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THE AMBIGUITY OF THE MODERN

Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Fate of the Subject in Modernity

Roger David Owen

Ph.D Thesis

University of Durham

Department of Sociology and Social Policy

1989

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21 DEC 1990

ROGER DAVID OWEN

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE MODERN: NIETZSCHE, WEBER, FOUCAULT AND THE FATE OF THE SUBJECT IN MODERNITY

Ph.D, 1989

It is argued here that Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault represent a discrete tradition of theorising in the human sciences. More particularly, that they constitute a tradition of theorising about the fate of the modern subject. This argument is established by examining each theorist in relation to three areas. Firstly, the philosophical and methodological position occupied by each is analysed. Secondly, the diagnoses of modernity offered by these theorists are examined. Finally, the politics of the forms of theorising deployed by Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault are elaborated.

It is shown on a philosophical level, that these theorists can be grouped about the notions of perspectivism, subjectivity and genealogy. With regard to modernity, it is pointed out that each theorists treats the modern as an ambiguous achievement. Their analyses being structured about an opposition between discipline and self-discipline in the constitution of the individual's subjectivity. In relation to the political dimension of their forms of theorising, it is illustrated that each displays a reflexive concern with the nature of the human sciences. For all three theorists, it is shown, the role of the human sciences manifests itself as a reflection on the possibility of meaningful action by the individual in the modern age.

In the conclusion, it is argued that this tradition avoids the problem posed by the subject-object distinction for the human sciences. It is pointed out that this tradition represents mode of critique for articulating our 'common concerns'. It is also claimed that this form of theorising cannot be easily assimilated under either of the rubrics 'modernism' or 'postmodernism'.

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Declaration

This is to certify that none of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other university.

Statement of Copyright

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

Full details of editions, translators, etc. can be found in the bibliography. The particulars of the quotations used to open the thesis and the chapters can also be found at the being of the bibliography.

Nietzsche

AC - The Anti-Christ

BGE - Beyond Good and Evil

BT - The Birth of Tragedy

EH - Ecce Homo

GS - The Gay Science

GM - On the Genealogy of Morals

TI - Twilight of the Idols

TP I - 'The Philosopher'

TP IV - 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'

WP - The Will to Power

Z - Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Weber

FMW - From Max Weber

MSS - The Methodology of the Social Sciences

PESC - The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

TSEO - The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations

Foucault

AK - The Archaeology of Knowledge

DP - Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison

FCR - Foucault: A Critical Reader

FR - The Foucault Reader

HS - The History of Sexuality, volume 1.

KER - 'Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution'

MC - Madness and Civilisation

OD - The Order of Discourse

OT - The Order of Things

P/K - Power/Knowledge

QM - 'Questions of Method'

SP - 'The Subject and Power'

UP - The Use of Pleasure: the History of Sexuality, volume 2.

The Ambiguity of the Modern

Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Fate of the Subject in Modernity



To my parents,
without whom nothing

What the brazen Fascists hypocritically laud and pliable humanist experts naively put into practice - the indefatigable self-destructiveness of enlightenment - requires philosophy to discard even the last vestigages of innocence in regard to the habits and tendencies of the spirit of the age.

- Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer

INTRODUCTION

The attempt to encapsulate the thought of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault within a single volume might seem a somewhat foolhardy undertaking. It would be so. This, however, is not the enterprise of this thesis. The considerably more limited objective to be accomplished here is to show that these three theorists can be seen to constitute a tradition of theorising in the human sciences (broadly conceived). More specifically still, our argument is that Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault constitute a more or less discrete tradition of theorising *modernity*, in particular the fate of the modern subject.

Strong has argued that the claim to know Nietzsche is (borrowing Wittgenstein's metaphor) rather like the claim to know Paris or Rome[1]. 'Knowing' here means being able to find one's way about, perhaps even to be able to give directions. In this thesis, certain routes through the thoughts of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault will be indicated. Like all tourists guides, there is an element of the arbitrary in which streets, buildings, nightspots and restaurants will be recommended. In the end, perhaps all one can hope for is that the traveller had an interesting stay. In this introduction, the comments will geared towards orientating the visitor to the itinerary which awaits them (this is, after all, a package holiday) and to lessening the possibilities of culture shock.

Why consider Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault? The answer to this question today is undoubtably different to that which would have been proferred even ten years ago. A series of original Anglo-American studies of Nietzsche, often in response to the emergence of slightly older Continental

works, has re-awoken interest in this most abused philosopher[2]. The pre-figuring of current debates on interpretation, subjectivity and meaning in Nietzsche's work has resulted in a path being beaten increasingly back to his door. Perhaps too, the fact that this present generation of scholars do not remember (in an experiential sense) the Nazi deployment of Nietzsche for their own ends has meant a more sober appreciation of Nietzsche's philosophy could emerge. Weber, too, is emerging anew, though from a different form of subjugation. Indeed, it was the very sobriety of Weber's work which made it so attractive to a post-war Anglo-American audience. Here it seemed was a figure whose heroic refusal of value-judgements matched the mood of an empirically orientated human sciences. This Anglo-American appropriation of Weber has been summed up recently by Lassman and Velody who note:

> In the main, postwar Anglo-American social science has made use of a particular interpretation of Weber's work that has served to justify its own current practice. ... In general terms it is possible to point to the existence of two main trends in the interpretation of Weber's work. One of these, the most influential, has attempted 'to pick useful sociological concepts at random from Weber's "Interpretive Sociology" without giving much thought to the context in which they are being put forward. It is most unfortunate that Weber has sometimes become little more than a useful quarry for concepts and ideal-types' (Lassman and Velody 1988 p160).

More recently, this 'orthodoxy' has re-examined and powerful new interpretations of Weber have been put forward[3]. These 'heterodox' interpretations have tended to be more sensitive to the cultural context of Weber's work, in particular to the debates that animated the human sciences in Germany during Weber's life. One side-effect of this 'sensitisation' towards Weber has been that his relation to Nietzsche is

being rescrutinised and taken seriously as an issue in achieving interpretive adequacy with regard to Weber's work. The significance of the thought of Foucault is, perhaps through its very contemporary nature, both more and less difficult to indicate. On the one hand, the sheer weight of work on Foucault's ideas, either explicating or applying them, can be taken to show its importance. On the other hand, the lack of temporal distance from his texts makes judgement as to their lasting significance imposible to render. What is certainly the case is that Foucault has contributed to the increase in contemporary importance of the ideas of Nietzsche and Weber*. As such, the treatment of these theorists together would seem to be a reasonable undertaking.

In (re)constructing the tradition of theorising constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, three dimensions will be considered. Firstly, the philosophical and methodological relations that exist between them. Secondly, their treatment of the issue of the fate of the modern subject in terms of *discipline*. Thirdly, the politics of their individual modes of theorising. It is useful to specify these in rather more detail.

The discussions of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault offered here begin by highlighting their theoretical positions, particularly in terms of the methodological approaches they deploy. By focusing in each case on the notions of 'perspectivism', 'subjectivity' and 'genealogy', the relations between their positions are brought out. This gradualist approach allows us to be sensitive to the particularity of each theorist while building up an outline of the theoretical nature of the tradition being specified here.

In considering the diagnoses of modernity put forward by these theorists, we focus on the concept of 'discipline' as it is (explicitly or

implicitly) deployed by these theorists. In particular, the opposing of 'discipline' and 'self-discipline' is illustrated as we take up the issue of the fate of the subject within modernity considered as an ambiguous achievement. We are here concerned to establish substantive similarities between Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault in terms of their treatment of this issue.

Finally, the politics of the theories considered are drawn out. Nietzsche and Weber are shown to be attempting the generation of a form of theorising which will enable the subject to invest their life with meaning. While this issue is similarly of concern to Foucault, it is pointed out that this question becomes subordinate to the problem posed by disciplinary power for the individual's subjectivity in modernity. In each case, reflection on the form of theorising deployed in the human sciences is shown to be of central concern.

This threefold delineation of the tradition constituted by these theorists enables us to locate the philosophical, substantive and political dimensions of the form of human science being articulated. The question of the 'superiority' of this tradition to other approaches is not explicitly discussed. Indeed, whether or not one may evaluate rival traditions would appear to require another thesis in itself. However, some obstacles for alternative approaches are indicated.

Returning to our earlier metaphor, we may now say that you - the traveller - have read the itinerary and looked over the thumbnail maps in the brouchure. However, as with all package holidays, some formal points remain. These concern the style of the tour offered.

Veyne recounts that in 1560 before Pasquier published his Recherches de

la France, he circulated the manuscript amongst his friends. Veyne goes on:

> The most frequent reproach they made to him concerned his habit of frequently furnishing the references to the sources he cited. This procedure, it was noted, was too reminiscent of the "shadow of the schools" and was hardly appropriate to a work of history. (Veyne 1981 p4).

Times change. Today not only references but all kinds of asides are contained in the footnotes, occasionally one must seek the author's entire basis for his argument there. Retaining a certain sympathy with Pasquier's friends, footnotes have been minimised as far as possible in this thesis.

Our second (and final) point concerns the rather more serious issue of the use of the pronoun 'we' in this thesis. Who is this 'we'? It may be argued that the use of this pronoun constitutes an implicit appeal to the idea of a theoretical reason common to all subjects (perhaps with its roots in the Christian notion of the 'equality of souls before God'). If some form of this argument is accepted, it would follow that the use of this pronoun is singularly inappropriate to this thesis (in which the theorists considered reject the idea of a transcendental subjectivity on which the notion of theoretical reason is predicated). It must be stated, therefore, that the deployment of the pronoun 'we' in this thesis is purely performative in character. If this still remains problematic, then so be it.

NOTES

1. Strong, Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (1975) pp4-7.

2. On the Anglo-American side, a few of the interesting publications are: Strong op. cit., Nehamas Nietzsche: Life As Literature (1985), Schacht Nietzsche (1983) and Schutte Beyond Nihilism (1984). On the Continent, interesting work has been done by, most notably, Derrida Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (1972: trans. 1979) and Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962: trans. 1983).

3. Three book which have illustrated this heterodoxy though in different ways are: Hennis Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction (1988) (probably the single most powerful reinterpretation of Weber), Eden Political Leadership and Nihilism (1983) (particularly for its location of Weber in relation to Nietzsche), and Mommsen & Osterhammel (ed) Max Weber and his Contemporaries (1987).

4. Foucault's own essays on Nietzsche, notably 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Reader pp76-100, were a part of the increasing interest in this thinker. More recently heterodox interpretations of Weber have been utilised in conjunction with interpretations of Foucault, the best example of this work being Gordon's 'The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government' in Whimster & Lash (ed.) Max Weber: Rationality and Modernity (1987).

Frederich Nietzsche

LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY, PERSPECTIVISM

Introduction

In this chapter, we will introduce the philosophical themes which are embodied in Nietzsche's thought. The themes which structure his analysis of *nihilism* and his positing of the figure of the Overman. In other words, we shall be concerned with rendering explicit the presuppositions of Nietzsche's philosophy. We shall approach this task by examining a series of issues. Initially, we shall be concerned with Nietzsche's philosophy of language, concentrating on two aspects in particular: (i) his analysis of the *grammatical catagories of language* and the reification of these catagories, and (ii) his conception of language as, inherently, *rhetorical* in form, here we shall focus on his treatment of language as *metaphor*. In the next two sections, we will draw out the implications of this philosophy of language in relation to developing the themes of *subjectivity* and *perspectivism* in Nietzsche's thought. Finally, we will attempt to relate these themes to Nietzsche's treatment of the question of *origins* and his conception of *genealogy*. The analysis of these issues should provide us with the basis necessary to move to a consideration of Nietzsche's treatment of *nihilism* as the defining characteristic of modernity.

1. The Subject of Grammar

> 'Reason' in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar ... (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 5)

For Nietzsche, grammar is no neutral reflection of the structure of the

world, on the contrary, grammar - in particular the subject/predicate distinction - is a cultural invention which, reified onto the world, poses a serious issue for philosophy. In elucidating Nietzsche's comment, Hollingdale notes:

> Because the grammar of the language we have inherited is founded upon a relationship between subject and predicate, we cannot help thinking this subject-predicate relationship into the real world in the form of 'thing' and the 'action' of a thing, of 'being' and 'doing'; ultimately we believe in 'God-world' only because we believe in 'subject-predicate'. (TI/AC p190)

When Nietzsche refers to the philosopher as being 'caught in the nets of language' (TP I p42), he is not making the facile claim that we can, somehow, step outside of language, but, rather, the claim that we must investigate how the structure of language has been unconsciously reified in various philosophical positions. As Strong has indicated, for Nietzsche: '*Language contains a hidden philosophical mythology.*' (Strong 1984 p87, cf. TI/AC p191). Moreover, we should not underestimate the significance of this *mythology*:

> The singular family resemblance between all Indian, Greek and German philosophizing is easy enough to explain. Where there exist a language affinity it is quite impossible, thanks to the common philosophy of grammar - I mean thanks to the unconscious domination and directing by similar grammatical functions - to avoid everything being prepared in advance for a similar evolution and succession of philosophical systems: just as the road is barred to certain other possibilities of world interpretation. (BGE 20)

Nietzsche sets himself the task of unearthing the consequences of this 'unconscious domination', this grammatical refication, in particular, in relation to the subject-predicate distinction. Approaching this obliquely, we can note that it is through language that the distinction between the

'real' world and the 'apparent' world emerges: 'The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world besides the other world,' (HA 11). The distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds is closely related to the operation of the subject-predicate distinction: the subject as, in essence, immutable and the acts of the subject as historically contingent. Strong has suggested that when 'combined with the general architectonic features of language, the subject-object distinction produces particularly unfortunate consequences.' (Strong 1984 p93). These being twofold: (i) a privileging of consciousness and (ii) an 'imperative towards ahistoricity' (Strong 1984 p93). While each of these aspects is significant in their own right, it is in their combination that Nietzsche sees the main philosophical problem arising.

The privileging of consciousness, the separation of 'doer' and 'deed' (which implies an intentionality), involves a conception of the subject-as-unity - a transcendental subjectivity - which 'makes man *qua* subject a prime mover in his own right; it tends to fix a supposed correctness on whatever reflexive conclusions the subject may arrive at.' (Strong 1984 p93). It is from this that is generated the 'imperative towards ahistoricity'. For, if the 'reflexive conclusions' of consciousness are ahistorical, it is quite legitimate to *mummify*, '*sub specie aeterni*'[1], our subjectivity. What is represented by these two points, taken together, is the philosophical privileging of *theoretical reason*. By which is meant a reason which operates ahistorically and is founded on a conception of a transcendental subject. This being distinct from, and superior to, practical reason - by which we refer to a conception of reason as practice, grounded in particular cultural forms of life. The reification of the subject-predicate distinction leads to a conception of the subject as

transcendental and this, in turn, acts as a *foundation* for generating an ahistorical, theoretical reason. We can illustrate this understanding by reference to the Kantian conception of theoretical reason . As McIntyre points out, for Kant: 'The rational agent prescribes the maxims which express the universal generalizations to himself... And since reason is the same in all individuals, all individuals will legislate the same set of maxims.' (McIntyre 1978 p25). This Kantian understanding falls into what Nietzsche terms 'the *error of imaginary causes*'[2], which is to say it posits a transcendental subject which is unproblematically expressed by the grammatical structure of language, instead of recognising that this subject is produced by the reification of a grammatical catagory. Moreover, this procedure is repeated in its privileging of consciousness as the homogeneous ground of reason. For Kant, it is the architectonic structure of our consciousness which defines the form of reason, but, Nietzsche claims, this privileging of consciousness is founded on a logically invalid inference (from the operation of the subject-predicate distinction in language to the positing of subject-object distinction in the world).

Here we come full circle to the remark of Nietzsche's with which we opened this section. Our belief in *God* - taken both literally and as a metaphor for absolute values - is produced through the operation of an transcendental reason, which, in turn, is generated through our unconscious reification of grammatical catagories. For Nietzsche, an adequate philosophy must not only, as here, explore (and thus partially undermine) the role of such a grammatical reification, it must, further, present a philosophical style of reasoning which avoids such reification .

2. Language and Metaphor

In the last section, we noted the role played by *grammar* in Nietzsche's analysis of language. In this section, our concern will focus on the issue of language as inherently rhetorical in nature[3]. We shall be attempting to draw out the significance of this conception of language for Nietzsche's relation to the concepts of 'reason', 'truth' and 'subjectivity'.

If the transposition of grammatical relations and categories represents one condition of possibility for the emergence of nihilism[4], another is indicated by our adoption of the correspondence theory of truth. In the context of the distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds, the correspondence theory acts an imperative towards the belief that because we have terms like 'will', 'good', 'true', 'God' and 'substance', there is necessarily something which corresponds to these terms. A true statement is one in which the structure of the statement, the arrangement of the terms deployed, corresponds to the structural arrangement of the 'things' designated by these terms in the world. Nietzsche finds this problematic not just because it acts as a further buttress for the belief in the subject as an entity distinct from the acts performed by that subject, but also because it acts as a veil, an illusion, an error (in the full irony of these terms)[5] which is no longer useful. Indeed, this belief is now harmful: 'God is dead; but given the way of men, there may be still caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. - And we - we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.' (GS 108). The correspondence theory of truth is one such shadow. It is useful to note here that, for Nietzsche, the falsity of a belief does not necessarily constitute an argument against it, as he says: 'The conditions of life might include error.' (GS 121). What is significant is it's value for life: 'The value for

life is ultimately decisive.' (WP 493). As Nietzsche puts this point in relation to another context:

> The only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that their errors have ceased to be beneficial - that they rather do harm; in short, that their own "proof of power" no longer holds good - (WP 158).

In modernity, the "proof of power" of the correspondence theory of truth, as a form of the will to truth, no longer holds good. Why? Nietzsche's argument operates on various grounds, one of which we noted above[6]. In general, we can say that the correspondence theory of truth represents a denial of the death of God, or, more accurately, an attempt to replace the authority of God with the authority of reason. This, for Nietzsche, represents the adbication of self-responsibility: 'One wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk of positing a goal *for oneself*; one wants to rid oneself of the responsibility' (WP 20). In other words, *passive nihilism*: the 'decline and recession of the power of the spirit:' (WP 22). We will be exploring Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism in the next chapter[7], however it is necessary now to look at is his account of how language seduces us into an acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth. At the same time, we will indicate the general features of Nietzsche's philosophy of language.

Let us begin by noting the Nietzsche's characterisation of the conception of language which leads us to adopt the correspondence theory:

> The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon itself, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in *aeternae veritas* he has

appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world. (HA 11)

How is it that this should come about? To explain this Nietzsche develops an alternative conception of language and provides us with a *psychological allegory* of its origin. This development and provision draw on, and radicalise, the Romantic conception of language which we find, for instance, in Herder, a conception of language which connects metaphor with the emergence of speech itself. The allegory Nietzsche offers us goes as follows:

> *Psychological explanation.* - To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown - the first instinct is to *eliminate* these distressing states. First principle: any explanation is better than none. ... The cause-creating drive is thus conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear. ... Thus there are sought not only somekind of explanation as cause, but a *selected* and *preferred* kind of explanation, the kind by means of which the feeling of the strange, new, unexperienced is most speedily and most frequently abolished - the *most common* explanations. (TI 'The Four Great Errors' 5).

The device by which we most readily translate the strange into the familiar is *metaphor*[8]. However, it is psychologically entailed, for Nietzsche, that having metaphorically assimilated the strange, the unknown[9], we must *forget* that this assimilation is (merely!) metaphorical in operation - 'Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security and consistency ...' (TP IV p86) - and redescribe it as conceptual, that is, give it a solidity and form, make it into a *causal explanation*. As he puts it:

> Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends

> upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept... (TP IV p86)

We may scarcely recognise that our concepts are, what Rorty would call[10], metaphors which have died off into literalness, yet this is the claim Nietzsche is making. Language and rhetoric are co-extensive. This claim has several implications, which Nietzsche recognises, wih regard to our conceptions of 'reason', 'knowledge' and 'truth'.

If: 'No such thing as an unrhetorical "natural" language exists that could be used as a point of reference:' (in De Man 1979 p105/106), if: 'Tropes are not something that can be added or subtracted from language at will; they are its truest nature.' (in De Man 1979 p105/106), then it follows that our formulations of 'reason' (which, after all, must be expressed through language) are themselves rhetorical. Thus Nietzsche argues: 'All rhetorical figures (i.e. the essence of language) are logically invalid inferences. This is how reason begins.' (TP I p48). On this model, '[k]nowing is nothing but working with the favourite metaphors,' (TP I p51) - and truth? Truth, in the famous phrase, is:

> A moving army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms, in short a summa of human relationships that are being poetically and rhetorically sublimated, transposed, and beautified until, after long and repeated use, a people considers them as solid, canonical, and unavoidable. Truths are illusions whose illusory nature has been forgotten, metaphors that have been used up and have lost their imprint and that now operate as mere metal, no longer as coins. (TP IV p84)

It is not difficult to see that if one operates this conception of language, then, as with Wittgenstein's later philosophy, it undermines any attempt to generate firm foundations for knowledge[11] - *the philospher of*

language as Sapper. Nietzsche deploys this model of language with devasting irony, on the Kantian synthetic a priori, for example: 'A synthetic judgement describes a thing according to its consequences, i.e. essence and consequences become identified, i.e. a metonymy.' (TP I p52). Now it is all very well to satirise our philosophical conceptions of 'reason', 'knowledge', 'truth', etc., but such a move *demands* an alternate philosophy consistent with the conception of language deployed here. We will be examining various aspects of this philosophy in the remaining sections of this chapter, it is relevant though to sketch here what a particular aspect of such a philosophy might look like. As our example, we shall take the way 'reason' might be conceived within such a framework.

We can begin by reminding ourselves that, for Nietzsche, there is no theoretical reason divorced, superior, or separate to practical reason. Practical reason here signifying the way(s) we go about living, our everday practices, as philosopher, father, political activist, lover, etc. ... In this sense, Nietzsche is being rigorously nominalistic about our use of the term 'reason', undercutting the homogeneity ascribed to it by philosophers. Recalling Nietzsche's comments on the value for life as the ultimate tribunal, we may go so far as to suggest a way of acting is rational in so far as it fosters the life of the individual, that is the individual's individuality; and irrational in so far as it hinders such fostering. Theoretical reason, on this model, is that form of practical reason which reflects on the forms, rationality and irrationality of our practices (including itself as a practice, or set of practices, for theoretical reason may also be irrational). It is useful to add two points to what has been posited so far.

Deleuze has suggested that in the context of Nietzsche's thought:

> any proposition is itself a set of symptoms expressing a way of being or a mode of existence of the thinker, that is to say the state of forces that he maintains or tries to maintain with himself and others (consider the role of conjunctions in this connection). In this sense a proposition always reflects a mode of existence, a "type". (Deleuze 1983 px).

What this implies is the claim that, for Nietzsche, our mode of expression affirms a particular mode of being, which is to say, a style of reasoning[12]. This point can be specified through the second point we shall mention. If language is, as has been argued here, thoroughly rhetorical, for Nietzsche, and, moreover, reasoning is throughly linguistic (i.e. it makes no sense to talk of reasoning 'outside' of language), then it follows that reasoning is throughly rhetorical[13]. This implies that our mode of expression embodies a (necessarily rhetorical) style of reasoning which is constitutive of a particular mode of being. The rhetorical nature of reasoning is significant here not just because it enables us to speak of reasoning in terms of *style(s)*, but because it also instances a particular exemplar of the will to power. That is, our mode of expression is inherently *performative*, it seeks to persuade, to encourage, the adoption of a particular mode of being[14]. We can now see the kind of notion of 'reason' which operates in Nietzsche's texts, the cogency of this notion of 'reason' is, of course, another question and one which it would be premature to try to answer here before examing Nietzsche's remarks on subjectivity and perspectivism.

What has been indicated in this section is the sort of account of language we can find in Nietzsche. It has been suggested elsewhere[15] that there are similarities between Nietzsche's account and that offered by the later Wittgenstein. This is an interesting parallel which, particularly in respect of their common relation to and rebellion against Schopenhauer,

would repay further study, however, we can, for the moment, indicate two fairly strong points in common: (i) a rejection of correspondence theories of truth and thus of the traditional epistemological enterprise and (ii) a treatment of language as practice, that is, of language as inseparable from our everyday practices and forms of life. Beyond this point, it would be foolhardy to commit ourselves with respect to Wittgenstein's position on the issues of rhetoric and reason, which anyway, while they might serve as useful indicators, are besides our main concern: the outlining of Nietzsche's general philosophical position. A significant point which was raised briefly in this discussion was the issue of the value for life of particular beliefs (and modes of being) over time, we shall return to this issue, which is central to an understanding of Nietzsche, in the next chapter. At this stage, however, we can productively move to a discussion of Nietzsche's conception of subjectivity, a discussion which will indicate some of the ways Nietzsche develops his general philosophical position in relation to the account of language he presents.

3. Subjectivity and Style: Becoming Who One Is

What does it mean to talk of subjectivity in relation to Nietzsche? After all, have we not already noted that Nietzsche regards the subject as a fiction? Yet, at the same time, the notion of a 'fiction' is problematic here, a 'fiction' by contrast with what? - facts, perhaps? But we have already seen that Nietzsche abolishes the distinction between the real and the appararent which is also the distinction between fact and interpretation. After all, he notes: 'facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.' (WP 481). Here, perhaps, in the form of our questioning we find a clue, we find a point of entry into this area. By treating Nietzsche's claim that the subject is a fiction as, in effect, the claim that the positing of the subject, aided and abbetted by the structure of language, is a particular kind of interpretation - one which Nietzsche wants to move away from. To talk about subjectivity in relation to Nietzsche, then, is to examine his reasons for rejecting the interpretation which posits the subject as a given unity - the 'I' in 'I think therefore I am' is always the same 'I'[16] - and to analyse the notion of subjectivity which Nietzsche offers within his own interpretive activity. It should be noted that the use of 'interpretation' here should not be taken to imply that there is some singular object being interpreted, as we shall come to see in this, and the next, section, Nietzsche's paradoxical claim that there are 'only interpretations' has radical and far-reaching implications which attempt to dissolve the scheme/reality distinction that language imposes on us.

What form does Nietzsche's rejection of the subject as a given unity take? We can begin by noting that while we have, hitherto, concentrated on the 'subject' side of the subject-predicate distinction, Nietzsche's

argument revolves equally about our reification of predicates. Today, he says, we know that the will is 'merely a word' (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 5), while 'thinking' is 'a quite arbitary fiction' (WP 477). What leads Nietzsche to make these outlandish sounding remarks? Actually, his point is a relatively straightforward one: simply that to speak of 'willing' or 'thinking' as conceptually isolatable is absurd, 'willing' is always a 'willing something', 'thinking' is always a 'thinking something'. That is, we cannot separate 'willing' from what is being willed, 'thinking' from what is being thought about. In other words, Nietzsche is rejecting the distinction between form and content as regards human activity. If we reflect on this for a moment, we may find that it doesn't surprise us; for what would be the presuppositions underlying such a distinction between form and content? On one level, it would need to be assumed that we could identify something called 'thinking' (i.e. 'it' would have to be homogeneous in its application). Underlying this assumption, it would be required that there be a subject doing this 'thinking', applying the process we designate by this term, moreover, this subject would itself have to be a unitary constant. For, as was mentioned above, to make the claim 'I think therefore I am' requires that this 'I' is always the same 'I', for if the 'I' is not the same 'I' how can we identify its activity 'thinking' as the same activity. Nietzsche develops this theme, in a way strangely reminiscent of Wittgenstein's argument concerning the possibility of a private language[17], through a consideration of the assumptions begged in the use of the phrase 'I think'. It is worth quoting this at length given its significance for Nietzsche's rejection of the notion of the subject as a unitary given. The argument goes as follows:

the philospher must say to himself: when I analyse the event expressed in the sentence 'I think', I acquire a series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove - for example, that it is *I* who think, that it has to be something at all which thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an 'I' exists, finally that what is designated by 'thinking' has already been determined - that I *know* what thinking is. For if I had not already decided that matter within myself, by what standard could I determine that what is happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? Enough: this 'I think' presupposes that I *compare* my present state with other known states of myself in order to determine what it is: on account of this retrospective connection with other 'knowledge' at any rate it possesses no immediate certainty for me. In place of the 'immediate certainty' in which the people may believe in the present case, the philosopher acquires in this way a series of metaphysical questions, ... (BGE 16).

'I think' represents then a highly problematical statement. What Nietzsche establishes here is that the claim 'I think', which is the claim that there is an 'I' and that this 'I' performs something formally identifiable as 'thinking', is not self-evident but rests on a whole series of assumptions. Yet this still does not explain, in itself, why Nietzsche - even given that 'both the doer and the deed are fictions.' (WP 477) - should reject this interpretation of subjectivity. To explore this point requires we examine what Nietzsche concieves of the implications of this interpretive positing of the subject-as-unity to be.

Without pre-empting our discussion of Christianity and Nihilism too much[18], we can refer Nietzsche's rejection of the subject as 'a neutral substratum' (GM I 13) to his discussion of the emergence of slave morality in the essay '"Good and Evil," "Good and Bad"' (GM I). Here Nietzsche argues of the weak:

This type of man *needs* to believe in a neutral independent "subject," prompted by an instinct for self-preservation and

> self-affirmation in which every lie is sanctified. The subject (or to use a more popular expression, the *soul*) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a *merit*. (GM I 13)

Nietzsche does not suggest that this has not at times been a positive value for life; in the context of modernity, however, it operates as an negative force. To expand this point a little, we can note two points of significance: (i) Nietzsche suggests that we believe in the concepts "truth," "reality" and "substantially" only because we believe in the subject (WP 485), and (ii) this interpretation of subjectivity has been 'taught best and longest' by Christianity (BGE 12). Taking these two points together, we can see that belief in the subject constitutes one of the conditions for the emergence of nihilism, given that this emergence is marked by the will to truth turning against Christian morality. There is, moreover, a further ground on which Nietzsche rejects this conception of the subject, this being that this belief in *'soul atomism'* (BGE 12), in our subjectivity as possessing a transcendental unity, is the ground on which is based the claim to generate a conception of the *good life* which is universally applicable. That is, a system of morality which *should* be applied to all. This is anathema to Nietzsche, for whom it is precisely such totalising moral systems which result in the formation of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience*[19]. Consequently, this 'soul-hypothesis' must be overcome.

Given that Nietzsche rejects the 'soul-hypothesis' which treats of the subject as a given unity, our question necessarily becomes: with what is it replaced? Our starting point here will be a remark which follows

Nietzsche's rejection of *soul atomism*: 'Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary by the same act to get rid of 'the soul' itself and thus forgo one of the oldest and most venerable of hypotheses' (BGE 12). He goes on:

> the road to new forms and refinements of the soul-hypothesis stands open: and such conceptions as 'mortal soul' and 'soul as multiplicity of the subject' and 'soul as social structure of the drives and emotions' want henceforth to posssess civic rights in science. (BGE 12).

With the demise of the interpretation of the subject as a unitary given, a range of options are opened up for us in trying to conceptualise subjectivity. Nietzsche's soul-hypothesis conceives of the subject as multiplicity (WP 490). We can get a first approximation of what he refers to by this through a consideration of the following two passages:

> "The subject" is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum: but it is we who first created the "similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity (-which ought to be denied -). (WP485)

> The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and understanding how to command? (WP 490).

What Nietzsche is suggesting here is that we consist of many states or selves or subjects, and that to generate an account of subjectivity requires that we theorise both how these selves interact and how our subjectivity comes to have the 'semblance of unity' (WP489). We will consider these points concurrently as we outline Nietzsche's account of subjectivity.

We will approach this issue by way of the notion of a *style of reasoning* (which was touched upon in the last section). This notion has been developed recently by Hacking who argues: 'My relativist worry is, to repeat, that the sense of a proposition *p*, the way in which it points to truth or falsehood, hinges on the style of reasoning appropriate to *p*' (Hacking 1982 p49) and again:

> For my part, I have no doubt that our discoveries are 'objective', simply because the styles of reasoning we employ determine what counts as objectivity. My worry is that the very candidates for truth or falsehood have no existence independent of the styles of reasoning that settle what is to be true or false in their domain. (Hacking 1982 49).

There is some resemblance between this notion deployed by Hacking and Nietzsche's concept of reasoning, this consisting primarily in the idea that our style of reasoning creates our world. However, Nietzsche's concept of reasoning takes this process a step further into the claim that our styles of reasoning are constitutive of not just our world but also our selves. If we relate this back to our earlier discussion, it becomes clear. Whereas Hacking talks of the style of reasoning appropriate to a proposition *p*, for Nietzsche, a proposition *p* embodies a style of reasoning. This apparently slight difference has considerable consequences[20].

It was suggested earlier by 'style of reasoning' is intended a style of living, a set of practices we engage in everyday life. We have also seen that Nietzche rejects the schema of 'doer' and 'deed' as fictitious. If, however, this schema is rejected, one is left with the *doing*, the living, the practices in which we engage. We can, therefore, say our selfhood is constituted through the totality of our practices, which is to claim that we are constituted through our acts. This point has been summed up by

Nehamas who notes that for Nietzsche: 'no person remains beyond the totality of its experiences and actions.' (Nehamas 1985 p155). The implication of this is simply that we are constituted through the styles of reason we deploy. Formally speaking, in stating a proposition *p*, one affirms a style of reasoning *r* which is constitutive of a mode of existence *e*.

But what of Nietzsche's notion of 'multiplicity'? This idea enters the arena once we note that in our lives we deploy a range of different styles of reasoning embodied in the different practical activities in which we engage. Each particular style of reasoning constituting a specific self, affirming a given mode of existence. Our subjectivity is the multiplicity of selves formed through these different practices. We can investigate this idea in greater detail by considering Nietzsche's notion of 'character', a move which will indicate also how we come to conceive of ourselves as a unity.

This exposition necessarily begins with Nietzsche's comment on what is *needful*:

> *One thing is needful.* - To "give style" to one's character - a great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit the into an artistic plan until everyone of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed - both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. ... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! (GS 290).

This passage shows that what is significant, for Nietzsche, is the

'enforcement of an interpretive homogeneity throughout all aspects of one's being.' (Davey 1987 p276). We can illustrate this point further by reference to Nietzsche's comments on weak and strong characters:

> *Weakness of the will*: that is a metaphor that can prove misleading. For there is no will, and consequently neither a strong or a weak will. The multitude and disgregation of impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a "weak will"; their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a "strong will": in the first case it is the oscillation and the lack of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of direction. (WP 46).

The subject as multiplicity thus consists in the notion that our subjectivity is formed through the interaction of our multiple selves. Each style of reasoning (embodied in a given self) attempts to enforce its own style over the other styles of reasoning. As Nietzsche puts this point: 'each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other[s] ... to accept as a norm.' (WP 481). We will consider the relation between a style of reasoning and a perspective in the next section, the point made here though should be clear. We can back up this interpretation of Nietzsche further by reference to two exemples. The first concerns his conceptualisation of 'the weak'. Nietzsche uses the term 'weak' to designate those in whom the multiple selves are not welded into a coherent whole. Following his characterisation of style as *needful*, he states: 'it is the weak characters without power over themselves that *hate* the constraint of style.' (GS 290). In this context, the positing of the subject as unitary, as a 'neutral substratum' makes sense; for this is the means by which the weak subvert the constraint of style and give themselves the semblance of unity. Moreover, this also operates as the first move in undermining those of strong character as we shall see in our discussion of *ressentiment*[21].

The second example concerns Goethe, who, for Nietzsche:

> did not sever himself from life, he placed himself within it; nothing could discourage him and he took as much as possible upon himself, above himself, within himself. What he aspired to was *totality*; he strove against the separation of reason, sensuality, feeling, will ...; he disciplined himself to a whole, he *created* himself. (TI Expeditions of an Untimely Man 49).

Goethe's attempt to transform himself into a totality, to give style to his character, represents 'the highest of all possible faiths' (TI Expeditions of an Untimely Man 49). This, for Nietzsche, is what is involved in 'becoming who one is', a phrase which indicates both that who one is changes over time as one engages in new practices, undergoes new experiences, and that one is actively involved in this creation of oneself. We can further specify this notion of subjectivity by adopting and adjusting a recent argument put forward by MacIntyre.

In 'Dramatic Narratives, Epistemological Crises and the Philosophy of Science'[22], MacIntyre argues that we can understand selfhood in terms of a narrative. Transposing this into the Nietzschean terms of the subject as multiplicity, we get the notion of the subject as consisting of a set of narratives recounting different stories and deploying different styles. Our subjectivity consists in the way in which these stories and styles interact and mesh together. In a strong character, like Goethe, this meshing is accomplished by the generation of an overarching narrative which exhibits a stylistic coherency; in a weak character, the narratives remain more or less discontinuous and stylistically varied. A further benefit of this metaphor of narrativity is that it is useful in indicating the mobility of our sense of ourselves as a subject over time. MacIntyre suggests that our response to a personal crisis can be descibed in terms of a rewriting of

the narrative that constitutes the 'I'. This rewriting consisting of two moves: (i) an explanation of how our previous narrative was unable to cope with the given crisis-event and (ii) a reinterpretation of this crisis-event such that we *overcome* it, such that we assimilate it into our sense of ourself. In our terms, this consists in a rewriting which is both a re-coordination and a rewriting of some of our various narrative selves. The ability of this model to cope with crises indicates its flexibility in terms of conceiving of our subjectivity as non-static, as mobile. In terms of this model that we can make sense of Nietzsche's epigram: 'What does not kill me makes me stonger' (TI Maxims and Arrows 8) and his formula for happiness: 'a Yes, a No, a straight line, a *goal* ...' (TI Maxims and Arrows 44). The former of these aphorisms represents the claim that the *overcoming* of a crisis-event forces one to reintegrate one's various selves. The latter formulation may be read as suggesting that the positing of a *goal* is a useful device in the task of rendering one's subjectivity coherent.

To conclude this section, let us note the diverse facets of Nietzsche's account of subjectivity. The first move in this account is negative: an attack on the conception of the subject as a given unity. The second move has two related elements: (i) an alternative account of our subjectivity, the subject as multiplicity, and (ii) an explanation of how we came to conceive of the subject as a given unity, as a 'neutral substratum'. The notion of a 'style of reasoning' was deployed to facilitate this account of our subjectivity and it is to further utilisation of this notion that we turn as we transfer our focus to the issue of perspectivism.

4. Perspectivism

In this section, we shall be concerned with Nietzsche's formulations concerning the perspectival character of existence. Firstly, it will be shown that Nietzsche rejects the conditions of possibility of epistemology. Secondly, we will set out the sense in which Nietzsche uses terms 'fiction', 'interpretation' and 'perspective' by reference to his abolition of the distinction between the 'real' and the 'apparent'. Thirdly, we will consider the notion of a 'style of reasoning' in relation to the doctrine of perspectivism. Finally, the sense in which one can refer to two distinct versions of perspectivism will be examined, as will some of the critical problems posed for the notion of perspectivism.

Epistemology is here taken to refer to the attempt to specify the criteria which must be satisfied for something to be defined as 'knowledge'. Its aim is 'to delineate a realm secure from the phenomenal vagaries of the knower' (Strong 1985 p165). Consequently, 'epistemology must either seek to establish a knowing self that transcends the vagaries of phenomenal life or despair of attaining knowledge at all.' (Strong 1985 p165). As was pointed out in the last section though, to speak of a transendental subjectivity is ruled out by Nietzsche; as is, therefore, any attempt to specify either the knowing subject or the knowledge as distinguishable from the act of knowing[23]. This rejection of the possibility of epistemology emerges in Nietzsche's assertion that:

> physics too is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world (according to our own requirements, if I may say so!) and *not* an explanation of the world: ... (BGE 14).

and, moreover, other interpretations may be made (cf BGE 22) which, in

knowledge terms, are equally valid. At this point, the spectre of relativism appears to be emerging, however we will postpone discussion of this issue until we have examined Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism.

'Interpretation' and 'fiction' are terms frequently deployed by Nietzsche, however, as was noted in our discussion of subjectivity, he appears to deploy these terms while denying the term to which they are generally opposed i.e. 'fact' (WP 481, for example). On one level, this strategy is part of his polemical attack on the distinction between the real and the apparent worlds. Beyond this (though related to it), this usage is linked in to his notion of perspectivism. An entry point to this issue is available in the following remark:

> There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes - and consequently there are many kinds of "truths," and consequently there is no truth. (WP 540)

Here Nietzsche appears to be claiming that our "truth" depends on the perspective we deploy, there is no absolute or underlying truth, no 'real world'. This can be clarified further:

> The perspective therefore decides the character of the "appearance"! As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! (WP 567)

Our perspective generates the apparent world, our interpretation, our fiction, but this is the only world: 'The "real world," however one has hitherto conceived it - it has always been the apparent world *once again.*' (WP 566).

Two points require analysis at this point: (i) what are the implications of this perspectivism? and (ii) what constitutes a perspective? We can examine this first point through a passage from The Gay Science which is

highly important for an understanding of perspectvism as the human condition:

> How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without "sense," does not become "nonsense"; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in *interpretation* - that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and *only* in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless curiousity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there *might* be; for example, whether some beings might be able to experience time backward, or alternately forward and backward (which would involve another direction of life and another concept of cause and effect). But I think today that we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are only permitted from this corner. Rather has the world become "infinite" for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that *it may include infinite interpretations*. (GS 374)

In this passage, all the major points consequent to the doctrine of perspectivism are brought out. Firstly, we cannot get outside our human perspectives. Secondly, we operate (as a species) a variety of perspectives and consequently, it is absurd to claim that a given perspective represents *the* truth. Thirdly, we are faced with the possibility that there may be, for us, an infinite number of possible perspectives - the challenge Nietzsche poses is the affirmation of this possibility[24]. We will be returning to the first of these points towards the end of this section, while the latter two should be born in mind relative to the discussion of Christianity and Nihilism in the next chapter. For the moment, it is necessary to pick up our second issue which concerns the formal features

of a perspective.

Discussion of this issue can begin by reference to the issue of *value* in Nietzsche's formulation of what makes up a perspective. Thus:

> The apparent world, i.e., a world viewed according to values; ordered, selected according to values, i.e., in this case according to te viewpoint of utility in regard to the preservation and enhancement of a certain species of animal. (WP 567).

and again:

> That the value of the world lies in our interpretation (- that other interpretations than merely human ones are perhaps somewhere possible -); that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and new horizons - this idea permeates my writings. (WP 616).

A perspective then involves a valuation, a ranking of values about which we generate our world. It is important to note here that: 'One may not ask: "who then interprets?" for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a "being" but as a process, a becoming) as an affect.' (WP 556). In other words, the 'I' is formed through the activity of interpreting, is generated from the perspective. Both the knower (the subject) and the known (the world) are constituted through the activiy of knowing. How does this fit in with the notion of a 'style of reasoning' which was utilised to explore Nietzsche's account of subjectivity?

In actuality, a perspective consists precisely in the deployment of a particular style of reasoning. We can explore this by reference to Nietzsche's distinction between strong and weak individuals. It will be

recalled that a strong individual is one who welds his disparate selves into a coherent whole, whereas a weak individual is one in whom these selves remain more or less disparate. One's perspective(s) develop out of the selves one consists of and the way in which selves are more or less coordinated. In the weak individual, the lack of coherent coordination of the selves results in the positing of a 'neutral substratum' which is termed 'the subject'. But what is involved in this process? It will be recalled that, for Nietzsche, each of our selves attempts to impose its perspective on the other selves. To put this another way, each of the styles of reasoning we deploy attempts to dominate the other styles of reasoning. In the case of the weak individual, this results in the continuing war of rival styles of reasoning. The positing of a 'neutral substratum' is, thus, the means by which the weak individual maintains at least the semblance of unity. In contrast, the strong individual is the one who coordinates these warring perspectives into a coherent whole, deploying each when it is deemed appropriate. In terms of the narrative metaphor that was utilised earlier, we can state that the weak individual unable to coordinate his perspectives into an aesthetic unity invents a narrator who tells all the disparate stories as a means to giving himself a superficial unity, while, in contrast, the strong individual organises his disparate stories into an overarching narrative totality. It should now be clear what Nietzsche means by the term 'perspective' and we can consider the question of whether there are two distinct versions or levels of perspectivism and examine the problem of relativism that has been posed for this doctrine.

Up to this stage in our argument, we have been focusing on the form of human perspective valuations of the world. We have, for Nietzsche, a

potentially infinite number of such perspectives open to us. This version of perspectivism may be termed 'immanent perspectivism' since its operation is immanent to the make-up of the human body. However, there are also, Nietzsche argues, an infinite number of perspectives we cannot deploy or even grasp as perspectives: 'We cannot look around our own corner ...' (GS 374). Nietzsche's point here is that just as our physiological constitution makes a variety of perspectives available to us, at the same time it rules out the possibility of other perspectives. To take up the example Nietzsche gives (cf GS 374): we cannot experience time backwards and consequently we cannot even conceive of a perspective generated out of such an experiential framework. Indeed, since one cannot conceive of such a perspective, it actually makes no sense to call this perspective a 'perspective' at all. This second version of perspectivism may be termed 'ontological perspectivism' since its argument is that our ontological condition sets limits to the perspectives possible for us as a particular kind of being. It is apparent, therefore, that Nietzsche does operate with two versions of perspectivism. For our concerns, *immanent* perspectivism is the important version and it is to this that we shall refer by the term.

The second issue to be examined here is the relativist spectre raised for perspectivism, which in its strongest form is the argument that perspectivism is self-refuting. This can be expressed as follows:

> Suppose we characterize Nietzsche's perspectivism as the thesis (P) that every view is an interpretation. Now it appears that if (P) is true, and if every view is in fact an interpretation, this would apply to (P) itself. In that case (P) also turns out to be an interpretation. But if this is so, then not every view need be an interpretation and (P) seems to have refuted itself. (Nehamas 1985 p66).

This argument only appears to work, however, because of the assumptions

underlying its use of the term 'true'. To hold that perspectivism is true implies that it is possible to determine that a given view is true or false, *that a given view corresponds to the way reality is.* But this assumption necessarily implies that perspectivism, given its rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, is false. The paradox lies in the use of the term 'true' in this context and not in perspectivism which rejects this true or false dichotomy along with the distinction between real and apparent worlds. In effect, what is going on in the generation of this 'paradox' is the affirmation of two different (and conflicting) philosophical vocabularies[26].

Another form of the relativist argument holds that the problem with perspectivism is that it rules out the possibility of distinguishing between different knowledge claims on grounds of epistemological adequacy, and is consequently thrust into relativism. This, therefore, raises the standard relativist paradox: a thesis (R) that everything is relative if it is true implies that (R) is relative and, consequently, that not everything need be relative. On one level, this is the same argument that we have just dealt with, however if we remove the phrase 'if it is true', a slightly different and more subtle problem is being posed. Yet if we remove this phrase, we can justifiably hold that Nietzsche's position is not (R). This can be detailed as follows: if we remove the phrase 'if it is true', the relativist argument would now hold that perspectivism gives us *no* grounds for distinguishing the force of different knowledge claims. This, however, is not the case, as can be illustrated by reference to Nietzsche's point that perspectives can and must be evaluated in terms of their value for life (cf. WP 493).

To conclude this section, let us sum up the principal features of our discussion. Firstly, we noted briefly Nietzsche's grounds for rejecting the epistemological enterprise as a non-starter. Secondly, the general features of perspectivism were outlined. Thirdly, we illustrated the features that constitute a perspective. Fourthly, it was shown how one's perspective is related to one's subjectivity and one's world. Fifthly, it was pointed out that Nietzsche operates two (more or less) distinct levels of perspectivism. Finally, it was argued that perspectivism is neither self-refuting or relativist. In the next section, we will be examining how Nietzsche goes about analysing how perspectives emerge and whether a perspective is of value for life.

5. Genealogy and Origins

The purpose of this section is to outline Nietzsche's conception of *genealogy*. This being understood as his mode of investigating the emergence of perspectives and evaluating their value for life. This task will be approached initially through a consideration of Nietzsche's rejection of the pursuit of the *origin* (*Ursprung*) in favour of an analysis posed in terms of *emergence* (*Entstehung*) and *descent* (*Herkunft*). We will then move to consider the operation of this form of analysis through an examination of the essay '"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"', focusing on the emergence of slave morality, which is to say, the perspective of the slave. From this we will move to a discussion of how Nietzsche's principle of evaluation operates and, in particular, how the value of a perspective may ~~be~~ vary over time. Finally, we will delineate the principal features of genealogy and the notion of critique which it deploys.

Foucault[27] has suggested that we find two uses of the term *Ursprung* in Nietzsche's texts. The first is unstressed and used interchangably with the terms *Entstehung* and *Herkunft* among others. The second use is stressed and is used in 'an ironic and deceptive manner' (Reader p77):

> In what, for instance, do we find the original basis (*Ursprung*) of morality, a foundation sought after Plato? "In destable narrow-minded conclusions. *Pudenda origo.*" (Reader p77).

The most significant text with regard to these different usages of *Ursprung* is, Foucault suggests, the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals. Here the terms *Herkunft* and *Ursprung* are opposed:

> This use of the term *Herkunft* cannot be arbitary, since it serves to designate a number of texts, beginning with *Human,*

> *All Too Human*, which deal with the origin of morality, asceticism, justice, and punishment. And yet the word used in all these works has been *Ursprung*. It would seem that at this point in the *Genealogy* Nietzsche wished to validate an opposition between *Herkunft* and *Ursprung* which did not exist ten years earlier. (Reader p78)

At the least there appears to have been a self-conscious conceptual clarification by Nietzsche here. But why should he feel such a move necessary? We can approach this by pointing out the different senses of *Herkunft* and *Ursprung*. The former of these refers to origin in the sense of extraction or provenance, i.e. origin in a *genealogical* sense, where genealogy here is used in its normal sense of referring to *lineage*. The latter, however, deploys the concept of origin in the sense of *source*, as *primal*. It is now possible to see why Nietzsche should wish to oppose these two terms. *Ursprung* as *primordial source* when used in relation to the origin of perspective implies an essence from which the perspective flows, a 'real world' as *cause* of the perspective. As Foucault puts it, such an endeavour would be directed:

> to "that which was already there," the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. (Reader p78).

Such a project would be precisely antithetical to Nietzsche's critique of the distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds, and his espousal of perspectivism. That he should, therefore, take up the notion of *Herkunft* is not surprising; particularly since, as Foucault notes, this concept does not represent a 'catagory of resemblance' (Reader p81) but rather 'allows the sorting out of different traits' (Reader p81). Having here indicated the general outline of the genealogical project, we can examine precisely the

sense of the 'sorting out of different traits' through an analysis of the essay '"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"' which is the first of the analyses offered in On the Genealogy of Morals.

In this essay, Nietzsche attempts to draw out, to distinguish, two points of emergence and lines of descent of the concept 'good'. One in relation to the *master* (the strong individual) and one in relation to the *slave* (the weak individual). Nietzsche begins with a critique of 'the English psychologists'[28] - these 'old, cold, and tedious frogs,' (GM I 1) - who hypothesise that 'originally':

> one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; (GM I 2).

In opposition to this hypothesis Nietzsche suggests that, on the contrary, it was not those who were the beneficaries of acts who termed them 'good', rather:

> it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebian. It was out of this *pathos of distance* that they seized the right to create values and to coin names for values: what had they to do with utility! (GM I 2).

What grounds does Nietzsche present for this claim? Nietzsche puts forwrd two arguments. The first is the negative one that the argument of 'the English psychologists' is a psychological absurdity[29]. Much more important though is the second point:

> The signpost to the *right* road was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designations for "good" coined in the various languages? I found they all led back to the *same conceptual transformation* - that

> everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the social sense, is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," "noble," "with a soul of a high order," "with a privileged soul" necessarily developed: a development which always runs parallel with that other in which "common," "plebian," "low" are finally transformed into the concept "bad." (GM I 4).

From this Nietzsche develops the argument that ' a concept denoting political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of the soul' (GM I 6). What is significant, for Nietzsche, here is that the noble identifies himself as good and only then identifies the plebian as bad. In other word, this perspective is an active affirmation of self. What then of that other origin of the concept "good"?

For Nietzsche, we can trace the lineage of the concepts "good" and "evil" back to the 'slave revolt in morality' (GM I 10), that is, 'when *ressentiment* itself became creative and gave birth to values: the *ressentiment* of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge.' (GM I 10). The term *ressentiment* here refers to the slave's rejection of the world, this world which made the slave a slave. The form of emergence of this "good" is as a negation. Nietzsche suggests that:

> slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and *this* No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye - this *need* to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself - is of the essence of *ressentiment*: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all - its action is fundamental reaction. (GM I 10).

Unable to *act* against the world and against the master, the slave describes them as "evil". Only having defined the Other as "evil" does the

slave turn to himself as, therefore, "good":

> here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "*the Evil One*," and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a "good one" himself. (GM I 10).

Here are the two points of emergence, here are the lineages of the concept "good". One an active affirmation of the world, of becoming. The other a reactive negation of the world in favour of a 'real world', of becoming in favour of being. Having indicated these 'different traits', we will examine Nietzsche's critique of slave morality.

It must be remembered that Nietzsche is self-consciously speaking from the standpoint of modernity, addressing his comments to modern man[30]. The significance of this point will become apparent later in our discussion. We begin with the famous discussion of the lambs and the birds of prey:

> That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: "these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb - would he not be good?" there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: "*we* don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb." (GM I 13).

This extravagent metaphor expresses Nietzsche's point that the strong individual can only express himself *as he is*, while the weak demand the strong express themselves as other than they are. The condition of possibility for this demand is, as we have seen, the reification of the subject-predicate distinction. It is:

> only owing to the seduction of language (and of the

> fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a "subject," (GM I 13)

that the weak 'gain the right to make the bird of prey *accountable* for being a bird of prey.' (GM I 13). In modernity, for Nietzsche, though we are largely bound within the linguistic and ethical structures of the weak, the Death of God signals a point of renewed struggle between "good and bad" and "good and evil"[31]. The name of this struggle in modernity is *Nihilism*, the movement to which and the nature of which will constitute our next chapter.

At this moment, however, it is useful to reflect on the way in which Nietzsche operates a principle of evaluation for determining the value of values. It is noticeable in the above discussion that while Nietzsche is undoubtably predisposed towards the strong individual, he does point out that there is nothing wrong with slave morality for the slaves: 'there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal,' (GM I 13). What Nietzsche objects to is the universal application of this ideal, in particular its application to the noble man. To put this another way, Nietzsche does not object to the slave defining the noble as "evil" and himself as "good", but only the move from this point to the positing of the subject as a 'neutral substratum' and the transformation of slave morality into a set of universal ethical standards. It is difficult to see that Nietzsche can sustain this position however given that, while these two aspects are logically distinct, it does appear to be a psychological imperative for the slave to make this move[32]. This is, no doubt, why Nietzsche describes the slave revolt in morality as such a fundamentally dangerous one, it has, in his sense, an 'awe-inspiring' *Jewish* rigor (cf GM

I 7). It must be noted though that Nietzsche does not regard this triumphal phenomenon in an altogether negative sense. Thus he notes in the essay 'What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?':

> It must be a necessity of the first order that again and again promotes the growth and prosperity of this *life-inimical* species - it must indeed be in the *interest of life itself* that such a self-contradictory type does not die out. (GM III 11).

This point will emerge in greater detail in the next chapter, however, it may be noted here that, as regards Nietzsche's principle of evaluating values, that while Nietzsche holds that 'value for life' is the ultimate criterion for adjudicating between rival perspectives, something '*life-inimical*' may be of 'value for life'. This is the point Nietzsche is making when he suggests that man 'will rather will *nothingness* than *not* will.' (GM p97). The second point we should consider here is that whether a perspective has 'value for life' is dependent on context. With the entrance of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche holds that man may be overcome now that opposed to ascetic ideals are Zarathustra's counter-ideals (cf EH GM). At this point, ascetic ideals lose their "proof of power". Having here sketched the outline of Nietzsche's criterion for evaluating values, we are in a position to delineate the formal features of genealogy and its mode of critique.

In a sense, we have already outlined Nietzsche's concept of genealogy: as a tracing of the lineage of perspectives, as a seperation of its different traits. We can, however, fill in some of the detail of this sketch now. Firstly, it can be said that genealogy performs a form of conceptual analysis; be this in terms of an etymological tracing or a reversal of a conceptual hierarchy[33]. Secondly, this analysis is played out through the figures of particular human *types*: the noble, the slave and the priest, for

example. Thirdly, genealogy operates a form of *immanent* critique; it undermines the self-evident or transcendental status of our values by tracing their mundane and humble lineages, that is, by exhibiting their historicity. Fourthly, a *rhetorical* critique is deployed; the juxtaposing of our 'highest' values with the basest of points of social emergence. Finally, a *value* critique may be utilised which evaluates our values in terms of their 'value for life'.

While a distinction has been drawn here, for purposes of clarity, between immanent and rhetorical moments of critique, such a distinction is artificial. Reason and rhetoric, it will be recalled, are inherently entwined for Nietzsche. This is central to the fundamental *aim* of Nietzsche's genealogical enterprise: the transformation of his readers. Here the text is political practice. For if Nietzsche can seduce us with the *style of reasoning* deployed in his texts, then it follows from his views on the constituting of our subjectivity that *we*, his readers, in adopting this *style of reasoning* are transforming ourselves, are involved in a rewriting of the narratives which constitute our "I's". On this reading, genealogical critique is truly a *practical* critique.

To conclude this section, we may review the points that have been established as significant. Firstly, the general kind of operation that Nietzsche terms 'genealogy' was noted and we indicated the sense of 'origin' with which this enterprise is concerned. Secondly, the initial discussion was rendered concrete through an exposition of the essay '"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"' in which was noted Nietzsche's delineation of two origins of the concept "good" corresponding the perspectives of master and slave. Thirdly, it was pointed out that Nietzsche's evaluation of a

perspective in terms of its 'value for life' is not absolute but, rather, depends on the context within which the perspective is being deployed. Finally, we outlined the formal features of genealogy, in particular the modes of critique it utilises and the consequences of these modes of critique.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the different dimensions of Nietzsche's overall philosophical position as a mode of laying the groundwork for our discussion of his substantive concerns. We began by noting his anti-foundational account of language. It was shown that, for Nietzsche, the grammar of our language when treated as reflecting the structure of the world results in a series of metaphysical assumptions being treated as given. Nietzsche's concern was to expose this grammatical reification as such and thus undermine the 'given' status of our belief in, for example, the subject.

It was then illustrated that by treating language as inherently rhetorical, by treating concepts as metaphors that we have forgotten are metaphors, Nietzsche is able to mount an attack on the correspondence theory of truth. It was suggested, within the framework of this attack, that Nietzsche rejects the notion of theoretical reason in favour of a conception of reason as practice and this this conception can be usefully denoted by the idea of 'styles of reasoning'.

This notion of 'styles of reasoning', it was argued, can be deployed in terms of explaining Nietzsche's conception of the 'subject as multiplicity' particularly when combined with the deployment of the metaphor of narrativity. Prior to this exposition, the central features of Nietzsche's rejection of the idea of the subject as a given unity, as a 'neutral substratum' were also indicated.

From this point, we moved to an explanation of Nietzshe's doctrine of perspectivism beginning with his critique of the very idea of epistemology. The significance of 'values' relative to one's perspective was indicated, as

was the relationship between perspectivism and Nietzsche's account of subjectivity. We also noted at this point Nietzsche's setting up of 'the value for life' as his criterion for adjudicating between respective perspectives.

Finally, it was shown how these concerns relate to Nietzsche's concept of *genealogy* and his rejection of the search for *origins*. In the course of this discussion the features of this concept of *genealogy*, in particular, in modes of critique were indicated.

Having set out these features of Nietzsche's position, we will now move to a discussion of his genealogy of *nihilism* as the condition of the modern. At several points in this initial exposition we have referred ahead to the notions of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience*. By now exploring these notions in relation to the emergence of *nihilism*, it will be possible to generate Nietzsche's account of the fate of the subject in modernity (which is also his account of the *Typus Mensch* produced in modernity). This account will put us in the position of being able to indicate, in the final chapter on Nietzsche, how his abstract philosophical concerns and his concrete ethical concerns combine in the figure of the Overman.

Notes

1. Cf. TI 'Reason' in Philosophy I. Here Nietzsche analyses philosophers as 'conceptual idolators', complaing of their *Egyptianism*.

2. Cf. TI The Four Great Errors 4. In relation to the subject also see 3 in the same section.

3. Nietzsche gives a sustained treatment of this issue in the essay 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', TP IV pp79-100.

4. This is because nihilism emerges from the will-to-truth of Christainity turning against Christian morality, without the reification of the catagories 'subject' and 'God' Christianity would not have developed its universalistic claims, as such its self-undermining would not have occurred.

5. Cf. Opening of section 3 and section 4 of this chapter.

6. In relation to GS 108.

7. Cf. Section 3 of Chapter 2. From Christian to Nihilist.

8. This point is discussed in TP IV

9. Do we recognise the figure of God here? Yes.

10. Cf. Rorty's 'The Contingency of Language', (1986) pp3-6.

11. For a discussion of Wittgenstein in this mode cf. Rorty Philosphy and the Mirror of Nature (1981). pp367-372 and also his Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) Ch.2.

12. The use of this phrase is freely adapted from its deployment by Hacking in a series of papers, to note one: 'Language, Truth and Reason' in Hollis and Lukes (ed.) Rationality and Relativism (1982).

13. Incipit Derrida. Cf. especially the essay 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosphy' in Margins of Philosophy (1982).

14. It should be noted that this in no way implies an interpretation of

the will to power as a wanting of power, rather the point is merely to illustrate that we can do no other than seek to persuade since the model of language Nietzsche deploys implies that our utterances are necessarily performative in character.

15. Cf. Schacht Nietzsche (1983) p4 and Strong Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (1975) pp78-86, for example.

16. Cf. discussion of BGE 16 below.

17. Cf. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (1958) Remarks 256-280.

18. Cf. Sections 2 and 3 of next chapter.

19. Cf. Section 2 of next chapter.

20. Cf. discussion of this point in section 4 of this chapter relative to perspectivism and also Hacking's 'Making Up People' in Reconstructing Individualism ed. Heller, Sosna, Wallberg. (1986).

21. Cf. section 2 of next chapter.

22. This paper is from Ethics No.60. It seems to me that McIntyre moves away from this specific use of the metaphor of narrativity in his later work (e.g. After Virtue (1981)).

23. Cf. for example, WP 477.

24. This refers to Nietzsche's notion of *amor fati*, cf. WP 1041, also EH II 10.

25. On the first point cf. GM I 13 and on the second point cf. Nehamas Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985), pp 179-194.

26. This point was brought to my attention by Dr. Paddy Fitzpatrick.

27. Cf. Foucault's essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Reader pp76-100.

28. Cf. Nietzsche states that his impulse to publish the Genealogy came from the topsy-turvy arguments put forward by Dr. Paul Rée, cf. GM Preface 4.

29. Cf. GM I 3.

30. This point is characteristic of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, i.e. an awareness of the historicity of their own texts and the audience addressed by these texts.

31. Cf. GM I 16.

32. As, for example, indicated by Nietzshe comments in GM I 13.

33. This is the strategy Nietzsche deploys in the second essay of GM, where he argues that forgetting is logically prior to remembering, cf GM II 1.

Introduction

In this chapter, we will explore the relationship between Nietzsche's critique of Christianity and the development of his account of Nilllism. In effect, we will examine Nietzsche's *genealogy of nihilism*. Our strategy will be to argue that Nietzsche offers a genealogical account of the *type of man* (*Typus Mensch*) that has been produced by and is characteristic of modernity[1]. For it is his concern with the *Typus Mensch* promoted by Christianity that leads Nietzsche to present his diagnosis of the modern soul. We will open this discussion with an account of some of Nietzsche's more general comments on the origins of religions before moving to a more detailed examination of his characterisation of Christianity. This move will involve an examination of Nietzsche's portrayals of the priest and believer as psychological types and of his analysis of *asceticism*. Having considered the relation of these themes to the phenomenon of nihilism, we will attempt to reconstruct Nietzsche's notion of nihilism as the defining feature of the modern and of modern man. Finally, we will note the way in which Nietzsche's theorising can viewed in terms of the concept of *discipline*, a concept which, it will be argued, is central to his account.

1. On the Origins of Religions

A useful starting point is to note Nietzsche's formulation of the psychology of religious belief. Thus:

> On the *origin of religion*.- In the same way as today the uneducated man believes that anger is the cause of his being angry, spirit the cause of his thinking, soul the cause of

> his feeling - in short, just as there is still thoughtlessly posited a mass of psychological entities that are supposed to be causes - so, at a yet more naive stage, man explained precisely the same phenomena with the aid of psychological personal entities. Those conditions that seemed to him strange, thrilling, overwhelming, he interpreted as obsession and enchantment by the power of a person. ... In other words : In the psychological concept of God, a condition, in order to appear as effect, is personified as cause. (WP135)

The problematic character of religion is immediately presented by this passage: 'Morality and religion fall entirely under the *pyschology of error*', or, more specifically, under the error of *imaginary causes* (TI The Four Great Errors 6). Yet Nietzsche's position is, as one might expect, rather more complex than a critique based on the falsity of religion in epistemological terms, for, as we have noted:

> The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, species-preserving, perhaps even species breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements ... are the most indispensable to us, (BGE 4).

It is, rather, in relation to the question of 'what type of human being one ought to *breed*,' (A-C 3) that religions must be analysed; the psychological type of the religious man becomes the issue to be examined.

For Nietzsche, the '*[r]udimentary pyschology of the religious man*' has as a consequence the belittling of man by himself:

> he has separated the two sides of himself, one very paltry and weak, one very strong and astonishing, into two spheres,

and called the former "man," the latter "God." (WP136)[2].

This debasement of man by himself leads to a development crucial to Nietzsche's characterisation of Christianity: the emergence of the priest as (sole) mediator between man and God. The priest, as an actor 'of something superhuman which ... [he] has to make easily perceptible'(WP 138), generates the conditions through which he can claim to be the *highest type of man* by virtue being the representative of divinity and by making the criterion of access to truth membership of the priesthood (WP 139). For Nietzsche, this elevation of the priestly type results in the values embodied in this type being constituted as the highest values, and concurrently, the practices through which these values are promoted being the highest form of human activity. Nietzsche's concern with the meaning of ascetic ideals begins with this insight and will be one of the principle themes of the next section.

However, in terms of Nietzsche's abiding concern with developing a strategy for the 'revaluation of all values', his general comments on religion, while operating on a level of his familiar concerns with language, causality and psychology, presents none of the meticulous genealogical detail that Nietzsche's central question demands. This should not however surprise us. For to analyse 'religion' as a unitary phenomenon would be to deploy the *Egyptianism* that he so often critised in others (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 1). In order to analyse *genealogically* the value of Christian values, it is necessary to treat Christianity in its own right; as Deleuze has pointed out, genealogy is the art of difference or distinction[3]. Nietzsche's questions on the origin(s) and nature(s) of religion(s) demands such a non-reductive approach and thus, having noted the general psychological point, it is necessary (both for Nietzsche and

for us) to move to a detailed examination of the Christian perspective in terms of the *Typus Mensch* promoted by Christianity.

2. ON CHRISTIAN PRIESTS AND ASCETICISM

Nietzsche's writings on Christianity, scattered and often repetitive as they are, present the would be interpreter with an immediate problem; where precisely does one start? Here we shall locate two beginnings, representing the points of emergence of the Christian interpretation of the world. This will enable us to proceed to a discussion of the concepts of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience* around which Nietzsche constructs his portrayal of the Christian priest and believer.

The first of our starting points is Judaism:

> I only touch on the problem of the origin of Christianity here. The *first* proposition towards its solution is : Christianity can be understood only by referring to the soil out of which it grew - it is *not* a counter-movement against the Jewish instinct, it is actually its logical consequence, one further conclusion of its fear-inspiring logic. (A-C 24).

The *falsified* soil represented here - 'the Jewish instinct' - is consequent to the 'the radical *falsification* of all nature,' (AC 24) and the '*contradiction of their natural values*' (AC 24) as the price paid for 'being *at any cost*' (AC 24). Or, put psychologically:

> the Jewish nation ... placed in impossible circumstances, voluntarily, from the profoundest shrewdness of self-preservation, took the side of all *décadence* instincts - *not* as being dominated by them but because it divined in them a power by means of which one can prevail *against* 'the world' (AC 24).

The ambivalence nature of Judaism reflected here; that it falsifies nature yet that this falsification emerges from an instinct for self-preservation, is a theme that we shall find also in our examination of Christianity . Nietzsche's objection to Judaism as a world-interpretation becomes clearer once we examine it in terms of the *Typus Mensch* promoted by Judaism as

embodied in the figure of the Judaic priest:

> this kind of man has a life-interest in making mankind *sick* and in inverting the concepts 'good' and 'evil', 'true' and 'false' in a mortally dangerous and world-calumniating sense. (AC 24)

The reasons behind this assertion will be clarified later in our examination of the distinction Nietzsche makes between a *noble* morality and a morality of *ressentiment*, however, for the moment, let us turn to our second point of departure.

The second moment to which we must attend concerns the soil on which Christianity flourished and the nature of this blossoming:

> *On the origin of religions.* - The distinctive invention of the fonders of religions is, first: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday customs that have the effect of a *disciplina voluntatis* and at the same time abolish boredom - and then: to bestow on this life style an *interpretation* that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value so that this life style becomes something for which one fights and under certain circumstances sacrifices ones life. Actually, the second of these is the more essential. The first, the way of life, was usually there before, but along side other ways of life and without any sense of its special value. (GS 353)

In other words, the 'founders of religions' make available a perspective valuation of the world which is adopted by a particular social grouping as a means of identifying their self with one particular ~~particular~~ self, of generating a unity by the subsumption of their different selves under the domination of a particular perspective. The life style, Nietzsche claims, that was distinguished by Christianity was that of the herd:

> Christianity only takes up the fight that had already begun against the *classical* ideal and the *noble* religion. ... Christianity accommodated itself to already existing and established antipaganism ... more precisely, to the

> religions of the lower masses, the women, the slaves, the non-noble classes. (WP 196).

The distinction between the nobility and the herd thus becomes important to our analysis. Although this theme was touched on in the last chapter, it is useful to repeat the salient points.

This distinction is developed by Nietzsche in the essay '"Good and Evil," "Good and Bad"' in terms of the respective forms of morality of the noble and the slave. The ethics of the herd, slave ethics, 'begins by saying *no* to an "outside," an "other," a non-self, and that *no* is its creative act.' (GM I 10), that is a *reactive* act. In contrast, the noble 'spontaneously creates the notion *good*, and later derives from it the conception of the *bad*.' (GM I 11), an active self-affirmation. These two distinctions; between noble and slave, and between active and reactive modes (or forces) provide the bases of explication for the concepts of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience* that occupy the heart of Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity. It is at this point also that our two beginnings re-unite: the slave revolt in morals and the Judaic inversion of natural (noble) values are joined together in the concept of *ressentiment*.

We can approach this area via the idea of reactive forces. Deleuze, in a detailed analysis of the concepts *ressentiment* and *bad conscience* has suggested that:

> In a normal or healthy state the role of reactive forces is always to limit action. ... But, conversely, active forces produce a burst of creativity: ... In this way a *riposte* is formed. (Deleuze 1983 p111).

In other words, the active type (the noble) embodies both active and reactive forces but the relationship between them is 'such that the latter are themselves acted.'(Deleuze 1983 p111). In contrast, *ressentiment* is

defined by: 'a type in which reactive forces prevail over active forces. But they can only prevail in one way: by ceasing to be acted.'(Deleuze 1983 p111). We are concerned here with articulating the development of *ressentiment* as opposed to its dynamics, however, it should be noted that this concept has two moments which, following Deleuze, we may label: topological and typological. The first : 'constitutes *ressentiment* as raw content: it expresses the way in which reactive forces escape the action of active forces' (Deleuze 1983 p124) and the second : 'expresses the way in which *ressentiment* takes on form: ... reactive forces are then opposed to active forces and separate them from what they can do'(Deleuze 1983 p124). We can see, in these two moments, the movement we traced in the last chapter from the slave's 'No' (the topological aspect) to the positing of the subject as a 'neutral substratum' (the typological aspect). Our question thus becomes: who elaborates this formalisation of content, who articulates the fiction(s) by means of which active forces are prevented from achieving what they can do? It is here that the Judaic priest emerges as 'the "artist" of *ressentiment*' (Deleuze 1983 p125). It was the Judaic priest:

> who, with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equations (good=noble=powerful= beautiful= happy=beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence) saying "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone - (GM I 7).

Through the figure of the priest, another world is *fictioned* from the point of view of which the affirmation of life appears 'evil' as such (cf.

AC 24). A second fiction is also developed in this attack on the 'natural'; the postulation of God as opposed to nature results in 'an imaginary *teleology* ('the kingdom of God', 'the Last Judgement', 'eternal life').' (AC 15). However, at the same time, the postulation of *free will* via the idea of the soul acts as an enabling device for the weak in providing them with grounds for condemning the noble while simultaneously interpreting 'weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a *merit.*' (GM I 13). The development of *ressentiment* by the Judaic priest may thus be described by these two aspects: the fiction of free will, whereby the noble is condemned for being noble and the weak praised for their weakness, and the fiction of an after life, whereby those weaknesses, having been constitued as virtues, result in eternal bliss while the noble values, having been constituted as vices or sins, result in eternal damnation and hell fire (GM I 7). This was the acüevement of the Judaic priest, however, 'Christianity raised all this to the second power' (WP 182).

It is at this point, that of the emergence of the Christian priest, that we must also turn our attention to the concept of *bad conscience*. For it is through this notion that Nietzsche explores the distinctive 'contribution' of the Christian priest to the promotion of a given *Typus Mensch*. The first point of importance to note is Nietzsche's contention that:

> 'All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly *turn inward* - this is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul." (GM II 16).

Those active forces prevented from expressing themselves, displaced by the fictions of *ressentiment*, turn against themselves and produce pain. We can

examine this by reference to the topological and typological dimensions of *bad conscience*. The topological aspect of *bad conscience* may be defined, Deleuze suggests, as the '*multiplication of pain by the interiorisation or introjection of force*' (Deleuze 1983 p129). In its typological aspect, however, this pain is given meaning and itself internalised, it is as the artist of this movement that the Christian priest plays his role.

The pain generated by the internalisation of force requires an object on which to vent itself, this is the role of the priest: 'if one wanted to express the value of the priestly existence in the briefest formula it would be: the priest *alters the diretion of ressentiment*.' (GM III 15). The priest's *raison d'etre* is to redirect *ressentiment* in such a way that it injures neither himself nor the herd:

> For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a *guilty* agent who is susceptible to suffering - in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vents his effects, actually or in effigy: (GM III 15).

Initially, this "guilty agent" is the *other*, the noble, the master, however, '*ressentiment is an explosive substance: it makes active forces become reactive.*'(Deleuze 1983 p.131), in other words, the Christian priest has 'set the bad conscience of the noble soul against its self-sufficiency; they have led astray, to the point of self-destruction, the brave, magnanimous, daring, excessive inclinations of the strong soul' (WP 205). The absorbtion of the noble into the herd results in a further redirecting of *ressentiment*. The new direction taken is into himself:

> "I suffer: someone must be to blame for it" - thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: "Quite so, my sheep! someone must be to blame for

> it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it - *you alone are to blame for yourself!*" (GM III 15).

The deployment of the concept of *sin* is particularly important in this process of internalising fault, redirecting suspicion onto oneself in an on-going procedure of inspection and supervision. We can illustrate this self-suspicion by reference to the *Journal* of the seventeenth-century New England Puritan, Thomas Shepard. This journal constitutes a regular record of self-interrogation, thus:

> March 18. I saw if my mind acted it spun nothing but deceit and delusion, if my will and affections acted, nothing but dead works. ... I saw the Lord made me live by faith by making me feel a want of both, to distrust myself and trust more unto the Lord. (Paden 1988 p70).

As Paden has noted in this context, if 'the Antichrist is the "self" in all, subjectivity here is no mere innocent bystander ... but is itself the primary antagonist to God.' (Paden 1988 p70). The logic of Puritanism is:

> the logic of reflexive self-examination, every religious assertion - including every act of confession and every act of self-accusation - could become suspect of its own possible self-deception. (Paden 1988 p78).

On this picture, Puritanism represents *bad conscience* in its purest and most developed form. As Deleuze notes, we may now sum up the relationship between Judaism and Christianity as twofold. On the one hand, Christianity completes the project of Judaism: 'The whole power of *ressentiment* end with the God of the poor, the sick and the sinners.' (Deleuze 1983 p.132). Yet, on the other hand, Christianity also makes its own original contribution to the issue: 'It is not content to complete *ressentiment*, it changes its direction. It imposes ... bad conscience. ... *Ressentiment* says

"its your fault", bad conscience says "its my fault".' (Deleuze 1983 p.132). But what was the purpose of these manoeuvres, why did the form of *bad conscience* manifest itself, via the activity of the priest in this way? In answering this question we must recognise the subtle ambivalence of Nietzsche in his characterisation of the Christian priest.

This ambivalence itself reflects, what we may call, the *paradox of asceticism*. The asceticism of the Christian priest represents for Nietzsche: '*Anti-natural* morality ... [it] turns ... *against* the instincts of life - it is a now secret, now loud and impudent *condemnation* of these instincts.' (TI - Morality as Anti-Nature 4). This presents two related problems for Nietzsche, given his naturalistic mode of accounting for phenomena: how can moral asceticism emerge and how can it coninue to survive? Nietzsche's answer is to suggest that given the 'ascetic life is a self-contradiction.' (GM III - 11), then it must be:

> a necessity of the first order that again and again promotes the growth and prosperity of the *life-inimical* species - it must indeed be in the *interest of life itself* that such a self-contradictory type does not die out. (GM III 11).

The struggle of Christian asceticism against nature is, in Nietzsche's terms, the struggle of 'nature against something that is also nature.' (WP 228)[4]. The question thus becomes: in what way is Christian asceticism 'in the *interest of life itself*'? We have seen that, relative to *bad conscience*, the priest provides a *meaning* for suffering. Through the ascetic rejection and condemnation of noble values, the constitution of each subject as sinner in perpetual punishment, and the fiction of eternal bliss for those who live according to the ascetic values, the priest provides the reason to go on living. For although it is based in '*a will to nothingness*, an

aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presupositions of life; ... it is and remains a *will*' (GM III 28) and, for Nietzsche, 'man would rather will *nothingness* than *not* will' (GM III 28). Here, the paradox of Christian asceticism is resolved, the expression of the form of *bad conscience* explained:

> *the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life* which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence;... The No he says to life brings to light, as if by magic, an abundance of tender Yeses; even when he *wounds* himself, this master of destruction, of self-destruction - the very wound itself afterward compels him *to live*. (GM III 13).

As such, the ascetic priest - 'this apparent enemy of life' - represents one of 'the greatest *conserving* and yes-creating forces of life.' (GM III 13). To put this another way, Christian asceticism is the means by which the weak avoid self-destruction. This can be briefly explained by reference to the effect Christianity has on the weak individual. It will be recalled that the weak individual is one whose selves are disparate, in conflict, unorganised. Christianity by emphasising a particular perspective, a particular self already operant in the weak individual, enables that perspective to dominate and organise the others. Thus the superficial unity of the weak individual which resulted from the psychologically necessary positing of a 'neutral substratum' called 'the subject', is replaced by the identification of that substratum with a particular self. As such a form of unity, a kinding of willing replaces an illusory unity, an inability to will. This is the sense of Christianity which Nietzsche deploys when describing it as having provided the great bulwark against theoretical and practical nihilism (WP 4).

We have examined most of the characteristics of the *Typus Mensch* bred

by Christianity: sick, impotent, mediocre, embodiments of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience*. The final characteristic of the Christian to be examined in this section is his *fanaticism*. From where does this emerge and how does it manifest itself? Fanaticism emerges from the *absolutism* of Christian morality and Christianity's pretensions to universality which are themselves grounded on its teaching of *soul atomism*. By positing a transcendental subjectivity, Christianity can make the claim that there are universal moral standards. It is but a short step for Christianity to affirm that it embodies those very standards itself. By representing itself as 'fact', rather than interpretation, Christianity demands the adoption of its standards; in effect it insists that all become Christians. We saw this fanaticism in its initial instant as the absorbtion of the noble into the herd. It is this aspect of Christianity that leads Nietzsche to describe it as '*the true calamity* in the history of European health' (GM III 21). This intolerance towards the Other, the need to transform the Other into the Same, is exhibited on several levels (WP 315). Firstly, with regard to the noble, the master, as we have already noted. Secondly, with regard to the pagan, the infidel (the Crusades, the Missionary Society). Finally, and most significantly for this discussion, with regard to the self of the believer. While this will to a single morality represents:

> a tyranny over other types by that type whom this single morality fits: it is destruction or a levelling for the sake of the ruling type (whether to render the others no longer so fearsome or to render them useful) (WP 315),

it also represents a tyranny over the self of the Christian type. By this latter point is meant the *eternal vigilance* required of the Christian, the watchfulness relative to the subtle schemes of the Other as represented in

the figure of the Devil and the need to be on continually on guard as to the origins of any given thought or desire. Such a self-tyranny is represented in a particularly stringent way by the logic of Puritanism (which was discussed above). As Nietzsche puts it: 'nothing but insanely important souls, revolving about themselves with a frightful fear' (WP 339). It is with the consequences of this will to self-interrogation that we shall begin our discussion of the movement from Christianity to Nihilism.

3. FROM CHRISTIAN TO NIHILIST

Ansell-Pearson has argued that 'the Western manipulative conception of truth ... begins with the Socratic maxim that "Virtue is knowledge, man sins only from ignorance,"' (Ansell-Pearson 1986 p501). The psychological anxiety[5] of on-going self-interrogation can be negated, on this conception, by the achievement of a perfect state of knowledge, and even a state of imperfect knowledge reduces the risk of acting from ignorance and thus potentially sinning. Or, put in Nietzschean terms, this will to truth 'enslaves man to positivism, to seeking the *facts* about the world at any cost.' (Ansell-Pearson 1986 p501). However, given the potential psychological relief offered by this manipulative conception of truth, it is of little surprise that Christian morality should embrace such a will to knowledge, a will to truth, as integral to its practice, or that the Christian as a human type is impelled towards a morality of truthfulness (WP 277/278) and thus towards science (scholarship). (It is on the basis of this insight that Nietzsche locates the *'more concealed forms of the cult of the Christian moral ideal.'* in Rousseau, in J.S.Mill and in Socialism amongst others)[6]. This point completes the outline of the Christian as a human type. Having thus noted the relation between the Christian imperative towards self-interrogation and the will to truth in Christian morality, we can begin to chart the movement from Christianity to Nihilism within European culture and present a portrayal of the Nihilist as a human type.

Our point of departure here is Nietzsche's claim that 'it is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is rooted.' (WP 1). How is this claim justified? If the advantage of the Christian moral hypothesis was that it acted as 'the great *antidote* against practical

and theoretical *nihilism.*' (WP 4), how is it that this same hypothesis can be the soil in which European nihilism develops? It is here that the will to truth embraced by Christianity becomes a crucial factor, for Nietzsche suggests that:

> this [truthfulness] eventually turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective - and now the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness that one despairs of shedding becomes a stimulant. Now we discover in ourselves needs implanted by centuries of moral interpretation - needs that now appear to us as needs for untruth; on the other hand, the value for which we endure life seems to hinge on these needs. This antagonism - *not* to esteem what we know, and not to be *allowed* any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves - results in a process of dissolution. (WP 5)

This 'process of dissolution' results in, and is partially constitutive of, nihilism, 'this uncanniest of all guests' (WP 1). It is the 'rebound from "God is truth" to the fanatical faith "All is false";' (WP 2). This movement manifests itself in two phases: firstly, the 'end of Christianity - at the hands of its own morality ..., which turns against the Christian God' (WP 2) and secondly, the 'end of the moral interpretation of the world' (WP 3). For Nietzsche it is this 'Skepticism regarding morality ... [that] is decisive.' (WP 3). This is so since, as Nietzsche recognises, other *absolutes* will be put forward to replace God; conscience, reason, social instinct, history, happiness, all stake their claim to act as the new Archimedean point from which our moral values may be derived (WP 20,see also WP 18). In the space between these two stages, this plurality of other criteria offer themselves up and infiltrate our practices and science (WP 53). However, against the skepticism of nihilism, these act merely as local anaesthetics and temporary anodynes to the pain of nihilism. In its first guise, this

skepticism takes the form of *pessimism* (cf. WP 9).

What is the sign of this pessimism? It is a weariness, the cry "In vain so far!" (WP 8). It is manifested both as strength 'in the energy of its logic' and the rigor of its attack on moral valuations; and as decline 'as growing effeteness, as a sort of cosmopolitan fingering,' (WP 11)[7]. Pessimism is the inability to answer the question "for what?". Thus: 'Modern pessimism is an expression of the uselessness of the *modern* world - not of the world of existence.' (WP 34). Nihilism is pessimism raised to the second power:

> The development of pessimism into nihilism. - ... The repudiated world versus an artificially built "true, valuable" one. - Finally: one discovers of what material one has built the "true world": and now all one has left is the repudiated world, and one adds this supreme disappointment to the reasons why it deserves to be repudiated. ... (WP 37)

With the completion of the process engendered by pessimism one reaches nihilism. Modern man lives in a world he repudiates - consequently, 'The aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer.' (WP 1). That is:

> one grants the reality of becoming as the *only* reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities - but *cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.* (WP 12).

Thus 'the catagories "aim," "unity," "being" which we used to project some value into the world - we *pull out* again; so the world looks *valueless.*' (WP 12). Given this valuelessness, we must now examine what forms nihilism manifests itself in and what its consequences are for the *Typus Mensch* characteristic of modernity.

As with pessimism, its preliminary form, nihilism is *ambiguous*. It can be 'a sign of increased power of the spirit: as *active* nihilism.'; however, it

may also signify 'decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as *passive* nihilism.' (WP22). The former 'reaches its maximum of relative strength as a violent force of destruction' (WP 23) and in this form it is not 'merely the belief that everything deserves to perish: one helps to destroy.- ... The reduction to nothing by judgement is seconded by the reduction to nothing by hand.' (WP 24). The latter manifestation of nihilism is the opposite of the first; 'the weary nihilism that no longer attacks' (WP 23)and which takes refuge in '*self-narcotization*' (WP I-29), intoxication by a 'medley of means' as escape.

In both these manifestations, the meaning of nihilism is that '*the highest values devaluate themselves.*' (WP 1) and thus '[t]he most universal sign of the modern age... [is that] man has lost *dignity* in his own eyes to an incredible extent.' (WP 18). The radical distinction Nietzsche draws between active and passive forms of nihilism is highly significant for his argument. We shall examine precisely how shortly. For the moment, let us direct attention to the forms of life in which *passive* nihilism exhibits itself in modernity.

In the first place, modern man suffers from a '*[p]rofound weakening of spontaneity*' (WP 71). His occupations - historian[a], critic, analyst, interpreter, observer, collector, reader - are all *reactive* in their operation (cf. WP 69), a response to stimuli. *Modernity* is characterised by an '[o]verabundant development of intermediary forms; atrophy of types;' (WP 74), the 'predominance of dealers and intermediaries' (WP 76) and by the 'modern spirit's lack of discipline, dressed up in all sorts of moral fashions.' (WP 79). In contrast to Niezsche's *formula* for happiness - ' a Yes, a No, a straight line, a *goal*... ' (TI. Maxims and Arrows 44) - the modern spirit substitutes 'tolerance (for "the incapacity for Yes and No");'

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(WP 79). All of these attributes lead Nietzsche to the *principle* that there 'is an element of decay in everything that characterises modern man:' (WP 109). However, as already noted, there is an ambiguity to nihilism - '*[o]verall insight: the ambiguous* character of our *modern world* - the very same symptoms could point to *decline* and to *strength*.' (WP 110). This ambiguity allows Nietzsche to suggest that 'close beside this sickness [in modern man] stand signs of an untested force and powerfulness of the soul. *The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of man* drive the *stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness*.' (WP 109).

What are Nietzsche's grounds for this suggestion? To examine this we must return to an analysis of passive (*reactive*) and active forms of nihilism. We have noted that *tolerance*, for the reactive nihilist, signifies an incapacity for descision. However, it is also (in this mode) a signification of *pity* as a tolerance for the weaker forms of reactive life though which the passive nihilist negates his own sickness. It was this pity which choked God (Z- Retired from service), whose pity became unbearable for reactive man such that God had to die (Z- The Ugliest Man) and which moves then to the pity of the stronger reactive man for the weaker and eventually to self-pity and the escapism of self-narcotization. This is the decay, the sickness, of modern man. In contrast, *active* nihilism 'as a sign of increased power of the spirit', is the point at which the will to nothingness as a negative, as the weariness of the last man, is ended. Here the will to nothingness is transmuted into an *affirmation*, an affirmation of destruction, of self-destruction, an affirmation of *becoming* and of being *overcome* (Z- Prologue 4). That is the point at which the will to nothingness turns against the reactive forces and negates them, thus transmuting itself into an affirmation of the life that reactive forces

deny[9]. This necessarily involves the destruction of all those moral values which persist, indeed, of all known moral values. This is the role and delight of the active nihilist, those 'stronger and rarer' individuals who prepare the ground for the Overman. The genealogist constitutes such a figure, indeed the genealogist is the exemplary exemplar of the active nihilist.

We began by filling out the characteristics of the Christian as a type, noting the will to truth inspired by Christian morality, and illustrating how this results in the undermining of Christianity by its own morality. The consequence of this process was the development of pessimism as a preliminary form of nihilism which, through its inability to answer the question 'For what?', repudiates the modern world and leads to nihilism proper. In its reactive form, characteristic of the majority of modern mankind, this results in an inability to act and sterile escapism. Yet, in its active form, it results in the development of conditions whereby the Overman may become the dominant human type.

4. DISCIPLINARY REGIMES

So far, we have been concerned with outlining Nietzsche's genealogy of nihilism. This section, however, will consist of a reflection on this genealogy in terms of *discipline*. It will be argued that two distinct notions of discipline can be identified in Nietzsche's work based on the distinction between the weak and the strong individual. Such a reflection will clarify both Nietzsche's claim that modernity is characterised by an '[o]verabundant development of intermediary forms: atrophy of types' (WP 74) and his espousal of active nihilism.

Let us begin by taking up Nietzsche's conception of the strong individual. This individual, it will be recalled, is one who organises his multiple selves into an aesthetically coherent whole. One who enforces 'an interpretive homogeneity' (Davey 1987 p276) throughout all aspects of his being. This aesthetic coherence, however, does not just appear through some pure act of willing. On the contrary, it is very much a *practical* procedure. Thus Nietzsche states:

> Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed - both times through long practice and daily work at it. (GS 290).

Consider as a fairly trivial example of this someone with a fierce temper, who sets himself the task of counting to ten everytime he feels himself getting angry and thus gradually brings his temper under control. Of course, this example refers only to a singular instance but it brings out the point that it is the *practical disciplining* of oneself that is significant here. To enforce an interpretive homogeneity over *all* aspects of oneself, therefore, demands that one construct for oneself a *disciplinary regime*, an aesthetically coherent set of disciplinary practices

which one imposes on oneself.

In contrast, the weak individual is one in whom the multiple selves constituting this individual lack co-ordination and are not brought under the self-imposed stylistic schema of the strong individual. The weak are those who lack self-discipline and who fail to set up the constraints of a disciplinary regime as a context for their actions[10]. In his comments *on the origin of religions*, Nietzsche writes:

> The distinctive invention of the founders of religions is, first: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday customs that have the effect of a *disciplina voluntatis* and at the same time abolish boredom - and then: to bestow of this life an *interpretation* that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value so that this life style becomes something one fights for and under certain circumstances sacrifices one's life. Actually, the second of these is the more essential. The first, the way of life, was usually there before, but along side other ways of life and without any sense of its special value. (GS 353).

The way of life of the weak, the herd, is taken up by Christianity and affirmed as exemplifying the highest value. This was achieved through the imposition of a single perspective over all other perspectives. To put this in other terms, Christianity enables a particular self to dominate all the other selves that constitute the individual. Central to this procedure is the invention of the *soul* and the representation of the individual as a transcendental subject. It may be noted here that Christianity, at least later, developed numerous disciplinary regimes to complement this way of life of which monastic existence is one example, while the self-interrogatory regime of the Puritan would be another[11]. Our question, therefore, becomes: what, if anything, distinguishes this kind of regime from that of the strong individual, of the noble?

The primary feature marking the difference between the two is in their relation to subjectivity. In terms of the present discussion this concerns the operation of the strong individual's regime around a conception of the subject as multiplicity, in contrast to the Christian regimes movement about the axis of the *soul*. This difference has significant implications which can be described by a series of oppositions. Firstly, the noble regime treats our subjectivity as requiring the achievement of a coherent unity as an on-going practical concern , while the Christian regime treats the unity of the subject as given. Thus, secondly, the noble regime aims at the formation of an individual's 'nature' (becoming who one is), whilst the Christian regime treats the nature of the subject as given and acts as a device to attempt to *control* this given and fallen nature. Thirdly, while the noble regime is geared towards the disciplined expression of one's multiple selves, the Christian regime consists precisely in the denial and prevention of expression of one's multiple selves in the name of a specific singular self. This results in those selves dominated by this singular Christian self redirecting themselves inward and thereby producing *ressentiment* and *bad conscience*. Finally, the noble regime is individual-specific, while the Christian regime claims a universal status and is thus imposed on the individual impersonally[12]. These oppositions may be summarily expressed as the contrast between self-expression and self-flagellation.

The will to truth and the will to knowledge are specific elements of the Christian regime. The will to knowledge represents a means whereby the Christian aims to ameliorate his sinful nature by acting in accordance with reason, by aiming at a perfect state of knowledge[13]. The will to truth operates both as a part of this will to knowledge and in its confessional

aspect as a continual self-interrogation. The point at which the will to truth turns against Christianity exposing its 'partial perspective' (WP 5) is the point at which the will to truth interrogates and undermines the disciplinary regime which produced it.

Insofar as the disciplinary regime of Christianity is productive of a given *Typus Mensch*, then with the break up of this regime, which announces the arrival of nihilism, it is not surprising that a great diversity of intermediary forms emerge. This 'atrophy of types' (WP 74) represents the point at which the Christian regime with its distinctive valuation of the world disintegrates and yet, despite the claims of reason, social conscience, etc., the positing of a new Archimedean point (a universal disciplinary regime) to replace Christianity is ruled out by the same will to truth which undercut the universal claim of Christianity. We can sketch this atrophying of types in a bit more detail.

Nihilism is the point at which:

> one grants the reality of becoming as the *only* reality, forbids oneself everykind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities - but *cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.* (WP 12).

In its passive form, this results in the lack of any disciplinary framework; unable to integrate their multiple selves, the weak take refuge in *self-narcoticism*:

> Deep down: not knowing whither. *Emptiness.* Attempt to get over it by intoxication: intoxication as music, intoxication as cruelty in the tragic enjoyment of the destruction of the noblest; intoxication as blind enthusiasm for single human beings or ages (as hatred, etc.). - Attempt to work blindly as an instrument of science: opening one's eyes to many small enjoyments; e.g., also in the quest of knowledge (modesty towards oneself); resignation to generalizing about oneself, a pathos; mysticism, the voluptuous enjoyment of

> eternal emptiness; art "for its own sake" ("*le fait*") and "pure knowledge" as narcotic states of disgust with oneself; some kind or other of continual work, or of some stupid little fanaticism; a medley of all means, sickness owing to general immoderation (debauchery kills enjoyment). (WP 29).

A vast array of devices for escape, for cutting out the unendurability of this transient world of becoming. Many of these intermediary forms taken up by the weak, the herd, draw on fragments of the Christian regime; thus, for example, the 'quest for knowledge'. But under Nihilism the *raison d'etre* of these fragments, held together in the totality of the Christian regime, is absent; the foundational justification for these practices no longer holds[14]. This is what Nietzsche means by the 'atrophy of types'.

In contrast, the active nihilist (the strong individual) organises his selves under a disciplinary regime geared about the will to nothingness. The style of this regime is one of destruction, of total skepticism towards all moral values. Where that will to nothingness which characterises the Christian is orientated towards a rejection of the apparent world, the world of becoming, the will to nothingness embodied in the active nihilist is directed at the 'real world' constructed out of Christian morality. As such, it engages in the abolition of the distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds, the transient world of becoming is the only world left. It is here that Zarathustra enters to teach the Overman[15] through the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. The kind of disciplinary element embodied in Nietzsche's portrayal of the Overman and the overcoming of nihilism is considered in the next chapter. For the moment, let us conclude our discussion of Christianity and Nihilism.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have traced Nietzsche's genealogy of nihilism through an examination of the *Typus Mensch* characteristic of, firstly, Christianity and, secondly, nihilism itself. We have seen how concepts of *ressentiment* and of *bad conscience* are used by Nietzsche to generate an account of Christianity in terms of the *Typus Mensch* it produces. The emergence of Nihilism and the dimensions of its ambiguity can now be seen as simultaneously a sign of weakness and of strength. By treating these dimensions in relation to the notion of a disciplinary regime, we have indicated the significance of this ambiguity, for Nietzsche, as the defining feature of modernity.

Notes

1. It is interesting to compare this to Weber's concern with investigating a culture in terms of *Typus Mensch* that has 'the optimal chances of becoming the type' in Hennis Max Weber, Essays in Reconstruction (1988) p152.

2. This was a theme explored by various German philosophers, notably Feuerbach cf. Kolakowski Main Currents of Marxism Vol.1 (1981) pp114-119.

3. In Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983) pp1-3.

4. A full and interesting discussion of this issue can be found in Nehamas Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985) pp106-137.

5. Weber,of course, shared this concern with investigating the practical affects of psychological anxiety, most notably in his analysis of Calvinism. Cf. PESC pp98-128.

6. Cf. Chapter 3, Section 2 for a discussion of Nietzsche's attitude towrds these 'more concealed forms ...'.

7. It seems unlikely that Nietzsche would have had much time for the 'body beautiful' set, cf. Reader p350 for a similar comment by Foucault.

8. By 'historian' Nietzsche is naturally referring to the practitioner of traditional history as opposed to genealogy which is active.

9. For a discussion of this point, cf. Deleuze op. cit. pp171-175.

10. Cf. GS 290 on this aspect.

11. Cf. Paden 'Theatres of Humilty and Suspicion: Desert Saints and New England Puritans' (1988) pp64-79.

12. We could crudely describe the noble regime as an *internal* disciplining, and the Christian regime as an *external* disciplining, one developed by the individual, the other developed institutionally.

13. On the perfectability of man, cf Paden op.cit. on Cassian, pp64-68.

14. This point is similar to Weber's when he talks of the Puritan having chosen to work in a calling while we are forced to do so, PESC p181.

15. Cf. TI How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth 6.

THE OVERMAN AND THE POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

In this final chapter on Nietzsche, the philosophical and moral concerns outlined in the preceding pages will be brought together. Our aim here is to explicate Nietzsche's notion of the Overman and to eludicate his conception of the role of philosophy in modernity. This project will draw on the earlier discussions of his notions of subjectivity, discipline and genealogy, as well as introducing the idea of *Eternal Recurrence*. These themes will aid us in unearthing the *politics* of Nietzsche's mode of philosophical theorising.

1. The Overman and Eternal Recurrence

The Overman: this figure is the goal of Nietzsche's philosophical activity. However, a full description of the Overman requires an account of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. As Nietzsche writes, this doctrine represents the highest point of his philosophy: '6,000 feet beyond man and time' (EH Z 1). Various issues are raised here. What is it that distinguishes the Overman from the active nihilist, for example? What sort of doctrine is this 'Eternal Recurrence'? What is the form of Nietzsche's philosophical activity here? These questions lead us to the heart of Nietzsche's existential politics.

In the last chapter, it was argued that the genealogist constitutes the active nihilist *par excellence*. The strong individual who faces up to the collapse of moral values and affirms this condition actively through genealogical critique. In the discussion of Nietzsche's place in relation to the themes of subjectivity and self-discipline, it was pointed out that the

strong individual is the one who welds his life into a coherent totality, *who becomes what he is*. How then does this strong individual who is still a *man* come to be overcome? What is it that distinguishes the strong man from the Overman? These two questions are intimately related. The means by which man is to be overcome is provided by the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence and, at the same time, it is this which separates man and Overman.

Although the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is central to Nietzsche, it is certainly the case that little elaboration of this idea can be found in his texts. Zarathustra was seen by Nietzsche as the teacher of this doctrine, yet it is largely unstated by this figure. Moreover, when this 'most abysmal idea' is put forward, it is unclear what its status is: Cosmological theory or ethical doctine?' We can begin to explore this issue by reference to the section *Of The Vision And The Riddle*. Here Zarathustra states a version of Eternal Recurrence:

> 'Behold this moment!' I went on. 'From this gateway Moment a long, eternal road runs *back*: an eternity behind us.
> 'Must not all things that *can* run have ready run along this lane? Must not all things that *can* happen *have* already happened, have done, run past?
> 'And if all things have been here before: what do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, too, have been here - before?
> 'And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? *Therefore* - draws itself too?
> 'For all things that *can* run *must* also run once again forward along this long lane.
> 'And this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and you and I at this gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things - must we not all have been here before?
> ' - and must we not return and run down that other lane out before us, down that long, terrible lane - must we not

return eternally. (Z *Of the Vision and the Riddle* 2).

In this allegorical vision, Nietzsche appears to present Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological theory, as the idea that any (and every) moment in the universe will recur eternally. The history of the world, our life - these things will recur *identically*. This is the thought Zarathustra finds so abysmal. As it is spoken in *The Convalescent*:

> '"Alas, man recurs eternally! The little man recurs eternally!"
> 'I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man: all too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human!
> 'The greatest all too small! - that was my disgust at man! And eternal recurrence even for the smallest! that was my disgust at all existance! (Z *The Convalescent* 2).

Yet, in the same section, the animals tell Zarathustra, and Nietzsche tells us, that he is to be the teacher of Eternal Recurrence and that to teach this is to teach the path to the Overman. Zarathustra's final affirmation of this doctrine is the affirmation (and redemption) of the existence of all the base and mean moments of man for the sake of those moments which are great and noble. This interpretation of Eternal recurrence is further supported by some of Nietzsche's unpublished remarks in The Will To Power, where he states: 'the law of conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence.* (WP 1063) and, elsewhere, in greater detail:

> If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of force - and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless - it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more, it would be realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to

> take place, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game *in infinitum* (WP 1066).

Two different sorts of problem emerge for us at this point. The first concerns the validity of the position Nietzsche appears to subscribe to in this passage. The second raises the question of whether or not this is indeed the position Nietzsche affirms.

The account of history in this passage asserts that since the history of the universe is made up of a finite amount of energy, then any given distribution of this energy must recur eternally given an infinite period of time. If this is Nietzsche's analysis of Eternal Recurrence then it cannot be sustained, and that for two reasons. Firstly, it does not follow from the fact that there is a finite amount of energy that there are a finite number of distributions of this energy. Secondly, even if this were granted, it would not follow that a particular distribution of energy need recur[2]. This later point was made by Simmel, whose argument has been usefully summarised by Schacht[3]:

> it would be at least possible for a world ... to contain an analog of a relatively simple model (involving marked wheels of equal size revolving at specified rates of n, 2n and n/π), of which it can be shown mathematically that a certain state of the model (the original alignment of the marked points) will never be repeated. (Schacht 1983 p263).

It would appear then that the Eternal Recurrence, on this interpretation, is severely flawed. This may explain why Nietzsche never published any of his 'proofs' of Eternal Recurrence. Yet this failure to publish the 'proof' demanded by such a cosmological doctrine raises the question as to whether

such a theory is Nietzsche's intention. Why is it that the dwarf, the Spirit of Gravity who is Zarathustra's opponent, in *Of The Vision And The Riddle* is rebuked by Zarathustra for saying 'All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.' (Z *Of the Vision and the Riddle* 2). In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says of The Gay Science that 'in the end it even offers the beginning of *Zarathustra*, and in the penultimate section of the fourth book the basic idea of *Zarathustra*.' (EH Z 1). The less poetic form of expression deployed in this earlier formulation may help us to get a better grasp of the nature of Eternal Recurrence as a doctrine. It is necessary here to quote the relevant passage in its entirety:

> *The greatest weight.* - What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existance is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"
>
> Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke us? Or have you experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and everything, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (GS 341).

The demon is Zarathustra, yet here Nietzsche's primary concern is with the response of the individual to this thought, not the 'truth' of the thought itself. It is the *psychological* consequences of the idea of Eternal

Recurrence which are important[4]. In a sense, it is Nietzsche's principle of selection; a sorting of the wheat from the chaff, of those who are fated to remain all too human and those who will pass over the bridge, who will become Overmen. This version of Eternal Recurrence seems more plausible. Consider the following comment from Ecce Homo, in which Nietzsche considers why the ascetic ideal of the priest was so powerful:

> Answer: not, as people may believe, because God is at work behind the priests but *faute de mieux* - because it was the only ideal so far, because it had no rival. "For man would rather will even nothingness than *not* will." - Above all a *counterideal* was lacking - *until Zarathustra.* (EH GM).

A counterideal. This does not imply that Eternal Recurrence is true, rather that it is of similar mythic dimensions as the figure of God. What is important in terms of this discussion is its 'proof of power', which is to ask: in what does the 'value for life' of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence consist?

Primarily, it consists in providing the strong individual with the means to both face up to the lack of absolute values and yet to still evaluate his own actions and life. It enables the strong individual to endow his life with *positive* meaning and value. To examine how Eternal Recurrence achieves this, it is necessary to return to Nietzsche's position on the issue of subjectivity.

It will be recalled that for Nietzsche *what is needful* is to give one's life a coherent style. The nature of this style is relatively unimportant, its uniformity is the significant feature. But how is the individual to decide on the question of the performance or non-performance of a given action? Particularly if both these possibilities are consonant with the style of the individual's subjectivity. Within a given set of stylistic

parameters a potentially infinite number of narratives are possible. In this interpretation, the significance of Eternal Recurrence is that to be able to affirm this doctrine is to be able to say of one's life 'Thus I willed it, all of it.' Expressed positively the demon's thought becomes the injunction: 'Live your life such that if you had to live your life over and over again, even eternally, you would live it in the same way.'

The question this poses to the individual pondering various courses of action is 'Which course of action would I wish to live an infinite number of times?'. It should be noted that, as with Nietzsche's injunction to stylistic coherency, this criterion for decision-making is *formal* in character. The nature of the action is less important than the mature desire to repeat it eternally. In this way, the individual forms his life into a *work of art*; each element, every brushstroke, is affirmed as integral to the totality. Eternal Recurrence thus provides the individual with meaning and value for his life. However, the sketch given so far does not entirely distinguish the Overman from the noble man, nor does it completely explain why the Eternal Recurrence is such an 'abysmal thought'. To fill in the picture however, requires a detour through Nietzsche's notion of the *Will to Power*[5].

'*This world is the will to power - and nothing besides!*' (WP 1067). This section is essentially a discussion of the implications of the theory of the *Will to Power* for Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. An apposite starting point is Nietzsche's rejection of the Kantian 'thing-in-itself':

> The properties of a thing are effects on other "things":
> if one removes other "things," then a thing has no properties,
> i.e., there is no thing without other things,

i.e., there is no "thing-in-itself." (WP 557).

That is 'the "thing" in which we believe was only invented as a foundation for the various attributes' (WP 561). With regard to subjectivity, we posit a transcendental subject as the cause of a variety of actions performed by an individual. Nietzsche argues that this tendency also characterises our treatment of things: 'we take the sum of its properties - "x" - as cause of the property "x": which is utterly stupid and mad!' (WP 561). As a philosophical thesis, the *Will to Power* is initially the argument that "thingness" is a property which we have ascribed to things through a false reversal of cause and effect. In contrast to the Kantian distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds which is presupposed by the idea of a 'thing-in-itself', Nietzsche poses the everyday world of flux and perpetual change. In this world, the only world, a thing is constituted by its effects. What are the implications of this thesis?

Now, for Nietzsche, the world is constituted by the perspective; this perspective being an ordering and valuing of the world. Perspectivism as such does not require an ontological pluralism, however, Nietzsche's notion of the Will to Power does seem to entail such a position. We can explain this as follows: a 'thing' is constituted by its effects, yet these effects are the product of a particular perspective valuation; this implies that different perspectives may produce different effects and, therefore, different 'things'. The crucial point though is that all the 'things' in a given perspective-world are constituted by their effects on the other 'things'. As Nietzsche puts it: 'If I remove all the relationships, all the "properties," all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over;' (WP 558).

This is not such a strange sounding claim as it might immediately

appear. As Nehamas has pointed out, in some ways Nietzsche's position with regard to 'things' parallels Saussure's arguments on language[6]. For Saussure, a particular set of noises or inscriptions do not constitute a 'word-in-itself', on the contrary, its status as a 'word' with a more or less specific meaning is given by its position in a system of differences. Thus, for example, the meaning of 'cat' is given through its differential relationships with such terms as 'mat', 'cot' and 'cap'. So too, for Nietzsche, there are no 'things-in-themselves' rather 'things' are constituted as 'things' through the total system of relationships they have to other 'things'. This entails, for Nietzsche, that 'everything' is more or less directly related to every other 'thing'. Consequently, to remove any given 'thing' is to change, however subtly, the total system. The remarks offered up to this stage deal only with the *synchronic* dimension, it is necessary that we also take note of the *diachronic* or historical axis.

Nehamas's account is again useful for our purposes. He points out that for Nietzsche:

> There can be no antecedent ground of the unity or identity of an object through time any more than there is such a ground in the case of an object at a particular time. Over time an object is constituted by the best history of a group of phenomena, a history embodied in the best narrative of the relations among them. Such narratives reveal that different phenomena have served the same purpose or that different purposes have succeeded one another in ways that allow them to be parts of a single history and therefore parts of a single object through time. (Nehamas 1985 p100)[7].

Nietzsche's genealogical essays are examples of such narrative accounts. It will be recalled that in each of these essays Nietzsche is concerned with tracing the conditions of emergence of a particular phenomenon. Moreover, in the fragmented narrative which constitutes his genealogy of nihilism

Nietzsche is clearly concerned with charting how we have become to be as we are. It follows that for Nietzsche the particular system of relationships which characterises a state of affairs, at a given point in time, *conditions* the states of affairs which follow. In one of the passages in which may be used to indicate Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological theory, this 'conditioning' is blown up into full determinism:

> And since between every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these combinations *conditions* the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: (WP 1066).

Our reasons for rejecting the cosmological determinist interpretation of Nietzsche have already been given. Suffice it too say here that such a determinism would be unable to account for the high place that Nietzsche assigns to contingency in human affairs. The significant issue for our concerns is the point that not only are 'things' defined by a system of relationships synchronically but also by the relationships of the systems of differences diachronically. The implication of this, for Nietzsche, is that to remove a 'thing' from a given totality is not just to alter that system but to change those which relate to it.

Now, naturally, for Nietzsche we cannot move back in time and change an event, however, this is not his concern. What is significant to him is that the individual may desire to do so. It is this *will* to change history which he is attempting to counter with the notion of the *Will to Power*. In part we have already seen this in Nietzsche's account of subjectivity. Within the parameters of the narrative conception of subjectivity which Nietzsche deploys, it would be *inauthentic* to desire to

change an aspect of one's past since this past is constitutive of who one is today. The affirmation of one's life which Nietzsche lays down as the criteria for the Overman requires a *total* affirmation. This goes some way to explaining why for Nietzsche the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is such an 'abysmal thought'. However, the full dimensions of its horror are revealed when it is grasped that this affirmation goes beyond one's own life and involves affirming the whole of human history as well. That this is so is axiomatic to the idea of the *Will to Power*. For were any aspect of history to be altered then the whole of history following that moment would be changed including oneself (if indeed one still existed). A full affirmation of oneself consequently requires a total affirmation of all of history. One need only reflect on the events of this century to grasp the terror of this thought. It is appropriate that Nietzsche makes the moment of this thought appear in the image of a shepherd choking:

> And truly, I had never seen the like of what I then saw. I saw a young shepherd writhing, choking, convulsed, his face distorted; and a heavy, black snake was hanging out of his mouth. (Z *Of the Vision and the Riddle* 2).

It is not until the much later section, *The Convalescent*, that Zarathustra understands that being the shepherd was the symbolic representation of his own fear at the thought of Eternal Recurrence. Yet *instinctively* Zarathustra recognises the course of action the shepherd must take:

> The shepherd, however, bit as my cry had advised him; he bit with a good bite! He spat the snake's head away - and sprang up.
>
> No longer a shepherd, no longer a man - a transformed being, surrounded with light, *laughing*! Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed! (Z *Of the Vision and the Riddle 2*).

This is significant for two reasons: firstly, Nietzsche's claim that the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence brings with it a feeling of joy, of power; and secondly, the passage's implicit espousal of instinct. In the context of Nietzsche's concern with *breeding*[8], it becomes clear that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence constitutes a principle which Nietzsche wishes to breed into man. The expression of Eternal Recurrence, as the injunction to live your life such that if you had to live over again eternally you would live it in the same way, is the starting point for a breeding programme such that this principle becomes automatic. This principle of recurrence then constitutes the central point of the disciplinary regime, a regime which one must impose on oneself to give one's life value; that is, to be an Overman.

To conclude this section, it seems appropriate to sum up the features of Nietzsche's position which have been identified. We began by indicating Nietzsche's concern with formulating a basis upon which the individual might reinvest his life with meaning and value. This basis was the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, the demand that one affirm one's own existence with all the implications this affirmation has. It is the acceptance of Eternal Recurrence which distinguishes the Overman from the strong individual as such, since for past *nobles* there were foundational values which acted as Archimedean points for their self-affirmation, whereas for the post-nihilist no such values exist and consequently only a formal principle is available. Here we have offered an interpretation of Eternal Recurrence as primarily a prescriptive injunction (though the force of this injunction may draw on a cosmological doctrine as a mythic resource). In the next section we will examine the *politics* of this

doctrine as embodied in the Overman and retake up the issue of the role Nietzsche assigns to philosophy.

The Politics of Philosophy

To some extent, the politics of Nietzsche's philosophy has been illustrated in the previous section. An existential politics whereby the individual is enabled to reinvest his or her life with meaning and value. In this section, the politics embodied in the figure of the Overman will be contextualised by reference to Nietzsche's fragmentary remarks on the political nature of modernity. Through an exposition of Nietzsche's position on this issue, which will involve examining Nietzsche's comments on various political theorists and theories, we will be able to further grasp the kind of politics involved in Nietzsche's espousal of the Overman.

A useful starting point is to remind ourselves of the ambiguous nature that modernity has for Nietzsche by noting the following comments:

> Principle: There is an element of decay in everything that characterises modern man: but close beside this sickness stand signs of an untested force and powerfulness of the soul. *The same reasons that produce the increasing smallness of man* drive the *stronger and rarer individuals up to greatness.* (WP 109).
>
> *Overall insight: the ambiguous* character of our *modern world* - the very same symptoms could point to *decline* and to *strength.* (WP 110).

Two significant issues arise here: firstly, the operation of Nietzsche's distinction between the weak herd and the strong few; and secondly, the immediate problem that Nietzschean political analysis is posed with if political institutions are ambiguous phenomena (how then may we evaluate them?). By taking up the first issue and elaborating the way in which this distinction is operated, we can also resolve the question of how Nietzsche does in fact evaluate political phenomena. This exploration will begin by looking at Nietzsche's critiques of various social theorists before going

on to look at how he handles a general political issue such as 'democracy'.

While a number of social theorists provoke Nietzsche's ire, the most significant are Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. We will begin by analysing the style of Nietzsche's rejection of Rousseau. For Nietzsche, Rousseau represents the *bad conscience* of his age, the spirit of *ressentiment* is alive and well here. He views Rousseau as:

> a symptom of self self-contempt and heated vanity - both signs that the domineering will is lacking: he moralises and, as a man of rancor, seeks the cause of his wretchedness in the ruling classes. (WP 98).

To see how Nietzsche arrives at such an assessment, we must first identify the form of argumentation that Nietzsche locates in Rousseau. This strategy can be seen at work in the following passage:

> *Morality as a means of seduction.* - "Nature is good, for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, then, is responsible for the 'corruption of mankind'? Its tyrants and seducers, the ruling orders - they must be destroyed" - : *Rousseau's* logic (WP 347, cf. also WP 100).

For Nietzsche, Rousseau's argument involves three significant assumptions: 'the rule based on feeling; nature as the source of justice; man perfects himself to the extent to which he approaches nature' (WP 100). This *romanticism* manifesting itself as an plea for 'passion ("the sovereign right of passion")' (WP 100), again: 'the "libertinism of passion" (Rousseau's intent)' (WP 106). But isn't this espousal of passion in some sense similar to Nietzsche's own espousal of 'instinct'? It would appear not, Nietzsche argues that:

> libertinage, the principle of "*laisser aller,*" should not be confused with the will to power (- which is the counterprinciple). (WP 122).

And, moreover, he goes on to identify in the section *My Five 'No's'*:

> My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against his "nature," his "good man," his belief in the domination of feeling - against the softening, weakening, moralization of man: an ideal born of *hatred for aristocratic culture; in praxi* the doination of the feeligs of an unbridled *ressentiment*, devised as a banner for the struggle (- the morality of guilt feelings of the Christan, the morality of *ressentiment* a posture of the mob). (WP 1021).

Here we reach the heart of Nietzsche's critique of Rousseau, that at root Rousseau's idealised concept of 'nature' is utilised as a means for the weak to refuse responsibility for themselves, that is, *ressentiment*. We can see here how the figure of the Overman represents a point from which Nietzsche is able to generate his critique. The Overman represents an individual taking total responsibility for their own life, saying 'Thus I willed it'. In contrast, Rousseau's 'good man' represents a total abnegation of responsibility; firstly, in the identification of self as a response to 'the tyrants and seducers' and secondly, in a libertinage of feelings which refuses self-discipline[9]. The critique Nietzsche developed, in the essay '"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"', of slave morality might equally apply to Rousseau, whose position is fundamentally one of:

> *The more concealed forms of the cult of the Christian moral ideal.* - The insipid and cowardly concept "nature" devised by nature enthusiasts (- without any instinct for what is fearful, implacable and cynical even in the "most beautiful" aspects), a kind of attempt to read moral Christian "humanity" into nature - Rousseau's concept of nature, as if "nature" were freedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, justice, an idyl - still a cult of Christian morality fundamentally. (WP 340).

To invest Christian morality into 'nature' is not, for Nietzsche, a

productive move. Rather, it is one which merely reaffirms the Christian denial of the world in yet another form.

We can illustrate this point on grounds not directly considered by Nietzsche by reference to the logic of Puritanism discussed in the last chapter. There it was pointed out that Puritanism represented *bad conscience* in its purest form, this being exemplified in:

> the logic of reflexive self-examination, every religious assertion - including every act of confession and every act of self-accusation - could become suspect of its own possible self-deception. (Paden 1988 p78).

A similar logic is apparent in the Rousseauian self. This aspect can be brought out by considering a recent argument by Gutman. He quotes the following passage from Rousseau's Confessions:

> since I have undertaken to *reveal myself absolutely* to the public, nothing about me must remain hidden or obscure. *I must remain incessently beneath his gaze*, so that he may follow me in all the extravagencies of my heart and into every least corner of my life. Indeed, he must *never lose sight of me for a single instance*, for if he finds the smallest gap in my story, the smallest hiatus, he may wonder what I was doing at that moment and *accuse me* of refusing to tell the whole truth. I am laying myself sufficiently open. (Rousseau 1953 p65 in Gutman 1988 p106).

As Gutman indicates, this confession 'develops as a response to social accusation, ... it consists in total exposure, and ... its revelations are to be subjected to an external (and judging) gaze.' (Gutman 1988 p106)[10]. In other words, the Puritan regime of self-suspicion is objectified. While the self is still rendered transparent, it is now subject to the gaze of the other, as well as the gaze of the self. Rousseau's logic represents the socialisation of the logic of Puritanism, and as such it, too, exemplifies *bad conscience*. Thus although Nietzsche did not consider this aspect of

Rousseau's work, an examination of Rousseau's conception of the self in Nietzschean terms leads to the same conclusion that Nietzsche reached concerning Rousseau's thought.

If Rousseau represents the Christian moralisation of 'nature', what does Mill represent?[11] Nietzsche's critique can be located as beginning with this remark on Utilitarianism *per se*:

> The value of an action must be judged by its consequences - say the Utilitarians - : to judge by its origin implies an impossibility, namely that of *knowing* is origins.
>
> But does one know its consequences? For five steps ahead, perhaps. Who can say what an action will stimulate, excite, provoke? As a stimulus? Perhaps as a spark to touch off an explosion! - The Utilitarians are naive - (WP 291).

This comment poses a logical problem for *consequentialist* forms of argument. If an action is to be judged by its consequences, to what extent can another action be judged as consequential? Given Nietzsche's notion of the *Will to Power*, the consequences of any given action will be timeless; as such the possibility of judging these consequences in any but a temporary manner is ruled out. It follows that the individual cannot deploy utilitarianism as a meaningful ethical criterion. However, this immanent critique is only the initial stage of Nietzsche's argument. The most significant area of Nietzsche's critique is the attack on the idea of 'reciprocity'. This manifests itself in the following form:

> Marginal note on a *niaiserie anglaise*. - "Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you." That counts as wisdom; that counts as prudence; that counts as the basis of morality - as the "golden rule." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not?) But this rule does not brook the slightest attack. The calculation, "do nothing that ought not to be done to you," prohibits actions on account of their harmful consequences: the concealed premise is that an action will always be requited.

> But what if someone holding the *Principe* in his hand were to say: "It is precisely such actions that one *must* perform, to prevent others from performing them first - to deprive others of the chance to perform them on *us*."? (WP 925).

It is not so much that Nietzsche is advocating a morality of pre-emptive strikes, rather, his point is that the concept of 'reciprocity' which constitutes Mill's "golden rule" breaks down in the face of the Machiavellian ethic of pre-emption. However, the primary attack that Nietzsche operates on this reciprocal morality develops out of his own *deontological* theory of ethics. Thus Nietzsche argues:

> And in all decent actions, are we not deliberately indifferent to the prospect of what may happen to us? To avoid an action that might have harmful consequences for us - that would mean a ban on decent actions in general. (WP 925).

To illustrate this Nietzsche uses the example of a *vendetta*. Here the person declaring the vendetta may not wish to be shot but the likelihood of this event does not prevent him from undertaking the vendetta to vindicate his honour. As one might expect, however, Nietzsche's deontological stance does not resemble standard versions of such theories such as Christianity. In the traditional stamp, deontological theories involve the ascription of an absolute obligation to the performance or non-performance of particular classes of actions which applies equally to all individuals. Nietzsche's position, in contrast, makes the ascription of such obligations an individual affair. An action may performed for its own sake but this value is not inherent to the action, on the contrary, what gives it value is the specific individual's affirmation of it. In other words, Nietzsche's position may be characterised as a *deontological subjectivism*.

Let us now return to Nietzsche's onslaught on Mill. The final move in this critique is to show that Mill's position exemplifies herd morality. In the section *Against John Stuart Mill*, Nietzsche argues that Mill's "golden rule":

> wants to establish all human intercourse on the basis of mutual services, so that every action appears as a kind of payment for something done to us. The presupposition here is ignoble in the lowest sense: here an equivalence of value between my actions and yours is presupposed, here the most personal value of an action is simply annulled (that which cannot be balanced or paid in any way -). (WP 926).

The 'value' of Mill's formulation is in the fact that 'it betrays a type of man: it is the instinct of the herd that finds its formula in this rule' (WP 925). The belief in 'equivalence' and 'reciprocity' must be, Nietzsche argues, predicated on the belief in 'equality'. 'Equality' however, is, in turn, based on a belief in the 'soul'; this positing of 'equality' is precisely one of the purposes Nietzsche ascribed to the invention of the 'soul' by the masses in the essay '"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"'[12]. As such, Mill's argument represents another of the *more concealed forms of the cult of the Christian moral ideal* (cf. WP 340).

However, on a practical level, Nietzsche seems less opposed to the position articulated by Mill in On Liberty. Nietzsche notes, for example, that this 'moral liberality is one of the best signs of our age. ... If anything can reconcile us to our age, it is the great amount of immorality it permits itself without thinking any the worse of itself.' (WP 747). It would appear then that Nietzsche's objection is not so much directed at the form of society which Mill advocates, but rather the presuppositions upon which Mill grounds his advocacy (in particular, the universality Mill attributes to his "golden rule"). The apparent ambiguity of Nietzsche's

position here can be explained by analogy to his stance concerning language. Recall Nietzsche's argument that language contains a 'hidden mythology', that it seduces us towards belief in 'the subject', 'substance', etc. through its grammatical structure and the reification of metaphors into concepts. He does not suggest, however, that we try to formulate a non-metaphysical language; such a project would be, for him, doomed to inevitable failure[13]. With regard to 'moral liberality', Nietzsche is not so much concerned with this state (which he appears to view rather positively) as with the ideological reification of this state through a series of abstract concepts: such as 'equality,' 'equivalence' and 'reciprocity'. It is this *conceptual mummification* in the spirit of the herd which represents the point of Nietzsche's critique of Mill. This is not to say though that Nietzsche was entirely unconcerned with the nature of modern political institutions themselves. On the contrary, the institution of democracy was of great concern to him as we shall now see.

In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche begins his *glance at the state* by considering democracy as a political institution in modernity. Thus:

> *Permission to speak!* - The demagogic character and the intention to appeal to the masses is at present common to all political parties: on account of this intention they are compelled to transform their principles into great *al fresco* stupidities and thus to paint them on the wall. This is no longer alterable, indeed it would be pointless to raise so much as a finger against it; for in this domain there apply the words of Voltaire: *quand la populace se mêle de raisonner, tout est perdu. (HH 438).*

All may be lost but Nietzsche does not seem overly distressed by this condition, indeed he finds the desire for democracy on behalf of the herd quite understandable. He comments:

> if the purpose of all politics really is to make life endurable for as many as possible, then these as-many-as-possible are entitled to determine what they understand by an endurable life; ... They *want* for once to forge for themselves their own fortunes and misfortunes; and if this feeling of self-determination, pride in the five or six ideas their head contains and brings forth, in fact renders their life so pleasant to them they are happy to bear the calamitous consequences of their narrow-mindedness, there is little to be objected to, always presupposing that this narrow-mindedness does not go so far as to demand that *everything* should become politics in this sense, that *everyone* should live and work according to such a standard. (HH 438).

As a political institution, democracy satisfies the demands of the herd (cf WP 215). The crucial issue from Nietzsche's perspective is that the will-to-democracy should not entail the demand that everyone be required to manifest this will. The problem of democracy, for Nietzsche, is that its grounding on the idea of 'equal rights' impells it towards such a *universalist* requirement. The basis for this claim can be located in Nietzsche's genealogy of 'equal rights'. This concept's lineage is directly tracable to the Christian idea of the 'equality of souls before God' (WP 765). As such it also involves a concealed commitment to *ressentiment*, for as Nietzsche argues, wherever 'responsibilities have been sought it was the *instinct of revenge* that sought' (WP 765). As our detailed discussion of Christianity shows, *ressentiment* implies a universal morality. It is this totalising tendency of the will-to-democracy that Nietzsche has in mind when he suggests that:

> Democracy represents the disbelief in great human beings and an elite society: "Everyone is equal to everyone else." "At bottom we are one and all self-seeking cattle and mob." (WP 752).

Yet while Nietzsche attacks the foundational values on which democracy

rests, he also perceives the opportunities opened up by democray as an institution. As he puts it:

> The same conditions that hasten the evolution of the herd animal also hasten the evolution of the leader animal. (WP 956)[14].

How does this 'hastening' operate? In the context of modern mass democracy, Nietzsche suggests that the *degeneration* against which Christian asceticism acted manifests itself again in the various forms of passive nihilism. The herd allows itself to be disciplined by external forces. This, Nietzsche argues, is no reason for discouragement, on the contrary:

> Whoever has preserved, and bred in himself, a strong will, together with an ample spirit, has more favourable opprtunities than ever. For the trainability of men has become very great in this democratic Europe; men who learn easily and adapt themselves easily are the rule: the herd animal, even highly intelligent, has been prepared. Whoever can command finds those who *must* obey: I am thinking, e.g., of Napoleon and Bismarck. (WP 128).

It is precisely the 'ever greater weakness of man' (WP 130) which provides the ever greater opportunity for the emergence of the Overman. One further comment is useful here; as regards the weak and the Overman, Nietzsche suggests:

> In a certain sense, *the latter can maintain and develop himself most easily in a democratic society*: namely, when the coarser means of defence are no longer necessary and habits of order, honesty, justice, and trust are part of the usual conditions. (WP 887).

It appears then that Nietzsche's attitude towards democracy is decidedly ambiguous. On the one hand, he objects to the universalising thrust of the will-to-democracy and the values on which this will is grounded. On the

other hand, as a political institution Nietzsche sees democracy as providing optimal conditions for the emergence of the Overman. The task of evaluating democracy (or any other dimension of modernity) can be seen to consist of two requirements: (i) a genealogical tracing of the lineage of its foundational values (and a critique of these values) and (ii) an analysis of the conditions which the phenomenon opens up relative to the emergence of the Overman.

The central issue that has been established by Nietzsche's treatment of both political theories and political institutions is that his revaluation of the values they embody is developed from the perspective of the Overman. This figure functions as the critical device whereby Nietzsche develops his critique of values in terms of their 'value for life'. As the great 'Yea-sayer', the Overman represents the highest point of the affirmation of life, and as such it provides Nietzsche with a non-transcendental site from which to articulate his critical concerns.

To conclude this section, let us note the important areas covered. Firstly, modernity represents, for Nietzsche, an ambiguous phenomenon. Secondly, Nietzsche's *value* critique of social theorists operates from the perspective of the Overman. Thirdly, Nietzsche's concern with political institutions operated on two levels: a value critique of the institution's foundational values and a practical evaluation of the possibilities opened up by the institution for the development of the Overman. Finally the Overman functions in this political dimension of Nietzsche's activity as a critical site for the task of revaluating values.

Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been shown that the politics of the Overman are twofold. The first dimension is the *affirmatory politics of the self* which is displayed in Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. This doctrine provides a formal device whereby the individual can overcome nihilism and reinvest his life with meaning and value without recourse to foundational values. The second dimension is the *critical politics of evaluating values*. Here the Overman functions as a non-transcendental site for the critique of values. Together these positive and negative dimensions constitute the politics of Nietzsche's philosophy: the diagnosis of modernity and the concern with the fate of the human subject.

NOTES

1. For a variety of recent positions taken on the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, cf. Strong Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (1975) pp260-295, Schacht Nietzsche (1983) pp253-266, Schutte Beyond Nihilism (1984) pp66-75, Nehamas Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985) pp141-169, Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983) pp47-49 and 68-72.

2. Both these points are discussed well in Nehamas op. cit. pp143-148.

3. Schacht himself does not regard Simmel's objection as in-itself crucial, cf. Schacht op. cit. pp263-266.

4. This pyschological conception is particularly well discussed in Nehamas op. cit. pp151-154.

5. It should be noted that the discussion of the *Will to Power* is not intended to illuminate all its aspects, merely those directly related to our concerns. For two full and useful discussions of this concept, cf. Strong op. cit. pp218-259 and Nehamas op. cit. pp74-105.

6. Whether or not this parallel between Nietzsche and Saussure opens Nietzsche up to the kind of deconstructive exercise that Derrida performs on Saussure is an open question. From Derrida's comments on Nietzsche, most notably in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (1979), it would appear that Nietzsche's texts open themselves up in a reflexive and deliberate manner for Derrida. For discussions of Saussure by Derrida, cf. Of Grammatology (1976) pp 27-73.

7. Foucault makes a similar point in the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', cf. Reader pp87-88.

8. *Breeding* is used by Nietzsche in deliberately polemical fashion as a concept here. The terms 'rearing' and 'educating' come perhaps closest to

what is intended by this use of the idea of 'breeding'.

9. The importance of 'responsibility' and 'self-discipline' is central to Weber and Foucault as well as Nietzsche, cf. chapter 5 and chapter 8 respectively.

10. Nietzsche comments on this social dimension of 'truthfulness' in WP 277 and 278.

11. One might think that Mill's defence of genius in <u>On Liberty</u> would put him closer to Nietzsche. The presuppositions involved Mill's philosophy however, appear to rule this out.

12. Cf. GM I 13.

13. Cf. chapter 1, sections 1 and 2. An somewhat different but interesting conception is developed by Haar in 'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language' in Allison (ed.) <u>The New Nietzsche</u> (1985) pp5-36.

14. Here, yet again, is the ambiguous character of modernity for Nietzsche.

Max Weber

BETWEEN NIETZSCHE AND THE NEO-KANTIANS

Reflections on Weber's Methodolgy

Weber's 'methodological' treatises spring ultimately from his awareness of this particular situation, that 'after a thousand years of alledgedly or supposedly exclusive orientation to the magnificent pathos of the Christian ethic, our eyes have become blinded to it'. His essays emerge with an inner logic from his recognition of the questionable character not merely of modern science and culture but of our present orientation to life in general.
  - *Karl Löwith*

Nevertheless, by the road of reason, Weber reached a point which was not that different from that reached by another humanist, Nietzsche, who pursued the road of unreason. God, even Rickert's God, was dead now. History ceased to be a meaningful process and became the scene of insoluble value conflicts. Man, confronted by the ethical meaninglessness of the universe, found nothing left but the will to power.
  - *George Iggers*

Introduction

In this chapter, Weber's methodological considerations will be addressed. The quotations above by Löwith and Iggers, though we may not entirely agree with them, raise the question of Weber's relation to Nietzsche. Consequently, it will be argued here that an adequate conceptualisation of Weber's position requires an examination of the Nietzschean themes and perspectives which pervade his work[1]. To facilitate this analysis, three area's, in particular, will come under scrutiny. Firstly, we will consider the issue of *value*, specifically Weber's formulation of the fact-value distinction. Secondly, that nature and status of *ideal-types* will be examined, notably in relation to perspectivism. Thirdly, we shall take up the conception of the *subject* that Weber deploys. In discussion of each of

these issues, Nietzschean and neo-Kantian elements will be counterposed to bring out the peculiar location occupied by Weber in his writings. Finally, a short discussion of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism will be utilised to indicate the initial features of Weber's concept of modernity.

1. Knowledge and Value

The question of value occupies a central but ambiguous position in Weber's writings. In this section, the character of this place will be brought out through a consideration of the issue of value in relation to Nietzsche and Rickert. By the juxtaposition of these antithetical theorists, the ambiguity and tension that characterises Weber's deployment of the term 'value' will be contextualised and, thus, brought into focus.

To begin, let us briefly explore the importance of the issue of value for Nietzsche. The concern here will be, at least initially, only with the relation of value and knowledge in Nietzsche's philosophy. A starting point for this discussion is immediately afforded by Nietzsche's genealogical concerns. In the essay *"Good and Bad," "Good and Evil"*, which has already been examined[2], Nietzsche argues that our values are socially contingent historical constructions and in no way can we identify 'real' transcendental values. A given hierarchy of values, such as that operated by Christianity, is rooted in a particular perspective valuation of the world.

The implications of this claim will emerge as we consider the doctrine of perspectivism which Nietzsche puts forward. It will be recalled that 'for Nietzsche, the whole epistemological enterprise is flawed' (Strong 1985 p165). Against the Kantian argument that 'the unity of the world is

derived from the unity of the archetectonics of the faculty that makes knowing possible - from the nature of the self' (Strong 1985 p171), it is claimed that 'the unity of the known and the unity of the knower are derived from the activity of knowing' (Strong 1985 p171). In other words, our mode of knowing is productive of both us and the world. Given that, for Nietzsche, the activity of knowing is always an activity of interpreting from a particular perspective and that 'the value of the world lies in our interpretation' (WP 616) (and that, moreover, 'we cannot reject the possibility that *it may include infinite interpretations'* (GS 374)), it follows that to speak of value-free, objective knowledge, to speak of a fact-value distinction is a nonsense for Nietzsche. As he has put it: 'facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations' (WP 481). This is not to say that Nietzsche does not operate a notion of objectivity, merely that this Nietzschean objectivity is not value-free. The notion of objectivity deployed by Nietzsche must be:

> understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability *to control* one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. (GM III 12).

It will be recalled that the strong individual is one who coordinates his various perspectives into a coherent whole. For Nietzsche, it is this strong individual who approaches objectivity through this coordination of perspectives:

> There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective "knowing"; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be. (GM III 12).

It should be noted that these perspectives are not reducible to eachother, they are 'different eyes'. Despite this notion of 'objectivity', the point remains that the very idea of value-free knowledge represents 'a nonsensical absurdity' for Nietzsche.

Against this Nietzschean backdrop, Rickert's idea's seem more immediately related to our commonsense conception of Weber's methodology. For instance, Rickert's distinction between the natural and cultural sciences in terms of their respective interests:

> only a concept that is likewise logical can constitute the opposite of the *logical* concept of nature as the existence of things as far as it is determined according to universal laws. But this, I believe, is the concept of *history* in the broadest formal sense of the word, i.e., the concept of the *nonrepeatable event* in its particularity and individuality, which stands in formal opposition to the concept of a universal law. (Rickert 1962 p15)

appears to be directly adopted by Weber in his methodological discussions. It is readily apparent in Science and History in which direction Rickert's discussion of values will proceed. For example, in discussing the objectivity of a given historical investigation Rickert claims that what guides selection of the data of history and thus ultimately determines the foundation of all historical concepts is *values*. However, Rickert is sensitive to the potential problems raised by this formulation. He notes that a 'representation of events that makes reference to values is only valid for those who belong to the same culture' (Rickert 1962 p133) and further:

> if the objectivity of a representation of events that makes reference to values is always confined to a more or less large circle of men with a common cultural background, it is

> an *historically limited objectivity.* (Rickert 1962 p136).

As a way of moving to a discussion of the notion of *objective values* which Rickert raises in order to resolve some of the problems he sees as associated with the historically relative nature of objectivity in the cultural sciences, it is useful to note his commitment to the idea of social scientific activity as, in some sense, *value-free* even at this stage. Rickert's proposal here is to distinguish between theoretical values and practical values, or in his terms, between a *value-relation* and a *valuation.* The latter of these implies a notion of value-judgement, while the former indicates only that a particular phenomenon is 'worth knowing'. For example, the socialist and the conservative make very different kinds of value-judgement in the political sphere, however they both hold that 'politics' as an area of human activity is worth knowing about, they have a value-relation to politics as a theoretical value (cf. Aron 1970 p78). Rickert argues that insofar as it is *logically* possible for a social scientific account to rest purely on theoretical values which are common to a particular community, then this account is *value-free* in the sense of having *empirical objectivity.* That is being valid for all the members of the community whatever the differences they have on the level of practical values. An integral component of this is that if the account has universal validity across a community, the account *in itself* cannot be utilised to justify one particular valuation as opposed to another. Rickert himself has expressed this cluster of points as follows:

> Of course, our line of thought can be convincing *only* if we keep in mind the difference between positive or negative valuation and the purely theoretical *value relation* that is completely independent of this alternative. This is why the objectivity of concept formation in history that is exclusively intended here should not be linked with *that*

> sort of objectivity that, for example, is juxtaposed to the historical representation that is "subjective" because it is governed by "confessional" presuppositions. Representations of historical events written from different confessional standpoints will never proceed in a purely theoretical value-relevant fashion. This is why they cannot in fact possess scientific objectivity. Suppose, however, that all value *judgements* are disregarded. Then, for example, in a representation of the reality that is called "Luther," the same aspects that are essential for Protestants must also be essential for Catholics. (Rickert 1986 p200).

This specification of the nature of the *empirical* objectivity of the social sciences still leaves open though the problem of the cultural relativity of this objectivity. Moreover, even if some theoretical values appear to be common across cultures, it could still be claimed that:

> from a purely scientifc point of view, the entire development of human history may be regarded as a completely indifferent and meaningless chaos of individual events, the representation of which must be far inferior in scientific importance to the search for general laws. In general, the relating of reality to values is always a matter of human caprice. The consensus of many or of all makes no difference. (Rickert 1986 p205).

Thus, for Rickert, 'if historical science claims that its problem is a scientific necessity, it must assume that in the domain of value as well, it is not *only* a question of the caprice of many or all persons.' (Rickert 1986 p205). This necessarily implies the *meta-empirical* claim that there must be:

> *some* values that are *unconditionally* valid and that all human value positions stand in a more or less proximate *relation* to them that is defined as more than capricious. If this were not so, purely scientific history with a value-relevant, individualising concept formation could never be written. (Rickert 1986 p205).

In other words:

We must, in fact, assume, if not the existence of an already definite body of knowledge of what values are valid, then the validity of objective values and the possibility that we can approach knowlede of it ever more closely. (Rickert 1962 p139).

Rickert utilises Riehl on this point, arguing that:

"unless he possesses an ideal to aspire to, man cannot achieve his full spiritual stature." But the values that constitute this ideal "are discovered, and, like the stars in the sky, with the progress of culture they gradually enter into man's field of vision. They are not *old* values or *new* values; they are the values. (Rickert 1962 p145).

In other words, the objectivity of the cultural sciences is legitimated by the claim that there are some values which exist which are objective values. On this point Aron has noted that, for Rickert:

there is at least one value which must be admitted by any science, namely truth. This is sufficient to justify theoretically the idea of a universal theory of values, and therefore the possibility of a universal history. (Aron 1970 p78).

The possibility of a *universal history* demands that there are certain values that are objectively valid for mankind. *Truth* would appear to be such a value in so far as, Rickert might argue, it is difficult to conceive of a culture for which *truth* would not be a value.

It is clear, at any rate, that Rickert's distinction between value relations and practical valuations, and his positing of the existence of objectively valid values, is radically at odds with Nietzsche's perspectivist approach. Rickert was well aware of this point:

This [Nietzsche's] point of view is, if one will, indeed consistent. But its consistency destroys the objectivity of *every* science, that of the natural sciences as well as of the cultural sciences ... The scientist is the very one who

> must assume the *absolute* validity of theoretical values if he does not wish to cease to be a scientist. (Rickert 1962 p144).

Given this antagonism between the the positions of Nietzsche and Rickert, an approach which draws on both is difficult to imagine. Yet this is precisely the position occupied by Weber.

The question of Weber's formulation of the relationship between social scientific knowledge and values can begin with his rejection of Rickert's notion of discovering *the* values. As Rickert himself noted: 'Weber was convinced that there was no way theoretical research could deal with the question of the validity of values.' (Rickert 1988 p79). In contrast, Weber argues that there is an 'irreconcilable conflict' between values, in other words, 'polytheism' (cf. FMW pp147-149). In this at least, Weber seems closer to Nietzsche than Rickert.

This polytheism, though, operates on two distinct levels. On the one hand, in the conflict of 'various life-spheres, each of which is governed by different laws' (FMW p123), politics and science would be examples of such life-spheres. On the other hand, in the clash of 'ultimate *Weltanschauungen*' (FMW p117), that is, the conflict of our different value-orientations towards life[3]. It is with the introduction of this notion of a 'life-sphere', which may also be termed a *value-sphere*, that indicates Weber's attempt to avoid the total undermining of the status of scientific knowledge which Rickert has located in Nietzsche. How does this operate?

The first point to note is that, for Weber, it is our value-orientation which determines the issues and area's that the scientific researcher choses to address. However, once the particular site of the investigation

has been specified, it is on the basis not of the value-orientation but, on the contrary, of the values immanent in science as a value-sphere, as a discrete way of life, that scientific knowledge is generated. To be a scientist, for Weber, presupposes a commitment to *truth* as a value. In other words, it is *truth* as a value immanent in science as a value-sphere that enables us to talk of objectivity in the social sciences. It is unclear, however, to what extent Weber conceives of the objectivity as being partial and historically contingent. A point that can be illustrated by reference to the tension exhibited in Weber's work relative to the issue of *progress* in science.

Weber approaches this issue in Science as a Vocation by contrasting the position of science with the position of art:

> A work of art which is genuine 'fulfillment' is never surpassed; it will never be antiquated. Individuals may differ in appreciating the personal significance of works of art, but no one will ever be able to say of such a work that it is 'outstripped' by another work which is also 'fulfillment'.
>
> In science, each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very *meaning* of scientific work, ... We cannot work without hoping that others will advance further than we have. In principle, this progress goes on *ad infinitum* (FMW p138).

At least two interpretations of this passage can be given. On the one hand, the notion of scientific progress which Weber is ascribing to here may be read as resembling the (more or less) straightforward triumphal process traditionally assigned to the natural sciences. On this reading, progress in the social sciences would consist in the on-going refinement of methodological procedures and ideal-types, the 'objectivity' of the social sciences increasing concommitently with this progressive refinement

of scientific procedures. On the other hand, however, Weber may be read in terms of his rejection of 'the neo-kantian categorical objectivity' (Bruun 1972 p138), that is, his rejection of the notion of 'objective values'. It is this move which, Bruun argues, enables Weber to 'emphasise to a far greater extent the importance and positive role of the personality of the scholar in the field of social science' (Bruun 1972p138). Yet it emerges from this move that it is precisely that while 'Weber's elaboration of the subjective point of view permits the scholar to leave an imprint on an age,' (Bruun 1972 p139) it necessarily 'compels him to acknowledge that his work will by necessity grow obsolete and unimportant' (Bruun 1972 p139). In others words, given that the personality of the social scientist, the values he holds and questions he asks, is relative to the particular period in which that scholar is working, it follows that with regard to another period in which these questions are no longer seen as the important questions then the work of that scholar becomes 'obsolete and unimportant'. On this reading, the objectivity of a social scientific account is not historically contingent but inherent to the operation of science itself. While the notion of progress that Weber deploys becomes somewhat unorthodox here, this reading can be seen to fit into the pattern of his methodological reflections. Having illustrated this tension in Weber's work in relation to the notion of 'objectivity', the next step in the analysis of his position is to examine the nature of the claim for *value-freedom* that he makes.

On this point, it is necessary to refer back to the distinction that Weber draws between value-orientations and value-spheres. It seems here that there is an equation of value-orientations with *practical valuations* and of value-spheres with *theoretical values*. On one level, then, it would

appear that Weber is simply reformulating the distinction operated by Rickert. On another level, though, the form of this reformulation is significant. The deployment of the notion of a value-sphere can be seen in this context as Weber's attempt to hold on to a conception of social scientific knowledge as objective knowledge while rejecting Rickert's positing of objective values in favour of a Nietzschean polytheism. The significant move here is Weber's rooting of the value-sphere of science in the self of the scientist. In this sense, it is in science as a way of life, as a set of self-forming practices, that Weber grounds his claim for the objectivity of social scientific knowledge. The notion of a value-sphere, on this reading, closely resembles the notion of *perspective* in Nietzsche's sense, or, to put it in other terms, a value-sphere embodies a *style of reasoning*. Having noted this point, however, it must be yet again indicated that Weber draws a distinction between practical and theoretical values, a move which distances him from Nietzsche who rejects any such distinction.

At this point, we are in a position to explain Weber's formulation of the fact-value distinction. This distinction operates, unsurprisingly, around Weber's divorcing of practical and theoretical values. While it is the practical values of the researcher which determine the selection of the issues to be investigated, the site of the investigation, it is on the basis of the theoretical values immanent to the value-sphere of science that objective knowledge is generated. The construction of 'facts' is resultant upon the theoretical values involved in the scientific method being deployed relative to a given problem selected on the basis of the practical values of the social scientist. Weber's fact-value distinction can thus be reformulated as the claim that theoretical values cannot be

utilised to legitimate practical values. The status of this distinction will be left, for the moment, suspended.

In this section, it has been illustrated that Weber draws on and transforms elements from both Rickert and Nietzsche. This path is by no means without hazard, as was pointed out by reference to the ambiguity that characterises Weber's conception of 'objectivity' as regards the social sciences. However, it is clear that, on the issue of knowledge and values at least, Weber is attempting to retain both Rickert's notion of value-free objectivity while abandoning Rickert's idea of objective values and Nietzsche's polytheism without denying the distinction between practical and theoretical values. The extent to which this interweaving of Nietzschean and neo-Kantian threads goes on will become clearer as we move to examine Weber's notion of an *ideal-type* and his conception of *subjectivity*.

2. Ideal-Types

In this section, Weber's conception of an ideal-type and of ideal-typical analyses will be examined. It has already been noted that Weber's notion of a value-sphere may be linked to Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism and this issue will be taken up in more detail here. Weber's conception of reality will also be taken up in this context. The delineation of these issues and relationships should take us a step further in the location of the Nietzschean input into Weber's methodological procedures.

Wolfgang Mommsen has described Weber's historiographical standpoint as a '*perspectivistically* employed neo-Kantianism which went *radically* beyond Rickert' (Mommsen 1983 in Hennis 1988 p239). However, as Hennis notes, Mommsen fails to relate this conception of Weber's methodology to the Nietzschean influence on Weber's thought and thus does not raise the question of whether this standpoint can be meaningfully categorised as 'neo-Kantian'. To begin the analysis of this question, it is useful to take up the issue of Weber's conception of *reality*.

In an examination of the relationship between Weber and Rickert, Bruun has argued that:

> Just like Rickert, Weber concludes from the view of reality as boundless that a scientific reproduction of the whole of reality is a practical, indeed a logical, impossibility. (Bruun p100).

The implication of this is that:

> a scientific discipline is never justified in claiming that its concepts reproduce reality, but only that they represent a *selection* from *reality*. (Bruun p100).

However, Weber takes a further step relative to this conception of reality which moves him away from Rickert and in the direction of Nietzsche. This

emerges in the claim that, for Weber:

> the idea of the inexhaustability of reality in its immediate aspect implies the existence of an equal, or perhaps even greater, infinity of potential causal explanations; (Bruun 1972 p98).

Two significant points emerge from this notion of infinite explanations. Firstly, a link with Nietzsche, for whom there were also no limits to the ways in which the world can be interpreted. Secondly, a 'weak' notion of causality which distinguishes him from Nietzsche (who rejected the concept of causality (WP 551)). This conception of causality operated by Weber is 'weak' since the idea of an 'infinity of potential causal explanations' would imply that there might be equally valid yet contradictory causal explanations. It seems here that Weber is caught between the acceptance of a Nietzschean standpoint as to the infinite number of ways the world may be interpreted and the desire to hold onto a concept of causality, that is, to affirm a neo-Kantian conception of *interpretative adequacy* as taking the form of *explanation*.

A further tension between the Nietzschean and neo-Kantian threads permeating Weber's conception of reality emerges in relation to the question of whether or not he deploys a distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds in his methodological argument. To take up this point it is necessary to examine his conception of the *ideal-type*.

In the essay 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', Weber sets out the integral features of an ideal-type. It is worth quoting at length in this instance:

> It offers us an ideal picture of events. ... This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an

> intenally consistent system. Substantively, this construct is in itself like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to empirical data consists solely in the fact that ... we can make the *characteristic* features of this relationship pragmatically *clear* and *understandable* by reference to an ideal-type. This procedure is indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal-typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in *research*: it *is* no *"hypothesis"* but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a *description* of reality but aims to give unambigous means of expression to such a description. ... An ideal-type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidely emphasised viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality, (MSS p90).

While, this passage raises a wide range of issues, however, only certain of them are relevant to our concerns. Firstly, the issue of 'comparing' an ideal-type to reality. Secondly, the concept of reality referred to here. Finally, the extent to which the parallel between ideal-typical analyses and perspectivism may be meaningfully mooted.

Concepts, for Weber, are necessarily partial and selective in their representation of reality. An ideal-type as a logical complex of concepts not only shares this partiality but, through a deliberately *utopian* accentuation of this conceptual selectivity, extends it to the point that it cannot be catagorised as a *description* of reality. This raises the question as to the point at which a conceptual complex ceases to be a description and becomes an ideal-type. For Weber, it would appear to be the case that what distinguishes an ideal-type from a description is its

reference. Whereas a straightforward conceptual complex refers to reality, an ideal-type refers to a *utopia* which is found nowhere in reality. What then of the notion of comparing an ideal-type with reality? The problem that emerges here is in Weber's statement that it is through an ideal-type, itself not a description, that we give 'expression to such a description.' (MSS p90). Yet if our conceptual description is generated by an ideal-type, it is difficult to see how we can determine 'the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality' except by reference to other ideal-types. To put this simply, if an ideal-type produces our description of reality, it cannot be compared to this reality other than by recourse to other ideal-typically created descriptions of reality which are involved in the same problematic. This point was recognised by Landshut who:

> sees in the artificiality of this construction an abandonment of Weber's own investigative aim to attain a knowledge of reality in its own meaning - 'a lack of relation between value orientation and reality', based more generally on an erroneous 'disjunction between humanity and the world'. (Lowith 1982 p62).

What emerges here is the, perhaps unwittingly, perspectivist aspect of Weber's theory of ideal-types. It will be recalled that Nietzsche put this point in the following way: 'The perspective therefore decides the character of the "appearance"!' (WP 567). Correspondingly, Löwith has noted that 'the basic philosophical character of ... [the ideal-type] lies in the fact that it lays open reality while at the same time constructing it.' (Löwith 1982 p62), a point which would appear to indicate the perspectivist character of the ideal-type as a methodological device[4]. However, Nietzsche goes on to state: 'As if any world would remain over

after one deducted the perspective!' (WP 567). It is not clear whether Weber would make this further step. For while Weber embraced the necessity of looking at reality through a variety of ideal-types (and in this dimension his procedure may readily be related to Nietzsche's statement: 'Task: to see things as they are. Means: to look on them from a hundred eyes, from many persons.' (in Strong 1985 p172)), he also stated that nothing:

> is more dangerous than the *confusion* of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the "true" content and essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs, or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such "ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works itself out in history. (MSS p94).

While directed at crude versions of Marxism, this statement does seem to imply that Weber wants to draw a distinction between ideal-typically generated descriptions of reality and reality itself. This apparent problem may be ascribable to the structure of language, the 'unconscious domination' of grammatical categories. After all, it will be recalled that Nietzsche similarly often talks as if there were a world separate from the interpretations *of it*, for example, in the statement: 'the value of the world lies in our interpretation' (WP 616). Supporting this version of Weber is Bruun's comment that there 'seems no doubt that Weber's discussions always relate to reality in its perceiv*able* aspect.' (Bruun 1972 p141). To clarify this issue, it is useful to take up the idea that there may be two more or less distinct levels of perspectivism being operated by Weber.

It was noted in the previous section that Weber's notion of a *value-sphere* can be seen as corresponding to Nietzsche's conception of a perspective. Each involves a valuation of the world in terms of a commitment to a set of *ultimate ideals*. The significant feature which distinguishes these two conceptions is that while for Nietzsche this valuation is always a *practical* one, for Weber it is a valuation in terms of a commitment to a set of *theoretical* values. And it is the distinction Weber makes between practical and theoretical values which allows him to introduce two levels of perspectivism into his argument. We can explore this with regard to Weber's conception of the self and the activity of the social scientist.

The theoretical perspective of the scientist involves, for Weber, a commitment to truth as the ultimate ideal. The objectivity of the social scientific account is grounded on this will to truth. As Löwith notes that 'this reduction of scientific truth to 'intellectual integrity' corresponds to Nietzsche's reduction of Truth *in toto* to 'honesty' as the 'ultimate virtue' of 'free, self-possessed' minds.' (Löwith 1982 p67). From the theoretical perspective of the social scientist, the 'objectivity' of an account is generated on the basis of the integrity of the social scientist towards himself as a social scientist. However, within the framework of this theoretical scientific perspective, there operates a second form of perspectivism which relates to the practical values held by individual scholars. It is these practical values which for Weber determine the issues which the scholar takes up and, consequently, the ideal-types which a given social scientist constructs. If this exposition is referred back to the Nietzsche quote utilised above (p123), it becomes possible to see this two-tier perspectivism more clearly. Nietzsche's position was that:

> The perspective therefore decides the character of the "appearance"! As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! (WP 567).

If we begin with the ideal-type, this implies that the *practical* perspective 'decides the character of the "appearance"' but that a world is still there if one removes a practical perspective, namely the reality which is generated out of the scientist's theoretical perspective. However, if the theoretical perspective is removed, then there is no world left over in Nietzsche's sense. In practice, of course, the theoretical perspective of the social scientist only comes into play in the activity of research, of constructing ideal-types. The distinction between theoretical and practical levels of perspectivism is an analytic rather than empirical distinction. To establish the points put forward concerning theoretical perspectivism, and thus in effect our argument, requires that Weber's account of subjectivity resembles Nietzsche's. To put this negatively, if Weber's account of the subject posits our subjectivity as in some sense given and transcendental, it would follow that the claim being made here (that Weber operates a form of perspectivism) cannot be sustained. After all, the appearance-reality distinction, which is rejected by Weber, is itself predicated on a notion of transcendental subjectivity (as our discussion of Nietzsche established). Before we move onto this account however, it will be useful to sum up the signficant points put forward in this section.

We began by noting that Weber's notion of reality as susceptible to infinite causal accounts pulls in both Nietzschean and neo-Kantian directions. It was then considered whether such a tension characterises

Weber's theory of ideal-types particularly in terms of whether or not he operates a distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' worlds. It was indicated that there is a slippage in the notion of comparing ideal-types and reality which blurs the distinction between appearance and reality. In contrast to this it appeared that Weber *did* intend to operate such a distinction. To clarify this apparent antinomy, it was suggested that we can identify a two-tier version of perspectivism at work in Weber's methodology which is structured about his retention of the neo-Kantian distinction between practical and theoretical values. Finally, it was noted that the force of this suggestion is dependent on the nature of Weber's account of the subject.

3. Subjectivity and Calling

In this section, Weber's conception of the subject will be examined. Central to this an analysis will be a illustration of the Nietzschean form of this aspect of Weber's work. At the same time, the points at which Weber distances himself from a purely Nietzschean account will be indicated, as well as the significance of such moves in terms of the reasons underlying them.

A useful starting place for this discussion is to consider Weber's *ontological politics*[5]. This dimension of Weber's thought is set out clearly in the following passage:

> so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only an unceasing struggle of ... gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice. (FMW p152).

This notion of the necessity of making a 'decisive choice' has been seen to illustrate Weber's debt to the neo-Kantian legal philosopher Radbruch. It had been proclaimed by Radbruch that a philosophy of law appropiate to modernity:

> must do justice to the paradoxies, antinomies and relativities of life. It must be antinomic, that is to say, it must not cloud the irremovable contradictions between the highest legal values, such as justice, expediency, legal security; on the contrary it must fearlessly state them as such. It must be relativistic, ... it must present the various conflicting concepts of law and life ... without one-sidedly identifying it with one or the other. And it must be decisionistic ... it must vigorously appeal to responsible decision of the individual's legislation between such antinomies and relativities. (Turner and Factor 1984 p31).

Or, more succinctly: 'I have no fear of irreconcilable antinomies, to decide oneself is to live!' (Turner and Factor 1984 p31). This decisionistic perspective parallels Weber's insistance that:

> Figuratively speaking, you serve this god and offend the other god when you adhere to this position. And if you remain faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certain final conclusions that subjectively make sense. (FMW p151).

However, Weber's language at times suggests that it is not so much that one makes a choice but that one adheres to the *daemon* already within one. The following statement by Weber illustrates this point:

> We shall set out to work and meet the 'demands of the day', in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life. (FMW p156).

This proposition would appear to indicate that there is a true self which the subject must seek to discover. As such, it represents a contrast with the self-constructive position of decisionism. It would appear then that there is something of a tension operating in Weber's conception of the subject between a self that is created and one that is discovered.

It is this very tension though which indicates Weber's commitment to an at least partially Nietzschean conception of subjectivity, for it is isomorphic with the apparent antinomy in Nietzsche's injunction: 'You must *become* who you *are* [my italics].' (in Nehamas 1985 p171). The surface difficulties of such a position have been sketched out by Nehamas:

> It seems, then, that the self, even it is to be at some point discovered, must first be created. We are therefore faced with the difficult problem of seeing how that self can be what one is before it comes into being itself, before it is itself something that is. Conversely, if that self is something that is, if it is what one already is, how is it

> possible to become that self? How could, and why should, that self be what one properly is and not some, or any, other? Why not, in particular, one's current self, which at least has over all others the significant advantage of existing? (Nehamas 1985 pp174/175).

Without going into the detail of Nehamas's argument, it is useful to sketch out the salient features of the interpretive solution that he offers. This resolution revolves about the assertion that this conception of the subject may be read as analogous to the model of a literary text. To illustrate this, Nehamas deploys the example of Proust's narrator, who:

> believes "that in fashioning a work of art we are by no means free, that we do not choose how we shall make it but that it pre-exists and therefore we are obliged, since it is both necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a law of nature, that is to say to discover it." Yet this discovery, which he explicitly describes as "the discovery of our true life," can be made of in the very process of creating the work of art which describes and constitutes it. And the ambiguous relation between discovery and creation ... also captures perfectly the tension in the very idea of being able to become who one actually is. (Nehamas 1985 p188).

The Weberian subject, like the Nietzschean subject, is involved in an ongoing process of self-creation and self-discovery. However, this formal similarity between Nietzsche's and Weber's position should not blind us to the existance of sigificant differences also. This issue can be examined by reference to Nietzsche's notions of *style* and *virtue*.

It will be recalled that, for Nietzsche:

> *One thing is needful.* - To "give style" to one's character - a great and rare art! ... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! (GS 290).

For Nietzsche, the strong individual makes his life into a work of art. This task is by no means straightforward since with regard to the various selves constitutive of the individual, Nietzsche notes: 'each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other[s] ... to accept as a norm.' (WP 481). Nietzsche is making a related point when he states:

> My brother, if you are lucky you will have only one virtue and no more: thus you will go more easily over the bridge. To have many virtues is to be distinguished, but it is a hard fate; and many a man has gone into the desert and killed himself because he was tired of being a battle and battleground of virtues.
>
> ...
>
> Behold how each of your virtues desires the highest place: it wants your entire spirit, that your spirit may be *its* herald, it wants your entire strength in anger, hate and love. (Z Of Joys and Passions p64).

It is this notion of 'one virtue' which distinguishes Weber from Nietzsche; a claim that can be clarified by noting their respective attitudes to Goethe.

For Nietzsche, Goethe represents a first approximation to the Overman. Goethe attempted, on this reading, to form his life into a work of art: 'What he aspired to was *totality*; he strove against the separation of reason, sensuality, feeling, will ... he disciplined himself to a whole, he *created* himself' (TI 49). In other words, Goethe imposed an order on his various conflicting virtues and gave his character a coherent stylistic identity. He provided an aesthetic justification for his life. Weber's portrayal of Goethe involves a significant difference. He argues:

> As far as his art is concerned, even with a personality of Goethe's rank, it has been detrimental to take the liberty of trying to make his 'life' into a work of art. And even if one doubts this, one has to be a Goethe in order to permit oneself such liberty. Everyone will admit at least this

much: that even with a man like Goethe, who appears once in a thousand years, this liberty did not go unpaid for. (FMW p137).

While Weber does not here entirely reject Nietzsche's conception of the Overman and the aesthetic justification of life, it does seem that he wants to distance himself from this conception. We can take up this distancing act through Weber's notion of a calling. With regard to the conceptualisation of Goethe just quoted, the central issue for our concern involves the phrase 'As far as his art was concerned,'. What Weber is doing here is arguing for the priority of Goethe as an creative artist over Goethe as himself a work of art. For Weber, Goethe's calling, his vocation, was to be an artist. To try to make one's own life into a work of art represents, for Weber, a problem insofar as it involves the attempt to engage with several callings. In Nietzsche's terms, it represents an acknowledgement and co-ordination of various 'virtues', whereas Weber appears to claim that one virtue is central in a given individual and that to attempt to integrate any others with this one is to its detriment. We can express this abstractly as follows: for Nietzsche, one's calling is towards the totality of one's life, forming one's personality into an aesthetic whole, this work of art justifying one's existence; in contrast, for Weber, one's life is justified by a commitment to a given calling (such as art or science or politics), the totality of one's life should be addressed to this calling and not *vice versa*. In effect, Weber is engaged in what Wolin has called a foundational operation which attempts to legislate the form of modern man as existence about a calling[6]. This exercise is given a particular resonance by the integrity with which Weber attempted to follow the scientific calling despite the conflict with the

political dimension of his personality which this exclusory operation engendered.

To conclude this section, it is useful to summarise the points that have been indicated. It was shown firstly that Weber's conception the subject is formally similar to that deployed by Nietzsche in terms of articulating a conception in which a perpetual relationship between creation and discovery is played out. It is worth noting here that Weber's concept of reality operates around an identical notion of creation and discovery; we need merely recall Löwith's comment that the philosophical character of the ideal-type 'lies in the fact that it lays open reality while at the same time constructing it.' (Löwith 1982 p62). Having established this, it was illustrated how Weber distinguishes his position from Nietzsche's in terms of advocating the priority of the calling of the subject, the value-sphere they are committed to, over the totality of the subject as aesthetic construct. This position is, in its rejection of a transcendental model of subjectivity, perfectly compatible with the two-tier version of perspectivism which was ascribed to Weber in the last section. Indeed, the distinction drawn here between Weber's conception of the subject and Nietzsche's parallels the distinction between their respective forms of perspectivism in that it is precisely in the notion of a calling that Weber articulates his notion of a value-sphere as consisting of the affirmation of a given set of theoretical values. Having developed the argument to this stage, it is necessary that we move to an examination now of the issue of whether Weber's form of argument in his substantive work can be meaningfully described as genealogical in nature.

4. <u>Genealogy</u>

The question as to whether Weber's style of analysis is genealogical in character demands a series of responses. We must take up again his relation to values as well as the formal features of his substantive work. The issue of whether Weber structures his analyses around a concern with *human types* will also need examination. Similarly, the question of *origins* must be raised. Only once having indicated Weber's position with regard to each of these issues will it be possible to place Weber's form of analysis in its relation to the concept of genealogy.

A useful starting point for this discussion is the recent characterisation of Nietzsche's genealogical enterprise by Foucault. In 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Foucault points out that a significant trait of genealogy is its 'affirmation of knowledge as perspective' (Reader p92), he goes on:

> Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy - the unavoidable obstacles of their passion. Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in it's perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice. (Reader p92).

This 'historical sense' parallels Weber's on at least two levels. Firstly, the acknowledgement of perspective is explicitly drawn out by Weber. Thus in referring to his studies on the 'Economic Ethics of the World Religions', he points out that 'they quite deliberately emphasise the elements in which it differs from Western civilisation' (PESC p27). Weber's position is distinguished from Nietzsche's however in that, given the grounding of Weber's accounts on theoretical values, he refuses to commit himself to the task of evaluating the value of values. It is worth noting that Weber's

declaration of this refusal in the 'Author's Introduction' to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is closely followed with what could easily stand as a reference to Nietzsche. Thus:

> The question of the relative values of the cultures which are compared here will not receive a single word. It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appall him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentaries to himself, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form. (PESC p29).

With regard to the second level of similarity, it is clear that, for Weber, the social scientists must necessarily acknowledge 'their grounding in a particular time and place,' since the practical values which orientate them towards the construction of specific ideal-types, the questions they ask, are themselves spatio-temporally dependent. This point can be illustrated by the following passage:

> In a time of specialisation, all work in the field of cultural science will regard the material as an end in itself, once the material has been defined by a specific problematic and some methodological principles have been set up. One then no longer constantly and deliberately measures the cognitive value of discrete facts and findings against ultimate value assumptions: indeed, one altogether ceases to be conscious that these facts are anchored in value assumptions. And it is a good thing that this is so. But at a certain point a different perspective enters: the meaningfulness of unreflectively applied perspectives becomes uncertain, and the way is lost in the dusk. The light of the great cultural problems also moves on. Then science too prepares to change its standpoint and its conceptual apparatus and to look down from the heights of thought towards the stream of events. (MSS p112 in Lowith 1982 p35).

The significant part of Weber's remarks is the indication that concommitant with a change in our *Weltanschauungen* there is a shift in what constitute

the 'great cultural problems'. Thus the perspectives embodied in our ideal-typical constructions, and these constructions themselves, become obsolete in the sense of that they no longer address the issues which concern us. The historicity of the historian is, for Weber, an inevitable part of the structure of historical knowledge.

Having established two dimensions of the similarity of Weber's style of analysis and that embodied in the concept of genealogy, the issues of *origins* and *human types* may legitimately be raised. The question of *origins* may be dealt with briefly in that it should be readily apparent from Weber's general methodological stance that his analyses are not concerned with unearthing any 'primal source'. After all, it is precisely the uni-causal claim made by Marxism for the mode of production as the *central generating mechanism*[7] of social and historical change that Weber objects to. Marx's analysis of the role of the 'economic base' for the emergence of capitalism represents, for Weber, a rich and fruitful ideal-type not a *total* explanation. One of the aims of Weber's work on the Protestant ethic was specifically to illustrate that several origins may be identified for capitalism, that is, that as a phenomenon capitalism has several traits which must be indicated. Whereas Marx was concerned with the dynamics of the interrelationship between the forces and relations of production as articulated in class struggle, Weber's interest lay in:

> what *manner* (*Richtung*) the specific religious forms of the diverse ascetic tendencies of Protestantism ... have influenced the conduct of life, *there, where* such influence in fact existed. ...
> The clarification of the '*characterological*' effects of specific forms of piety, insofar as such effects are here relevant. ...
> the rise of the *ethical Lebensstil* spiritually adequate to the economic stage of capitalism and *which signifies its*

> *triumph in the "souls" of men* (Weber 1978 in Hennis 1983 p143).

This reference to '*the "souls" of men*' is significant in that it indicates Weber's concern with *human types*. The discussion of this aspect of Weber's form of argumentation will draw on the recent reinterpretation of Weber offered by Hennis[8], it is useful to start though by indicating how this concern has been characterised within the more orthodox tradition of Weber scholarship. Wrong presents us with a good starting point here. He argues that there is:

> a tendency in Weber's thought to see a system of cultural values or an institutional structure as embodied in a concrete human type. Thus Weber stresses the Calvinist rather than Calvinism: ascetic Protestantism is carried by a type of man who fears God, drives himself at work and denies himself all material and sensual pleasures. (Wrong 1970 p23).

This represents, for Wrong, a flaw in Weber's style of analysis. He goes on to suggest that if Weber:

> had possessed an adequate theory of personality, he might have avoided this tendency to overconcretize cultural values and social roles. He might have recognised that values and roles do not completely shape their carriers even though they exist only in subjective attitudes of liveing men. (Wrong 1970 p23/24).

In other words, just as Nietzsche's analysis of the emergence of nihilism is structured about a concern with the human types involved in this emergence, so too Weber presents his analysis of the emergence of capitalism in an account built around the figure of the Calvinist. However, Weber's concentration on the issue of human types expresses much more for Hennis than a methodological flaw, it indicates Weber's 'central question'. This central questions concerns nothing less 'than the establishment of the

genesis of modern man - no! *Menschentum* - via a historical-differential investigation!' (Hennis 1983 p156). Without entering the detail of Hennis's argument, this interpretation can be backed up by reference to the following passage which Hennis quotes:

> Without exception every order of social relations (however constituted) is, if one wishes to *evaluate* it, ultimately to be examined in terms of the human type (*menschlichen Typus*) to which it, by way of external or internal (motivational) selection, provides the optimal chances of becoming the dominant type. For without it empirical research is neither really exhaustive, nor is there the necessary real foundation for such an evaluation, be it a consciously subjective, or an evaluation claiming objective validity. (Weber 1973 in Hennis 1983 p169).

This passage could just as well have been written by Nietzsche as by Weber, certainly it indicates Nietzsche's concern in tracing the genealogy of nihilism. As for Wrong's critical comments on Weber as operating an oversocialised conception of man, these remarks fail to acknowledge the ideal-typical character of the Calvinist in Weber's texts. A failure which nullifies their critical force.

It has been pointed out in this section that Weber's form of analysis is distinguished from genealogy by its refusal to evaluate values. However, this distinction itself slips at times. It is readily apparent in 'Politics as a Vocation' that, on a rhetorical level at least, Weber's argument pushes the reader towards an evaluation of 'leadership democracy' as superior to 'leaderless democracy'[9]. This point returns us to Weber's concern with the issue of a *calling*. It appears that in the same way that Nietzsche's texts attempt to *leglislate* that the Overman be the dominant type of a post-nihilist age, so Weber is concerned with the articulation of the individual with a calling as the human type which *should* be the

dominant type in modernity. At least the essays on the scientific and political callings appear to act as attempts to *legislate* a form of self-conceptualisation, to encourage those engaged in these practices to *exclusively* acknowledge a particular set of theoretical values, a specific *perspective*. This dimension of Weber's textual activity will become clearer in the detailed examination of 'Science as a Vocation' and 'Politics as a Vocation' offered in the next two chapters[10]. For the moment, let us conclude this section.

The points indicated here can be summed up as follows. It was shown that Weber's mode of analysis shares many of the features that constitute a genealogical approach. Thus his analyses involve an explicit perspective and acknowledge the historicity of the scholar. They also involve a concern with points of emergence and lines of descent rather than with the identification of some 'primal source' or central generating mechanism. Further, the mode of analysis is structured around an attention to human types. In general, however, Weber's analyses do not take up the genealogical value critique which is, perhaps, the *raison d'etre* of Nietzsche's investigations. The extent to which Weber's examination involve a more or less implicit set of evaluations will be one of the area's to be addressed in the following chapters.

NOTES

1. Until recently, Fleischmann's 'De Nietzsche à Weber' (1964) was the only significant study of Weber's relationship to Nietzsche. However, several papers have now taken up this theme. Notably Hennis 'The Traces of Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber' (1988) and Schroeder 'Nietzsche and Weber: Two 'Prophets' of the Modern World (1987).

2. Cf. Chapter 1, section 5 and Chapter 2, section 2.

3. This dimension of Weber is well discussed in Brubaker *The Limits of Rationality* (1984) pp61-90.

4. The character Löwith assigns to the ideal-type also represents a good picture of Foucault's concept of 'dispositif', cf. Chapter 7, section 2.

5. For a discussion of this cf. Wolin 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method and the Politics of Theory' (1981).

6. In Wolin op. cit.

7. This useful phrase is taken from Velody 'Socialism as a Sociological Problem' (1988).

8. Hennis' reinterpretation is contained in *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction* (1988).

9. Cf. Chapter 5, section 2.

10. Cf. Chapters 5 and 6.

DISCIPLINE AND CHARISMA

Max Weber's 'Politics as a Vocation' and the Fate of the Subject in Modernity

> It is the fate of charisma, whenever it comes into the permanent institutions of a community, to give way to powers of tradition or of rational socialisation. ... And of all those powers ... the most irresistible is *rational discipline.*
>
> \- *Max Weber 'The Meaning of Discipline'*

> Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, ...
>
> \- *Max Weber 'Politics as a Vocation'*

Introduction

In this chapter, Weber's remarks on politics as a *vocation* will be examined in the context of his overall project of analysing, and coming to terms with, the *fate* of the human subject in modernity. Weber's distinctive formulation of *the modern* is necessarily explored within the framework of such an investigation. Our route into this discussion will operate about the notions of *discipline* and *charisma*, these two concepts providing the axes around which an understanding of Weber's theorisation of the place of the individual in modernity may proceed. At the same time, we will be concerned to accommodate Weber's remarks on rationalisation, bureacracy and legitimacy within this structure. Finally, we will attempt to illustrate the relationship between the concepts *charisma* and *personality* as mediated by Weber's idea of a *calling*. This meandering path will, it is hoped, lead us to a clearer understanding of the significance of Weber as a theorist of modernity and, more particularly, of the modern subject.

1. Discipline

That the concept of *discipline* deployed by Weber has, perhaps, not received the attention it deserves relative to its importance in his formulation of modernity may not necessarily surpise us. In the dominant trend of Anglo-American interpretation, Weber's 'theory' of bureaucracy appears more immediately applicable to mainstream social scientific concerns[1], however there is little doubt that bureaucracy, for Weber, was a (important) sub-section of the 'ever-widening grasp of discipline' (FMW p262). Given this state of affairs, an analysis of the disciplinary nature of the modern is central to our understanding of Weber. In this section, our concern will be to generate (at least partially) the grounds for such an understanding by tracing Weber's *genealogy* of discipline, by examining the relationship between discipline and rationalisation as exemplied in various forms, and, finally, by exploring the links between discipline and nihilism.

(a) *The Genealogy of Discipline*

Weber's tracing of the descent of discipline, while sketchy, operates on two discernible levels. The first concerns discipline in relation to the military. The second examines discipline relative to religion.

'The discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline.' (FMW p261). Military discipline, which in Weber's account begins with the idea of *'warrior communism'*, has had ambiguous implications in terms of its social and political consequences, however, we are concerned presently with this discipline's own development. The 'primeval' constitution of warrior communism, that is of a community of warriors as a rule operating within a polity, involved the separation of the warrior 'from the family and from

all private economic interests' such that the disciplining of the warrior in the service of his master is uncomplicated by alternative commitments (cf. FMW pp257-260). The full development of the institution which Weber names *the bachelor house* results in the complete exclusion of familial relations, while females (bought, captured, or claimed) are provided on impersonal grounds. Historically, Weber suggests, discipline was most effective when these bachelor houses were organised in a highly centralised style. Weber goes on to argue that the growth of discipline in military organisations has been mediated by economic changes and 'on the basis of an increased concentration of the means of warfare in the hands of the war lord.'(FMW p260):

> This has been achieved by having a condottiere recruit mercenary armies, in part or wholly, in the manner of a private capitalist. Such an arrangement was dominant in the late Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era. It was followed by the raising and equipping of standing armies by means of political authority and a collective economy. ... Finally universal conscription was introduced during the nineteenth century. The whole development meant, in effect, the clearly increasing importance of discipline ... (FMW p260)

While the economic organisation of the polity is thus an influential factor in the development of discipline, the discipline of the army is a major factor in the determination of the social and political order. The ambiguity of this influence, already referred to, can be illustrated by Weber's claim that:

> Discipline, as the basis of warfare, gave birth to patriachal kingship amongst the Zulus, where the monarch is constitutionally limited by the power of the army leaders (like the Spartan Ephors). Similarly, discipline gave birth to the Hellenic polis with its gymnasiums. (FMW p257)

The form of the polity is related by Weber to the style of military organisation and discipline exemplified by the given society, thus:

> When infantry drill is perfected to the point of virtuosity (Sparta), the polis has an inevitably 'aristocratic' structure. When cities are based on naval discipline, they have 'democratic' structures (Athens). ... The rule of the Roman particiate, of the Egyptian, Assyrian, and finally of modern European bureaucratic state organisations - all have their origin in discipline. (FMW p257)

Without implying a full-blown determinism around this concept, it does appear that discipline is a central focus for Weber's analytic concerns. Before turning to the forms of rational discipline in modernity, however, we must note Weber's remarks on discipline and religion.

While Weber notes that the monk is the counter-part to the warrior, as is the monastry to the warrior community, our concern here refers to the discipline of Puritanism. This religious form of discipline is related to military discipline both historically and symbolically. With regard to the historical relationship, Weber notes: 'Cromwell's victories - despite the fierce bravery of the Cavaliers - were due to sober and rational Puritan discipline.'(FMW p256). While to locate the symbolic linkage one need only note Puritan hymn titles such as 'Onward Christian Soldiers' and 'Fight the Good Fight'[2].

Our major concern, however, is with the ethical terms of discipline in its Puritan form. The presupposition of 'a "sense of duty" and "conscientiousness." ('Men of Conscience' *versus* 'Men of Honour,' in Cromwell's terms.)' (FMW p254). In the The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber describes these Puritan presuppositions, in relation to the process of rationalisation, as promoting individual autonomy based on calculated rational action. It appears, however, that in so far as

Puritanism promotes discipline, it is precisely involved in undermining individual autonomy. For, as Weber notes, 'of all those powers that lessen the importance of individual action, the most irresistible is *rational discipline*.' (FMW p253). To elucidate what seems to be a paradoxical position, we must explore the relationship between discipline and rationalisation.

(b) *Discipline and Rationalisation*

This relationship approaches the heart of Weber's account of the place of the individual in a disenchanted world, that is the concern with the possibility of individual freedom in the 'iron cage' of modernity. Here some careful distinctions are required. Firstly, we must distinguish between discipline and *self-discipline* and secondly, we must draw a line between discipline and bureacracy. These distinctions provide our access to Weber's analysis of the fate of individual liberty.

Discipline, as we have noted, is portrayed by Weber as a *disciplining* of the individual. That is a more or less complex set of social rules are imposed on the individual, rules about, for example, social relationships, diet (particularly in the monastry), hours of sleep, financial status, and several other aspects of everyday existence. This *regime* that governs the individual is laid down externally and its operation remains outside the individuals control. In contrast, the Puritan determines his own regime, through his inner calling he generates a code of behaviour and disciplines himself to the standards and conduct this way of life demands. A distinction operates here then between the determination (or shaping) of an individual and self-determination by an individual. This distinction notably parallels Nietzsche's oppostion of weak and strong individuals[3].

Our second distinction involves a straightforward caution: while bureaucracy is the form of discipline that Weber concentrates on in his accounts of modernity, we should be careful not to equate the two. Weber defines 'the content of discipline' as:

> nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command. In addition, this conduct under orders is uniform. ... What is decisive for discipline is that the obedience of men is rationally uniform. (FMW p253)

While this description fits his account of bureacuracy, it also applies to other area's of modern life, notably the factory mass production line, prison and the army[4]. Consequently, many of our comments which are geared to an understanding of politics in modernity may also relate to other parts of the social body, as will become clear in our comments on discipline and nihilism .

Towards the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber states that:

> One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture; rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born ... from the spirit of Christian asceticism. (PESC p180)

However, while the 'Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.'(PESC p181). This comment reflects, at least partially, the distinction between discipline and self-discipline already noted, for the following reasons. The process of rationalisation, that is the increasing goverance of actions by a schema of formal rationality, originates in the irrational belief of the Puritan and the potential for mastery of the world

is embodied in the practice of the Puritan which is generated through his self-discipline. In other words, it is the self-discipline of the Puritan that generate the *regimes* of rationalisation. However, the religious foundations of man's inner calling upon which the self-discipline of the Puritan was based have been 'hoist by [their] own petard':

> Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrivably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. (PESC p181/182)

As with Nietzsche, modernity is ushered in by the products of Christianity turning on their creator[5]. With the undercutting of the idea of an inner calling and, therefore, of the self-discipline of the individual, there emerges 'the distinctive irrationality which forms itself in the process of rationalisation,':

> That which was originally a mere means (to an otherwise valuable end) becomes an end or end in itself. In this way, means as ends make themselves independent and thus lose their original 'meaning' or purpose, that is, they lose their original purposive rationality orientated to man and his needs. This reversal marks the whole of modern civilisation, whose arrangements, institutions and activities are now so rationalised that whereas humanity once established itself within them, now it is they which enclose and determine humanity like an 'iron cage'. Human conduct, from which these institutions originally arose, must now in turn adapt to its own creation which has escaped the control of its creator. (Löwith 1982 p48)

Consequently, the process of rationalisation, which expressed the autonomy of the Puritan, becomes a major factor in the structural domination of the individual. Alexander[6] has pointed out the positive and

negative sides of this process. On the one hand:

> World-mastery, or at least the potential for it, has come to man through rationalisation. Humans have replaced God as masters of their destiny. Modern people are governed, or at least would like to think of themselves as governed, by institutions that are man-made, that have been constructed fortheir effectiveness in achieving human goals. In principle, leaders are held accountable for the way these institutions work. (Alexander 1987 p188)

On the other hand, Alexander suggests, for Weber, 'this-worldly asceticism made it possible not only to master the world but to master other human beings.'(Alexander 1987 p193):

> Depersonalisation and self-discipline promoted autonomy in part because they allowed the actor to distance his ego from emotions that represented dependency. But this rejection of one's own dependency needs forced one to reject the needs of others as well. The capacity to make a 'tool' out of oneself, therefore also allowed one to depersonalise and objectify others. Domination could become ruthless only when the personal and idiosyncratic qualities of the other were eliminated. (Alexander 1987 p193)

This 'paradox' can be more concretely illustrated by reference to Weber's comments on the relationship between bureaucracy and mass democracy.

These two institutions are, he suggests, inextricably linked: 'Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy'(FMW p224). At the same time, 'democracy inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which ... democracy has produced.'(FMW p226). In what areas and why do they conflict? An answer to this question requires that we delineate more fully the characters that Weber ascribes to bureaucracy and modern democracy.

As one would expect, Weber is careful not to treat bureaucracy as a unitary phenomenon embodying set characteristics across time and space. The nominalism that runs through his analyses operates just as clearly in

delineating the various forms and directions taken by *bureaucratic* organisations. This does not, however, prevent us from noting some general points relative to contemporary forms of bureaucracy. Thus Weber suggests:

> The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organisation. ... The extraordinary increase in the speed by which public announcements, as well as economic and political facts, are transmitted exerts a steady and sharp pressure in the direction of speeding up the tempo of administrative reaction towards various situations. The optimum of such reaction time is normally attained only by strict bureaucratic organisation. (FMW p214/215)

Given that these factors govern the need for bureaucratisation in the increasingly complex and fast-changing situations that characterise modernity, it is still necessary to identify those aspects of modern bureaucracies that generate this efficiency and speed of response. These elements, Weber claims, are twofold: firstly, 'a discharge of business according to *calculable rules*' (FMW p215) and secondly, an operation 'without regard for persons'(FMW p215). Both of these considerations are 'of paramount importance for modern bureaucracy,':

> The peculiarity of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands this very 'calculability' of result. When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands, in a specific sense, under the principle of *sine ira ac studio*. Its specific nature, which is welcomed by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanised,' the more completely it suceeds in eliminating from official business love, hate, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue. (FMW p215/216)

Thus, while on the one hand, bureaucracy is the most efficient means of

attaining the goals of the modern state, on the other hand this efficient execution requires the dehumanisation of the individual. How does this fit in with Weber's conception of modern mass democracy?

The analysis of democracy, Weber puts forward, focuses on two levels; the state and the nature of the modern political party. With regard to the state, Weber suggests that the most important factor operating 'is the *levelling of the governed* in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group, which in its turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and in form.' (FMW p226). The power of the bureaucratic apparatus becomes a central issue in articulating the relationship between individuation and domination. Concerning this power position, Weber states that:

> Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 'expert', facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration. (FMW p232)

The bureaucratic apparatus, by a process of specialisation and an adherence to secrecy, undermines the effective control of government by politicians and imposes its own form of domination. Consequently, one of Weber's central themes in 'Politics as a Vocation' is the formulation of a form of democratic government most able to resist the encroachment of bureacratic power. With regard to political parties, Weber notes that the *formal* democratisation of the party results in power resting with 'those who, within the organisation, handle the work *continuously*.' (FMW-103). Further, the mass nature of these parties while offering greater potential expression by the individual in influencing the values and goals that

govern society, simultaneously leads to the treatment of citizens as tools for the production of votes by the party 'machine'. This process of rationalisation in the political sphere produces *pari passu* individual autonomy and self-expression on the one hand, and the dehumanisation and objectification of individuals on the other. Weber's problematic concerns the necessity of retaining a balance between these two movements; to resist the tendency of the objectified expressions of discipline to ruthlessly dominate the individual and to close the space of individual freedom. Weber's articulation of a defence against this disciplinary tendency will be dealt with in the next section. However, his concerns also go beyond this point into an analysis of the existential condition of the human subject in modernity. And before we move to an analysis of his defence of individual freedom,, some remarks must be made regarding the nature of this existential condition in so far as it relates to discipline.

(c) *Discipline and Nihilism*

For Nietzsche, a central characteristic of nihilism is that '[an] aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer.' (WP 2), as passive nihilism, the result of this 'lack' is *self-narcotisation* expressed through a 'medley of means' of escape. In Weber's work, this insight is deployed in terms of historically grounded figures exemplifying two distinct forms of escape. The first form of escape involves the perception of the nature of the modern world but a refusal to accept any responsibility for this condition. Alexander identifies three figures embodying this form:

> Here is the bureaucrat who obediently follows his orders; the practical politician who pleads his helplessness before interest-group demands and the pressures of the moment; the scientist who becomes a cog in the research machine. In this

> mode of flight the individual becomes a mere tool of the disciplned spirit; he is no more than a means for some determinate power or end. (Alexander 1987 p199)

The most extreme of this form is the 'I was obeying orders' defence offered at Nuremburg[7]. That is, the subsumption of self to the depersonalising force of discipline as a mode of denying responsibility for the world. Our second form of escape involves an total denial of the world in favour of a fantasy world in which a given 'god' operates as an Archimedean point. Here stands the outright Marxist, for example, but also the bohemian or hedonist. This position involves self-discipline as the creation of self, but from *bad conscience* which results in a reduction of self, be it as a tool for revolution or as a vessel for pleasure. Given that this situation arises out the loss of a set of commonly held cultural values formed about the figure of God, Weber's commitment to a polytheistic metaphysics may appear to be rather paradoxical. However, as shall be illustrated in the next section, it is through the idea of irreducible value conflicts that Weber finds a route out of nihilism and towards a mode of generating meaning for the life of the individual.

In this section, we have traced the context of Weber's use of the concept of *discipline* and its place in his characterisation of modernity. We have noted the two sides of rationalisation, that is, domination and individuation, and explored this concretely in relation to Weber's comments on bureaucracy and democracy. Finally, we have seen how the concept of discipline is related to nihilism in modernity. These formulations provide the context for our discussion of Weber's 'Politics as a Vocation', the site for Weber's attempt to generate a space for individual freedom where a

meaningful individual expression may take place. This attempt brings the concept of *charisma* to the fore.

2. CHARISMA

Of the themes that run through Max Weber's essay 'Politics as a Vocation', there are perhaps three central concerns. The first of these is with the position of the individual in relation to the structural forces of domination in an increasingly disciplinary society. The second concerns the possibility of generating meaning for an individual's existence in modernity. The third involves generating a non-ideological defence of liberal institutions. This section will constitute an attempt to illustrate these themes and their inter-relationship. To facilitate this, we shall address Weber's comments on modern politics, his concept of 'charisma' and the idea of a calling drawing on our discussion of discipline where required. As part of this project, we will also examine Weber's discussion of legitimation and his comments on the *ethics* of politics before delineating the implications of 'Politics as a Vocation' for our understanding of Weber as a social theorist.

(a) *Charisma and Calling*

We have already traced the context of domination within which the modern subject operates, a central element of which concerns the make-up of the modern state. In 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber moves to a detailed discussion of this sphere, that is, the sphere of politics. He begins by asking what we mean when we use the term 'politics', suggesting that, in this context, we are referring to the 'leadership, or influencing of the leadership, of a *political* association, hence today, of a state.'(FMW p77). Here a state is identified as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.'(FMW p78)[8]. These preliminary formulations lead Weber to reflect

upon what grounds this 'relation of men dominating men' rests. In response, he sets up a series of ideal-types, three of which concern 'inner justification' and two of which relate to 'external means'; our concern, as was Weber's, is primarily with the former. These 'inner justifications' are, briefly: the authority of the 'eternal yesterday', that is, of traditional cultural mores; the authority of charisma, the devotion of individuals to a person possessed of an extraordinary '*gift of grace*'; and, finally, the authority of 'legality', i.e. authority guaranteed 'by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional "competence" based on rationally created *rules.*'(FMW p79). It is readily apparent that the modern state, as described in the previous section, approximates most closely to the third of these types; our concern, however, is with the concept of 'charisma'.

Early on in 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber declares that he is, in this essay, 'interested above all in':

> domination by virtue of the devotion of those who obey the purely personal 'charisma' of the 'leader.' For this is the root of the idea of a *calling* in its highest expression. (FMW p79).

We will, therefore, attempt to sketch this notion of a *calling* before going on to comment on Weber's deployment of the concept of 'charisma'. In <u>The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism</u>, Weber devotes a chapter to 'Luther's Conception of The Calling' in which he claims that:

> if we trace the history of the word [calling] through the civilised languages, it appears that neither the predominantly Catholic peoples nor those of classical antiquity have possessed any expresion for what we know as a calling (in the sense of a life-task, a definite field in which to work), while one has existed for all predominantly

Protestant peoples. (PESC p79)

That this idea emerges with the Reformation is, for Weber, a commonplace observation; however, he is at pains to point out what was *distinctively* new about it. This, he suggests, was as follows:

> the valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral actvity of the individual could assume. This it was which inevitably gave every-day worldly activity a religious significance, and which first created the conception of a calling in this sense. ... The only way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed on the individual by his position in the world. That was his calling. (PESC p80)

This religious conception of a calling is transformed by Weber into a secular ethic which, however, retains its existential force. The figure of God no longer acts as a judge on the individuals mode of existance, rather the individual is required to take up this role himself and face up to 'the demands of the day'. At the same time, Weber retains much of the original rhetorical force of the idea of a calling through his use of language, notably his appeals to 'the gods', 'fate' and 'destiny'. Thus, in the context of Weber's 'polytheism', choosing a calling becomes the fate of the individual, which is in every sense a *fateful decision*. On one level, then, we may read 'Politics as a Vocation' as a kind of guide to this decision in so far as the individual is considering the calling of politics. On a second level, however, it may be seen as illustrating the figure an individual must create himself into if he is to enter this area. To discern how this conception of a calling is intimately linked, as Weber suggests, to charisma, requires that we understand how, and in what sense, charisma is 'the root of the idea of a *calling* in its highest expression.' (FMW p79).

(b) *Charisma and the Ethics of Politics*

Weber's claim is that the emergence of charismatic domination has been historically linked with two particular types of man: the magician or prophet, on the one hand, and the warlord or gang leader,on the other. These two figures are paralleled by the two ethical standpoints Weber suggests can be taken with regard to politics, that is, an ethic of *responsibility* or an ethic of *absolute ends*.

The charisma of the prophet is generated out of his personality as expressed through his committment to a set of ideals. THis portrayal is transfigured by Weber in his delineation of the modern politician via a discussion of the Sermon on the Mount. With regard to the instruction to 'turn the other cheek,' for example, Weber points out that:

> [t]his command is unconditional and does not question the source of the other's authority to strike. Except for a saint it is an ethic of indignity. This is it: one must be saintly in everything; at least in intention, one must live like Jesus, the apostles, St. Francis, and their like. Then this ethic makes sense and expresses a kind of dignity; otherwise it does not. (FMW p119)

In so far as the form of such an ethic operates in politics, it expresses a commitment to action according to principles whatever the consequences. As Weber notes 'If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actors eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil.' (FMW p121).

In contrast, the charisma of the gang leader is expressed through a pragmatic commitment to success, that is the achievement of certain ends held to be desirable in so far as the consequences of actions leading to the achieving of these ends do not outweigh the benefits attained by gaining them. In its modern political form, Weber terms this an ethic of

responsibilty and suggests that an individual operating according to this form of ethic 'takes account of the average deficiences of people; as Fichte has correctly said, he does not even have the right to presuppose their goodness and perfection. He does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to see them; he will say: these results are ascribed by my action.' (FMW p121).

However, Weber is well aware that such ideal-typical constructions reflect only partial truths and are by no means entirely opposites. Just as a prophet may also be a warlord and a magician may be a gang-leader, so to the two ethics Weber has set out may act as supplements in the person of the politican. As Weber puts it:

> it is immensely moving when a *mature* man - no matter whether old or young in years - is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do no other.' That is something genuinely human and moving. And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realise the possibility of finding himself at sometime in that position. In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man - a man who *can* have the 'calling for politics.' (FMW p127)

Weber's reasons for claiming that only together do these two ethics transform the politician into a man with a *calling* for politics are readily apparent, given his commitment to defend liberal insitutions without recourse to liberal ideology (as Eden has cogently argued). In the context of this commitment, one can see that the ethic of ultimate ends in its pure type can be represented in modernity by the figures of the revolutionary terrorist and the religious fanatic, while the ethic of

responsibility can be seen in its pure type in the figures of the machiavellian opportunist and 'Tammany Hall' boss. Only in the combination of these two ethics is, what Bruun labels, 'goal responsibilty' maintained; that is, a commitment to a goal without ignoring the consequences of the means of achieving that goal or getting so involved in the importance of the means that the goal is itself neglected.

To sum up the gist of our discussion so far. Firstly, we have outlined Weber's concept of *charisma* and illustrated how he transforms this concept via a process of 'professionalisation' into the idea of a *calling*, a conception he has borrowed (and secularised) from Protestantism. In the sphere of politics, this transformation has been achieved through a paralleling of the two major types of charismatic man with two ethics of political practice. Secondly, by drawing out the logical consequences of these two ethics, as embodied in given types of political man, we can see how Weber requires their combination, as a condition of having a genuine calling for politics. And this in itself is part of his stategy for defending a liberal conception of politics. Thirdly, Weber grounds *meaning*, in the existential sense, in the idea of a calling. This is significant both as a mode of overcoming nihilism and in its relation to Weber's conception of 'vocational man' as a self-disciplining subject. We will now turn to a discussion of Weber's attempt to preserve a space for individual liberty in an increasingly disciplinary society. Before illustrating the relationships between these three themes.

(c) *Charisma and the Fate of the Subject in Modernity*

We have already discussed the rationalisation of modern politics, in relation to the state and the party, as the encroachment of bureaucratic

power over democratic forms. Weber's problem thus becomes the formulation of that type of democratic organisation most able to resist such encroachment. In Nietzschean terms, this involves the relationship between Appollonian and Dionysian forces in modernity. Weber's transformation of this issue operates on a number of distinct levels.

We can approach this issue through an initial consideration of Weber's discussion of two opposing types of democractic organisation that may be taken up by the modern state; these, Weber labels, 'leadership democracy with a "machine" and leaderless democracy.' (FMW p113). The latter of these is constituted by 'the rule of professional politicians without a calling, without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader, and this means what the party insurgents in the situation usually designate as "the rule of the clique."' (FMW p113). Such a form of government is represented, for Weber, by democracies employing proportional representation:

> This is the case not only because it facilitates the horse-trading of the notables for placement on the ticket, but also because in the future it will give organised interest groups the possibility of compelling parties to include their officials in the list of candidates, thus creating an unpolitical Parliament in which genuine leadership finds no place. (FMW p114)[9]

Weber goes on to point out, with reference to Germany, that 'the President of the Reich could become the safety-valve of the demand for leadership if he were elected in a plebiscitarian way and not by Parliament.' (FMW p114). This leads us to a consideration of the former of Weber's democratic types, 'leadership democracy with a "machine"' (FMW p113), and its potential implications for individual liberty. In his The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Weber devotes a short section to this issue under

the title 'The Transformation of Charisma in an Anti-Authoritarian Direction' in which he illustrates some of the dangers that this form of democratic organisation entails:

> The use of the plebiscite as a means of legitimising leadership on a democratic basis is the most conspicuous type in which democracy is combined with an important role of leadership. In its fundamental significance it is a type of charismatic authority in which the authoritarian element is concealed, because the traditional position of the leader is held to be dependent onthe will of those over whom he exercises authority and to be legitimised only by this will. In actual fact the leader, in this case the demagogue, is able to influence action by virtue of the devotion and trust his political followers have in him personally. In the first instance his power is only a power over those recruited to his following, but in case, with their aid, he is able to attain positions of wider authority it may extend to the political group as a whole. The type is best illustrated by the 'dictators' who have emerged in the revolutions of the ancient world and of modern times. (TSEO p387/388)

Weber's approach to the problem raised by the *demagogue*, 'the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership.'(TSEO p389), proceeds by reference to his concept of a calling. In 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber suggests 'that three pre-eminent qualities are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion.'(FMW p115), remembering that by 'passion' here is denoted a 'sense of *matter-of-factness*'(FMW p115). What Weber is attempting to do here, is to undercut the potential authoritarianism of the plebiscitory leader through a pincer movement: firstly, by making the criteria of political *personality* qualities that rule out the mere power-hungry demagogue and secondly, as Eden points out, '[t]he followers of the Weberian leader ... need have no reverence for the

person of the leader, as in Fascist and Communist regimes. What they find "irresistible" is the man who approachs politics with matter-of-fact devotion.'(Eden p208). It is with respect to the second of these points that the following of Weber's comments is appropriate:

> the relative immunity of formerly Puritan peoples to Caesarism, and, in general, the subjectively free attitude of the English to their great statesmen as compared with many things we have experienced since 1878 both positively and negatively. On the one hand, there is a greater willingness to give the great man his due, but, on the other, a repudiation of all hysterical idolisation of him and of the naive idea that political obediance could be due anyone from thankfulness. (PESC p224/225, fn. 30)[10]

Thus through the transcription of charisma into the conceptions of calling and personality, Weber seeks to negate the dangers of plebiscitary leadership democracy while preserving its potential for ameliorating the forces of rationalisation and thus retaining a space for individual liberty and self-expression. We are not concerned at this point with the efficacy of Weber's solution to this dilemma of modernity as he has formulated it, rather my concern is that of illustrating the politics of Weber's social theory as it is expressed through the dilemma's and solutions he sets out.

At the start of this section were set out three central issues in Weber's discussion of politics: the possibility of individual self-expression in an increasingly disciplinary society, the possibility of generating a meaningful existential ethic for modern man, and the possibility of producing a non-ideological defence of liberal institutions. The relationships between these three should be relatively clear; Weber's defence of liberal institutions is grounded in the self-disciplinary

character of a calling and orientated towards the retention of a space for individual self-expression, at the same time the conception of calling operates as an existential grounding for meaningful action by the individual. The political dimension of these relationships emerges at several points: in Weber's treatment of democratic types, his account of bureaucracy and his setting out of the idea of calling. In each of these instances, the fact/value distinction is undermined on at least a rhetorical level. Thus under the guise of setting forth the two forms of democratic organisation available in modernity, he states: 'there is only the choice between leadership democracy with a "machine" and leaderless democracy, namely, the rule of professional politicians without a calling,'(FMW p113). Given the rhetorical force with which Weber endows the conception of 'calling', we are left in little doubt as to which of these forms is preferred. Similarly, Weber's appraisal of the structural forms of domination encouraged by bureaucratic development is juxtaposed to his attempt limit or undermine such forces of domination, in this context, 'the iron cage' is hardly a model metaphor of scientific objectivity. Finally, in his delineation of the political as a calling, Weber prescibes a set of criterial conditions that effectively rule out politicians who would undermine the democratic apparatus. Thus, through these and other devices, Weber imposes a liberal conception of politics through his sociological analysis.

Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been showm how Weber characterises the fate of the human subject in modernity and his attempt to illustrate a mode of coming to terms with this fate and transforming it into an affirmation of

the modern condition through the concept of a calling. By focusing of the idea of discipline (as expressed through bureaucracy) and charisma (as expressed through, in this instance, the political calling), it has been shown how Weber's analysis of the modern intertwines existential, social and political moments in an attempt to overcome the threat posed by nihilism on both structural and individual levels. At this stage, the question of the role of the human sciences in this overcoming of the meaninglessness of existence in modernity must be raised.

Notes

1. The Anglo-American appropriation of Weber is discussed in Lassman and Velody Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation' (1988) pp160-167.

2. Does Catholicism have a similar militant symbolism?

3. Cf. Chapter 1, section 3.

4. Compare Weber's notion of discipline with that developedby Foucault notably in DP.

5. Cf. Chapter 2, section 2.

6. In this article, 'The Dialectic of Individuation and Domination: Max Weber's Rationalization Theory and Beyond' (1987),Alexander develops an interesting comparison between Weber and Sartre.

7. Is discipline after Nuremburg barbaric?

8. A virtually identical definition of the state is developed in a radically different manner in Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), ch.3. Although Nozick's argument is explicitly prescriptive rather than descriptive.

9. An example here might be Israeli politics over the last five years.

10. A good example of this is the Labour Party victory over Churchill in the 1945 election.

LIBERALISM, SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THEORY

> In "Science as a Vocation," his great essay about how it is possible to know, Max Weber insists in a very Nietzschean mode that the acceptance of the essential ultimate inconsequentiality of scientific achievement is a prerequisite for being able to do science. His problem is Nietzsche's: How does one write, then, so as not to deny precisely that which one is asserting? - *Tracy B. Strong.*

Introduction

This chapter will be concerned with taking up the issues of Weber's characterisation of science and its implications for the political dimension of his texts. Initially this will be considered through an analysis of his structuring of the vocation of science or scholarship. The extent to which this involves an implicit commitment to an evaluatory theory of modernity will be examined. The figure of the scientist that Weber constructs in the course of his disquisition will also be taken up. The question will be raised as to whether Weber's practical values intrude into his investigation to the extent undermining the dichotomy between theoretical and practical values. Finally, we will assess Weber's conception of the role of the human sciences.

1. Science as a Calling

> In our time, the internal situation, in contrast to the organisation of science as a vocation, is first of all conditioned by the facts that science has entered a stage of specialisation previously unknown and that this will forever remain the case. Not only externally, but inwardly, matters stand at a point where the individual can acquire the sure consciousness of achieving something truly perfect in the field of science only in case he is a strict specialist. (FMW p134).

This matter of 'fact' statement opens Weber's discussion of the idea of having a *calling* for science. His explication of what it means to have a vocation for science and whether such a conceptualisation can make sense in this instance. Weber's formulation of what is required to justify the ascription of such a calling to oneself in the modern age is sharply articulated:

> A really definitive and good accomplishment is today always a specialised accomplishment. And whoever lacks the capacity to put on blinders, so to speak, and to come up with the idea that the fate of his soul depends on whether or not he makes the correct conjuncture at this passage of this manuscript may as well stay away from science. He will never have what one may call the 'personal experience' of science. Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider; without this passion ... you have no calling for science and you should do something else. For nothing is worthy of man as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion. (FMW p135).

Weber's rhetorical language is orientated towards dispelling a disjuncture, which he envisages as gaining popular credence, between the categories of calculation and imagination, or hard work and inspiration. However, this rhetoric also operates as a means of enabling him to claim that in 'the field of science only he who devoted *solely* to the work at hand has 'personality'.' (FMW p137). The entwining of the idea's of *personality* and *calling* was noted in the last chapter with regard to politics[1], it is a theme which will again concern us as we explore Weber's delineation of the scientific vocation. At this stage, however, it is useful to return to the issue of 'passionate devotion' and scholarship. Weber's espousal of the interdependence of science and passion was by no means original as Nietzsche had earlier ennunciated a similar point:

> All problems demand great love, and of that only strong,

round, secure spirits who have a firm grip of themselves are capable. It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his great happiness, or an 'impersonal' one, meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it ... for even if great problems should allow themselves to be grasped by them, they would not permit frogs and weaklings to hold onto them. (GS 345 in Eden 1984 p40).

In Weber's work however this claim is turned towards the *professions* in a way absent from (and alien to) Nietzsche's thought. Further, although Weber is here concerned specifically with science as a vocation, the issue of 'passionate devotion' is generalisable across callings. Wherein then lies the specifity of science as a calling? What is the particular form of 'passionate devotion' integral to science? The pursuit of these questions requires an examination of 'progress' as a defining characteristic of science.

For Weber, scientific work is 'chained to the course of progress; whereas in the realm of art there is no progress in the same sense' (FMW p137). What Weber means by this is that in science 'each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very meaning of scientific work' (FMW p138), while on the contrary a 'work of art which is genuine 'fulfilment' is never surpassed, it will never be antiquated' (FMW p138). If this is the case, questions arise as to the *value* of science as a mode of practical activity[2]. This point has been elegantly expressed by Löwith:

Homer was not supplanted by Dante, nor Dante by Shakespeare. But the cosmology of Aristotle was indeed supplanted by that of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, just as Newton was later

> displaced by Einstein. Indeed the very 'point' that makes scientific work 'meaningful' is precisely that every answer should produce new questions, that science should desire to be superseded as knowledge develops and progresses. ... Yet this in itself raises the question ... why should one pursue an activity or harness oneself to a professional enterprise which has no prospect of fulfilment? (Löwith 1988 p139).

For Weber, the pursuit of limited practical or technical goals is not an adequate answer to the dilemma posed for science, rather he argues one must attempt to make sense of the idea of 'science pursued for its own sake'. This task is given an existential urgency by Weber through his interrelation of scientific progess with the concept of *disenchantment*.

For Weber, scientific progress represents

> a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualisation which we have been undergoing for thousands of years and which is usually judged in such an extremely negative way. (FMW p138/139).

The meaning of this 'process of intellectualisation' resides not in 'an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives' (FMW p139). But rather in:

> the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it [the mechanics of a car, for example] at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. ... Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualisation means. (FMW p139).

Weber elucidates the existential problematic raised by the discenchantment of world by reference to the thought of Tolstoy:

> All his brooding increasingly revolved about the problem or whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilised man death has no meaning. It has none because the individual life of civilised man, placed

> into an infinite 'progress', according to its own immanent meanings should never come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead of one who stands in the march of progress. And no man who comes to die stands on the peak which lies in infinity. ... And because death is meaningless, civilised life as such is meaningless; by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness. (FMW p139/140).

The question at this juncture is no longer merely that of the meaning and value of an individuals calling for science. For to raise this quetion 'is to ask for the vocation of science within the total life of humanity' (FMW p140). If science as 'the most important fraction ...' is constitutive of a politics of nihilism, as is suggested by Weber's interpretation of Tolstoy, it follows that Weber must resurrect the question of the *value* of science.

In a section reminiscent of Nietzsche's *How the 'Real World' at last became a Myth*, Weber approaches the question of the value of science through a consideration of the foundations ascribed to the value of science in different historical periods. For Plato, the value of science lay in that it seizes not upon illusions and shadows but upon the true being. To expand this a little:

> True science or knowledge is, for the Greeks, the pathway to *true being*, and above all to true politics, which demands a truly just regulation of communal life within a public community. True being is, moreover, also *good* and *beautiful* being; for it is not possible for the beautiful or good to exist in the absence of true insight into what it is that makes anything good or beautiful. (Löwith 1988 p141).

In the Renaissance, these value-claims shift to science as *rational experiment*, science as representing the '*pathway to true art and thus at the same time the pathway to true nature*' (Löwith 1988 p142). Again:

> Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton were all equally convinced that God had ordained the world mathematically and

> that they could come to know Him by reading what, by analogy with the Bible, they termed the 'book' of Nature. The biologist Swammerdamm's triumphant declaration, 'I bring you here the proof of God's providence in the anatomy of a louse' gives an indication of the confidence with which a belief in natural science as a pathway to God could be assumed in the period before Kant produced his critique of physico-teleological arguments for God's existance. (Löwith 1988 p142).

Löwith points out that there was the 'fear already expressed in Kant that the new mechanical view of the world might become "a profane, secular science"' (Löwith 1988 p142). For Weber this fear is a modern reality:

> And finally, science as a way 'to God'? Science, this specifically irreligious power? That science today is irreligious no one will doubt in his innermost being, even if he will not admit it to himself. (FMW p142).

As for science as a way to happiness, Weber dismisses this by referring to Nietzsche's criticism of the 'last men' who 'invented happiness'[3]. In a disenchanted world, the illusory nature of these historical valuations of science emerges. Who today believes in science as a way to true being, to true nature, to God, to happiness? No one 'aside from a few big children in university chairs or editorial offices.' (FMW p143). Weber's question is now:

> Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions ... have been dispelled. Tolstoy has given the simplest answer, with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'' That science does not give us an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives *no* answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question properly. (FMW p143).

At this stage, as part of putting 'the question properly', Weber takes up

the related issue of whether 'what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is 'worth being known'.' (FMW p143). Can this central presupposition of science be validated? For Weber, in this:

> are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be *interpreted* with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept, according to our ultimate position towards life. (FMW p143).

Having argued that, in Tolstoy's sense, science is *existentially meaningless*; it now appears that it is *logically valueless*. Strangely, it is precisely at this point that Weber begins to reconstruct science as a meaningful activity. The problematisation of the value of science - 'Is life, the object of the doctor's efforts, worth preseving?' (Curtius 1988 p71). - 'can only be resolved by human beings who adopt positions for or against available options' (Löwith 1988 p144). Science is given meaning and value by the *leap of faith* involved in accepting its presuppositions, in adopting an ultimate position towards life which affirms these presuppositions.

The grounds on which Weber develops the idea of a *calling* for science become clear at this point. For given that the central presupposition of science cannot be rationally grounded, it follows that the affirmation of the value of science is a matter of personal decision. As Weber puts it:

> whether, under such conditions, science is a worthwhile *vocation* for somebody, and whether science itself has an objectively valuable *vocation* are again value-judgements about which nothing can be said in the lecture-room. (FMW 152).

However, and here the purpose of Weber's historical tour becomes apparent, this personal choice *must* be an informed decision. Here Weber's remarks on

the nature of science in modernity are relevant:

> Science today is a *vocation* organised in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosphers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it as long as we remain true to ourselves. (FMW p152).

The thrust of Weber's argument here is to argue that it is not enough that one commits oneself to an ultimate position towards life which affirms and prioritises the preconceptions underlying the claim to value of science. Beyond this, it is necessary that in making this commitment one recognises the 'historical situation' of science. Only then, in facing up to the demands of the day while retaining 'the plain duty of intellectual integrity' (FMW p156), does one satisfy the criteria of having a vocation for science.

To develop this issue of the 'historical situation' of science further requires that we return to what is, for Weber, a central element of this situation: 'the sense in which science gives us *no* answer' to the question "'What shall we do and how shall we live?"' (FMW p143). To take this up necessitates an examination of Weber's formulation of the relationship between social science and political practice.

It was pointed out in our discussion of Weber's methodology that the fact-value distinction he operates revolves about a separation of theoretical and practical values. What is it though that motivates this distinction? According to Löwith, Weber is impelled to make such a distinction because of his insight into the fact that:

> *we here today* live in a world that has become reified

> through scientific technology while, at the same time, the objectivist rationality of science has liberated us from an adherence to universally binding moral and religious norms. Since the progress of science is unstoppable, it must be seen as a force which destroys the authority of tradition. The value judgements we ultimately make can therefore neither find support in tradition, nor claim scientific foundation; they are, whether we like it or not, a matter of personal decision. (Löwith 1988 p145).

Similarly Landshut notes that the process of rationalisation constitutes the '*progressive destruction of any generally binding force in the public sphere*' (Landshut 1988 p101). Classical social theory, for Landshut, finds its *raison d'etre* in the quest for the *summum bonum* and its *telos* in the reconstitution of the 'binding character of the public sphere' (Landshut 1988 p102). Classical theories:

> start from the presupposition that the principle of binding force itself, the criterion of legality, can be discovered and derived from man's existance in the world. Indeed the claim to general binding force is supposed to have its foundation in this very fact. (Landshut 1988 p102).

For Weber though, given that the

> end of the nineteenth century brought with it the most radical dismantling of all received public values, forms of life and principles (Landshut 1988 p103),

the possibility of deducing the good life from the *experience of facts* has become an intellectual absurdity:

> the validity of a practical imperative as a norm on the one hand, and the claim to truth of an empirical observation of facts on the other, belong on absolutely heterogenous levels of any given complex of problems. (Weber in Landshut 1988 p104).

What is significant here is the suggestion by both Löwith and Landshut that Weber's conception of an increasingly rationalised world acts as a

preconception informing his notion of the social sciences and impelling him towards his formulation of the fact-value distinction. Yet Weber's claim as to the rationalised make-up of modernity is, supposedly, founded in this very same scientific activity. This problem leads on to the issue as to whether Weber's positing of the fact-value distinction, and thereby his conception of *science* is rooted in a transcendental or historicist framework.

On the one hand, if Weber is making a transcendental claim about the status of science as his use of the terms 'progress' and 'illusion' suggest and which his formulation of a mehodology delineating the legitimate activity of science indicates, then we are brought up against the problem of his grounding science in subective orientations towards life and his use of rationalisation as a preconception informing his own conception of the social sciences. On the other hand, if Weber is deploying a historicist conception of science, then his use of the terms 'illusion' and 'progress' becomes problematic. The former term might be accounted for by arguing that Weber utilises it in the Nietzschean sense whereby no claim is being made as to the possibility of being illusionless, rather it is the claim that the 'illusion' in question has lost its *proof of power*[4]. However, even in adopting such a reading, Weber's commitment to a conception of 'progress' militates against such a historicist interpretation. It would appear here that a genuine tension disrupts Weber's account of science. This tension creates a problem regarding the issue of the relationship between social science and politics.

If Weber is operating a transcendental claim about the status of the fact-value distinction, it is readily apparent that he wishes to preserve an absolute separation between science and politics. However this would

negate his concern to formulate a conception of social scientific activity for *the fate of our times*. If the fact-value distinction operates within a historicist framework, however, then it would be necessary to specify the sense in which a separation of science and politics is peculiarly appropriate to modernity. Moreover, given that the process of rationalisation involves an inherently political dimension, this formulation would allow for the re-introduction of politics into a Weberian social science. It is this latter point which will concern us in the second part of this paper, for the moment though it is useful to summarise the points established to date.

In this section, Weber's account of science as a vocation has been sketched out. The movement in his text from the issue of scientific progress to the question of the value of science has been clarified. His discussion of the commitment involved in having a calling for science and the meaning of this affirmation for the value of science has been brought out. Finally, the tension in Weber's concept of science was indicated. The questions which concern us now relate to the *politics* of this conception of science.

2. Liberalism and the Politics of a Calling for Science

> *Methodology is mind engaged in the legitimation of its own political activity.* (Wolin 1981 p106).

This perceptive remark by Wolin neatly opens up the space to be examined in this section: the politics of Weber's theoretical operation in 'Science as a Vocation'. In his essay 'Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory', Wolin argues cogently that Weber's ideal social scientist is shaped in the image of, or rather an image parallel to, the Calvinist as presented by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Thus Wolin notes:

> The dogma of predestination decrees that the Calvinist will labour amidst unrelieved uncertainty. Scientific man is in a similar predicament. 'Our highest values' are 'a matter of faith.' Although they are crucial in orientating us towards our scientific work, there is no way that we, as scientists, can be assured that these values are 'true'. Knowledge of values, like the knowledge of secret election by God, is inaccessible. (Wolin 1981 p413/414).

This modern formulation of the 'politics of the soul' is, for Weber, articulated about the fact-value distinction: 'As long as science could not, in principle, determine choice, men were forced to be free to choose.' (Wolin 1981 p414). For Wolin, the significance of this is clear:

> The inherent limitations of science, its inability to make good the deficiencies of the world's meaning, provide the backdrop to the political role of the methodologist. His task is not to undertake scientific investigations or even to instruct his co-workers on how best to conduct research, much less to offer a special field of study. Rather it is to show them that significant action in their chosen realm is possible. It is, therefore, a form of political education in the meaning of vocation. Its politicalness comes from the seriousness, even urgency, of the relationship between vocational action and the world. (Wolin 1981 p416).

Here, Wolin suggests an affinity between Weber's concepts of science and *charisma* and indeed an affinity which informs the politics being legitimated in 'Science as a Vocation':

> Science is charisma 'in a godless and prophetless time' and it is displayed by the person 'with an inward calling' who can endure that 'the world is disenchanted'. It is for the chosen few, 'the affair of an intellectual aristocracy'. It is, above all, charisma because science requires 'inspiration' [*Eingebung*]. It has nothing to do with any cold calculation. ... 'Whether we have scientific inspiration,' he [Weber - RDO] continued, 'depends upon destinies that are hidden from us, and besides upon "gifts".' (Wolin 1981 p417).

It is at this stage that Wolin's analysis becomes problematic. The *inspiration* or *frenzy* he refers to is not unique to science:

> Inspiration in the field of science by no means plays any greater role, as academic conceit fancies, than it does in the field of mastering problems of practical life by a modern entrepeneur. (FMW/SV p136).

Certainly, Wolin's point that charisma is exhibited by the person with an 'inward calling', who stoically accepts that the modern world is 'disenchanted', is essentially correct. However, it is not the specificity of science which uniquely displays this feature, rather it is in relation to the concept of a *calling* as such that Weber's notion of charisma applies. It will be recalled (from the opening remarks of this chapter) that Weber deploys the idea of *personality* relative to the individual with a calling. The significant of this concept of *personality* is that it embodies a *vocationalised* concept of charisma. In a 'prophetless time' Weber reorientates the concept of charisma into the professions by way of the notion of a calling so that it re-emerges as *personality*. This specific theme will be taken up again later; for the moment however, it is

necessary to return to the general issue of the politics of 'Science as a Vocation'.

In a recent argument[5], Eden has suggested that 'Science as a Vocation' constitutes part of Weber's strategy for presenting a defence of liberal institutions without recourse to classical liberal ideology. For Eden, Weber's reformulation of the Thucydidean *politikos*, the unending and inevitable tragic conflict between ultimate values, entails his affirmation of the fact-value distinction. This in turn requires science to transcend liberalism as an ideology. Consequently, the liberal dilemma concerning the destructive potentiality of science is avoided:

> The tragic outlook of "the ancients" enables Weber to invest science with a skeptical empiricism that claims not to be shakeable by the realisation that scientific technique has made the human future problematic and uncertain as never before. By abandoning liberalism, Weberian science surmounts the discovery that modern scientific progress has become "the great pain-bringer" or that technological humanitarianism is in actuality profoundly inhumane. (Eden 1984 p138).

It is Eden's argument that despite Weber's commitment to the fact-value distinction and thus to the separation of science and ideology, his formulation of science as a human practice does indirectly offer a defence of liberal institutions. Consequently, two questions arise for Eden (and for us): (i) *How does this defense operate?* and (ii) *Is it based on intelligible and acceptable grounds?*

For Weber, liberal democracy is founded on the division of labour, consequently a defense of liberal institution requires that Weber provide a legitimation of the division of labour which undermines both the Nietzschean critique of *decadence* and the Marxist critique of *alienation*.

This difficulty of this is indicated by the fact that for Weber:

> The probity of a scholar today, and above all of a philosopher today, can be measured by how he stands towards Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever does not admit that he could not conduct the most weighty part of his own work without the work these two have done, swindles himself and others. Intellectually, the world in which we ourselves exist is to an exceptional degree a world formed by Marx and Nietzsche. (Weber in Eden 1984 p143).

Here our concern is with Weber's defence against Nietzsche's comments on *decadence*. It will be recalled that for both Weber and Nietzsche 'nothing is worthy of man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion' (FMW/SV p135). It is at the point after this agreement that their paths diverge. For Nietzsche, this imperative manifests itself in the individual's self-formation as an aesthetic whole; the individual has a calling towards welding all the diverse practices he engages in into a coherent totality and none of these practices have a necessary priority over the others[6]. However, for Weber, this 'passionate devotion' needs necessarily to be expressed within the framework of a single vocational practice: the 'professions are the testing grounds for that devotion' (Eden 1984 p143). As Eden puts it:

> Weber's intention is to compel men to prove their nobility and greatness, above all to themselves, *within* the "iron cage". (Eden 1984 p143).

Central then to Weber's argument is his focus on the issues of self-discipline and self-delimitation. However, before developing these concerns, it is necessary to return to the question of the status of science.

The Nietzschean critique of the autonomy of science rests, Eden suggests:

> upon the comprehensive responsibility and creativity of the philosopher. Science cannot be independent, because there are no intelligibles beyond the becoming, the endless creation and destruction, of the world as will to power. The philosopher's affirmation is superior to the highest theory because it is a ranking of values consonant with an eternally recurring world. (Eden 1984 p156).

This critique undermines the classical transcendental defence of the autonomy of science as founded on the autonomy of intelligibles. To reply to Nietzsche here, Weber must locate a non-transcendental site on which to ground science's autonomy. Eden argues that:

> What the new basis might be seems to be revealed in the fact that science can survive the collapse of these former illusions. The new foundation of scientific autonomy would take account of what is permanent, the dstinctive means of scientific work: science would have to generate a critique of itself that could comprehend all the means of scientific work. But it would also have to account for the experience of disillusionment, as Weber does. Weber's survey [of former grounds put forward as foundations for science] adumbrates a historicist explanation of disillusionment. ... The sequence culminates in the uniqueness of the present age. "We live in a godless and prophetless time" but also a time in which these former philosophical and political ideals no longer move science. (Eden 1984 p156).

Eden locates Weber's argument as a form of *practical historicism* and yet, at the same time, imbues it with a *teleological* strain. This issue will be taken up shortly, but first we must relate this account of scientific autonomy to Weber's emphasis on self-delimitation.

> The self-delimitation of science is an instance of the more general problem of how the modern self can determine itself. What authenticity (holding true to one's individuality, or becoming what one is) would require is not primarily a matter of doctrine or right belief. In the case of science, self-determination would entail affirming the full means of science and the articulation of science as an enterprise in the world with a specialised division of labour. More generally, this instantiates the rquirement that the self

affirm the conditions of its own autonomous activity, hence its own necessities. (Eden 1984 p157).

Today, therefore, the scientist must affirm the uniqueness of the scientific predicament in modernity and 'thus pose to science the choice of responsibility for the ultimate meaning of its own conduct' (Eden 1984 p158). Finally, science is to take its responsibility upon itself. The ultimate foundation of scientific autonomy, on this account, is the self of the scientist, a self attuned to the problematic moral character of science and taking 'a new pride in its unprecendented moral seriousness' (Eden 1984 p158). If Weber's argument holds good, it acts as a *de facto* defence of liberal institutions; thus Eden states:

> having broken the connections between liberal cause and the cause of science at the level of theory, Weber can nevertheless assert that the defense of liberal democratic institutions is a cause worthy of man as man. At the level of practice, there can be no doubt that a professional science resolved to take responsibility for itself along the lines we have sketched could do so energetically within the framework of the liberal commercial republic. (Eden 1984 p158).

For Eden, however, the case Weber constructs involves a set of 'dubious assertions about the history of science' (Eden 1984 p159).

These 'dubious assertions' relate to Weber's treatment of Bacon. Weber's critique of Bacon is that this conception of science fails to perceive its nihilistic potential, only in modernity does this responsibility come to be placed fully on the scientist. The Baconian chimera 'denied to the scientist ... that distinctive moral sobriety which Weber holds out for science today as the well-spring of its great dignity in the total ethical economy of human life' (Eden 1984 p160). Weber's reading of Bacon though is fundamentally flawed for Eden who argues that, in actuality, Bacon's

description of science is radically similar to Weber's own characterisation:

> In his writings on science, Bacon advocated the transformation of science into a specialised experimental enterprise such as Weber describes. He propounded the elaborate division of labour on which Weber dwells in the opening part of *Science as a Vocation* ... Weber's conception of empirical knowledge as the inversion of means/ends propositions is Baconian. ... Weber's definition of science is straight from Bacon: it is 'knowledge of the techniques by means of which one masters life, both external things and the actions of men, through reckoning.' (Eden 1984 p161).

If this is so, then the dilemma posed is this: does this description which seems to suggest that Bacon's plans for science have been adequately realised, square with Weber's interpretation of Bacon's plans, whereby this outcome is seen as an unintended consequence? If the account of science in modernity offered by Weber and his interpretation of Bacon do not square, if the account of Bacon offered by Weber is inadequate, then it may well follow that Weber's defence of liberal institutions is similarly flawed. For Eden, this is entailed by the reading that:

> Weber's entire argument for the autonomy of science stands or falls with the ethical doctrine conveyed by his treatment of Bacon, the doctrine of the unique predicament and responsibility of contemporary science. (Eden 1984 p165).

If the *telos* that Eden locates in Weber's argument cannot take the strain of exposure to "inconvenient facts" raised through the study of the hisory of science, a discipline which operates as a branch of science, then the consequence 'is a profoundly troubling ambivalence regarding the pursuit of truth' (Eden 1984 p165).

Eden's own argument, however, is itself by no means unproblematic and it may be that by identifying lacunae here a way out of the dilemma posed for Weber's account of science will emerge. The fundamental flaw in Eden's

case is a conflation of scientific activity with the meaning of that scientific activity. That science in modernity is consonant with the description of its form and activity as described by Bacon does not imply that the meaning of the practice of science is similarly identical. The 'unintended consequence' of the development of Bacon's plans for science is that this development has itself undermined the foundation of science as a way to *true nature*. For Bacon, the value of science is unproblematic yet, in modernity, this value has been rendered problematic by the very development of science itself. The 'unique predicament' of modern science relates to the shift in its existential meaning. As such, Weber's account of the autonomy of science in terms of its ethical responsibility in modernity is resistant to the line of argument Eden deploys.

To conclude this section, it is useful to summarise the significant points. We began by indicating the political character of the concept of vocation. This vocational politics was then taken up specifically in reference to the calling of science and it was illustrated how Weber's conception of science in terms of a vocation could act as an alternative to Nietzsche's critique of liberalism. To raise the question of whether this alternative is effective requires that the coherence of Weber's project for the social sciences in modernity be examined.

3. The Politics of the Human Sciences

In the interpretation developed in both this chapter, and in our discussion of 'Politics as a Vocation', it has been noted that Weberian social science involves a commitment to a liberal democratic form of society. In this final section, the nature of this affirmation will be brought out in relation to the question of the role of the human sciences for Weber. Firstly, the issue of the fact-value distinction will be raised again to demonstrate the nature ofthe liberal values involved in Weber's form of argument. Secondly, we will return to the role of the concept of a 'calling' in Weber's work, relating this to the problem of the groundlessness of existence which is posed for Weber by modernity. Finally, Weber's conception of the meaning and value of the human sciences in modernity will be elaborated.

In our discussion of Weber's methodology, it was argued that the distinction drawn between empirical statements of fact and judgements of value rests on a prior distinction between theoretical and practical values. This prior distinction is embodied in the separation of the notions of *value-sphere* and *value-orientation*[7]. It was also noted that Weber's conception of a *calling* operates as a device for the articulation of his liberal politics. What must be established here is the connection between the formulation of the fact-value distinction and the idea of a calling.

To begin with we must note the intimacy of the notions 'value-sphere' and 'calling'. A value-sphere, it will be recalled, is the abstract expression of the theoretical values immanent to a particular way of life or mode of activity. Modernity is characterised, on one level, by the clash of contrasting value-spheres. One must affirm a particular value-sphere to the exclusion of others. This is an integral aspect of Weber's 'polytheism'.

A given value-sphere is, for Weber, the articulation of the nature of the 'god' appropriate to a specific calling. The value-sphere of science, for example, involves a commitment to *truth* as immanent in the vocational activity of science. For Weber, without this prioritisation of truth as a theoretical value one cannot be said to have a calling for science and yet the concept of a calling is, for Weber, the product of Protestant asceticism. As such Weber's formulation of the idea of a value-sphere is made possible only in modernity.

The central point here is that Weber's formulation of the fact-value distinction involves an affirmation of the form of society where work in a calling is made possible or necessary and where one may decide on the 'god' one will adopt. In other words, underlying his formulation of the distinction between value-spheres and value-orientations, is a *practical* commitment to liberal democracy as the form of society most able to aid the articulation of the individual's calling within the disciplinary framework of modernity. We have noted the way this commitment emerges in 'Politics as a Vocation', for example, in Weber's rhetorical advocacy of 'leadership democracy' against 'leaderless democracy'[8]. It appears then that integral to Weber's formulation of the fact-value distinction, there is always already an affirmation of the value of liberal institutions. As Löwith has put it: Weber 'denied the intrinsic value of all modern institutions, but affirmed them nevertheless as the given means towards a freely chosen purpose' (Löwith 1982 p49). Here we must ask the question as to why Weber should feel such a political move necessary. The exploration of this issue requires a brief resumé of Weber's characterisation of modernity before we take up once more the concept of calling in his work.

Landshut has argued that a central theme for Weber is that the

'disenchantment of the world puts the "groundlessness" of free existance, in all its mysteriousness, at the center of the the debate' (Landshut 1988 p110) on the nature of modernity. Why should this be the case? We can begin with Hennis' suggestion that Weber 'accepted without reservation Nietzsche's diagnosis of the time: God is dead' (Hennis 1988 p158). This acceptance takes the form of a realisation of the *irrationality* of capitalism (and thereby of the ways of life concommitant with capitalism) in modernity.

For the Puritan, economic behaviour in the form of the rational accumulation of capital was founded upon certain religious beliefs. Yet, in modernity, these beliefs have disintegrated under the force of the process of rationalisation which they, in part, created. As Weber puts it:

> Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and work out its ideal in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrivably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. (PESC p181/182).

Under the aegis of capitalism, there is a reification of material products which finally cuts capitalism free from its religious foundations. At this point, an 'irrationality' may be located within the very process of rationalisation. As Löwith notes:

> the economic beliefs of the bourgeois stratum of society, which were originally 'religiously' motivated ... become 'irrational' when, emptied of their religious content, they are transformed into profane economic activity. (Löwith 1982 p50).

Expressed generally, modernity is marked by the fact that what were previously merely means to given valued ends are transformed into ends in themselves. Moreover:

> In this way, means as ends make themselves independent and thus lose their original 'meaning' or purpose, that is, they lose their original purposive rationality orientated to man and his needs. This reversal marks the whole of modern civilisation, whose arrangements, institutions and activities are so 'rationalised' that whereas humanity once established itself within them, now it is they which enclose and determine humanity like an 'iron cage'. (Löwith 1982 p48).

God is dead: as with Nietzsche, this indicates the collapse of the foundations of all values and ends. Activity in modernity is divorced from the context of values which gave it meaning, this separation renders modern modes of life meaningless. Yet, again as with Nietzsche, this collapse of foundations for values has made us what we are, nostalgia for a binding public sphere is a flight from the reality of our being in modernity. This is why, for Weber, any attempt to operate a classical form of social theory in modernity is merely to present 'a mixed posy of cultural evaluations' (Weber in Landshut 1988 p103). The loss of binding values, the disintegration of the public sphere - these facts render modern existance 'groundless'. Our task now is to uncover how and why Weber attempts to reaffirm the meaning of individual life in modernity without recourse to foundations.

A starting point for this topic is given by Löwith's discussion of Weber's individualism. Disenchantment, the loss of faith in values, is the fate of modernity. Yet this disenchantment is an ambiguous phenomenon, at the same moment that faith is lost so to a new space is opened up for the

possibility of giving meaning to one's individual actions. The following two comments by Löwith indicate the positive side of this ambiguity:

> The positive 'opportunity' presented by this disappointment of man and the disenchantment of the world through rationalisation is the 'sober' affirmation of everday life and its 'demands'. (Löwith 1982 p56).

> The positive element of this lack of faith in something that goes beyond the destiny of the times and the demands of the day - this lack of faith in the objective presence of values, meanings and validities - is the subjectivity of rational responsibility as the pure responsibility of the individual towards himself. (Löwith 1982 p56).

The fate of the individual in modernity is to face up to the demands of the day or to take flight from the reality of the times to the 'arms of the old churches' (FMW p155). The basic attitude:

> which Weber assumed in this rationalised world, and which also governed his 'methodology', is therefore the objectively unsupported obligation of the individual to himself. Placed into this world of submission, the individual, *qua* 'human being', belongs to himself and relies on himself. (Löwith 1982 p57).

Self-responsibility, then, is to be the attitude assumed by the strong individual in modernity. Our question becomes: how is this doctrine of individual self-responsibility to be articulated? It is at this juncture that Weber's secularised conception of a calling becomes significant. He notes: 'The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.' (PESC p181). With the loss of faith, the religious content and meaning of a calling is also lost. This may be expressed as the movement from a *calling* to a *profession*. We have become 'specialists without spirit' yet, as Löwith noted, Weber:

> deliberately renounced the aspiration to 'universal

humanity', limiting himself to the specialised work of the specialist, which he regarded as being 'in today's world the precondition for any kind of worthwhile action'. (Löwith 1982 p59).

It is because meaningful action in modernity requires specialisation that Weber, to express his doctrine of self-responsibility, attempts the revitalisation of the idea of a calling. His 'polytheism', the demand that one choose one particular god, his rhetorical deployment of the terms 'fate', 'destiny', 'demon' - all of these factors are orientated to the reinvestment of the idea of a calling with meaning. This is necessarily so for Weber, given his claim that meaningful action in modernity is always specialised action, since 'self-responsibility' presupposes that one's action relative to one's self are meaningful. As Löwith has expressed it:

> The antinomy of Weber's political science is basically that it is just this inexorable adjustment to the rational, enterprise-like character of all modern institutions that becomes the locus of possible self-realisation: the cage of 'subordination' becomes the only available space for the 'freedom of movement' which was Weber's primary concern, both as man and as politician. (Löwith 1982 p49).

Having located the nature of, and the reasons for, Weber's development of the idea of a calling as a means of overcoming the groundlessness of modern existence, we may now examine the role he assigns to the human sciences relative to this existential politics.

As a prolegomenon to this task, it may be useful to relate Weber's project to Nietzsche's characterisation of the modern. For Nietzsche, in its preliminary form, nihilism is expressed as pessimism: the cry 'In vain so far!' (WP 8), an inability to answer the question 'for what?'. In its developed form, nihilism is expressed as a lack of aim: '"why?" finds no answer' (WP 1). Weber's conception of the human sciences may be read as an

attempt to address and overcome both these questions. We shall take them together as Weber presents a single solution to both of the problematics posed.

Much of Weber's answer has already been outlined in our earlier discussion of the concept of a calling. To the question 'for what?', Weber poses the possibility of existence without illusions. To the question 'why?', he advocates self-responsibility, the creation of a meaningful lifethrough the self-affirmation of a specific set of theoretical values. Through the idea of a calling, Weber reinvests life with an aim and thereby with meaning. To face up to the meaninglessness of the world and to create meaning for it through one's own activity - this is the challenge Weber places before the modern subject. What then is the role of the human sciences?

Specifically, the function of the Weberian social scientist is to enable the individual to 'give himself an *account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct*' (FMW p152). This role requires at least two kinds of account to be given by the social scientist. The first is to put forward an account of the nature of modernity in terms of how we have come to be as we are. The purpose of this presentation is to persuade the individual of the reality of the dilemma posed for meaningful human action by modernity. The second task is to clarify the nature of the different vocations. To bring into view the theoretical values which relate to the different callings so that the individual is made aware of the commitment involved in opting for a particular calling and the kind of selfhood this commitment requires of him. It is not for science to adjudicate the value of the different callings (including itself), rather its purpose is to articulate the

presuppositions involved in the various vocations. It need hardly be said that this value-freedom itself presupposes the value of callings as such.

To conclude this section, it is useful to review the points established. We began by illustrating that Weber's formulation of the fact-value involves an inherent affirmation of liberal democracy. By examining Weber's diagnosis of the nature of modernity and his development of the idea of a calling, it was established that his central concern was with the possibility of articulating a space for human self-realisation within the 'iron cage'. Finally, it was pointed out that Weber's conception of the role of the human sciences involves an existential politics which is geared towards the individual's self-clarification of the meaning of his life.

Conclusion

In concluding both this chapter and the section of this thesis dedicated to Weber's work, it is useful to locate this discussion in relation to the analysis of Nietzsche already put forward. We will begin on a philosophical and methodological level before moving to their analyses of modernity and the role they assume for their work.

Various philosophical parallels run through the writings of Nietzsche and Weber, and yet these similarities never merge into identical positions. This can be illustrated by reference to three issues: perspectivism, subjectivity and genealogy. Weber's perspectivism is distinguished from Nietzsche's by its affirmation of a distinction between practical and theoretical values. Although this separation is never entirely free from tension in Weber's work, as his implicit commitment to a liberal democratic form of society illustrates, it is a distinction which lies at the heart of his social science. This can be seen again in the respective positions occupied by Nietzsche and Weber in relation to the theme of subjectivity. Nietzsche's commitment is to the human life as a totality, whereas Weber's affirmation of the idea of a calling (that is a set of theoretical values) presents a transfigured form of individualism. This point being illustrated by their respective attitudes to Goethe. Finally, the separation of facts and values emerges again in their genealogical forms of analysis. Despite Weber's evaluation of the value of the duty of a calling, for the most part he refuses to engage in the 'revaluation of values' which was such a central feature of Nietzsche's project.

With regard to their diagnoses of the nature of modernity, again similarities rapidly emerge. While Weber's analysis tends to be more

concrete in its focus, it is clear that he takes on Nietzsche's formulation of the collapse of the foundations for values. Similarly, Weber's concern with asceticism and the disciplinary nature of the modern would appear to owe much to Nietzsche. His insight into the ambiguity of modernity as an achievement is also articulated in Nietzschean terms as a distinction between discipline and self-discipline. However, Weber's perception of modernity as fundamentally structured about a division of labour contrasts with Nietzsche's linking of the division of labour to *ressentiment*[9]. As such Weber's formulation of the mode of overcoming the groundlessness of modern existence takes a different route to that of Nietzsche.

This brings us to the rather different views each had of role of his work. While that both men were concerning with overcoming nihilism and thus with developing an existential politics which could reinvest individual life with meaning, Weber saw this process as occuring within the liberal democratic forms of society which characterised the Western nation-states. Nietzsche's call for a thoroughgoing destruction of the values characteristic of modernity is transformed by Weber into an implicit affirmation of liberal values. For Nietzsche, Weber's fatalistic acceptance of the division of labour and the consequent articulation of selfhood about the idea of the calling represents *bad conscience*, the domination of one self over all others. This should not surprise us given the comparison Wolin draws, and with which this chapter opened, between the Weber's Puritan and the Weberian scientist[10]. From Weber's perspective, Nietzsche's concept of the Overman represents a naive denial of the specialised nature of modernity. For Foucault, the third figure in our tradition, we shall see that this issue of subjectivity and modernity is transformed once more.

NOTES

1. Cf. Chapter 5, section 2(c).

2. But do these questions arise on a Kuhnian view of science? Is Weber's existential dilemma generated out of an inadequate philosophy of science? Or is Kuhn's philosophy of science the ideology of a relativist age? cf. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970).

3. Cf. Z 'Prologue' 5.

4. Cf. Chapter 1, sections 3 and 4.

5. Eden Political Leadership and Nihilism (1984).

6. Cf. Chapter 1, section 3.

7. Cf. Chapter 4, section 1.

8. Cf. Chapter 5, section 2(c).

9. For a good discussion of this see Strong Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguaration (1975), pp198-202.

10. Cf. Chapter 2, section 2.

Michel Foucault

THE FORMS OF GENEALOGY

> We can say that in his great work of critique Kant laid down and founded that critical tradition of philosophy which defines the conditions under which a true knowledge is possible; and one can say that a whole area of modern philosophy since the nineteenth century has been presented and developed on that basis as an analytic of truth.
>
> But there also exists in modern and contemporary philosophy another kind of questioning, another mode of critical interrogation: this is one whose beginning can be seen precisely in the question of *Aufklarung* or in Kant's text on the Revolution; this other critical tradition asks: what is our present? What is the contemporary field of possible experience? Here it is not a question of an analytic of truth, but of what one might call an ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves, and it seems to me that the philosophical choice which today confronts us is the following: one can opt for a critical philosophy which is framed as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or one can opt for a critical thought which has the form of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present; it is this latter form of philosophy which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche and Max Weber, has founded a form of reflection within which I have tried to work.
>
> \- *Michel Foucault*

Introduction

In this chapter, we will explore this 'form of reflection' by way of the relationship between Foucault's various projects and trajectories, and those of Nietzsche and Weber[1]. Primarily, we will outline, and interpret, Foucault's methodological position(s) and trace connections between these positions and those occupied by Nietzsche and Weber. Integrally to this enterprise we will also analyse various criticisms which have been made of Foucault's texts.

Operationally, Foucault distinguishes three *domains* of genealogy[2]:

> First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. (Reader p351)

In broad terms, these three approaches to analysis correspond to the movement of Foucault's own theoretical trajectory. Thus the *archaeological* works (particularly The Order of Things) are orientated towards *truth*, Discipline and Punish and volume 1 of The History of Sexuality are orientated to *power*, and the later volumes of The History of Sexuality are orientated towards *ethics*. Consequently, we shall distinguish between these three *domains* in attempting to trace out Foucault's relations to Nietzsche and Weber. In arguing that such relations exist, it should be noted that our analysis will be both 'slanted' and 'idealised', that is to say, it will involve the construction of ideal-typical versions of Foucault and makes no claim to exhaust the interpretive richness of Foucault's texts.

Section One: Archaeology and Episteme

> My problem was ... to pose the question, "How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?" But the important thing here is not that such change can be rapid and extensive, or rather it is that this extent and rapidity are only the signs of something else: a modification in the rules of formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true. ... It is a question of what *governs* statements, and the way in which they *govern* each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being

> verified or falsified by scientific procedures. In short, there is the problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement. (Reader p54)

The archaeological project may then be read as an attempt to 'reveal a *positive unconscious* of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity or seeking to diminish its scientific nature.' (OT pxi). Foucault's concern is with 'these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitarily perhaps, archealogical.' (OT pxi).

This project is most clearly revealed in The Order of Things, where Foucault attempts to delineate three distinct *epistemological fields*; the Renaissance episteme, the Classical episteme and the Modern episteme. Using these, we may illustrate what we take this curious term '*episteme*' to signify. An initial formulation by Foucault states:

> what I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the *episteme* in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. (OT pxxii)

Thus by attempting to identify the relationship between general grammar, natural history and the study of wealth on the one hand, and between philogy, biology, and political economy on the other; Foucault is making the claim that:

> If the natural history of Tournefort, Linnaeus and Buffon can be related to anything at all other than itself, it is not to biology, to Cuvier's comparative anatomy, or to Darwin's theory of evolution, but to Bauzee's general grammar, to the analysis of money and wealth as found in the works of Law, or Veron de Fortbonnais, or Turgot. (OT pxxiii)

It would seem then that by *episteme* is meant the 'hidden network' that constitutes this relationship, the underlying principles of organisation that determine this form of empirical science. Thus, '*episteme*' is the name given to:

> the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalised systems... The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type or rationality, which, crossing the boundaries of the the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit or a period; *it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.* (AK p191, my italics)

We can concretise this by reference to the relations that Foucault suggest constitute the Classical period; these revolve around the central figure of the *table* organised about the terms '*comparison*' and '*order*'. The project of the representative mapping of the order of the world consists in the identification of similarities and differences through comparative analysis, the tabulation of results, and the discussion of classificatory systems. The central point for Foucault concerning this episteme is *the activity of tabulation is not itself, and cannot be, represented on the table*. For, in this account,

> what Classical thought reveals is the power of discourse. In other words, language in so far as it represents - language that names, patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes them visible in the transparency of

> words. ... The profound vocation of Classical language has always been to create a table - a 'picture': whether it be in the form of natural discourse, the accumulation of truth, descriptions of things, a body of exact knowledge, or an encyclopaedic dictionary. It exists, therefore, only in order to be transparent; ... in the Classical age, discourse is that translucent necessity through which representation and being must pass - as beings are represented to the mind's eye, and as representation renders beings visible in their truth. (OT p311)

Given the unproblematic nature of language and, therefore, representation, man's role in this process is that of vessel through which language flows unimpeded about its task of representing the world. For Foucault, it follows that: 'Classical language, as the *common discourse* of representation and things, as the place within which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes anything that could be a 'science of man'.'(OT p311). To put it another way, it appears that Foucault is making the claim that, within the Classical episteme, Man as both subject and object (in the Kantian sense) does not exist, that the structure of the Classical episteme rules out the possibility of conceiving Man in this way, and consequently, the conditions of possibility of a 'science of man' do not exist.

The deployment of the concept of *episteme*, about which Foucault's archaeological method operates, to generate a descriptive, non-triumphalist account of the history of the human sciences, should now be relatively clear. The strength of the claim being made however, is, perhaps, less transparent and this issue will feature strongly in the attempt we now make to relate Foucault's archaeological methodology to Nietzsche and Weber.

Nietzsche's comments on the reification of grammatical catagories onto the world are reasonably well known[3], in particular his remarks concerning the subject/predicate distinction in language as resulting in the subject/object distinction in the world (TI 'Reason' in Philosophy 5). An aspect of this discussion which has received less attention however, occurs in the section 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers' from Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche makes the following claim:

> That individual philosophical concepts are not something arbitary, something growing up autonomously, but on the contrary grow up connected and related to one another; that, however suddenly and arbitarily they appear to emerge in the history of thought, they nonetheless belong just as much to a system as do the members of the fauna of a continent: that fact is in the end also shown in the fact that the most diverse philosophies unfailingly fill out again and again a certain basic scheme of possible philosophies. ... The singular family resemblance between all Indian, Greek and German philosophising is easy enough to explain. Where there exists a language affinity it is quite impossible, thanks to a common philosophy of grammar - I mean thanks to the unconscious domination and directing by similar grammatical functions - to avoid everything being prepared in advance for a similar evolution and sucession of philosophical systems: just as the road seems barred to certain other possibilities of world interpretation. (BGE 20)[4]

Nietzsche is making two inter-related points here. Firstly, that the emergence of a concept or theory, at any given time, however original is governed by a set of underlying principles which relate it fundamentally to other existing concepts or theories. Secondly, that these underlying principles are generated out of the grammatical catagories of our language. Thus the realm of what may intelligibly be spoken, what counts as being 'up for grabs' as true or false[5], is circumscribed by the 'unconscious domination' of grammatical catagories.

There is a certain kinship between these comments of Nietzsche's and the project Foucault undertakes in The Order of Things, this can be illustrated by reference to Foucault's characterisations of both the Classical and the Modern episteme. These, he claims, are constituted as follows:

> the Classical *episteme* can be defined in its most general arrangement in terms of the articulated system of a *mathesis*, a *taxinomia*, and a *genetic analysis*. The sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; (OT p74)

> The connection of the positivities with finitude, the reduplication of the empirical and the transcendental, the perpetual relationship of the cogito and the unthought, the retreat and return of the origin, define for us man's mode of being. It is in the analysis of that mode of being, and no longer on the analysis of representation, that reflection since the nineteenth century has sought a philosophical foundation for the possibility of knowledge. (OT - p335)

Here we are presented, in each case, with three principles which, it is suggested, structure and delineate the realm of possible meaningful discourse within the classical and the modern respectively. In each case, these principles present us with the *project* of the respective epistemes. An analysis of representation, that makes possible the ordering of the world, in the Classical episteme and an analysis of man's mode of being in the Modern episteme. It is these projects which define man's mode of being in the respective periods. To put it another way, the principles of an *episteme* constitute an opening of the way to

certain 'possible philosophies' and a barring of the way to others. In this light, we may locate Foucault as offering an exposition of the philosophical grammars of given periods. On this reading, Nietzsche's comments are on an abstract or meta-epistemic level, whereas Foucault is operating in a functionally isomorphic manner but on a more concrete

plane. This relationship can be illustrated by their respective treatments of the subject as a *grammatical fiction*: Nietzsche notes that the positing of the 'I' is the result of the reification of the subject/predicate distinction in language onto the world and he is content with noting the subject's fictivity; Foucault, on the other hand, is concerned with the historically specific modes that this 'fiction' has taken, that is to say, he is attempting in The Order of Things to bring out those historically specific mechanisms, or grammars, which structure the fictioning of our subjectivity, in given periods.

However, whatever the status of the interpretation we are offering here, what is, perhaps, still unclear here is the precise nature of the claim that Foucault is making. Is he ascribing an ontological status to these relations which constitute given epistemes? Or is his text operating on a more ironic level reflecting on the practice and rhetoric of the historical scholar? Given the critique of Foucault by Merquior[6], for example, this question assumes significant proportions. For while it is in the very process of criticising Foucault that Merquior also notes his Nietzschean heritage, he claims that any such use of Nietzsche implies that Foucault cannot make epistemological claims for his archaeologies. Moreover, 'far from despairing at such a cognitive plight, Foucault rejoices in it. Knowledge, for him, is not geared towards truth but to the everlasting *skepsis* of endless random interpretations - and his Nietzschean soul refuses to be depressed by it.' (Merquior 1985 p 75). We will return to this issue as we examine Foucault's relation to Max Weber in this context.

In his essay 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', Max Weber elucidates some of the features of the ideal-type:

> Substanively, this concept in itself is like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of our reality. ... This ideal-typical concept will help to develop our skill in research: it *is* no *'hypothesis'* but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. (MSS p140)

A given ideal-type may, in this context, be read as an enabling device, a useful fiction. This 'heuristics' is echoed by Foucault (with a typically ironic twist) in the 'Foreward to the English Edition' of The Order of Things, where he states:

> In this work, then, I left the problem of causes to one side; I chose instead to confine myself to descibing the transformations themselves, thinking that this would be an indispensible step if, one day, a theory of scientific change and epistemological causality was to be constructed. (OT pxiii)

The device whereby this description is brought out is, as we have noted, the episteme, which in itself constitutes neither description nor explanation. Leaving the detail of this claim for the moment, let us address the alternative readings of Foucault's archaeological works which might be made.

On the one hand, we may read Foucault as offering a kind of Bachelardian version of Levi-Strauss (cf. Habermas 1987 p242) and, on the other hand, we may read him, a la Merquior, as a 'Nietzschean' rejoicing in the infinity of interpretation.

The first reading would imply the unproblematic opening out of history through a systematised semiotics, the introduction of the paradigm-like

concept of episteme as a means of over-coming the problems of historical change that pervade the work of Levi-Strauss, and a strong ontological claim for the status of epistemes. If one adopts this 'strong' reading of Foucault, however, then the achaeological gaze involves a strict *caesuralism*[7]. This raises various interepistemic problems concerning'transepistemic problematics, epistemic lags and dialectical returns' (Merquior 1985 p67) in the body of scientific knowledge; as well as opening up Foucault's account to arguments concerning the accuracy of his intraepistemic representations, particularly with reference to the homogenity of the picture he offers; finally, it also raises the question of intraepistemic collapses or breaks (unless these are ruled by definition, a procedure which would raise yet further problems)(Merquior 1985 p68/69). Within this framework, Merquior's waspish remark :

> If epistemes are far more internally differentiated than the archealogical gaze cares to acknowledge, it comes as no surprise to hear that, in the name of its unitary obsession, *The Order of Things* often overrates the position and prestige of some intellectual trends. (Merquior 1985 p68)

and Habermas's wry comment:

> Under the *stoic* gaze of the archeologist, history hardens into an iceberg covered with the crstalline forms of arbitary formations of discourses. (Habermas 1987 p253)

become understandable complaints despite their polemical overtones. This reading of Foucault's archealogical project seems to raise several problems and opens up his accounts to all kind of query. Perhaps the second kind of reading we indicated will present us with a less problematic picture, that which Merquior labels 'Nietzschean'.

The basic position, for this second interpretation of Foucault's

archeologies, is that he adopts an extreme form of relativism which undercuts any notion of historical objectivity, leaving only the infinite play of interpetations. On this reading, Foucault is engaged in some form of quasi-philosophical, quasi-historical rhetoric celebrating its own will-to-power. History is set up as being capable of having innumerable typologies or schemata imposed on it in the interpretive process. The text of The Order of Things, for example, becomes an exercise in the politics of historical scholarship, a *rhetorical* critique of Whig historiography. Unsurprisingly, this position is also extremely problematic, for, while it effectively abolishes as irrelevant the problems of our previous reading, it simultaneously undermines the critique of triumphalist accounts of the sciences on all but the rhetorical level. Similarly, Foucault's attempt to describe the emergence of the human sciences in their modern form, and his problematisation of this form, loses any claim to epistemological status. The issue of 'what *governs* statements', which he locates at the heart of his enterprise, is reduced to the fantasies of Foucault's own intellectual imagination.

In contrast to these two accounts of Foucault's epistemic enterprise, let us offer a treatment of the episteme as an ideal-type. Firstly, we can note that it is a feature of ideal-type that they involve the one-sided accentuation of certain features of reality, thus the problems raised by Merquior (and similarly by Huppert and Miel, cf. Racevskis 1983 p58) concerning The Order of Things homogenising misrepresentation of 'the facts' can be answered, in that, Foucault is involved in presenting a deliberately slanted perspective which does not make the claim of truth-status, it is, rather, a *utopian* representation. Secondly, the caesuralism which led Boudon and Bourricaud to suggest that (as Merquior puts it)

'Foucauldian history of science ... [is] a mere typology'[8] (Merquior 1985 p75), is both weakened and strengthened in a way which renders their remark trivial. It is weakened in that the status of the claim being made with the episteme is no longer an ontological one but rather a nominalist one, and strengthened in that, as a consequence of this, its typological character reduces its vulnerability to critiques based around interepistemic lags, etc. Thirdly, viewing the episteme as an ideal-typical construct undercuts Merquior's complaint that Foucault is merely rejoicing in the infinity of interpretation; while ideal-type analysis may be linked to Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism[9], there is a stronger claim be made than Merquior's reading of Nietzsche and Foucault suggests. While it is correct to note that Nietzsche undercuts the idea of historical objectivity (in its traditional sense), this does not imply the extreme relativism that Merquior claims for it. On the contrary, Nietzsche transfigures our notion of objectivity, suggesting that it is:

> not ...'contemplation without interest' (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but ... the ability to *control* one's own Pro and Con and to dispose of them so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge (GM, III, 12 in Nehamas 1985 p84)[10]

Nehamas has provided a cogent counter-argument to the relativistic interpretation of Nietzsche that Merquior deploys. Firstly, he notes with regard to perspectivism:

> [it] does not imply that we can never reach correct results or that we can never be "objective," ... The fact that other points of view are possible does not by itself make them equally legitimate: whether an alternative is worth taking ... must be shown independently in each particular case. (Nehamas 1985 p49)

Nehamas illustrates this point by reference to criticisms made of M.H. Abram's Natural Supernaturalism, with regard to which he quotes Wayne Booth's reply:

> It ... seems likely that we *could* have other legitimate histories of Abram's subject ... But whether or not one could be written that would falsify any or his central theses will be settled not by propositional argument but b the argument peculiar to writing a history: can the history be written and, once written, can it be read? ... If someone can write a debunking history of Wordsworth and Romanticism ... then of course we must take his view into account. Go try. (in Nehamas 1985 p64)

Similarly if it is argued that Foucault's ideal-typical epistemes divide and misrepresent the histories with which he is concerned, this must be established by an alternative account which avoids whatever pitfalls Foucault is supposed to have fallen into. Further, the very fact that Foucault has written a particular kind of interpretation and not another should illustrate that he is not engaged in the nihilistic operation that Merquior ascribes to him. It is not denied that other histories of Foucault's subject might be written but, in so far as we treat epistemes as ideal-types, we have seen that the majority of criticisms raised rest on grounds which are negated by this ideal-typical status. Our final point concerns the *politics* of Foucault's archaeologies, that is, their attempt to undermine traditional Whig historiography, to act as a critique of standard triumphalist narratives. It is a feature of our first reading that this element is figured strongly, however we have already noted the problems raised by such a 'strong' reading, our issue becomes, therefore: can we retain the critical thrust of Foucault's mode of writing while reading epistemes as ideal-types?

In answering this, we should note again the points made by Nehamas above, however, it must be recognised that while Foucault's critical intentions are not reduced to a merely rhetorical level, neither do they retain the force our first reading generates. In so far as we are concerned with the politics of Foucault's 'scientific statements', it is clear that the critique of triumphalist accounts similarly stands or falls with the status of his ideal-types. This status, however, is by no means clear - in the essay 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', Weber suggests that:

> Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case the extent to which this ideal- construct approximates to or diverges from reality, ... (MSS p140)

This formulation presents us with certain problems, for if it is the ideal-type which, while 'not a description of reality', is our mode of giving 'unambiguous means of expression to such a description' (MSS p140), then it is difficult to see how one can compare ideal-type and reality except by reference to other ideal-typical constructs whose status would be similarly open to question[11]. In order to avoid this collapse, it becomes necessary to read the ideal-type as a form of perspectivism which entails, as we have already noted, that it is grounded in the richness of its own account rather than on epistemological foundations. As we have pointed out, this does not imply some form of rhetorical relativism, moreover, it goes on to a rejection of the famework within which such epistemologically minded criticisms[12] are raised in favour of the interpretive fruitfulness of Nietzschean perspectivism grounded in its rejection of the natural and given unity of the subject. In the context of our initial characterisation of Foucault's project as being concerned with locating the historically

specific modes or grammars by which man fictions his subjectivity, the resolution offered here between two extreme readings of Foucault would appear to have a certain elegant circularity.

To conclude this section, let us sum up the version of Foucault's archealogical project being offered here in terms of its methodological operation. Firstly, Foucault is deploying a form of ideal-type based perspectivism, we have seen that such a reading undermines the traditional criticisms offered of Foucault's accounts while retaining the political and critical impulses to a greater or lesser extent. Secondly, by combining this reading of Foucault with the *grammatical* interpretation we offered, it becomes apparent that the archaeological enterprise is on one level an attempt to present a genealogy of man's modes of fictioning his subjectivity, the grammars that pattern the interpretive moves by which the subject has been constituted, in various ways, as a having a 'natural given unity'. Given the common nominalism that runs through Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, we should not perhaps be altogether surprised that methodological parallels exist in their work. We shall see, however, that the connections run deeper still than this, a point which will be brought out as we move to the discussion of Foucault's genealogies of power and subjectivity.

2. POWER/KNOWLEDGE

In this section we will examine the underpinnings of Foucault's second genealogical domain: 'a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others.' (Reader p351). Central to this enterprise is the notion of *power/knowledge* and it will be one of the principal tasks of this section to exemplify this often confusing idea. The second major task to be dealt with here is to bring out Foucault's genealogical method, partially in an edificatory mode. Contemporaneously, we will be continuing to locate Foucault in relation to Nietzsche and Weber.

In an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pacquino entitled 'Truth and Power', Foucault comments 'When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was I was talking about, in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power?' (Reader p57). This unformulated issue becomes central in the period which produces Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Vol.1 [hereafter The History of Sexuality]. We can, perhaps, best approach by this examining the confusion Foucault sensed in his own work and, following from this, his critique of traditional conceptions of power. In The Order of Discourse, Foucault presents a relationship between discourse and power organised about the notion of exclusion:

> In a society such as our own we all know the rules of *exclusion*. The most obvious and familiar of these concerns what is *prohibited*. ... We have three types of prohibition, covering objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject; these prohibitions interrelate, reinforce and complement each other, forming a complex web, continually

> subject to modification. I will note simply that the areas where this web is most tightly woven today, where the danger spots are most numerous, are those dealing with politics and sexuality. ... In appearance, speech may well be of little account, but the prohibitons surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire and power. (OD p8)

In a later interview with Lucette Finas, Foucault reflects on this conception of the power/knowledge relationship in the light of his concerns in The History of Sexuality:

> I think that in *The Order of Discourse* I conflated two concepts, or rather that for what I take to be a legitimate problem (that of the articulation of the data of discourse within the mechanisms of power) I provided an inadequate solution. It was a piece I wrote at a moment of transition. Till then, it seems to me, I accepted the traditional conception of power as an essentially juridical mechanism, as that which lays down the law, which prohibits, which refuses, and which has a whole range of negative effects: exclusion, rejection, denial, obstruction, occultation, etc. Now I believe that conception to be inadequate. (P/K p183)

What precisely is this juridical conception of power? What forms does it take? What is its effects? Racevskis notes that normally power has been conceieved 'as a negative force of oppression or repression: there are the subjects who possess power and those subjected to it' (Racevskis 1983 p92). Foucault's position in Madness and Civilisation and The Order of Discourse can be read as two more or less sophisticated versions of this *juridico-discursive* conception. At least three (and probably rather more) exemplars of this form of power can be isolated. Firstly, there is the traditional idea of power operated in terms of law about the notion of *sovereignty*. Secondly, the Marxist conception of power geared around class struggle and modes of production, and articulated as an *economic functionality of power*, in Foucault's terms. Finally, there is the pyschoanalytic notion of power which moves about Freud's and, later,

Reich's ideas of *repression*[13]. These three conceptions of power have certain 'family resemblances' for Foucault and, in The History of Sexuality, he sets out some of the principal features of this kinship in relation to sex:

> - *The negative relation.* It never establishes any connection between power and sex that is not negative: rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment, or mask. ...
> - *The insistence of the rule.* Power is essentially what dictates its law to sex. ...
> - *The cycle of prohibition:* ... To deal with sex, power employs nothing more than a law of prohibition. It's objective: that sex renounce itself. It's instrument: the threat of a punishment that is none other than the suppression of sex. ...
> - *The logic of censorship.* This interdiction is thought to take three forms: affirming that such a thing is not permitted, preventing it from being said, denying that it exists. ...
> - *The uniformity of the apparatus.* Power over sex is operated in the same way at all levels. ... Confronted by a power that is law, the subject who is constituted as a subject - who is "subjected" - is he who obeys. ... A legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other. (HS p83-85)

Why, given the sophistication with which Foucault formulates this model of power, does he suggest it is inadequate to his needs? There are several factors involved here, but centrally placed is the issue of the *productivity* of power, Foucault comments:

> If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (P/K p119)

At this point, it lies with Foucault to illustrate the benefits of treating power as a 'productive network'. It is in this context that he suggests that if we are to concentrate on 'the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place a function within the social organism' (P/K p96), certain methodological precautions are necessary. As Smart has noted, these concern 'the form, level, effect, direction, and 'ideology' of power.' (Smart 1983 p82). Firstly, Foucault suggests that we should analyse power in its more local forms, that is 'at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character' (P/K p97), since if his reformulation of power is to operate it will be seen most clearly in the more 'marginal' instances. Secondly, instead of saying 'Who has power and what is being done with it?', we should examine it in terms of its manifestations, its relationship to a 'field of application' and the effects produced. Thirdly, power should not be treated as coming from individuals or collectivities, rather, he suggests, individuals are constituted by power while also being 'the elements of its articulation' (P/K p98). Fourthly, the analysis of power should operate in an *ascending* manner, that is 'starting ... from its infinitesimal mechanisms ... and then see how these mechanisms have been - and continue to be - invested, colonised, utilised, ... by ever more more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination.' (P/K p99). Finally, while there may have been certain ideological effects produced by power, we should eschew the idea of ideology. Foucault has expanded this final point in an interview which it may be useful to note:

> The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth. ... -The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Third,

> ideology stands in a secondary position relative to somethingwhich functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc. For these three reasons, I think that this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection. (Reader p61)[14]

If one is concerned, as Foucault is, with attempting to examine the emergence of 'regimes of truth' and the ways in which the subject is constituted, it should be apparent that the notion of ideology has no real role to play.

At this point, that is, as we move meanderingly towards an exposition of Foucault's reformulation of the notion of power, a certain wariness is required. Utterances such as 'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (HS p93) have led Foucault to be accused of determinism, hyper-functionalism, hyper-rationalism, etc., in other words, an *absolutising of power*. As Merquior, for example, puts it:

> How can readers avoid the impression of an omnivorous power monolith when, for each sporadic reassuring clause granting power does not embrace everything, they tumble over scores of totalist expressions such as 'disciplinary society', 'disciplinary generalisation', 'general tactics of subjection', 'generalised carceral system', 'carceral continuum', 'carceral texture of society', 'society of surveillance', and so on. How can they readily discard the idea of an omnipotent domination when they are told that our schools and hospitals and factories are essentially mirrors of the prison, our lives being everywhere 'normalised' from cradle to tomb? After all, if Foucault did not mean it, why the deuce did he keep saying it? (Merquior 1985 p115)

Moreover, this leads to a potentially serious methodological problem for Foucault, as Couzens Hoy has noted, since if the social is totally normalised, how is it that Foucault can write genealogies critical of it? The conditions of possibility for the enterprise he is involved in would

appear to be ruled out! For the moment, we will suspend this issue which we shall be examining in detail when we come to look at the notion of 'genealogy', let it suffice to say for now that our reply to this issue will have recourse to the Nietzschean and Weberian threads that permeate Foucault's texts at this point.

Returning to the issue of power, or, more accurately, power/knowledge, we should note, firstly, that Foucault's analyses are characteristically *nominalistic*. We are not concerned with identifying a 'thing' that is Power, but rather 'power' is 'the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.' (HS p93). Secondly, Foucault claims that power is (a) intentional and non-subjective and (b) power relations presuppose relations of resistance. To explain these strange sounding notions, it becomes necessary to note that, as with Nietzsche[15], the underlying metaphor for Foucault's analyses is one of *struggle*. Continuing this metaphor, Foucault argues that three levels of analysis are possible: a level of tactics, a level of strategies, and a level of apparatuses. The relationships between these levels has been nicely summarised by Thiele, who notes:

> Apparatuses are groupings of strategies that respond to a particular historical problem. Strategies, "anonymous and almost unspoken," are co-ordinated groupings of tactics that "becoming connected to one another, but finding their base of support and their conditions elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems." Tactics, on the other hand, are "locquacious," often being "quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed." They are the configurations taken by relations of power imbued with knowledge, and are the forms of power-knowledge relations to serve particular ends. Tactics, in turn, are the form that struggles take. (Thiele 186 p256)

Bearing in mind Foucault's nominalism, i.e. that these are levels of

analysis, his claim that power can be read as both intentional and non-subjective becomes intelligible at least on the levels of apparatuses and strategies. Thiele, again, draws this point out neatly:

> Apparatuses and strategies of power-relations may be proposed as "both intentional ad non-subjective" because their intelligibility, if they are intelligible, results from their being "imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives." Their intelligibility, then, derives from the calculation that goes into each of their tactics. Their non-subjectivity derives rom the lack of any identifiable co-ordinator of these same tactics. ... This means, however, that one cannot say that tactics, like strategies and apparatuses are non-subjective. Like the struggles they manoeuvre, tactics remain tied to subjects. (Thiele 1986 p256)

In the essay 'The Subject and Power', Foucault recognises this point noting, among a series of criteria that a adequate analysis of power relations must satisfy, that it is necessary to locate '*[t]he types of objectives* pursued by those who act upon the actions of others: the mantenance of privileges, the accumulation of profit ...' (SP p223). (This is, perhaps, why Foucault suggests that his analyses of 'technologies of domination' need to be supplemented by analyses of the 'techniques of self'. (cf Habermas 1987 p273)). Similarly, the concept of resistance becomes relatively clear at this point, for once *struggle* is identified as the root of Foucault's conception of power, resistance operates as an immanent element of this conceptualisation, as a 'counter-power'.

Having noted this, it must be said that Foucault's analyses in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality operate at the level of *apparatuses*, a term which does not do justice to the subtlety of the French term *dispositif*. Dreyfus and Rabinow note, for example, that an

equally accurate translation might be *'grid of intelligibility'*, a phrase which more clearly conveys Foucault's nominalism and the fact that *dispositif* is 'the method of the effective historian as well as the structure of the cultural practices he is examining,' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982 p121). We shall return to this later, however, it might be apposite at this moment to give an example of Foucault's power-knowledge analyses.

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies two modes in which the strategies of power become manifest: (a) an anatomo-politics of the human body and (b) a bio-politics of the population. The former of these concerns 'the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, ... its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls,' (HS p139). The latter 'focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.' (HS p139). The ways in which, and through which, these two modes become integrated operates as the central issue in Foucault's analyses; thus in 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century', he concludes that:

> The return of the hospitals, and more particular the projects for their architectural, institutional and technical reorganisation, owed its importance in the eighteenth century to this set of problems relating to urban space, the mass of the population with its biological characteristics, the close-knit family cell and the bodies of the individuals. (P/K p182)

We can see a further exemplar of this kind of analysis, which is quite revealing, if not so elaborated, in an example Foucault gives to illustrate what he means by describing power as intentional and non-subjective. We

shall quote this at length:

> From around 1825 to 1830 one finds the local and perfectly explicit appearence of definite strategies for fixing the workers in the first heavy industries at their work-places. At Mulhouse and in northern France various tactics are elaborated: pressuring people to marry, providing housing, building *cities ouvrieres*, practising that sly system of credit-slavery that Marx talks about ... Around all this there is formed little by little a discourse, the discourse of philanthropy and the moralisation of the working class. Then the experiments become generalised by way of institutions and societies consciouly advocating programmes for the moralisation of the working class. Then on top of that there is superimposed the problem of women's work, the schooling of children and the relations between the two issues. Between the schooling of children, which is a centralised, Parliamentary measure, and this or that purely local initiative dealing with workers' housing, for example, one finds all sorts of support mechanisms (unions of employers, chambers of commerce, etc.) which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place - so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it. (P/K p202/203)

The series of relays, Foucault traces here, from the economic utility of the worker to the future of the nation involves several further features which are not elaborated on in this interview. Thus the threefold relationship between statistical societies (prominent in England from the 1830's onwards), the women's movment and the 'scientisation' of charitable practices, relate into a series of local campaigns concerning temperance, hygiene, education, family planning, etc., which acted as further relays, supports, and buttresses[16]. Returning to our central theme however, we have here a concrete example of how power operates both in terms of an anatamo-politics of the body and a bio-politics of the population, but also, further, how it can intelligibly analysed as both intentional and non-subjective. On this second point, it is worth noting that Catherine Millot

follows the above example by Foucault with the question 'But then what role does social class play?' (P/K p203). Foucault's answer illustrates his (sympathetic?) critique of Marxist analyses: '[O]ne can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. ... But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or eonomic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibily imposed this strategy on the working class.' (P/K p203).

One could multiply further examples of this form of analyses (Donzelot's The Policing of Families, for example, as well as Foucault's own studies), but, at this moment, we shall return to two issues we have left suspended at earlier points in our discussion. Let us, therefore, conclude this area of analysis by summarising the principal features of Foucault's *analytics* of power which we have examined. Firstly, power should be treated nominalistically and as a relational concept . Secondly, 'power' denotes struggles and is analysable at three levels (tactics, strategies, apparatuses). Thirdly, conceptually it appears that relations of resistance are immanent in relations of power. One might extend this list further, but to do so would pre-empt our coming discussion which will continue to clarify this notion of power/knowledge by locating it within the context of the *genealogical* project Foucault is operating.

We have already noted that the term *dispositif* refers both to the method of the historian and the structure of the practices being examined. In the first section of this chapter, we explored the relationship of the concept of *episteme* to the notion of an *ideal type*. By relating the concept of *dispositif* to that of *episteme* we may find a route into the further

uncovering of links between Foucault's work and that of Weber and Nietzsche.

In the interview 'The Confession of the Flesh', Foucault states:

> What I should like to do now is to try and show that what I call an apparatus [dispositif] is a much more general case of the *episteme*; or rather, that the *episteme* is a specifically *discursive* apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous. (P/K p197)[17]

Thus if, as we have argued, the episteme can be seen as a form of ideal-type, it follows that the concept 'dispositif' is similarly a form of ideal-type, albeit one which deals with non-discursive, as well as discursive, phenomena. Consequently, the dispositif that Foucault sets up about the figure of the Panoptican consists of discourse about the prison as well as the practices deployed in relation to the prison. That the Panoptican operates as a *perspective* concept through which Foucault generates a deliberately one-sided analysis of modernity should, therefore, not surprise us since it is deployed in an ideal-typical fashion. At this point, it becomes necessary to raise what, at first sight, appears to be a difficulty for my interpretive strategy here, which is simply this: Foucault totally rejects that he is doing an ideal typical analysis within some kind of history of rationalisation. Both in The Archeaology of Knowledge (p15) and in 'Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault'[18], he rejects the Weberian tag. The manner in which this occurs, however, is revealing. Firstly, let us note Foucault's description of the concept 'ideal type':

> Schematically one can say that the "ideal type" is a catagory of historical interpretation; it's a structure of understanding for the historian who seeks to integrate,

> after the fact, a certain set of data: it allows him to recapture an "essence" (Calvinism, the State, the capitalist enteprise), working from general principles that are not at all present in the thoughts of the individuals whose concrete behaviour is nevertheless to be understood on their basis. (QM p109)

This interpretation is somewhat strange to put it mildly, since Weber is catagorically not concerned with locating "essences" but rather with developing perspective concepts, logically coherent utopia's, which aid us to order the multi-dimensional flux of reality, thus he states:

> Nothing ... is more dangerous than the *confusion* of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the "true" content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such "ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works itself out in history. (mss p94)

That Weber should be accused by Foucault of the very 'naturalistic prejudice' he warns of is rather harsh. Indeed, Foucault's own comments on genealogy (FR p76-100) - paticularly on its explicitly slanted perspective - serve to reinforce both the relationship between genealogy and ideal-type, and between ideal-type and dispositif. We can take this further by illustrating another instance of Foucault's misinterpretation of Weber (noted by Colin Gordon), shortly before the above quote he says:

> I don't believe one can talk in this [Weberian] way of 'rationalisation' as something given, without on the one hand postulating an absolute value inherent in reason, and on the other taking the risk of applying the term empirically in a completely arbitary way. I think one must confie ones use of this term to an instrumental and relative meaning. (QM p107)

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Merquior gives us a good indication of where to begin when he makes the following point:

> In chapter VII of *The Joyous [Gay] Science* Nietzsche gives a list of histories yet to be written: the history of love, greed, envy, conscience, pity and cruelty; a comparative history of law; another of penalties. ... Can anyone read this without instantly recognising at least part of Foucault's historical enterprise? (Merquior 1985 p143)

Probably not. The Nietzschean thrust of Foucault's work is well recognised and, in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Foucault makes his bow to Nietzsche's influence; several points in that essay are salient to our current discussion. A reasonable starting place is to consider the distinctions Foucault makes between Nietzschean genealogy and traditonal history, these move about history's tacit deployment of hidden metaphysics. Thus, for Foucault, traditional history assumes:

> a suprahistorical perspective: a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed on itself; ... a history whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development. The historian's history finds its support outside of time and pretends to base its judgements on an apocalyptic objectivity. This is only possible, however, because of its belief in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself. (Reader p86/87)

Genealogy, in contrast, 'refuses the certainty of absolutes,' combining both ontological and ethical scepticism. Thus, for example, in contrast to Whig historiography, Foucault presents the darker side of the Enlightenment project thereby illustrating the crucial ambiguity of modern humanism - both in content and stylistic terms, Foucault deliberately reverses the triumphalist rhetoric of Whig history as a means of undermining the disciplinary rationality embodied in this discourse. This is significant

also as Foucault notes that:

> The final trait of effective history is its affirmation of knowledge as perspective. Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy - the unavoidable obstacles of their passion. Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice. (Reader p92)

To read Foucault's studies as making standard historical truth-claims is, therefore, to misunderstand the nature of the enterprise. His nominalist histories, like Nietzsche's essays in The Genealogy of Morals, operate both as attempts to undercut the presuppositions in which traditional historical discourse is grounded and as accounts which, through their deliberately one-sided accentuation of certain features of reality, render ambiguous standard versions of historical events.

In this context, we can see that, apart from certain formal similarities with Weber's ideal type, the concept of dispositif also operates for similar functional purposes: just as the ideal-type implicitly criticises the presuppositions of (Hegelian and Marxist) teleological versions of history[19], so too the dispositif enables Foucault to mount a two-pronged attack on triumphalist accounts of modernity. We have been concentrating on Foucault's relations to Weber here, largely because his relations to Nietzsche, in this area, are already well documented. There are some aspects of these relationships, however, which we have not yet explored. To facilitate this, we will return to that other issue that we left suspended in our discussion: does Foucault absolutise power and, thereby, rule out the possibility of his own discourse?

In its standard form, this assumes Foucault views modernity as totally

normalised (i.e. the Panoptican *is* modern society), however, a slightly more sophisticated version is offered by Charles Taylor, who argues that Foucault talks:

> as though regimes of truth were all encompassing, governing a domain of second- and first-order discourse alike. But, in fact, they are more porous and elastic, as his own work shows. ... If this were not so, none of the books he produced could have been written; we would have no meta-discourse at all on epistemai and regimes of power. (Taylor 1985b p381/382)

We may deal with the standard version of this critique relatively rapidly in order to get on to the rather more interesting points raised by Taylor. At least three points of rebuttal have been deployed here: (a) Foucault's accounts are 'terribly one-sided' (Taylor 1985a p164) precisely because he is operating an ideal-typical/genealogical mode of representation, he is not saying 'Here is a true and accurate representation of modernity,' but, rather, 'Here is a version of modernity which counteracts traditional versions and illuminates that the modern is an essentially ambiguous achievement.', (b) Foucault is not suggesting that the various programmes that he focuses on correspond to strategical reality, rather, he is interested precisely in their non-correspondences, their unintended consequences (P/K p250), and (c), as David Couzens Hoy points out, Foucault 'paints the picture of a totally normalised society, not because he believes our present society is one, but because he hopes we will find the picture threatening.' (FCR p14) i.e. to provoke us to resist the trends that are taking our society in this direction. Can these points[20], singularly or in some combination, undermine or deflect Taylor's criticism? To examine this, we should clarify the criticism itself - Taylor, in 'Foucault on Freedom and Truth', quotes the following passage to exemplify Foucault's

Nietzschean relativism:

> Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the aquisition of truth; the status of whose who are charged with saying what counts as true. (P/K p131 in Taylor 1985a p177)

Two points arise, for Taylor, out of this threeway Nietzschean link-up Foucault operates between the will-to-knowledge, the will-to-truth and the will-to-power. Firstly, different historical regimes of truth are incommensurable, therefore, 'transformation from one regime to another cannot be a *gain* in truth or freedom, because each is redefined in the new context.' (Taylor 1985a p178). Secondly, 'because of the Nietzschean notion of truth imposed by a regime of power, Foucault cannot envisage liberating transformations *within* a regime.' (Taylor 1985a p178). The consequence of these issues is, for Taylor, that Foucault's operation becomes incoherent in that the logic of his discourse rules out that same discourse by fiat. We can argue, following Connolly, that Taylor's critique of Foucault rests largely on a misreading of his rhetoric and, consquently, his enterprise. On his first point, we may note the following misunderstanding: he suggests that by representing regimes as discrete units for rhetorical purposes (the ironic critique of triumphalism), Foucault denies the porousness of these regimes but, as Connolly has noted, Foucault talks of 'this will to truth which has crossed so many centuries of our history' (Connolly 1985 p369). While Foucault takes up a stance of ethical scepticism relative to the notion of progress, this does not imply an out and out ethical neutrality. Taylor's second point manifests quite clearly the misreading at

work here; for to criticise Foucault in terms of the issue of liberation, is to miss the point entirely. Foucault precisely rejects the repression/liberation dichotomy as part and parcel of the role of the juridico-discursive conception of power in acting as a means of disguising the operations of power in modern society (HS p86). A more serious point lies behind this though, if Foucault rejects the 'ideology of liberation', in what terms are movements counter to the power apparatus of modernity to be posed? Here we are brought back to the issue of resistance and its forms. In the interview 'Truth and Power', Foucaults states:

> It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. (Reader p75)

This implies, for instance, that we can read Foucault's own texts as examples of resistance, as attempts to undermine the modern forms of hegemony within which power operates. This would explain, also, why Foucault says he would like his books to be like 'Molotov cocktails' (in Merquior 1985 p118). A final point remains, relative to Taylor's critique, that is his suggestion that Foucault fails 'to recognise the ambivalence of modern disciplines, which are the bases both of domination and self-rule.' (Taylor 1985a p179). Now this would be significant were such an attentive reader of Nietzsche to deny, what has already been referred to as the essential ambiguity of modernity. However, Foucault is guilty of no such offence, stating, for example, 'If one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western societies, one has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self.' (in Habermas 1987 p273). The analysis put forward in <u>Discipline and Punish</u> is, thus,

acknowledged as only a partial account.

Before concluding this section, we must examine one last problem raised for Foucault's accounts. This perspicious point is made by Frederic Jameson:

> What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic - the Foucault of the prisons book is the obvious example - the more powerless the reader comes to feel. Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that degree he loses, since the critical capacity of his work is thereby paralysed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself. (FCR p11)

Now it is not enough here to say that there is a misreading of Foucault going on, since it is prescisely this kind of misreading that is common enough in the critical responses to Foucault to make Jameson's point a serious one. Here is the true role of the secondary text (Rajchman's, and Dreyfus and Rabinow's commentaries/interpretations are the best examples here), to clear up misunderstanding and to prevent the 'winner loses' logic that Jameson points to taking effect. This solution does seem somewhat inadequate though.[21].

Let us conclude this section, however, by reviewing what Foucault offers us here. Firstly, a reformulation of power (drawing on Nietzsche) in terms of the triple axis: power-knowledge-truth. Secondly, a genealogical project (following on from Nietzsche and Weber) which maps the essentially ambiguous achievement that constitutes modernity. Thirdly, a rhetorical strategy that *attempts* to disrupt power relations of domination by acting as an exemplar of resistance to such relations. These three points give us

some indication of the weight of Foucault's achievement, in the next section we will explore how he moves on from these concerns.

SELF-MAKING

In this section, we take up the third domain of genealogy identified by Foucault: 'a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.' (Reader p351). Foucault's use of the term *ethics* is, as we shall see, a touch unorthodox, however during the course of this section we will reach an understanding of precisely what this latest move is meant to achieve. We will, of course, be continuing to relate Foucault's trajectory to Nietzsche and Weber.

Foucault's point of departure in these studies was a problematisation of the notion of the *desiring subject*. That is to say, in order to be rigorously nominalistic, Foucault could not just take on board the notion of the desiring subject as a 'generally accepted theoretical theme' (UP p5), on the contrary, it seemed:

> that one could not very well analyze the formation and development of the experience of sexuality from the eighteenth century onward, without doing a historical and critical study dealing with desire and the desiring subject. ... Thus, in order to understand how the modern individual could experience himself as a subject of "sexuality," it was essential first to determine how, for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognise himself as a subject of desire. (UP p5/6)

Consequently, Foucault relocates his project in the period from classical antiquity through the first centuries of Christianity, since it is here, he suspects the moves leading to the notion of man as a desiring subject emerge. How then is this *problématique* approached? For Foucault, the quest begins with a question: 'How did sexual behaviour ... come to be conceived

as a domain of moral experience?' (UP p24).

At this point, it becomes necessary to focus on Foucault's conception of 'ethics' and the methodological elements implied by this conception. The concern is not merely with codes of morality or tables of laws for, as Foucault points out, any given rule of conduct may be interpreted in a variety of ways. Rather we must focus on the *rapport à soi*, the relationship of the actors self to itself, the "practices of self" (UP p28) which support the constitution of the suject as a moral agent and, thereby, particular moral domains. 'Ethics', for Foucault, is this self-activity, the kind of relationship one has with oneself. He identifies four methodological implications as arising out of this approach.

Firstly, a concern with the *determination of the ethical substance*; this involves analysing 'the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as as the prime material of his moral conduct.' (UP p26), in other words:

> [This] aspect answers the question: which is the aspect or the part of myself or my behaviour which is concerned with moral conduct? For instance, you can say, in general, that in our society the main field of morality, the part of ourselves which is most relevant for morality, is our feelings. ... Well, it's quite clear that from the Kantian point of view, intention is much more important than feelings. And from the Christian point of view, it is desire - ... (Reader p352).

In the same interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow, from which the above quote is taken, Foucault gives a useful example of the way the ethical substance may shift:

For the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a boy, but did not touch him, his behaviour was valued. The problem was: does he touch the boy or not? That's the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire. For Augustine, it's very clear that when he remembers his relationship to his young friend when he was eighteen years old, what bothers him is what exactly was the kind of desire he had for him. So you see that the ethical substance has changed. (Reader p353).

The second element Foucault indicates as relevant is a concern with the *mode of subjection* (*mode d'assujettissement*), by which is signified 'the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognises himself as obliged to put it into practice.' (UP p27)[22]. Thus, for example, one may be faithful to a conjugal partner on a variety of grounds: because infidelity is sinful, because one wishes to set an example, because one is giving a certain aesthetic form to one's life, because one is obeying the conventions of a community of which one is a member, etc. The mode of subjection concerns the particular relation and form of practice a subject takes up.

Thirdly, Foucault points to the notion of *ethical work*, that is, 'the self-forming activity (*practique de soi*) or *l'ascétisme - asceticism* in a very broad sense' (Reader p355) which one operates on oneself. This refers to kinds of procedures one deploys to upon oneself 'not only in order to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behaviour.' (UP p27). Foucault illustrates this with regard to sexual austerity:

[Which] can be practised through a long effort of learning, memorization, and assimilation of a systematic ensemble of precepts, and through a regular checking of conduct aimed at

> measuring the exactness with which one is applying these rules. It can be practiced in the form of a sudden, all-embracing, and definitive renunciation of pleasures; it can also be practiced in the form of a relentless combat those vicissitudes ... can have meaning and value in themselves; and it can be practiced through a decipherment as painstaking, continuous, and detailed as possible, of the movements of desire in all its hidden forms, including the most obscure. (UP p27)

In other words, just as an adequate analysis of meaning requires that we identify the particular mode of subjection deployed so, also, we must deliniate the specific kind of ethical work going on in order to grasp the regime of self-making in operation.

Foucault final methodological point concerns the *telos* of ethical activity: 'What is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?' (Reader p355). Are we aspiring to self-mastery, purity, immortality, freedom - '[a] moral action tends towards its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the establishing of a moral conduct that commits an individual, not only to other acions always in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject.' (UP p28)[23].

To understand, to grasp, how sexual experience entered the moral domain and to trace the emergence of man as a desiring subject requires that we examine not the codes of morality in the ancient world but, rather, that we shift our emphasis to an inspection of the changing relations of self qua self, the mutating ways in which 'the individual is summoned to recognise himself as an ethical subject of sexual conduct.' (UP p32). This constitutes a significant reformulation of the question concerning the

relationship between Antiquity and Christianity, it is however one prefigured in the writings of Nietzsche. Before we go on to examine this point however, it may be useful to look at the kind of result which emerges from this style of analysis and how it relates to the kinds of analyses by Foucault we have examined in the previous two sections.

The four aspects of the kind of relationship to oneself, which we have illustrated, are deployed by Foucault to generate schema's of Greek and Christian *ethics*. Thus, he suggests, that:

> the *substance éthique* for the Greeks was the *aphrodisia*; the *mode d'assujettissement* was a politico-aesthetic choice; the *form d'ascèse* was the *techne* which was used - and there we find, for example, the *techne* about the body, or economics as the rules by which you define your role as husband, or the erotic as a kind of asceticism towards oneself in loving boys, and so on - and the *téléologie* was the mastery of oneself. (Reader p357)

In contrast, the Christian *rapport à soi* revolved about rather different self-practices:

> the telos has changed: the telos is immortality, purity, and so on. The asceticism has changed, because now self-examination takes the form of self-deciphering. The *mode d'assujettissement* is now divine law. And I think that even the ethical substance has changed, because it is not *aphrodisia*, but desire, concupiscence, and flesh, and so on. (Reader p358)

This change in the kind of relationship one has with oneself is significant, however, not merely in terms of the emergence of the Christian *hermeneutics* of the 'subject of desire' but, perhaps principally, in relation to the issue of *subjectivity* in Foucault's thought. It will be

recalled that in the 'Foreward to the English Edition' of <u>The Order of Things</u>, Foucault states that:

> If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which gives a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity - which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. (OT pxiv)

In analysing Foucault's epistemic version of history, it was argued that he was concerned with the historically specific grammars which structure the fictioning of our subjectivity, that is a set of rules which delineate the framework within which the fashioning of our subjectivity occurs. Given this interpretation implies the rejection of any notion of a 'transcendental consciousness', Foucault's rejection of phenomenological approaches was relatively straightforward. It is in the latter two volumes on sexuality that Foucault provides an account of the constitution of subjectivity which concretises his earlier objections towards traditional philosophical treatments (particularly the phenomenological treatment) of this issue.

In <u>The Use of Pleasure</u>, Foucault makes a point along these lines when he says:

> The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms [of the problematisations] themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter. (UP p12)

His concern in these later texts is largely with the emergence of *rapport à soi* in relation to particular practices. To illustrate Foucault's critique

of standard accounts of subjectivity, we have to examine how the concept of 'self' relates to the concept of 'subjectivity' as he deploys them. Mark Poster, in 'Foucault and the Tyranny of Greece', suggests that there is some lack of clarity here:

> Characteristically Foucault does not spend much time defining his categories of analysis, in this case those of 'self' and 'subject'. It appears from the text that 'self' is a neutral, ahistorical term, almost a synonym for individual. 'Subject' is an active, historical term that refers to the process of interiorization. Foucault, of course, continues to reject philosophies of consciousness by which the individual constitutes himself or herself through mental activities. Still, there is some ambiguity in Foucault's use of the term 'subject'. It is not always clear that he avoids a 'subjectivist' use of the term. (FCR p212)

There is some truth to Poster's remark, however, he misses the point a little when he suggests that the term 'self' acts as a virtual synonym for 'individual', and that this 'slip' is significant to generating a coherent interpretation of what Foucault is doing here. To bring out this significance requires that we attempt to (re)construct the notion of self that Foucault is deploying here.

Concerning 'The Moral Problematization of Pleasures', Foucault expresses the intention of trying to illustrate:

> how ... three practices were conceptualised in medicine or philosophy and how these reflections resulted in various recommendations, not for codifying sexual conduct in a precise way, but for "stylizing" it: stylizations within dietics, understood as an art of the everyday relationship of the individual with his body; in economics as an art of a man's behaviour as head of a family; and in erotics as an art of the reciprocal conduct of a man and a boy in a love relationship. (UP p93)

Here the use of the notion of *stylisation* is crucial to locating Foucault's

position relative to the concept of selfhood. To make an initial connection on this issue, let us compare the above quote to Nietzsche's comments on the giving of style to one's character:

> *One thing is needful* - To give 'style' to one character - a great and rare art. It is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears an art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added, here a piece of original nature has been removed - both times through long practise and daily work. ... (GS 290)

Davey has pointed out that it is in Nietzsche's remarks on character and style that a coherent (if implicit) version of the self as multiplicity emerges. This consists in the recognition of the point that Nietzsche's notion of wholeness with reference to the self is of an aesthetic wholeness, not a logical wholeness, thus, as Davey puts it:

> Giving style to one's character does not involve a change of physical person but the enforcement of an interpretive homogeneity throughout all aspects of one's being. The task is regulative and will never be complete for just as the changing web of historical and cultural relations in which an art work exists will alter the readings that constitute it, so the changing web of complexities surrounding subjects-as-multiplicities will affect how they construct and re-construct themselves as characters. (Davey p276)

In fact, Foucault has explicitly acknowledged this relationship to Nietzsche in an interveiw with Dreyfus and Rabinow (FR p351)[24]. Consequently, we can see that Foucault's concept of self is not synonomous with the individual, but rather, closely related to Nietzsche notion of character. Of those elements involved in Foucault's analysis of the stylisation of self, perhaps the most important as regards the hermeneutic organisation and integration of one's multiple selves is the *telos* of one's ethical action. While we can

recognise that within the framework of any given *telos*, a variety of distinct specific stylisations are possible, we can, perhaps, say that the *telos* sets the stylistic parameters within which one's self-stylising activity operates. What are the implications of this for the issue of subjectivity? Cook has suggested that subjectivity is constituted through 'the self-reflexivity that comes of practicing various moral precepts on oneself,' (Cook 1987 p219). This leads to the stronger claim that '[t]hinking itself is made possible by the self-reflexivity of various historical practices.'(Cook 1987 p220). Certainly, there appear to be good grounds for this suggestion; Foucault has, after all, stated that he is concerned with 'the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and must be thought.' (UP p6/7). The mechanics of this self-reflexive process, however, have been left at the level of being subsumed under the phrase 'a fold or double' (Cook 1987 p219). Foucault gives us a fuller description:

> Of course all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply "self-awareness" but self-formation as an "ethical subject," a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself. There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without "modes of subjectivation" and an "ascetics" or "practices of the self" that support them. (UP p28)

In other words, the formation of subjectivity relates to the active relation of self qua self grounded in particular cultural practices. By

specifying particular historal subjectivity-formations, Foucault not only, genealogically, undermines versions of history and philosophy that take the subject as, in a variety of senses, *given*; he also provides us with a set of procedures for the analysis of the emergence of 'modern man'. Whereas, in Discipline and Punish, he had been concerned with the emergence (Entstehung) of particular constellations of power relations which act to *normalise* the subject in its constitution; he is now concerned with the 'technologies of the self' by which the subject qua subject constitutes itself. It should be noted that there is no theoretically necessary or smooth incorporation of these technologies of self-production into networks of power relations. Only detailed genealogical analysis will illustrate how, over a given period, relations between technologies of self and relations of power (and resistance) are articulated[25].

Having outlined the kind of operation that Foucault is involved in these later works, we are now in a position to relate this to Nietzsche and Weber. On one level, of course, we have already argued that the notion of self that Foucault deploys is closely related to Nietzsche's reflections on character. However, Poster has also noted that Nietzsche has been important in a variety of ways for the constitution and operation of Foucault's work in this area, thus: 'Even more than to Marx, Foucault demonstrates his debt to Nietzsche, especially in *The History of Sexuality* [Vols. 2 & 3 - my insert],' (FCR p210). Firstly, it is not difficult to perceive that the trajectory of Foucault's project in the latter volumes of The History of Sexuality mirrors Nietzsche's concerns in the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche, in setting up a contrast between good-bad morality and good-evil morality, recognises that the analysis of systems of ethics has to be grounded in an analysis of relations to self, be it in the self-affirmation

of the Greeks or the self-negation of the slave. Secondly, in the essay on *bad conscience*, he argues that the emergence of man as 'an animal with the right to make promises' (GM p189), that is the emergence of conscience, is grounded in a series of social practices. It is Nietzsche's deployment of these two strategies that Foucault develops in his studies on sexuality; thus he 'substitute[s] a history of ethical problematisations based on practices of self, for a history of morality based, hypothetically, on interdictions.' (UP p13). Their treatments of the relation between 'pagan' and Christian ethics, similarly, operate on parallel lines. Nietzsche's comment that: 'Christianity only takes up the fight that had already begun against the *classical* ideal and the *noble* religion.' (WP 196, cf. also WP 195), and his observation that Christianity both draws on and re-interprets particular ways of life existing within Antiquity (GS 353), while differing in emphasis and some details, makes essentially the same points as Foucault does when, for example, he discusses four aspects of similarities between 'pagan' and Christian practices and ethics (UP p15-20), while stressing 'they do not have the same place or value within them.' (UP p21). Beyond these points, it has been suggested in relation to these texts, as it has been for the earlier writing, that Nietzsche's concept of truth is central to Foucault's enterprise. For Poster, for example, it is the adoption of a Nietzschean notion of truth that leads to Foucault's rejection of the foundational subject and, consequently, his preference for a version of the subject that is 'both de-centered and relativist' (FCR p212). All in all, the significance of Nietzsche permeates the work on sexuality on a level much more apparent than in some of Foucault's earlier work.

The relationship of these studies to the work of Max Weber is less

immediately apparent. Certainly, Foucault is operating an analysis set up about a *dispositif* (grid of intelligibility) of desire as an ethical problem; beyond this point, however, few points of similarity spring to mind. By drawing on Hennis's recent work on Weber, however, it may be that buried connections will emerge.

Hennis points out that Weber's analysis of religions treated them as 'systems for the regulation of life' (Hennis 1988 p42) whose practical effects concern the social scientist. For Hennis, this mode of analysis develops out of Weber's 'Central Question', a concern with '[n]othing less than the requisite comprehension of the genesis of modern man - no! *Menschentum* - by way of a historical-differential investigation!' (Hennis 1988 p43/44). This investigation being constituted by two accounts: a history of modern science and a history of modern *Lebensführung* (style of life/form of life/manner of life). If Hennis is correct in his suggestions, that is, if Weber is fundamentally concerned with generating a 'history of the present' by tracing the genealogy of the modern *Typus Mensch*, then it is apparent that his project is rather closer to Foucault's than might be initially imagined. Certainly, on a formal level, Weber's use, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, of Benjamin Franklin's Necessary Hints to Those That Would Be Rich and Advice to a Young Tradesman parallels Foucault's use of prescriptive texts in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. Similarly, Weber's distinction between the meaning of making money for Fugger and Franklin (PESC p51) formally parallels Foucault's comments on the difference in meaning of sexual austerity for Greeks and Christians in The Use of Pleasure. While they are both concerned with modes of being-in-the-world, however, their emphases are distinct. Foucault, as we have already noted, is concerned with

changing 'practices of self' in relation to the way, as Poster has put it, 'through which individuals become, in the modern period, subjects whose truth is their sexuality.' (FCR p212). Weber, in contrast, examines changing *styles* of life in relation to their consequences for the constitution of the modern subject as *disenchanted*.

To conclude this section, we will comment on the significance of this portion of Foucault's work for his over-all project, that is, a history of the present. While at first sight, being incomplete, The History of Sexuality series seems a distance from Foucault's general concerns, however, as he pointed out, a genealogy of the desiring subject demands the humble beginnings represented by the latter volumes. His comment at the start of the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' is singularly apposite here:

> Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been stratched over and recopied many times. (Reader p76).

On a theoretical and methodological level though, Foucault's attempt to rethink the relationship between selfhood and subjectivity is particularly rich. With regard to selfhood, he avoids the customary problems concerning the self-as-multiplicity by operating a hermeneutic procedure organised about the *telos* of the individual which allows for integation without sacrificing the notion of change and movement by the self. By making subjectivity an outcome of this self-reflexive hermeneutic, he undermines traditional versions of the subject while offering a mode of analysing the constitution of this subject. This is relevant to both the earlier work on *epistemes* and *power*. With regard to the former, it clarifies his rejection

of 'phenomenonological' approaches and illustrates the concern with modes of being in a less abstract manner. In relation to power, these formulations offer the possibility of resolving the problem of analysing power on the level of the subject while indicating how we may concretise the rather vague comments on the role of power in the constitution of the subject which were offered in the first volume of _The History of Sexuality_. It may be that so far as generating a genealogy of man in modernity is concerned this latter issue will be the most significant of all Foucault's theoretical shifts and reformulations.

Notes

1. The relationship between Nietzsche and Weber themselves has been recently explored by Hennis: 'Traces of Nietzsche in Weber' in Max Weber: Essays in Renconstruction (1988). Also in Fleischmann's 'De Weber à Nietzsche' in Archives Européennes de Sociologie, (1964) Vol.5, pp190-238.

2. It is interesting to note that 'archaeology' is subsumed under 'genealogy' here. On the whole, Foucault tends to suggest they constitute different levels of analysis, cf. UP p11/12.

3. Cf. Schacht Nietzsche (1983) pp130-32, for example, or Strong Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (1975) pp78-86, amongst others.

4. It would be interesting to know if Wittgenstein was aware of Nietzsche's use of the phrase 'family resemblances', particularly given their parallel developments in relation to Schopenhauer.

5. This general idea of being 'up for grabs' as true or false was developed by Ian Hacking cf 'Language, Truth and Reason' in Rationality and Relativism (1982) ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes.

6. Cf. his Foucault (1985) especially Ch.5.

7. This term originally applied to Foucault by Herminio Martins in his 'Time and Theory in Sociology'.

8. Interestingly this remark echoes a complaint made by Talcott Parsons about Weber, cf. Max Weber's Ideal-Type Theory (1969) ed. Rogers p61.

9. Cf. chapter 4

10. This can be compared with Weber's notion of the necessity of 'passionate devotion' for meaningful scholarship. Cf. Weber's 'Science as a

Vocation' in FMW. Cf. also p174.

11. This problem, I think, develops out of the tension between Nietzschean and neo-kantian elements in Weber's work.

12. This point is nicely dealt with by Strong's 'Texts and Pretexts: Reflections on Perspectivism in Nietzsche' (1985) in Political Theory Vol. 13, No.2, which brings out the point that Persectivism is not an alternative epistemlogy but an alternative to epistemology.

13. Cf. P/K 'Two Lectures' pp 78-109

14. The ideology/truth dichotomy, Foucault suggests, is generated out of the constitution of man as an empirico-transcendental doublet in the modern episteme. Cf. OT pp319-321.

15. For Nietzsche, *struggle* is the manifestation of the will to power both in relation to the world and oneself: 'Every living thing reaches out as far from itself with its force as it can, and overwhelms what is weaker:' (WP 769).

16. I illustrate this in my 'Fictioning Feminism: The Construction of "Woman" 1750-1930' (unpublished B.A. dissertation).

17. This quote also illustrates why Foucault can treat archaeology as a sub-section of genealogy.

18. This interview is in After Philosophy (1987) ed. Baynes et al. pp100-118.

19. This criticism being the third mentioned in the quote from Weber on p26 of this paper.

20. NB. the first two points of rebuttal here operate on theoretical grounds, while the third provides a practical instance of defence.

21. It might be possible to develop a defence against Jameson's point by suggesting that the interpretation depends on the type of reader, i.e. the

'strong' reader will interpret the text in terms of struggle against the society portrayed, while the 'weak' reader will acquiese. A parallel with Nietzsche's distinction between active and passive nihilists could be utilised here.

22. This notion of 'filling in' the rule might be compared with the ethnomethodological position on the insufficiency of rules in themselves.

23. The notion of the individual's *telos* has also been deployed by MacIntyre in the narrative conception of selfhood he develops in After Virtue (1981), although for ends diametrically opposed to Foucault.

24. Foucault: I would like to say ...: we should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.

Dreyfus/Rabinow: That sounds like Nietzsche's observation in *The Gay Science* [no. 290] that one should create one's life by giving style to it through long practice and daily work. (Reader p351).

Foucault: Yes. My view is much closer to Nietzsche's than to Sartre's.

25. Cf. Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987) p273.

DISCIPLINE, SUBJECTIVITY, POWER

Introduction

In the last chapter, we examined Foucault's theoretical trajectory in a fairly abstract manner. Our concern now is to ground this trajectory through an analysis of its concrete exemplifications. In other words, we shall be delineating Foucault's theorisation of modernity. In our earlier analyses of Nietzsche and Weber, we have seen how the concept of 'discipline' occupies a central role in the diagnoses of the modern they offer[1]. This moves about 'discipline' in the sense of the *disciplining of the individual by external forces* but also in the sense of the *disciplined self-creation of the individual by the individual.* The ambiguity of the modern for Nietzsche and Weber is generated through the tension embodied in these two senses of 'discipline'. Having illustrated some of the ways in which Foucault's mode(s) of theorising relate to the work of Nietzsche and Weber, our analysis of Foucault's account of modernity will, therefore, operate in terms of this dual sense of discipline.

Initially, we will take up Foucault's earlier concerns, as manifested in Madness and Civilisation, in order to examine the rationale behind the movement from archaeology to genealogy. Secondly, we shall look at Foucault's depictions of the various measures, devices, discourses, etc. which act to discipline the individual. Here we will be concerned, largely, with the arguments presented in Discipline and Punish and in The History of Sexuality Vol.1. In the third section, we will examine the implications of Foucault's suggestions for analysing the subject's self-constitution, as illustrated in volumes 2 and 3 of the Sexuality series: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. We will throughout be touching on the

issue of the *politics* of Foucault's theorising, particularly in relation to its potential operation as a critique of liberalism. This theme, it will be recalled, has already been shown to be significant in relation to Nietzsche and Weber - Foucault joins in the conversation. This issue will, however, be largely suspended till the next chapter

1. Discipline and Archaeology

We have referred to the sense of 'discipline' being examined here as the disciplining of the subject by external forces. However, we should note that this rather schematic way of posing the issue misses much of subtlety of the analyses offered in this tradition of theorising. It is, almost, one of the tenets of the tradition constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault that this disciplinary dimension of modernity operates in a dual manner. This duality is brought out clearly in Foucault's conception of power where it is claimed that, beyond operating on the subject, power relations are constitutive of the subject's formation. Before we go on to examine this claim in the next section, we shall briefly consider the issue of discipline in relation to Foucault's earlier work; this is in order to, both, demonstrate the importance of this theme throughout his writing and to locate the reasons for his shift from the site of archaeology to the genealogical terrain.

In Madness and Civilisation the themes of exclusion, internment and subjection, which characterise his later work on power, are already present. After all, as Foucault himself put it: 'When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was I was talking about in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power?' (Reader p57). Here we

will touch on only two aspects of this study: (i) the account of the emergence of the 'scientific' asylum and (ii) the conditions of possibility for the enterprise Foucault is undertaking here.

Foucault's account argues that in the classical period, confinement is related to moral laxity and, thereby, to idleness. In 1656, the time of the foundation of the Hôpital Général in Paris, the category of 'the idle' included the poor, the unemployed, the sick, the mad, the vagrant, etc. This institution had as its task the prevention of "mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders." Foucault notes that:

> When the Board of Trade published its report on the poor in which it proposed the means "to render them useful to the public," it was made quite clear that the origin of poverty was neither scarcity of commodities nor unemployment, but "the weakening of discipline and the relaxation of morals." (Reader p136/37)

The form of this interventive prevention, the remedy of disorder, was simply work. That the interned should do 'honest labour' was not just an economic imperative but, more importantly, a moral one. Idleness was seen as constituting both a deliberate individual rejection of bourgeois morality and a collective threat to bourgeois order. The internee who fulfilled the labour demands made could be released as having 'again subscribed to the great ethical pact of human existance.' (Reader p137).

The move from the homogenising schema of 'idleness' towards the differentiation of the figures subsumed under that schema occurs for a variety of reasons having little to do directly, Foucault suggests, with the progress of humanitarian enlightenment. On one level, there is the emergence of a differentiation generated through the protest of 'the confined themselves.' Thus Foucault notes the authorities were bombarded

by complaints from prisoners at being '"forced to mingle with madmen, some of whom are so violent that at every moment I risk suffering dangerous abuse from them"' (MC p224). This differentiation being officially recognised by La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt: '"One of the punishments inflicted upon the epileptics and upon other patients of the wards, even upon the deserving poor, is to place them among the mad."' (MC p225), a consequence of which was to render them mad themselves. The deployment of the phrase 'the deserving poor' is an indicator of another shift which reinforces the nascent differentiation emerging here: poverty was being transformed into an economic phenomenon. The pauper, whose very being represented for mercantilism a moral problematic, is rehabilitated by classical economics as 'a part in the body of the nation'. The confinement of the poor, according to the economic critique, represents a 'dangerous financing' for on 'close scrutiny, the classical forms of aid were a cause of impoverishment, the gradual immobilization and in a sense the slow death of all productive wealth:' (MC p233/34). With the moral rehabilitation of the poor, the 'undifferentiated unity of unreason had been broken' (MC 228) and within confinement, '[t]he presence of the mad appears as an injustice; but *for others.*' (MC p228). The political critique of confinement, Foucault suggests, 'linked madness more firmly than ever to confinement, and this by a double tie:'

> one which makes madness the very symbol of the confining power and its absurd and obsessive representative within the world of confinement; the other which designated madness as the object *par excellence* of all the measures of confinement. ... by a paradoxical circle, madness finally appears as the only reason for a confinement whose profound unreason it symbolizes. (MC p227)

It is at this point that madness becomes isolated, becomes an object whose

forms may be differentiated and classified; it is at this moment that the asylum emerges not as a liberation of the mad but as a mastering of madness. This mastery is operated along two axes, surveillance and judgement, which are embodied in four dimensions: (1) silence, (2) recognition by mirror, (3) perpetual judgement, and (4) the medical personage[2]. These dimensions set up a juridico-medical complex in which the madman is rendered up to be 'observed, condemned, and punished; a trial which has no outcome but in a perpetual recommencement in the internalised form of remorse.' (MC p269). The humanitarian deliverance of the madman is rather a shift to new, more insiduous forms of subjection which are given epistemological status through the psychiatrists enclosure of his knowledge within 'the norms of positivism'.

Although, in Madness and Civilisation, Foucault's rhetoric embodies a nolstagic romanticism[3] which has largely disappeared by the time of Discipline and Punish, we can see that here already is a series of concerns which would mark his genealogical studies. Confinement, surveillance, the complicity of 'scientific knowledges' with structures of power - all these are thematic elements which distinguish Foucault's writing. This being the case, the question arises as to why the theoretical shift from this form of archaeology to genealogy occurs. We can locate a possible set of reasons in the problems raised for Foucault by the romanticism of Madness and Civilisation in relation to the subject, to power, and to reason.

Although not explicitly theorised as such, on one level Madness and Civilisation is concerned with power. The conceptualisation of power which is implicitly deployed here however is essentially a juridical one, defined negatively in terms of its repressive operation on the body and soul of the madman. Concomitantly, the subject upon whom this power operates is

treated as an unproblematically given entity. In the previous chapter, we indicated Foucault's movement from this juridical conception of power to a positive analytics of power wherein the subject is conceived as being both produced by power relations as well as articulating these relations - here at least is one ground for the shift from archaeology to genealogy. An altogether deeper problem is encountered however when we consider the issue of reason in relation to the activity of the philosophical historian. Here we are faced with Derrida's comments on the possibility of Foucault's enterprise in attempting an archaeology of madness's silence.

Foucault is concerned with disclosing representations of 'fundamental structures of experience', in this case, the experience of madness. That is, as Derrida points out, an attempt ' to write a history of madness *itself. Itself.* Of madness itself. ... that is madness speaking on the basis of its own experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness described from within the language of reason, the language of psychiatry *on* madness -' (Derrida 1978 p33/34). As Foucault puts it: 'We must try to return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself.' (MC pix) and again 'A history not of psychiatry but of madness itself, in its most vibrant state, before being captured by knowledge.' (Derrida 1978 p34). The fundamental problems with this enterprise are that, firstly, any access to 'madness' in its historical dimension that Foucault has is through texts within which madness is represented as Other, within which madness is operated on. That is, the madness Foucault encounters is *always already* a madness captured by knowledge. And secondly, the activity of writing a history, even an archaeolgical history, is one circumscribed by Reason, one which deploys a

language of reason. As such the experience of madness would again be rendered up bound by the chains of a post-Cartesian rationality. Derrida has put the critique of Foucault's enterprise succintly:

> A history, that is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, despite all appearences to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational one. It is the meaning of "history" or *archia* that should have been questioned first perhaps. A writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values ."origin," "reason," and "history," could not be contained within the metaphysical enclosure of an archaeology. (Derrida 1978 p36)

While the subsequent archaeologies produced in the 1960's show little sign of the romanticism which characterises Madness and Civilisation, and thus avoid this final critical problem, they leave the issues of power and subjectivity unresolved. In short, while we may already sense the presence of themes and issues which will occupy Foucault in his genealogical work, these elements are theoretically unarticulated and it is only after the experience of 1968[4] that Foucault will reformulate his position, initially with regard primarily to power and, latterly, with a greater focus on subjectivity.

2. <u>Discipline and Power</u>

We have already considered the concept of 'genealogy' in its methodological dimension. By focusing here on its concrete deployment, the diagnosis of the modern which Foucault offers will be clarified. Initially we shall be concerned with delineating further the notion of a genealogical history as deployed by Foucault. This can be facilitated by comparing Foucault's enterprise to Nietzsche's. We shall then go on to consider in detail the concept of 'discipline' being utilised here, before finally analysing some objections to this mode of accounting.

Let us begin by noting Foucault's characterisation of Nietzsche's genealogical project. In 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' Foucault claims that 'descent attaches itself to the body':

> The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintergration. Genealogy, as the analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body. (Reader p83)

The text of Nietzsche's which most readily lends itself to such a characterisation is the essay '"Guilt", "Bad Conscience" and the Like'[5]. In this essay, Nietzsche considers the institution of promising: 'To breed an animal with the right to make promises - is this not the paradoxical task that nature set herself in the case of man. Is this not the real problem concerning Man?' (GM II 1 in Minson 1985 p65). He begins by noting the relationship posited between the capacity to make promises and the human attribute of self-determination, and in a series of manoeuvres, deploys this relationship as a means of undermining the transcendental status of

human freewill. By contrasting self-determination, as a self-evident human attribute, with the capacity to forget - the active apparatus of repression that enables us 'to cope with the inexhaustible and exhausting multiplicity of thoughts, feelings and perceptions which enter the manifold of human experience.' (Minson 1985 p64) - Nietzsche claims forgetting as logically pior to remembering. For without the capacity to forget there would be no thought, no memory, and, therefore also, no ability to make promises. Consequently, 'the acquisition of memory as a partial and positive overcoming of forgetfulness must be accounted for.' (Minson 1985 p65). In this context, the issue of self-determination, and thus the capacity to make promises, becomes a historical question concerning the conditions of emergence of this attribute. Nietzsche's account suggests that self-determination as 'memory of the will' is a consequence of the operation of penal practices (physically and symbolically) on the body of the subject:

> Consider the old German punishments; ... stoning ... breaking on the wheel ... piercing with stakes ... quartering ... cutting flesh from the chest. With the aid of such images and procedures one finally remembers five or six 'I will not's' in regard to which one has given one's promise. (GM II 3 in Minson 1985 p66)

It is this brutal rendering of men calculable which allows for the emergence of self-determination and promising, of 'ordaining the future in advance' as Nietzsche puts it.

The critical impulse of this genealogical strategy of accounting is, thus, generated out of twin tactics. Firstly, an analytic critique, the undermining of the transcendental status of 'self-evident' attributes and values. Secondly, a rhetorical critique, the relation of these, now historised, attributes and values to the lowest, most antithetical of

conditions of emergence.

We can now examine the extent to which Foucault adopts this kind of strategy in his account of modernity. Foucault's primary target, in Discipline and Punish, is liberal humanism, that legacy of Enlightenment rationalism which sets the tacit framework within which human science accounts and socio-political policies operate. To generate the distance he requires for this task, Foucault initiates a variety of moves. Firstly, he adopts a position of ethical scepticism, that is to say, he suspends the assumption that humanism represents a position of moral superiority with regard to previous ethical positions. Secondly, he suspends the conception of the subject as a given rational unity, suggesting instead that we treat this subject as an historically achieved figure. Thirdly, he suspends the notion that power and knowledge are antithetical, suggesting that we may conceive of them as positively co-productive. This series of suspensions allows Foucault to generate an account of the emergence of modern penal practices which undermines the ethical claims of humanism. How is this done?

Foucault begins by juxtaposing the death of the regicide Damiens in all its grotesque brutality, a carnival of violence, to Faucher's rules "'for the House of young prisoners in Paris'" (DP p6). For all its extremity, Foucault suggests, the locus of punishment as regards Damiens is his body; in the *amende honorable*, corporal pain and the cessation of corpoal being constituted retribution for the criminal act. Yet, Foucault also points out, that here there operates a precise regulation of pain relative to crime. What this operation of punishment on the body of the condemned represents, Foucault claims, is a juridico-political reconstitution of sovereignty. A crime constitutes an injury to the kingdom and as such represents an

affront to the person of the king. The physical redress, most spectacularly illustrated in the pomp and ritual of a public execution, marks (in a very real sense) 'the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. ... The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of 'terror'. ... [T]o make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign.' (DP p49). In contrast, while Faucher's rules operated on the body of his 'young prisoners' this was not the target of their operation, rather, a means of access to the true locus of their punishment: the soul. The nature of 'crime', of 'judgement' and of 'punishment' undergo profound changes. As Foucault puts it:

> The question is no longer simply: 'Has the act been established and is it punishable?' But also: 'What *is* this act, what *is* this act of violence or this murder? To what level or to what field of reality does it belong? Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action?' It is no longer simply: 'What law punishes this offence?' But: 'What would be the most appropriate measures to take? How do we see the future development of the offender? What would be the best way of rehabilitating him? (DP p19)

In modern judgement, a whole army of scientific discourses analyse the nature of the act and the best form of punishment relative to act and offender. The articulation of this shift rests, for Foucault, not in the region of liberal humanist politics but, rather, in a whole series of tactical engagements between diverse and contradictory protagonists. On the one hand, a concern with the paralysis of the system of justice which was generated out of the sovereign 'constantly creating new offices that ... multiplied the conflicts of power and authority.' (DP p80). This was manifested in the critique of 'not so much, or not only, the privileges of

justice, its arbitrariness, its archaic arrogance, its uncontrollable rights that were criticized; but rather the mixture of its weaknesses and excesses, its exaggerations and loopholes, and above all the very principle of this mixture, the 'super-power' of the monarch.' (DP p80). On the other hand, it involved a concern with 'popular illegalities'. This can be illustrated by reference to the figure of the vagabond, a figure tolerated by the Ancien Régime is now transformed into a central threat to civil society: '"A reward of ten pounds is given for anyone who kills a wolf. A vagabond is infinitely more dangerous for society."' (DP p88). With the emergence of capitalist society, the increasing movement of lower class crime from violence towards illegalites of property represented a threat which had to be controlled: 'It proved necessary, therefore, to control these illicit practices [pilfering, theft, etc.] and introduce new legislation to cover them. The offences had to be properly defined and more surely punished; ...' (DP p86). For Foucault, 'the humanization of the penalties' represents 'a calculated economy of the power to punish.' (DP 101), to speak of which in terms of a progress in ethical standards is to miss the point. Indeed, the point of this transformation, this 'reform', was:

> to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body. (DP p82)

It is in relation to this deepening of the power to punish that new forms of knowledge (*connaissances*) and technologies of power develop and emerge to inscribe the criminal within a new disciplinary space. A space that emerges in relation to the plague and is architecturally displayed in the

construction of the Panoptican. Plague quarantine controls set up a segmentation of space which contrasts with the binary spatial split which characterised the Great Confinement. Whereas the exclusion of lepers, for example, had represented a purification of the body of the community, the fixed and surveyed spaces of plague control represent 'the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning of power;... The plague as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder had as its medical and political correlative discipline.' (DP 198). The Panoptican is the ordering of disciplinary space in which this penetration of regulation operates at its most 'scientific'. But whereas the plague controls had represented a locus of extremity, panopticism represents the transformation of this disciplinary space from the margins into the centre of the social body itself. In this ordering, three disciplinary effects operate, one negatively and two positively. The negative effect is represented by the abolition of the crowd, in its place a 'collection of separated individualities' (DP p201). As Foucault puts it:

> The arrangement of his [the inmates'] room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is the guarentee of order. If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen, there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents. (DP p200/201)

Separation and visibility; these are the twin tactics which ensure the

economic deployment of power relations. Inscribed within a relation of being observed but unable to observe the observer, the operation of power becomes automatic, the inmate 'becomes the principle of his own subjection.' (DP p203). This negative operation of power opens up the possibility of its positive effects: as menagerie and as laboratory. The former of these effects operates a system of classification, 'the analyical arrangement of space' (DP p203):

> makes it possible to draw up differences: among patients, to observe the symptoms of each individual, wihout the proximity of beds, the circulation of miasmas, the effects of contagion confusing the clinical tables; ... (DP p203)

... and so on ... To generate systems of classificatory types through which forms of knowledge may be generated, organised, deployed; this is the project of the Panoptican. Here, menagerie meets laboratory; experimentation with different medical treatments, the use of varying types of punishment, different techniques of teaching, all these procedures given a *scienticity* through the controlled categories of disciplinary space. The Panoptican represents a polyvalent political technology which places relations of discipline into, and throughout, the social body, that is, the constitution of a disciplinary society.

Let us briefly reflect on the tactical structure of Foucault's argument. Firstly, Foucault's juxtaposition of classical and modern modes of punishment while formally suspending ethical judgement, on a rhetorical level presents modernity as a space permeated by power relations, as a totally normalised body[6]. Secondly, he argues that the emergence of modern penal techniques should not be located within an evolutionary schema of increasing humanitarianism but in a series of diverse and conflicting

tactical engagements. Thirdly, he suggests that power and knowledge are inextricably entwined in these penal techniques, as in the positive effects of panopticism. Fourthly, he claims that the subject as the focus of various classificatory scientific discourses is, partially at least, constituted through the practices operated by these discourses; thus the patient is conceived of as a depressive, the schoolchild as a delinquent, etc. Through these analytical and rhetorical arguments, liberal humanism is subjected to the characteristic two-pronged genealogical critique. On a rhetorical level, its progressive ethical claims are ironicised; while on an analytical plane, its assumptions and claims about power, knowledge and the subject are exposed and undermined in order to present an alternative vision of modernity.

However, if Foucault rejects, as he does, the moral vision of liberal humanism, what precisely is the nature of this alternative vision of modernity we to replace it with? Here we must, at last, come to grips with the conception of modernity as a disciplinary society which Foucault offers and examine in rather more detail the senses of discipline deployed here.

In some part, we have already seen that 'discipline', for Foucault, refers to the emergence of a mode of operation of power relations which can be sited, on one level, in the appearence of the Panoptican. We have also noted that this mode of power operates not only on the subject but is, to some extent, constitutive of the subject. The first aspect, we have mentioned, is relatively unproblematic; one notes the emergence of meticulous detailed training regimes throughout the social body, as 'general formulas of domination' (DP p137). We can locate several principles embodied in these regimes:

1. An arrangement of space: 'De La Salle dreamt of a classroom in which

the spatial distribution might provide a whole series of distinctions at once: according to the pupil's progress, worth, character, application, cleanliness and parents' fortune.' (DP p147)

2. An arrangement of time: Time-tabling - 'a time of good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise.'(DP p151) - a technology of 'rhythm and regular activities' which governs every aspect of the subjects' day.

3. Time and Movement: The framing of an activity - for instance, the drilling of soldiers which involves a 'degree of precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements,' (DP p151) - 'A sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined. The act is broken down into its elements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed.' (DPp152)

4. Body and Gesture: 'Disciplinary control ... imposes the best relation between a gesture and the overall position of the body, which is its condition of efficiency and speed. ... A well-discilined body forms the operational context of the slightest gesture. Good handwriting, for example, presupposes a gymnastics - a whole routine whose rigorous code invests the body in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger.' (DP p152)

5. Body and Object: The articulation of the activity of object use: 'It consists of a breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the parts of the body to be used ... and that of the parts of the object maipulated ...; then the two sets of parts are correlated according to a number of simple gestures ...; lastly, it fixes the canonical succession in which each of these correlations occupies a particular place.' (DP p153)

6. Exhaustive Use: 'Discipline ... arranges a positive economy [of time]; it poses the principle of a theoreticall ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces.' (DP p154), consequently, in the school, for example, the rhythm imposed by the timetable, with all its signals, whistles, bells, "'is to accustom the children to executing well and quickly the same operations, to diminish as far as possible by speed the loss of time caused by moving from one operation to another'." (DP p154).

These principles indicate the dimensions of the disciplining of the subject, a subject organised, occupied and trained. To put it another way, such principles delineate an *anatomo-politics* of power, its micro-physics, yet their coalition in the spread of panopticism sets up another analysable level of the operation of discipline: '*bio-politics*'. Whereas discipline on the level of an anatomo-politics concerns the individual, bio-politics is a concern with the social body as a whole. Thus the introduction of birth certificates at the anatomo-political level relates to the generation of statistics analysing birth rates at the bio-political level, the examination as a mode of disciplinary surveillance relates to the statistics concerning pass rates as an 'external index' of the state of the education system, etc. As Foucault pus it: 'The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed.' (HS p139). It is through the articulation of these two poles that there emerges an array of forms of knowledge which attempt to analyse the relationship between the individual and society, individuals in terms of society or society in terms of individuals. That is to say, there emerges the human sciences.

At this stage, we must explicate the sense of discipline as constitutive of the subject, for here we can see a kind of cognitive panopticism. In other words, here the effects of the Panoptican escape architectural enclosure. That is, while the Panoptican is a point of emergence for the classificatory analysis and experimentation which will develop into the human sciences; with the fuller development of these sciences, society as a whole becomes a Panoptican. Every aspect of human existance is exposed to the unrelenting gaze of the social scientist on the theoretical plane and the social worker on the practical plane (although the distinction between theory and pracice here is by no means clearcut). Modernity constitutes itself, through the human sciences, as the disciplinary society *par excellence*.

With this emergence of the human sciences come a whole series of figures: the delinquent, the incapable mother, the child abuser, the psychopath, etc. Here we see the line of Foucault's argument when he states that power-knowledge relations are constitutive of the subject. Here the subject as infant, as child, as adolescent, as adult, as middle-aged and as senior citizen is analysed in terms of age, maturity, capability and normalcy, is labelled in relation to a given context, is placed within a specific regime of judgement, and is subject to a particular set of measures dependent on the outcome of that judgement. The young offender becomes a 'delinquent' subject to a form of correction geared specifically to his being as a delinquent from a particular type of enviroment, with a certain level of education, and a given record of character, of past offences, of cupability. However, while we may sense Foucault's argument, that by defining the subject as exemplifying a given mode of being and, consequently, gearing the general disciplining of the subject to that mode

of being, it does seem that a further step in the argument is required, that is, an account of the construction of subjectivity through which the disciplinary mechanism operate. Here, however, Foucault offers no such account.

We can illustrate this point by reference to Foucault's consideration of four figures he locates as emerging through 'this preoccupation with sex which mounted throughout the nineteenth century - ' (HS p105):

1. the hysterical woman.
2. the masturbating child.
3. the Malthusian couple.
4. the perverse adult.

Each of these figures, he suggests, corresponds to a given strategy 'which, each in its own way, invested and made use of the sex of women, children, and men.' (HS p105). In these strategies, architectural, biological, moral, psychological, and pedagogical knowledges are deployed on the subject in question. Yet, despite Foucault's indications as to the forms of knowledge deployed in the given combinations of 'disciplinary techniques with regulative methods' (HS p146) that these strategies embody, it is not enough to point to these technologies of power to justify the claim that power-knowldge relations are constitutive of our subjectivity. While we may well agree that the pychiatric delineation of homosexuality or female hysteria may generate sets of practices which, in acting on the subject, are constitutive of the subject as a 'homosexual' or 'hysterical woman', if this is to have a meaning beyond that of the way in which subjects are socially defined and treated, an account of the mechanism of this subjectivisation is necessary.

To conclude this section, let us sum up the significant points. Firstly, we have illustrated the nature of such a genealogical account, in particular, its combination of anlytical and rhetorical levels of critique. Secondly, we have explored the senses of 'external discipline' (we use the term 'external' here to differentiate, for the moment at least, this use of 'discipline' from 'self-discipline' in its more or less voluntary intentional mode) indicating that Foucault's attempt to deploy a dual meaning in this term requires further theoretical elaboration if it is to achieve its intended effect. This last point is one we will return to as we move to consider Foucault's analyses of 'self-disciplinary' practices, of modes of self-construction. Finally, we should note the role of the human sciences within the vision of modernity offered here, far from being, as liberal humanism would have us believe, potential guides to a utopian form of social life, they represent panopticism taken to its limits, not the formation of a utopia but rather the creation of a disciplinary society.

3. Discipline and Subjectivity

In this section, we shall be concerned with three inter-related issues. Firstly, a grounding and clarification of Foucault's account of subjectivity. Secondly, the implications of this account for his conception of power-knowledge. Thirdly, the consequences of these first two points for his account of modernity. While we shall be largely drawing on the later work on sexuality, other pieces will also be utilised. These works help us to delineate the notion of 'self-discipline' which Foucault deploys and, further, to indicate the relationship between 'external discipline' and 'self-discipline', though these terms themselves may prove all too schematic in representing Foucault's theorisation of the disciplinary nature of the modern.

Foucault's attempt to analyse the *rapport à soi*, the self-relationships by which we constitute oureselves as ethical subjects, operates, as we have noted, about four aspects:

1. The *ethical substance* - 'the aspect or the part of myself or my behaviour which is concerned with moral conduct' (Reader p353).

2. The *mode of subjection* - 'the way in which people are invited or incited to recognise their moral obligations' (Reader p353)

3. The *self-forming activity or asceticism* - 'the means by which we change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects' (Reader p354)

4. The *telos* - 'Which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way' (Reader p355)

We can ground this formulation concretely by reference to Foucault's analysis of Greek self-practices. Here he suggests that the ethical substance can be located through the concept of *aphrodisia*, the mode of

subjection through the notion of *chēsis*, the asceticism through the concept of *enkrateia*, and the *telos* through the notion of *sōphrosynē*. By examining these aspects we may be able to generate a clear picture of how Foucault conceives of the construction of selfhood and its relation to the construction of subjectivity.

'The *aphrodisia* are the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure.' (UP p40). However, the ethical substance, for the Greeks, was not the form of the act(s), their morphology, nor was it 'the pleasure that was associated with them ... [or] the desire to which they gave rise.' (UP p42), rather, it was:

> 'the dynamics that joined all three in a circular fashion (the desire that leads to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire). The ethical question that was raised was not: which desires? which acts? which pleasures? but rather: with what force is one transported "by the pleasures and desires"? (UP p43)

Two aspects structure the analysis of this dynamics: firstly, a quantification of the degree of sexual activity, of the intensity of this practice; excess or moderation, and secondly, the role of the sexual actor; passive or active, penetrated or penetrator. If the individual succumbs to the enjoyment of pleasure ungoverned by reason or takes up a role contradictory to his natural position, he becomes degenerate, unable to govern himself how can they govern others? The issue thus becomes one of 'right use'; that is to say the male citizen should exercise moderation and operate as the active partner in accordance with his natural role, he should enjoy his pleasure "as one ought". This "ought" leads us to the mode of subjection, to 'the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognises himself as being obliged to put it

into practice.' (UP p27).

The reflection on the *aphrodisia* in terms of its dynamics leads to the notion of *chrēsis aphrodisiōn*, the use of pleasures, a reference to 'the manner in which an individual managed his sexual activity,' (UP p53). The delineation of "right use", of the correct management of one's sexual activity, is structured around three variables:

1. The strategy of need - 'people should "limit themselves to such indulgence as the soul would reject unless the need of the body were pressing, and such as would do no harm when the need was there."' (UP p55)
2. The strategy of timeliness - '[This] consisted in determining the most opportune time, the *kairos*. ... That time could be decided according to several scales. There was the scale of a person'sentire life. There was the scale of the year with its seasons: ... It was also recommended to choose the right time of day: ... The choice of the moment - of the *kairos* - ought to depend on other activities as well. If Xenophon could point to Cyrus as an example of moderation, this was not because he had renounced pleasures; it was because he knew how to distribute them properly over the course of his existance, not permitting them to divert him from his occupations, and allowing them only after a prior period of work had cleared the way for honourable recreation.' (UP p57-59)
3. The strategy of status - 'The art of making use of pleasure also had to be adapted to suit the user and his personal status. ... In order to show the advantages of moderation to his disciple Aristippus, who "was rather intemperate in such matters," Socrates, still according to Xenophon, asks the question: if he had to educate two youths, one of whom would go on to lead an ordinary life and the other would be destined to command, which of the two would he teach to "control his passions" so that they would not

hinder him from doing what he had to do?' (UP p59-61).

These strategies define the dimensions of the individuals relation to aphrodisia, we now have to bring out the active ways in which these strategies are brought into practice, how the individual makes himself into a person who deploys himself correctly in relation to these strategic lines.

At this point, one encounters the notion of *enkrateia*, of 'an active form of self-mastery, which enables one to resist or struggle, and to achieve domination in the area of desires and pleasures.' (UP p64). For the Greeks, the achievement of self-mastery demanded an *askēsis*, an ascetics, thus, 'the Pythagorean tradition recognised many exercises: dietary regimens, reviewing of one's misdeeds at the end of the day, or meditation practices that ought to precede sleep to ward off bad dreams and encourage the visions that might come from the gods.' (UP p74). This ascetics, however, was not, on the whole, separated from the ascetics which were deployed to create the citizen, mastery of oneself and mastery of others were organised about the same set of exercises. Through the self-mastery which emerges as a consequence of these training regimens though, one could approach *sōphrosynē* which is 'characterised as a freedom' (UP p78).

Sōphrosynē, according to Foucault, 'is described ... as a very general state which ensures that one will do "what is fitting as regards both gods and men" - that is, one will not only be moderate but righteous and just, and courageous as well.' (UP p64). Thus the significance of two moral figures: firstly, the tyrant: 'he was incapable of mastering his own passions and was therefore always prone to abuse his power and to do violence (*hubrizein*) to his subjects' (UP p81), and secondly, in contrast, 'the positive image of a leader who was capable of exercising a strict

control over himself in the authority he exercised over others.' (UP p81). These two images point to the importance of the relationship between self-mastery and mastery over others, only by achieving the former can the proper exercise of the latter be ensured. As the *telos* of the individual's rapport à soi, *sōphrosynē* represents the final element in this brief summary of Foucault's analysis of Greek self-relationships, at this point we can reflect on this mode of analysis of selfhood and subjectivity.

In the last chapter, it was argued that Foucault's concept of selfhood is strongly related to Nietzsche's conception of character, this led to the further suggestion that Foucault is deploying, in these texts, a verson of self-as-multiplicity and, moreover, that the formation of subjectivity relates to the reflexive relation of this self to itself. If we regard our multiple self as a series of stories which, through the mediation of our *telos*, interactively resolve themselves into an overarching narrative, then subjectivity emerges as this narrative's reflection on itself. We can illustrate this by reference to the Pythagorean practice of noting down at the end of the day a review of one's actions. This practice is both an action performed by the self and a reflection on the nature of this self, it is the reflexivity of this self-practice that accounts for the emergence of subjectivity. Thus the Greeks - through the specification of *aphrodisia* as a domain of moral concern, of *chēsis* as the perception of 'the type of subjection that the practice of pleasures had to undergo in order to be morally valorized;' (UP p37), of *enkrateia* as the active work one had to do on oneself, and of *sōphrosynē* as 'ethical subject in his fulfillment.' (UP p37) - are delineating a set of stylistic parameters within which the (narrative) self may operate. This is, at the same time, a definition of a mode of formation of the subject, a mode of being-in-the-world set up,

Foucault suggests, about the idea of the 'care of the self'. If we have here something approaching an account of Foucault's reformulation of the issues of selfhood and subjectivity, it is fitting at this point to consider the implications of this account for the lacunae present in his concept of power.

It will be recalled that Foucault's conceptualisation of power involves the twofold claim that power relations not only operate on and through the subject but are also (partially) constitutive of the subject. Foucault's arguments as presented in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Vol.1 do not present an adequate justification of this claim and such a justification requires an account of the mechanisms of the subject's formation. Since we now have the outline of such an account, we should be able to ascertain whether an adequate justification of Foucault's claim is possible or whether this issue poses a deeper threat to the cogency of Foucault's account of modernity.

Let us begin by returning to the prisoner we left in Bentham's Panoptican, we can attempt to generate a sort of external *rapport à soi* through which power relations can operate in the (re)constitution of the prisoner's subjectivity. What would be the ethical substance here? We can suggest that 'intention' may be taken as constituting the primary material of the prisoner's moral conduct, thus the immense battery of forms of knowledge brought to bear on the offender: 'What *is* this act, what *is* this act of violence or this murder? To what level or to what field of reality does it belong? Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action?' (DP p19). The question posed is one of the nature of the offender's intention and its relationship to the offender's

act(s) - a question of responsibility[7]. What then is the mode of subjection, what strategic elements are involved in defining a style of responsibility? In this case, it seems to be that one strategy concerns correct obedience to the conventions of a community of which one is a member, the doctrine of the rule of law[8]. Another strategy might be that of 'samaritanism', helping one's fellow man, being courteous, kind, etc. The self-forming activities would be all those exercises and employments whereby the prisoner is made, to some extent, responsible for the performance of a given act together with the structures of reward and punishment which operate consequent to the performance or non-performance of the act[9]. Finally, the *telos* is the prisoner as a responsible citizen, as liberal man, rational, autonomous, respectful of the social contract he has implicitly signed[10].

What differentiates the technology of self outlined here from those Foucault discusses is, of course, that here it is not the individual's own self-constituting practices but rather a set of self-constitutive activities imposed upon the individual. At this point, our distinction between self-discipline and external discipline begins to break down, both the individual's own technology of self and that technology of self imposed on the individual represent forms of self-discipline, but what we may call voluntary and involuntary forms of self-disciplinary acivity. The implications of this for Foucault's concept of power should be emerging here, let us clarify them further.

Discipline as a modality of power operates through the construction of technologies of the self, it operates as the *form d'ascèse*, the *techne* which are used to transform the subject. The Panoptican represents the pure form of this asceticism, a surveillance which places the prisoner

within a perpetual structure of punishment and reward according to their exhibition of the characteristics of responsible action (for example, the cleanliness, tidiness and content of their cell would be one sign used to judge their degree of responsibility)[11]. Here we can see the deployment of power relations as constitutive of the subject. However, it will be recalled that Foucault states that '[w]here there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.' (HS p95). Resistance, in our example, operates through the prisoner's own technology of self which is likely to be considerably different to that developed by the prison authorities. Resistance is the asceticism of the prisoner exemplified in the rejection or alternative usage of the disciplinary forms imposed by the Panoptican. The formation of the prisoners subjectivity is, thus, generated through the struggle of relations of power and relations of resistance, a struggle articulated through two (more or less) opposed technologies of the self. Gordon has suggested that Foucault's interest in analysing such institutions as the prison is, precisely, the non-correspondence 'between the orders of discourse, practice and effects, ... the manner in which they fail to correspond and the positive significance that can attach to such discrepancies.' (Gordon 1979 p36). In other words, as regards the prison, how is it that the discourse of the reformers, the practice of the aurthorities, and the subjectivity of the prisoners failed to rehabilitate prisoners and reduce crime? Locating this as one of Foucault's foci makes good sense since it is at the level of the struggle of power and resistance articulated through opposed technologies of the self that, at least, one aspect of this non-correspondence is rendered accountable. Having illustrated that an account of the relationship between

power, subjectivity and resistance in Foucault's texts can be given, we can now go on to consider the implications of this account for Foucault's representation of modernity.

At the start of this chapter, it was noted that Foucault, like Nietzsche and Weber, conceives of modernity as an ambiguous achievement. We are now in a position to clarify the nature of this ambiguity. In contrast to Whiggish accounts of modernity, the narration of a triumphal progression on the part of the forces of liberal humanism, Foucault's account stresses the dark side of Enlightenment. Discipline and Punish, in particular, presents the spectacle of a totally normalised society, a society penetrated throughout by panopticism, each aspect of existance subject to disciplinary regulation. In the last chapter, it was argued that this totalising account of the disciplinary nature of modernity operates as a deliberate rhetorical strategy to undermine standard historical accounts, the perspectivist nature of Foucault's method deploying an explicitly one-sided accentuation of the features of modernity. Yet there is also a sense in which the *logic* of Foucault's formulation of power at that point pushes him to give such an account of modernity. Despite the gesturing to the concept of resistance, in the History of Sexuality, Vol.1, there is little elucidation of this concept or its role. At this point, it would appear that Foucault's account of modernity is merely an inversion of Whig histories. However, once the analytical apparatus he sets up about the idea of 'technologies of the self' is brought into play, this situation is altered. We now have a concept of resistance that can be put to work, while the nature of modernity as a disciplinary society takes on a new dimension.

In the previous chapter, it was noted that "struggle" was the root

metaphor of Foucault's reformulation of the concept of power. This notion of struggle is now perceivable as the battle of relations of power and resistance in the construction of the individual's subjectivity, the struggle for the subject's *soul*. To be sure, modernity is penetrated through and through by panopticism, but it is also penetrated throughout by relations of resistance, by local self-practices and asceticisms. The ambiguity of modernity now emerges clearly, at the same time offering up increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for the operation of power relations and a growing number of localised popular forms of knowledge which can act as grounds for the development of self-practices resisting the operation of power into, on and through the subject. For Foucault, the question becomes one of the role of the human sciences and of the intellectual in this struggle between power and resistance.

The ambiguity we find in Foucault's disciplinary representation of modernity recalls the ambiguity of the processes of rationalisation for Weber and the ambiguity of nihilism for Nietzsche. With each of these theorists, a concern with the *disciplinary* leads to portrayal of modernity at once more complex and understandable in terms of our everyday experience of the modern than that offered by conventional triumphalist accounts. In concluding this chapter, let us note that in developing this account of the disciplinary nature of the modern, Foucault has raised large areas of the social to the level of the theoretically perceivable. By utilising a mode of analysis which examines diverse and humble points of emergence, in contrast to the isolation of origins that characterises mainstream accounts, the mundane becomes significant, the 'meticulous details' of genealogy represent a gaze for which no event is too humble to

be examined. At this point, we can to sum up the points that have emerged from our consideration of the concept of discipline in Foucault's work. Firstly, we have seen that there are at least two disciplinary dimensions to modernity, which we may describe roughly as (i) the disciplining of the individual through external constraints and (ii) the voluntary self-disciplining of the individual. Secondly, we have noted that these two forms of discipline represent respectively the modern modalities of power and resistance. Thirdly, that the operation of these modalities is articulated through technologies of the self. Fourthly, we can see that this conception of discipline renders modernity an ambiguous achievement.

Notes

1. Cf. ch.2 section 3 and ch.5

2. These dimensions briefly are: (i) silence - not talking to the inmate, (ii) recognition by mirror - confronting the madman with his own madness, forcing madness to observe itself, (iii) perpetual judgement - forcing madness to judge itself through the use of punishments such as cold showers, (iv)medical personage - the opening of the asylum to medical personality, physician as absolute authority. cf. MC pp260-278.

3. This romanticism comes across most clearly in the 'Preface', cf. in particular MC ppix-xi.

4. Cf. Reader p53.

5. GM II.

6. By 'normalised', Foucault means organised and constituted around norms which act as demarcators of one's 'normalcy', as criteria of judgement.

7. cf. Reader p352, here Foucault links intention as the ethical substance to Kant; given that discipline is the mode of power of modernity and this period begins with Kant, it does not seem unreasonable to locate intention as the ethical substance as regards the technologies of the self set up about the prison.

8. This point comes out in Foucault's reference to the both the critique of the 'super-power' of the monarch (DP p80) and the concern with popular illegalities (DP p88).

9. Foucault provides a morphology of this asceticism DP pp149-156, the schema of punishment involved in this disciplinary power is examined also DP pp177-184.

10. This point most clearly comes across in Foucault's discussion of the release of the mad, Reader p137.

11. This criteria is rendered up by the permanent visibility in which the Panoptican places the prisoner.

THE POLITICS OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

> All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human experience. They show the arbitariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made.
>
> \- *Michel Foucault*
>
> To change something in the minds of people - that is the role of the intellectual.
>
> \- *Michel Foucault*

In this chapter, we shall be examining the politics of Foucault's theorising, concentrating primarily on his account of the emergence, and role, of the human sciences in modernity and his conception of the role of the modern intellectual. Through this analysis we shall attempt to illustrate the nature of Foucault's critique of humanism and, moreover, to specify the relationship between the social and political that we find deployed in Foucault's work. We have seen, in our interpretations of Nietzsche and Weber, that a strongly political dimension appears characteristic of the tradition of theorising that is being delineated, it will be consequently significant to determine the extent of this dimension in Foucault's thought.

We will begin by considering Foucault's archaeological argument concerning the conditions of possibility of the human sciences and the dichotomies that structure their formulation and operation. Proceeding from this, in the second section, we will examine the social conditions of emergence of the human sciences and the role Foucault's sees them playing in relation to power and resistance in modernity. In the third section, we will look at the significance, and role, Foucault attaches to his own

theorising; this will involve a consideration, particularly, of his reflections on Kant's essay 'What is Enlightenment?', as well as analysing the position Foucault assigns to the modern intellectual.

An Archaeology of the Human Sciences

Foucault's delineation of the modern *episteme* in The Order of Things remains one of the most controversial aspects of his work (cf. Merquior 1985, Habermas 1987). In this section, we will explicate the sense in which his observations on the human sciences raise a series of problems for the practice of this calling. It will be recalled that earlier it was argued that the *episteme* as a methodological device represents an attempt to outline the modes by which man has *fictioned* his subjectivity, it would follow that there is a sense then in which the oppositions Foucault notes as both structuring and problematising the human sciences emerge out of his comments concerning the constitution and operation of the modern subject[1]. We shall bring out the way in which this problematisation of the human sciences in the modern is dealt with by Foucault and what its implications are for the trajectory of his work. Let us begin, however, by sketching his representation of the modern *episteme*.

Schematically, we may depict the relation between language and knowledge of things in the Classical *episteme* as one of 'word-object': 'words ... intersect with representations ... to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things' (OT p304). In contrast, the Modern episteme may be depicted as language-man-world,, that is the activity of representing, which is immanent to language in the Classical episteme, becomes problematic with the insertion of the figure of Man, as representing agency, into the equation. But how did man come to be inserted here?

Foucault noted with regard to the Classical episteme that : 'Classical language, as the *common discourse* of representation and things, as the place within which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes anything that could be a 'science of man'.' (OT p311). To put it another way, if the Classical project was a tabulation of the order of things in the world, and yet man's activity as tabulator can itself not be represented on this table, this rules out the possibility of a 'science of man' since man as both subject and object does not, at this point, exist. The point of emergence of this 'Man' can be, Foucault suggests, located in relation to Kant, or more specifically, to Kant's transformation of the finitude of being into the condition of the possibility of knowledge. As Foucault puts it: 'modern man ... is possible only as a figuration of finitude.' (OT p318), that is, *modern man* is the product of an analytic of finitude which, Foucault suggests, is articulated about three dimensions or doublets: the empirical and the transcendental, the cogito and the unthought, and the retreat and return of the origin. It is to an examination of these, therefore, that we must turn.

'Man,' Foucault suggests, 'in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.' (OT p318). This doublet constitutes the 'threshold of modernity' and is announced in Kant's lecture 'What is Man?' (FCR p32). For Foucault, 'the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called *man*' (OT p319) is the condition of possibility for the engendering of two forms of analysis. The first of these forms of knowledge 'functions as a sort of transcendental aesthetic' (OT p319), that is to say, it operated upon the physical body of the subject and, through the analysis of perception, sensory mechanisms,

etc., 'led to the discovery':

> that knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within the structures of the body, that it may have a privileged place within, but that its forms cannot be dissociated from its peculiar functioning; in short, that there is a *nature* of human knowledge that determines its forms and that can at the same time be made manifest to it in its own empirical contents. (OT p319)

The second of the forms of knowledge, engendered by the formation of *man*, 'functioned as a sort of transcendental dialectic;' (OT p319), which is to say, that it illustrated that:

> knowledge had historical, social, or economic conditions, that it was formed within relations that are woven between men, and that it was not independent of the particular form they might take here or there; in short, that there was a *history* of human knowledge which could be both given to empirical knowledge and prescribe its forms. (OT p319)

What is significant for concerning these two forms of knowledge, for Foucault, is that 'the search for a nature or history of knowledge, in the movement by which the dimension proper to critique is fitted over the contents of empirical knowledge, already presupposes the use of a certain critique - ' (OT p319), that is, implicit in the structure of this search are a set of assumptions which already imply the operation of a critique. These presuppositions, which function as a series of implicit divisions in the structure of these knowledges, constitute a primary problematic for these knowledges. To illustrate this requires that we outline the divisions Foucault diagnoses:

1. 'the division that distinguishes rudimentary, imperfect, unequal, emergent knowledge from knowledge that may be called, if not complete, at least constituted in its stable and definitive forms (this division makes

possible the study of the natural conditions of knowledge);

2. 'the division that distinguishes illusion from truth, ideological fanatasy from scientific theory (this division makes possible the study of the historical conditions of knowledge);

3. 'a more obscure and more fundamental division: that of truth itself; there must, in fact, exist that is of the same order as the object - the truth that is gradually outlined, formed, stabilized, and expressed through the body and the rudiments of perception; the truth that appears as illusions are dissipated, and as history establishes a disalienated status for itself; but there must also exist a truth that is of the order of discourse - a truth that makes it possible to employ, when dealing with the nature or history of knowledge, a language that will be true. It is the status of this true discourse that remains ambiguous. (OT p319/320)

If we can concentrate on the final of the divisions implicitly structuring modern thought, it becomes rapidly apparent that the entire enterprise of the human sciences (which is, after all, our concern) is being undermined, that is it is being placed in an unstable oscillation between operating as a transcendental form of knowledge and operating as an empirical form of knowledge, or, as Foucault puts the same point but slightly differently:

> either this true discourse finds its foundation and model in the empirical truth whose genesis in nature and in history it retraces, so that one has an analysis of the positivist type (the truth of the object determines the truth of the discourse that describes its formation); or the true discourse anticipates the truth whose nature and history it defines; it sketches out in advance and forments it from a distance, so that one has a discourse of the eschatological type (the truth of the philosophical discourse constitutes the truth in formation). In fact, it is a question not so much of an alternatve as a fluctuation inherent in all analysis, which brings out the value of the empirical at the

transcendental level. (OT p320)

In effect, Foucault is claiming that the constitution of man as an empirico-transcendental doublet both acts as the condition of possibility for the human sciences and, simultaneously, engenders within these knowledges an instability which undermines them. The history of the human sciences may thus be read as an ongoing attempt to locate 'the locus of a discourse that would neither be of the order of reduction nor of the order of promise: a discourse which would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both;' (OT p320). This rendering of the human sciences as inherently problematic is, we must remember, the outcome of only one dimension of the analytic of finitude Foucault posits, let us move then to consider the second dimension of modern man.

This second doublet is that of the 'cogito' and the unthought, that of Man and his Other. To express this less enigmatically, it seems that Foucault is suggesting that 'man cannot posit himself in the immediate and sovereign transparency of a *cogito*' (OT p322), that is, given that act of thought, of reflection, operates in a space which is permeated by conditions both natural and historical, then this act is no longer the pure and immediate act it was conceptualised as within the Classical episteme. On the contrary, this thought is now surrounded by the unthought, by the psyche of the thinker, by social, economic and historical conditions of the thinker; the act of reflection has become reflection in a dark mirror. Consequently, a second dynamic of the human sciences emerges, just as they are compelled to seek an order of discourse which will 'keep separate the empirical and transcendental, while being directed at both;' (OT p320), so to they are impelled to render the unthought up as thought, to shine a light into the darkness: 'the whole of modern thought is imbued with the

necessity of thinking the unthought - ' (OT p327). This compulsion manifests itself in various forms:

> of reflecting the contents of the *In-itself* in the form of the *For-itself*, of ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence, of making explicit the horizon that provides experience with its background of immediate and disarmed proof, of lifting the veil of the Unconscious, (OT p327).

Yet the logic remains the same. This logic leads us to another problematic for the operation of the human sciences. As Foucault puts it:

> Whatever it [thought] touches it immediately causes to move: it cannot discover the unthought, or at least move towards it, without immediately bringing the unthought nearer to itself - or even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a change by that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between them. (OT p327)

To put this argument in its simplest form: by 'making explicit the horizon that provides experience with its background of immediate and disarmed proof,' (OT p327), we alter the horizon. By rendering up the unthought as thought we change both thought and unthought, both Man and the/his Other. The logic of the necessity of rendering up the unthought thus leads to an unending sequence, an infinite regress: 'modern thought is advancing to that region where man's Other must become the Same as himself.' (OT p328). Having examined the problem posed for the human sciences by the 'cogito'/unthought doublet, let us proceed to the final dimension of Foucault's analytic of finitude.

This last doublet concerns 'the retreat and return of the origin', Foucault's point here is that the *ideal geneses* about which thought in the Classical episteme reflected on origins broke down as 'labour, life, and

language acquired their own historicity,' (OT p329). The origin of language, for example, becomes a matter of historical investigation, its beginnings perpetually 'shrouded in mystery' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p38). Man, in relation to these historicities, finds himself within an arrangement of labour already institutionalised, in an evolutionary system of life which began millions of years before him, and using a language which is already established: 'It is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as an origin.' (OT p330). Consequently: '[w]hat is conveyed in the immediacy of the original is, therefore, that man is cut off from the origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are born in time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there.' (OT p332). Man's being always already there though implies, in one sense, that it is through man that time is constituted; so while man, on the one hand, is perpetually placed in relation to a time of things into which he is *thrown*, on the other hand, it is his being-there that enables the articulation of time. As Foucault has put it: 'though all man's beginnings have their locus within the time of things, his individual or cultural time makes it possible, in a psychological or historical genesis, to define the moment at which things meet the face of their truth for the first time' (OT p333). With regard to what may serve for man as an origin, modern thought then offers up our 'cultural time', that is, our historicising practices. The problematic this embodies has been nicely illustrated by Dreyfus and Rabinow who point out that:

> like all attempts to relate the positive and fundamental (here the temporal beginning and the temporalizing clearing as kinds of sources or origin) so as to make factual limitation the ground of its own possibility (in this case

> to make the historical practices found history as the source of their own beginning) this solution is unstable. The origin, once regained as man's historicizing practices, retreats again since these practices turn out to be inaccessible to the practitioners. Although man is defined by the cultural practices which establish the temporal clearing in which objects can be encountered, and this temporality is "preontologically close" to man since it is his very being, he cannot reflect on what these practices are precisely because they are too near to him and thus too encompassing. Thus man's primordial temporality is "ontologically farthest" from his understanding. (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p39)

The remorseless logic of this problematic goes further however, for this origin - our historising practices - which retreats through our inability to articulate the Being of our being (or, in more foucauldian terms, to articulate the epistemic principles through which our being is articulated), retreats again for what of the origin of this origin, what of the origin of our historicising practices, when is it 'that the historical clearing which makes history possible' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p40) is itself first opened up? As Dreyfus and Rabinow put it:

> The attempt to pinpoint those practices which begin our history, rather than enabling us to get clear about the sources of our culture, finds those practices retreating further and further in to the distant past until they become what Heidegger calls "the essential mystery". (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p40)

This project of locating an origin for man, which is also the project of understanding the meaning of man, that is of finding meaning in history, leads to two kinds of hermeneutic approach in the human sciences, to two kinds of attempt to uncover, to decode, the truth of man's being hidden behind Heidegger's 'essential mystery'. The first of these strategies embues history with a teleological character. So we find Hegel, Spengler

and Marx with history as a movement towards the total return of the origin, that is the 'fulfillment of man's true meaning,' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982 p42) - man recovers his essential being at this point where history ends and yet history truly begins. The second strategy - which Foucault associates with Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Heidegger - suggests that once man had an understanding of his Being, but that this understanding has been lost. The only way we can get in touch with this Being is through a detailed tracing of what it is we have lost. For Foucault, both these strategies of future or past rupture are ultimately doomed. In their positing of a dichotomy of appearance and reality into which man's historicity is placed as both real and unreal, they collapse into the same instability which marked the first aspect of this analytic of finitude, that is, the transcendental and empirical - defined both by relation to man's Being and in relation to the absence of this Being, the human sciences seek a discourse in an overlapping space which does not exist.

To sum up our analysis of this analytic, let us briefly borrow Foucault's résumé of this structuring of modern thought. We can depict the elements of the analytic of finitude as follows:

> in showing that man is determined, it [the analytic of finitude] is concerned with showing that the foundation of those determinations is man's being in its radical limitations; it must also show that the contents of experience are already their own conditions, that thought, from the very beginning, haunts the unthoughts that elude them, and that it is always striving to recover; it shows how the origin of which man is never the contemporary is at the same time withdrawn and given as imminence: in short, it is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same. (OT p339)

The human sciences represent the attempt of thought in modernity to set

up a discourse which occupies simultaneously the space of the Other and the Same. In this discussion we have tried to indicate the inherent problematics which Foucault suggests are implicit within such an enterprise. At this point, the very significance of doing human scientific activity is at all might be called into questionand, further, what is Foucault operating in the human sciences for if the very conditions of possibility of these knowledges simultaneously undermine that possibility. We shall take up this question in the third section of this chapter, however, for the moment, let us turn to the politics of the human sciences in their practical dimension, that is the relationship between the human sciences and the disciplinary constitution of modernity.

Human Scientific Disciplines

In this section, we shall be exploring Foucault's insights concerning the interaction of power and knowledge in the formation of discipline as the mode of power/knowledge operation characteristic of modernity. We shall look firstly at the parasitic forms deployed by the human sciences and the relation of the human sciences to humanism. Secondly, we shall look at the role which Foucault suggests was (and, largely, is) occupied by the human sciences in relation to the disciplinary techniques that emerge in modernity, commenting on the relation between the human sciences and the formation of technologies of the self. Finally, we will suggest the grounds on which Foucault rejects humanism.

Knowledge in the modern episteme, Foucault suggests, may be represented as 'a volume of space open in three dimensions' (OT p347), these dimensions being: 1. the natural sciences - 'for which order is always a deductive and linear linking together of evident or verified propositions;' (OT p347), 2. the semi-hard sciences (biology, economics, philology) - 'that proceed by relating discontinuous but analogous elements in such a way that they are then able to establish causal relations and structural constraints between them.' (OT p347), and 3. philosophical reflection - 'where concepts and problems that first arose in different empirical domains are transposed into the philosophical dimension' (OT p347). The first two axes define a plane which may be represented 'as the field of application of mathematics to these empirical sciences, or as the domain of the mathematicizable in linguistics, biology, and economics.' (OT p347). The second and third axes define a plane which generates 'whose regional ontologies which attempt to define what life, labour and language are in their own being;' (OT p347).

The first and last axes define a plane which constitutes 'the formalization of thought.' (OT p347). The human sciences are not themselves directly to be located on any of these axes or planes, rather, they exist in the space defined by these three dimensions, that is, they exist three dimensionally. Foucault has explained this claim by suggesting that this situating of the human sciences:

> (in one sense minor, in another sense privileged) places them in relation to all the other thoughts of knowledge: they have the more or less deferred, but constant, aim of giving themselves, or in any case of utilising, at one level or another, a mathematical formalization; they proceed in accordance with models or concepts borrowed from biology, economics, and the sciences of language; and they address themselves to that mode of being of man which philosophy is attempting to conceive at the level of radical finitude, whereas their aim is to traverse all its empirical manifestations. (OT p347).

The human sciences, then, occupy a space which is related to these three dimensions, in a sense, these sciences exist within the interstices of these three axes. For the moment, however, we will focus on the second of the relations Foucault has noted; the human sciences use of 'models or concepts borrowed from biology, economics, and the sciences of language;' (OT p347).

The history of the human sciences (and the methodological divisions that occupy this history) is, Foucault suggests, generated out of three models acquired from biology, economics and linguistics. From biology come the conceptions of man 'as a being possessing *functions*' (OT p357) and of 'the possibility of finding average *norms* which permit him to perform his funcions.' (OT p357). From economics come the conceptions of man as 'in an irreducible situation of *conflict*;' (OT p357) and of 'a body of *rules* which

are both a limitation of this conflict and the result of it.' (OT p357). From linguistics comes the conception of man's behaviour as having meaning, as *signification* and of the totality of his significations as constituting 'a coherent whole and a *system* of signs.' (OT p357). Consequently, Foucault claims,

> these three pairs of *function* and *norm*, *conflict* and *rule*, *signification* and *system* completely cover the entire domain of what can be known about man. (OT p357).

Further, while these three pairs correspond roughly to psychology, sociology, and the study of literature and myth respectively - 'the human sciences interlock and can always be used to interpret one another: their frontiers become blurred, intermediary and composite disciplines multiply endlessly, and in the end their proper object may disappear altogether.' (OT p358).

Two movements relative to these models structure, for Foucault, the history of the human sciences. Firstly, a movement from one model to the next, thus: first, the biological model is ascendent and man is defined in functional terms; second, the reign of the economic model and man's being is located in conflict, thirdly, the linguistic model where man's being is defined as a hermeneutics or as a structural element[2]. The second movement occurs within the models, the movement from the dominance of the first element of the pair to the dominance of the second[3]. While the first term was dominant, a series of oppositions operated - 'the normal and the pathological, the comprehensible and the incommunicable, the significant and the non-significant' (OT p361) - as a mode of analysis based around norms, rules and systems overcomes that based on funcion, conflict and signification, however, these oppositions are erased, e.g. while analysis

operated from a functional point of view, 'it was of course necessary, *de facto*, to share the normal funcions with the non-normal; thus a pathological psychology was accepted side by side with normal psychology,' (OT p360); once, however, a normative perspective is adopted, this functional distinction collapses and the normal and pathological graduate into each other. The distinction between the normal and the pathological is replaced, Foucault suggests, by the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious[4]. Functional identification is replaced by depth hermeneutics. We will return to this issue when we consider the role of the human sciences in relation to the formation of disciplinary modes of power. At this stage, however, it is apposite to return to the question of the relationship of the human sciences to humanism.

The doctrine of humanism can be broadly defined as the belief that man is the single sufficient source of all our values. As Fraser[5] has pointed out, however, three kinds of reading of Foucault's conception (and rejection) of humanism can be given. The first reading suggests that Foucault rejects the philosophical framework within which humanism has been articulated, but 'not necessarily the values and forms of life which that framework has served to underpin and legitimate.' (Fraser 1985 p168). On this reading, humanism as a distinct form of moral and political praxis emerges with the constitution of 'Man' in the modern episteme, yet it is geared to the subjective side of this 'Man doublet', to rationality, autonomy, and a transcendental subjectivity which as soon as they are posited are undermined by their *doubles*. As Fraser puts it, humanism, here, 'is the contradictory, ceaseless, self-defeating project of resolving this Man problem.' (Fraser 1985 p169). This reading, then, would suggest that

humanism and the human sciences, sharing the same conditions of emergence, are implicitly interwoven with one another. The philosophical grounds of humanism are beset by the same unstable logic which we have already examined in relation to the human sciences.

The second version of Foucault's rejection of humanism suggests that the philosophical rejection is backed up by a strategic rejection. Here, the point is that while the aim of humanism, as a form of political praxis, was to oppose premodern forms of power, its effect has been to aid the formation of modern disciplinary power, a mode of power more subtle and widespread through the social body. The nature of the humanist vocabulary renders it blind to the formation of operations of power which are non-juridical in character and helpless in the face of these operations once they are established. Moreover, the complicity of humanism and the human sciences is one of the grounds which make possible the formation of this modern form of disciplinary power. Humanism's positing of the subject as a rational, autonomous agent demands the human sciences investigate individual's relation to this norm, consequently, from 'the standpoint of social control, the relevant catagories ceased to be the old-fashioned juridical ones of guilt and innocence. Instead they became the social scientific ones of normalcy and deviancy.' (Fraser 1985 p174). Humanism is related to the human sciences here as partners in the constitution of modernity as a disciplinary society.

The third form of rejection of humanism, which may be ascribed to Foucault, is a treatment and rejection of it on substantive grounds. This implies that Foucault is suggesting that 'humanism is intrinsically undesirable, that the conception of freedom as autonomy is a formula for domination *tout court*.' (Fraser 1985 p177). This is an altogether stronger

claim tham either of the two previous readings, implying as it does that there can be located an immanent connection between a conception of the subject as rational and autonomous, and a conception of power as disciplinary. Such a claim might go along the lines that the humanist treatment of the subject as possessing a given rational, autonomous unity rules out the possibility of conceptualising a form of resistance to the disciplinary mode of power which does not become complicit with this operation of power at another level, only by treating the subject as multiplicity can we formulate a concept of resistance which would be counteract on all levels the operation of a disciplinary mode of power. Humanism, here, is related to the human sciences through the latter's identification with the subject as having a given unity, a point we will return to as we consider the relationship between the human sciences and the formation of disciplinary technologies of the self.

At this stage, we shall not commit ourselves, directly, to any of these readings of Foucault, instead, we will move to an examination of the relationship between the human sciences and the formation and deployment of power in its modern disciplinary mode. This will clarify which, if any, of the above readings of Foucault is most coherent within the framework of interpretation we have been offering.

We have noted above that the human sciences operate initially on a model borrowed from biology, that is, an organic model structured about the concepts of function and norm. The significance of this model for the role, initially, assigned to the human sciences in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Vol.1is that we may conceive of the concept of *function* as corresponding the level of analysis Foucault refers to as an

anatomo-politics of the human body, and the concept of *norm* as corresponding to a *bio-politics of the population*. In others words, these two levels of analysis operated by the human sciences are correspondent with two levels of the operation of disciplinary techniques. How does this work out?

Firstly, given the human science model operating is an *organic* one, this implies that the health of the whole is dependant on the health of the parts, i.e. it sets up an imperative that, for the health of society, it is necessary to examine, render visible, every aspect of society, for who knows where a germ culture may be developing, and, further, once identified such an aspect must be neutralised and then transformed into a positive element of the social whole. The first part of this imperative is the role played by an analysis about average norms and the second is the function of an analysis built about man's functioning. We can show how these are related to the respective levels of power deployment by considering these two roles.

The relation of normative analysis to bio-political power can be brought out by considering the emergence, in Britain, of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science and of the great statistical societies from the 1830's onwards, a movement which resulted eventually in the establishment of Population Census. Through the statistical examination, according to the *normal* distribution curve, of birth rates, death rates, examination pass rates, etc., broken down according to age, income, sex, region, etc., average norms could be established and deviations from these norms rendered visible. Through normative analysis, bio-political power - bodies responsible for placing deviation under surveillance, e.g. charity workers and social workers among others - comes into operation[6]. If

normative analysis and bio-political power are responsible for the identification of deviation, the preliminary diagnosis; functional analysis and anatomo-political power represent the secondary diagnosis and means of treatment. Thus the functional analysis examines how it is that deviation is occurring, which of man's functional elements is impaired, and anatomo-political power places the deviant within a disciplinary framework which attempts the repair of this functional disability, e.g. as regards the criminal, functional analysis examines the reasons behind the performance of the crime and the level of reality it belongs to, and anatomo-political power produces a discipinary regime geared to overcoming these reasons through the reconstitution of the deviant individual.

This example, which refers to the renormalisation of the deviant fails to illustate that, as Foucault suggests, such post hoc treatment is only one dimension of the operation of power/knowledge relations. The other dimension is the panopticisation of society, which, following our medical metaphor, can be seen as preventátive treatment. The supervisory role of normative analysis/bio-political power exaimes not just the appearence of deviancy but also the imposition of disciplinary techniques formulated to encourage the development of the individual towards the norm. These techniques being formulated at the functional/anatomo-political level in response to the average norms supplied by the normative/bio-political level and we examined some of them - time-tabling, spatial arrangement, coordination of body and gesture, etc. - in the last chapter.

This indication of the linkage between the human sciences and the emergence of a disciplinary mode of power, however, does not go far enough. What we must move on to examine now is subject-constitutive role played by these power-knowledge relations. At this point, we will leave

aside the initial (biological) model of the human sciences, and move the discussion to a more general level. It will be recalled that, in the last chapter, it was argued that disciplinary power is articulated, in its constitution of the subject, through technologies of the self. So far in this chapter, we have indicated how the human sciences are related to the disciplinary operations of power in a general sense but not in relation to this specific point, which is the strongest point in Foucault's claims about power/knowledge relations. To establish a connection between the human sciences and the disciplinary constitution of the subject, we must, then, illustrate a relation between the human sciences and the technologies of the self through which discipinary power is articulated.

To produce such an illustration, let us refer back to the technology of the self articulated about the prisoner in the panoptican. There the ethical substance was intention linked to reponsibility, the mode of subjection was linked to the conventions of one's community, the *techne* were the discplinary exercises and employments imposed on the prisoner, and the *telos* was a rational, autonomous individuality. It was argued that humanism constitutes the tacit framework within which human sciences accounts and socio-political policies operate. These two aspects provide pointers to the relationship between the human sciences and technologies of the self. It will be argued here is that the human sciences provide the technical apparatus necessary for the development of specific technologies of the self.

Firstly, let us note that intention and responsibilty are both central elements of a humanist conception of man. Within this framework, it should not surprise us that *intentionality* is a crucial theme in the human sciences, we need merely note that the structure/agency dichotomy, which

has dominated debate in the human sciences since their emergence, revolves about this issue. Secondly, the mode of subjection, in so far as it concerns the conventions of one's community, demands the identification of those conventions relevant to a given individual. Thirdly, the *techne* involve the comparative analysis and elaboration of effective disciplinary techniques. Finally, the *telos* is humanist man. What is apparent here is that while the ethical substance and telos may be defined by reference to the humanist framework within which the human sciences are deployed, at least, the specification of the mode of subjection and the production of the *techne*, by which the *telos* is to be achieved, demand the utilisation of the human sciences. The precise identification of the cultural conventions of a community, the ethical rules that are operant within a society, may, roughly, be assigned as a sociological task. The development of the technical practices through which one's subjectivity is restructured may be assigned, primarily, to the psychologist. While these are only crude catagorisations, they can give us a sense of the role of the human sciences (and of humanism) in the construction and elaboration of technologies of the self. If this argument is sound, it would indicate that the human sciences play an absolutely central role in the development of the disciplinary mode of power which, Foucault has argued, characterises modernity.

At this moment, one might be tempted to accept all three interpretations of Foucault's rejection of humanism which Fraser offered. However, before such a move is made, another question must be posed: do humanism and/or the human sciences present resources for the development of technologies of the self by the individual which can resist the effective deployment of institutionally generated technologies of the self imposed on the

individual? Our answer to this question will be a key determinant of what kind of rejection of humanism we see Foucault offering. Unfortunately, there are very few resources in Foucault's works to aid us in replying to the issue posed. Two points do allow us some entry into this area however: (i) the commitment of humanism to a philosophical anthropology which treats of man as a subject as possessing a given unity and (ii), relatedly, the operation in the human sciences of a dichotomy between appearance and reality.

On the first point, it is apparent that Foucault's commitment to the notion of 'multiplicity' (Deleuze 1988 p14) involves a rejection of humanism's acceptance of a unity subject, which is, at the same time, the acceptance of a sovereign consciousness. In so far as the notion of 'sovereign consciousness' is immanently involved in the generation of humanist values, e.g. rationality and autonomy, then his rejection of the philosophical conceptualisation of the subject as having a given unity necessarily implies a rejection (or reconceptualisation) of humanist values. Further, there is a less abstract level of rejection built in here, since, for Foucault, this aspect of humanism also generates what he considers to be the blindness of humanism to the operation of modern disciplinary modes of power. A blindness which moves into complicity since the juridical model of power analysis promoted by humanism acts as a veil over the operation of disciplinary power[7]. Our second point concerns the obsessive concern of the human sciences with epistemology and methodology, with attempting to perceive through the appearance of social events to the 'real forces' operating behind them. What is significant about this model is its commitment to humanist values on both methodological and utopian grounds - that is, it is through the (more or less disinterested) operation of

rationality by a sovereign consciousness that the levels of appearance and reality are to be distinguished, yet the aim of human science analysis is the generation of the state of rationally autonomous consciousness presupposed in its mode of analysis. As we have noted, however, it is precisely this mode of analysis which engenders the construction of disciplinary technologies of the self, e.g. the psychiatrist who gives evidence as to the capability of the delinquent, the level of reality to which the delinquent's act belongs, the best mode of recourse for the rehabilitation of the delinquent, etc. It appears then that humanist values are inexorably involved in the operation of disciplinary power. It would appear that in so far as humanism is committed to the notion of a sovereign consciousness, this implies a constitutive complicity with disciplinary power which rules out the possibility of humanism (and the human sciences) operating as a resource for the generation of technologies of resistance.

In relation to the three potential forms of rejectionism that Fraser has delineated then, we should note that in one sense the rejection of the philosophical underpinnings (or vocabulary) of humanism necessarily involves a rejection of humanist values since without this philosophical back-up the nature and meaning of these values changes, that is they are no longer the same values. Consequently, it appears that Foucault rejects humanism *tout court*, which does not involve, necessarily, a rejection of something we might want to call 'rationality' or 'autonomy' but rather a reconceptualisation of these values within a non-humanist framework. We will go on to explore this idea further in our final section, which is concerned with Foucault's conceptualisation of his own philosophical position

To conclude this section, let us sum up the major points. Firstly, we have noted Foucault's conceptualisation of the epistemological space occupied by the human sciences. Secondly, we have delineated the models and movements deployed in this space which have structured the history of the human sciences. Thirdly, it was argued, using the biological model as an example, that these models set up imperatives such that one term, of the pair which defines the model, operates inherently at the level of bio-political power and the other term at the level of anatomo-political power. we illustrated the way in which such a power/knowledge relation could operate. Fourthly, we indicated how the human sciences may be linked to the construction of technologies of the self through which disciplinary power is articulated. Finally, we pointed out the ways in which the human sciences may be related to humanism, and what kind of rejection of humanism Foucault's work may involve. In the next section, we shall be considering how Foucault situates his own texts vis-à-vis the human sciences, this shed further light on his relation to humanism and on the role played by humanism and the human sciences in modernity.

Kant, Critique, Intellectuals

In this section, we shall be examining Foucault's comments on Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?' in an attempt to position Foucault in relation to the human sciences. We will then move to a discussion of Foucault's conception of *Kulturkritik* and the implications this has for my comments on Foucault's situating of humanism and the human sciences in relation to disciplinary power in modernity. Finally, we will consider how Foucault formulates the role of the modern intellectual. In all, we will be continuing our exploration of the political dimension of Foucault's thought.

Kant's essay *'Was ist Aufklärung?'* ('What is Enlightenment?') represents, for Foucault, a focal point in the history of thought (and being) in that it poses, for the first time, the question of the present not in terms its 'belonging to a certain era of the world,' (Reader p33) or as 'the heralding signs of a forthcoming event.' (Reader p33) or as 'a point of transition toward the dawning of a new world.' (Reader p34), but, rather, in terms of a triple questioning: 'What is my present? What is the meaning of this present? And what am I doing when I speak of this present?' (KER p90). Kant's reflections on the Enlightenment denote the point at which a certain reflexivity between the philosopher's utterance and the conditions of this utterance emerges: 'it seems to me that with this text on *Aufklärung* one sees philosophy ... problematising its own discursive present-ness: a present-ness which it interrogates as an event, an event those meaning, value and philosophical singularity it is required to state, and in which it is to elicit at once its own *raison d'être* and the foundation of what it has to say.' (KER p89). If the question 'What is *Aufklärung?*' defines one dimension of our reflection on our present-ness, the second dimension of

this reflection, Foucault argues, can be located in relation to Kant's essay on Revolution. Here, according to Foucault, Kant suggests that the significance of the Revolution lies not so much in the Revolution-as-event but, rather, in the Revolution-as-manifestation, as a manifestation of *the will to revolution*. This will-to-revolution constitutes a perpetual questioning of the the present, an on-going interrogation of its social and political forms; perhaps, we may say it is *'eternal vigilance'* in Voltaire's sense. The significance of these two essays, for Foucault, is twofold; firstly, in relation to the articulation of a mode of philosophy, and secondly, in relation to reconceptualisation of modernity as an *ethos*.

The mode of philosophy that is engendered by the form of reflection exemplified in these two essays represents, for Foucault, an alternative kind of questioning to that engendered by Kant's works of critique: 'Here it is not a question of an analytic of truth, but of what one might call an ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves,' (KER p96). The fundamental question posed by this form of theorising is 'How did we come to be constituted as we are?', a question which is addressed by each of the three domains of genealogy Foucault explores. This is also the question of Nietzsche in his investigation of the emergence of nihilism and of Weber in his examination of the condition of modern man. As such we can read Foucault's remarks on Kant as a delineation of the situatedness of his own theorising and as a sketching of the tradition of theorising within which he operates: ' it is this ... form of philosophy which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche and Max Weber, has founded a form of reflection within which I have tried to work.' (KER p96). It should be noted that this location by Foucault of his enterprise places it within philosophy not the human sciences, although it might be more

accurate to suggest that this form of reflection exists in the interstices between philosophy and the human sciences, at once marginal and central to both.

In relation the second significant aspect of these essays, that is in relation to modernity, Foucault suggests we may usefully adopt, from Kant's comments on the will to revolution, the idea of treating modernity as an attitude or ethos, 'a mode of relating to contemporary reality;' (Reader p39). To explore this idea briefly, Foucault has recourse to the 'consciousness of modernity' (Reader p39) represented in the work of Baudelaire. For Baudelaire, as Foucault presents him, while modernity may be characterised as ' "the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent." ' (in Reader p39), it is not this 'consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment.' (Reader p39) which constitutes being modern, but, rather, it is the adoption of an attitude with regard to this consciousness which 'consists in recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it.' (Reader p39). Modernity, then, is 'the will to "heroize" the present' (Reader p40):

> For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desparate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is. (Reader p41)

Yet modernity is also a mode of self-relationship which, for Baudelaire, is represented by *dandysme*, the demand that man creates himself. Both of these aspects of modernity can be produced, Baudelaire suggests, only in the realm of art. The relation of the human sciences to this exemplar of a characterisation of modernity is somewhat curious and, while Foucault

indicates that he has merely been seeking to:

> [1.] emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation - one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject - is rooted in the Enlightenment. (Reader p42)
>
> [and 2.] stress that the thread that may connect us to the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era. (Reader p42),

we can also utilise this characterisation of modernity as a further way of situating Foucault in relation to the human sciences. The aspects of our relationship to modernity, noted above, may also be read as defining the project of the human sciences. The need to imagine modernity otherwise than it is corresponds to the utopian dimension of the human sciences, here Marx's communist society and Durkheim's organic society represent the other of modernity[8]. While the necessity of grasping the true nature of modernity as means for achieving its transformation is indicated in perpetual debate over the 'real' forces generating modernity, only by locating the essential nature of alienation and anomie can we hope to transform the modern. In contrast, the kind of self-relationship one has to modernity, the ways in which we invent ourselves, corresponds to that form of human science analysis which examines the meanings and actions of the individual. This aspect can be illustrated by Schutz's analysis of meaning and subjectivity[9]. What is both obvious and significant in the history of the human sciences is that these two kinds of approach have appeared to be, more or less, irreconcilable. The problematic posed for the human sciences by the structure/agency dichotomy is an enduring one which has

shown little sign of disappearing.

Yet, we can also read these two passages in relation to Foucault's theoretical trajectory. In this context, however, the meaning of these two forms of relation to modernity is markedly different. Rather than indicating a theoretical project, these two aspects constitute problematics whose emergence is to be explained. It would follow from this that instead of taking the path defined by the human sciences, Foucault's concern is with how this particular path was constituted. In other words, while a relation to the present and a relation to one's self as well as constituting the orientation of man to modernity also define the twin projects of the human sciences, what they constitute for Foucault is a distinct problematic which requires investigation. On this reading, Foucault's concern with the conditions of possibilty and emergence of the human sciences is a necessary element in the exploration of the constitution of modernity. Foucault, in a sense, is operating a *meta*-human science, that is, as we have noted, a project which exists in the intertices between the human sciences and philosophy. Can we apply this *meta*- label to those other thinkers in relation to whom Foucault places himself? Here we need to be careful. While, on the one hand, we could argue that, for example, the Frankfurt School are engaged in a project which can be treated as operating between philosophy and the human sciences, and, further, that they are concerned with the relationship between the human sciences and modernity, that is, there is a reflexivity immanent in their mode of theorising concerning the relation between the human sciences as objective theory and as historically specific production. On the other hand, there is a teleological and utopian strain to their thought which relates it more closely to the depiction of the human sciences we have just noted.

To clarify this (potentially) three-way relationship between Foucault, the Frankurt School and the human sciences, it may be useful to look at the different notions of *critique* with which they operate. This approach may have the further advantage to clarifying Foucault's relation to humanism. Before moving to this issue, however, we should also note that Foucault's deployment of Baudelaire has a further significance which involves reading the passages noted above in the light of a remark Foucault offers nears the end of his essay on 'What is Enlightenment?'. Here, he suggests:

> The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with going beyond them. (Reader p50)

Given this comment, we can read Foucault as being involved in a reconceptualisation of the project of the human sciences. What is significant in this rethinking is twofold: (i) a rejection of the structure/agency distinction, or, rather, the adoption of a philosophical methodology which avoids raising such a dichotomy, and (ii) the employment of a political dimension (experimenting with transgressing socio-historical limits) which does not have recourse to utopian thinking. Foucault's reading of, Baudelaire's conceptualisation of modernity would appear to contain within it *both* an implicit delineation of the project of the human sciences and, also implicitly, the possibility of setting up a critical ontology of ourselves, which itself necessarily involves a radical rethinking of the very project of the human sciences. It is hoped that as we now take up the issue of 'critique', which we have momentarily postponed, the kind of rethinking of the human sciences involved here will

be made clearer.

> For Foucault, the challenge of the Kant texts he has chosen is to decode that will once contained in the enthusiasm for the French Revolution, namely, the will-to-knowledge, which the 'analysis of truth' was unwillingly to concede. Up to now, Foucault has traced this will-to-knowledge in modern power-formations only to denounce it. Now, however, he presents it in a completely different light, as the critical impulse worthy of preservation and in need of renewal. This connects his own thinking to the beginning of modernity. (FCR p107)

Habermas, in a more than usually sympathetic piece, has suggested that Foucault's reflections on Kant may indicate to us that Foucault had realised that the notion of critique he wished to operate was caught within a contradicion:

> ... Kant entangled himself in an instructive contradiction when he declared revolutionary enthusiasm to be an historical indicator that reveals the intelligible arrangement of mankind in the world of phenomena. Equally instructive is another contradiction in which Foucault becomes enmeshed. He contrasts his critique of power with the 'analysis of truth' in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity which he thought he could explode. (FCR p107/08)

This is an interesting point which raises two, related, questions. Firstly, are the 'normative yardsticks' we acquire from an 'analysis of truth' necessary for the deployment of something we would recognise as a 'critique'? Secondly, does the notion of 'critique' imply some form of commitment to a variety of humanism? To answer these points requires a careful examination of the concept of 'critique' Foucault is utilising.

We can begin by distinguishing Foucault's version of critique from Habermas's. For Habermas, 'critique' (in either Kantian or Hegelian mode) implies a set of underlying postulates, that is universals, which legitimate the normative power of a given critique and make its application *practical*. Given the distinction between theory and practice that Habermas operates, this latter point is particularly vital for the effectiveness of his accounts. Moreover, the generation of a foundation for his critique marks an attempt to answer the question: 'how can the possibility of critique be sustained, if the historical contextuality of knowledge is recognised?' (Held 1980 p398). Here we get back to the question, for Habermas, of postulating something which functions as a universal (and transcendental) aspect of man's finitude. In his theory, this role is taken up by the notion of an *ideal-speech situation* - which is 'both anticapated in [all] discourse and yet marks an unrealized actuality.' (Held 1980 p399). The model of language that Habermas takes up in postulating this ideal-speech situation, however, involves two crucial moves. Firstly, 'privileging the communicative use of language without taking into consideration that other philosophers of language ... have interpreted language as that which *first opens up* an arena for action and communication by letting things appear *as* something.' (FCR p119). Secondly, 'he proceeds to exclude the perlocutionary effect of what is said and assert that ideally only the illocutionary content should play a role in reaching agreement.' (FCR p119), that is, he excludes the rhetorical dimension of language from having any, but a mystifying, role to play. Having outlined Habermas's conception of what is built into the notion of critique, we can utilise this as a device for bringing out the critical dimension of Foucault's thought.

Our first point must be that Foucault rejects the idea of the necessity of grounding one's critique on some set of universals. Indeed, it is precisely the universalising move made by Kant which he wishes to move away from involving as it does an attempt to provide 'universal norms for human action' (FCR p118), thus he states: 'The search for a form of moral theory acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me.' (FCR p119). For Foucault, the hierachical distinction between theoretical and practical rationality which is implicit in the search for foundations marks an attempt to transcend our historicity which is not only doomed to fail (cf. section 1 of this chapter) but, moreover, engenders a form of thought which is inherently propelled into the construction of utopia's. That is a notion of critique which involves this distinction deploys not merely an immannent form of critique but also a (more or less) transcendental critique, and this latter form of critique requires the postulation of a set of social arrangements in which man's essential being is (potentially) fulfilled to legitimate its critical accounts of past and contemorary social arrangements. Foucault argues that utopian modes of theorising, which represent 'the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.' (Reader p46). In contrast, Foucault's notion of critique involves the recognition that theoretical rationality is merely a particular form of practical rationality, that is, no attempt is made to construct grounds for transcending our historicity. Consequently, Foucault also jettisons the idea of his form of critique as having universal application. Foucault indicates how he sees his critique in relation to

Kant's: 'The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.' (Reader p45). The consequences of this kind of move are far reaching and important for our exploration of Foucault's critical movement, we will therefore quote his outlining of the form of this practical critique as transgression at length:

> this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological - and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are do or think. (Reader p46)

It was noted earlier that genealogy has two critical dimensions, an immanent critique and a rhetorical critique, and we can see here the way in which these dimensions are played out. The immanent critique involves a tracing of how we have become what we are, that is an examination of the articulations of technologies of self and technologies of power which constitute the formation of our subjectivity. The narrative generated out of this critique provides the possibility of creating new resources for the resistance of power-formations. The rhetorical critique acts as an incitement to produce these new resources, that is, to experiment, to transgress, to resist. Here is the perlocutionary or rhetorical dimension of language, which Habermas attempts to suppress, operating as a critical resource.

At this point, we can return to the two related questions which arise out of Habermas's earlier comments on Foucault. With regard to the issue of whether some kind of 'analytics of truth', that is, some sort of universal, is required for the operation of something we would recognise as a critique; we can note that, for Foucault, such a universal requirement is only entailed when a sharp distinction is posed between theoretical and practical forms of rationality. When, on the contrary, we conceive of theoretical rationality as a specific form of practical rationality then the ideals and norms, which Habermas claims we must generate and legitimate through some sort of quasi-transcendental appeal to universals, are always already present within our practices, and critique, on one level, consists in precisely articulating the specific forms these norms take up and the area's of experiece which they are constitutive of. As to whether the notion of critique necessarily implies some form of relationship to humanism, we can note the comment Rajchman has made in relation to this issue. In relation to Foucault's formulation of a conception of freedom grounded in practice, Rajchman states:

> Within his Nietzschean or "genealogical" work, Foucault elaborates this conception of freedom - freedom not as the end of domination but as revolt within its practices, and domination not as repression or ideological mystification, but as dispersed formations of possible action which no one directs or controls. It is in this way thathe devises a concept of political freedom within an anti-humanist framework. (Rajchman 1985 p115)

Through such a reformulation of humanist values within an anti-humanist framework, Foucault frees the notion of critique from its humanist origins and puts it to work in a new way. Rajchman has summarised Foucault's conception of critique in a way which captures the central thrust of

Foucault's position:

> The central issue in his critique is neither the justification nor the realisation of philosophical ideals of communication; it is the willingness or unwillingness of people to play their roles in specific though anonymous configurations of power. In his conception, critique would increase the estrangement with which people participate in such configurations, but would not supply them with another form of life more in accord with philosophical principles. Thus he does not advance a global critique of all of society and its political institutions by reference to the standards of an ideal form of life. Rather he directs his "critical theory" to those historical forms of experience whose "politics" no state or society can easily ignore. (Rajchman 1985 p79/80)

If, however, the general tenor of our argument, that is that Foucault's conception of critique successfully overcomes the problems posed for it by Habermas, is correct, there are still two practically orientated problems we may pose for this kind of critique. Firstly, what would make one critique of this kind better than another? Secondly, doesn't this form of critique imply that we can only struggle against forms of domination on a local basis? A way to counter this first problem is articulated by Dreyfus and Rabinow, who argue that while:

> [w]hat makes one interpretive theory better than another on this view has yet to be worked out, ... it has to do with articulating common concerns and finding a language which becomes accepted as a way of talking about social siuations, while leaving open the possibility of 'dialogue', or better, a conflict of interpretations, with other shared discursive practices used to articulate different concerns. (FCR p115)

In other words, this issue will be worked out pragmatically by a community of individuals and not legislated on by the philosopher. The second problem posed has been explicitly noted by Foucault, he states:

> Still, the following objection would no doubt be entirely

> legitimate: if we limit ourselves to this type of always partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures of which we may well not be conscious, and over which we have no control? (Reader p47)

Yet this, for Foucault, is an inherent part of our modern subjectivity: 'we are always in the position of beginning again.' (Reader p47). On the other hand, the form of analysis and critique which he suggests we adopt is not purely a matter of contingency. As we noted in relation to the first problem posed here, we are members of a cultural community and consequently share certain common concerns. These concerns can, Foucault argues, be organised about three axes which correspond to the three domains of genealogy he has articulated: 'relations of control over things, relations of actions upon others, relations with oneself.' (Reader p48). As such, although our operation of critique is a local affair, the concerns articulated are of 'general import'.

Having delineated at some length Foucault's conception of critique, we can now look at the implications of this conception for a cluster of issues which have been, more or less, suspended in this discussion. These issues basically concern the relation of Foucault's 'critical ontology of the present' to the human sciences, humanism, and disciplinary modes of power. With regard to the human sciences and the Frankfurt School, we can suggest that, for Foucault, in so far as they are deploying Kantian, neo-Kantian or Hegelian notions of analysis and critique, this involves a commitment to philosophical humanism which raises more problems than it solves in both theoretical and, more particularly, practical senses. In these senses, the human sciences constitute part of the problematic Foucault is concerned to analyse. Yet there is also a sense in which

Foucault is not meely doing a meta-human science operation but is reconceptualising the whole project of the human sciences and locating himself as doing this reconceptualised human science. Operating within this reconceptualisation is an anti-humanist version of critique which attempts to open up new perspectives and incite experimental action. The project of this human sciences is to create new forms of subjectivity, new ways of resisting the operation of disciplinary power. The human science Foucault is arguing for, involves another level of reflexivity; for the role of the human scientist, the role of the intellectual undergoes a shift concommitant with the shift of the human sciences themselves. To conclude our discussion of the political dimension of Foucault's thought, we move to an examination of the 'ethic of the intellectual' with which he presents us.

For such philosophers as Habermas, the role of the philosopher-intellectual is a universal one. Exemplifying a concern with defining the limits of man's finitude, developing a conception of the good life, deploying a critique which is universal in its application. This is a picture of the intellectual as legislator, the intellectual who lays down the rules governing whether something is true or false, good or bad, real or unreal, central or marginal. In contrast, the role of the intellectual, for Foucault, is rather more modest. It is not the role of the intellectual to develop a form of life more philosophically "sound" than that existing, nor to generate universal conditions governing truth or falsity, rather the intellectual's role is to open up our forms of life to new ways of being through an analysis of the emergence and constitution of our present mode of being. Moreover, the Foucauldian intellectual does not lay down the

parameters of the good life but indicates the resources available for subjects self-constructions of their own good lives. In particular, the intellectual does not speak for others, deploying the light of reason to generate a complete and certain understanding of their problems which renders their own voices silent, rather, he concentrates on creating the conditions whereby these others may speak for themselves. Foucault's involvement in the G.I.P. provides a concrete example of this form of intellectual praxis[10]. Foucault's intellectual then is not a universal legislator, a Lawgiver, but an assistant to the struggles of others, attempting to clarify the way they came to be as they are, the possibilities open to them, and making space for their voices to be heard.

Conclusion

The politics of Foucault's thought is, thus, a politics of perpetual struggle. As new ways of life are taken up to resist the disciplinary technologies of modernity, so to the disciplinary apparatus grows more sophisticated, colonising these forms of self-construction and necessitating further critque. Foucault's rejection of humanism does not imply, as Habermas suggests, a rejecton of modernity but, rather, a sensitisation to modernity as an ambiguous achievement. The various facets of this political dimension to Foucault's work have been examined in this chapter. Illuminating his critique and reconceptualisation of the human sciences, his undermining of humanism, his conception of modernity as both historical event and as ethos of being, his conception of critique and of the role of the intellectual. This mode of theorising modernity presents us with a conceptual apparatus with which we can articulate our common concerns, raise the possibility of "being" in other ways, and resist the

disciplinary technologies which would constitute our being.

Notes

1. In other words, the three dimensions of the analytic of finitude define both man's mode of being in modernity and the structural possibilities open to the human sciences.

2. cf. OT p359

3. cf. OT p360

4. cf. OT p360/61

5. 'Michel Foucault: A Young Conservative?' in Ethics (1985) 96, pp165-84.

6. cf. DP pp184-194 on the examination and disciplinary power, also cf. 'Fictioning Feminism: The Construction of Woman, 1750-1930' (1985) R.D. Owen, unpublished B.A. dissertation.

7. cf. HS p86

8. cf. 'Socialism as a Sociological Problem' (1989) Velody in Politics and Social Theory ed. P. Lassman.

9. cf. for example, Schutz The Phenomenology of the Social World (1972), ch.2.

10. On this cf. P. Major-Poetzl Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture (1983), pp49-54.

Conclusion



CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have attempted to argue the case for conceiving of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault as constituting a discrete tradition of theorising modernity. That is to claim their modes of theorising possess a certain family resemblance which distinguishes these modes from other family groupings. Having examined their individual positions, we should now be in a position to outline the general features of the tradition they constitute. We will do this in two ways: (i) by contrasting this tradition of theorising to, what we may call, the 'mainstream' tradition of the human sciences, and (ii) by considering the position of this tradition in relation to current debates concerning modern and post-modern forms of theorising. This will not only aid us in firming up the outlines of this tradition, but also, in pointing to the implications of this tradition for our contemporary conceptualisations of the nature and role of the human sciences in society.

Traditions of Theorising

In this section, we will begin by presenting Velody's account of the (mainstream) human sciences which argues that certain formal features have pervaded our ways of generating accounts of the modern. We will then proceed to utilise this account as a device for delineating, by opposition, the features of accounting which we can locate in Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. It is intended that it shall be shown how type of account of the modern offered by our triumvirate avoids the problems which plague traditional human science accounts.

In generating an account of the human sciences, Velody borrows, from art

history, Bryson's notion of the *essential copy*. The features which Bryson assigns to the doctrine of the Essential Copy can, Velody claims, also be regard as the features which structure human science accounts. These features may be enumbrated as follows:

1. The image is thought of as self effacying entity ... The goal towards which it moves is the perfect replication of a reality found existing 'out there' already...

2. Each advance in art consists of the removal of a further obstacle between painting and the Essential Copy.

3. All men are agreed that Giotto's registration of the visual field is subtler, etc., and in every way superior to that of Cimabue. Thus advance and progress in painting is open to recognition and general agreement. The criterion for this is of course fidelity to the Essential Copy. (Bryson 1983 p6-7; Velody 1989 p124).

The Essential Copy constitutes the transcendental object towards which art history must progress, as Velody puts it:

> This progressive, forward moving account of art history thus requires its transcendental object. It would be difficult to make sense of the claimto progress if this claim did not imply some kind of *telos*; here the *telos* is the Essential Copy. Thus the diachrony of this type of historiography is encoded with its synchrony: the theme of progress chained to the transcendental object. (Velody 1989 p126)

We can see a precisely isomorphic logic being played out in the human sciences, Velody suggests, a logic which is embodied in two related claims made by the human sciences. The first of these is the triumphalist claim that society and our knowledge of society are progressing:

> Quite consistently the analyst proffers a view of social change and social structure: the transitions from the

simpler pre-industrial relationships of mechanical solidarity to the complex processes indicated within organic, industrial society. ... [Moreover], wherever such theorists concern themselves with the nature of knowledge and changes in its constitution, all are constrained to recognise science and its cognate activities as both itself advancing and in some necessary sense a component of more general advances in society at large. (Velody 1989 p126)

The second claim concerns: 'the nature of the underlying theoretical dimension relating to the imagery of society which such theories provide.' (Velody 1989 p126). It's most significant aspect, Velody suggests, is 'the assumption of an interior mechanism beneath a (relatively) superficial integument.' (Velody 1989 p127). For instance, we are invited to reflect on Marx's claim: 'If there were no difference between essence and appearence there would be no need of science.' (in Velody 1989 p127). The significance of this comment is that it points us towards a recognition that in the human sciences there operates a sharp distinction between the real and the apparent which has wide-reaching effects on the formal features of human scientific theories. So Velody states:

> Such theories are in agreement that immediate empirical evidence is quite insufficient to provide an adequate explanation of social phenomena. Further, mainstream sociology requires that explanation of the phenomena or happenings must be adduced to a mechanism which gives rise to such surface phenomena. Precisely what these mechanisms are and how they are linked to the observational data is a matter of dispute. But that such mechanisms are linked, and connected casually to empirical features of the world is not at issue. (Velody 1989 p127)

Or in other words:

> this tradition assumes social phenomena to require both interpretation and causal explanation. For to speak of social phenomena here is to claim that what actors, agents, say or do is not what these actions or doings really signify. These significations lie elsewhere, very much in

> the heart of society, and indeed are finally determined by causal mechanisms, the beating heart which both orders society and moves it through time. (Velody 1989 p127-28).

This beating heart, these central generating mechanisms, represents, for Velody, the Essential Copy of the human sciences. Yet we must also note that there is inherent within these mechanisms a *utopian* dimension. In a sense, the *telos* of the human sciences is twofold relating to the duality of its transcendental object. What is meant by this is that the discovery of the essential nature of society, of its central mechanisms (transcendental object part 1) is also, at the same time, the discovery of the *telos* of society, the arrangement of its form which allows the fullest expression of its essential nature and towards which it is progressing (transcendental object part 2). To understand the 'syntax and logic' of this tradition of theorising requires we grasp this duality within its Essential Copy.

Having delineated the form of mainstream human science theorising, Velody considers the problems which this form generates. While these will not be discussed in detail, it is worth noting them for reference with relation to the tradition of theorising we have been mapping in this thesis. Briefly, there are the issues of how to relate structure and agency, cause and meaning, science and ideology, knowledge, social structure and progress, and, finally, the issue of the place of politics in relation to the human sciences. For Velody, each of these issues, these problematics, is generated out of logic of the Essential Copy style of theorising, which, in broad philosophical terms, is to say out of the appearence/reality distinction: 'Fundamentally the same old sun, but shining through mist and scepticism;' (Nietzsche TI p40).

What can be argued here, is that it is precisely this distinction between the real world and the apparent world which is rejected in the tradition constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. As regards Nietzsche, this is a relatively unproblematic claim, we need only recall that sketch of a genealogy "How the 'Real World' at last Became a Myth" (Nietzsche TI p40). As regards Weber, Velody points out: 'No essential copy lies in wait for the social investigator to discover; there are, quite simply, no such discoveries to be made.' (Velody 1988 p132). We can back up this claim by reference to my earlier discussion of ideal-typical analysis as a form of perspectivism. As was noted there, the notion of comparing an ideal-type (appearence) to the world (reality) collapses since such a comparison can only be done on the basis of other ideal-types, consequently, the distinction between appearance and reality falls into itself. Finally, as regards Foucault, his methodology is perspectivist in character, a consequence of which Deleuze notes:

> In a certain way Foucault can declare that he has never written anything but fiction, as we have seen, statements resemble dreams and are transformed as in a kaleidoscope, depending on the corpus in question and the diagonal line being followed. But in another sense he can also claim that he has written only what is real, and used what is real, for everything is real in the statement, and all reality in it is openly on display. (Deleuze 1988 p18)

The distinction between the real and the apparent collapses, Foucault has himself made the same point, with regard to his work, in a more general way:

> I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a

> true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' something that does not yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existance on the basis of a historical truth. (P/K p193).

For this tradition, the appearance/reality distinction represents something to be overcome. However, remembering Nietzsche's remark: 'We have abolished the real world: but what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? ... But no! *with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!*' (Nietzsche TI p41), it becomes necessary to ask what is left, is the need for science, as Marx would have it, abolished at the same time? If this tradition rejects epistemology (even as methodolgy), what replacement is offered? The short answer to this is: perspectivism. However, in this context, a fuller reply is necessitated.

To start, by taking a slightly oblique route into this question, we can argue that it is only by taking on board the distinction between a real world and an apparent world that one can, similarly, operate a sharp distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. That is between an reason which is transcendental and a reason which is historically contingent. Only by assuming that there is some true human nature, form or essence can, one posit a form of reasoning which operates outside of history. If, as this tradition does, we treat our being as historically contingent, our form of subjectivity as an historical achievement, it follows that no such basis, or foundation, is available. Consequently, what we refer to as 'theoretical reason' - the reflexive reasoning of the philosopher - is a form of practical reason. Moreover, it would also follow that there are a variety of forms of practical reason, and that, by treating the subject as multiplicity, we can conceive of our

sense of our self as a subject as being constructed out of the interaction of the different styles of practical reasoning we deploy in our daily lives. Perspectivism involves the claim that 'the unity of the known and the unity of the knower are derived the activity of knowing.' (Strong 1985 p171). In our terms, this is the claim that our unity as a particular subject and the unity of the world as a particular world is generated out of the *style of reasoning* deployed. Our total subjectivity emerges out of the hermeneutic interaction of the different styles of reasoning deployed, out of the overall style that emerges from this process.

Given this framework, the tradition constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault involves not an appeal to the *real* but, rather, an attempt to develop a particular style of reasoning and to seduce us into the deployment of this style. The highly rhetorical nature of their texts constitutes not an absence of scientific precision but an integral element of their texts as a themselves form of political practice. Foucault explicitly noted this point in reference to a comment by Rorty, Foucault states:

> R. Rorty point out that ... I do not appeal to any "we" - to any of those "we's" whose consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated. But the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a "we" in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a "we" possible, by elaborating the question. (Reader p385)

In this light, this tradition's elaboration of the various technologies of discipline in modernity is to encourage the formation of a "we", a community of action, which will resist these technologies. The form of this

encouragement will be examined in the next section, it is, perhaps, though time to return from this theoretical flight to the somewhat more mundane question of the advantages of this tradition in relation to the sets of problems which, in Velody's characterisation, plague the human sciences.

Yet, if we agree with Velody that these problems are generated out of logic of an Essential Copy style of analysis, that is, in effect, out of the appearance/reality distinction, then with the collapsing of this distinction so we collapse the problems. And while it may be argued by Habermas, for example, that an inability to distinguish between science and ideology is a serious dilemma for a human *science*, one which entails an inability to present an effective form of critique; this is only so if one accept his terms of debate. If, as this tradition does, we reject the presuppositions behind the objection, then it hardly constitutes an serious objection. Now this may all be very well, but, it does pose the thorny issue of how we adjudicate between the claims of the two traditions we have represented here, assuming that is that their own presuppositions do not rule out the possibility of their successful operation. Is it, for example, possible to develop a formal language which is neutral with regard to the multiferious philosophical presuppositions involved here? I think this unlikely. If there is to be a way of adjudicating between them, it seems to me that it must be one rooted in practice. By which is meant in a pragmatics, we could decide, perhaps, on the basis of which style of reasoning is deployed to articulate our communal concerns, which philosophical vocabulary we adopt. Even such a criteria as this would appear to be problematic though, for different sections of the community might deploy different vocabularies, different practices. Perhaps all we can do is make the distinction between these traditions clear. To further this aim, which has been partially

developed in this section, it is useful to repose their relationship in terms of the current debates over the nature of modernity and postmodernity.

Modern and Postmodern Theorising

In this section, we will deploy a distinction developed by Bauman in order to situate the two traditions outlined in relation to contemporary debates over the form of modern and postmodern styles of theorising. This will also aid us in delineating the form of *politics* involved in these traditions, in particular that tradition constituted about Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault.

Bauman suggests the modern theory is fundamentally *legislative* in character, while postmodern theory is basically *interpretive* in form (cf. Bauman 1987a). These two categories present us with a useful schema, which we, therefore, borrow unashamedly. We use *legislative* to refer to those theories which embody a conception of the good life and/or the good society, that is a *telos* towards which we approach. We can see two such leglislative theories in looking at Habermas - the ideal-speech situation as a critical device for delineating the features of the good life and the good society - and at McIntyre - a reformulation of the Aristotelian tradition which sets out the features of the good life through a conception of the *virtuous* individual - in both these theories an attempt is made to lesgislate from a set of philosophical presuppositions what the form of the good life would be. This conception of *legislative* theorizing is fairly close to what Wolin describes as *epical* theorizing and we can use Wolin's conception to clarify the form of such theorising further. As Wolin puts it, in epical theory:

> 'concepts, symbols and language are fused into a great political gesture towards the world, a thought-deed inspired by the hope that now or someday action will be joined to theory and become the means for making a great theoretical statement in the world' (Wolin 1970 p8 in Lassman/Velody

1988 p170)

As Lassman and Velody note, 'the impetus to theorizing comes from the problematic or crisis-ridden nature of the political world' (Lassman/ Velody 1988 p170). Moreover, and most importantly for our concerns:

> The vision of an 'epic' theorist typically encompasses a theory of knowledge and of the future in terms of an alternative set of possiilities in which a transformation of man and his social life can lead to the creation of the 'good society'. (Lassman/Veolody 1988 p171)

In other words, it is a defining feature of legislative or epical theories that they embody an utopian dimension. Given this, we can place the tradition of theorizing that Velody outlined about the concept of the Essential Copy firmly within the tradition of modern theorizing. Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault, however, would not appear to sit easily within this catagorization, lacking, as they do, a utopian vision.

Perhaps, we shall be able to situate them within postmodern theorizing, within a conception of theorizing as *interpretive*. Bauman gives a useful precis of postmodern theory which goes as follows:

> it proclaims the 'end of modernity' and the coming of 'postmodernity'. Accordingly, the times of 'universal projects', of a world which made such projects plausible, are over. From this point on, however, the theorists of postmodernity split. Some dwell on the growing plurality of the contemporary world, on the autonomy of 'language games', 'communities of meaning' or 'cultural traditions' which are impervious to objective evaluation since they themselves individually provide the ground of all authority that any evaluation may claim. Others do not feel obliged to refer to the changing world to justify a plurality of ideas. The difference between postmodernity and modernity appears to them as another chapter in the history of thought. They abandon the futile search for universal standards of truth, justice and taste, and modestly claim that there is nothing but their own conviction to justify our decision to pursue values we claim worth pursuing. In varying degrees, both

> forms of postmodernist theory are philosophies of surrender. Both resign themselves to the impossibility, or unlikelihood, of improving the world, aware of the powerlessness of critique in influencing other communities. (Bauman 1987b p21)

While Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault share some characteristics with this form of theorising, most notably a scepticism towards universal standards, at the same time, their seats within this type of theorising would appear to be fairly uncomfortable given that they do not acknowledge the 'powerlessness of critique'. On the contrary, while they abandon that form of critique which characterises modern theorising, they develop a form of critique which operates both immanently and rhetorically, that is a form of critique as *seduction* towards a particular *style of reasoning*. We can clarify this by reference to Lassman and Velody's discussion of Weber's style of theorising. They argue that:

> 'The strange and paradoxical quality of Weber's thought seems to reside in the fact that what we are presented with is the construction of an 'epical' denial of the possibility of an 'epical' theory for the moden age. (Lassman/Velody 1988 p172)

This 'strange and paradoxical quality' is characteristic of this tradition of theorizing. On the one hand, a style which is 'epical' and, on the other hand, a rejection of the *leglislative* nature of 'epical' theorizing. And, simultaneously, an acceptance of the postmodern rejection of 'universal standards, but a rejection of the postmodern acceptance of the 'powerlessness of critique'. The implication of this would appear to be that we cannot easily situate this tradition of theorizing within either modern or postmodern modes, rather we should situate Nietzsche, Weber and

Foucault as operating in the space between modern and postmodern styles of theorizing, on the margins of both but of neither.

Endings

In this conclusion, we indicated the various dimensions of the tradition of theorizing which has concerned us in this thesis. By juxtaposing this tradition to an alternative tradition and by situating it in relation to current debates about modern and postmodern styles of theorizing, we have attempted to bring out the salient features of the tradition constituted about the figures of Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault. We can now sum these significant features: (i) a rejection of the appearance/reality distinction, which is to say, a rejection of epistemology in favour of perspectivism, (ii) a conception of the subject as a 'becoming what one is', as involved in its self-constitution through the deployment of particular styles of reasoning, (iii) a conception of critique as practice which is an attempt to seduce us into the deployment of the style(s) of reasoning embodied in their texts, (iv) a rejection of utopia's addressed to a particular "we", a particular historical agent, in favour of an attempt to constitute a "we", a community of action, which resists the disciplinary technologies which operate in the modern age, (v) a style of reasoning, a mode of theorizing, which is neither modern nor postmodern but exists between the two. The conception of the nature and role of social theorizing which is embodied in these features is particularly attractive, most notably in its refusal to leglisate the nature of the good life or the good society. It is this modesty of purpose which most distinguishes it from the totalising claims of the mainstream human sciences, a modesty which addresses the fate of the subject in modernity but offers no glib or easy solutions to the

dilemma's with which this subject is faced.

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a. p11 - this quote is from T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer (1979) pxi.

b. p117 - the first quote is from K. Lowith (1982) p34, the second is from G. Iggers (1968) p173.

c. p149 - these are both from FMW p253 and p128 respectively.

d. p174 - this is from Strong 'Epilogue' in Frederich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration Revised Edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p316.

e. p205 - this is from KER p96.

f. p290 - both these are from Martin 'Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault' in Martin, Gutman, Hutton (1988) p11 and p10 respectively.

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