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**HAMIT ERSOY**  
**TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN WESTERN DEFENCE**  
**INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1950s**  
**ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines how and why Turkey became involved in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s - a period of exceptional significance for Turkey since it began with free elections that brought about a change of government and ended with a military coup that overthrew that government. It was also the period when Turkey was admitted to NATO and joined the Baghdad Pact as a founder member.

British documents in the Public Record Office, Kew, American documents from the Library of Congress, Washington, DC., Turkish material from the Library of the Grand National Assembly and the National Library, Ankara, constitute most of the primary written research material. This is supplemented by information obtained in personal interviews with a number of politicians, diplomats and others with special knowledge of the subject.

A brief introductory chapter outlines the relevant political background of the 1950s and records the research methods adopted. The following chapter contains a discussion of relevant theories. In Chapter III attention is turned to the historical background of the region including a brief survey of the countries concerned. Chapter IV offers a closer look at the Turkish historical development, the struggle for independence, Kemalist reforms, and the process of westernisation.

Chapter V is concerned with the various western defence plans for the Middle East in the early 1950s up to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. Chapter VI examines the formation of the Pact, the attempts that were made to expand it, and the regional repercussions to these developments. Chapter VII deals with the collapse of the Pact and the impact of its failure. The final chapter contains the conclusions of the research - in essence that the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East mostly originated from the British, who were hoping to preserve their own interest in the region, and were adopted and promoted by the Turks, who were keen to gain Western acceptance and were willing to lend their support to these plans as payment for admission to NATO which they regarded as proof of significant advance along the road to westernisation.

# **TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN WESTERN DEFENCE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1950s**

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**Hamit ERSOY**

**A Thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Durham**

**The Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Durham  
March 1994**



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**Dedicated to all who seek genuine peace and justice in the Middle East.**

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Within the University of Durham, the Centre for Turkish Studies, The Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, the Computer Centre and the Main Library have earned my gratitude for the use of their facilities and the helpfulness of their staff.

Outside Durham University, my work was most heavily dependent upon the excellent material and facilities provided by the Public Record Office, Kew. My thanks are also due to the British Library in Boston Spa, Wetherby, the university libraries in Manchester, Leicester and Newcastle Upon Tyne from where I collected a considerable amount of material, and the US Government Printing Office, which provided me with most of the American documents I needed, and the US Library of Congress from which I collected further material.

I would like to register my thanks to the Library of Turkish National Assembly, the National Library in Ankara, and the Faculty of Political Science Library, Ankara. However, I am, unfortunately, unable to extend my thanks to the Archives Department of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and General Archive Directorate of Prime Ministry which are assumed to hold most of the Turkish documents on the country's foreign affairs as they were not able to allow me to have an access to those documents. The same holds true for Pakistan, Iran and Iraq as when I wrote to them, their Embassies in London either failed to mention in their letters to me whether it was possible to obtain any documents related to the Baghdad Pact in their countries or else they did not bother to reply at all.

With regard to individuals, it will be apparent to readers of this thesis that I am enormously indebted to my interviewees (listed on p. 403.) for the information and ideas they were kind enough to give me so unstintingly.

To produce a Ph.D. thesis a research student needs someone with whom one can discuss one's ideas and from whom one can receive support and guidance. I am most grateful to Mr. John Norton, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies, who not only supervised me throughout the period of my research but also helped me to become familiar with research techniques and methodology and encouraged me to use a wide range of computing facilities for my work and to learn to type with ten fingers!

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February 1994

## **NOTES ON THE TRANSCRIPTION AND PRONUNCIATION OF TURKISH WORDS**

Turkish words in the text are given in modern Turkish spelling.

The Turkish alphabet is phonetic and presents few problems, but readers unfamiliar with it should note particularly the pronunciation of the following letters:

**c** - is pronounced like the English **j** in **jam**.

**ç** - is pronounced like the English **ch** in **church**.

**g** - is always pronounced hard like the English **g** in **gun**.

**ğ** - after **e**, **i**, **ö** or **ü** is pronounced like the **y** in English **yes**. After **a**, **ı**, **o** or **u** it is itself silent and serves only to lengthen the preceding vowel.

**i** - is pronounced like the English **i** in **fit**.

**ı** - is rather like the English **i** in **fir**. (The corners of the mouth should be pulled back when pronouncing **ı**).

**ö** - is pronounced as it is in **German**.

**ş** - is pronounced like the English **sh** in **ship**.

**ü** - is pronounced with the lips forward and rounded as for the French **tu**.

A circumflex over a vowel denotes a slight ``y'' sound between it and a preceding **g**, **k**, or **l**. Otherwise the circumflex serves to lengthen the vowel.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AHC	Arab High Committee
AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
ARAMCO	Arab-American Oil Company
BRISMES	British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CIGS	[The British] Chief of Imperial General Staff
DLF	Development Loan Fund
DP	Democrat Party
EMDO	East Mediterranean Defence Organisation
EURAMES	European Association for Middle Eastern Studies
FO	Foreign Office
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MEC	Middle East Command
MEDO	Middle East Defence Organisation
MMDT	Millet Meclisi Devlet Tutanagi
MESA	Middle Eastern Studies Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Salvation Party
NUC	National Unity Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PRO	Public Record Office
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RPP	Republican People's Party
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
UAR	United Arab Republic



## PREFACE

The present research topic is the consequence of a change of direction necessitated by the 1991 Gulf War. Before that began I had intended to concentrate on Turkish-Iraqi relations, and to that end had undertaken extensive reading on Iraqi history and politics and attended classes to improve my Arabic before a proposed field trip to Iraq. When the course of world events rendered that visit impractical it became clear that it would be impossible to continue balanced research in sufficient depth on my original topic. I therefore sought a new topic, preferably one that would allow me to make use not only of the general skills I had by then acquired in research techniques, familiarity with computers, and so on but also to profit from the specific knowledge I had attained since embarking on research as a Ph.D. student.

Several additional reasons prompted my present choice of topic: it was an aspect of international relations in which Turkey had played a key role (though my research later showed that this concept of Western defence did not originate in Turkish minds); substantial documentary sources were available, including material in the British Public Record Office at Kew, American documents, and records of Turkish parliamentary debates, as well as numerous books and articles; and a number of Turks who had been actively involved in the politics of the period were willing to speak to me about the subject. Baha Aksit, for example, was extremely emotional and eager to speak for hours, if not days. As he put it, ``the Democrat Party decade in the 1950s was the turning point for Turkey and

for the whole world, because by siding with the 'Free World' - the West - Turkey had changed the destiny of the world in favour of the Western democracies".

The importance of this decade for Turkey reinforced my desire to study it. The events of this period not only set the course of future politics in the region, they also created a golden opportunity for Turkey to align with the West and secure a place under the Western defence umbrella. She played an important part in the Korean War, joined NATO, became a founder member of the Baghdad Pact, entered an irreversible process of dependence upon the United States by signing numerous agreements that tied the future of the country to Washington, applied for EEC membership - a goal that remains a major objective of Turkish foreign policy - and did all this while the country's first genuine multi-party democracy was beginning to function.

A further attraction of this period and this topic was dearth of academic research into it, even in Turkey. In recent years many books and articles have been published about various aspects of the states that form the 'Northern Tier': Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of these publications have dealt with the political and economic development of these countries, whereas their relationship with the superpowers was examined either briefly or not at all. There are very few works on this area in French or German, as France and Germany had no vital interests in this region in the 1950s. There were very few books even in Turkish, although Turkey is a regional country. Most importantly, there has been no genuine research based on the first-hand documents relating to Western defence attempts in the area. This thesis is largely based on the British and American documents. It also has the benefit of

the considered opinions given to me in private interviews of some of the prominent politicians and diplomats who were professionally involved in the policies concerned and of scholars who have subsequently assessed these policies.

While all these views proved invaluable in helping to form my own judgements, I should of course state that the conclusions reached are my own. At the same time, I should note that, although I have had access to British and American documents relating to the 1950s, regrettably, the official documents of the regional countries are not available for inspection, so a definitive assessment of the topic must await the rise of less secretive regimes in the area. In Turkey I sought permission to consult the records in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Prime Ministry. At both I was informed that "no-one can have access to the archives relating to the Republic of Turkey". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave me a certificate to that effect (see Appendix 1), but the State Archives Centre in the Prime Ministry declined even to issue any statement that the archives were not available to researchers.

Despite that handicap, it is my hope that the research has helped to reveal the main issues quite clearly and contribute to an understanding of developments in the Middle East in the 1950s, particularly as direct access to some of the people involved in policy making at the time has allowed me to compensate at least partially for the lack of regional primary documentary evidence other than what I was able to consult in the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the form of records of Assembly debates and official statements that had been issued by the Turkish authorities on foreign policy.

# Chapter I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of Study

The subject of this thesis is a very good example of an apparently regional project that reveals a great deal about the relations of Middle Eastern countries with outside Big Powers.

The Middle East is generally acknowledged to be of critical importance to the superpowers. Its economic importance became crucial to the industrialised world with the discovery and exploitation of oil. These factors prompted both superpowers to make tremendous efforts to take control of the region or at least to deny their rival that control. Other rivalries grew with the creation of the state of Israel in an area that contains not only Jewish but also Christian and Muslim Holy Places, and this has added to the reasons why the Middle East never drops from the world's political agenda.

In historical perspective, when our study begins, the Muslim Golden Age and the concurrent European Dark Age were, of course, long past. After the Second World War the countries of the Middle East, including Turkey, were obliged to adjust their economic and political systems to the new post-war order. Both internal and external pressures forced them to make these adjustments. Similar pressures affected the regional players. The erstwhile "Great" Britain, debilitated by her efforts in the Second World War, was getting ready to transfer her responsibilities to her transatlantic friend, the United States, which was setting her face against



any return to isolationist policies and was accepting a global role. Our study covers the application of this global policy to the Middle East.

Following the Second World War all sides were convinced that another global war meant the end of our planet. Yet none of the parties was ready to give up its imperialist ambitions for the sake of a universal peace. The determination of both superpowers to control more parts of the world and to influence more countries and spread their own political system is a major aspect of the background against which this study is set.

Within the very complicated field of extremely elusive, unsettled and fast changing Middle East politics, this study is concerned only with political and military policies and it is focused on the Northern Tier. We have tried hard to avoid reference to other regional events and developments unless they had a direct impact upon or were directly influenced by developments in the Northern Tier. Many of the events that occurred within the Middle East during this period such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Suez crisis, the Cyprus problem, North African independence, and the Kurdish issue merit separate studies but could be mentioned in this thesis only insofar as they were directly relevant to our subject. The thesis is also limited in terms of time, being concerned with the 1950s and mentions earlier and later developments briefly and only when required.

## 1.2 Aim of the Research

The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s and the Turkish involvement in them were aimed at defending the region against “all” outsiders, in favour of regional countries or whether they were just a means to defend Western economic and political interests in the region while denying the other powers in general and the Soviet Union in particular benefit from the regional resources. It also examines whether these initiatives were indigenous or externally imposed.

At the same time it questions the role of Turkey in this process and asks whether the Turks were self-motivated in leading the regional countries to align with the West against the Soviet bloc or whether they were prompted by others to do so. It was hoped that an examination of Turkey’s motives would answer the following questions:

(1) Were the Turks genuinely expecting this regional alliance to guarantee their national security in the face of Soviet aggression as stated in various Turkish and Western official statements?

(2) Or were they just paying the price of admission to NATO?

(3) Was the new Turkish leadership, inspired by the history of pre-Republican Turkey, seeking an Islamic alliance and thus turning away from the course set by Atatürk? In other words, did Turkish policy in the Middle East represent a divergence from the Kemalist line or was it a convergence with the West in keeping with Atatürk’s own ambitions?

### 1.3 The importance of the Problem

The importance of this study is heightened because its concern with a vital region in a turbulent period of history sheds light on the nature of international relationships, and in particular the nature of alliances and relations between big powers and small powers, between advanced industrial powers and developing nations.

The importance of the region has already been noted but the significance of the 1950s for anyone seeking a key to understanding the changing pattern of relationships merits a brief comment. The decade was important because:

(1) it was a period of decolonisation.

(2) it was the first decade of the Cold War, which continued with some fluctuations until 1990.

(3) the British were ceding their supremacy in the region to the Americans, so anyone who wishes to understand current American involvement in the Middle East should turn to the 1950s to study how they took on that role.

(4) it was a period of coups and revolutions such as the coup in Syria in 1951, the Egyptian and Lebanese coups in 1952, the coup against Musaddiq in 1953, the coups in Pakistan and Iraq in 1958 and in Turkey in 1960.

(5) it was the decade that saw the most dramatic socio-economic and political effects of commercial oil production.

(6) it was the decade in which Israel, having achieved its recognition, struggled successfully to survive and by various strategies established itself more firmly in the Middle East.

(7) it was the first decade of Turkish multi-party democracy.

(8) it was the first decade of Turkey's integration with the West on the institutional level as she became a member of Western organisations such as NATO, OECD, the Council of Europe, etc., and signed many international treaties binding Turkey to the West.



## 1.4 Methodology

Following a study of the various theories relevant to this field of international relations, and after becoming more familiar with the overall history of the period, I began to search for and study the documentary evidence and to conduct interviews with individuals who had been personally involved in events of the period or who had subsequently examined them closely.

British documents in the Public Record Office, Kew, constitute some of the most useful source material for this thesis. All relevant documents of the 1950s and also documents about the 1937 Sadabad Pact have been consulted in the course of this research.

The American documents which are published by the US Government Printing Office under the title *Foreign Relations of the US* constitute a second important source of material for the thesis. These were obtained from the Library of Congress, from which I subsequently collected additional material during my visit to the United States in 1993.

Visits to the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and to the National Library in Ankara gave me access to records of 1950s' debates and discussions in the Assembly and to official statements that had been issued by the Turkish authorities about their foreign policy in general and the Middle East in particular.

The non-availability of Turkish records comparable to the British records that were accessible in Kew proved frustrating but their lack was to some extent remedied by the interviews I conducted during my two visits to Turkey in the course of the research.

I was fortunate to be able to discuss the Baghdad Pact and Turkey's role within it with former Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil. Sadly, shortly after I had interviewed him his health failed and he died a few months later. Another very valuable interviewee was Baha Akşit from whom I gained a unique insight into the thinking of the Turkish President, Prime Minister and other government leaders of the 1950s with whom he had been on close terms both as a friend and in some instances as personal physician. Hayrettin Erkmen impressed me not only by the breadth of his personal involvement in the events of the period but also by the depth of his academic grasp of the situation which he was able to review dispassionately and objectively. Another interviewee with the benefit of a relevant academic training as a graduate of and later teacher in the Political Science Faculty, Ankara University, was Semih Günver. He had a sensitive awareness of Turkish-Arab relations in the period under discussion.

Some other interviewees proved singularly useful contributors by touching upon aspects that discretion has until recently banned from open discussion in Turkish academia: the Kurdish and the Islamic elements in the picture. In this respect, Melik Fırat, grandson of Sheikh Sait who led the Kurdish rebellion in 1925, shed great light upon Kurdish attitudes and Islamic developments, as also did Gıyasettin Emre, Kendal Nezan and Abbas Vali. By adding greatly to my understanding of the feel of the period and of the personalities who made the policies that are studied throughout this thesis these interviews well repaid the considerable time they took to conduct, transcribe and digest.

At conferences, workshops, seminars and lectures I was able to make other less formal contacts with many of the leading scholars who have studied this period and these further enhanced my knowledge both in general and in detail and alerted

me to many important lines of inquiry. The wide range of views they represented helped me to see the subject from different angles and allowed me to see it in perspective. International conferences were particularly useful in this respect by reflecting different national and even different continental attitudes. BRISMES, EURAMES and MESA conferences all gave valuable opportunities for me to assess these attitudes and also to test my own ideas.

## 1.5 Outline

Naturally, only a fraction of the massive amount of material assembled could actually be incorporated in the thesis. This has been organised to offer first a historical background, then a consideration of relevant theories before a close examination of Turkey's role and Arab reactions. Thus, Chapter II is devoted to theories relating to this aspect of international relations, Chapters III and IV cover the history of the region as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the smaller nation states emerged, Chapters V, VI and VII examine Turkey's role in the abortive attempt to implement Western defence projects and the effects of these actions upon Turkey's relations with the West and the Middle Eastern countries, with special emphasis on neighbouring states and the USA. Chapter VIII presents the conclusions of the research and indicates areas for further study.

## Chapter II

# THE RELEVANCE OF THE MODERN THEORIES TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

### 2.1 General

In this chapter, we shall attempt to analyse some of the alliance theories and the patron-client relation approach within the context of great power-small power relationships in order to understand Turkey's attempts to promote a Western sponsored defence pact in the Middle East in the 1950s. After presenting a picture of the general post-World War II situation we shall concentrate on formation of alliances and how they are maintained. Later, we shall see how these theories apply to the Middle East, with special emphasis on Turkey. In the second stage we shall discuss the patron-client relation approach, which makes it easier to understand the process of alliance formation and its consequences. We shall conclude the chapter with a consideration of the Turkish case.

Before analysing the theoretical background of the Western defence initiatives intended to form an alliance with the help of regional countries, we should remind ourselves of the general picture of the post-war world. The world system which emerged in the late 1940s was characterised by substantial bipolarity unlike the 19th century European multipolar system. As is often the case when power is divided almost equally between two major powers, those two powers would naturally disagree on many issues. One consequence of this disagreement in this instance was the formation of two major blocs, forming the poles of the bipolar system. The

radical change that took place in American foreign policy at the close of World War II - when the United States shifted from a policy of “going it alone” to its new policy of “going it with others” - was the most influential factor shaping the post-war international order. US dominance, coupled with the desire to “go with others”, remains valid in the New World Order of the 1990s as well. The United States became first powerful, then one of the superpowers, and finally, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it became the “only” power.

When the US realised after World War II that an effective collective security system had not been established by the UN, she began to construct a vast system of alliances against the Soviet Bloc. Among those were SEATO and CENTO.<sup>1</sup> Those alliances should therefore be seen in the light of American global strategy rather than as regional initiatives.<sup>2</sup>

Conflict had developed in the late 1940s over Berlin, Iran, Greece, Turkey and later in the 1950s over the Middle East. The West countered these Soviet threats by the formation of NATO as the major western alliance. The Soviet Union also set up the Warsaw Pact with her satellites. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 spread the contest to Asia, and led the United States to encourage the establishment of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

These alliances were formalised during a period of ambivalent international

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<sup>1</sup> Holsti, Ole R., et. al., *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances; Comparative Studies*, John Wiley and Sons, London, 1973, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> The alliances or pacts concluded under pressure or threats from a great power (cat and mouse theories) are called Al Capone alliances. Examples are those concluded between the USSR and the Baltic States in September and October 1939 or most of the 329 bilateral treaties, agreements, and protocols signed by the USSR and the East European countries in the ten years preceding the Warsaw Pact or similar alliances formed under the United States dominance. If some of these Al Capone alliances had not been made by the “free choice” of the weak states, the USSR would have occupied their territory directly. Not only had the weak states no choice about signing the treaties offered them, they could not align themselves with any other great power. This is true of certain western alliances too but to a different degree, as evidenced by the British treatment of Iraq and Egypt in the 1950s. It was not completely successful though.

developments. On the one hand, the end of the Korean War and Stalin's death in 1953 led to some relaxation of tension<sup>3</sup> and to the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference which brought western and Soviet leaders together for the first time since the Second World War. On the other hand, the Soviet response to the 1956 Hungarian uprising caused further shock waves. Nevertheless a partial *détente* was maintained throughout the remainder of the 1950s and Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited the USA in 1959.

While the Atlantic Alliance reposed upon the firm foundation of shared perception of the communist threat and reliance upon NATO to avert it, no such general and reassuring statement can be made about the Western alliances with nations outside Europe. Considering Asia and the Middle East, we agree with Arnold Wolfers that,

Asian alliances, of which SEATO and the Baghdad Pact provide the outstanding examples, are of an entirely different type. They have three characteristics in common: complementary interests tending toward transformation into incompatible ones, a radically unequal distribution of benefits, and ideological emphasis.

These alliances, on the face of them, were conceived in terms of common action on behalf of common interests. However, in view of the remoteness of the apparent *casus foederis*, that is, Communist attack upon a member, and of the virtual impossibility, in case of such an attack, for most members to act in common, commitment to common action has receded into the background and been distilled into an anti-Communist ideological commitment. Of the Asian members, this commitment requires nothing more than membership in the alliance; it requires no common objective, policy, and action - beyond anti-Communism at home and abroad. Yet of the Western members, especially the United States, it requires specific policies and actions on behalf of the Asian members.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, one can argue that when the Soviet Union protested to the regional countries about their membership of a Western sponsored defence project, namely the Baghdad Pact, the West encouraged those countries to firmly resist. For ex-

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<sup>3</sup> Although it had little effect on Turkish foreign policy, in July 1953 the Soviets also officially withdrew all claims to Turkish territory. Dallin, David J., 'Soviet Policy in the Middle East,' *Middle East Affairs*, (November 1955), p. 340.

<sup>4</sup> Wolfers, Arnold, *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959, pp. 202-203.

ample, as Bağcı stated to the author, “for the first and last time the US reacted within 24 hours to the Soviet protest against Turkey during the Syrian Crisis of 1957.”<sup>5</sup>

The regional members were interested in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact primarily because of the economic, military, and political support they received from the United States. Many of them regarded their membership in these alliances to constitute a special claim upon the American economic aid, American arms, and American political support for their special national aspirations. In other words, the American support was the price the United States paid for having the receiving nations as allies.

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Bağcı.



## 2.2 Alliance Theories

An alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations<sup>6</sup> to collaborate on national security issues. Some authors used the terms alliance, coalition, pact and bloc interchangeably, whereas others distinguish among them on various criteria. Nor is there agreement on classifying types of alliances. Most authors seem to agree that the adjectives “offensive” and “defensive” are too value-laden to be of much utility. “Defensive pact,” “neutrality and non aggression pact” and “entente” are also used widely, but not necessarily uniformly. But the differences are not merely semantic, as authors diverge in their fundamental conception of alliances. They are variously considered as techniques of statecraft, international organisations, or regulating mechanisms in the balance of power.<sup>7</sup>

Affiliation theories approach alliance formation from a sociometric perspective, addressing themselves to the similarities and differences of two or more nations as an element in their propensity to align. The initial premise is that nations are likely to be selective in their choice of allies, exhibiting a preference for partners with whom they share common institutions, cultural and ideological values, or economic interests.

Nations feel the need for allies when they are not strong enough to face potential dangers alone. In choosing their allies they are obliged to weigh both external and internal factors: they must consider the international regimes concerned and also their own government’s ideology and their nation’s political, economic and military situation. So, the alliance formation process becomes quite complicated depending on the international regimes involved, its costs, risks, advantages and

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<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 405.

<sup>7</sup> Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 3.

disadvantages since smaller members of an alliance face tremendous constraints due to their affiliation to it. These constraints have considerable effects on their behaviour and, to a certain extent, determine how they will respond to each other, within or outside alliances. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and bear in mind the post-war bipolar international regime, in another words, the cold war conditions when the communist threat seemed very real.<sup>8</sup>

In a bipolar system, weak states seek different ways and means to attract the support of the big powers and influence their foreign policy in their favour. Weak states can strengthen the commitment of a great power by establishing a symbolic value - a reputation as a "bastion of democracy," a model of a "harmonious alliance" or a "staunch resister of aggression." The weak state in the alliance gives the great power an opportunity to demonstrate a benevolent attitude toward all weak states. (Turkey, for example, gave the Americans an opportunity to project a positive American image and thus, committed America to carrying on its favourable policy towards her after the Truman Doctrine.)

As Michael Handel rightly put it, when "treaties are made by the 'free choice' of two unequal partners, the issues of maintaining the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the weak state are secondary."<sup>9</sup> In elaboration he states:

In some instances, the relationship between a great power and a weak can take on a less favourable form from the weak state's point of view. The weak state can still get protection or material aid in time of need, but in return it has to render services which considerably limit its freedom of action and decision on a large variety of international issues. On almost every issue it has to follow the great power's lead and continuously try to please it. Sometimes the weak state is asked to do so; sometimes, on its own initiative, it tries to guess what the great power would like it to do.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Surprisingly this threat still seemed very real to many educated people, even some Turkish intellectuals during my fieldwork in 1992.

<sup>9</sup> Handel, M., *Weak States in the International System*, Frank Cass, London, 1981, p. 122.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 131-32.

The validity of this assessment was especially apparent during the cold war period. Turkey's attitude towards the Middle East and her voting patterns in the UN during this period constitute a good example. Indeed, the chief result of the Baghdad Pact, as far as the regional countries were concerned, was to bring the rivalry of the two blocs into the Middle East and to divide the regional countries into different groupings.

In fact, a respectable argument is that alliances act as conduits to spread conflict to regions previously free from it.

Kautilya said that "a state located between two powerful states should seek collaboration and protection from the stronger of the two."<sup>11</sup> It was indeed the United States economic, military and political power that attracted most of the poorer countries hoping that they would be provided with generous United States economic aid. This is another fact that indicates the Third World countries were after "money" rather than anything else.

That party which is the keener of the two to maintain an alliance is naturally placed in the weaker bargaining position. It is frequently the case that the stronger alliance partner is the one which is keener to maintain the alliance and thus, is in the weaker bargaining position. This was true of the Turkish-American alliance.

Nations join forces in order to aggregate sufficient capabilities to achieve certain foreign policy goals. One of the most important motives for alliance formation is to prevent any nation or combination of countries from achieving a dominant position. For example, the Baghdad Pact was basically set up to prevent a probable Soviet dominance in the Middle East whose oil was vital to the West.

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<sup>11</sup> Holsti, Ole R., *op. cit.*, p. 1.

Some writers suggested a relationship between a nation's political structure and its alliance policy. Queen Margaret poetically recorded this point in Shakespeare's Henry VI:

For how can Tyrants safely governe home,  
Unlesse abroad they purchase great allyance?<sup>12</sup>

There could be more than one reason prompting a state to align with one or more external powers. Some of them are as follows:

Having faced a perceived threat, weak nations will seek strong alliance partners. The Turkish alignment with the United States can, among other things, be seen in this context as a consequence of the Soviet threat against Turkey.

Accepting this general view, Fox suggests that the small states turn to the "lesser of the two evils". In her view, the main external source of a small state's strength in dealing with one great power was "the knowledge, open to both parties, that there were behind the small state one or more other great powers."<sup>13</sup> Turkey's policy towards the USSR in the 1950s constitutes a good example. In fact, Turkey consulted her allies before answering the Soviet protests concerning Turkey's membership of the Baghdad Pact.

According to Fox geography is also an important factor in calculations of the small state and great state.<sup>14</sup> Turkey's geostrategic location and its importance to the defence of the Western world was indeed one of the major factors producing the Turkish-Western alignment in the 1950s.

The attraction of strong states for the weak is based primarily on economic

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> Fox, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Fox, op. cit., p. 8.

need. Indeed, one of the reasons for Turkey to align with the United States was to improve her badly managed economy and modernise it while guaranteeing security of the country and westernising its society.

A weaker power will be commonly anxious to seek alignment with geographically remoter powers. This is accidentally also true for the Turkish case, but a country does not align with the remoter power just because it is remote. Turkey chose the West instead of the USSR for ideological, historical, economic and military interests.

However in some exceptional cases, the alliance between the weak and great powers may be useful for both sides.<sup>15</sup> For instance, the alliance between the United States and Israel is useful for both sides, but this is not the case for most of the alliances. This pattern of patron-client relations developed between Israel and the United States ever since its establishment. While both sides benefited from this type of mutual dependence, it seems as if Israel gained even more for services she rendered her patron, at least in the short run.

As far as survival of an alliance is concerned we note that a rigid alliance system is likely to suffer much greater disintegration than a loose one.<sup>16</sup> Indeed the Baghdad Pact was relative to the CENTO more rigid and therefore very short-lived. With the exception of Iraq the same members set up a looser alliance, CENTO, and it survived up to the end of the 1970s, possibly because the latter had, among other things, looser objectives than the former.

Maintenance of an alliance may be more difficult than its formation. There are many factors affecting durability of an alliance. For example, domestic instability is

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<sup>15</sup> Han, Sungjoo, 'South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the United States-Korean Alliance,' *Orbis*, 21(1978), pp. 897-898.

<sup>16</sup> Holsti, Ole R., *op. cit.*, p. 29.

the national attribute most often associated with alliance disintegration. Unstable regimes may experience radical changes in elite which, in turn, result in shifting patterns of alignment. Qassem's shift from the Western alliance, the Baghdad Pact, to a Non-Aligned bloc following his successful July revolution is a case in point.

An alliance has traditionally been regarded as an instrument of policy by means of which a nation may augment its own capabilities. Among the benefits that should accrue from alliance membership are enhanced security from external threat, reduced defence expenditures, and possible side benefits such as economic aid and prestige. Most of the weak states agree to the unfavourable conditions of an alliance to achieve these objectives. However, great powers also have their own priorities, which are mostly contrary to those of the weak states. Such an alliance could not survive without external support or without domestic political support. For a regime with shaky popular support a strong ally may be a necessary condition for survival. It is a matter for speculation how long for instance Nuri Said or the Shah would have remained in power without full British and American support respectively.

Domestic political support for an alliance is also an important factor. Nuri Said found that his domestic political support was withdrawn when he followed a foreign policy that was identified with an attitude of the West and by looking at the world from the viewpoint of London rather than Baghdad he gave too little emphasis to locally more important issues. He placed co-operation with the West ahead of greater Arab nationalism and paid for it with his life. The alliance of the free nations, in so far as it depends upon a common evaluation of the external threat, is tenuous, and vacillating.

The effectiveness of an alliance is directly proportional to the stability of its members. Since none of the regimes of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact was stable the Pact itself quickly disappeared from the scene with the collapse of one member, Iraq, as a result of the military coup in 1958. Both the Pakistani and Turkish governments were also ousted from power by the year 1960.

The stronger the polarity of the international system, the greater the cohesion of component alliances; conversely, the weaker the polarity, the less the alliance cohesion. The alliances formed during the cold war generally survived longer than those of pre-World War II, because the polarity of the international system was not so strong before the war.

It is often claimed that the generality or scope of an alliance is inversely related to its durability. It is easier to maintain co-operation for specific purposes in geographically limited areas than in global alliances that make a substantial claim on resources and freedom of action. Thus, it may be argued that in reality the scope of the Baghdad Pact was too wide. Contrary to the assertions of its regional promoters that it was brought into being to further regional co-operation and development, it was actually intended to struggle against international communism. Such a broad aim, which was not also fully shared by the regional members, was inimical to its durability.

Another factor playing a crucial role in forming as well as maintaining an alliance is the ideology. Ideology provides the rationalisation for many alliances. Ideology may also play a part in sustaining or dissolving alliance bonds. Arguing that a similarity in values adds to the durability of alliances Holsti states: "there is widespread affirmation, even by those who tend to minimise the importance of ideology in alliance formation. ... The greater the need to maintain ideological

homogeneity in an alliance, the greater will be the tendencies toward disintegration.”<sup>17</sup>

In alliances which are ideologically homogeneous, there are fewer problems of performance than in those that are ideologically heterogeneous. It was for this reason that the British diplomats emphasised the point that they had to create an ideology for the Baghdad Pact.<sup>18</sup>

External threat is generally linked to both alliance formation and alliance cohesion. The logical extension of these observations is that as the bond of fear dissolves, so do alliances. Indeed one cannot just claim that the Baghdad Pact dissolved simply because Iraq left it. Although that played a very important part, the *détente* between the superpowers played a more crucial role than anything else.

Effective agreement on disarmament measures has also been associated with the dissolution of alliances. Those who assume that present levels of military arsenals are the major source of international tensions might conclude that a disarmed world would be free of the kinds of external threat which have often given rise to alliance formation.

Other popular propositions concerning the duration of alliances are those that examine the effects of size, structure, and purposes on the duration and termination of alliances.

Palmerston once noted that nations have neither permanent enemies nor permanent allies, only permanent interests. More recently Fedder has asserted that enmities and alliances are not “particularly viable” components of the interna-

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957: Near East Region, Iran, Iraq*, Vol.12, 7 June 1956, Meeting of Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact Powers, Department of State, Washington D.C., p. 305.



tional system. Why do some coalitions endure for relatively long periods, whereas others are stillborn virtually from the moment of conception? This is mainly due to the combination of most, if not all, of the factors mentioned so far.

## 2.3 Application of Alliance Theories to the Middle East

When the Baghdad Pact was created, the international scene was governed by the bipolar system. The West was at pains to convince Third World countries that there was an international communist threat to their existence. On one hand, Great Britain and the US had to reconcile their own views on several points regarding how to keep the Middle East under the Western control, on the other hand, both together had to convince the Middle Eastern countries themselves that the Communist threat was of prime importance. Indeed as summarised earlier, the patterns of relationships between weak and greater powers are very much applicable to our case study.

As previously mentioned, treaties signed between two unequal partners push the sovereignty, independence and integrity of weak state into second place. This is applicable to the Turkish pattern of foreign policy in general and in the 1950s in particular. Turkish diplomats extended their support to the extent that it became so embarrassing for the Americans that they felt obliged to advise the Turks not to follow the United States in the UN so closely.<sup>19</sup> It is also clear in many other basic Turkish foreign policy issues such as the Korean war, Middle East and Balkan defence initiatives, Turkish policy toward Israel, North African and many other Middle Eastern countries, etc. It could be said that Turkey did not try to make her own separate and independent foreign policy especially in the 1950s but left this job to Washington. All Turkey did was to follow the steps of America in the manner described by Michael Handel above.

As stated earlier, the formation of alliances usually but spread conflict to re-

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<sup>19</sup> Handel, op. cit., pp. 131-132; Singer, Marshall, *Weak States in a World of Powers*, The Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 315, and McGhee, George, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, MacMillan, London, 1990, p. 140.

gions where the alliances are formed, as the establishment of the Baghdad Pact increased the pace of the Superpowers contest in the Middle East. The point is that it was not only the USSR that made Al Capone alliances with her friends. Most of the Western alliances such as SEATO, CENTO, Central American Organisation etc. could be placed in the same category.

In Asia, all that the West wanted was the maximum number of Asian allies and all that the Asian allies wanted was the maximum amount of Western support for their own specific national objectives in so far as the two interests could be said to complement each other, provided these objectives were compatible with those of the other allies. This compatibility, in view of the nature of the interests involved, is bound to be precarious. Such alliances are bound to disintegrate whenever a latent conflict of interests between two allies or an ally and another nation becomes acute. The conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, and Iraq and Israel over the Palestinian issue are cases in point. In consequence, the United States engaged, as it were, in an armaments race with itself by proxy, its left hand supporting Pakistan by virtue of the alliance, its right hand aiding India by virtue of its vital interests. When the Iraqi coup occurred, the Baghdad Pact ceased to exist. Although it was succeeded by CENTO, the expectations from this new organisation were different. Whereas the Baghdad Pact had been exclusively military and political, CENTO's range of interests was wider and it was increasingly concerned with regional development and cultural activities, and the political and military expectations were considerably reduced. In this way it was hoped to keep the organisation in existence and enhance its standing.

As stated earlier, the Asian pacts were meant to serve the American cause in the

first place. Commenting on the first step of the Baghdad Pact, the Turco-Pakistani agreement, an American Joint Chiefs of Staff paper mentioned that it was mainly a political ploy to awaken both states to “common external dangers and internal threats of subversion.”<sup>20</sup> Linked to NATO by Turkey and to SEATO by Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact was meant to close a gap in the encircling containment of the Communist bloc of nations. Although it was intended to promote good relations with the Arab states of the Middle East, all of them except Iraq regarded the Baghdad Pact as an effort to disrupt Arab unity, if not to perpetuate British influence in the area. The United States was not a member but increased its support for the Pact and its efforts to reconcile the aspirations of Arab nationalism with its own determination to limit the penetration of Russian influence into the Middle East. This met with indifferent success.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the Middle East Resolution, or Eisenhower Doctrine, of March 1957 - by which the United States sought to repair the damage wrought by the fiasco of the British and French invasion of Egypt in the Suez war of October-November 1956 and their ignominious withdrawal under combined pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth - has been described by the Secretary of State as having “as much effectiveness as membership in the Baghdad Pact organisation.”<sup>22</sup>

As far as the Baghdad Pact was concerned, Ayesha Jalal claimed that it was a United States creation to oust the United Kingdom from the region, it was not a joint, co-ordinated project against the USSR.<sup>23</sup> In fact, this is an extreme

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<sup>20</sup> Joint chiefs of staff paper 2099/374, 12.5.1954, cited in Aronson, Geoffrey, *From Sideshow to Center Stage: US Policy toward Egypt 1946-1956*, Lynne Rinner Publishing, Boulder, 1986, p. 87.

<sup>21</sup> Jalal, Ayesha, ‘Towards the Baghdad Pact; South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955,’ *International History Review*, (August 1989), p. 433.

<sup>22</sup> Dulles, J. Foster, *New York Times*, 31 January 1958.

<sup>23</sup> Jalal, *Towards*, op. cit., p. 433.

exaggeration of United States success. It is true that there was not complete agreement between Britain and the USA on every point regarding the Baghdad Pact,<sup>24</sup> but this does not suggest that the rivalry between the two was so high. Neither the British nor the regional members shared the American view that the Pact had to be set up solely against the USSR. What happened was that every nation thought of its own national interests and acted accordingly. That is, the United States expected to use the Baghdad Pact to contain USSR, the United Kingdom thought of using it to preserve, if not to promote the British interests in the region and the regional countries optimistically hoped to acquire through it more economic aid and political support mainly from the United States and Britain.

It seems difficult, therefore, to see how the Baghdad Pact could have added to the security of the Middle East. Turkey, a member of NATO, had no real interest in propping up a decidedly inferior regional security organisation. Although Pakistan and Iran did have such an interest, nothing much came of their efforts to streamline CENTO and give it the same standing as NATO. And if General Qassem's coup of July 1958 in Iraq is any indicator, it did not help ensure the stability the United States was seeking either. The reason why Turkey was involved in these initiatives could not be the fact that Turkey expected this regional defence organisation to guarantee her security. In fact, Turkey was simply asked to cover the "imperialistic face" of the West in the region and therefore it was acting on behalf of the West as well evidenced by then the Commander in Chief of Pakistan, General M. Ayub Khan's request. He "wanted Turkey to sponsor Pakistan as a member to the proposed command, as otherwise Middle East states, not to men-

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 411.

tion the people of Pakistan, might interpret the decision as evidence of a British effort 'at consolidating ... their own imperial interests'."<sup>25</sup> So, it is clear that the regional countries were aware of the point that Turkey's duty or involvement was to be intermediary between the West and the regional countries and to create an image that this defence initiative was not western, alien or external but indigenous and regional so that it could be more appealing to the regional countries. However, for opponents of the West, Nasser's counter attacks made it clear that the Turkish rulers were puppets in the hands of the Americans and they were acting on their behalf and thus, the Baghdad Pact was a stillborn alliance. It would be an important omission if we did not mention one point here: Turkish involvement in the western defence initiatives in the Middle East was not due to any religious motive. Being a secular state and having the Western support and trust in this respect,<sup>26</sup> Turkey was not turning to the Middle East for religious motives but she was urged to use this means to strengthen the organisation later when Britain realised that the alliance was in need of an ideology to counterbalance the communist ideology.

It may be worth noting that in many instances these alliances brought into partnership with the USA states that had very different systems of government and traditions markedly at variance with the democratic and human rights ideals that the US preached, yet those states were not obliged to conform to the norms of Western society, arguably because the US found it easier to deal with autocratic rulers than with liberal democratic regimes, especially in the Middle East.

As stated earlier, the keener party is always in a weaker position and this party

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<sup>25</sup> FO, 371, 92876, 17.12.1951.

<sup>26</sup> Britain was encouraging Turkey to take part in every organisation of Islamic Countries so that they would be sure that those establishments would be on secular grounds and not Islamic. So, the Turks were to be there not to launch an 'Islamic Union' rather to prevent any genuine 'Union of Islamic Countries', if there was any possibility of this. See *Ibid.* op. loc.

is usually the greater power. This was true of the Turkish-American alliance. Although some people thought Turkey was crucial to the US containment policy and so, theoretically, was in the stronger bargaining position, Turkey could not exploit this position, in part because of the ineptness of Turkish politicians whose eagerness to foster the alliance made Turkey the keener partner, and in part because gratitude and unforced generosity are not a feature of international politics; American negotiators did not yield more than they were compelled to and Turkish negotiators failed to make them offer as much as might have been possible.

Although the U-2 crisis in 1960 and the erection of Berlin Wall in 1961 appeared to revive the cold war again, the Cuban missile crisis persuaded both the Soviet and the American leaders to recognise the dangers of nuclear war. This realisation was apparently reflected in the signing in 1963 of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the first in a series of limited but nevertheless significant arms control agreements between the great powers. "The overall trend toward increased *détente* on a number of issues has been accompanied by a change in the structure of the international system."<sup>27</sup> The tight bipolar system which emerged in the late 1940s became looser and consequently polycentrism began to take place in the international system.

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<sup>27</sup> Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., pp. 89-90.

## 2.4 Patron-Client Relation Approach

The patron-client relationship is one type of informal relationship between unequal partners. The main characteristics of patron-client relations as they appear in the literature on this topic can be summarised as follows:

1. They are instrumental relations between actors of unequal power and status (a superior patron and an inferior client) They are based on reciprocity (as distinguished from pure coercion) in the exchange of material goods or protection for services, loyalty, and deference to the patron. Most often there is an imbalance in these relations favouring the patron, despite the reciprocity involved in the process. The relation in its pure form is conditional in character.

2. The exchange is mutually valued by both parties. Coercion, manipulation, and authority can exist implicitly in the background but are not dominant. the power imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship. The relations are a balance between voluntarism and coercion.

3. The Patron: The bargaining power of the patron is by definition greater than that of the client. The resources he has and the protection he can offer usually have a strong monopolistic element. The patron assembles clients on the basis of his ability to assist them.

4. The Client: The client usually has a moral or contractual obligation which binds him to the patron. His position is determined by (a) the availability of other patrons who can render the same protection or material support. (b) and the mobility of the clients between alternative patrons. (c) the degree to which the patron is dependent on his client's services.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, one can analyse alliance formation within the framework of a patron-client relationship. This makes it easier to perceive the process of formation and its consequences. The many reasons why weak states align with a great power include those on historical (colonial), economic, politico-military, ideological, psychological considerations. Depending on whichever reason is valid for formation of a particular alliance, the nature and the type of relationship between the client and patron may vary. For example, the patron-client relationship between former colonies and coloniser powers differs from other types of relationships such as those which were, say, generated from ideological or economic reasons. What might be

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<sup>28</sup> Handel, *op. cit.*, p. 132.



termed “psychological reasons” may also play a part in the alliance formation process. For example, for a weak state to find a patron is perhaps unconsciously, “to find a scapegoat - a foreign country that can be blamed for domestic failures. Identifying one’s state with a prestigious patron state can also be seen as a gratifying experience, permitting the weak country to enjoy the great power’s reputation vicariously.”<sup>29</sup> Pakistan, Iraq or Iran might resent patronage by a country such as Turkey, whose standard of living is not much higher than their own, but they might accept as natural the patronage of a distant, materially richer and culturally different country, such as Great Britain, the USSR or the United States. Most of the Middle Eastern countries resented Saudi, Iraqi or Egyptian interference, but they all sought Russian or American patronage.

When the relationships and alliance systems of great powers and weak states are seen in light of the patron-client model, it becomes apparent that both sides do benefit, even if asymmetrically. And just as in reality weak and powerful states exhibit overlapping characteristics and do not rigidly conform to ideal types, so too not only weak states, but also middle or even great powers (Britain, Canada, Australia) may become client states. Not infrequently Hegel’s dialectic of “master” and “servant” persists, with the master needing the servant’s services, and being to some degree dependent on the servant.<sup>30</sup> However, in our case study, none of the regional members could be regarded as middle powers. Therefore, we should continue to discuss only the small power-great power relations and their alliances.

Annette Baker Fox regards the small powers as “local powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas.”<sup>31</sup> More comprehen-

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>30</sup> Herz, John H., *International Politics in the Nuclear Age*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, p. 143.

<sup>31</sup> Fox, Annette B., *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in the World War II*,

sively, Rothstein defines a small state as “a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics.”<sup>32</sup>

Given the small states’ general lack of military strength against the superpowers, they trade their political favours for superpower support. By becoming active and willing participants in superpower competition, they try to gain influence beyond their own capabilities. In fact, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Soviet bloc and Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s constitutes a good example in point.

Thus, a patron-client relationship is a form of bilateral interaction, but it differs from the other types by the dominance of several elements. First, the client state cannot, by itself, guarantee its own security and become a major power in the international system. Second, the client nation plays an important part in patron competition. The more benefit the patron obtains over its competitor through its association with its client, the more the patron state will value the relationship, usually in apparent contradiction to the material gains that the patron derives. Indeed, compared with advantages the US gained from her association with Turkey, the material gains of the US were little. Nevertheless, she attributed a considerable importance to Turkey, because Turkey’s alignment with the West played a crucial role in the contest between the Western and Eastern blocs.<sup>33</sup>

Shoemaker suggests that patron-client relationships are primarily aimed at

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Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> Rothstein, Robert L., *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968, p. 29.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Akşit.

enhancing their respective security. There might be some other aspects, but “the security transactions are the most evident and pervasive.” He believes that arms transfers are a “powerful tool of influence” for the patron state.<sup>34</sup>

We agree with Shoemaker who argues that “when the ideological goals dominate the patron’s hierarchy, it will seek to present the client to the outside world as a showplace of the patron’s ideology and political system.”<sup>35</sup> Despite Turkey’s Muslim population, secular nature and pro-western ideology has been always presented to other regional especially Islamic countries as an “attractive model” to emulate.

The primary difference between small and great states, which generally holds true regardless of time, situation or countries involved, is the scope their intention. While great powers “broaden their gaze to sweep the whole international arena, and thus their focus upon a particular small power tended to be fleeting and not especially directed to the particular interests of that state,” in contrast to this, the small powers, “were primarily concerned with their own fate, regardless of the larger constellations of power over which they could have no control.”<sup>36</sup>

As regards to strategic goal of the patron, Shoemaker argues that the patron usually “seeks to control a vital piece of terrain owned by the client”<sup>37</sup> to gain some military advantages over the patron’s opponents. This was the case in US search for an alliance in the Northern Tier in the early 1950s. The patron state may also seek to control a resource that is vitally important to its adversary, which was the case in Middle Eastern oil.

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<sup>34</sup> Shoemaker, C.C. and Spanier, J., *Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crisis in the Nuclear Age*, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>36</sup> Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

However, the client's goals substantially differ from those of the patron. To the client, the relationship may be its means of national survival, which appeared to be the case for Turkey after the Soviet territorial demands following the Second World War. Therefore, "client goals center around the nature of the threat that the client believes exists to its nation and government."<sup>38</sup>

As Shoemaker suggests, in a high threat environment the client will be much more willing to meet the patron's demands. A desperate client under conditions of high threat "may be willing to grant considerable concessions to the patron, which it would not extend under less threatening conditions."<sup>39</sup>

Robert Rothstein is also concerned with small powers that "feel that they are potentially or actually threatened by the policies of the Great Powers."<sup>40</sup>

We are sympathetic to David's overall claim that domestic threats represent an important source of external alignments, but we broaden our focus to include dynamics rooted in the domestic political economy. Domestic threats sometimes could be a social, ethnic, sectarian or religious upheaval, and sometimes economic mismanagement or any kind of economic problem as was in the case of Turkey in the 1950s.

In support of the traditional alliance theory, Thucydides, for example, argues that mutual fear of a third party is the only solid basis on which an alliance can be formed and sustained, and Liska argues that "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something."<sup>41</sup> In the face of external threats,

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>40</sup> Rothstein, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>41</sup> Levy, Jack S. and Barnett, Michael M., 'Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security,' *Journal of South East Asia Studies*, (Winter 1990), pp. 21-22.

states seek alliances for the primary purpose of enhancing their effective military capabilities through combination with others.<sup>42</sup>

The theoretical literature has always recognised that alliances involve costs and risks as well as benefits and that there are alternative means for meeting external security threats. Balance of Power theorists often note that states can rely on internal military preparations or external alliances.<sup>43</sup>

The alliances are formed to deal with external security threats. But political leaders form external alliances or alignments for another reason besides the security guarantees that they provide; namely to secure resources that they urgently need to deal with pressing internal problems and to reinforce their own hold on positions of political power. Allies often provide economic resources that benefit the economy as a whole or certain supporters of the regime in power, or military resources that can be used for internal as well as external security purposes. The resource-securing function of external alignments is particularly important for Third World leaders and its neglect in the theoretical alliance literature is a serious omission.<sup>44</sup>

Flow of aid from a great power to a small country is quite likely to make it more dependent and after some time a client state. George S. Harris, an American specialist on Turkey, made this point clear: "in a situation in which a flow of material aid plays a central part in the relationship between two states, it is always hard to escape entirely the suspicion that the smaller has become the client or satellite of the larger."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>44</sup> Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>45</sup> Harris, G.S., *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p. 204.

Voting patterns of the UN provide another indicator of pattern-client relationships involving the US. Many analysts have used cross-sectional research designs to demonstrate that the UN voting patterns of states linked to America through trade or aid are likely to resemble the voting patterns of the United States. From this evidence they concluded that

weaker states abandon their preferences on Foreign-Policy matters and instead seek the approval of the United States, anticipating that future American policy will reward and punish states in proportion to their compliance, thereby justifying and reinforcing the compliance logic. Thus, this theory simultaneously explains the behaviours of both the dominant and dependent state in an asymmetrical dyad.<sup>46</sup>

As will be explained later, Turkish foreign policy behaviours after Turkey's membership to NATO constitute an important example of such a case<sup>47</sup> that weaker states abandon their preferences on foreign policy matters and instead seek the approval of a greater power.

The foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country.

As between individuals, so also patron-client relations between states may be of different degrees of intensity, dependence, and exploitation. They can range from an almost symbiotic relationship to a situation of almost unilateral exploitation.<sup>48</sup>

In international relations, the main characteristic of the relations between patrons and clients is their informality; they are much less rooted in tradition and less uniform in character than formal alliances. In every instance, however, the client state makes decisions regarding its foreign policy with one ear to the wishes of the great power. These wishes do not have to be explicitly or formally presented

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<sup>46</sup> Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-329.

<sup>47</sup> See the section on Conclusion with Special Emphasis on Turkey.

<sup>48</sup> Handel, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

to the client. As Handel noted, on most occasions patron-client relations in the international arena of the 1970s were characterised by the tacit understanding of the client state, which knows what is expected of it by the great power and adjusts its policy accordingly.

In the ideal form of patron-client relations (i.e. the non-coercive form), the client state voluntarily sets its own limits on action and makes decisions in support of the great power, hoping by such acts either to get immediate positive rewards from the great power or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the future.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, the relationship between the United States and Turkey is not ideal and it is not at a level of a middle power and great power relationship. Thus, although it slightly changes from time to time, it is more dependent than a middle country is dependent on a great power.

While great powers exert great efforts to turn independent countries into their client states, the over-zealous loyalty of a client state can sometime become embarrassing. Marshall Singer cites the following example:

I was once told by a representative of one of the Powers at the UN that he wished the delegates of his country's associated states would not always vote with his country on every minor issue, because it exposed those delegates to charges of being 'satellites' of the Power, and created the impression that the Power was forcing them to vote as they did. He cited a number of instances in which he was approached by delegates from weaker associated states asking him how his country intended to vote on an issue before they would decide how their delegation would vote.<sup>50</sup>

This was similar to the attitude of the Turkish delegates to the UN in the 1950s.<sup>51</sup>

A client state behaves like a politically penetrated system. It takes decisions on foreign affairs as if a foreign state were participating in its decision-making

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>50</sup> Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

<sup>51</sup> McGhee, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

process. By its own choice it sacrifices some freedom of action. In such relationships the known "leader [patron] may use military bases supplied by smaller allies for operations that have nothing to do with alliance business and which these allies may see as disadvantageous to themselves."<sup>52</sup>

In extreme cases a weak state may be militarily or politically penetrated to the extent that the great power is actually present in the decision-making process; but then the influence of the great power is gained by direct threats or coercion. Such circumstances are not illustrative of patron-client relations but of protectorates, puppet states, or satellites.<sup>53</sup> The weak state does not enjoy the benefits of reciprocal aid, nor can it decide to switch to another patron or quit the "arrangement" which has been forced upon it. In such cases the great power usually employs its own local agents, quislings, or parties. This was true in the Soviet satellite system and also in Iraq and Iran and many other countries that were dependent on the West.

The first question that a client state must ask itself in formulating policy is: how will this affect relations with our patron? Rose suggested that for Nepal, it was impossible to have even an autonomous foreign policy and she could not decide on any matter in her own that might have affected her relations with India.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, it is hard to suggest that any regional member dared to pursue a foreign policy that contradicted that of the United States in the 1950s. Turkey had always been repeating the slogan "peace at home, peace in the world", which is an empty expression and means nothing in reality. In fact, as will be explained in the fourth

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<sup>52</sup> Knorr, Klaus, *Power and Wealth: the Political Economy of International Power*, MacMillan, London, 1973, p. 28.

<sup>53</sup> Bettes, R.R., 'The European Satellite States,' *International Affairs*, 21(January 1945), pp. 15-29.

<sup>54</sup> Rose, Leo E., *Nepal's Strategy for Survival*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, p. 20.



chapter, Turkey did not attribute much importance to it when its national interests were not in conflict with those of the West, and expanded into the Sanjak of Alexandretta and Northern Cyprus.

The patron sometimes may choose one of the client countries to play a "patron" role in the region as well. This can be done in different ways. Therefore, patron-client relations are not limited to the relations between a great power and a weak state. Turkey's attempt to play a regional role in the 1950s might be seen in this context, because, as stated earlier, Turkey did not have any particular interest in the region to follow such a policy. This patron-client relationship may emerge as a result of a different motive as well. One can often find dual layers of patronage. Sometimes weak states can try to behave as patrons of even weaker states. For instance, Egypt, at times a British client, tried to control and lead the Arab world. From time to time, Turkish leaders felt similar anxieties. Supported by the West, Turkey tried to lead the regional countries in the Middle East in the 1950s. (With the collapse of the Soviet Union, once again Turkey began to try to play this role through RCD (Regional Co-operation for Development) in the East and Black Sea Economic Co-operation Region, while she herself is an American client.)

Although none of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact was incontestably a middle-ranking power, some aspects of patron-client relationship between the middle and great powers help us to understand some acts of Turkish authorities as they have some similarities. Compared with small or great powers, there is obvious difficulty in finding a simple and satisfactory definition of a middle power. On the whole, they exhibit the characteristics of the weak states, rather than those of the great powers. They can be divided into two categories: those with relatively small populations, but highly developed and efficient economies and those which

are highly populated but economically less developed.<sup>55</sup> Vellut describes them as “a state with a population of at least 50 million or a GNP of at least 10 billion dollars (as of 1958).<sup>56</sup>

Carsten Holbraad defines them as “a state occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power ... a country much stronger than the small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the states system.”<sup>57</sup>

When the patron-client relationship is between super or great powers and middle powers, then the relationships are not so intense. They are to a large extent a function of the feeling of constraint on the part of the middle power. Finding itself following too closely the policy of a super power, the middle power becomes afraid of losing its own identity (which is always a psychological problem present in patron-client relations), because it has not developed its own distinct foreign policy. The best examples of this type of relationship are Australia, Canada and New Zealand. No American pressure was necessary to encourage New Zealand's participation in Vietnam. Like the Australians, New Zealand wanted to “invest in the future” by morally obliging the United States to come to its aid should the need arise. Indeed many clients of the United States furnished token aid to demonstrate their good will, hoping later to cash in on the so-called “Lafayette Syndrome.”

Aside from the contradictory conclusions, a serious difficulty with most of these theories about the consequences of alliances is that virtually all of them are based on limited evidence, sometimes only on a single case. As some evidence

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<sup>55</sup> Handel, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>56</sup> Vellut, Jean-Luc., ‘Smaller States and the Problem of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the Emergence of Smaller States in Africa,’ *The Journal of Peace Research*, 4(1967), p. 255.

<sup>57</sup> Holbraad, Carsten, ‘The Role of the Middle Powers,’ *Co-operation and Conflict*, 6(1971), p. 78.

could be adduced for each theory, it is difficult to claim that they are wrong. The most obvious conclusion that emerges from this survey is that the literature on alliances is marked by competing explanations, none of which appears sufficient for a general theory, or to explain contradictory findings. Whether discussing the formation, performance, termination, or effects of alliances, we have repeatedly cited propositions which allegedly explain some fundamental issue, only to find that its exact opposite has been proposed by a different theorist. Indeed, it is not impossible to find contradictory propositions coexisting in the same source.

## 2.5 Conclusion with Special Emphasis on Turkey

The Turks considered their alignment with the West in general and the United States in particular in the light of their long-pursued efforts of modernisation or Westernisation, which commenced during the Ottoman Empire and attributed a paramount importance to it. However, it was America's strategic interests in the region that were of prime concern to the Americans, the Westernisation of the Turkish society by itself was far less important for the Americans. In contrast with the values the United States stand for, she extended her recognition to the junta following the 1960 coup and more ironically promised more economic aid. This suggests that when the Americans opposed the Democrat Party for undemocratic laws and practices and economic policies it was not due to the American idealistic liberal and democratic values but to pursuit of perceived American interests. The United States just used the democratic shortcomings as a pretext to cut the flow of aid to the Democrat Turkey. When the United States finds a regime that does not suit her own national interest she cites the undemocratic social and political conduct, and undesirable economic policy of that country as a pretext to put her on a black list until she forces that country to concede.

Despite a very clear pro-western foreign policy of the Democrat Party, it was unusual for the Turkish intellectuals or politicians to criticise the "state policy" even in the 1950s, most probably due to the tradition of one party rule era when the opposition were regarded as traitors should they criticise foreign policy or any fundamental domestic policy. Starting from the late 1950s Turkish intellectuals and politicians began to increase their criticism of the government's extreme and blind pro-western foreign policy. Many Turkish intellectuals and politicians mainly from the left wing believed that since the Truman Doctrine, Turkish foreign pol-

icy was left to American policy-makers' desires and decisions. They thought that Turkey seemed to have no foreign policy interests outside her alliance with the West and she just followed her Western allies' decisions and actions. This policy was especially clear in the 1950s.<sup>58</sup> In support of this view, Feroz Ahmad claimed that "throughout the fifties, Ankara pursued the foreign policy objectives set in Washington or London with conviction and without complaint."<sup>59</sup> Vali made this point quite clear when he claimed how the Turks were wrong in identifying their national interests with those of the United States and not questioning foreign policy issues according to their own national interests. He went further to suggest that "Turkey seemed to feel that ... what the United States wanted should not be questioned."<sup>60</sup> Turkish academic, Mehmet Gönlübol levelled a much sharper accusation against the Turkish foreign policy decision makers: "Turkey found herself following the policies of the United States almost step by step both within and outside NATO, thus, reducing herself to the position of a satellite."<sup>61</sup>

The first public criticism in Turkey against American influence on Turkey appeared in 1959 concerning the bilateral agreement of 1959 between Turkey and the United States, which aimed to secure American assistance in the case of communist aggression against Turkey. This agreement was a natural consequence of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which promised American support to the Middle Eastern countries against any internal and external communist subversive actions.

As will be seen below, some leftist Turkish intellectuals and politicians such as

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<sup>58</sup> Uslu, Nasuh, *Factors Affecting Turkish American Relations 1960-1975*, Ph.D. Thesis in Progress, University of Durham, 1991-1994.

<sup>59</sup> Ahmad, Feroz, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London, The RIIA, 1977, p. 395.

<sup>60</sup> Vali, op. cit., p. 71, and 356.

<sup>61</sup> Gönlübol, Mehmet, 'NATO, USA and Turkey,' in Karpas, K.H., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1975, p. 22.

Mehmet Ali Aybar, İlhan Selçuk and A.Ş. Esmer were of the view that Turkey was obliged to maintain a large army above its capacity just to defend American and NATO interests in the Middle East. While some argued that Turkey was forced by the United States to keep a large army beyond her needs, others suggested that Turkey followed such a policy regardless of American pressure just to please her allies, thus, to have an important place for herself within NATO or in the eyes of the American authorities. Perusal of American documents now available reveals that Turkey did indeed maintain much larger armed forces than the external threat really justified.

One of the most repeated accusations concerned Turkey's military dependence, which appeared in the late 1950s and especially following the Johnson letter in 1964, was that she was not able to use her army and arms for her own interests since her army was committed to NATO and arms were bought from the United States under certain conditions.

Accusations were made about economic dependence as well. These could be summarised as follows:

(a) The chief beneficiaries of American economic aid to Turkey were pro-American Turkish economic elite, multinational and American companies such as the consortium, which was established by several countries to supply economic aid to Turkey and the American aid agency, AID, and helped them to exploit Turkey's economic resources and direct the Turkish economy and involve other domestic affairs.

(b) The Turkish economy came under the influence of the American economy as a result of American aid and foreign investment. The Americans deliberately

tried to prevent the development of the Turkish economy and especially its industrialisation.

(c) The United States used its aid to Turkey as a lever to force Turkey to fulfil some American demands internally or externally.

Many Turkish critics of America noticed that America's most important means of maintaining Turkey under her control were bilateral agreements signed since the Truman Doctrine. For example, the leader of the Turkish Labour Party, M. Ali Aybar claimed that these agreements put Turkey in a position of a dependent state.<sup>62</sup>

Some even began to claim that almost all Turkish state activities fell under the full control of America. Vali said that in order to achieve military security and economic development the Turks threw themselves into the arms of their rich friend, the United States.<sup>63</sup> Another *Cumhuriyet* columnist, İlhan Selçuk claimed that Turkey was under the American occupation with American companies and experts in every corner of the country.<sup>64</sup> In the Turkish National Assembly Turkish Labour Party MP Muzaffer Karınca noted that "Turkey was caught in the net of American imperialism falling under American military and economic influence." He also claimed that "Turkey's foreign policy was determined according to American foreign policy, her defence strategy was formed in accordance with American defence strategy."<sup>65</sup>

A.Ş. Esmer, a professor of international relations in the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara, succinctly expressed his views on Turkey's foreign policy of the

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<sup>62</sup> Aybar, M. Ali, 'Dış Politikamız Nasıl Olmalıdır,' interview by Y. Çetiner, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.10.1964.

<sup>63</sup> Vali, op. cit., p. 116.

<sup>64</sup> Selçuk, İlhan, 'Pencere: Sivri,' *Cumhuriyet*, 17.08.1965.

<sup>65</sup> MMTD, term 2, meeting 1, vol.4, pp. 469-470.

1950s:

[Following Turkey's alliance with the USA and her membership to NATO] we signed numerous bilateral agreements with the United States and left our business in her hands. Our military is under the command of NATO, our bases are in the hands of the Americans, our security is dependent on America, our economic development is dependent on American aid. We saw it as our duty to support France, America and Britain in their dealings with the problems in Algeria, Vietnam and Suez. We also felt it our responsibility to defend Western colonialism in the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned countries. In the UN voting we look at the arm of the American representative. We have not got the initiative in foreign policy.<sup>66</sup>

Turkish authorities, categorically rejected these accusations and denied that Turkey was an American satellite. Their denials were so frequent that one could easily wonder why Turkish officials needed to issue so many. They only increased the suspicions of Turkey's dependence on America not otherwise, although even some American Ambassadors helped the Turkish authorities in this respect by making some statements that Turkey was not an American satellite.<sup>67</sup> In fact, the Turks' understanding of alliance responsibility prompted them to display loyalty through several statements and acts which could also be interpreted by the opposition as following in the footsteps of their American patron. It is interesting to note here that this active involvement with the West caused considerable controversy. On one hand, the Democrats claimed that their active western alignment policy was necessary to allow Turkey to overcome her traditional inferiority complex and take her place at the heart of the world politics. That is, Turkey should involve herself in every international problem that the big powers were involved in. Indeed, it was, among other things, this Democrat mentality that sent the Turkish soldiers to Korea where hundreds of them died. On the other hand, the Republicans claimed that the Democrat Party rulers, after the self-restrained and reasonably independent period of Kemal and İnönü, obeyed the western imperial-

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<sup>66</sup> Esmer, A.Ş., 'Uyduluk Siyasetine Son,' *Milliyet*, 24.12.1965 and Uslu, op. loc.

<sup>67</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 140.



ist countries, especially the United States, treated them as masters, and violated the sovereignty and independence of the state by bilateral agreements, bases and laws for petroleum and encouragement of foreign investment.

As a result of the widespread criticism of bilateral agreements the Turkish government eventually felt obliged to do something about them in mid-1960s. Turkish rulers could not escape from the influence of the leftist media and public opinion and asked the Americans to reconsider the agreements to make some amendments in favour of Turkish sovereignty. So, this admission of the Turkish government of some important mistakes in making and implementing these agreements could and should be taken as a proof that the Democrat Party was indeed wrong in following the American line in their foreign policy so blindly. It was only in 1969 that the Turkish authorities succeeded (if it was really a success) in securing the revision of all fifty four agreements in the light of one general agreement.<sup>68</sup>

It should be borne in mind once again that the United States was interested only in her own national interests in the region as far as her relations with Turkey were concerned. It would be naive to suggest that apart from her national interests she was ever genuinely interested in the "ideals" that she was supposedly defending all over the world, such as human rights, democracy, the market economy and so on. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how the Americans had alliances with many kings, dictators and juntas all over the world, just as they recognised the Turkish military rule, because of their loyalty to the United States. Indeed the military junta earned recognition from the day the Turkish military took power as the first thing they did was to announce Turkey's loyalty to the NATO and CENTO alliances.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Harris, *Troubled*, pp. 160-62.

<sup>69</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 27.5.1960.

As can be seen, in this chapter, we have demonstrated that both alliance theories and the patron-client relation approach are applicable to Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the 1950s. Affected by the external threat the Turks sought an alliance with the West. This alliance naturally created a dependent relationship between the two. As we suggested, this dependence was not desired by the Turkish leaders, but was unavoidable. In the short term, both sides benefited from the alliance. While by securing a permanent alliance with Turkey, the US increased her influence in the region, Turkey received a considerable amount of military and economic aid, she was admitted to NATO and most importantly this membership was regarded by the Turkish authorities as an approval for their Western identity. In the long term, the Turks felt increasingly frustrated because they had difficulties in pursuing their own foreign policy priorities.

## Chapter III

# HISTORICAL ACCOUNT: THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE 1950s

### 3.1 General

#### 3.1.1 Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

The main purpose of this chapter is to present an overall picture of what has been called the “Middle East” since 1924<sup>70</sup> when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey abolished the Caliphate. But in order to understand the problems of post-Ottoman developments in the Middle East it is first necessary to look briefly at the previous centuries of Turkish presence to note some factors that have influenced the subsequent course of events and have helped to create attitudes that still prevail.

One influential factor is the nature of the Turkish acceptance of Islam. Whereas the Persians and Kurds became Muslim after they had been vanquished by the Arabs in the battle of Qadisiyyah<sup>71</sup> in 637 AD and subsequent conquests of their

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<sup>70</sup> The term ‘Middle East’ was coined not by the people of the region but by Arnold Toynbee, who used it in the academic field for the first time in 1924 to imply that power in the region had been taken from Islam, so the Western-aligned secularists who ruled the area regarded it as between “East” and “West.” Thereafter the people of the region were content to use the term themselves. See for a detailed discussion on the history of the term “Middle East” the following articles: Keddie, Nikki R., ‘Is there a Middle East?’ *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 4(1973), pp. 255-271 and Davison, Roderic H., ‘Where is the Middle East?’ *Foreign Affairs*, (July 1960), pp. 664-675.

<sup>71</sup> During the reign of Umar, the second Caliph, Muslims conquered Mesopotamia and Iran which were mainly populated by Persians, Kurds and Armenians. It was only afterwards that the army of Islam reached Turan. Muslims aided by those converts in the area soon gained the allegiance of the Turks.

territories, most Turks were not defeated in battle but were drawn westward where many of them joined the armies of the Muslim rulers and adopted the faith. The Seljuks, who became a dominant Turkish group, followed their leader's example and embraced the Sunni form of Islam, as did their successors, the Ottomans, though many Turks were attracted by less orthodox varieties and by Shi'a teachings. But virtually all Turks professed Islam of one form or another. And what is important for our purposes, the government was always Sunni and from time to time even took up arms against the Shi'a, trying by every means to strengthen the Sunni position. Traditionally, in recognition of their ancestors' willing conversion, Turks describe themselves as "honoured by Islam."

Up to the time of their adoption of Islam most Turks had been nomadic. This mode of existence brought them into contact with various settled civilisations such as that of the Persians and gave them a capacity to accept new ways and adopt new cultures. But the nomadic way of life also required a readiness to fight. After adopting Islam Turkish warriors had an incentive to fight not only for existence in this world but also for spiritual rewards in the next. In effect, they thenceforth had religious sanction for the expansion they were already undertaking.

Thus, the Turks were drawn further and further westwards where lay Christian territory to be conquered for Islam and tempting pasture lands for their flocks. Their new position on the frontier of the Islamic world gave them every opportunity to demonstrate their zeal for their faith and their military prowess which eventually gave them the leadership of the Islamic world.

So, three Turkish characteristics relevant to our present study can be discerned in earliest Ottoman times: allegiance to Islam, a martial tradition, and a westward attraction.

In the course of their westward march the Ottomans destroyed the Byzantine Empire and made Constantinople their own capital in 1453. For centuries Turkish rule extended well into Europe - twice reaching the gates of Vienna - and also covered much of the world of Sunni Islam, including the holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. In their Golden age they seemed invincible but combination of internal and external factors led to their decline while the West grew ever more powerful. The Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, involving significant territorial loss for the Ottomans, demonstrated that their supremacy was no longer unchallengeable.

Painful acknowledgement that they had fallen behind the West prompted the Turks to try to catch up and obliged them to change the nature of their relations with the Europeans, whom they had always considered inferior. So, for the first time, they dispatched permanent representatives to European capitals. And from the eighteenth century onwards they attempted a series of reform measures.

When Ottoman rulers realised that the Empire was threatened with demise, they embarked on desperate measures to prolong its life. In particular they sought to play rival European powers off against each other and, in similar vein, within the Empire among their Arab and Kurdish subjects they incited intertribal disputes. Abdulhamit, the first sultan to appreciate the Turkishness of the Empire and to rely upon the Turks, was a pastmaster at playing one group off against another. As Antonius notes: he had a number of picked emissaries in the guise of preachers whose real mission was to sow discord and fan animosity between feudal chiefs and the heads of the larger nomadic confederations, family quarrels, tribal disputes and blood-feuds were exploited and promoted.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Antonius, George, *The Arab Awakening*, Khayats, Beirut, 1961, p. 72.

Abdulhamit also recognised that the Caliphate had potential as a unifying force in a multinational empire and that by personally asserting his claim to the title of Caliph he could help to consolidate his own power.

But non-Muslim forces had also achieved powerful positions in the administration during the nineteenth century, growing in strength throughout the reform process starting with the Western-supported Tanzimat of 1839, on to the Islahat of 1856, the first Constitutional period of 1876 and the second of 1908, to the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and its subsequent reform measures. In this process the Young Turks, who revolted against Abdulhamit in 1908, were as ruthless as Abdulhamit in playing the ethnic card. They were initially welcomed enthusiastically by the West.

Nurturing imperialist and pan-Turanist ambitions, the Young Turks sided with Germany in the First World War. The consequences for the Ottoman Empire were catastrophic. The defeat made the dismemberment of the Empire inevitable. At first it seemed that the very heartland of Turkey too would be split up and that the Turks would be subjected to the humiliating conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres that the Sultan felt obliged to sign. Resistance to these terms was organised by the "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti" which eventually produced the National Pact of 1920. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal the Nationalists proved victorious in the War of Independence, threw out the invaders, and negotiated a new peace treaty that was signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. They went on to expel the Sultan, end the rule of the House of Osman, and on 29 October 1923 to proclaim Turkey a Republic. This Republic is examined in the next chapter.

In this brief summary we can select from the many complex reasons for the

decline of Ottoman society and government the following important internal and external factors.

One major factor was the perpetual warfare in which the Ottomans were engaged, in the East with either Russia or Iran and in the West with various powers.

From 1450 to 1900, Ottoman Empire was at war for an average of 61 of every 100 years. Since the late 15th century, she has only been at peace four times for more than 15 years. In the 20th century, the Turks fought not only internally against nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire, but with Italy in 1911-1912, with the Balkan states in 1912-1913, and with the Allied Powers in the First World War, 1914-1918.<sup>73</sup>

Obviously such military commitments are bound to weaken any nation and are likely to lead to its collapse after a major war, as indeed happened to the Ottomans after the First World War.

Another factor was to be found in the Ottoman system of government, in particular its over-reliance on the character of the sultan. When the sultan was good and successful the Empire flourished, but weak and dissolute sultans contributed greatly to Ottoman decline. The absolute power (at least in theory) of the sultan exacerbated the situation. By the time that pressure for reform obliged the sultan to share power it was too late to save the Empire.

One of the common characteristics of empires, and the Ottoman Empire was no exception, is heterogeneity. This contributed to the decline of Ottoman society and state in modern times. As Ramazani notes:

as the result of the perennial migration, invasions, and settlements of diverse peoples, society was fundamentally divided along numerous linguistic, racial, religious, and

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<sup>73</sup> Ergil, Doğu, *From Empire to Dependence; The Evolution of Turkish Underdevelopment*, Ph.D. Thesis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1975, p. 121.

sectarian lines. The expansion of the [Ottomans] also contributed to diversity within their societies, as evidenced by the imposition of Turkish hegemony over the Christians, the Jews, the Arabs, the Kurds, and the Balkan peoples.<sup>74</sup>

A further cause of decline was intellectual rigidity. In the beginning Islam had been a fundamental source of strength, helping to motivate the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and its swift expansion, particularly into the Christian West. However, this attitude was inimical to the transfer of technology from the West, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was undergoing those profound changes that laid the bases of the growing moral and material power of European nation states.

The Capitulations negotiated by certain European powers weakened the whole economic structure of the Ottoman Empire as well. These Capitulations paved the way for the first time for international interference. By means of them the Europeans sucked the life blood from the Ottoman economy through the centuries and finally brought the Empire to an end. Even when the Turks set up a modern Turkish Republic the effects of the Capitulations still persisted. Their legacy was a heavy burden to the young Republic until the Second World War.

One of the Middle East's chief attractions for rival capitalist powers was the region's rich oil fields. The importance the powers attached to this asset made them increasingly eager to occupy the area, particularly as there were no lands left to parcel out among themselves in the Americas or Africa. So territories such as those of the weakened Ottoman Empire presented tempting prospects.

Zionists were also eager to acquire a part of Ottoman territory. Their hearts were set upon Palestine and they refused to be deflected by offers of land in other

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<sup>74</sup> Ramazani, Rouhollah K., *The Northern Tier; Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey*, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York, 1966, p. 45.



parts of the world. To counter this threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire Abdulhamit declared this land to be his private property and therefore not available for sale to would-be Jewish settlers. (The creation of the state of Israel is discussed later in this chapter.)

The Ottoman Caliphate was an important factor in Turkey's relations with the outside world, particularly Britain. As the British Empire contained as many Muslims as there were in the Ottoman Empire, the British were eager either to keep the Caliphate under control or to secure its abolition once and for all, since it was a potential threat to the British both regionally and globally. For example, a call from the Caliph for a jihad would constitute a threat to the British in any conflict in which they were opposed to Turkey.

But Russian ambitions alarmed the British even more, so to defend their imperial interests in the East they sought to check Russian expansion into the Ottoman Empire and other parts of what later came to be known as the Northern Tier. Thus, the British were committed to maintaining the *status quo* in that region until the right time came to partition the Ottoman Empire.

The First World War gave the Ottoman Empire the *coup de grace*. On the pretext that the Ottoman Empire had sided with Central Powers, the Allies planned to divide it among themselves. Secret meetings were held between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy during the years of the war to achieve this. Despite rivalries among themselves, the allies seemed determined to solve the long-standing "Eastern Question" and to destroy the "Sick man of Europe." But, as Parker points out:

the publication of the treaties by the Soviet Government in 1917 caused a special embarrassment, since the treaties showed how frequently in the Near East the same things had been promised to different parties. For example, two separate policies were pursued in Arabia, one conducted from India in support of Ibn Saud and the other

conducted from London in support of the Sheriff of Mecca.<sup>75</sup>

This Soviet publication of secret treaties led to a deterioration of relations between the British and the Arabs, and these relations were further strained by the introduction of the Mandate system after the First World War. The treaties were briefly as follows:

(1) The "Constantinople Agreement", signed by Britain, France and Russia on 18 March 1915.

(2) The "Secret Pact of London" signed by Britain, France, Russia, and Italy on 26 April 1915.

(3) The "Sykes-Picot Agreement" signed by Britain, France, and Russia on 16 May 1916.

(4) "St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement" signed by Britain, France and Italy on 17 April 1917.

In the event, the Ottoman Empire was broken up and a Mandate regime was imposed over its domain in Arab lands.

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<sup>75</sup> Parker, John and Smith, Charles, *Modern Turkey*, George Routledge and Sons Ltd., London, 1942, p. 180.

## 3.2 The Post-World War I Middle East

Despite the fact that the Middle Eastern peoples had been, to some extent, exploited by the Ottoman Empire, which was largely indifferent to the “East”, they had a better life then than after having their quasi independence.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the lot of the non-Turkish subjects went from bad to worse. For centuries the Ottomans used Muslim subjects from the East in wars against the “infidel” West. But they concentrated most of their investment in the West, neglecting the development of the East. The splendours of Ottoman architecture, for example, are found in the West not the East. But the degree of exploitation these eastern subjects suffered under Ottoman rule was greatly preferable to what they had to endure under the Mandate system. Their new masters did not divide them just ethnically and religiously but also along completely arbitrary geographic boundaries. These new divisions created the fundamental problems in the Arab world that would last for decades, perhaps centuries.

The way in which the West acquired the right of mandate indicates that the British had a leading role. While they had secret negotiations with their allies the English officials in the Middle East also had contacts with Arab leaders.

To incite the Arabs to rebel against their Turkish masters the British contacted Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, and promised to set up an Arab Empire or Federation of Arab States in order to fan their desire of independence. However, the British and French were embarrassed by the Soviet disclosure of the secret agreements to dominate the region and they were further discomfited by President Wilson’s declaration of his “Fourteen Points”, the 12th of which said that the non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire should be assured of autonomous

development.

Consequently, the Arabs thought that the European Powers were ready to recognise their independence. Faisal, the son of the Sherif Hussein, attended the San Remo Conference held in April 1920, and defended Arab independence. He found that Britain and France had decided to establish a Mandate regime in the Arab countries, though they recognised his rule over Syria. Subsequently, Syria and Lebanon came under a French Mandate while Iraq, Jordan and Palestine were given to the British. The animosities thus, engendered by British and French deceit caused the Middle East to boil continuously in between the two world wars and the effects of Western Imperialism continue to the present day.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Siyasi Tarih, 1789-1960*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1973, p. 513.

### 3.2.1 Iraq

At the 1920 San Remo Conference, Britain was given a mandate over Iraq, and this decision was later ratified by the League of Nations. At the time of the Conference, Iraq was actually under British military occupation. Contrary to the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, this Mandate placed Mosul under British, not French, control. Following a positive outcome of a referendum in Iraq, the British appointed Faisal as King of Iraq. (The French had deprived him of the throne of Syria.) To keep Iraq under its control Great Britain installed a feudal system in Iraq, thereby provoking the intense opposition of Iraqi intellectuals whether they were Kurds or Arabs.

Confronted with vehement Iraqi nationalism, Britain prepared to relinquish the mandate and signed an agreement in October 1922 to adjust her relations with Iraq. But this did not lessen the pressure of Iraqi nationalists, and Britain was compelled to sign a new agreement on 14 December 1927 to reduce her control over Iraq. Eventually the British recognised the independence of Iraq by an agreement signed on 30 June 1930, and in 1932 allowed Iraq to become a member of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, a great majority of Iraqis, whether military or civilian, regarded their independence as incomplete so long as British forces were stationed in their country. The 1930s were a decade of instability marked by ethnic riots, tribal revolts, and sectarian disturbances. Among these were the uprisings of the Kurds in 1932 (crushed only with British assistance),<sup>77</sup> the Assyrians in 1933, and the tribal rebellion of 1935-1936 in the south (which was reinforced by Shi'a hostility).

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<sup>77</sup> Olson, Robert, 'The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990s,' *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, (Summer 1992), p. 3.

Moreover, in October 1936, Iraq underwent its first military coup. This was led by Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman, who aimed to put an end to this turbulence. The configuration of the new government reveals the orientation of their foreign policy. This government comprised not a single supporter of the pan-Arab cause. Sidqi was of Kurdish stock; Hikmat was mainly Turkish in origin and orientation. Also two of the ministers were Shi'a, and not one of the Ahali Party ministers was interested in Arab nationalism. Such a configuration produced foreign policy oriented not towards Arab countries but Turkey and Iran. Consequently, the Sadabad Pact was concluded between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 1937.

However, in August 1938 while on his way to follow a Turkish military exercise, Bakr Sidqi, the leader of the coup, was assassinated in Mosul.<sup>78</sup> The following April, King Ghazi was killed in a traffic accident. As Faisal II was under age, the deaths of these leaders left the stage clear for Nuri Said, who had been educated in Istanbul and was a fervent pro-British politician, to direct internal as well as external policy.

In 1941 Rashed Ali Gailani, who succeeded Nuri Said as premier, staged a coup against the British. But Nuri Said was reinstated by the British and he declared war on Germany in 1943. After the Second World War, limited parliamentary democracy was restored and political parties began operating again.

In 1948 Iraqi troops were sent to fight the Israeli army but performed poorly. This disappointed the Iraqis who blamed King Faisal II and the Regent, his uncle, for the Iraqi humiliation in the war. As a result, Nuri Said banned political parties when he realised that he was not able to manipulate the elections or the electoral

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<sup>78</sup> It is ironic to note that, exactly two decades later, another Iraqi leader who signed an agreement of alignment with Turkey was assassinated before he departed from Baghdad to Turkey. The only difference this time was that he was to leave Iraq by plane not car.

system. Moreover, by joining the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955 and refusing to denounce the Anglo-French-Israeli offensive against Egypt in November 1956 he damaged his regime beyond repair. Finally, under the leadership of Abdul Karim Qassem and Abdul Salam, the Free Officers' Group, as it was later called, decided to abolish the monarchy, end the pro-Western foreign policy and adopt non-alignment instead, and establish a true parliamentary democracy. The royal family and Nuri Said himself were put to death within the first few days of the coup, and Iraq demonstrated its foreign policy switch by withdrawing from the "notorious" Baghdad Pact. But the third aim, establishment of a "true parliamentary democracy" has yet to be achieved in Iraq.

### 3.2.2 Syria and Lebanon

Most Arab states have a comparatively short history as separate nations, having come into existence since the First or Second World Wars. The secret arrangements made during the First World War by the powers that were ultimately to triumph allocated control over much of the Arab world to Britain and France. But these colonial powers met with intense resistance in the region when they tried to rule it.

In March 1920, a month before the San Remo Conference, a congress of artisans had convened and announced the formation of a Kingdom of Greater Syria that included Palestine and Lebanon and appointed as its monarch Faisal, the son of King Hussein of the Hijaz. The San Remo Conference, however, did not recognise this kingdom and separated Palestine from Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently France was given the mandate over Syria and Lebanon.

Contrary to the terms of the mandate, France stationed a 90,000 strong army in Syria to keep it under control. This was necessary because the disillusioned Syrians felt compelled to resist the French. Faced with Syrian revolt, in July 1920 General Gourand, the French High Commissioner, entered Damascus and ousted Faisal I from his throne. Henceforth Syria was under tight French control.

Having taken control of Syria, the French decided to divide up the country in order to divide opposition to their rule. General Gourand, "enlarged the pre-war district of Christian Mount Lebanon by adding Muslim areas to its north, west and south and naming it the new province Greater Lebanon",<sup>79</sup> with which France maintained historical ties. Dividing what was left into four more provinces, namely, the autonomous provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, and the independent provinces

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<sup>79</sup> Hiro, Dilip, *Inside the Middle East*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982, p. 41.



of Jebel of the Druzes and Latakia State of the Alawites, set up a federal state of Syria. This fragmentation provoked the Arabs to rebel. The French seemed to realise their mistake and duly recognised the “independence” of Lebanon in May 1926 and that of Syria in May 1930, and proclaimed both to be republics.

Popular protest led by the Nationalist Bloc against French rule in Syria closed public services, schools and bazaars for fifty days in early 1936. Further unrest in the 1930s was fomented by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy who launched a campaign against the British and French in the Middle East. France was compelled to sign new agreements with both Syria and Lebanon in September 1936 and November 1936 respectively and agreed to pull out of these countries. When Syria came under the control of the pro-German Vichy French government, the British, supported by Free-French leader Charles de Gaulle, attacked and defeated the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon in mid-1941. Having restored the constitution, the Free-French leadership called for parliamentary elections in Syria in 1943. At the end of World War II, France vainly attempted to reaffirm her ascendancy in Syria by force, and in April 1946 French troops left Syrian soil.

Two years later, Syrian failure in the war with Israel led to a popular revolt against the authorities, and a military coup occurred in March 1949. It was in February 1954 that restoration of democracy was achieved following the downfall of Colonel Adib Shishakli, the military ruler of the country.

After a few years of nationalist-leftist ascendancy in Syria, in February 1958 the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria was inaugurated amid high hopes for wider Arab unity and progress. Not unexpectedly, these hopes were disappointed and the United Arab Republic broke up in September 1961 following the arrest in Damascus of Nasser’s deputy, Abdul Hakim Amr, and the concurrent proclamation

by a group of Syrian officers of Syria's secession from the Union.

Meanwhile, Lebanese politics fluctuated from one side to another and it remained under the constant pressure from both Western and nationalist Arab countries led by Egypt throughout the 1950s until the American marines landed on its soil in 1958. Afterwards, Lebanon tried to remain neutral as much as possible. Yet it always remained open to the rivalry between the internal Arab groupings as well as the influence of Western powers.

### 3.2.3 Jordan

Jordan, an impoverished and artificial state carved out by the British from an unlikely part of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>80</sup> was presented to Abdullah, whose elder brother was appointed to the Iraqi throne. The Hashemite family connection kept the two countries on close terms until the Iraqi revolution and the influence of Nuri Said with his close links with Turkey helped the development of cordial relations between Jordan and Turkey as well as Iraq and Turkey. These links were never strong enough, however, to drag Turkey into the Arab-Israeli conflict which was of prime concern to Jordan. The strong continuing British influence in Jordan and its concern for defence arrangements in the region was another factor drawing these countries together, but was not strong enough to tempt Jordan - fearful of Nasser - into the Baghdad Pact with Iraq, Turkey and British.

In May 1923, Abdullah declared Transjordan "independent", but the 20 February 1928 treaty between Britain and Transjordan confirmed British authority over the country. It was not until 22 March 1946 that full independence was achieved when Abdullah declared himself King and proclaimed a new constitution. A new agreement was signed by Britain and Transjordan, but this was resented by Jordanians and a revised agreement was signed on 15 March 1948. King Abdullah merged the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which he had occupied in the 1948 Israeli war, into his kingdom, which he renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

In May 1951 he was assassinated and succeeded by his son Talal, who, seven months later, was replaced by his son Hussein on the grounds of ill-health. Hussein maintained close relations with Iraq. Indeed, reconciled with Nuri Said, he set up a

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<sup>80</sup> See for details on the establishment of the Hashemite power in Jordan, Robins, Philip, *The Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan 1921-1946*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. University of Exeter, 1988.

federation between Iraq and Jordan in 1958 in pursuance of his pro-Western policy against Nasser-led Arab nationalism. Within a few months both Nuri Said and the Iraqi royal house were executed by the new revolutionary regime in Iraq. But in Jordan King Hussein remained on the throne and has now been ruling for more than four decades.

### 3.2.4 Israel

Since the outlines of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has been such a dominant feature of Middle East politics, especially since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, are so well known it is unnecessary to retrace at length its progress here. With regard to Turkey's relationship with Israel, it should not be forgotten that Palestine was ruled by the Turks from 1517 to 1917. As will be noted later, the secular Republic of Turkey granted recognition to Israel as early as 24 March 1949, but Turkey has always tried to keep aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflict and has successfully avoided active embroilment in it. British and US relationship with Israel also had their impact on the West's defence initiatives in the Middle East.

Britain's role in the birth of Israel is well known. On 2 November 1917 the famous - or infamous - Balfour Declaration was announced by His Majesty's Government and soon approved by the United States, France and Italy. It stated:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.<sup>81</sup>

The Balfour Declaration was very short but it was enough to meet Jewish aspirations. Subsequently, it had an immense impact on the Middle East politics. This declaration gave the Jews a new momentum in their struggle for a national homeland.

At the end of the First World War three empires of the old order, i.e. the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire all collapsed. As mentioned earlier, the victorious powers, which shaped the post-war order made some changes to the agreements relating to Palestine that they had previously

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<sup>81</sup> Grant, Neil, *The Partition of Palestine*, World Focus Books, New York, 1973, p. 9.

signed. Accordingly, the British were granted a mandate over Palestine in order to implement the Balfour Declaration policy. Not ignoring the role of the United States, without the British support a national home for Jews could hardly have been achieved. The close co-operation between the Zionist Organisation and the British Government is illustrated by the surprising fact that the original draft of the mandate was actually drawn up by the Zionist Organisation.<sup>82</sup>

All concerned, especially Britain, gravely underestimated the degree of political awareness among the Palestinians in their decisions. When the Jewish immigration increased, clashes started between the Arabs and the authorities whom they held responsible. Immigration sharply increased in 1920 and has continued at varying rates ever since. The Nazi assumption of power in Germany in 1933, created an excellent opportunity for the Zionists to exploit. They swiftly accelerated Jewish immigration to Palestine. This was “encouraged, organised and financed by the Zionist Organisation,”<sup>83</sup> making it impossibly difficult for Britain to keep it under control.

Having seen that Britain was unable to cope with the problem, the Arabs put aside their differences and formed the Arab High Committee (AHC) in 1930 to press for Arab independence and to put an end to Jewish immigration. They attacked the Jews for a time and eventually announced a general strike in 1936. Britain responded to this disturbances by sending the Peel Commission to Palestine. Having investigated the events, the Commission published its report in July 1937. According to Grant, “its conclusions were clear-sighted and free from prejudice.”<sup>84</sup> The report stated: “we have no doubt as to what were the underlying

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

causes of the disturbances. They were (a) the desire of the Arabs for national independence, and (b) their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home. ... All the other factors were complementary or subsidiary.”<sup>85</sup> The report, therefore, stated that the mandate system would not work. The only solution was the partition of Palestine. It was resented by the Jews while the Arabs responded by renewal of resistance and the British could only postpone its implementation.

Following the negotiations with the authorities, the Arabs called off the strike and never again managed to achieve unity. This left the field clear for Jewish terrorist organisations such as Irgun and Stern. New clashes took place, and Britain sent another inquiry commission. This, too, indicated that some concessions had to be made to the Arabs. The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 described the new British policy. It did not favour the views of the Zionists. It demanded “a state in which two peoples ... share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.”<sup>86</sup> With the exception of Mufti and AHC moderate Arabs accepted while the Jews regarded it as an utter betrayal. This, one can say, marked the beginning of the end for the alliance between the British and the Zionists who thereafter rebelled against their former benefactors.

Having witnessed the killing of some of her prominent personalities by Irgun, Britain declared her intention of delivering her responsibilities for Palestine to the UN. The UN reached its Resolution of Partition on 29 November 1947. This was rejected by the Arabs but accepted by the Jews. Britain abstained from voting on the resolution and announced that she was to abandon the Palestine mandate on 15

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<sup>85</sup> Grant, *passim*.

<sup>86</sup> Nyrop, Richard F., *Israel: A Country Study*, The American University Press, Washington D.C., 1979, p. 35.

May 1948. Israel declared her independence on the same day and being ruled by a pro-Jewish President, Truman, the United States extended her recognition within the first hours and, as expected, the Arab forces began to attack the newly declared State of Israel. However, the forces of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and smaller numbers from Saudi Arabia and Yemen consisted of only 55,000 while the Israeli forces were around 100,000, a quarter of whom were veterans of World War II. By January 1949 the war was over and Israel occupied an area larger than the UN had proposed (80 per cent instead of 56). Yet the UN recognised and accepted Israel as a member on 11 May 1949. The Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950 was aimed to prevent the “use of force ... between the any of the states” of the Middle East and thus the defence of Israel was thought to have been secured. When the West realised that it was not the case, Nasser’s propaganda machine claimed, “a Western-sponsored pact might prevent a ‘second round’ with Israel.”<sup>87</sup>

As for the Palestinians, 374 of their 807 villages within Israeli territory had simply disappeared by 1969. The Israeli government took over more than ten thousand business places and many more homes. Moreover, Israel confiscated something between 40 and 60 per cent of the possessions of departed Arabs and banned the Arabs from buying new land in the country.<sup>88</sup>

The State of Israel faced tremendous internal and external problems. Astonishingly the Israelis had to create a state out of nothing in the same place they had left about 2000 years ago. They needed more Jews to outnumber the indigenous Arabs. Even by encouraging, organising and financing immigration to Israel they were only able to achieve a Jewish majority in 1952. This continuous immigration

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<sup>87</sup> Wright, Esmond, ‘Defence and the Baghdad Pact,’ *Political Quarterly*, 28(1957), p. 162.

<sup>88</sup> Nyrop, op. cit., pp. 52-53.



created constant problems of accommodation and employment. Not surprisingly, 180,000 migrants left Israel, because, among other reasons, the Government could not solve these problems.<sup>89</sup> Integrating the newcomers into society was another formidable task, since they were coming from all over the world where they had been living in a completely different culture and environment. The Turkish Jews were the most successful in this regard. Another problem was teaching Hebrew, a language spoken only by a minority, to the new citizens who were speaking the language of nations they used to live with.

In the sphere of foreign policy, apart from the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War (to the Israelis, the War of Independence), the Israelis had to be ready to defend their territory against another possible attack. Therefore, they looked for regional as well as global powers to make alliances with. They felt very isolated in the first half of the 1950s. However, they successfully used the conflict between Egypt and the Western Powers, i.e. Britain and France, to break this isolation and to identify themselves with those major powers. In fact, to the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular, Israel was regarded as a Western creation in the heart of the Islamic World to serve Western interests in time of crises and it was seen to be doing so. To the Arabs, Israel was essentially created in such a strategically important place to influence or control, if not to intimidate and threaten the regional countries whenever required. The successive wars, which took place almost every decade (1948-1949; 1956; 1967; 1973; 1982; 1991) served to confirm to the Arabs that they were right in this belief, even if it was not the West's aim, when they created Israel. It is interesting to note that at the time the Balfour Declaration was announced 85 per cent of the globe was under European

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<sup>89</sup> Mehdi, M.T., *Peace in the Middle East*, New World Press, New York, 1967, p. 57.

occupation.<sup>90</sup> Therefore, as Said put it, the creation and protection of Israel in the Middle East was

seen as extending, perpetuating even enhancing (to the advantage of the West) the age-old conflict between the West and the Orient, whose main surrogate was Islam. This was not only a colonial matter, but a civilisational one as well. ... Herzl used this idea, Weizmann used it, every leading Israeli since has used it. Israel was a device for holding Islam - and later the Soviet Union, or communism - at bay. ... Zionism and Israel were associated with liberalism, freedom and democracy. ... By contrast, Zionism's enemies were simply a twentieth century version of the alien spirit of Oriental despotism, sensuality, ignorance and similar forms of backwardness.<sup>91</sup>

Before closing the decade under discussion, it must be mentioned that Israel quite successfully used all opportunities to strengthen her position in the region. Having consolidated her national strength she emerged out of the Suez crisis victorious and very powerful. When *coup d'état* occurred in Iraq, a member of the Baghdad Pact, Israel attempted to exploit this event too. Having some features in common with the ousted Iraqi rulers the Iranian Shah and to some extent Turkish leaders, too, were frightened by this and responded warmly to the Israeli proposal of a "Peripheral Pact" between non-Arab Middle Eastern countries, i.e. Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, Jewish Israel and Christian Ethiopia. Turkey strengthened its relations with Israel just five days after the coup in Iraq. Israel pressed the United States to help the three economically as well as politically. Subsequently the United States promised the three economic and political support.<sup>92</sup>

Following the Western intervention in the Middle East<sup>93</sup> the United States

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<sup>90</sup> Said, Edward W., *The Question of Palestine*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, p. 3.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>92</sup> Robinovich, I., Reinharz, S., (ed.) *Israel in the Middle East, Documents and Readings on Society, Politics and Foreign Relations 1948-Present*, Oxford University Press, London, 1984, pp. 166-169 and Chomsky, Noam, 'Israel's Role in US Foreign Policy,' in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation*, I.B.Tauris, London, 1990, p. 260.

<sup>93</sup> In a determined effort to limit the effects of the Iraqi coup, the US sent Marines to Lebanon and Britain landed paratroops in Jordan to stop the spread of rebellion.

and the Soviet Union reached a *modus vivendi* in the region. This, in the long run, "meant that both the Great Powers accepted limitations - tacitly to be sure - of their own actions on the supposition that beyond a certain point a nuclear confrontation might be engendered."<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Merlin, Samuel, *The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East: A Colloquium*, Fairleigh, Dickinson University Press, Madison, 1968, p. 65.

### 3.2.5 Iran

Iranians had first appeared in world history in about 550 BC when Cyrus II revolted against the Medians (who are considered the ancestors of today's Kurds).<sup>95</sup> Their rulers subsequently bore many different names, including Parthian (140 BC - 224 AD), Sassanian (224-642), Safavis (1502-1796), Qajars (1796-1925), Pahlavis (1925-1979), before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Like many other peoples of the region, the Iranians have a long tradition of subjection to despotic power. Edward Gibbon in chapter 3 of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* noted, "When Persia was governed by the descendants of Sefi, a race of princes whose wanton cruelty often stained their divan, their table, and their bed with the blood of their favourites, there is a saying recorded of a young nobleman, that he never departed from the sultan's presence without satisfying himself whether his head was still on his shoulders."

In the nineteenth century Russia steadily encroached upon territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia to which Iran laid claim, eventually imposing the present border between the two countries. During the second half of the nineteenth century Great Britain took an interest in both eastern and western Iran. The British had the dominant say in the delimitation of Iranian boundaries with Afghanistan and with Baluchistan, which was then part of India and is now in Pakistan.

The 1905-1906 Constitutional Rebellion in Iran and the increasing German interest in Iranian affairs caused concern in Britain and Russia and prompted

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<sup>95</sup> Bender, Cemşid, *Kürt Tarihi ve Uygarlığı*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991; Beşikçi, İsmail, *Bilim-Resmi İdeoloji, Devlet-Demokrasi ve Kürt Sorunu Özgürlük Yolu*, İstanbul, 1990; Minorsky, V., *Kürtler, Özgürlük Yolu*, İstanbul, 1973. Chaliand, Gerard, *People Without a Country*, Zed Books, London, 1989.

them to sign a protocol in 1907 partitioning the country into three commercial interest zones: the northern part of the country was put under Russian control, the southern part under British control and a neutral zone was created in between. "All this was done without consulting the Iranian Government."<sup>96</sup>

In 1914 British and Russian troops occupied Tehran. The Bolshevik Revolution in March 1917 led to the withdrawal of Russian troops, giving the Turks an opportunity to invade Western Persia again,<sup>97</sup> but British troops remained. In 1919 Britain pressured Iran into accepting a proposed treaty which, in effect, would have put it under complete British domination. In 1920 the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan, an Iranian province on the Caspian Sea, was established with the help of Communist Russians, but it collapsed when the Russians signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Iranians and pulled their army out of Iran in 1921.<sup>98</sup>

In 1923 Ahmet Reza Khan, the Minister of War, carried out a coup and became Prime Minister and while Ahmet Shah was abroad in October 1925 Ahmet Reza Khan ousted him and put an end to the Qajar dynasty. Subsequently, in December 1925, the Majlis declared Reza Khan to be the Shahinshah of Iran. He signed a Treaty of Non Aggression and Neutrality with Russia on 1 October 1927, and thereafter Iran was free from outside interference until the outbreak of the Second World War.

Iran attempted to keep its neutrality at the beginning of the Second World

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<sup>96</sup> Borthwick, Bruce M., *Comparative Politics of the Middle East; An Introduction*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliff, NJ., 1980, p. 195.

<sup>97</sup> Kirk, George E., *A Short History of the Middle East; From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, Methuen, London, 1964, p. 250.

<sup>98</sup> It is interesting to note how history repeats itself: the Republics of Kurdistan (Mehabad) and Azerbaijan collapsed following Soviet withdrawal from Iran at the end of the Second World War just as the Republic of Gilan had collapsed when the Soviets pulled out of Iran at the end of the First World War.

War, but Britain and the Soviet Union were of the opinion that the Shah was inclined towards Germany so they occupied Iran on 16 September 1941. It is interesting that in both the 1907 and 1941 occupations the British and Russians were nominally allies against the same power, Germany, and, "in both cases as far as the Persians were concerned, the underlying rivalry was more apparent than the surface alliance, and a factor to be used and exacerbated as far as possible by the Persians in an attempt to exploit the disabilities imposed on them by that alliance."<sup>99</sup>

The Shah was compelled to leave the country and he died in South Africa in 1944. As a result of Iran's impotence Russia was able to receive war materials via the Trans-Iranian Railroad, which was of special importance to the Allies, because it was the only route to Russia that could be utilised during all four seasons of the year, and the only one that was immune from Axis air and submarine attacks. As Sheehan puts it: "the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran might have never occurred had the Iranian State Railway not existed."<sup>100</sup> By the end of the war the Soviet Union had enormously increased her influence in Teheran to the extent that two separate republics were established in northern Iran with their assistance and protection in 1945. When Russia withdrew from the country under increasing western pressure, it abandoned the Azerbaijani and Kurdish Republics to destruction by the Shah's army just as in 1921. By early 1947 the Shah's control had extended once again over the whole country.

In October 1947, encouraged by the implied American promise of support, the Majlis reacted against the oil agreement which was signed on 4 April 1946 between

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<sup>99</sup> Marlowe, I., *Iran: A Short Political Guide*, Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 70.

<sup>100</sup> Sheehan, Michael K., *Iran: The Impact of US Interests and Policies 1941-1954*, Theo. Gaus' Sons, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 10.

Iran and Russia. This provoked furious Russian protests. In February 1949 the Shah banned the Tudeh party, the most popular and best organised one, on the grounds that a Tudeh member had attempted to assassinate him. Afterwards, in April 1949, two changes were made in the constitution to reinforce his power, and Iran began receiving a considerable amount of aid from the United States. It is interesting to note that the political vacuum created by outlawing the Tudeh Party was filled by the National Front, which was equally, if not more, disliked in the West.

As Sheehan says, "Iranians have a tendency to be xenophobic."<sup>101</sup> So, the right and the left wing met on common grounds over the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). Both considered it should be expropriated. It was this understanding that brought about the nationalisation of oil on 15 March 1951.<sup>102</sup> Hussein Ala, who became Prime Minister following the assassination of Razmara by the Fadayan Islam, resigned on 27 April, and the Majlis voted the 73-year old Dr. Muhammed Mosaddeq premier. "The Shah in the prevailing atmosphere, had no choice but to accede." By the end of September, however, the British staff left the country<sup>103</sup> and oil shipment was to halt for about three years. On 21 July 1952 the International Court decided it had no jurisdiction in the dispute between the Iranian government and the AIOC. This was considered a victory for Mosaddeq.

In August 1952 the United States and Great Britain reached an accord on a common policy to be followed against Mosaddeq which marked the beginning of

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. vii.

<sup>102</sup> Gürel, Şükrü, *Ortadoğu Petrolü*, SBF Yayınları, Ankara, 1981, p. 82.

<sup>103</sup> Ruehsen noted that "it is no coincidence that the beginning of the end of British influence in the region began with an expulsion from Iran, as would happen to America 25 years later", because unlike its Arab neighbours Iran has a longer and stronger nationalistic history. See Ruehsen, Moyara de Moraes, 'Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, (July 1993), p. 467.

the end for him. Having suspected that the British were about to stage a plot, Mosaddeq severed diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran on 16 October 1952. The Shah was no longer in control of the country. When he appointed as premier General Zahedi<sup>104</sup> (whose son was married to the former Shah's daughter), Mosaddeq did not recognise him, and the Shah was obliged to leave the country in August 1953. But he was away for only a few days.

At that point, Eisenhower authorised the CIA to organise and carry out a political coup.<sup>105</sup> Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of the former president Theodore Roosevelt, arrived in Teheran in early August and made the necessary preparations and improvised a plan called AJAX, and then staged the coup successfully.<sup>106</sup> Despite American official denial of involvement in the coup, it was later known that

... privately the president praised Kermit Roosevelt ... for acting 'intelligently, courageously, and tirelessly', even awarding him the National Security medal in secret, publicly Eisenhower cabled his congratulations to both General Zahedi and the Shah and on September 5 formally committed 45 million dollars on economic aid to the new Iranian Government. By 1954 the position and influence of the United States had become such that she was able to almost completely control the course of internal events in Iran.<sup>107</sup>

It was calculated that oil revenue plus American aid would justify the authoritarian nature and pro-Western tendency of the regime and inoculate the people against threats of communism from the left and xenophobic nationalism from the right. Consequently, the urgency of sustaining the 'centre' regime in Iran was fairly fully appreciated both in Washington and London."<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Ruehsen alleged that Roosevelt convinced the Shah to issue two royal decrees, one dismissing Musaddeq and the other appointing Zahedi. See *Ibid.*, p. 478.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 467.

<sup>106</sup> Gasiorowski speculated that if Musaddeq had not been overthrown, the Islamic revolution might have not happened. See Gasiorowski, Mark, 'The 1953 Coup D'état in Iran,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19(1987), p. 261.

<sup>107</sup> Sheehan, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>108</sup> Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p. 103.



In January 1954 elections were held and in April an international consortium was formally set up to negotiate with Iran. The new government accepted the terms which Mosaddeq had refused after the act of nationalisation.<sup>109</sup> The Shah was “determined never again to be placed in a position subordinate to that of his prime minister and ... slowly but surely established himself as the real chief executive, the fount of power...”<sup>110</sup>

Once he had all the power in his hands, between 1954 and 1960 the Shah appointed Zahedi, Hussein Ala, Manuchehr Eqbal and Sherif consecutively to the post of prime minister. He finally appointed pro-American Dr. Amini to carry out the reforms which were the condition for the new American Administration to continue support for the Shah. This was to be known as the White Revolution of 9 May 1961.

For three main reasons Iran's relations with Iraq were not very cordial. First, there was the question of Iranian access to the Shi'a shrines at Najaf and Kerbela, second, the sufferings of the large number of Iranian subjects living in Iraq, and third, the disputed Shatt al Arab boundary. Her relations with Turkey and Pakistan were reasonably cordial apart from her suspicion that they might obtain from the US more favourable military and financial aid than Iran.

To sum up, today's Iran is shaped by six major events that occurred in the twentieth century: the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, the bloodless coup of 21 February 1921, the Anglo-Russian invasion of August 1941, the Oil Nationalisation Crisis of 1951-1953, the White Revolution of 1961-1963, and finally the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.

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<sup>109</sup> Brands, H.W., 'The Cairo-Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East 1951-1953,' *International History Review*, (August 1989), p. 453.

<sup>110</sup> Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

### 3.2.6 Pakistan

Pakistan is a unique country in the modern world. As Callard states, "Pakistan was created to be the state organisation of the Muslim nation of the Indian sub-continent. ... It has no common language, nor uniform culture, and it is neither a geographical nor an economic unit."<sup>111</sup>

Khalid Sayeed considered the Army Mutiny of 1857 or the First War for the Independence of India as a starting point for the history of the formation of Pakistan. But this does not seem very convincing, because his main argument is based on a vague suspicion about the Army. It seems more reasonable to accept the date 1892 as the turning point for the Muslim demand for a separate state. This was when the British government introduced the principle of elections and the establishment of representative institutions. Thereupon the Muslims, having been alerted by Sayeed Ahmed Khan, the leader of the Muslim League, "expressed their apprehension of being dominated by a majority with whom they differed in every sphere of life."<sup>112</sup>

Having been ruled by the Muslims for about one thousand years, the Hindus had no option but to embrace a policy of co-existence with the Muslims for centuries although there were some periods of tension between the two from time to time, for example when the British introduced laws favourable to the Hindus in 1892 and 1909. These laws exacerbated the rivalry between the two religious communities, but eventually, in 1916, the Congress-League Pact (otherwise known as the Lucknow Pact) was signed between the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. Most importantly, this pact produced a compromise

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<sup>111</sup> Callard, Keith, *Pakistan; A Political Study*, G.Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1957, p. 11.

<sup>112</sup> Choudhury, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p. 4.

agreement and a separate Muslim electoral list. In general, from the second half of the nineteenth century both communities vainly resisted their common enemy, the British, until the Second World War, with many attempts being made by leaders of the political movements, namely, Sayeed Ahmed Khan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Lquat Ali, Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity between 1916 and 1940. Two helpful factors were the perception on the sub-continent that the British had incited the Arabs to rebel against their colonial masters, the Turks, whereas the British repressive measures in India drove the Hindus and Muslims into each other's arms. This unity reached its peak under the Caliphate movement 1920-1922.

In 1928 Nehru drew up a proposed constitution for immediate dominion status for India. This, although never adopted, frightened the Muslims since "it proposed a strong federal government and the elimination of separate electoral rolls and other mechanisms on which the Muslims depended to maintain a political foothold."<sup>113</sup> Two successive Indian constitutions were granted by Great Britain in 1919 and 1935 but it was only "poison in the bloodstream of politics."<sup>114</sup>

In 1940 the Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution then under the leadership of Quaid-i Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim masses enthusiastically embraced the "Two Nation Theory"<sup>115</sup> of the League "not because it was a revolutionary doctrine but because it confirmed the basic theme of the Qur'an."<sup>116</sup>

It appeared that the Muslims often regarded themselves as an aggrieved mi-

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<sup>113</sup> Brines, Russell, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p. 24.

<sup>114</sup> Brines, *passim*.

<sup>115</sup> The Two Nation Theory mainly means that despite the linguistic and racial similarities the Muslims constituted a different nation from that of the other in the subcontinent since it was so mentioned in the Qur'an.

<sup>116</sup> Sayeed, Khalid B., *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p. 10.

nority in the pre-1940 period, but since then they were “no longer interested in constitutional safeguards and assurances.”<sup>117</sup> Then the dominant theme in their politics was not complaint against Hindu injustice but a demand for a separate political existence.

Jinnah and Gandhi held talks in September 1944 to prevent the division of the ‘Hindu homeland’, but nothing useful emerged. Nevertheless, this meeting showed that now there were two leaders not one. At the end of 1944 two other prominent representative of their respective communities, Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party, and Luita Ali, the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Party, signed the Desai Luita Pact that accepted Hindu-Muslim parity as the basis of a future interim government. But this, too, came to nought as Jinnah, the actual leader of the Muslim League, disapproved. In June 1945, on Lord Wavell’s initiative, the Simla Conference was held to plan the defence of India and the formation of a reconstituted Executive Council. This also failed, due to a fundamental disagreement on how to nominate the Muslim members of the Executive Council.

Following the December 1945 general election the British Government sent a Cabinet Mission to convene a constitution making body. The Mission soon realised that they were getting nowhere, either with the League or with the Congress. While Jinnah was demanding a full independent Pakistan, Gandhi was opposing any proposal but one India. The Mission declared its plan in May 1946, which turned down demands of the League as well as the Congress. The plan suggested a weak centre. It was accepted by the League’s resolution of 6 June, while the Congress announced on 25 June that these proposals fell short of their objectives.

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

On 29 July the League announced that "the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domination."<sup>118</sup> The Mission's effort succeeded in bringing the League into the Interim Government but could not prevent turmoil all over the country. Amidst the disastrous violence the withdrawal of Britain, as well as the division of the subcontinent became inevitable.

On 3 June 1947 the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, issued a statement concerning the transfer of power, and subsequently the League and the Congress on 10 and 14 June respectively had no option but to accept it. On 15 August 1947 both Dominions enthusiastically declared their independence.

There are different arguments regarding the division of the subcontinent. The Muslims often claim that Pakistan was created not only because the Muslims were intensely conscious of their national and cultural identity, but also because the Hindus were intolerant and exclusive. In fact, Hindu short-sightedness or exclusiveness were not only factors which created Pakistan. It is also not accurate to think that Muslim separatism was a product entirely of British machinations. It seems that Pakistan came into being, among the others, as a result of the combination of all these three factors.

The declaration of independence was not the end but the beginning of a series of problems. Even the civil war, which extended to 1948, did not solve them, but merely produced new ones such as partition of the country, irremediable poverty, mutual enmity, ethnic and religious conflicts within and between the two parties. In general, Pakistan received 17.5 per cent of the assets and India 82.5 per cent,

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

but some changes were made afterwards. After independence half a million people - perhaps more - were killed violently and the greatest mass migration in world history took place. The number reached 50 million in 1965.

On the whole, the poorer areas, which were lacking in industry were taken over by Pakistan. Its population was predominantly uneducated and unskilled. In Callard's words, "It was not self-sufficient in any important manufactured product and resources of fuel and power were pitifully inadequate."<sup>119</sup>

Consequently, it was highly dependent on imports. The most severe economic burden upon its over-strained economy were the refugees that came in by the millions, most of them with nothing but a small bundle of personal possessions. Therefore, the task that faced Pakistan in its first decade was gigantic.

It was unfortunate for Pakistanis to lose their two most pre-eminent leaders, Jinnah, who died in 1948, and Luliat Ali, who was assassinated in October 1951. Pakistan has never since had such rulers who were revered as symbols of national integration and unity. Following them came those who ruled the country until 1960: Khwaja Nazimuddin, Ghulam Muhammed, Muhammed Ali, Iskander Mirza, Fazlul Huq, Shudrawardy, President Ayub Khan.

It is worth noting that all members of the cabinet were from among the members of the Muslim League until its monopoly was broken by the Awami League. In March 1956 the first constitution was at last brought into operation and the country was declared to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. After two years in 1958, the army appeared on the political scene and the Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan, staged a *coup d'état* and ruled the country until 1969.

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<sup>119</sup> Callard, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

One of main problems facing Pakistan was the Kashmir question, over which war broke out in July 1947. Although the matter was referred to the UN in January 1948, the war continued until 31 December 1948 when a truce was agreed by both sides. In January 1949 the UN cease-fire line, which quickly solidified into a *de facto* international boundary, was accepted as a temporary border. This issue prompted Pakistan to become the only major power seeking decisive military assistance from both the Western and Eastern blocs. Although her alliance with the West in general and the Pakistan-US Agreement of 1954 in particular, to use Brines words, "probably postponed the India-Pakistani war by a decade, it nevertheless became either the cause or the justification for an intensified Indian effort to integrate Kashmir politically."<sup>120</sup> The UN, which had failed to find a solution in 1953, eventually recommended a settlement through direct Indo-Pakistani negotiations. But this seemingly insoluble problem is still before the UN.

Pakistan was divided into five provinces, one of which was the present state of Bangladesh 1000 kilometres away from the rest of the country. The very existence of this widely dispersed nation was therefore strategically dependent on India. But the creation of Pakistan had been the product of lack of mutual trust between the Hindus and the Muslims, and the existence of Pakistan further exacerbated the communal enmities and fears that had created it. Against that background, the survival of Pakistan in the face of the Indian threat was a major achievement for the country's leaders.

While the first aim of Pakistani policy was simply to survive, the second main objective was to reinforce her position *vis a vis* India, which repeatedly threatened her. (As late as 1963 Nehru considered Pakistan a region "which should

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<sup>120</sup> Brines, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

be reincorporated into an Indian-dominated confederation.”)<sup>121</sup> For Pakistan, all other foreign policy matters such as attempts to form close relationships with the Islamic countries of the Middle East, the agreement with the US, membership of the Baghdad Pact and of the SEATO, were subsidiary to the problems of survival and standing up to India.

The problem of survival was made more difficult by the tremendous socio-economic problems facing the country. Pakistan, like Turkey and Iran, clung desperately to the US as the main source of international economic assistance. But this had the effect of isolating Pakistan from Arab co-religionists and from Afghanistan and also provoking the hostility of communist states. After the 1956 Suez Affair, Pakistan was severely criticised on account of her military ties with the West. Regarding her alliance with the US, Ziring was of the view that after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, it soon became evident to both countries that “neither could be expected to serve the interests of the other at the expense of its own interests.”<sup>122</sup> Pakistan was less concerned with the containment of international communism, while the US saw no point in making an enemy of India.

Pakistan’s foreign policy can therefore be seen as a classic example of a weaker, smaller state driven by fear of its larger, stronger neighbour India, much as the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran were dominated by the fear of their Soviet neighbour.

In short, Pakistan is, in Ziring’s words, “in large measure a manifestation of acute emotion and fear as much as ambition and human aspirations.”<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Choudhury, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>122</sup> Ziring, L. et. al., *Pakistan: The Long View*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1977, p. 22.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 3.



### 3.2.7 Egypt

Strategically located at the nexus of Asia and Africa and situated in the middle of Arab World, Egypt is of great importance in the area and in the world in general. Egypt has always been a power in the Arab and Islamic World owing to its large population, military strength, advanced bureaucracy, often charismatic leadership and relatively developed economy. It is, in Borthwick's words, "a forerunner for the Middle East of social and political change, and a vortex in which all the modern Arab and Islamic social, political, and intellectual currents have swirled."<sup>124</sup>

Egypt is one of the oldest and most famous civilisations in the world. The first Dynasty of Egyptian Kings began as early as the thirty second century BC. Egypt took a new turn when the Muslim Arab conquest in 642 ended the Pharaohs' ascendancy and replaced it with a quickly spreading Islamic one. Indigenous people, mainly the Copts, mostly embraced Islam as their religion and Arabic as their language. Muslim Egypt was ruled by Fatimids (909-1169), the Ayyubids (1169-1252), the Mamluks (1252-1517), and the Ottomans (1517-1923) respectively.

In Ottoman times, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1789 opened a new page in its history and radically changed the minds of the country's rulers. Although Egypt was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire after the French left in 1805 under British pressure the Dynasty of Muhammed Ali, an Albanian, ruled the country until 1952. However, it was the British who practically ran the country from 1882 when they defeated Urabi Pasha and his forces, the first Egyptian nationalist movement, at the battle of Tel al Kebir. "The right to intervene was not questioned by most Victorian politicians if British interests were thought to be threatened. The invasion was justified as an attempt to save the Egyptian people

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<sup>124</sup> Borthwick, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

from a military dictator and to protect the Khedive from opposition.”<sup>125</sup>

The Suez Canal had been built by the French with Egyptian money, but due to the Egyptian ruler's financial irresponsibility Great Britain purchased the Egyptian shares in 1875. The ill-fated alliance between Turkey and the Germans in World War I subsequently left Egypt under complete British control. Like Urabi Pasha, Sa'd Zaghlul, who set up the Wafd in 1918 and attended the Peace Conference in Paris, was determined to fight against outsiders for a complete independence. But, on the whole, according to Hopwood, “the politicians rose through royal favour and British support and fell when these were withdrawn.”<sup>126</sup>

There were twenty Egyptian governments and eight sets of negotiations with Britain from which the former ceaselessly tried to obtain their independence during the 1918-1936. Although nominal independence was granted in 1922, nothing changed in practice. Nonetheless, the two sides were obliged to sign an agreement in 1936 in the face of an Italian threat from Libya and Abyssinia. In fact, King Faruq, offended by the paper he was asked to sign, first complained, saying, ‘but this paper is dirty, crumpled, and soiled to sign’, however, the British Ambassador Sir Miles Simpson insisted and King Faruq had no option and complied. Rather than abdicate, the King asked Nahas Pasha, the British choice, to form the government. Both sides agreed on the status of Sudan, the capitulation, revision of the Treaty and Egyptian independence in accordance with this ‘Treaty of Alliance.’

Egypt remained faithful to her undertakings to Great Britain during the Second World War, however, such “pressure and humiliation could not be forgotten, and

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<sup>125</sup> Zayid, Mahmud Y., *Egypt's Struggle for Independence*, Khayats, Beirut, 1965, p. 28.

<sup>126</sup> Hopwood, Derek, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1985, p. 12.

served to strengthen the resolve to gain independence.”<sup>127</sup> The Wafd had won a substantial electoral victory, but it had been kept out of power by the Palace between 1930 and 1936 and a power struggle went on unabated in the subsequent ten years. After World War II there were many political groups such as the Ikhwan al Muslimin (the Brethren), the Wafd, Young Egypt and the Free Officers that all had common demands; (a) evacuation of the British (b) the unity of the Nile Valley - Egypt and Sudan. -

Anwar al Sadat, one of the Free Officers, speaking of period of 1945-1952, from the national standpoint said that during this period “Egypt lived in terror, with the severest restrictions of the freedoms of the meeting, speech and the press... It was one of the saddest periods in her history.”<sup>128</sup> According to Mahmud Y. Zayid, three main factors contributed to the awakening; (a) the increasing number of Arabs educated abroad or in similar schools in Egypt, (b) European interference and Egyptian financial crisis and (c) the teaching of Jamal al Din al Afghani, (1839-1897) who had worked for the regeneration of Islam and resistance to Europeans, particularly the British. If the British were hated occupiers, Faruq became the symbol of the corrupt ancient regime. Therefore, the first aim of a revolution was to rid the country of both.<sup>129</sup>

After a long period of preparation, the Free Officers comprising eleven junior officers staged a bloodless coup on 25 January 1952 and obliged King Faruq to abdicate in favour of his son and go into exile. Since his fatherly bearing and reputation as a humble pious Muslim contributed to his popularity among the

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<sup>127</sup> Zayid, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>128</sup> Hopwood, op cit., p. 24 and Dikmejian, R.H., *Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, University of London Press, London, 1971, p. 19.

<sup>129</sup> At this point it is worth recording that the Egyptian revolutionary commanders of the 1950s were the Military Academy's recruits from the middle class, if not lower, who were admitted for the first time, as was the case with Qassem and his generation in Iraq.

people, the Free Officers Executive Committee chose General Nagib, as their leader for legitimacy. This Committee later renamed itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

The conflict between the RCC and civil governments, which veteran politicians were asked to form, kept Egyptian politics in turmoil until mid-1954. The RCC attempted to use three factors to establish popular bases of legitimacy: (a) abolition of monarchical rule, (19 June 1953) (b) Agrarian Reform Law, (September 1952) and (c) reorganisation of political groups (1954). The Pro-Nagib alliance consisting of the Brethren, the Wafd and Leftist coalition protested in February against the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in January 1954 by means of student and labour disorders. However, Nasser eventually eliminated pro-Nagib elements in the Army and put Nagib himself under house arrest on 14 November. Thus, Nasser won the power struggle against Nagib and his supporters. His strategy of eliminating the 'weaker group first', such as the Communists, the royalists and the Wafd, successfully ended with the final reckoning with the Brethren, which was the most powerful organised group inside as well as outside the army until 1952.

Subsequently, Gamal Abd al Nasser, the "Arab Atatürk",<sup>130</sup> set up a military rule over Egypt which lasted until his death in 1970. He accomplished the political phase of the revolution by eliminating all organised opposition, while he was obliged to postpone the social phase of it until 1961. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Suez in February 1952 had led the West to think that it was possible to include Egypt in a Western Defence Pact. Nasser and the Arabs in general, never considered the Soviet Union whose forces were thousands of miles away to be a threat to them.<sup>131</sup> Their concern was with their neighbour, the expansionist State

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<sup>130</sup> Perlmann, M., 'Egypt Versus the Baghdad Pact,' *Middle East Affairs*, (March 1956), p. 100.

<sup>131</sup> In replying to the American authorities Nasser said "I must tell you in all frankness that I cannot

of Israel,<sup>132</sup> which had support of almost all the Christian World. The sudden declaration of the Baghdad Pact by Nuri Said in 1955 may be considered a turning point for Nasser to discover new bases for legitimacy of his regime. His bitterest enemies, the Brethren internally and Israel and the West externally created great opportunities for him to shift from internal affairs to the international arena.

The internal factor was that the suppression of the Brethren and their religious message of Islamic brotherhood made Nasser champion first of Arab Unity and second of Islamic Unity. One of the external factors was Israel's attack on Gaza on 28 February 1955 which proved his military weakness. Another one was that on 18 July 1955 Dulles publicly announced the withdrawal of United States offer of aid for the Aswan High Dam. These factors combined to force Nasser to look for modern weapons from anywhere he could get them. When the West failed to provide these he turned to the Soviet Union with no hesitation and made the famous Czech arms deal in September 1955. The third factor leading Nasser to turn to the international arena and replaced Egyptian nationalism with Arab nationalism was the Baghdad Pact, which is at the heart of this thesis and will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. It is interesting to note that this shift of nationalism, closely resembles the case of Turkey, which was certainly not of the same magnitude as the Kemalist reversion from Pan-Islamism to Turkish nationalism.

In fact this deal with the Czechs increased his popularity in the Arab World, because it proved that Egypt was now really free from the Western influence.

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see myself waking up one morning to find that the Soviet Union is our enemy. We do not know them. They are thousands of miles away from us. We have never had any quarrel with them. I would be laughingstock of my people if I told them they now had an entirely new enemy ... Nobody would take me seriously if I forgot about the British." See FRUS, Vol.9, pp. 19-25.

<sup>132</sup> All interviewees who were asked questions on the Arab-Israel conflict agreed that the Arabs rightly or wrongly perceived the State of Israel as the major threat to the Arab world and therefore they did not interest themselves in the Western defence projects.

There were some other factors, too, contributing to the increase of his popularity in the Arab World and in Third World countries at large. Nasser's successful performance in international affairs and his ideology of Arab Unity gained him great popularity in the entire Arab World. His prominent role at Bandung Conference and anti-Western neutralism further increased his prestige in the Arab and Non-Aligned countries. On the other hand, Great Britain, the experienced master of the Arab World, acted swiftly, directly and indirectly to try to recruit as many Arab countries as possible to the Baghdad Pact. The aim was that Egypt was either to become a member of the Pact or was to be isolated from other Arab countries and the latter would be rendered safe from Nasser's anti-Western propaganda. According to Dikmejian, "more than any other factor, the Western efforts to lure the Arab States into the new security system contributed the development of a more aggressive neutralism."<sup>133</sup> As a matter of fact, most of the analysts agree that "the Baghdad Pact was the single most important variable in regional power politics which served to change the entire configuration of the forces in the region, thus, giving rise to new power alignments and constellations."<sup>134</sup>

The invasion by Israel, France and Britain of the Suez to maintain the control of the Canal was a military defeat for Nasser but he successfully turned it into a political victory when the former invaders were obliged to withdraw from the region under pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. This, too, furthered Egypt's popularity in the Arab World in particular and in Asia and Africa in general.

Why was Egypt so influential in the Arab countries especially in their foreign

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<sup>133</sup> Dikmejian, op cit., p. 111.

<sup>134</sup> Dawisha, A.I., *Egypt in the Arab World: the Elements of Foreign Policy*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1976, p. 11.

policy? There are some natural and historical reasons. These are its economic potential, size, population, stability, experience and religious intellectual leadership in the Arab World, particularly through the al Azhar, the pre-eminent university of the Muslim World.

Moreover there had been a series of developments that alienated Egypt from the West in the middle of 1950s. These were the Baghdad Pact, the tripartite arms embargo, the Aswan High Dam controversy, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French-Israeli attack.

Partly as a result of these events in the Middle East, Eisenhower, the President of the United States, announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, which will be explained later in detail. This produced its first fruits when Saudi Arabia, formerly the staunch ally of Egypt, sided with the West immediately after the Doctrine's declaration. Consequently, within six months Egypt lost all her allies except Syria. The suspicion arose that it was perhaps for this reason that the West created the 1957 crisis in Syria in order to separate it, too, from Egypt. Tension increased to the extent that Turkey, the loyal member of the West since it joined NATO, hinted that "it may take action if the Communists come to power in Syria." It was again for such reasons that Syria, not Egypt, asked for the union between the two, resulting in the proclamation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 1 February 1958.

Reacting to this Union, Nuri Said of Iraq, whom the Egyptians considered a stooge of the West, rushed to form an Arab Union Federation with Jordan on 12 February. However, this was not enough to protect him from the Middle Eastern revolutionary generation of the 1950s and the Iraqi army led by Abd al Karim Qassem rid their country of this last symbol of the ancient regime. Nuri and

all members of the royal family were brutally killed in the first days of 14 July 1958 revolution. Panicking at what had happened in Iraq, American marines and British paratroopers landed in Lebanon and Jordan respectively to protect these regimes against similar actions and if possible to restore law and order in Iraq. Thus, the balance of power once again changed in favour of Egypt after one year as far as the Arab East was concerned. When Abd al Salam Aref, the second man of the revolution, signed the Iraqi-UAR Mutual Aid Pact, he was sent abroad as ambassador. Iraqi-UAR relations were severed by activities of "Iraq first" elements consisting of the Kurds, National Democratic Party and al Ahali group incited by the external powers. So, at the end of the 1950s, relations between Egypt and Iraq became as unfriendly as they were when Iraq had sided with the West to form a Middle East defence pact.



### 3.2.8 The Kurds

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) provided for the recognition or the creation not only of the Arab states of Hijaz, Syria and Iraq, also an Armenia state and plus an autonomous Kurdistan. The Turkish victory over the Greeks in the Turkish War of Independence and the subsequent Turkish alignment with the West dashed the Armenian and Kurdish hopes of independence. Nevertheless this dream of an independent Kurdistan remained on record in an international document and was not forgotten. The Treaty stimulated the hopes of the Kurds for independence in a united Kurdish State. After 1920 armed nationalistic risings occurred in all three countries. The Southern Kurds under Sheikh Mahmud resisted incorporation in Iraq for some years. In Turkey the most formidable revolt was that of Sheikh Said of Palu in the Kharput region in 1925, and there were others at Siirt, Ararat, and elsewhere. In Persia, in 1922, Sayid Taha and Ismail Agha Shikak achieved widespread successes for a time; and more recently in 1945-46 the Mukri Kurds set up the "Kurdish Republic of Mehabad."<sup>135</sup>

Since 1945 there had been little manifestation of Kurdish political nationalism in any of the three countries. The intellectual Kurdish leaders seemed to have been persuaded that for the time being, in the face of the opposition of the three governments, nothing could be done; they could only wait in the hope that some future international upheaval would give them or their sons an opportunity of renewing their movement with some chance of success.<sup>136</sup> They could not maintain a popular opposition within these countries but they managed to organise themselves abroad. The activities of Kurdish elements and centres outside the three country,

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<sup>135</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, E1821/20, 29.4.1959. For a good account of Kurdish uprisings in the Middle East see 'The Kurds in Persia,' *Central Asian Review*, 7(1959), pp. 175-201.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. op. loc.

increased considerably in the 1950s and they tried especially to influence Turkish Eastern provinces. Following the collapse of the Mehabad Republic of Kurdistan most of Kurdish leaders from Iran and Iraq were obliged to go to the USSR where they had stayed for more than a decade.

The Kurds disliked the Baghdad Pact, "seeing in it a reinforcement of the Treaty of Sadabad (1937), which they have always regarded as aimed at the Kurds."<sup>137</sup> They feared that close co-operation between the Turks, Arabs and Persians might result in a combined squeeze by all the three countries concerned on the Kurds. According to HM Ambassador in Tehran there was not such a feeling before the Baghdad Pact.<sup>138</sup>

The Baghdad Pact only strengthened the tendency of Kurdish malcontents to look to Soviet Russia for support. The British view on the question was that "the Russians may be able to develop anti-Pact themes in their propaganda for Kurdistan, and be listened to by some of the mullahs and tribal leaders."<sup>139</sup> Khadduri also pointed out the danger of spread of communism among the Kurds and said "one of the purposes of the Baghdad Pact, it seems, is to co-ordinate" the work between the signatories against it.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, there was a potential danger of Kurdish nationalism. It constituted "a powerful weapon in the hands of the Russians if they should ever be in a position and wish to embarrass all three (repeat three) Governments concerned at the same time. From this it follows that

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.; Gunter, Michael, 'Foreign Influences on the Kurdish Insurgency in Iraq,' *Orient*, 34(1993), p. 105; also all of the Kurdish interviewees, namely Gıyasettin Emre, Melik Fırat, Abbas Vali and Kendal Nezan, claimed that Sadabad Pact was perceived as being against the Kurds. Other interviewees also said that the Kurdish question was one of the factors contributed to the formation of the Pact except Hüseyin Bağcı, who said he did not specifically study the Kurdish involvement in the process.

<sup>138</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127141, EP1821/1, 29.1.1957, Tehran.

<sup>139</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127141, EP1821/1A, 14.2.1957, Tehran

<sup>140</sup> Khadduri, Majid, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal,' *The Middle East Journal*, 11(1957), p. 21.

all three Governments have a very strong common interest in damping down the present unrest in Kurdistan.”<sup>141</sup> However, after the collapse of the Baghdad Pact the union between three collapsed and instead of co-operating against the common threat they began to use each other’s Kurds against one to another.<sup>142</sup> This policy of oppressing their own Kurds and supporting others’ Kurds was very detrimental to all Kurds. This has been the case since 1958 and has continued up to now to an increasing degree.

Meanwhile the efforts to gain the Kurdish support through the radio broadcast in the 1950s is also an indication demonstrating the influence of the Kurdish factor on the security of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact as well as on the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East. According to the British documents, it seems that the Soviets were quite successful in using such ethnic means. The Soviet broadcast in Kurdish to pass on to the Kurds of the Middle East their message was very harmful for the West. For example, on the broadcast talk on 26 July 1950 (17.30 FBIS), the speaker said that “the Kurds had been suppressed by the Turks and Arabs as well as by the British and American imperialists. But the Kurds were aware that their brothers in the USSR had obtained the full political and social rights of their country.” The Azerbaijani station went on to say that “the Kurds should be made aware of the USSR, because under Soviet leadership the vile imperialist policy could be abolished.”<sup>143</sup> The radio told the Kurdish listeners that “the Kurds will establish their own country on the border of the USSR” and urged Iraqi Kurds “to awaken the people to the fact that Kurdistan is one country

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<sup>141</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, 1081/59G, 7.5.1959.

<sup>142</sup> Shikara, Ahmed A.R., ‘Middle Eastern Politics between Domestic Constraints and International Intervention,’ *Presented to BRISMES Annual Conference, Warwick, 8-11 July 1993*, pp. 13-17.

<sup>143</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/20, 1.8.1950. quoted from the FBIS 22 and 26 July 1950.

and should be liberated.”<sup>144</sup>

The Egyptian Radio Kurdish service was no less provocative than the Azerbaijani one. For example, concluding the Kurdish program, Cairo radio said “Dear Kurds, the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan is the most ancient and honourable of the histories of the world. Then why have we hitherto been separated from each other and dispersed? When shall we awake? When shall we see the birth of another son like Ahmed the son of Marvan to set us free?”<sup>145</sup>

Soviet broadcasts in Kurdish ceased in August 1953. Thereafter, communist propaganda to Kurds was conducted through the communist parties in the various countries where they existed. It was difficult to assess the influence of communist doctrine on the Kurds as a group but some of the Kurdish leaders were no doubt genuinely attracted to communism but most of them were mere opportunists ready to flirt with any group which would advance their aims.

After the coup, Iraqi radio was also broadcasting in Kurdish and appealing to the Iranian Kurds to unite with their brethren in Iraq where they were sharing equal rights with their Arab brothers. Iranians reacted to such broadcasts in the same way. They claimed that Iran was the fatherland of the Persians as well as the Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds must thus unite with their brethren in Iran.<sup>146</sup>

Meanwhile the Turks pursued a completely different policy to solve their Kurdish problem. The Turks pursued with characteristic thoroughness not to say ruthlessness a policy of out-and-out assimilation seeking to extinguish all traces of a distinctively Kurdish culture and to transform the Kurds into Turks, having

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<sup>144</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/20, 1.8.1950.

<sup>145</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140683, Cairo Radio, Kurdish News Bulletin, No: 289, 11.6.1959.

<sup>146</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133019, EP1055/2, 23.10.1958, Tehran.

isolated them from outside Kurds. "They were already achieving some success but undoubtedly several generations would be required to turkify all Kurds. Peasants were fined for not speaking Turkish in the market-place. Talking a language which was never taught to them would have been a miracle,"<sup>147</sup> HM Ambassador in Ankara reported.

The Turkish authorities preferred to forget the Kurds and ignore their very existence. When the Kurdish question once again arose in the Middle East and this time it became an international problem, they were forced to think about it seriously for the first time. The General Inspector of the Eastern Provinces, Avni Doğan, was therefore allowed to write a series of articles in the Turkish press that was the first of its kind. "The first thing one has to do in order to avert possible dangers is to face realities instead of ignoring them," said Avni Doğan in the daily, Vatan, in October 1958. Then he cited the fact that "The whole world is aware of this Kurdish movement and newspapers, scientific periodicals and foreign ministries are dwelling on the matter at great length. ... And yet we appear to think that all this will disappear if we keep silent about the whole issue." He finally concluded that "we shall regret it forever if we are unable to save these valuable elements from internal and external provocations and give them a secure and tranquil life within the framework of the unity of the Turkish Republic."<sup>148</sup> The Turkish authorities must be regretting now in the 1990s that they did not heed the recommendations of this report.

The Kurds of Iraq were less numerous than those of Persia and Turkey, but in view of their more privileged position they could with some plausibility assume "the role of the free nucleus of a United Independent Kurdistan. In 1918 Kurdish

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<sup>147</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, 1081/59G, 7.5.1959.

<sup>148</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, 1081/59G, 7.5.1959, quoted from Vatan dated 23.11.1958.

was introduced by the British military administration as the official language in Southern Kurdistan. Since then there has been in Iraq a regular if not very prolific output of periodicals, anthologies and new works of all kinds.”<sup>149</sup>

The Russians were prepared to exploit anything they could to encounter the Western propaganda in the Middle East. Therefore, the Shah was afraid of the Soviet Union stirring up trouble in Kurdistan. He wanted to know how far the West was ready to help Iran against the Kurds, who were supposedly backed by the USSR. However the British Ambassador could not give any guarantee until he received the positive American response. In addition, Great Britain believed that the Turks were also worried about communist activities among the Kurds and the growing Kurdish nationalism. Britain was also aware that Iran and Turkey were undoubtedly “comparing notes and working on each other’s anxieties”.<sup>150</sup>

Indeed HM Ambassador in Ankara reported that it was impossible for the UK to support an independent Kurdish State and “would inevitably alienate both Turkey and Persia. But this should not prevent the USA from feeling the pulses of Turkey and Persia to see if they cannot allay Kurdish separatism by more generous treatment of the Kurdish minorities within their boundaries”.<sup>151</sup>

In the 1950s, the regional member countries felt more than ever the need to combat the Kurds who were a potentially formidable threat to each country. However, as soon as Iraq had withdrawn from the Pact the Kurds raised their voice once again and became a central issue of foreign policy concerning all the three on which they found it hard to agree any more in the absence of the Pact and especially Iran and Iraq began to use each other’s Kurds while they looked

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<sup>149</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, E1821/20, 29.4.1959.

<sup>150</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133019, EP1055/3, 20.11.1958.

<sup>151</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, E1821/20, 29.4.1959.

after their own Kurds to prevent them being exploited by the other. Turkey was to join this same policy only after the second Gulf war in 1990 by supporting the Iraqi Kurds against Saddam Hussein who lost his famous “mother of all battles” against the Allies led by George Bush.

## Chapter IV

### HISTORY OF TURKEY TO THE 1950s

#### 4.1 Emergence of Kemalist Turkey

##### 4.1.1 Introduction

Since it may be argued that Turkish involvement in Western defence initiatives in the 1950s is a function of Turkish attachment to the West, it is necessary to look in some detail at the process of westernisation in Turkey in order to appreciate what had by the 1950s become dominant mentality of Turkish policy makers. As explained in the previous chapter, although efforts to westernise the Ottoman Empire began in the eighteenth century, with every passing year it grew weaker and weaker. Abdulhamit's authoritarian attempts to slow down, if not reverse, the process of decline failed. To preserve the integrity of his empire he had pursued an adventurous but unsuccessful pan-Islamist policy and also sought to play off the European powers against each other as well as suppressing the ethnic groups that were seeking autonomy or independence. Nevertheless, it may be claimed in his favour that he lost less Imperial territory during his rule of thirty three years than did the Young Turks in only eleven years. In fact, the Young Turks' nationalist and pro-Western policy caused resentment and spurred the other ethnic groups within the Empire to revolt, and eventually the Empire came to the brink of collapse before World War I broke out. The War served simply to complete this process and relegate to the pages of history the last state to be ruled by the "Caliph of Islam." At the end of the war the Turks acknowledged their loss of Empire and





could no longer lay claim to sovereignty over northern Africa, the Fertile Crescent, Iraq, Yemen, the Gulf States, the Aegean islands, Cyprus, and even many parts of Anatolia itself.

### 4.1.2 The War of Independence

The innate fighting spirit of the Turks, who for centuries had been the guardians of Islam, would not permit them to submit passively to enemy occupation of what they regarded as the essential territories without which their nation could not survive. Resistance was organised by Associations for the Defence of Rights in Anatolia and Thrace. The Sultan appointed Mustafa Kemal, Inspector of the Ninth Army (later renumbered Third Army), which was commanded by Kazım Karabekir. Mustafa Kemal, who was given the wider task of restoring order in the Black Sea region and supervising the demobilisation of Turkish forces there, landed at Samsun on 19 May 1919 and actually proceeded swiftly to lead and organise nationalist forces to oppose foreign occupation.<sup>152</sup> It was Karabekir's army that removed the remaining Armenians from the region. Although written evidence is hard to come by, some writers, such as Abdurrahman Dilipak, claim that Kemal was informally asked by the Sultan to organise a national resistance movement, because the Government, being under the eyes and influence of the Entente Powers, could not do so itself.<sup>153</sup>

When Mustafa Kemal landed on Samsun on 19 May 1919 the Society for the Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Anatolia (Şarki Anadolu Müdaafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) had already called the local leaders for a meeting in Erzurum. He sent communiqués to the commanders, governors, mayors and local resistance forces in the eastern provinces to continue the national struggle. The Erzurum Congress of July 1919 whose main subject was the protection of the eastern provinces, laid down the basis of the “national pact.” The main decisions were: “the nation would

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<sup>152</sup> Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 241.

<sup>153</sup> Dilipak, Abdurrahman, *İnönü Dönemi*, Beyan Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, p. 14.

oppose every kind of foreign occupation ... and mandates or protectorates could not be accepted.”<sup>154</sup> The next congress held in Sivas in September reviewed the decisions taken in Erzurum Congress and gave the local resistance movements a national character. Consequently, all Societies for the Defence of the Rights were united under the name of Society for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Thrace (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdaafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti).

In October, on behalf of the Ottoman Government, Navy Minister Salih Pasha met Mustafa Kemal in Amasya where they came to an understanding on holding general elections. The new Parliament declared the famous “national pact” (*misak-ı milli*) on 28 January 1920. The most important points of the Pact were that the areas inhabited by the Turks would in no circumstances be surrendered and the capitulations that had thwarted the political, judicial and financial development of the country, would never again be accepted. When the Ottoman government was paralysed by the Western influence in İstanbul, the former Ottoman general Mustafa Kemal declared that the Turkish Grand National Assembly would meet in Ankara on 23 April 1920 and would have the sole authority to represent the nation.

On the one hand, the National Forces were bound to fight against the European invaders, on the other hand, they were exposed to the local revolts incited by the İstanbul Government. When the İstanbul Government signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 12 August the last ties were severed between the two. The Ankara Government strongly condemned those who signed it and began forming regular armies to resist its implementation.

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<sup>154</sup> The General Directorate of Press and Information of Prime Ministry of the Turkish Republic, *Turkey 1988*, Kurtuluş Yayınları, Ankara, 1988, p. 40.

The intact forces of Kazım Karabekir backed the Ankara Government on the eastern front and signed an agreement with the Armenians on 3 December 1920. On the western front, the units of the Society for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Thrace were fighting against the Greek troops. After Ankara had endured months of gloom and pessimism, National Forces headed by İsmet İnönü won their first victory against the enemy in April 1921.

Following this Nationalist success, on 10 March 1921 the Entente Powers held a conference in London to make some concessions in the Treaty of Sèvres to make it acceptable to the Ankara Government, but failed. When the Allied Powers came to realise that a Turkish victory against the Greeks was inevitable, first, Italian and later French forces withdrew from Anatolia in June and October 1921 respectively. Eventually the “Great Attack” (Büyük Taarruz) by the Turkish Army started on 26 August 1922 and ended on 18 September with the liberation of the country from Greek occupation.

Under French and Italian pressure the British Government agreed to cease-fire negotiations with Ankara and subsequently the convention of Mudanya was signed on 11 October 1922. It was now the right time to assure the Western Powers that the new state would never be the same as the “blood-stained” Ottoman Empire. The first indication, if not assurance of that, was the abolition of the six century-old Sultanate on 1 November. The peace conference started in Lausanne on 21 November, but was interrupted on 4 February 1923. This led Kemal to assure the Western leaders more clearly that he was sincere in his reform plans. On 17 February he held the famous Economy Congress, which continued until 4 March, in İzmir, during which he produced more tangible confirmation of that. For example, some discussions were devoted to non-economic social and political

matters such as the progress of Westernisation, the futility of purely military power, and perhaps most importantly the introduction of the Latin script. The Lausanne Peace Agreement was eventually signed on 24 July 1923. Although some matters such as finance, sovereignty of the Straits and the question of Mosul remained unsolved from the Turkish point of view, it was a victory for the Turkish diplomacy. It showed the world that the new Turkish Republic was now independent, vigorous, self-assured and determined to establish a strong position in the international arena.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

### 4.1.3 Foundation and Orientation of the Republic of Turkey

The Treaty of Lausanne was generally considered by the new rulers as international approval for a completely different state from the Ottoman Empire. Some were later to claim that its foundations were laid down at the Lausanne Conference.<sup>156</sup> Mustafa Kemal, who was “only anxious to see Turkey a secular Republic”<sup>157</sup> was determined to “turn Turkey into a European state and the Turkish people into a European nation, because he believed that there was only one type of real civilisation; the Western one.”<sup>158</sup> He had been paying lip-service to Islam<sup>159</sup> but, now he was recognised as leader of the country, he no longer needed to dissemble. Thus, he felt free to implement his reform program in order to put an end to the theocratic regime.

Lord Curzon’s conversation with the Chief Rabbi of Egypt, Haim Naum and his speech in the House of Lords concerning the recognition of the independence of Turkey gives us an outsiders’ views about orientation of the Kemalist revolution. Strongly reacting against the recognition of Turkish independence, Lord Curzon said “the reality is that the Turks will never again recapture their former glories, because we have killed them morally and spiritually”<sup>160</sup> by establishing a secular Turkish state which was going to deprive the Turks from leading the Muslim world.

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<sup>156</sup> Mısıroğlu, Kadir, *Lozan Zafer mi Hezimet mi?* Sebil Yayınları, İstanbul, 1971, pp. 28-29.

<sup>157</sup> Price, M.P., *A History of Turkey; From Empire to Republic*, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York, 1961, p. 128.

<sup>158</sup> Vali, Ferenc A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus; the Foreign Policy of Turkey*, The Johns Hopkins Press, London, 1971, pp. 21-22.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>160</sup> In Turkish: “İşte asıl bundan sonraki Türkler bir daha eski şevketlerine kavuşamayacaklardır. Zira biz onları maneviyat ve ruh cephesinden öldürmüş bulunuyoruz.” Dilipak, Abdurrahman, *İnönü Dönemi*, Beyan Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, p. 91. We could not find Lord Curzon’s statement but we suspect that there is such a statement, because in ‘Parliamentary Debates’ the following note is recorded: “...towards the absolute assurance regarding her future security given to Turkey, according to Curzon’s statement ...” See *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol.170, 1924, p. 24.

It is believed that Haim Naum, told Lord Curzon that “if Britain recognised the territorial integrity of independent Turkey he would guarantee to tread Islam and the Turks’ representation of it under foot.”<sup>161</sup>

Although it was chiefly Kemal who oriented the new Republic as he wanted, one should bear in mind that his negotiations with the Italians, the French and particularly the British during and after the War of Independence also contributed the Republic’s new orientation. Kemal desperately needed external support and obtained it at a critical time.

Having internally as well as externally consolidated its power, the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared the new country a Republic and appointed Mustafa Kemal its President virtually for life on 29 October 1923. Commenting on the newly adopted orientation of the republic, Karpas said that this declaration and one year later the abolition of the Caliphate proved that Kemal abandoned his old pro-Islamic attitude of 1919-1921<sup>162</sup> and became secular, if he was not already. Karpas went on to say that “this was a victory of the secular-modernists over conservative-religious”<sup>163</sup> in a struggle that had begun as early as the end of the eighteenth century.

Once firmly established in office, Kemal unhesitatingly used his presidential powers and the support of the recently formed Republican People’s Party to “impose his will upon, and to maintain the control of the assembly”,<sup>164</sup> which turned to be only a mere “debating-club, where members are at liberty to talk for hours

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<sup>161</sup> In Turkish; “Siz Türkiye’nin mülki tamamıyetini kabul ediniz. Onlara ben islamiyeti ve islami temsilciliklerini ayaklar altında çiğnetmeyi taahhüt ediyorum.” See Dilipak, op. loc.

<sup>162</sup> Karpas, K.H., *Turkey’s Politics; The Transition to a Multi Party System*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1959, p. 45.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>164</sup> Tachau, Frank, *Turkey; the Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development*, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 38.

but never to make any constructive criticism and least of all to organise an effective opposition.”<sup>165</sup> Therefore, it has been argued that Kemal, a brilliant military tactician and a consummate political organiser<sup>166</sup> used every opportunity to eliminate his opponents as happened after the Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, the conspiracy against Kemal of 1926 and the Menemen incident of 1930. As Geoffrey Lewis put it, he made these events “the excuse for hanging or exiling virtually every prominent man known to be irredeemably opposed to his policies.”<sup>167</sup> Once again Kemal proved that he was, in Bernard Lewis’ words,

a man of swift and decisive action, of sudden and often violent decision. A tough and brilliant soldier, ... he was in all things a man of immense will and abounding vitality. By his contemporaries he was often called a dictator, and in a sense he certainly was. But, ... his rule was very different than that of other [dictators].<sup>168</sup>

Apart from his personal talents and the Western support for his plan of reforms, there was another factor that contributed to his successes in this field. This was the fact that in spite of the formal separation of military from civilian authority, he had the full support of the military for his far-reaching reform program.<sup>169</sup> This support continued so long as the Presidency was in the hands of distinguished former soldiers: Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938) and İsmet İnönü (1938-1950).

In fact, the political modernisation of the Ottoman Empire as well as Turkey<sup>170</sup> happened to be almost always under the military aegis.<sup>171</sup> “Thus, for nearly two

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<sup>165</sup> Kruger, K., *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1932, p. 72.

<sup>166</sup> Harris, G., *Turkey; Coping with Crisis*, Westview Press, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 56.

<sup>167</sup> Lewis, Geoffrey, *Modern Turkey*, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 106.

<sup>168</sup> Lewis, Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

<sup>169</sup> Tachau, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>170</sup> The proportion of the recruitment to the bureaucracy from bureaucratic and military families, which reached its peak of 75 per cent during the period of the Young Turks and declined to only 50 per cent in Kemal’s period evinced this reality. Dodd, C.H., *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, The Eothen Press, N. Humberside, 1979, p. 56.

<sup>171</sup> Tachau, *op. cit.*, p. 76.



hundred years the soldier has been Turkey's foremost moderniser."<sup>172</sup> As a matter of fact, Kemal always regarded the military as both "the agent and guardian of the reforming ideals of his regime."<sup>173</sup> Indeed, the Turkish army proved this by remaining loyal to their "eternal chief", Atatürk and protecting the Kemalist principles against either subversive or separatist ideologies of rightists, leftists and Islamists in 1960, 1971 and finally 1980 at the expense of interrupting the course of infant Turkish democracy..

As can be seen, the new republic was founded on nationalist, secular and pro-Western bases. As Atatürk was later to put it: "Turkey must be freed from some, if not all, of the 'backward-looking institutions' of Islam."<sup>174</sup> and "the truest order is the order of civilisation,<sup>175</sup> scholarship and science (bilim ve teknik). We do not accept anything else."<sup>176</sup> In fact, this was not only a secularist but also a positivist manifesto. It was therefore quite evident that the new nation was in due course to take its appropriate place among the Western nations. However, to achieve such lofty aims it would first of all have to get rid of all 'backward-looking Islamic institutions.' Thus, began the Kemalist reforms that were without parallel anywhere in the world.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Rustow, D.A. and Robert, E.W., (ed.) *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1964, p. 352.

<sup>173</sup> Dodd, op cit., p. 135.

<sup>174</sup> Weiker, Walter F., *The Modernisation of Turkey; From Ataturk to the Present Day*, HM Publishers, London, 1981, p. 2.

<sup>175</sup> The perception of the civilisation is explained later in this chapter.

<sup>176</sup> Atatürk, Kemal, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1908-1938*, Vol. II, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, pp. 214-215.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Fırat.

#### 4.1.4 Kemalist Reforms

The Kemalist reforms gave paramount importance to creating a modern country on a European model out of the ashes of the oriental Ottoman Empire. Others before Kemal had nurtured the same ambitions but to achieve them it required both a man of his invincible determination and also propitious circumstances. His reform package was by no means entirely new. The westernisers in the Ottoman Empire had attempted to introduce similar reforms from the end of the eighteenth century. The pressure for such reforms started with the military following their disastrous defeat by the Russians in 1778. Kemal had studied the reasons for the failure of these earlier reformers and he seized his own more favourable opportunity to try again. Like them he had a concept of civilisation that was pro-Western so, his reforms were intended to make Turkey a completely different state from that of the old Ottoman Empire that the West had regarded as the number one enemy of the Christian World. As Weiker, like many others, comments:

Many of the reforms which Kemal Atatürk implemented were facilitated by events and trends of the Ottoman period.<sup>178</sup> Some were even begun at that time. Actually, reformers had come to power in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but were able to achieve little in the way of development, because, among other things, Turkey was soon beset by the Balkan wars and World War I. It remained for the Ottoman General, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) to widen, deepen and quicken many of these changes.<sup>179</sup>

Indeed, the influence of the pro-Western elements on the Ottoman state and society had been immense. It is widely believed that in addition to the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms, the Young Turk Revolution prepared the ground for the Kemalist Revolution.<sup>180</sup>

In publications at home and abroad these reforms are often referred to as Kemalism, Atatürkism, the Principles of Atatürk, the Turkish Transformation or

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<sup>178</sup> Interview with Emre and Fırat.

<sup>179</sup> Weiker, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>180</sup> Interview with Emre and Fırat.

the Turkish Revolution.<sup>181</sup> We should look at the reasons and motivations behind it.

One of the first fundamental reforms was the abolition of the Sultanate. But the way this was achieved provided a model for the method by which many other reforms were subsequently introduced. Mustafa Kemal generally proceeded as follows: he would encourage Members of the Parliament whom he had carefully and appropriately selected for the particular purpose especially to prepare the public for the reform and then introduce necessary legislative measures in the Assembly after the reform had been widely discussed for a few days, weeks or months depending its nature. However, when he realised that the National Assembly seemed unlikely to pass the Bill he would cow its opponents. In the case of the abolition of the Sultanate, Kemal, an unusually perceptive, energetic and determined man, suddenly jumped on the desk and said quite clearly that "this will prevail even if some heads may roll in the process."<sup>182</sup> Thereafter, few dared criticise him to his face<sup>183</sup> and MPs would agree to reforms even if they were actually opposed to them, since they knew the price for refusal could be death. Thus, it can be said that the reforms were all imposed upon society from above.<sup>184</sup>

He had already managed to separate the Sultanate from the Caliphate, a change that could scarcely be resisted on Islamic grounds. But, this, it seemed, did not decrease the danger to his regime. Being aware of the fact that the Caliphate was to remain a constant menace to his own power and the major obstacle in the

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<sup>181</sup> Afetinan, *A History of the Turkish Revolution and Turkish Republic*, translated by Uysal, A.E., Pars Matbaası, Ankara, 1981, p. 143.

<sup>182</sup> Eren, Nuri, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernisation*, Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 87.

<sup>183</sup> Lewis, G., op. cit., p. 96 and Mırsiroğlu, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>184</sup> İnalçık, Halil, 'Turkey between Europe and the Middle East,' *Foreign Policy*, 8(1980), p. 16.

way of reforms,<sup>185</sup> he, therefore, after a preliminary campaign, abolished it on 3 March 1924 and subsequently expelled the Caliph from the country. This was, one could argue, the most radical reform, not only in Turkey but also in the whole of Islamic World. No one could even imagine that it was possible to propose its abolition until the “right” time came. As Kruger comments “public opinion was unanimous in declaring that this step was madness on the part of Kemal, and might indeed have disastrous reactions, not only in Turkey, but throughout the Muslim world.”<sup>186</sup>

For the first time since the birth of Islam, this left the whole Islamic world with no Caliph, the dignitary who was regarded by many Muslims as their sole representative and the symbol of Muslim unity and cohesion. It left the Islamic countries in a state of disunity, disarray and complete confusion. They held the Turks responsible for the removal of the caliphate, and they suspected that Kemal was under British<sup>187</sup> and Jewish influence. In fact, modern Turkey has never since had such an independent minded statesman who acted in accordance with his own convictions.

One example of the reactions coming from the Muslim world was the case of the Indian Muslims who had sent a considerable amount of their gold and jewellery to the National Forces during the War of Independence. On behalf of the Indian Muslims, the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali sent a letter addressed to İsmet İnönü, Turkey’s “Second Man” (İkinci Adam) in which they stated that the Caliphate had a strong link with the past and Islam and therefore, had to be protected for the

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<sup>185</sup> Karpat, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>186</sup> Kruger, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>187</sup> Başkaya, Fikret, *Batıllaşma, Çağdaşlaşma, Kalkınma: Paradigmanın İflası*, Doz Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p. 42.

benefit of the Muslim peoples including the Turks themselves. Not surprisingly, Mustafa Kemal agreed with them in seeing this link. It was, in Bernard Lewis words, "precisely for that reason that he was determined to break it."<sup>188</sup> In fact, most of the reforms were intended to serve the very same purpose.

Indeed, it was mainly the caliphate, the symbol of Islamic unity, that had kept other Muslim ethnic groups, under the banner of Ottomans for so long. With its abolition, the Kurdish ulamas and sheikhs, for example, saw no reason to submit to Turkish unIslamic administration. They rose in rebellion, led by Sheikh Said, to restore the caliphate in İstanbul and, if that was not possible, to form their own national Islamic state.<sup>189</sup>

On the day of the abolition of the caliphate, the Assembly adopted some other parallel reforms as well. These were the closing down of all Muslim schools, not the Christian and the Jewish ones, and the establishment of a unified schools system under a secular Ministry of Education. A month later, on April 8, the Assembly abolished the Courts of the Islamic Shari'a. One day later the law allowing the public sale and consumption of alcohol was enacted. On 2 September 1925 the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted to abolish all Islamic orders (tarikats), the closure of the dervish lodges (tekkes) and tombs. This law became effective on 30 November. From 28 November the Assembly outlawed the wearing of any Islamic male headdress such as the fez and other forms of it without a peak or brim. On 30 November Imams of the Mosques were granted permission to wear the Islamic headgear only within the mosques.

The Islamic Hijri Calendar and time system were replaced by the Gregorian

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<sup>188</sup> Lewis, B., op. cit., p. 258.

<sup>189</sup> Interview with Firat.

Calendar and European time system on 26 December 1925.

Mustafa Kemal discarded the Islamic Law, the Shari'a. In its place he introduced the Swiss Civil Code on 17 February 1926; the Italian Criminal Law on March 1; and the German Commercial Code of Law on April 22, with changes only to meet the peculiar conditions of Turkey.

Meanwhile the first statue<sup>190</sup> of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the secular Turkey, was unveiled in Sarayburnu, İstanbul, on 3 October 1926.

On 10 April 1928, the Assembly amended the constitution and struck out the clause stating that Islam was the religion of the Turkish State, the clause committing the Assembly to the application of Islamic Laws and the requirement to swear in the name of Allah as one takes an official oath.<sup>191</sup>

On 24 May 1928, the Parliament forbade the use of Arabic numerals and adopted the numerals used internationally, on November 1 of the same year, it banned the use of the Arabic alphabet and chose the Latin Alphabet. This had a major effect on the irreversible process of the westernisation. Indeed, as expected, it successfully cut off links and connections with the past and Islam. People were virtually not allowed to learn and teach the Ottoman script<sup>192</sup> owing to the fear that they might learn something about Islam from the books already written in that script. And there were virtually no Islamic books printed in the new Latin Alphabet.<sup>193</sup> The Turks were bound to remain ignorant of Islam for decades to

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<sup>190</sup> This is unanimously accepted as an unIslamic act as the very first aim of Islam was and is to put an end to all sorts of idols both on earth as well as in the hearts of the people. The statue was regarded as an idol.

<sup>191</sup> Webster, D.E., *The Turkey of Ataturk, Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*, AMS Press, New York, 1973, p. 129.

<sup>192</sup> The Ottoman script is a version of the Arabic script with some additional letters.

<sup>193</sup> The new Turkish Alphabet is a version of the Latin Alphabet with some additional letters.

come. Arabic and Persian were taken out of the curriculum in the schools on 1 September 1929. The international measurement system was adopted on 26 March 1931.

On 15 April 1931 the Turkish History Institute was established to rewrite Turkish history from beginning to end according to the new way of thought, which simply limited the Islamic part of the Turkish history to the Sultan's harem and his adventures. Briefly the Institute created a new theory to explain Turkish history by alleging that most of the ancient civilisations, if not all, stemmed from the Turkish civilisation. It even went on to claim that there was no great man in the world that was not a Turk. It was through such an approach that the reformers had hoped to change the Turkish mentality and instil the confidence that they lacked in their dealings with other "superior" nations. It even conducted a short-lived investigation into the measurement of the skulls of such "pure Turks" as Mimar Sinan and Yunus Emre but had to abandon this when the results were not encouraging.<sup>194</sup>

On 19 February 1932 the Turkish Language Institute was set up to perform similar reforms in the field of the Turkish language. Briefly, it aimed to improve the Turkish language within its own structure and purify it from the Persian and Arabic words and patterns. It attempted to secularise the language as the Turkish History Institute had rewritten Turkish history. The Institute propagated the Sun Language Theory, which, in parallel with the Turkish History Thesis, assumed that all world languages stemmed from Turkish. The reformers anticipated that this belief would help the Turks overcome the inferiority complex that they felt towards Persian and Arabic as well as European languages. In supporting this

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<sup>194</sup> Doğan, Mehmet D., *Türkiye'de Darbeler, Mücadeleler ve Siyasi Sistem*, Rehber Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1991, p. 73.

idea, Mustafa Kemal stated that “this nation was not created to be ashamed of itself, but to be proud of it.”<sup>195</sup>

On 18 July 1932 the Arabic ezan (the call for prayer from the minarets) was replaced by a Turkish version, the first attempt of its kind ever in Islamic history. As a matter of fact, Kemal was contemplating more radical changes in the field of religion and made some attempts in this regard, but failed at the end. For example, a Committee was set up under the well-known scholar and politician, Fuat Köprülü, in 1928 to turkicize worship, to turn the mosque into a “Muslim church”, with pews, organ and an imam-presenter,<sup>196</sup> but the spirit of the time was not conducive to the realisation of this goal<sup>197</sup> in the face of opposition.

On 21 June 1934 the Assembly passed the Surname Law forbidding the use of any traditional family name and/or those with ethnic or religious connotation and replaced it with the Western tradition of surname. On 29 November 1934, the use of some titles such as “Hacı, Molla, Hafız, Hoca, Hazret, Paşa, Bey, Beyefendi and Hanımefendi,”<sup>198</sup> were forbidden, though it was never applied for the rulers themselves. On December 3, some Islamic garments were banned and on December 5, Turkish women were granted all social and political rights that men enjoyed, thus, putting them ahead of their contemporaries in many European countries.

On 5 January 1937, the Assembly put the “six arrows” into the constitution, thus, symbolising the fact that the Republican People’s Party had completed the process of settling the constitutional foundations, on which the state affairs were dealt with. It demonstrated that the Party had no serious opposition and nobody

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<sup>195</sup> Atatürk, op. cit., p. 253.

<sup>196</sup> Eren, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>197</sup> Lewis, B., op. cit., p. 409.

<sup>198</sup> Kili, Suna, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1980, p. 179.



would easily be able to change the fundamentals of the secular and nationalist state any more.

On 15 April 1937, “ölüm salası” (the call to funeral service from the minarets) was banned. This was Mustafa Kemal’s last effort to curb Islamic influence in Turkey before he died on 10 November 1938.

#### 4.1.5 Post-Atatürk Era

Following Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü, a staunch Kemalist and a close friend who is known as National Chief (Milli Şef), became President of the Republic, and Celal Bayar was appointed Prime Minister. Bayar, too, was an ardent admirer of Mustafa Kemal. (Turks still recall his declaration, "Atatürk'ü sevmek milli bir ibadettir" (to love Atatürk is a form of national worship).) In 1950, after the first genuinely free multi-party elections, the DP replaced the RPP in government. Celal Bayar replaced İsmet İnönü as President, and Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister. Despite these apparently major changes, it can be argued that until very recently Turkey has continued to be run by a small section of society that had established its Kemalist credentials. As far as the ordinary humble citizens were concerned the change of regime from sultanate to republic and the change of government from RPP to DP produced little change in their relationship with state institutions. Such individuals remained powerless and obsequious before a contemptuous bureaucracy. They passively accepted their lot as the docile servants of the state, ordered about in accordance with the whims of their rulers. Their attitudes did not change even after they had the vote. Turks traditionally have submitted loyally to the dictates of whoever is regarded as a legitimate ruler, and this tradition continues today.

İnönü applied an even firmer, if not more dictatorial grip during his one party rule.<sup>199</sup> Having exploited the war conditions he resorted to unjustifiable taxation and political restrictions. The Village Institutes were set up to train the new generation to protect and stiffen the Kemalist regime against communist, rightist and Islamist currents. On 10 January 1945, the Assembly purified the language of

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<sup>199</sup> Eren, op. cit., p. 23.

the constitution and adopted new names for some months with Arabic names.

Having assumed that the regime was free from any danger, the rulers prepared Turkey to hold its first direct election on 21 July 1946. Moreover, on May 1948, it approved the abolition of the Revolutionary Courts, which had already fulfilled their duty by executing many opponents of the regime in processes more remarkable for ruthlessness than for justice. As Başkaya says, it was only possible to protect the reforms by force, because they were carried out by force.<sup>200</sup>

Kemalist progress in the cultural, religious and legal fields was almost completed. At the end of the Second World War the democratic powers had defeated the dictatorships in Germany, Italy and Japan; it was time for Turkey to line up with the honourable victorious Western countries. So, the new international order as well as the frustration of the people who had been harshly repressed for three decades obliged the Republican People's Party to accept its overwhelming defeat in the general election and transfer power to the Democrat Party on 14 May 1950.

Turkey then speeded up its socio-economic and political transformation and integration with the European democracies. The Democrat Party enacted a law to safeguard Atatürk's sacred position. Subsequently, the Kemalist regime was, in one way or another, accepted by Turkish governments no matter whether they were from the left or right wing. And when the civil authority was unable to do so, the Army, acting as the guardian of the existing regime as is the norm in other Third World countries to which Turkey was no exception, stepped in and restored the rule of law and order in 1960, 1971 and 1980. These coups may have been disliked, but it was the only way to maintain the Kemalist regime.

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<sup>200</sup> Başkaya, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

#### 4.1.6 The Kemalist Perception of Civilisation

As explained earlier, the modernisers or westernisers of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey all tended to perceive civilisation in more or less the same way. While the Ottoman reformers believed that it was possible to reform the state and society without touching the Caliphate and the sultanate, Mustafa Kemal and his companions realised that as long as these fundamental institutions lasted the chance of transforming Turkey would be slim. Some further explanation may help to convey what the reformers meant when they spoke so enthusiastically about civilising Ottoman or Turkish society.

Mustafa Kemal and his companions, like their predecessors, had tried hard to westernise their society by all possible means. But the atmosphere was not conducive to Westernisation before the multi-party system was introduced.

In general the westernisers were not content with the existing state of society and therefore, searched for a new national identity. But this completely eluded the pre-Republican reformers and personally eluded Mustafa Kemal. The Turks remained a people in search of a personality. Kemal made the crucial decision on behalf of the nation and introduced his western reforms in order to mould a new Turkish identity. Many Turks were not happy with this decision, but there was little they could do to oppose it. Once the multi-party system started to operate in the country the majority of the people began to adopt the reforms willingly, unlike the former generation during the establishment of the Republic. With the exception of a negligible number of Islamists, they forgot all about their Islamic past. After three decades of one party dictatorship, Turkey underwent its first true multi-party elections in 1950, but the democratisation process was interrupted by the Turkish Armed Forces at the beginning of the next two decades. The

more warmly Turkey embraced a true democratic regime, the stronger became the opposition of extremists from Right and Left.

Consequently, Kemalism itself took a different shape adapting to the changing social and political conditions. It was interpreted by the Republicans and the non-Republicans differently. This can be seen in detail when we discuss Kemalist principles later in this chapter.

Though Kemal was one of the most radical reformers, he reflected the general mood of the educated class and, to some extent, of all Turkish society when he said "They [the Western Countries] shall know that we are as good as they are! They shall treat us as their equal! Never will we bow our heads to them!"<sup>201</sup> This approach indicates that while he was trying to inject confidence into the hearts of the people he himself revealed the frustration and the inferiority complex that all Turks shared towards Western civilisation. These words gained popularity among the Turkish authorities and affected their attitudes in their international conduct. In another words, unlike many rulers of former colonies, the Turkish rulers succeeded to overcome their "inferiority" complex.

Kemal had already decided to create a new state as well as a new nation from the remnants of the theocratic Empire and its peoples. Vali accurately commented that Kemal's aim was

"to turn Turkey into a European state and the Turkish people into a European nation, because he believed that there was only one type of real civilisation; the Western one. ... he did want them [the Turks] to adopt Western European principles and attitudes which had become secularised following the Middle Ages."<sup>202</sup>

As a consequence of such a perception of civilisation the de-Islamisation and Europeanisation reforms soon extended to all political, social and cultural fields.

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<sup>201</sup> Adivar, H.E., *Türk'ün Ateşle İmthihanı*, Kurtuluş Matbaası, İstanbul, 1962, p. 149.

<sup>202</sup> Vali, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

As mentioned earlier, many reforms had been carried out to serve this very aim. To give some apparently trivial but nonetheless revealing examples, for years Turkish music was banned from broadcasts on the “Turkish” radio; men wearing headgear associated with Islam (i.e. *külâh* and *sarık* or *kefiye*) were often barred from entering various cities until very recently;<sup>203</sup> Arabic inscriptions on some gateways and in entrances of house were removed since they were regarded as traces of the past. Many historical buildings were damaged in this way, for example, Bursa lost many of its prized buildings.

To the reformers, there was one condition for being objective and scientific (*evrensel ve bilimsel*): estrangement from anything and everything belonging to themselves and their past or preserving Islamic traditions, since all of that was regarded as “backward,” “nonsense,” “unscientific,” “crude,” “bad,” and “worthless.” The only solution was to embrace anything “western.”<sup>204</sup>

It was, and is, thought that oriental culture in general and Islamic culture in particular, was the [fundamental] reason for backwardness. According to such a primitive logic, estrangement from oriental culture was perceived as identical with getting free from backwardness. Whereas, in that case, backwardness would only have been limited to the Islamic countries. Then it would be hard for us to understand backwardness in many Latin American, Asian and African countries.<sup>205</sup>

One of the main aims of the Kemalist reforms was to complete the final process of two-centuries of Westernisation of Turkish society. This was by and large achieved through the famous Kemalist principles, the “six arrows,” though it brought about an irreversible dependence on the West. For instance, it was a consequence of such policies that the constant cry of the new civil-bureaucrats

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<sup>203</sup> For example, zealous gendarmes would not allow peasants wearing the *külâh* to enter even the small eastern township of Ergani in the late 1960s and even in the 1980s *sarıks* were confiscated and destroyed. Such restrictions were imposed in eastern Turkey where Kemalist reforms had yet to take effect; in western Turkey the situation did not then arise, because most inhabitants had abandoned their traditional headgear following the ‘Hat Law’ of 25 November 1925.

<sup>204</sup> Başkaya, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

became (and still remains) “what will Europe think of us?”<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> Lewis, G., *op. cit.*, p. 114.

#### 4.1.7 Kemalist Principles

There are six Kemalist principles, which define the aims of the reforms. One can say that these principles are the fundamentals of the Kemalist school of thought. The new regime was based on these six arrows, which were incorporated into the constitution in 1937 before Kemal died. A brief explanation of them is necessary as they influenced foreign policy insofar as that was directed at creating conditions favourable to the implementation of Kemalism. They are also important in defining the boundaries within which Turkish foreign policy is pursued.

(a) *Republicanism* (Cumhuriyetçilik): This principle provided for the demise of the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate and their replacement by the sovereignty of the Turkish nation as expressed through the National Assembly. This was the main principle preventing any opposition from challenging the new rulers and/or proposing any other sort of administration for the country.

(b) *Nationalism* (Milliyetçilik): This has actually more than one aspect. First of all, unlike other movements such as pan-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism,<sup>207</sup> it denounced the irredentist ambitions and recognised the borders of the country as constituted at the end of the War of the Independence. Secondly, it was invoked to prevent expression of internationalist ideologies, namely, Communism, Socialism and Islamism. The third and probably the most important aspect of nationalism was that it became the basis for numerous efforts and exhortations to heighten “Turkish” self-esteem and pride. For example, statements such as “Turkey is for the Turks,” and “Blessed is he who can say, “I am a Turk”” were intended to eliminate the Turkish inferiority complex and instil national pride. The

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<sup>207</sup> Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 252, also, Kili., *op. cit.*, p. 82.



reformers believed the peasants should be made to narrow their universalist “Muslim” identity and the educated class should cease to see themselves as Ottomans and identify with the Turkish nation as a whole and take pride in being part of the West. The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were intended to serve these lofty aims. Finally, it was based on the assumption that Turkey was a modern nation-state with no “ethnic” group. In fact, the policy of nationalism, in Karpas’s words, “was carried out in many cases by deliberately attempting to assimilate non-Turkish Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds.”<sup>208</sup> It was only after the 1980s that this assumption proved to be wrong and in 1991, the year of the US-led war against Iraq, the Turkish authorities admitted for the first time that there was a separate Kurdish ethnic identity in Turkey.

(c) *Populism* (Halkçılık): This principle especially emphasised the sovereignty of the people, as in Kemal’s much-quoted phrase “sovereignty belongs unconditionally and without reservation to the people.” Also, it stressed the mutual responsibilities of the state and individuals toward each other, and the absence of social classes in the Turkish state<sup>209</sup> and rejected special privileges for any individual family, class or organisation.<sup>210</sup> During the single party period, however, populism in practice was seen more often as “government for the people” to the relative neglect of “by the people.” Denial of the existence of social classes was politically utilitarian in that it helped to legitimise the single party as the sole representative of all elements of the society.<sup>211</sup> In practice, until the emergence of the Cyprus issue in the mid-1950s, the general public’s role in foreign affairs was purely passive.

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 254.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>210</sup> Kili, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>211</sup> Karpas, op. loc.

(d) *Laicism* (Laiklik): This was explained earlier due to its importance and its overwhelming relevance to the whole subject. Briefly, the principle of secularism was seen as “an indispensable component of modernisation”<sup>212</sup> by the reformers who refused the acceptance of a state religion, any Islamic institutions and most importantly any involvement of Islam in state affairs. Laicism meant separation of religion from educational, cultural and legal affairs too. In fact, this principle was at the very heart of the matter and permeated the spirit of all the reforms.<sup>213</sup> Once this was instilled into the hearts and minds of society, then all other reforms would be safe and secure from any potential danger. Therefore, most of the reforms were carried out to create a fertile soil for this principle. Indeed, as a consequence of Kemalist reforms in general, and secularism in particular, today the Turkish nation is second to none in being a secular “Muslim” nation in the world. Thus, the Turks took upon themselves the task of weakening the political impact of Islam in the Middle East. This principle had an important impact on Turkish foreign policy, removing the need to heed Muslim opinion. One illustration of its effect is the prompt Turkish recognition of the state of Israel in less than year time from its declaration of independence.

(e) *Etatism* (Devletcilik): Etatism (or statism) was the name used to describe the economic system that was intended to develop the country. Speaking to some journalists on 16 January 1923 Kemal said, “the Turkish state will not be a military state. But the new Turkish state will be an economic state.”<sup>214</sup> He made similar statements at the 1923 Economy Congress in İzmir. This was another change from Ottoman policy and a far cry from the early days of the Empire when the spoils

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>213</sup> Kili, op. loc.

<sup>214</sup> Kili, Suna, *Kemalism*, Menteş Matbaası, İstanbul, 1968, p. 78.

of conquest were the main source of income for the Ottoman economy. The etatist principle, which was interpreted quite differently from time to time by different parties, gave the state an active role in economic development and stressed the public sector's primacy in industrialisation, though private enterprise was also to be encouraged.

It can be argued that one purpose of etatism was to create a bourgeoisie to replace the dominant non-Turkish bourgeoisie. Indeed, it was this nascent petty bourgeois class that took over power and to some extent replaced the classical civil-military bureaucratic rule in the 1950s.

Etatism was, in fact, the only one of the "six arrows" the DP challenged, but they did so, because none of the other "arrows" could survive if the economy failed, and the economy was bound to fail unless the etatism principle was modified. İnönü had begun to modify the principle but more drastic change was dictated by external influences, particularly the demands of the US administration that was reluctant to give aid to countries not pursuing a liberal economic policy. By adopting etatism Turkey signified that prosperity was to be sought not by conquest as in the golden age of the Ottomans but by internal development. This facilitated better Turkish relations with the outside world. Later, as the alliance with the West developed, the preponderance of state economic enterprises in Turkey was in stark contrast to the principles of private enterprise embraced so firmly by the Americans.

(f) *Revolutionism* (Devrimcilik): This was one of the vaguest principles. It enabled any potential opposition to be eliminated before it became a real threat. Essentially, it meant identifying traditional concepts and institutions that Kemalists considered inimical to the progress of the state and people and replacing them with modern ones and thereafter protecting these reforms. The Republicans

generally considered Revolutionism the summation of Kemalist reforms, because “modernism was the goal of the new regime and reformism was the only means to achieve it.”<sup>215</sup> But the Democrats and their successors challenged this interpretation and said that the true revolutionaries were those who exercised the popular sovereignty during the multi-party period by reflecting “the will of the people.”<sup>216</sup> As for the effect of this principle on Turkey’s foreign policy, unlike the revolutionism of, say, China or Iran, Turkish revolutionism was not intended for export. Turkey wanted to be left in peace to perfect her own internal revolution.

All in all, Kemalism helped the Turkish nation towards Westernisation and secularisation (which is what Kemalists meant by “civilisation”) even though this was not achieved in Kemal’s lifetime. Kemalism has demonstrated remarkable durability. Even up to the present any party (including the former so-called Islamist NSP (National Salvation Party), later Welfare Party) coming to power has had to legitimise its actions by claiming that what it has done does not conflict with Kemalist principles. Despite the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, Kemalism remains the dominant ideology in Turkey. The New World Order is taking shape, but one way or another, it seems, Kemalism will live for the foreseeable future. No doubt it will continue to be interpreted in different ways to suit changing fashions; that is how it survives.

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<sup>215</sup> Karpas, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>216</sup> Interview with Mr Gürsoy who claimed that the Democrat Party is the “reincarnation of the Kemalist ideology”.

## 4.2 Turkey's Politics to 1950

### 4.2.1 Introduction

The founders of modern Turkey reoriented the internal socio-economic and external policies of the country from the theocratic and expansionist base to a democratic and non-expansionist one. The internal policy objectives were, *inter alia*, to transform the society according to the new de-Islamisation and Westernisation reforms. The foreign policy objectives were, among other things, to obtain support for this package of reforms and to protect Turkish territory. Therefore, the internal and external policies were closely interlinked, particularly, in the case of Republican Turkey.<sup>217</sup> The success, if not the very survival, of the new regime partly depended upon finding a solution for economic and social problems of the people that had been neglected for centuries.

Under Mustafa Kemal Turkey concentrated on implementation of the reforms and as far as this permitted it was engaged in establishing good relations with neighbouring countries. Turkey was not as involved in the global affairs as it became in the 1950s by which time it was assumed that the implementation of reforms was complete and changes had occurred in the international order. Since Turkey's foreign policy was mainly motivated by the need for foreign aid for its economic development and territorial security alike, its economic policy must be considered before we turn to foreign policy.

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<sup>217</sup> Interview with Gülek who said "since Kemal's time, internal and foreign policy had both been regarded as directed towards westernising Turkey."

#### 4.2.2 Economic Policy

The modern Republic of Turkey had an unenviable economic legacy from the Ottoman Empire. Following the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Turkey started receiving international loans from the Western Powers, namely, Britain and France. The sultans, however, were incapable of translating these millions of francs and pounds into an economic development to catch up with their European rivals in material well-being. The Palace attempted to establish state-supported industries, but this policy had little effect on the economy as a whole. Railway construction was probably the only basic improvement in the economic infrastructure of the Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In short, manufacturing industry was mainly dominated by the non-Muslim subjects, while agricultural production was carried out in a primitive fashion mainly by the Muslim subjects. The Empire was, like any other developing country, exporting raw materials and importing finished products from abroad and, therefore, she had a persistent deficit in her balance of trade. The Empire died, but left Turkey, its main inheritor, with an infrastructure almost completely destroyed by war against Russians and Armenians in the East and war against British, French, Italian and the Greeks in the West. As a result of the successive wars between 1912 and 1922 Turkey lost most of its qualified male population. The exodus of the Armenians and the exchange of the Greek population of Anatolia and the Turks of the Western Thrace caused an enormous loss of experienced business and technical talent since the Turks were mostly soldiers, government employees and farmers. In addition, Turkey undertook payment of sixty six per cent of the Empire's foreign debts.

Actually, the Treaty of Lausanne included several provisions which had influ-

ence over future Turkish economy. On the whole, the Treaty was less damaging than the Treaty of Sèvres, but in accordance with a protocol attached to the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey still undertook to maintain all economic concessions granted to foreign companies before October 1914.<sup>218</sup> Turkey was also obliged to maintain until 1929 the Ottoman customs tariff which some argued restricted the central authorities' ability to raise revenue. On the positive side, the Treaty of Lausanne formally abolished the capitulations and Turkey's share of the Ottoman debts was reduced to 78 million pounds sterling from 118 million.<sup>219</sup>

The founders of the Republic were reluctant to adopt either a capitalist or communist economic system, the two major alternatives of the time, and followed something in between: the revised Ottoman economic system. The governments exerted immense efforts to establish a state-supported industry and alleviate the position of the peasants, who were completely cut off from the outside world. The government could do very little to achieve these economic aims in 1920s owing to the internal revolts against the new secular regime and heavy international restrictions imposed on her in Lausanne. George Harris alleged that "the Turks found their economy lagging farther behind the level of Europe than it had been two decades earlier."<sup>220</sup>

On 1 March 1922, Mustafa Kemal presented a six-point program of economic development: Its aims were

[to] resuscitate and modernise agriculture and industry, ... to develop the forests, ... to nationalise - in accordance with the ability of the state - those economic institutions and enterprises most directly concerned with the general welfare, ... to exploit the mineral wealth of the country, ... to protect and reinvigorate existing industry and to

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<sup>218</sup> Hale, William, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 39, and Harris, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>220</sup> Harris, op. loc.

consider protective measures for ... new industry ... to secure financing of the national revolution by creating ... a balanced budget suited to the national economic structure.<sup>221</sup>

However, most of these objectives still wait to be achieved.

Turkey adopted a policy of "state capitalism" in order to bolster up its industrialisation in the absence of a Turkish entrepreneurial class. The attempt to construct a railway network was one of the first indications that such a policy was needed. Apart from such practical reasons, there was a set of psychological factors that forced Turkey to embrace etatist policies. From the Ottoman experiences with the West, the Turkish authorities concluded that political independence had to be complemented by economic protectionism and autarky. Turkish foreign trade had a deficit throughout the 1920s for reasons already explained. Significantly, consumption goods constituted the bulk of imports instead of investment goods.<sup>222</sup>

After the world-wide depression of 1929, the year the international restrictions imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne expired, Kemal moved towards establishing a form of state capitalism based on the creation of state-run manufacturing enterprise. This policy of etatism could be defined simply as the intervention of the state in economic matters to achieve rapid economic development and protect the general welfare. For these reasons, the government established state monopolies in most of the economic areas: the production of salt, coal, cellulose and papers, chemicals, iron and steel, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages except wine, matches, tea, sugar, explosives, gas, rail, postal-telegraph-telephone and the maritime passenger services.<sup>223</sup> Turkish etatism invaded the field of labour-

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<sup>221</sup> Atatürk, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

<sup>222</sup> Alkin, Erdoğan, Prof., *Turkey's International Economic Relations*, Guryay Matbaası, İstanbul, 1983, p. 5.

<sup>223</sup> Rivkin, Malcolm D., *Development for National Growth: the Turkish Precedent*,



management relations as well. Yet it seems safe to conclude that these efforts induced relatively few new investments. It was only in 1947 that the right of either employers or employees to associate freely in the formation of associations and unions was formally recognised. In fact, even this recognition did not mean much to either employers or employees until 1960s, when a new constitution was introduced to guarantee these rights.

Apart from a private American loan in 1930, Turkey received international loans for the first time from the Soviet Union in 1934, when Turkey started to implement its first five year development plan. Then British loans followed in 1938 and French and German ones in 1939.

New industrial enterprise enjoyed almost complete freedom from state intervention until the end of the Second World War. The law required the city, provincial and national governments to buy home-made commodities. Several banks, namely, İş Bank, Sümer Bank, Ziraat Bank, Eti (Hittite) Bank were established for the purpose of implementing the state industrial program, more specifically for industry, textiles, agriculture and mining and power respectively.

As a part of the etatist policy, Turkish governments made great efforts to realise the expressed six objectives, but there was little they could do as long as they could not get international loans. Therefore, İnönü, the second president of Turkey, decided to align with the victorious powers and in February 1945 declared war against the Axis Powers and thus, Turkey became a founder member of the United Nations.

A general characteristic of the governments of Kemal and İnönü was neglect of agriculture and thus, also of the peasants. They applied oppressive policies in

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Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 79, and Robinson, op. cit., p. 110.

agriculture and industry alike.<sup>224</sup> There had been a few new investments in industry and some improvements in the textile industry and enlargement of the state farms during one party rule, particularly during the Second World War. All attempts to create a self-sufficient economy were doomed to fail. Consequently, there had been little progress until 1945 as far as the ordinary people were concerned. According to Robinson, "if Turkish income estimates bear any relevance to reality, per capita real national income was very little higher in 1945 than in 1929, if at all."<sup>225</sup>

Apart from 1938, there had been no deficit in Turkish foreign trade from the World Crisis of 1929 until the endorsement of the new policy of international economic co-operation after World War II. This change of policy, among other things, prepared the ground for the liberal open market economic policy of the Democratic Party in the 1950s.

Amid the "severe pent-up demand, high rates of inflation, an eroded and inadequate industrial base and an infrastructure insufficient to meet communication and energy demands,"<sup>226</sup> Turkey faced the Soviet demands over the Straits and eastern provinces. This threat<sup>227</sup> made it easier for the West in general and the US in particular and Turkey to co-operate against international communism. As a result, Turkey obtained a considerable amount of economic and military assistance from the US, thereby strengthening Turkey's international position and its domestic investment load in accordance with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948. By the end of the 1949-1950 fiscal year, Turkey had received 180 million dollars as American economic assistance. The loans were spent

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<sup>224</sup> Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>226</sup> Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>227</sup> All interviewees agreed on the point that the Soviet threat to Turkey was perceived as genuine.

on major projects such as improvement of the road and rail networks, modernisation of iron and chrome mines, expansion of irrigation and an ambitious technical assistance program.<sup>228</sup>

The Turkish authorities had already decided to align with the West when the new republic was founded. Alignment with the West, however, took different forms depending, inter alia, on the dominant figures of the successive governments and international order. So, during one party rule, the governments were mainly engaged in transforming state apparatus and society into a modern and European shape. When these objectives were by and large achieved in the domestic field, the authorities, helped by the international order, decided to integrate into the Western liberal economy too. However, the Western capitalists were reluctant to invest in Turkey as long as it was ruled by the same party,<sup>229</sup> the Republican People's Party. It can be argued that Turkish politicians were cognisant of this fact and thus, had no choice but to let the multi-party system proceed.

On 14 May 1950, in Turkey's first, honest, contested, general election, the opposition Democratic Party swept into office with an impressive majority. This success was to a considerable extent due to the frustration of the people with what people especially peasants perceived and called, the "Allahsız", anti-Islamic Republican People's Party. Of course they were unaware that Bayar assured İnönü about secularism, education and foreign policy when he was allowed to establish the Democrat Party.<sup>230</sup>

Generally speaking, the Turkish economy boomed in almost all sectors during

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<sup>228</sup> Robinson, op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>229</sup> Interview with Ahmet and Nilüfer Gürsoy.

<sup>230</sup> Timur, Taner, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p. 16.

the first three years of Democrat Party rule, with the combined help of international loans and very good weather. Turkey underwent an enormous process of industrialisation as well as modernisation in the field of agriculture. Turkey, an importer of wheat until 1950, became the world's fourth largest exporter of it in 1954.<sup>231</sup> The cultivated areas increased owing to the mechanisation in agriculture. In industry, factory units increased from 2,335 in 1950 to 4,527 in 1954. Agricultural as well as industrial production rapidly increased throughout the 1950s. In short, heavy investment continued in all sectors.<sup>232</sup> This rapid economic advance especially in the early 1950s strengthened the hope of the Turkish authorities and the people themselves of catching up with the West in material well-being, which was one of Kemal's aims. To cite one instance of this optimism, in 1957, President Bayar said, "we hope that thirty years from now when our blessed country will have a population of 50 million, it will be a little America."<sup>233</sup> One can observe this premature satisfaction from Orga's views as well: "Were he [Kemal] to see his changed people today he would indeed realise that from the ashes of the past has truly arisen the bright phoenix of a new Turkish nation."<sup>234</sup>

Foreign experts warned Turkey not to move so fast, but, the Turks ignored the advice. Menderes was determined that "in 50 or 80 years Turkey would be within the general economic range of Western Europe. That was the target."<sup>235</sup> He believed "that in the absence of such a development, Turkey would be swallowed up either by her friends - through growing dependency - or by her foes - through

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<sup>231</sup> Hale, op. cit., p. 104.

<sup>232</sup> Rivkin, op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>233</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 21 October 1957.

<sup>234</sup> Orga, Irfan, *Phoenix Ascendant; The Rise of Modern Turkey*, Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1958, p. 197.

<sup>235</sup> Robinson, op. cit., p. 152.

subversion and ultimate aggression.<sup>236</sup>

He showed more concern for Turkey's economy than any Turkish leader other than Turgut Özal in the history of the Republic. His fear of the consequences of dependency of the Turkish economy led him to resist American demands concerning economic policy. This resistance contributed to the fall of his government, though this was just one of the reasons for the Democrats' demise.

The Democrats could not have conducted such an accelerated development program without substantial foreign aid. These funds came in response to Turkey's assumption of international military obligations in the Western defence system and continued even after the Menderes government was overthrown.

Indeed, it is difficult to deny the importance and contribution of the international economic and military assistance to Turkey's economic development. Yet one should remember that this process of seeking and acquiring United States aid started irreversibly in 1947, not in 1950, even though the amounts were lower. This policy of economic development with international aid was enthusiastically followed throughout the 1950s as well. The United States sales and grants to Turkey reached a total of about 1,616 million dollars between 1950 and 1962.<sup>237</sup> However, this inevitably entailed a complete dependence upon the West not only in economic matters but also in foreign policy.

In short, the United States has never been satisfied with the liberalisation policy in Turkey and Turkey has never been satisfied with the amounts of economic and political-military support from the West in general and the United States in particular. To cite one example of this dissatisfaction, Menderes did his best to

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<sup>236</sup> Robinson, *op. loc.*

<sup>237</sup> Rivkin, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

obtain 300 million dollars for his development projects at the end of the 1950s, but he received only 30 million dollars. Moreover the growing Islamisation of the bureaucracy due to the liberalisation policy was to the liking of neither the United States nor the Turkish leadership, including the Democrats. This was another source of conflict between the allies. It happened without government intent.

Toward the mid-1950s the weather cycle turned unfavourable and once again Turkey became a wheat importer in 1955 and remained so until the end of the Democrat rule. The effect of weather on agriculture had a great impact on one of the basic sources of revenue. In addition, the 6-7 September 1955 disorders, which had some negative implications on the Turkish economy, were another setback in the Democrats' relations with the West. Besides, the Democrat government pegged the value of Turkish currency at an artificially high level and imposed heavy customs duties thereby fostering the evolution of a protectionist import-substitution regime. Foreigners were naturally reluctant to see this shift of policy. Moreover, some "disputes with the World Bank and the United States over the political orientation of certain development projects led to a reduction in essential inputs of funds from abroad."<sup>238</sup> Also, the growing economy had suffered from the failure of the oil and mining sectors to meet their potential. Finally, the lack of any precise plan for economic development was probably the major economic factor that led to the downfall of Democrat Party rule in Turkey.

The deficit in Turkish foreign trade had continued to increase since 1947.<sup>239</sup> "Despite American warnings, the government felt compelled to intervene more actively than ever in the economic life."<sup>240</sup> At the same time, there were heated

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<sup>238</sup> Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>239</sup> Alkin, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>240</sup> Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

criticisms from the opposition, but Menderes disregarded them. The Democrat Party in general, and Adnan Menderes in particular, increasingly closed their eyes to criticism regardless of whether it was destructive or constructive, and by so doing, they prepared their fate with their own hands.<sup>241</sup>

During 1955 and 1956 Menderes found himself increasingly preoccupied with Turkish foreign relations as he realised that Turkish diplomatic support was worth a great deal to the West, possibly even large scale economic subsidy. However, as will be explained later under the title of Foreign Policy, the importance of Turkey in terms of global interests of the United States had changed by this time and thus, American aid to Turkey was reduced accordingly. Aside from the internal problems, this perception of Turkey by the United States and American reluctance to support Turkey subsequently helped to bring Menderes' rule to an end on 27 May 1960.

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<sup>241</sup> For details see Birand, Mehmet Ali, *Demirkırat*, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991.

### 4.2.3 Foreign Policy in General

In order to place the Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1950s in a proper perspective it is necessary to review first the major factors which produced Turkey's alignment with the West, second the objectives of her foreign policy, and third the way Turkey perceived and implemented her foreign policy.

As already explained, the leadership of modern Turkey, taking lessons from the process of Westernisation of the Ottoman Empire, decided to reform the state as well as the society. Headed by Mustafa Kemal, they introduced a series of reforms to achieve these goals. This is why there has been a strong link between domestic and foreign policy of the country. A successful foreign policy that would secure international support and aid was, the reformers thought, essential for the implementation of her package of reforms and the solution of economic problems.<sup>242</sup> Indeed, as Vali pointed out, the Turkish foreign policy was mainly aimed at implementing domestic policy.<sup>243</sup>

One could say that all these arose partly from Turkey's need for time and peaceful conditions which would allow the reformers to concentrate on domestic affairs. Both her domestic and her foreign policies were therefore aimed at making Turkey a fully-fledged member of the European family of nations on an equal basis. This has always been a driving force for the Turkish foreign policy makers.<sup>244</sup> Turkey has been using all available means to achieve these objectives since the establishment of the Republic.

But aside from the reforms, Turkey also felt the need to align herself with the

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<sup>242</sup> Vali, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

<sup>244</sup> Tamkoç, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.



West in order to secure effective support in resisting all territorial demands (such those as on the eastern provinces by the USSR, Hatay by Syria, the western part of Turkey by Greece and later Enosis of Cyprus with Greece.) At the same time, certain changes made Turkey a more congenial ally for the West. First, the secular Republic refused to enter any international organisation or alliance on the basis of a common religion, namely Islam. Second, Turkey's disavowal of all irredentist claims and official restriction of its territorial ambitions to the area delimited in the National Pact. Finally, Turkey's active support for genuine international co-operation.

Although the Kemalist foreign policy objectives had required Turkey's alignment with the West, her close association with the West actually developed through the Truman Doctrine of 1947, and accession into NATO in 1952, as well as through membership, at various dates, of most of the major Western European organisations such as the Council of Europe, OECD and finally through application for Common Market membership in 1959. Turkish authorities used all available means and opportunities in the international arena to achieve the country's integration with the West. The moment the United States realised that it needed Turkey to accomplish her global policies in the Balkans and the Middle East Turkey began emphasising, if not overstating, its geostrategic importance and the role that it could play. Both sides had their own national interests, so they had a close relationship from the Truman doctrine in 1947 and throughout the 1950s. Quite understandably this relationship became a patron-client relationship in time.

#### 4.2.4 Kemalism and Foreign Policy

The Kemalist principles and reforms were previously explained to demonstrate the ingredients and boundaries of the Kemalist ideology, which has been the most dominant factor in forming the Turkish internal as well as external policy of modern Turkey. Here we shall attempt to explain the guidelines of the Kemalist foreign policy and its possible impact on the Turkish foreign policy after Kemal's death.

There were three major watchwords that expressed the guiding principles of Kemalist foreign policy. The first and most important of these were "peace at home and peace in the world". Therefore, Kemalist foreign policy was dedicated to the idea of co-existence between all nations in the world. On the internal front, this belief assumes that there is no class conflict and on the external front, it rejects any irredentist or expansionist aim. In this respect, Mustafa Kemal in the congress of the Republican People's Party in 1927 said: "for us there can be no question of the lust of conquest".<sup>245</sup> According to the Foreign Minister, T.R. Aras, this "pacific quality of Kemalism" was because of necessities of the Kemalist revolution and of the special geographic position of Turkey. Kili, a staunch Kemalist academic, noted that Mustafa Kemal wanted "peace at home and peace in the world" so as to "concentrate on his supreme goal which was the realisation of the complete modernisation of Turkey."<sup>246</sup>

In pursuit of this goal of universal peace and avoiding embroilment in the disputes of other nations, Turkey, particularly influenced by the alliances that brought about World War I strove to remain aloof from alliances. Addressing the National Assembly in June 1930, T.R. Aras said: "Believing that every separate alliance

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<sup>245</sup> Atatürk, *Söylev*, p. 379.

<sup>246</sup> Kili, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

brings about others, Turkey has abstained from participation in such initiatives. But she hastened to subscribe to the Kellogg Pact which required a universal entente among all the nations". Similarly, Turkey's aversion to military alliances at that time did not extend to treaties that involved no such commitments. So, Turkey was happy to sign Treaties of friendship and co-operation and did so with, among others, Albania (December 1923), Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (October 1925), the USSR (December 1925), Iran (April 1926), Iraq (June 1926), Afghanistan (May 1928), Balkan Pact members - Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia- (February 1934), Sadabad Pact members - Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq - (July 1937).

Therefore, one can argue that the motives of the foreign policy decision makers in the 1950s were not much different from those of Kemal's time. In their international conduct, decision makers of both periods believed that they were promoting the cause of peace in the world. Thus, the main line of Kemalist foreign policy that did not change in the 1950s.

The second and third watchwords of the Kemalist foreign policy were "national independence" (*istiklal-i milli*) "complete independence" (*istiklal-i tam*). In short, this meant a "national" foreign policy. In elaboration of this, Mustafa Kemal said:

when I speak of a national policy I mean it in this sense: to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them misfortune, and expect from the civilised world civilised human treatment, friendship based on mutuality.<sup>247</sup>

By "national independence" Mustafa Kemal meant the preservation of the Republic's territorial integrity and by "complete independence" he meant the preservation of "Turkey's political, economic, legal, financial and ideological indepen-

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<sup>247</sup> Atatürk, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-379.

dence".<sup>248</sup>

Thus, after Turkey's declaration of national independence, as Mustafa Kemal was against the use of force as a means to achieve a foreign policy goal, he tried to solve international problems of the country by peaceful means. For example, the important questions of Mosul, the Straits and Hatay were left unresolved at the Lausanne Conference, but he succeeded in reaching agreement on all of them without the use of force.

In short, Mustafa Kemal made a revolution in order to westernise the Turkish society and state. The magnitude of the job and the internal reforms required time and energy. Therefore, he himself in particular and his governments in general, during all his life concentrated on internal policy rather than external policy. As most of the Turkish interviewees stressed the aim of Kemalist policy was to westernise the society and thus the Turkish foreign policy was directed to achieve this very internal objective.

Atatürk who ruled Turkey with an absolute power until he died in 1938, pursued neither a completely pro-Western nor pro-Soviet policy in the field of foreign affairs. This was mainly due solely to his personal characteristic: he wanted to be his own man. Though the Turks never forgot that they were the sons of an imperial nation, they restrained themselves as far as their irredentist ambitions were concerned. Officially, as previously explained "peace at home, peace in the world" was one of the fundamentals of Kemalist foreign policy and Turkish politicians remained loyal to this principle in general. Nonetheless, when the Turks saw an opportunity to regain their imperial territories they could not stop themselves

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<sup>248</sup> Kili, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

from military intervention as happened in Cyprus in 1974.<sup>249</sup>

After Kemal's death, when first the RPP in the late 1940s and later the DP in the early 1950s supported the idea of alignment with the West and NATO membership, both believed that the Soviet or international communist expansionism was threatening Turkish independence and world peace. Joining NATO seemed the only way to secure the independence of Turkey and that of the peace loving countries.

The only change that did take place during that period was that Turkey became more actively involved in international problems. This did not represent a fundamental change in the Turkish foreign policy, in fact, as explained earlier, it sprang from the belief that the internal transformation reforms were completed and now it was time to shift to the international platform how to the whole international community that Turkey was really a **European** nation,<sup>250</sup> in the service of universal peace.

When the Democrats were accused that their economic and foreign policy violated the Kemalist watchwords, they rejected these claims on the grounds that the changing conditions of the international system required a reinterpretation of the Kemalism and what they followed was the "real or pure Kemalism".<sup>251</sup>

Eventually when the proponents of Kemalism concluded that the Kemalist regime was irreversibly established, they decided to move forward and become actively involve in international problems. All Turkish interviewees argued that alignment with the West was the eventual objective of Kemalism and thus Akşit

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<sup>249</sup> Mango, *op. cit.*, p. 63 and Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>250</sup> See the section on Kemalist Reforms for the objectives of the Kemalist reforms.

<sup>251</sup> Interview with the Gürsoys and Mr Akşit.

and Gürsoy vigorously denied all allegations that the DP foreign policy was a divergence from the Kemalist foreign policy and claimed further that it was a requirement of Kemalist foreign policy. These views are in agreement with those expressed by Zorlu and reported by Burrows "Turkey had chosen her foreign policies and had joined NATO and founded the CENTO in order to preserve her independence and democratic principles". He added that "it was Ataturk's policy that Turkey should cooperate closely with the West".<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> PRO, FO, 153039, RK1022/1, 18.1.1960, Ankara. Also interview with the Gürsoys and Erkmen.

#### 4.2.5 Pre-1950 Foreign Policy

Having reviewed the general picture of Turkish politics, before analysing Turkish-Western relations in detail, we should study the pre-1950 political situation in Turkey and its international problems and their influence on Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s. Shorn of most of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, the new Turkish Republic fearing that the Big Powers might attempt further division of Turkey itself, quelled all irredentist thoughts. It was painful for the Turkish statesmen to see the Empire lost to their minorities, but, they knew that there was no choice but to accept the reality. Therefore, they restrained themselves in respect of their former territories and even abandoned the Turkish people left behind in former Ottoman lands except those in the Balkans where there was at least a partial exchange of populations.<sup>253</sup>

Turkey was internationally recognised after the Treaty of Lausanne, which was considered a national triumph in Turkey. In fact, it was not so in reality at least not to the extent that the government presented it to the people. The National Pact endorsed by the Ottoman Assembly was not fully implemented. The Dodecanese Islands were lost to the Italians, Hatay to the French, Cyprus and today's Northern Iraq to the British, Batum to the Soviet Union and the Straits were left to the International Administration. Customs duties were to be left at the 1917 level for years. Turkey had to pay sixty per cent of the Ottoman debts. She could not get any war reparations from Greece. In the opinion of its

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<sup>253</sup> It is worth mentioning here that Turkey did nothing to exchange the Turks in the Middle East. The reasons for that were probably that the Turks in the Middle East were religious, whereas those in the Balkans were thought to be progressive and Western. So, this would have helped the Westernisation of the society. Secondly, The Middle Eastern Turks were less qualified than the Balkan Turks, which made the latter more attractive. Thirdly, the Turks in the Middle East were under Muslim rule unlike those in the Balkans who were under Christian rule, which could have had undesirable consequences. Finally, Turkey thought that the Turks in the Middle East had already felt that they were superior to the indigenous people, which was not the case in the Balkans where they needed help.

critics, the Treaty of Lausanne was simply a document that officially buried the six centuries-old Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate and allowed the establishment of a secular and Western state, Turkey, headed by Mustafa Kemal and his right-hand man İsmet İnönü. Turks, these critics claimed, were a people who found themselves only and when they became Muslim and led the Islamic ummah for about a millennium. Now, after a victory in the battlefield of the War of Liberation the Turkish Republic meekly accepted most of the demands of the victors in the First World War and accepted all Western ideals in almost all fields.

When Turkey withdrew from the Balkans, she left behind a great number of ethnic Turks. In order to protect their rights, Turkey subsequently had to compromise with the Balkan States. Both that necessity and increasing fascist danger in Europe increased the need for the Balkan Pact signed between Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1934.<sup>254</sup>

After the Atatürk era, İnönü tried to follow a similar neutralist foreign policy. In Fox's words, "thanks to competition among three great powers to influence Turkey, the Turks' skill in bargaining, their immunity to propaganda, their understanding of the military and economic position of the parties involved at each stage, and their lack of sentiments Turkey stayed out of the war."<sup>255</sup> However, following the war, the Turkish decision makers felt that they were left with no option but to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy, since internal policy had been directed towards westernising Turkey since its establishment in 1923.<sup>256</sup> At the end of the war Republican Turkey sided with the Allied Powers by declaring war against Germany and Japan in order to ensure admission to the United Nations.

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<sup>254</sup> Shorter, Frederic C., (ed.) *Four Studies on the Development of Turkey*, London, Cass, 1967, p. 119.

<sup>255</sup> Fox, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>256</sup> Karpat, op. cit., pp. 2-4.



Turkey's neutral policy during the Second World War left her vulnerable to Soviet territorial and ideological expansionism.

Both military vulnerability and economic weakness were powerful factors prompting the İnönü government to seek American support. The Republicans noticed the fact that Franco's Spain had been excluded from benefit of Marshall Plan because of her persistent authoritarian practices. These external factors led to internal changes. In order to establish democratic credentials İnönü agreed to the introduction of multi-party politics in 1945. This in turn led to further softening of hard-line Kemalism; religious education was reintroduced to Turkish schools in early 1949, and the Faculty of Theology was opened in October the same year, and so on. Though the West was very sceptical of the Republicans' commitment to the multi-party system and liberal economy, the Republican government worked very hard to convince the West that they were sincere in their pro-Western policy. Fortunately, for the Turks, the Americans' desire for Turkish support for containment policy and their wish to ensure the security of Israel made the US willing to give a large amount of economic and military assistance to Turkey in return for this support. This aid was particularly welcome to the Turks as, in addition to the Soviet threat, Turkish territorial integrity also seemed at risk from the establishment of the Mehabad Kurdish Republic in north-western Iran.

#### 4.2.6 Post-1950 Turkish Politics

Eventually, under the internal and external pressure,<sup>257</sup> the Republicans were obliged to adopt a multi-party system which was to end their dominance and brought the Democrats, apparently a sincere liberal party, to power in 1950.<sup>258</sup>

This bloodless transition in Turkey from a single party authoritarian regime to a multi-party democratic system deserves some more elaboration. The main factors inducing this radical change were the following:

- (a) the character of the Turkish leadership;
- (b) increasing popular demand for greater participation in government by a growing middle class;
- (c) the Soviet threat to the integrity of the country;
- (d) the Turkish need for Western aid and support for her economic development and security;
- (e) the victory of the liberal nations over the authoritarian ones in the Second World War;
- (f) the obvious growth of corruption within the single party system and İnönü's personal reaction to this state of affairs;
- (g) unpopularity of the Republican People's Party, particularly in the rural areas, due to economic hardship, political pressure and the restriction, if not absence of, religious freedom and excesses committed in the villages by the gendarmes.

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<sup>257</sup> Timur, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>258</sup> Emre claimed that there was no difference between the two parties as far as the Kemalist regime was concerned. He said their differences were artificial and only on the surface. In respect to Turkey's relations with the West both were the same. Akşit also agreed with the last point.

With regard to the leadership of the DP, Robinson commented that it “came from a marriage of the new middle class and the traditional, pre-Republican social elite. The Republican leadership had been derived from the new military group which came into power with Kemal plus a substantial number of intellectuals and idealists.”<sup>259</sup>

The new Democratic leadership was eager to take part in a campaign against “international communism”, because they believed that this would help to secure economic and military aid from the West. Developments in Turkish politics in the 1950s pertaining to involvement with the West can be summarised as follows: The Democrat Party pursued an unconditional pro-Western foreign policy during most of the 1950s and accordingly increased Turkey’s popularity and prestige internationally and secured economic and political support for its modernisation program. In 1950, Turkey sent Turkish troops to Korea to protect the “free world” against the “international communism”. In 1952, Turkey managed to become a NATO member and, in return, she led attempts to establish the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact in 1954 and 1955 respectively. She also supported the British in their dispute over the Suez with Egypt and the French in their dispute over North Africa with North African Arabs. Most importantly, despite her desire and efforts to improve her relations with the Arabs in order to form a Western sponsored defence system, she managed to maintain good relations with Israel throughout the 1950s. However, when the Western friends realised that, among other things, the Turkish politicians had a nationalist tendency and were attempting to industrialise the Turkish economy in addition to modernising agriculture, the West decreased its economic and political support. This meant the end for the Democrat Party

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<sup>259</sup> Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

as its political and economic reform program mostly depended on external support backed by the West's collaborators within the country. Consequently, the Democrat Party era ended on 27 May 1960 as the Turkish Army, shown the green light by the West, staged the first of its three successive military coups in order to put an end to the increasing reactionary, nationalist, communist and/or separatist currents in the state apparatus.

#### 4.2.7 Factors and Events Affecting Turkish Foreign Policy

We should now turn to specific factors affecting the Turkish foreign policy orientation and direction. Though the westward orientation of the Turkish foreign policy has never changed, it has slightly fluctuated from time to time due to some specific factors and events. Those factors and events that contributed to the formation of Turkish foreign policy could be summarised as follows:

First of all, Turkey's geostrategic location was one of the main factors forming the Turkish foreign policy. Turkish politicians sometimes overstated or exploited this feature to get the most out of it. Simply on account of its geopolitical location Turkey has received a great amount of economic and political support from the West, but never enough to satisfy the Turks.

Turkey's proximity to the USSR, one of the superpowers, could be considered as an advantage as well as a disadvantage depending on how the Turkish politicians portrayed it. At the beginning it was an advantage for the reformers to keep the masses under a constant pressure in order first to implement the reform plan and second, by pointing to such a formidable external enemy, the government could manage to strengthen national unity and integrity. Though in fact there were many religious, ethnic and ideological groups in Turkey almost all of them believed that the Turkish state must survive in any case.

Turkey, for one reason or another, adopted a "bridge policy"<sup>260</sup> for decades. The emphasis was on the point that Turkey was, without having her own particular identity, a bridge between the West and the East, the Christians and the Muslims, Europe and Asia, democracy and monarchies, stability and instability depending

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<sup>260</sup> Soysal regarded the Sadabad Pact and the Baghdad Pact as the first and second bridges between the East and the West respectively. See Soysal, İsmail, 'the Sadabad Pact,' *Türk-Arap İlişkileri Vakfı*, Ankara, 1988, p. 153.

on the current valid ticket in the Western market. Indeed, the West took Turkey quite seriously in these arguments as long as their interests permitted. It was for these reasons that the West admitted Turkey to the Western family of nations by accepting her membership in various western organisations.

Secondly, the Turks attribute more importance to national integrity and security than to anything else. The influence of the Western diplomats over the İstanbul Government during the previous two centuries and the memories of the West's partition of the Ottoman Empire never left the Turkish authorities permanently wary as they feared the prospect of a further division of Turkey itself between the Greeks, the Armenians and the Kurds. The bitter consequences of previous friendship with the West had influenced the thinking of a large section of society. Atatürk did not align with the West, due, *inter alia*, to the fear of a dangerous popular reaction. When such a strong reaction was no longer a threat to the regime, the authorities openly sided with the West as they did in the 1950s.

One of the main factors, which formed the foundations of the Turkish foreign policy was the demand of founders of the modern Turkey to westernise the society as well as the state. As explained earlier, on one hand, the founders of the Republic were hostile to and afraid of the Western Powers because of the involvement of these powers in dividing the Ottoman Empire and their hatred against Islam in general and the Turks, the representatives of Islam for last six centuries, in particular. But, on the other hand, the rulers of the Republic felt obliged to cooperate with the West to complete the transformation and modernisation process in the country.

Another factor, which is partly linked to the previous one and explains the foreign policy of the first two decades of Turkey, was the principle of non-alignment. This was due mainly to the "peace at home, peace in the world" principle. Also,

three major factors contributed to the formation of this Non-Aligned foreign policy in 1920s and early 1930s: the existence of international order for peace between the First and Second World Wars, the nature of relations with neighbouring countries and the need for a peaceful period to carry out the internal reform package. The articles in the Lausanne Treaty about customs tariffs, Ottoman debts, and the position of the minorities justified Turkish fears and reluctance to co-operate with the West in the early years of the Republic. Most Turks thought, and actually still think that the whole world is against them and is poised to divide or erase Turkey from the map of the world. Though Mısıroğlu claimed that the West in general, and Britain in particular, promised Atatürk full support if he abolished the Caliphate and thus, dropped leadership of Islamic World, Atatürk was not so sure that the West would keep its promise if their national interests required otherwise. To the founders of the Republic, the Mosul affair and Kurdish insurgence led by Sheikh Said proved Atatürk right and produced some justifiable pretexts for Turkish relations with the West. So, being engaged with social and political transformation, Turkey kept a low profile during the Republic's first three decades in the international arena.

Turkish control over the Straits was another factor contributing to the formation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey lost control over the Straits in Lausanne. Having successfully carried out social and political transformation and diminished any prospect of internal disturbances, e.g. ethnic (Kurdish) or religious (Islamic) danger, Turkey prepared herself to regain control over the Straits. Eventually, with the help of the changing international order, Turkey achieved control of Bosphorus by the Treaty of Montreaux in 1936.

Another factor influencing Turkish foreign policy was the Western support in

Turkey's regional conflicts against her neighbours until the end of 1950s. British support in co-operating with Turkey against any possible Kurdish rebellion,<sup>261</sup> against which Sadabad Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan was set up in 1937, was one of such examples and this made the prospect of the Anglo-Turkish-French friendship more certain. Turkey eventually signed a Treaty of Friendship with France and Britain in 1939.

Last but not least, Turkish need and demand for Western aid and alignment was another factor affecting the formation and orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Being vulnerable to any international conflict in Europe and in the Middle East due to its geostrategic location and its historical links both with Islamic countries and European states, Turkey tried hard not to become involved in World War II. By staying out of the war Turkey managed to increase her exports to both sides and avoided the destructive results of the war. When the war was about to end a new world order was going to be established and Turkey felt ready to take a role in it. Realising that the Western democracies would have an absolute victory over the European dictatorships, Turkey overtly sided with victorious party and declared war on Germany and Japan without firing a shot. By so doing, she became a founder member of the United Nations. Her subsequent alignment with the West brought her a considerable amount of aid and credits under the Marshall and Truman Doctrines. Facing the Soviet demands over the Straits and the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, Turkey had had no option but to align with the West. Therefore, Turkey also had to embrace Western ideals and principles fully in order to get necessary economic and political support from the West to maintain the integrity and welfare of the state, which was based on the Western model.

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<sup>261</sup> Shorter, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-125.



So, for both internal and external reasons, İnönü was obliged to allow the democratic process to begin.<sup>262</sup> Internally it was no longer possible to keep society under oppressive secular control. As a consequence of twenty seven years of oppression, a social explosion was highly likely at any time. Secondly, social transformation was believed to have been nearly completed so that there was no need any more to continue the dictatorial pressure over the people. Thirdly, the Kemalist regime itself was believed to have become firmly established. Therefore, it seemed time to allow certain opposition groups to operate openly within the boundaries of the law. This process brought the Democrat Party to power and this allowed the liberal capitalist system to begin operating irreversibly in Turkey.

In this brief survey of factors affecting Turkish foreign policy we should mention the following events. The Mosul question was one of the most important events that highly influenced the foreign policy in short as well as long term. Following Turkish compliance with British demands over Mosul, Turkey felt obliged to have friendly relations with Britain in order, inter alia, to avoid any potential Kurdish danger coming from the South.<sup>263</sup> Turkey tried hard to obtain similar close co-operation with Iran for the same reason. Indeed, Turkey managed to crush the Kurdish rebellion of 1930 in Ağrı only with Iranian co-operation and subsequently the two sides signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1932. The Kurdish issue has always been one of the main factors influencing the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. It was one of the factors that helped to create the Baghdad Pact.<sup>264</sup>

Another specific event affecting Turkish foreign policy was Hatay's annexation

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<sup>262</sup> Zürcher, Erik J., 'The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodisation', *Die Welt des Islams*, 32(1992), p. 252.

<sup>263</sup> Kruger, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

<sup>264</sup> Eren., op. cit., p. 240.

to Turkey. This has remained as a problem between Turkey and Arab countries up to the present day. Five main reasons led to the cession of Hatay from Syria to Turkey: the first was the good relationship between the French and Turkish foreign policy decision makers. Second, both sides, the Ottoman and French, had been the dominant or ruling powers and reasonably close friends for two centuries.<sup>265</sup> Third, the success of modernising measures in Turkey changed French views regarding the future of Hatay. Turkey's insistence on regaining Hatay due to its strategic location had a considerable effect too.<sup>266</sup> Last but not least, the possible alliance between Turkey and France against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which was concluded in 1939, made it possible for France to hand over Hatay<sup>267</sup> from the backward and religious Arabs to the secular and modernising Turks. The Assembly of newly independent Hatay decided to join Turkey under the shadow of Turkish military might which was concentrated on the borders.<sup>268</sup>

Although the Turkish government hailed alignment with the West between 1946-1959 as a one-sided triumph for Turkey it was actually the mutual interests between Turkey and the West in general, and the United States in particular that brought them together. The United States did not need Turkish territory or its political support until the cold war started. It was only after witnessing the expansionist Soviet policy in Eastern Europe that the United States re-evaluated her policy towards Turkey who demanded full support from the West against her

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<sup>265</sup> Robinson, op. cit., p. 169. In this respect Gülek explained that the French culture has always been dominant in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>266</sup> Sanjian, Avedis K., 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations 1939-1956,' *The Middle East Journal*, 10(1956), p. 381.

<sup>267</sup> Shorter, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., op. loc. Also, Mr Gürsoy pointed out that "accompanied by some western diplomats, Atatürk himself went to Adana to join a protest, during which supposedly 'men and women from Hatay' cried out and asked for Turkish help in 1938." He suggested that Atatürk said that "the Europeans especially the Germans were busy with war preparation, therefore they could not declare war on Turkey. So, he implied that he could push harder to regain Hatay."

northern historical enemy and also needed a great amount of economic aid to modernise her economy which had been seriously affected by the Second World War. Washington tried to implement a containment policy and secure the Western oil interests in the Middle East in accordance with its global policy. Therefore, it attached high importance to Turkey during this period well above its actual military and political potential. The United States expected Turkey to play a major role in defence of the Middle East and Balkans, because Turkey's unique position enabled her to defend the region as part of a string of military bases and a sophisticated network of intelligence-gathering devices located near the Soviet border. Turkey was treated almost as if she were a Big Power during the early 1950s. One enthusiastic American pointed out that she really was. "Obviously such compliments pleased enormously at that time some foreign ministry officials in Turkey, whose exaggerated Big Power complex inherited from the Ottoman times had not been trimmed to its realistic size yet."<sup>269</sup>

Soon after the Second World War, the Soviets launched an expansionist policy towards Eastern Europe and to the warm seas of the South. This sowed the seed of the cold war in international relations, which was to affect the patterns and perceptions of the way in which international relations have functioned. In brief, it forced the small powers to align with one of the Big Powers. The small powers, made important concessions to the Superpowers in order to obtain this association with the Western or Eastern Power, depending on their geostrategic location (as was in the case of Turkey) and/or economic resources (as in the case of most of the Middle Eastern countries).

As the cold war atmosphere prevailed in international relations, the US, intent

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<sup>269</sup> Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

upon containing international communism within the Soviet Union and its allies, felt obliged to change her attitude towards Turkey. Turkey was to fulfil a historical obligation which would change the course of events in international relations in favour of the western democracies.<sup>270</sup> Thus, as soon as the United States promised Turkey NATO membership, Turkey wholeheartedly pledged the United States and Great Britain that she would become involved with the Balkans and Middle East. Having being urged by the West,<sup>271</sup> Turkey took the leading role in establishing the Balkan Pact on 28 February 1953 (became Bled Alliance on 9 September 1954) and the Middle Eastern defence pact in 1955 after long simultaneous negotiations with neighbouring countries. However, both would disappear from the active scene of international politics before the end of the decade.<sup>272</sup>

Turkey was seeking every possible way to assure the West that she wanted to have close relations with the Western world. The Korean War was a golden opportunity for Turkey in this regard. The Democrat Party government was aware of the fact that the West had overwhelming military and strategic interests in Turkey and would, without any serious resistance, finance Turkey's economic development project. In return, the government outdid itself in fulfilling its share of the bargain by meeting fully its military and political obligations as attested by numerous and very generous bilateral agreements signed with the United States. Some historical and sentimental factors also played a considerable role in this process of improving special relations between the two. The American public greeted with undisguised admiration the bravery of the Turkish soldiers fighting in the Korean War of early 1950s. They had sailed on American ships thousands of miles away from home to

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<sup>270</sup> Interview with Erkmen and Çağlayangil.

<sup>271</sup> In fact, Günver claimed that Britain put too much pressure on Turkey to form a defence pact in the Middle East.

<sup>272</sup> Kunalp, Zeki, *Sadece Diplomat: Hatırat*, İstanbul Matbaası, İstanbul, 1981, pp. 98-102.

defend freedom, democracy and ultimately Western civilisation on the far shores of Asia.

Turkey's membership of NATO is one of the main milestones on the way to Westernisation. Turkish decision-makers believed it to be more important than anything else, for NATO had rebuffed Turkey's first application to join, because members considered that Turkey was not a Western nation in terms of location, economic development and religion. As we have seen, soon afterwards two developments led the Americans to a change of mind. Turkey, intent on establishing her western credentials, contributed a contingent to the UN force in Korea, thereby greatly enhancing her prestige through the valour of her troops. Simultaneously, increased Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe alarmed the US government, which in turn persuaded other NATO members to accept Turkey as a member of the alliance. Turkey's second application was eventually accepted in 1952, and within Turkey this was hailed as a DP achievement.<sup>273</sup>

From 1952 onwards alignment with her NATO allies was a main plank in Turkey's foreign policy and she took a particularly prominent and active role in promoting what she deemed to be Western interests in the Balkans and Middle East. In the opinion of some critics like Mehmet Ali Bozarslan, NATO membership became a more important factor than Kemalist principles.<sup>274</sup> If the Kemalist principles had been intended to transform the society into a western one, NATO membership was to irreversibly accelerate this process and ensure its completion forever. So, Turkey was prepared to do anything to please and rushed into the international arena so naively that this caught the eyes of developing countries.

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<sup>273</sup> Interview with Gülek.

<sup>274</sup> Bozarslan, Mehmet Emin, *Hilafet ve Ümmetçilik Sorunu*, Ant Yayınları, İstanbul, 1967, p. 78.

The image of Turkey as an American satellite within NATO was a disadvantage of NATO membership. One commentator claimed that “after joining NATO Turkey was used by the western powers as an instrument to protect their interests in some of the developing countries. She was one of the few states that posed as the spokesman of the West at the Bandung Conference of 1955, and attracted the scorn of all the developing countries.”<sup>275</sup> This is so evident from the speech given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu who said that “I was obliged to attend the Bandung Conference, because our Western friends said that if we did not participate it would have been disastrous.”<sup>276</sup> Indeed, Turkey became so isolated from the rest of the developing world because of this unlimited support for intimate association with the West and her blistering attacks on non-alignment, neutralism, socialism and communism.

With respect to Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries the following could be said: Turkish rulers were extremely pleased with Turkey’s new role and declared that it was national policy to defend western interests in the region.<sup>277</sup> This led communists to claim that Turkey had become an instrument for the protection of Western interests in neighbouring countries.

The new role as partner of the West and especially the uninhibited friend of the United States, the defender of the Western civilisation was, in the eyes of some Turks, the proof that they were finally accepted and had become part of the Western world. With an almost total dedication to a cause encountered only among the new converts to a faith, Turkey appeared to have become more

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<sup>275</sup> Karpas, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>276</sup> Gevgilili, Ali, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, Altın Kitaplar Matbaası, İstanbul, 1981, p. 84.

<sup>277</sup> See, for example, Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü’s statement that became famous in Turkey and was reported in the *Birmingham Post*, 15 May 1951. Also Rıza, p. 73 and interview with Erkmen.

pro-Western than the West itself.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

#### 4.2.8 The Cyprus Question

The rising Cyprus question was another factor that began, in the late 1950s, to affect Turkey's foreign policy. According to J. Landau, Cyprus had been "one of the pet issues of Pan-Turkists in Turkey" since the end of the Second World War.<sup>279</sup> Nationalist Turks organised themselves under the name of several organisations such as Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği (Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association) in 1946, Türkiye Milliyetçiler Derneği (Association of Nationalists of Turkey) in 1951, Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti (Cyprus is Turkish Society) in 1954 and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (Turkish National Student Federation) in 1954, in order, among other things, to promote the Turkish cause in Cyprus. In the 1950s, the most influential group was Cyprus is Turkish Society. It was secretly supported by the DP and RPP as well as some conservative groups.<sup>280</sup> However, neither the Republican nor the Democrat government was officially willing to admit that there was Cyprus question. As a result of public pressure some MPs raised the question of Cyprus in the National Assembly on 23 January 1950. In reply to criticism, Sadak said "gentlemen, there is no such thing as a Cyprus question ... because this island is under British rule". Later, when Köprülü replied to a question in the same way, he was badly criticised by the public.<sup>281</sup>

On 29 August 1955 the London conference began between Turkey, Greece and Britain. On 29 August the London Conference began between Turkey, Greece and Britain. A few days later, on the night of 6-7 September 1955, anti-Greek riots in İstanbul and, on a smaller scale, in İzmir were allegedly prompted by a request from Foreign Minister Zorlu for demonstrations that would strengthen

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<sup>279</sup> Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

<sup>280</sup> Ioannides, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>281</sup> Dikerdem, *op. cit.*, p. 122.



his negotiating position by indicating the strength of Turkish public opinion on the subject.<sup>282</sup> 1956 was an eventful year for Cyprus. Relations between the two communities went from bad to worse everyday. Eventually Turkey began to adopt the "Taksim" policy (division of the island between the two communities) as an alternative to the Greeks' "Enosis" policy (unification of the island with Greece). The question was discussed in the UN General Assembly between 25 November and 4 December 1958. But there was no real progress towards a solution until the Turkish and Greek leaders met in Zurich in early 1959 and agreed a bi-communal constitutional framework for the island that was subsequently accepted in London on 19 February 1959 in a Treaty that was later criticised for paying insufficient heed to the wishes of the Cypriots. The Treaty appointed Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantors of the island's independence. (Turkey's intervention in the island in 1974 to "restore law and rule of order" was based on this treaty.) Cyprus declared her independence on 16 August 1960.

As regards to the effect of Cyprus question on Turkey's relations with regional members of the Baghdad Pact, one could argue that it did not have much effect, because all Turkey anticipated from the regional countries, at that stage, was to listen to the question from the Turkish standpoint. In fact, the Turks were not as anxious to publicise and promote their views on Cyprus as the Iraqis and Pakistanis had been to canvass support on Palestine and Kashmir respectively, because, according to the British Ambassador in Ankara, the Turks were of the view that "Britain's occupation of the island was necessary to enable her to carry out her treaty obligations in the Middle East, and that as long as British sovereignty was maintained there was no Cyprus question as far as Turkey was concerned."<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> Weiker, *Turkish Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 33-35.

<sup>283</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 130179, RK1022/4, 26.1.1957.

The Turks believed that to the British, sovereignty over Cyprus was absolutely paramount, because the British considered the Cyprus problem within the broader context of the Middle Eastern and especially eastern Mediterranean politics.

The coincidence of British and Turkish interest in Cyprus strengthened Turkey's role as an interested party in the dispute. Through membership in the Baghdad Pact, Turkey slowly emerged as one of the staunch allies of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, thus, on the one hand, preventing Soviet penetration into the Middle East and, on the other, helping preserve British oil interests in the region. The then British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden emphasised the importance of the British-Turkish partnership when he said: "I regard our alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world."<sup>284</sup>

Moreover, Turkey's policy concerning the Cyprus problem, namely defending the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and safeguarding Turkey's vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region were, Ioannides claims, seen as coinciding with those of NATO and the Baghdad Pact. "The position of the UK was much closer to Turkey's view that the Cyprus problem was not of the self-determination, but, rather, one to be settled among three NATO allies, namely Turkey, Greece and the UK."<sup>285</sup>

The E.O.K.A. campaign in the late 1950s also "became a catalyst for the strengthening and consolidation of an Anglo-Turkish alliance against the Greeks at all levels and in all fora."<sup>286</sup>

Additional British setbacks in the region, namely the 1956 Suez Crisis, Jordan's

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<sup>284</sup> Eden, Anthony, *Full Circle*, Cassell, London, 1960, p. 414.

<sup>285</sup> Ioannides, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

dismissal of Glubb Pasha (the British military commander of its Arab League), the Lebanese civil war of 1958 and the 1958 Iraqi coup weakening the Baghdad Pact, increased Britain's dependence on Turkey and increased the importance of Cyprus as an advanced British base in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the membership of Britain, Turkey and Greece in NATO made the Cyprus question more complicated.

In view of these imperatives, the most important development of this time was a distinct change in British strategic requirements. By late 1957, it became clear that the British government decided that it no longer needed the island as a base but rather it needed "bases" in Cyprus. This change of strategy facilitated the eventual solution in 1959.

Additional factors facilitated this change in British policy concerning Cyprus dispute. The E.O.K.A. guerrilla warfare became an increasingly serious operation and the intercommunal violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots forced the UK to play the role of policeman. As a result, there was increasing pressure in Britain to relinquish this task of keeping peace between the two communities on the island. The Turks were satisfied by the eventual solution of the dispute. Kyriakides claimed that "there is a reason to believe that the increasing importance of Turkey as a strategic factor to the US and Great Britain resulted in the corresponding weakening of Greece's position concerning the Cyprus dispute."<sup>287</sup>

In support of this, Anthony Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, stated: "I have never felt ... that Cyprus is an Anglo-Greek question. ... Our duty, if called on, ... is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (Turkey). Neither the NATO obligations... nor the Baghdad Pact nor any agreement in the

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<sup>287</sup> Kyriakides, Stanley, *Cyprus: constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1968, p. 142.

Middle East ... can be speedily and effectively carried out today unless we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and the use of facilities in Cyprus.”<sup>288</sup>

Turning specifically to the Cyprus question within the narrower context of the Baghdad Pact, one can argue that it did not have as important a place as the Kashmir and Palestine problems. There were many reasons why the Cyprus dispute was not brought into the Baghdad Pact meetings until the late 1950s. First of all, as previously explained, until Britain agreed to abandon her sovereignty over the island, Turkey had believed that it was a British problem and thus there was no need to carry it to the Baghdad Pact. Second, unlike Pakistan and Iraq who had Kashmir and Palestine problems in their minds respectively, Turkey did not join the Pact with the Cyprus question in mind. Third, the Turks tried to find a solution for the island through bilateral negotiations with Britain, because they believed that regional members could not do much about it.<sup>289</sup> Finally, even when they brought the question to the Pact meetings in the late 1950s,<sup>290</sup> they just wanted to inform their allies in the Pact and nothing more. In fact, without the British and American support, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, regional members knew that nothing could be done about these three questions. But the reason why Pakistan and Iraq had always emphasised the Kashmir and Palestine issues, while Turkey did not raise the Cyprus dispute were due to different causes. For Pakistan, internal public pressure played a major part, for Iraq, the radical Arabs' propaganda against pro-Western Iraq policy compelled her to do so, with the hope that lip service to the Palestinian cause would avert criticism that Iraq was betraying the Arabs. However, in the case of Turkey, both public and the

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<sup>288</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, 1956-1957*, Vol. 550, op. cit., pp. 403-409.

<sup>289</sup> Interview with Günver.

<sup>290</sup> *Vatan*, 7.6.1958.

government were aware that the solution for Cyprus did not lie in the Baghdad Pact. But, after Cyprus gained her independence in 1960 and the Greek Cypriots were reluctant to implement the constitution, Turkey felt a desperate need to obtain support of the Third World and especially Muslim-Arab countries.

In fact, regional countries did not want to make enemies because of their cooperation in the Baghdad Pact. All they had done was to pay lip service for each other's problem.<sup>291</sup> For example, Turkey did not want to alienate India and Israel because of her close relations with Pakistan and Iraq respectively. When Turkey signed the bilateral agreement with Pakistan in April 1954, instead of taking sides with Pakistan and attacking India, she declared that "now it is time to mediate between Pakistan and India to find a peaceful solution for Pakistan."<sup>292</sup> Similarly, with regard to Palestine, although Turkey reduced her diplomatic representation to a lower level in order to appease the nationalist Arabs, she consistently continued to maintain good relations with Israel and support a UN sponsored peaceful solution.<sup>293</sup> Moreover, Turkey did not support Egypt in her dispute over the Suez with Britain in 1956 and also failed to support the independence of the North African Arabs against the French.<sup>294</sup> Therefore Turkey was not in a position to ask regional countries to do much about the Cyprus question.

Meanwhile, voting patterns in the UN were another indication of Pact members' solidarity or lack of it. With the possible exception of voting in the UN General Assembly on 23 November 1955, when the spirit of the Pact was at its peak, Iraq never voted for Turkey in its dispute over the Cyprus with Greece. She

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<sup>291</sup> Vatan, 21.4.1955 and 24.3.1956.

<sup>292</sup> Vatan, 1.5.1954.

<sup>293</sup> Gruen, George Emanuel, *Turkey, Israel and Palestine Question, 1948-1960*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1970, *passim*.

<sup>294</sup> Vatan, 26.2.1953 and interview with Günver and Gülek.

either abstained or joined the Egyptian group of Arab countries.<sup>295</sup> Pakistan consistently voted with Turkey on the Cyprus issue, but this had nothing to do with membership of the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish-Pakistani friendship dates back to pre-Pakistani days when the then Indian Muslims supported Turkey's national independence. Because of such historical cordial relations it is difficult to say if the Pact affected the attitude of Pakistan when the Cyprus problem emerged in the second half of the 1950s.

In conclusion, as far as Pakistan and Iraq were concerned the Kashmir and Palestine problems were important alliance dynamics, the opportunities the Pact provided for Pakistani and Iraqi governments to raise these issues at international level gave them a degree of psychological satisfaction and enabled them to counter internal and external critics of their Pact membership by pointing and how they were using that membership to urge support for these national issues. On the other hand, Turkey raised the Cyprus issue in the Baghdad Pact only in June 1958<sup>296</sup> and one month later the Pact collapsed. Compared with these two alliance dynamics for Pakistan and Iraq, the Cyprus dispute partly became an alliance dynamic for Turkey when Britain declared that she might abandon her sovereignty in early 1958. Had the Pact not prematurely collapsed in July 1958 one could have expected that Turkey would have more enthusiastically discussed the Cyprus question in the Pact meeting and like Pakistan and Iraq would have asked for a more active support from her allies. However, by the time the Turkish leaders realised that the Cyprus issue was an international problem, the Pact was weakened by the coup in Baghdad and later replaced by the CENTO in 1959 and Turkey began to attach even less

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<sup>295</sup> Armaoğlu, Fahir H., *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959: Türk Hükümeti ve Kamuoyu Davranışları*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1963, pp. 98, 178, 386, and 502.

<sup>296</sup> Vatan 7.6.1958.

importance to the Pact. Nevertheless, the Cyprus question became an alliance dynamic for Turkey even if it was for a short period of time.

#### 4.2.9 Turkey's Relations with Regional States

Turkey's pro-Western stance in her relations with Arabs in the 1950s also affected her foreign policy. The sharp contrast between Turkish and Arab attitudes and aspirations made mutual understanding difficult. The Turks eagerly sought closer relations with the West and their psychology was not affected by the experience of colonial subjugation. The Arabs, however, were fearful of Western power, eager to rid the region of all vestiges of colonialism forever and to demonstrate their own independence. In a mood of increasing nationalism in Egypt, Egyptian rulers demanded that Britain should evacuate the Suez Canal and cease to administer Sudan. At the same time the financing of the Aswan Dam became a heavy burden for the Egyptian economy and a major problem between Egypt and the West. When Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal in order to implement her full sovereignty over her territorial land and sea and to finance the Aswan Dam project, Britain, France and Israel, having common interests in the region, attacked Egypt. The stand taken by Turkey during the Suez Crisis of 1956 was due solely to her NATO membership. This policy led to a further deterioration in relations between Turkey and the Arab countries which were already poor. It could be argued that by siding with the Big Powers in international conflicts the Turkish authorities made a realistic assessment that Turkey would be more secure and economically better off but psychological factors also influenced this preference; they had inherited a superiority complex from the Ottomans and it would have been unimaginable for them to side with non-European developing countries, several of which had previously been their colonial subjects. As the founders of the modern Republic were the admirers of Western civilisation and created a society with the same mentality, successive rulers too pursued the same line of policy. So, the Turks looked down on



the non-European nations yet felt inferior to the Europeans, as the Westernisation process had still not been fully and comprehensively completed.

Turkey's relations with Iraq had been more than cordial because of the role played by Nuri Said and Hashemite royal family. Exceptionally in the Arab world, both were inclined towards Turkey. Having a common threat, the Kurds, also helped them to improve their relations. After the Second World War Turkish diplomacy began to appreciate the importance of a gradual improvement of relations with the Arab countries. Accordingly, a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations was signed with Iraq on 29 March 1946. In October 1946 both the Turkish President himself and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka reiterated Turkey's desire for friendly relations with all the Arab countries modelled after the Turco-Iraqi Treaty. Turco-Iraqi co-operation reached its peak when both declared formation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, but came to a halt with the Iraqi coup in 1958.

Turkey's relations with Jordan had also been cordial due to the Hashemite royal family. Turkey's good relations with Iraq had a positive effect on Turkey's relations with Jordan. After the Turco-Iraqi Treaty of 1946, Transjordanian King Abdullah expressed his desire for Turco-Arab rapprochement. On 10 January 1947 King Abdullah stressed the necessity for a Turco-Arab bloc in which Turkey could assume a leading role and announced his support for Turkey in its dispute with Syria over Hatay as did so Nuri Said.<sup>297</sup> On 11 January 1947 a Treaty of Friendship was signed by Turkey and Transjordan. Turkey's relations with Jordan remained cordial, but fell short of attracting Jordan into the Baghdad Pact due to the latter's fear of Arab nationalism led by Egypt.

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<sup>297</sup> New York Times, 11 January 1947.

Already affected by territorial conflict over the Hatay province, Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated further when the eventual Syrian independence was declared on 28 September 1941. The situation was further aggravated by numerous demands for the unequivocal restoration of the territory to Syria. Relations were partly improved when Turkey recognised Syrian independence on 16 March 1946 as a result of mediation by Nuri Said.<sup>298</sup> This secured Turkey's consent not to insist on formal Syrian recognition of annexation of Hatay and Syria's agreement not to present formal demands. Finally, deterioration of relations reached its peak in 1957 when the prospect of a so-called communist danger surfaced because of a power struggle between rival political groups in Syria. As will be shown in more detail later,<sup>299</sup> Turkey followed the events closely and prepared to intervene if the anti-colonialist nationalists and/or communists took power. The Americans had difficulty in preventing Turkish military intervention in Syrian affairs, just as they later found it hard to restrain the Turks after the 14 July coup in Baghdad.

In 1958 a problem of presidential succession appeared in Lebanon and President Chamoun invited the Americans to the country in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine. That opened the way to American intervention to prevent a communist danger against any regional country that requested help from United States. Unlike most of the Muslim and Arab countries and even the Lebanese people, Turkey supported the Christian President Chamoun of Lebanon. Turkey went further by allowing the Americans to use the military base in İncirlik, Adana,<sup>300</sup> to intervene in the Lebanese crisis, while the British paratroops landed on Jordanian soil for the same purpose of protecting pro-Western governments.

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<sup>298</sup> Sanjian, *op. cit.*, p. 383.


<sup>299</sup> See pp.

<sup>300</sup> Commenting on Turkish-Arab relations Günver noted that this Turkish stance revived bad memories of the Turks in the past and the Arabs have not forgotten these up to the present day.

The part played by Turkey in the Syrian and the Lebanese crises of 1957 and 1958, neither of which fell within the responsibilities of NATO, could be called an indirect consequence of her membership in NATO. As the years went by the Turks became alien to the Muslims in general, and the Arabs in particular.

The 14 July military coup in Iraq increased the already high tension in the region and gave the Turkish military ideas and made Turkish politicians fear the same fate as their Iraqi counterparts. Also, relations with the US began to deteriorate with every passing year after the general elections of 1957 in Turkey and eventually the Turkish army seized power to reinstate the "true Kemalist regime."

As can be seen, our study in this chapter showed that the Ottoman Empire tried to survive, but failed. After the War of Independence the Turks managed to form a Republic based on Kemalist reforms. These reforms were intended to westernise the Turkish state and society. By Kemal's and his successors' efforts, Turkey eventually managed to align herself fully with the West by her membership of NATO.



UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

### NORTHERN TIER AND THE MIDDLE EAST

## Chapter V

# TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WESTERN DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1950-1955

### 5.1 General

In this chapter, after recalling the events, which led the cold war to dominate the international politics, we shall concentrate on the rivalry of the two superpowers and early Western defence initiatives in the Middle East. Having discussed these abortive attempts to establish a Western defence system in the early 1950s, we shall study the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, the first ever successful Western defence Pact in the region, paying particular attention to Turkey's involvement in the process.

With the elimination of Germany, Japan and Italy and the weakening of Great Britain and France in the Second World War, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics emerged as the two superpowers. Their rivalry in such a bipolar world led to the cold war which was to intensify in the period under the discussion.

Already visible at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, their conflict of interests became more acute after the death of F.D. Roosevelt and the succession of Harry S. Truman as president of the United States in April 1945. The American monopoly of the A-bomb, first successfully detonated on 16 July 1945, increased tension and after the inconclusive Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, the

Soviet Union under Stalin decided to consolidate Communist control of Eastern Europe. In 1947, Soviet dominated governments were set up in Albania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and finally, in February 1948, in Czechoslovakia. When civil war broke out and an attempted Communist take-over occurred in Greece in December 1947 and the Russians threatened in April 1948 to freeze out the Western sectors of Berlin, the United States reacted vigorously. (Even earlier in 1947 the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had been established as the American reply to the alleged Russian threat.)

Starting as a conflict over Central Europe and divided Germany, the Cold War spread to Asia following the Communist victory in China in 1949 and developed into a global conflict. For the United States the Korean War of 1950-1953 was evidence of a world-wide Communist conspiracy. Facing this expansionist Soviet policy, the United States decided to "contain" the Soviet Union by a series of encircling alliances and bases around its frontiers in 1949. These were the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (henceforth called SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation in 1959 (henceforth called CENTO, replacing the Baghdad Pact of 1955). By this time the United States had over 1400 foreign bases in 31 countries, including 275 bases for nuclear bombers.

The most intensive phase of the cold war occurred during the period 1949-1961 when Dean Acheson and J.F. Dulles were United States secretaries of state. After the Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955 the cold war spilled over into the Middle East. The conflict was manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Syrian Crisis of 1957, and the United States intervention in Lebanon and the British intervention in Jordan in 1958. The cold war proved a divisive force in the Middle East where some countries sought Soviet and others American support. During the late 1950s

the two monolithic blocs were showing signs of strains. Uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956 had shaken Soviet self-confidence. Eventually both superpowers seem to have concluded that they had more to lose than to gain by the conflict, and after the settlement of the Cuban Crisis in 1962, Soviet-American tension gradually relaxed. A first sign of this was the signature of a nuclear test ban treaty in 1963.

With this outline in mind, we should now turn back to the beginning of this intensive cold war period and note the milestones in the process of the superpowers' rivalry in the delicately located oil-rich part of the world, the Middle East, and the Turkish involvement in it.

Starting with the declaration of war on the Axis Forces in 1945 Turkey came increasingly under the influence of the United States. This process gained momentum when the Soviet Union officially demanded that Turkey return Kars and Ardahan provinces in the east to Russia and modify the Montreaux Treaty to allow a joint defence of the Straits.<sup>301</sup> As Turkey had already decided to integrate into the Western community, she understandably, turned to the West in general and the United States in particular to consolidate her power in order to defend her national integrity and sovereignty. The more the cold war intensified, the more Turkey realised that she had to align with the West even at the expense of abandoning some of the Kemalist principles and accept a free market economy, in place of etatism, association with the West instead of a neutral foreign policy and more democracy instead of the three-decade-long one party dictatorship. Britain, gravely weakened by World War II, was struggling to reconstruct her devastated national economy and was not in a position to protect Turkey and Greece. She therefore sought to transfer this responsibility to the United States fearing that otherwise she might

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<sup>301</sup> McGhee, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

lose control of the whole Middle East and Africa, including former colonies. This decision was immediately followed by the Truman and later Marshall Doctrines to counter the threat of Communist expansion in Europe including Turkey that was to be not only the regional backbone for the defence of the Middle East but also to have an important role in the defence of Western Europe.

As the superpowers began dominating the course of events in international relations, the small powers like Turkey lost their ability to manoeuvre even when their vital national interests were at stake.<sup>302</sup> The whole international community including the middle-ranking powers thus became dependent on one or other of the superpowers to protect their national interests or to solve the world conflicts. A miscalculation regarding American support in the Suez Crisis cost Britain dear and led to the complete British withdrawal from Egypt. Without having one of the superpowers' support none of the small powers was able to solve any international conflict in the cold war period, especially in the 1950s.

Turkey, though it was a small power, played a crucial role during this critical period. By siding with the Western world Turkey probably changed the destiny of the world in favour of the West.<sup>303</sup> Had she not associated with the West the Soviet Union could have easily controlled the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the lifeline of the West, and the oil resources in the Middle East without which the West could not have survived for long. It was for these reasons that the West treated Turkey so gently in the 1950s and sometimes, pretended that they considered Turkey as a "Big Power." Therefore, one could easily say that it was neither the Turkish desire to join the western club nor the Western endorsement of Turkish westernisation that brought about the mutual understanding on the world conflicts

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<sup>302</sup> The famous L.B. Johnson letter dated 5 June 1964 was one of the best examples in this regard.

<sup>303</sup> Interviews with Çağlayangil and Erkmen; both former Turkish Foreign Ministers.



during the cold war. It was in reality the mutual interests of the two parties, stimulated by the Soviet threat to Turkey and other parts of the world, that forced Turkey as well as the West to work together in international affairs. While the West, by so doing, partly recognised Turkish westernisation, Turkey abandoned pristine Kemalism,<sup>304</sup> adopted the multi-party system and offered the West many military bases and considerable economic concessions. In return, Turkey guaranteed her national security while the West secured the free flow of oil to the West and maintained its control over many strategic places in the region.

Generally speaking, the West won the rivalry in the short run, but, it failed in the long run to achieve its objectives in the Middle East. Briefly, the West attempted to contain the Soviet Union and therefore it exerted great efforts to set up a defence mechanism in the Balkans and the Middle East, and though it succeeded in establishing them on paper, it failed to maintain them or to make them function as intended. Also it failed in long term because it created a deep-rooted hatred towards the US in the region and lost Iran in 1979.<sup>305</sup>

Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s cannot be studied on its own as it became an integral part of the West for the first time, full of enthusiasm due to the satisfaction it felt from becoming a full member of NATO. Therefore, although this is a study of the Turkish involvement or contribution to Middle Eastern defence,<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> See for details on Kemalism Chapter IV.

<sup>305</sup> Gerner, Deborah J., 'Missed Opportunities and Roads not Taken: the Eisenhower Administration and the Palestinians,' *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (Winter-Spring 1990), pp. 78-92 and Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 279.

<sup>306</sup> It is interesting to note that Issawi made a remarkable point when he pointed out the parallelisms between the Crusades and their aftermath and their modern version in the 1950s: the establishment of the Crusader states and a modern parallel, the establishment of the State of Israel; Egypt's attempt to secure a monopoly of the spice trade and the similar contemporary attempts to control the petroleum trade; and the Crusaders' attack on Alexandria from Cyprus and the Anglo-French attack on Port Said. Perhaps he missed one point, which was related to the Turks who then opposed the Crusaders but now support the Western world. Issawi, Charles, 'Crusades and Current Crises in the Near East: A Historical Parallel,

*International Affairs,* (July 1957), p. 271. it should be made clear that this can only be analysed by studying the "independent" Western initiatives. The Turkish initiatives compared with the Western ones were dependent and subsidiary, vital though they were. They were inspired, if not directed, from the United States and sometimes from Great Britain and France. Turkey did not try to form her own Middle Eastern or Balkan policy. It was evident that those regional countries were unable to guarantee Turkish defence. Therefore, it did not create any major difficulty for the Turks to adopt a completely identical foreign policy. In addition, apart from her national integrity and sovereignty, Turkey did not have any major problem as far as her foreign policy was concerned. This made it easier for the Turkish decision makers to oppose any Soviet initiatives and give full support to the West. Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s is full of the examples of this unre-served Turkish support to the West. After some time the Turkish authorities came to think that if anything was in the interest of the West it must be in the interest of Turkey as well. The time came when the American Ambassador to the United Nations felt obliged to tell his Turkish counterpart that it was against Turkish interests always to vote in favour of the United States in the UN.<sup>307</sup> It was this Turkish attitude that left Turkey isolated when it later faced a major international problem, the Cyprus question.<sup>308</sup> Then the Turks realised that they were being manipulated too much by the Americans in the field of the foreign policy and for the first time they turned to the Third World countries to seek their support in the UN where the issue was discussed on 18 December 1965.<sup>309</sup> It was too late

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<sup>307</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>308</sup> Günver stated that Turkey was completely isolated from the Third World countries due to her pro-Western policies in the 1950s. In the 1960s, the only possible way for Turkey to break this isolation was, he said, to improve relations with the Muslim countries in general and Arab states in particular.

<sup>309</sup> Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernisation of Turkey*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1976, p. 273.

for Turkey to get any support from either the Arab or the other Islamic countries that had seen Turkey become secular and sever her relations with her Islamic past. Moreover, the Third World countries that had observed Turkey working for the West at the Bandung Conference in 1955 were not disposed to support her.

Why did the West desperately need Turkey for its own defence? The West appreciated that Turkey was strategically located between Europe and Asia, the Christian world and the Muslim world and more importantly, between the Soviet Union and the oil reserves of the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey's geostrategic location enabled the West to listen to and observe developments in the Soviet Union. Turkish territory also represented a natural barrier between the Soviet Union and warm-water ports of the Mediterranean and secured the Middle East from international Communist danger.<sup>310</sup> Finally, the 600,000 strong Turkish army, the largest in the area, with its historical enmity towards the Russians was another appealing factor for the West. Once the West came to know that it was much cheaper to maintain a Turkish soldier rather than to feed a western one in the region,<sup>311</sup> it preferred to help Turkey to maintain her army.

Thus, this Middle East defence project had four aspects. One was the West with its objectives and expectations from the project. Another was the Soviet Union, the West's rival in the region. The third was the Middle Eastern countries for whose support the rival powers were competing. And the fourth was Turkey which had no particular interest in the region but felt obliged to do the West's bidding even when this was occasionally contrary to Turkish national interests.

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<sup>310</sup> McGhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>311</sup> The cost of one American soldier was 6,500 dollars while one Turkish soldier cost Americans 235 dollars only. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

## 5.2 Expectations from a Middle Eastern Defence Organisation

Great Britain, the former colonial power, faced great difficulties in the process of negotiations to renew her agreements or extend her privileged position especially in Iraq and Egypt. It was, Britain foresaw, no longer possible to sign an agreement on the previous conditions with these countries. Therefore, she decided, in Nasser's words, to cover her imperialist face and get agreement signed under disguise of a collective defence pact. So, to the British, the defence pact was nothing but a means to achieve her objectives that she was not able to achieve by herself alone. Those objectives were mainly to renew her agreements with Egypt and Iraq to prolong continuing British interests there, such as oil, other raw materials and cheap agricultural products. The area was also a good market for British products. Another objective for the British was to maintain British control over the Suez Canal.

To the Americans, it was a means to keep Soviet Communism out of the region where many American oil companies had vital interests, and in common with the British, secure the free flow of oil to the West as well as to evict the other powers from the region.

To the Turks, participation in the Middle East defence organisation would be seen as fulfilment of their promise or a payment of the price that she had to pay for becoming a full member of NATO.<sup>312</sup>

For most of the Arabs, a Middle East defence organisation was an imperialist tactic to prolong imperialistic exploitation. Exceptionally in the Arab world, Nuri Said thought that he would receive considerable Western economic and military aid if he entered a defence pact sponsored by the West. He did not sincerely believe

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<sup>312</sup> Interview with Günver, Erkmen and Çağlayangil.

that there was any communist threat to any Arab country but being well disposed to the British, he tried to convince other Arab leaders that the Soviet Union was more dangerous than Israel to the Arabs, which nobody then believed.<sup>313</sup>

The Israelis regarded the Western defence project favourably since they saw its effect would be to divide their Arab and other Islamic enemies. Nevertheless they still feared that it could backfire and turn out to be a real Islamic threat to Israel.

Bearing in mind this general picture about the western defence initiatives, we may now turn to the process of the attempt to establish first, Middle East Treaty Organisation, Eastern Mediterranean Pact, Middle East Command, later Middle East Defence Organisation and the Baghdad Pact which in 1959 was to be called the Central Treaty Organisation.

At the very beginning the British and the Americans always agreed first on any plan that was put forward concerning Middle East defence and then they would open it for discussion. Following the transfer of responsibility for Middle Eastern defence to the Americans, many meetings were held between the high ranking military and political authorities from the United States and Britain. One of them was held at Malta in January 1951. The main object of the meeting was “to adjust the respective lines of approach between the Americans and the British over the defence policy in the Middle East.”<sup>314</sup> It is interesting that the conditions favouring the establishment of joint British-American military missions did not exist in any Middle Eastern country with the exception of Saudi Arabia.<sup>315</sup> However, two basic assumptions preoccupied the minds of the British; “the supreme importance of

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<sup>313</sup> Interview with Akşit.

<sup>314</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/8G, 5.2.1951.

<sup>315</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/9G, 29.1.1951.

Egypt and the vital need to defend Middle Eastern oil and communications.”<sup>316</sup>

These assumptions were naturally due to British expectations from Egypt which was strategically located and the most populated and influential Arab country. It is needless to repeat the importance of oil for Britain, the first industrialised country. Having lost her imperial power, Britain yet managed to maintain direct or indirect control in various parts of her colonial territories in different degrees up to quite recently.

The expectations of the parties concerned as revealed in the British documents in the Public Record Office, London, reveal Britain as the driving force behind Middle East defence. “Our Middle East defence plans aim at defending as much of the Middle East and of the Middle East oil as possible, and as a whole (the outer ring), and that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff Egypt still constitutes the only suitable wartime base from which to conduct the operations for this purpose.”<sup>317</sup> As seen, the British objectives were quite naturally limited to their own national interests in the region. It had in reality nothing directly to do with Turkish defence. In another words, the problem in British eyes was not the defence of Turkey itself. This was considered only as far as it could help the British objectives in the region and admittedly nothing further.

Although the US accepted the responsibility to defend the area against any external or internal threat, she was not still sure how far to commit herself for such a purpose. Therefore, she preferred to let Great Britain, the experienced colonial power in the region, keep her leading role in the Middle East while she almost fully supported the British initiatives aiming regional defence. The US was briefly

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<sup>316</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 4.1.1951 and Raleigh, J.S., ‘The West and the Defense of the Middle East,’ *Middle East Affairs*, (June-July 1955), p. 177.

<sup>317</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 10.1.1951.

interested in the defence of the region and by agreement with the UK, the latter had the primary responsibility for regional defence, but “America is solidly behind the UK in her dealing with the problem.”<sup>318</sup>

As seen, the US had many reservations about Middle Eastern defence. She had intimate relations with Saudi Arabia on one hand and she had more than intimate relations with Israel on the other. The US, therefore, had to be very careful about her role in the region. Any policy antagonising Israel or the Arab countries could have catastrophic consequences for her own national interests. It was not actually a matter of liking the Jews or the Arabs, it was only a matter of material interest. In fact, in the Middle East the political and military problems were and are so inextricably intermingled that neither could be considered in isolation. Citing the importance of the Middle East for the West in general and the reasons why the Americans were reluctant to defend the area a British document recorded that the strategic importance of the Middle East (briefly) derives from:

- (a) its oil resources,
- (b) its importance as a base for ultimately developing offensive action against one of the most vulnerable areas of the Soviet Union,
- (c) its importance as a bastion defending the African continent with its sources of strategic raw materials (including uranium),
- (d) the importance of denying its sources to the enemy, and
- (e) its importance as a centre of communications.<sup>319</sup>

The continuing need to maintain security on the basis of Western influence in the region derives from the fact that in Hoskins’ words “no segment of the earth’s surface so greater significance in international affairs than that which binds together the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, bringing into juxtaposition not only people of the eastern hemisphere but also - in this age of technology - those of

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<sup>318</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/24G, 10.2.1951.

<sup>319</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 4.1.1950.

the western hemisphere as well.”<sup>320</sup> The CIGS explained that the American view “that defence of the Middle East was a commonwealth responsibility arose not from lack of conviction as to its strategic importance but from the inadequacy of their existing military resources in view of their other commitments.”<sup>321</sup>

Explaining the reasons why the West was not even interested in any regional pact discussion with all the Arab states, a document recorded that “the argument against bringing in any other Arab states, other than Iraq and Egypt, at this stage is that, if we had any more, we should have to have them all; this would make the conference unmanageable, would confront us with an Arab League bloc within it and would highlight the exclusion of Israel.”<sup>322</sup> The West was very careful about their relations with the Arab states pertaining to the regional developments on the ground that it should not have incited the regional rivalries and Arab nationalism and that it should not have been assumed that it was against Israel. Otherwise, the West rightly presumed that it was not going to be an applicable project.

Western eagerness for the participation of Iraq and Egypt is very clear from the British documents:

(a) that Iraq alone of the Arab states had shown a keen and friendly interest in our approach to the problems of Middle East defence,

(b) that after Egypt, Iraq is the most important Arab state in terms of size and economic potential,

(c) that Iraq forms with Turkey the Northern bastion for the defence of the Middle East, with Egypt as the natural base.

(d) that Iraq is in a position to provide the command with forces and facilities superior to those of any Arab state outside Egypt.<sup>323</sup>

The Arab east, of which Iraq was an integral part, has historical importance in

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<sup>320</sup> Hoskins, Halford L., ‘Changing of the Guard in the Middle East,’ *Current History*, (February 1967), p. 65.

<sup>321</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 4.1.1950.

<sup>322</sup> FO 371, FY1023/7, 27.4.1951.

<sup>323</sup> PRO, FO, 371, FY1023/7, 27.4.1951.



the Arab eyes. In spite of its multi-racial and multi-sectarian structure, Iraq contested with Egypt and Saudi Arabia for Arab leadership due to her "eastern front" position from where she would save Arabs from non-Arab invasions. Therefore, as H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad commented, Iraqi pro-Western policy regarding the Middle East defence "was due purely to the personal vanity of Nuri Said or perhaps Jamali" rather than a general "Arab" policy. Besides, it was common knowledge that Nuri Said, who became prime minister fourteen times, had been a pro-western leader throughout his political life. Indeed he was so pro-British that one of the British dispatches sent from Baghdad stated that "Nuri may be told that his assurance that the Iraqi Army will fight with us wherever we are is very welcome, though we should, of course, have expected nothing less of him."<sup>324</sup>

Iran was under British influence right up till the time when Musaddeq came to power through general elections. As J.H. Huizinga stated, "even now ... no provincial governor in the South could be appointed without British approval."<sup>325</sup> Iran remained under Musaddeq till the CIA had a successful operation there and restored the Shah to his throne. The West was confused and frightened for their interests in Iran during Musaddeq's rule, fearing that he could align with the Soviets. According to British diplomats, for Musaddeq neutralism meant, "towards Russia; a policy of friendliness and appeasement, towards the West; a policy of diminishing Western interests in the oil industry and influence generally in Persia."<sup>326</sup> When the Shah began to rule his country he knew to whom he was indebted.<sup>327</sup> Therefore, he, too, against the will of his people, aligned with the West, though he was

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<sup>324</sup> PRO, FO, 371, EQ1071/1, 12.1.1951.

<sup>325</sup> PRO, FO, 371, EP 1022/4, 9.2.1951, quoted from Manchester Guardian dated 9.2.1951.

<sup>326</sup> PRO, FO, 371, EP1022/8, 18.10.1951.

<sup>327</sup> In fact, after the coup the Shah reportedly told Roosevelt: "I owe my throne to God ... and to you." See Gasiorowski, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

persuaded to do so only after long negotiations with the Turkish and Pakistani leaders.

Pakistan, a state established because of religious conviction like any other concerned power had her own expectations from any defence pact in the Middle East. Her national security was under threat from India. She had other problems of secondary importance with Afghanistan. The new state of Pakistan had a formidable economic burden due to the immigration of millions of Muslims coming from India and establishing her infrastructure, which was still almost non-existent. She was too, like other would-be members of the Baghdad Pact, in need of international aid and thus alignment with the West seemed a reasonable price to pay for it. The satisfaction the various members obtained from their membership and this alignment and its consequences will be discussed in the following chapter.

Turkey constituted the most important country in the region for the West: geostrategically, Turkey had control over the Straits and the Eastern mountains, which constitute natural barrier against Soviet expansionism towards the southern warm seas and Middle Eastern oil. Economically, it was part of the free market economy with the largest population in the region. Politically, Turkey was well inclined to the West and it was democratic, compared with other Middle Eastern states. Militarily, it was the strongest country with the largest army in the Middle East. Having an Islamic background and a western objective, Turkey was the ideal candidate to mediate between the regional Islamic countries and the West with whom she shared the secular ideals. As the cold war began to dominate the international system, Turkey's need for the West as well as West's need for Turkey grew stronger and eventually brought them both together in NATO. As will be explained later, Turkey's membership of NATO required her to become actively

involved in Middle Eastern defence projects, which after a few abortive attempts, took the form of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and later CENTO in 1958 when the Baghdad Pact was left without Baghdad as a result of the military coup in Iraq.

### 5.3 Early Western Defence Initiatives in the Middle East

Although the British were obliged to hand over their responsibility to the Americans in Turkey and Greece, they could not easily give up all their national interests in the region at once. Britain wanted the Americans to shoulder the economic burden but not to harm the British position in the region, if possible. As American economic and military aid in area grew the more the British were forced to defer to American wishes their interests there. These partly conflicting interests caused great rivalry between the two powers. As *L'Observateur*, recorded, "the greatest obstacle to the realisation of a regional security system in the Eastern Mediterranean is Anglo-American rivalry; and that London is by no means disposed to yield to Washington the leadership in this area."<sup>328</sup> Turkey, expecting a lot from the country's NATO membership, was ready to do anything she could do to achieve this objective. She mediated not only between the Western Powers and the Middle Eastern countries to settle their differences, but also mediated between the US and the UK in order to remove the differences concerning Middle Eastern defence. The notes added that "The Government of Ankara hopes to arrive at a settlement of these differences by stressing the strategic importance of Turkey."<sup>329</sup> In reply to this dispatch, British Secretary of Defence admitted the lack of co-ordination, saying, "we fully appreciate your anxiety concerning the lack of co-ordination with Americans which is at present apparent in defence planning in your theatre, with particular reference to Turkey."<sup>330</sup>

In search of candidates for a possible pact the British Ambassador consulted Köprülü. When asked by Sir Noel Charles what countries he hoped should be

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<sup>328</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1192/12, 11.5.1950.

<sup>329</sup> PRO, FO, 371, EK1192/12, May 1950.

<sup>330</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1192/13, 11.5.1950.

included in the Pact, Köprülü replied that “he referred in the first instance to the Arab countries, Israel and Turkey. He pointed out later when I mentioned to him that His Majesty’s Government hoped Turkey would assist us in improving our relations with Egypt, that a pact would put Turkey in a better position to ‘help us’.”<sup>331</sup>

In reply to Köprülü’s question whether Egypt would be included in a system of regional defence, the British Ambassador in Ankara, said that he “had been considering for some time the possibility of the countries of the Middle East themselves suggesting a regional system in association with us. It might be possible to replace the Anglo-Egyptian Alliance by a multi-lateral one.”<sup>332</sup> This dispatch is of crucial importance for an understanding of the British view on the issue, because it was clear that it was no longer possible to sign a bilateral agreement with Egypt. Therefore, instead of signing bilateral agreements, a multilateral agreement would be wiser and it would be easier to conceal its imperialistic nature.

Having considered their national security and sovereignty in the face of the Russian threat, the Turks wanted to secure this by aligning themselves with the West. That is why the Turkish authorities put great pressure on their western friends to accept Turkish demands. In order to convince the West that Turkish defence was vital for the defence of the West, the Turks emphasised the strategic importance of the Turkish Straits and soil for Western defence, their secular and democratic system and the deterrent power of Turkish army. The Turks, according to Sir Noel Charles, “do not much mind whether this guarantee is obtained by their inclusion in the Atlantic Pact (though they would prefer this) or a new Mediterranean Pact or some other arrangement, but they want the US to be legally

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<sup>331</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/10, 26.5.1950.

<sup>332</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1051/8, 21.12.1950.

committed.”<sup>333</sup>

It took long time for the West to make up its mind whether to accept the Turks, a Muslim and Asiatic nation and for centuries a deadly enemy of the Christian World, into a western defence pact. The western countries had many reservations about the Turks as they recalled the Huns invading Europe in the fifth century and the Ottomans invading from the fifteenth century. Having considered the necessity of the Turkish army as well as territory for the defence of the Western Europe and the Middle East, the Western countries were inclined to believe that the social and political changes in Turkey were real and persuaded themselves that it was possible to accept such a nation into the North Atlantic Pact. The Turkish insistence and threats by some of the opposing elements such as extreme leftists to remain neutral had helped the West to make up its mind more quickly. For example, Esat Adil Müstecabi was a prominent representative of the neutralist circles and defended his neutrality policy on each and every occasion that the West gave a negative reply to the Turkish demands and after any negative statement made in the West in this regard.<sup>334</sup>

Until the summer of 1950, however, there was not any positive sign for Turkey's admission to NATO. This was basically due to the following reasons: First of all, the US was not in position to enter any politico-military commitments because of her other commitments in other parts of the world.<sup>335</sup> Second, without military commitments it was impossible to enter into military understandings with Turkey. Third, since the British and American plans for the Middle East were dovetailed together, without the participation of the US, the British saw no benefit in military

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<sup>333</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/14, 17.8.1950.

<sup>334</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/17, 28.9.1950.

<sup>335</sup> Interview with Gülek and Erkmen.

understandings and staff talks with Turkey. Finally, the British strategy in the region had not fully been decided by the early 1950.<sup>336</sup>

Nevertheless the West was anxious to maintain Turkish support, so Western diplomats conspired to refresh the Turkish fear of the Russians by fabricating some stories that the Russians still intended to launch an attack against Turkey. Some rumours accordingly appeared in western diplomatic circles that “two trains with guns, vehicles and estimated one battalion of infantry each passing south last week taking branch line to Erivan.”<sup>337</sup> These reports were later found to be groundless.

In reply to a negative approach by Sir Noel Charles, concerning Western support for Iran, Köprülü strongly and nervously reacted that had the West accepted the Turkish application for NATO membership, Iranians would not have reached an agreement with the Russians, who were quite happy about the refusal. Sir Noel Charles had the impression that, according to the Turkish authorities, Iran turned to Russia because if the West refused to accept Turkey’s NATO membership Iranians had nothing to expect from the West as far as genuine economic and military aid was concerned.<sup>338</sup>

From various observations in the Chiefs of Staff telegram, it was assumed that what was being contemplated was the eventual formation of a Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO, a Middle Eastern version of NATO) as a parallel organisation to NATO and that “METO would guarantee Turkey all the advantages that she would receive from full membership of NATO as without such guarantees it seemed unlikely that she would co-operate wholeheartedly with the proposed

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<sup>336</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/16, 19.6.1950.

<sup>337</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1197/1, 20.6.1950.

<sup>338</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/8, 7.12.1950.

Allied Command.”<sup>339</sup>

Turkey's decision to turn her attention towards the East was not a change of policy, but an attempt to strengthen her position *vis a vis* the western front.<sup>340</sup> Turkish foreign policy pursued since its establishment had all along aimed to align with the West by every possible means. From the very first day of the modern Republic, Turkey had always been ready to perform her role to achieve these objectives as far as possible unless it was thought that the integrity of the state and national interests would be prejudiced. And the West was prepared to permit such an association with the Turks whenever and as long as it was in Western interests. In supporting this view, for example, a dispatch addressed to the Foreign Office, having referred to Turkey's possible contribution to the stability and security of the Middle East, pointed out “what was needed was that Turkey should be brought into the Atlantic Pact. This would improve her moral and material situation and would enable her to play a more active part to the advantage both of herself and her allies. She would, of course need further US economic assistance.”<sup>341</sup> It also stated that Köprülü agreed with Mr Bevin's view that the area from Persia to Pakistan was of great importance for the security of the Middle East. And if Turkey's application for NATO membership could be accepted it would have a most beneficial effect in the whole Middle Eastern area. It recorded that Köprülü

was confident that Turkey and Britain working together could do a great deal for the maintenance of the peace of that area. He wished to assure Mr. Bevin that the Turkish government would always work closely with His Majesty's Government and that they wished their relations to be as frank and sincere as possible.<sup>342</sup>

But one should not forget that Turkish pro-Western policy in general and pro-

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<sup>339</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1198/2G, 16.6.1951.

<sup>340</sup> Mango, Andrew J.A., ‘Turkey and the Middle East,’ *Political Quarterly*, 28(1957), p. 152.

<sup>341</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/4, 5.8.1950.

<sup>342</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/4, 5.8.1950.



American in particular did not start with the DP. Such a policy had already been virtually adopted by the RPP. This was clear from Mr. Sadak's speech given in the National Assembly. Commenting on that speech, Sir Noel Charles wrote that "he [Mr. Sadak] had failed to bring back a treaty from the US by explaining America's traditional reluctance to enter into bilateral military agreements."<sup>343</sup> He pointed out that a regional arrangement to which the US could adhere was not at present possible in Turkey's geographical area,<sup>344</sup> but said that "the government would continue to urge their point of view on the Americans. Mr. Köprülü endorsed this policy on behalf of the DP."<sup>345</sup>

Similarly, Turkish willingness to act in an intermediary role to reconcile Western powers and Middle Eastern countries was not a DP innovation but was also a continuation of RPP policy. The RPP promised the UK to help solve the conflict between Egypt and Britain and wanted to form a Middle Eastern organisation to which the US was to become a member.<sup>346</sup> However, as Sir Noel Charles, writing to Attlee from Ankara, stated, "it was possible that the Turks over-estimated their influence in the Arab world." And he was cognisant of the fact that Egypt, in common with other Arab states, had, among other things, felt resentment towards Turkey by reason of the Turkish recognition of Israel. He was also aware of the fact that, as he put it,

in any approaches made by Turkey to the Arab states with a view to influencing them towards alignment with western policy, the states would recognise Turkey's anxieties about her own security and, while considering Turkey justified in getting all the support she could from the Western Powers, they would hardly be likely to see any

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<sup>343</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/4, 28.2.1950.

<sup>344</sup> Akşit pointed out that when Bayar became the president he asked İnönü why he did not accede to NATO. İnönü replied "Do you think they agreed to let us in and we did not enter?" (aldılar da mı girmedik?) He also complained that in Sadak's visit to the US, he waited for days to be able to see the American authorities.

<sup>345</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/4, 28.2.1950 and interview with Gülek.

<sup>346</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/5, 18.5.1950.

reason to abate their national aspirations for the sake of Turkey's security.<sup>347</sup>

Sir Noel Charles' view was confirmed by later developments in the Middle East, when the West encouraged the establishment of a Western sponsored Pact in the region. In fact, Egypt used the very same argument in refusing to join the Western defence initiatives in the 1950s. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sadak, talking to his constituents about the recent meeting of US representatives in the Middle East, said that Turkey was "no longer standing alone as the defence of Turkey and her territorial integrity was vital to the defence of the US."<sup>348</sup>

The Turks had proved their loyalty and usefulness to the Americans before the DP came to power. That is why General Collins declared to the Turkish press that "the Turkish Army would not be left to stand alone in the event of a major war." There were some fears in the minds of the American diplomats that these words were to be interpreted by the ordinary Turkish readers as an American promise. This declaration was later clarified as "the US would help the Turks with the long range bombing of the USSR but not with troops." It is interesting to note that this same top secret dispatch also recorded that "everywhere in official circles Turkey is regarded as America's 'surest bet' in Europe. US aid has taken root. The Turks are the 'best boys.'"<sup>349</sup> In fact these words were no groundless according to Arcayürek who pointed out that İnönü said to General Collins that "we are working with the US, there is nothing to hide from you."<sup>350</sup>

The Turkish economy had been devastated by the heavy military budget which was among the highest in the world. Turkey's military budget was incredibly high

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<sup>347</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/5, 18.5.1950.

<sup>348</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/2, 18.1.1950.

<sup>349</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1192/7, 4.4.1950.

<sup>350</sup> Arcayürek, Cüneyt, *Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye*, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 1987, p. 349.

during the Second World War although it did not join in. This did not decrease even when the war was over. Even in 1950, "no less than 75 per cent of the Turkish budget was devoted to military purposes."<sup>351</sup> Being cognisant of the nature of the Turks, the West knew that the Turks would anyway resist any Russian attempt to penetrate into the Middle East.

In the 1950s, it was quite evident that without the Turks, the West's pioneer in the Third World countries in general and in the Middle East in particular, Britain, which the Muslims considered a Christian, outsider, alien and imperialist power, could not alone even attempt to form a regional pact.<sup>352</sup> Being the former masters and coreligionists of the people in the region, the Turks were immensely useful for the West in gathering intelligence and giving useful advice<sup>353</sup> on how to make friends with and rule the Arabs and other peoples of the region. Having appreciated, among other things, the value of the indispensable Turkish role, the British were of the opinion that "we shall gain the Turks' full adherence," for the regional pact, which was to be "linked" to NATO "by one superior body concerned with world-wide planning against possible communist aggression."<sup>354</sup>

The DP leadership, which was well-known for its staunch pro-American inclination, demonstrated its loyalty to the West by its decision to send Turkish troops to Korea. This was one of their first acts after they came to power and was indicative of their eagerness to be accepted into NATO. As explained earlier, there were many factors that contributed to Turkey's admission to NATO. The Turks

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<sup>351</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/1, 20.2.1950.

<sup>352</sup> Interview with Erkmen.

<sup>353</sup> See for such useful advice given that by the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers, especially Fuat Köprülü, a well-known Middle Eastern historian and the various Turkish ambassadors, in the following documents; EP1022/6, 26.2.1951; WK1022/2, 16.5.1952; 101861, WK1052/2, 8.12.1952.

<sup>354</sup> PRO, FO, 371, E1198/1G, 16.6.1951.

believed the Turkish role in the Korean War was one of the major factors that had convinced the West that the Turks could perform an important role in the Middle East on behalf of the West.<sup>355</sup>

In criticism of the Turkish policy towards the Korean War, İ. Bilen, writing in Pravda, claimed:

Turkey has become a selling market for the American arms manufacturers and a supplier of cannon fodder for the Pentagon. General Wyman who drove thousands of Turkish soldiers to their deaths in Korea, has calculated with the cynicism of a businessman that 'a Turkish soldier costs four times less than an American soldier' And the Turkish press, which "has sold itself for dollars," - being bought by the US with dollars - wrote no less cynically! 'We have set up a company. The Americans are giving money, we give the blood of the Turkish soldiers.'<sup>356</sup>

This was of course an extreme criticism of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish press. However, it is true that after Turkish alignment with the West, Turkey began to pay more and more for the arms imported from the West. It was also true that the Turkish press rarely tried to criticise American policy or pro-American Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s. Pravda also alleged that the Turkish government sent 20,000 soldiers to Korea of whom 14,000 have been killed, wounded or taken prisoner.<sup>357</sup> The Turkish authorities acknowledged that 4,500 soldiers were sent to Korea and 2400 of them were killed, wounded or taken prisoner.<sup>358</sup> The generally accepted figures are that a total of around 25,000 men served at some time in the 5,000-7,000 strong Turkish brigade, of whom 617 were killed in action, 100 died

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<sup>355</sup> All Turkish interviewees agreed that Turkey was accepted into NATO chiefly as a result of the role of the Turkish troops in the Korean War. Gülek mentioned that Turkish participation in the Korean War was also a part of a new vision of Turkish foreign policy that 'Turkey should join anything that civilised nations are involved in' and this was necessary." He also suggested that apart from the security reasons, this mentality was responsible for Turkish involvement in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East.

<sup>356</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 107553, WK10345/1, 6.2.1953; quoted from "Turkish people fight against American enslavement" in Pravda.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

from other causes and 2,156 were wounded.<sup>359</sup>

We should now turn our attention particularly to Turkey's involvement in the early western defence initiatives in the region. Faced with Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey tried to obtain Western support to defend her territorial integrity. After the establishment of NATO Turkey tried to convince the West, especially the US that Turkey should join. However, this effort "was unsuccessful, because security of Turkey was seen within the context of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East."<sup>360</sup>

Therefore, understandably, it was not Turkey's choice to devote her energy to the formation of a Middle East defence system or to become an intermediary between the UK and the Arab world. "She was cast in this role by the West and more specifically by her own desire to establish a firm alliance with the western bloc at almost any cost."<sup>361</sup> However, Turkey's relationship with Israel and her dispute over Hatay severely limited her suitability for the part.

When the Democrats came to power they "fully" supported the main themes of the previous government's foreign policy, namely to resist the Soviet threat and to align with the western bloc. In fact, the new government was more eager than its predecessor to align with the West. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Köprülü stated that the new government was determined to ensure that Turkey's post World War II orientation towards the West would "take a more energetic form in this direction."<sup>362</sup> Moreover, a pro-government daily newspaper, Zafer,

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<sup>359</sup> Lewis, op. cit., p. 199.

<sup>360</sup> Rıza, Bülent Ali, *Turkish Participation in the Middle East Defence Projects and its impact on the Turco-Arab Relations, May 1950-June 1953*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1982, p. 11.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>362</sup> Cumhuriyet, 2.6.1950.

recorded that Turkey would therefore “do everything in her power to bring about a rapprochement between the Western powers and the regional countries.”<sup>363</sup>

Meanwhile, since the end of the Second World War, discussions between the US and the UK on the defence of the Middle East had been going on. In September 1951 these focused on a specific plan. On 3 September, the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, wrote to his Turkish counterpart “reminding him of his earlier commitment to help in the defence of the Middle East.” Once Turkey had joined NATO the Turkish Foreign Minister stated, she “would help in the establishment of a Middle East defence system.”<sup>364</sup>

However, Turkey’s backing for the Middle East Command (MEC) project was not welcomed in Egypt where the MEC was seen as an “ill-disguised” attempt to perpetuate the British occupation of Egyptian territory. On 27 October Egypt officially rejected the MEC and declared the continuing British military presence to be a forcible and illegal occupation of Egypt. “The Egyptian rejection had effectively scuttled the MEC project and the sponsor of the project were not in position to proceed with its establishment. Nevertheless, “the continuing Turkish commitment to assist in the establishment of a regional defence system as well as the genuine Turkish concern about the security vacuum”<sup>365</sup> in the Middle East drove the Turkish government to maintain its support for the project. The principle reasons which had driven the UK to try to organise a MEC was the Egyptian threat to her Suez canal Zone base and the need to strengthen her position in the Middle East through allied support.

Commenting on reactions of the Arab states on 1 November, Bayar declared

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<sup>363</sup> Zafer, 14.9.1951.

<sup>364</sup> Rıza, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>365</sup> Rıza, op. cit., p. 100.

that he was saddened to see that Turkey's recent political activities in the region were misinterpreted by some of their Arab friends in a way which did not reflect Turkey's "genuine and sincere feelings."<sup>366</sup>

Turkey supported the MEC project for a number of reasons: first, "Turkey was committed by the promise which had been made to the UK that she would play her part in the defence of the Middle East after joining NATO and the US prevailed upon her to ensure that she did so."<sup>367</sup> Second, Turkey took a stand against the USSR and international communism and could not logically refuse to participate in such a defence system in the region. Finally, the Turkish government believed that the Arab world was not so opposed to the defence project as the attitude of Egyptian government on the MEC suggested and that therefore, it was, at least in the long run, amenable to Turkish persuasion.

Rıza claimed that Turkey's backing for these Middle Eastern defence systems "was to have greater effect on Turco-Arab relations, particularly in the longer terms, than the Turkish government could have possibly anticipated at the time." He also claimed that Turkey was unable "to take any major steps on the Middle East defence independently of the UK."<sup>368</sup>

Following Turkey's admission to NATO the Turkish rulers continued to suggest that Turkey intended to promote co-operation between NATO and Arab world "as she believed that this would improve the Arabs' prosperity and satisfy their defence requirements."<sup>369</sup>

As regards to the struggle of the Arabs in North Africa, the Turkish view

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<sup>366</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

<sup>369</sup> Cumhuriyet, 15.1.1952.

was, it seems, highly affected by the propaganda war between the West and the East. The Turkish policy on North Africa stemmed from the Turkish government's narrow interpretation of the North African situation as a struggle between an ally and "communism", which was seen as a threat to peace and stability of the free world. For example, the Turkish press was claiming that the withdrawal of the French from the region would cause instability and threaten the peace of the Middle East.<sup>370</sup>

Turkey's relations with Arab world slightly improved in the first half of 1952 partly as a result of the waning of the MEC initiative. Therefore, supported by the West, Turkey tried to seek support for a western defence project, this time called the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) in August 1952. Rıza noted that "the main features of the proposed MEDO were significantly different" from those of the MEC. "The intended scope and functions of MEDO were comparatively modest". MEDO's main task was to be "only the facilitation of detailed military consultation between the member states."<sup>371</sup>

During this period, the US was in favour of waiting for the Arabs to change their mind and then to establish a defence project, while the UK wanted to establish it and wait for the Arabs to join. Change of government in Egypt led to a more optimistic view in the West, but Egypt continued to thwart all western defence initiatives in the Middle East throughout the 1950s.

Turkey always seemed eager to help the West in its defence projects in the

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<sup>370</sup> Zafer, 30.3.1952.

<sup>371</sup> Rıza, *op. cit.*, p. 164. It is interesting to note a parallelism regarding change of policy following the collapse of the MEC project and the collapse of the Baghdad Pact. This shift of policy, between the MEC and MEDO, as will be shown later, would occur when the Baghdad Pact collapsed and it was replaced by CENTO. Compared with the Baghdad Pact, the scope and functions of CENTO were modest as well. This shift of policy was adopted by the British in order to make it more attractive or acceptable to the regional members as in the case of MEDO, and it was done to prolong its life as in the case of CENTO.



Middle East. As well as the MEC, even before the British informed the Turks that they were willing to accept the American view in favour of yet another attempt to persuade the Arab states to join MEDO, the Turkish leaders had initiated their own campaign to this end. They intensified their visits to Arab capitals, starting with Cairo, to persuade the Arab rulers. The Turkish press was in the service of the Turkish government as it had usually been. For instance, Zafer suggested that undoubtedly “the Arab countries have welcomed the fact that Turkey has taken over the planning of Middle East defence.”<sup>372</sup>

However, all Turkish efforts were hampered by the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over Suez Canal base and the Arabs, Egypt at the lead, hardened their policy concerning the defence initiatives in the region. This process was further highlighted by the Turkish stance in the UN on the question of North Africa. While Arab and Asian countries agreed to include the question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, Turkey failed to support this initiative.

By the end of 1952 it was clear that Turkish diplomatic initiatives to persuade the Arabs to enter into negotiations on a general Middle East defence arrangement had not been successful. The British realised that it was difficult to gain Egyptian support for a Middle East defence organisation and solve the Suez Canal base dispute and subsequently slowed down its activities in this respect. It is possible to argue that the development of the hydrogen bomb and its effect on western strategic thinking was also responsible for changing the perception of the value of the base, because the base was gradually becoming less important at a time of increasing reliance on the deterrent capability of nuclear bombers.

The change of government in the US affected the Turkish policy towards the

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<sup>372</sup> Zafer, 25.10.1952.

Middle East, because the new government was more determined to fight international communism and this determination necessitated the further development of American air bases in the countries bordering the USSR and the establishment of new ones. This naturally meant even greater American interest in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

However, there were some obstacles in implementing this American policy. One of the main obstacles was ambiguity in the American position, which stemmed from the desire to support the UK as an ally and to encourage an Anglo-Egyptian settlement of the Suez base dispute while avoiding total identification with the British policy towards Egypt and maintaining good relations with Egypt and other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. This was understandably regarded by the British as factor which undermined their position in the region, especially in the dispute with Egypt.

Having had an experience of two unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Arab leaders to join a western defence organisation, Turkey prepared for yet another attempt, at the beginning of 1953. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a report, which examined the attitude of five Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to the question of Middle East defence and drew conclusions on the likelihood of their participation in Middle Eastern defence.<sup>373</sup>

The report suggested that Egypt would eventually overcome their hesitation and agree to join a Middle East defence organisation. Turning to the other Arab states, it suggested that, with the exception of Iraq, they were unlikely to join any Middle East defence arrangement before a general improvement of relations between the West and Arabs states, "even though the leaders in these countries were

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<sup>373</sup> Rıza, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

personally in favour of collective defence.”<sup>374</sup> All sides were aware that Iraq was ready for co-operation, but concentration on Iraq would have been an admission of a major setback, if not outright failure for Turkey as well as the West. Although the support of Turkish leaders for a regional defence arrangement had not been successful during the first three years of 1950s they continued to believe that they are able to convince the whole Arab world to share their views on the international communist threat to the region, to contribute to reduction of the tension between the West and the Arab world, which they rightly regarded to be the major obstacle to the formation of such a defence system. However, in April 1953, as Zafer noted, the Turkish government slowed down its campaign until the tour of J.F. Dulles at the end of May 1953.<sup>375</sup> This marked the end of the prolonged attempt to establish a defence system for the Middle East. Dulles was convinced that the Arab opposition to the planned MEDO made it impossible to bring into existence. The subsequent change of policy of the US undermined the defence schemes which had been initiated by the UK and supported by Turkey.

The American Secretary of State had been impressed by the desire of Iraqi leaders to establish closer co-operation with the US to confront the Soviet threat and he had found a similar attitude in Pakistan during his trip. Dulles believed that it made sense to build on the determination to resist Soviet aggression which he had observed in Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq. He added that the US “would play her part in this process by supplying increased military aid to these countries.”<sup>376</sup>

Pakistan and Iraq were equally ready for co-operation with the West. When Operation AJAX ousted the anti-western leader, Musaddeq, in Iran and replaced

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<sup>374</sup> Ibid., p. 206.

<sup>375</sup> Zafer, 3.4.1953.

<sup>376</sup> Rıza, op. cit., p. 244.

the Shah on his throne, it was hoped that Turkey's new effort to establish a regional defence system would be successful.<sup>377</sup> The emergence of the Northern Tier scheme reflected a divergence between American and the British policies on regional defence. In fact, it also reflected the steady replacement of British power and influence in the Middle East by that of the US.

Briefly, Great Britain initiated a policy in the Middle East, among other things, to replace her bilateral agreements with Iraq and Egypt with a multilateral one and in order to do so, she was obliged to ask the US and Turkey for various reasons to help her accomplish her objectives. However, starting from 1949, first, to form Mediterranean Pact, later, Middle East Command and Middle East Defence Organisation, all attempts failed, due, among other things, to Egyptian opposition. After the last Egyptian rejection of the British proposal for a defence pact, the British was obliged to accept the American proposal of a Northern Tier and to wait, in vain, for Egypt to join the Pact at a more appropriate time.

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<sup>377</sup> It is interesting to note that one day after Dulles arrived in the Middle East, on 30 May Molotov informed the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that the USSR formally renounced her claims on the Turkish territory and was ready for a new agreement on the Turkish Straits. Turkish government regarded the new Soviet initiative as a ruse to weaken its policy of steadfastness against the USSR.

## 5.4 Baghdad Pact

To establish some of the main factors which contributed to the formation of the Baghdad Pact one should start with the importance of Egypt and the vital need to defend Middle Eastern oil and communications for the West in general and for the British in particular.

Another equally important factor was the American containment policy against International Communism, without which the formation of the Baghdad Pact would probably not have been realised. This policy required the Americans to change their minds about the Middle East and subsequently give aid to the regional countries.

Another factor that contributed to the formation of the Baghdad Pact was, one could argue, the Kurds, the common threat to the regional members of the Pact. As the *New York Herald Tribune* stated, "potential source of trouble is the Kurdish minority. ... Though for the time being the Iraqi Kurds are tractable, they are, as always, an unstable and uncertain element. Their pan-Kurdish aspirations are kept alive by a steady flow of Moscow-inspired propaganda broadcast by the so-called Azerbaijani radio, which is believed to operate in Soviet territory."<sup>378</sup> It was asking to the Kurds to awaken and liberate Kurdistan from the imperialist powers.

Having observed such a provocative broadcasts the West as well as the regional countries were persuaded to follow a common policy against the Kurds and this was partly achieved by the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. As Turkey agreed with the West to establish what would be later called the Baghdad Pact, Adnan

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<sup>378</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 98737, EQ1017/4, 26.6.1952, quoted from *New York Herald Tribune* dated 26.6.1952.

Menderes, the Turkish prime minister, arrived in the US on an official visit accompanied by a large and varied team of advisers to discuss, among other things, military collaboration, Middle East affairs and the proposed Balkan Alliance. The main objective of the visit was “to obtain some continuing aid from the US over the next four years to enable Turkey to keep her armed forces at their present level.”<sup>379</sup> However, the presence of large and varied a team of advisers indicates that other subjects were discussed “including military collaboration, Middle East affairs and the proposed Balkan alliance.”<sup>380</sup>

It was quite understandable that the regional countries were reluctant to form a defence pact with Turkey and Britain as members, because the regional countries regarded both countries as the former ‘exploiters’ and this was well known to the Turks as well as the British; “that the British and the Turks are undoubtedly the two nations most disliked in that area.”<sup>381</sup> Yet the partial success that Adnan Menderes achieved was partly due to his popular image and persuasive diplomatic personality and partly due to the attractive generous American military and economic aid to the regional members. It was not, in another words, a matter of liking or not, it was, to the decision makers of the relevant countries, a matter of national interests to follow the steps of the US.

Following Turkish shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, Turkey managed to reach an agreement on the fundamental problems of the region. Turkey exerted a strong influence on the possible candidates for what would be called the Baghdad Pact to signify their alignment with the West under a regional pact. Turkey pursued a “step by step” policy to achieve her goals. The first concrete step was taken

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<sup>379</sup> PRO, FO, 371, WK1013/13, 4.6.1954.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>381</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/7, 3.5.1950.

by signing an agreement with Pakistani government on 2 April 1954. It provided that both countries should refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the other; that they would co-operate closely in matters of common interest and in cultural, economic and technical matters. They would exchange military information and help one another in the production of arms and co-operate in the accession of other powers. The new pact had been given a cordial welcome in the Turkish press which generally regarded it as the possible basis for a regional defence system and some commentators were hopeful of Iraqi and Iranian participation. Some were more optimistic hoping until the end of 1954 to enlist Jordan, Lebanon and even Egypt.<sup>382</sup> On 5 April 1954, Altemur Kılıç, wrote in Turkish daily newspaper *Vatan* that two realist countries had come together to fill the defence vacuum in the region. No country with good intention should worry because of this pact. Undoubtedly, it is not an aggressive pact, it is a defensive one. Everyone will soon realise how right the two countries were and the best evidence for it was, he stated, the Soviet protests to both countries.<sup>383</sup>

Menderes and Nuri Said were both willing to conclude a treaty with certain Arab states in place of the Turkish-Pakistani Treaty. They wanted to sign a new agreement that would be more attractive to Arab countries. What they considered the first step towards this goal was the signing of the Baghdad Pact. Before Menderes left for the final tour to the Arab states on 27 December 1954, he made a statement on Middle East defence in which he said: "if the area enjoyed a certain security, it was thanks to NATO. But the Arab states must take steps for their own security and it was not enough that they should unite among themselves to

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<sup>382</sup> *Vatan*, 3-5.1954 and 20.10.1954.

<sup>383</sup> Kılıç, Altemur, 'Türk-Pakistan Paktı,' *Vatan*, 5.4.1954. and also see other Turkish daily newspapers such as *Zafer*, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on 3-5 April 1954.

obtain security they must co-operate with the free world.”<sup>384</sup>

One can see from the statements made by different authorities that at the beginning of 1955 the atmosphere for Turkey's move to form a regional pact was more convenient than ever before. In a statement welcoming the prime minister's forthcoming visit to Iraq between January 6 and 14, the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara “has stressed the strong friendship between Turkey and Iraq and declared that Iraq's security is linked with that of Turkey and Iran.” The Ambassador of Pakistan in Ankara also made a statement on Turkey's move to conclude a treaty with Iraq in which he, “welcomed Turco-Arab friendship,” which he believed would “serve the cause of peace in the Middle East and the whole world.” The Jordanian Minister in Ankara “welcomed” the recent statements about Turco-Arab friendship and pointed out that relations between Turkey and Jordan were “already very close.” The Egyptian Prime Minister was reported to have told journalists that the Turco-Egyptian “co-operation should be extended beyond the limit of cordiality and should develop into close economic and cultural relations.” The Egyptian press went on to say that “it is unrealistic to rely on the Arab League for the security of the Middle East.”<sup>385</sup> Yet there had still been some negative voices as well. For example, Major Salah Salem said that “neither Egypt nor any Arab country was prepared at this stage to join in a defence system with the western powers.”<sup>386</sup>

Menderes and Nuri Said managed to reach such a level of understanding that they could issue to the world a joint communiqué on 13 January. The communiqué announced that the two governments had decided to conclude a treaty under which they “will co-operate against aggression from any quarter, whether from within the

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<sup>384</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/1, 4.1.1955.

<sup>385</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/3, 31.1.1955.

<sup>386</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/1, 4.1.1955.



Middle East or from outside." The two powers considered it "useful and necessary" that "those other countries should participate in the treaty, who had given proof of their determination to resist aggression to co-operate in ensuring the stability of the Middle East, and were able to further ends in virtue of their geographical position or the means at their disposal."<sup>387</sup>

Sir James Bowker, writing from Ankara, mentioned that the communiqué was regarded in Turkey as a "source of great satisfaction that a member of the Arab League has finally been won over to co-operation in Middle East defence. British approval of the Turkish initiative has been quoted in the Turkish press".<sup>388</sup>

By mid-February Egypt once again broke with Turkey and resumed propaganda against her. The Egyptian reports alleged that Turkey had concluded a military agreement with Israel. Turkey denied not only this but also the existence of ordinary commercial relations with Israel. Ironically, an "Israeli delegation has in the meantime arrived in Ankara for "routine trade talks"<sup>389</sup> though the Turkish government denied that they have any official status."<sup>390</sup>

Commenting in Rome on the approaches of Middle Eastern countries, Adnan Menderes emphasised the "special position of Iraq, referred to understanding shown by the Lebanon and Jordan, and praised the helpfulness of Syrian statesmen."<sup>391</sup>

The Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Turkey and Iraq providing secu-

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<sup>387</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/2, 18.1.1955.

<sup>388</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/2. 18.1.1955.

<sup>389</sup> Quotation mark belongs to the author.

<sup>390</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/4, 15.2.1955.

<sup>391</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/4, 15.2.1955. Britain also worked hard to persuade Jordan to join the Pact: first, Britain said if Jordan join the Baghdad Pact it will get what it wants from the West, later she said if Jordan does not join the Pact she will withdraw her support, yet Jordan did not dare to join due to fear of radical Arab nationalism led by Nasser. Dann, Uriel, 'The Foreign Office, the Baghdad Pact and Jordan,' *Asian and African Studies*, 21(1987), pp. 253-258.

rity, co-operation and defence and open for accession to "any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the high contracting parties" was signed in Baghdad on 24 February 1955. Turkey had received many strong reactions from various countries for her involvement in the Middle East and these reactions reached a peak with signing the Baghdad Pact, which was allegedly directed at the Soviet Union, while protecting the Western interests in the region. The Prime Minister's efforts towards concluding the Pact had met with general support in the country and its conclusion had been greeted with great satisfaction. On 26 February the National Assembly unanimously ratified the Pact. The accession of the UK and later the US were now expected.<sup>392</sup> With the accession of Iran, the Northern Tier had been established and a "link formed between NATO and SEATO through Turkey and Pakistan. The US had given continuous assistance and encouragement, lately reinforced by increasing aid on the occasion of the accession of Persia."<sup>393</sup>

The external reactions were strong, especially those of the Soviet Union and Egypt. Turkey was not disturbed by criticism from outside. This was mere propaganda which did not affect the fundamental regard of the Arab countries for Turkey nor Turkey's friendship for them. It was to be hoped that others would soon adhere to the treaty. It was noteworthy that Köprülü "avoided any recriminations against Egypt or Saudi Arabia over their hostile attitude to the Treaty."<sup>394</sup>

To sum up, the Soviet expansionist intention towards the end of the Second World War and her expansionist policies towards eastern Europe and the Far East

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<sup>392</sup> Turkish daily newspapers, e.g. *Vatan*, *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet*, etc., on 25-27 February 1955.

<sup>393</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 117722, RK1022/5, 7.11.1955 and interview with the Gürsoys.

<sup>394</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 117722, RK1022/1, 18.1.1955. Quoted from the US News and World Report.

after the war led the US to encourage the formation of collective security systems from Atlantic to Pacific, namely NATO, SEATO and Baghdad Pact in order to contain the spread of “international communism.” In this chapter, we particularly studied Turkey’s involvement in Western defence attempts to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern part of the World. Despite initial failures in forming a Western defence Pact in the early 1950s, Turkey succeeded forming the Baghdad Pact by signing the Mutual Agreement with Iraq in February 1955. In establishing this Pact, Turkey was motivated by a desire to consolidate her national integrity and secure her national independence against the internal and external threat by obtaining more economic and military aid from the West as a reward for her endeavours to secure the Western interests in the region. As previously explained, Turkey did not have any particular interest in the Middle East, but she was aware that by co-operating with West in the Middle Eastern affairs she would more strengthen her relations with the West. Turkey’s strategy to achieve these goals were to persuade the West that Turkey was a useful ally and that her geostrategic location was vitally important for the security of the free world especially Western Europe. To this end, Turkey sent the Turkish troops to Korea to prove usefulness of the Turkish army and launched a diplomatic campaign of persuasion in the West. As has been seen, when the US realised that both parties needed each other as a result of changing American global policy, Turkey was admitted to NATO and she started to become actively involved in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East.

The long term reactions to the Pact and its positive and negative consequences for the countries concerned will be discussed in the next chapter.

## Chapter VI

### FORMATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PACT: SUCCESSIVE CRISES AND COUPS

#### 6.1 General

In this chapter, we shall discuss the Western efforts in general and Turkey's efforts in particular to recruit as many regional countries to the Baghdad Pact as possible. We shall also study the means and incentives that were available for those who were willing to join and the means and tactics that were used to attract more members or failing that, to render opponents harmless as far as the Western defence initiatives were concerned. Finally, we shall follow the successive crises and coups that took place immediately after the formation of the Pact, namely the Suez crisis in 1956, the Syrian crisis in 1957, the landing of the American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 respectively and coups in Iraq and Pakistan in 1958 and in Turkey in 1960. We conclude the chapter by studying developments that took place in regional member countries after the collapse of the Baghdad Pact. Turkey's motives and aims after the formation of the Baghdad Pact were to expand it as much as possible. Turkey's interests in doing so were to show her usefulness and her loyalty and to build confidence in the West by fulfilling her promise."<sup>395</sup> To this end, Turkey supported Great Britain in the Suez crisis, France in her struggle with North African Arabs, and the US in her global policy, namely anything to curb "international communism" all over the world especially

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<sup>395</sup> Birmingham Post, 15.5.1951; Rıza, *op. cit.*, p. 123 and interview with Günver, Erkmen and Çağlayangil.

in her own region by voting on American side in the UN all the time, providing military bases on her national soil and maintaining a large army.

The establishment of the Baghdad Pact opened a new page in the Middle East for the regional countries as well as the superpowers which were bitterly contesting with each other from Eastern Europe to the Far East. The rivalry in the Far East where the Korean War took place just two years before and Eastern Europe where the situation had not settled was carried to the Middle East by the formation of this Pact.

As was explained in the previous chapter, the Pact was only formed after five years' hard work during which many attempts were made to establish a defence pact under different names namely, Mediterranean Pact, Middle East Command and Middle East Defence Organisation. None of these attempts was successful. This insistence on establishing a political as opposed to a purely military pact in the region was mainly due to the insistence, for their own individual reasons, of the future members of the Pact.

The credit for the theoretical initiative might be given to Great Britain who was trying to find a way by which she could replace with a new treaty the bilateral ones she had with Iraq and especially Egypt. The credit for the practical initiative might be given to Turkey<sup>396</sup> who needed a way to integrate with the Western world politically, militarily and socio-economically. Having been threatened by the Soviet Union she applied for NATO membership to gain protection from the Soviets but had been refused. Turkey was, therefore, open to any option which could help her to associate herself with the West. The British need for a regional defence pact was, therefore, seriously assessed by the Turkish authorities but they were always

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<sup>396</sup> Kyle, Keith, *Suez*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, pp. 56-59.

trying to find a way to combine it with NATO. Otherwise the Turks would never have been interested in such a regional pact as they knew none of the possible regional members would be able to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union.

As explained in the Introduction, first hand material on the Baghdad Pact is not available from the regional members. Therefore, their views on the issue are studied here mainly from the British and American documents which are available for research. Pakistan and Iran had a secondary role to play in the Baghdad Pact as the initiative was basically directed to the Arab countries in general and Iraq and Egypt in particular. This is why the emphasis will be mainly on Iraq and Egypt not Iran and Pakistan.

Admitting Western failure concerning the strong demand to form a pact comprising all Arab countries, HM Ambassador in Tehran noted: "we have still not succeeded in promoting a regional defence policy acceptable to all the Arab States, though the Baghdad Pact, unlike any of our previous efforts, has succeeded in creating a strong line from Turkey to Pakistan. The trouble is lack of depth."<sup>397</sup> But even the Baghdad Pact "failed to achieve its original objective of bringing together the main Arab states in a common front with Turkey, Iran and Western powers - on the contrary, it actually pushed them towards the Soviet camp."<sup>398</sup>

Turkey's actions at this time should be seen in the context of the Cold War which largely explains what now may seem the irrational mentality of the contemporary political thoughts and attitudes. For example, commenting on the Turkish stance towards the Russian desire to improve her relations with Turkey, Orhan Eralp, Head of the Second Department at the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said

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<sup>397</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 121233, V1054, 14.1.1956.

<sup>398</sup> Hale, William, 'Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis,' *International Affairs*, (October 1992), p. 681.

“Turkish policy had definitely not changed, ... if the Russians wished to improve relations with Turkey, they must do so by improving relations with the West as a whole.”<sup>399</sup> The British Ambassador in Ankara reported that Turkey was against “accepting even invitations for cultural or sporting contacts, because they were afraid that this might give the impression that they were weakening in their general policy.”<sup>400</sup>

Having realised the dangers the Pact had faced, the American Ambassador in Baghdad admitted that the Pact nations “are still confronted by a strong current of anti-Pact propaganda and there is need from time to time to give the Pact a new impetus, either by having the US formally join or by new ideas and new objectives.”

The Ambassador, seeking for some new positive step by the nations in the Pact, suggested that a cultural committee might be formed. He proposed a “cultural offensive which would emphasise that through that Pact the Moslem nations were ready to co-operate with the Christian nations to meet the Communist threat.” He emphasised that “the Pact needed an ideology to combat Communist ideology.”<sup>401</sup>

The British considered that if the Pact was to achieve its objectives it needed not only an ideology but it also had to be expanded because the more Arab states were committed to the Western sponsored Pact the stronger the West would become against the “international communism”. It was also important to bring more Arab states into the Baghdad Pact, because otherwise the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq, would be increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab

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<sup>399</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124010, RK10338/1, 10.1.1956.

<sup>400</sup> Ibid. op. loc.

<sup>401</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 7 June 1956, Meeting of Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact Powers, p. 305.

world, which was dominated by the nationalist policy of Egypt. Finally, without working to expand the Pact, the British were afraid that she might lose the confidence of regional member countries. In support of this, HM Ambassador in Tehran wrote to the Foreign Office saying that there were several considerations in favour of trying to extend the Pact, for example:

(a) It is a good thing in itself. The more Arab States we can commit to this multi-lateral association with us the better. There is no alternative instrument of association in sight.

(b) It is arguable that if we want to avoid a fall in our prestige we must redress our recent defeat over the Pact in Jordan.

(c) It is important that Iraq should retain her attachment to the Pact and that Iraq's influence should grow, and be seen to grow through her association with us. Unless we can get other Arab members, Iraq may feel increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab world and the Pact might not stick.

(d) If we do not actively pursue a policy based on the Baghdad Pact we might lose the confidence of its present non-Arab members, and in particular Turkey's.<sup>402</sup>

They realised how difficult it was to establish a Western sponsored Pact in the Middle East in the early 1950s. After establishing the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the West came to realise it was still more difficult to expand or even to maintain it. Moreover, there were also disadvantages in attempting to expand the Pact. First of all, it was difficult to persuade smaller Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent to join the Baghdad Pact while Egypt was vigorously opposing to it. Second, even if the West was successful in expanding the Pact, this would possibly push Egypt further into the arms of the USSR. Finally, the British were of view that "the policy of pressing Arab States to join the Pact now finds little support with Western public opinion, even in the UK. This tends to discredit the Pact itself."<sup>403</sup>

However there were some other factors the Ambassador had not mentioned. It should be added that Mr Morse [the Director-General of the ILO, who vis-

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<sup>402</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 121233, V1054/9, 3.1.1956.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc.



ited Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel] was, the Ambassador reported, convinced that “one of the reasons why things are going badly in that region is because American and British policies are not in harmony there, largely because they are, in his view, governed by the conflicting commercial interests of the two countries.”<sup>404</sup>

Peter Grubbe, the London correspondent of *Die Welt* devoted a lengthy article on January 20 to the UK’s Middle East policy. He stated that one of the main causes of Anglo-American differences over the Middle East was that the “Middle East was of special importance for the UK, as a focal point for British communications with her colonies and with commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa. For the US, it was merely a “weak spot” in the defence belt around Soviet Russia. For this reason London was striving to maintain its Middle East position.”<sup>405</sup> In reply to the Russian intrusion in that area, the UK had not, Grubbe said, “given strong support to Israel, as had been expected, but had entered into competition with the Kremlin for the favour of the Arabs. Israel was too small for use as a bridgehead.”<sup>406</sup> A second factor was that the UK needed Middle East oil supplies if she did not want to become dependent on the US in this respect.<sup>407</sup>

One of the major factors affecting any kind of political decision was definitely the Palestinian question. It was recorded that the Palestine problem “is generally admitted to be the biggest thorn in the flesh in the Middle East today. And no policies embracing the whole region are likely to be successful while this thorn remains.”<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>404</sup> Ibid., ./26, 8.2.1956.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid., ./15, 21.1.1956, Bonn.

<sup>406</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>408</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 121233, V1054, 14.1.1956 and Raleigh, op. cit., p. 183.

Another matter forcing the Western members of the Pact to be more cautious was the Kurdish factor. This was not as serious as other factors, yet it deserved to be taken into consideration when the West tried to make a decision about the region. As HM Ambassador in Tehran recorded:

Two new factors affected the attitude of the Kurds in Iraq after the Suez crisis. The first was a "kind of a ambivalent attitude to the Baghdad Pact." He thought that the Kurds "feared that close co-operation between the Iraqis, the Turks and Persians may lead to a combined squeeze by the authorities of all three governments on their Kurdish nationals." The second trend was, he noted "that the exaggerated emotional reaction of the Arabs to the Anglo-French attack on Egypt "accentuated in Kurdish eyes the difference between them and their Arab neighbours and has given a consequent fillip to Kurdish national feeling."<sup>409</sup>

The following dispatch sent to the Foreign Office, showed that the fear was not due to an independent Kurdish revolt but the Soviet agitation and support for a united Kurdistan. It pointed out that:

the Baghdad Pact can only strengthen the tendency of Kurdish malcontents to look to Soviet Russia for support. Our view about this is that the Kurdish peasants and tribesmen probably neither know nor care very much about the Baghdad Pact. ... However it is of course useful to make the point that the Russians may be able to develop anti-Pact themes in their propaganda for Kurdistan, and be listened to by some of the mullahs and tribal leaders.<sup>410</sup>

Such fears grew stronger later when broadcasts in Kurdish from anti-Western countries had increased influence on the Kurds in the late 1950s. As a consequence, Western support for the regional countries against the Kurds increased.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127141, EP1821/1, 29.1.1957, Tehran.

<sup>410</sup> Ibid., EP1821/1A, 14.2.1957, Tehran.

<sup>411</sup> See for details the section on the Kurds.

## 6.2 Expansion of the Baghdad Pact

Although the US had overthrown Musaddeq, and rethroned the Shah, it was still not an appropriate time to force Iran into a Western sponsored alliance. The question of Iran joining a Western pact arose in the summer when the only Pact available was the Pact between Turkey and Pakistan. The British Ambassador reported the result of a meeting as follows:

We saw no military advantage in Persian adherence, but definite political advantage, principally, because the appearance of so traditionally neutral a country on the Western side might have been useful psychological support for our defence plans for the Middle East as a whole. We had, however, two very firm reservations; first, that we must not be drawn into any military commitment to Persia, and second, that Persian adherence must not provoke either Soviet attack or so much opposition inside Persia that the Government could not control it.<sup>412</sup>

Clearly, the West wanted the advantages of Persian adherence to the Baghdad Pact, but was not prepared to pay a high price for them. The same arguments were later used with respect to proposed membership of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

The British were anxious about the possibility of the Russian-Iranian Treaty of 1925 being extended and were also aware of other outside pressures on the Persians. They did not underrate the influence of Nehru and his policy on Persian thinking. The British Ambassador, seeking to know whether the Pakistanis were endeavouring to counterbalance the influence of Nehru and his Non-Aligned policies, asked Entezam, the Iranian Foreign Minister, whether he had any confirmation that Pakistan was planning to bring Persia into any kind of defence pact, e.g. was planning to work on Persia in the same way as Turkey on Iraq. Entezam "said that he had no information. His attitude suggested, however, that he was rather nervous at the possibility."<sup>413</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 114820, EP1071/18, 10.6.1955.

<sup>413</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 114820, EP1071/1, 31.1.1955.

It is understood from the documents that American as well as Pakistani and Turkish efforts were needed to persuade the Shah. As one note suggests, the diplomats were not sure if the Shah really had decided to join the Pact. Before the Shah left the US, he informed the American government that Iran would join the Pact. However, the British documents recorded that it was difficult to see "to what extent the Shah has been influenced in this decision by absence from Persia and an American atmosphere ... but it seems possible, if indeed not probable, that his views may change when he gets back to Tehran. ... Nevertheless we should hesitate to discourage him."<sup>414</sup>

Turkey and Pakistan also worked hard to convince the Shah to join the Pact as quickly as possible. The presidents of both countries told the Shah "if you face any aggression we will be the first to protect you and the US is also ready to support you."<sup>415</sup>

A few weeks before joining the Baghdad Pact Iran signed an agreement with the US and began receiving economic and military aid. After a long period of hesitations due to internal and external opposition, Iran eventually decided to join the Baghdad Pact and formally became a member in October 1955. As a result, the flow of aid increasingly continued until the Islamic revolution put an end to the Shah's regime in 1979.

The US and the UK wanted regional members to do more to convince other Arab countries to join the Pact, but according to the Ambassador, the influence of the Saudi finances and Egyptian political activities had to be stopped at all costs. Detachment of Saudi Arabia from Egypt would solve many problems at a stroke

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<sup>414</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 114820, EP1071/5, 21.2.1955.

<sup>415</sup> Interview with Akşit.

if it could be affected within a matter of months, but time was of the essence, and if these efforts failed, there would be strong pressure on the Americans to “starve Saud into submission” if not for more drastic measures. And at that stage:

their argument, which is in effect that it is worse for them to be accused of economic imperialism than for their money to be used to destroy the Pact is not likely to carry any conviction whatever. ... HM Ambassador in Washington might be requested to follow up the indications given by Mr Henderson that the US Government might shortly send a special emissary to King Saud, to ascertain more closely what particular form of persuasion (bribery or threats or both) the US Government has in mind, and to express our views as to the urgency of the operation.<sup>416</sup>

As the document recorded, having been aware of the effect of the Saudi money on the regional countries, the British tried to put pressure on the Americans to stop the Saudis, who have since the Second World War been under American influence,<sup>417</sup> from working against the Baghdad Pact. The Saudis were paying a subsidy of 500 pounds per month to any four-page newspaper which would accept the subsidy. In the face of this challenge Abdul Jelil Beg suggested a possible means of influencing opinion in Syria: the provision of 20,000 pounds a year for this purpose. “He thought that with 15,000 pounds he could keep the press sweet by paying the friendly paper 100 pounds a month.”<sup>418</sup>

To contain the influence of Nasser, the US Secretary of State thought it overly ambitious to try to establish a charter for the Arab countries' relations with the Atlantic Community; he thought “it would be better to ride a rising tide of Arab nationalism by some such means as endorsement of the Arabs' own efforts to maintain their independence and security against international communism and Western imperialism.”<sup>419</sup> He thought the US could give financial support to a balanced

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<sup>416</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120725, EP1071/6, 24.4.1956.

<sup>417</sup> Interview with Emre.

<sup>418</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120738, EP1192/3, 17.1.1956.

<sup>419</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, 3.12.1956, p. 367.

organisation of Arab countries perhaps through some mechanism analogous to that of the Marshall Plan. The Eisenhower Doctrine was only the implementation of this policy commencing in 1957.

There was some discussion in the State Department about Saudi Arabia taking the lead in establishing such an organisation and bringing Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in. The Secretary of State thought that since Turkey was already covered in NATO and Pakistan in SEATO, for the West, it would be better to keep the organisation Arab. The only problem was Iran. The American documents noted that "while the long-term objective would be to get all the Arab states together, it might prove desirable as a preliminary step to exclude and thus isolate Egypt and Syria as a means of diminishing Nasser's influence so that he could not aspire to take over leadership of the larger group."<sup>420</sup>

The British were still doing the job in the Middle East on behalf of the West until the Suez Crisis. Thereafter they practically left the region clear for the US which took the full leadership on behalf of the Western world. Therefore, it was the Americans who suggested the policy and implemented it after the Suez Crisis in 1956. "US prestige in Middle East has never been higher. At the same time British prestige has dropped sharply as a result of the Suez intervention."<sup>421</sup>

The major phenomena affecting the US since the ill-fated British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in November, 1956 had been the emergence of the US as the leader of Free World interests in the area and

tacit recognition of that fact by Britain and France in all areas except the

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<sup>420</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>421</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, 14 November 1956, p. 322 and Davids, Jules, 'The US and the ME: 1955-1960,' *Middle East Affairs*, (May 1961), p. 136.

Gulf. American action opposing the British-French attack on Egypt was generally appreciated by the Arab countries at the time, but the strong position which the US achieved began to fade quickly, because the Americans made it clear that

the US would under no circumstances permit developments in the Middle East to lessen its support of the Western European alliance. This continuing and necessary association with the West makes it impossible for us to avoid some identification with the powers which formerly had "colonial" interests in the area.<sup>422</sup>

Another American document rightly said "how could we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world."<sup>423</sup> US State Department documents from this period reveal that long-term US aims in the region were twofold: to preserve peace and to improve political stability. To achieve the former aim it was proposed to strengthen Iran militarily with emphasis on internal security and countering infiltration and guerrilla activities. To increase political stability it was proposed to take every suitable opportunity to reduce Nasser's prestige and influence, help Iraq to expand its influence in Syria and Jordan and possibly encourage a North African confederation. The US policy makers, recognising that the British and French had been seriously disadvantaged by their Suez adventure, urged the US to assume leadership and maintain and restore the Western position in the area.<sup>424</sup> Their stated aims were:

- (a) The elimination or reduction of Soviet Bloc influence in the area.
- (b) The production and transit of oil through the area of the Middle East to the satisfaction of Free World requirements.
- (c) Denying the Soviet Bloc access to the resources, markets, and lines of communication of the Middle East.
- (d) The development of pro-US governments in all nations of the area (defence).<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, 14 November 1956, p. 322.

<sup>423</sup> *FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis*, Vol.16, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC., 1990, p. 910.

<sup>424</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the President. 21.11.1956. pp. 349-350.

<sup>425</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Memorandum from the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat to the National Security Council Planning Board, Review of Long Range US Policy toward the Near East Policy Questions, 8.10.1957,

As a result, "the US has formally assumed Free World leadership in the Near East."<sup>426</sup>

The US now assumed practical responsibility for protecting the Western interests in the Middle East. Since the only instrument by which to influence the regional politics and to maintain the Western position was the Baghdad Pact, the American State Department started to calculate American advantages and disadvantages in adhering to the Pact. The views of the NSC Planning Board Assistants were set out in detail in a document dated 2 May 1956 and entitled "immediate US adherence to the Baghdad Pact." Since this is of great importance, the text is given in full:

Advantages;

(1) Would make continued public acceptance of the Pact in the Middle East member countries more certain by

(a) Removing doubts concerning US support which our present relationship to the Pact appears to engender,

(b) Lessening the criticism of the Pact throughout the Middle East on grounds that it is essentially a British plan.

(2) Would enable the US to exercise greater influence in development of Pact activities by permitting formal participation with the full weight of membership in Council meetings and Council deputy meetings. This would

(a) Facilitate and accelerate military planning in consonance with US interests,

(b) Give the US a more authoritative voice in political deliberations.

(3) Would strengthen the position of Nuri Said and the other pro-West elements in Iraq and the Shah and other pro-West elements in Iran.

(4) Would help to stem growing criticism and dissatisfaction within Pakistan of that government's policy of alignment with the West.

(5) Would strengthen the Pact's appeal to pro-Western elements in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and might increase the chances of accession to the Pact by Lebanon and Jordan.

(6) Would demonstrate the firm, consistent and continued support by the US of the concept of collective security which the US has promoted and encouraged throughout the world to counter the Soviet Communist threat.

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p. 613.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid., op. loc.



(7) Would strengthen NATO's southern flank and facilitate co-ordination of planning between NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

(8) Would increase the possibility of developing adequate capabilities to resist aggression with a minimum expenditure of US resources.

(9) Failure to adhere could well result in;

(a) The collapse of the Pact and the victory of neutralism in the area [thus confronting the US in the event of hostilities with the necessity of undertaking military operations in a neutral or hostile environment.]

(b) The collapse of the south-eastern flank of NATO.<sup>427</sup>

Turning to the disadvantages of American adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the State Department document went on record that it

Disadvantages:

(1) Would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a US security guarantee and for armaments.

(2) Would cause Nasser and possibly Saudi Arabia and Syria to seek greater support from the USSR.

(3) Would stimulate the USSR to give even greater support to the Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia axis [formed on 2 March 1955 and Yemen joined it few days later].

(4) Might provide a pretext for a *coup d'état* in Jordan that would take Jordan firmly into the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia camp.

(5) Would provide a pretext for increased attacks on the Baghdad Pact in some of the Arab States and Israel.

(6) In the absence of an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement would cause possible complications in Saudi-US relations and in forthcoming negotiations for the extension of air base rights.

(7) Might involve the US more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi and Iraqi-Egyptian disputes and would complicate US relationship to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

(8) Would bring a new wave of dissatisfaction with US policy in India

(9) [Would increase expectations and demands of Pact members for increased US military and economic aid.]

(10) Would further exacerbate US-USSR relations.

(11) Might lend some color to charges of US imperialism in a new form.

(12) Would tend to give the impression that the US continues to place priority emphasis on military pacts in the face of the new Soviet economic diplomatic offensive.<sup>428</sup>

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<sup>427</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Draft Paper by the NSC Planning Board Assistants, Washington 2 May 1956; Immediate US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, pp. 295-297.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc., pp. 295-297.

Meanwhile, there were also some reasons for an early American adherence to Pact. In support of this, Ambassador Chapin telegraphed from Tehran "now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid to consolidate US position by early adherence to Baghdad Pact." The following appear to be the basic reasons why US adherence would be desirable, the telegraph says:

(1) Adherence would strengthen the general stability of the governments of the Asian Pact members, all of whom are staunch US friends.

(2) Adherence would give convincing evidence to the USSR of the deep US interests in the security of the area. It might deter the USSR from manoeuvres against the independence of the Pact members.

(3) Adherence might strengthen US leadership in the Middle East thus lessening the damage to the Western position resulting from the UK-French action in Egypt.

(4) US adherence would strengthen the Pact itself and make its operation more efficient.

(5) Adherence would formally close the last major link in security arrangements on the peripheries of Russia.

#### Reasons against US Adherence

(1) The US has given its full support to the UN effort to stabilise the delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French and Israeli military actions. Any change in the current US relationship with the powers in the area might seriously jeopardise these efforts.

(2) The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. US adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against the West in the Near East. US-USSR relations would be further exacerbated.

(3) There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalising on existing tensions in the area and using psychological, economic and covert military measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing, they are in effect hoping over the "northern tier" line.

(4) The US must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve the US more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian disputes.

(5) While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the US adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support in two of its important members.

(6) Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a US security guarantee.

(7) While the US might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step might well be followed by strong demands for further US aid to member countries on grounds that, as a member we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support for these nations.

(8) Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia where the US has important interests.

(9) The original concept of the "northern tier" was one of an indigenous organisation. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states of the area as in large part UK dominated. The decline of UK prestige in the Middle East will probably be so serious that some other vehicle must be found for exerting US leadership if we are to maintain our position. We must at least wait until we know what changes in UK personnel and policy will take place in HMG.

(10) We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present relationship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to the Pact itself.

(11) The immediate pressure upon the US to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the Israel-UK-French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means.

(12) The problem of obtaining senate ratification of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, discussed in the Secretary of State's letter of April 23, 1956, to the Secretary of Defence, is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the Pact.<sup>429</sup>

After further general comments, the telegram concluded "we are proposing immediately; the immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar, with training crews. This equipment would serve, also, south-eastern Turkey and parts of Iran."<sup>430</sup>

Thus, the document presented to the policy makers with a difficult decision. The balance of advantages and disadvantages was uncertain. As a result, the US remained reluctant to adhere to the Pact and this, as expected, resulted in destruction of the Pact when the military coup occurred in Baghdad in 1958.

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<sup>429</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Memorandum from Rountree (the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs) to the Acting Secretary of State, 18.11.1956, pp. 334-337.

<sup>430</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, Memorandum from Rountree (the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs) to the Acting Secretary of State, 18.11.1956, p. 337.

Israel saw some advantages in US adherence to the Baghdad Pact and probably also favoured Lebanese and Jordanian membership. Israel regarded these developments as blows to Egypt's prestige and strength in the area and probably hoped that they would serve to lessen the likelihood of a co-ordinated Arab attack on Israel. However, Israel still remained apprehensive about the consequent military build-up of the Arab Baghdad Pact members by the US and of Egypt by the USSR.<sup>431</sup>

When the sponsor powers came to the conclusion that it was hardly possible to persuade other countries to join the Pact, they then threatened them to make them do so, and when that did not work either, they attempted to apply military force as in the case of Egypt and Syria. Of course, this was not to force them to join the Pact any more but at least to force them to stop their activities to undermine the Pact. After the Suez Crisis, Turkey by itself was thought to be after a forceful solution in Syria<sup>432</sup> hoping thereby to establish still more strongly her credentials as a vigorous and useful ally of the West in the region. In the words of an American report, "Turkey ... is anxious that some positive action be taken to overthrow the Syrian coalition that to be politically successful intervention in Syria must appear to be Arab, and awareness that Iraq would be unlikely to commit itself, makes it unlikely that Turkey will act without prior assurance of US support. Turkey's concern will not abate, however, and the possibility of precipitate action by Turkey cannot be ruled out."<sup>433</sup> The report continued:

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<sup>431</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, p. 193.

<sup>432</sup> Andrei A. Gromyko claimed before the General Assembly of the UN on 22 October 1957 that "over 50,000 men and some 700 tanks and self-propelled guns" were massed by Turkey on the frontier with Syria. Perlmann, M., 'The Syrian Affair,' *Middle Eastern Affairs*, (December 1957) p. 405.

<sup>433</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, National Intelligence Estimate, Near East Developments Affecting US Interests, 8.10.1957, p. 600.

“His [Nuri’s] attitude had been that once Nasser had been brought down all would be well, [just like Köprülü]. ... They [the Turks], therefore, regarded Syria as the core of the problems whether or not we were going to establish a sound position in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Lebanese were also much afraid that, unless Syria could be saved, all would be lost.”<sup>434</sup>

In the 1950s, the Arab world was divided into two camps: pro-Western countries led by Iraq and anti-Western countries led by Egypt. While economic and military aid appeared to be attractive to the smaller Arab countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, the influence of Egyptian political activities, especially the broadcast of Egyptian radio of *Sawt al Arab*, was strong enough to deter those regional countries from joining the Pact and even influenced the Western countries concerning their defence initiatives in the Middle East. Recalling the political atmosphere in the Middle East in the 1950s will enable us to appreciate the nature of the criticism made by Egypt and its relevance to the Baghdad Pact. The following passage gives us an idea why the Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact was taken so seriously.

The BBC, the mouthpiece of the aggressors against Egypt, the conspirators with Israel, and of the colonisers of Bahrain, ... Tel Aviv radio, the mouthpiece of the Zionists, the enemies of the Arabs, the cat’s-paws of British and French imperialism, and those who rendered the Palestine Arabs homeless, [are] gloating over the free Arabs because of Nuri al-Said’s statement. ... O head of the Iraq Government, you who wish to mislead us into believing in the existence of a vacuum in our Middle East, we the Arabs are the Middle East ... so why do you deny our existence and ignore our nationalism, and why do you pretend to forget 100,000,000 Arabs living in the most important and richest spots of the world, from our Arab Gulf to the Atlantic? Why are you doing all this, Nuri Al-Said? So that we may agree with your alliance with Britain and accept imperialism? Or so that we may keep quiet before Zionist aggression? ... There is no vacuum, therefore, in the Middle East; we, the Arabs, are still alive and dignified, we know what is good and bad for us. ... There is no good at all for the Arabs in a pact whose proprietor is Britain, a state which continues to murder the Arabs of Egypt, and whose main instrument is Turkey, a state which supports Israel in rendering our Arabs homeless. ... There is not dignity at all in accepting a pact which plots against our independence and freedom, for investigations in Syria and Jordan have uncovered the

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<sup>434</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

plots of the states of this pact against Syria and Jordan. ... Turkish ports provided shelter for the enemy's ships during that time. President Abd al-Nasser rejected the participation of the Arabs in the imperialist pact, because he saw, with his wisdom, that it was a base for imperialism in the Middle East and means of pressure in the Arab countries whenever they advanced forward with their liberation movement. ... Britain on the one hand, and France, the USA and Turkey on the other, persisted in putting forward one proposal after another for joint defence. These proposals were for something which in fact was merely a new form of the colonial bonds which linked the Arab world with Britain.

The Baghdad Pact was a link in this chain. ... This treaty was described by the British Prime Minister, Eden, as stronger than the previous treaty. ... The significance of this agreement is evident from the statement made by the British Prime Minister about it in the British House of Commons, when he said; ... among other things the Turkish-Iraqi pact, and Britain's accession to it, will safeguard Britain's interests in a much better and more useful way than the treaty.

The dangerous aims of the Baghdad Pact, as far as the Arabs are concerned, are the threats it presents to Arab nationalism and the Arab renaissance. ... They [British and French] realise the strength of the Arabs and their nationalism, and have thus established bases round the Arabs to prevent their march forward, [and he gives the example of British bases in Cyprus, Israel and Iraq]. ...

The Western Powers which are supplying you with arms are doing so to make you serve the aims of the Pact, and they will prevent you from using these arms for any other purpose. It is not possible or feasible that after the conclusion of this pact Iraq will be able to give any aid to Jordan and Syria or to rally to the defence of these two countries. ... When the aggression [on Egypt] occurred, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia supported Egypt. The Iraqi Government, however, was the only Government which did not do so. Indeed, it gave permission for the use of Iraqi air bases - in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi treaty - for supplying aircraft with fuel and ammunition in order to enable them to bomb Port Said and its struggling Arab people.<sup>435</sup>

As this extract shows, the arguments that radical Arab nationalists were using were expressed in language designed to persuade the Arabs masses. It proved extremely influential, as was admitted even by the Western authorities as well. The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn George recorded in his personal diary that he hated the efficacy of the Egyptian radio of Sawt al Arabs (Voice of Arabs), because, in his view, it was "as powerful as Goebbels."<sup>436</sup>

Unsure whether Turkey was satisfactorily doing what was expected of her in

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<sup>435</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124021, RK1052/19, 21.12.1956. Comment on Nuri al-Said's Broadcast, Voice of the Arabs, 18.12.1956.

<sup>436</sup> Kyle, op. cit., p. 321.

the region, the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the British Embassy in Ankara. It posed three basic questions:

- (a) Was the Baghdad Pact still the best means at our disposal for achieving stability in the Middle East?
- (b) If so, what should be done next? and
- (c) the general position of Turkey in relation to the Baghdad Pact and her other commitments.<sup>437</sup>

We do not know what the reply was but shortly after this the West's position in the Middle East suffered a severe setback as a result of the Anglo-French Suez adventure in 1956 in collaboration with the Israelis.<sup>438</sup> The regional countries which the West had urged to join a defensive alliance to protect the area from external aggression considered that the would-be "protectors" had in fact proved to be aggressors.<sup>439</sup> This was an embarrassment to the Turks who could no longer convincingly urge the advantages of a Western alliance upon reluctant Arab States. Thereafter it was futile to consider expanding the Baghdad Pact.

The US steadily withdrew her economic aid from Turkey and searched for a new government when she realised that it was ceasing to be as fully submissive as it had been. Zorlu also had his part to play in this context.<sup>440</sup> The policies of the Democrat Party since it achieved power in 1950 had been directed towards a rapid expansion of the Turkish economy and a consequent improvement in the standard of living of the Turkish peasant.<sup>441</sup>

This expansion was based largely on American economic aid, which had been

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<sup>437</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124021, ./7, 24.9.1956.

<sup>438</sup> Britain and France reached an agreement with Israel about how to co-ordinate the attack on Egypt at Sèvres without informing the US. Warner, Geoffrey, 'The United States and the Suez Crisis,' *International Affairs*, (April 1991), p. 313.

<sup>439</sup> Wheeler, G.E., 'Russia and the Middle East,' *International Affairs*, (July 1959), p. 300.

<sup>440</sup> Firat claimed that being of a Kurdish stock Zorlu had an uncompromising personality and the Americans were not happy with him.

<sup>441</sup> Interview with the Gürsoys and Erkmen.

generously granted up to early 1955. At that point, Washington indicated that further American economic aid "could only be granted on condition that certain remedial measures were applied to Turkish economic planning. The overtone to the whole picture has therefore been of American assistance in the economic field with a particular emphasis on aid to the Turkish defence effort."<sup>442</sup>

The Ministry of State had drawn attention to reports that "US policy in Turkey is at present directed towards achieving the downfall of the present Turkish government and returning the opposition to power. ... In the process of forming a new government M[r] Menderes was forced to abandon his closest associates, on whom he had hitherto relied for the execution of his policies."<sup>443</sup> However, all these changes were not to help him few years later when he was ousted by the military and eventually executed with his staunch associate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir Charles Hambro told Mr Nutting that they had it on very good authority indeed that

the American Government were working for the downfall of the present Turkish Government and trying to get the opposition back into power. No particular reason was given for this save that they had more trust and confidence in the opposition party than they had in M[r] Menderes. ... He [Nutting] was told that they were operating in a very ham fashion and that their activities had got to the notice of the Turkish government and consequently made them extremely unpopular.<sup>444</sup>

In order to make the Baghdad Pact more viable Great Britain tried to appease the opponents of the Pact by trying to persuade them that the Pact had nothing to do with them or it was even in their interest too. For example, British Ambassador to Israel Sir Hoyer Millar told the Israeli Ambassador Mr Elath that one of the

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<sup>442</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124012, RK10345/1, 10.2.1956.

<sup>443</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124012, RK10345/1, 10.2.1956.

<sup>444</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124021, RK10399/7, 24.9.1956.



Pact's principal virtues from the Israeli point of view was that "it turned Iraqi and no doubt other Arab eyes away from their preoccupation with Israel. I said that it would be quite contrary to the whole idea underlying the Pact if its members were to take advantage of its meetings to organise an Arab attack on Israel. The Ambassador seemed reasonably reassured by all this."<sup>445</sup>

Campbell, agreeing with such a policy suggested to Washington that one of the principles on which the United States, "must stand is that it will not permit the destruction of Israel by force".<sup>446</sup> Campbell seemed quite realistic as well as cautious in approaching Arab-American relations, as he stated, "we need not object to their clinging to the idea of eventual victory as a matter of faith. But we should make it clear that, so far as the present and the foreseeable future are concerned, they will not be allowed to wipe Israel off the map."<sup>447</sup>

As for the Palestinian question, it was the first time since 1947 that an Arab country had accepted the UN partition plan. "The acceptance of the 1947 plan as a basis for solution suggests realism in the Baghdad Pact more constructive than the introversions of the Arab League."<sup>448</sup>

In order to secure the survival of pro-Western regimes, internal matters were considered to be within the scope of the Military Committee's interest. As the dispatch clearly mentioned, from the point of view of the Military Committee, "the political directive would be required to assess the chances of global war, of local troubles, the internal security aspect and generally to say what troops in the

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<sup>445</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127815, VB10353, 28.3.1957, Tel Aviv.

<sup>446</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p. 316. When American support of corrupt and reactionary regimes in the region and their identification with hated French and British imperialism were added to their support for Israel, the Middle Eastern people tended to turn against the US. Nolte, Richard H., 'American Policy in the Middle East,' *Journal of International Affairs*, 13(1959), p. 114.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>448</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127836, VB1076/14, 26.3.1957, Baghdad.

Pact area are likely to be needed for.”<sup>449</sup>

On the positive side, one could argue that there was only some economic benefit of the Baghdad Pact, even though it cost the regional countries quite dear. For example, the Pact planned to form a Fund to sponsor capital projects in the area and thus to show the economically beneficial and attractive side of the Pact. This was to be achieved by forming a development consortium of the oil companies in the Middle East under the Baghdad Pact for the purpose of developing the resources of the area as well as constructing capital projects of a joint nature. According to the British Ambassador in Baghdad, this plan anticipated to have the following benefits:

(1) It would have strengthened the Pact immensely in the eyes of the world, particularly in the economic field, drawing attention away from its controversial aspects;

(2) it would restore public confidence of the Arab world, not least the Iraqi people, in Pact affairs, the Western Powers and the oil companies, as it would bring about actual economic development of their countries;

(3) It would attract other Arab countries, and especially Saudi Arabia in view of its connections with ARAMCO, to the Baghdad Pact.

(4) It would frustrate subversive elements and confound the adversaries of the Pact.

(5) It would restore the UK to favour with the Arab people.

(6) It would deflect from the insistence on immediate joining of the Pact by the US if she is unable to do so at present.

(7) It might render unnecessary the review of the oil fabric in the Middle East, as it would demonstrate additional benefits to the Arab and Middle Eastern countries from this project.<sup>450</sup>

However, after the effects of the Suez crisis steadily disappeared when the two superpowers urged the invaders to withdraw from the area and Nasser skilfully turned his military defeat into a political victory, the West no longer considered it necessary to spend money creating this Fund.

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<sup>449</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/41, 22.11.1958.

<sup>450</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127823, VB1072/1, 6.12.1956.

### 6.3 The Israeli Factor

As mentioned earlier, the importance of Israeli factor was crucial as far as Middle Eastern defence was concerned. Therefore, the West was very anxious not to provoke the Israelis while working to bring regional Islamic countries together to form an alliance against the internal and external threats. Unlike the West, Turkey had no influence on Israel, but after her involvement in Western defence projects, she felt the need to try to pursue a balanced policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was not seen satisfactory by the Arabs, so the Israeli factor had a negative effect on Turkey's relations with Arab countries. Meanwhile, it has to be mentioned that although the western support for Israel made it harder for the West to obtain Arabs' support for the defence initiatives in the region, the British documents show that the West tried to consolidate its position in the Middle East by using the Israeli card.

Ever since the famous Arab rebellion against the Turks in 1915, the Arabs have been confused and began to suspect a foreign finger both in their internal and external affairs. Some western plans and assessments also had part in making them more cautious and suspicious of any western involvement in the Middle East. In supporting this conspiracy theory, one typical dispatch stated: "there are risks in prompting the Israelis to attack the Baghdad Pact and Nuri." First, as the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Sir John Nicholls suggests, "it would not be in our interest in the long run to work up Israeli opinion against Iraq; secondly I doubt very much if we can trust the Israelis sooner or later not to leak the fact that we have prompted them if they ever found it would be advantageous to them to do so. There is thus a risk of further charges of collusion."<sup>451</sup>

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<sup>451</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127822, VB1071/1, 31.12.1956, Tel Aviv.

The British diplomats decided to provide the Israelis with suitable material but the Ambassador in Tel Aviv thought that the best hope of getting it was to suggest to Israel privately that a few suitable attacks on the Baghdad Pact and on Nuri would be useful to the British and indirectly to them. He also said that "I cannot be sure that Israel would play, but I think they probably would. You may feel, however, that it would not be in our interest in the long run to work [up omitted] Israel opinion against Iraq."<sup>452</sup>

British authorities suggested that they had no wish to incite the Israelis to make suitable comments simply to have the "texts of anything which may from time to time appear in the daily, weekly or monthly papers in Israel and on the Israeli radio."<sup>453</sup> It is interesting to note this way of making alliances with so called friendly countries.<sup>454</sup>

As noted earlier, the Pact mainly served the foreign nations, namely the British, the Americans, the Russians and the Israelis rather than the indigenous regional countries. The West managed to exploit the region through some pro-Western leaders in the region. In support of these allegations that the Pact did not serve the regional member countries, Sir Anthony Eden, the author of the Pact, said at a meeting:

The goal which we seek from the Baghdad Pact is very simple. By our adherence, we have consolidated our influence and raised our voice in the Middle East. Britain's

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<sup>452</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127822, VB1071/1, 31.12.1956, Tel Aviv.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid., ./1A, 3.1.1957, Baghdad.

<sup>454</sup> Ibid., 3.1.1957, Baghdad. Why did the British think it useful for the Israelis to condemn the Baghdad Pact? It was to make the Arabs think that the Pact was against Israeli interests. So, the British cleverly envisaged that the Arabs witnessing such developments in Israel would tend to support the Pact. Secondly the Arabs would think that the West was not supporting or was at least ignoring Israel as far as regional defence was concerned. Thirdly, this fear of Israeli attacks would oblige the Iraqi authorities, already facing the strong reactions from the radical Arabs, to make more concessions to the British or at least continue to accept the *status quo*. Fourth, it was assumed that other Arab countries would no longer accuse Iraq of being on the Israeli side, etc.

adherence to the Baghdad Pact provides her with continued interference in the affairs of the Middle East.” [Eden also said] “I believe that a simple geographical glance will make the Israeli Government believe that the object of the Baghdad Pact is to direct the attention of both sides to something other than Israel. And since the Israelis are very intelligent I had imagined that this pact would leave them in security and stability.”<sup>455</sup>

Finally, the Egyptian pamphlet concluded that “this is the Baghdad Pact and this is the Nury Elsaid Bilateral Agreement with Britain. ... It made of Iraq a British colony and Els. Nury Elsaid not only sold Iraq to Britain but wanted to make us drink from the same cup.”<sup>456</sup>

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<sup>455</sup> Ibid. op. loc.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid. op. loc.

## 6.4 Reactions to the Baghdad Pact

The American Ambassador admittedly said "I realise that the Baghdad Pact is in a feeble condition. It is being attacked by Moscow, the anti-West Arabs, and by the neutralists led by Nehru. One of its weaknesses is that it has the reputation of being a British instrument. ... It would be unfortunate if the British should reappear in the Middle East full of bitterness stemming from the fact that when they seemed to be down and out in that area we treated them as pariahs and did nothing to help again to become respectable."<sup>457</sup>

In the course of a television interview which Tito gave to Ed Murrow and to CBS and which was broadcast in the US on June 30, he ascribed the unsatisfactory situation in the Middle East largely to the disruptive influences of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. About the Pact he said: "The Baghdad Pact itself was an error. The Pact, in fact, represented a move aimed at disuniting the Arab countries, and following the attack against Egypt that process of disuniting Arab countries and nations, was further intensified."<sup>458</sup>

Even the American press agreed on this point. The Philadelphia Bulletin, for example, commented briefly that the Pact had been assailed as divisive, since it split Iraq from other Arab states and its value was questioned when Russia leapfrogged it to develop relations with Egypt and Syria. The paper said "In recent months, however, the Pact has twice shown itself, in the Suez and Jordanian crises,

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<sup>457</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, pp. 388-389. The same document goes on to say "take Iran for example. For years we have been endeavouring to persuade the Iranians that it would be impossible for Iran to continue as an independent state if it should try to play the role of a neutral as between the free world and the Soviet bloc. In 1955 we actually brought pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. At the last moment, however, when Iran had already decided to join the Pact, we suddenly drew back and advised the Iranian Government that it must follow its best judgement. Iran, therefore, joined the Pact somewhat puzzled as to what our real feelings were with respect to the Pact."

<sup>458</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127822, VB1071/3, 17.7.1957, London.

to be an effective “stabilising influence” in this area”<sup>459</sup> by supporting the Western countries not her Arab fellow countries in their rightful national causes.

Commenting on the US politics in the Middle East, the Chinese radio noted that the four countries received American aid for a long time but its only result was to raise their military expenditure and create financial difficulties. “Taking the Middle East as a whole the policy of the American aggressive bloc is to divide the Arab countries, weaken the popular anti-colonial struggle and threaten national independence and peace in that area.”<sup>460</sup>

The Egyptian reaction was the fiercest of all. Egypt was of the view that the West was able to gain support of some regional countries only through a handful of collaborators within the elite of the countries involved. In Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and even partly in Turkey, it was a limited number of people who decided to work with the West against the Soviet bloc.<sup>461</sup> It seems difficult to say that this decision had popular support of the people with a possible exception of Turkey. Expressing Egyptian reactions to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and its impact on the Middle East, with specific emphasis on Iraq’s involvement Egyptian radio broadcast:

All Arabs know that events which had taken place in the Arab nation in 1955 and 1956 were the result of the signing of the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was the starting point in the strong controversy between supporters of the policy of complete independence based on liberation and the consolidation of Arab nationalism and the supporters of imperialism who were seeking to enable British imperialism to have a firm footing by any means and at any price. ... Nury Elsaid had failed in achieving his objective and in performing the task entrusted to him. He had failed even in deceiving the free and haughty Iraqi people who had firmly believed that the Baghdad Pact was nothing but a “large prison” set up by British with Elsayed Nury Elsaid as its chief Gaoler.<sup>462</sup>

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<sup>459</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127838, VB1078/4, 22.6.1957, Washington.

<sup>460</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127838, VB1078/1, 24.1.1957, Peking.

<sup>461</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

<sup>462</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127822, VB1071/1A, 3.1.1957.

Joining the Egyptian campaign against Nuri, *Falastin*, a Jordanian newspaper, complained that Nuri only blamed France and Israel but not Britain, who led the aggression against Egypt. Nuri, “attacked the tail instead of the head of the snake, thus maintaining Iraq’s ties with Britain, the enemy of the Arabs.”<sup>463</sup>

From the very beginning the US had serious reservations about the Baghdad Pact. She realised the problems it raised in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, the US never became a full member of the Pact. She tried to find a way to convince the regional members that she was with them in the case of war coming from outside of the region. The distinction between “membership of” and “active participation in” the committees may, in practice, be quite meaningless, but, as the British Ambassador in Washington, recorded; “it would be unfortunate if the regional members were to become aware of it and to deduce that the US are getting cold feet about the Pact. The State Department are well aware of this and I hope you will agree to let sleeping dogs lie.”<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> PRO, FO, 371, Reactions from Jordanian papers dated 16.12.1956.

<sup>464</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/38, 14.11.1958, Washington.



## 6.5 Developments Following the Iraqi Coup of 1958

Following the Iraqi coup, the Americans completely lost their faith in the Pact, but yet again tried very hard not to lose the region completely to the Russians. To achieve such an objective, the US started to reach an agreement with each single member of the Pact. However, having seen the bilateral agreements as a sign of weakness for the Pact, Turkey opposed the initiative at the beginning. The US Charge d'Affairs, Hall, told the British Ambassador in Ankara that Zorlu had indicated that the Turkish Government "would like to see a multilateral agreement between the US and regional members of the Pact rather than separate bilateral agreements, [Zorlu] admitted in replying to a remark by Hall, that the purpose was to align the US more closely to the Pact." Hall volunteered that he doubted whether more than fifty per cent of Zorlu's ideas would be acceptable to the State Department. Indeed, the US views were implemented in 1959 by signing the bilateral agreements with every individual regional member.<sup>465</sup> The British diplomats agreed that the bilateral agreements would strengthen the Pact as it was recorded by a Foreign Office document that the Pact was very greatly strengthened by the decision of Washington "to accept the same responsibility and commitments towards individual members which they had undertaken towards one another by signing the Pact, and this was given effect to in the London Declaration" signed by delegates of the remaining four member countries of the Baghdad Pact and the Secretary of State of the USA on 28 July 1958.<sup>466</sup>

The US in the London Declaration agreed to co-operate with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and the UK for their security and defence and would, in due course, enter

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<sup>465</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/26, 24.10.1958, Ankara and Yazar, Yusuf, *Ortadoğu'da Değişen Dengeler*, Rehber Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1991, p. 43.

<sup>466</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132924, EB1072/207, 19.12.1958.

into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation.<sup>467</sup>

The UK agreed that “there seems to be no practical advantage in a similar bilateral agreement being signed between the US and the UK. We also thought of the proposed bilateral agreements simply as an alternative to US membership of the Baghdad Pact.”<sup>468</sup>

Eilts confirmed the British belief that the US Government “would not regard themselves as technically members of the Pact **if and when** the bilaterals are signed and Iraq has left the Pact. The whole object of the agreement is to bolster up the morale of the regional members without the US joining the Pact. They are **essentially in lieu of.**”<sup>469</sup>

As regards Iran, “we have stated publicly that we are vitally concerned in the independence integrity and security of Iran, but we have not been prepared to enter into an “open-ended” agreement guaranteeing Iranian territorial integrity.”<sup>470</sup>

As regards Pakistan, almost the same attitude towards Iran was adopted. Indeed, when India attacked Pakistan in 1965, the West in general and the US in particular, did nothing to support their ally, Pakistan.<sup>471</sup>

As regards Turkey, “there is no reasonable doubt that this is so,” although Article 5 of NATO does not in fact oblige members to go to war in each other’s defence. “It recognises that armed attacks on any of the parties would endanger the “peace and safety” of other parties, who will each act to meet the common

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<sup>467</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132924, EB1072/207, 19.12.1958.

<sup>468</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/29, 4.11.1958, London.

<sup>469</sup> Ibid., ./31, 7.11.1958, Washington.

<sup>470</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/41C, 5.1.1959.

<sup>471</sup> Walt, Stephen, ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest Asia,’ *International Organisation*, 42(1988), p. 305.

danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”<sup>472</sup>

It seems to be the general military conclusion that the Pact without Iraq “is if anything stronger rather than weaker. To have Iraq as an uncertain neutral rather than an ally increases the danger to Iran of subversion from the south, but hardly that of armed attack.”<sup>473</sup>

The Afghan drift toward the Soviet Bloc may be regarded as dating from the visit to Kabul in December 1955 of Messrs Bulganin, Khrushchev, this resulted in a promise of a Russian credit of 100 million dollars. In short, he said that “Afghanistan has already moved towards the USSR” (in 1955-1956), but that she had not recently moved any further. “Any further mortgaging of Afghanistan to the USSR will clearly be unwelcome to us, but it is not easy to see how to prevent this”<sup>474</sup> he concluded.

Having thought over all aspects of the Baghdad Pact, the British were of the view that there was great administrative advantage in retaining the same organisation. The British Ambassador in Washington reported that

legally it would be tidier to have a new instrument and there might be political advantage if such a new instrument took the form of a treaty among the three regional members (to which the UK would then accede) and could therefore be described as a regional initiative. But if, despite the absence of Iraq the US were unable to accede, much of the political value of a new treaty would be lost, even though in theory the Americans could use their bilateral agreements already enabled them to participate fully in the work of the Pact (or whatever the new alliance was called.)<sup>475</sup>

As can be seen, the British were aware that the Pact should be initiated by the regional members rather than imposed by the West. They believed that the success of the Pact partly depended on the extent to which the regional countries

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<sup>472</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>474</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/46, 7.12.1958, Kabul.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid., ./41, 22.11.1958, Washington.

were made to believe that it was a regionally inspired initiative.

As Iraq left the Pact, the UK took the opportunity to change the name of the Pact to make best use of it according to the changing balance of power. This was suggested by HM Ambassador at Tehran who said the US wanted the name changed. He also noted that the US were against Iraqi membership<sup>476</sup> due to their relations with Israel, because the US realised that it was detrimental to the US interests to have Iraq within the Pact rather than outside.<sup>477</sup>

The Americans began suggesting new possible names for the new pact. A possible name they suggested, was "Northern Tier Defence Organisation." As regards the actual name, the Ambassador agreed with the State Department that they should avoid the term "Middle East." He was not sure that "Northern Tier" was really very suitable since it was only "northern" in a limited sense, i.e. when looked at from the South. Other possible terms were, he noted, "West Asian or Aryan though the latter probably does not apply to the Turks and still suffers from its use by Hitler. West Asia Co-operative Defence Organisation would make possible word in initials. TIPUCDO (initials of members) is pretty awful."<sup>478</sup>

The British thought that to introduce the concept of Middle East might be interpreted by other Arab States "as the beginning of a new attempt to coerce them to join the Pact." The only suggestion the British Ambassador in Tehran made were the Middle East Regional Organisation (MERO) and South West Asia Regional Organisation (SWARO).<sup>479</sup> The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact

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<sup>476</sup> Ashton, Nigel J., 'The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the ME, 1955-1958,' *Review of International Studies*, (April 1993) p. 130.

<sup>477</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127839, VB1079/1, 28.6.1957.

<sup>478</sup> Ibid., ./54, 24.12.1958, Washington.

<sup>479</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127839, VB1079/1, 28.6.1957, Tehran.

tried to find a more acceptable and popular name for the Baghdad Pact as the Pact was left without Baghdad. Some of the suggested names taken from the British documents were as follows: METO, SWARO, MERO, NTDP, Aryan, TIPUCDO, WACDO, TIPTO, SWATO, UKTIPUS, ATODEC, ATOMEK, DA, MAP, EDCG, WADO, WATO, ADETO, ATO, NORMETO, ALTO.

At the beginning, without an official answer from Baghdad, the West could not decide about the Baghdad Pact. One of the dispatches sent from the British Embassy in Washington stated that unless the Iraqi government's intentions were not clear to the British, the dispatch suggested, a change of name for the alliance and no decision whether to recast the Pact or not should be considered. If Iraq stayed in, it would be more difficult for the US, because "The US would be unable to work with Iraq on the "sensitive" committees, i.e. all but the Economic Committee"<sup>480</sup> the British believed.

Having realised that the situation was hopeless in Iraq, the governments of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the UK and the US decided to establish a provisional Baghdad Pact HQ in Ankara including the Council, the Secretariat and combined military staff. This transfer was an administrative step designed to ensure continuity of Pact activities and was entirely without prejudice to the eventual Iraqi decision with respect to membership of the Pact. The Government of Iraq was informed of the above decision.<sup>481</sup>

As soon as the transfer of the institution was put on the agenda, the regional members started to contest with each other to move some important institutions to their own countries. Pakistan and Turkey demanded the Nuclear Centre be

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<sup>480</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/41C, 5.1.1959.

<sup>481</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132930, EB1076/7, 22.10.1958, Ankara.

moved from Iraq to themselves but the UK preferred Iran as the latter needed more gestures than other two. But this decision had to be “defended on technical grounds.”<sup>482</sup> In this dispatch the Ambassador went on to explain the reasons why it was unacceptable to move the Nuclear Centre to Turkey or Pakistan.

Following many discussions, at a meeting of delegations on August 13, the draft communiqué was revised as follows: “By the decision of its Council in Ankara the Organisation hitherto known as the Baghdad Pact has adopted the name of Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).”<sup>483</sup>

With Pakistan both a Commonwealth colleague and in SEATO, and Turkey a member of NATO, the chief political purpose of the organisation was to encourage Iran to resist persistent Soviet pressure and propaganda.<sup>484</sup>

Though the Turkish politicians were normally careful not to spell out the truth behind their policies in the region, Zorlu openly stated that the main reason for the foundation of CENTO was to save Iran from communism. He also said that “it was Turkey’s duty to save Iran and to establish close ties between Iran and the West.”<sup>485</sup> The British Ambassador reported this remark, since although it went no further than the line which Zorlu had frequently taken in private, it was “apparently the first made in public by a member of the Turkish Government”.<sup>486</sup> It was a candid expression of Turkey’s genuine motives as regards the establishment of CENTO, and her estimate of the position of Iran<sup>487</sup> and was accepted as such by Sir Bernard Burrows.

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<sup>482</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132941, EB1241/131, 28.11.1958, and ./80, 21.8.1958, London.

<sup>483</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140702, EB10113/17, 14.8.1959.

<sup>484</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149696, EB1051/1, 3.5.1960.

<sup>485</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153039, RK1022/1, 18.1.1960, Ankara.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc.

<sup>487</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc.

Since Iraq left the Pact, the British Ambassador in Ankara said that the absence of Iraq meant that “we need not lay such stress on Palestine and other Arab problems, but this is offset by the fact that the situation in Iraq will itself be a major item for discussion.”<sup>488</sup>

The new position of the Pact was not very promising. Therefore, Britain wanted to decrease her role accordingly. However, any move “towards a reduction to observer status of the one non-regional member of the Pact would be regarded here as the beginning of the end of the Pact.”<sup>489</sup>

Britain thus decided to change the function of the Pact as well. Writing from Ankara, the British Ambassador entirely agreed that “we should aim to build up the economic side of the Pact. Although the regional members still regard it primarily as a source of additional aid for projects in their individual countries, they are also, beginning to value it as an organisation for economic co-operation.”<sup>490</sup>

Britain was of the view that “a Baghdad Pact without Iraq is not a practical possibility.” Indeed, though even the Baghdad Pact, too, had not been popular, CENTO never functioned even as the Baghdad Pact did.<sup>491</sup>

The Iraqi coup carried out by Qassem radically changed the course of events in the Middle East. Unlike most of the suppositions, the actual impetus and initiative for the July Revolution in Iraq was not Communist, let alone Soviet inspired. The Communist Party in Iraq had, however, contrary to what the old regime and the British believed, not been entirely destroyed by Nuri’s repression and it was quick

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<sup>488</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132923, EB10399/222, 12.12.1958, Ankara.

<sup>489</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140714, EB1071/9B, 10.8.1959, Karachi.

<sup>490</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140685, EB1001/4, 4.2.1959, Ankara.

<sup>491</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133021, EP1072/2, 17.2.1958.

to come out into the open and fall in behind the banner of the revolution.<sup>492</sup>

The West usually consulted the Turkish politicians in respect to Middle Eastern matters. This time the Turks were upset with what they expected to happen. Menderes indicated at an interview that there was a reasonably good prospect that Iraq might stay in the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish representative at the meeting of CSO on November 6 mentioned that he was convinced that Qassem wanted the friendship of Iraq's allies in the Baghdad Pact.<sup>493</sup> One week later, the Egyptian newspaper Al Messa quoted the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo, Mr Fayel al Samarai, as saying that Iraq had "withdrawn *de facto*" from the Baghdad Pact.<sup>494</sup>

The Karachi evening "Leader" of September 10th, however, carried an article datelined Baghdad September 10th which opened as follows: "Iraq's Foreign Minister, Siddik El Shanshal, said here that he felt his country will have to quit the Baghdad Pact in order to obey the universal public opinion,"<sup>495</sup> wrote a special correspondent of PPA touring the Middle East. Mr Shanshal was also the Minister for National Guidance and a very important and influential member of the Revolutionary government.

Six weeks later, the news came up "from well informed sources that Iraq had decided to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact after the term of the Pact expires next February [in fact, it was to expire in February 1960.]"<sup>496</sup>

Finally, the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo was reported by the New China Press Agency as having commented to Al Messa as regards the US bilateral agreements

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<sup>492</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140946, EQ10338/12, 21.4.1959.

<sup>493</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132922, EB10393/21, 7.11.1958.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid., ./27, 17.11.1958, Cairo.

<sup>495</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132922, EB10393/20, 26.9.1958, Karachi.

<sup>496</sup> Ibid., ./33, 11.12.1958, Baghdad, quoted from BBC Broadcast, Monday, 12.39, 11.12.1958, MAT.



with members of the “crippled Baghdad Pact, my country is in fact considered outside the Pact. Iraq’s policy is based on positive neutrality and will not tie itself to any military bloc. When the Pact expires in a year and a few months’ time, Iraq will officially notify the parties that she wishes to cease membership.”<sup>497</sup>

Iraq abrogated three of the former regime’s treaties with the USA too. Three agreements were signed by the previous regime under the proviso that the US Government “conducted Iraq’s foreign policy. ... The abrogation of these agreements opens a new chapter in the history of Iraq’s complete withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.”<sup>498</sup>

With the overthrow of the monarchic rule which was subordinate to the “influence and directives of imperialism and which depended on the Baghdad Pact as one of the pillars of the imperialistic policy in the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact became, in a *de facto* sense, a bygone affair as far as Iraq was concerned.”<sup>499</sup> But this was not so in respect to the other member countries as the causes which had prompted these countries to form the Pact still existed in respect to them. However, the Iraqi revolution “has considerably weakened the Pact.”<sup>500</sup> Cognisant of this fact, thereafter, even these countries started to focus on bilateral negotiations in meetings of the Pact.<sup>501</sup>

One of the points made at the Iraqi Prime Minister’s second Press Conference on March 24 in which he announced withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact was as follows: On 14 July 1958 the Pact was “destroyed” and on 24 March “uprooted”.<sup>502</sup>

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<sup>497</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/45, 4.12.1958, Baghdad.

<sup>498</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140683, E1821/40, 16.6.1959, quoted from Kurdish News Bulletin.

<sup>499</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/3, 24.1.1959, Baghdad.

<sup>500</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/3, 24.1.1959, Baghdad.

<sup>501</sup> Yavuzalp, Ercüment, *Menderes’le Anılar*, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 1981, p. 63.

<sup>502</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/14, 25.3.1959, Baghdad.

Not only was the withdrawal itself detrimental to the Western Powers but also the conduct of the new Government, in persecuting the former authorities was also harmful. For instance, the Iraqi Government made public use of what they were told in strict confidence during a pact ministerial session, contrary to the security regulations and to the accepted rule of behaviour governing such meetings. The Ambassador complained, "Nor do I think we should wish to make use of this Iraqi lapse for public relations purposes, as is suggested, unless there is a drastic turn for the worse in our relations with Iraq."<sup>503</sup> Under the Baghdad Pact security regulations such information should be safeguarded by Pact members and that this public use of protected information, the Ambassador suggested, "should not go unchallenged."<sup>504</sup>

Great Britain was ready to adjust herself to the new atmosphere in Iraq. While the State Department were prepared to agree that for the moment, it would seem that the preservation of Qassem's regime was the lesser evil, they were not optimistic about his chances of being able to avoid Communist influence and the British thought that the US "may therefore reach the conclusion sooner than we might do that the success of pro-Nasser forces would be preferable."<sup>505</sup> In the event of a further sudden deterioration in the situation, he emphasised that "you should take the opportunity to discourage strongly any thought of possible intervention by our allies, apart from our general position that we do not think the matter should be even discussed let alone recorded owing to the danger of leakage."<sup>506</sup>

In fact, the time came when Britain could not stop herself from thinking of a

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<sup>503</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132922, EB10393/22, 6.11.1958, Baghdad.

<sup>504</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid., ./31, 5.12.1958, Ankara.

<sup>506</sup> Ibid., ./31, 5.12.1958, Ankara.

military intervention in order to prevent any possible integration of Iraq and the UAR. However, the likely long term consequences were quite sufficient to deter her. "A joint Anglo-US-Turkish intervention in Iraq might well be militarily feasible. The political consequences of such intervention would however be serious. Were the object of overthrow or prevent the establishment of a pro-UAR regime it would unite the whole Arab world (and much of the non-Arab world) against us and jeopardise all our oil supplies from Arab sources."<sup>507</sup>

When the British could not, as usually happens in international relations, direct the Iraqi foreign policy by threat they tried to be more friendly and made some concessions to keep Iraq on a reasonably acceptable line. Such an attempt can be seen in the supply of arms to Iraq. In answer to a question in the House of Commons, Mr Profumo said then that "some requests from Iraq for arms had been met, others were under consideration."<sup>508</sup>

At the beginning Turkey had little interest in Middle Eastern defence but her inability to pursue an independent defence policy had profound consequences for herself, so Turkish involvement in these initiatives, though destined ultimately to be futile, needs special scrutiny.

As stated earlier, the three-decade-long dominance of the Republicans was over but nothing changed in the field of the Turkish foreign affairs. The new rulers signalled to the West that they, too, would pursue the same line as the Republicans as far as foreign relations were concerned. They went even further to say that it was essential to establish a Mediterranean defence system linked to the Atlantic Pact.<sup>509</sup>

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<sup>507</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140956, EQ1071/1, ./13, 17.2.1959.

<sup>508</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/9, 24.3.1959, quoted from Daily Telegraph, 25.3.1959.

<sup>509</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/13, 9.6.1950.

The DP adopted a pro-western policy, especially an active Turkish participation in the western defence initiatives in the region. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was reported to have said that the Sadabad Pact should be revived for the Middle Eastern neighbours and Turkey could participate in a Balkan entente.<sup>510</sup> Turkey's main aim was to demonstrate its usefulness to the West.

Despite all the American military and non-military aid Turkey had received, and the military prowess of the Turkish people, if Russia firmly resolved to conquer Turkey at any cost, she eventually could.<sup>511</sup> That was known to the Western politicians, if not to the Turks themselves. To the most Turks, Turkey guaranteed her national integrity and security by joining NATO.

Meanwhile, Turkey was believed to have an important influence over the Middle Eastern countries. Also it had shown a constancy of policy that had made it the most reliable American ally in the Middle East. The West also believed that should Turkey waver or be reduced to desperate measures by economic troubles, the entire defence of the Middle East would crumble. Later, however, Western countries realised that Turkish political influence was virtually non-existent, owing to Arab distrust of the Turks as former Ottoman overlords and present partners of the West and to Turkish contempt for the weakness and indiscipline of the Arabs.

Following five years' hard work, what Turks had in their hands was the Baghdad Pact, which was supposed to include most of the important Arab countries especially Egypt and the Fertile Crescent countries. But, only Iraq joined the Pact in the end. In 1958, the Iraqi revolution happened and considerably weakened the

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<sup>510</sup> PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/3, 12.6.1950.

<sup>511</sup> Thomas, Lewis V. and Frye, R.N., *The US Turkey, and Iran*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 149.

Pact.<sup>512</sup>

If the Turkish initiatives were said to have aimed to defend the Middle East and thus to defend her own national territories against the expansionist Soviet threat, the so called architect of the Baghdad Pact itself, Adnan Menderes, admitted the failure by saying in a conversation with the UK Defence Minister that he thought that the position of the West had declined during the last ten years and the position of Russia had grown stronger both as regards technical superiority and as regards the extent of Russian subversive influence.<sup>513</sup>

Being more pro-Western than the West, Turkey always demanded that the West be less compromising with the Arabs in the course of the negotiations. However, Turkey was aware that without strong American support she would not be able to make the regional member countries commit themselves to the Western cause. The United States Charge d'Affairs, Hall, told HM Ambassador in Ankara that Zorlu had indicated that the Turkish Government would like to see a multilateral agreement between the United States and regional members of the Pact rather than separate bilateral agreements that the US wanted to sign. He admitted, in replying to a remark by Hall, that the purpose was to align the United States more closely to the Pact. Hall doubted whether more than fifty per cent of Zorlu's ideas would be acceptable to the State Department.<sup>514</sup> In 1959 the United States' signed the bilateral agreements with every individual regional member. In another words, the Pact was replaced by bilateral arrangements.<sup>515</sup>

In the end Turkey, with her Western friends, failed to maintain a viable de-

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<sup>512</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/3, 24.1.1959, Baghdad.

<sup>513</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140681, E1071/6, 21.5.1959.

<sup>514</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132921, EB10345/26, 24.10.1958, Ankara.

<sup>515</sup> 'The Middle East,' *Survey of International Affairs*, (October 1957-December 1958), p. 398.

fence organisation in the Middle East and they were to let the defence measures fade away in time. This was partly because of the mutual understanding of the superpowers that the escalative methods to maintain their interests in the areas where they had conflicting interests were self-defeating and they abandoned in the early 1960s. So, the world entered into a new phase, which was later to be called *détente*. (In this transitional period too, Turkish territory was to play another vital role due to the Jupiter missiles, though the Turks themselves were not privy to the decision-making process.)

On the internal front, the Americans came to realise that it was no longer in the interest of America to maintain the Democrats in power, among other things, because Adnan Menderes and his Democrats were determined to radically and rapidly industrialise the country, while the Americans demanded that Turkey remain an agricultural country.<sup>516</sup> Turkey's rigid refusal to accept American advice on the measures which she should take to put her economy in order lost her a good deal of the abundant good will which she had hitherto enjoyed in America. Matters were not improved by Zorlu's visit to Washington in early June. This was to be the apparent reason why the Americans withdrew their economic and political support for the Democrat Turkey.

This loss of popularity was, mainly due to "economic factors" (the rising cost of living and recurrent shortages of certain necessities including some foodstuffs), but partly also to "political causes" (dissatisfaction with repressive press regulations and with threats to the independence of the universities and judiciary).<sup>517</sup> Dissatisfaction with Menderes' economic and financial policies, particularly his "over-

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<sup>516</sup> Erkmen suggested that "the West believed that Menderes would modernise the agriculture, but when he attempted to industrialise the country, they started to hesitate giving economic aid."

<sup>517</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124001, RK1016/4, 1.17.1956.

ambitious and insufficiently selective industrialisation program",<sup>518</sup> budgetary deficits and high agricultural subsidies, precipitated the deterioration of relations.

We should glance at Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s in order to understand and assess better the advantages and disadvantages of the policy pursued in the 1950s. It was only in the early 1960s that Turkey slowly began questioning her foreign policy. Both the Cuban missiles crisis and developments in Cyprus were important factors in prompting Turkish reassessment of foreign policy.<sup>519</sup> Henceforth, the Turkish leadership, regardless of political affiliation, accepted the need to explore all foreign policy options, one of which was certainly better relations with the USSR. A tentative examination into the assumptions underlying Turkey's post World War II foreign policy began to appear gingerly in the Turkish press and was actively discussed in private among the elite. The people concerned began to ask the following questions:

Had the departure from Atatürk's antipathy to entangling alliances been really necessary? How valuable was NATO membership? Could greater flexibility and scope be introduced into Turkish foreign policy? Was the Soviet threat really serious?<sup>520</sup>

Indeed, following the military coup of 1960, Turkey tended to improve her relations with Non-Aligned countries. For example, in October 1964 Turkey sent two observers to the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned states, which was the beginning of a flexible attitude towards closer association with the Afro-Asian countries.

On 23 January 1963, when Washington announced that the Jupiters were to

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<sup>518</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 124001, RK1016/4, 1.17.1956.

<sup>519</sup> Walt, op. cit., p. 294.

<sup>520</sup> Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: the Dynamics of Influence*, Praeger, New York, 1982, p. 21.

be removed the effect on Ankara was nothing less than electrifying, though this was not immediately evident, except to keen observers of the Turkish scene. But when İnönü received the Johnson letter on 5 June 1964 Ankara was shocked by the crude implication that it might find itself alone should the USSR intervene in a local dispute that Ankara but clearly not Washington, regarded as impinging on its own security and as being quite divorced from East-West considerations. Once again, as in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, Washington had shown itself self-righteous in dealing with close allies, insensitive to their regional interests, and indifferent to the domestic consequences for the pro-United States governments of these countries, and to the future of the alliance. Therefore, Turkey's reappraisal of its relationship with the United States and its fresh assessment of prospects for Soviet-Turkish relations may be said to date from the Johnson letter.<sup>521</sup> As a result, many Turks came to believe that the United States was less concerned with Turkey's security than with its own superpower game and when they looked back at the 1950s with the benefit of hindsight they were less enthusiastic about the alliance.

Briefly, the factors prompting Turkish authorities to understand the disadvantages of their "unreserved and unconditional" association with the West may be stated as follows: removal of the Jupiters from the Turkish soil without the knowledge of the Turks; the Johnson letter regarding the question of Cyprus; and the general drift towards *détente* in the international order. Those factors changed the way in which the United States perceived Turkey and consequently it relatively diminished the importance of Turkey and this led the United States to give less and less military and economic aid to Turkey with every passing year.

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<sup>521</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-21.



On the economic and military aid front, Turkey was perhaps in a better position compared with other regional members. However, apart from the incomparably greater aid offered to Israel,<sup>522</sup> another important fact was that aid given to Turkey was mostly military and had nothing to do with the welfare of the people at all. For example, the original 100 million dollars appropriation for Turkey was allotted ninety five per cent to military requirements and five per cent to improve transportation and communications facilities with the hope of thereby increasing Turkish military efficiency.<sup>523</sup> Yet the effect of this improvement on social and economic life in Turkey was quite considerable.

Indeed, it was also more economic for the Americans to invest their money to Turkey rather than anywhere else.

Many American in Turkey will tell one - and the more the individual official's work gives him an overall grasp of the picture, the more likely he is to hold this view - that there is no other place in the entire world where the American tax dollar spent abroad for military purposes buys as much as it does in Turkey today, and also that there is no place in the world where the American tax dollar spent to strengthen a foreign country ... finds a better potential use than it does in Turkey.<sup>524</sup>

Thus it can be acknowledged that US military aid to Turkey was actually even more beneficial to the Americans than it was to the Turks. Calculations based on the comparative costs of different nations' troops reveal that it cost the Americans 27 times as much to employ one of their own soldiers to carry out the same duties as one Turkish soldier in the region.<sup>525</sup>

The British also agreed with this point when HM Ambassador noted that their

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<sup>522</sup> In fact, Israel has always been an exception and should not be compared with any country neither economically nor politically. Findley claimed that "whatever Israel wants [from the US], Israel gets it." Findley, Paul, 'The Israeli Grip on US Middle Eastern Policy,' *Asian Affairs* (Winter 1986-1987) p. 13.

<sup>523</sup> Thomas, op. cit. p. 146.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

<sup>525</sup> Robinson, op. cit., p.181.

present contribution was rather small in proportion to the intimacy of their general relations with Turkey and "its importance to United States for our Middle Eastern policy, in Cyprus and for the strategic facilities, mainly in terms of over-flying, which we now enjoy."<sup>526</sup>

Another important point in respect to the foreign aid given to Turkey was that political strings were always attached to it.<sup>527</sup> The Board of Trade, for example, wrote to the Foreign Office that the economic departments should not seek to impose on Turkey a debt settlement out of step with their current friendly relations with the Turks, or affecting those relations adversely. The report stated that, "this is no very onerous task for United States, since the other Departments are well aware of the political considerations involved (indeed the whole OEEC rescue operation has been undertaken mainly for political reasons) and in any case they are well aware that the Turks simply cannot afford a debt settlement which is generous to the creditor."<sup>528</sup>

In fact, the Turks themselves were well aware of this feature of international aid. Armstrong claimed that foreign aid is "the single most important influence on the pattern of political compliance."<sup>529</sup> The Turks tended to look at the whole question of aid as primarily political in character. The Turkish authorities, therefore, took it amiss when the United States adopted a narrowly economic approach to their requests for assistance, admonishing them to put their economy in order, while offering more to neutrals or to less stalwart allies. The experiment of a combined bailing-out operation, shared by the IMF, the OEEC and the United States,

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<sup>526</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153030, RK1011/1, 26.1.1960, Ankara.

<sup>527</sup> Hoskins, Halford L., 'Aid Diplomacy in the Middle East,' *Current History*, (July 1966), p. 19.

<sup>528</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144759, RK1123/8, 20.1.1959, Board of Trade, London.

<sup>529</sup> Armstrong, Adrienne, 'The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (September 1981), p. 416.

provided desperately needed financial aid in 1958 and also some means of control for the future. (A total of 359 million dollars was made available; 234 million dollars by the United States, 100 million dollars by members of the OEEC, and 25 million dollars by the IMF).<sup>530</sup>

Since 4 August 1958, the Turkish economy was operating under a stabilisation program involving a fairly high degree of internal austerity. This was introduced as a result of consultation with the OEEC. The credits amounting to the equivalent of 359 million dollars (including "normal" United States defence support aid amounting in 1958 to perhaps 100 million dollars) were extended to Turkey by the United States and the principal OEEC countries in 1958. "The last instalment of these credits had just been made available to Turkey. Agreements to consolidate Turkish debts to the principal OEEC countries and the United States and Canada had also just been concluded and others were in final stages of negotiation in 1960."<sup>531</sup> These agreements were to provide for the repayment of commercial obligations totalling about 450 million dollars over the next 12 years.

Despite all efforts, the economic situation in Turkey irreversibly deteriorated and reached a level where the Ministry of Finance was obliged to suspend the import of foreign periodicals, books and newspapers, except American ones. This was a measure taken by the Turkish authorities in an attempt to prevent a further increase in Turkey's arrears of trading debts. "The American trade is excepted, because it is paid for in currency made available under the American aid program."<sup>532</sup>

On the other hand, the Russian press took the opportunity to evaluate the

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<sup>530</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Vol.39, 25 August 1958, pp. 321-324.

<sup>531</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144755, RK1102/3, 10.7.1959, Istanbul.

<sup>532</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144790, RK1451/3, 18.7.1959, Ankara.

Turkish foreign policy and its implications on the economic policy. *Izvestia* attributed the "hopeless conditions" of the Turkish budget to the Government's foreign policy. Zorlu was said to have disclosed that Turkey was receiving 200 million dollars annually from the United States as military aid, in addition to 90 million sterling under the NATO infra-structure program. The article ended by alleging that the questions put to the Foreign Minister and his replies showed that Turkish foreign policy was "actually shaped by the ruling circles of another state."<sup>533</sup>

The policies of the Democrat Party after it achieved power in 1950 were directed towards a rapid expansion of the Turkish economy and a consequent improvement in the standard of living of the Turkish peasant. This expansion was based largely on American aid, which had been liberally granted up to the spring of 1955. At this point the United States Government indicated that further economic aid could only be granted on condition that "certain remedial measures" were applied to Turkish economic planning. The overtone to the whole picture had therefore been of American assistance in economic field with a particular emphasis on aid to the Turkish defence effort.

Having stated the economic and political situation in Turkey we may now conclude our discussion on Turkey by looking briefly at British view of the possibility of a military coup in Turkey. In February 1959, Sir Bernard Burrows, the British Ambassador in Ankara, assessed the situation in Turkey in a dispatch he sent to the Foreign Office. Having cited the economic and political situation in Turkey and the RPP's views on the Middle East, he noted the reactions to and the vicarious excitement caused by the military coups in Iraq, Pakistan and the Sudan. He reported that "the exchange of violent polemics between the Prime Minister and

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<sup>533</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144747, RK10338/1, 23.1.1959, Moscow.

İnönü<sup>534</sup> in the autumn on the subject of the analogy between the old regime in Iraq and the regime in Turkey,"<sup>535</sup> caused a speculation among the western diplomats about the possibility of a coup in Turkey. In spite of this, the Ambassador's view remained that "such a possibility was extremely remote." In his view, there were many factors preventing such a possibility to happen. In explaining why a military coup could not possibly take place, he said:

(a) The Turks are a disciplined people with an ingrained respect for constituted authority.

(b) The genuine Turkish nationalistic patriotic spirit would make anyone think twice before risking a major upheaval in the country, surrounded as it is by hostile and potentially hostile neighbours.

(c) The Turkish people learned in 1950 that they have the power to get rid of an unpopular government by constitutional electoral means.

(d) Both the main political parties are based on large elements of solid popular support. There should therefore be no need for either of them to consider calling in an instrument like the army to achieve their ends.

(e) Even if the will existed to organise a coup amongst, say, certain senior or middle rank army officers, the execution would be appallingly difficult, taking into the account the size and the dispersion of the armed forces. In an Arab country it is possible to control events with a handful of tanks, but any such attempt in Turkey might well lead to civil war.<sup>536</sup>

Finally he predicted, partially correctly, that the only possibility that he could foresee, "and this was remote," of military intervention in politics would be some form of intervention designed to "protect the constitution, the established electoral processes, or Turkey's national honour."<sup>537</sup> Although he was mistaken in predicting the possibility of a coup in Turkey, his prediction about the pretext that the military would use to justify the coup was correct.

The Birmingham Post of the 18th September, 1959, commenting on Turkish

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<sup>534</sup> For a remarkable account of polemics between the two leaders, see Tekil, Füzünan, *İnönü Menderes Kavgası*, Tekil Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1989.

<sup>535</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144742, RK1015/5, 4.2.1959, Ankara.

<sup>536</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc.

<sup>537</sup> *Ibid.*, op. loc.

relations with the US wrote that signs of hard feeling against Americans were noticeable for the first time in Turkey, the US's closest friend and ally in the Middle East. Irresponsible acts by some Americans stationed in Turkey, and the sensitiveness of the Turkish people, were the main reasons for this.

According to the paper, a few incidents that occurred in 1959 seem to have changed the opinions of many Turks about Americans. There was in Turkey a feeling of widespread sympathy and gratitude towards the US. Substantial economic and military aid, totalling two billion dollars, strong political ties within NATO and CENTO and extensive cultural exchanges, had largely contributed to that end. The arrest of four American sergeants serving with NATO's South-eastern HQ, in the city of İzmir, and its political implications, "have been the drop that made the cup overflow. Minor incidents earlier aroused nation-wide indignation."<sup>538</sup>

It is not clear whether the religious developments in Turkey were among the reasons affecting the attitude of the Americans negatively, but what was clear was that the US increasingly distanced herself from Turkey from the mid-1950s. One of the occasions indicating the Islamic revivalism in Turkey was also quoted by the above paper. The paper reported that it had received a letter, posted in Alexandria and dated 2 November, stating that a "very well known Turkish personality" had been writing letters to members of the former Ottoman dynasty, including Prince Faruk (former King of Egypt) informing them that the "situation in Turkey was now ripe" for a restoration of both the Sultanate and the Muslim Caliphate, and advising members of the royal family to be ready to take over. It went on to say that the day was fast approaching when the "flag of the Caliphate will once again fly over the Ottoman homeland." The reported letter also alleged that the present

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<sup>538</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144748, RK10345/3, 18.5.1959, Birmingham Post, 18.9.1959, Turks harden in their attitude to Americans.

Government of Egypt was supporting these aspirations for a Turkish restoration.<sup>539</sup>

Turkish relations with the US in particular and the West in general deteriorated and this caused tension between the two and strained the nerves of Adnan Menderes who worked to improve Turkish-American relations and protect the Western interests in the Middle East. In a conversation with the UK Defence Minister, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes said that even he thought that “the position of the West had declined during the last ten years and the position of Russia had grown stronger both as regards technical superiority and as regards the extent of Russian subversive influence.”<sup>540</sup>

When the Turkish politicians realised that *détente* would probably take place and they felt disappointed with the American economic and military aid, the Prime Minister of Turkey announced his intention to visit Mr Khrushchev in July, with the prospect of a return visit later. “Both the Iranian and Pakistani Ambassadors in Moscow were shaken and very apprehensive of the effect of the Turkish move on the Shah and the Iranian Government.”<sup>541</sup>

Finally one should remember that the Democrat Party had fulfilled its mission by the end of the 1950s. In Zorlu’s words, “Turkey’s policy today centred around integration with the West. Turkey and Greece, which had originally been left outside the two economic groups formed in Europe, had decided to join the

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<sup>539</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144813, RK1941/1, 10.11.1959, The Times, 10.11.1959, Hints of Ottoman Restoration, translated and published in Cumhuriyet.

<sup>540</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140681, E1071/6, 21.5.1959.

<sup>541</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153041, RK10338/1, 10.4.1960. First, Iraq was lost with its large oil resources. If now, Iran was on the same truck, then the West would have lost an unacceptable amount of oil resources. One could argue that perhaps it was such a thought that led the West not to discourage the Turkish army to stage a military coup interrupting the multi-party system, but pledging the loyalty to CENTO and NATO to restore Kemalism. Loss of Turkey would, the West may have thought, encourage the radical elements in Iran to topple the Shah.

Common Market.”<sup>542</sup> Indeed before Zorlu, together with his Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes were ousted from power and executed, they applied for membership to the Common Market. And it was this application that concluded the DP’s westernising mission for Turkey. Since then, for more than forty years Turkey has been working to attain the necessary conditions to become a full member of the Common Market, though it still seems very unlikely to achieve this. It is an irony that as soon as DP performed its westernising role its rule in Turkey ended.

Against a background of widespread urban unrest and a mounting national deficit, the Turkish Armed Forces assumed the direction and administration of the country on 27 May 1960. The Presidency of the Committee of National Union set up by the Armed Forces was given to General Cemal Gürsel.<sup>543</sup> The Turkish Armed Forces are the most loyal organ of the state, and therefore, whenever the Kemalist regime has been in danger either from rightists or leftists or from Islamists, they assumed the administration as happened in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Since then they have accepted that this is no longer the way to protect a regime, so, the army has tended to force the politicians to compromise for the sake of Kemalism and to eliminate the unwanted elements in the country.

The objectives of the 1960 coup had not much to do with foreign policy of the country. That policy remained the achievement of westernisation of the country as had been. To reassure the Western friends and allies, the Turkish representative made a statement in a special restricted meeting of CENTO, in which he said that he did not wish to enter into a discussion on the internal situation, but there

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<sup>542</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153039, RK1022/1, 18.1.1960, Ankara.

<sup>543</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153046, RK1051/3, 29.5.1960, Ankara. In fact, Gülek claimed that the armed forces have been busy with making preparation for the coup since last few years. Bozdağ evidenced his allegation that preparation started in 1954 and noted as RPP realised that it was no longer possible to come to power through fair elections they prepared the ground for a coup. See Bozdağ, İsmet, *Demirkırat Aldatmacası*, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991 pp. 92-100.



was one point of importance for CENTO: He wished to declare categorically that although "there had been a change of government and of political philosophy and of regime, the foreign policy of the Turkish Government and in particular their attitude towards CENTO, had in no way changed."<sup>544</sup> It was later declared that Turkey's attitude towards NATO was not to change and the westernisation process of Turkey was to continue as had been commanded by Kemal Atatürk.

Iraq's importance for the West especially the UK was due basically to its oil reserves, its military bases granted to the British and its role in the Arab politics. Baghdad was one of the centres of Arab power like Cairo and Riyadh.<sup>545</sup> It was also geographically a gate to the Arab oil sources, if the USSR ever tried to occupy the region. Its relations with Britain historically had a special role to play as far as the Western defence initiatives were concerned. Iraq was in the hands of a handful pro-British rulers led by a King placed on his throne by the British. Therefore, Britain wanted to prolong its privileged position in Iraq as long as possible. However, the new wave of the Arab nationalism, it seemed, was powerful enough to threaten all colonial powers in the Arab lands. Britain, therefore, wholeheartedly urged the United States to join her in defending the region against the external Communist threat and most importantly against the internal nationalist or any anti-Western or anti-colonial elements.

Being ruled by the pro-British oligarchy, Iraq had never created any major trouble for Britain since its establishment in the 1920s. The government kept the country under strict control in the face of the opposition. Freedom of expression had been mercilessly suppressed especially during the two years since Iraq had started to contemplate joining the Baghdad Pact. Two conflicting trends emerged

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<sup>544</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149690, EB10344/1, 31.5.1960, Ankara.

<sup>545</sup> Rustow, Dankwart A., 'Defense of the Near East,' *Foreign Affairs*, (January 1956), p. 278.

in Iraqi Arab policy: an "anti-imperialism trend in defence of national rights and national honour, and an artificial pro-imperialism trend sponsored by the few supporters of the Baghdad Pact (Nuri Said in the lead) which, they will know, will not live long".<sup>546</sup> The special bilateral agreement concluded with Britain as an addendum to the Pact, "made Iraq in time of peace as well as in time of war, subject to British domination," and isolated her from the other Arab states. Britain was aware that Nuri Said was forced to pursue a fundamentally different foreign policy and thus recognised that any situation that brought the West against the Arabs would oblige Nuri Said to abandon his pro-Western policy.

The sponsors of the Pact tried to impose on Jordan, but failed. They launched a campaign against Egypt and withdrew their offer of aid for Aswan Dam only to provoke the nationalisation of the Canal. ... This situation in Iraq cannot last long. Should the West resort to force against Egypt the Iraqi people would be the first to "terminate" the Baghdad Pact, hasten to support Egypt and threaten the British oil interests in Iraq. An [sic] Saudi Arabia also "will cut the oil flow" to the Western Powers.<sup>547</sup>

As can be seen, the British tried hard to bring other Arab countries in, but failed. They were even aware that the pro-Western situation in Iraq could not last long, therefore, Britain treated Nuri Said quite gently, whenever required. For example, HM Ambassador in Tehran recorded that the apparent feeling in Iran was that Iraq was the British "favourite son" and Iran, the Cinderella, might well benefit not so much from the name of the Pact as from the policies Britain had pursued towards her during the past year or two. He also said that "we have found it necessary, in order to keep Iraq aligned with the West and inside the Baghdad Pact, to make a fair number of gestures to her, notably in gifts of arms and in such matters as deciding that the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre should be located in Baghdad. We have not felt it necessary to make similar gestures to Iran."<sup>548</sup>

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<sup>546</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 121648, VQ1022/13, 7.8.1956.

<sup>547</sup> Ibid., 13, 7.8.1956.

<sup>548</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127839, VB1079/1, 28.6.1957, Tehran.

Despite all the gestures Iraq could not avoid a military coup and its subsequent consequences. The West felt quite uneasy about what had happened in Iraq and frustrated by it. Despite a vague attitude showed by the Iraqi administration to the USSR and UAR, Britain even considered a counter military intervention against Qassem. But, as was stated in a British document, the inestimable consequences were feared:

“A joint Anglo-US-Turkish intervention in Iraq might well be militarily feasible. The political consequences of such intervention would however be serious.”<sup>549</sup> The West was afraid that an attempt to overthrow the suspected pro-UAR regime in Iraq “would unite the whole Arab world (and much of the non-Arab world) against United States and jeopardise all our oil supplies from Arab sources.”<sup>550</sup>

The withdrawal of Iraq, finally announced on 24 March 1959 seemed to have given the Baghdad Pact a greater unity of purpose and eliminated its involvement in inter-Arab quarrels and Arab-non-Arab problems such as Arab-Israeli and Arab-French conflict, but in fact it remained a rather artificial combination of three Middle Eastern states which had few natural ties with each other.

Britain eventually admitted that total loss of Iraq was due completely to the Iraqi involvement in the Baghdad Pact. Iraq’s joining the Baghdad Pact “proved to be a fatal mistake for Nuri, since it ignored the strong Arab nationalist trend sweeping the Middle East under the leadership of Egypt’s popular Prime Minister Gamal Abd-al-Nasser and resulted in the break up of the Arab League.”<sup>551</sup>

Also, the British interests in the Persian Gulf were threatened as a result of

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<sup>549</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140956, EQ1071/1, ./13, 17.2.1959.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>551</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 157.

the Iraqi revolution. In terms of the prevalent nature of rulership, the Gulf was truly a unique area in the world. Of all of the states or sheikhdoms ringing the Gulf, only one was non-royal or “non-traditional” in its form of government; the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq had thus far been the only break in the chain of ruling tradition that linked the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, “since 1958 Iraq has been an energetic exporter of its brand of Arab nationalism and movements that seek to overthrow kingly and sheikhly rule.”<sup>552</sup>

The new administration caused also a series of new problems between Iraq and Iran. Apart from the Kurdish question, these included the dispute over the Shatt al Arab and the matter of the Persians who had settled in Iraq. Something never seen as a problem, suddenly became a problem after the coup: The Shah was asking for fifty-fifty rights over the Shatt al Arab. He said “whatever the law might be, it was illogical and unreasonable that Nuri Said claim full control. He [the Shah] would if necessary abrogate the 1937 agreement.”<sup>553</sup> One could argue that this was purely due to the boosting of the Shah by the Western world, because Iran had never before claimed such a right over the Shatt to this extent. In addition, Iranians in Iraq were being required within a period of three months to become Iraqi citizens or to leave the country. Such developments caused some alarm and indignation in Iran. A total of 500,000 persons of Iranian stock were living in Iraq (some put this figure at 800,000), and about 300,000 retained Iranian citizenship.<sup>554</sup>

For the West, Iran was perhaps more strategically situated than Iraq. Its closer location to the USSR, rich oil reserves and large population were some of the other reasons for Western concern. Therefore, the destabilisation of Iran accompanied by

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<sup>552</sup> Cottrell, Alvin J., *Iran, Diplomacy in a Regional and Global Context*, Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, Washington DC., 1975, p. 17.

<sup>553</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/24, 4.8.1959, Tehran.

<sup>554</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/2, 7.1.1959, Tehran.

an increase of Soviet influence in the country would affect the security of the West in a two-fold way: first of all, given the geopolitical situation of the country and its size, it is obvious that, whoever dominates Iran, has a dominating influence in the Gulf area. The nature of the system in Iran has a bearing on the politics of her neighbours. With increasing influence in Iran the Soviet Union would gain a great say in all vital political, strategic and economic decisions in the area. Secondly, with a Soviet dominated cordon stretching from Afghanistan via Iran and Syria into Lebanon including probably Iraq, pressure on Turkey would tremendously increase. In addition, playing on the minorities, i.e. the Kurds, in Western Iran a spillover effect into Turkey could be generated and domestic problems could be created. This, to a certain extent, already existed after the Iranian and central governments partly lost control over the adjacent area.

At the beginning Iran had no strong desire to ally with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan or Great Britain. Without American adherence the Pact had limited significance in the eyes of the Iranian Government as well as all the other Asiatic members.

Actually, with the co-operation of the United States, Iran's aims might have been as well or better attained without joining. The equivalent of an American guarantee, if it did not already exist in the deterrent effect of Washington's long-expressed interest in Iran on the Soviet leadership, was later provided by the Eisenhower Doctrine and by bilateral treaty of March 1959. The desired increase in United States aid could have been provided without a formal treaty tying Iran to other states in the Middle East.<sup>555</sup>

However, once Iran decided to align with the West then, it requested and received military, economic and technical assistance from the United States. Iran, backed by the West, felt more confident and ignored Soviet threats and blandishments. Finally, in October 1955, she joined the Baghdad Pact. The reaction from Moscow was a strongly worded note calling this step "contrary to Iran's good-neighbour relations with the Soviet Union and to certain of Iran's treaty

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<sup>555</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

obligations.”<sup>556</sup> But Iran stood firm. And in 1959, Iran declared her treaty with the USSR no longer valid.<sup>557</sup>

A brief glance at the amount of aid received by Iran demonstrates that it had a really great influence on the Shah and his government decisions. For example, for two years after the overthrow of Premier Musaddeq in 1953 the United States bolstered Iran’s sick economy with monthly grants of 5,250,000 dollars to cover the Government’s monthly deficit alone. Combined military and economic aid to Iran since 1951 totalled “about 400,000,000 dollars”.<sup>558</sup>

In his dispatch, HM Ambassador in Tehran, included some recommendations that Britain should briefly make “a token gift of say five jet trainers to be followed by a few obsolete or obsolescent jet fighters”; obsolete or obsolescent surplus radar equipment might be granted as a gift; some led-down radar facilities might be supplied free or on favourable credit terms. Finally it concluded that they were “certainly interested in the development of an early warning Radar system to provide some security to UK air forces deployed in the Middle East”.<sup>559</sup>

Regretting what happened to their friends in Iraq, the British authorities were more careful about their relations with other regional countries. They tried not to repeat the same mistakes in other countries to avoid a similar fate there. They therefore tried to persuade the rulers of those countries that they should not follow the same policy as the old regime in Iraq had followed. After dinner at Buckingham Palace on 5 May 1960 one British official referred to the Iraqi tragedy and said to the Shah that he was convinced that it had nothing to do with the foreign policy

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<sup>556</sup> Hurewitz, J.C., *Middle East Dilemmas: Background of US Policy*, Russell and Russell, New York, 1953, p. 416.

<sup>557</sup> New York Times, 3 March 1959.

<sup>558</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120731, EP1105/14, 16.4.1956.

<sup>559</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120726, EP1072/2, 4.4.1956.

of the old regime. The causes, the British thought, were that the rich had not been taxed sufficiently and that Nuri had not allowed the middle classes to share the responsibility of running the country. He had sat on the lid far too tightly. If there had been a moderate system of taxation of the large landowners and if some kind of expression of opinion had been allowed to opposition elements, he believed that Nuri would have remained in power and the regime lasted a long time.<sup>560</sup>

He said that after what had happened in Iraq one "could not help wondering whether the same thing was true of Iran. Some people said it was so. I hoped that HM would permit me to enquire from him his views. The Shah said that he was inclined to agree with me about Iraq but I must remember that Iraq was a new country without national loyalty and that the royal family were Hashemite, not Iraqi."<sup>561</sup> They were regarded as foreigners. In Iran the situation was quite different. Iran had 2,500 years of history. As the Shah predicted it did not happen then, but despite more US support and this long history of loyalty, Iran fell into the hands of the Mullahs in 1979.

One of the Ambassador's old Oxford friends, Hussein Garagozlou, who was the brother of the Shah of Persia's Chamberlain, and whose sister was Mrs Ata, and whom he had always considered to be well-informed on what was going on in Iran, said, among other things:

American financial aid can have no real effect in cementing the stability of any of the Middle East countries, because the money offered only sticks in the hands of the ruling class: "Like oil on water". Yesterday I met my colleague, the Iranian Ambassador to the Holy See... [who] is also apprehensive about the future, but he told me that the Iranian Government were doing their utmost to exert a restraining hand in Iraq through the channel of the Kurdish population. One or two highly placed Moslem ecclesiastics in Iraq were themselves Kurds, and the Iranian Government had lately sent to Baghdad a Kurd as their Ambassador [Hussein Jamil].<sup>562</sup>

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<sup>560</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/15, 5.5.1959.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>562</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140794, EP1022/2, 6.4.1959, Rome.

In fact, like the British Ambassador in Italy, many Western diplomats shared Hussein Garagozlou's views about the effect of the Western aid to Iran. As other documents also suggested<sup>563</sup> after the coup in Iraq, the Kurdish question once again gained a momentum in threatening the regional stability.

For Iran the most important development of the period was the *coup d'état* in Iraq of the 14th of July. Not only had the Iraqi revolution substantially changed Iranian relations with Iraq, but it had affected the internal situation in Iran also. In so many obvious respects the situation in Iraq before the revolution was so similar to the situation in the neighbouring kingdom that the sudden collapse of the Iraqi monarchy made a profound impression in Iran,<sup>564</sup> and neither the regime nor its critics and opponents were slow to take note.

The Iranian armed forces were at once alerted and remained in a state of alert until the 18th of August. The Shah's Palace Guard was reinforced. On the 21st of September an unusually long list of military promotions was published. Negotiations for the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which took place in London, went unexpectedly well and a draft text was initialled in August. UK exports to and imports from Iran showed satisfactory increases.<sup>565</sup>

The documents imply that the effects of the Iraqi coup on Iran had swiftly been reduced to a harmless level for various reasons. For example, the British Ambassador, reporting from Tehran on a conversation with the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hekmat, said the Minister considered the revolution in Iraq had made a great impact on Iranian public opinion, but:

fortunately, the brutalities committed in Baghdad and the hostile attitude which

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<sup>563</sup> See the section on the Kurds.

<sup>564</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/5, 31.10.1958, Tehran.

<sup>565</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/5, 31.10.1958, Tehran.



the new regime had adopted toward Iran had largely destroyed any initial sympathy which had been felt in Iran for the revolution. ... The minister urged that the Western Powers should strengthen the present Government which was fundamentally anti-Communist and pro-Western. ... His view was that the situation [in Iraq] was still fluid. Kurdish ambitions had been aroused and Arab opinion in Iraq was divided between pro-Nasser and Iraqi Nationalist factions. ... Dr Hekmat expressed particular concern about the attempts which the Iraqi radio was making to stir up the Kurdish tribes in Iran, urging them to unite with Iraqi Kurds etc. I said that I thought the Iranian Government ought to bring this situation to the attention of the UN. ... Dr Hekmat said he would act upon my advice.<sup>566</sup>

As can be seen from the document, the impact of the Iraqi coup was initially doubled by the use of the Kurdish factor against Iran. The emergence of disagreement between the Kurds and Baghdad in 1959 also helped to reduce the negative impact of the coup on Iran. However, one can argue that apart from the global conflict between the two superpowers and the British interests in the Middle East, there was another important factor which promoted the alliance at least between the regional members of the Pact. This was the Kurdish problem.<sup>567</sup> As soon as the Pact was divided, the Shah said he was afraid of the Soviet Union stirring up trouble in Kurdistan and spoke of the possibility of several tens of thousands of Kurds being infiltrated over the Iran-Soviet border. He wished to know "how far he could count on British and American support in dealing with an act of indirect aggression of this nature."<sup>568</sup> One of the conclusions in one of the contemporary papers on the Kurdish problem was that

if the Soviet Union made trouble among the Kurds in Iran we should give unconditional diplomatic and moral support to Iran. US concurrence in this conclusion is being sought and HM Embassy at Tehran are aware of it. When we have American agreement I think Sir Geoffrey Harrison should be instructed to reply to the Shah along those lines. There is no other form of help which we can promise since intervention is out of the question. We must expect the Iranians to press the US further on the Kurdish question, because the Turks also are clearly worried about communist activities among the Kurds

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<sup>566</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133010, EP1022/6, 25.8.1958, New York.

<sup>567</sup> Although Hüseyin Bağcı denied the importance of the Kurdish factor in the process of the formation of the Baghdad Pact, he noted that Turkish regional interests were identical with American global interests and therefore Turkey "accidentally" was obliged to align with the US.

<sup>568</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133019, EP1055/3, 20.11.1958.

and the two Governments are no doubt comparing notes and working on each other's anxieties.<sup>569</sup>

Although Sanandaji did not go into details when he had a talk with the British Ambassador in Tehran, he indicated that "talks between the Turks and the Iranians about the Kurds had not made much progress, presumably because of Turkish dislike of anything which smacks of a forward policy and which might stir up the Kurds in Turkey."<sup>570</sup>

Apart from the common Kurdish issue, there were other relatively less important problems. One of them was the status of the Iranians in Iraq. Under the new regulations, Iranians in Iraq were being required within a period of three months to become Iraqi citizens or to leave the country.<sup>571</sup>

One of the diplomatic dispatches sent from Iran is particularly interesting, because it reveals how the British looked upon the Middle Eastern countries and their rulers:

The Shah though he may sometimes behave childishly, expects adult treatment. He is not content with the role of a minor satellite, and is determined to assert himself. At the same time it would be unwise to assume that, in fundamentals, his head is not properly screwed on, or that his hand has lost its cunning. He can be expected to play most of his cards with skill. But the sort of game he will play depends to some extent (but to some extent, because of the limitations imposed on both sides by the rules of the game) on what cards are dealt to him by the Americans and ourselves in the next few months and not least on what happens at Ankara in January 1958. And on the foreign, as on the domestic, front it is he who will be in charge here.<sup>572</sup>

Another document shows how Great Britain used every opportunity to align a country with the West.

Attracting Iran towards Europe and the West. By this Iran means we must seize every opportunity to help Iran to choose as Turkey has deliberately chosen during the past forty years - to regard herself more as a member of the European, rather than of

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<sup>569</sup> Ibid., ./3, 20.11.1958.

<sup>570</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/5, 15.1.1959, Tehran.

<sup>571</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/2, 7.1.1959, Tehran.

<sup>572</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133001, EP1011/1, 6.1.1958.

the Afro-Asian, group of nations. To this end any strengthening of Iranian links with Western Europe, e.g. with Italy or Spain, should be welcomed by us in principle. ... We cannot, therefore, afford to forget that the westward orientation of Iran rests on the narrow basis of the Shah and the upper class. And, so long as this basis remains narrow, internal stability as well as westward orientation can never be taken for granted. We must rather regard Iran as still largely uncommitted in the ideological sense; as in part leaning towards, and in part reacting against, the West and ourselves, the British.<sup>573</sup>

It is sentiments such as these that persuade anti-Western elements in Turkey that Turkey was encouraged, if not forced, to Europeanise itself. Be that as it may, the westernisation achieved in Turkey seemed impractical in Iran, and the regime eventually collapsed in 1979. The British Ambassador wrote from Tehran that "as you are aware, politics in Iran today begin and end with the Shah. During the past four years he has steadily concentrated power and executive authority in his own hands."<sup>574</sup> All his rivals had been pushed or had fallen out of the way. Giving details on how the Shah eliminated his opponents it claimed that there was no outstanding figure capable of rallying opinion or initiating policies against the Shah's wishes. "Like Eclipse, the Shah truly comes first and the rest nowhere."<sup>575</sup>

Another dispatch clarified the dominance of the Shah by giving more details about how he handled his ministers, officials etc. "The political plane has been dominated by the ascendancy of the Shah, not merely over his ministers, but over every organ of government."<sup>576</sup> The patterns of his personal rule were "steadily becoming clearer. He alone determined policy; all the strings of control were firmly in his hands. Through his trustees in the Army and the newly formed Security Organisation, he kept himself minutely informed of everything."<sup>577</sup> He interested himself "increasingly and unhealthily" in the "minutiae of government

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<sup>573</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133009, EP1018/2, 17.2.1958. Note the frequently used punctuation of three dots are in the original.

<sup>574</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133009, EP1018/2, 17.2.1958, Tehran.

<sup>575</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133009, EP1018/2, 17.2.1958, Tehran.

<sup>576</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133001, EP1011/1, 6.1.1958.

<sup>577</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133001, EP1011/1, 6.1.1958.

contracts and private (notably Royal Family) business deals. Even when away he still pulled all the strings.”<sup>578</sup>

The British were naturally delighted with the suppression of the opposition. However a time came when the Shah felt obliged to make more concessions to the opposition to secure his place in his Palace. That is where the trouble started for the British as the British Ambassador in Tehran recorded: “The trouble is that the Shah is unlikely to draw the opposition’s teeth by making a few harmless concessions.”<sup>579</sup>

The Shah had various means to secure his position. A Government communiqué was issued on 27th of February. A foreign news agency reported rumours to the effect that a plot “has been recently uncovered in Iran. These rumours have caused speculation among the public. ... There are indications of growing concern on the part of the Shah at the extent of the plot, and the Americans fear an attempt to pin the blame on foreigners and on themselves in particular.”<sup>580</sup>

Indeed, it was true that the Shah played a successful game. On 28 February the arrest of General Qarani, and hints of other arrests were announced. On 1 March the extensive circulation of a scurrilous forged letter, purporting to have been written on 8 October 1957, by Mr F. Dulles to Mr Chapin, US Ambassador in Iran, clearly designed to implicate the Americans in a conspiracy against the Shah. The Ambassador said he had “no doubt at all that the leak was specifically designed to prepare for the communiqué,” though it was by no means clear what precise object the press campaign was intended to serve. He went on to say that presumably the Government wanted to give the Americans a fright (they have

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<sup>578</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>579</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133009, EP1018/2, 17.2.1958, Tehran.

<sup>580</sup> Ibid., ./4A, 28.2.1958, Tehran.

certainly succeeded) but then the Shah may have got cold feet. The principal aim of the publicity however may be to frighten off Iranians from seeking contact with, or at least support from, foreigners. ... The Americans, on the other hand, are not yet out of the wood. ... If the Shah were to fall out with the mullahs at this juncture, the consequences might be much more serious than anything which has developed.<sup>581</sup>

The British Ambassador in Tehran was perfectly right in his assessment of the situation in Iran and indeed the leak served its purpose in the short term, but this was not enough for the long term health of the regime. Eventually when the Shah was toppled from his throne the consequences were, as the British Ambassador rightly predicted, much more serious than anything, which has developed in the Middle East, as it entirely changed the course of events with respect to American relations with the region.

The so-called Qarani conspiracy was, the British Ambassador noted, "a fascinating affair - currents of right-wing opportunism and idealism" leading to vague theories of reform and the drawing up of a shadow cabinet list, followed by approaches for support and guidance first to the US Embassy and then to HMG's Embassy; discovery and denunciation; investigation and arrests by the security organisation, exaggeration, rumour and governmental anxieties that the Anglo-Americans, particularly the latter, had been planning a "coup to establish a strong Prime Minister to balance the power of the Shah; the circulation of a cleverly forged and maliciously anti-Shah letter designed to promote an Iran-American crisis, and, then, anti-climax."<sup>582</sup>

When he allied himself firmly with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact, the Shah made a number of calculations; he could swing an unenthusiastic public; he would be associating with the sort of people who would be congenial; he would have

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<sup>581</sup> Ibid., ./7, 4.3.1958, Tehran.

<sup>582</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/2, 22.4.1958.

rich friends who would give him ample loans to tide over the financial difficulties of the next few years; given Iran's exposed strategic position, he would be entitled to receive massive military aid. This would help to make Iran secure against internal troubles as well as external aggression. After two years, only the first two of these calculations had been fulfilled according to expectation. He wanted to show his people that he could record dramatic progress. "The Western alliance has not served this purpose as effectively as he hoped. In his heart of hearts, he must know that he is too deeply committed with the West to go fully into reverse. The risks would [be] too great."<sup>583</sup>

When Washington announced its program of non-military aid to Iran in early December, an impressive total of 112 million dollars for the July 1957-1958 period, the Shah was dissatisfied with this amount. This dissatisfaction found an outlet in a critical attitude towards the Baghdad Pact which he claimed had yielded little benefit to Iran, notably on the military side. He had gone so far as to hint that "Iran might have to consider withdrawing from the Pact".<sup>584</sup>

In fact, there were other reasons for the Shah to reconsider his attitude about the Baghdad Pact, though the British were not happy with what was seen as source of dissatisfaction. Writing from Tehran, for example, the British Ambassador stated that "for obvious reasons Government must decline absolutely to discuss in public the precise plans which the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact would work out. ... Dr Amini [Iranian Prime Minister] professed complete agreement".<sup>585</sup>

This secret plan was about the defence of the Middle East in general and Iran

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<sup>583</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133001, EP1011/1, 6.1.1958.

<sup>584</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/1, 21.1.1958.

<sup>585</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120738, EP1192/1, 2.1.1956.

in particular. The mere mention of the Zagros line<sup>586</sup> suggested to the Iranians the abandonment of the greater part of Iran to Soviet Russia and "the occupation of the remainder by UK troops and their allies," in order to retain control of the oil-producing areas as happened during the two world wars. As regards the presentation of the problem, however, no Iranian Government could admit that their plan for the defence of the country involved abandoning two-thirds of it without a serious attempt at resistance. If it was widely believed in Iran that this was the Baghdad Pact strategy, it would deal a fatal blow to Iranian morale, would destroy any prospect of a loyalty to the western alliance and would encourage them to revert to neutralism or to come to some arrangement, e.g. a non-aggression pact, with the USSR.<sup>587</sup>

In his report describing the opinion of the Iranian Government, HM Ambassador in Tehran noted that, Zelli's views "if not of Iranian people and their government," briefly were:

a- The Americans had made it known some two years ago, and never withdrawn, that the line of defence in Iran was the Zagros Mountains, since the important thing was to protect the oil.

b- The British could certainly not provide the troops to protect Iran, nor would the other Baghdad Pact powers. Consequently the military value of the Pact to Iran was zero.

c- No economic benefits seemed likely to occur to Iran from the economic side of the Pact. It was ridiculous to suggest that "peaceful uses of Atomic Energy" had any application to Iran with its vast resources of energy in the form of oil. Britain had admitted that she could make no financial contribution. Therefore, the Pact was economically zero to Iran.

d- Far greater help had been extended by the West to neutrals, such as Egypt and India, than to ally Iran. I did my best to answer the above changes, although I did not feel on very secure ground in doing so; particularly since, if I were an Iranian, I would feel like Mr Zelli.<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> Samsun-Hatay line was proposed by the Western allies but Turkey categorically rejected it. The US and the UK wanted to leave east of Samsun-Hatay line to the responsibility of CENTO, which was planned to have its own armed forces. See Yavuzalp, op. cit., p.69.

<sup>587</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120738, EP1192/3, 4.1.1956.

<sup>588</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120725, EP1071/1, 16.2.1956.

The Shah was frightened by a growing Arab nationalism and unity under Nasser. Therefore, he did not create any trouble for the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. In order to balance the growing weight of the Arab World, he intended to recognise Israel and/or form an Aryan Confederation with Pakistan and Afghanistan, grouping of over a hundred million Muslims which would be able to deal with both the Arab World and India on more or less equal terms.<sup>589</sup> "Fanciful as this idea may appear, it has already gained a number of adherents in Tehran" the Ambassador noted. Another embroidery on this theme was that the British Ambassador envisaged that "Pakistan would agree to an Iran-Pakistani Federation under the Shah's sovereignty in return for a share of Iranian oil revenues. Later, so it runs, the two countries would, with British and American assistance, swing Afghanistan into line. Iran's application to join ECAFE, presumably at the instigation of Pakistan, has some relevance here."<sup>590</sup>

As is clear from the documents, the Shah began to adhere to anything and anybody to save his regime. The more Iran was squeezed between the revolutionary regimes around herself and rebellious social forces inside the country the more the Shah's nerves strained and saw no limit to his search for a way out.

The Shah's military Adjutant, General Yazdanpanah, even went so far as to claim that Israel was an Iranian shield against Arabia. He also suggested that "it may well be that the Shah's insistence on expanding and modernising his army is based to some extent on his belief in its role as the defender of his southern, rather than his northern frontiers."<sup>591</sup>

When he became aware of the fact that neither foreign aid nor a strong army

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<sup>589</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133021, EP1072/3, 12.4.1958, Tehran.

<sup>590</sup> Ibid., op. loc.

<sup>591</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133021, EP1072/2, 17.2.1958.



were sufficient to secure his throne he formulated policy of "positive nationalism." This slogan was a typical piece of royal ingenuity, and had much to recommend it from a tactical standpoint. Its objects were to steal the clothes of the nationalists, to cash in on the development program and the oil revenue, to show at once that the Western alliance was to Iran's advantage but since it was also to a large extent on Iran's terms, it was no master-slave relationship.<sup>592</sup>

Despite all these efforts to avoid a possible coup taking all the Western interests away, Great Britain was not satisfied with these measures. The British feared that the "danger was that if the Shah continued with his present policies at home there might well be an internal explosion."<sup>593</sup>

Quite understandably the West employed counter-tactics to restrain the Shah. A timed leakage of an event was the traditional way of sending a message to friends as well as enemies. A note sent to the Foreign Office was as follows: "An attempt to assassinate Shah Reza Pehlevi will be made exactly three weeks from today. At this very moment the Russians are planning a coup in Iran. Get ready for something sensational to take place in Teheran in the last week of September or the first week of October."<sup>594</sup>

Meanwhile the New York Times wrote that, "If Iran collapses it will mean the end of the rump Baghdad Pact, a need to revise our own basic strategy and, perhaps war."<sup>595</sup>

The fact is that most Iranians were convinced that "Iran is effectively in the

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<sup>592</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/3, 30.7.1958.

<sup>593</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140817, EP1071/17, 1.10.1959.

<sup>594</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140818, EP1071/14, 27.8.1959, Tehran.

<sup>595</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140809, EP10345/22, 28.9.1959, Washington, quoted from New York Times, 28.9.1959 by C.L Sulzberger.

hands of foreign powers and that nothing can happen in this country at present but by foreign initiative. Whereas the paramount power was formerly the British Empire it is now the US, supported by the UK.”<sup>596</sup> Many Iranians believed that those two powers upheld the Shah and his regime; and that if Iran was a poor and backward country it was because the Americans and the British wished it so or because they were grudging of more generous assistance.

Great Britain had learned enough lessons from the coups that had been taking place in the colonies as well as in this part of the world and she was determined not to repeat similar mistakes in Iran. The British Ambassador stated in this respect that “I should have hoped we might all have learned our lesson from Iraq. I cannot believe it would suit our interest or the Americans’ to have here a July 14 blood-bath, followed by a Qassem-like figure teetering between Communism and Nationalism.”<sup>597</sup>

The Shah was aware that in spite of all the foreign aid guarantees it might not be possible to secure his throne. His efforts to implement the “land reform” project as well as “providing jobs for the unemployed” and his attempts to remove the feudal atmosphere, bribery and corruption gnawing at the administrative machinery are worthy of notice. However, “the presentation of all these efforts as favours for the people and the non-existence of structural changes towards democracy will cause the Shah difficulties in getting rid of the nightmare in which he is living.”<sup>598</sup>

On Western advice the Shah let the elections take place to avoid a social explosion or a military coup. Yet, he tried to shape even the political parties in the way he wanted. He did not allow the real opposition to participate in the elections.

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<sup>596</sup> Ibid., ./12, 16.4.1959, Tehran.

<sup>597</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140809, EP10345/9, 19.3.1959, Tehran.

<sup>598</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140793, EP1019/1, 22.6.1959.

Yet it was a sort of relief in the political atmosphere of the country. The August elections were the first held in Iran on the basis of a two-party system. They were between the Nationalists, who won, and the People's Party. But as the American Ambassador observed, "actually there is no genuine difference between the two parties."<sup>599</sup> Both the social classes they represented and their goals were similar. Of course this development was not seen as sufficient and further reforms were needed the following year. The Shah called these reforms the White Revolution in order to give the impression that a revolution was being carried out in Iran as well. As the Western Powers had enough experiences in the region concerning the coups and their possible consequences this so called revolution was successfully carried out and by doing so, a social explosion incited by the intellectuals, clergy and unhappy military elements, was avoided. As the British Ambassador wrote from Baghdad, Mr Strachey "said that he did not meet a single person in Iran outside their Embassy who believed that the Shah and the present regime had the remotest chance of surviving."<sup>600</sup> Because he perceived that middle class and upper class youth looked around and saw Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan all, in their eyes, making some degree of progress and all having their revolution. "They were all convinced that nothing could be done until Iran too had its revolution. Mr Strachey thought that this might come at any time, next week, next year or in three or four years."<sup>601</sup>

Indeed after similar discussions on a "rescue operation" both decided that "we and the Americans should go to the Shah and formally tell him that unless he carried out the sort of reforms which we all know to be necessary we, or rather

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<sup>599</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149816, EP1671/15, 8.11.1960, Washington.

<sup>600</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149875, EQ1051/8, 20.1.1960, Baghdad.

<sup>601</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149875, EQ1051/8, 20.1.1960, Baghdad.

the Americans would stop subsidising him.”<sup>602</sup> Asked about the reactions of the intellectuals, Mr Strachey told the British Ambassador that he thought that they would welcome it. The British thought that “the withdrawal of the Iranians would presumably mean collapse of the Baghdad Pact and a major defeat for the West.”<sup>603</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the United States was aware that any move for an intervention to encourage reform in Iran would backfire. The aid program could have some influence toward reform, but it was hampered thus far by a measure of waste and lack of direction for the Americans in addition to obstacles on the local scene. Yet the Americans preferred to put pressure on the Shah to choose his policy wisely when the choice was between reform today and revolution tomorrow.

Indeed, the Shah was persuaded to carry out a reform package that he was to call the “White Revolution” later in 1961. Speaking in terms of the Middle Eastern defence, Iran was much weaker and more unstable than Turkey and Iraq. It added no significant military strength to the Middle Eastern defence. She gave little solid assurance of continuity either in internal or foreign policies. Her negotiations with the USSR on a non-aggression pact early in 1959 conveyed a message to the Western powers that her reversion to neutrality and a balancing of the great powers was not out of the question. This would not be to the Western liking. Yet Iran’s membership of CENTO was important only as it served the end of greater strength and stability; it was considered harmful if it tended to generate internal conflict and to increase opportunities for outside meddling. More than formal allies Iran needed encouragement, help and time to settle down and build sound institutions to keep up with the Western alignment.

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<sup>602</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149875, EQ1051/8, 20.1.1960, Baghdad.

<sup>603</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140706, EB10334/4, 17.2.1959.

As the *détente* era began to operate in the international system, Iran, too, like Turkey, began to change her priorities, even if she was not forced to do so by changing United States priorities in the Middle East. By the mid-1960s, therefore, the Iranian foreign policy started to move away from earlier and overwhelming preoccupation with the Communist threat to the north and “tended to pay more and more attention to threats to Iranian interests in the south, particularly in the Persian Gulf.”<sup>604</sup> The US attached increasing importance to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf area. Her growing interest, backed with military and naval presence, increased tension in the area. The US saw Iran as its outpost in the region, and Iranians were happy to turn their attention south at American behest. Iran had vital interests in the Gulf (oil, trade and security). She felt strong enough, with Western support in reserve behind her, to assert some of her claims by the end of 1950s: the demand for joint control of the Shatt al-Arab, proper representation in Kuwait, occupation of any unoccupied islands, closer relations with the Sheikdoms and Bahrain. Those were, of course, understandably encouraged by Great Britain and the US, because Iraq already fell out of the way by the coup in 1958 and the Arab nationalism led by Nasser was still against the British presence in the region. Therefore, the Shah was the preferred ruler in the region to support. Thanks to the generous American moral and material support, the Shah maintained his rule over his country until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In fact, before the decade ended, the Middle East in general ceased to be the main centre of interest and attention had moved to the Far East, to Europe and to Africa South of Sahara.<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>604</sup> Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>605</sup> ‘The Middle East,’ *Survey of International Affairs*, (October 1957-December 1958), p. 399.

Pakistan with its geographical location and large population was another important country for the West and an indispensable part of the defence chain linking SEATO to the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and thus to NATO via Turkey. The West therefore wanted to control Pakistani foreign policy. Its strategic importance was enhanced by its closeness to three most populous nations in the world, China, India and the USSR, all of which were against the Western designs globally as well as regionally. Pakistan was a country with a military potential, a dislike of communism, and a willingness to stand up and be counted.

On the other hand, Pakistan had its own problems; Kashmir, border disputes with its neighbours and Canal waters with India. She was aware that she was not able to solve them alone neither through bilateral nor via the UN. Indefinite postponement was not obviously helping to solve the Kashmiri problem. Indefinite continuance gave the advantage to the party in occupation, namely India. Therefore, Pakistan was in search of international support and this, the Pakistani rulers believed, could be obtained by alignment with the West in general and the US in particular.<sup>606</sup> For Pakistan, her alignment with Turkey and SEATO in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 meant military, economic and diplomatic support. Pakistan, a recently established country was really not expected to interest herself in Middle Eastern defence initiatives. Her apparent alignment with the West or her estrangement from other major forces was more than enough for the West. At least one could say that Pakistan engaged in the defence of the Middle East not because of her realisation of the need for the Middle Eastern defence, but rather for more immediate reasons such as Kashmir and border disputes with her neighbours. If all these border disputes were settled in her favour Pakistan would get

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<sup>606</sup> Jillani, Anees, 'Pakistan and CENTO: An Historical Analysis,' *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, (Fall 1991), p. 41.

approximately four times more than India.<sup>607</sup> There was stalemate in this respect too.

Commenting on the problem, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Manzur Qadir noted that within the last eleven years there had been fourteen proposals. He suggested that "if the interested parties cannot agree, the only other peaceful alternative is to let someone else decide. Indefinite postponements are not solutions. They are only means for indefinite continuance of the advantage gained by the party in occupation."<sup>608</sup>

In Pakistan, it was actually just a few strong persons who aligned the country with the West, just like its other friends in Iran, Iraq and perhaps to a lesser extent Turkey. Campbell summarised Pakistan's position accurately:

Behind them, and behind the front of solidarity with the West, is a nation that has not yet found political stability. Handicapped by its geographical division into two separate territories dissimilar in population, history and outlook, it has been held together by the bonds of religion, by antipathy to India, and by the leadership of men like Jinnah, Luliaqat Ali Khan, and Mohammed Ayub. How well it will weather the inevitable crises of the future is an open question. ... Moreover, if Pakistan is to have a role in the Middle East it will not be because of its armed strength or its membership in the Baghdad Pact but primarily because, as an Islamic nation of 70 million souls that has preserved some part of its British heritage and found strength in its own institutions, it may exert a healthy influence on other Moslem nations and help to bring Arab and non-Arab states closer together.<sup>609</sup>

The expectation that Pakistan would positively influence coreligionists in the Arab world persuaded the British, albeit reluctantly, to accept the American proposal of a Northern Tier project after the abortive attempt to establish MEDO in 1953. Although Pakistan worked quite hard to bring the Middle Eastern countries closer and aligned with the West but in the end like its fellow Muslim country Turkey, it inevitably failed to achieve any expansion of the Baghdad Pact into the

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<sup>607</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144467, DY1042/3, 17.1.1959, Washington.

<sup>608</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 144467, DY1042/3, 17.1.1959, Washington.

<sup>609</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

Arab world.

Ten years of difficult diplomacy in the UN made Pakistani authorities lose faith in the international community in respect of solutions to their problems. In addition to the foreign policy difficulties, the internal problems too remained without solution for a decade. The Army headed by Ayub Khan, decided to take power in 1958. The Pakistani Ambassador in Tehran noted that "changes of regime in Pakistan caused some anxiety. The *coup d'état* was interpreted by some as a British device to anticipate a revolution, and was generally not welcomed. Discussion of the Aryan Union of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan was discontinued."<sup>610</sup> One wonders whether this coup was planned to disrupt such an attempt.<sup>611</sup>

She, too, was disillusioned with the economic, military and diplomatic support that she received from the West and eventually neither the Western Powers nor the regional member countries were satisfied with the various Middle East defence initiatives and all lost ground to the Soviet political and diplomatic counter attacks. The headworks of the Pakistan canals, which were under India's control, were turned off and people in Pakistan faced famine conditions. This was a very serious problem for Pakistan and resulted partly from her pro-Western policies. Although Pakistan managed to maintain her independence, she was not in a strong position with regard to her neighbour India, her other neighbour, China or the Soviet Union, which was not a neighbour but a potential danger to any country in the world if it was suffering from poverty.

She even sometimes failed to defend her national cause in the meetings of the Baghdad Pact, while pretending that the Baghdad Pact was "for" this aim. For ex-

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<sup>610</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 133003, EP1013/4, 6.11.1958.

<sup>611</sup> It is worth noting here that compared with other members of the Baghdad Pact there were quite few documents on Pakistan in Public Record Office as well as in the Library of Congress.



ample in April 1956 Mohammed Ali, Pakistani Prime Minister, insisted that some references to Kashmir in the conference communiqué were essential to reassure Pakistan public opinion. If there was no such reference, the Pakistan public would doubt the value of membership of the Pact. What he got was complete exclusion of Kashmir from the communiqué. HM Ambassador defended this attitude when he wrote to the Foreign Office on the ground that "any more public references will ruin any chance we have of influencing Nehru in London in June".<sup>612</sup>

When the Americans did not give careful attention to their demands Ayub Khan began seriously to reconsider his foreign policy line. Ikramullah confirmed that Ayub Khan's statement was intended to convey that "if there were no expansion of military aid from friendly countries, Pakistan would be unable to undertake any external military obligations under the Pact."<sup>613</sup> However, Pakistan, like any other small power, had no option but to align herself with one of the superpowers and the US was destined to be her ally regardless of her own genuine wishes.

One could not easily claim that the revolutions in this part of the world were all planned by the imperialist powers and they were taking place at the time and in the way that the imperialists wanted. However, whatever reasons or motives were behind the revolutions, the imperialists were clever and capable enough to influence, if not direct, the new rulers of the countries involved. Therefore, revolutions rarely changed the course of events drastically.<sup>614</sup> On the other hand, one should not forget that it was all these revolutions that considerably changed the course of relations with the Western World in favour of the exploited nations in long term.

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<sup>612</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 123674, DY1071/2, 13.4.1956.

<sup>613</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140714, EB1071/9D, 13.8.1959, Karachi.

<sup>614</sup> The Iranian revolution is almost the only exception in this respect.

As well as the Muslim members of the Pact, Jordan had a special place as far as the security of Israel was concerned. Jordan was also important for the Baghdad Pact, since it was the most likely candidate for membership if the Arab countries would ever join. Having cordial relations with Turkey, the Hashemite King of Jordan, together with Iraqi rulers, constituted a pro-Western bloc against the radical nationalist Arab countries led by Nasser's Egypt. When Egypt united with Syria in 1958 Hashemite rulers of Jordan and Iraq reacted to this by forming a federation between themselves. As the July coup swept away the rulers of Iraq, King Hussein declared himself the King of both Jordan and Iraq, but it soon became clear that federation would not work. Eventually, in order to maintain friendly relations with Jordan, the US and the UK came to an agreement to grant the former economic and military aid. Reacting to this, Al Shaab's account of the Anglo-American agreement with Jordan, said to have resulted from the visits to Washington and London of King Hussein and the Jordanian Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, was, the British thought, more plausible, being largely a repetition of known or assumed facts. Thus, America and Britain were to grant financial and military aid to Jordan of the order of 50 million dollars, but in return, Al Shaab said, "Jordan will maintain her estrangement with the UAR, will be used as a military base to stop the infiltration of communism, and will adopt a neutral attitude in the present dispute between the Arabs and Israel." For Al Shaab "it has become quite clear that there is a tacit pact between the imperialists and their stooges in this part of the world, including communist agents."<sup>615</sup>

Always there is sufficient apparent conviction expressed to inspire the question

how much is policy, how much suspicion, how much plain neurosis; Probably as usual in the Middle East there is a bit of everything involved; and some diplomatic observers have even adopted the plausible belief that Russian intelligence is deliberately

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<sup>615</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140946, EQ10338/10, 6.5.1959.

planting stories about collusion with the West against Arab nationalism in order to keep President Nasser in a state of physiological isolation.<sup>616</sup>

Such plans and assessments indicate how truly convoluted the politics of the Middle East are and serve as a timely reminder that the situation is usually more complicated than it may seem on the surface. Indeed they may help to explain why the Arabs are so often confused about their problems, both internal and external. A foreign finger can usually be found in any problem in the region. So the Arabs have always been cautious and indecisive in their policies ever since the famous Arab rebellion in 1915.

Having no friendly relations with Turkey due to the question of Hatay, the Syrian government was reluctant to participate in any defence initiatives in the Middle East. Syria was also unhappy about Iraq and Jordan because both of them supported Turkey in its dispute with Syria over the Hatay question. This eventually led the Syrians to seek external help, which was generously granted by the Soviets. When the Turks suspected that some communist elements had infiltrated into Syria, where an anti-western government was in power, Turkey began to calculate the possibility of external intervention, thereby hoping to win the American favour and build up credit for the future, but they worked hard to stop Turkey from such intervention in 1957. In 1958 Syria ended her isolation by uniting with Egypt, but it lasted only three years.

Lebanese politics had always been dominated by pro-western governments. However that was not sufficient to bring Lebanon into the Baghdad Pact. Turkey as well as the West initially hoped that Lebanon would adhere to the Pact, but the internal turmoil and Egyptian opposition prevented this from happening. When

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<sup>616</sup> Ibid., ./10, 6.5.1959, FO, London.

the coup took place in Iraq, the US felt obliged to land American marines to the country in order to save Chamoun's rule in Lebanon. When the Americans realised that the possibility of revolution in Lebanon was over they evacuated their forces from there.

As Ali Sabri, the Director of Political Office of Egyptian Presidency, said, the situation in 1959 was very different from the situation in 1951; the USSR was incomparably stronger militarily, economically and diplomatically; in 1951 the UAR had not been in a position to act freely, whereas in 1959, it could, and so it was a factor in the situation.<sup>617</sup>

In short, Turkey used all means available to bring more Arab countries into the Baghdad Pact, but failed. Although Turkey did her best to maintain Western interests in the region, her efforts were thwarted by strong Arab nationalism, successful Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres and miscalculation of the West about the influence and power of the radical Arabs. As a result, none of the Arab countries joined the Mutual Agreement between Turkey and Iraq and instead of improving relations between the West and the Arab countries the Western defence initiatives alienated these countries from the West more than ever. These initiatives also created an opportunity for the USSR to penetrate into the Middle East with the help of local nationalisms, namely Arab and Kurdish nationalisms. In the late 1950s, Turkey found herself strongly aligned with powerful Western countries but completely isolated from the rest of the world.

The reasons why the West's influence had declined and the Communist Bloc was winning the contest in the Middle East in the 1950s and also the extent to which this happened and the consequences of this contest will be discussed in the

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<sup>617</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140952, EQ1051/16, 5.2.1959.

following chapter.

## Chapter VII

# THE COLLAPSE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

### 7.1 General

Despite all political and diplomatic efforts of Great Britain and generous financial support of the US the failure of the Baghdad Pact was inevitable. In this chapter, we should focus on the causes of this failure, the political consequences of the Pact for the West as well as for the Middle East, long term measures taken by the West after the collapse of the Pact, and finally concentrate separately on the position of each regional member of the Pact, paying particular attention on Turkey.

The British, whose goal was to hold on to the military value of British treaty rights in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, for as long as possible, perceived the defence of the Middle East as a means of continuing British influence in the region. This was their "inner defence" strategy centred on the "inner ring" whose locus was Suez.<sup>618</sup> This was not because the Suez was under Communist threat, it was due, understandably, to British imperial interests.

For Britons, especially those long associated with the Middle East, there was no joy in retreat from the last British strongholds in the region. Yet it was pertinent for them to consider whether the reasons for taking the strongholds in the first place and for keeping them since were still valid. The original purpose was to

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<sup>618</sup> McGhee, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

protect India and the routes of the British Empire; but India was no longer a British responsibility and most of the empire in Asia was gone. The last efforts were intended to safeguard Britain's vital oil supplies in the area of the Persian Gulf; but this was an interest of all Western Europe and of other countries as well, including the United States.

Despite the renunciation of "imperialist" aims and privileges, Soviet policy maintained many of the traditional conceptions of Russian strategic interests followed by the Tsarist regime, e.g., control of the Black Sea, egress for Russian naval power through the Straits, and spheres of influence in the Balkans and toward the Persian Gulf. Soviet policy had been dynamic and actively expansionist.<sup>619</sup>

Britain was obliged to transfer her responsibility in the Middle East to the United States, but this did not mean that both countries were to agree on every single point concerning the protection of the Western interests in the region. So, their differences remained even when they desperately needed a "united Western front" against the USSR. In time, the breakdown of unity between Britain and the United States was less noticeable but even more serious. Yet, despite differences of approach the two powers seemed to be agreed on the importance of defence of the Middle East against the Soviets. Both supported the Baghdad Pact. Minor troubles reflecting differences in attitude toward Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia were not permitted to shake the general agreement on the main lines of policy. That policy, judging by the British acceptance of the withdrawal from the Suez base in 1954 and later from those in Iraq, seemed to envisage a gradual Western retreat from positions that local nationalism would no longer accept. No agreement existed on how far and how fast the process was to go. As in the past, the degree of pressure

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<sup>619</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

which nationalism could generate would probably be the determining factor. But the idea of a gradual transition to a new system based on consent seemed to be at least tacitly accepted by both Great Britain and the United States. Indeed, when the decolonisation process started in 1960s, the whole Arab world was eager to enjoy independence as a result of such strong nationalism.

Measures to ensure continued access to Middle East petroleum resources were seen as necessary, because it was, at least for the next ten years, vital to the security of Western Europe. Now, it depended only on the maintenance of friendly and influential relations with those countries. In this connection, the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, the British position in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf in general and finally United States' relations with Saudi Arabia were very important.

Underlying the West's involvement in the Middle East throughout the 20th century were its interests first in the oil and second in the survival of the Israeli state and perhaps finally in its strategic geographical location, though this used to have the first priority till the beginning of the century. Western politicians were anxious to prevent the USSR gaining control over Middle East oil or over the routes by which it was transported to the West. Although the United States could get along without Middle Eastern oil, Western Europe could not. A few figures will illustrate the extent of Western European dependence, and vulnerability. Their oil requirements by 1959 were over 3,300,000 barrels a day, (over 20 per cent of the total energy used). Between 70 and 80 per cent of European imports of crude oil came from the Middle East.<sup>620</sup>

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<sup>620</sup> Ibid., p. 250. Ashton recorded that according to the British figures, this figure was 90 per cent. Ashton, *op. cit.*, p. 124.



The crisis of 1956, when the Suez Canal was blocked<sup>621</sup> and the pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean were cut, showed how vulnerable the Western European economy was to the interruption or sharp diminution of these supplies. They were not entirely cut off: some 200,000 barrels still moved to Europe daily by pipeline from Saudi Arabia, and some of the tankers which had previously gone through the Suez delivered oil by the longer route around the Cape. The crisis was surmounted, because the loss of Middle Eastern oil was not lasting (the canal was open again in May 1957 and the pipelines from Iraq were in partial operation by March of that year), and was almost matched by added supplies from the Western Hemisphere. If the whole supply from the Middle East were unavailable and/or the Soviet rulers had it under their control, to turn the tap on or off at their whim, it would be very doubtful if Europe could stand the financial strain of meeting its requirements indefinitely from the American continents.

Once the British, like any other colonial power, settled in the region, they began to maintain their position by every available means. One of the well known means was the famous "divide and rule."<sup>622</sup> Dividing Arab territories into twenty two countries seems to be result of such a policy. In order to maintain their influence over these countries, Great Britain tried to direct affairs from behind the scenes by urging local allies to initiate groupings such as the Arab League and the Baghdad Pact too.

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<sup>621</sup> Günver mentioned that, only one Turkish ship was passing through the Suez Canal a month yet we interested ourselves so closely with negotiations in London.

<sup>622</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p. 308. Jordan is a case in point, a state kept in being by the rivalries of others both inside and outside the Middle East. Created arbitrarily by the British for their own strategic purposes and to establish a throne for their friend Abdullah, its original frontiers were but arbitrary lines drawn or left vague in the desert. It was obvious that Transjordan would never be able to stand on its own feet. In fact the US regarded Jordan a country which has no logical *raison d'être*. See 'The Eisenhower Doctrine, Soviet Policy and Arab Reactions,' *Survey of International Affairs*, (December 1956-October 1957), p. 173.

Another tactic was to keep the traditional rulers in power and through them to maintain Western interests. Pressure was mounting on Western oil companies for arrangements more favourable to producing and transit countries. The American intelligence service stated that, "at least as long as conservative governments remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western interests can probably be worked out."<sup>623</sup>

As seen already in the previous chapters, every country had its own problem to cope with. So, every single country tended to join the Baghdad Pact for a different set of reasons. As these have already been explained we shall only briefly recall them here since those conflicting expectations were bound to cause failure of the Pact. For instance, Turkey did not seriously expect the Middle Eastern countries to contribute to her national defence against Soviet expansionism. If Turkey nonetheless pressed her neighbours to form such a defence pact, this was mainly due to her responsibility in the region, which she assumed as a result of the negotiations, in which she promised the West to "defend the Western interests in the region" as her "national duty."<sup>624</sup> On the other hand, Turkey, its forces already committed to NATO, could not be expected to do more in the east than try to hold its own territory. However, since the mid-1950s Turkey, too, had a foreign policy problem to wrestle with in the shape of Cyprus.<sup>625</sup> So, Turkey, though she had not joined the Pact with that problem in mind, thereafter considered the Baghdad Pact a platform where she could publicise her views on the subject and gain international support. The same was true for Pakistan with regard to the

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<sup>623</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, National Intelligence Estimate, Near East Developments Affecting United States Interests, 8.10.1957, p. 611.

<sup>624</sup> Birmingham Post, 15.5.1951. Erkmen regrettably acknowledged this statement during the interview. Reading from his personal notes, Akşit also stated that Turkish relations with the West drastically changed as Turkey accepted this role in the Middle East.

<sup>625</sup> See the fourth chapter pp. 150-153.

Kashmir and for Iraq on the Palestine question. Generally speaking, Iraq and Iran were woefully weak and Pakistan was absorbed in its disputes with India. All three had joined primarily in order to get arms from the United States rather than out of faith in the concept of regional security. Britain, ironically, never accepted those problems as being within the Pact's area of interest as she, too, had her own reasons to join the Pact: to save her position in Iraq and to bolster a sagging influence throughout the Middle East. The Pact mainly served her own interests since Britain was the dominant power. Therefore, the Pact understandably stopped even discussing the Palestinian question as soon as Iraq abandoned the Pact *de facto* 1958. Finally, the refusal of the United States to join had left all members with a feeling they had been deceived and let down.<sup>626</sup>

As seen from the above explanation, the Baghdad Pact failed, because the assumptions as well as the foundations were wrong: three of the regional members did not see the USSR as their major threat. Pakistanis regarded India as their main danger, Iraq proclaimed Israel the main enemy to the region, and Iranians felt they were being exploited more by the British and Americans than by the Russians. Therefore, if there was any threat to be protected against, it must have quite logically been the Western threat with the help of some "other nations" whoever they may be, not the other way around. So, Iran, too, was not genuinely after a Western protective umbrella, but was forced to join the Baghdad Pact and as far as the Shah himself was concerned, this accession was, meant to secure the Shah's throne against the internal elements not the Middle East against the external threat, the USSR. Turkey always considered the USSR as a threat, but the Turkish attitude in aligning herself with the West in the 1950s could not be

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<sup>626</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

explained only by this historical factor. It may have helped the process but the main motivation behind the Turkish alignment with the West was due to the characteristic of the Kemalist regime irrespective of this perception of the Russian threat.<sup>627</sup> Turkey was never sincere in attempting to defend the Middle East but used it as a springboard to become a NATO member in order to be able to defend herself against the USSR as well as become more integrated with the West in accordance with Kemalist aims. So, the assumptions were wrong, the foundations were false and thus the failure and decease were inevitable.

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<sup>627</sup> Interview with Gülek

## 7.2 Reasons for the Baghdad Pact's Failure

However, as the Americans admitted, the situation in certain Middle Eastern areas had deteriorated since the first Baghdad Pact Council meeting. Two interacting factors produced this result. One of them was the intensification of Soviet activity and the other was the further growth of "false nationalism" accompanied by "irrational neutralism". The "result was that some countries had been weakened and had become increasingly susceptible to Soviet Communist intrigue. Leaders of certain countries [were] apparently willing [to] rely on Soviet promises to achieve success."<sup>628</sup> In fact, deterioration of relations between the West and the pro-Western countries was understandable because "those countries which caused trouble or disturbances, i.e. Egypt, Afghanistan, even Jordan did better than those which remained quiet and well-behaved"<sup>629</sup> in terms of getting economic aid.

Another disadvantage for the West was the fact that the students, a real political force in the Middle Eastern countries, "have been drawn toward communism and xenophobia by their dissatisfaction with the existing order and their susceptibility to the argument that the West is to blame."<sup>630</sup>

Much of the trouble the Western powers harvested in the Middle East, indeed, grew out of the impression that they were trying to dragoon nations into alliances against their will. So, Soviet propaganda made inroads in the Middle East by playing upon this very theme. Therefore, the Baghdad Pact "like the Arab League, might well be left to find its own level as a Middle Eastern organisation. Perhaps it will gently fade into obscurity like its predecessor, the Sadabad Pact of 1937,"<sup>631</sup>

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<sup>628</sup> *FRUS*, Vol.12, op. cit., p. 292.

<sup>629</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120731, EP1105/1, 26.1.1956.

<sup>630</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p. 299.

<sup>631</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243.

which linked Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan.

Moreover, the strong Egyptian opposition to the Pact also had an immense negative effect on the regional countries.<sup>632</sup> The Voice of Arabs, broadcasting to all the Arab world, identified as Zionists those who associated with the West and declared them to be the enemies of the Arabs. The radio cited Turkey as “a main instrument of the West and a state which supports Israel in rendering our Arabs homeless”. It said the Baghdad Pact was a link in the imperialist chain.

Not only the nationalist Arabs but also the Kurds, one of the destabilising elements in the Middle East, were against the Baghdad Pact. They did not know much about the workings of the Pact, but, they suspected that close co-operation between the three governments could easily bring about the squeeze of the Kurds. Therefore, on one hand, the Baghdad Pact was to disadvantage of the Kurds who were forced to cease their national activities in each separate country, on the other hand, it served them to become more nationally conscious for a United Kurdistan.

Criticism of the Baghdad Pact by Tito as one of the influential names of the Non-Aligned movement was another cause of failure. Like Nasser he emphasised on the “disruptive influence of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine”<sup>633</sup> and the Pact’s disuniting influence on the Arab countries.

Some comments, which appeared in the American Press, shared the same view. The Philadelphia Bulletin, for example, commented that “the Pact has been assailed as divisive, since it split Iraq from its Arab neighbours, and its value was questioned when Russia overleaped it to develop relations with Egypt and

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<sup>632</sup> British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd noted in his personal diary that he hated the efficacy of Radio Cairo “as powerful as Goebbels.” Kyle, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

<sup>633</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127822, VB1071/3, 17.7.1957, London.

Syria.”<sup>634</sup> Together with other factors, these causes accelerated the failure of the Baghdad Pact.

Suppression and increasing opposition in Iraq was another factor. The situation in the Middle East in general was not very favourable to the West. Since Iraq started to plan for joining the Baghdad Pact, freedom of expression of opinion was suppressed by the government. Besides, Nasser launched a successful campaign against the rule of Nuri Said. It was obvious that this situation in Iraq could not last long. Iraq was suspected to terminate its membership and threaten the Western oil interests in Iraq if the West attacked Egypt. Meanwhile, even Saudi Arabia was expected to cut the oil flow to the Western Powers.<sup>635</sup>

Indeed the situation in Iraq did not last long and the 14 July revolution, terminating the Baghdad Pact, occurred just three years later following its establishment. With the overthrow of the monarchic rule, which was subordinate to the influence and directives of the West and which depended on the Baghdad Pact as one of the pillars of its policy in the region, the Pact became a matter of history as far as Iraq was concerned. The Iraqi revolution considerably weakened the Pact and compelled the Western powers that had formed it to seek out new ways and means of strengthening it, such as arming the regional member countries, establishing military bases in their territories and concluding military treaties with them with a view to reviving the Pact.<sup>636</sup>

The Baghdad Pact, as previously described, was destined to have a short life. It fell apart on 14 July 1958, with the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the only Arab country in the Pact. In the ensuing wave of Arab nationalism there was

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<sup>634</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 127838, VB1078/4, 22.6.1957, Washington.

<sup>635</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 121648, VQ1022/13, 7.8.1956.

<sup>636</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140711, EB10393/3, 24.1.1959, Baghdad.

trouble in Aden and also in Lebanon, where the United States landed troops on 15 July at the request<sup>637</sup> of the Lebanese president, Chamoun. They were to stay until 25 October, a few days before the British retired from Jordan. With the Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, an era in US-UK efforts to organise a Middle East defence involving the Arab states had resulted in failure.<sup>638</sup>

In fact, as HM Ambassador in Tehran noted, on the Baghdad Pact front there was apathy and disillusion. "It has, as you know, never been popular."<sup>639</sup>

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<sup>637</sup> Turkish Ambassador in Amman, Mahmut Dikerdem suggested that he personally conveyed the message from the presidents of Turkey and Pakistan and the Shah of Iran to King Hussein of Jordan to officially request the help of the West. He noted the same had been done for Chamoun of Lebanon. See Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları*, Cem Yaynevi, İstanbul, 1990.

<sup>638</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 158 and interview with Gülek.

<sup>639</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140818, EP1071/9, 23.7.1959, Tehran.



### 7.3 Impacts of the Failure of Western Defence Initiatives

This development in Iraq consequently affected the neighbouring countries as well as the Pact itself. As previously mentioned unless Pakistan was offered more military aid,<sup>640</sup> Ayub Khan was ready to reconsider Pakistan's foreign policy line.<sup>641</sup> Its effects on Turkey, which will be explained later, were more than on Pakistan.

One of the direct effects of the Iraqi withdrawal was that the British Ambassador, writing from Ankara, for example, noted that the absence of Iraq meant that "we need not lay such stress on Palestine and other Arab problems."<sup>642</sup>

In addition to the domestic sources of unrest and revolution, the humiliation of Arab weakness in the conflict with Israel had created a continuing mood of frustration and discontent which any clever demagogue or political manipulator could exploit, particularly if outside assistance was available to him. Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" in this respect, provided continuing incitement to revolution. But the basic cause of the instability and unrest was that the old static society was breaking up, because the presence of western oil companies affected the nature and tempo of life in the region in general, in Iraq and Saudi Arabia in particular. These economic changes were "affecting the habits and outlook of the peasants of Iraq, many of whom now flock to the cities to form a new floating proletariat."<sup>643</sup>

Growing Arab nationalism, which was another cause for the Iraqi revolution and thus for the failure of the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East, was inspired in large degree by the Western example and grew up in hostility

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<sup>640</sup> Walt claimed that Pakistan received an average of 120 million dollars per year between 1953 and 1958. Walt, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

<sup>641</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140714, EB1071/9D, 13.8.1959, Karachi.

<sup>642</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 132923, EB10399/222, 12.12.1958, Ankara.

<sup>643</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

to the West. This, in Campbell's words, "without any doubt, eased the way for the advance of Soviet influence into the Middle East. But this has happened not because of any natural affinity between nationalism and communism in the Middle Eastern mind. It has happened, because the targets of nationalism were positions held by the Western powers. Recent events have removed some of those targets."<sup>644</sup>

Some in Europe thought that the withdrawal of Iraq gave it a greater unity of purpose and eliminated its involvement in inter-Arab quarrels, but in fact it remained a "rather artificial combination of three Middle Eastern states which have few natural ties with each other."<sup>645</sup>

The failure of the Middle Eastern defence initiatives and the Turkish involvement in it once more indicated that Turkish political influence was virtually non-existent, owing to "Arab distrust of the Turks as former Ottoman overlords and present partners of the West, and to Turkish contempt for the weakness and indiscipline of the Arabs".<sup>646</sup> In fact, Turkish support of Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, their confrontational policy towards Syria in 1957, Iraq in 1958 and granting permission to Americans to use İncirlik base during Lebanon Crisis in 1958 all caused "Turkey's credibility to sink even further in the eyes of the Arabs and provoked the opposition at home."<sup>647</sup> Turkey tried to safeguard security against the Soviet threat by participating in the Western and regional security systems and received American military aid. However as İbrahim Barutçuoğlu, a Turkish navy commander, noted that "participation in formal regional defense organisations did not add to the security of Turkey, but as in the 1950s caused Turkey's isolation and

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<sup>644</sup> Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>645</sup> Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>646</sup> Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>647</sup> Ayhan, Mahmut Bâli, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (1993), p. 93.

encirclement by hostile states.”<sup>648</sup> The Western sponsored alliances also proved ineffective against internal threats. For example, “neither the Baghdad Pact nor CENTO could prevent the Iraqi and Iranian revolutions.”<sup>649</sup>

The failure also showed that supporting evidence was lacking for the theory that the Arab states would follow the Turkish example. At the beginning, the West had hoped that the Middle Eastern countries would follow the Turkish model. But, the West eventually realised that the Turkish model was not applicable to the other Middle Eastern states, which possessed a different culture and history.

Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact did have a number of political consequences for the West:

(1) Although it made no positive contribution to regional defence it did at least split the anti-Western solidarity of the Arab League.<sup>650</sup> As the Suez Crisis showed, neither the Arab League nor its Collective Security Pact met the security needs of the region. “Thus the Arab states fell into a number of different and conflicting alignments, although all still proclaimed loyalty to the Arab League and its Collective Security Pact of 1950.”<sup>651</sup>

(2) It accelerated the shift of power in the region from the British to the Americans. Although the British had hoped the Pact would protect their interests in the region for a few more years it had the opposite effect. The Iraqi government’s failure to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli adventure demonstrated that govern-

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<sup>648</sup> See Barutçuoğlu, İbrahim, ‘Evolution of Turkey’s Security Role in the Middle East,’ p. 66 and Kırkcüoğlu, Ömer, ‘Evolution of Turkish-Arab Relations,’ p. 46 both in Harris, George S., *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 1985.

<sup>649</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>650</sup> Campbell, op cit., p. 61.

<sup>651</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

ment's subservience to the West and its infidelity to the pan-Arab cause. This created disaffection in the hitherto obedient Iraqi armed forces and eventually led to the revolution that toppled the king and sent the British packing from their bases in Iraq.

(3) In the aftermath of this reverse for the British and of the Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez, the US became the dominant Western power in the region.

(4) The Pact exacerbated regional disappointment and dissatisfaction with the West. Regional members who had been under great pressure to join did not gain the benefit they had anticipated or been led to expect. Neither Pakistan nor Iran, for example, were happy with the US economic and military aid received in return for their support for this defence pact.

(5) Iraq was isolated in the Arab world and its government's position was gravely weakened and finally all those who were responsible for accession to the Pact were brutally murdered by the Iraqi masses or the army itself.

(6) Israel was one of the chief beneficiaries. She not only survived throughout the decade but also increased her gains from the Arab countries and put herself in a better position to defeat them in the future.

(7) The Kurds, as well as the Arabs, suffered as a consequence of the Pact. While Turkey, Iraq and Iran were in the Pact, the Kurds were unable to promote their own interests against this united front and suffered a decade of inactivity and silence in these countries.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was, among other things, declared by the United States to strengthen the Baghdad Pact, but, it failed to produce the expected results. Then the events of 1958 brought Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, which had

moved closer to the United States at the beginning, to a more neutral or hesitant position, removed Iraq from the northern tier alliance, and led the United States to conclude bilateral treaties with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to avoid less favourable consequences.

Afghanistan, traditionally a neutral buffer state, had not committed itself to either side in the cold war and received economic aid from both. With Pakistan tied formally to the West, Afghanistan became all the more open to Soviet blandishments and penetration. The most spectacular step was the dramatic offer at the end of 1955, of 100 million dollars in credits, accompanied by verbal support of Afghanistan's territorial claims on Pakistan. Arms aid followed in due course. The Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, in one sense, could be seen as a reply to Pakistan's adherence to the Pact. It may not perhaps have been the intention of those who conceived and organised the Pact to consign an independent country in the Middle East to the Soviet bloc, but they found themselves facing the serious problem of how to prevent it. Indeed, it fell into the hands of the USSR in 1978 and the West could do nothing but rely on the Jihad carried out by the Mujahedeen for the following fourteen years until the communist system itself collapsed in 1990.

## 7.4 Long-term Measures After Collapse of the Baghdad Pact

Iran was much weaker and more unstable than Turkey and it added no significant military strength to the defence of the Middle East. It gave little solid assurance of continuity either in internal or foreign policies as far as the Western Powers were concerned. Its negotiations with the USSR on a non-aggression pact early in 1959 carried a hint that its reversion to neutrality and a balancing of the great powers was not out of the question. "That would", Campbell mentioned, "not be to our liking. Yet Iran's membership in CENTO is important only as it serves the end of greater strength and stability; it is harmful if it tends to generate internal conflict and to increase opportunities for outside meddling. More than formal allies Iran needs encouragement, help and time to settle down and build sound institutions."<sup>652</sup>

Therefore, when the Western countries lost their faith in the Middle Eastern defence pact they tried to protect at least Iran, which would not have any security shield against the internal as well as the external threats although Turkey and Pakistan had a NATO and SEATO security umbrella respectively. Therefore, with Pakistan both a Commonwealth colleague and in SEATO, and Turkey a member of NATO, the chief political purpose of the CENTO was "to keep up the morale of Iran in the face of persistent Soviet pressure and propaganda."<sup>653</sup>

Since the coup in Iraq had given the impression that it had weakened the Pact, the West wanted to dispel this impression by intensified economic activities within the Pact. The West no longer wanted to promote politico-military aspect of the Pact. Promoting the economic aspect of the Pact was intended, on the one hand

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<sup>652</sup> Ibid., p. 234.

<sup>653</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149696, EB1051/1, 3.5.1960.

to preserve the West's prestige and on the other hand, to keep CENTO alive and bolster Iran. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Zorlu publicly pointed out that one of the major reasons why CENTO was established was to save Iran by establishing close ties between Iran and the West and he said this was "Turkey's duty."<sup>654</sup>

Transformation of the Pact into an economic and cultural affair would also suit the British longer term interests in Pakistan. HM Ambassador in Karachi recorded that by getting rid of the grounds for the Pakistani charge that the UK was arming them against the wrong quarter and of the Indian and neutralist charge that the Pact was provocative. It would also serve Pakistan's proper interests: economic rehabilitation and cultural and other ties with the Muslim world. But "if the change were made suddenly or obviously there would," the Ambassador warned his government, "in fact be opposition from the Pakistan Government".<sup>655</sup>

Within our discussion of economic aspects of Western defence initiatives we should note that, as previously explained, the British were of the view that internal economic factors were among the chief reasons for the collapse of pro-Western regime in Iraq. According to them, the fall of the old regime had nothing to do with Nuri's pro-Western foreign policy.<sup>656</sup> The West saw that poverty in the region made the inhabitants susceptible to Soviet propaganda, so it was necessary to improve the economic situation in order to counter this propaganda and deny the Soviets the resources of the region, especially oil, which was the real aim of the Western defence initiatives. Therefore the West in general, and the United States in particular, maintained aid to regional countries on a more regular basis. Nevertheless, as Campbell pointed out, the West "really have had no choice". For

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<sup>654</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 153039, RK1022/1, 18.1.1960, Ankara.

<sup>655</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140685, EB1001/19, 14.4.1959, Karachi.

<sup>656</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140945, EQ10334/15, 5.5.1959.

the wealthiest countries not to help developing countries develop their economies would, the United States feared, "destroy all faith in American leadership in the free world, turning allies into neutrals and neutrals into enemies. A foreign aid program, long labelled as temporary for home consumption, has come to be an accepted concomitant of leadership of the free world."<sup>657</sup>

HM Ambassador in Ankara noted that he entirely agreed that the UK should aim to build up the economic side of the Pact. Although the regional members still regarded it primarily as a source of additional aid for projects in their individual countries, they were, he assumed, also beginning to value it as an organisation for economic co-operation.<sup>658</sup>

The United States economic and military assistance to the Middle Eastern countries in the 1950s was broadly as follows:

Although it is difficult to obtain accurate details and precise amounts of American economic and military aid to the Middle Eastern countries in the 1950s, it is useful to give some general indications. The pattern varied according to differing needs and political attitudes of regional countries. Campbell notes that

Turkey, besides, getting considerable economic benefits from military aid, has received economic aid at an annual level of over 100 million dollars. Iraq while it was still a Western ally, received United States technical aid, relying on its own oil revenues for capital. Iran has had substantial aid since 1953, chiefly to keep the government solvent and to give technical help to the development program. Modest amounts have been granted to Lebanon and Jordan for specific public works and industries. Syria refused all aid on the ground that the conditions attached to it (the same as for all other recipients) were unacceptable, but now as part of the UAR shares in the assistance now provided to that country. Saudi Arabia accepted technical assistance for a while, then arbitrarily terminated it in 1954. Egypt got a grant of 40 million dollars in 1954 at the time of American faith and hope in the Nasser regime, but for political reasons there were no new grants until recently and for some time even the CARE program was cut off by the decision of the United States Government. Israel has received, since 1948, 297 million dollars in grants and 326 million dollars in loans, more than all the Arab

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<sup>657</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p. 267.

<sup>658</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140685, EB1001/4, 4.2.1959, Ankara.



states combined, in addition to considerable sums from private American sources. The table shows the totals through the middle of 1959.<sup>659</sup>

**Table 1: US Non-Military Aid to the Middle East**

**July 1945-June 1959**

Countries	Grants				Loans (net) (from 1940)
	A	B	C	D	
Turkey	586.6	12.2	1.5	633.0	270.3
Iran	263.2	2.8	2.6	274.0	204.1
Pakistan	271.6	115.1	20.8	425.3	284.9
Afghanistan	22.8	11.6	0.1	34.6	51.7
Iraq	16.9	-	1.0	17.9	1.2
Saudi Arabia	2.9	-	-	4.5	32.0
Syria	0.1	0.2	0.8	1.1	0.1
Lebanon	47.1	10.5	2.4	60.0	1.6
Jordan	125.5	7.0	5.0	137.5	1.2
Egypt	45.0	1.2	36.6	83.1	29.1
Libya	50.0	9.8	2.6	83.1	8.5
Israel	255.4	-	41.1	296.6	325.6

A: Mutual Security Program (Economic and Technological Aid) B: Extraordinary Relief

C: Agricultural Surplus through Private Agencies

D: Total Grants

**Source:** Campbell, op. cit., p. 269.

Hoskins claimed that no one knows exactly what the totals of US aid may have been “partly because of the multiplicity of undertakings and datelines by many units of government, ... partly because of the confidential character of certain forms

<sup>659</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p. 267.

of aid.”<sup>660</sup> The measures taken by the West were intended briefly to accomplish the following results: to have an immediate impact on decisions of the Middle Eastern governments and on the views of major important sections of the population; to encourage those who co-operated with the United States; to counter and frustrate moves by the Soviet Union, both political and economic; to promote stability and strengthen the capacity of Middle Eastern countries to uphold their independence; to set habits of co-operation and mutual confidence between the West and the region; and to help construct a more prosperous Middle East as a means of trade and general economic progress throughout the “free world.”

As the grant program faded out, except for military aid and “defence support,” it was the loan program that would have to carry the burden. With DLF (Development Loan Fund) loans to Middle Eastern countries totalling only 198.3 million dollars by mid-1959, the current level of aid seemed clearly inadequate for the future, if the United States expected some solid results. Division of this aid was as follows: Pakistan, 89.6 million; Turkey, 25.4 million; Israel, 20 million; Jordan 1.2 million. An additional 72.6 million dollars had been committed to Middle Eastern countries and projects, but the loan agreements had not yet been signed.<sup>661</sup>

Meanwhile the West was now prepared to accept the Nasser regime in order to prevent further Soviet penetration to the region. Four years of hard psychological war and one real war between Egypt and the West had helped only to worsen relations not to improve them. Wright held chiefly the Baghdad Pact responsible for this Soviet penetration to the southern tier.<sup>662</sup> The consequences of this period were more favourable to the Egyptians not to the West. Therefore, it

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<sup>660</sup> Hoskins *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>661</sup> International Administration, Operations Report, 30 June 1959, pp. 42-43 quoted from Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

<sup>662</sup> Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

was the West that initiated the normalisation of relations. A sign of the steady rapprochement between Cairo and the West was the final conclusion in February 1959 of financial negotiations with Britain over the claims and counterclaims left over from the Suez crisis, a settlement that led to the resumption of normal trade and, by the end of the year, of diplomatic relations. With the United States the UAR Government negotiated new arrangements involving the purchase of 58 million dollars worth of surplus agricultural commodities for local currency, renewal of the CARE program, renewal of technical assistance and a new commitment of 8.4 million dollars, Export-Import Bank loans totalling 12.6 million dollars, and a small Development Loan Fund credit for a textile mill in Syria. These were the first new grants or loans made by the United States to Egypt since 1955. In addition, for assistance in improving the Suez Canal the Nasser regime turned to the World Bank, which granted a loan of 56.5 million dollars in December 1959. This move was intended to balance in part the heavy dependence on Soviet aid in the building of the High Aswan Dam, the agreement on the second stage of which was announced in January 1960.<sup>663</sup>

As these developments between Egypt and the West indicated, the reason for the Western aid to the developing countries was based neither on humanitarian grounds nor on close understanding of the countries involved, because in many instances the neutral countries acquired more aid than the friendly countries did. One of the British dispatches rightly noted that in the Middle East, "there was a feeling that the Western Powers were failing to differentiate between ally and neutral or even foe."<sup>664</sup>

To avoid a misunderstanding it is worth recording a point here regarding the

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<sup>663</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

<sup>664</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 120712, EP1013/4, 4.7.1956.

amount of Western aid received by the regional countries. Annual figures tend to be misleading since they did not bear much relation to the actual amount of aid received by a country in that year; money appropriated in one year might not be spent in practice for anything up to three years later, so the figures could never show the level at which aid was actually running.<sup>665</sup> This practice allowed the United States to vary the flow of aid in accordance with their appreciation of the situation in the countries where the aid was supposed to be used and its anticipated effects.

On another front, there were international oil companies operating throughout the Middle East. It is worth noting that rivalries between companies, whose role by the very nature of their operations tended to be political as well as economic, did "not damage governmental relations."<sup>666</sup> In the post-war period the share of American companies in total Middle East oil production was going up while that of British companies was going down. In 1946 the American share was 35 per cent and the British share 50 per cent (57 per cent including British-Dutch interests). In 1955 the figures were reversed, 58 per cent American and 35 per cent British. In Iran the crisis over nationalisation was settled to Britain's satisfaction in 1954, but one of its results was that an international consortium (40 per cent American) went into operation where the exclusively British-owned Anglo-Iranian had operated before.

In 1960 the area under British control stretched around the outer edge of the Arabian Peninsula from Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea to Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf. The juridical status of the territories varied from a directly ruled colony, Aden, all the way to the nominally sovereign Muscat and Oman.

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<sup>665</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 149790, EP1192/4, 25.10.1960, Washington.

<sup>666</sup> Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

In between were the protected states of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, the Aden Protectorate, and the eight “trucial sheikhdoms” of Oman. All were tied to Britain by treaty arrangements and by the presence of British officials or military officers as advisers to the local sheikhs or nominally in their employ. “All foreign relations were in British hands.”<sup>667</sup> However, Britain lost a partial control or influence over Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Cyprus.

Experience showed that unless all parties concerned worked together, the defence of the region could not be effectively organised. When the West tried to impose its defence arrangements on the region without local support it failed. Similarly when the British tried without the open support of the Americans they failed. The only effective arrangement would have been a system that gave the lead to the USA, took local wishes into consideration and had local support plus the support of the British who had the benefit of detailed knowledge.<sup>668</sup>

The West wearied of the setbacks to its regional defence plans in the 1950s and concluded that further attempts to build a system of pacts and alliances in the Middle East would be self-defeating. The Baghdad Pact, the concrete expression of that policy, brought more trouble than it was worth. The northern tier alliance (CENTO) was of limited importance. Therefore, it seemed high time to accept neutralism, which was a force with which the United States would have to live. As one of the American experts, Campbell commented, nothing was gained and much was lost by acts that pushed genuine neutrals into the Soviet camp, or, “unless the evidence is incontrovertible, by the assumption they are already there. It is enough that they should have the will to defend their independence.”<sup>669</sup> (Campbell speaks

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<sup>667</sup> Ibid., p. 301.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid., p. 357.

<sup>669</sup> Ibid., p. 361.

as if it was some other nations that were violating the independence of the Middle Eastern countries, conveniently ignoring the fact that the actual, as opposed to the feared, violations were being perpetrated by the West.)

Many Soviet moves in the region had been reactions to those of other powers or the consequence of circumstances, favourable or unfavourable, as they occurred. As Campbell noted "At this particular juncture in history, from 1955 to 1960, the circumstances were especially favourable. Khrushchev and his colleagues have found themselves at a point much further advanced toward domination of the Middle East than Stalin or the Czars had ever reached."<sup>670</sup>

Ali Sabri also agreed with this view and recorded that the situation in 1959 was very different from the situation in 1951. In 1959 "the USSR was incomparably stronger militarily, economically and diplomatically."<sup>671</sup>

The USSR was now capable of influencing Middle Eastern politics through the Egyptian regime as well as having the ability to use the most destabilising element, the Kurds, to interfere in the internal affairs of the three members of the Pact. Although the danger of Kurdish nationalism was potential rather than actual, it constituted a powerful weapon in the hands of the Russians if they should ever be in a position and wish to embarrass all the three countries. Therefore, they were natural allies in fighting Kurdish nationalism.<sup>672</sup>

On the contrary the British position in the Middle East had never been as bad as it was at the second half of the 1950s. Britain lost most of her bases in

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<sup>670</sup> Ibid., pp. 214-15 and Issawi Charles, 'Negotiation from Strength? A Reappraisal of Western-Arab Relations,' *International Affairs*, (January 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>671</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140952, EQ1051/16, 5.2.1959.

<sup>672</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140682, 1081/59G, 7.5.1959. In Emre's words "the Kurds functioned like a 'Japanese glue' as far as the foreign policy of Turkey, Iraq and Iran was concerned." Interview with Emre.

the region and she was obliged to move her military presence to Cyprus to help protect what was left behind in the region, especially the Pact. And the Pact countries were thought to be prepared to let the British forces operate from their territories. In particular, as the British Ambassador noted "the Royal Air Force in Cyprus which is allocated to the task of immediate support to the Pact in time of war might be required to operate from any of the Pact countries."<sup>673</sup> So, four years after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact Britain was able to maintain her interests in the Middle East only from her bases outside the Middle East in Cyprus.

Meanwhile, Britain, too, was obliged to accept the existing situation in the Middle East, namely the legality of the Egyptian regime and its consequences regarding the Suez Canal as well as the newly emerged trend of neutralism. Consequently, the announcement on 19 October 1959 of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Australia and the UAR and hints in Cairo of forthcoming developments in UK-UAR relations had been rumoured in the Middle Eastern diplomatic circles and aroused speculation in Iraq.<sup>674</sup>

The Americans had difficulties in developing their relations with the Arabs too. The previous ten years' attempts to form a defence organisation in the Middle East had alienated the Arabs instead of bringing them to a closer understanding. As Campbell concluded, "at the close of the year 1959 the United States had perhaps less direct influence in the Arab Middle East than at any time in the past five years".<sup>675</sup>

To conclude, the collapse of the Baghdad Pact was due to the following reasons:

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<sup>673</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140685, EB1001/20, 16.4.1959, Ankara.

<sup>674</sup> PRO, FO, 371, 140953, EQ1051/36, 7.10.1959, Baghdad.

<sup>675</sup> Campbell, op. cit., p.157.

intensification of the Soviet propaganda, vigorous opposition of Arab nationalism, reaction against forceful methods of the West to bring as many Arab countries into the Baghdad Pact as possible and extreme suppression of opposition in Iraq. Failure of Western defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s and Turkey's involvement in them showed that the Turkish political influence was virtually non-existent. Eventually as a part of long term measures to maintain their interests the US and the UK began to transform the Baghdad Pact from a politico-military one into an economic and cultural one. This transformation was aimed to make it easier to maintain the Pact that they had preserved their prestige in the region. As a result, all sides, namely regional members, the US and the UK were all disappointed with Western defence initiatives and the US decided to practically take-over the responsibility of maintaining the Western interests in the region. However, it can be concluded that it was chiefly the USSR and Israel who benefited from these attempts first to form and later to maintain a Western sponsored defence system in the Middle East in the 1950s.



## Chapter VIII

### CONCLUSION

#### 8.1 General

The end of the Second World War was closely followed by the commencement of the Cold War. This was carried to the Middle East by the Western defence initiatives in the region in the late 1940s and more vigorously in the early 1950s. Great Britain was weak by the end of the Second World War and transferred her responsibilities in Greece and Turkey to the US in 1947. In the mid-1950s she felt a similar need to hand over her responsibilities in the Middle East too. Meanwhile, the US acted quite cleverly and exploited every opportunity to oust the colonial powers from the region and install herself there instead. Operation "AJAX" in Iran and the Suez crisis should be especially mentioned in this connection. In 1953, by carrying out Operation "AJAX" the US paved the way for Iran to align with the West. Second, she signed an agreement with Pakistan and Iraq in 1954 and began to help them economically and militarily. Finally, as a result of crises following the Suez intervention by the French and British in collaboration with Israel, the US proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 and after the eventual collapse of the Baghdad Pact signed bilateral agreements with remaining member countries in March 1959. By so doing, the Americans had almost completed their replacement of Britain as the leading power to protect Western interests in the region. In short, there were two major differences between the Middle East of 1950 and 1960: first, the Americans had replaced the British, and second, the

Soviets had greatly increased their interests in the region and penetrated into it through local nationalisms.

As we have seen, much of this Soviet activity was a response to Western military alliances and arrangements in the region. Our study of these initiatives and in particular of the Turkish involvement in them leads to the following conclusions that are confirmed by the evidence of American and British documents and the personal witness of a number of important interviewees.

## 8.2 Consensus Views Confirmed

The points where the evidence led us to general agreement with many experts in the field and some erstwhile statesmen from the West are as follows:

(1) In all the defence proposals that the West persuaded Turkey to promote in the Middle East after the Second World War Egypt was seen by all as of immense importance.

(2) The existence of Israel and the consequent problem of Palestine proved virtually insuperable obstacles to the successful implementation of defence initiatives from the West because the West including its regional ally, Turkey, was seen as pro-Israeli.

(3) The West's chief interests in the region lay in its great strategic importance and oil resources. Turkey herself, having secured her membership of NATO without any particular interest of her own in the Middle East, felt obliged to become involved in Western defence initiatives there partly to fulfil her promise and partly in pursuit of her proclaimed policy of defending peace loving countries throughout the world. For the Middle Eastern states themselves the Western defence proposals were insufficiently attractive because they failed to address what those states regarded as their own real problems and offered the risk of new dangers for little reward.

### 8.3 Previous Claims Disproved

Against this background, our study has revealed a number of areas where widely held assumptions should be challenged. For example, it is still commonly believed that Turkey sought NATO membership and involved herself in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East after World War II merely to defend her territorial integrity. However, as seen in the previous chapters, this Turkish quest for membership had a wider and deeper meaning and other intentions such as transforming a Muslim Turkish society into a Western and secular one, receiving more economic and military aid to modernise her economy and armed forces, and simply following Kemalist principles which aimed to demolish anything that “belonged to the past and reflected backwardness”, as well as securing western support against persistent separatist Kurdish nationalism, and so on.

It is also necessary to challenge the idea held by a large section of Turkish society that Turkish involvement in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East was due to any ideological (Islamic) belief of the DP. In fact, our study has documented that Turkish involvement in the Middle East as well as the granting of some concessions to the religious circles started well before the Democrats came to power with the establishment of religious schools, publication of religious books, and the adoption of a more tolerant stance towards religious people, and so on.

Our study refutes the view that Turkish involvement in the Balkans and the Middle East was an independent and self-inspired Turkish policy. The documents we have quoted show that it was simply a fulfilment of a promise given to the West in return for Turkey’s admission to NATO. The argument whether or not this was a price worth paying is beyond the scope of this thesis.

It has also been shown that prior to the establishment of the Democrat Party,

Celal Bayar gave assurances to İnönü on secularism, education and foreign policy. Without wishing to enter into arguments about whether this is an indication that İnönü did not intend to allow a genuine opposition to operate in Turkey, we can nevertheless claim that this does suggest that the change of power was not meant to bring about any radical change in these three fields. The apparent changes of government and political power and growing liberalisation should therefore not be regarded as fundamental and should not be seen as due to having a new party in power but rather due to the internal and external demands of the times.

Our research has also demonstrated that Turkey's NATO membership was not a one-sided victory for Turkey but was the result of necessity and mutual interests. Especially it was not, as claimed by most of the Democrats and their contemporary sympathisers, a DP victory. Given the same international conditions of the early 1950s, one could confidently assert that Turkey would have become a NATO member even if the RPP had been in power. (Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the widespread acceptance of the Democrats' claim has added to the mythology of the period.)

One of the rarely mentioned but important facts that have come to light in this research concerns American reduction military support and of financial and political support for Turkey under DP rule in the late 1950s. This was to a considerable extent because of American objection to the DP's determined insistence upon industrialising Turkey after modernising agriculture. Many scholars and writers have wrongly attributed the end of US support for the DP to the government's mismanagement of the economy.

This research has also disproved the widely held view that the Western attempts to defend the Middle East were generated from fear that the Soviet Union

would occupy or penetrate into the region. Documents and interviews demonstrated that the West needed Middle Eastern oil for its economy regardless of any external threat. In fact, it is apparent that in addition to trying to deny the region's resources to the Soviet Union, the West was also seeking new ways to protect the conservative regimes in the area against anti-colonialist local nationalisms, which they dubbed as "international communism".

Underestimation of the influence of indigenous nationalism in general and Arab, especially Egyptian nationalism, in particular, was another factor that contributed to the failure of the Baghdad Pact, and this is another fact that escaped the notice of many politicians at the time.

We have shown that the expectations of each member of the Baghdad Pact differed one from the other and this was one of the fundamental factors that led to its demise. It is worth pointing out that many writers ignored this crucial factor, the importance of which was noted in the chapter on theory.

The thesis indicated that the credit for **devising** Western defence schemes in the Middle East should be given to the British, while the credit for taking **practical** steps to implement them should be awarded to the Turkish leaders who conscientiously worked on the West's behalf. At the same time our work shows clearly that the initiative came from the West and not from within, as the British strove hard to claim.

This thesis also showed that American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan respectively in 1958 did not, as claimed by almost all scholars, occur as a result of an "official request" by these countries. In fact, it was the West itself which "unofficially requested" the regional members of the Baghdad Pact to ask the King of Jordan and the President of Lebanon to "officially request" help from

the US and Britain. This message was conveyed orally to King Hussein of Jordan by Mahmut Dikerdem, the Turkish Ambassador in Amman.

Our research has indicated that the two chief beneficiaries of Western defence initiatives were Israel and the Soviet Union. Israel was indirectly helped in its struggle to survive the first and most precarious period of its existence because the Arabs were at least partially distracted by Western involvement and interference in the Middle East. The Soviet Union skilfully exploited the unpopularity of the West in the region and managed to penetrate into it largely through Arab and partly through Kurdish nationalism. (Over 800 prominent Kurds, some having been promoted to high ranks in the Soviet Army, returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union after the July coup in Baghdad.)

The study has also shown that although in the Cold War the Turkish authorities could justify keeping a large army, the maintenance of such a strong force appears to have been in large part due to the requirements of American global interests. As we have noted, the cost of keeping one American soldier in the area was 27 times more than it cost to maintain one Turkish soldier. Helping the Turkish army was therefore directly helping American military interests and thus the American economy.

Among the remarkable discoveries in the documentary evidence were certain aspects of the West's collaboration with Israel and the West's tactics to maintain its interests in the region: advising Israel to attack the Baghdad Pact in a regular manner on radio, in her daily papers, and weekly and monthly magazines in the hope that this "Israeli" opposition would convince the Arabs that the Pact was advantageous to them is just one of several examples.

The documents lead to the conclusion that to get economic and military aid it

was not necessary to align so closely with the US as Turkey and the other regional members of the Pact had done; some Non-Aligned countries managed to receive more than the member countries did.

Other documents reveal a surprising naivety among many Western politicians and scholars with regard to the Arabs. In the first place they made insufficient allowance for the Arab perception that Israel - a new state established on Arab land - was the major threat to Arab countries, and in the second place they did not appreciate that to the Arabs the former colonial powers seemed a much greater threat than did the Soviets who were thousands of miles away.

Previous works have failed to point out that although the Baghdad Pact was allegedly a result of George Kennan's famous "containment policy", the West concentrated on Egypt rather than Afghanistan, a Soviet neighbour with a poor economy. This choice suggests that in addition to containing the Soviet Union the Baghdad Pact was intended to protect the pro-western governments so that the Western economic interests, especially oil interests, could be maintained. All other stated factors were of secondary importance.

In the end, none of the countries involved in the Western defence initiatives achieved their expectations. All of them were disappointed with the result and dissatisfied with what they obtained at the end of the decade. All the rulers of the regional members lost their positions. In 1958 Nuri Said and the Iraqi royal family were lynched and killed in Baghdad. Their Pakistani counterparts were ousted by a military coup the same year. Adnan Menderes and his close associates fell in another military coup in 1960. The Shah struggled on into the 1970s by implementing a reform program - the White Revolution - proposed by the Americans. The stateless Kurds were also losers as they did not even dare to



launch any campaign against any of the regional members. As has been seen, when it became clear that even with the help of Muslim Turkey the West could not tempt the Arabs to join with them under the same security umbrella, the United States took all the strings into her own hands by signing bilateral agreements with the regional members. In humiliating circumstances the United Kingdom was forced to leave Egypt and Iraq completely and Iran, Jordan, Sudan and Turkey partly.

Turkish foreign policy actions in the 1950s constitute a good example of political behaviour of the small state within the context of alliance theories. Of course, it is difficult to claim that all her behaviour was in line with foreign policy behaviours of a stereotypical small state. (In reality very few states conform closely to the theorists' stereotypes.) However, our research has shown that Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s generally fitted the patterns of the small state foreign policy. To cite some examples, as suggested by alliance theorists, Turkey strove hard to gain a reputation as a "bastion of democracy" a model of a "harmonious ally" or a "staunch resister of aggression".

Moreover, Turkey, as a small state, tried hard to use her geostrategic location and her proximity to a great power (the USSR) to obtain alliance with another great power or powers in order to benefit from the advantages of this alliance, which were briefly economic and military aid, the prestige of having the support of an illustrious great power and securing national integrity of the country and survival of the regime against internal and external threats and so on.

However, one side-effect of Turkey's close alliance with the West was an over-willingness to identify herself with her Western allies even at the expense of her own interests. On a number of issues she failed to adopt an independent line that could have been justified and won her greater influence and respect in the rest of

the world without necessarily jeopardising her position within the alliance. Turkish policy towards Israel, the Korean war, Suez crisis and North Africa in the 1950s were among some the examples.

With respect to Turkey's relations with West within the context of the patron-client relation approach, one can argue that Turkey formed a good example, but again was not a stereotypical client state. Turkey's political behaviour towards the US in the 1950s showed that Turkey can be considered a client state. As Turkey's official statements indicate, Turkey's policy towards the Soviet bloc and her stance towards the Non-Aligned movement, especially in the Bandung conference were seen by these countries as client behaviour. Voting patterns of Turkey in the UN in the 1950s were another indication that Turkish foreign behaviour resembled a those of a client state. However, one should remember that the degree of dependence and exploitation differs from one patron-client relation to another. Despite the accusation of its critics, Turkey did not behave like a politically penetrated system and the DP was able to insist on its industrialisation program, though it cost the DP leadership dear. In fact, compared with other client states Turkey was in a much better position, because she was chosen to play a patron role in the Middle East. Therefore, one can conclude that the DP aligned with the West to secure her national independence, complete her westernisation process and consolidated her integration with the West but, in long run, this led to the critics of the DP to accuse the party leadership of making Turkey a client state.

Turning specifically to the Turkish case, we can now answer the questions we posed in the Introduction and state that Turkey became involved in the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East to pay the price of admission to NATO and not with any genuine expectation that these regional countries would give

her any greater degree of security. As shown throughout the thesis, since the end of the Second World War, Turkey strove hard to integrate with the West. With the establishment of NATO, Turkey's chief foreign policy priority became gaining membership of this organisation not only to resist the Soviet threat but also to display the West's seal of approval of Turkey as a **Western** country. To this end, as we have shown, both Republican as well as the Democrats had done their best to achieve this goal. Both were willing to co-operate with the West in the Middle East, if Turkey was admitted to NATO. By becoming a NATO member Turkey achieved her primary goal and what remained for Turkish leaders was to repay the price of this admission by launching a campaign to establish a Western defence system in the Middle East. As a result of Turkey's efforts over five years, the Baghdad Pact was formed, but it lasted only a few years. Like all member countries, Turkey was disappointed with the result, because her efforts to form a defence Pact in the region further alienated the Arab countries and left her isolated from the Third World due to her negative stance towards the Non-Aligned movement.

We can also state that this Turkish policy in the Middle East did not represent abandonment of the Kemalist line. The traditional objective of Kemalist foreign policy was "peace at home and peace in the world." Moreover, it was directed to secure "national independence" and "complete independence". As previously explained, Turkey's involvement in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s were meant to contain the danger of "international communism" and serve the security of "peace loving" countries. By securing the Western politico-military support through such activities, Turkish leaders hoped to guarantee "national independence" of the country and by obtaining the Western military and economic aid the Democrats tried to modernise the Turkish army and improve

the Turkish economy. Only in this way could “complete independence” of the country be achieved. Thus, one can accept that, at least as far as foreign policy was concerned, Ahmet Gürsoy was right in claiming “the Democrat Party was reincarnation of the Kemalist philosophy.”

The Middle Eastern involvement was undertaken at the bidding of the West. It was with the West not the Middle East that the Turkish government sought stronger ties. There had been no change in general attitude since the days of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s (Turks from Europe were considered worthy of acceptance whereas those in the Arab countries were abandoned without a mention by the Turkish authorities). Turkey’s involvement in the West and in the Middle East was a natural consequence of Turkish aspirations to be a Western power.

## 8.4 Points for Further Study

In the course of the present research a number of topics beyond the scope of this thesis were seen to merit further research. Most of them, however, would require access to regional records. For example, it is quite clear from American and British documents that the Western defence initiatives emerged from the idea that Middle Eastern oil had to be under Western control because it was vital to western economies. As the United States became involved in containing the Soviet Union, her desire to deprive the Soviets of the oil became an added factor. At the same time, the West appreciated that it was necessary to convince the regional countries that the Soviet Union and international communism represented a major threat to the region; they knew that otherwise it would take more than some symbolic gifts or aid to get the regional states to agree to Western policies. It would be interesting to see how the regional leaders actually appreciated the situation. The documents might also shed light on the measures taken by the West to secure the compliance of some of the regional states. Accurate details of aid granted are difficult to obtain; many of the published tables are inconsistent and conflicting. As British documents reveal that coercion was recommended to ensure compliance with Western wishes when the need was seen to be desperate, further information on what actual offers were made and what concessions, gifts or perquisites were exchanged would provide a fascinating insight into the motivations involved.

The role and activities of the Baghdad Pact Anti-Subversion Committee merit special attention. Though information on this subject will doubtless remain secret for a very long time, it would shed light on whether the Pact was defensive, as its members claimed in public, or aggressive as its opponents maintained.

Access to regional documents might also reveal the extent to which fear of

Kurdish nationalism prompted the regional members (with the exception of Pakistan) to join the Baghdad Pact. Most Kurdish scholars maintain that in addition to their stated aims the Sadabad Pact and the Baghdad Pact were both intended to quell rising Kurdish nationalism. The documents would help to show whether such claims could be substantiated.

On a wider field, should the conspiracy theories that have been aired in recent publications on the whole subject of the Cold War gain more general acceptance there would be a need to re-examine the factors leading to the creation of the Baghdad Pact to test these theorists' claim that it had been intentionally created to promote the interests of both the West and the Soviet Union by driving the smaller nations into one or other bloc, on the assumption that a state of high tension between these blocs made it easier to control the smaller nations. Such speculation can, however, be safely left for examination in a more distant future.

For the present, it is hoped that this thesis has succeeded in utilising the light now available to illuminate the topic, and allow a more accurate understanding than was previously available.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

T.C. Dış İşleri Bakanlığı,  
Arşiv ve Ulaştırma Dairesi Başkanlığı,

Sayı: ARUD-171-174-13-6056

Konu: Arşiv'de Araştırma talebiniz hk.

Sayın Hamit Ersoy

Strasbourg Cad. 18/15

SIHHIYE/ANKARA

İlgi: 11 Ekim 1991 tarihli dilekçeniz.

“Devlet Arşivlerinde araştırma veya inceleme yapmak isteyen Türk veya yabancı uyruklu gerçek veya tüzel kişilerin tabi olacakları esasları düzenleyen” 89/14028 sayılı Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı'nın 2. maddesi, tasnif edilmiş ve taşıdığı tarihin üzerinden en az elli sene geçmiş arşiv malzemesi üzerinde araştırma ve inceleme faaliyetlerine imkan tanıdığından, ilgide kayıtlı dilekçenizdeki araştırma talebinizin yerine getirilmesi mümkün görülmemektedir.

Bilgilerinizi rica ederim.

Volkan Çotur (17.10.1991)

Elçi

Arşiv ve Ulaştırma Dairesi Başkanı



## Appendix 2

### TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION (SADABAD PACT): AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, IRAQ and TURKEY

8 July 1937

(Ratifications deposited, Tehran, 25 June 1938)

[League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 4402. vol. 190 (1938) pp.21-27.]

Border disputes arising from the peace settlement or inherited from earlier centuries kept relations between Iran (as Persia became known after 1935), Turkey and Iraq far from friendly for more than a decade following World War I. An agreement reached in Tehran on 23 January 1932 (text in League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1935, pp. 237-39) demarcated the Turco-Iranian frontier. But as late as January 1935 the Council of the League considered an Iraqi territorial complaint against Iran. Although the Council took no decision, Iraq nevertheless requested in January and September 1936 and again in May 1937 that the item be stricken from the Council's agenda. One reason for the Iraqi change of heart could be found in the draft treaty, initialed in Geneva on 2 October 1935 by the Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish delegates to the League of Nations, encouraged in their action by the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. According to the preamble of the treaty, signed at Sa'dabad Palace - Riza Shah's summer residence in the northern suburbs of Tehran - on 8 July 1937, the four Muslim states were "actuated by the common purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Near East by means of additional guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations." An accompanying protocol (not reproduced) announced that a permanent council would meet at least once annually. The Sa'dabad Pact, automatically renewable every five years, was never formally terminated. But this was, without practical

significance, for the quadripartite council, whose chief function apparently was to press for rotational membership in the League Council of the signatory states, did not ever convene after the outbreak of World War II. 'Survey of International Affairs,' 1936, pp. 793-803; M. Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, pp. 247-48, 261-63; A. Khalatbary, *L'Iran et le pacte orientale*.

ART. 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to pursue a policy of complete abstention from any interference in each other's internal affairs.

ART. 2. The High Contracting Parties expressly undertake to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers.

ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties agree to consult together in all international disputes affecting their common interests.

ART. 4. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes in no event to resort, whether singly or jointly with one or more third Powers, to any act of aggression directed against any other of the Contracting Parties.

The following shall be deemed to be acts of aggression:

1. Declaration of war;
2. Invasion of the armed forces of one State, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. An attack by the land, naval or air forces of one State, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Directly or indirectly aiding or assisting an aggressor.

The following shall not constitute acts of aggression:

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate self-defence, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression as defined above;

2. Action under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

3. Action in pursuance of a decision of the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or under Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided always that in the latter case such action is directed against the State which was the first to attack;

4. Action to assist a State subjected to attack, invasion or recourse to war by another of the High Contracting Parties, in violation of the Treaty for Renunciation of War signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928.

ART. 5. Should one of the High Contracting Parties consider that a breach of Article 4 of the present Treaty has been or is about to be committed, he shall at once bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations. The foregoing provision shall not affect the right of such High Contracting Party to take any steps which, in the circumstances, he may deem necessary.

ART. 6. Should one of the High Contracting Parties commit an aggression against a third Power, any other High Contracting Party may denounce the present Treaty, without notice, as towards the aggressor.

ART. 7. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within his respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitutional system of such other Party.

ART. 8. The High Contracting Parties, having already recognised, in the

General Treaty for Renunciation of War August 27th, 1928, that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise among them, shall never be sought by other than pacific means, reaffirm that principle and undertake to rely upon such modes of procedure as have been or shall be established between the High Contracting Parties in that respect.

ART. 9. No Articles of the present Treaty shall be considered as in any way diminishing the obligations assumed by each of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ART. 10. The present Treaty, drawn up in the French language and signed in quadruplicate, one copy having, as they severally recognise, been delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties, is concluded for a period of five years.

On the expiry of that period, and failing its denunciation, with six months' notice, by one of the High Contracting Parties, the Treaty shall be deemed to be renewed for successive periods of five years, until its denunciation with six months' notice by one or more of the High Contracting Parties. On its denunciation as towards one of the Parties, the Treaty shall nevertheless remain in force as between the others.

### Appendix 3

## TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND TURKEY

19 October 1939

(Ratifications deposited in Ankara, 16 November 1939)

[League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 4689, vol. 200 (1940-41), pp.167-89.]

The 1936 Montreux Straits convention (Doc. 60) together with France's progressive cession to Turkey between 1936 and 1939 of the sanjaq (provincial district) of Alexandretta - which contained a substantial Turkish population, but not a majority, and which Ankara agreed in 1921 (Doc. 35) and 1926 might remain part of the French mandate on condition that the district was placed under a special regime erased the young republic's major surviving grievances against Britain and France. The rapprochement found tangible expression in the following fifteen-year tripartite treaty of "mutual assistance in resistance to aggression." Article 7 stipulated that the terms of the pact were "equally binding as bilateral obligations" between Turkey and each of the other signatories. Attached to the treaty were several financial instruments (not reproduced) which provided for an Anglo-French credit to Turkey of 25 million pound sterling (three-fifths from France) for the purchase of military equipment and further loans totalling 18.5 million pound sterling. The two sets of obligations were to be amortized over a twenty-year period, the first at 4 per cent and the second at 3 per cent interest. The military convention, which formed an essential element of the tripartite arrangements, was not published with the other instruments. Despite the treaty engagements, Turkey remained neutral throughout most of World War II. J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, chap. 5; W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, pp. 312-18; C. Acikalin, 'Turkey's International Relations,' *Interna-*

*tional Affairs*, 23 (October 1947), 477-91; N. E. Kocaeli, 'The Development of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance,' *Asiatic Review*, (new series) 42 (October 1946), 347-51; Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, chap. 12; M. Weygand, *Recalled to Service*, chaps. 1, 3.

ART. 1. In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

ART. 2. (1) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power.

(2) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United Kingdom will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

ART. 3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Romania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.

ART. 4. In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that

Power against either of those States without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together.

It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.

ART. 5. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event of either:

(1) Aggression by a European Power against another European State which the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, or

(2) Aggression by a European Power which while directed against another European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.

ART. 6. The present Treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure France, the United Kingdom and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance in resistance to aggression should the necessity arise.

ART. 7. The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between Turkey and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ART. 8. If the High Contracting Parties are engaged in hostilities in consequence of the operation of the present Treaty, they will not conclude an armistice or peace except by common agreement.

ART. 9. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited simultaneously at Angora as soon as possible. It shall enter into force on the date of this deposit. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of fifteen years. If none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the two others of its intention to terminate it six months before the expiration of the said period, the Treaty will be renewed by tacit consent for a further period of five years, and so on.

#### PROTOCOL NO. 1.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries state that their respective Governments agree that the Treaty of to-day's date shall be put into force from the moment of its signature.

The present Protocol shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty concluded to-day between France , the United Kingdom and Turkey.

#### PROTOCOL NO. 2.

At the moment of signature of the Treaty between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have agreed as follows:

The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union.



## Appendix 4

### THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

12 March 1947

[The Department of State Bulletin, 16 (23 March 1974), 534-37]

The United States Policy of containing the Soviet Union, when first announced in March 1947, aimed - as its immediate objectives - at frustrating Russian designs on Greece and Turkey. Nor was it surprising that the Near and Middle East - strategically, an extension of the eastern Mediterranean - should have been singled out. Of all the regions on the Russian periphery this was one of the most exposed. Until the beginning of 1947 the Near and Middle East constituted a zone for whose defense Britain claimed primary responsibility. But World War II left the United Kingdom in a nearly prostrate financial condition. As elsewhere in Asia, Britain was contracting its commitments. Yet the demands of imperial and commonwealth defense and dependence on Near and Middle East oil and markets did not lessen the region's importance to the United Kingdom. American financial and military aid to Turkey (and Greece) was predicated on the assumption that the United States would shore up and supplement Britain's Near and Middle East defense arrangements. But the problems of defense in that region were tightly interlocked with other problems - notably, depressed economic and social conditions, general political instability, the legacy of hostility toward European controls, and intraregional rivalries and conflicts - which did not respond readily to global policy generalizations. Outlined below is the section on Greece. J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, chaps. 1, 5-7; H. L. Hoskins, *The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics*, chap. 13-14; Brookings Institution, *The Security of the Middle East, A Problem Paper*; H. S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, chaps. 7, 16.

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey... [Section on Greece omitted.]

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the

creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees, of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed

upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so

long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of 400,000,000 dollars for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the 350,000,000 dollars which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated

in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed 341,000,000,000 dollars toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of one percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

## Appendix 5

### TRIPARTITE (BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES) DECLARATION ON SECURITY IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL ZONE June 1950

25 May-21 June 1950

[Tripartite declaration from Department of State Bulletin, 22 (5 June 1950), 886; Israel reply translated from the Hebrew text in Israel, 1st Kneset, 2nd sess., Divrei ha-Kneset vol. 5, pp.1571-72; Arab League Council reply translated from the Arabic text in *Revue egyptienne de droit international (Arabic section)*, vol. 6 (1950), pp. 151-52]

The conclusion of the Arab-Israel armistice in 1949 (Doc. 92) did not soon lead, as some optimistically had hoped, to formal peace. Britain's resumption of arms shipments to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, in accordance with treaty obligations, was accompanied by widespread talk in the Arab East of a "second round" against Israel. For its part Israel continued to maintain a state of vigilance, purchasing military equipment wherever available and stepping up its production of small arms. A miniature arms race thus developed. Meanwhile, the cleavage within the Arab League between the Hashimi bloc (Jordan and Iraq) and the others was widened, and Jordan threatened with expulsion. The immediate cause of friction arose from the enlargement of Jordan's domain. On the eve of the signature of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement Iraqi troops withdrew from the interior of central Palestine, leaving the sector entirely to the military administration of King Abdallah's Arab Legion. Jordan progressively absorbed the district in the ensuing year. Palestine Arabs were encouraged to participate on 11 April 1950 in the Jordan election, and the new legislature formalized the annexation on 24 April by adopting a resolution giving its blessing to the merger. Three days later

Britain granted de jure recognition to Abdallah's enlarged kingdom. The tripartite statement was intended to stress to the governments concerned that the Western powers would not tolerate any renewal of the Arab-Israel war or any punitive action against Jordan. Apart from the three-power declaration, the formal replies of Israel and the Arab states are reproduced below. J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, chap. 4; G. Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950*, pp. 294-319.

#### TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, 25 MAY 1950

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state



in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

## 2. STATEMENT BY THE ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE KNESET, 31 MAY 1950

The publication a week ago of the declaration by the three great powers - the United States, Britain and France - on arms and security in the Arab states and Israel did not escape notice in our country, although the exaggerated sensitivity toward political declarations by foreign powers, so natural when our land was under foreign rule, is now a matter of history. The young state that emerged from a defensive war, when [Israel] fought alone against six Arab states that invaded the country in violation of the United Nations charter, views its existence, security and future as dependent primarily on its own efforts to conquer the desert, absorb immigrants and mobilize the spiritual and material resources of the nation. But it does not ignore for one moment the inescapable fact that the world in which we live is based upon mutual co-operation between the large nations and the small, and that even a great power cannot any longer live in isolated security, to say nothing of such a small and weak state as that of Israel. We ardently desire friendly relations with all nations, near and far, and the strengthening of security and peace in the

world.

The Kneset has surely noted that the three-power declaration is a unilateral instrument, issued to define the policy of the above powers toward the state of Israel and the Arab states on the question of arms and security. It is not necessary to stress here that the policy of the state of Israel is formulated only by the government of Israel in accordance with the sovereign will of the people and the consent of the Kneset. The declaration was transmitted to the government of Israel by the ambassadors of the three powers for information only.

Insofar as the declaration is designed to strengthen security and peace, even if only in the restricted Arab-Israel zone, it will receive the faithful support of the government of Israel. In the view of the government of Israel, the bolstering of peace in one corner of the world will contribute, directly and indirectly, to bolstering peace throughout the world. The government of Israel welcomes the statement of the three powers against an arms race between the Arab states and Israel. This statement, as it is noted in the declaration, was made by the three powers in the Security Council as early as 4 August 1949. But the government of Israel must call attention, with astonishment and concern, to the fact that from that time to the present, as before the above date, the furnishing of arms has continued to one side only - the Arab states, which have not ceased to threaten a new war against Israel and up to the present have refused to discuss peace with us. At the same time there is constant refusal to furnish arms and war material to Israel. This discrimination undermines the security of the state of Israel and endangers the peace in the Near East.

The three powers now inform us that they have received assurances from the states to which arms have been supplied that they harbor no aggressive designs on

any other state. But these assurances by the Arab states have not been accompanied by any practical guarantee. Moreover, [they] patently contradict the ceaseless preparations for war against the state of Israel.

Whoever knows the truth of the situation in the [Arab] lands will understand without hesitation that the arms sent to these states, if used at all, will be used against Israel, and perhaps against Israel alone. The government of Israel expresses satisfaction that the three powers now recognize that Israel has no less a need than the Arab states to maintain armed forces of a certain level.

Israel has never had, and never will have, aggressive intentions against anyone. Israel's hand is extended in peace to all the Arab states, severally and jointly. But Israel has the right and the duty to look after its own security, and the three powers have recognized this. The government of Israel hopes that this recognition will be translated into action, and that the discrimination against Israel in the supply of arms will be stopped completely by the governments that have signed the declaration. The government of Israel received with particular satisfaction the public announcement by the three powers of their deep interest in and their desire to promote peace and stability in the Arab states and Israel and of their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of the use of force by any state in this part of the world.

The three powers have pledged to take action against every violation of the frontiers or armistice lines, in accordance with their obligations as members of the United Nations. This pledge applies equally to the frontiers of the Arab states and to the domain of Israel, as fixed in armistice agreements with Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon.

As a government directly concerned and as a member of the United Nations,

the government of Israel feels obliged to state that it is not sufficient merely to prevent hostilities among neighbors. There is also a need to support and accelerate the negotiations for an enduring peace among all nations, among them Israel and the Arab states, and for this purpose it is essential to employ the full authority and resources of the United Nations.

The government of Israel will lend its hand faithfully to any endeavor designed to strengthen peace among all nations, and to raise the power and authority of the United Nations.

### 3. STATEMENT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL,

21 JUNE 1950

The governments of the Arab states, severally and jointly, have studied the joint declaration issued by the United Kingdom, France and the United States on 25 May 1950. The exchange of views on this declaration was one of the most important reasons that prompted the Arab states to expedite the meeting of the Arab League Council on 12 June 1950 and was one of the most important items on the agenda of the meeting. The Arab states have agreed to issue the following statement:

1. No one is more anxious than the Arab states about the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East. The [Arab lands stand] by nature at the head of the peace-loving countries. Successive events have proved the degree of their respect for the United Nations Charter.

2. If the Arab states have shown, and continue to show, an interest in meeting their military needs, this has been due to their deep sense of responsibility for safeguarding the internal security of their countries, insuring the legitimate defense

of their neutrality and fulfilling the obligation of safeguarding international security in this region. This is primarily the obligation of [the Arab states] and of the Arab League as a regional organization under article 52 of the United Nations Charter.

3. Even before the three powers ever thought of issuing their declaration, the Arab governments on their own initiative had decided to express the peaceful intentions of the Arabs and to refute the allegations that Israel has persisted in circulating [to the effect] that the Arab states are requesting arms for aggressive purposes. [The Arab states] hereby reiterate their peaceful intentions and declare that the arms that have been, or may be, ordered from the three powers or from others will be used solely for defensive purposes.

4. It goes without saying that the level of armed forces maintained by every state for defense purposes and for participation in the maintenance of international security is a matter that can only be estimated by the state concerned. It is also subject to various factors, chiefly the size of the population, the area of the country and the length and diversity of its frontiers.

5. The Arab states take note of the assurances that they have received to the effect that the three powers did not intend by their declaration to favor Israel, or to exert pressure on the Arab states to enter into negotiations with Israel, or to affect the final settlement of the Palestine problem or to preserve the status quo; but that they did intend to express their opposition to the use of force or to the violation of the armistice lines.

6. The Arab states declare that the most preferable and reliable measures for maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East would consist in solving its problems on the basis of right and justice, re-establishing the conditions of understanding and harmony that once prevailed and hastening the execution of

the United Nations resolution on the return of the Palestine refugees to their homes and on compensation for their material losses.

7. The Arab states also take note of assurances given them that the three-power declaration, both in its manner of presentation and in its provision for prior guarantees from the states purchasing arms, neither signifies the division of this region into zones of influence nor in any way infringes on the independence and sovereignty of the Arab states.

8. It is self-evident that the doubts, which the assurances mentioned in the preceding paragraph were designed to dispel, were raised by paragraph 3 of the three-power declaration, which laid down that, if the three powers should find that any state of this region was preparing to violate the frontiers or the armistice lines of another state, they would immediately take action, within or outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

There is no doubt that action alone will dispel these doubts, if it demonstrates that the three powers are in fact concerned with maintaining peace in the Middle East impartially and on the basis of right and justice and respect for the sovereignty of the states and without subjecting them to domination or influence.

9. In conclusion the Arab states can only affirm once again that, despite their anxiety for peace, they cannot approve any action that would harm their sovereignty and their independence.

## Appendix 6

### FOUR-POWER (BRITAIN, FRANCE, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES) PROPOSALS FOR A MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

1 October-10 November 1951

[The Department of State Bulletin, 25 (22 October 1951), 647-48, (19 November 1951), 817-18]

The Western search for ways to develop a "situation of strength" in the Near and Middle East gathered momentum after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. The British defense system in that region, which had proved so invaluable to the allied cause in two world wars, was contracting steadily. The overriding Western strategic problem at the time was to keep the Suez Canal base within the allied orbit. Anglo-Egyptian talks (June 1950-July 1951) turned out to be less exploratory than explosive, so that the breach between the two positions widened appreciably. At this juncture the United States took the initiative in persuading Britain, France and Turkey to become with itself co-sponsors of an Allied Middle East Command with which Egypt would be invited to associate itself as a founder member. The projected scheme, it was hoped, by substituting a joint allied for an exclusive British base in the canal zone, would meet at once Egyptian demands for the elimination of British hegemony and allied needs for the continued maintenance of the vital canal base in a condition for immediate emergency use. Inasmuch as Egyptian territory was slated under the scheme to serve as an allied base, the failure to consult the Egyptian government in formulating the plans wounded nationalist sensitivities. But this merely added another emotional irritant to an already highly charged situation, for, in the final analysis, the Western powers and Egypt were at cross purposes. The allies were anxious to bolster their defense against the

USSR; Egypt, to rid itself of foreign controls. Egyptian rejection of the four-power proposal was accordingly a foregone conclusion. Following the Egyptian Parliament's enactment on 15 October 1951 of decree laws repudiating the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreements on the Sudan (Doc. 99) and the 1936 treaty (Doc. 61), the four allies issued on 10 November a fresh set of principles under which any Near and Middle East state might voluntarily join the proposed allied-sponsored organization. J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas*, chap. 3; *Survey of International Affairs*, 1951, pp. 255-92; H. L. Hoskins, *Middle East, Problem Area*, chaps. 13- 14; R. P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs*, pp. 281-93.

1. INVITATION TO EGYPT TO PARTICIPATE IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST  
COMMAND, 13 OCTOBER 1951

Document A

POINT I. Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations.

POINT II. The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East against aggression from without can only be secured by the cooperation of all interested powers.

POINT III. The defense of Egypt can only be assured through the effective defense of the Middle East area and the coordination of this defense with that of adjacent areas.

POINT IV. It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United



States are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing such a Command. Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their interest in the defense of the area and who have agreed in principle.

POINT V. Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle East Command on a basis of equality and partnership with other founder members.

POINT VI. If Egypt is prepared to co-operate fully in the Allied Command Organization in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex, His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree to supersession of the 1936 Treaty and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as are not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement between the Egyptian Government and the Governments of other countries also participating as founder members.

POINT VII. As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Allied Middle East Command and the provision to that Command of the necessary strategic defense facilities, such as military and air bases, communications, ports, etc., Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on the same footing as other participating powers.

POINT VIII. In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements Egypt would be invited to accept a position of high authority and responsibility with the Allied Middle East Command and to designate Egyptian officers for integration in the Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff.

POINT IX. Facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Allied Command in a position to do so.

POINT X. The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East Defense Organization and its exact relationship with the N.A.T.O. have yet to be worked out in consultation between all the powers concerned. For this purpose it is proposed that all founding members of the Allied Middle East Command should send military representatives to a meeting to be held in the near future with the object of preparing detailed proposals for submission to the governments concerned.

Document B Technical Annex

[1] In common with other participating powers who are making similar contributions to the defense of the area.

(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East Command Organization such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the Middle East.

(b) that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Command all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communication.

[2] We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the Allied Supreme Commander's Headquarters being located in her territory.

[3] In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it would be understood

(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of this base in peace and war.

(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participating nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would be determined between the participating nations including Egypt from time to time as progress is made in building up the force of the Allied Middle East Command.

[4] It also would be understood that an air defense organization including both the Egyptian and Allied forces would be set up under the command of an officer with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Government and to the Allied Middle East Command for the protection of Egypt and Allied bases.

## 2. FOUR-POWER STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND, 10 NOVEMBER 1951

In proceeding with their announced intention to establish the Middle East Command, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey state that they are guided by the following principles:

1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that peace is indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of the peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent upon the states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area.

2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the cooperation of all interested states.

3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole; the achievement of peace and security in the area through the Middle East Command will bring with it social and economic advancement.

4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist and support the states willing to join in the defense of the Middle East and to develop the capacity of each to play its proper role in the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression. It will not interfere in problems and disputes arising within the area. The establishment of the Middle East Command in no way affects existing arrangements relating to such matters, notably the armistice agreements and the United States United Kingdom-French Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.

5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle East States on their request with assistance in the form of advice and training. Requests for arms and equipment made by states in the area willing to join in its defense to sponsoring states in a position to assist in this connection will be filled by them to the extent possible following the coordination of such requests through the Middle East Command.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander of Middle East will command forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for the operations of all forces within the area (or to be introduced into the area) in time of war or international emergency. However, the placing of forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East in peacetime is not a prerequisite for joining in the common effort for the defense of the Middle East. Movement of those troops placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East to or within the territories or states joining in the defense of the Middle East will be made only with the agreement of the state or states concerned and in full accord with their national independence and sovereignty.

7. While details have yet to be formulated, the sponsoring states intend that the Middle East Command should be an integrated allied command, not a national

command. The responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will be to insure the effectiveness of the corporate defense enterprise represented by the command. All states joining in this enterprise will be individually associated with the command on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense Liaison Organization which will be located at Middle East Command Headquarters and will be the link between the command and the countries ready to join in the defense of this area.

8. Any facilities granted to the Middle East Command by states joining in the defense of the Middle East will be the subject of specific agreements.

9. The broad mission of the Middle East Command and its cooperative character make it necessary that all States, whether territorially or not part of the area, act in the best interests of the cooperative defense of the area; the Middle East Command naturally will not further the national interest of any particular state.

10. A continuing objective of the Middle East Command is to reduce such deficiencies as exist at present in the organization and capacity for defense in a vitally important area so that the peacetime role of the states of the area in Middle East defense will progressively increase, thus permitting the peacetime role of states not territorially part of the Middle East to be decreased proportionately.

11. The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do not regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command will be organized as unchangeable; they believe that the Middle East Command through mutual understanding should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the Middle East area as a whole.

## Appendix 7

# REPORT ON THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST BY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES

1 June 1953

[The Department of State Bulletin, 28(15 June 1953), 831-35]

Less than four months after entering office Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, accompanied by Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen, spent two and one-half weeks (11-28 May 1953) in visiting most of the Near and Middle East lands. The unprecedented trip dramatically underscored the substantial development of United States interest and responsibility in that strategic region in the post-war period. In the following report delivered over national radio and television networks, Secretary Dulles demonstrated that the Republican Administration would not recoil from obligations in the Near and Middle East accepted by its Democratic predecessor. Indeed, he suggested that the United States would offer to the area even greater economic and military assistance than in the past. Among notable changes in emphasis from that of the outgoing administration, Secretary Dulles proposed to inaugurate an "impartial" policy in the Arab Israel zone and to abandon as sterile in the immediate future efforts to create a region-wide collective security system (Doc. 97) in favor of one that would embrace "the northern tier of nations," where, he felt, because of proximity to the USSR there was an "awareness of the [Soviet and communist] danger." R. P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs* 1953, chap. 5; J. W. Spain, 'Middle East Defense: a New Approach,' *The Middle East Journal*, (Summer 1954), pp. 251-66; H. L. Hoskins, *Middle East, Problem Area*, chaps. 12-14.

About 3 weeks ago, the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Harold Stassen,

and I and our associates set out, at President Eisenhower's request, on a trip to 12 countries which lie in between the Mediterranean in Europe and China in Asia. I shall give you our country-by-country impressions and then our general conclusions.

First, let me say that everywhere we were well received. This was encouraging, for several of the countries feel that the United States policies have, in recent years, been harmful and even antagonistic to them. The Communists have vigorously exploited this feeling. They staged some hostile demonstrations. But these were inconsequential. The governments received us with warm hospitality, and as we drove through the streets, the people usually greeted us with friendly smiles and applause. The political leaders talked intimately with us, and we gained new friendships and new understanding which will stand us in good stead for the future. Also in each capital I spoke to all of the United States Foreign Service personnel. They are a fine body of men and women of whom we can be proud.

It is high time that the United States Government paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia, which, until our trip, no United States Secretary of State has ever visited. Our post-war attention has been primarily given to Western Europe. That area was and is very important, but not all-important.

It came as a surprising shock when the 450 million Chinese people, whom we had counted as friends, fell under Communist domination. There could be equally dangerous developments in the Near East and South Asia. The situation calls for urgent concern.

The area we visited contains about one-fourth of the world's population. It represents about one-half of the people of the world who are still free of Communist domination.

The Near East possesses great strategic importance as the bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The present masters of the Kremlin, following the lead of past military conquerors, covet this position. In 1940 Soviet leaders specified, in secret negotiations with the Nazis, that Soviet "territorial aspirations center ... in the direction of the Indian Ocean and ... the Persian Gulf."

This area contains important resources vital to our welfare oil, manganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals. About 60 percent of the proven oil reserves of the world are in the Near East.

Most important of all, the Near East is the source of three great religions - the Jewish, the Christian, and the Moslem - which have for centuries exerted an immense influence throughout the world. Surely we cannot ignore the fate of the peoples who have first received and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths from which our own society derives its inner strength.

#### EGYPT AND THE SUEZ BASE

Our first stop was in Egypt. There we had 3 days in which to get acquainted with General Naguib, who heads the Government. He is a popular hero, and I could readily see why. He and his associates are determined to provide Egypt with a vigorous government which will truly serve the people. Also, they seek to end the stationing of British troops and exercise of British authority at the Suez base. Before we arrived in Egypt, a very tense situation had developed between the British and the Egyptian Governments. Conversations looking to an orderly withdrawal of British troops had been suspended, and there was danger that hostilities would break out.

We discussed the situation with General Naguib. The heart of the trouble is



not so much the presence of British troops, for both sides agreed that they should be withdrawn, but the subsequent authority over and management of this gigantic base, its airstrips, and its depots of supplies. Experienced administrative and technical personnel is needed to keep the base in operating efficiency and the provision of this personnel causes difficulty. The matter has an importance which goes beyond Egypt, for the base serves all Near Eastern and indeed Western security. I am convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this international concern and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with some success, that there be further time to find a peaceful solution. The United States is prepared to assist in any desired way.

Egypt stands at the threshold of what can be a great new future. If this Suez problem can be satisfactorily solved, I am confident that Egypt can find the means to develop its land and lift up its people and add a new bright chapter to a glorious past.

#### ISRAEL, JERUSALEM, AND REFUGEES

Next we went to Israel. We were impressed by the vision and supporting energy with which the people are building their new nation. Inspired by a great faith, they are now doing an impressive work of creation. They face hard internal problems which I believe they can solve. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, and other Israeli officials asserted convincingly their desire to live at peace with their Arab neighbors. Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between Israel and the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere is heavy with hate. As I gazed on the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the holy place of the Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths. This has been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations. This does not necessarily exclude some political status in

Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular nation.

Closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees, who fled from Palestine as the Israeli took over. They mostly exist in makeshift camps, with few facilities either for health, work, or recreation. Within these camps the inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate.

Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated into the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however, awaits on irrigation projects, which will permit more soil to be cultivated. Throughout the area the cry is for water for irrigation. United Nations contributions and other funds are available to help refugees, and Mr. Stassen and I came back with the impression that they can well be spent in large part on a co-ordinated use of the rivers which run through the Arab countries and Israel.

## JORDAN

Irrigation needs became most vivid as we motored from Jerusalem to Amman, the capital of Jordan. The road goes through the Dead Sea area, a scene of desolation with no sign of life other than the tens of thousands of refugees who survive precariously on the parched land largely by aid of United Nations doles. Later on, as we flew north, we observed the waters of the Yarmak River, which could perhaps be diverted so as to return some of this vast desert valley into fertile land. At Amman we dined with the charming and able new King Husein and his Government. They are preoccupied with the problem of refugees and of relations with Israel. The inflow of refugees has almost doubled the population, and the long

armistice line with Israel gives rise to frequent and dangerous shooting episodes.

## SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ, AND SAUDI ARABIA

From Jordan we went to Syria. There we were impressed by General Shishakli. He is eager to develop the resources of his country, which are substantial. Thus, the living standards of the Syrian people could be raised. This would, in turn, enable them to receive more refugees into a land which relatively is sparsely populated.

From Damascus, the capital of Syria, we motored to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. The road took us over a mountain range, with refreshing snow in sharp contrast to the heat of the desert plains.

You will recall that Beirut is the home of the American University, which has educated many of the Arab leaders of today. President Chamoun of Lebanon talked to us of his high hopes for his country and pointed to the role it might play, representing uniquely a meeting of East and West.

Leaving Lebanon for Iraq, we flew over the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys. This was the site of the Garden of Eden. Under its new ruler, King Faisal - who visited the United States last summer - the Government of Iraq is beginning to develop these valleys and restore their former productivity. The revenues from the oil production are being largely directed to this and other construction purposes. Iraq can be, and desires to be, the granary for much of this part of the world.

In Saudi Arabia we were received by King Ibn Saud, one of the great Near Eastern figures of this century, conspicuous in his dignity and singleness of purpose. He is a good friend of the United States as he has shown by deeds. Our policy will be to reciprocate this friendship. In Saudi Arabia Americans and Arabs are working together in good fellowship in the vast oil fields of the country. It is a

good relationship.

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN

We left the Arab area to go first to India and then to Pakistan. These two nations although independent for less than 6 years already play an influential part in world affairs.

In India I met again with Mr. Nehru one of the great leaders of our time. We had long conversations together in the intimacy of his home. His calm demeanor and lofty idealism impressed me. We reviewed together the international problems which concern both our countries, including the problem of a Korean armistice and the threat to Southeast Asia. We did not always agree, but we did clear up some misunderstandings and, I felt, gained respect for the integrity of our respective purposes. India is now supporting the armistice position of the United Nations Command in Korea.

Mr. Stassen and I also obtained a clearer view of the Government of India's 5-year program to improve the welfare of the Indian people. India is the world's largest self-governing nation. It has about 2,000 miles of common boundary with Communist China. There is occurring between these two countries a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police-state methods can achieve better social progress. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these 2 countries. In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity, including ourselves. Our interest fully justifies continuing, on a modest scale, some technical assistance and external resources to permit India to go on with its 5-year plan.

Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make

them a dependable bulwark against communism.

The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, whom we recently knew as Ambassador to Washington, energetically leads the new Government. We met with a feeling of warm friendship on the part of the people of Pakistan toward the United States.

A grave and immediate problem is the shortage of wheat. Without large imports widespread famine conditions will ensue. Last year we helped India in a similar emergency. I believe that prompt United States wheat assistance to Pakistan is essential.

It is not possible to think about United States aid without also thinking that these countries cannot afford to waste their efforts in quarreling with each other and diverting their strength for possible use against each other.

That thought applies to the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir. It is my impression from my conversations with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that this controversy can be settled. Surely it needs to be settled. We tried, tactfully but firmly, to make clear that the United States, as a friend of both countries, hopes for an accord which would make more fruitful such economic aid as we render.

## IRAN

It was not practical to include Iran in our schedule. However, we arranged that our Ambassador to Iran should meet us in Pakistan. Iran is now preoccupied with its oil dispute with Great Britain. But still the people and the Government do not want this quarrel to expose them to Communist subversion. They have not forgotten the Soviet occupation of 1941-1946.

The United States will avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute. But we can usefully continue technical aid and assistance to this agricultural nation of Iran and in that way perhaps help prevent an economic collapse which would play into the hands of predatory forces.

#### TURKEY, GREECE, AND LIBYA

After Pakistan, we went to Turkey and Greece. These two countries have clearly demonstrated their intent to stand steadfast against Communist aggression and subversion. Despite their heavy commitments to NATO, both countries have contributed valiantly to the United Nations efforts in Korea.

We, in turn, plan to continue to help Greece and Turkey to grow stronger. They are valiant in spirit and hold a strategic position in Europe and Asia which enables them to help us. While in Greece I dined with the King and Queen and passed on to this charming couple President Eisenhower's invitation that they visit us this fall.

Our last stop before returning to the United States was Libya, the newest member of the family of nations. This country is located at a key spot on the North African coast on the Mediterranean. It has recently become an independent nation by action of the United Nations. Libya is co-operating with the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening its own defenses and those of the Mediterranean area.

Let me turn now to conclusions.

1. Colonialism. Most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because,

it is reasoned, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.

I am convinced that United States policy has become unnecessarily ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully recognize that it would be a disaster if there were any break between the United States and Great Britain and France. They don't want this to happen. However, without breaking from the framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose, from an orderly development of self government.

I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none forget that the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it seeks to capture the dependent peoples.

2. Living Standards. The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the governments and the peoples themselves. In some cases they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. Mr. Stassen and I feel that money wisely spent for this area under the mutual security program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and co-operation.

3. Arab Good Will. The United States should seek to allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. In the past we had good relations with the Arab peoples. American educational institutions had built up

a feeling of good will, and also American businessmen had won a good reputation in this area. There was mutual confidence to mutual advantage.

Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the new State of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest the United States become the backer of expansionist Zionism.

On the other hand, the Israelis fear that ultimately the Arabs may try to push them into the sea.

In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States joined with Britain and France in a Declaration of May 25 1950, which stated that "the three Governments, should they find that any of these states (of the Near East) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation." That Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present U.S. administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of Communist dictators.

The leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples. We shall seek such policies.

4. Peace Between Israel and the Arab Nations. There is need for peace in the Near East. Today there is an uneasy military armistice between Israel and the Arab States, while economic warfare is being conducted by the Arab States, in



retaliation for alleged Israeli encroachments. The area is enfeebled by fear and by wasteful measures which are inspired by fear and hate.

Israel should become part of the Near East community and cease to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this community. This is possible. To achieve it will require concessions on the part of both sides. But the gains to both will far outweigh the concessions required to win those gains.

The parties concerned have the primary responsibility of bringing peace to the area. But the United States will not hesitate by every appropriate means to use its influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of tension in the area and the conclusion of ultimate peace.

5. Middle East Defense Organization. A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

6. Friendly Understanding. In conclusion, let me recall that the primary purpose of our trip was to show friendliness and to develop understanding. These

peoples we visited are proud peoples who have a great tradition and, I believe, a great future. We in the United States are better off if we respect and honor them, and learn the thoughts and aspirations which move them. It profits nothing merely to be critical of others.

President Eisenhower's administration plans to make friendship - not faultfinding - the basis of its foreign policy. President Eisenhower brought with him from Europe an unprecedented measure of understanding and personal friendships. Before he was inaugurated, he went to Korea. Twice since inauguration, Mr. Stassen and I have been to Europe. Now we have been to the Near East and South Asia. Later this month the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and Assistant Secretary of State Cabot will go to South America.

Thus your Government is establishing the world-wide relationships and gathering the information which will enable us better to serve you, the American people.

## Appendix 8

### AGREEMENT OF FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION: PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

2 April 1954

(Ratification exchanged, Ankara, 12 June 1954) [Pakistan, Treaty Series (1954), No. 4]

The practical significance of Secretary Dulles' "northern tier" concept began to clarify early in 1954. On 2 April Turkey and Pakistan, with United States encouragement, concluded in Karachi the present agreement. This was followed on 19 May by a mutual assistance agreement between Pakistan and the United States [Pakistan, Treaty Series (1954), No. 9], under which Pakistan became eligible for American military grant aid. The Pakistan-Turkish agreement, although intended to serve as the nucleus of the projected "northern tier" collective security arrangement, was for all practical purposes superseded by the Turco-Iraqi agreement of 24 February 1955 (Doc. 1073.) Omitted below is the amendment of 19 August 1954, effected by an exchange of notes between the Pakistan Charge d'Affaires in Ankara and the Turkish Foreign Minister, which altered article 4 (b) to read "production and supply of arms and ammunition." J. W. Spain, 'Military Assistance for Pakistan,' *The American Political Science Review*, (September 1954) 738-51.

#### Pakistan and Turkey

Reaffirming their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give effect to these Purposes and Principles,

Desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere friendship happily existing between them,

Recognising the need and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the wellbeing and security of their peoples.

Being convinced that such cooperation would be to the interest of all peace-loving nations and in particular also to the interest of nations in the region of the Contracting Parties, and would consequently serve to ensure peace and security which are both indivisible,

Have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly Cooperation....

ART.1. The Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any way in the internal affairs of each other and from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other.

2. The Contracting Parties will consult on international matters of mutual interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate between them to the maximum extent.

ART. 3. The Contracting Parties will develop the cooperation, already established between them in the cultural field under a separate Agreement, in the economic and technical fields also by concluding, if necessary, other agreements.

ART. 4. The consultation and cooperation between the Contracting Parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:

a. exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress,

b. endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the Parties in the production of arms and ammunition,

c. studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which

might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.

ART. 5. Each Contracting Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement and that this Agreement shall not affect, nor can it be interpreted so as to affect, the aforesaid engagements, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Agreement.

ART. 6. Any State, whose participation is considered by the Contracting Parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present Agreement, may accede to the present Agreement under the same conditions and with the same obligations as the Contracting Parties.

Any accession shall have legal effect, after the instrument of accession is duly deposited with the Government of Turkey from the date of an official ratification by the Government of Turkey and Government of Pakistan.

ART. 7. This Agreement, of English text is authentic, shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Ankara.

In case no formal notice of denunciation is given by one of the Contracting Parties to the other, one year before the termination of a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, the present Agreement shall automatically continue in force for a further period of five years, and the same procedure will apply for subsequent periods thereafter.

## Appendix 9

### (BAGHDAD) PACT OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ

24 February 1955

(Ratifications exchanged, Ankara, 15 April 1955) [Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1955, Misc. No. 5, Cmd. 9429]

Announcement by Turkey and Iraq in mid-January 1955 of plans to conclude a military alliance in co-operation with the West precipitated a crisis in the Arab League. The Revolutionary Command Council (military government) in Egypt was apparently persuaded that Iraq's contemplated action would destroy Arab solidarity in international politics, would thereby weaken the Arab League security system (Doc. 93 ) and would accordingly curtail in the West the bargaining influence of Egypt the League's dominant member. Despite mounting Egyptian pressures, including sponsorship in Cairo of an emergency meeting of the premiers and foreign ministers of the Arab League states (22 January-6 February 1955), Iraq signed the following military alliance, which replaced the Turco-Pakistan agreement of 2 April 1954 (Doc. 102) as the basic instrument of the "northern tier" collective security arrangement. One reason for Iraq's insistence upon a fresh formula may be found in article 5, which lays down that the "pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties." The last phrase, it is clear, was designed explicitly to exclude Israel. Britain acceded to the Baghdad Pact - as the Turco-Iraqi alliance became known - on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September and Iran on 25 October 1955. Indeed, the shah's government took its action in the face of a Soviet note of protest (Doc. 114).

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims....

ART. 1. Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ART. 2. In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High

Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ART. 4. The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

ART. 5. This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

ART. 6. A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function



within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ART. 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

ART. 8. This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications. In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

## Appendix 10

### SPECIAL AGREEMENT: BRITAIN AND IRAQ

4 April 1955

[Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1955, Treaty Series No. 50, Cmd. 9544]

Because of the failure to obtain Iraqi ratification of the draft agreement signed at Portsmouth on 15 January 1948 (Doc. 89), the 1930 treaty of alliance (Doc. 56) continued to govern Anglo-Iraqi relations in the decade following World War II. The present special agreement, which automatically came into force upon the United Kingdom's accession to the Baghdad Pact (Doc. 107) on 5 April 1955, ended Britain's preferential alliance with Iraq and established a relationship between the two countries more closely in accord with post-war realities. Reproduced below are the main instrument and two subsidiary agreements in the form of memoranda, defining the conditions of military co-operation. Omitted are exchanges of notes declaring that the terms of the two memoranda should remain valid for the same period as the special agreement and that the United Kingdom would provide pensions, gratuities, vocational training and grants to Iraqi levies and civilian employees of the R.A.F. under the expiring preferential alliance.

ART. 1. The two Contracting Governments shall maintain and develop peace and friendship between their two countries and shall co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with the Pact of Mutual Co-operation.

ART. 2. The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on June 30, 1930, with annexure and Notes exchanged, shall terminate from the date when the present Agreement comes into force.

ART. 3. The Government of Iraq by the present Agreement undertakes no

obligations beyond the frontiers of Iraq.

ART. 4. The Government of Iraq assume full responsibility for the defence of Iraq and will command and guard all defence installations in Iraq.

ART. 5. In accordance with Article 1 of the Pact, there shall be close co-operation between the competent authorities of the two Governments for the defence of Iraq. This co-operation shall include planning combined training and the provision of such facilities as may be agreed upon between the two Contracting Governments for this purpose and with the object of maintaining Iraq's armed forces at all times in a state of efficiency and readiness.

ART. 6. The Government of the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the Government of Iraq, do their best

(a) to afford help to Iraq;

(i) in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi Air Force by means of joint training and exercises in the Middle East;

(ii) in the efficient maintenance and operation of such airfields and other installations as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary;

(b) to join with the Government of Iraq in

(i) establishing an efficient system of warning against air attack;

(ii) ensuring that equipment for the defence of Iraq is kept in Iraq in a state of readiness;

(iii) training and equipping Iraqi forces for the defence of their country; and

(c) to make available in Iraq technical personnel of the British forces for the

purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article.

ART. 7. Service aircraft of the two countries shall enjoy staging and over-flying facilities in each other's territories.

ART. 8. In the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed attack which, in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments, endangers the security of Iraq, the Government of the United Kingdom at the request of the Government of Iraq shall make available assistance, including if necessary armed forces to help to defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq shall provide all facilities and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective.

ART. 9. (a) The present Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Pact. (b) The Agreement shall remain in force so long as both Iraq and the United Kingdom are parties to the Pact.

#### MEMORANDUM NO. 1

1. (a) Command of Habbaniya, Skaiba and Margil shall pass as from the date of signature of the Special Agreement to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi officers of appropriate rank shall be appointed for this purpose on May 2, 1955.

(b) All flying units of the Royal Air Force now stationed in Habbaniya and Shaiba shall be withdrawn progressively, and their withdrawal shall be completed within one year after the date of signature of the Special Agreement.

(c) As the withdrawal of these flying units proceeds, the Government of the United Kingdom shall also progressively withdraw members of their technical and administrative personnel and personnel of authorised service organisations until only those remain in Iraq who are required for the purpose of the Special Agreement and this Memorandum.

2. (a) Under the Special Agreement, British personnel shall be in Iraq to assist the Iraqi Forces with training and with the installation, operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment, and to service aircraft.

(b) The command and administration of British personnel and installations shall be the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom and for this purpose the Government of the United Kingdom shall make available the necessary British staff to command and administer them under the overall authority of the Iraqi officer in charge of each establishment.

(c) The senior British officer appointed in each case shall act in close liaison with the Iraqi officer in command.

3. The provisions of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in London on June 19, 1951 shall apply to the forces of each Government in the territories of the other Government. Detailed arrangements for the application of those provisions shall be made by the two Governments as soon as possible. Until such detailed arrangements have been made in Iraq, the provisions at present applicable to British forces there shall continue to apply.

4. (a) In accordance with Article 4 of the Special Agreement, the Government of Iraq shall assume responsibility for the protection of all airfields and installations in Iraq and to this end shall incorporate into the Iraqi Forces those members of the R.A.F. Levies of Iraq, who wish to volunteer. The Government of the United Kingdom shall, for a limited period, make available for loan to the Iraqi forces British personnel, as far as possible from among those now serving with the Royal Air Force Levies, Iraq, to facilitate such transfer and integration.

(b) The two Governments shall use their best endeavours to ensure that as many as possible of the civilians at present employed at Habbaniya, Shaiba and Margil shall continue in employment there.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom undertake, in accordance with Article 6 (a) and (c) of the Special Agreement and in order to facilitate the closest co-operation between the air forces of the two countries, to do their best:

(a) to provide expert advice and assistance in operational and technical matters, including the extension of Iraqi airfields, and in the construction of such additional airfields and facilities as may be agreed to be necessary;

(b) to provide personnel to assist in the training of the Royal Iraqi Air Force and to offer continuous consultations regarding methods and techniques of training at all stages;

(c) to arrange that Royal Air Force, squadrons and other British aircraft shall make periodic visits to Iraq in accordance with the provisions of the Special Agreement and this Memorandum, in particular for the purpose of joint training at all times;

(d) to make available in Iraq British personnel for the servicing, maintenance and repair of British aircraft as well as for such airfield services as it may be agreed that they should provide on airfields jointly used by both parties;

(e) to grant facilities, including instructional courses abroad, for training Iraqi personnel if suitable facilities are not available in Iraq;

(f) to facilitate as far as possible the supply of necessary aircraft and associated equipment of modern design.

6. The Government of the United Kingdom shall do their best to join with the Government of Iraq in establishing as soon as possible an efficient system for anti-aircraft defence, including radar warning system and a system for aircraft reporting. For these purposes, the Government of the United Kingdom shall make available to the Government of Iraq the co-operation and advice of qualified service and technical personnel.

7. For the purposes of Article 8 of the Special Agreement, the Iraqi land forces shall be so trained as to facilitate closest co-operation with land forces of the United Kingdom and suitably trained and experienced British personnel shall be made available to assist in the training of Iraqi land forces and to attend and advise on field and other exercises. The Government of the United Kingdom shall do their best to facilitate the supply to the Government of Iraq of arms and other appropriate equipment of modern design.

8. The Government of the United Kingdom will co-operate with the Government of Iraq in establishing in advance and maintaining to an agreed standard such maintenance installations, including tank repair facilities, as may be agreed to be necessary in the event of an armed attack for Iraqi forces and British forces co-operating with them. Expert service advice on their siting and construction, and advice and assistance in their maintenance and manning, shall be made available by the Government of the United Kingdom.

9. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall make available, as may be agreed between the two Governments, the co-operation and advice of suitably qualified service and technical personnel with a view to the establishment of an organisation for mine watching and mine clearance on the Shatt el Arab.

(b) The Government of Iraq shall continue to permit British naval units to

visit the Shatt el Arab at any time on previous notification being given.

10. The existing procedures and facilities under which aircraft, under the control of the R.A.F., overfly, land, refuel and are serviced in Iraq, shall be continued. Similar procedures shall apply and similar facilities shall be made available in the United Kingdom and its dependent territories to aircraft under the control of Royal Iraqi Air Force.

11. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall join with the Government of Iraq in establishing in Iraq stocks of military stores and equipment for use by the armed forces of the two countries for the defence of Iraq in the event of an armed attack against Iraq. These stocks shall be stored at sites in Iraq to be agreed between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

(b) The Government of Iraq shall provide the depots necessary for the safe keeping of those stocks and shall assume full responsibility for their security.

(c) For administrative purposes, stocks which are the property of the Government of Iraq shall be stored separately from those which are the property of the Government of the United Kingdom.

(d) The stocks shall be kept in a state of readiness at all times. Accordingly, provision shall be made for their maintenance, turn-over, inspection and periodical replacement, and each Government shall provide the personnel necessary for those purposes with respect to the stocks belonging to them.

(e) The Government of the United Kingdom may freely dispose of any items of such stocks, the property of the Government of the United Kingdom, which may become surplus to British requirements, subject to the offer of first refusal to the Government of Iraq in the case of any property to be disposed of in Iraq.



12. (a) The Government of Iraq shall make available essential services for the use of British personnel and shall, if necessary, allocate suitable accommodation for them and their families.

(b) Where new installations are from time to time agreed to be necessary for the purposes of the Special Agreement and this Memorandum, the terms of their provision shall be agreed between the two Governments.

#### MEMORANDUM NO. 2

(a) All immovable property now in British ownership shall either continue in British ownership or be handed over to the Government of Iraq, or be freely disposed of by the Government of the United Kingdom. Certain installations that will serve the needs of both Governments shall be handed over to the Government of Iraq free of charge. All other immovable property handed over to the Government of Iraq as above shall be paid for at its in situ value.

(b) Where installations have been handed over free of charge the Government of the United Kingdom shall enjoy full rights of free user. Where the Government of Iraq have paid for immovable property, they shall be entitled to make a reasonable charge, to be settled by agreement, for its subsequent use by the Government of the United Kingdom.

(c) Each Government shall be responsible for the operation and maintenance of immovable property in their ownership. The two Governments shall agree on the standards to be observed, and, in appropriate cases, the apportionment of costs, in respect of the operation and maintenance of the installations which serve the needs of both Governments.

(d) Movable property required for the operation of any property handed over

under paragraph (a) above shall be paid for by the Government of Iraq at full cost, if new, and if used, at a fair valuation. The Government of the United Kingdom shall retain all other movable property and shall have the right to dispose of it in Iraq or elsewhere.

(e) The Government of Iraq shall bear the cost of their air warning system and of improving their military airfields to standards to be agreed.

(f) Each Government shall meet the cost of its own forces and any civilian personnel employed by it, except that the cost to the Government of Iraq of British personnel loaned or seconded to the Iraqi forces shall be mutually agreed.

(g) Any other financial questions shall be settled by agreement between the two Governments.

## Appendix 11

### FIRST STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE

The revolution of May 27 was completed within four hours. Strategic posts were secured, the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet taken into "protective custody," and military commanders placed in charge of the areas in which they were stationed. At 4 p.m. the curfew in Ankara was lifted, and the city witnessed a celebration such as it had not seen since the victory in the War of Independence. Istanbul was also the scene of wild celebrations. The rest of the country was less excited, partly because most of the disturbances had been confined to Ankara and Istanbul (and to a small extent Izmir), partly because there were still many Menderes sympathizers in the nation, and partly because few people had any idea what to expect from the armed forces. Most of those who initially hesitated were quick to get on the band wagon. Celebration and ceremony continued for the better part of a month, no day going by without several groups laying wreaths at the Ataturk Mausoleum. Then Turkey began to settle down and to realize the difficulty of the work ahead.

In mid-morning on May 27 the armed forces broadcast a message to the Turkish nation and to the world:

Honourable Fellow Countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country.

Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and for handing over the administration to whichever party wins the elections.

Our initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort to any aggressive act against personalities, nor will it allow others to do so.

All fellow countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the laws and all the principles of law.

For the elimination of all our hardships and for the safety of our national existence, it is imperative that it should be remembered that all our fellow countrymen belong to the same nation and race, above all party considerations, and that therefore they should treat one another with respect and understanding, without bearing any grudge.

All personalities of the Cabinet are requested to take refuge with the Turkish armed forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by law. We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours and the entire world. Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag.

We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and we are faithful to them. We repeat: Our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world.<sup>676</sup>

The body formed to govern the nation became known as the National Unity Committee (NUC). For several days neither the names nor the number of officers composing the junta was officially known, other than that of General Cemal Gursel, former Commander of Land Forces, who became Chairman of the NUC, President, Prime Minister, and Chief of the General Staff. A few days later the official list of thirty-eight officers was published. One of the first acts of the NUC was to bring to Ankara a group of professors from the Law Faculty of the University of Istanbul, to write a new Constitution and Election Law. On May 28 the junta appointed a seventeen-man cabinet, of whom fifteen were civilian "technicians" who had not been identified with any political party.

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<sup>676</sup> Weiker, Walter F., *Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics*, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC., 1963.

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