

The concept of 'joy'
in Old and Middle English
A semantic analysis

Małgorzata Fabiszak

Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu
Piła
2001

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter One. Linguistic approach to lexical semantics.	3
1.1. Introduction.	3
1.2. Semantic fields.	3
1.3. Componential analysis.	5
1.4. The criticism and defence of componential analysis.	6
1.5. Semantics and generative grammar.	11
1.6. Cognitive semantics.	16
1.7. Conclusion.	18
Chapter Two. Approaches to emotion.	19
2.1. Introduction.	19
2.2. The concept of emotion: its definition and structure.	19
2.3. Emotions in general psychology.	24
2.3.1. Universality vs. culture-specificity of emotions.	24
2.3.2. Emotions as cognitive phenomena.	27
2.3.3. The development of emotion concepts in children.	28
2.4. The linguistic approach to emotions.	29
2.4.1. Emotions in historical linguistics.	29
2.4.2. Emotions within Natural Semantic Metalanguage.	29
2.4.3. The linguistic constructionist approach to emotions.	32
2.4.4. Cognitive semantics and emotion concepts.	34
2.4.5. Verbs of emotions as experiencer verbs.	37
2.5. The historical approach to emotion.	39
2.6. Conclusion.....	41

Chapter Three. A semantic analysis of joy words in Old English.....	43
3.1. Data and method.	43
3.2. Analysis of words.	44
Bliss	44
Bliþe	46
Dream	48
Glaednes	50
Gefea	52
Liss	54
Mirhþ	55
Wynsumnes	57
3.3. The structure of the concept of 'joy' in Old English.	58
3.4. The scenario for the concept of 'joy' in Old English.	63
Chapter Four. The concept of 'joy' in Middle English.	67
4.1. Introduction: scope, methods and a general background.	67
4.2. Analyses of words.	68
Bliss	68
Blithe	70
Cheer	71
Delight	73
Dream	75
Gainesse (gay)	76
Gladnes (gladschipe, gleadung, glad)	76
Joy	78
Lisse	79
Mirth	79
Wynn	81
4.3. The evolution of the semantic field of 'joy' in Middle English.	81
Conclusions	88
Bibliography	96
Sources	96
Other Works	97

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this work is to arrive at a description of the semantic structure of the concept of 'joy' in OE and ME periods as well as to pinpoint changes that the concept underwent over this time. The concept of 'joy' is here understood as a mental representation of the meaning of a lexical field. In the present study only the core members of the field will be analysed for OE. These have been identified as *bliss*, *bliþe*, *dream*, *glædnes*, *liss*, *mirhð* and *wynsumnesse*.

The development of these words will be traced on into ME, even if the words show signs of falling out of the field of 'joy', i.e. I will in this respect be adopting a semasiological approach to the change of meaning. New words borrowed into ME to designate the concept of 'joy', such as *cheer*, *delight*, *gay* (*gainess*) and *joy*, will also be investigated, I will thus also be incorporating an onomasiological perspective.

The choice of this particular field is based on the suggestion that it is relatively poorly described in the history of the English language (cf. Strite 1989 on OE, Diller 1992). A number of works have been devoted to other emotion words, 'gloom' in particular (for example: Lochrie 1986, Magennis 1986). Those studies which have dealt with 'joy', however, have either investigated it with a different aim in mind (Ostheeren 1964) or focused on other lexical items (Fell 1982-83).

The present study consists of four chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter One is a review of methods and theories in lexical semantics. The review is intended as an attempt to find a common core in the competing theories so that the analysis of the data can be based on widely accepted, though often variously labelled methods. This chapter begins with a survey of the basic tenets of lexical field theory and compositional analysis, devotes some space to those approaches to semantics stemming from generative transformational grammar, and finishes with a discussion of cognitive semantics as advocated by the Berkeley school.

Chapter Two presents a number of studies devoted to emotions from a number of different perspectives: psychological, linguistic and socio-cultural. The goal of this chapter is to provide a wider background for my study. Emotions have been a research

concern in psychology for almost a hundred years. I therefore believe that problems identified within this discipline, as well as attempts at solving these problems, can serve as reference points for those studying emotions from a different perspective. An interest in emotions in social history, on the other hand, is a recent development, but this thriving research field can also contribute to our understanding of emotions and, in particular, changes in emotions.

The first part of Chapter Three is devoted to an analysis of OE words for 'joy'. The *Microfiche Concordance to Old English* (henceforth *MCOE*) serves as a source of data. The second part presents the results of the analysis which is an attempt to construct the scenario for 'joy' in OE and to identify the metaphors which govern it.

Chapter Four contains an analysis of ME terms for 'joy'. This chapter not only uses the methodology developed in Chapter Three, but also utilises its results in both the analysis and interpretation of data. The data come from a number of concordances, supplemented with literary texts as indicated in the Bibliography. The chapter ends with an outline of developments between the OE and ME periods.

The thesis ends with conclusions which summarises the results of the study.

The Reference Section consists of two parts: the sources and reference books employed, and the literature quoted in the thesis.

CHAPTER ONE LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO LEXICAL SEMANTICS.

1.1. Introduction.

Diachronic lexical semantics stems from etymology, which has been an interest of linguistically oriented philosophers at least since Plato. In its most common form it was based on a belief that words have a true meaning (the ideal in the Platonic sense) and that the role of a philosopher is to find this meaning. In modern times the quest for the only true meaning was often understood as finding the Latin or Greek source word and tracing its development in other European languages (Malkiel 1993). This model of linguistic inquiry has a strong resonance in the folk theory of language and manifests itself in vehement public discussion on the deterioration and decay of language, its lexical meanings and grammatical form. With the development of historical linguistics, a better understanding of the mechanisms of language change discredited such views as non-scientific. The approach to the study of the change of meaning also evolved.

1.2. Semantic fields.

Trier (1934) was one of the first scholars, working within the framework of *field theory*, to point out the weaknesses of atomistic approaches to meaning. Studying words in isolation leads to a neglect of important generalisations. As a post-Saussurean structuralist, he advocated an analysis of words as parts of a system, a *word-field*. In his influential study of the conceptual field of knowledge and understanding in Middle High German, he pointed out that a change in meaning of one lexical item influences the meaning of the related items and the structure of the system itself. The organisation of a lexical field, as conceived of by Trier, was based on *paradigmatic relations*. Other scholars, notably Porzig (1934), understood semantic fields as sets

of words standing in *syntagmatic relations*, arranged in terms of collocations and selectional restrictions.

Trier has been criticised for making some ungrounded assumptions, for example for postulating the mosaic structure of lexical fields. Such a structure implies that all the possible meanings within a conceptual field are expressed lexically, or to put it in other words, that the whole semantic space is covered by the meanings of lexical items. This position has been criticised by Lehrer (1974), who proved that this is not the case in many lexical fields. Following the results of Berlin and Kay's (1969) research on colour terms, she suggested that lexical fields consist of a set of *basic terms* and less clearly delineated *peripheral terms*. Componential analysis of basic terms determines the dimensions or parameters structuring the lexical field. Parameters or components weave into the senses of existing terms, but not all possible combinations of the components are lexicalised, thus creating lexical gaps in the field. The lack of lexicalisation is often due to extralinguistic, pragmatic factors of language use. Only if a need for a new lexical item arises in the speech community is a lexical gap filled. The drive to internal symmetry or analogy plays no role in filling the gaps.

Apart from the meaning components common to the words in a particular semantic field, these words, especially basic terms, often share syntactic structures in which they can appear, as illustrated by Zwicky's (1971) analysis of manner-of-speaking verbs.

These two characteristic features of lexical fields, i.e. semantic parameters creating lexical gaps, and common syntactic behaviour of words belonging to the same field, endow field theory with a certain explanatory and predictive power. Lexical gaps help to explain the extension of meaning of lexical items and the invention and borrowing of new items. The shared syntactic behaviour predicts the collocability of the new items added to the lexical field.

The theory of semantic fields has been successfully applied in lexicographic research, for example in constructing *Roget's Thesaurus* (1962) and the dictionary of about 500 German verbs, designed as a reference for teachers at German universities preparing courses and textbooks in German as a foreign language (Ballweg-Schramm 1981). It is also believed that semantic fields understood as sets of contrastive items are a necessary device for the organisation of memory, language learning and categorisation (Grandy 1987).

1.3. Componential analysis.

Another approach to lexical semantics, stemming from structural linguistics, and often used in combination with the semantic field framework, is *componential analysis*. It is based on the assumption that words in a lexicon constitute a structure of systematically related elements which themselves are further decomposable. It aims at determining a particular word's place in this structure by delimiting the *distinctive features* that recur in the meaning of related items. They are often held in *binary* or *n-tuple oppositions* which weave into a complex net of paradigmatic relations. Moreover, binary opposition is considered to be "one of the most important principles governing the structure of languages" (Lyons 1977: 271).

Bendix (1966), following Stern (1931) rejected the idea that words may be studied in isolation. Hence he constructed a set of nuclear sentences of the form "A has B", "A gives B to C", etc. to establish what relations verbs in such sentences create. One of the bases of his theory was that to describe the meaning of a sentence is to supply its closest possible paraphrase. Thus he subjected contrasting sentences with the verbs under study to native speaker's judgements. From these he extracted criterial components of meaning. Then he devised a set of conversion rules which, in a quasi-logical form, presented a definition of meaning of a given word. Finally, he presented the results in a table of components for the whole domain.

The method of componential analysis integrated with the field theory has been further refined and tested in numerous semantic studies conducted by the linguists from the Tübingen School of Structural Semantics. The framework, as originally developed by Coseriu (1962, 1967) under the name of *lexematics*, is basically paradigmatic and employs decomposition into the meaning-differentiating features. A lexical field, according to Coseriu (for an excellent summary see Geckeler 1981, 1988), consists of lexemes analysable by means of *semes* (minimal distinctive features organised in oppositions along a dimension characteristic for a single field) and *classemes* (units functioning across linguistic fields, determining syntagmatic relations, often grammaticalised). The content of the whole lexical field is expressed by means of an *archilexeme*, a general label determining the scope of the field, which may but need not be lexicalised in a particular language (Geckeler 1988: 15, Lyons 1977: 296).

Lehrer (1974) pointed to the contribution componential analysis can make to the understanding of the dynamic nature of language. She emphasised the difference between general and salient components (similar to the markers and distinguishers

posited by Katz and Fodor (1963) – see below). Non-universal components of meaning (distinguishers) may be more salient for the meaning of a given word and it is these that determine the metaphoric extensions of words. “If there is no way of matching these features with anything in the new field of discourse, there does not seem to be any point in using the words. Moreover, much of the rhetorical force of using these terms in slightly non-standard contexts is achieved by associating the normal [salient-MF] component with a new referent” (Lehrer 1974: 116). The ability of these components to influence and extend the meaning of words modified by their carriers, without themselves belonging to the specification of these words, aligns them with Weinreich’s (1966) transfer features.

The basic tenets of componential analysis treated in a less orthodox manner than in the approaches presented above are also present in *the contextual theory of lexical meaning* developed by Cruse (1986, 1988). Within this framework word meaning is analysed in terms of *semantic traits*, which are derived from the *actual* and *potential contexts*. Actual context is here understood as the data-derived context, whereas potential context is the one available to native speakers (including linguists), through introspection. The meaning of a word can be derived from an investigation of both its syntagmatic (*collocation*) and paradigmatic (*substitution*) affinities and is understood as the entire pattern of a word’s contextual relations.

1.4. The criticism and defence of componential analysis.

Componential analysis in combination with semantic field theory has been utilised in several anthropological and linguistic studies of, for example, possession verbs (Bendix 1966), cooking verbs, belief predicates, container words, sound words (Lehrer 1974), judging verbs (Fillmore 1971), semantic oppositions (Mettinger 1988a and b), and the domain of humans (Kleparski 1990).

Despite its wide application the feature based approach has been criticised on the following grounds:

1. Semantic components are indeterminate, and their ontological status vague so that one cannot tell the difference between metalinguistic components and the words of the natural language.
2. Binary oppositions do not allow gradability of concepts as revealed by prototype effects.
3. The approach suggests that certain concepts are more complex than others, which is allegedly not supported by psycholinguistic experiments (see below).

The suggested solutions to these criticisms, however, either look conspicuously

similar to componential analysis (points 1 and 2) or do not themselves withstand the same criticism (point 3).

Balmer and Brennenstuhl (1981a and b) reject feature analysis on the grounds that the ontological status of features is disputable and that discovering exhaustive lists of features both for the meaning of a single word and for the entire lexicon is problematical. They propose a *holistic approach to lexical analysis*, that is starting with the analysis of the entire lexicon and breaking it down into smaller parts. The first division they suggest is that into word categories, i.e. nouns, verbs and adjectives, adverbs and prepositions. Then they proceed to break up the verbs into smaller groups on the basis of two semantic relations: *similarity* and *presupposition*. This leads to the establishment of a *verbgroup*¹, which seems to be nothing more than a group of synonyms of a classical Thesaurus, for instance: “verbgroup, e.g. tun jd 1 etw 2 (do), durchführen jd 1 etw 2 (perform), machen jd 1 etw 2 (make), basteln jd 1 (work at as a hobby), schaffen jd 1 (execute), tätig sein jd 1 (be busy)”. The next step is to extract a *title verb* with the most general meaning (cf. a thesaurus entry), so that the remaining verbs in a group can be paraphrased by means of the title verb with a modifier. Verbgroup together with its title verb creates a *verbcategory*. On the basis of similarity of title verbs these can, in turn, be grouped into *verbmodels* (cf. *scripts*, *scenes*, etc.). For example, the Individual/Object-Existence Model consists of the following verbcategories: Not Exist-Come Into Existence-*Exist*-Vanish-Have Existed (Balmer and Brennenstuhl 1981b: 421-422).

The question arises: what is left of the novel approach once it is stripped of the new labels? How does this method differ from the common lexicographic practice of grouping synonymous words in thesauri and paraphrasing them in alphabetical dictionaries? In fact no difference is detectable.

However, due tribute must be paid to the authors for pointing out certain general trends in the organisation of verbmodels. They singled out three dimensions along which verbmodels are structured. These are: *aktionsart*, i.e. the linear arrangement in the process phases; *intensity* of the process visualised by means of a hat graph; and *interference* (involvement, influence), i.e. degree of subject agentivity.

Nevertheless, as far as methodology is concerned Balmer and Brennenstuhl’s approach seems just a notional variant of the lexicological approach. Moreover, if we disregard the ontological status of semantic features, it is difficult to see the difference between a classical paraphrase, feature analysis and the Balmer and Brennenstuhl method. What they all do is describe the meaning of a word in different

¹ Terms: *verbgroup*, *verbcategory*, *verbmodel*, *title verb*, *hat graph* follow the terminology and the spelling suggested by Balmer and Brennenstuhl.

metalanguages, one closer to natural language and the other attempting to draw on the artificial language of logic. In most cases, however, both would point to the same components of word meaning. For example:

- (a) 'mother' 1. Your mother is the woman who gave birth to you. (*Collins Dictionary*)
- (b) 'mother' [female], [parent]
- (c) 'mother' person giving birth (a possible definition within Balmer and Brennenstuhl framework)

where 'woman' of the first definition = 'female' of the second = 'person' of the third, and 'who gave birth to you' = 'parent' = 'giving birth'. Of course, these definitions highlight slightly different aspects of the word meaning. The first is the most detailed one, but disregards the relationships between the defined word and other words in the lexicon; the second does not differentiate the role of the female as opposed to the male parent, but places the word firmly within the network of other lexical items; and the third gives the highest superordinate of the defined word thus disregarding the component 'female', but emphasising the link with all the other words denoting human beings. These nuances of metalinguistic description, however, are too small to be regarded as a solution to the problem of the ontological status of semantic features.

A more viable solution is the one developed by Wierzbicka (1992, 1996) who suggested that semantic components reflect *semantic universals (primitives)* common to all humankind. The first step in semantic research should then be to produce a set of such primitives through cross-linguistic research. The *Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)* as worked out by Wierzbicka and her colleagues is very appealing, but has certain drawbacks. The list of the proposed universals has grown from 14 (1972) to over 50 (1996). They are not mutually independent and it is difficult to ascertain their psychological reality. Moreover, in defining abstract entities, Wierzbicka allows the use of features which are not included in the list, for economy and ease of description, on the assumption that these components are definable by means of primitives. In terms of "elegance of description" it is naturally more convenient to employ the higher level items. However, if we do so, our semantic analysis will no longer meet the requirement of being based on universals and will not differ much from classical componential analysis, whose only metalinguistic commitment is that the defining features should exhibit a higher frequency of occurrence, most often determined only by a linguist's introspection, than the defined term.

Nevertheless, if we treat NSM as a tool for the description of meaning and do

not commit ourselves to the philosophical implications adhered to by the author, it proves to be a very efficient method of semantic analysis (Fabiszak 2000). Moreover, it clearly remains one of the better developed and more widely tested semantic theories (see the collection Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994).

The criticism of componential analysis stemming from research on prototypes should not be regarded as being aimed at discrediting the model, but rather as an important insight that can improve the existing theory. Most linguists working within the semantic feature framework incorporate the results of Rosch's² experiments into their own studies, admit the existence of focus-periphery structure and introduce prototypicality-based ordering of linguistic features (Lehrer 1990, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1985, 1993). Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the theory of prototypes is a theory of conceptualisation and not of linguistic coding. The idea of a prototype as the centre of a conceptual category is useful for semantic theory in as much as it provides a referent, understood as a mental representation and not a real world entity, for the lexical item (Wierzbicka 1985, 1990). The difference between the meaning of a lexical item and its real word referent has often been underestimated in prototype oriented linguistic investigations and has led to a misrepresentation of semantic meaning in terms of features characteristic of the referent, which do not necessarily have to coincide with those of a lexical entry (for details see Kastovsky 1988). Encyclopaedic knowledge of the world as perceived and interpreted by human beings should not be mistaken for the dictionary meaning of words. Definitions of lexical meaning usually refer to encyclopaedic knowledge, but they also include vital information on a word's expressive meaning, register affiliation and collocational restrictions (Cruse 1988, 1990).

The effect of the theory of prototypes on lexical semantics is often overestimated, and the striking similarities between prototype theory and field theory overlooked. This can be demonstrated by a comparison of Coseriu's lexematics and prototype semantics as follows.

Although the theory of prototypes claims to examine the meaning of concepts, in most cases it is their lexical realisations that serve as inputs in psychological experiments. Hence, the basic level concepts and their superordinates posited by Rosch (1978) resemble lexemes and archilexemes, with a hyponymic relation obtaining between them. The unity of the semantic category/field is determined by its internal dimensions which organise its structure and attributes/features and account for the non scalar content of a word (for prototype theory see Russel and Mehrebian 1977,

² For a brief review of the theory of prototypes see Section 2.2.

for lexematics see Geckeler 1988). In fact, attributes or elements used as prompting cues in psychological experiments are nothing more than semantic features (Pullman 1983, Lipka 1986). Their psychological reality is the same as that of any meaning component, that is they work through their association with natural language words. This fact is used by Cruse (1986) in his contextual approach to lexical meaning to circumvent the problem of the ontological status of semantic features. He emphasises that the meaning of a word manifests itself in its relations to other words and should be described in terms of these relations without committing himself to any statement on what meaning really is.

The third criticism of componential analysis, i.e., that it presupposes that certain concepts are more complex than others, which, allegedly, is not borne out by psychological research, has been put forward by Chierchia and McConnel-Ginnet (1990: 360-368). They advance the Carnapian meaning postulate approach and argue for it as a more adequate theory on the basis of the acquisition of meaning by children. Their line of reasoning runs as follows:

Children acquire words like *kill* and *die* long before they learn words like 'cause' and 'become'. ... it is striking that what we have analysed as the relatively more complex items semantically are apparently more directly salient for children. (...) Even at a less abstract level we find the order of the acquisition frequently opposite to what relative complexity of proposed translations might predict. As Fodor (1987) p.161 observes 'Children know about fathers long before they know about males and parents....' (...) The decompositional approach suggests that the simple concept of 'father' that children first acquire is different from, and perhaps ultimately replaced by, the complex one that they later built from 'male' and 'parent'. In contrast, the meaning postulate approach need only suppose an enrichment of IPC [Intensional Predicate Calculus - MF] to include basic expressions like 'male' and 'parent' and the concepts they designate along with meaning postulates connecting these later acquired concepts to one another (Chierchia and McConnel-Ginnet 1990: 363).

The acquisition argument above does not seem to have more bearing on the psychological plausibility of componential analysis than it does on meaning postulate approach. It is quite obvious that the "simple concept of *father* that children first acquire is different from ... the complex one that they later build." In fact the whole conceptual system of a child is different from that which evolves later, be it word meaning, syntactic structures or more general cognitive skills (Gopnik 1983). However, if the original concept is abandoned or merely developed is not of concern

for decompositional analysis, which, by definition, does not account for a change in meaning, whether from the diachronic perspective of a language or the developmental perspective of an individual language user, but concentrates on determining the meaning of the words synchronically (Coseriu 1967). Consequently, the developmental argument disputes one of the basic assumptions upon which the theory of feature analysis is founded, but cannot be regarded as a challenge to its methodology.

1.5. Semantics and generative grammar.

Semanticists coming from the Chomskyan tradition of generative syntax attempted to devise a semantic theory which proposed projection rules generating the meaning of sentences and phrases from the meaning of lexical items as represented in the dictionary of a particular language (Interpretive Semantics – Katz and Fodor 1963). Their work often involved criticism of the philosophical implications of previous approaches. Katz (1972), for instance, rejects the ideational, the referential and the behavioural theories of meaning as inadequate. Fodor (1977) disputes the value of reductionist definitions as he believes that "the reduction of one kind of thing to another can be very revealing, but there is no guarantee that such a reduction will be possible for any particular given kind of thing" (Fodor 1977: 43). The problem with such an argument is that any type of science is by its very virtue a hypothesis that humans, endowed with cognitive abilities, construct about the external world. Hypotheses as such can only be expected to hold for some part of reality and, unless they are highly general, do not attempt to make claims about *every* "particular kind of thing".

Nevertheless, when faced with the question of the definition of lexical items, semanticists had to yield to an atomistic (and hence reductionist) approach. For Katz and Fodor (1963) the meaning of words can be analysed into smaller components and represented by *markers* and *distinguishers* strikingly similar to semantic features (for an illuminating discussion on similarities between markers and distinguishers on the one hand and *classemes* and *semes* on the other see Lyons 1977: 327). Semantic markers are awarded a universal status (see also Wierzbicka's NSM). Katz's (1972) most cherished example is that of 'bachelor' analysed as

bachelor: (Human) (Male) (Adult) [who has never married]

where semantic markers are put in parentheses, and distinguishers in square brackets.

Another attempt to describe lexical meaning within the framework of generative semantics was that of Fillmore (1968) who developed a theory of *case relations*. It aims at defining the semantic structure of verbs in terms of the case relations of their arguments. These relations determine sentence syntax structure and explain the combination of verbs and their arguments. They also characterise relations among verbs, in providing a particularly neat method of relating causative verbs to their non-causative counterparts. Their specifications differ only in terms of which case must be selected as their subject. Fillmore suggested six *case categories*: *Agentive, Instrumental, Dative, Factitive, Locative, Objective*. The major contribution of this approach is a more complete specification of the meaning of verbs. However, it was criticised by Chomsky (1970) as not abstract enough and not preserving meaning relations.

Gruber (1965) formulated a theory of *thematic relations*, which was based on the assumption that the spatiotemporal domain is the underlying foundation of all human reasoning. It is the conceptual construct in terms of which more abstract concepts are generated. According to this theory all verbs can be analysed by means of *thematic roles* such as *Agent, Patient, Theme, Source, Path, Goal*. This approach has been further developed by Jackendoff (1983, 1990) and Grimshaw (1990)³ among others.

Jackendoff develops a full theory of semantics, starting with philosophical assumptions and finishing with detailed specifications of word meanings. For him, word meaning is a part of a *conceptual structure* together with its *phonological* and *syntactic specifications*. The conceptual structure is connected with *perceptual* and *motor modules* of the mind, so that a lexical entry for physical objects also includes a *3D (three-dimensional) model* of the object as put forward by Marr (1982), and lexical entries for verbs would include a *scenario* determining what the action looks like and what it feels like to perform it. The major advantage of the 3D model is that: “[it] eliminate[s] the need for a plethora of objectionable conceptual features in favour of geometric representation ... [which remains] invisible to syntax.” (Jackendoff 1990: 33-34). Simultaneously, “referential linking is not all there is to word meaning” (Jackendoff 1992: 59).

To posit intermodule links between conceptual structures and perceptual and motor modalities is a very elegant solution to the problem of the definition of natural kinds, but cannot be applied in specification of meanings of abstract terms. Abstract terms, and emotion terms in particular, do not have objective reference and hence cannot be stored as 3D models. In most cases they cannot be determined purely on

³ See Section 2.4.5.

the basis of emotional display, so the link between the cognitive module and the perceptual module (for decoding emotional displays) and with the motor module (for encoding them) is not sufficient for the understanding of these terms. They can only be understood and learned in terms of shared and differentiating properties with other concepts.

Nevertheless, the intermodule links can produce some interesting results in defining emotion concepts. If we assume that a lexical entry for an emotion concept includes links to representations of the most common perceptions and motor activities related to experiencing emotions, then they can account for the dilemmas linguists encounter in determining whether a particular word belongs to the field of emotion terms or not. For example, Omondi (1997) observed that in Dhoulou it is difficult to judge if a given use of a word refers to emotion, physiological change within the organism that the emotion might have caused, or to the action which is the culturally accepted means of expressing the emotion. If all three aspects are unified in one conceptual structure then it is only natural that lexical items used in one of the domains might be extended to the other related domain, through metaphoric or metonymic extension.

Jackendoff (1992) postulates the existence of basic *conceptual categories*, such as Object, Event, Place, Action, Property and Amount. These coincide with the semantic primitives suggested by Wierzbicka for her NSM. For instance, Object can be translated as SOMETHING, Event as HAPPEN, Place as HERE, Action as DO, Property as GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL and Amount as ONE, TWO, MANY, SOME, ALL. The fact that semanticists working within different frameworks arrived at similar results strengthens their conclusions. However, Jackendoff emphasises that the proposed categories and *thematic roles* should not be regarded as *psychological universals*, but rather as “relational notions defined structurally over conceptual structure, with a status precisely comparable to that of the notions of Subject and Object in many syntactic theories” (Jackendoff 1990: 47). In this respect these notions share the same status as the semantic features of classical componential analysis which claim no psychological reality but are purely functional and intralinguistic in nature (Kastovsky 1988, Mettinger 1988a and b).

Conceptual constituents, according to Jackendoff, combine in a rule-governed fashion to generate word, phrase and, ultimately, sentence meanings. The rules are integrated in *Preference Rule Systems*, which account for *prototypical effects*. “Preference Rule Systems state that the decompositional features of a concept create a hierarchical structure with the stereotypical instance occupying the topmost position with the less stereotypical instances graded in an orderly fashion below it” (Jackendoff 1990: 37). He also notes that “fuzziness of categorisation may be somewhat strange

in a strictly digital conception of mental computation, but slightly less strange in a system that contains the possibility of continuously graded strengths of criterion application” (Jackendoff 1992: 8).

In defining verb meaning Jackendoff⁴ concentrates on the formal specification of verbs' *thematic roles*, their *selectional restrictions* and their mappings to *argument structure*. Thematic roles can be divided into two tiers: the *thematic tier* and the *action tier*. The thematic tier deals with motion and location and the action tier is responsible for Actor-Patient relations. Selectional restrictions determine verb arguments and “should not be regarded as a conceptual condition on the insertion of a verb. Rather, it is a part of the verb meaning” (Jackendoff 1990: 53). Thematic roles of the *Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS)* are eventually linked to syntactic structures in the syntactic module.

In his conceptual theory of lexical meaning, Jackendoff draws on the findings of field theory. He stresses that “to determine the boundaries of explanation rather than mere description, it is necessary to consider the behaviour of each individual verb within a context of the overall class to which it belongs. The class as a whole and its place in the larger system must be examined in detail in order to lay out a place of a verb within the system” (Jackendoff 1990: 123).

Conceptual Semantics also shares certain features with *Cognitive Semantics*. They both attempt to describe human cognition and categorisation in terms of a *representational theory of concepts* and believe that spatial concepts are the primary basis for the development of abstract concepts. They differ in that *Conceptual Semantics* adheres to the *autonomy of syntax principle* and is committed to the *formalisation* of the theory.

Another attempt to create a satisfactory semantic theory, developed from the Chomskyan tradition, is the *generative lexicon* theory proposed by Pustejovsky (1996). He stresses the importance of the link between meaning and structure and maintains that lexical meaning cannot be successfully analysed without taking into account syntactic structure. This basic assumption underlies the structure of the generative lexicon which, he suggests, consists of at least four levels of representation: *argument structure* specifying the type and number of arguments of a given lexical item; *event structure* (reminiscent of *aktionsart*) determining whether the lexical item belongs to STATE, PROCESS or TRANSITION; *qualia structure*⁵, describing an item's predication in terms of FORMAL, CONSTITUTIVE, TELIC and AGENTIVE roles; and *lexical inheritance structure (lis)*, relating every semantic

structure to other semantic structures and determining its position in the global structure of the lexicon (Pustejovsky 1996: 58, 61). *Qualia structures* and *lis* are the level of representation which has been traditionally investigated in semantics, whereas argument and event structure have usually been dealt with by syntax. Pustejovsky (1996) concentrates on explicating the organisation of qualia structure. He stresses that not all qualia roles have to be specified for every lexical item. And he derives their roots from Aristotle's notion of modes of explanation. Pustejovsky (1996: 85-86) proposes the following values for each quale role:

1. CONSTITUTIVE: the relation between an object and its constituents or proper parts.
 - i. Material
 - ii. Weight
 - iii. Parts and component elements
2. FORMAL: That which distinguishes the object within a larger domain.
 - i. Orientation
 - ii. Magnitude
 - iii. Shape
 - iv. Dimensionality
 - v. Colour
 - vi. Position
3. TELIC: Purpose and function of the object
 - i. Purpose that an agent has in performing an act.
 - ii. Built-in function or aim which specifies certain activities.
4. AGENTIVE: Factors involved in the origin or “bringing about” of an object.
 - i. Creator
 - ii. Artefact
 - iii. Natural Kind
 - iv. Causal Chain.

This explication can be the target of much criticism. First of all, as the very definitions of the roles suggest through the use of the word ‘object’ rather than ‘lexical item’, it is difficult to see that qualia roles are indeed a part of a specification of the meaning of a word and not a description of its referent. Even if we assume that Pustejovsky rejects the division between the dictionary and the encyclopaedic meaning, the values he puts forward have little to do with a folk theory of the world, and in many cases would demand a significant scientific knowledge from the language user. Of course, Pustejovsky admits that not all the values have to be defined for

⁴ For examples see Section 2.4.5.

⁵ Qualia structure is a term introduced by Pustejovsky to cover the propositional component of word meaning.

each *lexical conceptual paradigm (lcp)*, but it remains unclear whether the values remain unspecified when they do not apply, or when they are difficult to determine due to a lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker.

1.6. Cognitive semantics.

The theory of cognitive semantics will be discussed here as it has been developed by Langacker (1983, 1991) and also by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987). Both approaches stress the experiential basis of human cognition and reject objectivism. They describe meaning in terms of cognitive structures determined by interaction between a human being and the world but not identical with it. Human cognition influences human perception, hence rendering objective description of the 'real' world impossible. Thus the referential link of lexical meaning is denied any significance.

Langackerian *space grammar*, later renamed *cognitive grammar*, stems from dissatisfaction with the existing models of semantic structure. The criterial attribute model is found inadequate, as it cannot account for the fact that there is no feature of a category all members share, and that there exist members which lack certain criterial properties. Space grammar attempts to reconcile the findings of cognitive psychologists (mainly Rosch) with the description of human linguistic capacities, which should be regarded as an aspect of human behaviour in general. As Langacker puts it: "We can further observe many capabilities figuring in linguistic performance have far broader behavioural significance: memory, problem solving ability, planning strategies, stylistic and aesthetic judgement, and so on. Here too it seems plausible to regard linguistic phenomena as integral facets of a broader psychological matrix" (1983, I: 99).

Space grammar is also based on a criticism of generative grammar, as it denies the autonomy of syntax hypothesis. Langacker believes that it is possible to concentrate on the phonetic shape of an utterance and ignore the semantics and vice versa, but a naive speaker is unable to isolate the syntactic structure from its meaning and pronunciation (1983, I: 35). Moreover, lexicon and grammar are claimed to be based on conventional imagery. The imagery is grounded in the universal human perceptual experience, mainly focusing on space relations (hence the name: space grammar).

This assumption is supported by research in developmental psychology. The forefather of the discipline, Piaget (1970), claimed that human cognitive development is secondary to motor development, and it is through active interaction with the objects in the world that human conceptualisation develops. Although the order of concept development and the assumption that the human brain is a *tabula rasa* at birth have

been questioned and discredited, the contemporary theories retain Piaget's major claim in its weaker form: "whatever innate component we invoke it becomes part of our biological potential only through the interaction with the environment" (Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 10) and representations develop through "interaction with both the external environment and [the brain's] internal environment."

In his attempt to grasp the meaning of linguistic expressions, Langacker rejects neat formalism and advocates an eclectic approach. One of his assumptions is that rules of different degrees of generalisation and lists of expressions (even if they are regular and can be expressed by the rules) coexist in human semantic structure. He also believes that linguistic structures can retain componentiality even if they are usually treated as unitary entries (Langacker 1983, I: 76-98). Space grammar posits the existence of three basic types of linguistic structure: semantic, phonological and symbolic, the latter combining the other two.

Semantic structure is understood as being a realisation of cognitive structure regulated by the requirements of linguistic conventions. The meaning of a linguistic expression is not determined by the situations obtaining in the real world, but by human conceptualisation and interpretation of these situations. The differentiation between encyclopaedic and dictionary meaning is not retained (for arguments supporting this approach see Kövacs 1989), hence the meaning of a lexical item can be related to the entire conceptual system. This assumption cannot be borne out in practice, thus, for descriptive convenience, lexical items are defined by only a portion of linguistically relevant conceptual structure, delineation of which is a matter of degree. Consequently, word meaning can be represented in relation to one or more domains constituting a word's matrix. For example, 'knuckle' can be defined in reference to domain 1: [finger], domain 2: [process of bending], domain 3: [part/whole relation] (Langacker 1983, II: 55).

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), later developed by Johnson (1987), human cognition has experiential bases. The embodied imagination, which plays a crucial role in our understanding of the world is common to all humans, as it originates from their everyday basic experience of their bodies, and is a source of parallels in the semantic mappings of the world. Meaning of words is defined in terms of mental concepts and the structure of the vocabulary reflects human conceptual structure. Lakoff describes the latter in terms of Idealised Cognitive Models: "each ICM is a complex structured whole, a gestalt which uses four kinds of structure principles: propositional structure..., image-schematic structure..., metaphoric ...[and] metonymic mappings..." (Lakoff 1987: 68). He also makes suggestions concerning the principles of linguistic organisation, which consists of the distinction between central and peripheral members, with basic level objects at its centre, conventional mental images

and knowledge about them, image schema transformations, metonymy as applied to mental imagery as well as domains of experience and, finally, metaphors, which map domains to other domains (Lakoff 1987: 110)⁶.

1.7. Conclusion.

The review of the literature on lexical semantics suggests that lexical items should be studied in context, as their meanings reside in their paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations. Words remain parts of a system of interrelated items. The system may be viewed as a semantic field, a semantic representation of a conceptual domain, or a network of concepts. These structures exhibit prototypical effects, so that they may be differentiated into different levels of subordination. The most salient terms constitute the basic level and can be regarded as the central members of a category. The less typical concepts are regarded as the peripheral members of the category. The meaning of a single lexical item can be described in terms of meaning components. The recurrent components shared by the most basic terms structure the lexical field. The members of the same field also share similar syntactic behaviour. New items introduced into the field will follow the syntactic behaviour of the central members. The most salient features of meaning determine metaphoric extensions of a given item. Argument structure and thematic roles of verb arguments should be treated as integral parts of their meaning (they determine collocational restrictions, i.e. syntagmatic relations). The meaning of a lexical item can be regarded in connection with the entire conceptual system, though in a semantic analysis it is more plausible to restrict the investigation to the most immediate relations. The expressive meaning, register, style and dialect of a word influence its collocational restrictions and hence contribute to its meaning.

⁶ An example of an analysis of the concept of 'anger' in American English will be provided in Section 2.3.

CHAPTER TWO APPROACHES TO EMOTIONS

2.1. Introduction.

In this chapter we shall first discuss developments in the definition of the concept of emotion. In the overview of W. James's work the main questions, which are still being investigated within the psychological framework today will be indicated. These are:

- the status of emotions and their categorisation as psychological or social phenomena;
- the universality vs. culture-specificity of emotion, and related to it:
- primitive vs. secondary emotions.

These problems will be discussed in detail in a section devoted to emotions within general psychology.

Section 2.4. will then deal with the treatment of the topic of emotions in linguistics. Here we will concentrate on lexical semantics and omit morphopragmatic (e.g. Dressler-Barbaresi 1994) and pragmatic (e.g. Kryk-Kastovsky 1997) approaches to emotions, since they are beyond the scope of the present work. Finally, the chapter will close with an account of recent investigations into emotions from the point of view of social history.

2.2. The concept of emotion: Its definition and structure.

William James (1913) addresses all the points outlined above. Many of his statements are very insightful and presuppose the fuzziness of the concept of emotion. James does not draw a strict line between emotions and other cognitive processes. For example, he defines "belief" as a psychic state akin to emotion (1913: 283-285). He also concedes that the borderline between emotions, on the one hand, and what he calls instincts, on the other, is fuzzy as well:

In speaking of the instincts it was impossible to keep them separate from the emotional excitements that go with them. (...)

Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well (James 1913: 442).

James classifies romantic love, parental love, jealousy, modesty, shame, emulation or rivalry, pugnacity, anger, resentment, sympathy and fear as instincts. For him, fear and anger, for instance, are instincts of self preservation in the material sense, and he places them in a single category with hunting, the acquisitive, home-constructing and tool-constructing instincts (James 1913: 308). In addition, he stresses that not only is it pointless to try to establish sharp distinctions between emotions and other psychological processes, but also “the internal shadings of emotional feelings ... merge endlessly into each other” (James: 1913: 448).

Perhaps those emotions which are also termed instincts should be viewed, in present day terminology, as being both primary/primitive and universal emotions, as the following passage on the “instinct of modesty” indicates:

... **Everywhere** reserve must inspire some respect, and ... Persons who suffer every liberty are persons whom others disregard. Not to be like such people, then, would be one of the **first** resolutions, suggested by social self-consciousness to a child of nature just **emerging from the unreflective state** (James 1913: 437) [emphasis mine – MF].

James himself uses the term ‘primitive emotion’ and instantiates it with self-complacency, self-satisfaction, rage and pain (James 1913: 307).

A certain contradiction arises when James stresses that the only possible valid classification of emotions is one based on an analysis of their causes rather than their expression, while at the same time he also states that a determinant of a primitive emotion is its physiognomical, or as we would say today, facial, expression.

This brings us to the definition of emotion. According to James, emotions can be excited by objects, in a general, ontological, sense of the word, which are the foci of instinctive (both innate and acquired) interest for a given species such as the prey of the species or its food, enemies, sexual mates and young. The triggers of emotions can be either related to those four basic groups or to self-preservation and self-satisfaction in a wider sense.

Finally, James attempts to define emotions (in his own terms “coarser emotions”)

within a physiological theory of emotions:

... Our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of the term. Rapture, love ambition, indignation and pride, considered as feelings, are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily sensations of pleasure and of pain (James 1913: 467).

The ‘coarser emotions’ are distinguished from the ‘subtler emotions’, which he defines as “the moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings” (James 1913: 468), and which do not find any bodily expression, but are “genuinely cerebral forms of pleasure and displeasure” (James 1913: 468). With this mention of the moral aspect of certain emotions, he introduces the problem, often addressed in present day emotionology, of the moral bases of emotional evaluation of situations.

Despite the insistence on calling his definition “physiological”, James points to the fact that emotions are both bodily and mental in their nature. Other psychologists, such as Wundt (1912/1924) and Solomon (1977), regard emotions as basically mental phenomena. Some, notably Watson (1919), consider emotion as behaviour, or, eventually, as a strictly physiological activity (Wenger 1950).

These atomistic approaches were soon discredited as not allowing a holistic approach to emotional experience, and led to all inclusive definitions such as Izard’s (1972: 51): “... emotion is a complex process that has neurophysiological, motor-expressive and phenomenological aspects.” Unfortunately this is too general and allows one to label all human experience: ‘emotion’.

On the other hand, empirically oriented psychologists, disillusioned with the lack of progress in establishing an acceptable definition, resorted to operational definitions, equating emotions with galvanic skin response (GSR) and similar concepts, which are, however, of no use in lexical semantics.

Those who persisted in a conceptual analysis of the nature of emotions discovered that emotions can be studied on three bipolar scales: pleasure-displeasure, dominance-submissiveness and the degree of arousal (Kurcz 1976; Russel and Mehrebian 1977). These writers claim that the three dimensions can be regarded as “necessary and sufficient features to describe a large variety of emotional states” (Russel and Mehrebian 1977: 291). They also believe that the three scales are independent of one another. This is disputed by Krzeszowski (1997: 180ff) who stresses that the most primary and salient scale is the positive-negative (good-bad)

scale and that all others are derived from it. He points out that dominant, high arousal and pleasure can be generalised as positive; submissiveness, low arousal and displeasure as negative. He convincingly argues for the primacy of the positive-negative scale throughout his book (cf. Inchaurrede 1997, who also supports this view). These two conflicting stands can be reconciled within the framework of Langackerian cognitive grammar. In developing his theory of conceptual domains, Langacker (1983, I: 78) claims that although some structures are innate and serve as input into cognitive operations, the results of these operations i.e. the secondary structures can in time become internalised to an extent that they are no longer perceived as consisting of functions on input structures, but as non-divisible entities, thus becoming "primary" secondary structures. (This view is also supported by neuropsychological research. Luria (1966) reports that new experiences reshape the human brain and nervous system.) In this way the three scales used for the description of emotions can be seen as mutually uncorrelated despite being developmentally derived from the basic axiological scale.

The three dimensions can be used to structure the semantic field of emotion, although they must be applied with caution. Apparently, the degree of arousal does not have to be inherent in an emotion, but can change, depending on contextual factors, as indicated by the discrepancy in the results of the two studies conducted by Russel and Mehrebian (1977: 290):

In the first study, friendliness and social affection... both contained small, negative arousal components, whereas in the second study, "friendly" and "affectionate"... both contained high arousal components.

Russel and Mehrebian solve the problem by concluding that friendliness is an emotion for which the degree of arousal is not perceived as a determinant and hence can occur with both high and low degree of arousal.

Surprisingly, a similar discrepancy appeared with the pleasure-displeasure scale. Russel and Mehrebian, however, decided to dismiss "aggression", the problem term, as an emotion term, rather than question the validity of the scale. Taking into account that they analysed 151 terms, this exclusion of the problematical item seems a sound decision.

With the discovery of prototypicality effects (Rosch 1973a and b, 1975, 1978), psychological research into the nature of emotions began to utilise the new theory. Fehr and Russel (1984), for example, argued for a prototype-based definition of the concept of emotion. In a series of psychological experiments they showed that the

concept has fuzzy boundaries and exhibits prototypical structure:

... the concept of emotion [appears] at the topmost, or superordinate, level. At the middle level might appear such familiar types of emotion as anger, fear, love happiness, sadness and the like... [and] less prototypical emotions as pride, envy, courage, lust. Each middle level category might be further subdivided at a subordinate level: anger subdivided into wrath, annoyance, rage fury, and indignation; fear subdivided into apprehension, panic dread, and alarm; love divided into filial love, romantic love... (Fehr and Russel 1984: 467).

They further argue that "... membership in the concept of emotion is a matter of degree ... and no sharp boundary separates members from non-members" (Fehr and Russel 1984: 464). Hence, as with all gradable concepts, the lexical field of emotion may not be analysed exhaustively, since language users will disagree on the membership of non-prototypical examples.

Fehr and Russel also claim that the idea of primary/basic/fundamental emotions which recurs in much of the psychological literature may originate in the existence of prototypical emotions at the basic level. Still, despite their significant saliency in a given social community, they are culture specific. Furthermore, they may vary in degree of basicness/prototypicality and the group membership.

According to Fehr and Russel (1984), and Bullock and Russel (1986), the categorisation and labelling of novel emotions as representative of a given type is performed on the basis of their resemblance to idealised concepts (what Abelson 1981, calls scripts; Lakoff 1987, Idealised Cognitive Models; Langacker 1983, abstract domains or, in his earlier works functional assemblies; and others variously refer to as frame, scenario, schemata). These idealised concepts consist of prototypical causes, appraisals of situations, physiological reactions, feelings, facial expressions, actions, and consequences (Bullock and Russel 1986: 210). The source of these concepts is the folk theory of emotions adhered to by the members of a given speech community. Naturally, there is individual variation in what stimulus triggers an emotion and what emotional display the bearer of the emotion will employ.

Emotional display, as well as the conceptualisation and categorisation of emotion, like any socially shaped phenomenon, is culture-specific (Geertz 1959; Lofland 1985; Lutz 1988; Heelas 1996; Omondi 1997). Moreover, some researchers question even the universality of the emotion concept as such, since there are languages that do not have a cover term for the field, or to put it in a different way, they do not recognise mental states as separate from physiological reactions or social behaviour (Lutz 1988 on Ifaluk; Omondi 1997 on Dhoulo). Specific terms for emotions are

embedded in a language culture, and reflect the moral and ethical values of the community. (Heelas 1996; Stearns and Knapp 1996; Krzeszowski 1997; Omondi 1997).

However, linguists working within the field theory of semantics combined with componential analysis have suggested that the general term for a field may, but need not be, lexicalised in a language. For example, Coseriu (1967) pointed out that an archilexeme is not always realised lexically, and Lyons (1977), when devising an abstract model of a hierarchically organised vocabulary, left the beginning node unlabelled to indicate that: "the vocabulary, and indeed any particular part of it, may be structured hierarchically from a point which itself is not associated with an actual lexeme" (Lyons 1977: 297). The lack of a label for a lexical field, then, does not necessarily deny its existence, as the unity of the field is determined by its internal dimensions, a notion used both in lexematics (Geckeler 1988) and cognitive psychology (Russel and Mehrebian 1977), which organise its structure and its semes/features which, in turn, account for the non scalar content of words.

2.3. Emotions in general psychology.

The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a new surge of interest in emotions. Some of the main issues addressed by the researchers follow the tradition going back to James, although the emphasis has often been shifted to less well-investigated problems. For example, the question about the existence of universal emotions is now often rephrased as a question concerning what exactly universal means, and what degrees or types of universality can be expected of emotions.

Secondly, with the development of cognitive sciences, another popular issue has become the question of the degree, to which emotions are mental, and hence partly conscious phenomena, as opposed to purely instinctive reactions developed by the species to speed up reaction times and avoid the time-consuming mental processing of stimuli.

The final issue mentioned in this section will be the development of emotional behaviour in children. This discussion will aim at determining to what degree one can talk of the acquisition of a socially shaped system as opposed to the development of an innate system. An answer to this question may shed some light on the other two.

2.3.1. Universality vs. culture-specificity of emotions.

One of the questions psychologists have been trying to answer is whether basic (universal, primitive) emotions exist. The issue raises much debate. Averill (1994a

and b) claims that the question itself does not have much validity, as it is not emotions themselves that might be basic but the concepts that aid our understanding of emotional states. He points out that if we take prototypical emotions as the basic ones, their basicness should only be understood as the basis for identifying new members of the category and not endowing these specific emotions with any fundamental import (thus anger, fear and grief should not be regarded as of more weight for the understanding of human emotional system than pride, hope and guilt). He also notes that concepts which may be termed basic at a more general level of categorisation (e.g. anger as a label for all aggressive behaviour) cease to display this feature at a more specific level (anger as opposed to anxiety, rage, ire, fury and exasperation). The use of the same label at two different levels of classification causes confusion when the issue of basicness is addressed, hence it is beneficial to dispose of the notion of basicness altogether. The last argument Averill puts forward is based on the fact that emotions can be viewed as complex phenomena consisting of several levels of description such as biological, social and psychological. Different emotions can be considered basic depending on the perspective one employs. This choice, however, is arbitrary and does not have much validity. To put it succinctly, Averill believes that "because an emotional concept is basic within some classification scheme, it does not follow that the corresponding emotion is somehow more fundamental than other emotions" (Averill 1994a: 7). What this approach emphasises is the disparity between emotions as such and the human construction of emotions. It follows from this observation that hypotheses about conceptualisation and the linguistic labelling of emotions may not hold for the descriptions of emotion per se undertaken from, for example, the physiological perspective. Averill (1994c) restricts the role of biology to providing humans with a capacity for emotions, but the realisation or instantiation of emotion is culture-driven. He draws a striking parallel between language and emotion:

The capacity for language is a biological adaptation; but any specific language (English, say, or Chinese) is the product of social, not biological evolution. Similarly, emotions presume biological capacities, but any specific emotion (anger, say, or *liget*) is the product of social, not biological evolution (Averill 1994c: 269).

Scherer (1994a) emphasises the fact that the verbal labelling of emotions reflects only the conscious part of the emotion system and may focus on one of its aspects, for example, the evaluation of the situation, expression, or action tendencies. He also notes that verbal labelling plays an important communicative and evaluative function in social interaction.

Shweder (1994) avoids giving a straightforward answer to the question of the existence of basic emotions, stressing that present research is not sufficient to address the issue. He views emotions as complex narrative structures which make our emotional experience meaningful and help individuals to understand their position in the world. He suggests that different cultures may share certain universal components of emotion scripts, such as the relation between the ego and its environment, with subcomponents such as status loss and status gain, success and failure, protection and threat, blocking of the goal, and novelty; bodily reactions, for instance fatigue and agitation; behavioural strategies like attack, withdrawal, hiding, confession, repair. The idea of emotions as narrative structures has been further developed in linguistic research by, for example, Bamberg (1997a and b, see 2.4).

Levenson (1994) also addresses the problem of the universal vs. culture-specific status of emotions. He advocates a biocultural model. According to this model emotions arise from interaction between the organism and its external and internal environment. In the first stage, the stimulus is appraised in relation to the organism's well-being, long-term plans and immediate goals, and a prototypical emotion concept is identified. At stage two, the prototype determines response strategies. Cultural learning influences both the appraisal of the situation and the choice of expressive behaviour.

Ekman (1994) observes that there might exist certain universal antecedent events eliciting emotions, and suggests the following cause-emotion pairs:

An actual or threat of harm for fear. The loss of an object to which one was attached for sadness. An event that is either unexpected or contrary to one's expectations for surprise. Something that is repulsive, to the senses or to one's beliefs, for disgust. Disapproving or feeling morally superior to someone for contempt. For anger we suggest five antecedents: frustration resulting from interference with one's activity; a physical threat; an insult; seeing someone do something that violates one's values; another person's anger directed at oneself. For happiness we suggested four antecedents: sensory pleasure; excitement; praise; relief when something unpleasant has ceased (Ekman 1994: 146-147).

Ekman does not say, however, that actual instantiations of stimuli for emotions may differ from culture to culture, since the value of objects, beliefs, morality, and the definition of unpleasantness, which all appear among the triggers, are culture specific. This may question the validity of the proposed, allegedly universal, stimuli. Scherer (1994b), unlike Ekman, phrases his claim for universality in more cautious terms: "Emotion antecedent situations are *both* universal – with respect to many structural

characteristics – *and* culturally specific – due to differences in values, practices, history, interaction patterns, demography, climate, economy, and social structure" (Scherer 1994b: 175, his italics). Whereas Ellsworth (1994a) notes that what might be cross-culturally universal is whether the stimulus evokes a positive or negative response and not a more specific emotion. This view is supported by research in developmental psychology which suggests that infants do not differentiate between complex emotion categories, but can only categorise emotions as negative or positive (Dunn 1994).

2.3.2. Emotions as cognitive phenomena.

The issue of the link between emotion and cognition has also met with significant interest. Clore (1994) defines emotion as a mental state, so that for him the role cognition plays in emotion is substantial by definition. This definition, however, excludes concepts such as 'abandoned' since this refers to an external situation rather than to a mental state, 'tired' as referring to a bodily state, and 'faithful' as not referring to a state at all. This approach is in an apparent contrast with that of Scherer (1994a), who stresses that in the process of conceptualisation only one of the aspects of emotion, for example the evaluation of the situation, may be the target of verbal labelling. Yet, as evaluation is a mental activity, Scherer's definition can in fact be viewed as complementary to that of Clore, who claims that "good examples of emotion terms do not refer directly to events, bodily reactions, feelings, or behaviour, but to mental events in relevance to all these feelings" (1994: 184). Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988) develop a Cognitive Model of Emotions, in which events, actions and objects are appraised in terms of one's goals, standards and attitudes and result in an emotion. According to Clore (1994: 187),

All emotions can be seen as differentiated forms of ... [the] three general affective reactions – (1) *being pleased or displeased at the outcome of events that are appraised as desirable or undesirable for one's goals*, (2) *approving or disapproving of the actions of agents appraised as praiseworthy or blameworthy with respect to one's standards*, and (3) *liking or disliking the attributes of objects appraised as appealing or unappealing with respect to one's tastes or attitudes* (his italics).

This model underscores the fact that emotion is a part of a larger information-processing system.

Less cognition-oriented psychologists admit that cognition plays some role in

producing emotion, but allow also for instinct-based emotional reactions. Cognition is necessary to assign a label to the emotion and "the realisation of a name undoubtedly changes the feeling, simplifying and clarifying" (Ellsworth 1994b: 193).

2.3.3. The development of emotion concepts in children.

Developmental psychology has also contributed to the understanding of emotion. The early researchers suggested that the expression of emotion is innate and can be observed already in very young infants. This hypothesis has met with subsequent qualification (Dunn 1994): although infants do have quite an array of facial expressions, they are used indiscriminately, so that all the categorisation that infants seem to be capable of is distinguishing between positive and negative stimuli, whereas specific emotions appear as a result of their social development. Infants as young as 10 months recognise and interpret their mother's facial expression to guide their own reactions (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde and Svejda 1983; Bodor 1997). They use the technique of social referencing as a help in deciding on their behaviour (approach or withdrawal) when exposed to a new situation. It seems, however, that all that infants can actually infer is the negative vs. positive factor⁷.

In the process of socialisation human infants learn how to organise, categorise and interpret emotions of the self and other, and become an adult of a specific culture (Geertz 1959; Bullock and Russel 1986). Children between 2 and 4 years of age start to associate expressions with the context in which they occur and, simultaneously, acquire the language of emotion. Gradually they impose a temporal dimension on events and eventually construct generalised scripts for the categorisation of emotional behaviour (social dimension) and emotional experience (psychological dimension).

Camras (1994) suggests that two aspects of the emotion process change as a result of a child's psychological development: the appraisal of the antecedent situation, and expressive behaviour, both of which are culture-dependent. Only with the development of these do a child's emotions become more discrete and clearly interpretable. The language of emotion facilitates the categorisation of emotional states and allows a child to participate in the shared cultural concepts of emotion of their particular world" (Dunn 1994: 355).

The development of emotion concepts is not finite. It does not lead to an acquisition of a fixed taxonomy of emotion, but should be viewed as a constant process of conceptualisation and labelling of human experience. Yet linguistic expressions of emotions should not be viewed as mere labels of inner states. They

⁷ On the basicness of the positive-negative axiological scale see also Krzeszowski 1997.

allow evaluation of the emotional situation and enable the bearers of emotion to control their reactions and express them in a socially meaningful way. As such they should be understood as performative devices in the Austinian sense (Bodor 1997; Bamberg 1997a). In this context it must be stressed that the causes of an emotional display must be transparent to the decoder to reinforce the correct interpretation (Bodor 1997; Oller and Wiltshire 1997).

2.4. The linguistic approach to emotions

Most linguistic research on emotions, with the notable exception of Diller (1994), has been devoted to modern data. Wierzbicka (1988a and b, 1992, 1993, 1996) has carried out large amount of cross cultural research into emotions as well as presented a coherent system for the description of selected emotion words in English. Bamberg (1997a and b), dissatisfied with the Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach developed by Wierzbicka, has suggested a social-constructionist approach to emotions, which, however, bears considerable similarity to her proposals. Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), later included in Lakoff (1987), have examined the meaning of the concept of 'anger' in American English within the theory of cognitive linguistics.

The fact that emotion verbs require an Experiencer theme has attracted the attention of generativists, who have researched the syntactic behaviour of what they call psych-verbs in great detail. From their work only that by Jackendoff (1990) and Grimshaw (1990) will be presented below.

2.4.1. Emotions in historical linguistics.

Diller (1994) has made an attempt to capture the meaning of *anger* and related words in Chaucer using a schema developed by the cultural anthropologist White. Diller (1996) develops a scenario for the consistent study of emotion terms in which he emphasises the importance of the cause of emotion, the expression of emotion, and the social aspect of emotion (is it individual or shared by others?). He also tags them with positive or negative value. His analysis accentuates the consequences of variation in the distribution of terms across literary genres.

2.4.2. Emotions within Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

Wierzbicka (1992, 1993, 1996) has also carried out research into emotion terms. She rejects the claim that there are basic emotions and emphasises rather that they are culturally embedded. She suggests that even the emotional interpretation of

facial expressions is not universal but culture-specific. That is, even if some facial expressions are cross-culturally similar, the labelling of the emotion they are believed to express will impose an interpretation that is dependent on the culture and language of the 'face-reader'. She agrees, however, that the components of emotions may be universal, but warns against equating a single component with the emotion, which is a complex mental concept. She proposes that emotion concepts should be described in terms of "prototypical scripts or scenarios, formulated in terms of thoughts, wants and feelings" (Wierzbicka 1992: 539) and posits the following frame for the description of emotion terms:

X feels something
 sometimes a person thinks something like this:

 because of this, this person feels something
 X feels something like this

(Wierzbicka 1996: 182).

This proposal stresses the role of cognition 'think' in the interpretation and labelling of our emotional experiences (cf. Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988; and Clore 1994).

As Wierzbicka's major research concern has been to devise a culture-independent tool for semantic analysis, she insists that definitions of emotion terms should be explicated in terms of her NSM (Natural Semantic Metalanguage). The lexical primitives of NSM, Wierzbicka believes, are sufficient to describe the meaning of emotion concepts. Nevertheless, it seems to me that although they can indeed serve the aim of finding what is universal in human emotions, they allow only for the most general categorisation of emotions along the three continua: positive-negative, degree of submissiveness, and degree of arousal (Russel and Mehrabian 1977); or, as Wierzbicka would have put it: I feel something good – I feel something bad, I want to do something – I don't want to do anything; and I want to do something – I want to do something very much. The finer distinctions of meaning cannot be satisfactorily reduced to semantic primitives, and attempts to do so would produce very long and awkward definitions. Wierzbicka's method seems to be a very useful analytic tool for a cross-cultural comparison of general terms, emotions included, but may not be equally adequate for developing a detailed analysis of a semantic field.

Wierzbicka also claims that the lexical primitives of NSM are indefinable not

by virtue of being the primitives of her theory but because they are "intuitively intelligible and self-explanatory" (Wierzbicka 1993: 5), and should be understood as the building blocks of the language of thought. This claim seems rather difficult to defend as an analysis of the following example attempts to prove:

- I am angry >
 (a) I think something like this (of someone)
 (b) this person did something bad
 (c) I don't want this
 (d) I want to do something because of this
 (e) I want this person to feel something bad because of this
 (f) when I think this, I feel something bad

This analysis corresponds to a considerable extent to that proposed by O&T [Ortony and Turner 1990] (although the fact that they don't use the standardised semantic metalanguage prevents any precise comparison).

Component (a) in the explication above indicates the presence of a thought (O&T appraisal); (b) indicates a negative evaluation of something that someone (or a personified machine, such as a car or a washing machine) did (cf. O&T reference to "the agent who is blamed for what has happened"); (c) and (d) indicate the experiencer's active attitude" (O&T resolve to take some action, to remove the source of goalblockage); (e) corresponds to O&T's "desire or a tendency to aggress against the agent"; and (f) shows that experiencer's attitude is an emotion, that is that it includes a feeling that is causally linked with the appraisal of the situation (Wierzbicka 1993: 12).

In this excerpt Wierzbicka is comparing her definition with that of Ortony and Turner (1990), using natural language to mediate between the two. Hence the definition of the word 'anger' appears in three different translations. It is quite clear that the NSM definition might be a useful tool for cross-cultural comparison with their translational equivalents, such as the Ilongot word 'liget', the Ifaluk 'song', and the Yankunytjatjara 'pika' (see Wierzbicka 1988a and b), and this is certainly an advantage it offers over the other definitions. It is hard to see, though, how, or indeed if, it is superior in facilitating the understanding of the definition, i.e. it is a self-explanatory language of thought. After all, when we formulate our thoughts and give them linguistic expression, it is not in the NSM, but in the language or languages we can actually speak. For a semanticist to use the NSM one must learn the primitives and how to operate them and reduce thoughts to NSM. This, it seems to me, needs as much training as translating natural language into any Logical Calculus, and hence NSM is

no more “intuitively intelligible and self-explanatory” than any other formalised language used in semantic explications.

2.4.3. The linguistic constructionist approach to emotions.

Bamberg (1997b) devises a linguistic-constructionist approach to emotions in which he concentrates on the role the expression of emotion plays in constructing discourse, and emphasises the fact that this construction is aimed at arousing empathy in the audience, in a sense, to secure their co-operation. Analysis of data from experiments with four groups of children (mean age for each group: 5;2, 6, 7;3, 9;1) led him to formulate the following “grammar of being angry” in the first person genre:

(i) a highly individuated agent... and a highly individuated undergoer; (ii) marking the action as highly transitive (often elaborating on visible or otherwise empirical effects of the action); (iii) positioning the ‘I’ as the experiencer and the target of the action in the direct object slot; and (iv) the ‘other’ (the agent) in subject slot (Bamberg 1997b: 328).

This contrasts with the “grammar of being sad” in the first person genre:

(i) positioning the ‘other’ in subject position, ... accomplishing the construct of inagentive happening [for example]

it was when I was about 5 or 4 years old
my biggest sister got into a car accident
so she died
because of a car accident
and I was really sad for a few weeks

... (ii) positioning the ‘I’ in the subject slot, accomplishing the construct of an undesired state, as in example (10):

(10) I was in Charlton
and I moved to Worcester
and I couldn't see my neighbours and their dogs (Bamberg 1997b: 328)⁸.

Bamberg notes that although anger is more complex in its discursive function because it aims at both winning empathy and allocating blame (sadness is aimed only at eliciting empathy), the linguistic construction of sadness is more complex than that

⁸ The examples provided by Bamberg are the narratives children constructed as one of the tasks in the experiment.

of anger since it employs a non-prototypical sentence structure with a weakening of the topical focus.

The construction of both these emotions in the explanatory genre differs from that in the first person genre in being more detached and hence without an explicit attempt at passing a moral judgement on the ‘wrongdoer’. The accounts provided by children in the explanatory genre, it must be noted, are strikingly similar to the schemas in NSM (Natural Semantic Metalanguage) suggested by Wierzbicka. Compare, for instance:

you are angry at someone
because they did something to you
and you didn't like
what they did

(Bamberg 1997b:330)

and

Anger
X feels something
sometimes a person feels something like this:
this person did something bad
I don't want this
because of this, I want to do something
I would want to do something bad to this person
because of this, this person feels something bad
X feels like this (Wierzbicka 1992: 569).

As can be seen, the phrasing and the structure of the framework elicited by Bamberg from American children in the psycholinguistic experiment coincides with the definition frames developed by Wierzbicka. That his results should support her claims is particularly ironic in the light of Bamberg's criticism of Wierzbicka: “one is left wondering whether Wierzbicka's rather undertheorised view of the cognition-language relationship has anything to contribute to how people in actual discourse settings talk...” (Bamberg 1997b: 314). Wierzbicka's definition includes an element of revenge absent from the definition in Bamberg, but she herself stresses (1992: 569 s. note 9) that anger calls for further investigation since it is not clear whether “the angry person wishes that ‘something bad should happen’ to the target person or rather that the target person should ‘feel bad’”.

Bamberg also discusses the status of dual or simultaneous emotions and comes to the conclusion that "it is the verbal account that gives rise to the illusion of the actual possibility of holding more than one emotion at the same time" (Bamberg 1997b: 320). Such an account of emotions presupposes that they are clear-cut categories, so that two or more distinct emotions can occur simultaneously or, as argued by Bamberg, sequentially. However psychologists working on the human categorisation of emotion claim that emotion categories overlap to a large degree and have fuzzy borders (Bullock and Russel 1986: 206). If this is the case, the confusion of emotion terms on the part of younger children, as well as descriptions of dual emotions which Bamberg believes "cannot be derived from two concurrent feeling states" (1997b: 320), are not so much a result of the "linguistic ability to view a situation for two discursive purposes" (1997b: 320), but a consequence of the fact that emotions, like many abstract concepts, escape easy categorisation. Reports of simultaneous emotions seem to be yet another piece of evidence of human attempts to impose order on the surrounding chaos – attempts to classify and label the variety of experience in a systematic way by means of language. These attempts aim at reducing human psychological states to the rigours of linguistic expression, and as is the case with any reduction, they leave a residue of the inexpressible. This residue forces the speaker to use different discourse techniques to convey as much as possible through the linguistic channel.

Bamberg has also found that younger children think that to equate being sad with crying is a sufficient definition of the emotion. He is convinced that this is due to the fact that the cause of emotion is less clear to younger children, or, to put it in other words, the link between the stimulus of the emotion and the labelling of the emotion is more difficult to determine than the link between the label and the emotional display connected with it. An interesting question arising from this interpretation is whether the fact that children have bigger problems with perceiving the first link than with perceiving the second, is cognitively-based or results from the type of linguistic input provided by their caretakers. It could be the case that the input takes the form of "Why are you crying? Are you sad?" (the display-label link explicitly accentuated) more often than "Why are you crying? Has your brother taken your toy?" (the cause-emotion link expressed). Further research would be needed, of course, to show this.

2.4.4. Cognitive semantics and emotion concepts.

Lakoff (1987) has also tested his cognitive linguistic theory of the Idealised Cognitive Model in the field of emotions. One of the first analyses conducted within

this framework was an analysis of the concept of 'anger', which was conducted together with Kövecses and published as a chapter in Lakoff (1987)⁹. The analysis starts with a presentation of the folk theory of anger which describes anger in terms of its physiological effects, such as body heat, increased internal pressure (blood pressure, muscular tension), agitation and impairment of accurate perception (Lakoff 1987: 381). This folk model leads to a series of metonymies for anger, for example:

Body heat:

They were having a heated argument.

Redness in face and neck area:

She was scarlet with rage.

He got red with anger.

Agitation:

She was shaking with anger.

He was quivering with rage.

Interference with accurate perception:

She was blind with rage.

I was beginning to see red.

These metonymies result in a central metaphor ANGER IS HEAT which, when applied to fluids, is specified as ANGER IS HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER and when applied to solids as ANGER IS FIRE. For instance:

ANGER IS HEAT:

Billy is a hothead.

Don't get hot under the collar.

ANGER IS HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER:

You make my blood boil.

She was seething with anger.

⁹ The full analysis of the concept was first published in Kövecses (1986).

ANGER IS FIRE:

He was blazing with rage.

She was going to flare up in anger.

The metaphor ANGER IS HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER is also related to a more general metaphor BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS, as indicated by the following examples:

He was filled with anger.

She couldn't contain her joy.

The ANGER IS HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor can be further analysed into the following schemata for mappings:

Source: Heat of fluid in a container Target: Anger

ontological correspondences:

The container is the body.

The heat of fluid is anger.

Explosion is loss of control.

and many others (for a detailed analysis see Lakoff 1987: 380-415). These correspondences can be related to stages of the anger scenario, which consists of the Self (= the experiencer of the emotion), the wrongdoer, the offending event, retribution (= anger) and an attempt to control anger.

Apart from the central metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, the anger scenario is also understood in terms of other, peripheral metaphors such as:

ANGER IS INSANITY:

She was raving mad, when she heard about it.

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT

She was fighting to control her anger.

ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL

He unleashed his anger.

The above analysis suggests that the Idealised Cognitive Model of anger in American culture consists of the scenario of anger, conventional mental images of the

physiological effects of anger, metonymies based on these physiological effects, and a system of metaphors which are derived from such domains as HEAT (with the subdomains HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER and FIRE), INSANITY, STRUGGLE and DANGEROUS ANIMALS.

This approach is of significance to all sciences attempting to describe the human conceptualisation of emotion, as it attempts to examine and pinpoint the metaphors in terms of which humans are trying to make sense of their emotional experience. These metaphors can shed light on the inferences humans make about emotional states, as these inferences depend on the system of metaphors a person employs to enhance their understanding of the situation.

Unfortunately the method was designed to deal with larger chunks of discourse, i.e. idioms, and can be used in lexical semantics only in so far as a given word actually appears in idioms. In this case the determining of metaphoric mappings and source domains can enhance the description of the meaning of the word.

2.4.5. Verbs of emotions as experiencer verbs.

Verbs of emotions such as *like*, *fear*, *please*, and *frighten* have also been of interest to researchers coming to the area from the perspective of generative grammar. These psych-verbs, together with verbs of intellectual judgement such as *regard*, *concern*, *worry*, and verbs of physical force in their abstract meaning e.g., *strike*, are all subsumed under the term *experiencer verb*, as they all exhibit a similar argument structure with the experiencer role in the specification. According to their syntactic behaviour these verbs may be divided into two groups: one places the Experiencer in the oblique position, as in the case of *please*, *fear* and *strike*; and the other places the Experiencer in the subject position, as in the case of *like*.

Jackendoff (1990) proposes to regard the Experiencer as Patient. This allows him to analyse these verbs in terms of an *action tier* (Agent-Patient differentiation). Experiencer in the oblique position is understood as the person affected by the State or Event, while in the subject position it is understood as a person reacting to a stimulus. Jackendoff suggests a set of three parameters for the definition of these verbs: the position of the Experiencer; the affect/reaction differentiation; and the State/Event differentiation. Both affect (AFF) and reaction (REACT) can assume one of the three values: positive (e.g., 'like'), marked as "+", negative (e.g., 'fear'), marked as "-", or neutral (e.g., 'strike'), marked as *n*. This proposal can be instantiated with the following analysis (Jackendoff 1990: 141):

- (44) a. X pleases Y. [State AFF+ ([x], [y])]
 b. X displeases Y. [State AFF- ([x], [y])]
 c. X (suddenly) frightened Y. [Event AFFn ([x], [y])]
 d. X strikes Y as crazy. [State AFFn ([x], [y])]
 e. X matters to Y. [State AFFn ([x], [y])]
- (45) a. Y likes X. [State REACT+ ([y], [x])]
 b. Y fears/hates X. [State REACT- ([y], [x])]
 c. Y regards X as crazy. [State REACTn ([y], [x])]

Jackendoff stresses the fact that the action tier was initially developed for the analysis of force-dynamic verbs, e.g., 'hit', 'throw', 'enter', and was subsequently extended to logical verbs and psych-verbs. This suggests that both the force-dynamic verbs on the one hand and the logical and psych-verbs on the other share similar structural configurations in conceptual structure. This, in turn, may indicate that humans tend to understand their internal, psychological lives in terms of less abstract physical relations¹⁰; in Jackendoff's words: "verbs of logical relation express an abstract form of force-dynamic interaction, not too distantly related to verbs that express pushing around things in space" (1990: 141).

Grimshaw (1990) suggests that the assignment of the Experiencer to different positions in a sentence depends on the verb's aspectual properties. She divides Experiencer verbs into two classes: the *fear* class, in which the Experiencer is mapped onto the subject position; and the *frighten* class, in which the Experiencer is mapped onto the oblique position. She proposes the following aspectual and thematic analysis for these two classes:¹¹

(a) Psychological state (fear class)

(Exp (Theme))

1 2

e.g. Children fear darkness.

(b) Psychological causative (frighten class)

(Exp (Theme))

2 1

e.g. The storm frightened the children.

¹⁰ This thesis has also been elaborated by cognitive semanticists in terms of experientialism (see Lakoff and Johnson 1981 BODY AS MIND metaphor, further employed by Sweetser 1991).

¹¹ The example sentences are mine.

(c) Agentive psychological causative (frighten class)

(Agent (Exp))

1 2

e.g. Bill frightened the children.

The syntactic analysis of Experiencer verbs suggests that they can focus on one of the two perspectives of an emotional scenario: one when the attention centres on the experiencer of the emotion; and another when the attention focuses on the cause of emotion, be it a personified Agent or a nature-related Theme.

2.5. The historical approach to emotion.

The basic premise assumed by historians dealing with change in emotions is that emotions can be regarded as social as well as psychological phenomena. A purely psychological vantage point was most usually assumed by historians concentrating on writing biographies, who often stressed the universal nature of feelings underlying human behaviour at all periods in history, so as to facilitate the understanding of historical personages by modern readers. On the other hand, historians who deal with social rather than biographical history tend to focus on change in emotions. In fact, attempts to analyse emotions from a socio-historical perspective are a relatively recent endeavour, so that practitioners of this discipline have found it helpful to postulate a dichotomy between what they call emotional experience and emotionology. Stearns and Stearns (1988: 7) claim that "it becomes increasingly obvious that emotional standards – what the editors [i.e. Stearns and Stearns] have urged be labelled "emotionology" – change more rapidly and completely than emotional experience does". Emotionology is here understood as the set of beliefs, scenarios or folk theories shared by a community about the meaning and role of emotions. These beliefs are tightly linked to the values the community adheres to such as emotions and value judgements about other people, objects and the position of the self in the world. These judgements are reciprocally related to emotions as emotions affect value judgements and are, in turn, affected by them. With historical changes in the economic and social structure of a society, the nature of relations between people and the hierarchy of values they recognise also undergo a change. The change in socially approved values and roles available to community members influences the perception, apprehension and cognitive structure of emotional scripts.

Carol Stearns (1988: 57) points to a major shift in the construction of the role of the self in emotions which took place during the Enlightenment. According to her, early modern society (late 16th and 17th c.) was characterised by a pervasive sense

of uncertainty concerning satisfaction of even the basic life sustaining needs. The Enlightenment brought an increasing belief in the power of humankind and its ability to discover order in the surrounding world and, eventually, to control this order. This view contributed to a gradual change in the perception of the relation between feeling and behaviour. Emotions ceased to be regarded as uncontrollable passions, and it slowly became a responsibility of experiencers to control their emotions.

Gillis (1988: 89) stresses the importance of describing the emotions of our ancestors in terms in which they themselves would have understood them and of avoiding a modern bias (cf. Wierzbicka's emphasis on a culture-independent perspective in emotionology). He also discusses the issue of the independent status of the concept of emotion addressed by Lutz (1988) and Omondi (1997), and suggests that:

...early modern people were less likely to make the distinction between action and feeling. It would not have occurred to them to dig deep into the emotions. "Feeling" still meant both physical and internal sensation; and, at a time when medical authorities made no sharp distinction between psyche and soma, anger and love were seen as having an actual physical presence in the "cold stare" or the "warm embrace".... Love was treated more like a script than a drive, something to be negotiated, acted out, worked on, with a public as well as a private dimension (Gillis 1988: 90-91).

In his research on the concept of love and its expression, Gillis discovered that in the 16th and 17th c. the predominant view of love was one of mutual co-operation and physical sharing. It was expressed in such courting and wedding rituals as the mutual exchange of gifts and jumping the petting stone¹² performed both by the groom and the bride. It was the peers and not the family that played the main role at a big wedding, where ritual joking and teasing were an outlet for the emotional tension brought about by the removal of any single person from the pool of eligible mates.

The new concept of ideal love and a quiet wedding which no longer involved the whole community, but only a small circle of family and invited friends, emerged with the new, bourgeois division of labour and the new role it assigned to women. As men became the sole breadwinners, the idea of co-operation between the future spouses weakened and was slowly replaced by the active role of the male suitor as opposed to the passive role of the woman, who was no longer allowed active participation in the courting ritual. This led to a subsequent idealisation of women in

¹² The petting stone was a barrier, such as a stone or a stone or wooden bench, placed in the door of the church or in the church gates symbolising the first obstacle that the newly-weds had to conquer together after their marriage.

the middle and upper classes. As these women yielded to the socially enforced ideals of passionless purity, they often became rather passionless wives. Their husbands would seek the satisfaction of their sexual desires with lower class women, further reinforcing the bourgeois separation of "true love", understood in terms of pure emotion, from sexuality, defined as physical lust.

Peter Stearns (1988) analyses the change in the perception of sibling jealousy that took place in the early 20th c. The emotion is largely disregarded in parents' manuals of the 19th c. If it appears at all, it is subsumed under the heading of anger, or lack of obedience or generosity on the part of children. The label *jealousy* appears only with reference to the feeling that might appear among adolescents, e.g. when two brothers are courting the same girl. The idea of sibling rivalry for maternal love does not constitute a problem till the 1920s, when it becomes a major issue in child-rearing manuals. P. Stearns stresses, however, that the feeling itself does not originate all of a sudden with the beginning of a new century. It is evident in 19th. c. letters. What changes is the social apprehension of the emotion. With the increasing popularity of Freudian psychology, any negative strong feeling experienced in early childhood is viewed as a potential destructive force for future adult life.

The findings of C. Stearns, Gillis and P. Stearns emphasise the relationship between the general outlook on life prevalent at a given time and the construction and understanding of emotions. They identify two major forces behind changes in particular emotion concepts. One is change in the economic situation influencing the social structure which affects the perception of the role of self in the society. The position of self and others, and the relationship between them, is one of the defining features of emotions, and when this relationship changes, so does the construction of emotions. The other force is the change in the socially accepted hierarchy of values, which may be linked to socio-economic changes or originate from developments in religion, philosophy or science. Value judgements, as has been pointed out before, are intricately linked to emotions, and a change in the conceptualisation of one inevitably exerts an impact on the other.

2.6. Conclusion.

This chapter has presented research into emotions from a number of different perspectives: psychological, linguistic and socio-historical. Theories presented in these fields often supported one another.

Both psychologists and linguists agree that emotions, or at least their labelling and categorisation, are cognitive phenomena. Wierzbicka's cross-cultural research

supports psychologists' claims that, although the capacity for emotion is universal, particular categorisation, labelling and expression of emotion are culture-specific.

Russel and his associates claim that the concept of emotion is structured prototypically, with superordinate level, basic level (often overgeneralised as universal), and subordinate level categories. The concept is characterised by fuzzy boundaries and overlapping categories, and is organised along three dimensions or scales: pleasure-displeasure, dominance-submissiveness and the degree of arousal. Categories are recognised and labelled according to scripts which consist of, at least, the cause, the behavioural display (facial and verbal expression), the inner state (the feeling), and the physiological reaction (not relevant to linguistics). Classical, feature based lexical semantic approaches can play a role in attempting to define prototypical scripts and in arranging them along the three dimensions.

The idea of prototypical scenarios for emotion concepts has been further developed by Lakoff and Kövacs. They start their analyses by positing a folk theory or scenario of an emotion and then, through an examination of linguistic patterns, go on to discover the metaphoric structure of the concept.

Bamberg emphasises the social role of emotions, as do Bodor, Camras and Dunn.

Jackendoff and Grimshaw concentrate on the role of the experiencer of an emotion, and on the grammatical expression of this role.

Gillis, a social historian, agrees with Wierzbicka on the importance of a culturally unbiased approach to data.

C. Stearns and P. Stearns stress the link between emotions and a society's socio-economic situation and hierarchy of values.

CHAPTER THREE

A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF JOY WORDS IN OLD ENGLISH

3.1. Data and method.

The group of Old English words denoting the concept of 'joy' analysed in this chapter consists of *bliss*, *blīþnes* (*blīþe*), *dream*, *gefeā*, *glædnes* (*glæd*), *liss*, *mirhð* and *wynsumnes*. The choice of the field members is based primarily on those suggested in the *Old English Thesaurus* (henceforth *OET*) under 08.01.01.03 Good feeling, joy, happiness. *OET* gives 17 words as the members of the field core. However, *eadwela*, *estnes*, *fægennes*, *gefeannes*, *gefeohsumnes*, *glīwstæf*, *hyhtwynn*, *reotu* and *gesælignes* appear in rather negligible quantities in the *Microfiche Concordance to Old English* (1-17), which does not allow us to hypothesise about differences in their use and meaning. I have replaced *blīþness* with *blīðe* and *wynsumnung* by *wynsumnesse*, as the second form is better represented in the *MCOE*. I have also supplemented the field with *mirhð*, which, although not present in the *OET* under this heading, occurred in many similar contexts to the other 'joy' words in *MCOE*.

The analysis is based on a careful examination of the collocational patterns of these words. The adjectival phrases into which the joy words enter reveal what attributes are associated with them. Verb phrases answer questions concerning how to achieve joy and what activities it may assist or result from. Nouns which co-occur with the 'joy' words or stand in opposition to them give an indication of what other concepts 'joy' is related to in OE. I do not make any claims concerning the synonymy of concepts. "Relation" is here understood in its weak, cognitive sense.

When dealing with collocations in what follows I sometimes give a number in brackets to signal the frequency of occurrence. These numbers are intended as an indication of dominating trends in collocability. When no numbers are given (often in case of verbs) it means that none of the verbs quoted dominates in the phrases, or

they appear only once or twice. The OE words quoted in the running text and the quotations are in italics. The translations are given in single quotation marks. The source is given according to the abbreviations in the *MCOE*. The translations provided after the longer quotations are mine. The word under investigation is replaced with three hyphens (- - -) in the translations to avoid biased reading of the context. The words in parentheses are those that would appear in a word-for-word translation, but are not necessary for the understanding of the modern version. The words in square brackets are not in the OE original but have been added to the modern version to facilitate understanding. Wider contexts are analysed to posit the causes and experiencers of the emotions, where possible.

The results of both analyses, of collocations and of longer stretches of text, are employed in an attempt to create a general model of the OE concept of joy. An indication will be given of which words are employed to express certain parts of the model most effectively. A hypothesis concerning the conceptual metaphors according to which the model is structured is also offered. In conclusion the relations between the members of the field will be clearly indicated to determine the degree of the overlap of meaning.

I realise that the majority of the extant texts are religious in their nature and, hence, present the conceptual system advocated by the Church. Nevertheless, descriptions of earthly joys also appear, if only to be condemned as undesirable. This negative perspective does not appear in poetry, where, for example in *Beowulf*, the social role of inducing joy is well described. Bearing these reservations in mind, it is thus possible to posit the structure of the concept of joy for Old English. The hypothesis concerning this structure, however, is not claimed to be exhaustive.

3.2. Analysis of words.

BLISS

200 forms of *bliss* (*bliss*, *blyss*, *blis* and the inflected forms) were analysed.

The most prominent sense of *bliss* is that of the heavenly joy achieved after death. In this meaning it collocates with *ece* 'everlasting' (12), *a buton ende* 'endless' (2), *soðlic* 'true' (2), *syngal* 'exceptional' (2), *swiðlic* 'very, strong' (4), *micel* 'much' (13), *on heofonum* 'in heaven', *heofonlice* 'heavenly' (6), *godes* 'God's' (1), *engla* 'angels-Gen.' (4), *halgena* 'saints-Gen.' (3), *gastlic* 'spiritual' (4), *hlæfordes* 'Lord's' (1). It co-occurs with such words as *sibb* 'peace, love, happiness' (4), *liss* 'joy, grace, mercy' (4), *blæd* 'prosperity, happiness' (2), *wynn* 'joy' (2), *lufu* 'love', *gefæa* 'joy', *mærhþ* 'glory', *mirhþ* 'joy, mirth'. It is contrasted with *sorgh* (*sorh*)

'sorrow', *sar* 'suffering', *unrotnes* 'sadness'. People experiencing *bliss* (*brucan* 'enjoy') receive it from God (*becuman* 'get', *begitan* 'get'). God bestows it on people (*gifan* 'give', *bringan* 'bring', *gegearcian* 'prepare'), brings people to it (*gelædan*), or takes it away (*ascirian* 'separate'). People themselves can either earn it (*geearnian*) or lose it (*linnan*) through their conduct, for example,

ða wearð heora bliss awend to ðan mæstan sare: for ðan heora ... sorh bið endeleas
'Then their - - - turned to the greatest pain, therefore their sorrow will be endless' AC
Hom I 15.222.24

for þi is nu selre cristenum mannum þæt hi mid earfoðnyssum and mid geswince
geearnian þæt ece rice and þa ecan blisse mid gode and mid eallum his halgum
'Therefore it is now better for Christian men that they with earthly suffering and hardship earn this eternal kingdom and everlasting - - - with God and all his Saints'
AECHom I, 19 270.2

we ... sceolon herian urne drihten on eallum þam ðingu þe he for ure lufe gefremede
us to alyssednyssse and to ecere blisse 'we should obey our Lord in all things, that he for the love of us committed us to redemption and eternal - - -' AECHom I, 2 44.1.

Heavenly *bliss* is strongly contrasted with the hardships and sorrows of life on earth and, especially, with the joy aroused by bodily pleasures, as in:

... ne sio hehste blis nis on þam flæslicum lustum 'the highest - - - does not lie in bodily desires' Bo 33.74.20.

Nevertheless, *bliss* may be caused by some earthly experiences, such as somebody's arrival, return or travel:

æfter þysum gecyrde ypolitus to his hame and mid godes blisse his hiwan gecyste
and hi ealle gehuslode 'after this returned Hypolitus to his home and with God's - - - kissed his family and administered to them the sacrament' AECHom I, 29.430.30.
Maurus ða ferde mid mycelre blisse and his gefarad samod to Francene rice 'Then Maurus rode with much - - - together with his companions to the Kingdom of the Franks' AELS (Maur) 90.

Bliss may also arise from singing:

sungen mid mycelre blisse 'sang with much - - -' AELS (Eugenia) 35.

Bliss also co-occurs with gratitude:

He þancode þa gode mid gastlicra blysse 'Then he thanked God with spiritual - - -'
AELS (Basil) 454.

It may be expressed in words (*clyppodan mid blysse* 'talk...', *cweþan mid blysse* 'speak...', *talian mid blysse* 'tell, pronounce ...').

Bliss also collocates with *beorht* 'bright' (3) and *hluttur* 'light' (1).

BLIÐE¹³

200 examples of *bliðe* were analysed.

Bliðe as a religious emotion falls into the familiar pattern displayed by other joy words in this sample. In this meaning it collocates with such verbs as: *lædan* 'lead' (2), *gelædan* 'bring to', *gefæran* 'go, experience', *gefindan* 'find', *on bliðe wunian* 'to live on - - -', *eardian* 'inhabit', and *forlætan* 'lose'. The only intensifier *bliðe* collocates with is *swiðe* 'strong, very' (16). Phrases with *unendlice* 'never ending' and *heofonlice* 'heavenly' are rare. This emotion may arise in people departing from this life:

... & heo sona unforhte & bliðe underhnigon ... deað þurh þone heo ne tweodon ferende beon to þæm ecan rice heora sawla. 'They soon unafraid and with - - - underwent death because they did not doubt their souls were going to the eternal kingdom' Bede 4.18.308.24.

Nevertheless *bliðe* seems to be linked predominantly with earthly experiences. It results most often from social interaction such as meeting somebody, talking (7) and hearing good news:

Ða se halga egidius geherde þæt he wunede on swylce life eal swa he self wilnode an to drohtnigenne, þa wearð he swa bliðe þæt he cleopode þone godesmann and gecyste hine myd mycelre lufe. 'Then Saint Egidius heard that he lived such a life that he himself always wished to lead [literally: dwell together, convert to], then he was so - - - that he embraced this good man and kissed him with much love' LS 9 (Giles) 96

...Constantinus þa þis gehyrde, he sona swiðe bliðe forlet a leohtfatu, þe he behwearf,

¹³ *Bliðe* is here interpreted as a label for a "state of being *bliðe*".

& hrædllice nyðer astah & þone ceorl beclypte & mid swiðlicre lufe ongann mid his earmum hine clyppan & cyssan & him swiðe þancian. '... when Constantine heard that, he [was] soon so - - -, that he left the lantern he was carrying and came hastily down and embraced this man with much love and took him in his arms and kissed him to thank him very much' GD 1 (H) 16.46.27.

These two quotations also indicate that *bliðe* can be expressed by kissing and embracing people. It can also be accompanied by laughter and a characteristic facial expression (*bliðe anwlitan*). This is the only description of the social expression of joy. Analyses of other words did not contribute much to this element of emotion. They suggested that 'joy' is associated with a characteristic facial expression, but did not give any details.

Other situations from which the state of being *bliðe* arises are finding a wife, return, or seeing somebody dear, return home, a victory, feasting or music. For example,

Se casere þa and ealle wæron swiðe bliðe his ongeancymes 'The emperor and everybody else were - - - on his return' LS 8 (Eust) 292,

... hie bliðe wæron forðon siges ... '... they were - - - because of the victory...' LS 13 (Machutus) 28.12.16,

... he wolde swyðe lytel drincan, þeah he mid gebeorum bliðe wære. 'he wanted to drink little, though he was - - - with beer' Leof 23,

& bliðe mode heo sang on þæm cantice 'and with - - - heart he sang the song' Hom U 18 (BIHom 1) 54.

The returning-home motif reappears in the collocation *bliþe ham* ' - - - home', where joy is attributed to its source rather than the experiencer.

Bliðe co-occurs with such other emotion and emotion-related words as *fægenes* 'joy', *myrhð* 'joy', *gefean* 'joy, symbol', *feast*, *eadignys* 'prosperity' and *milde* 'meek, mild'. Gratitude is also associated with *bliðe* (*mid bliðe þancian* 'to thank with - - -').

An interesting construction in which *bliðe* appears is the one describing persons as the sources of *bliðe*, for instance, *lareow bliðe* ' - - - teacher' – Christ, *bliðe þingestre* ' - - - maiden' – Virgin Mary¹⁴.

¹⁴ Bliss also enters into this construction as in *blisse drihten* ' - - - lord' – God.

DREAM

167 examples of *dream* and its inflected forms have been analysed.

Dream is often used in religious contexts, where it refers to an eternal (*ece*, *unhwilen* (13)), heavenly (*heofonlice*, *on heofonum*, *þæs heofonlican lofes* (9)), holy (*halgig* (6)), perpetual (*singal* (2)) emotion experienced primarily by God (*drihtlic*, *Godes*, *dryhtnes* (5)), the angels (*engla* (5)) and the holy ghost (*haliges gastes* (1)). Christ's followers, such as saints (*halige menn*) or priests (*se heofonlic þegnung* 'those in the heavenly service') may join God's noble retainers (*dugub*) and obtain (*agan* (7)) this privilege:

heo mid wuldorcyninge wunian moton ... agan dreama dream mit drihtne gode
'they with the glorious king to live will be allowed ... (will) obtain the - - - of - - - with the Lord God' (Sat 309).

The experiencers of this emotion are mostly passive: they obtain it (*agan* (7)), *forgifan* (1)), *dream* is created or sent by God (*sceopan* 'create', *delan* 'distribute', *onsendan*), in one case: *wodan dream*, it is sent by the devil. People may be guided towards it (*lædan* (2)), or, rarely, they can ascend to it through their own suffering (*aspringan*). The 'heavenly' *dream* may be bestowed on the meek, but it may also be taken away (*bedalan* (4), *bidreosen* (3), *biscyrian* (2), *beniman* 'deprive' (1)) from those who turn away from it (*ahwerfan* (1)).

To lose the 'heavenly' *dream* is easy, as the border between the acceptable earthly *dream* (*eorþan* (5), *woruld* (2) 'worldly', *eorþlic* (1) and the doomed *dream* (*læne* 'sinful, transitory' (3), *tealt* 'unstable' (3), *dol* 'foolish') of the hell-dwellers (*hellenweras* (2)) is not clearly indicated. For example, the unspecified earthly pleasures of the next passage bring those who had enjoyed them to hell:

Hie þære snytro so gelyfdon lytle hwile, oðþat hie langing beswac eorðan dreamas eces rædes, þæt hie æt siðestan sylfe forleton drihtnes domas, curon deofles cræft
'They, who believed for a short while in the true wisdom, until the weariness, earthly - - - overcame the eternal wisdom, so that they themselves finally abandoned God's laws, chose the devil's power' Dan 28.

Even the same author can use *dream* with contradictory senses:

Ofgiefep his þas eorþan wynne, forlætep þæs lænan dreamas, ond his wiþ þam lice gedæleð
'He resigns from earthly joy, rejects transitory (sinful) - - -, and parts with

the body' Guth A,B 2.

Oþer him þas eorþan wynne, læne unter lyfte ond þa longan god herede on heofonum, þær haligra sawla gesittað in sigorwuldre dryhtnes dreama 'Besides him the earthly joy transitory under the sky and the eternal god, the hearer in heaven, where the souls of the holy ones sit in the triumphant glory of the Lord's - - -' Guth A,B 119.

However, if we accept Menner's (1945) claim that contradictory senses rarely, if ever, coexist synchronically, then we would have to posit that it was not so much the *dream* itself which had contrasting senses, but rather that it was so general that it did not carry any value judgements, which were determined instead by modifiers. This lack of a definite identity of *dream* may reflect the medieval dichotomy between body and soul introduced by the Christian thinkers of the period between the 7th and 12th centuries (Le Goff 1997: 131-150) and evident in the quotation below:

Swa tealte syndon eorþan dreamas, and swa todæleð lic ond sawle 'So unreliable (unstable) are the earthly - - -, and so separate the body and soul' Hom S 40.3 (McCabeVercHom 10) 323.

Dream also has the sense of 'music' and appears in this meaning in 17% of quotations, for example,

... Daid mid his hearpan, and þone heofonlican dream, ealle singende, þæt seo sawul gehyre heora ealra stemma... 'David with his harp, and the heavenly - - -, all singing, that the soul could hear the voices of them all' AE Hom 28 70.

In some cases it is difficult to ascertain whether *dream* means 'joy' and the noises accompanying the festivities or music proper, as in:

þæt he dogora gehwam dream gehyrde hludne in halle, þær wæs hearpan sweg, swutol sang scopes 'that he each day heard the loud - - - in the hall, there was the sound of a harp and the clear poet's song' Beo 88.

Such cases may suggest a link between joy resulting from music, which accompanied many feasts, and the merry noise of a feast itself.

Summing up, *dream* carries a meaning of 'joy' unspecified for moral judgement and hence used both in reference to spiritual joy and bodily pleasures. It has a secondary sense of music.

GLAEDNES

Only 31 examples of *glædnys* (*glædnesse*, *glædnys*, *glædnysse*, *glædnis*) appear in the *MCOE*. The hypothesis about its meaning has therefore been additionally supported by an analysis of the related adjectives *glæd* in its different spellings and inflectional forms, *glædmod*, and the deadjectival noun *glædmodnesse*, which all together add further 61 examples.

In 18% of cases the adjective *glæd* is used in the meaning 'bright, shining'. For example:

sunne up on morgentid... glad ofer grundas 'the sun up in the morning time ... bright over the earth' (Brun 10);

glæd seolfor 'shining silver' (Gen A,B 27 19);

glæd mid gold 'shining with gold' (Rid 63 1).

It retains its visual aspect in such collocations as *glæde onsiene* '- face' (3), *glæde anwlita* '- face' (2), *glædmod on gesihþe* '- face', *glæd hiw* '- appearance', *heo ær gladu wære on to lociende* 'earlier they were to - - - look at'. In this context *glæd* may be translated either as 'bright, radiant, beaming' or 'radiant, beaming with joy' or, finally, 'joyful, happy'. The last translation is further supported by the exchangeability of *glæd* with other joy words, such as *eadwela*, *bliss*, *wynsumlic*, *wlitig*.

Glædnes seems to be related semantically to *blæd* 'prosperity, enjoyment' and *þancnung* 'gratefulness'. *Glæd beon* is often a result of receiving gifts, both material, as in,

Beo wiþ Geatas glæd, geofena gemyndig 'Be - - - with the Geats, mindful of gifts' (Beo 1173),

and more abstract, such as profound understanding:

Him mæg beon þe glædre his hearte, þe he sum þing herof undergyte 'His heart may be the - - -, when he may understand some of this' (Byr M 1 (Crawford) 114.28).

It is also a reaction to receiving an invitation or good news. The sense of gratitude may also be coloured with the feeling of willingness as in:

... *ða gyngran mid ealre glædnysse hyrsumion heara [þes ylðrana] hæsum* 'the youth with all - - - obey their [elders'] orders' (ChrodR I 80.33).

Glædnes is expected to assist good deeds, such as helping the weak, giving presents or making sacrifices:

And seo clæne lac, þæt is mægðhad, sceal beon Gode mid glædnysse geoffrod, na mid neadlunge ænigre hæse. 'And this chaste gift, that is virginity, should be offered to God with - - -, and not under a compulsion of any order' AEHom 20 50.

In this sense *glædnys* may be interpreted as generosity or willingness and is regarded as a desirable feature in a leader.

Ongan þa duguþa hleo, glædmod gode leof, geongran retan, ... 'The lord of the nobles, - - - loved by God, began to comfort the young ones, ...' Guth A,B 1061.

The meaning of generosity is further supported by collocations with the verb *sellan* 'give'.

Furthermore, *glædnes* appears among the eight Christian virtues:

Donne syndon eahta healice mægnu þurh Godes mihte mannum gescypte: ðæt is rumheortnys & sylfærnys, clæennes & modwærnes, glædnes & anrædnys, sybgeornes & edmodnes. 'There are the eight holy virtues assigned to men through the power of God: generosity and moderation, purity and meekness, - - - and diligence, the love of peace and humility' WHom 10 65.

In this sense it goes together with *smyltnes* 'tranquillity, peace', contrasts with *costnung* 'temptation', and carries overtones of peacefulness, which is most pronounced when *glædnysse* emerges from sleep.

The last source of *glædnes* is the down-to-earth pleasure of drinking:

& siððan hi of beoderne gan drincan innan heora fyrhuse tuwa oððe þriwa locahu þonne seo gesetnis vel glædnysse beo, huru þæt þær druncen ne rixie. 'And then they began to drink in their warm house twice or thrice, see how then there is will or - - -, at least that the drunken ones do not rule' ChrodR I 34.12.

However, *glædnes* appears only once in this context.

GEFEA

200 examples of *gefea* were analysed.

Gefea in its religious sense often collocates with *bliss* (21), *heofonrices* 'heavenly kingdom's', *heofonlice* 'heavenly', *engla* 'angels', *hlæfordes* 'Lord's' (together 10), *micel* 'much' (19), *ece* 'eternal' (30), *lang* 'long' (4), *soðan* 'true' (4), *æ* 'divine law' (5), *sib* 'peace, love, happiness' (7), *rest* 'rest' (4) and *lufu* 'love' (4). These collocations indicate that *heofonrice gefea* is an everlasting (*ece*), intense (*micel*) feeling, related to peace (*sib*), love and rest (*lufu*, *sib*). In this meaning it contrasts with *unrotnys* 'sadness' (11), *untrymnys* 'weakness' (2), *sar* 'sorrow' (2), *þistru* 'darkness' (2), *woruldsorg* 'worldly sorrow' (1), *adl* 'illness' (1) and *wite* 'torment' (1). The opposition between these two groups of feeling is repeatedly employed in a prevalent discourse pattern, where the positive experiences that will be bestowed upon the righteous in heaven are contrasted either with earthly hardships or, less frequently, with the punishment which will be wrought on the followers of the devil:

swa swa crist forseah: for þan ðe we gewilniað þat we rice beon on his rice on þam næfd adl ne untrumnyss ne unrotnyss ne deað nænne stede: ac þær is ece sælð and eadignys gefea buton ende mid ecum welum 'as Christ renounced, we want that we are strong in rank in his kingdom where we will not have [suffer from] disease or weakness or sadness or death in any place: but there is the eternal dwelling and happiness, - - - without an end with eternal prosperity...' ACHom I, 31 460.11.

ond on þam ecan life þe æfter þysum cymð bið þam rihtwisum forgifen rest and gefea, und þam unrihtwisum þa ecan wita 'and in the everlasting life which comes after this life will the righteous be granted a mild [quiet] rest and - - -, and the unrighteous [will suffer] the eternal torture' AELS (Cecilia) 149.

Dar bið lif butan deape & god butan ende & yld butan sare & dæg butan nihte; and þær bið gefea buton unrotnesse & rice butan awendednesse 'There is life after death, welfare (good) without end and old age without suffering and day after night and there is - - - without sadness and the kingdom [of God] without change' HomS4 (FoerstVercHom 9) 150.

The verb phrases in which *gefea* appears indicate that it may be a goal of human desires (*gefea habban willan* 'desire', *tohopian* 'hope for'). It may arise from a man's experience such as miraculous healing of the sick or being saved from evil (*aweaxan* 'awake', *aspringan* 'rise to', *ariran* 'lift up', *astigan* 'move up to'). A person may be filled with *gefea* (*gefullian*) or led to it by God (*gelædian*, *faran*).

God gives it (*gifan*) to those who follow him, but the unrighteous will be deprived (*beniman*) of it or will have it destroyed (*forwyrcan*):

þa mæsse preostas beoð þonne on unriht awende from Gode; and heora ellen beoð gebrocene; & heora bliss & heora liss bið eall to tælnesse geþeoded; and heora gefea gewiteð & forwyrðeð 'these clergymen turned away from God to sin, and their zeal wore off, and their [religious] joy and their learning are all liable to reproof, and their - - - departs and vanishes' HomU6 (FoerstVercHom 15).

People can come to *gefea* (*cuman*), find it (*gemetan*), enjoy it (*brucan*) or simply have it (*habban*).

Gefea may also be induced by such earthly experiences as the birth of a son:

and þin wif Elizabet þe gebereþ sunu, ... & þe bið þonne hyht & gefea 'and your wife, Elisabeth, will bear you a son, ... and you will have happiness and - - -' LS 12 (NatJnBat) 75.

The birth of Christ, the saviour (*hælend*), also awakens *gefea*, but of a more abstract nature. This more abstract feeling may appear already on earth and remains related to religious experience as in:

he us fægran gefes bringe ofer þa niþas þe we nu dreogað 'he will bring us the beautiful - - - after the hatred that we now suffer' Guth A,B 46
& *hig gebiddende hig gehwurfon on Hierusalem mid mycelum gefean* 'and having prayed they turned to Jerusalem with much - - -' Lk(WSCP) 24.52.

Gefea also results from success, such as finding somebody, or victory in war, as in:

... se casere com to Rome mid sigefæste gefean & mid blisse 'emperor came to Rome with victorious - - -' HomS I (VercHom 5) 67.

It may also be caused by somebody's return, by giving help, a wedding or another festivity. Finally it may refer to unspecified, but condemned by the Church *unnyte gefean* 'vain - - -'.

The collocations of *gefea* with *leoht* 'light' (14), *beorhtness* 'brightness' (4), *torhtness* 'brightness' (2) and *wlite* 'light' indicate that light as opposed to darkness is an important element. It seems that the sight of light may enhance positive feelings.

Gefea is also strongly related to the concepts of prosperity and reward. It co-occurs with *med* 'reward' (3), *eadignys* 'prosperity' (3), *lean* 'reward' (2), *giefu* 'gift' and *wela* 'prosperity' (1).

LISS

Liss appears only 57 times in the *MCOE*. Nevertheless, the existing collocations allow us to posit certain suggestions concerning its meaning.

Like other joy words *liss* in its meaning of religious joy appears supported by the presence of *bliss* (4), as in:

æghwylc ælda bearna forlæte idle lustas, læne lifes wynne, fundige him to lissa blisse, forlæte heteniþa gehwonne sigan mid synna fyrnum, fere him to þam sellan rice 'each of children of men should abandon vain desires, the joy of this transitory life, and aspire to the bliss of - - -, should abandon wickedness accompanying the crimes of sin, should conduct him to this happy kingdom' Orw 98.

In this sense it collocates with *biddan* 'ask, pray', *sohtan* 'seek', *standan* 'uphold, continue', *lengdan* 'lengthen', *lean* 'reward', *lifigend* 'living', *liffrean* 'the lord of life'.

However, it seems to co-occur with *lufu* 'love' (6) more often than with *bliss*. It then collocates with such words as *þancan* 'thank for' (3), *lænan* 'grant, lease', *miltse* 'mildness, favour' (2), *arstæf* 'favour'. In this use *liss* tends to mean 'mildness, favour, grace', as indicated in the following examples:

ac him næs getipod þære litan lysse 'but him [Lazarus] was not granted this small - - - [of getting a drop of water]' AECHom I, 23.330.28
þæt ic þe hneaw ne was landes and lissa 'that I was not mean to you in lands or - - -' Gen A,B 2824.

In some cases it is difficult to determine whether *liss* should be interpreted as 'joy' or 'mercy' as in:

þæt he þær brucan mot wonges mid willum, and welan neotan, lifes ond lissa, londes frætwa, oppæt he þusende þisses lifes, wudubearwes weard, wintra gebideþ 'that he was allowed to enjoy the world with delight, and make use of wealth, life and - - -, the riches of the land until he lived thousands of winters, the protector of tree groves, endured winters [years]' Phoen 147.

Lifde siððan and lissa breac Malalehel lange, mondreama her, woruldgestreona. 'Then lived Malalehel and long enjoyed - - -, the joy of men in this life, this worldly wealth.' Gen A,B 1175.

I would be inclined to suggest that such indeterminate occurrences indicate the link between the two senses, so that a person who enjoys life's favour also experiences joy.

MIRHÐ

138 examples of *mirhð* were analysed. The following spellings were taken into account: *myrhð*, *myrihð*, *mirhð*, *murhð* and the related adjective *murig* (*myrig*).

Mirhð often appears in strongly religious contexts, where it enters patterns similar to *bliss* and other joy words. It collocates with *heofonan* 'heaven's' (16), *heofonlice* 'heavenly' (9), *micel* 'much' (11), *ece* 'eternal' (38), *neorxena wanges* 'of the fields of Paradise' (3), *mid Gode* 'with God' (4), *mid halgum werum* 'with holy men' (3) and *bliss* 'bliss' (15). It appears in verb phrases with *libban* 'live' (3), *wunian* 'live' (5), *mid myrhðe onwunian* 'continue'. One can be led into *heofonlice mirhðe* (*lædan* 'lead' (2), *gelædan* 'bring to' (5), *faran* 'conduct' (2)), travel there (*siðian*) or enter it (*becyman into* (6)) and be surrounded by it (*behalban*), as in:

þæt hi ætsomne siðian moston of ðisum earfoðnyssum to ecere myrhðe 'so that they must travel together from the hardships of this earth to eternal - - -' AECHom II, 10 90.317.

God prepares the *mirhð* for his followers *gegearwian* (4) and *gegearcian* (2); *mirhð* is considered as a reward (*lean*, *edleane*, *med*) God will give (*forgifan* 'give', *sellan* 'give') if they earn it through their conduct on earth (*geearnian* (14)):

...us sylfe mid godan geþance on worde & on weorce wenian to rihte & geearnian þa myrhðe mid Godes fylste þe ðam is gegearwod ðe Gode wel gehyrað & his lage healda þa hwyle þe hy libbað '... we ourselves with good grace in word and deed should get used to the right way of life and earn - - - with God's help, which is prepared for those who listen to God and obey His law while they live' Whom 10c 196.

Those who do not follow God's law will be deprived of *mirhð* (*benæman* 'deprive', *asceafan* 'separate', *adraefan* 'get separated' (5), *forwyrnan* 'deny'

(2), *aweorpan* 'cast away', *ascyrian* 'separate' (2), *gesyndrian* 'separate').

The *mirhð* of this world is by no means comparable to that of heaven:

þeos woruld þeah ðe heo myrige hwilitudum gebuht sy: nis heo hwæðre þe gelicre þære ecan worulde: þe is sum cweartern leohtum dæge. 'this world sometimes may seem - - -, however it is not like the eternal world, it is like a prison to a bright day.' AECHom I, 10 154.16,

as it was created by the devil himself:

Ac þe deofol hæfde þeah mid leasunge þurh his syncrefte middaneardes murhððe & all woruldlice fegernesse togædere æthiwod. 'But the devil had with deception through his sinful skills the - - - of the middle earth [the earth, as opposed to heaven or hell] and all the worldly beauty together misshapen' HomU 1 (Belf 10) 121.

Non-religious contexts, however, do not diminish the role of the earthly *mirhð*. It co-occurs with such words as *sib* 'peace, love, happiness', *lufu* 'love', *mærhð* 'glory' (8)¹⁵, *gesibsumnes* 'concord, peacefulness' as well as the very down to earth *mete* 'food', *gamen* 'games, social activities', *hleahtor* 'laughter' and *rest* 'rest'. These contrast strongly with *hungor* 'hunger', *þurst* 'thirst', *cele* 'cold' and more general *sar* 'suffering', *sorh* 'sorrow', *yfel* 'evil', *gedrecednys* 'torture' and *susl* 'torment'.

Mirhð may arise from music:

þone sang singende ... mid micelre myrhðe þæs mæran dreamas 'singing this song ... with a lot of - - - of this mighty sound' AEHom M8 (Ass 3) 475.

Yet, it is most closely linked with tactile rather than auditory perception, as in:

... and þær wæs micel gærs on ðære stowe: myrige on to sittenne '... and there was a lot of grass in this place, - - - to sit on.' AECHom I, 12 182.11.

It may also be attributed to a place when it seems to mean 'suitable for something':

... and wæs se stede myrig to þam mynsterlife. '... and was this place — to monastic life.' AEHom 8 106.

¹⁵ The relatively high degree of collocability with *mærhð* may have not only conceptual but also stylistic reasons, such as alliteration.

WYNSUMNES

76 examples of *wynsumnes* were analysed.

Wynsumnes appears in contexts which suggest that one of its senses is that of the religious joy experienced in heaven. In this sense *wynsumnes* co-occurs with *bliss* (4) and *gefea* (3) and collocates with *mycel* 'much' (6), *heofonlice* 'heavenly' and *a buton ende* 'endless'. It appears in verb phrases with *faran* (*in wynsumnes faran*) 'travel', *wunian* (*on wynsumnes wunian*) 'live' (2), *libban* 'live', *belædan* 'lead', *geearnian* 'earn' and *gegearwian* 'prepare' and *scypan* 'create' with God as subject. God is regarded as the source of *wynsumnes*, as in:

God us lærð sibbe and wynsumnesse and deofol us lærð unsibbe and wrohte. 'God teaches us - - - and peace but the devil teaches us unrest (war) and hatred' Hom S6 (Ass 14) 111,

... bider com se ordfruma sylf and scyppend eallra wynsumnesse 'thither came the Creator himself and Creator of all - - -' Bede 5 13. 430.22.

Religious experiences in this world can also give rise to *wynsumnes*, for instance,

we magon cuman to þan Easterlican dæge þe aa bið mid fullum glædscipe & wynsumnysse & ecere blisse. 'We may come to this Easter day that has always been with all *glædscipe* and - - - and everlasting *bliss*' ByrM 1 (Crawford) 140.28.

The strongest association that *wynsumnes* provokes, however, is with perception. In this case the meaning of *wynsumnes* seems to be 'so beautiful as to cause joy'. In this sense it co-occurs with *fægernes* 'beauty' (4), and *glædscipe* 'fairness'. The *wynsumnes* of nature may appeal to various senses, such as vision, smell and hearing, as indicated in the following quotations:

Swylce eac swelce þæt leoht & seo biorhtnes þæs blostmiendan felde wæs ... gesewen in ðære stowe wynsumnesse. 'Such was the light and the brightness of this blooming field seen in the - - - of this place.' Bede 5 13.430.22,

þær wearð swa mycclu wynsumnes þæs æþelastan stences tostrognen 'there was so much - - - of the noblest scent spread [around]' GD Pref 4 (C) 15.282.18¹⁶,

¹⁶ This collocation is repeated 11 times. Ten times in the same text, GDPref, and once in Mart.

eal seo eorðe þæs sanges wynsumnesse and ðæs sweges swiðnesse wæs gefylleðo
'all the earth was filled with the --- of this song and the power of this sound' LS 21
(AssumptTristr) 167.

Wynsumnes in the meaning 'earthly joy' can accompany such actions as speaking (*mid wynsumnesse asecgan*) and praising (*mid wynsumnesse herian*).
Wynsumnes also collocates with *gefyllan* 'fill' and *brucan* 'enjoy, experience'.

3.3. The structure of the concept of 'joy' in OE.

The collocational behaviour of the words analysed falls into several recurrent patterns¹⁷. These patterns merge into a number of conceptual metaphors such as UP IS GOOD, BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTION, EMOTION IS A CONTAINER (FOR THE EXPERIENCER), EMOTION IS A COMMODITY.
UP IS GOOD is represented by such verb phrases as

blisse astigan 'rise, ascend to ---'
gefea astigan 'ascend to ---'
wynsumnesse astigan 'ascend to ---'
mirhð astigan 'ascend to ---'
to gefea araran 'lift up to ---'
to gefea aspringan 'ascend to ---'
gefea him upahafan 'he was elated with ---'.

BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTION is demonstrated in:

mid blisse gefyllan 'fill with ---'
mid gefea gefyllan 'fill with ---'
mid wynsumnesse gefyllan 'fill with ---'
mid bliðe affyllan 'fill with ---'
dream bið in innan cwicra wihta '--- will be inside this man's body'
blisse on breostum '--- in heart' (lit. in the breast)
bliðe on breostum '--- in heart' (lit. in the breast)
mid glædre heortan 'with a --- heart'
glæd on mode '--- in mind/heart'

¹⁷ Cf. Kövecses (1990: 153), who suggests that emotion concepts should be viewed as a set of cognitive models, with a prototype in the centre. The prototype is based on conceptual metaphors and metonymies, which are discovered on the basis of an analysis of the conventionalised expressions in the language.

blisse on mode '--- in mind/heart'
bliðe mode '--- in mind/heart'.

The noun phrases in which a 'joy' word collocates with parts of the body such as heart or mind suggest that, although the whole body can be filled with an emotion, there are particular organs which are favoured as seats of particular emotions. Often the names for these organs can later develop secondary meanings related to emotions, as in *cordial greeting* or *hearty laugh*.

The OE word *mod* is particularly interesting in this respect as it is believed to be polysemous and mean 'heart, mind, thought, feeling' (*BT*). The extensions from 'heart' to 'feeling' and from 'mind' to 'thought' follow this tendency. The link between 'heart' and 'mind', on the one hand, and 'feeling' and 'thought', on the other, indicate that, in the conceptual system adhered to at the time there was no distinction between reason and emotion. With the introduction of the dichotomy between the two the word underwent a deterioration of meaning, so that OE *modig* 'proud, courageous' (< 'one who puts his heart and mind into his works') has changed into *moody* 'indulging in moods of bad temper, depression' (*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*).

The EMOTION IS A CONTAINER FOR EXPERIENCER metaphor is supported by two clusters of collocations. One involves motion words which suggests that 'joy' may be regarded as a goal, a space to enter at the end of a journey, for instance,

cuman to blisse 'come to ---'
to mirhð siðian 'travel to ---'
gelædan into blisse 'lead into ---'
gefea ingongann 'enter ---'
in gefea gelædan 'lead into ---'
to gefea faran 'travel to ---'
to gefea cuman 'come to ---'.

Static verbs meaning 'live, inhabit' also suggest that 'joy' is conceptualised as a space to enter and stay in, for example,

on blisse wunian 'to live in ---'
bliðe eardian 'to inhabit ---'
on mirhð wunian 'to live in ---'
on wynsumnesse wunian 'to live in ---'
on mirhð libban 'to live in ---'
on wynsumnesse libban 'to live on ---'.

Sceptics might argue that both the UP IS GOOD schema and the EMOTION IS A CONTAINER metaphor are not so much characteristic of the conceptualisation of 'joy' as such, but rather that they are linked to the conceptualisation of paradise and appear in the context of joy only if it is a 'heavenly joy'. Although I believe that the fact that Christian 'paradise' and 'joy' are concepts which are both assigned a positive value, and occupy the same end of the axiological axis (for arguments see Krzeszowski 1997), which may facilitate a transfer of conceptual metaphors between the two, one should not be regarded as more basic than the other. Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) both stress that one of our most salient experiences is that of our BODY AS A CONTAINER (to fill with food, etc.) and BODY IN A CONTAINER (getting out of bed, into the room, inside/outside the house, etc.). Krzeszowski (1997) develops this idea positing that the primary experience for the CONTAINER schema is that of living in and later leaving the warmth, comfort and safety of the mother's womb. He further claims that

The axiological ambivalence of the schema is grounded in the contradictory values associated with being in or getting out of this original container. On the one hand, we experience getting out of the container as being born and as gaining freedom. On the other hand, getting out of the original container may be experienced as leaving the security of the protective confines of a shelter and as being exposed to various external dangers (Krzeszowski 1997: 142).

I would like to stress that the concept of safety in a container, unlike that of personal freedom, is very close to the Anglo-Saxon mind. Two Old English elegies, *The Wanderer* and the *Deor's Lament*, clearly show that freedom, understood as the lack of personal links, is a source of grief. A lordless person, i.e. one who does not belong to a group of retainers, is suspect and undesirable. Only those who can relate themselves to the leader, those who belong to the group, are allowed to enter the meadhall and enjoy the company and the food and drink. The meadhall, filled

with light and music, provides the desired safety, comfort and rest.¹⁸ It is both a place which is a shelter from fear, war and death, being a seat of a mighty leader, and a hall used for feasts. These two aspects - lack of worry and the merrymaking - are often the causes of joy¹⁹.

The present analysis of 'joy' words has also indicated a strong link between the concepts of 'joy' and 'light'. They co-occur in the following collocations:

hluttur and bliss 'light and ---'
fæger and bliss 'fairness and ---'
beorht and bliss 'light and ---'
leoht and liss 'light and ---'
leoht and dream 'light and ---'
leoht and gefea 'light and ---'
leoma and liss 'light and ---'
gleam and dream 'light, shining and ---'
gleow and dream 'light, shining and ---'
scima and dream 'light and ---'.

Glæd, of all the 'joy' words, seems to be most closely related to the concept of 'light'. One of its senses seems to be 'shining, bright', when it is attributed to the polished surfaces of gold and silver or to sources of light, such as the sun. The concept of 'joy' is not only related to the shining of treasures or to the light (of the sun, or of the meadhall) as opposed to darkness, but it may also be linked to more metaphoric uses of the 'light' concept, as in *faces beaming with joy* (see also the analysis of *glædscepe*). It seems that broad daylight, the meadhall with the firelight reflected in the faces of companions - faces, which might have, in fact, also been lit up with drink - constitute some of the nodes in a network of concepts contributing to the model of 'joy' in Old English.

¹⁸ For details of Anglo-Saxon life and social structure see Girvan 1971, Blumenstengel 1964 and Hill 1995.

¹⁹ I believe that these two components constituted an integral part of the meaning of the OE concept of 'joy' even before the introduction of Christianity. Korn (1932: 101-126) claims that Christianity offered to the Anglo-Saxons a previously unknown joy that did not depend on the passing conditions of life. Although, no doubt, true, this claim seems to overlook the degree to which 'heavenly joy' was modelled on the joy induced by the basic pleasures of the meadhall: fraternity and togetherness with the companions and, most of all, the presence of the safety providing leader. What the Christian missionaries did was not to offer an unknown type of joy, but to extol the ultimate Lord, the king of kings, above all the earthly leaders and offer fraternity with the heroes of the new faith: saints, and the followers of the new leader: angels.

In spite of the fact that impermanence is an often emphasised feature of medieval life, I do not think that before the introduction of Christianity Anglo-Saxons were dissatisfied with the joys and pleasures of the meadhall. The need for eternal bliss had to be created by degrading the joys of this life as evidenced by the depiction of earthly pleasures in the Homilies (for details see the analysis of the religious sense of the 'joy' words in this chapter).

Another positive sensation co-occurring with 'joy' is music. Singing and the sounds of various instruments may be stimuli for *gefea*, *liss*, *bliss*, *bliðe*, *mirhð*, *wynsumnes* and most of all *dream*. In many cases it is difficult to determine whether *dream* is used in the meaning 'joy aroused by music' or 'the sound of music, music' (for more details see the analysis of *dream*).

Other senses that may participate in the experience of joy are smell and the sense of touch. *Swetan stencas* 'sweet smells' are a source of *wynsumnes* and also of *dream* and *gefea*. And grass may be *myrig* to sit on.

The EMOTION IS A CONTAINER metaphor can also be used as a conceptual link allowing for the attributing of 'joy' words to non-animate experiencers, all of them words denoting spaces. For instance, *ðære stowe wynsumnesse*, *bliss on burgum*, *bliðe ham*, *bliðe in burgum*.

Another well developed metaphor structuring the concept of 'joy' is JOY IS A COMMODITY. It is expressed in such collocations as

blisse gifan 'give ---'
dream forgifan 'give ---'
mirhð forgifan 'give ---'
mirhð sellan 'give ---'
glædnes sellan 'give ---'
mirhð gebycgan 'procure, buy ---'
blisse begitan 'get ---'
mirhð begitan 'get ---'
dream agan 'possess ---'
blisse habban 'have ---'
mirhð habban 'have ---'
dream habban 'have ---'
gefea habban 'have ---'
blisse findan 'find ---'
blisse linnan 'lose ---'
on huse blisse healdan 'keep --- at home'
blisse geearnian 'earn ---'
mirhð geearnian 'earn ---'
gefea geearnian 'earn ---'
mirhð leanian 'give --- as a reward'
liss leanian 'give --- as a reward'

mirhð edlean 'give --- as a reward'
edlean and mirhð 'reward and ---'
med and mirhð 'reward and ---'
med and gefea 'reward and ---'
lean and gefea 'reward and ---'
lean and liss 'reward and ---'
geofu and gefea 'gift and ---'.

'Joy' is here understood in terms of a commodity entering an exchange, where it can be given, received, owned, lost or even earned. When earned, it is regarded as a reward for obedience.

When viewed from a more abstract perspective, 'joy' is a feeling associated with bestowing gifts and favours (related to generosity) and with receiving them (linked to gratitude). In both cases it is stressed that giving and receiving must be performed with free will. Although *bliss*, *bliðe* and *gefea* all occur in this context, it is *glædnes* (*glæd*) and *liss* that are most closely related to this conceptual model. (For details see the analyses of these two words).

The exchange of gifts is a very important concept in Anglo-Saxon England as it represents symbolically the existing social relations and social order²⁰. It stresses the reciprocity between the generosity of the lord and the loyalty of his retainers. Both must be performed with free will and, when performed to the satisfaction of both parties, will induce joy.

Gift exchange usually takes place during the feast in the meadhall, which intensifies the feeling of joy. In this image the two metaphors EMOTION AS A CONTAINER and JOY AS A COMMODITY amplify one another. They can also be linked through another conceptual pattern, i. e. emotion is a container – container is space – space is the goal of a journey – journey is work – work to achieve joy – joy as commodity. These two association paradigms suggest that even if a concept is structured by seemingly unrelated metaphors, when these metaphors are fed into images/scenarios it is possible to discover how one can facilitate the understanding of the other.

3.4. The scenario for the concept of 'joy' in Old English.

As indicated in Chapter Two, psychologists suggest that if we view emotions as scenarios, these should consist of: the cause of emotion; appreciation of the situation;

²⁰ See Hill (1995: 85-108 and 140-144).

categorisation and naming of the emotion; reaction to the original stimulus. According to this paradigm, emotions have socio-psychological characteristics in that the reaction display must be performed in accordance with the schemata recognised by a given community (the social aspect), but the stimulus is experienced and decoded on the basis of the personal past.

In an attempt to present the Anglo-Saxon concept of 'joy' the above paradigm may be reduced to cause – emotion (experiencer) – reaction. The psychological processes of stimulus appreciation and categorisation are not of interest in the present work. The reaction, which belongs more to the realm of pragmatics than semantics, is also of limited concern.

The collocability analyses of 'joy' words in Old English suggest the following links between cause and the emotion, i.e. the emotion aroused by the following stimuli would be labelled as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Cause-emotion relationships in Old English.

CAUSE	OE 'JOY' WORD
going to heaven	<i>bliss, bliðe, dream, gefea, liss, mirhð, wynsumnes</i>
religious experience on earth	<i>gefea, wynsumnes</i>
being saved from danger	<i>gefea</i>
return to health	<i>gefea</i>
finding a wife	<i>bliðe</i>
birth of a son	<i>gefea</i>
return of somebody dear	<i>bliss, bliðe, gefea</i>
somebody's arrival	<i>bliss</i>
meeting somebody	<i>bliðe</i>
finding somebody	<i>gefea, bliss</i>
return home	<i>bliðe, dream</i>
hearing good news	<i>bliðe, glæd</i>
travel	<i>bliss</i>
receiving gifts	<i>glæd</i>
gratefulness	<i>gefea, glædnes, liss</i>
generosity	<i>glæd, liss</i>
feast including drinking	<i>bliðe, dream, gefea, glædnes</i>

talking with other people	<i>bliðe</i>
music/singing	<i>bliss, bliðe, dream, mirhð, wynsumnes</i>
pleasant smell	<i>wynsumnes, gefea, dream</i>
pleasant tactile experience	<i>myrige (mirhð)</i>
bodily pleasure of unidentified character ²¹	<i>bliss</i>
victory	<i>bliðe, gefea</i>

The analysis of the cause-emotion relationship and the conventionalised metaphors (section 3.3) most often employed for a given emotion word suggest the following grouping of these words:

GROUP 1: emotions predominantly used in religious contexts: *bliss, gefea, mirhð, wynsumnes*²². The emotions of high intensity (high collocability with *micel* and *swiðe*).

GROUP 2: emotions important for building and sustaining social relations: *bliðe* (also very intensive, but rarely religious), *glædnes, liss* (both closely linked with the generosity/gratefulness patterns), *dream*. *Bliss* and *gefea* also appear in this context, though, at least according to the examined data, their first sense seems to be that of religious experience.

GROUP 3: emotions arising from a perception-related pleasure: *dream* (mainly music, but also smell), *glædnes* (mainly visual), *wynsumnes* (mainly olfactory).

This division is not a strict one. As shown in Table 3.1., almost all the 'joy' words (with the exception of *glædnes*) can be used to describe 'heavenly joy'. Music is almost equally indiscriminate in inducing *bliss, bliðe, dream, mirhð* and *wynsumnes* (5 out of 8 examined emotions). The predominantly religious emotions may also arise from experiences in this life. Nevertheless, I believe that this grouping enables us to emphasise which of the 'joy' words are most closely related to each other, and which of their senses seems to dominate.

As far as the social display of emotion is concerned (the reaction element of

²¹ LeGoff (1997) suggests that in early medieval Christianity bodily sin was understood as all the weaknesses of the body, such as gluttony, abuse of drink, sloth and sexual pleasure. Only later was it narrowed down to sexual pleasure. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the exact nature of the *fleschly lustas* which are a cause of *bliss*.

On pleasure in Middle Ages see also Verdon 1996.

²² Though *wynsumnes* simultaneously belongs to Group 3.

the paradigm), the data analysed allow us to posit the following 'display-of-joy' scenario: joy has a characteristic facial expression; when very intensive, it may be conveyed by kissing and embracing the person involved in the stimulus situation (*bliðe*); it may be accompanied by laughter. Joy may be expressed in words, and in this case it may perform the important social function of strengthening relations in kinship and retainer groups. When joy arises from a gift exchange between the leader and his follower, it creates an emotional bond of mutual dependency between them. To conclude, 'joy' plays an important social role in the Anglo-Saxon world where sharing joy facilitates fraternity and friendship among the warriors, as well as their loyalty to the king.

CHAPTER FOUR THE CONCEPT OF 'JOY' IN MIDDLE ENGLISH

4.1. Introduction: Scope, methods and a general background.

This chapter describes the evolution in the use of seven words continuing from OE and denoting 'joy' and 4 words borrowed from OF with the same denotation. These are *bliss*, *blithe*, *dream*, *gladnes*, *liss*, *mirth*, *wynn* and *cheer*, *delight*, *gainess* (*gay*), and *joy*. The data used in the analysis comes from three major sources: concordances, original texts, and the *MED*. The list of concordances and texts is provided in the bibliography.

When discussing collocability of these words I have used PDE spellings whenever possible. The original spelling is retained in the longer quotations. Then the source is given in brackets. Translations are provided only for the most difficult words and given in single quotation marks. Words in square brackets have been inserted in the quotations to facilitate their comprehension.

As with Chapter Three the analysis consisted of two stages: analysis of collocations and analysis of longer text parts. The first stage allowed us to identify the characteristic syntactic behaviour of the words in the semantic field of 'joy' and show continuity in the use of these words in OE and ME. It also demonstrated that new words entering an existing field follow the syntactic behaviour of the established members²³. The second stage of analysis enables us to posit the causes and means of expression of the emotion of joy. This part of the conceptual structure of 'joy' is closely related to the social life of the period, its entertainments and hierarchy of values. It is therefore important to discuss those changes in social and cultural history most pertinent to my research. For example, with the improvement of living conditions between the two periods, a group of closely linked warrior-companions developed

²³ Cf. the discussion of Lehrer (1974) in Chapter One.

into a royal court. This new social group enjoyed different social activities and shared different social values. In literature, the genre of the epic poem devoted mainly to the life of a brave warrior came to be replaced by romances aimed at entertaining both men and women. The change in topics dealt with in literature testifies to a change in tastes and values of the speech community.

In early Anglo-Saxon society it was the relationship between the leader and his followers that was the focus of social life. The leader was the provider of peace and riches, and the owner or builder of the meadhall, the place for feasts, the dominant entertainment. The joy of his retainers depended on their relationship with the leader. In Anglo-Norman literature, on the other hand, there is a shift of emphasis from the relationship with the leader to the relationship between a man and a woman. Love and sexual fulfilment become an important source of joy. Feasting does remain a major source of joy, but the appearance of new entertainments such as games, tournaments, hunting and hawking, contributes to an increase in the number of its causes.

4.2. Analyses of words.

BLISS

A sample of 200 instances, concerned with religious experience, were chosen out of 574 attested occurrences in *Ancrene Wisse*, *Shorter Poems* and Caxton's *Prose* for an analysis of collocations. The analysis rendered similar results to those for OE. *Bliss* entered adjectival phrases such as *heavenly bliss* (25), *everlasting bliss* (10), *much bliss* (2), *sweet bliss* (3). The EMOTION IS A CONTAINER metaphor underlies verb phrases such as *lead to bliss* (2), *send to bliss* (1), *take into bliss* (2), *bring to bliss* (18), *come to bliss* (3), *go to bliss* (6), *abide/dwell in bliss* (5), as well as prepositional phrases, such as *in/into bliss* (10). Interestingly, this metaphor, and the UP IS GOOD metaphor represented by such collocations as *bliss above* (4) and *up to bliss* (1), have become so deeply internalised in ME that *bliss* has begun being used as a synonym for *heaven*. For example, *Fro blis that we be not exielde* (5.199.6 3) (37) and *to restore to bliss* (2) clearly refer to Adam and Eve's banishment from heaven.

The JOY IS A COMMODITY metaphor is represented by verb phrases such as *have bliss* (3), *give bliss* (3), *find bliss* (1), *grant bliss* (2) and *get bliss* (2).

The OE phrase *bliss drihten* finds its continuation in *King of Bliss* used in reference to Christ and God (6) and *Queen of Bliss* used in reference to the Virgin Mary (7).

For non-religious contexts, a sample of 49 occurrences of *bliss* from Gower's *Confessio Amantis* and Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, *Romaunt of the Rose*, and *The Canterbury Tales* has been examined. In most cases *bliss* in these contexts is brought about by love between a man and a woman. Surprisingly, the same collocations are used in the description of 'worldly joy' as in the description of religious experience, for example: *live in bliss* (2), *dwell in bliss* (1), *send to bliss* (1), *go into bliss* (1), *recover bliss* (2), *bring bliss* (4), *have bliss* (2), *perfect bliss* (1), *sovereign bliss* (1), and even *heavenly bliss* (4), as in

Me thenkth it [the singing of my beloved] is a blisse of hevene (G CA 874);

and at the reunion of lovers, as in

O blisful nyght, of hem so longe isought, ... lat hem in this hevene blisse dwelle, ...
(Ch TC III 1317-1322).

Moreover, a lover could call his beloved *his bliss*, as in

First he gan hire his righte lady calle, his hertes lif, his lust, his sorwes leche, his blisse, ... (Ch TC II 1065-1067).

In OE only Christ could be called the *bliss* of his people.

Although bodily pleasures are condemned in religious writings, and this attitude also appears in the romances, as in *The ende of blisse [of love] ay sorwe it occupieth*; (Ch TC IV 836); the very same bodily pleasure is described as *bliss*, for example,

For joye he hente hire in his armes two. His herte bathed in a bath of blisse. A thousand tyme a-newe he gan hire kisse, and she obeyed him in every thyng That myghte doon hym plesance or likyng (Ch CT WB 1252-1256)

and

Womman is mannes ioye and al his blis (Ch CTNP B 4356).

Literary critics suggest that the conception of the relation between a lover and his adored lady in courtly love, as developed by the Provençal troubadours and later taken up by other medieval writers, is based on the relationship between a feudal follower and his lord. However, although the lady does indeed behave like a lord, putting her knight to trials, the language used to describe the emotion between them

is that of religious writings. It seems that during the period investigated the concept of 'joy' has evolved from the pre-Christian (hypothesised) OE 'joy' of a feast with other warrior-companions, organised by a powerful leader, through Christian OE and ME 'joy of heaven' offered by Christ, regarded as the king of kings, to the joy of the very earthly experience of romantic love and sexual pleasure. The final stage of the development may be either considered as a semantic weakening of the concept of 'joy' or an amelioration of the concept of earthly pleasure and, in particular, love.

An analysis of examples quoted in the *MED* allows us to identify the following causes of *bliss*: returning home, ruling, music, feasting, wedding and being with the beloved, but also a funeral: *þær we hit [Severus' body] sculleð bi-burien mid muchelere blisse* (Lay.Brut. 10437)! This last cause for *bliss* should be understood in the religious context of Christ's teaching (especially the Sermon on the Mount), according to which death is a beginning of a new life²⁴. That also explains the following use:

To þa blisse of my deth daye... (3.124 63).

No wonder that þine blisse ne mei no wiht understonden (1.3 31).

BLITHE

Blithe has much fewer occurrences than *bliss*. It appears 25 times altogether in *Ancrene Wisse* and *Shorter Poems* and is not attested in Caxton's *Prose*. In Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, *Troilus and Criseyde* and *Romaunt of the Rose* and in Gower's *Confessio Amantis* it is attested 21 times.

In religious texts it retains its OE meaning of 'religious ecstasy', which can be caused by, for example, redemption, or a promise of life in heaven. *Blithe* accompanies singing. It co-occurs, too, with *glad* (6) and appears in the phrase *to make somebody blithe* 'to entertain or please somebody'. It also appears in set phrases, such as *be blithe* and *bid somebody blithe*. These fossilised collocations, together with a general decrease in usage, can be regarded as an indication that a word is becoming rare or obsolete²⁵ and increasingly appears only in traditionally used set expressions.

In romances *blithe* results from dancing, singing or a reunion of lovers or their caresses as in:

²⁴ The apparent reversal of positive and negative values in Christian ethics is discussed at length by Krzeszowski (1997: 261-273).

²⁵ *OED* indicates that noun *blithe* is obsolete, and the adjective in the meaning of 'joyous' – rare since the 16th c.

And to the Rose anoon wente I,

And kisside it full feithfully.

Thar no man aske if I was blithe,

Whanne the savour soft and lythe [smooth]

Strok to myn herte ...

(ChRR B 3759-3763).

Blithe appears in set expressions also in this genre, for instance, *bid somebody blithe*, *Be blithe*, *Be glad and blithe* and *Be wroth and blithe*.

The quotations from the *MED* suggest further causes of *blithe*: seeing somebody dear, somebody's arrival, children, good news, favours and feasts. *Blithe* may be expressed by laughter: *þay lauged, & made hem blyþe...* (*Gawain* 1398). The OE link between gratitude for gifts and *blithe* is retained as indicated in such examples as:

Of þis tybandis [grant] was he not blithe (*Trental St. Greg.*(2) 21)

and

The yifte [gift] of al this worldes good Ne scholde have mad hir half so blyþe (*Gower* CA 8.929).

The fact that *blithe* is slowly becoming a dead 'joy' word, appearing mostly in polite expressions, is further supported by the following use: *His barounes bowed hym to, blyþe of his come* (*Cleannes* 1706).

CHEER

MED gives the following senses of *chere*²⁶:

1. (a) The human face; ... the face or presence of God; (b) the face (of a flower, star); surface.
2. The face as expressing emotion, attitude or character; facial expression, mien; (b) *maken chere...* make faces, grimace.
3. A gesture or act indicative of an attitude or intention; (b) outward appearance or show; display (of emotion); insincere show of affection.
4. The way in which one behaves; manner, bearing, behaviour, or an instance of it; ...; polite or courtly manner.
5. (a) Frame of mind, state of feeling, spirit; mood, humour; ... (b) good cheer or humour; gladness, happiness, joy; ... (c) *what chere?* how do you feel?

²⁶ Unlike in case of other words, the *MED* definition has been used to facilitate the analysis, as *cheer*, in the sense of 'joy', appears an insignificant number of times in the examined concordances.

how are you? ...

6. (a) Kindness, friendliness, sympathy, hospitality (as shown a visitor or friend)... (b) *ungodli* - - -, unkind reception or treatment (of a visitor).

7. (a) *maken* (sb.) *chere*, to treat (sb.) kindly or hospitably; welcome; entertain; also to humour, amuse, or flatter (sb.)...

(MED)

MED also suggests the source of the word: "OF *chier*, *cher* (from L *carum*)". The OED entry for *cheer* 'joy, gladness' and the related senses identifies its etymology in the following way: "ME. *chere*, a. OF. *chiere*, *chere* face (= Pr., Sp., Pg. *cara* face): late L. *cara* face, countenance".

Both the etymology of the word and the senses suggest an interesting development of meaning, i.e.:

face → facial expression → gesture → behaviour → state of mind (emotion) → joy
face → facial expression → gesture → behaviour → hospitality → entertain.

Scherer (1994a)²⁷ suggests that an emotion term labelling a certain emotion may refer to only one of the stages of the emotional process: stimulus; assessment of the stimulus; physiological reaction; or social display of reaction. In the case of *cheer*, the label for the display of emotion (facial expression) is first adapted from a general term for face, then develops the meaning 'mood, state of mind', usually positive, and eventually is used to refer to the positive emotion of 'joy'. The development of meaning toward 'hospitality' and 'entertain' seems to be a parallel development. It is quite likely that the relation between these two meanings goes along the lines: 'happy to see a guest' ('joy') – 'hospitable' ('hospitality') – 'willing to share the joy with the guest' ('entertain'). Therefore the most common triggers of *cheer* 'joy' are feasting and social amusements as in:

pey ete & drank & made good schere. (Methodius (3) 765)

and

Of sportis & of chere, And of othir myrthis. (Beryn 202).

In *Ancrene Wisse* and Chaucer's *Boece* *cheer* is used 19 times, always with the meaning 'face'.

In the *Shorter Poems*, *cheer* appears 122 times, mainly with the sense 'face,

²⁷ Cf. Chapter Two.

manner, behaviour' (45%); with the sense 'mood' (14%) when it collocates with *change* (5), *amend* (4) and *comfort* (1); with the sense 'entertain' (5%) and 'joy' (5%); and with the sense 'hospitality, welcome' (4%). The remaining occurrences are ambiguous.²⁸

In the sense of 'entertainment' it most often appears with the concept of 'music', i.e.

Fore to syng and mak good chere (5.79A.7 2);

Streke vp, harper, and make goode chere; (5.419.B.6 2).

In the sense of 'joy' *cheer* co-occurs with such words as *laughing*, *kissing* and *merry*.

In 72 occurrences in Gower's *Confessio Amantis* it appears only twice with the sense of 'joy', collocating once with *lose*. Out of 49 occurrences in *The Canterbury Tales*, *cheer* has the meaning of 'joy' only 3 times, the emotion here resulting from feasting, dancing and a lovers' reunion. In the *Romaunt of the Rose* (22 occurrences), *Legend of Good Women* (16) and *Troilus and Criseyde* (26) *cheer* in the sense of 'joy' appears three times and collocates with *great*, *comfort* and *love*.

DELIGHT

Unlike most other 'joy' words, *delight* is rarely²⁹ used to denote religion-induced emotion. Even in such religious texts as *Ancrene Riwe*, it denotes 'heavenly joy' only 5 out of 17 times. Then it collocates with the expected *buton ende*, *waxen* and the UP IS GOOD related *come up* and *up toward*. 12 times it describes earthly pleasures, such as *blodi delite* (in war or murder), *delite in fleschliche smealles*, *delite in leccherie*, *delite of the stinkinde lust*, *delit of ful [foul] lust*. In the meaning of 'sexual pleasure' it is in apposition with *uuel huue* 'evil love'. All of these receive strongly negative colouring by means of the metaphor DOWN IS BAD, the opposite extreme of the bipolar value axis. This metaphor underlies the phrase *fall to delite*.

In Chaucer's *Boece*, *delight* appears 16 times, only twice in relation to 'heavenly joy', when it collocates with *sovereign*. When *delight* denotes 'earthly

²⁸ This distribution pattern is typical also of the other analysed texts.

²⁹ This claim has been questioned by Prof. Ruta Nagucka in her review of my Ph. D. thesis in the light of the quotations from a 14th c. English mystic Richard Rolle. Having consulted MED which gives 7 examples of the use of *delight* in a religious sense (3 of which come from Rolle) versus 97 examples in the non-religious sense, and OED which does not mention the religious sense of *delight*, I still feel the right to claim that *delight* is rarely used in religious context.

pleasures' it is regarded as sinful and leading to sorrow, as in

But what schal I seye of delyces of body, of whiche delyces the desirynges ben ful of anguissch, and the fullfilyngnes of hem ben ful of penance? How grete seknesses and how grete sorwes unsuffrable, ryght as a maner fruyt of wykkidnesse, ben thilke delices wont to beyngen to the bodyes of folk that usen hem (Ch Boece p 7 1-8).

In this case it falls together with such other pleasures as riches, position, power and glory. It then co-occurs with *myrnesse* and is described as *desceyvable* or *voluptuous*. *Delight* usually receives negative colouring unless it results from singing.

In *Shorter Poems* (12 occurrences) and Caxton's *Prose* (1 occurrence), *delight* is not used with such a negative evaluation. It co-occurs with *pleasure* and *joy* and is used in such phrases as *my heart is set in your delight*, *to do something in/with delight* and *to please is my delight*. The range of causes for delight is widened by love, pleasing others, drinking and fishing.

In the romances (Gower's *Confessio Amantis* and Chaucer's *Romaunt of the Rose*, *Troilus and Criseyde*) and in *The Canterbury Tales* *delight* appears 96 times in the sense of 'joy'. (It also appears three times in the *Romaunt of the Rose* in the sense of 'beauty'). Although *delight* appears with the basic collocations identified for the field of 'joy' such as *to have delight* (15), *live in delight*³⁰, *to be full of delight*, it does not seem to enter into all the structures identified for the OE 'joy' words. It appears in verb phrases, such as *to set chiere* 'face' *at no delight*, *to set upon delight*, *to take delight in something*, *to hasten one's delight*, *to do something for delight*, *to accomplish lust* 'will, desire, fancy' *in delight*, *to do something in delight of one's thought*, *to perform delight*, *to fulfil delight*, *to accomplish delight*. These phrases suggest that *delight* does not arise from an unexpected event like somebody's return, a visit, or good news, but results rather from conscious choices made by the experiencer, who can perform actions which lead directly and immediately to *delight*. These then are actions which are unlike the good behaviour or life in accord with God's law which are first judged by God and only then rewarded with *eternal bliss*, for which, however, one must wait till the Last Judgement and afterlife. Hence, *delight* is extremely rarely used in the meaning of 'heavenly joy'³¹, as indicated in our analyses of the religious and philosophical treatises.

Despite this element of 'will' in the meaning of *delight*, it is often stressed in the texts under analysis that the desire to fulfil one's delight is stronger than reason:

³⁰ Unlike *live in bliss*, which refers to the 'bliss of heaven', *live in delight* refers to 'love and sexual satisfaction'.

³¹ It never co-occurs with *bliss*, which seems to be primarily related to religious experience.

resoun refreyneth nat his foul delit (Ch CT (I) PS 294). In Anglo-Saxon society, 'joy' performed the role of strengthening the bonds created by oaths and the exchange of gifts. Now, it seems that there is a discrepancy between *delight* and *reason*, and that, instead of mutual dependence, one controls the other, as in *And that youre resoun briddelede youre delit* (Ch TC IV 1678).

Delight most often results from sexual pleasure and is synonymous with it. For example *bodily delight*, *foul delight* (3), *fleshly delight* (2), *vain delight* and *burning delight*. It co-occurs with *joy*, *gladness* and *glory*, but not with *bliss*. This and the evidence from verb phrases suggests that, although it may still be regarded as an emotion, it is very close to pleasure and more general goal satisfaction, which, in strict terms, are causes for emotion, sensual or other, and not emotions as such.

Apart from sexual pleasure, *delight* may result from a wide range of various stimuli, such as the familiar acquisition of goods, singing, drinking, eating, as well as the new entertainments, for example, keeping horses, painting. Finally, power, lying, and bloodshed in war or murder could also lead to delight.

An analysis of the examples in the *MED* adds one more source of delight, i.e. one's children.

DREAM

OE *dream* was retained in ME. With the increase in the use of *dream*³² in the sense of 'a vision experienced in sleep', however, *dream* in the sense of 'joy' has become rather rare and neither *OED* nor *MED* give any examples beyond the early 13th c. *Dream* in the meaning 'music, noise, singing' survived a century longer.

The only ME examples of *dream* 'joy' suggest that it could result from feasting or starting a journey. For instance:

Heo æten, heo drunken; dræm wes in burhen (Lay.Brut. 14286);

Ankeres heo updrogen, drem wes on uolken; (Lay.Brut. 25540).

³² BT, *OED* and *MED* all insist that there are no examples of *dream* in this sense in OE. BT and *OED* quote Kluge's hypothesis according to which *dream* in the sense of 'a vision in sleep' is derived from Gmc *draumo- 'to lie or deceive'. For the sense of 'joy' both sources give the OE root draum-. *MED* suggests an ON influence and posits that *dream* 'vision' is a blend of OE and ON. Both *OED* and *MED* stress that despite lack of evidence, *dream* in the sense of 'a vision in sleep' must have been present in OE, perhaps restricted to non-literary register.

GAINESSE (GAY)

In the concordances which I used as the primary source of data the nominal form: *gaines* is not attested, and the adjectival form *gay* has been investigated instead. It appears in *Confessio Amantis* (5 times), *Romaunt of the Rose* (10 times), *Troilus and Criseyde* (1) and *The Canterbury Tales* (32 times). It is predominantly used with reference to looks and clothes, where it means 'well-dressed, elegant'. It appears only 9 times with the meaning 'merry, joyous', and occurs in such phrases as *lusty 'merry' and gay, gay and amorous, gay and full of gladness, fresh and gay and jolly and gay* (4). This feeling may arise from dancing or love and sexual intercourse. In fact one of the senses of *gay* is 'lewd, promiscuous', as in *But in oure bed he was so fressh and gay* (Ch CT WB (D) 508).

In Caxton's *Prose gay* is used 4 times, once to describe the looks of a woman and 3 times in reference to rhetorically elegant phrases.

MED has an entry *gaines* with the senses

- (a) frivolity, merriment, pleasure; love of show and luxury;
- (b) brightness, showiness, beauty of appearance; also elegance of literary style

which suggest that the deadjectival noun remained very close to the meaning of the adjective from which it was formed.

GLADNES (GLADSCHIPE, GLEADUNG, GLAD)

The twelve occurrences of *glead-nes*, *-schipe*, and *-Ø* in *Ancrene Wisse* indicate that it may mean both 'heavenly joy' and 'earthly joy': *gastelich gleadschipe* vs. *gleadschipe of his uuel luue* or *eorðlich gleadunge*. The 'earthly joy' receives a negative colouring as suggested in:

ðat euch eorðlich gleadunge is unwurð her to geine (2 24b 1).

In the *Shorter Poems* 121 various nominal and adjectival forms have been examined. The adjective *glad* most often co-occurs with *blide* (14), *merry* (9), *jocund* (2), *joyful* (1) and *game* 'entertainment, joy' (1). The noun *gladness* appears together with *joy* (5), *comfort* (3), *felicity* (2) and contrasts with *sorrow* and *despair*. The adjective appears in a set phrase of greeting *Be glad!* (10). It also often refers to the looks of a person and then collocates with *chere* 'face' or *eyes* (6), in which case it usually means 'bright'. The noun appears in phrases suggesting the underlying JOY

IS A CONTAINER/SPACE metaphor, as in

Past all despeyre and owte of all gladenesse (4.165 4).

An analysis of the *Shorter Poems* implies the following causes of 'gladness': feasts, drinking, spending time with friends, jesting, singing and music, riding horses, news or a letter, somebody's visit and helping somebody. The element of an interaction between people and the mutual dependence of their state is also indicated as in

Whan she is mery þan am y gladde (4.171 11).

In *Confessio Amantis*, *The Canterbury Tales*, *Troilus and Criseyde*, *The Legend of Good Women* and *Romaunt of the Rose*, 43 occurrences of *gladness* and *gladschipe* and 20 of *glad* have been taken into account. *Glad* collocated with *cheer* (2), *eyes* (1), *jolly* (1), *light* (1), *merry* (1), and *joyful* (2). The element of mutual dependence of emotions also appears: *whan sche gladeth, he is glad* (CA 7. 1897). *Gladness* is modified by *blissful*, *light* and *wonderful*, co-occurs with *delight* (1), *mirth* (1), *joy* (2), *play* (1) and *sweetness* (1) and contrasts with *hevynesse* 'sorrow' (1) and *bitterness* (1). It results from meeting somebody dear, lovers' reunion, love, music or simply a walk on a nice spring day. It appears in the following verb phrases: *bathe in gladness* and *make somebody gladness (or glad)* or *do somebody gladness (or glad)* which mean 'please' or 'entertain'. *Gladness* may be expressed through dancing and jumping:

Whanne I mai hire hand beclippe, With such gladnesse I daunce and skippe, Me thenkth I touche noght the flor (G CA 4. 2784).

Gladness may be used as a label for emotion in the strict sense, i.e. as a reaction to a stimulus, present or remembered, but it may also be used to name a state, mood or disposition as in

A man that is ioyous and glad in herte, it hym conserueth florissshynge in his age (CH CTML (B) 4264).

The data in *MED* give further causes of *gladness*: hunting, the birth of a child, somebody else's failure, and martyrdom. They also suggest a possible expression of the emotion, namely speechlessness:

For very glad he wist not what to saye (Gener. (2) 1255).

The collocation *glad sorwe* glossed as *state of mixed or conflicting emotions* indicates that already in the Middle Ages people conceived of the possibility of experiencing different emotions simultaneously. This concept is criticised by Bamberg (1997b) (for more details see Chapter Two).

JOY

141 occurrences in *Ancrene Wisse*, Chaucer's *Boece*, *The Short Poems* and Caxton's *Prose* have been analysed. This analysis provides a clear picture of a dichotomy between 'earthly joy' (*idel ioies*) and that resulting from religious experience (*ioie of þe hali gast, joye of heaven*). The former leads to pain, and it is *wykkid men* [who] *habounded in joye and gladnesse*; (Ch *Boece* I p 4 307). The transitoriness and worthlessness of earthly joy is often stressed as in: *þe ioie of þis wrecchid world is a schort feeste* (3.134 25) and *This warldly Ioy is onely fantasy* (9.167 1). The latter, religion induced joy, is *perdurable* (1) *everlasting* (5), *without end* (9), *endless* (2), *perpetual* (3), *eternal* (1) and *sweet* (3). It co-occurs with *bliss* (35), *mirth* (17), *gladness* (6), *plesaunce* (4), *play* (2), *glee* (2), *game* (1), *felicity* (1), *delight* (1), *sovereign good* (1), *comfort* (8), *peace* (3), *rest* (2), *health* (3), *honour* (2), *prosperity* (1), *glory* (2) and *victory over enemies* (1). It contrasts with *pain* (6), *woe* (5), *sorrow* (2), *hevynesse* 'sorrow' (1), *torment* (1). Joy in this meaning appears in the same verb phrases³³ as *bliss*: *give joy* (1), *have joy* (2), *grant joy* (3), *pay with joy* (1), *find joy* (1), *bring joy to somebody* (here joy often stands for good news that Christ was born), *be in joy* (3), *live in joy* (1), and *be full of joy* (1).

178 occurrences of *joy* in *Confessio Amantis*, *The Canterbury Tales*, *The Book of the Duchess*, *Troilus and Criseyde*, *Legend of Good Women* and *The Romaunt of the Rose* have been analysed. It appears with the following positive emotions and states: *bliss* (15), *mirth* (4), *gladness* (2), *plesaunce* (2), *playing* 'entertainment' (1), *delight* (1), *felicity* (1), *health* (2), *honour* (3), *rest* (1), *quiet* (1) and contrasts with *sorrow* (12), *woe* (8), *pain* (7), *distress* (1), *harm* (1), *hevynesse* 'sorrow' (1), *tribulations* (1), *grief* (1). In most cases the negative feelings are aroused by a disappointment in love, love itself being by far the most common cause of the *earthly joy*. As this type of joy is *brotil* 'uncertain' it may become *sovereign*, *endless*, *eternal* [sic!], *great*, but also *dreadful* and *piteous*.

Joy is a loanword that entered English from OF, but it appears in all those

³³ The relation of verb phrases to the metaphors identified as structuring the concept of 'joy' will be discussed at more length in the analysis of non-religious texts.

collocation types which determine the metaphorical structure of the concept of 'joy' that we established for OE. The BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTION metaphor is represented by a verb phrase *be full of joy*. JOY IS A COMMODITY is expressed by *get joy*, *give joy*, *lose joy*, *send joy to somebody* and *have joy* (11). JOY IS A CONTAINER is illustrated by *be in joy* (5), *live in joy* (3) and *bring to/ out of joy* (2). The importance of the role of self is indicated in such collocations as *win joy*, to *make joy* 'entertain, enjoy' (5) and *seek joy* (3). Now it is not only God, or even the beloved raised to the status of God (lover = *my life's joy*), but anybody who may *do* or *make somebody joy*. The increase in the degree of control that one has over one's joy is evident. However, the idea of the transitoriness of 'earthly joys' also persists, as shown in: *joye lasteth little while, joye of worldly thyng ...shal flee, worldly joye is soon ago / may not alway dure / ne lasteth / shal turn to sorrow*.

The non-religious sources of joy are love, kissing and other bodily pleasures, talking about the beloved, lovers' reunions, meeting or seeing somebody dear, generosity, prosperity, receiving gifts, having a child and another person's misfortune.

Joy may be expressed through laughing, singing, loud behaviour, dancing, jumping, kissing, holding hands and weeping.

The data from *MED* give three more causes for joy: hunting, keeping horses and possessing something valuable, and two more means of expressing joy: throwing a feast and fainting, the latter usually performed by ladies either successful or unsuccessful in love.

LISSE

In ME *lisse* is increasingly used in the sense of 'relief' or 'remedy'. The sense of 'joy' has become increasingly rare. According to *MED* (19 examples), it is used in the following verb phrases: *live in/on lisse* (4), *send lisse to sb*, *have lisse* (3). It co-occurs with related words such as *bliss* (7), *rest* (2), *joy* (2), *love* (1) and contrasts with *pain* and *woe*. I believe that the link between the two main senses goes along the following lines: pain – relief = lack of pain – comfort, peace – joy. If this hypothesis is correct it would illustrate one of the possible conceptualisations of 'joy', i.e. as lack of suffering.

OED suggests that *lisse* in the sense of 'joy' has become obsolete by late ME.

MIRTH

69 occurrences of *mirth* in *Ancrene Wisse*, *Boece* and *Shorter Poems* have been analysed. It co-occurs with *joy* (17), *play* (3), *glee* (2), *pleasance* (1), *game*

(1), *jollity* (1), *reverence* (1), *noblesse* (1), *goodness* (1), *comfort* (1), *bliss* (1) and contrasts with *sorrow* (1). It is used in verb phrases with *get*, *find*, *have* (3), *live in* (1) and *make* (14). The excerpt: *And bryng vs to hys place where ys myrthe and solas* (5.170.10 3) suggests that it might not be possible to treat *mirth* as a synonym of *heaven* and endow it with features characteristic of space. It seems that humans have a significant degree of control over *mirth* as indicated in the following quotations:

And all with myrthe he myngyd my mode (9.97 34);

With all the murþes þot mon mai Minne (3.96 26);

Wiþ al þe murþes þat men vise (3.101 14).

Apart from rarely indicated religious experiences, *mirth* may result from listening to music and singing. It may also be expressed through singing.

19 uses of *mirth* in *The Canterbury Tales*, *Troilus and Criseyde* and *The Legend of Good Women* have been examined. It co-occurs with *gladness*, *jolities*, *play*, *revelery*, *comfort*, *lusty game* 'merry game or theatrical performance'. It appears in the following verb phrases: *speak/tell/talk (of) mirth* 'entertain, tell funny stories', *live in mirth*, *do mirth to somebody* and *to have mirth*. The most common cause of *mirth* is a sexual intercourse – *make mirth* may actually mean to have sex. *Mirth* may also result from an interaction with other people, entertainments and feasts.

MED provides examples of a number of entertainments causing *mirth*, and of *mirth* being regarded as an unspecified entertainment, most closely related to music:

Alle maner of merth and mynstralcy (*Mandev.*(4) 2713);

þei take heede to noon oþir þing þan to mirþis and games. (*Orch.Syon.* 292/35);

þe lykynge mirþe of knighthode þat is in lepyng, in rennyng, in rydinge ... moste ben used and assayed bifore in gouþe, or in þe body be made sleuþful. (*AwntyrsArth.* 181);

Lordes... Gentilmen... and other Comyners have used the occupation of shotyng for their myrthes and sportes. (*RParl.* 6.156a).

Mirth may also result from the beauty of nature, especially when related to the concept of the land of plenty, as in

Medewes þer weoren brade ... þer wes fisc, þer wes fugel, and feiernesse inoge. þer wes wude and wilde deor; wunder ane monie. þer wes al þa murhðe þe æi mon mihte of þenche (*Lay.Brut* 24269).

Mirth may be expressed through laughter or by kissing.

MED also provides examples that imply that *mirth* may be used rather like *bliss* in the sense of 'heavenly joy'. It enters into collocations such as *hevenriches mirhte*, *soverain mirthe*, *bring to mirthe/comen/gon wenden to mirthe*, *forelesen/lesen/missen mirthe*, *in mirthe wunien*. It may also be used as an epithet for God (*Ihesu, myrth of herte*).

WYNN

Wynn appears 20 times in *Ancrene Wisse* and the *Shorter Poems*, and is absent from the works of Chaucer and Gower. It appears in the following verb phrases: *give wyne* (2), *ofearnen* 'earn' *wynne*, *forgo wyne* (1), *gitsen* 'covet' *wynne*, *think of wyne* (3). It also appears with such prepositions as *in* (3) and *to* (2), which are indicative of the EMOTION IS A CONTAINER metaphor. These collocations suggest that the experiencer of *wynn* is largely passive, and that *wynn* awakened by religious experience is more of a state than emotion in its strict sense³⁴.

The absence of *wynn* from the works of Chaucer and Gower implies that by late ME the word became obsolete.

4.3. The evolution of the semantic field of 'joy' in ME.

The study of the semantic field of 'joy' in OE identified the core of the field as consisting of eight words: *bliss*, *blithe*, *dream*, *gefea*, *gladness*, *lisse*, *mirth* and *wynne*. There were two criteria of membership. The first was the frequency of occurrence, which eliminated such words as *eadwela*, *estnes*, *fægennes*, *gefeannes*, *gefeohsumnes*, *gliwstæf*, *hyhtwynn*, *reotu* and *gesalignes* since they were either not attested or infrequent in the *MCOE*. The second criterion was common syntactic behaviour. This allowed us to posit the structure of the concept of 'joy' and the metaphors governing this structure. Two major and two minor metaphors were identified. The JOY IS A CONTAINER/SPACE and JOY IS A COMMODITY metaphors are responsible for the bulk of patterns in which the 'joy' words appear. The two remaining metaphors were BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS and UP IS GOOD.

The membership of the field of 'joy' has undergone significant changes by the ME period. *Gefea* became rare in late OE and is not attested in ME sources. The remaining seven OE words are retained in ME. However, four of them have undergone

³⁴ Cf. OE *gladness*.

a considerable decrease in use. These are *blithe*, *dream*, *lisse*, and *wynne*. *Blithe*, although its form has survived till today, is marked as poetic. In ME, it remains relatively popular in comparison to the other declining words, but it still seems to have become rather rare. Set phrases and fossilised expressions characteristic of the decline in creative use, constitute a considerable part of the data for *blithe*. *Dream* in the sense of 'joy' is used only in early ME and becomes extinct by the 13th c. This loss can be explained by the increase in the use of *dream* in the sense of 'a vision seen in sleep' and ascribed to ON influence on English. *Lisse* has undergone a change similar to that of *dream*, in that one of its senses gets intensified, while the other is gradually lost. The surviving sense of *lisse* is the one of 'relief, remedy'; while the sense of 'joy' becomes extinct by late ME. *Wynn* undergoes a complete loss, so that even the form does not survive till present day.

New words have also been added to the field, mainly from OF. Four of them, *cheer*, *delight*, *gainess* and *joy* have been investigated in this chapter. Others, such as, for example, *hilarity* are not attested in sufficient numbers to be considered common in ME. Words such as *game* and *play*, although sometimes used to denote the emotion of 'joy', most often refer to entertainment, i.e. a stimulus for emotion and not the emotion itself. In fact, *cheer*, *delight* and *gainess* can also be regarded as similar border cases, since their main ME senses are not 'emotion of joy', but the related 'expression of the emotion'; 'pleasure' i.e. a cause of emotion; and 'elegance, good looks'. Nevertheless, they have been included in the sample analysed, as the sense of 'joy' becomes predominant later. They also allow us to observe certain interesting meaning developments typical of words denoting 'joy'. *Cheer*, etymologically related to OF *cara* 'face', is borrowed into ME with the sense 'face' and 'facial expression'. This meaning is later generalised to refer to other means of expression, such as gesture, behaviour and manner. As expression, facial or otherwise, is related to the state of mind or the experienced emotion, the meaning of the word becomes extended to 'mood' and 'feeling'. Eventually it narrows down to 'joy'. (This picture of the development of the meaning of *cheer* has, of course, been somewhat simplified in order to facilitate the development of hypotheses concerning the sources of emotion words. The fact is that all the senses of *cheer* exist simultaneously in ME usage.)

The main meaning of *delight* is that of 'pleasure'. Whether 'pleasure' is an emotion, as suggested by the MED gloss for *delight*, or a cause for emotion, is difficult to ascertain. However, *delight* appears only extremely rarely in relation to religious experience. This seems to result from the fact that the meaning of *delight*, in most of its non-religious uses, is that of 'bodily pleasure' or 'sensuous pleasure'. Because of the body-soul dichotomy introduced by the medieval church, this meaning

cannot be reconciled with the spiritual experiences offered by religion. Moreover, *delight* rarely enters into the collocations characteristic of the field of 'joy'. These two factors – rare use in reference to religious experience and rare occurrences in syntactic structures common to the other 'joy' words – places *delight* outside the core of the field.

Gay and the deadjectival noun formed from it have two senses 'joy' and 'good looks' (cf. OE *glad* and its meaning of 'bright', and OE *dream* and its sense of 'music'). It seems likely that the following link obtains between the two senses: rich → good looking³⁵, well-dressed; rich and good-looking → happy.

Joy seems to be the only loanword which has been fully assimilated into English already in the ME times and which therefore displays all the characteristic syntactic behaviour of the core words in the 'joy' field. Its collocations support all the metaphors posited for the structure of the concept. Unlike *cheer*, *delight* and *gay*, it is as often used in relation to 'heavenly joy' as to 'earthly joy'. It is also distinct from *cheer* and *gay* in that all its senses are related to 'joy' and it is not used in other meanings.

An analysis of the wider contexts in which the 'joy' words appear enables us to posit the causes and means of expressing joy. The relationship between the causes and the terms denoting them are presented in a table, similar to that in Chapter Three. As *dream*, *lisse* and *wynn* are in decline they are not included in Table 4.1. The drastic decrease in the number of causes with which these three words appear is not due to a shift of their meaning, but a complete loss of the sense of 'joy' in the meaning of *dream* and *lisse*, and a loss of the lexical item *wynne*.

Table 4.1. Cause-emotion relationship in Middle English.

No.	CAUSE	ME 'JOY' WORD
1.	religious experience	<i>bliss, blithe, gladness, joy, mirth</i>
2.	martyrdom, death, funeral	<i>bliss</i>
3.	having a child	<i>joy</i>
4.	children	<i>blithe</i>
5.	wedding	<i>bliss</i>

³⁵ The "General Prologue" to *The Canterbury Tales* proves that the looks and a persons social status are closely related and transparent. The hypothesised link between high economic status and lack of worries, as well as the wider range of entertainments available, seems equally plausible.

6.	seeing somebody dear	<i>blithe, joy</i>
7.	somebody's arrival	<i>blithe</i>
8.	somebody's visit	<i>gladness</i>
9.	meeting somebody dear	<i>joy</i>
10.	returning home	<i>bliss</i>
11.	good news or a letter	<i>blithe, gladness</i>
12.	ruling, power	<i>bliss, delight</i>
13.	receiving favours, gifts	<i>blithe, joy</i>
14.	acquisition and possession of goods	<i>delight, joy</i>
15.	helping somebody	<i>gladness</i>
16.	generosity	<i>joy</i>
17.	entertainments (unspecified)	<i>mirth</i>
18.	feasting (drinking, eating)	<i>bliss, blithe, cheer, gladness, mirth</i>
19.	spending time with friends	<i>gladness</i>
20.	jesting	<i>gladness</i>
21.	music, singing	<i>bliss, delight, mirth</i>
22.	dancing	<i>cheer, gainess</i>
23.	keeping horses	<i>delight, joy</i>
24.	riding horses	<i>gladness</i>
25.	hunting	<i>joy</i>
26.	painting	<i>delight</i>
27.	admiring the beauty of nature; walking	<i>mirth, gladness</i>
28.	love	<i>joy</i>
29.	talking about the beloved	<i>joy</i>
30.	lovers' reunion	<i>cheer, joy</i>
31.	bodily pleasure (kisses, caresses, sexual intercourse)	<i>bliss, delight, gainess (gay), joy, mirth</i>
32.	somebody else's misfortune	<i>joy, gladness</i>
33.	lying	<i>delight</i>
34.	spilling blood (murder or war)	<i>delight</i>

The causes of 'joy' presented in Table 4.1. may be divided into several types:

TYPE 1: religious experiences (No. 1-2);

TYPE 2: family life (No. 3-5; 10);

TYPE 3: interaction with other members of the community (No. 6-9);

TYPE 4: news (No. 11);

TYPE 5: ruling and power (No. 12);

TYPE 6: exchange of gifts (No. 13-16);

TYPE 7: entertainments (No. 17-27);

TYPE 8: romantic love (No. 28-30);

TYPE 9: deeds of definitely negative value (No. 31-33).

Types 1-4 and 6-7 were represented already in OE. Types 1-4 and 6 have undergone little or no change. Type 7, however, developed dramatically. The simple joys of eating, drinking and listening to singing in the safety and warmth of the meadhall have been supplanted by elaborate social activities, such as dancing; sports, such as riding horses; and arts, such as painting. This development is due to changes in the social structure briefly indicated in the introduction to this chapter.

Type 5 – ruling and power, seem to be entirely new causes for 'joy'. Perhaps an Anglo-Saxon ruler felt more responsibility for his closely related kin and retainers than a king who does not know all his subjects personally. Dangers presented in the Germanic poems may have appeared more real and immediate and hence there was less room for enjoying power. However, a more plausible explanation might be that, although the phenomenon of the enjoyment of power was very well known all along, the attitude to it changed and critical comments were voiced only later, that means in the ME treaties devoted to abuses of power.

Type 8 – romantic love, is a completely new source of 'joy'. In Anglo-Saxon society love was primarily a bond, or an emotion of respect and utter loyalty to the leader, hence the description of Hrothgar as *leofe cyning*. Of course, we cannot say that love between men and women³⁶ did not exist at all, and that it suddenly appeared as a result of the Troubadour culture of Southern France, but we can state that romantic love was at least not a topic of literary works. Religious writing concentrated on the love of God and on morality; poems written for entertainment were devoted to heroic warriors distinguishing themselves in superhuman fights with human and supernatural enemies. Romantic love had no place in either. Only when a significant

³⁶ Krygier (personal communication), however, suggests that it is very likely that romantic love as a literary topic existed, but the writings did not survive. He stresses that there exist explicitly sexual lewd OE riddles. I am not sure, though, if they can be regarded as evidence for romantic love.

number of relatively idle higher-class women awaiting the return of their husbands from wars and crusades developed as a group in need of entertainment did the theme of romantic love appear in literature to meet the taste of the new audience.

Type 9, like type 5, seems absent from the OE data. The explanation for this may run along similar lines, that is religious and philosophical treatises of the later time dealt with the issue in greater detail.

Grouping the words according to type of stimulus for 'joy' gives an interesting pattern of mutual dependencies between them.

Type 1 – religious: *bliss, blithe, gladness, joy, mirth*. It is surprising that the word *gladness*, which in OE is the only word not used for religion-related 'joy', developed a sense it did not have formerly.

Type 2 – family life: *bliss, blithe, joy*.

Type 3 – interaction with the other members of the community: *blithe, gladness, joy*. In OE there is also evidence of *bliss* being used in this group. *Gladness* was not.

Type 4 – good news: *blithe, gladness*. Precisely as in OE.

Type 5 – power - *bliss, delight*.

Type 6 – exchange of gifts: *blithe, joy, delight, gladness*. *Gladness*, but not *blithe*, was used with this trigger in OE.

Type 7 – entertainments: *bliss, blithe, cheer, delight, gainness, gladness, joy, mirth*. Although all the words discussed appear in this type, a closer examination of particular varieties of entertainment reveals a more complicated pattern. *Bliss, blithe* and *mirth* occur only with feast and music, which were already known in OE. From the repertoire of OE words only *gladness* was flexible enough to be used in connection with new types of entertainment. Whether this is linked to the fact that it did not have a religious meaning in OE is difficult to establish. Most of the new varieties of entertainment appear with the OF loanwords. To claim that new social activities called for new words to describe new emotions they arouse would be an unfalsifiable, but tempting, hypothesis.

Type 8 – romantic love: *bliss, cheer, delight, gainness, joy, mirth*. As was the case with type 7, the newly introduced concept is most often described by means of the new loanwords.

Type 9 – deeds of definitely negative value: *delight, gladness* and *joy*. It must be stressed that it is *delight* which is used with the most negative concepts.

Generally, it seems that the words continuing from OE retained most of their characteristic causes. *Blith* is the most stable of them all, which may be related to the fact that it was declining in creative use. Unlike in OE, it appears in the exchange-of-

gifts type of cause, but this type was already known in OE. *Gladness* seems to be the most flexible, being applied to new entertainments, as well as developing the religion-related sense absent from OE data. The use of *mirth* in the religious sense decreases (see the analyses of the word for OE and ME), and it is now applied to the 'new' cause of sensual and sexual pleasure (see also the relation of OE *mirth* to tactile experience). The most unexpected development is that of the word *bliss*. It remains at the very top of the UP-DOWN, POSITIVE-NEGATIVE hierarchy³⁷, as the most prototypical word for 'heavenly joy'. However, it simultaneously comes to be used in connection with sexual pleasure³⁸ and power, both of which arouse negatively coloured emotions such as the lowest in the hierarchy, *delight*.

The new members of the field are predominantly restricted to the new concepts, such as power (*delight*), new entertainments (*cheer, delight, gainness, and joy*), and romantic love (*cheer, delight, gainness, joy*). In fact *cheer* is limited to three causes: feasting, dancing, and lover's reunion; and *gainness* to two: dancing and sexual intercourse. *Delight* is relatively more versatile and is used with as many as six causes. However, it often seems to carry negative connotations. *Joy* is the most commonly used, not only among the loanwords, but in the whole semantic field in general. It appears with as many as 13 causes, compared to 8 for *bliss* and *gladness*, 7 for *blithe* and 4 for *mirth*.

The means of expressing the emotion of joy have also become more varied and included: laughing, kissing and holding hands (already found in OE), as well as singing, dancing, jumping, loud behaviour, speechlessness, weeping and fainting.

³⁷ The hierarchy coincides to a large degree with the vertical placement of the causes in Table 4.1.

³⁸ Cf. footnote 10 in Chapter Three.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The present analysis of the semantic field of 'joy' in OE and ME has suggested certain methodological implications for lexical semantics. First, it supported Lehrer's (1974) claim that new members of a semantic field will assume the syntactic behaviour of the core members. Secondly, it showed how collocational analysis allows us to construct the basic metaphors structuring a concept. These metaphors can underlie not only idiomatic expressions and metonymies, but also collocations, which do not qualify even as dead metaphors. This is particularly true of verb phrases, which seem to be the most telling evidence for metaphors. Using verb phrases as data for identifying conceptual metaphors is a development of Lakoff and Kövacs's (1987) method, which concentrated on the analysis of idiomatic expressions only.

2. At a more theoretical level, my work shows how Jackendoff's conceptual semantics can be supplemented by the cognitive approach advocated by the Berkeley school of semantics. Jackendoff (1990, 1994) introduced the suggestion that there exist intermodule links between conceptual structures and the motor and perception modules of the human mind. He therefore posited the existence of a 3D model of objects for lexical entries for nouns, and action scenarios for verbs.

I suggest that lexical entries for emotion words, regardless of their grammatical category, consist of scenarios which present a generalised (prototypical) picture of the cause-emotion-reaction chain. I believe that there is a single representation for all the 'joy' words, as suggested in Chapter Three. At the level of actualisation of causes, emotions and reactions, however, there may be alternative links, as will be shown below. Different lexical items might focus on different stages of the scenario or represent various combinations of elements, but they all refer to the same representation. As my research indicates, the scenario could be specified in the following way:

Table 5.1. The specification of the scenario for 'joy'

CAUSE	→ EMOTION	→ REACTION
religious beliefs	prototypical label: <i>bliss</i> , other labels: OE: <i>bliðe</i> , <i>dream</i> , <i>gefea</i> , <i>liss</i> , <i>mirhð</i> , <i>wynnsumnes</i> ; ME: <i>bliðe</i> , <i>gladness</i> , <i>joy</i> , <i>mirth</i>	OE: verbal expression or singing; ME: singing
family life	OE: <i>bliðe</i> (prototypical), also <i>gefea</i> ; ME - a variety of words: <i>bliss</i> , <i>bliðe</i> , <i>joy</i>	not specified
interaction with others	OE: <i>bliðe</i> (prototypical), also <i>bliss</i> , <i>gefea</i> ; ME: <i>bliðe</i> , <i>gladness</i> , <i>joy</i>	OE: kissing, embracing; ME loud behaviour,
entertainment ³⁹	OE: <i>bliss</i> , <i>bliðe</i> , <i>dream</i> , <i>gefea</i> , <i>glædnes</i> , <i>mirhð</i> , <i>wynsumnes</i> ; ME: <i>bliss</i> , <i>blithe</i> , <i>cheer</i> , <i>delight</i> , <i>gainness</i> , <i>gladness</i> , <i>joy</i> , <i>mirth</i>	ME: laughter
romantic love	ME: <i>bliss</i> , <i>cheer</i> , <i>delight</i> , <i>gainness</i> , <i>joy</i> , <i>mirth</i>	jumping, dancing, singing, speechlessness, kissing, weeping, fainting

³⁹ Although many entertainments do consist of interaction with others, in the technical sense used here the difference between the 'interaction-with-others' group and the 'entertainment' group lies in the fact that entertainments are usually planned activities, whereas interaction with others, as understood here, bears the element of unexpected.

news	OE: <i>bliðe, glad</i> ; ME: <i>blithe, gladness</i>	not specified
ruling and power	ME: <i>bliss, delight</i>	not specified
exchange of gifts	OE: <i>gefeā, glad</i> , <i>gladness, liss</i> ; ME: <i>blithe, delight</i> , <i>joy, gladness</i>	not specified
deeds of definitely negative value	ME: <i>joy, gladness</i> , <i>delight</i>	not specified

3. What is missing from this scenario is the description (folk theory) of the emotion itself, i.e. a description of what it actually is like to feel *bliss*, *blithe* or 'joy' in general. There is no straightforward answer to this question, but it may be inferred from the metaphors structuring the concept of 'joy', from other concepts with which 'joy' co-occurs, from an emotional display following the experience of emotion, and from the role of experiencer as implied by the verb phrases.

The metaphors: JOY IS A CONTAINER and BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTION⁴⁰, as indicated by the particular collocations discussed in Chapters Three and Four, result in a picture of 'joy' which is understood as a peaceful experience of comfort, rest and satisfaction. This is also supported by the co-occurrence of 'joy' with *peace*, *rest* and *sleep*. In this case the role of the experiencer is either passive or underspecified.

An analysis of the expression-of-the-emotion (reaction) element of the scenario can also contribute to the description of the actual feeling. Reactions such as speechlessness support the previous findings, according to which 'joy' is a quiet emotion. Other types of reaction, such as laughing, singing, loud behaviour, dancing and jumping suggest that the experiencer is very active. The experienced feeling should therefore be classified as a positive, high arousal emotion.

This contradiction suggests some necessary modifications of the original

⁴⁰ This claim is true only for 'joy'. The metonymies for 'anger' resulting from the BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS metaphor are entirely different, as shown in Chapter 2.

scenario. First, a regrouping of the causes for 'joy' seems necessary. Then feeling and reaction can be more appropriately distributed over categories. The seven types of causes of 'joy' can be regrouped into three new categories:

Category 1: religious beliefs;

Category 2: social life: interaction with others, romantic love, entertainment;

Category 3, which is actually not a coherent category. It rather groups all the other types of causes, for which we do not have any data on reaction i.e. family life, news, exchange of gifts, ruling and power, and deeds of negative value.

The causes of 'joy' in Category 1 result in a powerful, often long-lasting (collocations with *much* and *swiðe* and the 'everlasting' group), and quiet emotion which might be metaphorically perceived as a warm and safe place to enter. Such a representation of the feeling implies that it is very close to state rather than emotion proper. This type of 'joy' can be expressed either verbally or by singing.

'Joy' resulting from the Category 2 stimuli is a positive, high arousal emotion which provokes the experiencer to a very lively expression of emotion, such as jumping, dancing and loud behaviour.

4. This study also shows how an analysis of a somewhat neglected field of 'joy' in OE and ME helps us to draw a more detailed picture of social life in medieval England. On the one hand, the identification of the stimuli for 'joy' gives an idea of what the most popular entertainments were in OE and how this part of social life developed in ME times. On the other hand, the discovery of metaphors governing the conceptualisation of 'joy' provides an insight into the hierarchy of values of the society. The JOY IS A CONTAINER metaphor stresses the need for safety and close relationship with other members of the group⁴¹. The JOY IS A COMMODITY metaphor emphasises that exchange is the basic concept in terms of which all social relations, including emotional links, are understood.

5. The present work has also suggested word histories of *mood*, *cheer* and *gay*. The OE *mod* meant 'heart, mind, thought, feeling'. This polysemy has been explained as the development of the more abstract meaning of 'thought' and 'feeling' from the less abstract 'mind' and 'heart'. It is also hypothesised that the meaning of OE *modig* 'courageous, proud' underwent a deterioration of meaning to PDE *moody* 'indulging in moods of bad temper, depression' as a result of the dichotomy between

⁴¹ In this case the meadhall, standing for the metaphoric container, is often juxtaposed with hostile nature outside.

body (heart) and soul (mind) introduced by Christianity. *Cheer* and *gay* are words which develop the meaning of 'joy' from 'face, facial expression' and 'looks'. These words, therefore, add to the possible sources of emotion words those words which label the expression associated with the emotion (*cheer*) or evidence for the accessibility of sources of 'joy' (*gay*).

6. *Bliss* also underwent an interesting development of meaning. Originally a word used prototypically of religious experience and occupying the top of the evaluation axis, in ME it has been applied to the new source of 'joy' that is 'romantic love'. This is rather surprising as this 'romantic love' is also associated with *delight*, which occupies the lowest level of the evaluation axis.

7. The present semantic study of 'joy' in OE and ME can also shed some light on issues raised in other disciplines researching emotions. One such issue is the question of universality vs. culture-specificity of emotion. Ekman (1994: 117), who is a proponent of universality, wrote: "For happiness⁴² we suggested four antecedents: sensory pleasure; excitement; praise; relief when something unpleasant has ceased". Two of the antecedents of 'joy', claimed by Ekman to be universal, i.e. sensory pleasure and relief (see in particular the analysis of *lisse* in Chapter Four) are very well represented in both OE and ME data. The sensory pleasure antecedents take the form of eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, nice smells, views and tactile experiences, music, warmth and light. The whole idea of 'heavenly bliss' is based on relief from suffering, hunger and other earthly hardships. If we reinterpret giving gifts as a form of praise, then there is evidence for this antecedent as well. However, such an interpretation, it seems to me, is not very convincing. It is also difficult to substantiate the hypothesis that excitement is a source of 'joy'. I would be inclined to claim that excitement might be a reaction to a cause, rather than a cause in itself. In fact, it may result from a wide range of specific causes such as seeing the beloved, riding horses and being tortured on behalf of the true faith. Therefore it does not seem to be a valid label for a type of cause at all.

Scherer (1994b: 175) claims that emotion antecedents may be both universal, in their structure, and culture-specific, when it comes to particular instantiations. This view finds partial support in my study. Six types of causes for 'joy' have been identified both in OE and ME data. They differ only in the specific forms they might take, and these mirror the values adhered to in the two periods. However, in ME three new types have been discovered which result from changes in culture and the system of

⁴² I assume that Ekman's 'happiness' can be equated with our 'joy', as the two terms are often used interchangeably in psychological literature.

socially accepted values. This may either mean that even the cautious claim by Scherer cannot be fully defended, or, more likely, that the level of generalisation assumed in my study was not abstract enough to support his theory.

These facts suggest the answer to the question as to whether emotions are universal or culture specific depends largely on the degree of generalisation (cf. Averill 1994a and b). At a certain level they undeniably are universal. It is doubtful, however, whether such a level of generalisation would allow us to conduct any insightful research into the nature of emotions, unless the identification of the most general core of basic emotions would enable us to assume that all other features are culture-specific and could therefore be restructured if they resulted in undesirable effects, such as traumas and depressions.

8. The social constructionist approach to emotions (Bodor 1997, Bamberg 1997b), claiming that emotional expression is a means of communication aimed at securing an audience's co-operation, is confirmed by the results of my research concerning the OE period. There, the exchange of gifts and the joy displayed on the occasion performed the important social function of creating and/or strengthening the bond between the leader of the group and his retainers. 'Joy' in these circumstances was something tangible, an integral part of social custom⁴³.

9. The social role of emotions is also stressed by the results of the analysis of the 'joy' words in OE. These words fall into three groups: religion-related joy, joy important for building and sustaining social relations, and joy arising from perception-related pleasure. The second group is particularly important, as it shows the role of 'joy' in social life.

10. My research has, moreover, contributed to the discussion of the structure of the concept of emotions. Psychologists (Izard 1972, Fehr and Russel 1984) working on this issue have suggested that it is structured along three dimensions: degree of arousal, degree of submissiveness, and a positive-negative axis. As for degree of arousal, 'joy' does not seem to be a coherent concept. I have already indicated above, in the discussion concerning the actual emotional experience felt by the subject of the emotion, that it may vary significantly and ranges from quiet contemplation to a considerable motor activity. Degree of arousal, therefore, cannot be regarded as a determining factor for 'joy' in general. An attempt to arrange particular labels for 'joy' along this axis is also doomed to failure, because there is no evidence

⁴³ Cf. Gillis' (1988) results on love.

about behavioural display for most of these words (cf. Chapters Three and Four).

The degree of submissiveness criterion when applied to my data gives more interesting results. It can be translated into linguistic terms as the degree of control enjoyed by the experiencer of the emotion. It seems that only the extreme values of this axis can be labelled. *Bliss*, as a prototypical name for religion-related 'joy', marks the highest degree of submissiveness, and *delight* marks the highest degree of control⁴⁴. The position of the remaining 'joy' words is difficult to establish with any degree of certainty. Even secondary evidence, i.e. whether a particular word occurs in apposition with *bliss* or *delight*, is of little value, as most of them appear with both.

The criterion of submissiveness allows us to emphasise a change in the concept of 'joy' between the OE and ME periods. OE evidence on verb phrases predominantly concerned 'heavenly joy', the experiencer of which remained rather passive and was described mainly as a recipient of 'joy' or a person led to, living in or, at most, earning joy through good conduct. In this period all 'joy' words, with the exception of *gladness* in the case of which there were little or no data from verb phrases, entered these and similar collocations. In ME *bliss*, *blithe*, *joy* and *mirth* appear in the patterns identified in OE. At the same time *blithe*, *mirth* and *gladness* collocated with *make* and *do*, and *delight* with a significant number of verbs not attested in connection with 'joy' words in OE, such as, for example *accomplish* and *perform*⁴⁵. These verbs suggest a greater degree of control on the part of the experiencer. We could therefore posit that according to the available data there was a shift in the degree of submissiveness of 'joy' towards a greater degree of control between OE and ME periods. We must remember, however, that historical data, and OE data in particular, are far from exhaustive. Consequently, it may be the case that OE 'joy' words displayed similar patterns to those of ME, i.e. an experiencer had less control over 'heavenly joy' and more control over 'earthly joy'. If this were the case, then we would be dealing here with synchronic rather than diachronic variation.

As far as the positive-negative axis is concerned, 'joy' is definitely a positive emotion. The introduction of Christian values, however, created a higher order hierarchy which reverses the values of the lower order, placing suffering and death for faith, very much against natural instincts of self-preservation, at the top of the hierarchy. 'Earthly joys', on the other hand, are assigned negative moral value. In this process 'joy' words develop an internal positive-negative evaluation scale, with *bliss* at the top and *delight* at the very bottom of the scale. If we compare this scale with the

⁴⁴ This hypothesis is based purely on an analysis of collocations, in particular verb phrases. Native speaker intuitions could not be consulted.

⁴⁵ For more data see Chapter Four.

degree of submissiveness axis we can notice that the Church fostered rather passive contemplation and discouraged active fulfilment of the natural human desires.

11. Social historians studying emotions emphasise the link between moral and cultural standards adhered to at a given time and the conceptualisation of emotions. My research, as shown in the conclusions to Chapters Three and Four, supports the hypothesis that emotions are intricately interwoven with the social structure and values of a given community, and reflect their understanding of the outside world. With a change in social structure, cultural interests and everyday activities between the OE and ME periods, the conceptualisation of 'joy' also underwent changes. The number of entertainments resulting in 'joy' increased, and new causes, such as romantic love, ruling, and somebody else's failure were introduced. The degree of control an experiencer had over 'joy' also increased.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SOURCES

- Bosworth, J. and T.N. Toller. 1898. *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Here referred to as BT]
- Gower, J. 1963. *Confessio Amantis*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Healey, A. and R. Venetzky. 1980. *A microfiche concordance to Old English*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
- Kurath, H. et al. (eds). *Middle English dictionary*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [Here referred to as MED]
- Mizobata, K. (ed.). 1990. *A Concordance to Caxton's own Prose*. Tokyo: Shohakusha.
- Murray, J. et al. 1884-1933. *The Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Here referred to as OED]
- Oizumi, A. 1991. *A complete concordance to the works of Geoffrey Chaucer*. New York: Olms Weidman.
- Pickles, J. D. and J. L. Dawson (eds). 1987. *A concordance to John Gower's Confessio Amantis*. Cambridge: Brewer.
- Potts, J., Stevenson, L. and J. Wogan-Brown. (eds) 1993. *Concordance to Ancrene Wisse*. Cambridge: Brewer.
- Preston, M. 1975. *A Concordance to Middle English Shorter Poems*. Leeds: Maney and Son.
- Roberts, J. and C. Kay with L. Grundy. (eds). 1995. *Old English thesaurus*. London: King's College London Medieval Studies 11. [Here referred to as OET]
- Robinson, F. N. 1987. *The Riverside Chaucer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. 1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

OTHER WORKS

- Abelson, R.P. 1981. "Psychological status of the script concept." *American psychologist*. 36. 715-726.
- Averill, J. R. 1994a. "In the eyes of the beholder." In Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 7-14.
- Averill, J. R. 1994b. "It's a small world, but a large stage." In Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 143-145.
- Averill, J. R. 1994c. "Can we control our emotions?" In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 264-271.
- Bach, E. and R. Harms. (eds). 1968. *Universals in linguistic theory*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Ballweg-Schramm, A. 1981. "Some comments on lexical fields and their use in lexicography". In: Eikmeyer, H. and H. Rieser. (eds). 462-468.
- Balmer, T. T. and W. Brennenstuhl. 1981a. "Lexical analysis and language theory." In: Eikmeyer, H. J. and H. Rieser. (eds). 414-461.
- Balmer, T. T. and W. Brennenstuhl. 1981b. "An empirical approach to frame theory: Verb thesaurus organisation." In: Eikmeyer, H. J. and H. Rieser. (eds). 297-319.
- Bamberg, M. 1997a. "Emotion talk(s): The role of perspective in the construction of emotions." In Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 209-225.
- Bamberg, M. 1997b. "Language, concepts and emotions: The role of language in the construction of emotions." *Language Sciences*. 19/4. 309-340.
- Bendix, E.H. 1966. *Componential analysis of general vocabulary: The semantic structure of a set of verbs in English, Hindi and Japanese*. Bloomington: Indiana University.
- Berlin, B. and P. Kay. 1969. *Basic colour terms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Blummenstengel, I. 1964. *Wesen and funktion des Bankets in Beowulf*. Marburg: Mauersberger.
- Bodor, P. 1997. "On the usage of emotional language: A developmental view of the tip of the iceberg." In: Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 195-208.
- Bullock, M. and J. A. Russel. 1986. "Concepts of emotion in developmental psychology." In Izard, C. (ed.). 203-237.
- Busse, W.G. (ed.). 1992. *Anglistentag 1991 Düsseldorf*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Camras, L. 1994. "Two aspects of emotional development: Expression and elicitation." In Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 347-351.
- Chierchia, G. and S. McConnel-Ginnet. 1990. *Meaning and grammar: An introduction to semantics*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT

- Press.
- Chomsky, N. 1970. "Remarks on nominalisation." In Jacobs, R. and P. S. Rosenbaum (eds). 184-221.
- Clore, G. 1994. "Cognition and emotions: Basic issues". In Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson. (eds). 146-150.
- Coseriu, E. 1962. *Teoria dell'linguaggio e linguistica general*. Madrid: Gredos.
- Coseriu, E. 1967. "Lexicalische Solidaritäten." *Poetica*. I. 293-303.
- Cruse, D.A. 1986. *Lexical semantics*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Cruse, D.A. 1988. "Word meaning and encyclopaedic knowledge." In: Hüllen, W. and R. Schultze. (eds). 73-84.
- Cruse, D.A. 1990. "Prototype theory and lexical semantics." In Tsohatzidis, S.L. (ed.). 382-402.
- Diller, H. J. 1992. "Introduction: Emotions and the linguistics of English." In: Busse, W. (ed.). 25-28.
- Diller, H. J. 1994. "Emotions in the English lexicon: a historical study of a lexical field." In: Fernandez, F. Fuster, M. and J. J. Calvo (eds). 219-234.
- Diller, H. J. 1996. "Joy and *mirth* in Middle English (and a little bit in Old): A plea for the consideration of genre in historical semantics." In: Fisiak, J. (ed.). 83-105.
- Dressler, W. and L. M. Barbaresi. 1994. *Morphopragmatics: Diminutives and intensifiers in Italian, German and other languages*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Dunn, J. 1994. "Experience and understanding of emotions, relationships, and membership in a particular culture." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 352-355.
- Eikmeyer, H. J. and H. Rieser. 1981. *Words, Worlds and Contexts. New approaches in word semantics*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Ekman, P. 1994. "Antecedent events and emotion metaphors." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 146-149.
- Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson. (eds). 1994. *The nature of emotions. Fundamental questions*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ellsworth, P. C. 1994a. "Some reasons to expect universal antecedents of emotion." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 150-154.
- Ellsworth, P. C. 1994b. "Levels of thought and levels of emotion". In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 192-196.
- Fabiszak, M. 2000. "An application of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage to diachronic semantics". In: Taavitsainen, I. Nevalainen, T. Pahta, P. and M.

- Rissanen. (eds.). 293-312.
- Fehr, B. and J. A. Russel. 1984. "Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective." *Journal of experimental psychology: General*. 113/3. 464-486.
- Fell, Ch. 1982-1983. "Unfrith: An approach to a definition." *Saga Book of the Viking Society for Northern Research*. 85-100.
- Fernandez, F., Fuster, M. and J. J. Calvo (eds). 1994. *English Historical Linguistics 1992*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Fillmore, C. 1968. "The case for case." In: Bach, E. and R. Harms. (eds). 1-90.
- Fillmore, C. 1971. "Verbs of judging: An exercise in semantic description." In: Fillmore, C. and D.T. Langendoen (eds). 273-290.
- Fillmore, C. and D. T. Langendoen. (eds). 1971. *Studies in linguistic semantics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Fisiak, J. (ed.). 1985. *Historical semantics. Historical word-formation*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Fisiak, J. (ed.). 1996. *Middle English miscellany. From vocabulary to linguistic variation*. Poznań: Motivex.
- Fodor, J.D. 1977. *Semantics: Theories of meaning in generative grammar*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Fodor, J. 1987. *Psychosemantics. Problem of meaning in the psychology of mind*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Geckeler, H. 1981. "Structural semantics." In: Eikmeyer, H. J. and H. Rieser. (eds). 382-413.
- Geckeler, H. 1988. "Major aspects of the lexematics of the Tübingen School of semantics." In: Hüllen, W. and R. Schultze. (eds). 11-22.
- Geertz, H. 1959. "The vocabulary of emotion." *Psychiatry*. 22. 225-237.
- Gillis, 1988. "From ritual to romance: Towards an alternative history of love." In: Stearns C. Z. and P. N. Stearns. (eds). 87-121.
- Girvan, R. 1971 [1935]. *Beowulf and the seventh century. Language and content*. London: Methuen.
- Goddard, C. and A. Wierzbicka. (eds). 1994. *Semantic and lexical universals: Theory and empirical findings*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Gopnik, A. 1983. "Conceptual and semantic change in scientists and children: Why there are no semantic universals." *Linguistics* 21-1 [263]. 163-179.
- Grandy, R. E. 1987. "In defence of semantic fields." In: Lepore, E. (ed.). 259-280.
- Grimshaw, J. 1990. *Argument structure*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Gruber, J.S. 1965. [1976]. *Studies in lexical relations*. Ph.D. dissertation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT. Printed in 1976 as *Language and spatial cognition*. New York:

- CUP.
- Harre, R. and W. G. Parrot. (eds). 1996. *The emotions. Social, cultural and biological dimensions*. London: Sage.
- Heelas, P. 1996. "Emotion talks across cultures." In Harre, R. and W.G. Parrot. (eds). 171-199.
- Hill J. 1995. *The cultural world in Beowulf*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Holland, D. and N. Quinn (eds). 1987. *Cultural models in language and thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hüllen, W. and R. Schultze. (eds). 1988. *Understanding the lexicon. Meaning, sense and world knowledge in lexical semantics*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Inchurralde, C. 1997. "Space, reference, and emotional involvement." In: Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds.). 135-154.
- Izard, C. 1972. *Patterns of emotions*. New York: Academic Press.
- Izard, C. 1986. *Measuring emotions in infants and children*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: CUP.
- Jackendoff, R. 1983. *Semantics and cognition*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Jackendoff, R. 1990. *Semantic structures*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press.
- Jackendoff, R. 1992. *Languages of the mind. Essays on mental representation*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press.
- Jacobs, R. and P. S. Rosenbaum. (eds). 1970. *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*. Waltham: Ginn.
- James, W. 1913. *Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Johnson, M. 1987. *The body in the mind. The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1992. *A developmental perspective on cognitive science*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press.
- Kastovsky, D. 1988. "Structural semantics or prototype semantics? The evidence of word formation." In: Hüllen, W. and R. Schultze. (eds). 190-203.
- Kastovsky, D. and A. Szwedek (eds). 1986. *Linguistics across historical and geographical boundaries*. Berlin: Mouton.
- Katz, J.J. 1972. *Semantic theory*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Katz, J.J. and J.A. Fodor. 1963. "The structure of a semantic theory." *Language* 39. 170-210.
- Kleparski, A. G. 1990. *Semantic change in English. A study of evaluative developments in the domain of humans*. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL.
- Klunnert, M.D., Campos, J.J., Sorce, J.F., Emde, R.N. and M. Svejda. 1983.

- "Emotions as behaviour regulators: Social referencing in infancy." In: Plutchik, R. and H. Kellerman (eds). 57-86.
- Korn, K. 1932. *Studien über Freude und Trüben bei mittelhochdeutsch Dichtern*. Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.J. Weber.
- Kövecses, Z. 1989. "Minimal and full definitions of meaning." Duisburg: LAUD A252. 1-27.
- Kryk-Kastovsky, B. 1997. "Surprise, surprise: The iconicity-emotionality scale of emotions." In Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 155-169.
- Krzyszowski, T. 1997. *Angels and devils in hell. Elements of axiology in semantics*. Warszawa: Energiea.
- Kurcz, I. 1976. *Psycholingwistyka. Przegląd problemów badawczych*. Warszawa: PWN.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. and Z. Kövecses. 1987. "The cognitive model of anger inherent in American English." In: Holland, D. and N. Quinn (eds.). 195-221.
- Lakoff, G. 1987. *Women, fire and dangerous things*. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.
- Langacker, R. 1983. "Foundations of cognitive grammar I: Orientation". LAUT A99.
- Langacker, R. 1983. "Foundations of cognitive grammar II: Semantic Structure." LAUT A100.
- Langacker, R. 1991. *Concept, image and symbol. The cognitive basis of grammar*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Le Goff, J. 1997 [1985]. *Świat średniowiecznej wyobraźni. [La 'imaginaire medieval. Essais.]* Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona.
- Lehrer, A. 1974. *Semantic fields and lexical structure*. Amsterdam and London: North Holland.
- Lehrer, A. 1990. "Prototype theory and its implications for lexical analysis." In: Tsohatzidis, S.L. (ed.). 368-381.
- Lepore, E. 1987. *New directions in semantics*. London: Academic Press.
- Levenson, R. W. 1994. "Human emotions: A functional view". In Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 123-126.
- Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, B. 1985. "On semantic change in a dynamic model of language." In Fisiak, J. (ed.) 297-323.
- Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, B. 1993. "Bilingual Thesaurus (BIT), field theory, and cognitive linguistics." In Lutzeier, P. R. 229-238.
- Lipka, 1986. "Semantic features and prototype theory in English lexicology." In: Kastovsky, D. and A. Szwedek (eds). 85-94.

- Lochrie, K. 1986. "Anglo-Saxon morning sickness." *Neophilologus* 70. 316-318.
- Lofland, L. H. 1985. "The social shaping of emotion. The case of grief." *Symbolic interaction*. 8/2. 171-190.
- Luria, A. R. 1966. *Human brain and psychological processes*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Lutz, C. 1988. *Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on an Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lutzeier, P. R. (ed.). 1993. *Studies in lexical field theory*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Lyons, J. 1977. *Semantics*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Magennis, H. 1986. "Monig oft gesæt: Some images of sitting in Old English poetry." *Neophilologus* 70. 442-452.
- Malkiel, Y. 1993. *Etymology*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Marr, D. 1982. *Vision*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Menner, R. J. 1945. "Multiple meaning and change of meaning in English." *Language* 21. 59-76.
- Mettinger, A. 1988a. Aspects of semantic opposition in English. A corpus-based study of binary meaning relations. PhD Dissertation. University of Vienna. [Later published as Mettinger, A. 1994. *Aspects of semantic opposition in English*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.]
- Mettinger, A. 1988b. "Pay Caesar what is due to Caesar...: Semantic features vindicated." In: Hüllen, W. and R. Schultze. (eds). 146-158.
- Moore, T.E. (ed.) 1973. *Cognitive development and the acquisition of language*. New York: Academic Press.
- Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 1997. *The language of emotions. Conceptualisation, expression and theoretical foundation*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Oller, J. W. and A. Wiltshire. 1997. "Towards a semiotic theory of affect." In: Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 33-54.
- Omondi, L. 1997. "Dhoulo emotional language: An overview." In: Niemeier, S. and R. Dirven. (eds). 87-109.
- Ortony, A. and T. Turner. 1990. "What's basic about basic emotions?" *Psychological Review*. 74. 315-331.
- Ortony, A. Clore, G. and Collins, A. 1988. [1990] *The cognitive structure of emotions*. CUP.
- Ostheeren, K. 1964. *Studien zum Begriff der 'Freude' und seinen*

- Ausdrucksmitteln in altenglischen Texten (Poesie, Alfred, AElfric)*. Heidelberg: no publisher.
- Piaget, J. 1970. *Genetic epistemology*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Plutchik, R. and H. Kellerman. (eds). 1983. *Emotion: Theory, research and experience*. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press.
- Porzig, W. 1934. "Wesenhaften Bedeutungsbeziehungen." *Beiträge zur deutschen Sprache und Literatur*. 58. 70-97.
- Pullman, S. 1983. *Word meaning and belief*. London and Canberra: Croom Helm.
- Pustejovsky, J. 1995. [1996]. *The Generative Lexicon*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Reymert, L.M. 1950. *The Second International Symposium on Feelings and Emotions*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Roget's Thesaurus*. 1962. New York: Crowell.
- Rosch, E. 1973a. "Natural categories." *Cognitive psychology*. 4. 328-350.
- Rosch, E. 1973b. "On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories." In: Moore, T.E. (ed.). 111-144.
- Rosch, E. 1975. "Cognitive representations of semantic categories." *Journal of experimental psychology: General*. 104. 192-233.
- Rosch, E. 1978. "Principles of categorisation." In Rosch, E. and B.B. Lloyd. (eds). 27-71.
- Rosch, E. and B.B. Lloyd. (eds). 1978. *Cognition and categorisation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Russel, J. A. and A. Mehrebian. 1977. "Evidence for a three-factor theory of emotions." *Journal of research in personality*. 11. 273-294.
- Scherer, K. R. 1994a. "Toward a concept of 'Modal Emotions'." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 25-31.
- Scherer, K. R. 1994b. "Evidence for both universality and cultural specificity of emotion elicitation." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 172-175.
- Sebeok, T. (ed.). 1966. *Current trends in linguistics*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Shweder, R. A. 1994. "'You're not sick, you're just in love': Emotion as an interpretive system." In: Ekman, P. and R. J. Davidson (eds). 32-44.
- Solomon, R. C. 1977. *The passions*. Garden City: Anchor Press.
- Stearns, C. Z. 1988. "'Lord help me walk humbly': Anger and sadness in England and America 1570-1750." In: Stearns C. Z. and P. N. Stearns. (eds). 39-68.
- Stearns, C. Z. and P. N. Stearns. 1988. *Emotion and social change*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Stearns, P. N. 1988. "The rise of sibling jealousy in the twentieth century." In Stearns, C. Z. and P. N. Stearns. (eds).
- Stearns, P. N. and M. Knapp. 1996. "Historical perspectives on grief." In: Harre, R. and W.G. Parrot. (eds). 132-150.

- Stern, G. 1931. [1965]. *Meaning and change of meaning*. Gothenburg: no publisher. (Reprinted: 1965. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.)
- Strite, V. 1989. *Old English Semantic-Field Studies*. New York and Bern: Peter Lang.
- Sweetser, E. 1991. *From etymology to pragmatics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Taavitsainen, I. Nevalainen, T. Pahta, P. and M. Rissanen. (eds.). 2000. *Placing Middle English in Context*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Trier, J. 1934. "Das sprachliche feld. Eine Auseinandersetzung." *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*. 10. 428-49.
- Tsohatzidis, S.L. (ed.). 1990. *Meanings and prototypes. Studies in linguistic categorisation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Verdon, J. 1996. *Le plaisir au Moyen Age*. Librairie Académique Perrin. [Translated into Polish by Jan Maria Kłoczowski as *Przyjemności średniowiecza* 1998. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen.]
- Watson, J.B. 1919. *Psychology from a standpoint of a behaviourist*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Weinreich, U. 1966. "Explorations in semantic theory." In: Sebeok, T. (ed.).
- Wenger, M.A. 1950. "Emotion as a visceral action: An extension of Lange's theory." In: Reymert, L.M. (ed). 3-10.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1972. *Semantic primitives*. Linguistische Forschungen. 22. Frankfurt: Athenäum.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1985. *Lexicography and conceptual analysis*. Ann Arbor: Karoma.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1988a. "L'amour, la colere, la joie, l'ennui: La semantique des emotions dans une perspective transculturelle [Love, anger, joy, boredom: The semantics of emotions in a transcultural perspective]." *Langages*. 89. 97-107.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1988b. *The semantics of grammar*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1990. "'Prototypes save': On the uses and abuses of the notion of 'prototype' in linguistics and related fields." In: Tsohatzidis, S.L. (ed.). 347-367.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1992. "Defining emotion concepts." *Cognitive Science* 16. 539-581.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1993. "Reading human faces. Emotion components and universal semantics." *Pragmatics and Cognition*. 1 (1). 1-23.
- Wierzbicka, A. 1996. *Semantics. Primes and universals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wundt, W. 1924. [1912]. *An introduction to psychology*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Zwicky, A. 1971. "In a manner of speaking". *Linguistic Inquiry*. 2. 223-233.