation of territory, and renunciation of relations with foreign powers. Moreover, Wilkinson noted that the treaty illustrates:



*“how the nature of the territorial understandings was reached, and how wording arose that was later to become of fundamental importance in the frontier dispute..”* (Wilkinson 1991, p.134).

Regarding of its wording, two main phrases can be highlighted from the above Article, which are that the mentioned territories will be “determined hereafter”, and the other phrase that those mentioned territories are “of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him”. The first phrase is very general and does not define any limits of those territories, leaving that for the future. The second phrase tacitly accepts the territorial limits of the past two Saudi States. The importance of this will be shown later when discussing the Buraimi dispute. The 1915 Treaty was presumed to have superseded the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman non-ratified Convention.

The Saudi boundaries with Kuwait, Bahrain and U.A.E. developed gradually through time from 1922 to 1974. In the following sections, a brief discussion of these boundaries traces their development.

### **3.3.4 Development of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary**

People in the Arabian Peninsula never knew the western-style of defined territory until 1922, although there were some concepts of territoriality among the Bedouin tribes called in Arabic *dira* which means ‘home land’. In this concept, each tribe has an area where it can graze its herds of livestock (Wilkinson 1994). The territorial arrangements that were agreed in 1922 were preceded by several events, among which were tensions in relations between Ibn Saud and the Shaikhs of Kuwait, and Ikhwan raids on Kuwait and Iraq. A dispute arose between Ibn Saud and Shaikh Mubarak when the latter gave sanctuary to the Ajman tribe, which was inimical to Ibn Saud at that time. The dispute worsened when Salim, Mubarak’s son, succeeded him in 1917 and started to claim all the territories within the Green Line, which had been defined by the Anglo-Ottoman 1913 Convention. Ibn Saud counterclaimed all the territory up to the walls of Kuwait City on the grounds that:

*“he had no cognizance of the 1913 Convention and that the tribes in the Southern region had, since 1914 or thereabout, been under his control, not under that of the Shaikh of Kuwait.”* (from Schofield 1990, p.618).

Friction occurred between the two sides, and Ikhwan raided Kuwait and inflicted heavy losses on the Kuwaitis in Al-Jahra, west of Kuwait City (Wilkinson 1991). The Ikhwan also raided Iraq several times. Sir Percy Cox, British Commissioner in Iraq, decided to put an end to these troubles and invited Ibn Saud to attend a conference in Muhammarah (a town near Basrah, south of Iraq) on 5 May 1922. The two sides, Ibn Saud and Percy Cox on behalf of the Iraq government, signed the Treaty of Muhammarah, which:

*“allocated the tribes as Cox decreed and agreed to form a commission to determine ownership of resources in order to fix a frontier.”* (Wilkinson 1991, p.134).

At another conference in Uqair in December 1922, Ibn Saud was invited again by Cox to the conference and the two parties, after a long discussion, concluded an agreement which was considered as a protocol to the Muhammarah Treaty. The protocols of Uqair defined for the first time boundary lines between Najd and both Iraq and Kuwait, and created the two famous neutral zones between Najd and Iraq and Kuwait (see figure 4.2). These newly introduced territorial arrangements, especially the one with Iraq, had significantly affected tribal mobility in the area. These arrangements were criticised by Dickson, a British politician who attended the conference, who said:

*“without them [i.e. the boundary lines] the friction with Iraq culminating in the Ikhwan rebellion might have been avoided, as too the fourteen years’ agony of the Kuwait blockade.”* (Wilkinson 1991, p. 145).

He also added that those boundary lines:

*“restricting the annual natural migrations of Najd tribes towards the north...diverting his people from their old and time-honoured communication with Iraq and Kuwait, trying instead to force them to get their necessities of life and daily requirements from Uqair, Qatif and Jubail his ports on the Persian Gulf.”* (Wilkinson 1991, p. 145).

Therefore, as there was no consideration the tribal realities of the desert, tensions continued to arise between Ibn Saud and his neighbours, especially Kuwait. It is worth noting here that after the 1922 agreement, relations between the two sides worsened especially after the ‘blockade’ exercised by Najd over Kuwait. Until 1922, Najd depended mainly on Kuwait to import most of its necessary and luxury goods, and there were only a few imports coming through the Najdi ports of Uqair, Qatif, and Al-Jubail.

When the *hijra*'s of the Ikhwan scattered in the territory near Kuwait, the Najdi government could not establish checkpoints to collect duties on the goods brought from Kuwaiti ports. Therefore, Ibn Saud requested from the Shaikh of Kuwait to agree on establishing a check-point at the new borders between the two countries to collect duties, but the Shaikh refused the request as it would affect the autonomy of Kuwait. Ibn Saud found himself in a position to ban trade with Kuwait, and transferred all import transactions to his ports in Uqair, Qatif, and Al-Jubail. These ports flourished after this action, and Kuwait suffered as a result (Zirkely 1997, footnote p.472). The blockade started in 1920, but in 1942 the two countries decided to resolve their outstanding problems and signed three agreements in Jeddah on 20 April 1942. The agreements were called the Friendship and Neighbourly Agreement, the Trade Agreement, and the Extradition of Offenders Agreement (Brown 1963). The first two agreements regulated the movement of people and goods, especially the Bedouin, across the boundary and ended the economic blockade of Kuwait. The third agreement regulated matters concerning the extradition of criminals, and stated in its Article 8 that the provisions of the agreement shall apply to the Neutral Zone and stipulated in Paragraph 1 that:

*“Where an offence, as defined in Article 3 of this agreement, has been committed in either of the two territories and the offender has fled to the Neutral Zone, the offender shall be deemed to be still within the territory in which the offence was committed, and may be arrested and tried by the Government thereof.”* (from Schofield and Blake 1988, p. 256).

The remaining two Paragraphs of Article 8 stipulated the conditions which decided when an offence has been committed within the Neutral Zone. From this period on, relations started to improve between the two sides, and in 1965, the two countries decided to partition the Neutral Zone (see Chapter 4) in terms of sovereignty, but each side would retain half of the net revenue of the extracted hydrocarbons.

### **3.3.5 Development of the Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary**

Disputes arose between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the late 1930s with the negotiation of oil concessions. Saudi Arabia protested against Bahrain for erecting some marks on the two islands *Lubayna Al-Khabirah* (Greater Lubaynah) and *Lubaynah Al-Sagherah* (Smaller Lubaynah), which lie half way between the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain main Island, and claimed sovereignty over these islands (see Schofield and Blake

1988, pp.3-74 and Schofield 1990, pp.107-237). In addition, in 1941 the Bahrain Petroleum Company was granted a concession for oil exploitation in several areas, among which was *Fasht Abu-Safah*. Saudi Arabia remonstrated against this action, and drilling was suspended (Amin 1981).

The two parties began a series of negotiations. The first round was held in London in August 1951 between the then Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to discuss three main issues, the south-east land boundaries of Saudi Arabia with its adjacent states, the division of submarine areas and the ownership of islands, reefs and shoals between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait islands (Schofield 1990, pp.153-154). Saudi Arabia's claims over the two islands and Fasht Abu-Safah were based on the principle of the proximity of those areas to the Saudi coastline, whilst the British side based their claims on the principles of historical ownership and traditional usage. In the negotiation, Saudi Arabia proposed that

*“Bainah-as-Saghir [Lubaynah Al-Sagherah] Island and Fasht- al-Jarim and Rennie shoals should be acknowledged as the property of Bahrain, while the Bainah-al-Kabir [Lubaynah Al-Kabirah] and Fasht-bu-Sa’fa shoals should be acknowledged as the property of Saudi Arabia.”* (from Schofield 1990, p. 217).

The British side rejected this proposition and suggested that both islands and Fasht Abu-Safah should go to Bahrain, but Saudi Arabia also rejected this offer and negotiations ended without reaching an agreement. In 1954, the two sides agreed to divide the Fasht Abu-Safah into two parts, a western part belonging to Saudi Arabia and an eastern part to belong to Bahrain (Amin 1981), and each party having 50% of the oil revenue extracted from the area (Schofield and Blake 1988). However, this agreement later failed because the two sides declined to “agree on a principle for drawing the dividing line of the Fasht” (Amin 1981, p.100). Eventually, on 22 February 1958, the two sides signed an agreement defining the limit of their maritime boundary. In this agreement, discussed in detail below in Chapter four, Lubaynah Al-Kabirah Island was given to Saudi Arabia and Lubaynah Al-Sagherah was given to Bahrain. Sovereignty over Fasht Abu-Safah was assigned to Saudi Arabia, but at the same time the revenue of the extracted oil in the Fasht triangle would be divided between the two countries.

### 3.3.6 Development of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary

The saga of the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and the imperial power of Britain on behalf of its protégés in the south-western coast of the Arabian Gulf was one of the most dramatic in the history of boundary drawing in Arabia in the first half of the twentieth century. It took from 1934 to 1974 before it was settled, and witnessed intense events between 1949 and 1956, from the use of force by Britain in 1955, to the break down of Anglo-Saudi relations in 1956 following the triple-invasion of Egypt. Many works have been written about it, among the best known are those of Kelly (1964), Al-Shamalan (1987), and Wilkinson (1991). The last two works are more balanced in their accounts than Kelly's, which proved to be largely biased to the British point of view. However, such sensitive issues seldom escape bias of any sort. The aim of this section is not to give a detailed account of the boundary dispute in south-eastern Arabia, but rather to show how the boundary, especially the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary, was developed until it has reached its present shape.

The territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Britain on behalf of the Shaikhs of its protégés started in 1934 when the US Government made an enquiry to the British Government in London based on the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) oil concession in eastern Saudi Arabia regarding the frontier limits of Saudi Arabia in that area. The British reply was that the Blue and Violet Lines represented those limits. In their reply to both the Americans and the Saudis, they referred to those lines as marking the limits of Britain's 'sphere of influence' in south-eastern Arabia (Wilkinson 1991). Saudi Arabia remonstrated at this statement, and King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) sent a cable on 7 October 1934 to London saying:


*"As for Muscat and Oman and Qatar, we know no boundaries for anyone there, since they formed part of the dominions of our forefathers, and no one questioned this. All of them have been under our hand from that day to this, especially the deserts and the Bedouins, for whom we are responsible. No-one has opposed us in this, and no-one - either Arab or foreigner - has shared with us in this, so we might know recognised boundaries for these lands. But now the people of Muscat, Oman and Qatar are our brothers and our adherents, and there is no dispute between them and us."* (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia 1955, Vol. I, p. 404).

The main British argument was that Saudi Arabia was a successor state to the Ottomans, and thus the 1913 and 1914 conventions devolved upon Saudi Arabia, and the Blue Line represents her limit to the east, and the Violet Line represents her limit to the South (see figure 3.6). The Violet Line was agreed in the 1914 Convention between the British Government and the Ottomans to separate Yemen (vilayat) from the nine cantons of the Aden protectorate. It starts from a point at the south-western corner of Arabian Peninsula west of Aden (see figure 3.6), and runs north-eastwards to the desert of the Rub Alkhali at an angle of 45° until it reaches the Blue Line agreed in the 1913 Convention between the two powers. The British at that time knew that this argument was unsound in terms of international law (Wilkinson 1991, Schofield 1994). The term 'sphere of influence' meant nothing in international law, because any territory should be either under *effective occupation* or it is *res nullis*. None of the areas east of the Blue Line, except coastal areas, was under effective control of the Shaikhs of the coastal Gulf, from Qatar to Oman (Wilkinson 1991).

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia based its arguments on the fact that, since the first and the second Saudi states, the tribes in the hinterlands of the areas east of the Blue Line, had been allegiant to the Saudi rulers (see Memorial of the Saudi Government 1955), paid *zakat* (tribute) to them, and were obedient to the calls of the Government to *jihad* (war). What strengthened the Saudi position was that in all the Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915, 1922, and 1927 the Blue and Violet Lines were never referred to at all. Moreover, when King Abdulaziz asked the British, following the 1927 treaty, to provide him with all the treaties regarding the Shaikhdoms of the Gulf, the British declined, deliberately or otherwise, to do so.

Several discussions took place between the two sides, and in 1935 Fuad Hamzah, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, produced the first Saudi frontier claim, which was called the Hamzah Line or the Red Line (see figure 3.6). In the same year, the British offered several frontier lines but they finally produced what was called the Ryan Line or Riyadh Line. The Hamzah Line starts from a point south of Qatar Peninsula on Khur Al-Udaid and eventually goes round to Aden. The Ryan Line starts from Salwa, at the base of Salwa Gulf, and surrounds the Hamzah Line from the south and continues south-west until it reaches Aden (see figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6: Territorial claims in south-eastern Arabia 1913-1955



Source: After Schofield (1994), with some modification.

The two sides basically retained their positions until 1949, when the Saudis were asked for a written statement of clarification. The Saudis laid a new territorial claim, further north than the Hamzah 1935 line. The new claim gave Qatar the whole Qatar peninsula but kept its base for the Saudis, and with Abu Dhabi the boundary starts from a point east of Bandar Mirfa and ends to the north of Buraimi oasis (see figure 3.6). This claim left Abu Dhabi with about the third of its current territory. By this new claim, a new phase of dispute began and Buraimi entered the dispute for the first time. This time, the Saudis based their claim on the fact that Buraimi area belonged to “Shaikdoms which were not in treaty relations with Britain.” (Wilkinson 1991, p. 288). It is worth noting here that the Aramco legal team, especially Judge Manely Hudson and his assistant Richard Young, played a major role at this stage in advising the Saudi government in their territorial disputes (Wilkinson 1991). The British rejected the Saudi 1949 statement, and at the same time insisted that two thirds of Buraimi villages belonged to Abu Dhabi and the rest to the Sultan of Oman (Wilkinson 1991).

As the two sides continued to hold firmly to their positions, it was obvious that reaching a settlement would be very difficult. The British suggested a fact-finding commission, which was accepted by the Saudis. The British later retreated from the idea when Prince Faisal, the then Saudi Foreign Minister, visited London in the summer of 1951, to discuss frontier problems with the British (see the previous section). The Prince suggested holding a conference between Saudi Arabia and Britain with the attendance of the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and even Oman. The British agreed on the conference and abandoned the idea of a fact-finding commission (Wilkinson 1991).

The conference was held in Dammam between 28 January and 14 February 1952. The British delegate was accompanied by the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Qatar, but the Sultan of Oman did not attend. In the conference, Britain laid a new claim on behalf of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhs and offered a frontier line starting from a point at the base of Qatar south of Salwa, and going southwards, turning south-east until reaching Quraini, then turning north-east to reach Umm al-Zamul as a tripartite junction between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman (see figure 3.6). Buraimi was not mentioned in the conference, and Saudi Arabia rejected the new British line. The conference ended once again in deadlock.



After the conference, the Saudis moved forwards on the ground and sent Turki Ibn Utaishan to Buraimi on the basis that several tribal chiefs appealed to the Saudis to intervene after a visit made by a British officer. In March 1952, Saudi Arabia complained to the British Embassy in Jeddah about the British activities, and the reply was that:

*“the visit made by a British political officer to Buraimi had been in the course of “administrative duties” such as were permitted under the London Agreement to continue in the disputed Area.”* (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia 1955, p. 444).

In August 1952, the Saudis sent Ibn Utaishan “to take up the duties of Amir of Buraimi, responsible to the Governor of Hasa.” (Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, 1955 p.444). This action caused what was called the ‘Buraimi Crisis’. Tensions started to rise between the two sides, and several negotiations took place. They first agreed on what was called the ‘Standstill Agreement’ in October 1952. The Saudis proposed a plebiscite in the area but the proposal was rejected by the British. In 1954, the two sides agreed to recourse to arbitration, and signed an arbitration agreement on 30 July 1954 (Kelly 1964). In 1955, the two parties exchanged their Memorials for the arbitration, and the British gave the Saudis their unilateral declaration of frontier in August 1955 as shown in figure 3.6 (Wilkinson 1991). However, the agreement could not stand for long and collapsed when the British accused the Saudis of bribing certain tribal chiefs and the British members of the tribunal resigned. On 26 October 1955, the British took military action to remove the Saudis from Hamasa, one of the Buraimi villages. The situation remained the same, with several attempts to negotiate, but Anglo-Saudi relations broke down in the wake of the British aggression towards Egypt in 1956. The Saudi government decided to negotiate her frontier problems directly with the Shaikhs of the Gulf, first with Qatar in 1965, and then subsequent to British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. The settlement successfully reached, and agreement signed, with Qatar defined their boundary from Salwa on the east to Khur Al-Udaid in the west. In 1974, the Saudi government reached an agreement with the Emirates to define their common boundary, which in fact did not differ much from the British 1955 unilateral declaration of frontier, with some exceptions. In the 1974 Agreement, the Saudis were able to achieve access to Khur Al-Udaid for its strategic importance (Schofield 1994), but conceded the Buraimi oasis to the

Emirates and Oman. In 1990, they signed an agreement with Oman, which settled their frontier problems.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The geographical setting of Saudi Arabia, as well as almost all the GCC countries, is characterised by a hot and dry climate that has, for many centuries, impacted on the human activities in the region, particularly agriculture and nomadic movement. Moreover, populations at the border areas are sparse and concentrated in major cities such as Dammam, Al-Khubar and Dhahran. The population is sparsest along the border with the U.A.E.

The climatic condition mentioned above which affected natural resources in the Arabian Peninsula was crucial in determining spatial economic patterns. Mobility was always the key to survival in the traditional Arabian economy. Therefore, grazing rights and the need of Bedouin tribesmen to control access to the scarce resources of grazing and water contributed to develop some sense of territorial space called *dira* which mean 'home land' (Wilkinson 1994; Finnie 1992).

As the historical background showed, the Islamic concept of the border-less state, prevailed during the first and second Saudi states. In the 1922 Uqair Convention, the people in Arabia were confronted by the Western concept of the territorial limit of states. Ibn Saud was persuaded by the British government to accept this new concept, despite strong opposition from his army, the Ikhwan. These new territorial arrangements were for some time a source of friction between the Ikhwan and neighbouring countries such as Kuwait and Iraq. The concept of the 'boundary' was rejected not only because it contradicted the Islamic concept of the state, but also because it interrupted the free movement of Bedouin across what they considered their *dira*. However, the concept of boundary has become gradually accepted, and Saudi Arabia has been able to define and settle almost all land boundaries with neighbouring countries, and most of the maritime boundaries with the Gulf states. Historical arguments were used heavily in the territorial disputes, especially the one with the Emirates and Oman, along with the allegiance of tribes and their payment of *zakat* and obedience to the government call to *jihad*.

The recent agreements between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours (1992 and 1998) gave much attention to Bedouin movement across the boundaries, and therefore bilateral regulations were set up to manage their movement. Some of these regulations will be discussed in Chapter seven. Against this geographical and historical background, the Saudi foreign policy towards its GCC neighbours can be best appreciated, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

## References

- Almana, M. (1980), *Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud*, Hutchinson Benham, London.
- Al-Othaimen, A. (1995), *The History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (Arabic), Sixth Edition, Vol. 1, Al-Obaikan, Riyadh.
- Al-Shamlan, A. (1987), *The evolution of National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula 1934-1955*, Unpublished Ph.D., University of Michigan.
- Amin, S. (1981), *International and Legal Problems of the Gulf*, Menas Press Ltd, London.
- Bahrain Central Statistics Organisation (BCSO) (1991), *Statistical Abstract 1991*.
- Bindagji, H. (1981), *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (Arabic), H.H. Bindagji, Jeddah.
- Brown, E. (1963), *The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone*, The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut.
- Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Department of Planning (ADP) (1996), *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.
- Goldberg, J. (1986), *The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years 1902-1918*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Finnie, D. (1992), *Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier With Iraq*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Kelly, J. (1964), *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, Faber and Faber, London.
- Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning (KMP) (1998), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1998*.
- Leatherdale, C. (1983), *Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis*, Frank Cass, London.
- McLoughlin, L. (1993), *Ibn Saud: Founder of A Kingdom*, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1, 1955.
- Schofield, R. (ed.) (1990), *Islands and Maritime Boundaries of the Gulf*, Vol. 16 1951-1954, Archive Editions, Farnham Common.

- Schofield, R. (1994), "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula during the twentieth century" in Richard Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp. 1-77.
- Schofield, R. and Blake, G. (eds.) (1988), *Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957*, Volumes 9, 10, and 15, Archive Editions, Farnham Common.
- The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990), *Oman/Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement*, unpublished text.
- The Saudi Ministry of Planning (SMP) (1996), *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.
- The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1972), *Topographic Map of the Arabian Peninsula, 1:4,000,000*. Compiled by U.S. Geological Survey.
- Troeller, G. (1976), *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud*, Frank Cass, London.
- Wilkinson, J. (1991), *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London.
- Wilkinson, J. (1994), "British Role in boundary drawing in Arabia: a synopsis" in Richard Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp. 94-108.
- Zirkely, Khairu Ddeen (1997), *The Arabian Peninsula During the Reign of King Abdulaziz*, (Arabic), Vol.2, Darul Elm Lilmalaeen, Beirut.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Political and Legal Management**

## 4.1 Introduction


International relations have a great impact on boundaries, indeed, according to Stephen Jones (1945) there is no intrinsically bad or good boundary, rather it “depends much upon the general situation” (Jones 1945, p.3). What he meant by general situation encompasses a wide range of matters, such as state policies and the attitudes of the people. But the most important of all is the international relations between two neighbouring countries. Based on this premise, if the relations between two neighbours deteriorates this could in turn have its impact upon the boundary between them as well, particularly management practices at the border area.

Since “the objectives of any boundary management strategy will be determined initially by national foreign policy objectives” (Blake 1998, p.56), a brief discussion of Saudi foreign policy objectives toward its GCC neighbours will first be introduced. The legal status of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours will be discussed next.

Before discussing Saudi foreign policy, it is appropriate to give a brief description of Saudi governmental bodies involved in the process of boundary management. There are four main governmental institutions directly responsible for managing boundary matters (see figure 4.1). First, the Ministers’ Council (MC), i.e. the Cabinet, which is responsible for formulating and supervising all public policies. King Fahad is the President of the Council and has, as the King, very wide powers at his disposal. All the decisions made by the Council are binding on other bodies of government (Al-Qabba 1986).

Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is mainly responsible, in co-ordination with the MC, for planning and implementing Saudi foreign policy (Al-Qabba 1986). Among the Ministry’s wide range of departments and sections a number of ‘regional’ sections are concerned with a particular geographical region of the world. These sections are essential to the decision-making process, for they provide the necessary information about each country or group of countries before any crucial decision is made. One of these is the Arabian Peninsula Section, whose main concern is the Arabian Gulf countries and Yemen. Some of the officials working in this Section participate in negotiations between the Saudi government and the other governments of the Arabian Peninsula, especially over boundary issues.

Figure 4.1: Major government bodies responsible for boundary management in Saudi Arabia



Source: The author.





The third important government body with respect to boundary matters is the Ministry of Interior (MI), which has two main divisions directly responsible for managing access for people, and security matters at the borders. One of them is the Passport Control Administration (PCA), with its subsections at all border checkpoints - land, seaports and airports. The PCA is responsible for applying immigration policy to all people entering or leaving Saudi territory. The other division is the Border Guards Administration (BGA), which is mainly responsible for protecting the entire Saudi land and maritime boundaries from illegal crossings and smuggling.

Finally, there is the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) which, through its Customs Department, has three main responsibilities (see figure 4.1):

- managing the access of goods and vehicles;
- preventing smuggling through the official checkpoints; and
- collecting duties on imported goods.

These four institutions have a co-ordinating function in terms of negotiations with foreign governments over any boundary issue that may rise, as well as exchanging information between them regarding boundary management matters. Together, they represent a potentially very effective border management apparatus. Nevertheless, the government bodies described above do not have a monopoly over all boundary-related issues. The role of senior Saudi princes, such as the Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence) is of crucial importance, because they can make decisive decisions in boundary matters. A good example of this is the boundary dispute with Yemen, in which Prince Abdullah played a major role to put this dispute to an end (Roberts 2000).

## **4.2 Saudi foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours**

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is affected by several factors. It is first necessary to stress the similarities between the countries, in terms of political system, religion, language, historical background, economic structure and the same strategic concerns (Wilson 1994). Despite dissimilarities in legislation as well as

controversies over some boundary issues, Saudi foreign policy toward the rest of the GCC countries has long been characterised as an amicable one.

Moreover, the Saudi elite gives the Arabian Gulf region particular importance for the following reasons. First, Saudi Arabia considers itself to be one of the main powers in the region, and regards it as a priority to keep the region secure from any disturbances. Second, the familial ties between the ruling families of the GCC states as well as historical relationships between them facilitate collaboration and solidarity in the face of external threats. Thirdly, the hydrocarbon reserves in the region require protection and good planning to utilise them for the best interests of the people (Al-Qabba 1986). Therefore, Saudi Arabia finds itself obliged, not just to defend her territory but to:

*“provide security to the smaller and more vulnerable neighbours like Bahrain and Kuwait, and for the waters of the Gulf and Gulf of Oman.”* (Cordesman 1997, p.9).

On the grounds mentioned above, the objectives of Saudi foreign policy towards its GCC neighbours can be classified into three main goals: achieving and maintaining security, attaining welfare, and preserving autonomy (i.e. preventing foreign interference). Saudi decision-makers believe that these goals can be fulfilled best through the GCC. King Fahad’s statement following the Fourth GCC Summit held in Dawha, Qatar in November 1983, affirms these objectives:

*“We are proud of what has been achieved regarding security and military matters which aim to enhance the self-reliance and self-capabilities of the GCC states to preserve their security and independence... We hope that this benevolent procession of co-operation continue its constructive process until the aims of the GCC, which are the unity of positions and decisions, security, stability, and the welfare of its people, are fulfilled.”* (Umm Al-Qura 1983, p.24).

The later events revealed how these goals, especially the security ones, became very prominent in Saudi policy. For example, Saudi Arabia suggested, in late 1981 and early 1982, a security agreement and encouraged the other GCC’s Member States to support it (Nakhleh 1986). By 1994, this agreement had been signed by all the GCC states except Kuwait, which had some reservations about it as contradicting their constitution (Nakhleh 1986; Al-Mihairy 1999). Another example, in the aftermath of the second Gulf War

(1990-1991), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began, as Cordesman described it, to conduct more realistic military exercises (Cordesman 1997).

The good-neighbourly foreign policy defines the way the Saudi government handles its boundary issues with its GCC neighbours. Saudi Arabia has been largely successful in resolving boundary disputes peacefully and fairly with its GCC neighbours as will be shown below. There have been some exceptions such as the incidents with Qatar in September 1992, but they have been rare.

### 4.3 The Saudi boundary treaties

Generally speaking, there is no standard model on how a treaty on international boundaries should be drafted. Rather, as Ron Adler (1995) suggests, there are some essential features which it is desirable for a good treaty to include. In particular:

- “ • *A statement regarding the principle of mutual consultation.*
- *A detailed description of mutual accommodation- withdrawals, exchange of territories etc.*
- *A definition and description of the agreed boundary.*
- *The treaty delimits the boundary and also specifies the provisions for its demarcation.*”

(Adler 1995, p.6).

In Addition, an ideal treaty will provide for some kind of joint commission or will specify who is to deal with boundary problems as they arise, and how they are to keep in touch.

Several good examples of an existing boundary treaty embodying these features can be found. One example will be given here which is the boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Kenya signed in 1970 (Brownlie 1979, pp.775-825). This treaty contains thirteen articles, two schedules, and one annex. The points suggested by Adler and mentioned above can be recognised very clearly in the treaty. First, it emphasises in its preamble that peace between the two parties is part of the peace and security of the African continent as a whole. Second, there is a statement (Article VII paragraph b) laying down the principle of consultation between the two parties in respect of possible future deviations in the

course of the River Dawa. It also describes in detail how resources, such as fresh waters near the borders between the two states should be shared (Articles VIII and IX and the Annex 1). Moreover, a clear definition of the boundary line is stated in precise terms, leaving little scope for ambiguity or misinterpretation. For example, in Schedule I it describes the starting point of boundary line as follows:

*“The boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya starts from a point on the lowest point of the course of the DAWA River opposite Boundary Pillar No. 1 of the boundary between Kenya and Somalia, situated on the right bank of the river about 650 metres north-west of the Police Post on the MANDERA-DOLO GEDO road of the MALKA RIE area.”* (Brownlie 1979, p. 797).

Finally, the treaty determines the provisions for the demarcation of the boundary line, and lays down principles of joint maintenance of the different sectors of the boundary line (Articles X, XI, and XII). For example, Article XI paragraph 2 says:

*“Such maintenance shall include the following obligation:*

- (i) the maintenance in good repair of the boundary pillars and also the reference pillars constructed on the banks of any watercourse whose bed is followed by the boundary line;*
- (ii) the clearance of trees or bushes growing up on the cleared width of four meters of the boundary line which render one pillar invisible from the next, or growing up in the bed of any small watercourse followed by the boundary line;*
- (iii) in the event of a boundary pillar or reference pillar having been completely destroyed or having disappeared without leaving marks enabling the exact site to be found again, the Contracting Party responsible for the maintenance of that sector of the boundary shall, before undertaking the reconstruction of the pillar inform the other Contracting Party so that the pillar can be jointly re-sited...”* (Brownlie 1979, p. 794).

This quality of detailed information leaves little room for ambiguity or disagreement between the two parties. Schedule I contains a very detailed description of the boundary demarcation in terms of type of pillars, their dimensions, and their physical structures. A very extensive and detailed table containing information such as the altitude, bearing to the next pillar and distance to the next pillar for each pillar is also supplemented. For example, it describes pillars 1 and 2 as follows:

**Table 4.1: A sample from Schedule I of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty**

Pillar No.	Type	Altitude (m)	Bearing to the next	Distance to the next
			pillar (° ')	Pillar (m)
1	P	315	264 16	274
2	S	318	251 14	134
etc.	...	...	...	...

Source: (Brownlie 1979, p. 797).

The type of pillar indicated in table 4.1 as 'P' refers to 'rectangular pyramid' and 'S' refers to 'triangular pyramid'. Schedule II specifies the sectors that will be maintained by each party with their length in kilometres as well as the number of pillars in each sector. For instance, it describes the maintenance of boundary sectors from Pillar No. 1 up to Pillar No. A 102 as follows:

**Table 4.2: A sample from Schedule II of the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty**

Description	ETHIOPIA		KENYA	
	No. of Pillars	km	No. of Pillars	km
Pillar No. 1 (Malka Mari) up to and including Pillar No. 72	—	—	72	74
From Pillar No. 72 (El Mole) up to and including Pillar No. A.102	140	128	—	—
etc.	...	...	...	...

Source: (Brownlie 1979, p. 821).

Table 4.2 ends up with a total of 372 pillars and 295 km, responsibility for the maintenance of which belongs to Ethiopia, and 280 pillars and 321 km, responsibility for the maintenance of which belongs to Kenya. Annex I of the agreement contains six Articles determining the protocol for trans-frontier watering and grazing rights between the two countries (Brownlie 1979). Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the 1970 Ethiopia-Kenya Treaty was before the days of GPS and the universal use of geographical coordinates.

**Table 4.3: Significant figures in coordinates of latitude and longitude**

Coordinates given	Implied accuracy	On the ground
35° N, 55° E	±0.5°	±50km
35° 20' N, 55° 10' E	±0.5'	±900m
35° 20' 24'' N, 55° 10' 17'' E	±0.5''	±15m

Source: Adler (1995, p. 61).

It should be emphasised that, according to Adler (1995), co-ordinates considerably vary in their accuracy. For example, if a co-ordinate is given to the nearest 'minute' the implied accuracy is ±half the last significant figure (i.e. ±0.5') representing ±900m on the ground. But if a co-ordinate is given to the nearest 'second' then the accuracy will be ±0.5'' or ±15m on the ground which means greater accurate (see table 4.3). In recent boundary treaties co-ordinates are given to the nearest fraction of a second (see for example Appendix VIII).

The boundary agreements between Saudi Arabia and the three selected GCC neighbours, Kuwait, Bahrain and U.A.E. will be discussed below to see how far those boundary treaties conform to the general principles mentioned above.


#### **4.3.1 The Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary agreements**

The boundary between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was agreed and delimited, as mentioned in Chapter three, at the Al Uqair Convention in December 1922. The agreement described the starting point of the boundary line (see Appendix VI) as follows:

*"The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi al Awja with Al Batin, leaving Riqai to Najd..."*


This description is very ambiguous, because the word 'junction' has two possibilities. It could refer to the middle of the wadi junction, or it could refer to the bank of wadi Al Batin at the junction. Another ambiguity lies in the description of the southern limit of the neutral zone, which states:

Figure 4.2: Kuwait-Saudi Boundary



Source: Blake (1991), Boundary and Security Bulletin (July, 2000), International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1982).

Figure 4.3: Sketch map for Kuwait-Saudi new maritime boundary July 2000



Source: Blake (1991), Boundary and Security Bulletin (July, 2000).



*“The portion of territory bounded on the North by this line [the red semi-circle] and which is bounded on the West by a low mountainous ridge called Esh Shiq and on the East by the sea and on the south by a line passing from West to East from Esh Shiq to Ain al Abd and hence the coast north of Ras al Mishab...”*

It did not say from where exactly this southern line should start and where exactly it should end. Although this agreement stated that both countries would share equal rights over the neutral zone, it did not explain precisely what are those rights should be and how they might be shared. This imprecision in determining the boundary line and ambiguity in stating the shared rights did not cause any problem in 1922 because:

*“the zone was mainly unpopulated, visited only by tribes from the two countries, and since oil had not yet been discovered there.”* (Al-Mayyal 1986, p. 304).

This state of affairs however caused several practical problems and disagreements between the two parties especially after the discovery of oil in the area in 1953. Al-Mayyal described the situation as follows:

*“When oil was discovered in the zone, life there changed greatly. The exploitation of oil in the region required a string of development which brought with it oil companies, workers, settlements, shops and social amenities. All this needed management and administration, and it was principally this which brought the Kuwaiti and Saudi authorities face to face. Chaos resulted in the zone where bilateral authorities were operating at the same time, with the differing laws of two separate countries. There were grave difficulties in applying law and order, not to mention the lack of any co-ordinated management.”* (Al-Mayyal 1986, pp. 304-405).

Therefore, the two sides decided to resolve these problems and subsequently reached a new arrangement that define their rights with more precision. In July 1965 they signed a new agreement (see Appendix VII) which divided the neutral zone area between them in terms of administration, sovereignty and defence but at the same time agreed to retain an equal share of natural resources found in the whole area (see figure 4.2). The agreement stressed in its Article IV that each party shall respect the rights of the other party in respect to the shared natural resources found in its annexed territory. Natural resources here, include all types of natural resources whether they are hydrocarbons, minerals or underground water resources.

This latter agreement (1965) resolved the problem of sovereignty and administration as well as how to exploit the natural resources in the area. However, the boundary line to divide the area into two parts was precisely defined in a subsequent agreement in December 1969 (see Appendix VIII). In this agreement, which was regarded as an annex to the 1965 agreement, co-ordinates for each pillar along the line were defined. Generally speaking, the 1965 and 1969 agreements were good in the sense that they laid down several principles relating to co-operation, consultation and set out conflict resolution mechanisms (Articles VI, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII). Interestingly enough, this agreement in its Article XVII sets out a joint permanent committee to administer the exploitation of natural resources, and its powers were determined in Article XVIII as follows:

*Article XVIII: The Committee shall have the following powers:*

*(a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary Companies and ancillary companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than the citizens of the two Parties.*

*(b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.*

*(c) To study the new licenses, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural resources and submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to who should be done in this respect.*

*(d) To discuss whatever items the two competent ministers refer to it.*

Despite Article VII of this agreement which states that the two parties shall exercise the same rights over territorial waters adjoining the Partitioned Zone, the boundary line which divides the territorial waters was not agreed even in the 1969 agreement. This was a source of disagreement between the two sides, especially in respect of the disputed sovereignty of the two islands, *Qaru* and *Umm Al Maradim*.

Nevertheless, the two countries have finally agreed on these issues, and signed an agreement on 2 July 2000 delimiting the boundary lines of the offshore area and determining the sovereignty of the two disputed islands (see Appendix IX). Article 1 of this agreement describes the line dividing the offshore area as follows:

*Article 1: The line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, which constitutes the dividing line between the area of each of the two states, runs from the land point on the shore (point Z) [which determined according to 1969 agreement, see Appendix VIII], with the geographical co-ordinates (28° 32' 2.488'' north and 48° 25' 59.019'' east) and runs through four points with the following co-ordinates:*

<i>Point</i>	<i>Latitude North</i>	<i>Longitude East</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>28° 38' 20''</i>	<i>48° 35' 48''</i>
<i>2</i>	<i>28° 39' 56''</i>	<i>48° 39' 50''</i>
<i>3</i>	<i>28° 41' 49''</i>	<i>48° 41' 18''</i>
<i>4</i>	<i>28° 56' 06''</i>	<i>49° 26' 42''</i>

*And from point No. 4, the line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone extends to the end of this line in an easterly direction. (Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000, p.70).*

The northern boundary line of the offshore area has been described in Article 2, which starts from the point on the land where the red circle ends with geographical co-ordinates 28° 49' 58.7'' north and 48° 17' 00.177'' east. They delimited this line according to the principle of equal distance from the low-tide line on the coast, without taking into consideration the locations of islands, shoals, and semi-submerged rocks. It is obvious here that Kuwait abandoned its position, since she originally wanted to use the islands of *Miskan*, *Filaka* and *Auha* as the base to calculate the equidistant line (Al-Mayyal 1986). The southern line of the offshore area has been described in Article 4. Regarding the ownership of natural resources in the offshore area, the agreement states in its Annex 1 that:

*The two contracting parties have agreed that their ownership of the natural resources in the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone shall be jointly shared, and this includes the islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim and the area lying between the northern line mentioned in Article 2 of the agreement and the adjusted course of the northern boundary, pursuant to Article 3 of the agreement.*

Although sovereignty over the disputed islands *Qaru* and *Umm el-Maradim* was not mentioned explicitly in this agreement, it is tacit in Article 1 which divided the offshore


area and as can be seen from the sketch map (figure 4.3) that these islands go to the Kuwaiti side. One issue remained undetermined in this agreement, namely that regarding measures and arrangements related to recreational fishing in the offshore area. Article 8 of the agreement states that an agreement over this issue shall be reached between specialist bodies in the two countries, but no action was taken.

#### **4.3.2 The Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary agreement**

On 22 February 1958 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain signed an agreement delimiting their offshore boundary. The agreement finally resolved the territorial disputes between the two countries over the two islands *Lubaynah al-Kabirah* and *Lubainah al-Saghirah*, and over the *Fasht Abu-Safah* hexagon as well (see Chapter 3). By this agreement, Bahrain relinquished its claims over *Lubaynah al-Kabirah* island and the hexagon (see figure 4.4). The agreement was “the first formally concluded agreement concerning the delineation of offshore boundaries in the Arabian Gulf” (Albaharnah 1975, p.306). It also represents a model in terms of achieving a peaceful solution to a territorial dispute. It contains six articles. Article 1 includes 16 paragraphs which delimits the maritime boundary line between the two countries (see Appendix X).

The agreement used three methods to delimit the boundary line. First, the agreement applied the unusual method of the ‘middle line’ by using headlands as starting points for the divided lines from points 1 to 7 and points 10 to 11 (see figure 4.4). This method is stated in Article 1 paragraphs 1 to 7 and paragraphs 10 to 11. The method of the ‘middle line’ is, however, extremely unusual nowadays, where more advance methods are available to delineate the maritime boundary using GPS, Delmar software or even the simple and much-favoured arcs of compass. The second method used in the agreement, is between the points 8 and 9 (see figure 4.4). In this method, they did not apply the ‘middle line’, instead they drew a line arbitrarily designed to solve the dispute over the two islands mentioned above. Therefore, the line from point 7 to point 8 is designed to assign *Lubainah al-Saghirah* island to Bahrain, and the line connecting point 9 to 10 is designed to assign *Lubaynah al-Kabirah* to Saudi Arabia. This is evident in paragraphs 8 and 9. The third method was to select points 12 to 14 as stated in paragraphs 12 to 14, to define the formerly disputed area, given in the treaty as co-ordinates of latitude and longitude.

Figure 4.4: Bahrain-Saudi maritime boundary 1958



Source: Blake (1991).

Paragraph 16 in Article 1 stated that in respect of the resulting line from point 1 on the map to point 14 what ever lies on the left (west) of this line belongs to Saudi Arabia, and whatever lies to the right (east) of the line belongs to Bahrain.

Article 2 in the agreement defined the six sides of the *Fasht Abu-Safah* hexagon, and stated that the sovereignty of this area as well as the administration rights will belong to Saudi Arabia. It also stipulated half of the net revenue of oil exploitation in this area should be granted to Bahrain:


*This area cited and defined above [Fasht Abu-Safah] shall be in the part falling to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area will be carried out in the way chosen by His Majesty on the condition that he grants to the Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the understanding that this does not infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the right of administration over this above-mentioned area.*

The construction of the King Fahad Causeway in 1987, resulted in a unique political landscape in which a maritime boundary passes through a small artificial island built in the middle of the causeway to contain the necessary services as a crossing point between the two countries (see figure 4.5).

### **4.3.3 The Saudi-U.A.E. boundary agreement**

The territorial dispute over the Buraimi Oasis was finally resolved when Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.. reached a binding agreement on 21 July 1974 (see figure 4.6). The dispute, which had lasted more than forty years, was between Saudi Arabia and the British authorities on behalf of the Sheikhs of the Trucial States. Resolution of the dispute was enabled by the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in 1971, and the agreement was registered with the United Nations in 1995 (Finnegan 1997).

Figure 4.5: Sketch map for KFC check-point services area



Source: The author.

The boundary line was determined in Article 2 by using co-ordinates for each turning point (see Appendix XI). However, the points from F- L were cancelled after signing the boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and Oman in 1990. That is because the Oman-Saudi boundary line starts from a point northeast of the point (E) of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary line (see figure 4.7). This has caused some overlapping between the two boundary lines and, in fact, some problems between the Saudis and the Emirates.

A beneficial aspect of this agreement lies in defining the boundary line with co-ordinates and in specifying the provisions for its demarcation. The agreement also sets out the way in which transboundary hydrocarbon resources should be allocated, as Article 3 states:

*Article 3:1. Hydrocarbon material located in Al-Shaibah-Zararah field shall be owned by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.*

*2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree to, and observe its obligation, not to carry out any search, drill for, invest or to profit from the hydrocarbon material, or give permission to do so, in the part of Shaybah-Zararah field which lies north of the border line.*


*3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or any company or establishment working under its name, shall be authorised to carry out search and drilling operations and invest and profit from the hydrocarbon material in that part of Al-Shaibah-Zararah field which lies north of the border line. Any agreement regarding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's carrying out such operation shall be agreed upon at a later time.*

Thus, according to this unusual agreement, the Shaibah-Zararah oilfield should be allocated in total to Saudi Arabia, because the majority of it lies within Saudi territory (see figure 4.6). Moreover, Article 4 stated that the two sides should apply the same principle to any oilfield of similar situation:

*Article 4: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall observe their obligation of stopping any drilling and investing or granting permission to do so the hydrocarbon material in that part of their territories in which the hydrocarbon field primarily extends inside the territory of the other state.*




Figure 4.6: Saudi-U.A.E. 1974 boundary and oil fields



Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1982), Geoprojects (no date).

**Figure 4.7: Saudi-U.A.E. boundary major turning points**



**Source:** The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1992).


This Article has continued to cause controversy in recent years. For example, the U.A.E. oil minister refused to attend the opening of Shaibah oilfield in March 1999 presumably because the U.A.E. has always regarded the 1974 treaty as having been imposed (EIU 1999).

Although the first paragraph in Article 5 (Appendix XI) determined the sovereignty of each State over some of the offshore islands, and even though paragraph 3 in the same article stated that both parties shall define the maritime boundary as soon as possible, this maritime boundary is still not precisely defined and remains a bone of contention between the two neighbours, especially with regards to what is mentioned in paragraph 3, which states that the territorial waters off Al-Hawaisat Island (see figure 4.8) should have free access to high seas. Another bizarre facet of the agreement was that upon certain islands (described as belonging to the U.A.E.), Saudi Arabia was allowed to erect “general purpose installations” (see Paragraph 2 of Article 5, Appendix XI).

Despite some of the ambiguities in the previous agreements, they were successful in setting out several rules and principles between the contracting parties and maintaining peace between the neighbouring states. Moreover, the impact of Saudi foreign policy was obvious on those agreements. For example, Saudi Arabia ceded the Buraimi oasis (see figure 4.6) to the Emirates after a prolonged claim of that area. Another example is the Bahrain-Saudi agreement in which Saudi Arabia agreed to give Bahrain half the net income of oil revenues extracted in the *Fasht Abu-Safah* hexagon (Blake 1991). We should also mention that Saudi Arabia kept this agreement secret and it was not released until registered with the UN in 1995. It is worth mentioning here that the Saudi government decided in 1991 to release boundary treaty texts with its neighbours (oral communication with Ewan Anderson 2001).

As stated in the text of two of the previous agreements, with Kuwait and U.A.E., the boundary lines between Saudi Arabia and the two neighbours were demarcated on the ground over different periods, as will be shown below.

**Figure 4.8: Saudi-Qatar maritime boundary**



Source: Alsaif (1990), with some modification.


#### **4.4 Demarcation of the Saudi boundaries**

Demarcating a boundary on the ground is very important for a number of reasons. First, by establishing the agreed boundary on the ground, it makes it less likely that any territorial disagreement will occur in future between the neighbouring countries. Second, the physical existence of the boundary line makes border management activities easier and more effective. For example, regarding security management, border guards on both sides can more easily plan and carry out their tasks along the border. Third, people on either side of the boundary, especially in densely populated areas and/or in areas where nomads are routinely crossing the border for grazing, a well-marked boundary makes those people aware of their location while moving. It should be noted, however, that boundaries in Arabia are usually demarcated every 2 or 3 km. Nowadays, the demarcation process is far more accurate than it was in the past. It involves much basic survey work, often including photogrammetry and the extensive use of global positioning (GPS).

An example of durable and accurate modern boundary demarcation will be presented before dealing with the Saudi boundaries. This example is the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary demarcation which started after the 1991 Gulf War when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 689 on 9 April 1991 (Schofield 1993). Based on that resolution, a five-member boundary demarcation commission was established in May 1991 and called the United Nations Iraq Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC). This commission immediately started its work to demarcate the boundary line precisely between Iraq and Kuwait based on 1963 Agreed Minutes between the two parties (see figure 4.9).


Using state-of-the-art surveying and mapping, the UNIKBDC undertook one of the most intensive demarcation yet. The outcome of their efforts was an accurately demarcated boundary line with all the necessary documentation and references that leave no room for any ambiguities or misunderstandings between the two neighbours. For example, the commission, besides locating the boundary pillars for boundary engineers to construct, documented them in different ways. First, they calculated the co-ordinates for

Figure 4.9: The Iraq-Kuwait boundary 1992





Source: UN, IKBDC (1992).

Figure 4.10: Boundary points of sections of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary



Source: UN, IKBDC (1992).

**Figure 4.11: A sample record of pillar 106 of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary**

UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT BOUNDARY DEMARCATION COMMISSION			1
<b>RECORD OF BOUNDARY PILLAR</b>			
PILLAR NO : <b>106</b>		REFERENCE MAPS : IKBDC Series 3 Sheet 14	
<b>GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES</b>			
	<b>LATITUDE</b>	<b>LONGITUDE</b>	
PILLAR	N 30 00 31.8988	E 47 57 15.8470	
WITNESS MARK 106 K	N 30 00 31.7136	E 47 57 15.0797	
WITNESS MARK 106 I	N 30 00 32.2919	E 47 57 16.4299	
WITNESS MARK 106 A	N 30 00 32.1758	E 47 57 15.6768	
WITNESS MARK 106 B	N 30 00 31.2472	E 47 57 16.2245	
GEODETTIC DATUM : Iraq Kuwait Boundary Datum 1992 (IKBD-92)			
ELLIPSOID : World Geodetic System, 1984 (WGS-84)			
<b>UTM COORDINATES : Zone 38</b>			
	<b>METRES NORTH</b>	<b>METRES EAST</b>	
PILLAR	3323443.97	784983.48	
WITNESS MARK 106 K	3323437.73	784963.06	
WITNESS MARK 106 I	3323456.48	784998.79	
WITNESS MARK 106 A	3323452.38	784978.70	
WITNESS MARK 106 B	3323424.16	784994.12	
			
View from pillar 106 towards pillar 105		View from pillar 106 towards boundary point 107	

Source: UN, IKBDC (1992).



each pillar precisely with the use of GPS. Second, they numbered each pillar on the ground very clearly. Third, they drew those pillars with their numbers on maps (see figure 4.10). Finally, each pillar has a single record showing information such as the reference map of that pillar, co-ordinates and geodetic datum. Moreover, the record contains co-ordinates for the witness marks for that particular pillar as can be seen from figure 4.11, which represents a sample record for pillar No. 106. In addition, it contains two photographs of the pillar showing the surrounding area and views towards the preceding and succeeding pillars. With such detailed documentation, any pillar destroyed in future could be easily and accurately relocated. The cost of the work of UNIKBDC ran to millions of dollars, equivalent to colossal sums for each pillar. Nevertheless, it is a model for modern boundary delimitation and demarcation.

Because access to meeting minutes of demarcation commissions of the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours was not possible, the author cannot judge the work undertaken by those commissions to make a valid comparison with the example given above. However, the three selected boundaries have co-ordinates for major turning points in the agreement texts. Moreover, those boundaries are not following a physical feature, as is the case of the western part of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq. Rather, they are artificial lines, i.e. they consist of straight lines connecting specific turning points.

#### **4.4.1 Demarcation of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary**

Surprisingly, neither the 1922 nor the 1965 agreements included any clauses regarding boundary demarcation between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Nevertheless, in 1982 the two countries decided to demarcate their shared boundary. The length of the line is about 220 kilometres (137 miles). It starts from a point at the seashore of the Arabian Gulf north of Alkhafji city (see figure 4.2) and ends up at the conjunction point of the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998 revealed that each mark used is made of 8 cm. wide (3 inches) steel tube erected in a square-shaped concrete base about 40 cm above the ground (see plate 4.1). Each tube is sealed with a plate showing the number of that particular mark (see plate 4.2). Beside each pillar, there is a witness mark also made of concrete, but as shown in plate 4.1, both the base of the pillar and the

witness mark have been severely affected by weathering. Moreover, those pillars and marks are not high enough off the ground, so they are not easy to see from a distance. In addition, the distance separating each pillar from the next one is about 700 metres.

#### **4.4.2 Demarcation of the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary**


Articles 6 and 7 of the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. (see Appendix XI) provided for the demarcation of the boundary. Five years later (in 1979), the boundary line of about 500 kilometres was demarcated from point A to point E. During fieldwork, the author saw that two types of demarcation markers were established. The major boundary points from point A to point E (see figure 4.7) are made of pyramid-shaped concrete pillars about one metre above the ground. Beside each of these concrete pillars is a witness post (see plates 4.3 and 4.4) showing the pillar number (A) or (B) as well as the direction of the previous and next pillars. A second type of marker intermediates the major points A-E. These intermediate markers, each a kilometre apart, are concrete pillars set on a round concrete base with a height of about one metre above the ground (see plates 4.5 and 4.6).

There is no intervisibility between pillars, partly because of the topography of the border area, and partly because of the physical construction of the pillars, especially the intermediates. The physical condition of the pillars is reasonable but, as can be seen from plates 4.3 and 4.5, weathering is proceeding. In some other places, especially where sand storms occur, the marks may disappear under the sands, after which they cannot be seen.


However, a Border Guard official told the author that there are unpublished agreements between the Saudi government and the governments of Kuwait and U.A.E. to renew those boundary marks in the near future and replace them with modern and more enduring types of pillars and marks.

#### **4.5 Cartographic records of the Saudi boundaries**

Adler (1995) emphasised the importance of maps, especially after demarcating the boundary line on the ground, for two purposes: to show the public the boundary line, and as an aid to boundary management and maintenance. One of the important elements of



**Plate 4.1: Point D-3 of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary line.**



**Plate 4.2: Point D-3 of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary line.**

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.




**Plate 4.3: Point A of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.**



**Plate 4.4: Point B of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.**

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.




**Plate 4.5: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.**



**Plate 4.6: Point A-B6 of the Saudi-UAE boundary line.**

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.

Figure 4.12: The Saudi-U.A.E. 1974 Boundary Agreement



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals (1992).

maps is scale. Therefore, as Adler stated, the best map scale after demarcating the boundary is 1:250,000 or larger, he wrote:

*“Map scale permitting, all demarcated boundary points ought to be shown, joined by a line symbol representing the exact course of the boundary between the points. One could say that a 1:250,000 and larger scale map would usually be able to show the demarcated points as well as the line.”* (Adler 1995, p.33).

Only two of the three Saudi boundary agreements have made provision for maps. The first, is the Bahrain-Saudi agreement in Articles 3 and 5, but it does not specify the scale of those maps. The second is the Saudi-U.A.E. agreement, which states in Article 2 that all the agreed boundary points should be depicted on a map with a scale of 1:500,000. However, this map shows only the major boundary markers from A-E as explained above, and the intermediate markers between the major points are not depicted on the map (see figure 4.12).

In their management practices, the Saudi Border Guards uses larger scale maps to 1:50,000 showing boundary lines very accurately. Those maps are heavily used in planning and conducting management tasks.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

From the above discussion, several observations can be made. First, the friendly Saudi foreign policy toward its GCC neighbours has played a major role in resolving boundary disputes peacefully. Despite some of the ambiguities in the boundary agreements and the fact that demarcation of those boundaries has sometimes taken place years after signing the agreements, especially with Kuwait, no major dispute has arisen between those countries regarding the exact position of the boundary line. However, the 1974 agreement with U.A.E. left some dissatisfaction among the Emirates because of the unusual arrangements regarding oilfields which straddle the border between the two countries. Second, the boundary lines are straight lines connecting points determined by coordinates, and in terms of boundary management, it is relatively easy to follow these lines on the ground and maintain their course. Third, the low intervisibility between boundary marks has had no serious effect on management practices or on the people crossing the

border, such as nomads. The Saudi Border Guards has utilised techniques on the ground, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter seven, that make the boundary line a very prominent feature. These techniques are building a sand-bank and a steel pipe along the border on the Saudi side to prevent vehicle intrusion and smuggling.

Fourth, the Saudi government practice of keeping boundary treaties secret for long time can be regarded as an unusual practice. Fifth, it is been noticed that there is an absence of institutional arrangements between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, except the committee mentioned above (the Kuwaiti-Saudi Joint Committee) to manage the exploitation of natural resources in the Partitioned Zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The ongoing political management needs a framework for both routine management purposes, as well as crisis management and friction over practical issues that may occur at the border. These institutions would discuss such matters and help resolve problems efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere without having to take those issues to higher authorities. Such institutions exist for several borders in the world. For example, there is the International Boundary Commission between Canada and USA, which consists of two members, one from each country. The main tasks of this commission include:

*“periodic inspection of the boundary, repairing and replacing damaged boundary markers, maintaining a cleared vest through the vegetation along the line and helping in the resolution of disputes that involve the boundary as they arise.”* (Biger 1995, p.144).

Finally, several positive aspects can be emphasised. The political atmosphere between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is enormously encouraging where political goodwill is present and stable relations are prevailing. The delimitation documents of the Saudi boundaries are generally good, and the demarcation complete and legally effective. However, in the boundary treaties and agreements, there is no provision for trouble-shooting and dealing with what Jones (1945) has called ‘friction’. Moreover, there is no permanent body to be pro-active in encouraging transboundary initiatives, such as environmental and protected amenities for tourists and visitors.



## References

- Adler, R.(1995), *Positioning and Mapping International Boundaries*, Boundary and Territory Briefing, Vol. 2 No. 1, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, Durham.
- Albaharnah, H. (1968), *The Legal Status of The Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and their International Problems*, Oceana Publications, Manchester.
- Alsaif, H. (1990), *Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Analytical Study in Political Geography*, (in Arabic) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Girls' College, Riyadh.
- Al-Mayyal, A. (1986), *The Political Boundaries of The State of Kuwait: A Study in Political Geography*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London.
- Al-Mihairy, S. (1999), *The GCC Procession: Goals, Performance and Achievements*, (in Arabic), The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Dubai.
- Al-Qabba, A. (1986), *Saudi Foreign Policy*, (in Arabic), Alfarazdaq, Riyadh.
- Biger, G. (1995), *The Encyclopaedia of International Boundaries*, Facts On File, New York.
- Blake, G. (1991), "International Boundaries of Arabia: The Peaceful Resolution of Disputes" in N. Kliot & S. Waterman (eds.), *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, Belhaven Press, London, pp. 153-65.
- Blake, G. (1994), "The Mapping of International Boundaries", *Society of Cartographic Bulletin*, V.28, pp. 1-7.
- Blake, G. (1998), "The objectives of land boundary management", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol.6, No. 3, IBRU, pp. 55-59.
- Boundary and Security Bulletin (2000), "Border agreement signed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 2 July 2000 demarcating their offshore Neutral Zone border", Vol. 8, No.3, IBRU, pp. 69-71.
- Brownlie, I. (1979), *African Boundaries: A legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia*, C. Hurst & Company, London.

- Cordesman, A. H. (1997), *Saudi Arabia: Guarding The Desert Kingdom*, Westview Press, Bolder.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (1999), *United Arab Emirates*, Country Report, 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter 1999.
- Finnegan, P. (1997), "Gulf Council Seeks Resolution of Border Disputes", *Defence News*, Vol. 12 Part 16, pp. 54-56.
- Geoprojects (no date), *Map of Saudi Arabia, Scale 1:3,500,000*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Reading.
- International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1982), PennWell Publishing Co., Tulsa.
- Jones, S. B. (1945), *Boundary Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.
- Nakkleh, E. (1986), *The Gulf Co-operation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Praeger Publisher, New York.
- Roberts, J. (2000), "The Saudi-Yemeni boundary treaty", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, International Boundaries Unit, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 70-73.
- Schofield, R. (1993), *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
- The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1992), *Saudi Arabia 1:500,000*, Maps, Sheets NG 39-SE, NF 39-NE, NF 40-NW.
- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, (Arabic), Vol. 61, Issue No. 2988, 11/11/1983.
- Wilson, P. W. & D. F. Graham (1994), *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Management of Access for People**

## 5.1 Introduction

The movement of people across international boundaries is affected largely by governments' management practices at their boundaries as well as by the international relations between neighbouring states. If the relationship between two neighbouring states is amicable then the governments' policies toward each other are likely to be more co-operative and their boundaries are likely to be more open. Consequently, the regulations and restrictions at the check-points are at a minimum level, which means reasonably easy access and flow for people.

This chapter will examine the management practices regarding the access for people between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, and how those practices have been affected by the GCC's general policies. It will also answer the question as to what degree those boundaries are open. Several variables have been used to evaluate the degree of open-ness, such as the time consumed by travellers at the selected check-points and the frequency of crossing the border.

Although the GCC was established seventeen years ago, which is a reasonable time in which to make significant progress in the course of regional co-operation, the member states have reached only one multilateral agreement on economic matters, which is the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA). The agreement was signed and ratified in 1981 and released to the public. There are bilateral agreements, such as the Security Agreement, which will be discussed in Chapter seven.

## 5.2 The Unified Economic Agreement

The UEA is wide ranging in scope, and includes issues of trade, customs, movement of capital and individuals, and development. However, the important principles, which are relevant to this study, are those stated in Articles 1-6, Articles 8 and 18 (See Appendix V). In Article 8, the Member States have agreed upon:

*Executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens without any discrimination of differentiation in the following fields:*

- 1- Freedom of movement, work and residence.*
- 2- Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.*
- 3- Freedom of exercising economic activity.*

4- *Free movement of capital.* (GCC no date, p.6).

Article 18 states that means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the Member States should be accorded equally when transiting or entering territory of those States, including exemption from all duties and taxes. To evaluate those principles it is important to review the progress made since 1981, especially on the movement of people on the Saudi side.

The GCC States have made a little progress in respect of the free movement of people across the border, as stated in the above-mentioned Article 8. Although citizens of the GCC do not require a visa to enter Saudi Arabia and are exempted from having permission to stay and work in the Kingdom as required from all foreigners (Interview with Aldawsary, 1997), they still have to present their passports at the check-points as the only accepted document for passage. It seems that the Saudi authorities are not keen to apply the ID as an accepted document for travelling, perhaps for security reasons as the interview with the legal advisor of the Director of Saudi Passport Control revealed:

*“There were some technical aspects regarding how to deal with the computer systems available to the other GCC states before applying the ID cards as a valid document for travelling, and because recently there is a new technology in using electronically read passports, which is far better than the ID cards practised bilaterally by some of the GCC Members. With the electronically read passports one can read all the data related to travellers, and even travellers can use it to travel abroad. Moreover, there is a multilateral agreement between the GCC members to use the electronically read passports, therefore the General Directorate of Passport Control is now undergoing a project to put the electronically read passport in progress”* (Interview with Aldawsary, 1997).


However, this project has still not been put in motion yet. It is worth mentioning here that some GCC countries have bilaterally agreed to accept the citizenship ID as an accepted document for crossing their borders. Citizens of Oman and U.A.E can now cross their shared boundaries without passports. In addition, citizens of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and U.A.E can do the same. These bilateral agreements between these countries have been blessed by the Supreme Council of the GCC in the Communiqué of the last Summit in Riyadh in November 1999:

*“The Supreme Council has blessed the agreements between Oman and UAE, Qatar and UAE, and Bahrain and Kuwait regarding the movement of their respective citizens between their countries by using the ID, and has regarded this as an important step towards enhancing the co-operation between the GCC states, deepening the bonds between their people, and representing a progress in relationships to the level that fulfils the aspirations of the GCC’s people.” (Al-Jazeera 1999, p.1).*

Nevertheless, the volume of people moving between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours has noticeably increased after the UEA, especially between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and Kuwait, as figures 5.1 and 5.2 show. The number of Saudi people travelling to Bahrain increased from 94,000 in 1982 to about 1.6 million in 1996. This increase in travellers can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the establishment of the Causeway and its opening in 1987 greatly facilitated the movement of people from the Saudi side to the Bahraini side and vice versa. Before the opening of the Causeway, people were travelling by sea and air, but air transportation captured more than 70% of travellers (Aljarad and Black 1995). Second, the geographical proximity of Bahrain Island to the eastern part of Saudi Arabia as well as the rest of the Gulf States has made it easier for people to travel. More detailed analysis for these reasons will be attempted later in this chapter. Whilst the number of Saudi travellers to Kuwait was about 270,000 in 1982, it dropped markedly to 88,000 in 1991. This decline was mainly due to the second Gulf War (1991). However, the number of Saudi travellers started to increase gradually when the war ended, from about 430,000 in 1992 to approximately 460,000 people in 1996. Saudi travellers to the rest of the GCC, like U.A.E, Qatar and Oman have never exceeded 200,000 (see figure 5.1). Nevertheless, travelling to the Emirates has increased from around 33,000 in 1982 to about 189,000 in 1985. The increase of traveller numbers began after the second Gulf War from 1992. The two most important factors contributing to this increase are the flourishing tourism industry, and business events, such as conferences and exhibitions, that take place occasionally in the Emirates.


Far fewer GCC nationals travel into Saudi Arabia, in general, than the number of Saudi nationals going out to the GCC States, as figure 5.2 illustrates. This is largely because of differences in population size between the Member States, although some additional factors are discussed below.

Figure 5.1: Saudi departures to GCC States 1982-1996



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Yearbook, several Volumes (1982-1996)

Figure 5.2: GCC's nationals arrivals to Saudi Arabia 1982-1996



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Yearbook, several volumes (1982-1996)



The number of Bahraini travellers increased from 47,000 in 1982 to around 760,000 in 1987, due to the opening of the Causeway in 1987. In 1991, the Gulf War caused the number to drop to about 380,000. Numbers rose again in the following years, reaching approximately 880,000 in 1996. The number of Kuwaiti people entering Saudi Arabia increased gradually from 22,000 in 1982 to about 270,000 in 1990, but because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the number jumped dramatically in 1991 to over one million people as refugees displaced by the conflict flooded into Saudi Arabia. Afterwards, the number dropped to 650,000 in 1993 but started to increase at a steady pace until 1996 when the travellers' numbers reached 775,000. For other GCC nationals, the number of arrivals has never exceeded 270,000. The effect of the Gulf War is very clear on those travellers in 1991 as figure 5.2 shows.

The analysis above shows that the movements of people between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC's members are varied. To understand those movements in more detail, a survey was undertaken along the three selected check-points with Kuwait, Bahrain and U.A.E. A thorough analysis of those movements is presented below.

### **5.3 Access for people**

The characteristics of the people travelling across the border, such as their age, sex, occupation, as well as some other variables such as the time consumed at check-points, are sometimes unobtainable from official statistics. Thus, a survey to obtain this type of information about travellers was necessary for this study. A sample of 597 people (265 arrivals and 332 departures), was randomly chosen. The sample size was determined according to the number of people crossing the check-points on selected days of the week (see the table in Appendix XII). However, some travellers (about 10% of the total sample size) did not respond as shown in table 5.1. The total outcome of the survey was 535 people responded (90%), 244 arrivals and 291 departures (see table 5.1). The author spent two weeks at Alkhafji and Albateha check-points, and 10 days at KFC to administer questionnaires according to the required sample size. As argued above, the total sample size is believed to be large enough to represent the population (i.e. travellers).

The random sample was set up according to the situation at a particular time at each check-point. For example, if there was a heavy movement of people during one day, the author selected every fifth person coming through the check-point. However, if the movement was low with few people coming through, the author selected every third person. This difference in the range of the sampling was to gather sufficient data to achieve the required sample size, and to minimise delay at the check-point.

**Table 5.1: The sample size for each check-point**

<b>Check-Point</b>	<b>Alkhafji</b>	<b>(K.F.Causeway)</b>	<b>Albateha</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Arrivals</b>				
Sample Size	103	86	76	265
(Responded)	<b>103</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>244</b>
(%)	<b>(100%)</b>	<b>(87%)</b>	<b>(87%)</b>	<b>(92%)</b>
<b>Departures</b>				
Sample Size	92	127	113	332
(Responded)	<b>84</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>291</b>
(%)	<b>(91%)</b>	<b>(84%)</b>	<b>(88%)</b>	<b>(88%)</b>
<b>Total</b>				
Sample Size	195	213	189	597
(Responded)	<b>187</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>535</b>
(%)	<b>(96%)</b>	<b>(85%)</b>	<b>(88%)</b>	<b>(90%)</b>

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998. The sample size is based on the table in Appendix XII.

Each selected individual was given a questionnaire form to fill in. The form in Appendix I was given to the departures, and the form in Appendix II was given to the arrivals at each check-point. In a few cases the respondent was unable to fill in the questionnaire form himself, and so the author undertook to fill in those forms.

### **5.3.1 General characteristics of the travellers**

Travellers' characteristics such as age, sex, occupation, and mode of transportation will help to analyse access for people, especially whether there are any apparent associations with patterns of time consumed at check-points. Before going into details about those characteristics it is important to explain the following point. The author was eager to include a question about gender in the questionnaire, but unfortunately, there was an apparent bias in the results. The survey results revealed that a very small

fraction of the respondents chose the 'female' box, which contradicts the answers of the question number six (see Appendix I) about the companions of the travellers. Table 5.3 shows that the percentage of people who are travelling with their families for all departures is 28%, and the percentage for the same category for all arrivals is 39%. The proportion of females for all departures was only 2%, and for arrivals 1% (see table 5.2). To explain this bias in the survey results, the author believes that all male respondents accompanied by their families filled in the questionnaire themselves and this is why they chose the 'male' box.

The other characteristics of travellers, such as their companions, age, occupation and mode of transportation are set out below. First, regarding the travellers' companions, the survey revealed that for all the arrivals at the three check-points about 39% of them were accompanied by their family, 31% accompanied by friends, and 28% were travelling on their own. For all the departures, about 41% travelled with friends, 30% by themselves, and 28% with families (see table 5.3).


The situation differs for each check-point. At Alkhafji, 36% of arrivals travelled with friends, and 35% with their families, whilst 46% of departures were accompanied by their families and 30% travelled by themselves (see figure 5.3 a, b). For KFC, 51% of arrivals were accompanied by their families and 32% of them were accompanied by friends, whilst 49% of departures travelled with friends and 34% of them travelled by themselves (see figure 5.3 c, d). At Albateha check-point, 39% of arrivals travelling by themselves, and 32% of them travelled with their families. For departures, 48% travelled with friends and 27% by themselves (see figure 5.3 e, f).

**Table 5.2: Sex of groups according to the travellers' answers**

	Arrivals				Departures			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
<b>Alkhafji</b>	101	98%	2	2%	83	100%	0	0
<b>KFC</b>	70	97%	2	3%	105	99%	1	1%
<b>Albateha</b>	63	98%	1	2%	96	99%	1	1%
<b>Total</b>	234	98%	5	2%	284	99%	2	1%

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Figure 5.3: Travellers' companions**



▨ By himself	▩ With family
▧ With friends	□ Other

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

At Alkhafji, the check point with Kuwait, the majority of departures are travelling with their families. For the arrivals the pattern is rather different. The majority of arrivals at Alkhafji were with friends, at KFC most of them were with families and at Albateha most of the arrivals were by themselves. This can be better appreciated when contrasted with the following results of other characteristics.

**Table 5.3: Travellers' companions**

Arrivals								
Check-Points	By himself		With family		With friends		Other	
Alkhafji	29	28%	36	35%	38	36%	1	1%
KFC	13	17%	38	51%	24	32%	0	0
Albateha	26	39%	21	32%	13	20%	6	9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>31%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3%</b>
Departures								
Alkhafji	25	30%	38	46%	20	24%	0	0
KFC	36	34%	17	16%	53	49%	1	1%
Albateha	27	27%	25	25%	47	48%	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1%</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Table 5.4: Nationalities of travellers**

Arrivals																
Check-Points	Saudi		Kuwaiti		Bahraini		Qatari		Emirates		Omani		Other Arab		Non-Arab	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Alkhafji	0	0	89	86	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	2	2
KFC	0	0	9	12	52	70	2	3	0	0	0	0	9	11	2	3
Albateha	0	0	3	5	10	15	4	6	20	30	4	6	22	34	3	5
Departures																
Alkhafji	67	80	0	0	8	10	1	1	2	2	0	0	3	4	3	4
KFC	81	77	5	5	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	6	6	10	10
Albateha	55	55	2	2	2	2	13	13	0	0	2	2	23	23	2	2

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Second, regarding travellers' age groups, the survey showed that the predominant age group of travellers, both arrivals and departures at the three check-points, is 20-40 years (see figures 5.4, a-h) and they represented no less than 68% at any check-point.

Then come the people between 40 and 60 years. The remaining two groups, which are less than 20 and over 60 years, formed not more than 2% and 9% respectively. This is explained by regulations in Saudi Arabia forbidding people under 18 years to travel on their own, regardless of gender. Young people must be accompanied by one or both of their parents or close relatives, or in exceptional cases with written consent from a guardian *in loco parentis*.

Third, in respect to travellers' occupation, there are four main occupations which are: students; government employees; private employees; and self-employed. For all the arrivals, 49% are government employees, 19% are private employees, 15% are students and 13% are self-employed. For all the departures, 34% are privately employed, 32% are government employed, and 15% are self-employed and students (see figure 5.5 g, h). For the Alkhafji check-point the major category for arrivals are government employees, which forms 65%. For departures at the same check-point the major category is private employees, which makes 31%, followed by government employees forming 30% of travellers (see figure 5.5 a, b). At KFC, the main group among the arrivals are government employees, while private employees form the major group among the departures, forming 44% and 48% respectively (see figure 5.5 c, d). Finally, the government employed group forms 29% of the arrivals at Albateha, and the same group constitutes 36% of the departures (see figure 5.5 e, f).

The fourth characteristic of travellers, which the survey revealed, is the mode of transportation. The survey showed that 41% of all arrivals travelled in small cars and the same percentage travelled by mini bus. For all departures, 66% travelled in small cars, and 28% by mini bus (see figure 5.6 g, h). For all the three check-points, as figures (5.6 a-f) show, small cars and mini buses are the predominant mode of transportation for travellers, except for the arrivals at Albateha, where 33% of the people travelled by bus.

The final characteristic is the nationality of travellers, and here it should be noted that the author used a method to avoid selecting respondents more than once at every check-point as follows. For both departures and arrivals, the returning home respondents in one direction were not selected for the fear that they might have been chosen in the other direction. For example, among the departures at KFC all nationals were selected except from Bahraini nationals, because possibly they might be chosen

when they arrived at the Saudi side. While among the arrivals at KFC, all nationals were selected except from Saudi nationals, for the same reason, i.e. they could have been selected among the departures. The result of the survey showed the following composition of nationality.



**Table 5.5: National and non-national population in Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours (1000s people)**

Country	National		Non-national		Total
	Number	%	Number	%	
Bahrain *	363	66	187	34	550
Kuwait **	656	42	920	58	1,576
Saudi Arabia ***	12,306	73	4,625	27	16,931
U.A.E. ****	228	12	1,672	88	1,900

*Source: \* 1992 estimates, Library of Congress Country Studies. \*\* 1995 census preliminary results, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstracts, 1998. \*\*\* The Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Preliminary results of 1992 Census. \*\*\*\* 1991 estimates, Library of Congress country studies.*

At Alkhafji, 86% of arrivals were Kuwaiti and 10% other Arabs (see table 5.4). Bahrainis and non-Arabs formed 2% each. At KFC, 70% of arrivals were Bahraini, 12% were Kuwaiti, and 11% other Arabs, while non-Arabs formed only 3%. At Albateha, 34% of travellers were other Arabs, and 30% Emirates. Other nationalities including Bahraini 15%, Qatari 6%, Omani 6%, Kuwaiti 5%, and non-Arabs 5%. From table 5.5 one can notice that non-nationals representing more than 50% in Kuwait and more than 80% in U.A.E. For departures at Alkhafji, 80% were Saudi, 10% Bahraini, 4% other Arabs and non-Arabs each. At KFC, 77% of departures were Saudi, 10% were non-Arabs, 6% other Arabs, and 5% Kuwaiti. At Albateha, 55% were Saudi, 23% other Arabs, and 13% were Qatari. There were some Omani, Bahraini, Kuwaiti, and non-Arabs formed 2% each. The above composition shows that most of the departures were Saudi at all the three check-points, and most arrivals were the nationals of the original country except at Albateha where most of them were other Arabs. The author observed that at Albateha, most of the other Arabs were employees in the Emirates and going to their home countries, the majority from Syria, for a holiday.



**Figure 5.4: Travellers' age groups**



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.




**Figure 5.5: Travellers' occupations**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Figure 5.6: Travellers' modes of transportation**



Small car
  Mini bus
  Bus
  Other

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

### **5.3.2 Check-Point infrastructures**

Infrastructure here means the formalities, facilities and amenities available at each check-point. Infrastructure is very important in studying any border, for it affects the access for people and goods, either positively or negatively. The three selected check-points vary in their infrastructures, especially facilities and amenities as illustrated below.

The first check-point is Alkhafji, which is one of two official Saudi check-points with Kuwait. The other one is Alriqai, which is located near the tripoint of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia-Kuwait boundaries, designated for pilgrims during the Haj or for travellers from Kuwait to northern Arab countries such as Syria. Alkhafji is designated for travellers from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia or to the other GCC countries. However, the Alkhafji check-point lies about 6 kilometres north of Alkhafji city on the western shore of the Arabian Gulf. The government authorities responsible for managing this check-point are the Customs Department and Passport Control. The Customs Department is responsible for checking (the people's) vehicles as well as commercial vehicles; (i.e. trucks), for both arrivals and departures. For the departures, they check the registrations of cars to verify their ownership. This procedure takes a few minutes, and the drivers pass through certain booths, which are equipped with modern computers. However, for the arrivals the checking procedures are more time consuming, where travellers have to stop their cars in designated areas. At this point, the Customs officials check not just vehicle registration, but also travellers' bags and belongings, even in some cases the car bodies, to make sure that there are no illegal materials being smuggled. There is a wide range of materials which are considered as illegal or prohibited, such as drugs, all types of weapons and explosives, alcoholic beverages, pornographic materials and certain types of publication. These illegal materials will be discussed in detail in Chapter seven.

Passport Control takes care of checking travellers' passports and identities. For departures, the travellers have to stop their cars and go inside the building where the Passport officials work. The time consumed here varies according to different situations. For example, during holidays the movement of people is greater than on normal days, or during some special occasions such as a sports tournament, as

illustrated in the following sections. Adding to these situations, the computer systems of Passport Control sometimes experience technical problems or break down. In such circumstances, additional delays will occur. For arrivals, the same previous procedures exist.

In respect to the available facilities and amenities at this check point, the author has observed the following. First, although there are some amenities such as toilets and a mosque available for travellers, other types of amenities, such as a medical care centre, a bank and restaurant or cafeteria, are not available (see table 5.5). Second, the working area for Passport Control is rather small and when many people come to check their passports, the place becomes very crowded and, even though it is air-conditioned, during summer when the temperature is 40°C or more, travellers suffer.

The second check-point is that at the King Fahad Causeway (KFC). This check-point is located at a point at the Causeway where the maritime boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain intersects. The formalities at KFC are almost the same as at Alkhafji except that outgoing travellers do not have to leave their cars to complete the procedures for crossing the border. There is only one exception which is after checking ladies' passports by male personnel, their identities have to be checked at a private office by female personnel, because women in Saudi Arabia according to Islamic teachings wear veils to cover their faces. The author observed that this process takes no more than 5 to 10 minutes at most. For departures, all cars pass through a number of booths distributed along different lanes, so each lane can receive as many cars as possible. All the booths are equipped with modern computer systems. For the arrivals, there are booths for checking passports but after passing through them, the travellers have to stop their cars for Customs clearance. This check point is well equipped in terms of its facilities and amenities. A wide range of amenities are available at KFC, as can be seen from table 5.5, except for petrol stations.

The Albateha check-point is the only official check point along the border between Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. This check-point is located about 270 kilometres to the south east of Al Hufuf, the administrative centre for Al Hasa district. The formalities there are much the same as the previous check-points. As at Alkhafji check-point, travellers at this check-point have to leave their cars to complete the necessary regulations for their passage, in both directions, arrival and departure. There are some amenities within

the check-point area (see table 5.6), such as a mosque, toilets and a cafeteria. However, other types of amenities, such as a medical centre, a bank, and a petrol station are located within walking distance outside the check-point area. The author observed that there are no restaurants or sunshades, especially for departures. Officials at Albateha told the author about the major problems faced at this check-point. For instance, because of the relative remoteness of this check-point from the urban centres, there was a lack of some vital infrastructures, such as no connection with national electricity grids, no wired-communication available, and no water networks. With regard to electricity, for instance, the check-point is powered by petrol operated generators, and interruption in power supply is common. This has tremendously affected the operational aspect in this check-point, which in turn affects the movement of people especially during the busy periods and in summer.


**Table 5.6: Amenities available at every check-point**

Check-Point	Mosque	Petrol station	Bank	Restau-rant	Café-teria	Medical centre	Waiting area	Sun shades	Toilets
Alkhafji	✓	×	×	×	✓	×	✓	✓	✓
KFC	✓	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Albateha	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	✓	×	✓

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

An important aspect regarding infrastructure are the main roads that connect Saudi Arabia with its three GCC neighbours. As shown in figure 4.2, there is a good network of roads that connect the major cities in Saudi Arabia with the GCC countries. They are all in good condition, except the one connecting the Al Hasa region with Qatar and U.A.E. The author travelled along this road, which is about 300 kilometres (186 miles) from Hafuf to Albateha check-point, and found that it is so narrow and in poor repair that road traffic accidents often occur on this road. The other roads, especially the one connecting Al-Khubar with Manamah, through the causeway (see figure 5.7), are excellent. The one connecting Alkhafji check-point with the rest of the eastern cities in Saudi Arabia is in good condition.

**Figure 5.7: King Fahad Causeway**



**Source: Farsi (no date).**

### 5.3.3 Monthly movement of people

The volume of people travelling through the three check-points varies from month to month, and from one check-point to another. This variation can be attributed to several factors. According to the information gathered from the officials as well as from the people, the number of travellers tends to increase during holidays, weekends and when special events are taking place in any of the GCC neighbouring states.

Figure 5.8 shows the monthly movement of Saudi nationals travelling to Kuwait at Alkhafji for two years, 1997 and 1998. During April and August, especially in 1998, the numbers of people increased to approximately 26,000 and 24,000 respectively. These two months, in these two years, coincided with two holidays in Saudi Arabia. In April was the Haj holiday, and in August was the summer holiday. The same pattern can be seen in figure 5.9 for the non-Saudi arrivals from Kuwait.

The monthly volume and pattern of Saudi departures to Bahrain differ from Alkhafji. Figure 5.10 shows that the number of Saudis who departed for Bahrain in 1977 gradually increased from 33,000 in January, to about 160,000 in April, coinciding with the Haj holiday. In August (summer holiday) the same year, the number rose to around 180,000, then fell in August and after. In the next year (1998), the number of Saudis jumped from 50,000 in January, to about 210,000 in March, and this month does not coincide with any holiday. Then it fell in May to about 100,000. In November, the figure increased again up to around 150,000. Another factor may explain this increase in the number of travellers at KFC, which is the geographical proximity of Bahrain to the major cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. The monthly movement of non-Saudi arrivals from Bahrain is shown in figure 5.11. The rise in travellers' numbers, for both years, occurred in the months February, April, May July and August. This pattern emphasises the effect of holidays on the volume of travellers.

The volume of Saudi departures to the Emirates is far less than those to Kuwait and Bahrain. The geographical distance, where the people from the major Saudi cities have to travel for a rather long distance to the Emirates, may explain this. For Saudi departures (see figures 5.12), in July 1997 the number of people reached about 26,000,

Figure 5.8: Monthly Saudi departures at Alkhafji 1997-1998




Figure 5.9: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Alkhafji 1997-1998




Figure 5.10: Monthly Saudi departures at KFC 1997-1998





Figure 5.11: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at KFC 1997-1998



— 1997 — 1998

Source: The Saudi Customs Department, unpublished statistics 1997-1998.



Figure 5.12: Monthly Saudi departures at Al-Bateha 1997-1998





Figure 5.13: Monthly non-Saudi arrivals at Al-Bateha 1997-1998



— 1997 — 1998

Source: The Saudi Customs Department, unpublished statistics 1997-1998.

and in April 1998 they reached about 21,000 people. Here both months coincided with holidays. The number of non-Saudi arrivals (figure 5.13) also witnessed an increase in two months, April and July, especially in 1998.

### 5.3.4 Travellers' frequency of crossing the border

It is important to know how many times a traveller crosses to the other side of the border, for it reflects, to some extent, the degree of flexibility at the check-points. The easier the crossing, the more people are likely to travel repeatedly to the other side, especially, of course, borderland dwellers. Table 5.7 shows the number of people who cross the border in four categories yearly, monthly, weekly and daily. The figures in this table illustrate that the majority of travellers cross the borders on a yearly basis, 47% for all arrivals and 53% for all departures. Those travellers who cross on a monthly, weekly and daily basis, for all arrivals, form 35%, 12% and 6% respectively. For all departures, 26% cross on a monthly basis, 16% and 5% on a weekly and daily basis.

**Table 5.7: Travellers' frequency of crossing the border**

Arrivals								
Check-Points	Yearly		Monthly		Weekly		Daily	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Alkhafji	32	31	46	45	17	17	7	7
KFC	27	38	29	40	9	12	8	11
Albateha	53	82	10	15	2	3	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>
Departures								
Alkhafji	41	49	29	35	12	14	2	2
KFC	36	34	29	27	30	28	11	10
Albateha	74	77	16	17	5	5	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Figure 5.14 (a-c) shows the pattern of the frequency of crossing the border at each check-point for both arrivals and departures. At Alkhafji, those crossing on a yearly basis represent the majority of departures (see figure 5.14, a), i.e. 49% of departures (see table 5.7). Those who cross the border on a monthly bases represent 35%, and the rest of people, 16% cross the border weekly and daily. Arrivals are rather different,

where 45% of them cross on a monthly basis, and 31% on a yearly basis, whilst 17% and 7% cross on a weekly and daily basis respectively. Despite the yearly and monthly travellers representing the majority, weekly and daily crossings are relatively high because Kuwait is not very far from some major cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia, comparing the same two categories with Albateha check-point with the Emirates, as shown below.

At KFC (see figure 5.14, b), the pattern is different and despite the majority of departures (34%) crossing on a yearly basis, those who travel on a weekly basis represent 28% of the departures (see previous table). The proportion of people (10% of travellers) who cross on a daily basis is higher. The greatest proportion of arrivals (40%) cross the border on a monthly basis, followed by those who cross yearly (38%). Those who cross on a weekly and daily basis represent 12% and 11%. One can notice that the weekly and daily crossings at KFC are higher than the other two check-points because of the geographical proximity of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia.

At Albateh check-point (see figure 5.14, c), the pattern differs from the previous two check-points. A majority of travellers cross the border on a yearly basis: 82% of arrivals and 77% of departures. Next are people who cross on a monthly basis: 15% and 17% for arrivals and departures respectively, whilst those who travel on a weekly basis represent only 2% of arrivals and 5% of departures. No-one crosses the border daily as an arrival, and only 1% crosses daily as a departure (see previous table). This affirms the effect of geographical distance on the frequency of travelling.

### **5.3.5 People's purpose of travelling**

The survey revealed that the travellers using the three check-points have a wide range of purposes. However, at each crossing-point some types of purpose dominate. At Alkhafji, it is obvious from figure 5.15 (a, b) that 'visiting relations' is the main purpose for travellers in both directions. It forms about 40% of arrivals, and 70% of departures. Family ties on both sides of the border can explain this. This boundary, as are most boundaries in Arabia, was originally a superimposed one, and it has divided some tribes between the two sides of the border, as Al-Ghamdi (1999) revealed in his study at the Saudi border with Yemen, that 89% of travellers crossing the border to

visit their relatives. Therefore, it is not surprising to see this type of familial contact across the Saudi border with its GCC neighbours.

At KFC on the other hand, the dominant purpose is 'leisure' (see figure 5.15 c, d), which forms about 35% of arrivals and 50% of departures. A different pattern can be noticed at Albateha where 40% of the arrivals are travelling to visit their relatives and 39% of departures are travelling for leisure (see figure 5.15 e, f and table 5.8).

For the other types of purpose, from figure 5.15 (a-f) and the previous table we can notice that 'trading' engages 12% of the arrivals at KFC and less than 10% for the other check-points, in both directions. The highest percentage for 'study' is at Alkhafji, which constitutes 5% of travellers. The author discovered that some Saudi students, most of whom are women, study in Kuwait. This is because Alkhafji City, Kuwait, which lies about 60 km away, is closer to them than the nearest Saudi university, which lies about 380 km away. The travellers for 'work' represent 8% at both Alkhafji and KFC, while at Albateha they represent 12% of the arrivals. For the departures, they represent 6% of travellers at Alkhafji, 11% at KFC, and 18% at Albateha.


**Table 5.8: The purpose of travelling**

Arrivals												
Check-Points	Trading		Work		Study		Leisure		Visiting Relatives		Other	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Alkhafji</b>	4	4	8	8	5	5	22	21	46	45	18	17
<b>KFC</b>	9	12	6	8	1	1	27	36	15	20	16	22
<b>Albateha</b>	3	5	8	12	1	2	12	18	28	42	14	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>20</b>
Departures												
<b>Alkhafji</b>	1	1	5	6	4	5	13	15	59	70	2	2
<b>KFC</b>	6	6	12	11	3	3	56	53	13	12	16	15
<b>Albateha</b>	9	9	18	18	2	2	39	39	22	22	10	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>10</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.


The last category of purposes, 'other', forms 22% and 20% at KFC and Albateha respectively. More details about other purposes can be found in Appendix (XVI).

Figure 5.14: Frequency of crossings




Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Figure 5.15: Purpose of travelling



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Figure 5.15: Purpose of travelling



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.


### 5.3.6 Travellers' trip origin and destination

One of the questions in the questionnaire was about travellers' origin of departures, and another question about their trip destination. These two questions revealed how far the travellers were long-distance or borderland dwellers although there problems in defining 'borderlanders'. The distance from the border which may be defined as borderland varies according to local geography, population density, and economic activity. It may be therefore range from one km to 40 or 50 km. First, as to trip origin of arrivals to Alkhafji from Kuwait, 32% of them came from Kuwait City, which lies about 100 Kilometres (62 miles) from Alkhafji check-point (see table 5.9). Surprisingly, only 3 people (3%) came from cities or towns which are near the border namely Saud Port (20 kilometres or 12 miles) and Alwafrah (9 kilometres or 6 miles) as shown in figure 5.16. The remaining travellers came from cities and towns, such as Sabah Assalim (6%), Assabahiah (6%), and Aljahra (5%), which lie more than 60 kilometres from Alkhafji check-point. This means that the majority of travellers are not borderlanders. For the departures from Alkhafji to Kuwait, 15% of travellers came from Alkhafji city, which lies about 8 kilometres (5 miles) from Alkhafji check-point. These people can be considered as borderlanders. However, the majority of people came from cities which are far from Alkhafji check-point such as Al-Jubail (14%), Riyadh, the Capital, (13%), and Dammam (11%), all of which are more than 100 kilometres from Alkhafji check-point (see table 5.9).

Second, trip origin of arrivals via KFC, as shown in table 5.9, is dominated by the people who came from Manama (25%), the Bahraini Capital, which lies about 25 kilometres (16 miles) from the KFC check-point. In fact, due to the small size of Bahrain Island (see figure 5.17) most of its cities can be considered, in effect, as border cities. The rest of the arrivals came from cities such as Al-Muharraq (13%), Madinat Hamad (8%), and Ar Refa Ash Sharqi (6%). Madinat Hamad is the closest to KFC, about 18 kilometres (11 miles) away. For the departures from KFC to Bahrain, most of the travellers came from border cities, Dammam (29%), Al-Khubar (25%), and Dhahran (8%). Thus, 62% of departures from KFC were borderlanders. This emphasises again the effect of geographical proximity of the eastern Saudi cities to Bahrain.




Figure 5.16: Major cities and towns in Kuwait



Source: Merriam Webster Geographical Dictionary (1997).

**Figure 5.17: Major cities and towns in Bahrain**



Source: Merriam Webster Geographical Dictionary (1997).

Third, trip origin of travellers at Albateha check-point is quite different from the other two (see table 5.9). For the arrivals, 23% of them came from Abu Dhabi which lies 350 kilometres (217 miles) from Albateha check-point, and another 23% came from Dubai which lies 500 kilometres (310 miles) from Albateha, and 11% came from Sharjah which also lies 500 kilometre from Albateha. Only 3 people came from As Sila (5%), which is a border town; in fact it is the Emirate check-point at the border with Saudi Arabia (see figure 5.18). The remaining (38%) came from various other cities and towns. For the departures, the majority of travellers came from Al Hufuf (23%), which lies 280 kilometres (170 miles) from Albateha. The remaining travellers came from cities all of which are far from the border. The previous results show that most of the travellers are not borderlanders except for Bahrain where most of them are borderlanders.

In regards to the travellers' destination, almost the same pattern prevailed, with some differences. First, most of the arrivals to Alkhafji check-point (22%) were going to Alkhafji city (see table 5.10), and 15% were going to Bahrain, and 13% were going to Dammam. For the departures from Alkhafji, most of the travellers were going to Kuwait City (94%), and one person only was going to Aljahra. The rest (5%), were going to different cities which are far from the border as well.

Second, for the arrivals at KFC, 50% of them were going to Dammam, and 25% were going to Al-Khubar (see table 5.10). Again, this situation conforms to the previous one mentioned above where geographical proximity has a far-reaching effect on the movement of people on both sides. Of the rest of the arrivals, 8% were going to Kuwait and 17% to different cities in the Kingdom. For the departures, 87% were going to Manama, and 3% to Al-Muharraq, which is near Manama (see figure 5.17). The remaining (10%) were going to other cities.

Third, the arrivals to Albateha, the majority of them (22%) were going to Syria, 12% were going to Qatar, and 9% were going to both Bahrain and Al Hasa. For the departures, 53% of travellers were going to Dubai, and 19% to Abu Dhabi, while 16% answered they were going to the Emirates. The remaining (3%) were going to Al Ain, and the other 3% were going to other cities (see figure 5.18).

**Table 5.9: Travellers' origin of departure**

Alkhafji					
Arrivals			Departures		
Origin	No.	%	Origin	No.	%
Kuwait	32	32	Alkhafji*	12	15
Sabah Assalim	6	6	Al-Jubail	11	14
Assabahiah	6	6	Riyadh	10	13
Aljahra	5	5	Dammam	9	11
Alqurain	4	4	Dhahran	6	8
Alahmadi	4	4	Bahrain	7	9
Alfahaheel	4	4	Hafar Albatin	2	3
Salwa	4	4	Alnoaireeah	2	3
Saud Port*	2	2	Other cities	21	24
Alwafrah*	1	1	-	-	-
Other cities	33	32	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100</b>
KFC					
Arrivals			Departures		
Manama*	18	25	Dammam*	31	29
Al-Muharraq*	9	13	Al-Khubar*	26	25
Madinat Hamad*	6	8	Riyadh	13	12
Ar Refa Ash Sharqi*	4	6	Dhahran*	9	8
Other cities	34	48	Al-Jubail	3	3
-	-	-	Al Hasa	3	3
-	-	-	Other cities	21	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100</b>
Albateha					
Arrivals			Departures		
Abu Dhabi	15	23	Al Hufuf	23	23
Dubai	15	23	Dammam	8	8
Sharjah	7	11	Doha	5	5
As Sila*	3	5	Riyadh	5	5
Other cities	24	38	Damascus	5	5
-	-	-	Abqaiq	3	3
-	-	-	Al-Khubar	3	3
-	-	-	Other cities	47	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

\* Border cities.


**Table 5.10: Travellers' trip destination**

Alkhafji					
Arrivals			Departures		
Destination	No.	%	Destination	No.	%
Alkhafji	23	22	Kuwait	74	94
Bahrain	15	15	Aljahra	1	1
Dammam	13	13	Other cities	4	5
Alnoaireeah	9	9	-	-	-
Al-Jubail	5	5	-	-	-
Riyadh	4	4	-	-	-
Joodah	4	4	-	-	-
Other cities	30	28	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100</b>
KFC					
Arrivals			Departures		
Dammam	36	50	Manama	91	87
Al-Khubar	18	25	Al-Muharraq	3	3
Kuwait	6	8	Other cities	11	10
Other cities	12	17			
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>100</b>
Albateha					
Arrivals			Departures		
Syria	14	22	Dubai	52	53
Qatar	8	12	Abu Dhabi	18	19
Bahrain	6	9	Emirates	16	16
Al-Hasa	6	9	Sharjah	6	6
Al-Khubar	4	6	Al Ain	3	3
Jordan	4	6	Other cities	3	3
Other cities	23	36			
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

\* Border cities.

Figure 5.18: Major cities and towns in U.A.E.



Source: Geoprojects (no date).

This result conforms with earlier conclusions regarding the purpose of travelling, where most of the departures at KFC and Albateha were travelling for pleasure. Here, most of the travellers at KFC were going to Manama the Capital attracted by shopping centres, restaurants, hotels and the like. The same can be said for departures at Albateha, most of them were going to Dubai and Abu Dhabi where leisure attractions are located. Such as shops, casinos, hotels, and restaurants.

### **5.3.7 Time consumed at the check-points**

The time spent at any border post is a crucial factor in determining the degree of open-ness of the boundary under investigation. Theoretically, if two neighbouring states decide to open their boundary for people and goods, they have to reduce the formalities at their check-points to allow people to pass through more easily and comfortably with minimum delay. Therefore, this study has investigated this aspect by including a question in the questionnaire forms regarding the amount of time a traveller has actually spent to complete all the formalities and pass through. The results were interesting as discussed below. Time here, theoretically, includes both waiting time and service time combined together. One point should be mentioned *before analysing the results*, which is the validity of the answers of travellers to the questionnaire. The author did his best to verify the answers on the spot, and it was easy to discover if there was any kind of exaggeration concerning the time consumed. For example, if a respondent answered the question about how much time he actually spent by putting unreasonable time, whether more or less, it was possible to confirm this situation by comparing his answer with the rest of the respondents and by observing the real situation at the check-point. The author discarded this type of invalid evidence. However, there were only a few such cases, not more than 1% of the whole sample.

First of all, the time consumed at each check-point for departures from the Saudi side was analysed and compared to the time spent by departures from the three neighbouring GCC check-points. It should be noted here that the regulations for the departures include vehicle and passport checking only, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. This comparison is important for it illustrates the difference between the Saudi check-points and those of the GCC States. Figure 5.19 (a, b) shows the time consumed for departures at Alkhafji check-point, as well as for the departures from the Kuwaiti

check-point. The diagram shows that 44% of departures from Alkhafji spent 10-20 minutes to complete their processing and 33% of them spent less than 10 minutes, whilst 64% of departures at the Kuwaiti check-point spent less than 10 minutes and 29% of them spent between 10-20 minutes. Moreover, about 6% of the departures at Alkhafji consumed more than 50 minutes to complete the process, compared to 1% of the departures from the Kuwaiti check-point for the same time spent (see table 5.11). This gives some indication of the degree of flexibility for crossing each check-point on both sides of the border.

The case at the Saudi-Bahraini check-point is rather different, especially on the Saudi side (see figure 5.19 c, d.) Only 7% of the departures at KFC spent less than 10 minutes, while 26% of them spent 10-20 minutes. Surprisingly enough, more than 50% of the departures at KFC consumed 21-50 minutes, and 15% spent more than 50 minutes, which is a quite long time at this check-point. Further discussion is given below to explain this situation. At the Bahraini check-point the situation is almost the same as the Kuwaiti post. Almost 60% of the departures consumed less than 10 minutes, while 27% spent 10-20 minutes. A few (9%) spent between 21 and 40 minutes, and 1%, in fact one respondent, answered that he spent more than 50 minutes (see table 5.11).

At Albateha check-point, 54% of the departures consumed less than 10 minutes, while 29% spent 10-20 minutes. Those who consumed between 21 and 40 minutes form 17% of the departures, and no one spent more than 40 minutes. On the Emirate side, 27% of the departures spent less than 10 minutes and 45% consumed 10-20 minutes. Around 17% of the departures consumed 21-30 minutes, while those who spent more than 30 minutes represent about 10% and only 2% (one person) consumed more than 50 minutes (see figure 5.19 e, f and table 5.11).

The result for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points is to some extent disappointing as figure 5.20 (a-c) demonstrates. At Alkhafji, about 58% of arrivals spent more than 50 minutes to complete the regulations and pass through. Only 14% spent less than 10 minutes, and about 20% consumed 10-20 minutes. The delay at this check-point will be discussed below. At KFC, 37% of the arrivals consumed less than 10 minutes and 32% spent from 10 to 20 minutes. Those who spent from 21 to 30 minutes represent about



19%, and 5% consumed between 31 and 50 minutes. The remaining 7% spent more than 50 minutes (see figure 5.20, b and table 5.12).

At Albateha check-point, the time consumed by arrivals divided almost equally between the two ends (see figure 5.20, c). The travellers who spent less than 10 minutes form 6% and those who consumed 10-20 form about 38%, which sum up to 44% of those people consumed 20 minutes and less. At the other end of the scale, about 35% spent more than 50 minutes and about 12% consumed from 41 to 50 minutes, which adds up to 47% of arrivals spending more than 40 minutes to finish the necessary regulations for their passage.

Congestion does occur at all check-points, especially during weekend and holidays (Interview with the General Director of Customs Department, 1998), the author has noticed this especially at Alkhafji, and this can be regarded as one factor causing the delay. However, there could be other factors which will be discussed below.

**Table 5.11: Time consumed for departures at Saudi and GCC check-points**

Check-Points	<10		10-20		21-30		31-40		41-50		>50	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Alkhafji	28	33	37	44	6	7	6	7	2	2	5	6
Kuwaiti-CHK.	66	64	30	29	5	5	1	1	0	0	1	1
KFC	7	7	28	26	29	27	15	14	12	11	16	15
Bahrain-CHK.	47	63	20	27	6	8	1	1	0	0	1	1
Albateha	54	54	29	29	11	11	6	6	0	0	0	0
Emirates-CHK.	18	27	30	45	11	17	1	2	5	8	1	2


Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Table 5.12: Time consumed for the arrivals to the Saudi check-points.**

Check-Points	<10		10-20		21-30		31-40		41-50		>50	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Alkhafji	14	14	22	21	2	2	1	1	4	4	60	58
KFC	28	37	24	32	14	19	3	4	1	1	5	7
Albateha	4	6	25	38	5	8	1	2	8	12	23	35
Total	46	19	71	29	21	9	5	2	13	5	88	36


Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Figure 5.19: Time consumed at the check-points




Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Figure 5.19: Time consumed at the check-points**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

Figure 5.20: Time consumed at the check-points



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

A cross-tabulation has been made between the time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transportation, and the following conclusions were reached. First, at Alkhafji check-point (see the table in Appendix XIII) a comparison between the pattern of time consumed and travellers' companions for arrivals shows that most of the people who spent more than 50 minutes at the check-point were accompanied by their families or friends, which gives an indication that this category take more time than the other categories for a variety of reasons. It is possible that this category, especially when there are more than three people in the car, have several passports to be processed, which takes more time. It is also possible that Customs officials give the second category, people accompanied by friends, more attention than the others for security reasons, *e.g. to prevent smuggling*. By comparing the pattern of time with mode of transportation for the arrivals at Alkhafji (see the table in Appendix XIII), it can be seen that most of those who spent more than 50 minutes are travelling by mini bus, which suggests that this type of vehicle takes longer at the check-point for Customs procedures.

For the departures at Alkhafji (see the table in Appendix XIV), the comparison between the pattern of time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transportation shows that most of the people who spent less than 20 minutes were on their own or accompanied by families, and that most of them are travelling by small car. This result conforms to the previous one concerning arrivals.

Second, most of the arrivals at KFC spent less than 20 minutes, most of whom were accompanied by family and friends, and travelling by small car. This result shows that this check-point is more efficient than Alkhafji in processing arrivals. For the departures, although about 30% of the travellers spent less than 20 minutes, about 15% spent more than 50 minutes of which most of them were accompanied by friends and came by small car (see the table in Appendix XIII). This delay could be due to congestion at the check-point which occurs occasionally.

Third, most of the arrivals who spent more than 50 minutes at Albateha were travelling by bus (see the table in Appendix XIII), and the author observed how buses take a long time to complete the formalities, especially the Customs regulations, when some of them waited for two hours. Customs officials conduct a thorough check up for the luggage and belongings of the travellers and they even check the bus itself by using

trained dogs, all this to make sure that no smuggled materials have been hidden. For departures at Albateha, most of them spent less than 20 minutes and were accompanied by their friends and were travelling by small car.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

From the foregoing discussion the following conclusions can be made. First, geographical distance played a major role in encouraging travelling across the border, and this was clear at KFC where a large number of people, compared to the other two check-points, are crossing in both directions. Second, the management of access for people is good in general, and the time spent is reasonable according to international standards, always remembering that the overall inconvenience experienced in border crossings is a product of departure time *plus* arrival time. For example, Paselk and Mannering (1994) showed that the average waiting time at the US-Canadian border is 20 minutes, but waiting time could reach 59 minutes, taking into consideration difference between the two cases. Another example is the Saudi-Yemeni border. However, for the arrivals, Alkhafji showed that there is some delay, and this delay is attributed to large extent to the formalities at this check-point, by both Passport Control and by Customs. Comparing the delays for arrivals at Alkhafji to the time consumed for arrivals at the Saudi-Yemeni border, which is from 1-2 hours (Al-Ghamdi 1999) makes Alkhafji check-point reasonable. Third, congestion occurs occasionally, particularly in holidays and the weekends, even at KFC which is more efficient than the other two check-points, and this is due to the volume of people. A point should be considered here which is there is only one crossing point at each of the three borders, compared to the US-Canadian border again where there are four crossing points along the border section in Washington State alone (Paselk and Mannering 1994).

Fourth, most of the travellers were GCC nationals, which can be explained mainly by two reasons: GCC nationals can enter any other GCC country without a visa; and cross-border familial ties. Finally, infrastructures and amenities were insufficient at Alkhafji and Albateha, as well as the absence of some facilities, even at KFC, that may reduce monotony, such as souvenirs, newspaper stalls and the like.

## References

- Al-Ghamdi, A. (1999), *The Case of Saudi Arabia-Yemen Boundary: Towards Settlement*, (Arabic), Almadinah Almonawarah Company for Printing and Publishing, Jeddah.
- Aljarad, S. and Black, W. (1995), "Modeling Saudi Arabia-Bahrain corridor mode choice", *Journal Transport Geography*, Vol.3, No. 4, pp. 257-268.
- Ebdon, D. (1977), *Statistics in Geography*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Farsi, Z. (no date), *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia National Road Atlas and Touring Guide*, Z. Farsi, Jeddah.
- GCC, Secretariat General, (No Date), *The Unified Economic Agreement*, Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General, (1998), *Joint Works Decisions*, (In Arabic), Riyadh.
- Krejcie, R.V. (1970), "Determining Sample Size For Research Activities", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 30,1, pp. 607-10.
- Library of Congress Country Studies, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>.
- McGrew, C. and Monroe, C. (1993), *An Introduction to Statistical Problem Solving in Geography*, WCB McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Merriam Webster Geographical Dictionary*, (1997) Third Edition, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, Publishers, Springfield.
- Paselk, T. A. and Mannering, F. L. (1994), "Use of duration models for predicting vehicular delay at a US/Canadian border crossing", *Transportation*, vol. 21, pp. 249-270.
- The Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, *Annual Statistical Abstracts 1998*.
- The Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy, *Preliminary Results of 1993 Population Census*.

## Interviews

- Interview with Mr. Mohammed Aldawsary, the legal advisor of the General Director of the Saudi Passport Control, in October 1997.
- Interview with Dr. Mohammed Aljabor the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department, in June 1998.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Management of Access for Goods**



## 6.1 Introduction

Some scholars argue that the regional integration process “exhibits a succession of oscillations between greater unification and stagnation” (Lawson 1997, p.14). The GCC as a regional organisation has arguably experienced much the same pattern as the European Union in which the integration process has undergone different stages, and each stage of “heightened integrative activity was separated from the others by periods of dormancy” (Lawson 1997, p. 15). Those periods of stagnation have affected the pace of economic integration among the GCC’s members, which in turn has its impact on the free movement of goods across their shared borders. The GCC, nevertheless, is going to take several decades to reach the level of economic integration achieved in the European Union.

Several factors have contributed to this situation. First, members of the GCC experienced serious economic difficulties due to the decline in oil prices which took place in the early 1980s. The second Gulf war (1991) and its aftermath worsened the economic performance among the member states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (*Nakhleh 1986, IMF 1996, El-Erian & Sassanpour 1997*). Second, the issue of national sovereignty, which remains of great importance to the individual governments of the GCC, also hindered moves towards greater integration (El-Kuwaiz 1987, Koppers 1995). The desire to preserve sovereignty is reinforced by the fact that all the GCC are monarchies. This latter factor will be further explored below.

Theoretically, economic integration between countries goes through five stages, as suggested by Balassa (in Koppers 1995): free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and finally complete economic integration (see figure 6.14). In the first stage, which is the operation of a free trade area, goods are granted free movement between the member states. If the tariffs against the non-member states are not equalised, then “customs authorities have to distinguish between partner and foreigner products according to the shares of value added in the product” (Koppers 1995, p. 58). In the second stage, there should be complete free trade between the member states as well as a unified tariff wall against the non-member states. After establishing a customs union, the group of states must move towards a common market. At this stage, the member states will abolish any restriction on the movement of factors of production, i.e. labour, capital, and services. The next stage is economic union, when the member states harmonise their economic policies in order to remove

any discrimination caused by disparities in those policies. A good example of this is the forming of a joint industrial policy by the members of the GCC. The final stage is complete economic integration, when member states have unified their economic policies and have set up a supra-national authority “whose decisions are binding for the member states” (Koppers 1995, p.58).

The GCC’s states have established a free trade area, through the UEA. Articles 1 and 2 state that all types of national products should be treated equally (see Appendix V), and all tariffs should be lifted against those products. Article 3 asserts that:

- 1- For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40% of their final value as at the termination of the production phase. In addition, Member States citizens’ share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 15%*
- 2- Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.*

Since 1982, several summits have been held and yet the Member States have still not reached an agreement about the unified tariff wall against non-member states. The differences are over which goods should be listed, and over the tariff level itself (GCC 1998, Wilson 1998). However, the Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal announced in November 1999 that there had been a break-through and that the Customs Union would be implemented in March 2001 (Al-Madinah Newspaper 1999). In 1983 the Saudi government started exempting the GCC’s industrial, agricultural, livestock and natural resources products from customs duties (GCC 1998). However, according to the second paragraph of Article 3, the customs authority has to check that every truck carrying a commodity produced in a GCC country is eligible for exemption from customs duties. This procedure along with other procedures, as will be explained later, have contributed to a noticeable delay in truck movements through the Saudi check-points.

Although Saudi Arabia’s trade with its GCC neighbours accounts for less than ten percent of its total trade (see table 6.1), trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC States increased through the period 1985-1996 (see figures 6.1 & 6.2). This increase can be attributed to two factors, first is the flourishing industrial development in the region which is planned and supported by the GCC’s governments

(Koppers 1995). The second is the UEA which has increased trade exchange between the GCC Members, as emphasised by Dr. Alajbor the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department:

*“The UEA since its implementation in 1982 has effectively contributed to increasing trade exchange between the GCC states”* (Interview with Dr. Alajbor, 1998).

**Table 6.1: Saudi trade of national products with its GCC neighbours (1994)**  
(Million US Dollars)


Countries	Exports	Imports
U.E.A	887.22	297.26
Bahrain	1311.66	168
Oman	78.48	43.76
Qatar	91.94	96.08
Kuwait	366.08	78.37
Total *	2735.38	683.47
Saudi World Trade**	42614.076	23342.633
% of total trade	6.42%	2.93%

Source: \* GCC, Secretariat General, *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. XII, 1997.


\*\* U.N, *International Trade Statistical Yearbook*, Vol. 1, 1997.

Several observations can be made about the exports shown in figure 6.1. First, the amount of exports from Saudi Arabia to the other GCC's States is generally greater than the amount of imports (See figure 6.2). This is because of the dominance of the Saudi economy over the other states' economies. The apparent decline of export value to Bahrain in 1996 is because the figure for that year did not include the value of export oil for reasons which are not obvious. Second, apart from the year 1996, exports to Bahrain are the highest, reaching about two billion US Dollars in 1990. However, this can be explained by figure 6.5 which shows that oil exports were the dominant part of exports to Bahrain. Exports to U.A.E. come in second position when they reached about 1.3 billion Dollars in 1995. Third, exports to Kuwait have reached approximately 400 million Dollars in 1996, while exports to Oman and Qatar never exceeded 200 million Dollars over the same period.

**Figure 6.1: Saudi Arabia exports of national products 1985-1996**



**Figure 6.2: Saudi Arabia import of national products 1985-1996**



Source: GCC, *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. XII, 1997.

Saudi imports, as shown in figure 6.2, have never exceeded 400 million US Dollars over the years 1985-1996 from all the GCC countries. This confirms that the trade balance of national products is in favour of Saudi Arabia. The highest imports were from U.A.E. which reached about 400 million US Dollars in 1996. Bahrain is in the second place, while the Saudi imports from it reached about 260 million US Dollars for the same year. The imports from the rest GCC countries are less than 100 million Dollars from each country. The previous description reflects that trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours is increasing with various degrees between those countries.

The structure of commodities exchanged between Saudi Arabia and the three GCC states selected for this study can be seen in figures 6.3 to 6.8. Exports from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait were dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.3) from 1985-1996, which accounted for not less than 50% of the total, except in 1986 when they accounted for about 40%. Agricultural products have accounted for less than 40% from 1985 to 1990, but in 1991 and 1992 they accounted for about 50% of Saudi exports. This increase in the share of agricultural products could be explained by the increase in demands in the Kuwaiti market after the second Gulf war. Natural resources products accounted for about 18% in 1986, but they represented no more than 10% in the years 1987-1989, and they accounted for less than 2% afterwards. While the imports from Kuwait are dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.4), which accounted for no less than 80% from 1985-1996.

The structure of trade exchange, especially exports, between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is quite different from the other two countries. Figure 6.5 shows that, from 1988 until 1995, Saudi exports to Bahrain were dominated by natural resources (crude and refined oil products). This situation can be explained by the fact that Bahrain oil production is the lowest among the GCC states. It is therefore trying to compensate for this shortage by importing crude and refined oil from Saudi Arabia. Saudi imports from Bahrain are dominated by industrial products (see figure 6.6).

With the U.A.E., Saudi exports were dominated by natural resources in the years 1985, 1987 and 1988 (see figure 6.7), but the rest of these years industrial products dominated the exports. The imports were also dominated by industrial products for the whole period, which accounted for no less than 75% of the total (see figure 6.8).

Figure 6.3: Saudi exports of national products to Kuwait 1985-1996




Figure 6.4: Saudi imports of national products from Kuwait 1985-1996




Figure 6.5: Saudi exports of national products to Bahrain 1985-1996








Figure 6.6: Saudi imports of national products from Bahrain 1985-1996



Source: GCC, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XII, 1997.



Source: GCC, *Economic Bulletin, Vol. XII, 1997.*

The above mentioned structure of trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the three GCC states indicates that because of the high level of demand for manufactured goods reflecting high incomes and a well developed industrial sector, notably petrochemicals, most of the exchanged commodities were industrial products. This suggests that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states are aware of the importance of the industrial base in their countries as a key part in the drive to diversify their economies. It should also be noted here that trade exchange and commodity structure discussed above also encompass goods exported and imported through air, sea, and land. The following section will analyse access of goods through land check-points only.




In order to test the ease of access for goods through the Saudi check-points, a sample of truck drivers was taken at the check-point with Bahrain on the King Fahad Causeway. Although the author is aware that to obtain a better understanding of truck and goods movements, it would have been preferable to make a more detailed study covering several check-points with the GCC countries, the time and resources available to the author were very limited, so he was obliged to confine the sample to this check-point. However, KFC in many ways is unique, for Bahrain is an island with no through trade by land. A sample of 57 truck drivers, 32 arrivals and 25 departures on the Saudi side, was selected randomly. The sample size was determined according to the number of trucks passing in and out in a single day, and from the table in Appendix XII. The selected truck drivers were given questionnaire forms to fill in themselves (see Appendix III). The results of the returned questionnaire forms are discussed below.

## **6.2 Truck drivers' characteristics**

Truck drivers (all male) were asked about their age, occupational details and nationality. The results showed that the majority of the drivers, in both directions of travel, were aged between 20 and 40 years (see figure 6.9 a, b). For the arrivals, 6% of the drivers were aged less than 20 years, and 39% of them were between 41 and 60. Those who were between 20 and 40 represented about 55% of the arriving drivers (see table 6.2). The situation is rather different for the departures, where there were no under 20 drivers. The first group was those between 20 and 40, representing 13%. The second group of between 41 and 60 represented 87% (see figure 6.9 b).



**Figure 6.9: Truck drivers' age groups**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

**Table 6.2: Age groups of truck drivers**

Age Groups (Years)	<20		20-40		41-60		>60	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Arrivals	2	6	17	55	12	39	0	0
Departures	0	0	21	87	3	13	0	0

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

The second aspect of the survey focused on details concerning the truck drivers' employment status. The survey showed that the majority of the drivers worked for private companies (see figure 6.10 a, b). About 74% of the arrivals were employed by private sector companies, and 26% were self employed. For the departures, about 67% were employed in private companies and 33% were self employed (see table 6.3).


**Table 6.3: Truck drivers' employment details structure**

Type of employer	Private company employees		Self employed	
	No.	%	No.	%
Arrivals	23	74	8	26
Departures	16	67	8	33

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.




Finally, data about the nationality of truck drivers showed that for the arrivals, about 68% were Bahraini and about 3% were Saudi and Qatari. Other Arab nationals represented 10% of the sample and about 16% were other nationals— most of whom were south-east Asians and south Asians. For the departures, only four major nationality groups were found (see table 6.4). Saudis represented 33% of the sample, while Bahrainis were 29%. Other Arabs amounted to 17% and other nationals, most of whom were south-east Asians and south Asians were about 21% (see figure 6.11 a, b).

**Figure 6.10: Truck drivers' employment status**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

**Figure 6.11: Truck drivers' nationality**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

**Table 6.4: Nationality of truck drivers**

Nationality	Saudi		Bahraini		Qatari		Other Arabs		Non-Arabs	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Arrivals	1	3	21	68	1	3	3	10	5	16
Departures	8	33	7	29	0	0	4	17	5	20

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

### 6.3 Types of goods

Most of the goods carried by the selected trucks were industrial products as table 6.5 shows. They represent about 65% for the trucks arriving from Bahrain and about 63% of the trucks departing from Saudi Arabia. Then comes processed food which represented about 26% of the arriving trucks and around 8% of departures. Agricultural products, chiefly fruit and vegetables, represented about 29% of departures only. This is because Saudi Arabia has a well established agricultural sector enabling the country to attain a surplus in some types of agricultural products.

**Table 6.5: Types of goods transported by trucks**

Arrivals			Departures		
Type	No.	%	Type	No.	%
Industrial Products	20	64.5	Industrial Products	15	62.5
Processed Food	8	25.8	Agricultural Products	7	29.2
Empty Trucks	3	9.7	Processed Food	2	8.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

### 6.4 Frequency of crossings by truck drivers

As for the individual travellers, truck drivers were asked about their frequency of crossing the border using the same four categories: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily bases. The results show that for the arrivals, 49% of the sample cross the borders on a monthly basis (see figure 6.12 a), while 38% of them cross on weekly basis. Only 6% cross on a yearly basis, and those who cross daily represent 8% of the drivers.


The frequency of travelling for departures is rather different from the previous one as illustrated in figure 6.12 (b). The drivers who are travelling on a monthly basis

represent about 24% of the total sample, while those who travel on a weekly basis represent 50%. Drivers travelling on a daily basis represent 13% of the sample. This pattern contrasts with the previous pattern of arrivals, especially on monthly and weekly bases, reflecting to some extent that there are more flows of goods from the Saudi side to the Bahraini side than the reverse. The arriving trucks from Bahrain to the Saudi side face a considerable amount of regulation and bureaucratic procedures that result in a substantial time delay at the check-point as will be explained below. The trucks going out of the Saudi side to the Bahraini side do not seem to be experiencing the same delays, as the results of the questionnaire show.

### **6.5 Time consumed at the check-points**

Generally, there are two types of trucks passing across the Saudi borders. One type is the 'transit' trucks whose destination is not Saudi Arabia, whether their origin is a GCC country or other than GCC, i.e. Arab countries such as Syria or Jordan or some times Turkey or a European country. The second type is those trucks which are heading for a Saudi destination, or which started from the Saudi side and aim at a GCC destination. At KFC, the first type spends less time in both directions, arrival and departure, because there are specific procedures regulating the movement of transit trucks. For example, if there is a transit truck coming from Jordan and heading for Bahrain, the truck should be sealed and secured and not allowed to be checked until it reaches its final destination. The same situation applies if a transit truck is coming from Bahrain heading to a country other than Saudi Arabia; the Saudi customs officials just check the papers of that truck and let it pass through without checking its load. Such transit trucks represented less than 36% of the total trucks in both directions in 1995 (see table 6.6). But the second type of trucks spend much more time, especially the arrival trucks, because the Customs Department conducts a thorough check for each coming truck and this takes a considerable amount of time at the check-point.

**Figure 6.12: Frequency of crossings by truck drivers**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

**Table 6.6: Type and number of trucks passing through KFC 1995**

Arrivals			Departures		
Truck Type	No.	%	Truck Type	No.	%
Saudi destination	10,900	64.7	Bahraini destination	31,800	76.2
Transit	5,900	35.3	Transit	10,000	23.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,800</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>41,800</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Saudi Customs, *The Yearly Report*, 1995.


The result of fieldwork reported above illustrates the pattern of time consumed for arrival and departure trucks as can be seen in figure 6.13 (a-c). First, 33% of the sample of truck drivers departing the Saudi check-point answered that they waited less than 30 minutes before exiting the Saudi check-point, and about 42% said they spent from 30 to 60 minutes. Those who waited from 61 to 90 minutes represented 21% of the drivers and only 4% answered they spent from 91 to 120 minutes. Nobody waited more than 120 minutes (see figure 6.13 b). This can be compared with trucks departing the Bahraini check-point (see figure 6.13 a), where 45% of arriving truck drivers reported that they spent less than 30 minutes at the Bahraini crossing point, while 48% of them said that they spent between 30 and 60 minutes. Only 3% answered they spent more than 120 minutes. From figure 6.13 b, one can conclude that up to 70% of the trucks departing from the Saudi side spent an hour or less to finish their regulations and formalities at the check-point, which means a quite reasonable time if one take into consideration that the daily average of trucks leaving the Saudi check-point is 172 trucks\*.

As to the truck arrivals from Bahrain at the Saudi check-point, the survey revealed that about 61% of the drivers said that they spent more than 120 minutes (see figure 6.13 c). Some of this category, as a Customs official told the author, waited up to 24 hours before being allowed to pass through. In contrast to this, only 6% of the drivers said they waited less than 30 minutes. Between these two extremes, about 19% answered that they spent from 30 to 60 minutes, while 12% spent from one hour up to two hours (see table 6.7).

\* The author calculated this figure for 1998 according to unpublished statistics provided by the Saudi Customs.



**Figure 6.13: Time consumed at KFC**



**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

This delay for arrival trucks at the Saudi crossing point is not unusual in global terms. For example, at some of the major crossing points within the European Union, specifically in central and eastern Europe, lorries during high seasons experience considerable delays reaching up to 24 hours, as revealed by the Official Journal of the European Community (Official Journal 1995, pp. C152/35-36). In the GCC case, it is the regulations and procedures undertaken by Saudi Customs which have mainly contributed to this delay, i.e. it is not the number of trucks. An interview with the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department revealed that his Department is aware of the delay problem, and has acted accordingly:

*“Since last year (1997) the Customs Department has undertaken some measures to increase the service hours at the check-points with the GCC from 8 hours to 12 hours daily to decrease the pressure on the check-points and to decrease the waiting time for trucks, and the service time for sections pertinent to immediate clearance designated for vulnerable goods, such as vegetables and dairy products, has been increased up to 24 hours daily”* (Interview with Dr. Aljabor, 1998).

However, as the results of the fieldwork revealed, the delay for trucks at KFC has still not been resolved. The regulations which are applied at KFC are as follows. According to Article 3 of the UEA mentioned above, for any product to qualify as a ‘national’ product should have a locally value added of it at least 40% of its final value. In addition, a GCC citizen should own at least 51% of the producing plant. To apply this regulation properly, the Saudi Customs officials should check every truck arriving at the border from a GCC neighbour and carrying ‘national’ products, by reference to the following documents. First, a ‘certificate of origin’, which contains information about the exported goods, to show that it has been produced nationally in order to exempt it from tariffs. Second, the ‘export manifesto’, which contains detailed information about the exported goods, i.e. their types, quantity and the like. Third, the invoice issued by the exporter concerning the goods on the truck giving information such as the value, the name of merchant, the name of customer and other details. Finally, a declaration produced by the exporter that all the information provided is correct and nothing prohibited is being dispatched (GCC, *Cooperation in Customs* no date). Of course, these regulations represent only part of the bureaucracy involved, other formalities undertaken by Passport Control officials also playing a part. Checking such details as well as checking the contents of each truck to make

sure that illegal items are not hidden takes a considerable amount of time. It is surprising that more time is not taken than appears to be the average.

The GCC as an organisation is still in the first stage of Balassa's classification of economic cooperation (see figure 6.14), which is the free trade area as explained earlier. To open the boundary further to good movements, the GCC should move towards the common market stage, where all the barriers at the borders can be removed. However, political factors are playing a major role in maintaining the status quo, and contributing to the slow pace of progress toward the final objectives of the GCC. This can be explained by two main factors can be highlighted, the first is the lack of legal sovereignty or a 'supra-national' government, and the second is the influence of different interest groups in Saudi society.


**Table 6.7: Time consumed by trucks at the check-points**

Time Categories (Minutes)	Arriving at The Saudi Check-point		Departing from the Saudi Check-point	
	No.	%	No.	%
<30	2	6.4	8	33
30-60	6	19.4	10	42
61-90	2	6.4	5	21
91-120	2	6.4	1	4
>120	19	61.3	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Fieldwork conducted by the author in June 1998.

As for legal sovereignty, it is hard for a regional organisation such as the GCC to implement decisions and agreements that have been reached without having a higher authority which possesses a legal power over each entity in the organisation. As Peterson's model suggests (Koppers 1995), the stronger that authority the faster the progress toward economic integration (see figure 6.14). In reality, however, the contemporary GCC leaders seem very reluctant to abdicate the national sovereignty of their states, as the former Associate General Secretary for Economic Affairs of the GCC, Abdullah El-Kuwaiz made clear:

**Figure 6.14: Peterson’s view of the relationship between legal sovereignty and Balassa’s classification of economic cooperation**



Source: (Koppers 1995, p. 209)

*“The issue of national sovereignty is still very dear to the people and leadership in each of the six Gulf States. The GCC as a regional integration institution, does not have power over national entities”* (El-Kuwaiz 1987, p. 77).

To clarify this, Saudi Arabia has its own legislative system based on the *shariah* or Islamic law. In this law the trading and use of goods such as alcoholic beverages, pornography, and explicit sexual literature are prohibited, thus the Saudi government does not dare to open its border totally to trade with the other GCC Members, while some of those States are not banning the use or import of such goods. For example, in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai, most of all alcoholic beverages are sold publicly. In addition, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia is based on *sharia*, while most of the judicial system in the other states, except in certain areas such as *personal status* laws, is based on civil jurisdiction. These differences in legislation and judicial systems have their impacts on life in general and on trade in particular; what is considered legal in one country may be considered illegal in the other.

The second factor influencing the policy making process in Saudi Arabia, which in turn has its impact on the government strategies toward its borders with the other GCC’s Members, relates to the role of interest groups (Koppers 1995). Saudi society has powerful interest groups, the most important among them being the royal family and the *ulima* or religious scholars. Each of these groups has different interests, but in the end they are in agreement regarding the broad objectives of society.

It is not the aim of this study to assess in detail the role of each group, but it is enough to say that the two groups are guided by the main value system of the society which is mainly derived from the principles of Islam. Thus, one can expect that even though those groups generally support more cooperation with the rest of the GCC

countries, they would prefer to proceed toward the final objectives at a moderate pace. Together they are a force for conservative values, and open borders are not high on their agendas.

By looking at what has already been achieved in the economic sphere, one can realise more clearly the current level of economic integration. The main achievements have been the exemption of national products from duties and tariffs, establishing the Gulf Establishment for Investment, and permitting GCC nationals to practice certain business activities freely such as hotel industry, restaurants and retail trade. The GCC has also agreed on a common agricultural policy, a common strategy for industrial development, and on an emergency plan for oil production. If one member state has a shortage in oil for any reason other members are obliged to supply the quantity needed as a loan. However, there are several areas which have not been achieved, for example the single currency, a unified tariff wall against the non-member states, and to connect the GCC with a unified network of electricity and roads (GCC 1998). Although the GCC agreed to construct such projects, they have still not been started yet.

Despite the fact that the economic cooperation between the GCC's States is clearly emphasised in its charter and given more explicit exposure in the media, some scholars argue that security cooperation was the main motive in establishing the GCC (Nakhleh 1986, Koppers 1995). This has clearly not received the same attention, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

## **6.6 Conclusion**

Despite the increase in trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the GCC, its magnitude is still small compared to its total world trade (see table 6.1). However, there is a great opportunity to increase this amount if there is freer movement of goods across the boundaries. Industrial products represented the majority of trade between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, except with Bahrain, and this is related to the developed industrial base in those countries. A detailed exploration of trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain showed that, according to truck frequency of crossings (see figure 6.12), about 50% of arriving trucks from Bahrain cross on weekly and daily bases, and about 60% of departing trucks cross on weekly and daily bases. This shows the effect of geographical proximity on goods movement as well.

The analysis of time consumed by trucks at KFC check-point showed that there is a considerable delay especially for the arrivals, and as the fieldwork showed is mainly due to the regulations carried out by the Customs Department. Those regulations are of two types, the first group relate to criteria for exempting 'national' products from tariffs, and the second group relate to security checks to prevent smuggling illegal materials. By doing so, Saudi Arabia is moving slowly towards a 'common market' as in Balassa's classification of economic co-operation. The ultimate aim is political integration and to be achieved through economic integration, so that progress towards economic integration is an important gauge of progress towards political integration. The introduction of a single currency may represent the final milestone in this process, which would be symbolically a very important step.

## References

- Almadinah Newspaper (in Arabic), Issue no. 13351, 8<sup>th</sup> November, 1999, p. 6.
- El-Erian, M. and C. Sassanpour (1997); "GCC's macroeconomic strategies: toward the twenty-first century", in J. Devlin (ed.), *Gulf Economies: Strategies for Growth in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
- El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah (1987); "Economic integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: challenges and future outlook", in J. Sandwick (ed.); *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Westview Press, Washington DC, pp. 71-83.
- GCC, Secretariat General (no date); *Cooperation in Customs Between the GCC's States*, (in Arabic), Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General (1997); *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 12, Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General (1998); *Joint Works Decisions*, (in Arabic), Riyadh.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), A report prepared by C. Sassanpour (1995); *Policy Challenges in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries*.
- Koppers, Simon (1995); *Economic Analysis and Evaluation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
- Lawson, Fred (1997); *Dialectical Integration in the Gulf Co-operation Council*, The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi.
- Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Customs Department (1995); *The Yearly Report of Saudi Customs*, Riyadh.
- Nakhleh, Emile (1986); *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Praeger, New York.
- Official Journal of the European Communities, C152, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 35-36.

## Interviews

- Interview with Dr. Mohammed Aljabor, the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department, in June 1998.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Security of Saudi Arabia's Borders**



## 7.1 Introduction

To maintain a degree of ‘openness’ and at the same time to preserve ‘security’ at the boundary is a major challenge facing contemporary states in their relationships with neighbouring countries. The more open a boundary becomes, the more difficult it is to secure it (Blake 2000). In this chapter, an attempt will be made to answer three key questions: What does border ‘security’ mean in general? What does it mean in respect to the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours in particular? What are the measures and methods used by the Saudi government to maintain security at its borders? This chapter draws, among other sources, on unpublished information gathered from some government institutions, notably the Border Guards and the Customs Department. These data are analysed and published for the first time.

There are several perspectives on security at the border that have been proposed, and three of them will be discussed here. First, Percy suggests that in order to make a balance between a degree of isolation and a degree of interchange at the border:

*“A state strives to prevent the entry of detrimental influences, but encourages beneficial intercourse. To effect such an ideal situation it becomes necessary to establish a well-ordered method of screening all ingress to and egress from the state”* (Percy 1965, p. 346).

Therefore, security means effective control over the border, and this control, as Percy goes on to explain, ranges from minimum restrictions on the movement of people, goods and ideas, to tight control.

The second perspective is proposed by Kambudzi and Linington who suggest that security at the border:

*“[R]efers to the absence of a real or perceived threat; the absence of disruptive instability or action, or simply the reign of order. It should be considered as the security of inhabitants and their property as well as the security of the state. .... Thus, in the absence of attacks, occupations and other unfriendly gestures, we can talk of security in the border area”* (Kambudzi & Linington 1997, p.31).

According to this perspective, security in the border area means peace and stability between the neighbouring countries, and this encompasses not only the borderland inhabitants but also the state as a whole. In addition, it is arguable that international borders provide the location for the first line of defence against a wide range of threats to national security. For example, Blake said that, in addition to conventional military security, borders are widely perceived as providing three other types of security to the citizens of the state:

- *Protection from unwanted people (e.g. illegal immigrants, terrorists, criminals, refugees, bogus asylum seekers);*
- *Protection from unwanted goods (e.g. smuggled goods, drugs, weapons, pornography);*
- *Protection from hazards to health and the environment (e.g. diseased animals, polluted rivers, infected foodstuffs, diseased seeds and plants) (Blake 2000, p.2).*

It is worth noting here that the outbreak of the *Rift Valley Fever* which has recently afflicted livestock in Jizan in Saudi Arabia (reports of this disease began in September 2000, Al-Riyadh Newspaper 15 September, 2000) was originally brought across the border by livestock from Yemen. This disease is of great danger not just to animals but to human beings as well; 120 deaths have been reported so far by the Saudi Ministry of Health, especially in Jizan and Asir provinces (Al-Riyadh Newspaper 1 February, 2001). This provides a good example of an undesirable trans-boundary incursion which the border has limited capacity to intercept.

To sum up the previous three perspectives, it can be said that land boundaries must play a crucial role in securing the state from external and internal threats. An external threat means any real or perceived danger of attack, aggression or occupation by an external power. Land boundaries still act as a trip-wire to conventional invading forces. Animosity between two countries may lead to government-sponsored sabotage operations across the boundary, and this may fulfil some of the objectives of the aggressor without having the risk of full-scale launching wars. The internal threat means any real or perceived danger of damage to the society (e.g. crime, drugs, riots, terrorism). Boundaries, in this respect, could facilitate for instance terrorism if they are not tight by providing bombs, weapons and the like which can be used to undertake such unlawful acts. While terrorism or any

criminal acts can be undertaken without relying on foreign sources, it is also true that cross-border links between criminal groups has been increasing in recent times. Therefore, the state has a legitimate right to implement all necessary measures along its border to maintain security of its people as well as its territory. This leads us to the question of what are the threats, external and internal, to Saudi security? And how does the Saudi government acts to protect its people and territory from such threats?


## **7.2 Threats to Saudi security**

Saudi Arabia is an important actor in the international community for three main reasons: the existence of the two holy places- Makkah and Medinah- on its territory; its possession of approximately 25% of the world's proven oil reserves; and its geostrategic position on the main world trade routes in the Red Sea and in the Arabian Gulf. These elements have created some challenges to Saudi Arabia, especially the substantial oil wealth. As a guardian of the holy places, some radical states such as Iran during the Khomeini revolution criticised Saudi Arabia and challenged its position as a guardian to the two holy mosques. This led Iran to take actions and policies which represented threats to Saudi Arabia as will be shown below.

In respect of oil wealth, this made Saudi Arabia a tempting target for a number of powers. Saudi policies and actions regarding its oil production may be regarded as a threat by foreign powers. For example, the 1973 oil embargo on the United States and Western Europe following the outbreak of the Arab-Israel war (in October 1973), was a major factor which made the US develop its Rapid Deployment Force during the Carter administration in the early 1980s.

As to the geostrategic location of Saudi Arabia on main world trade routes, this makes the country very vulnerable to any blockade by sea (see figure 7.1). In the north, there is the Suez Canal bounded by Israel east of the Sinai desert. In the south, there is Bab El-Mandab and bounded by Yemen to the east and Horn of Africa countries to the west. On the Arabian Gulf, there is the Strait of Hormuz, which is bounded by Iran to the east. The most prominent external threats to Saudi Arabia come from three main powers in the region, Israel, Iran, and Iraq as discussed in the following section.

Figure 7.1: Saudi Arabia's main military facilities



Source: Stork and Wenger (1991), with some modifications.

### 7.2.1 External threats

The external threats to Saudi Arabia have varied, from the early days of its existence as a sovereign state in 1932 through to the present. Nevertheless, the present major sources of threat lie in some of the surrounding regional powers, such as Israel from the north-west, and Iraq and Iran from the north-east (see figure 7.1).

Although there has been no direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Kingdom has always supported the Palestinians and the other Arabs in their prolonged struggle with Israel. During the 1973 War between the Arabs and Israel, Saudi Arabia sent troops to participate in the war effort alongside the Egyptian and Syrian forces, and at the same time used oil as a weapon to influence the Western countries, especially the United States, to pressurise Israel to stop the war (Safran 1985). According to some sources, Israel has developed, since 1987, 100 (or perhaps more) nuclear warheads which can be delivered by *Jericho* and *Lance* ballistic missiles with a range up to 1,500 kilometres (IISS 1993). This range puts most of the key cities in Saudi Arabia within reach (see table 7.1 and figure 7.1).

Since the revolution that toppled the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, Iraqi-Saudi relations have been unstable culminating in two particular episodes. The first was in 1961 when Iraq threatened to annex Kuwait based on historic claims of its subordination to Iraqi territory in Ottoman times. The second was during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, when Saudi Arabia condemned the invasion and strongly supported Kuwait, its GCC neighbour, and allowed the allied forces to use its territory and participated in the war to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the Al-Sabah, its ruling family, to their original position. Those events, as well as the conflicting political ideologies between the two countries, played a major role in formulating Saudi policy towards Iraq, which has always been characterised by discretion and distrust. Despite the disarmament process undertaken by the UN, Iraq is still a major military threat to Saudi Arabia. As table 7.1 shows, Iraq's military capabilities still far outnumber those of the Kingdom, especially the ground forces.

**Table 7.1: Military balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iraq and Israel**

Country	Population (Million)	Total Armed Forces*	Tanks	Combat Aircraft	Submarine	Warships	Missiles (SSM, SAM) <sup>1</sup>
Iran	71	540,000	307	115	3	117	Frog-7, Scud-B, Scud-c, CSS, SA, HN-5
Iraq	23.1	429,000	2700	310	0	15	SA-3/6/7/8/9/13/14/16, Scud, Roland <sup>2</sup>
Israel	6	175,000	4300	474	3	52	Lance, Jericho, Stinger, Redeye, Chaparral, Patriot
Saudi Arabia	17.5	105,000	1055	432	0	58	CSS-2, Crotale, Stinger, Redeye, Patriot

\* Not including reserves.

<sup>1</sup> SSM= surface-surface missiles & SAM= surface-air missiles.

<sup>2</sup> Many of the Iraq ballistic missiles capabilities have allegedly been destroyed after the War in 1990 by the UN inspection teams.

**Source:** *The International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998), The Military Balance 1998-1999, London.*

Although the Iranian-Saudi relationship during the Shah's reign was an unruffled one, the Saudis have been very cautious in their relations with Iran especially after the latter seized in 1971 three small islands in the Arabian Gulf- *Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs*. Moreover, there have been several disagreements between the two countries regarding oil production quotas and prices (Quandt 1981). The tension between the two sides noticeably increased after Khomeini's accession to power in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Saudi Arabia supported, alongside the other GCC members, the Iraqi position against Iran to prevent the latter from gaining an overwhelming victory which, they believed, would have a devastating effect on the stability of the Gulf region as a whole. Several events during the 1980s represent clear evidence of the threat that Iran could generate, not just to Saudi Arabia, but to the other GCC countries as well. For example, on December 13th, 1981 Bahrain's authorities announced that they had uncovered a major Iranian induced plot to overthrow the Bahraini government and destabilise Saudi Arabia (Safran 1985). Some days later, Prince Naif Bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi Interior Minister, visited Bahrain and signed a bilateral security agreement. He stated in a press conference that:

*“The encroachment of the security of any GCC state is an encroachment of the security of the Kingdom...the uncovered subversive conspiracy in Bahrain which has been produced by Iran is also directed at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”* (Albahrain 1981, p.6).

In 1982, an Iranian F-4 fighter intruded into Saudi airspace and was shot down by Saudi defences. During the Haj season, there have always been tensions, especially in 1986 and 1987. In the 1986 Haj season, a Saudi Customs officer discovered explosives in some Iranian pilgrims' bags upon their arrival at Jeddah airport, and the investigations showed that some elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard planned to use the explosives in sabotage operations in the Holy places. Those investigations were broadcast on Saudi TV shortly after the incident. In the 1987 Haj season, thousands of Iranians marched through Makkah streets against the Saudi regulations which prohibited any demonstration during Haj and, according to some reports, the Iranians started to attack the Saudi security forces who responded very fiercely to disperse the mobs (Wilson & Graham 1994).

From the above description, it is obvious that Saudi Arabia is bounded by several states with military capabilities exceeding those of the Kingdom (see table 7.1). Saudi Arabia's vast geographical area and its limited enlisted military manpower are the most important factors limiting the country's ability to confront these dangers. A total area of about 2.5 million square kilometres (965,000 square miles), maritime boundaries of about 2,510 kilometres (1,600 miles) and land boundaries of 4,172 kilometres (2,600 miles) need, in a context of threat, very large defence capabilities, especially in ground and naval forces (see figure 7.1). In addition, the enlisted military personnel, including National Guard, are estimated at about 105,000 (as shown in table 7.1). Therefore, Saudi Arabia has to rely heavily on air power to compensate for these shortcomings. The Saudi government started projects to develop its air forces in the early 1980s. An example is the Al-Yamamah Project, launched in 1985 following an agreement with the British government to provide Tornado fighters, helicopters, trainers, munitions and British support services to Saudi Arabia (Cordesman 1997).

The mentioned threats, especially from Iran and Iraq, have clearly had direct effects on border security, as hostilities between neighbours increase the pressure on their common

border to protect it from unwanted people entering for sabotage purposes. While such threats exist, it is difficult to operate a more open border policy.

### **7.2.2 Internal threats**

Internal factors play a more significant role in security matters. The development process, which started in the early 1970s, has noticeably changed Saudi society and made a great socio-political-economic impact on life. The flow of wealth gained from oil revenues has pushed society into modernisation on an unprecedented scale and at unprecedented rate. Moreover, interaction with the outside world and the flow of expatriate manpower has introduced new values to the society, which some times conflict with its traditional values. These factors, among others, have affected society and created a wide range of behavioural patterns that did not exist before. For example, drugs and alcohol trafficking have increased, as will be discussed in detail below, suggesting a clear and growing demand for these types of illegal goods. Another example is the two bombings in Riyadh in November 1995 and in Al-Khubar in June 1996 which represent a clear indication of the political impact of the Gulf war, as some extremist groups opposed the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait. The people committed the first bombing in November 1995 admitted, after they were caught, that they smuggled explosive materials used in the bombing from Yemen, as well as some light arms and munitions such as rifles.

Thus, the major internal threats to Saudi security can be summed up as: illegal immigration, terrorism, crime, and smuggling including notably drugs and arms smuggling. In some cases, these issues are interrelated and they become difficult to separate. For instance, terrorism or illegal crossing can be linked with smuggling. Customs officials told the author there were a number of cases where the officials caught some people trying to smuggle explosives through the Saudi check points to carry out subversive actions in the country. In practice, the seriousness of external threats from individual and small armed groups is less from Kuwait, Bahrain and the U.A.E. than from Yemen. Until the 2000 boundary treaty, the boundary with Yemen had the scene of serious incidents and loss of life over several decades.

Two of the security related issues will be discussed below; illegal border crossings and smuggling, for they are closely related to border management, the main focus of this



study. It might be noted that modern communications leap frog international boundaries, and state governments can do very little to control the flow of information and ideas. The government of Saudi Arabia is one of the few which has attempted to control the internet, not least in an effort to stem pornographic and politically inflammatory material. In February 1997, the Saudi government permitted the introduction of internet services to the country under the control and supervision of King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), which is technically responsible for implementing such control (KACST 2000). Nevertheless, before proceeding into a detailed study of the two issues mentioned earlier, it is necessary to throw some light on the means by which the Saudi government is maintaining security at its border with its GCC neighbours.

### **7.3 Methods of border security management**

The Saudi government has adopted several methods to secure its long borders with neighbouring countries from illegal crossings and smuggling. These methods are: the achievement of security agreements with its GCC neighbours, the control over the borders, both land and maritime, through the Border Guards, and firm control over the formal check-points through the Customs Department. Below is a brief description of each method.

#### **7.3.1 Security Agreements**

Saudi Arabia tried to persuade the other GCC members to sign a unified security agreement, similar to the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA), but it failed to reach its goal, partly because of pending border disputes between the member states, and also because Kuwait objected strongly to the Saudi proposal (Nakhleh 1986, Qassim, 1997). Nevertheless, the Saudi government was successful in reaching bilateral security agreements with the GCC's States with the exception of Kuwait. As mentioned earlier, in December 1981 the Saudi Minister of Interior signed a security agreement with Bahrain following the discovery of the Iranian sponsored plot in Bahrain to destabilise both countries. In the last week of February 1982, the Saudi Minister of Interior reached similar agreements with Oman, Qatar and U.A.E. (Safran 1985).

It is worth saying here that the author was able to read those agreements but was not allowed to include their full texts in this study, for they are confidential. However, the following remarks can be made. First, the wording of all the agreements is almost the same with slight differences between them, which gives an indication that they were intended to represent a unified approach to all the GCC members. Second, the agreements have two main parts, the first relating to security cooperation, and the second to criminal extradition.

The first part of the agreements, which is the most relevant to this study, has three main sections; which are: cooperation within border areas, cooperation in combating illegal crossing, and cooperation in combating crime. The section on cooperation within border areas stated that there should be regular meetings between officials of the Border Guards on both sides to coordinate their efforts and to exchange information regarding their work. In addition, it is stated that Border Guards patrols, in those cases when they are chasing law breakers along the borderline, must not exceed 20 kilometres inside the territory of the neighbouring country. This section also laid down some rules that should be followed during such pursuit.

The second section, which focuses on cooperation in combating illegal crossings, sets out some rules for dealing with the problem. For example, any individual who enters legally the territory of one state and enters illegally the territory of another, when apprehended he should be handed over to a Border Guards station of the first state where he entered legally. But those people, who illegally enter one state and illegally enter the other, should be treated by the laws of the state where he is caught.

The third section, which is related to cooperation in combating crime, draws out general principles regarding all types of crime, such as exchanging information regarding criminals and/or criminal activities, exchanging crime research and studies conducted by the ministries of Interior and exchanging information about any conference, workshop or session related to combating crime or to any field within the interests of the Ministry of Interior in each side.

From this evidence, it can be concluded that the first line of defence against smuggling and illegal crossing lies in the close cooperation between the neighbouring countries

along their borders. Without such cooperation, stopping or at least minimising smuggling and illegal crossing would be a very difficult task.

### **7.3.2 The Border Guards**

The second method of security management is by controlling borders through a specialised military force, which is the Saudi Border Guards. This force has expanded gradually through time from a small force with the limited task of patrolling the offshore areas until reaching its present status as a major force of about 10,500 men, with about 4,500 men assigned to coastal areas (Cordesman 1997), and equipped with modern light weapons and advanced equipment such as night vision devices. The main tasks assigned to this force as stated in its Register are:

- 1- Guarding the Kingdom's boundaries (land and maritime), sea ports and wharves and combating smuggling and illegal crossing (incoming or outgoing) according to legitimate regulations.*
- 2- The early warning of any unusual activities at/or near the borderline.*
- 3- To carry out search, rescue, and guidance operations and to provide assistance to the marine transportation.*
- 4- To guide lost people in the land borders area and provide assistance to them.*
- 5- The surveillance of the land/maritime boundary to make sure that every individual within border areas is acting according to the laws and regulations.*
- 6- Ensure security within seaports and wharves.*
- 7- To cooperate with other official agencies within the law and regulations to maintain the public interest according to the prescribed tasks to the Border Guards. (The Saudi Ministry of Interior, 1998, p.16).*

The wide range of missions and tasks assigned to this force makes it act as 'a light defensive screen' (Cordesman 1997, p. 175), which protects Saudi territory from any unwanted people or goods entering the country and harming its people. It also acts as an early warning system, as stated in paragraph 2 above, in case of military invasion to Saudi territory. This force has adopted a number of strategies to reduce the incidents of smuggling and illegal crossing to the lowest possible rate. First, they conduct a very complex system of surveillance along the entire land/maritime boundaries with GCC

neighbours, through fixed watch-towers and mobile patrols using four wheel-drive cars, hovercrafts and helicopters. The author discussed using the latest technology of satellite imagery in surveillance along the border in a private conversation with Brigadier Faisal (manager of operations in the Saudi Border Guards), but he explained that the Saudi Border Guards are not yet using this technology because of its high cost. However, a cost-effective highly advanced technology has been adopted from the 'Star Wars' project in U.S.A. and recently developed to be used in boundary surveillance (oral communication with Ewan Anderson 2001). Second, the Border Guards maintain a range of stations along the border area connected with the latest wireless communication to facilitate their patrols operations and other tasks mentioned above assigned for the Guards.

Third, they have established some types of physical barrier along the land boundaries and their main purpose is to reduce smuggling. Two types of barrier are worth mentioning here. The first, is the building of a sand-bank up to eight metres in height (lower in some areas), along the 456 kilometres Saudi-U.A.E. boundary line (see plate 7.1) and along some sections of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line as well, at a distance of about 500 meters from the boundary line itself (see figures 7.2 and 7.3). At the foot of this sand-bank, there is a ditch about one metre deep and two metres wide the main purpose of which is to hinder vehicles from crossing the boundary line. The second type of barriers, is the construction of a 60 centimetre diameter pipe about one metre above the ground (see plate 7.2), for about 60 kilometres along the southern section of the Kuwait-Saudi boundary line (see figure 7.2). The main purpose of this pipe is also to prevent vehicles from crossing the boundary. The Border Guards officials claim that these barriers have been very successful in reducing the rate of smuggling incidents since their establishment in 1985 (the sand-banks) and 1994 (the pipe).

The Saudi Border Guard is also responsible for managing and organising the legal crossings of Bedouin, for grazing purposes, at certain check-points exclusively designated for this purpose. For example, the Saudi Border Guards in 1992 had an agreement with its counterpart, the Kuwaiti Border Guards, to organise the Bedouin' trans-border movement at a point along the western section of the Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary line called *Alhamatyiya* on the Saudi side, and *Alrodaiyah* on the Kuwaiti side

(see figure 7.2). The agreement sets out the rules by which the Bedouin are allowed to cross the borderline to/from each side, such as giving them entry permission, after keeping their passports at the Border Guards check-point, to cross the border. As well as having a certificate of vaccination for their animals against communicable diseases, crossings are only allowed during daytime. All these regulations imply security measures which have to be managed by the Border Guards to make sure no one is utilising this arrangement for illegal purposes. A similar agreement had been reached in 1998 between the Saudi Border Guards and the Emirates Border Guards. They set out two crossing points for Bedouin, one is at *Albateha*, near the formal crossing-point, and the second at *Shabitah*, further to the south of first point (see figure 7.3).

Also the Border Guards has developed good relations with its counterpart GCC's border guards following the security agreements mentioned above. They meet regularly on a yearly bases, and they were able to construct a linked communication network between the Saudi Border Guards and the other GCC's border guards, to facilitate cooperation and coordination between them (Interview with Anqawi, 1998).

### **7.3.3 Customs Department**

With 6,224 employees working in all Saudi international airports, seaports and land crossing-points (The Saudi Customs Department 1995), the Customs Department has two main tasks: to inspect travellers, merchandise, trucks and the like to prevent smuggling of illegal goods and materials into Saudi territory, and second, collecting duties on various commercial goods. To accomplish the first task, which is related to security, the Customs Department employs various methods ranging from using x-rays machines to using well-trained dogs for detection of various goods in vehicles.

Total arrivals at all Saudi land crossing-points, as table 7.2 shows, were more than 6 million people in 1996 representing 59% of arrivals at all Saudi check-points. Of these about 4.5 million people arrived at the check-points with the GCC countries, which represents 44% of total arrivals into Saudi Arabia. By contrast, all other Saudi land crossings with Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen only account for 15%. This implies that security measures that need to be undertaken by the Customs Department at the land crossing-points are huge compared to sea and airports check-points. If we add the amount of goods to these figures, it can be demonstrated how vast is the task of this Department. Table 7.3

shows the amount of goods that cleared and entered through all Saudi check-points in 1995.

**Table 7.2: Total arrivals at all entry points in 1996**

Check-Point	Airports	Seaports	Land-Crossing-Points (other than with GCC)	Land Crossing-Points with GCC	Total
Total Arrivals	3,720,268	523,044	1,559,181	4,552,794	10,355,287
Percentage	36%	5%	15%	44%	100%

Source: *The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Statistical Yearbook 1996.*

As table 7.3 illustrates, 87% of total cleared goods entering Saudi Arabia in 1995 entered through seaports. But less than 1% entered through airports, and about 12% through land check-points of which 5% entered through land check-points with GCC countries. All these goods cannot be cleared and entered into Saudi territory before checking them for security purposes and, as we have discussed earlier in Chapter six, these procedures contributed to a considerable delay of truck movements at the check-points with the GCC countries.


**Table 7.3: Total amount of cleared goods entered the Kingdom in 1995**

Check-Point	Airports	Seaports	Land-Crossing-Points (other than with GCC)	Land Crossing-Points with GCC	Total
Total cleared incoming goods (Million Tons)	0.200	22.7	1.8	1.3	26
Percentage	0.77%	87.2%	7%	5.01%	100%

Source: *The Saudi Customs Department, The Yearly Report 1995.*




**Plate 7.1: The Border Guards' Sand-bank along the Saudi-UAE boundary line.**



**Plate 7.2: The Border Guards' pipe along the Southern section of Kuwaiti-Saudi boundary.**


Figure 7.2: The sand-bank and the steel pipe built by the Saudi Border Guards along Kuwait-Saudi boundary



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.



Figure 7.3: The sand-bank built by the Saudi Border Guards along the Saudi-U.A.E. boundary



Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in October 1998.

Although the methods outlined above - security agreements, the Border Guards' control over the borders, and the Customs Department control over formal check-points - have reduced the incidence of illegal crossing and smuggling, these two problems still occur at the borders with the GCC. The following sections will address the two issues of illegal crossing and smuggling in more details illustrating their size, pattern and trends.


#### **7.4 Illegal crossing**

Illegal immigration is one form of voluntary migration, and the major factors that are responsible for generating this form of migration are varied. Among the primary factors are inequalities between the sending and receiving countries in terms of economic development, income levels and wealth (Parnwell 1993). Moreover, political and economic instability, political persecution, rapid population growth, and economic stagnation are also inducements for people to leave their original home and find a better place to live (Collinson 1993, Leitner 1995).

Generally speaking, illegal immigration takes two forms, illegal crossings and immigrants who enter legally on short-term visas and subsequently overstay (Collinson 1993). The latter form is not the concern of this study, for it is more related to migration policy studies rather than boundary management. Rather, we are concerned here with the first form which is illegal crossing, for it actually occurs at the land borderlines, and points at entry by sea and air.

Considering the magnitude of illegal crossings (see figure 7.4), the number of captured illegal migrants at all the Saudi borders has dramatically increased over the period 1982 to 1997, from about 12,000 people in 1982 to 118,000 in 1997. As an oil rich country, Saudi Arabia is attracting more people, especially from poorer neighbouring countries, to enter the land of 'promised wealth'. The sudden increase in the number of captured people illegally crossing in 1992, and the continued rise until 1997, may be explained as follows. In 1992, about 84% of illegal entrants were from Yemen, and in the following years their percentage never fell below this proportion of those apprehended (see table 7.4 and figure 7.5). To understand this, during the Second Gulf War in 1990, about

Figure 7.4: Apprehended illegal crossings at all the Saudi borders 1982-1997



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, *Yearbook, Several Volumes (1982-1997)*.

500,000 Yemenis left Saudi Arabia (Segal 1993) as a result of the Saudi government's new regulations imposed on the Yemenis who resided in the Kingdom as a reaction to their government's support of Iraq. Therefore, in the following years, many Yemeni people tried to re-enter Saudi Arabia illegally thus escaping their country's economic crises and at the same time hoping that they would be able to find jobs for themselves.

Iraqis come second in rank of those who illegally cross the border. Before the Gulf War in 1990, they never exceeded 1.5% of the total numbers, but in 1997 they reached about 6,000 people representing 5% of the total captured crossing illegally (see table 7.4 and figure 7.5). This increase is, obviously, due to the deteriorating political, economic and social situations in Iraq in the aftermath of the war, which placed a tremendous pressure on Iraqi people to flee their own country.

**Table 7.4: Captured illegal crossings at all Saudi land boundaries 1982-1997**

Year	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997
<b>Total Captured Illegal Crossing</b>	11,808	11,302	9,923	10,098	10,692	25,786	55,754	110,146	117,640
<b>Captured Yemeni</b>	10,928	8,977	7,318	6,742	6,196	21,752	48,659	100,598	108,592
<b>Percentage</b>	92.5%	79.4%	74%	67%	58%	84%	87%	91%	92.3%
<b>Captured Iraqi</b>	171	129	57	93	33	606	1,559	4,497	6,198
<b>Percentage</b>	1.4%	1.1%	0.6%	0.9%	0.3%	2.3%	3%	4.1%	5.2%

Source: Saudi Ministry of Interior, *Statistical Yearbook, 1982-1997*.

The same trend applies, with slight differences, to the Saudi boundaries with the GCC in terms of the number of people captured crossing illegally. As figure 7.6 illustrates, in 1982, only 79 people were apprehended at the borders, but the number rose to about 3,200 people in 1998. These figures represent a small percentage, not more than 2%, of the total apprehended (see figure 7.5). In an interview with the General Commander of the Saudi Border Guards, the author asked about the proportion caught to uncaught crossing illegally, but he answered that they "do not have any information about it" (Interview with General Anqawi, 1998). However, one might suggest that for every person caught, there is at least one uncaught, so the figures provided by the Border

Guards could be doubled in this respect. Nevertheless, in 1990 and 1991, the numbers caught fell significantly to 196 and 59 people, because of the impact of the Gulf War during these two years. From 1993 the number crossing illegally started to rise again and continued to do so, with some fluctuations in the years 1993 and 1995 (see figure 7.6).

The nationality of most of the people who illegally cross the eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia is illustrated in table 7.5. Most of them (94%) are Iraqis (see table 7.5 and figure 7.7). The Sudanese come second (1.2%), then the Yemeni (0.9%). Ethiopian and Saudis representing less than 0.9% of the total people. The remaining 2.4% are from other nationalities, and there are some unidentified. Most of the Iraqi people were caught near the border with Kuwait, while most of the Sudanese and Yemeni were caught near the borders with the U.A.E.. This pattern of nationalities, if we exclude the Saudis, confirms that the countries of origin are either poor countries or those experiencing an unstable political-economic situation or both. Thus, these factors appear to be the most important as 'push factors' in illegal migration in general and illegal crossing in particular.

**Table 7.5: Nationality of captured illegal crossing at the Saudi eastern boundaries with its GCC neighbours in 1998**


Nationality	Iraqi	Sudanese	Yemeni	Unid.*	Ethiopian	Saudi	Others	Total
Number	3,035	39	29	23	18	17	77	3238
Percentage	94%	1.2%	0.9	0.7	0.6%	0.5	2.4%	100%

\* Unidentified

**Source:** *Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1998.*


The border sections with Kuwait (Alrighi and Alkhafji) are the busiest in terms of the number of illegal crossings (see figure 7.8), probably because there is no security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. However, there is some form of cooperation between the Saudi Border Guards authorities and their Kuwaiti counterparts. Most of the people caught at the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, 12 cases out of 17 in 1998 as the Border Guards' officials told the author, were trying to cross the border on foot (informal conversation with Major Khalid Alsobayee, 1998).

Figure 7.5: Illegal crossings along the Saudi boundaries 1997




Source: After Abu Dawood (2000), with numbers based on the Saudi Ministry of Interior (1997).

**Figure 7.6: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia 1982-1998**



**Source:** The Saudi Ministry of Interior, *Yearbook, volumes (1982-1997)*,  
The Saudi Border Guard, *unpublishe statistics for 1998*.


Figure 7.7: Nationality of captured illegal crossers to/from eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia 1997-1998



Source: The Saudi Border Guards, unpublished statistics for 1997, 1998.



**Figure 7.8: Captured illegal crossings at the eastern border Sections 1998**



**Source:** The Saudi Border Guards, *unpublished statistics, 1998.*

## **7.5 Smuggling**

Smuggling occurs in two different areas of the border, at the check-points and along the borderline itself. As mentioned above, one of the main tasks of the Saudi Border Guards is to prevent unlawful materials from being smuggled through the boundary in areas where there is no official check-point. One of the main tasks of the Saudi Department of Customs is to prevent unlawful materials from being smuggled through the official check-points. Below we will discuss each area in more detail.

Before discussing smuggling, it is worth noting at the outset of this section that the available data about smuggling which the author could obtain from the relevant government institutions, was not as complete as hoped. For example, the number of smuggling incidents along the border areas other than the official check-points was not available in the official statistics of either the Ministry of Interior or the statistics of the Border Guards. Moreover, information about the types of smuggled materials was not available for all types of materials for all the years, which makes it difficult to analyse the trends. For example, the author found that the statistics about drug smuggling are available for the years 1982, 1983, 1997 and 1998 only, and for the rest of the years they are not available thus creating a gap in the data between the four years 1984 to 1997. Fortunately, data about smuggling incidents at the check-points was available, which has made the analysis of some trends possible.

### **7.5.1 Smuggling along the borderline**

Materials smuggled across the Saudi boundaries are varied. However, the major materials at all the boundary sections are drugs, alcohol, livestock, light arms and foodstuffs. The available information in 1982 shows that each border section has a specific type of material which people were trying to smuggle. As table 7.6 illustrates, 68% of drugs seizures were at Alqurayat on the border with Jordan, and 20% at Arar on the border with Iraq. Only 5% of drugs that year were seized at the border section with Yemen (Najran). Regarding alcohol, 71% of alcohol was seized at the border with the GCC countries (Dammam), 20% seized either on Saudi territorial waters in the Red Sea (Jeddah) or at the shore, and 8% was seized at the border with Yemen (Jizan). Although the amount of smuggled livestock that year was very small, 11 head or 52% were seized

at the border with Yemen (Jizan). At the borders with Iraq and Jordan only 4 head or 19% were seized. As to foodstuffs, 99% of smuggled material (for example rice, cooking oil, petrol) was seized at the border with Yemen (Jizan), but most of these materials were smuggled from Saudi Arabia to Yemen, for their prices are cheaper in Saudi Arabia than in Yemen. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, we can not compare the situation that existed in 1982 with the current situation, because the available information is not complete.

The trend of smuggled materials will be illustrated for some of those materials for which detailed information for the period 1984-1996 is available. Those materials are alcohol, livestock and foodstuffs. For other types of material such as drugs and arms detailed information is available for only two years, 1997 and 1998, and then only for the borders with the GCC countries which is the focus of this study.

For alcohol, as figure 7.9 illustrates, the trend of smuggling appears to be decreasing, especially at the borders with the GCC. In 1984 the amount of seized smuggled alcohol was about 43,000 bottles at all the borders and about 17,000 bottles at the borders with the GCC which is lesser than those figures of 1982 (see table 7.7), and it declined significantly afterwards reaching 4,000 bottles in 1988 at all the borders and just 50 bottles in 1991 at the borders with the GCC, which is the lowest amount in this period. This decline at the borders with the GCC in this particular year is probably due to the Gulf War which affected smuggling activities across the Eastern borders. Livestock smuggling at all the borders has a different pattern (see figure 7.10), which fluctuates from 1984 until 1996, but at the borders with the GCC, is apparently almost absent from 1984 until 1990. Then it begins to rise gradually until reaching a peak of about 10,000 head of livestock in 1995 before dropping to about 7,000 head in 1996 and continuing to drop until reaching about 1,300 head in 1998 (see table 7.6).

The trend for foodstuffs (see figure 7.11), was not stable from 1984 until 1990, but begins to drop afterwards, with a slight rise in 1994 before continuing its decline again in 1996. At the borders with the GCC, the smuggling of foodstuffs scarcely feature except for four years and then only in small quantities. In 1984, only 48 items were seized, and

Figure 7.9: Smuggled alcohol seized at the borderline  
1984-1996




Figure 7.10: Smuggled livestock seized at the borderline  
1984-1996





Figure 7.11: Smuggled foodstuffs seized at the borderline  
1984-1996



Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Yearbook, several volumes (1984-1996).

100 items were seized in 1988 and 13 and 30 items in the years 1995 and 1996 respectively. This can be explained by the fact that foodstuff prices between Saudi Arabia and the GCC's countries have no major differences between them, by contrast with the case between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as noted above.

As to drugs seized at the borders with the GCC, in 1997 about 1,500 tablets\* of drugs were seized (see table 7.6). This significantly increased in the next year to reach more than 53,000 tablets. Most of this amount was seized at the borders with Kuwait for both years. Another type of drug, which is hashish, is insignificant in both years. However, in 1999 the Border Guards caught a very large amount of hashish (551 Kilograms) near the border with the Emirates, as one official informed the author. Arms seized in 1997 and 1998 were less than 400 items (see table 7.6), chiefly at the border with Kuwait. In addition, livestock seized in the same two years were almost all at the borders with Kuwait. This indicates that the border with Kuwait has witnessed the majority of the smuggling and illegal incidents for two possible reasons. As explained earlier in this chapter, one reason is no doubt the absence of a security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The second is the topography of the border area which is almost flat and easy to cross, and the major roads to the main cities are close to the border area. An extension of the steel pipe defence to cover the remaining sections of the border might reduce this activity along the boundary.

**Table 7.6: Major smuggled materials seized at the borders with the GCC**

Major caught materials	1997	1998
Drugs (tablets)	1,521	53,286
Hashish (sacks)	16	4
Arms (items) **	391	362
Alcohol (bottles & cans)	26,577	2,851
Sheep (heads)	4,053	1,331
Goats (heads)	77	25

\*\*Different types of guns, pistols and rifles.

Source: *The Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1997 & 1998.*

\* Some types of drugs are made in the form of tablets, the usual form is powder.

Table.7.7: Caught smuggled materials at all the Saudi border sections in 1982

Border Section	Jeddah	Dammam	Arar	Qurayat	Najran	Jizan	Alwajh	Total
Drugs (tablets)	1,123	3,068	20,819	61,157	4,340	86	0	90,593
Percentage	1.2%	3.4%	21%	68%	5%	0.09%	0	100%
Alcohol (bottles)	3,224	11,608	39	295	0	1,233	24	16,423
Percentage	20%	71%	0.2%	2%	0	8%	0.1%	100%
Livestock (heads)	0	2	4	4	0	11	0	21
Percentage	0	10%	19%	19%	0	52%	0	100%
Foodstuffs (items)	0	0	47	0	155	16,318	0	16,521
Percentage	0	0	0.3%	0	1%	98.7%	0	100%

Source: The Saudi Ministry of Interior, Statistical Yearbook, 1982.

In respect to the nationality of the smugglers at the borders with the GCC, the majority of them (94%) are Iraqi (see table 7.8 and figure 7.12). Saudis come second (3%), while other nationalities represent 3% of the total caught in 1998. Smuggling at official check-points to some degree looks different from open border smuggling, which the next section will discuss.

**Table 7.8: Nationality of caught smugglers at the borders with the GCC 1998**

Nationality	Number	%
Iraqi	757	94%
Saudi	24	3%
Others	21	3%
Total	802	100%

*Source: The Saudi Border Guards, Unpublished Statistics, 1998.*

### 7.5.2 Smuggling at land check-points

The huge number of people arriving at Saudi airports and land check-points (see table 7.2), as previously mentioned in this chapter, makes the task of the Saudi Customs Department very difficult and expensive. As figure 7.13 illustrates, most identified smuggling attempts took place at land check-points and airports. This reflects the small number of people who arrive in the Kingdom by sea, excepting those who arrive during the Haj season (their numbers are not included in table 7.2). Figure 7.13 shows a sudden increase in caught smuggling cases from about 500 in 1988 rising to 6,000 cases in 1989. This sudden increase is largely because the caught cases at KFC alone in the same year reached up to 3,000, because the KFC was opened in 1987 but there were not enough Customs staff at that time as will be explained below. However, the number decreased sharply in 1990 and onwards until it started to rise again in 1993 until it reached about 1,300 cases in 1995. This decrease in the number of caught cases could be attributed to more control procedures conducted by the Customs Department. At airport entry points, the number of caught cases is below 1,000 for the whole period, and it reached its peak in 1990 up to about 700 cases (see table 7.9 and figure 7.13). While, for sea entry points, the

highest number of caught cases of smuggling was 46 cases in 1995 (see table 7.9). Nevertheless, this figure may not reflect the actual situation, because as mentioned earlier the Haj figures are not included in these statistics.

**Table 7.9: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995**

Entry-Points	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Airports	815	458	668	365	460	361	524	605
Seaports	28	27	8	12	5	3	39	46
Land check-points	586	6,129	1,107	719	579	766	872	1,232


Source: Saudi Customs Department, *Yearly Statistical Book, 1995*.

The analysis of the official statistics, provided by the Saudi Customs Department, of caught smuggling cases at the three check-points selected for this study, Alkhafji, KFC and Albateha revealed the following results. First, most of the smuggling cases in 1997 were at KFC, which represent 80% of the total caught cases at the three check-points for the year (see table 7.10). This high figure reflects the huge number of people travelling through this check-point, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5. Alkhafji check-point comes next, with 19% of the total caught smuggling. Albateha check-point is the smallest in terms of the number of smuggling cases, representing only 1%. The author interviewed the General Director of Customs Department as well as the Managers of Customs offices at the three check-points and asked them about the proportion of caught cases of smuggling to uncaught cases, but they all answered that they do not have any absolute figure about this particular matter (Interview with Dr. Aljabor 1998; Attwaijeri 1998; Alamro 1998; Alhamad 1998). This uncertainty, makes it difficult to evaluate the smuggling process at the check-points in a more accurate way.

Second, in terms of seized illegal materials, there are five main types seized by Customs officials at the three check-points (see figure 7.14). These are alcohol, drugs, arms and munitions, pornographic materials (e.g. photos, videos) and banned publications (e.g. books, political pamphlets, magazines). Alcohol represents 55% of the total cases of




Figure 7.12: Nationality of apprehended smugglers at the borders with the GCC in 1998




Source: The Saudi Border Guards, unpublished statistics, 1998.

Figure 7.13: Total cases of caught smuggling at all entry points 1988-1995



Source: The Saudi Customs Department, *Yearbook, 1995*.

**Figure 7.14: Types of illegal materials seized at all the three check-points 1997**



Source: The Saudi Customs Department, unpublished statistics for 1997.

smuggled goods at the three check-points (see table 7.11), then comes pornography in the second place with 20%, banned publications represent 15% and arms and munitions represent about 8% of the total cases. Drugs and other goods (e.g. cigarettes, watches) represent less than 1% each.

**Table 7.10: Total cases of caught smuggling at each check-point**

Check-Point	Cases	%
Alkhafji	193	19%
KFC	831	80%
Albateha	13	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1037</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Source: The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.*

Third, each of the three check-points reveals differences from the others in terms of the type of illegal materials seized (see figure 7.15). For example, at Alkhafji 54% of the 193 cases in 1997 were pornographic materials, and about 36% arms and munitions (see table 7.12). The number of alcohol cases at Alkhafji was very small, because the law in Kuwait also prohibits alcohol. After the second Gulf War (1991), arms sales in Kuwait flourished, as Customs officials at Alkhafji (Interview with Alamro, 1998) told the author, and this is why arms smuggling is the highest at this check-point. The structure is different at KFC; about 67% of the cases were alcohol and about 17% banned-publications. Pornographic materials made up about 13% of the cases. Alcohol seizures at this check-point are the highest among the three check-points, because, unlike Kuwait, alcohol is not prohibited by law in Bahrain. At Albateha, nine cases of caught smuggling, which forms about 69% of the total cases at this check-point, were alcohol and only 3 cases drugs and 1 case banned-publications. Nevertheless, although the number of caught cases of alcohol is relatively small compared to the other two check-points, the quantity

of alcohol in these cases reached more than 40,000 bottles according to Customs official at Albatha (Interview with Alhamad, 1998).


The above description reveals two aspects. First, in terms of smuggling incidents, Alkhafji and KFC check-points are the highest, related largely to the large number of people who cross these check-points, especially KFC, and partially because of differences in laws and patterns of social life between Saudi society and the other Gulf societies. Second, in terms of the types of illegal materials caught, the data shows that alcohol is the most smuggled material into Saudi Arabia through all three mentioned check-points. Because alcohol is permitted in two GCC countries, i.e. Bahrain and U.A.E., the people inevitably try to smuggle it through to Saudi Arabia where it is forbidden. This may be an indication of social change in Saudi society, which needs to be studied more thoroughly to understand what is happening. The same thing can be said about pornography and banned-publications. In respect to arms smuggling, carrying arms (e.g. pistols, guns, hunting guns) is a very old tradition deeply rooted in Saudi culture, which stands for security and self-esteem. Therefore, people there find it important to own weapons although they are not allowed to trade them locally. As to drugs, incidents of smuggling are the lowest, because the penalty for smuggling drugs in Saudi Arabia is death. This is made clear to all incoming passengers and travellers. Overall, the level of drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia is still low compared with many other countries.

**Table 7.11: Types of illegal materials caught at all the three check-points 1997**

Type	Alcohol	Pornography	Banned Publication	Arms	Drugs	Other	Total
Cases	571	208	155	87	7	9	1037
Percent	55%	20%	15%	8.4%	0.7%	0.9%	100



**Source:** *The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.*

Figure 7.15: Types of materials smuggled at each check-point 1997




Source: The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics for 1997.

Figure 7.16: Types of illegal materials seized at each check-point 1988-1997



Source: The Saudi Customs Department, unpublished statistics 1988-1997.

Figure 7.17: Smugglers nationality at the check-points 1997



Source: The Saudi Customs Department, unpublished statistics for 1997.



Fourth, in respect to the trend of smuggling at the three check-points, figure 7.16 (a-c) shows the following patterns. At Alkhafji (see figure 7.16 a), smuggling of arms has two peaks, the first in 1989 when the Customs caught about 450 cases. The second is in 1991 when it reached about 200 cases. By examining more detailed statistics of both years that the author had access to from the Customs Department, showed that most of those arms are rifles, pistols, and hunting guns. At KFC (see figure 7.16 b), a significant increase in alcohol cases was in 1989, when they reached up to 3,000 cases, but other types increased suddenly in this year as well. This can be attributed, as the Customs officials asserted (informal conversation with Statistics Section at the Customs Department Headquarter), to the new situation that the opening of KFC in 1987 has created when so many people travelled (see Chapter 5) through the Causeway, and many of whom thought it would be easy to smuggle such materials. At Albateha, the trend is different from the other two check-points. There was a drop of smuggling incidence in 1992 and 1993, but it rose from 1994 onwards, especially alcohol which reached its peak in 1996 at about 30 cases and dropped again afterwards. Smuggling cases of other types never exceeded 15 cases.

**Table 7.12: Cases of smuggling illegal materials caught at the three check-points 1997**

Check-Points	Alcohol	Pornography	Banned Publications	Arms	Drugs	Other	Total
<b>Alkhafji</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>193</b>
Percent of Total	(2.1%)	(54%)	(6.2%)	(36.2%)	(0.5%)	(1%)	(100%)
<b>KFC</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>831</b>
Percent of Total	(67.2%)	(12.5%)	(17.1%)	(2%)	(0.4%)	(0.8%)	(100%)
<b>Albateha</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>
Percent of Total	(69.2%)	(0)	(7.7%)	(0)	(23.1%)	(0)	(100%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1037</b>

Source: *The Saudi Customs Department, Unpublished Statistics, 1997.*

Finally, the available data for 1997 showed the composition of smugglers' nationality (see figure 7.17, a-c) at each of the three check-points. At Alkhafji, 71% of the 193 cases involved Kuwaiti nationals (see figure 7.17, a), 24% Saudi nationals, and only 3% Bahraini. The remaining 2% are divided between Indians and Syrians. At KFC (see figure 7.17, b), 76% of cases were Saudi nationals, 9% Kuwaiti and 5% Bahraini. The rest of the cases (10%) are distributed between the following nationals: Qatari (2%),

English (1%), American (1%) Indian (1%), Filipino (1%), Unidentified (3%) and other nationalities (1%). At Albateha, the representation is slightly different, and the number of cases is smaller than at the other two at check-points. However, as figure 7.17 (c) shows, 39% of cases were Pakistani, 31% Syrian, 15% Saudi and 15% Thai nationals. From the previous description, it is obvious that the three major nationals who attempted smuggling at the studied check-points are Saudis, Kuwaitis and Bahrainis.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

In summary, illegal crossing and smuggling, at both the open border areas and check-points, represent a moderate but significant threat to the internal security of Saudi Arabia. The measures undertaken by the Saudi Border Guards to control and maintain security in the border areas with the GCC, are best described as tight and effective as reflected in the relatively small proportion of illegal crossings and smuggling along the borders with the GCC compared to the other border sections of Saudi Arabia (see figure 7.4 and table 7.6). However, although it is difficult to evaluate the measures undertaken by the Saudi Customs Department, the rate of smuggling at the check-points with the GCC shows that more effort may be needed in future to control check-points. There is a balance of course to be achieved between more stringent controls and long delays to passengers, and more open borders which inevitably allow illegal goods to pass through.

Although topography has a salient effect on the Border Guards' activities (Interview with Brigadier Abuthneen, 1998), they seem very efficiently adaptive to harsh geographical conditions. Moreover, as interviews with various Border Guards officials revealed (Interview with General Anqawi, 1998; with Abuthneen, 1998), there were no problems in identifying the border line for their patrols, and they never lost their way and crossed the border accidentally to the other side. This is because the border line is clearly marked with man-made features, i.e. the sand-bank and the steel pipe constructed by the Border Guards themselves, which make the tasks of patrols very easy.

Despite illegal crossing is not yet a major problem at the borders with the GCC neighbours, as figure 7.6 illustrates, it is already a major problem with Yemen where more than 100,000 illegal immigrants are caught at the border each year. Thus, proposals

to include Yemen to the GCC requires serious consideration, for this step might help to improve the general economic situation in Yemen and in turn help to release much of the pressure from the Saudi border with it.

To conclude this discussion, one can say that maintaining security at the borders is a vital element for Saudi Arabia as a state despite the pressures on it to relax those borders. The GCC charter, theoretically at least, asserts the principle of 'unity' between the Member States in Article 4, and the Unified Economic Agreement calls for 'opening' the borders and guarantees the free movement of people and goods. The Customs Union, which the Member States agreed at their 20<sup>th</sup> summit in Riyadh in November 1999, will come into force from 1<sup>st</sup> of March 2005 (Aljazirah 1999). This requires abolition of all the obstacles from the borders which inhibit movement of trade and goods (see Chapter 6). Therefore, the Saudi decision makers will have to find which way is best for the national interests, of which security is a fundamental part, and how to reconcile the regional collective cooperation efforts with the continued autonomy and uniqueness of the Saudi state. One practical solution might be the expansion of staff and facilities at crossing points to intensify surveillance while maintaining rapid transit for passengers.

## References

- Abu-Dawood, A. (1999), *Illegal Migration Across the Saudi International Boundaries* (a monograph in Arabic), The Fifth Geographical Symposium for Geography Departments in the Saudi Universities, 4<sup>th</sup> March 1999, Jeddah.
- Albahrain Magazine (in Arabic), Issue No. 641, 23 December 1981, pp. 1-6.
- Aljazirah Newspaper (in Arabic), Issue No. 9923, 30 November 1999.
- Al-Riyadh Newspaper (in Arabic), Vol. 37, Issue No. 11771, 15 September 2000.
- Al-Riyadh Newspaper (in Arabic), Vol. 37, Issue No. 11910, 1<sup>st</sup> February 2001.
- Blake, Gerald (2000), "Borderlands under stress: some global perspectives" in M. Pratt & J. A. Brown (eds.), *Borderlands Under Stress*, Kluwer Law International, London, pp. 1-16.
- Collinson, Sarah (1993), *Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
- Cordesman, A. H. (1997), *Saudi Arabia: Guarding The Desert Kingdom*, Westview Press, Boulder.
- Kambudzi, A. M. & G. Linington (1997), "Zimbabwe-Mozambique Border" in S. M. Nkiwani (ed.), *Zimbabwe's International Borders: A Study in National and Regional Development in South Africa*, Vol. 1, Harare, pp. 25-41.
- King Abdulaziz City For Science and Technology (2000), *Regulations for Internet Service Providers*, (In Arabic) Riyadh.
- Leitner, Helga (1995), "International migration and the politics of admission and exclusion in postwar Europe", *Political Geography*, Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 259-278.
- Nakkeh, E. A. (1986), *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Prager, New York.
- Parnwell, Mike (1993), *Population Movements and the Third World*, Routledge, London.
- Percy, G.E. (1965), "Boundary functions", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 64, Part 8, pp. 346-349.

Qassim, Jamal (1997), *Security Problems in the Arabian Gulf: From the British Withdrawal to the Second Gulf War* (in Arabic), The Emirate Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Dubai.

Quandt, W. B. (1981), *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.

Safran, Nadav (1985), *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge.

Segal, Aron (1993), *An Atlas of International Migration*, Hans Zell Publishers, London.

Stork, Joe and Martha Wenger (1991), "From rapid deployment to massive deployment", *Middle East Report*, January/February, No. 168, Vol. 21, No., pp.22-26.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1998), *The Military Survey 1998-1999*.

The Saudi Border Guards, *Unpublished Statistics 1997 & 1998*. (in Arabic)

The Saudi Customs Department, *Statistical Yearbook, 1988-1995*. (in Arabic)

The Saudi Customs Department, *Unpublished Statistics 1996 & 1997*. (in Arabic)

The Saudi Ministry of Interior, *Statistical Yearbook, 1982-1997*. (in Arabic)

The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Border Guards (1989), *Regulations of Borders Security and its Executive Register*. (in Arabic).

Wilson, P. W. & D. F. Graham (1994), *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.

### **Interviews**

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Aljabor, the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department, in June 1998.

Interview with General Talal Anqawi, the General Director of the Saudi Border Guards, in October 1998.

Interview with Brigadier Mutlaq Abuthneen, Director of the Border Guards at the Eastern Province, in October 1998.

Interview with Mr. Sulaiman Attwajjeri, Manager of the Saudi Customs at KFC check-point, in June 1998.

Interview with Mr. Salih Alamro, Manager of the Saudi Customs at Alkhafji check-point, in October 1998.

Interview with Mr. Abdulaziz Alhamad, Assistant Manager of the Saudi Customs at Albateha check-point, in October 1998.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Conclusion**

## **8.1 Introduction**

In our contemporary world, 'globalisation' is sweeping fast into many regions of the world. The most important aspect of 'globalisation' is to free world trade from barriers imposed by governments, which means more 'open' borders. However, this trend is confronted by many obstacles. Today, one can notice that there are two opposite trends in the world. On the one hand there is more cooperation and integration towards 'open' borders (integrated borderlands in the Martinez Model); the European Union is a good example here. By contrast, there are trends towards more 'closed' borders (alienated borderlands in the Martinez Model); for example in some Eastern European countries, including the former Yugoslavia, and many new international boundaries have appeared in the last decade or so.

Saudi Arabia, of course, cannot escape global trends, and it is evident from this study that the Saudi experience lies at a point between the two extremes mentioned above. Its borders with its GCC neighbours are not totally 'open', especially in terms of trade exchange, and at the same time are not totally 'closed'. The management task at the borders is to maintain the delicate balance between more open borders and continuing security. This is not easy to achieve. The study of management practices at the Saudi boundary revealed the following important conclusions.

## **8.2 Study Conclusions**

The geographical setting of Saudi Arabia, as well as almost all the area of the GCC countries, is characterised by hot and dry climate which in turn has affected, for centuries, natural resources and the economic system which is based mainly on agriculture and above all pasturage. Because of the aridity, there were no permanent stream flows on the surface and people depended largely on ground water and on wet season for grazing their herds. Mobility was thus the key to survival in this system. The topography of the eastern Saudi territories showed that it is characterised mainly by low-lying sand dunes and salt marshes. This has some effects on the management practices under study, especially security management.



As the historical background revealed, the borderless concept of state in Islam, which prevailed during the first and second Saudi states, was confronted by the new Western concept of territorial limits of states, which the people in Arabia first met in 1922 in the Uqair Convention. Ibn Saud was persuaded by the British to accept this concept, which he could not reject despite the strong opposition by his army the Ikhwan.

The good will policy of Saudi Arabia towards her GCC neighbours has enabled her to settle several territorial disputes with them, notably the dividing of the Neutral Zone in 1965 with Kuwait, and the establishment of the *Fasht Abu-Safah* maritime triangle with Bahrain in 1958 as part of a maritime boundary agreement. Moreover, the legal status of the Saudi boundaries with the three countries, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the U.A.E. is well established although there were some detailed shortcomings in the treaties. Those shortcomings still have recent political impacts (e.g. the Emirates position towards the opening of Shaibah oil field). However, these shortcomings proved to have little significant effect on day to day management practices. The condition of the boundary monuments on the ground has deteriorated, but this also has little effect on management practices. There was apparent absence of institutional arrangements, apart from the KSJC, to deal with day to day low-profile matters as well as more serious crisis and friction that may occur on the border areas.

Despite similarities and good relations between the GCC countries, and despite the GCC having produced general policies, such as the Unified Economic Agreement, which aim to open the borders between the member states for free movement of people and goods, there are some political differences between Saudi Arabia and those countries. The differences are mainly manifested in legislation and legal systems which affect Saudi strategies towards its borders with the GCC.

The management of access for people showed that despite Saudi Arabia having allowed other GCC citizens to enter the Kingdom without visas for long or limited stay, it is still requiring passports as the accepted document for entry, whereas several member states such as Oman and U.A.E. have accepted the ID card for passage. However, these requirements did not hinder people from travelling across the Saudi borders, rather the movement of people has noticeably increased after the UEA, especially between Saudi

Arabia and Bahrain. For example, the number of Saudis travelling to Bahrain increased from 94,000 in 1982 to about 1.6 million in 1996. The Bahrainis who entered Saudi Arabia in 1982 were 47,000 and they increased to 880,000 in 1996.

The study revealed that the travellers across the Saudi borders with Kuwait, Bahrain, and U.A.E., Saudis and non-Saudis, varied in their characteristics such as age, occupation, mode of transportation, companions, and nationality. It also revealed that the three check-points varied in terms of infrastructures and the availability of amenities. Despite computer systems being introduced to the check-points for processing the passage of travellers, the study showed that infrastructures at Alkhafji and Albateha are not as adequate as at the KFC. The shortcomings in providing good facilities could affect not just travellers but also officials at the check-points which might cause considerable delay.

The frequency of travelling across the border is a result of two factors, geographical distance and regulations at the check-points. At KFC, the geographical proximity and the reasonable efficiency of the check-point shows that for arrivals the majority of travellers (40%), which most of whom are Bahrainis, are travelling on a monthly basis and 12% on weekly basis, which perhaps underlines the effect of geographical distance. For the departures at KFC, 27% were travelling on a monthly basis and 28% on a weekly basis. This contrasted by travelling frequency at Alkhafji where 44% of arrivals and 31% of departures were travelling on a yearly basis. This is possibly affected by the regulations at Alkhafji which make the proportion of people travelling yearly rather high. At Albateha the majority of travellers on both directions are travelling on yearly basis, and a very small proportion on weekly and daily basis.

Analysis of the purpose of travelling showed that most of travellers at Alkhafji in both directions are travelling to visit their relatives, while most of them at KFC on both directions are travelling for leisure. At Albateha, most of departures are travelling for leisure, and most of arrivals are travelling to visit their relatives.

The efficiency of the check-points can be roughly measured by the time taken by travellers to pass through. The study showed that for arrivals at Alkhafji, 58% of travellers spent more than 50 minutes to finish their formalities as regulations differ for

departures and arrivals. This may reflect the fact that the infrastructure at the check-point, as discussed above, is not adequate and causes a considerable amount of delay, or it could be attributed to normal congestion which can occur at check-points. At KFC, by contrast, 37% of the arrivals spent less than 10 minutes, and 32% spent from 10-20 minutes. This suggests that this check-point may be more efficient in terms of procedures and infrastructure. At Albateha, 35% spent more than 50 minutes. This could be attributed to the local regulations and the mode of transportation; 33% of the arrivals came by bus. For the departures, the situation is different. The majority of travellers at Alkhafji and Albateha spent 20 minutes or less, while at KFC 26% spent 10-20 minutes and 50% spent 21-50 minutes. In general, the time consumed seems reasonable by international standards.

Access for goods reveals a different picture from the above. As a result of the UEA, tariffs on GCC's national products have been abolished between the members states, and therefore the trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and the three countries has increased, but it still represents only about 6% of the country's total trade. The majority of exports from Saudi Arabia to the three countries comprise industrial products, agricultural products, and natural resources. The amount of Saudi exports is larger than imports which reflects the dominance of the Saudi economy over other states' economies.

The survey of trucks crossing to/from Bahrain showed that most of the exported goods from Saudi Arabia are industrial products which represent 60% of the goods passing to Bahrain. Then comes agricultural products, which represent 29%; the remaining proportion is for processed foods. Also most of the imports from Bahrain are industrial products, but there were few agricultural products, because agriculture in Bahrain is very limited compared with Saudi Arabia. The frequency of trucks crossing reflects the extent of trade links between the two sides. For the departures, 50% of trucks cross weekly and 13% daily, while for the arrivals, 49% cross monthly, 38% cross weekly, and 8% cross daily.

With respect to time consumed for trucks at the border, the survey revealed a very interesting result, especially for the arrivals; 61% of the arrival trucks spent more than 120 minutes at KFC, some of them as long as 24 hours. This can be largely attributed to

the detailed regulations specifying how the Saudi Customs Department must check trucks, which are very time consuming. The situation for departures is rather better, where 33% of the trucks spent less than 30 minutes and 42% 30-60 minutes, because the regulations for departing trucks are less complicated.

It is arguable that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC states are still in the second stage of Blassa's classification of economic cooperation (Kopper 1995), which is the 'free trade area'. The move towards the third stage, which is the 'common market', is hindered by a number of factors, the most important of which are: sovereignty issues, boundary disputes (e.g. the Bahrain-Qatar dispute, which resolved in 2001) differences in reconciling legislation and legal systems, and national interest groups.

Therefore, management practices at the three Saudi boundaries show inconsistency with the GCC's long term objective of political unity. Regrettably the trend is seemingly not towards more openness. In due course, Saudi Arabia may be forced to conclude that the modern state can no longer function as the:

*"Container of modern society, but policy makers seem some way distant from this radical alternative" (Agnew 1998, p. 51).*

Fundamentally, the policy regarding border crossings, and control of movement across the border is the result of foreign policy, as primarily expressed in the GCC Charter. Local factors dictate the levels of demand for crossing, and the implementation of government legislation and directives is left to officials on the ground.

The analysis of security management practices at the border showed that both external and internal threats have their impacts on the border. The methods adopted by the Saudi government to manage all the country's borders with neighbouring states in terms of security, which are security agreements with the GCC neighbours; the Border Guards; and the Customs Department, were quite effective, despite the fact that there is a lack in adopting the latest technology in surveillance. However, as the official statistics showed, most of the challenge is at the land check-points with the GCC neighbours where 44% of arrivals to all the entry points come through the check-points with the GCC states. This is also reflected in the amount of smuggling at those check-points, especially the KFC. Another challenge to the Border Guards is tackling increasing levels of illegal migration,

a global phenomenon attributed to a number of factors, among them economic inequalities between countries, political instabilities and the like (Wood 1994). This is very clear in the nationalities of the caught illegal migrants, most of whom are Iraqis, Sudanese and Yemenis. Nevertheless, the rate of caught illegal immigrants at the borders with the GCC is lower than that with Yemen and Iraq (see figure 7.5).

Smuggling represents a serious problem at both check-points and open borders. A high proportion of the smuggled goods across open borders with the GCC countries are alcohol, livestock (e.g. sheep and goats), drugs, and arms. Most smugglers are Iraqis and Saudis. Most of the seized materials at the check-points are alcohol, pornographic materials, banned publications, and arms (e.g. rifles, pistols, and guns). At KFC most of the seized goods are alcohol and banned publications. At Alkhafji, most of the seized goods are arms and pornographic materials, and at Albateha, most of the seized materials are alcohol and drugs. This suggests that there are significant changes in Saudi society which create a demand for such materials, except arms whose ownership represents a deeply rooted tradition in Saudi society.

It can be said that management practices along the Saudi borders with its GCC neighbours have achieved reasonable success in maintaining security and allowing a degree of access. The success of security measures at the borders is evidenced by illegal crossings and smuggling which, however serious, are the lowest compared to the other Saudi borders. This can be mainly attributed to the cooperation between the Saudi authorities and their GCC counterparts, which at other non-GCC borders is not as strong as at these borders. The success in allowing access appeared in the reasonable time taken in crossing the borders, especially for people. There could be some improvements for allowing access for goods, but generally it is not fundamentally hindering the movement of goods.

Therefore, the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours lie somewhere between open and closed. Almost all the studied borders share the same situation, with small differences, and it is likely that this situation will prevail for some time in future unless Saudi Arabia and the GCC states reach a stage where they will concede some of their

sovereignty in the common interest, and until they find a formula to reduce remaining differences between them.


The foregoing results can be integrated in a general model of the Saudi boundary management (see figure 8.1). The model shows that there are two main sets of factor affecting Saudi foreign policy, boundary management policies and management practices. On one hand, there are the GCC Charter and general policies such as UEA, public opinion of the people, and economic realities (e.g. industrial policies, agricultural policies). Such factors are pushing towards more open borders to achieve the ultimate aim of the GCC which is 'unity' between its Member States. While, on the other hand security considerations, legal system and values, and illegal migrants are factors pushing towards more closed borders. Saudi foreign policy as it is affected by the GCC and other factors has its impact upon boundary management policies and practices in respect of access for people, access for goods, security management, environmental management, and resources management. Those practices in turn have a feedback to boundary management policies and strategies and to foreign policy as well.

The numbers in the model indicate the chapter numbers in this thesis where those topics have been covered. The dotted lines of the two boxes of environmental and resources management indicates that these two topics have not been covered in this study. The boxes on the bottom of the model shows which government body is responsible for certain management practice. The model reveals, however, how complicated is 'boundary management' and the wide range of factors which may affect management practices.

### **8.3 Recommendations**

It is very difficult to see how the contradictory objectives of open borders and a high level of security can be achieved. This problem is being faced by states all round the world which are experiencing the same dilemma. Even the citizens of most states have not decided whether they would prefer the social and economic benefits of open borders, or the sense of security which closed borders create. Although no easy solution can be

**Figure 8.1: A model of Saudi boundary management**



Source: The author.

suggested, there are certain actions which Saudi Arabia and the GCC states might take in an effort to reconcile open borders with national security. These are set out below as recommendations for serious consideration and further investigation. In detail they lie beyond the scope of this research. Taken together, they might provide important guidelines for the future management of Saudi Arabia's land boundaries. They might enable the borders examined in this thesis to move from about halfway along the spectrum between 'closed' and 'open', towards 'open'.

### **8.3.1 Provision of better facilities at border crossing points**

It has been shown that the facilities available at the border crossings selected for study are not good enough for the present number of travellers. Consideration should be given to providing a range of services for the comfort and convenience of those who pass through, including truck drivers. These might include some amenities typically found in a moderate-sized European motorway service station including shops, restaurants, mosques, and play area for children. The aim is to make delays at such places as tolerable as possible.

Secondly, the infrastructure necessary to process large numbers of transit passengers rapidly and thoroughly needs to be redesigned and expanded. With more lanes, larger offices, and more staff, transit times might be reduced without affecting the thoroughness of the Customs and security operations. There will always be a balance to be struck between time spent on searching vehicles and people, and the level of security to be achieved. From a political viewpoint what happens at the point of entry and exit creates a profound impression on visitors. If the GCC is to capture the enthusiasm of many of the common people on both sides of the border, crossing procedures need to be convenient, efficient and courteous. It goes without saying that tourists need to be treated with special courtesy. Consideration might be given to training border and borderland personnel in the art of courtesy and hospitality for which the region is traditionally renowned.



### **8.3.2 Adoption of high-technology surveillance systems**

More open borders might be achieved if there was less emphasis on security and control at the boundaries and more activity in the borderlands, assisted by a range of high-technology surveillance systems. Such systems might help in eliminating smugglers and illegal migrants, and assist in ensuring tighter control in a zone adjacent to the border. There would need to be agreements about the deployment of surveillance systems between states on both sides of the border. In recent years all kinds of detection systems have been developed particularly for use in coastal waters to assist in the interception of illegal travellers, smugglers, and the like. These include radar systems, electronic listening devices, advanced satellite monitoring, and sophisticated patrol vessels and aircraft. A lot more could be done to deploy these systems on the land. For example, there is a 200 kilometres electronic 'screen' in place along the south coast of Spain to protect the European Union from illegal migrants; a system of this kind would be a powerful deterrent to unwanted border crossing along selected sectors of the Saudi borders (Lynch 2000).

### **8.3.3 Tracking illegal migrants**

The fear of illegal migrants is one of the most compelling reasons why the GCC boundaries have not opened up in the way the GCC Charter had envisaged. This is hardly surprising. Migrations world-wide follow a similar pattern flowing from the poor and populous states to the rich states with employment opportunities. This has long been a problem because of Saudi Arabia's relative wealth, but even more powerful forces are at work today generated by poverty, political instability, and greater competition. The trend is likely to increase substantially with the oil rich states becoming targets for long-distance migrants from Asia and Africa. The problem needs to be tackled at the point of origin, in transit, and at the border.

Not enough is known about the routes being followed by international migrants, which can follow complex routes often by land and sea after paying large sums to agents to organise their journeys. It would represent a big contribution to the problem if a thorough investigation could be funded by the GCC states. The funding of such research might

help authorities to anticipate future coastal landings and attempted crossings, and concentrate efforts on critical spots. This research would need the full cooperation of a number of states beyond the Arabian Gulf. It might be difficult, because the most popular routes are liable to change, and they can follow very improbable itineraries. Nevertheless, GCC states would do well to attempt a comprehensive investigation and adopt policies to stem the flow before it becomes almost overwhelming.

#### **8.3.4 Borderland development**

There is probably not a lot of potential for borderland development on the Bahrain-Saudi and the Saudi-U.A.E. boundaries. Populations are too sparse and economic opportunities are limited by the absence of small towns or agricultural production. Nothing remotely like the borderland region of Europe can be expected to develop along these borders. However, the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia borderland in the vicinity of Alkhafji might have some potential. It deserves to be explored. The idea would be to open up the border to investment in industrial enterprises. On the face of it there is the potential to generate light industrial activities which might include fish processing based on fisheries in local waters, and oil-industry related products and services. The Kuwait-Saudi borderland might also be developed as a free trade zone of some kind to attract regional as well as local investment. Such a scheme would not resolve the security problem, but it might be managed so that it makes a significant contribution to the borderland security. Illegal migrants would have to pass into and out of the borderland zone where surveillance would be in place. Whatever happens on this border, it is likely to remain the most susceptible to illegal crossings of all the borders studied in this thesis, with Iraqis the largest group of migrants.

#### **8.3.5 Institutional arrangements**

It has been shown that a number of agencies work together to manage the Saudi Arabia-GCC international boundaries (see figure 4.1). In general they clearly deliver a service of reasonable efficiency, maintaining a delicate balance between freedom of movement and security control. Moreover, the Saudi-GCC borders enjoy one advantage which many

international boundaries do not enjoy; political harmony between the neighbouring states. Essentially they share the same aspirations and have signed up to the same objectives in the GCC Charter. From these sound foundations, it is arguable that a great deal more could be done to generate borderland prosperity (as recommended above), to facilitate movement of people and goods, and to continue a high level of local and national security. In addition, important activities which have not been discussed in this thesis need to be encouraged and developed, including transboundary resource management, and environmental and conservation projects in borderlands.

It is recommended that a Borderland Commission should be established with representatives from all the GCC states, to investigate and possibly implement some of the initiatives proposed in this section. Much needs to be done which the present agencies are unable to achieve. In future the challenges will become greater. A Borderland Commission with a permanent secretariat and a sensible budget would be able to carry these proposals forward. Its role would be consultation and planning, and of course it would be available to resolve problems rapidly as they arise between states. One of the early tasks of the Commission would be to assemble 'best practice' from borderlands around the world which might be useful in the Saudi-GCC context. The European Union and the Mexico-United States experiences might be of particular interest. In addition, the Saudi long experience in solving peacefully almost all of its boundary disputes with its neighbours enables her to take the lead in such a proposal. The Commission might also encourage appropriate borderland research, and the preparation of large scale transboundary borderland surveys and maps. In time, and given continuation of the critical ingredient of potential goodwill, the Commission may be able to lay foundations for a borderless world between Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours, but it is likely to take a long time.

## References

- Agnew, J. (1998), *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*, Routledge, London.
- Lynch, D. J. (2000), "Spain not welcoming to its new Europeans", *USA Today*, 11 December, 19A-20A.
- Wood, W.B. (1994), "Crossing the line: geopolitics of international migration" in G.J. Demko and W. B. Wood, *Reordering the World*, Westview Press, pp. 191-205.

## Bibliography

- Abu-Dawood, A. (1984), *Political Boundaries of Saudi Arabia: Their Evolution and Functions*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, U.S.A.
- Abu-Dawood, A. (1999), *Illegal Migration Across the Saudi International Boundaries* (a monograph in Arabic), The Fifth Geographical Symposium for Geography Departments in the Saudi Universities, 4<sup>th</sup> March 1999, Jeddah.
- Adler, R., (1995a), "International Land Boundary Database", *Surveying and Land Information System*, Vol.55, No. 4, pp.212-16.
- Adler, R. (1995b), *Positioning and Mapping International Boundaries*, Boundary and Territory Briefing, Vol. 2 No. 1, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, Durham.
- Agnew, J. (1998), *Revisioning World Politics*, Routledge, London, p.51.
- Albaharnah, H. (1968), *The Legal Status of The Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problems*, Oceana Publications, Manchester.
- Albahrain Magazine (in Arabic), Issue No. 641, 23 December 1981, pp. 1-6.
- Al-Ghamdi, A. (1999), *The Case of Saudi Arabia-Yemen Boundary: Towards Settlement*, (Arabic), Almadinah Almonawarah Company for Printing and Publishing, Jeddah.
- Aljarad, S.N. (1993), *Disaggregate Mode Choice Modelling For Intercity Non-Business Travellers in The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Corridor*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University.
- Aljarad, S. and Black, W. (1995), "Modeling Saudi Arabia-Bahrain corridor mode choice", *Journal Transport Geography*, Vol.3, No. 4, pp. 257-268.
- Aljazirah Newspaper (in Arabic), Issue No. 9923, 30 November 1999.
- Allcock, J. *et al* (1992), *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Longman Current Affairs, Harlow, England.
- Almadinah Newspaper (in Arabic), Issue no. 13351, 8<sup>th</sup> November, 1999, p. 6.
- Almana, M. (1980), *Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud*, Hutchinson Benham, London.
- Al-Mayyal, A. (1986), *The Political Boundaries of The State of Kuwait: A Study in Political Geography*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University Of London.

- Al-Mihairy, S. (1999), *The GCC Procession: Goals, Performance and Achievements*, (In Arabic), The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Dubai.
- Al-Othaimen, A. (1995), *The History of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (Arabic), Sixth Edition, Vol. 1, Al-Obaikan, Riyadh.
- Al-Qabba, A. (1986), *The Saudi Foreign Policy*, (In Arabic), Alfarazdaq, Riyadh.
- Al-Qasimi, S. (1999), *Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf*, Forest Row, Exeter.
- Al-Riyadh Newspaper (in Arabic), Vol. 37, Issue No. 11771, 15 September 2000.
- Al-Riyadh Newspaper (in Arabic), Vol. 37, Issue No. 11910, 1<sup>st</sup> February 2001.
- Alsaif, H. (1990), *Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: An Analytical Study in Political Geography*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (In Arabic), Girls Colleges, Geography Department, Riyadh.
- Al-Shamlan, A.R. (1987), *The Evolution of National Boundaries in the South-eastern Arabian Peninsula: 1934-1955*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan.
- Al-Ulama, H. (1994), "Federal Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, Durham, UK.
- Amin, S. (1981), *International and Legal Problems of the Gulf*, Menas Press Ltd, London.
- Anderson, E. (1993), *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crisis*, Pinter Reference, London.
- Anderson, E., (1996), "International Boundaries and the Law: Some Consideration", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Special Edition, pp.105-09.
- Anderson, J. and Dowd, L. (1999), "Border, Border regions and territoriality: contradictory meanings, changing significance", *Regional Studies*, Vol. 37, 7, pp. 593-604.
- Andrew, B. (1991), *An Atlas of World Affairs*, 9th Edition, Routledge, London.
- Arya, D.K. & Sharma, R.C.(eds.) (1991) *Management Issues and Operational Planning for India's Borders*, Scholars Publishing Forum, New Delhi.
- Bahrain Central Statistics Organisation (BCSO) (1991), *Statistical Abstract 1991*.
- Bidwell, R. (1972), "A British Official Guide To The Gulf", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 138, Part 3, pp.233-35.
- Biger, G. (1995), *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*, Facts On File, New York.

- Bindagji, H. (1978), *Atlas of Saudi Arabia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bindagji, H. (1981), *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (Arabic), H.H. Bindagji, Jeddah.
- Blake, G. (1991), "The International boundaries of Arabia: The peaceful resolution of disputes" in N. Kliot & S. Waterman, *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, Belhaven Press, London, pp.153-65.
- Blake, G. (1992), "International boundaries and territorial stability in the Middle East: an assessment", *GeoJournal*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 200-10.
- Blake, G. (1994a), "International transboundary collaborative ventures" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 359-364.
- Blake, G. (1994b), "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States" in R. Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp.200-10.
- Blake, G. (1994c), "The Mapping of International Boundaries", *Society of Cartographic Bulletin*, V.28, pp. 1-7.
- Blake, G. (ed.) (1995), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London.
- Blake, G. (1998), "The objectives of land boundary management", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, IBRU, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 55-59.
- Blake, G. (1999), "Geographers and international boundaries", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 55-62.
- Blake, G. (2000), "Borderlands under stress: some global perspectives" in M. Pratt & J. A. Brown (eds.), *Borderlands Under Stress*, Kluwer Law International, London, pp. 1-16.
- Boggs, S.W., (1940), *International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Boundary and Security Bulletin (2000), "Border agreement signed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 2 July 2000 demarcating their offshore Neutral Zone border", Vol. 8, No.3, IBRU, pp. 69-71.
- Brigham, A.P., (1919), "Principles in the Determination of Boundaries", *The Geographical Review*, Vol.52, No. , pp.201-19.
- Brown, E. (1963), *The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone*, The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut.
- Brownlie, I. (1979), *African Boundaries: A legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia*, C. Hurst & Company, London.

- Caponera, D. (1995), "Shared waters and international law" in G. Blake *et al* (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp. 121-126.
- Chanda, R. (1994), "SADCC/SADC as an instrument for coexistence in Southern Africa" in W. Galluser and *et al* (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 287-298.
- Cohn, T.H. (1999), *Cross-Border Travel in North America: The Challenge of US Section 110 Legislation*, Canadian-American Public Policy Paper Series, Canadian-American Centre, Orono.
- Collinson, S. (1993), *Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
- Cordesman, A. H. (1997), *Saudi Arabia: Guarding The Desert Kingdom*, Westview Press, Boulder.
- Duchacek, I. (1986), "International competence of subnational governments: borderlands and beyond" in O. Martinez (ed.), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp. 11-28.
- IBRU Database (1997), "08/06/1997, Mexico-United States: Clinton-Zedillo Summit", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>
- IBRU Database (1999), "04/03/1999, Armenia-Georgia: Trade Dispute", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>
- Ebdon, D. (1977), *Statistics in Geography*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (1999), *United Arab Emirates*, Country Report, 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter 1999.
- El-Erian, M. and Sassanpour, C. (1997); *GCC's Macroeconomic Strategies: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, in J. Devlin (ed.), *Gulf Economies: Strategies for Growth in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
- El-Kuwaiz, A. (1987); *Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges and Future Outlook*, in J. Sandwick (ed.); *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Westview Press, Washington DC, pp. 71-83.
- Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Department of Planning (ADP) (1996), *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.
- Falah, G. and Newman, D. (1995), "The spatial manifestation of threat: Israelis and Palestinians seek a 'good' border", *Political Geography*, Vol. 14, No.8, pp. 689-706.



- Farsi, Z. (no date), *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia National Road Atlas and Touring Guide*, Z. Farsi, Jeddah.
- Finnegan, P. (1997), "Gulf Council Seeks Resolution of Border Disputes", *Defence News*, Vol. 12 Part 16, pp. 54-56.
- Finnie, D. (1992), *Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier With Iraq*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Forsberg, T. (1995), "Theories on territorial disputes" in T. Forsberg (ed.), *Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Union*, Edward Elgar, Hants, England, pp. 23-41.
- Gallusser, W. (ed.) (1994), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Proceedings of the IGU-Symposium, Basel/Switzerland, 24-27 May 1994, Peter Lang, Berne.
- G.C.C. Secretariat General (1992), *The Cooperation Council's Charter*, G.C.C. Printing Press, Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General (1997); *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 12, Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General (1998); *Joint Works Decisions*, (in Arabic), Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General (no date); *Cooperation in Customs Between the GCC's States*, (in Arabic), Riyadh.
- GCC, Secretariat General, (No Date), *The Unified Economic Agreement*, Riyadh.
- Geisse, M. and Arenas, H. (1994), "An economic agreement between Chile and Bolivia as solution for a landlocked country" in W. Gallusser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 144-150.
- Giermanski, J.R. (1995), "Texas to Mexico: A Border to Avoid", *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, Vol. X, No. 2, pp. 33-50.
- Glassner, M. and de Blij, H., (1989), *Systematic Political Geography*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York.
- Glassner, M. (1993), *Systematic Political Geography*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York.
- Goertz, G. and Diehl, P. (1992), *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*, Routledge, London.
- Goldberg, J. (1986), *The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years 1902-1918*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Goonerate, W. and Mossleman, E.E. (1996), "Planing across borders: border regions in Eastern and Southern Africa", *Regional Development Dialogue*, Vol. 17, No.2, Autumn, pp. 136-155.

- Griffiths, I. (1995), *The African Inheritance*, Routledge, London.
- Hamadi, A.M., (1981), *Saudi Arabia's Territorial Limits: A Study in Law and Politics*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University.
- Hansen, N. (1986), "Border region development and cooperation: Western Europe and the US-Mexico borderlands in comparative perspective" in O. Martinez (ed.), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp. 31-44.
- Hartshorne, R. (1936), "Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries", abstract, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 26, (March), pp. 56-57.
- Hartshorne, R. (1937), "A survey of the boundary problems of Europe", in C. C. Colby (ed.), *Geographic Aspects of International Relations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 163-181.
- Hay, R. (1954), "The Persian Gulf States and their boundary problems", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 120, Part 4, pp.433-445.
- Hayashi, M. (1995), "The role of the United Nations in managing the world's fisheries" in G. Blake and et al (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp. 373-393.
- Hearn, G. and Tyedmers, P. (1995), "Poseidon's Trident: biological diversity preservation, resource conservation and conflict avoidance in the South China Sea" in G. Blake and et al (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp. 289-300.
- Hocknell, P. (1998), *Post-partition Management of Transboundary Resources: The Case of Cyprus*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, Durham.
- Holsti, K. (1995), *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- House, J. (1959), "The Franco-Italian boundary in the Alpes Maritimes" *Institute of British Geographers, Transactions and Papers*, No. 26, pp. 107-31.
- House, J. (1981), "Frontier studies: an applied approach" in A. Burnett and P. Taylor (eds.), *Political Studies From Spatial Perspectives*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 291-312.
- House, J. (1982), *Frontier on the Rio Grand: A Political Geography of Development and Social Deprivation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Huth, P. (1996), *Standing your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflicts*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
- IBRU Database (1997), "08/06/1997, Mexico-United States: Clinton-Zedillo Summit", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>

- IBRU Database (1999), "04/03/1999, Armenia-Georgia: Trade Dispute", <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/cgi-bin/data.pl>
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), A report prepared by C. Sassanpour (1995); *Policy Challenges in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries*.
- International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1982), PennWell Publishing Co., Tulsa.
- Johnson, D. (1917), "The role of political boundaries", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 208-13.
- Jones, S. (1943), "The description of international boundaries", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 99-117.
- Jones, S. (1945), *Boundary-Making: A Handbook For Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners*, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington.
- Kambudzi, A. M. and Linington, G. (1997), "Zimbabwe-Mozambique Border" in S. M. Nkiwani (ed.), *Zimbabwe's International Borders: A Study in National and Regional Development in South Africa*, Vol. 1, Harare, pp. 25-41.
- Kelly, J. (1967), *Eastern Boundaries of Arabia*, (Arabic Translation), Al Amal Library, Kuwait.
- Kelly, J. (1964), *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York.
- King Abdulaziz City For Science and Technology (2000), *Regulations for Internet Service Providers*, (In Arabic) Riyadh.
- Kitchin, R. and Tate, N. (2000), *Conducting Research into Human Geography*, Prentice Hall, London.
- Konard, V. (1986), "The subtle invasion: Canadian cultural transfers to the United States" in O. Martinez (ed.), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp.138-155.
- Koppers, S. (1995); *Economic Analysis and Evaluation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
- Koter, M. (1994), "Transborder Euroregions round Polish border zones as an example of a new form of political coexistence" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 77-87.
- Krejcie, R. and Morgan, D. (1970), "Determining sample size for research activities", *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 30,1, pp. 607-10.
- Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning (KMP) (1998), *Annual Statistical Abstract 1998*.
- Lawson, F. (1997); *Dialectical Integration in the Gulf Co-operation Council*, The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi.

- Leatherdale, C. (1983), *Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis*, Frank Cass, London.
- Leitner, H. (1995), "International migration and the politics of admission and exclusion in postwar Europe", *Political Geography*, Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 259-278.
- Lezzi, M. (1994), "Competition- cooperation: a creative interplay of border regions economic development planning and transborder institutions" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 322-332.
- Library of Congress Country Studies, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>.
- Lynch, D.J. (2000), "Spain not welcoming to its new Europeans", *USA Today*, 11 December 2000, pp.19A-20A.
- Martinez, O. (ed.) (1986), *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso.
- Martinez, O. (1994), "the dynamics of border interaction: new approaches to border analysis" in C. Schofield (ed.), *Global Boundaries: World Boundaries*, Vol. 1, Routledge, London, pp. 1-15.
- McGrew, C. and Monroe, C. (1993), *An Introduction to Statistical Problem Solving in Geography*, WCB McGraw-Hill, New York.
- McCloughlin, L. (1993), *Ibn Saud: Founder of A Kingdom*, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Meir, A. et al (1994), "Bedouin pastoral nomads and transborder grazing: the impact of the Israeli-Egyptian border" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 235-237.
- Melamid, A. (1955), "Political boundaries and nomadic grazing", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 287-90.
- Melamid, A. (1965), "The economic geography of neutral territories", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 45 pp. 359-374.
- Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1, 1955.
- Merriam Webster Geographical Dictionary*, (1997) Third Edition, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, Publishers, Springfield.
- Miles, W. (1998), *Bridging Mental Boundaries in a Postcolonial Microcosm: Identity Development in Vanuatu*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Minghi, J. (1963), "Review article: boundary studies in political geography", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 53, pp. 407-28.

- Minghi, J. (1991), "From conflict to harmony", in D. Rumly and J. Minghi (eds.), *The Geography of Border Landscape*, Routledge, London, pp.15-30.
- Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Customs Department (1995); *The Yearly Report of Saudi Customs*, Riyadh.
- Mladek, J. and Simko, D. (1994), "Development of transborder cooperation between Bratislava and Vienna" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 219-223.
- Momoh, C.S. (1989), "A critique of borderland theories", in A. I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi (eds.) *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa*, University of Lagos Press, Nigeria, pp. 51-61.
- Morrison, K. (1993), *Planning & Accomplishing School-Centred Evaluation*, Peter Francis Publishers, Norfolk.
- Murphy, A. (1990), "Historical justifications for territorial claims", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 531-548.
- Nakkeh, E. (1986), *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, Praeger Publisher, New York.
- Newman, D. (1994), "Demarcating a boundary of peace between Israel and the West Bank" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 171-181.
- Newman, D. and Passi, A. (1998), "Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 186-207.
- Newman, D. (1999), "Into the Millennium: the study of international boundaries in an era of global technological change", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, IBRU, Vol.7, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 63-71.
- Official Journal of the European Communities, C152, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 35-36.
- Palomaki, M. (1994), "Transborder cooperation over Quarken strait between Finland and Sweden" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 238-246.
- Parnwell, M. (1993), *Population Movements and the Third World*, Routledge, London.
- Paselk, T. A. and Mannering, F. L. (1994), "Use of duration models for predicting vehicular delay at a US/Canadian border crossing", *Transportation*, vol. 21, pp. 249-270.
- Passi, A. (1996), *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, John Wiley and Sons, New York.

- Passi, A. (1999), "Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows" in D. Newman (ed.), *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*, Frank Cass, London, pp. 69-88.
- Pearcy, G.E., (1965a), "Boundary Types", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 64, Part 7, pp. 300-03.
- Pearcy, G. (1965b), "Boundary functions", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 64, Part 8, pp. 346-49.
- Peterson, J.E. (1985), "The islands of Arabia: their recent history and strategic importance", in R.B. Serjeant & R.L. Bidwell, *Arabian Studies*, Vol. VII, Scorpion Publishing, London, pp.23-35.
- Pike, D. (1994), "Cross-Border Hydrocarbon Reserves" in R. Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp. 187-99.
- Pounds, N. (1972), *Political Geography*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Prescott, J. (1987), *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- Prescott, J. (1988), "Political geography", *Australian Geographical Studies*, Vol. 26, no. 1, April, pp. 149-156.
- Qassim, J. (1997), *Security Problems in the Arabian Gulf: From the British Withdrawal to the Second Gulf War* (in Arabic), The Emirate Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Dubai.
- Quandt, W. B. (1981), *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
- Reeves, J. (1944), "International boundaries", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 38, pp. 533-545.
- Ritter, G. and Hajdu, J.C. (1989), "The East-West German Boundary", *The Geographical Review*, Vol. 79, pp. 326-44.
- Roberts, J. (2000), "The Saudi-Yemeni boundary treaty", *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, IBRU, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp.70-73.
- Robson, C. (1995), "Transboundary petroleum reservoirs: legal issues and solutions" in G. Blake and et al (eds.), *The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources*, Graham and Trotman, London, pp. 3-21.
- Russell, I. (1903), "Geography and international boundaries", *Bulletin of American Geographical Society*, Vol.35, No.2, pp.147-59.
- Safran, N. (1985), *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge.

- Schofield, R. and Blake, G. (eds.) (1988), *Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957*, Volumes 9, 10, and 15, Archive Edition, Farnham Common.
- Schofield, R. (1990), *Islands and Maritime Boundaries of the Gulf*, Vol. 16 1951-1954, Archive Edition, Farnham Common.
- Schofield, R. (1993), *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
- Schofield, R. (1994), "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula During the Twentieth Century" in R. Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp.1-77.
- Segal, A. (1993), *An Atlas of International Migration*, Hans Zell Publishers, London.
- Shaw, G. and Wheeler, D., (1985), *Statistical Techniques in Geographical Analysis*, John Wiley & Sons, Norwich.
- Soffer, A. (1994), "Forms of coexistence and transborder cooperation in a hostile area:the Israeli case" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 182-191.
- Spykman, J. (1942), "Frontiers, security, and international organization", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32, pp. 436-47.
- Stoddard, E. (1986), "Problem solving along the US-Mexico border: a United States view" in O. Martinez, *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, Texas Western Press, El Paso, pp. 57-79.
- Stork, J. and Wenger, M. (1991), "From rapid deployment to massive deployment", *Middle East Report*, January/February, No. 168, Vol. 21, No., pp.22-26.
- Suarez-Villa, L. *et al* (1992), "Territorial and border barriers in information and communication networks: a conceptual exploration", *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 93-104.
- Tagil, S. *et al* (eds.) (1977), *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework*, Esselte Studium, Stockholm.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1998), *The Military Survey 1998-1999*.
- The Saudi Border Guard, *Unpublished Statistics 1997 & 1998*. (in Arabic)
- The Saudi Customs Department, *Statistical Yearbook, 1988-1995*. (in Arabic)
- The Saudi Customs Department, *Unpublished Statistics 1996 & 1997*. (in Arabic)
- The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990), *Oman/Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement*, unpublished text.

- The Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Border Guard (1989), *Regulations of Borders Security and its Executive Register*. (in Arabic).
- The Saudi Ministry of Interior, *Statistical Yearbook, 1982-1997*. (in Arabic)
- The Saudi Ministry of Planning (SMP) (1996), *Statistical Yearbook 1996*.
- Troeller, G. (1976), *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud*, Frank Cass, London.
- Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, (Arabic), Vol. 61, Issue No. 2988, 11/11/1983.
- Visher, S.S., (1932), "What Sort of International Boundary is Best?", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol.31, October, pp. 288-96.
- Visher, S.S., (1938), "Influences Locating International Boundaries", *The Journal of Geography*, Vol.37, November, pp.301-08.
- Walpole, N. *et al* (1971), *Area Handbook of Saudi Arabia*, The American University, Washington DC.
- Wilkinson, J.C (1968), "Britain In The Gulf", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 134, Part 1, pp.552-54.
- Wilkinson, J.C. (1971), "The Oman Question: The Background To The Political Geography of South-East Arabia", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 137, Part 3, pp.361-71.
- Wilkinson, J.(1991), *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., London.
- Wilkinson, J. (1994), "British Role in boundary drawing in Arabia: a synopsis" in R. Schofield (ed.), *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, UCL Press, London, pp. 94-108.
- Wilson, P. W. and Graham, D. F. (1994), *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.
- Wood, W.B. (1994), "Crossing the Line: geopolitics of international migration" in G.J. Demko & W.B. Wood (eds.) *Reordering the World*, Westview Press, pp.191-205.
- Zaidi, I. (1994), "On the forms of transborder cooperation between a landlocked state and neighbouring coastal state: the case of Pak-Afghan relationship" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp. 162-167.
- Zalad, K. (1994), "Border regions in West-Central Europe: common historical and cultural attitudes and centripetal effect of the Nation State" in W. Galluser and et al (eds.), *Political Boundaries and Coexistence*, Peter Lang, Berne, pp.197-206.



Zirkely, Khairu Ddeen (1997), *The Arabian Peninsula During the Reign of King Abdulaziz*, (Arabic), Vol.2, Darul Elm Lilmalaeen, Beirut.

## **Maps**

Geoprojects (no date), *Map of Saudi Arabia, Scale 1:3,500,000*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Reading.

Military Survey (1987), *Arabian Peninsula Map 1:2000,000*, Riyadh.

The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1972), *Saudi Arabia 1:500,000*. Maps sheets NG 39-SE, NF 39-NE, NF 40-NW.

The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1972), *Topographic Map of the Arabian Peninsula, 1:4,000,000*. Compiled by U.S. Geological Survey.

## **Interviews**

Interview with Mr. Mohammed Aldawsary, the legal advisor of the Saudi General Director of Passport Control, In October 1997.

Interview with Dr. Mohammed Aljabor, the General Director of the Saudi Customs Department, in June 1998.

Interview with General Talal Anqawi, the General Director of the Saudi Border Guards, in October 1998.

Interview with Brigadier Mutlaq Abuthneen, Director of the Border Guards at the Eastern Province, in October 1998.

Interview with Mr. Sulaiman Attwajeri, Manager of the Saudi Customs at KFC check-point, in June 1998.

Interview with Mr. Salih Alamro, Manager of the Saudi Customs at Alkhafji check-point, in October 1998.

Interview with Mr. Abdulaziz Alhamad, Assistant Manager of the Saudi Customs at Albateha check-point, in October 1998.

# **Appendices**

**APPENDIX I**  
Questionnaire Form for the Departures

***Dear the Traveller:***

I wish you a very nice and safe trip to where ever you go. This questionnaire is about a study concerning the “boundaries management”, to see how easy to cross the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours. So, I would be grateful if you would answer all the questions in this form. Please remember, the more accurate your answers are, the more reliable this study is.

Thank you very much for your kindness and cooperation.

The researcher:

**A. Alshaikh**

***King Saud University, Riyadh***

**Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In  
International Boundary Management**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PEOPLE TRAVELLING THROUGH THE  
SAUDI-GCC BOUNDARIES**

**Check point:-----**

**Date:-- / -- / ----**

**Time: -- : -- PM, AM**

**PART ONE: Trip Information:**

1. In which country do you permanently live? -----
2. From which (city, village) did you start your trip? -----
3. What is your itinerary?-----
4. What is the purpose of your trip?       Trading       Work       Study  
    Leisure       Visiting relatives  
    Other, (please specify).....
5. How many times do you cross the border? (Please indicate the number)
- Every year.....       Every month.....  
    Every week.....       Every Day
6. Are you travelling:       By your self       With your family  
    With friends
7. Do you have any relatives on the other side:       Yes       No

**PART TWO: Border's Check Points Information:**

8. How long did you take to cross the Saudi check-point (all formalities)?
- Less than 10 minutes       10 - 20 minutes       21 - 30 minutes  
 31 - 40 minutes       41-50 minutes       more than 50 minutes
9. Did you use the services available at the crossing-point:       Yes       No
10. If yes, What sort did you use:       Restaurant       Bank       Petrol  
    Mosque       Clinic       Shops  
    Other, (please specify).....

**PART THREE: Personal Information**

11. Sex:       Male       Female
12. Age:       less than 20 yrs       20-40 yrs  
    41-60 yrs       more than 60 yrs
13. Occupation:  Student       Government employed       Private employed  
    Self employed       Retired       Other, (please specify).....
14. Nationality:  Saudi       Bahraini       Qatari       Omani  
    Kuwaiti       U.A.E       Other Arab       Non-Arab

**15. Method of transportation:**

- Small car    Mini bus    Bus
- Other, (**please specify**).....

**The end of questionnaire**

## APPENDIX II

### Questionnaire Form for the Arrivals

***Dear the Traveller:***

I wish you a very nice and safe trip to where ever you go. This questionnaire is about a study concerning the “boundaries management”, to see how easy to cross the Saudi boundaries with its GCC neighbours. So, I would be grateful if you would answer all the questions in this form. Please remember, the more accurate your answers are, the more reliable this study is.

Thank you very much for your kindness and cooperation.

The researcher:

**A. Alshaikh**

***King Saud University, Riyadh***

**Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In  
International Boundary Management**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PEOPLE TRAVELLING THROUGH THE SAUDI-  
GCC BOUNDARIES**

**Check point: -----**

**Date: -- / -- / ----**

**Time: -- : -- PM, AM**



**PART ONE: Trip Information:**

1. In which country do you permanently live? -----
2. From which (city, village) did you start your trip? -----
3. What is your itinerary?-----
4. What is the purpose of your trip?     Trading     Work     Study  
 Leisure     Visiting relatives  
 Other, (please specify).....
5. How many times do you cross the border? (Please indicate the number)
- Every year.....     Every month.....  
 Every week.....     Every Day
6. Are you travelling:     By your self     With your family  
 With friends
7. Do you have any relatives on the other side:     Yes     No

**PART TWO: Border's Check Points Information:**

8. How long did you take to cross the Bahraini check-point (all formalities)?  
 Less than 10 minutes     10 - 20 minutes     21 - 30 minutes  
 31 - 40 minutes     41-50 minutes     more than 50 minutes
9. How long did you take to cross the Saudi check-point (all formalities)?  
 Less than 10 minutes     10 - 20 minutes     21 - 30 minutes  
 31 - 40 minutes     41-50 minutes     more than 50 minutes
10. Did you use the services available at the crossing-point:     Yes     No
11. If yes, What sort did you use:     Restaurant     Bank     Petrol  
 Mosque     Clinic     Shops  
 Other, (please specify).....

**PART THREE: Personal Information**

12. Sex:     Male     Female

13. Age:  lesser than 20 yrs       20-40 yrs  
 41-60 yrs       more than 60 yrs
14. Occupation:  Student       Government employed       Private employed  
 Self employed       Retired       Other, (please specify).....
15. Nationality:  Saudi       Bahraini       Qatari       Omani  
 Kuwaiti       U.A.E       Other Arab       Non-Arab
16. Method of transportation:  
 Small car       Mini bus       Bus  
 Other, (please specify).....

The end of questionnaire

**APPENDIX III**

Questionnaire Form for the Truck Drivers

**Saudi Arabia and its GCC Neighbours: A Study In  
International Boundary Management**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TRUCK DRIVERS TRAVELLING THROUGH THE  
SAUDI-GCC BOUNDARIES**

**Check point:-----**

**Date:-- / -- / ---**

**Time: -- : -- PM, AM**

**PART ONE: Trip Information:**

1. In which country do you permanently live?: -----
2. From which (city, town, village) did you start your trip?:-----
3. What is your itinerary?:-----
4. How many times do you cross the border:  
Every year.....  Every month.....   
Every week.....  Every Day
5. What kind of goods do you carryout?:.....
6. What is your truck capacity:  
1-less than 10 Tons  10-20 Tons  21-30 Tons   
more than 30 Tons

**PART TWO: Border's Check Points Information:**

7. How long did you take to cross the check point:  
less than 30 minutes  30 - 60 minutes   
60 - 90 minutes  90 - 120 minutes   
more than 120 minutes
8. Did you use the amenities available on the crossing-points: Yes  No
9. What sort did you use: Restaurant  Bank  Petrol  Mosque   
Clinic  Shops  Other, pecify.....

**PART THREE: Personal Information**

10. Age: less than 20  20-40   
41-60  more than 60

**11. Nationality:**

- |            |                          |          |                          |        |                          |
|------------|--------------------------|----------|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| Saudi      | <input type="checkbox"/> | Bahraini | <input type="checkbox"/> | Qatari | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Omani      | <input type="checkbox"/> | Kuwaiti  | <input type="checkbox"/> | U.A.E  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Arab | <input type="checkbox"/> | Non-Arab | <input type="checkbox"/> |        |                          |

The end of questionnaire

**APPENDIX IV**  
**THE GCC CHARTER**

The States of  
United Arab Emirates  
State of Bahrain  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Sultanate of Oman  
State of Qatar  
State of Kuwait

Being fully aware of their mutual bonds and special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and

Based on their faith in the common destiny and destination that link their peoples; and

In view of their desire to effect coordination, integration and cooperation among them in all fields; and

Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and integration among them serve the higher goals of the Arab nation; and

In order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links; and

In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all vital fields that concern their peoples and realize their hopes in a better future on the path to unity of their states; and

In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds; and

In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**

Establishment of Council

A council shall be established hereby to be named "The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf," hereinafter referred to as the "Cooperation Council."

**ARTICLE 2**

Headquarters

The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

**ARTICLE 3**

Cooperation Council Meetings

The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.

**ARTICLE 4**

Objectives

The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:

1. To effect coordination, integration and cooperation between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity among them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
  - a. Economics and finance
  - b. Commerce, customs and communications
  - c. Education and culture
  - d. Social and health affairs
  - e. Information and tourism
  - f. Legislation and administrative affairs.

4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, minerology, agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research centers; to implement common projects, and to encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

#### **ARTICLE 5**

##### **Council Membership**

The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on February 4, 1981.

#### **ARTICLE 6**

##### **Structures of the Cooperation Council**

The Cooperation Council shall have the following main structures:

1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat -General.

Each of these structures may establish branch organs as necessary.

#### **ARTICLE 7**

##### **Supreme Council**

1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall rotate alphabetically according to the names of the member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territory of member states.
4. A Supreme Council meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

#### **ARTICLE 8**

##### **Supreme Council's Functions**

The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly concerning the following:

1. Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations.
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.

#### **ARTICLE 9**

##### **Voting in Supreme Council**

1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by a majority vote.

#### **ARTICLE 10**

##### **Commission for Settlement of Disputes**

1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called “Commission for Settlement of Disputes,” which shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved within the ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

## **ARTICLE 11**

### **Ministerial Council**

1. The Ministerial Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or other delegated Ministers. The Council’s presidency shall rotate among members every three months by alphabetical order of the states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council’s meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

## **ARTICLE 12**

### **Functions of the Ministerial Council**

The Ministerial Council’s functions shall include the following:

1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination among member states in the various fields and adopt required resolutions or appropriate recommendations.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council’s resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities, develop cooperation between the member states’ chambers of commerce and industry, and encourage flow of working citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council’s Rules of Procedure as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council’s meetings and prepare their agendas.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.

## **ARTICLE 13**

### **Voting in Ministerial Council**

1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council on substantive matters shall be carried by a unanimous vote of the member states present and voting, and on the procedural matters by a majority vote.



## ARTICLE 14

### Secretariat-General

1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by deputies and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be renewed for one time only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries-general.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-General's staff from among the citizens of member states and may not make exceptions with the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-General and the smooth flow of work in its various organizations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers vested in him.

## ARTICLE 15

### Functions of the Secretariat-General

The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions:

1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, integration and programs for member states' common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the implementation by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budgets and accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings, prepare agendas and draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convening of extraordinary sessions of the Council whenever necessary.
9. Perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.

## ARTICLE 16

The Secretary-General, the assistant secretaries-general and all members of the Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the member states.

They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.

## ARTICLE 17

### Privileges and Immunities

1. The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize their objectives and carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council and the Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose among the member states. A special agreement shall organize the relations between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are pre-pared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar organizations.

## **ARTICLE 18**

### **Budget of the Secretariat-General**

The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal amounts.

## **ARTICLE 19**

### **Charter Implementation**

1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of the six member states named in this Charter's Preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which time the latter shall become depository.

## **ARTICLE 20**

### **Amendments to Charter**

1. Any member state may request an amendment to this Charter.
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if it is approved unanimously by the Supreme Council.

## **ARTICLE 21**

### **Closing Provisions**

No reservations may be voiced with respect to the provisions of this Charter.

## **ARTICLE 22**

The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.

This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to May 25, 1981.

United Arab Emirates

State of Bahrain

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Sultanate of Oman

State of Qatar

State of Kuwait

## **APPENDIX V**

### **The Unified Economic Agreement Between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council**

#### **CHAPTER ONE TRADE EXCHANGE**

##### **ARTICLE 1**

- a. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they shall permit exportation thereof to other Member States.
- b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from Member States shall receive the same treatment as national products.

##### **ARTICLE 2**

1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin shall be exempted from reciprocal charges.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, freight or unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on domestic products.

##### **ARTICLE 3**

1. For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40% of their final value as at the termination of the production phase. In addition Member States citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51%.
2. Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.

##### **ARTICLE 4**

1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs tariff applicable to the products of countries other than G.C.C. Member States.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff shall be the protection of national products from foreign competition.
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented gradually within five years from the date on which this agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its gradual implementation shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.

##### **ARTICLE 5**

Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of any Member State's goods to other Member States, exempting them from all duties and taxes whatsoever, without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.

##### **ARTICLE 6**

Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a Member State by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the Customs authorities of the Member States.

#### **ARTICLE 7**

Member States shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other states and regional economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and equitable circumstances and terms of trade therewith.

To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the following arrangements:

1. Coordination of import/export policies and regulations.
2. Coordination of policies for building up strategic food stocks.
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases where joint benefits to Member States would be realized.
4. Taking of action for the creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major products.

### **CHAPTER TWO THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND INDIVIDUALS AND THE EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES**

#### **ARTICLE 8**

The Member States shall agree on executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in the following fields:

1. Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.

#### **ARTICLE 9**

The Member States shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish joint ventures in order to link their citizens' economic interests in various spheres of activity.

### **CHAPTER THREE COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT**

#### **ARTICLE 10**

The Member States shall endeavour to achieve the coordination and harmonization of their respective development plans with a view to achieving integration in economic affairs.

#### **ARTICLE 11**

1. The Member States shall endeavour to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, the exploitation of natural gas, and development of energy sources.
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate united oil policies and adopt common positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in international and specialised organizations.

#### **ARTICLE 12**

To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the Member States shall

1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms which will lead to industrial development and the diversification of their products on an integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local production units to meet their needs.

3. Allocate industries between Member States according to relative advantages and economic feasibility, and encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary industries.

#### **ARTICLE 13**

Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the Member States shall pay special attention to the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve economic integration j productive interface, and common development on sound economic bases.

### **CHAPTER FOUR TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

#### **ARTICLE 14**

The member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical cooperation aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet the needs of the region and to achieve the objectives of progress and development.

#### **ARTICLE 15**

Member States shall establish procedures, make arrangement and lay down terms for the transfer of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve their various needs. Member States shall also, whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments and scientific or commercial organizations to achieve these objectives.

#### **ARTICLE 16**

Member States shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs for technical, vocational and professional training and qualification at all levels and stages, They. shall also develop educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development needs of the Member States.

#### **ARTICLE 17**

Member States shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and standardized criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among themselves and to optimize the utilization of available human resources.

### **CHAPTER FIVE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS**

#### **ARTICLE 18**

Member States shall accord passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the other Member States, when transiting or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their own citizens, including exemption from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, local means of transportation are excluded.

#### **ARTICLE 19**

1. Member States shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation, and communications. They shall also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such as

- seaports, airports, water and power stations and roads, with a view to realizing joint economic development and the linking of their economic activities with each other.
2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies among them and promote all areas of joint action at various levels.

#### **ARTICLE 20**

Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any Member State freely to use the various port facilities and grant them the same treatment and privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage and docking services, freight, loading and unloading, maintenance, repair, storage of goods and other similar services.

### **CHAPTER SIX FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION**

#### **ARTICLE 21**

Member States shall seek to unify investment rules and regulations in order to achieve a joint investment policy aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investments towards serving their interest, and realising their peoples' aspirations for development and progress.

#### **ARTICLE 22**

Member States shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including the endeavour to establish a joint currency in order to further their desired economic.

#### **ARTICLE 23**

Member States shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere of international and regional development aid.

### **CHAPTER SEVEN CLOSING PROVISIONS**

#### **ARTICLE 24**

In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting therefrom, consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development as between Member States and the local development priorities of each. Any Member States may be temporarily exempted from applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf.

#### **ARTICLE 25**

No Member State shall grant any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that granted herein.

#### **ARTICLE 26**

- a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the Supreme Council.
- b. This Agreement may be amended by consent of the Supreme Council.

**ARTICLE 27**

In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States, execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

**ARTICLE 28**

Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreements. Drawn up at Riyadh on 15 Muharram 1402, corresponding to 11 November 1982.

## APPENDIX VI

### Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention 1922

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi al Aujah (W. al Audja) with the Batin (El Batin), leaving Raq'i (Rikai) to Nadj, from this point it continues in a straight line until it joins latitude 29° and the red semi-circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 29th July 1913. The line then follows the side of the red semi-circle until it reaches a point terminating (*sic*) on the coast of south of Ras al-Qali'ah (Ras el Kaliyah) and this is the territory bounded on the North by this line and which is bounded on the West by a low mountainous ridge called Shaq (Esh Shakk) and on the East by the sea and on the South by a line passing from West to East from Shaq (Esh Shakk) to 'Ain al 'Abd (Ain el Abd) and thence to the coast north of Ras al Mish'ab (Ras Mishabb), in this territory the Governments of Nadj and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good offices of the Government of Great Britain a further agreement is made between Nadj and Kuwait concerning it.

The map on which this boundary has been made is Asia 1-1,000,000, made by the Royal Geographical Society under the direction of the Geographical Section General Staff and printed at the War Office in the year 1918.

Written in the port of 'Urqair and signed by the representatives of both Governments on the Second day of December 1922 corresponding to 13th of Rabi'al Thani, 1341.

Abduallah Sa'id Damluji  
Representative of His Highness the Sultan of Najd

J.C. More  
Major Political Agent, Kuwait

I have agreed to the content of this agreement,

'Abdul 'Aziz bib 'Abdul Rahman As-Sa'ud  
Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies

I have agreed to the content of this agreement,

Ahmad Al-Jabir As-Subah  
Hakim of Kuwait.



## APPENDIX VII

### **Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to partition the Neutral Zone Signed at Al-Hadda, Saudi Arabia 7 July 1965**

#### **Agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relating to the partition the Neutral Zone**

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Whereas the two Contracting Parties have equal rights in the shared Zone whose land boundaries are delineated in accordance with the boundary Convention made at Al Uqair in 13 Rabi, Thani 1314 corresponding to 2nd December 1922, and the agreed Minutes signed at Kuwait on 12 Shaul 1380 corresponding to 21st March 1961 (called hereinafter the 'Partitioned Zone"), and

Whereas the aforesaid Convention did not regulate the exercise of those rights, and as that state of affairs was of a provisional nature which entailed serious practical difficulties, and

Whereas the two Contracting Parties, by an exchange of notes on 15/3/1383 corresponding to 5th August 1963 (in regard to partitioning the Neutral Zone), have accepted to put an end to that temporary state of affairs by means of partitioning that Zone into two sections, so that one shall be annexed to the State of Kuwait and the other shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, provided that these equal rights of the two Parties shall be preserved in full in the whole Partitioned Zone as this had originally been decided by the Convention made at Al Uqair that is shared between the two parties, and shall be safeguarded by the provisions of international responsibility. They therefore have agreed upon the following:

*Article I.* The boundary line between the two sections of the Zone is to be the line which divides them into two equal parts and which begins from a point at the mid eastern shore on the low-tide line, and ends at the western boundary line of the Zone. That boundary line shall be demarcated in a natural manner by the Committee of Survey which is to be set up in the manner agreed upon in the protocol annexed to the notes exchanged between the two parties at Jeddah on 15/3/1883 corresponding to 5th August 1963. This boundary line shall be approved by the two sides in an agreement they will conclude later on.

*Article II.* Without prejudice to the provisions of this agreement, the part lying to the north of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to Kuwait as an integral part of its territory, and the part lying to the south of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an integral part of its territory.

*Article III.* Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise the rights of administration, legislation and defence over that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory in the same manner exercised in his territory of origin while observing other provisions of the Agreement, and without prejudice to the rights of the contracting parties to natural resources in the whole of the Partitioned Zone.

*Article IV.* Each of the Contracting Parties shall respect the rights of the other Party to the shared natural resources either existing at present or that shall exist in future in that part of the Partitioned Zone which is annexed to his territory.

*Article V.* If one of the parties cedes or otherwise alienates all or part of those equal rights which are safeguarded by the provisions of this Agreement and which are exercised over any part of the Partitioned Zone to any other State, the other party shall be relieved of his obligations under this Agreement.

*Article VI.* Each of the Contracting Parties shall be under obligation not to take any local or international measure or action which may result in whatsoever form of hindering the other party from exercising the rights which are safeguarded by this agreement, and he shall be under obligations to co-operate with the other Party fully to protect these rights.

*Article VII.* Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise over the territorial waters which adjoining that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory the same rights as those exercised over the part annexed to its territory; and the two Contracting Parties shall agree to determine the boundary line which divides the territorial waters which adjoin the Partitioned Zone.

For the purpose of exploiting the natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, not more than six marine miles of the sea-bed and sub-soil adjoining the Partitioned Zone shall be annexed to the principal land of that Partitioned Zone.

*Article VIII.* On determining the northern boundary of the submerged Zone adjoining the Partitioned Zone, it shall be delineated as if the Zone has not been partitioned and without regard to the provisions of this Agreement.

And, the two Contracting Parties shall exercise their equal rights in the submerged Zone beyond the aforesaid six miles limit mentioned in the previous Article, by means of shared exploitation unless the two Parties agree otherwise.

*Article IX.* Each of the Contracting Parties shall in the part annexed to the other party of the Partitioned Zone evacuate the establishments occupied by the government officials who perform administrative and legal work, and hand it over to the other party provided that such provisions shall not apply to establishments occupied by employees engaged in measuring oil, checking and auditing accounts, technical supervision and purchasing committees and such similar supervision work.

*Article X.* If one of the Contracting Parties entrusts the companies that have been granted a joint concession by the two parties, with the construction of establishments for judicial and administrative purposes in accordance with terms of the concession in that part of the Partitioned Zone to be annexed to his territory, the cost of establishing such constructions shall be deducted from the capital expenses of the concessionary companies, provided that such costs shall be limited to necessary and reasonable expenses.

*Article XI.* The present agreements of oil concessions shall remain in force and either Party pledges to respect their provisions and the amendments entered into in that half of the Partitioned Zone which shall be annexed to its territory. He shall also undertake such legislative and legal measures necessary for the continued exercise by the concessionary companies of their rights and discharge of their obligations.

*Article XII.* Each Contracting Party shall be responsible in that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory for protection and security according to the obligations provided for in the present concession agreements in force.

*Article XIII.* To avoid double taxation, each Contracting Party shall undertake to enact legislative safeguards which ensure the non-imposition of taxation or custom duties or royalties on the companies that have been granted a concession, in the Partitioned Zone by the other Party.

*Article XIV.* Entry of citizens of the two Contracting Parties, and their moving about in the Partitioned Zone, who are working as officials, employees, labourers and contractors in establishments and firms engaged in the exploitation of natural resources according to concessions now in force and their subsidiaries shall be by valid passports issued by the other Party or by a card of special form to be issued by one of the Contracting Parties, and to be agreed upon, without the need for obtaining entry visa.

*Article XV.* Without prejudice to the concessionary oil agreements in force, each of the parties shall safeguard in that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory, freedom of work to the citizens of the other party and the right to practise any profession or occupation on equal levels with his citizens, concerning oil resources granted in the present concessions or in what may supersede them in future.

*Article XVI.* Each of the contracting parties shall respect the rights of the other party's citizens in the present establishments and constructions, existing in that part of the Partitioned Zone which shall be annexed to its territory.

*Article XVII.* To safeguard the continuance of the two Contracting Parties' efforts in exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, a joint permanent committee shall be set up and called hereinafter the 'Committee'.

*Article XVIII.* The Committee shall be composed of an equal number from the two Contracting Parties' representatives, and the two competent ministers for natural resources, in each of the Contracting Governments, shall agree upon the number of the Committee members, its rules of procedure and how to safeguard the necessary appropriations for it.

*Article XIX.* The Committee shall have the following powers:

(a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary Companies and of ancillary companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than citizens of the two Parties.

(b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.

(c) To study the new licences, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural resources and submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to what should be done in this respect.

(d) To discuss whatever the two competent ministers refer to it.

*Article XX.* The two competent ministers shall consult together to grant or to amend any new concession relating to common natural resources and the party who does not agree with the other, shall send him a written notification giving the reasons, before granting or amending the new concession.

If any other establishment or company is allowed to replace any present establishment or company exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, this replacement shall not be considered as a new concession provided that the rights of the other Party shall remain in tact.

*Article XXI.* The two Contracting Parties shall undertake to supply the Committee with information, data and documents which are needed by it to facilitate its task.

*Article XXII.* If a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation or application of this agreement or the rights and obligations which it creates, the two Contracting Parties

shall seek to settle such disputes by friendly means for the settlement of disputes which include having recourse to the Arab League.

If the aforesaid methods fail to settle the dispute, then it shall be submitted before the International Court of Justice.

The two Contracting Parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in this respect.

If one of the two Contracting Parties takes a measure which is objectionable to the other Party, the objecting Party may ask the International Court of Justice to indicate any provisional measures to be taken to suspend the measure which is objected to or allow its continuance pending the final decision.

If one of the Contracting Parties refuses to abide by the judgment made against it, then the other party shall be relieved of its obligations under this Agreement.

*Article XXIII.* This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by each Contracting Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures and shall come into force on the date of exchanging of instruments of ratification.

Done in two original texts in the Arabic Language and both of them are authentic.

For the State of Kuwait

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**Annexed Agreement**  
**Delimiting the boundary Line dividing the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone**

This annexed agreement has been held in Kuwait City on 9 Shawal 1389 Hijrah corresponding to 18 December 1969, between:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by his Excellency Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources as a First Party, and

The State of Kuwait, represented by his Excellency Abdulrahman Salim Al-atiquee, the Minister of Finance and Oil as a Second Party.

Whereas the two Countries signed an agreement to divide the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone on 9 Rabi Awal 1385 Hijrah corresponding to 7 July 1965, which was known as "An agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to partition the Neutral Zone" and henceforth referred to as "the Partition Agreement".,

Whereas Article 1 of the Partition Agreement states that the dividing line for the Neutral Zone shall be delimited, based on direct observation, by the Committee of Survey of the Neutral Zone which has been formed according to the Agreement,

Whereas the mentioned Committee of Survey, which has been called "the Joint Technical Committee", supervises the delimitation process of the dividing line on the ground conducted by "Pacific AeroSurvey" company, who undertook the work according to two agreements the Company signed with the Saudi government and the Kuwaiti government. The Committee decided that "Pacific AeroSurvey" company has accomplished its mission according to the two mentioned above agreements, which in turn are based on the rulings of the "Partition Agreement". Consequently, the Committee approved the final report and the final map which have been designed by the mentioned above Company, and both sides, the Saudi and the Kuwaiti, signed copies of the report and the map and reported this in the minutes of the fourth meeting of "the Joint Committee" which was held from 10-12 Dhu Alqidah 1388 Hirjah corresponding to 28-30 January 1969,

Whereas the pertinent authorities in the two contracting governments have approved the decision of "the Joint Committee", and each party has informed the other party about his consent of this decision,

Whereas Article 1 of "The Partition Agreement" states that the delimitation of the dividing line of the Neutral Zone shall be agreed upon in a subsequent agreement, and

To execute the "annexation" mentioned in Article 2 in "The Partition Agreement", the two Parties agreed to delimit the dividing line as follows:

Article 1: The boundary line which divides the Partitioned Zone and which represents the final separating limit between the two Parts, is considered as straight lines connecting the points mentioned below with their coordinates. This boundary line is the one which "Pacific AeroSurvey" company has delimited, defined, and specified in the final report and the final map. Both contracting Parties signed a copy of the final map which has been annexed to this agreement. The final map, the final agreement, and the mentioned above fourth meeting minutes, all of which have been signed by the two Parties, and each Party has a copy of each, all together, these documents are representing a reference in defining and stating the dividing line:

<b>Point</b>	<b>Latitude-North</b>	<b>Longitude-East</b>
Z	28° 32' 02,488"	48° 25' 59,019"
D-1	28° 32' 01,985"	48° 25' 12,952"
D-2	28° 32' 01,184"	48° 14' 09,339"
D-3	28° 32' 00,874"	48° 23' 32,787"
D-4	28° 32' 00,382"	48° 22' 48,927"
D-5	28° 31' 59,676"	48° 21' 46,685"
D-6	28° 31' 59,239"	48° 21' 08,534"
D-7	28° 31' 58,580"	48° 20' 11,430"
D-8	28° 31' 58,021"	48° 19' 23,434"
D-9	28° 31' 57,530"	48° 18' 41,590"
D-10	28° 31' 57,050"	48° 18' 00,993"
D-11	28° 31' 56,662"	48° 16' 36,094"
D-12	28° 31' 56,035"	48° 16' 36,094"
D-13	28° 31' 55,485"	48° 15' 50,592"
D-14	28° 31' 54,947"	48° 15' 06,374"
D-15	28° 31' 54,362"	48° 14' 18,748"
D-16	28° 31' 53,713"	48° 13' 26,262"
D-17	28° 31' 52,948"	48° 12' 25,088"
D-18	28° 31' 52,076"	48° 11' 16,032"
D-19	28° 31' 51,410"	48° 10' 23,736"
D-20	28° 31' 50,630"	48° ' 09"23,111
D-21	28° 31' 49,779"	48° 08' 17,593"
D-22	28° 31' 48,907"	48° 07' 11,206"
D-23	28° 31' 48,056"	48° 06' 07,037"
D-24	28° 31' 47,518"	48° 05' 26,799"
D-25	28° 31' 46,788"	48° 04' 32,594"
D-26	28° 31' 45,842"	48° 03' 22,995"
D-27	28° 31' 44,833"	48° 02' 09,560"
D-28	28° 31' 44,361"	48° 01' 35,432"
D-29	28° 31' 43,435"	48° 00' 29,090"
D-30	28° 31' 42,472"	47° 59' 20,742"
D-31	28° 31' 41,526"	47° 58' 14,252"
D-32	28° 31' 40,470"	47° 57' 00,761"
D-33	28° 31' 39,454"	47° 55' 50,778"
D-34	28° 31' 38,554"	47° 54' 49,360"
D-35	28° 31' 37,795"	47° 53' 57,908"
D-36	28° 31' 37,363"	47° 53' 28,842"
D-37	28° 31' 36,567"	47° 52' 35,536"
D-38	28° 31' 35,865"	47° 51' 48,853"
D-39	28° 31' 35,156"	47° 51' 02,006"
D-40	28° 31' 34,360"	47° 50' 09,793"
D-41	28° 31' 33,596"	47° 49' 19,867"
D-42	28° 31' 32,789"	47° 48' 27,676"
D-43	28° 31' 31,833"	47° 47' 26,188"
D-44	28° 31' 30,941"	47° 46' 29,303"
D-45	28° 31' 30,339"	47° 45' 51,168"
D-46	28° 31' 29,449"	47° 44' 55,060"
D-47	28° 31' 28,369"	47° 43' 59,412"
D-48	28° 31' 27,072"	47° 42' 52,962"
H	28° 31' 26,526"	47° 42' 25,153"

Article 2: This agreement, with the documents mentioned in Article 1, is complementing and is part and parcel of "The Partition Agreement".

**Article 3: This agreement has been written in Arabic in two original copies, each Party retained one copy, and both copies are equally binding and will be effective from the date of signing them, and**

**The two mentioned above representatives, as authorised by their respective governments, have signed this annexed agreement.**

**on behalf of the government  
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

**Ahmed Zaki Yamani  
The Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources**

**on behalf of the government  
of the State of Kuwait**

**Abdulrahman Salim Al-atiquee  
The Minister of Finance & Oil**

## Appendix IX

### Border Agreement signed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 2 July 2000

#### Demarcating their offshore Neutral Zone border

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate,

An agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone.

Consolidating and strengthening the bonds of faith and brotherhood which bind the two brotherly peoples in the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

Confirming the unshakeable and deeply-rooted relationship between the two brotherly countries and the bonds of love and friendship that characterise the relationship;

And based on a desire on the part of His Highness Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah Amir of the State of Kuwait, and his brother, the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines, King Fahad ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to determine a line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone in a way that guarantees the interests and rights of the two brotherly countries in the area.

Based on the Agreement partitioning the Neutral Zone between the two states signed on 9/3/1385 H corresponding to 7/7/1965 AD (referred to henceforth as the Partitioned Zone), and the agreement to determine the median line in the Neutral Zone between the two states signed on 9/10/1389 H corresponding to 18/12/1969 AD

The two brotherly countries have agreed on the following:

#### Article 1

1. The line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, which constitutes the dividing line between the area of each of the two states, runs from the land point on the shore (point Z), with the geographical co-ordinates (28° 32' 2.488" north and 45° 25' 59.019" east) and runs through four points with the following co-ordinates:

Point	Latitude North	Longitude East
1.	28° 38' 20"	48° 35' 48"
2.	28° 39' 56"	48° 39' 50"
3.	28° 41' 49"	48° 41' 18"
4.	28° 56' 06"	49° 26' 42"

And from point No 4, the line dividing the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone extends to the end of this line in an easterly direction.

2. The contents of paragraph (1) of this article do not prejudice the contents of Annex (1) this agreement.

#### Article 2

The northern boundary of the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone has been demarcated, beginning at point 1 on the coast, with geographical co-ordinates 28° 49' 58.7" north and 48° 17' 00.177" east, on the basis of the principle of equal distances from the low tide line on the coast, without taking into consideration the location of islands, shoals and



semi-submerged rocks, in compliance with the contents of Article 8 of the agreement partitioning the Neutral Zone.

### **Article 3**

The course of the designated northern line shall be adjusted in accordance with Article 2 of this agreement by using the Failaka group of islands as the starting point for the demarcation, without contravening the contents of Annex (1) of this agreement.

### **Article 4**

The southern boundary of the offshore areas adjacent to the Partitioned Zone is the line currently established between the two countries, beginning at point 5 on the coast with the geographical co-ordinates 28° 14' 05.556" north and 48° 36' 06.916" east.

### **Article 5**

As regards the ownership by the two contracting parties of the natural resources in the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone, an agreement on this issue is stipulated in Annex (1), which is considered an integral part of this agreement.

### **Article 6**

The company commissioned by the two states to carry out a survey and prepare maps of the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone will determine the co-ordinates of the northern boundary according to Articles 2 and 3 of this agreement, and prepare maps in their final form, which will be signed by representatives of the two countries and be an integral part of this agreement.

### **Article 7**

The State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be deemed as one party in negotiations to determine the eastern boundary of the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone.

### **Article 8**

Agreement shall be reached between specialist bodies in the two countries on measures and arrangements related to recreational fishing in the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone.

### **Article 9**

The provisions of this agreement do not prejudice the agreement dividing the Neutral Zone signed on 9/3/1385 H, corresponding with 7/7/1965 AD.

### **Article 10**

This agreement is subject to the ratification of the two parties, and shall come into effect upon the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

This agreement was drawn up and signed in Kuwait City, with two original copies, on Sunday 30th of the month of Rabi'al-Awal of the year 1421 H, corresponding to 2nd July 2000 AD

Fr the State of Kuwait  
Sabah Al-Ahmad  
First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Sa'ud al-Faisal  
Foreign Minister

## **Annex I**

The two contracting parties have agreed that their ownership of the natural resources in the offshore area adjacent to the Partitioned Zone shall be jointly shared, and this includes the islands of **Qaru** and Umm al-Maradim and the area lying between the northern line mentioned in Article 2 of the agreement and the adjusted course of the northern boundary, pursuant to Article 3 of the agreement.

## APPENDIX X

### The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement dated 22 February 1958

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Bahrain

Whereas the regional waters between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Bahrain meet together in many places overlooked by their respective coasts,

And in view of the royal proclamation issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 1st Sha'aban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May 1949) and the ordinance issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June 1949 about the exploitation of the sea bed,

And in view of the necessity for an agreement to define the under-water areas belonging to both countries,

And in view of the spirit of affection and mutual friendship and the desire of H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia to extend every possible assistance to the Government of Bahrain,

the following agreement has been made:

#### *First Clause*

1. The boundary line between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Government will begin, on the basis of the middle line from point 1, which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the tip of the Ras al Bar (A) at the southern extremity of Bahrain and Ras Muharra (B) on the coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. Then the above-mentioned middle line will extend from point 1 to point 2 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point A and the northern tip of the island of Zakhnuniya (C).
3. Then the line will extend from point 2 to point 3 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point A and the tip of Ras Saiya (D).
4. Then the line will extend from point 3 to point 4, which is defined on the attached map and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points E and F which are both defined on the map.
5. Then the line will extend from point 4 to point 5, which is defined on the map and which is situated at the point (*sic*) of the line running between the two points G and H which are defined on the map.
6. Then the line will extend from point 5 to point 6, which is defined on the map and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points I and J which are defined on the map.

7. Then the line will extend from point 6 to point 7 situated at the mid-point of the line running between the south-western tip of the island of Umm Nasan (K) and Ras Al Kureya (L).
8. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity of the island of Al Baina As Saghir, leaving the island to the Government of Bahrain.
9. Then the line will extend from point 8 to point 9 situated at the eastern extremity of the island of Al Baina Al Kabir, leaving the island to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
10. Then the line will extend from point 9 to point 10 situated at the mid-point of the line running between the north-western tip of Khor Fasht (M) and the southern end of the island of Chaschus (N).
11. Then the line will extend from point 10 to point 11 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point O situated at the western edge of Fasht Al Jarim and the point N referred to in subsection 10 above.
12. Then the line will extend from point 11 to point 12 situated at latitude 26 degrees 31 minutes 48 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 23 minutes 15 seconds east approximately.
13. Then the line will extend from point 12 to point 13 situated at latitude 26 degrees 37 minutes 15 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 33 minutes 24 seconds east approximately.
14. Then the line will extend from point 13 to point 14 situated at latitude 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 46 minutes 24 seconds east approximately, leaving the Rennie Shoals (known as Najwat Al Riqai and Fasht Al Anawaiyah) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
15. Then the line will extend from point 14 in a north-easterly direction to the extent agreed upon in the royal proclamation issued on the 1st Sha'aban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May 1949) and in the ordinance issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June 1949.
16. Everything that is situated to the left of the above-mentioned line in the above subsections belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and everything to the right of that line to the Government of Bahrain, with the obligation of the two governments to accept what will subsequently appear in the second clause below.

### *Second Clause*

The area situated within the six defined sides is as follows:

1. A line beginning from a point situated at latitude 27 degrees north and longitude 50 degrees 23 minutes east approximately.
2. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 31 minutes 48 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 23 minutes 15 seconds east approximately.
3. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 37 minutes north and longitude 50 degrees 33 minutes east approximately.
4. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 46 minutes 24 seconds east approximately.
5. From there to a point situated at latitude 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds north and longitude 50 degrees 40 minutes east approximately.
6. From there to a point situated at latitude 27 degrees north and longitude 50 degrees 40 minutes east approximately.
7. From there to the starting point.

This area cited and defined above shall be in the past falling to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of

H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area will be carried out in the way chosen by His Majesty on the condition that he grants to the Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the understanding that this does not infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the right of administration over this above-mentioned area.

*Third Clause*

Two copies of a map shall be attached to this agreement, making as clear as possible the positions and points referred to in the foregoing subsections, subject to the map being made final by the expert knowledge of the committee defined in the fourth clause below. This map shall become final and an integral part of this agreement after approval and signature by the accredited representatives of the two governments on behalf of the two parties.

*Fourth Clause*

The two parties shall choose a technical body to undertake the necessary measures to confirm the boundaries in accordance with the provisions of this agreement on the condition that this body shall complete its work two months at the most after the date of execution of this agreement.

*Fifth Clause*

After the committee referred to in the fourth clause has completed its work and the two parties agree on the final map which it will have prepared, a body of technical delegates from both sides shall undertake the placing of signs and the establishing of the boundaries in accordance with the detailed announcements made clear in the final map.

*Sixth Clause*

This agreement shall come into effect from the date on which it is signed by the two parties.

Given in Riyadh in two original Arabic copies on the 4th of Sha'aban in the year 1377 corresponding to 22nd February in the year 1958.

## **Appendix XI**

### **The Saudi Arabia - United Arab Emirates Boundary Agreement**

**His Excellency Brother Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan President  
of the United Arab Emirates. Date 3 Shaban 1394 H  
(corresponding to 21 August 1974).**

Your Royal Highness,

I am pleased to refer to chapter three of article five of the boundary agreement signed between the two states on the 3rd of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of August 1974).

I would also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links, according to this agreement, the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the international waters does not include the potent natural resources which lay underneath the water surface and the sea bed. Such resources shall remain under the ownership of the United Arab Emirates alone and be excluded from the mutual sovereignty.

Thus, if the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding this issue matches that of the United Arab Emirates, I recommend that this letter, together with your excellency's response to it, be considered an agreement to determine that issue, and be annexed to the above mentioned agreement.

Please accept my best, truthful and respected regards, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud

King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

**His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud,  
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,  
Date 3 Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to 21 August 1974)**

I am pleased to refer to your Majesty's letter dated the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of August 1974) which reads as follows: "Your excellency Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates,

Your excellency,

I am pleased to refer to chapter 3 of article 5 of the boundary agreement signed between the two states on the 3rd. of Shaban 1394 H (corresponding to the 21st of August 1974). I would also like to point out to your excellency that the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links according to this agreement the coastal waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the international waters does not include the potent natural resources which lay underneath the water surface and seabed.

Such resources shall remain under the ownership of the United Arab Emirates alone and be excluded from the mutual sovereignty. Thus, if the understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding this issue matches that of the United Arab Emirates, I recommend that this letter, together with your excellency's response, be considered an agreement to determine that issue, and be annexed to the above mentioned agreement".

I am pleased to inform your Majesty that the understanding of the United Arab Emirates regarding the fight of ownership of the natural resources mentioned in your Majesty's letter matches that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Please accept my best, truthful and respected regards.

Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan

President of United Arab Emirates

His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and His Excellency Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nhayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, in accordance with the principles of the Islamic tolerant law which is followed by the Islamic nation, and proceeding from the spirit of Islamic solidarity which overshadows the Arab Peninsula, and on the basis of the peoples and the established relations of neighbourhood between the two states, and urged by the wish of the governments of the two states to determine the land and sea borders between them once and for all under the auspicious of Islamic and Arabic brotherhood, the two parties agree on the following:

**Article 1:**

The land borders between the state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall be the line which will be determined in accordance with the items of this agreement.

**Article 2:**

1. The land borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the state of the United Arab Emirates shall start from point A on the coast of the Arabian Gulf, situated on the Latitude line 24° 14' 58" North, and on the longitude line 51° 35' 26" East.
2. The land borders shall extend from point A in a straight line to point B which lies on the latitude line 24° 07' 24" North, and on the longitude line 51° 35' 26" East.
3. The land borders shall extend from point B in a straight North-East line until point C which lies on the latitude rifle 22° 56' 09" North, and on the longitude line 52° 34' 52" East.
4. The land borders shall extend from point C in a straight Northern-Eastern line until point D which lies on the latitude line 22° 37' 41" North, and on the longitude line 55° 08' 11" East.
5. The land borders shall extend from point D in a straight Northern-Eastern line, leaving Umm Al-Zumul east of point E which lies on the latitude line 22° 42' 02" North, and on the longitude line 55° 12' 10" East.

6. The land borders shall extend from point E in a straight line that reaches the following points which geographically lie on:

Point	Latitude line-North	Longitude line-east
F	23° 32' 11"	55° 30' 00"
G	24° 00' 00"	55° 34' 10"
H	24° 01' 00"	55° 51' 00"
I	24° 13' 00"	55° 54' 00"
J	24° 11' 50"	55° 50' 00"

7. The land borders shall extend from point J to point K which geographically lies approximately on the latitude line 24° 13' 45" North and on the longitude line 55° 45' East.
8. The land borders shall extend from point K to point which geographically lies approximately on latitude line 24° 19' North on the latitude line 55° 50' East.
9. The land borders shall extend from point L to the meeting point of the borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman, which will be agreed upon between the three states.

All the above-mentioned points are initially posted on a 1:500,000 map, attached to this agreement and signed by the two contracting parties of dignitaries.

**Article 3:**

1. Hydro-Carbonic material located in Al-Shayba-Zararah field shall be owned by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree and observe its obligation of not to carry out any search, drill for, invest or to profit from the Hydro-Carbonic material, or give



permission to do so, in the part of Shayba-Zararah field which lies north of the border line.

3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or any company or establishment working under its name, shall be authorised to carry out search and during operations and invest and profit from the Hydro-Carbonate material in that part of Al-Shayba-Zararah field which lies north of the border line. Any agreement regarding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's carrying out of such operations shall be agreed upon at a later time.

**Article 4:**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates shall observe their obligation of stopping any drilling and investing or granting permission to do so the hydro-carbonate material in that part of their regions in which the hydro-carbonate field primarily extends inside the region of the other state.

**Article 5:**

1. The United Arab Emirates shall recognise the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over Huwaisat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall recognise the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over all islands which lie opposite to its coasts on the Arabian Gulf.
2. The United Arab Emirates shall agree to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's establishment of any general purpose installations wished by the Kingdom on the islands of Qafay and Makasib.
3. Representatives of the two contracting parties shall determine, in the shortest time possible, the Sea borders between the region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that of the United Arab Emirates, and between the islands that are under the sovereignty of each state on just basis which secures a free and direct link between the regional waters that belongs to that part of the region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which lies adjacent to the region of the United Arab Emirates and the regional waters which belongs to Huwaisat island mentioned in the above paragraph, in a way that secures the possibility of navigation between the deep international waters and that part of the region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia mentioned above.

Each contracting party shall have the mutual sovereignty over the whole area which links - according to this chapter - between the regional water which belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the international waters.

**Article 6:**

A specialised international company, selected by the two states, shall assume the responsibility of surveying and determining the locations of the points and the border lines on the ground as explicated in article two above, and shall prepare a map, showing the land borders between the two countries and the date which accompany such a map, which will become, after being signed by the two contracting parties of dignitaries, the official map that shows the required borders and shall be attached to this agreement.

**Article 7:**

A joint technical committee, consisting of 3 members from each state, shall be organised in

order to prepare the specification for the required tasks of the company mentioned above and to post the points and border lines between the two countries in accordance with the items of this agreement and to supervise the execution of the these tasks and to study its results.

**Article 8:**

Each state shall keep a copy of the two produced copies of this agreement.

**Article 9:**

This agreement shall become effective at the time of signing it.

**Article 10:**

This agreement is written in Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 3rd of Shaban 1394 H, corresponding to the 21st of August 1974.

**First Party**

Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates.

**Second Party**

King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

## Appendix XII: Sample size selecting method

<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>
10	10	220	140	1200	291
15	14	230	144	1300	297
20	19	240	148	1400	302
25	24	250	152	1500	306
30	28	260	155	1600	310
35	32	270	159	1700	313
40	36	280	162	1800	317
45	40	290	165	1900	320
50	44	300	169	2000	322
55	48	320	175	2200	327
60	52	340	181	2400	331
65	56	360	186	2600	335
70	59	380	191	2800	338
75	63	400	196	3000	341
80	66	420	201	3500	346
85	70	440	205	4000	351
90	73	460	210	4500	354
<b>95<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>76</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>5000</b>	<b>357</b>
100	80	500	217	6000	361
<b>110<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>86</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>7000</b>	<b>364</b>
<b>120<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>92</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>8000</b>	<b>367</b>
130	97	650	242	9000	368
<b>140<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>103</b>	<b>700</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>10000</b>	<b>370</b>
150	108	750	254	15000	375
<b>160<sup>6</sup></b>	<b>113</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>20000</b>	<b>377</b>
170	118	850	265	30000	379
<b>180<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>123</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>40000</b>	<b>380</b>
190	127	950	274	50000	381
200	132	1000	278	75000	382
210	136	1100	285	1000000	384

*N* = population size

*S* = sample size

1: Al-Khafji Checkpoint (Arrivals).

2: Al-Khafji (Departures).

3: KFC (Arrivals).

4: KFC (Departures).

5: Al-Bateha (Arrivals).

6: Al-Bateha (Departures).

Source: (Krejcie, R.V. 1970, p. 608)

**Appendix XIII: Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transportation for the Arrivals**

Alkhafji										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	8	5	1	0	14	7	5	1	1	14
10-20	5	7	9	1	22	8	6	0	8	22
21-30	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	2
31-40	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
41-50	3	1	0	0	4	1	3	0	0	4
>50	11	22	27	0	60	26	30	2	2	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>103</b>
KFC										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	2	12	13	0	27	12	14	0	1	27
10-20	8	12	4	0	24	14	9	0	1	24
21-30	3	8	3	0	14	7	6	0	1	14
31-40	0	1	2	0	3	1	2	0	0	3
41-50	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
>50	0	4	1	0	5	1	4	0	0	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>74</b>
Albateha										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	0	1	2	1	4	2	1	0	1	4
10-20	11	7	4	2	24	9	11	0	4	24
21-30	0	4	1	0	5	3	1	1	0	5
31-40	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
41-50	1	3	3	1	8	4	3	1	0	8
>50	13	5	3	2	23	2	1	20	0	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>65</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

**Appendix XIV: Time consumed and travellers' companions and mode of transportation for the Departures**

Alkhafji										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	11	11	5	1	28	20	6	0	2	28
10-20	8	18	10	0	36	20	15	0	1	36
21-30	1	3	2	0	6	2	4	0	0	6
31-40	2	3	1	0	6	3	2	0	1	6
41-50	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	2
>50	2	2	1	0	5	3	2	0	0	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>83</b>
KFC										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	3	3	0	0	6	3	3	0	0	6
10-20	14	3	11	0	28	18	8	0	2	28
21-30	11	3	14	1	29	19	8	0	2	29
31-40	3	3	9	0	15	11	4	0	0	15
41-50	3	1	8	0	12	8	3	0	1	12
>50	1	4	11	0	16	13	3	0	0	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>106</b>
Albateha										
Time	Travellers' companion					Mode of transportation				
	By himself	With family	With friends	Other	Total	Small car	Mini bus	Bus	Other	Total
<10	17	11	25	0	53	36	8	6	3	53
10-20	6	7	15	1	29	21	6	1	1	29
21-30	2	3	6	0	11	6	5	0	0	11
31-40	2	4	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	6
41-50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
>50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>99</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.


### Appendix XV: Other types of travellers' purposes

<b>Alkhafji</b>					
<b>Arrivals</b>			<b>Departures</b>		
Purpose	No.	%	Purpose	No.	%
Multiple Purpose	4	22	Finding a job	1	50
Check Camels	2	11	Multiple Purpose	1	50
Check Sheep	1	6			
Fishing	1	6			
Garden Trip	1	6			
Marriage	1	6			
Reading Quran	1	6			
Moving	1	6			
Shopping	2	11			
Deliver Birds	1	6			
Visiting	3	14			
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>KFC</b>					
<b>Arrivals</b>			<b>Departures</b>		
Purpose	No.	%	Purpose	No.	%
Shopping	11	69	Multiple Purpose	5	31
Multiple Purpose	2	13	By a Medication	1	6
Returning	1	6	Finding a job	1	6
To Have Dinner	1	6	Returning Home	2	13
Not Specified	1	6	Shopping	1	6
			Meet Arrivals	4	25
			Fly to Japan		
			Picking Family	1	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Albateha</b>					
<b>Arrivals</b>			<b>Departures</b>		
Purpose	No.	%	Purpose	No.	%
Doing Omrah	5	36	Multiple Purpose	7	70
Multiple Purpose	3	21	Attend Camel Race	1	10
Driving a Bus	1	7	For Treatment	1	10
Buy a Car	1	7	Not specified	1	10
Hunting	1	7			
Check Camels	1	7			
Passing Through	2	15			
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Fieldwork conducted by the author in June and October 1998.

## APPENDIX XVI

### Simplified Family Tree of Al Saud Families



Source: After Mcloughlin, (1993), with slight modification.