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THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN SUDAN:

The Impact of Dr Hassan al-Turabi's Personality on the Movement

MASAKI KOBAYASHI

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Submitted by Masaki Kobayashi
to the University of Durham
as a thesis towards the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
in Middle East Politics, 1996.

Supervisor: Professor Tim Niblock

PhD Thesis 1996

Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
University of Durham

10 OCT 1997

Abstract

The research focuses on the Sudanese Islamist movement which has been led by Dr Hassan al-Turabi. The researcher believes that a better understanding of the Sudanese Islamist movement requires a better understanding of the personality of Dr al-Turabi. In this thesis, the Sudanese Islamist movement is analyzed in terms of Dr al-Turabi's personality.

The research includes two analyses: the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality and that of the Islamist movement. The former is used as the basic tool of the latter.

In personality analysis, a psychological approach is employed. Dr al-Turabi's personality is analyzed by means of a psychological theory - McAdams' "life-story model of identity". The research constitutes an innovational attempt at applying McAdams' model, and may suggest a new type of approach in the field of social science. One of the unique characters of this approach is the distinction between historical information and psychological information. Most of Dr al-Turabi's account is regarded as psychological information and used in order to understand his personality. The significance of psychological information lies in its "meaning" rather than in its historical accuracy.

In the six chapters of the thesis, the Sudanese Islamist movement from 1964 to 1995 is divided into five periods. The main developments (or key developments) in the Islamist movement are described in each chapter. This latter material, regarded as "historical information", is used as a basis for the analysis of the Islamist movement. The analysis draws conclusions about the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement during each period.

The researcher concludes that a number of unique aspects of the Sudanese Islamist movement can be better understood by making reference to Dr al-Turabi's personality.

Table of contents

Page

Title i
Abstract ii
Table of contents iii
List of tables, diagrams, and maps xii
Declaration xv
Statement of copyright xvi
Acknowledgement xvii
Preface xviii
Photographs xxv
Maps xxx
Definitions xxxii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 FOCUS AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 2

1.2 METHODOLOGY 3

1.2.1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 3
1.2.2 MCADAMS' LIFE-STORY MODEL OF IDENTITY 5
1.2.3 PERSONALITY AND LIFE-STORY 13
(1) DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY 13
(2) EXAMPLES OF PERSONALITY 13
(a) Agentic personality 13
(b) Communal personality 15
(3) NUCLEAR EPISODES 16
1.2.4 RESEARCHER'S APPROACH 17
(1) BASIC LOGIC OF THE APPROACH 17
(a) Finding out Dr al-Turabi's personality 17
(b) Assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement 18

(2) MATERIAL 19
(a) Location of the materials 19
(b) Qualification of the materials 20
(i) General description
(ii) Dr al-Turabi's account
(3) ANALYSES 21
(a) Analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality 21
(b) Analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement 22

1.3 CHAPTER PLAN 22

CHAPTER 2: PERSONALITY BUILDING 24

2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (UP TO 1964) 25

2.1.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY 25
(1) TRIBAL ORIGIN 25
(2) FAMILY HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS THINKING 27
2.1.2 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ABDALLA AND HASSAN 29
(1) ABDALLA 32
(2) HASSAN 33

2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 34

2.2.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY 34
2.2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S LIFE STORY 36
(1) INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD 36
(2) ADOLESCENCE 38
(a) Intermediate education 38
(b) Secondary education 39
(c) Higher education 40
(3) EARLY ADULTHOOD 42
(a) London period 42
(b) Paris period 46

2.3 ANALYSES 49

2.3.1 FACTORS OF DR AL-TURABI'S IDENTITY 49
2.3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 53

2.4 SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE 55

2.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S OWN ASSESSMENT ON HIS IDENTITY 55
2.4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY DESCRIBED BY HIS SUPPORTERS . 57
(1) YASSIN OMAR AL-IMAM 57
(2) ABD AL-RAHIM MAHMUD HAMDI 58
(3) HASSAN MAKKI 59

CHAPTER 3: BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT 60

3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1964-69) 61

3.1.1 CHRONOLOGY 61
3.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 63
(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 63
(a) Background 63
(b) Revolution 64
(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE 66

3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 68

3.2.1 INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 68
3.2.2 LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE 70

3.3 ANALYSES 72

3.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 72
3.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 76
(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 76
(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE 77

CHAPTER 4: ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND LEARNING PERIOD 79

4.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1969-77) 79

4.1.1 CHRONOLOGY 79
4.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT 80

4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT 85

4.2.1 IN PRISON (1969-72) 85
4.2.2 FREE (1972-73) 85
4.2.3 IN PRISON (1973-74) 86
4.2.4 FREE (1974-75) 86
4.2.5 IN PRISON (1975-77) 86
4.2.6 FREE (1977-) 88
4.2.7 THE ISLAMISTS INSIDE PRISON 88

4.3 ANALYSES 89

4.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 89
4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 92

CHAPTER 5: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NIMAIRI REGIME:
EXPANSION AND PRACTICE 95

5.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1977-85) 95

5.1.1 CHRONOLOGY 95
5.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: EXPANSION AND PRACTICE 97
(1) EDUCATION 98
(2) ISLAMIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 99

(3) ISLAMIC ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 101

5.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 106

5.3 ANALYSES 107

5.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 107
5.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 110

CHAPTER 6: TRANSITION PERIOD AND POWER STRUGGLE 113

6.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1985-89) 113

6.1.1 CHRONOLOGY 113
6.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 115
(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS . 115
(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) 121

6.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 123

6.2.1 DR AL-TURABI'S MAIN GOAL 123
6.2.2 THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS 123
6.2.3 POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) 124

6.3 ANALYSES 126

6.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 126
6.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 129
(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS . 129
(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89) 130

CHAPTER 7: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS 132

7.1 THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE 134

7.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-95) 135

7.2.1 CHRONOLOGY 135
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS 136
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 136
(a) Non-party democracy with Islamism: popular participation and consensus based on popular congresses 138
(b) Non-party democracy with Islamism: popular participation and consensus based on a federal system 144
(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 147
(a) Apostasy 147
(b) Blasphemy 148
(c) Theft 149
(3) ECONOMY (ISLAMIC ECONOMY) 151
(4) EDUCATION 155
(5) DEFENCE 158
(a) Regular army 159
(b) Popular Defence Force 161
(c) War in the South 163

7.3 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 167

7.3.1 DOMESTIC POLICY 167
7.3.2 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 170
7.3.3 LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 172
7.3.4 ECONOMY 174
7.3.5 EDUCATION 175
7.3.6 DEFENCE 176
7.3.7 DR AL-TURABI'S SATISFACTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SUDAN IN JANUARY 1995 177

7.4 ANALYSES 177

7.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 177
7.4.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY
ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 181
(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 181
(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 182
(3) ECONOMY 183
(4) EDUCATION 184
(5) DEFENCE 184

CHAPTER 8: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE:
EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER 186

8.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-95) 187

8.1.1 CHRONOLOGY 187
8.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS:
EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER 189
(1) THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY 189
(2) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (89-93) 190
(a) Sudan and its neighbors 191
(i) Egypt, (ii) Libya, (iii) Chad, (iv) CAR, (v) Zaire,
(vi) Uganda, (vii) Kenya, (viii) Ethiopia, (ix) Eritrea,
(x) Saudi Arabia.
(b) Sudan and the Middle East 208
(i) Algeria, (ii) Iran, (iii) Iraq, (iv) PLO,
(v) Tunisia, (vi) Yemen.
(3) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC) 221

8.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT 224

8.2.1 FOREIGN POLICY 224
8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 227
8.2.3 POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC) 236

8.3 ANALYSES 239

8.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY 239

8.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS 243

(1) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 244

(2) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC) 245

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 246

Notes 252

Chapter 1 253
Chapter 2 255
Chapter 3 261
Chapter 4 264
Chapter 5 268
Chapter 6 274
Chapter 7 278
Chapter 8 284

Appendices 296

Appendix (1): The Turabi family 297
Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan 299
Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident 300
Appendix (4): Development of the GMC 301
Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations 302
Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution 308
Appendix (7): Military ranks 310

Appendix (7): Military ranks 310
Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure 311
Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan 314
Appendix (10): Original diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses 323
Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi 324
Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC 328

Abbreviations 334
Glossary of Arabic terms 337
Chronology 340
Bibliography 354

List of tables, diagrams, and maps

Tables Page

2.1.(1): Moves of Abdalla and Hassan 30
2.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's personality described by adjectives 54
3.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-64) 73
3.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-64) 73
3.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1964-69) .. 75
4.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-69) 89
4.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-69) 90
4.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1969-77) .. 92
5.1.(1): Senior staff of the FIBS (1984) 103
5.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-77) 108
5.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-77) 108
5.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1977-85) .. 110
6.1.(1): The 1986 elections: the NIF's performance (territorial constituencies) 117
6.1.(2): The 1986 elections: comparison between the parties (territorial constituencies) 118
6.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-85) 126
6.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-85) 127
6.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1985-89) .. 129
6.1.(3): The 1986 elections: Dr al-Turabi's performance 120
7.2.(1): Regions and states 145
7.2.(2): Universities in Sudan (May 1995) 157
7.4.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89) 178
7.4.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89) 178
7.4.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95) .. 181

8.1.(1): Military balance between Sudan and Egypt (1993-94) 195
8.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89) 239
8.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89) 240
8.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95) .. 243
9.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-95) 248
9.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-95) 248
9.(3): The characters representing each period 250
A.2.(1): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan ... 299
A.7.(1): Military ranks 310
C.(1): Sources and abbreviations 340
C.(2): Chronology (1932-95) 341

Diagrams

1.2.(1): The position of the researcher's approach 4
1.2.(2): The position of McAdams' life-story model 4
1.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model 9
1.2.(4): Relations between life-story and personality 18
1.2.(5): Relations between Dr al-Turabi's personality and the Islamist movement 19
2.1.(1): Tribal origin of the Turabi family 27
2.1.(2): Family heritage in terms of religious thinking 28
2.2.(1): Signatures of the boycott declaration 38
3.1.(1): The structure of the organization (after 1962) 67
7.2.(1): Structure of the congresses 139
7.2.(2): The Second Civil War (1989-94) 164
7.3.(1): Development of the movement 168
A.1.(1): The Turabi family 297
A.4.(1): Development of the GMC 301
A.8.(1): The first structure 311
A.8.(2): The second structure (after 1962) 311
A.8.(3): The third structure (after 1974) 312
A.9.(1): Civil wars in Sudan 314
A.10.(1): Congresses 323

Maps

P.(1): Sudan xxx
P.(2): Tri-city area (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman) xxxi
2.1.(1): Places of the moves of Abdalla and Hassan 31
6.1.(1): Al-Sahafa and Jabra 120
7.2.(1): Sudanese states 146
7.2.(2): Increase of government-controlled area 165
A.9.(1): SPLA-controlled areas in March 1986 316
A.9.(2): Drop of SPLA-controlled area 320

Declaration

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

Statement of copyright

"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged."

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The final acknowledgement is due to the Overseas Research Students Awards Scheme (ORS) for financial support which the researcher has received.

Preface

The researcher has employed a set of rules on the usage of titles (Dr, Mr, and Mrs), an English transliteration system of Arabic words (used for linguistic correctness), and an English spelling system of Arabic words. The English spelling system is a simplification of the transliteration system (see III. Spelling System).

I. Titles (Dr, Mr, and Mrs)

In general, titles like Dr, Mr, and Mrs will be omitted. However, the researcher will use these titles in the following cases:

1. In the text, except for the section of chronology, "Dr Hassan al-Turabi" will be used, because he is widely known by followers, supporters, and observers as such.
2. In the notes, "Dr", "Mr", and "Mrs" will be used only when the reference is to an interview.

   e.g. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.
   e.g. Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.

II. English transliteration system

The researcher employs the following English transliteration system.

1. Letters

CONSONANTS						VOWELS	
ء	'	ز	z	ق	q	◌َ	a
ب	b	س	s	ك	k	◌ِ	i
ت	t	ش	sh	ل	l	◌ُ	u
ث	th	ص	s	م	m		
ج	j	ض	d	ن	n	(long)	
ح	h	ط	t	ه	h	ـا آ	aa
خ	kh	ظ	z	و	w	ـي	ii
د	d	ع	c	ي	y	ـو	uu
ذ	dh	غ	gh				
ر	r	ف	f				
ة	a (at in construct state)						
ال	al- (article)						

c = superscript

2. Marks

(a) " " Double quotation marks will be used instead of single quotation marks.

e.g. " 'Ansaar "

(b) - Hyphen will be used after the definite article " al " and to connect some kinds of words (wa, fa, bi, hu, ...) to the main words.

e.g. al-Haraka
e.g. qalam-hu wa-qalam-haa
e.g. al-Qamar wa-al-Shams (not wal-Shams nor waal-Shams)
e.g. madiinat-hum (not madiinathum)

3. Presentations

(a) B = b There is no difference between capital letters and small letters in terms of their pronunciations. The usage of capital letters follows the same rules of English.

e.g. Hasan Makkii (first letters of the names)

Definite articles will remain in small letters except for when they come out the beginning of the sentence.

e.g. Al-Turaabii wa-al-Mahdii

(b) al Definite articles in front of " Sun Letters " will not be changed and the first letter after the definite article will not be doubled.

e.g. al-Zuhr (not az-Zuhr nor al-ZZuhr)

(c) o Taa' marbuuta will be normally written as " a ".

e.g. Haraka (not Harakah nor Harak-a)

In the case of 'Idaafa, i.e. in construct state, it will be written as " at ".

e.g. Harakat al-'Islaamiiya

(d) Standard Presentations

First appearance:

e.g. *Hamas* (Hamaas)

Mixture with both Arabic and English

e.g. the *Umma* ('Umma) Party

e.g. the Turabi family

Name of place or person,

e.g. Khartoum (Al-Khartuum)

e.g. Al-Turabi (Al-Turaabii)

Second appearance:

e.g. *Hamas*

e.g. the *Umma* Party

e.g. Khartoum

e.g. Al-Turabi

After second appearance:

The form of the first appearance will be sometimes used in order to remind the reader.

(e) *** Authors' names for references will follow the same spelling used in their publications, even though they may be different from common spelling or the spelling based on my spelling system (see II. Spelling System).

e.g. Abdelwahab el-Affendi (for reference)
ᶜAbd al-Wahhaab al-'Afandii (transliteration)
Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi (by Spelling System)

(f) Quotations from Arabic Books
Quotations will be presented in the form of English transliteration.

4. References of Arabic Books

e.g. Note:
Hasan al-Turaabii, Al-Haraka al-'Islaamiiya fii al-Suudaan (The Islamic Movement in Sudan) (Al-Kuwayt: Daar al-Qalam, 1988), p. 15.

Bibliography:
Al-Turaabii, Hasan, Al-Haraka al-'Islaamiiya fii al-Suudaan (The Islamic Movement in Sudan) (Al-Kuwayt: Daar al-Qalam, 1988).

III. Spelling System

English spelling of Arabic words and names of people and places follows a system of spelling based on my transliteration system, however, the spelling which has been accepted widely as customary usage remains unchanged.

1. Letters

CONSONANTS						VOWELS	
ء	/	ز	z	ق	q	◌ُ	a
ب	b	س	s	ك	k	◌ِ	i
ت	t	ش	sh	ل	l	◌ٗ	u
ث	th	ص	s	م	m		
ج	j	ض	d	ن	n	(long)	
ح	h	ط	t	ه	h	آ ـا	a
خ	kh	ظ	z	و	w	ـي	i
د	d	ع	/	ي	y	ـو	u
ذ	dh	غ	gh				
ر	r	ف	f				
ة	a (at in construct state)						
ال	al- (article)						

	Arabic	Transliteration System	Spelling System
e.g.	التُرَابِي	Al-Turaabii	Al-Turabi
e.g.	أَحْمَدْ	'Ahmad	Ahmad
	exceptions		
e.g.	حَسَنْ	Hasan	Hassan (see Customary Usage)
e.g.	الخَرْطُومْ	Al-Khartuum	Khartoum (see Customary Usage)

2. Customary Usage

In the following cases, the researcher will use the spellings of customary usage which he and his supervisor have decided as fairly common usage and exceptions.

(a) Names of People

Customary	Transliteration System	Spelling System
Abdalla	ᶜAbd Allaah	Abd Allah
Awadalla	ᶜAwad Allaah	Awad Allah
Dafalla	Dafᶜ Allaah	Daf Allah
Faisal	Faysal	Faysal
Hassan	Hasan	Hasan
Husain	Husayn	Husayn
Nasser	Naasir	Nasir
Omar	ᶜUmar	Umar
Osman	ᶜUthmaan	Uthman
Shaikh	Shaykh	Shaykh
Yassin	Yaasiin	Yasin
Zain	Zayn	Zayn
Abdel Nasser	ᶜAbd al-Naasir	Abd al-Nasir
Anwar Sadat	Anwar al-Saadaat	Anwar al-Sadat
Chadli Bendjedid	Shaadhilii bin Jadiid	Shadhili bin Jadid
Habib Bourguiba	Habiib buu Ruqayba	Habib bu Ruqayba
Malik Bennabi	Maalik bin Nabii	Malik bin Nabi
Muammar Qadhafi	Muᶜammar al-Qadhdhaafii	Muammar al-Qadhdhafi
Jafar Nimairi	Jaᶜfar Numayrii	Jafar Numayri
Zain Ben Ali	Zayn bin ᶜAli	Zayn bin Ali

(b) Names of Places and States

Customary	Transliteration System	Spelling System
El-Hasaheisa	Al-Hasaa Hiisaa	Al-Hasa Hisa
El-Nahud	Al-Nahuud	Al-Nahud
El-Obeid	Al-'Ubayyid	Al-Ubayyid
El-Roseires	Al-Ruusiiris	Al-Rusiris
Halaib	Halaayb	Halayb
Hantoub	Hantuub	Hantub
Kassala	Kasalaa	Kasala
Khartoum	Al-Khartuum	Al-Khartum
Nimule	Nimuulay	Nimulay
Mecca	Makka	Makka
Omdurman	'Umm Durmaan	Umm Durman
Torit	Tawriit	Tawrit

Umm Ruwaba	'Umm Rawwaaba	Umm Rawwaba
Equatoria	Al-'Istiwaa'iiya	Al-Istiwaiya
Gedaref	Al-Qadaarif	Al-Qadarif
Gezira	Al-Jaziira	Al-Jazira
Jonglei	Juunqlii	Junqli
Kordofan	Kurdfaan	Kurdfan
Nile	Nayl	Nayl
Sennar	Sinnaar	Sinnar
Sudan	Al-Suudaan	Al-Sudan

(Definite articles will remain in capital letters.)

(c) Other Words

Customary	Transliteration System	Spelling System
dura	dhura	*dhura*
Fatah	Fath	*Fath*
Hizbolla	Hizb Allaah	*Hizb Allah*
Koran	al-Qur'aan	*al-Quran*

Photographs

The following photographs were taken by the researcher.

(1) Khartoum Mosque in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)

(2) Satellite dish on top of the house at Al-Ammarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)

(3) Public transport running on Africa Road at Al-Ammarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994) (fare: S£ 10)

(4) Public transport running on Africa Road at Al-Ammarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994) (fare: S£ 10)

(5) Street stall and a stallkeeper at Al-Ammarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)

(6) Water jars at Al-Ammarat in Khartoum, Sudan. (May 1994)



(7) Dr Hassan al-Turabi at his PAIC office in Khartoum, Sudan. (25 January 1995)

(8) President Omar al-Bashir and the researcher at the Presidential Palace in Khartoum, Sudan. (4 February 1995)

(9) Dr Hassan al-Turabi and the researcher at the PAIC office in Khartoum, Sudan. (14 May 1994)

Maps

Map P.(1): Sudan



Source: *The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Sudan, 1994/1995* (London: EIU, 1994). (photocopy)

N.B.: Some spellings of the place names are different from the researcher's usage (see Preface).
The names of Abu Hamad, El Nahud, Halaib, Umm Ruwaba, and ERITREA are added to the original map.

Map P.(2): Tri-city area (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman)



Source: Scott Wayne, *Egypt and Sudan: A Travel Survival Kit*, (Australia: Lonely Planet, 1990), pp. 386-387. (photocopy)

Definitions

"Islamism"

The term Islamism is used to refer to political ideology which advocates the establishment of an Islamic political order, such as an Islamic state or an Islamic community, *umma* ('umma), which clearly contradicts secularism.

"Islamist"

An Islamist is a person who adopts Islamism as his or her political ideology. For example, Dr Hassan al-Turabi (Hasan al-Turaabii) is an Islamist, but Sadiq al-Mahdi (Saadiq al-Mahdii) is not.

"Islamist movement"

An Islamist movement is an Islamic movement led by an Islamist leader (or leaders). An Islamic movement led by Dr al-Turabi is an Islamist movement. In this sense, any movement led by Sadiq al-Mahdi can not be regarded as an Islamist movement.

"Personality"

The researcher defines the term "personality" as the behavioral tendencies which stem from factors of identity, particularly "motives" and "characters (imagoes)" (see 1.2.3 for further details).

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 FOCUS AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Dr Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi (Hasan ᶜAbd Allaah al-Turaabii) is the most prominent and powerful Islamist[1] leader in Sudan. Many western scholars believe that Dr al-Turabi is the real leader of the country and that the 1989 military coup was planned by him. Whatever the truth is, there is no doubt that he has a great influence on Sudanese politics and government. He organized the first Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC)[2] in 1991 in Khartoum, and in the second conference in 1993 approximately 500 participants came from all over the world to attend. Among the movements represented was the Palestinian *Hamas* (Hamaas), the Lebanese *Hizbolla* (Hizb Allaah), and the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria (FIS).[3] The occasion demonstrated that Dr al-Turabi and Sudan had considerable influence on the Islamist movements[4] of the world.

The focus of the study is on the Islamist movement led by Dr Hassan al-Turabi from 1964 to 1995. Since 1964, the Islamist movement has been effectively under the influence of Dr al-Turabi, and Sudan today may be regarded as a state shaped by the Islamist movement. Compared to other Islamist movements in the world, the Sudanese Islamist movement has some unique aspects. The Sudanese movement was able to establish an Islamic state in 1989, while other movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (established in 1928), are still struggling as opposition movements. The current Sudanese government has been claiming and emphasizing that its economy is completely Islamic, even the Iranian government does not emphasize this point any more.[5] Despite Sudan's strong advocacy of Islam, the actual application of Islam in some fields seems to be more moderate than that in some other Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. For example, Sudanese women wear less restricted Islamic clothes than do Saudi women. Unlike Iran, Sudan has never banned video or satellite equipment.

Because Dr al-Turabi has been playing a very important role in the Sudanese Islamist movement, and is the most prominent and influential leader of the movement, the researcher believes that a better understanding of the Islamist movement requires a better understanding of Dr al-Turabi himself, starting with his personality.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

Because the researcher believes that the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality is very important, a psychological approach will be employed. This is then used to throw light on the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

1.2.1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

In the history of political science, a variety of psychological methods have been introduced into the field. There are many different approaches in this respect. An approach based on "personality theory" is deemed most suitable here, because the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality is seen as important.

"Psychobiography"[6] is one approach based on personality theory. This approach is associated with Freudian psychoanalysis and has many shortcomings.[7] The researcher believes that psychobiography relies too much on the interpretation of one's childhood. Although childhood influences are important for understanding personality, the researcher believes that behaviour is not determined wholly by childhood influences and that it is necessary to examine a longer period of life. McAdams points this out:

> 'Early experience does not determine the quality of identity. ... Instead, early experience provides "raw materials" or "resources" for the making of identity in adolescence and adulthood. Other resources come from biology and culture. Many different forces and factors, some within the person and some in the person's environment, may help shape identity by providing raw materials for the making of the self.'[8]

After examining various kind of psychological approaches based on personality theory, and with the help of Professor McAdams,[9] the researcher has chosen McAdams' life-story model of identity as the most suitable theory to understand Dr al-Turabi's personality.

Diagram 1.2.(1) is intended to show the position of the researcher's approach in political science, and Diagram 1.2.(2) is meant to show the position of McAdams' life-story model in psychology.

Diagram 1.2.(1): The position of the researcher's approach



Diagram 1.2.(2): The position of McAdams' life-story model



The researcher will employ a psychological approach based on McAdams' life-story model of identity in order to understand Dr al-Turabi. The Sudanese Islamist movement will be analyzed in terms of Dr al-Turabi's personality by using the life-story model.

McAdams' life-story model is a new theory and his major book on the theory was published in 1993. The researcher could not find any application of McAdams' model in a suitable political field when

developing his theoretical framework. Therefore, his research constitutes an innovational attempt at applying the model.

1.2.2 MCADAMS' LIFE-STORY MODEL OF IDENTITY

McAdams' life-story model is a theory of human identity and 'is built around the idea that each of us comes to know who he or she is by creating a heroic story of the self.'[10]
McAdams says:

> 'We are all tellers of tales. We each seek to provide our scattered and often confusing experiences with a sense of coherence by arranging the episodes of our lives into stories. This is not the stuff of delusion or self-deception. We are not telling ourselves lies. Rather, through our personal myths, each of us discovers what is true and what is meaningful in life. In order to live well, with unity and purpose, we compose a heroic narrative of the self that illustrates essential truths about ourselves.'[11]

Although a life story is based on facts and truth, the significance of it lies rather in the "meaning" of the story, i.e. it may tell us how the teller saw, understood, or wanted to understand the experienced facts and truth. In psychological research, the "narrative mode or approach" opens a way for the analysis of human action and intention[12] and is suitable to understand human needs and goals.[13] McAdams says: 'if you want to know me, then you must know my story, for my story defines who I am.'[14] This suggests that if we want to understand Dr al-Turabi, then we must know his story.

The main material in this approach is the verbal account. McAdams says: 'I ask people to tell me the stories of their lives because I believe their verbal accounts hold the outlines of internalized personal myths. ... An interview can elicit aspects of that myth, offering me hints concerning the truth already in place in the mind of the teller.'[15] Dr al-Turabi's verbal account will be the main material used in analyzing his personality.

According to McAdams, a person's identity is the story itself[16] and evolves gradually over time.[17] A life story is a 'patterned integration of our remembered past, perceived present, and anticipated future.'[18] The development of life story (or personal myth) is

explained through the following five periods: (1) infancy and early childhood (preschool age), (2) childhood (elementary school age), (3) adolescence (teenage), (4) early adulthood (ages approx. 20-40), and (5) middle adulthood and beyond (ages approx. 40-65). To understand how the theory can be used to analyze personality, the researcher will quote McAdams. Each period of development will be explained by two paragraphs which are written from slightly different angles. (Important terms are put in bold letters by the researcher.)

(1) INFANCY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD (PRESCHOOL AGE)

'The development of personality myth may be traced from infancy to old age. ... [In infancy and early childhood,] even before we consciously know what a story is, we are gathering material for the self-defining story we will someday compose. From the early bond of attachment formed with our parents, our first year of life leaves a legacy of optimism or pessimism that will influence the **narrative tone** we later adopt as adults. A second legacy of our earliest years may be the distinctive emotionally charged **imagery** we employ in our personal myth, whose roots lie in the fantasy play of preschoolers.'[19]

'In their first relationships of love and trust, infants develop unconscious attitudes about hope and despair. Babies learn the first unconscious lessons about how the world works and how human beings can be expected to behave. An infant's relationship with mother and father is likely to influence the long-term development of a myth's **narrative tone**. Every personal myth has a pervasive **narrative tone**, ranging from hopeless pessimism to boundless optimism. For Margaret Sands, the general tone is pessimistic, as she seeks meaning and purpose within a narrative couched in insecurity and framed in tragic terms. Preschool children collect the **central images** that someday will animate their personal myths. Arresting images make stories memorable to children of this age. The plots of many stories may be too hard to grasp *in toto*, but preschoolers remember the images. Four-year-olds make sense of their experience in terms of the emotionally charged symbols and images they collect - representations, for instance, of home and school, mommy and daddy, God and the devil ... While much of this early imagery passes into oblivion as children grow up, some significant images and representations survive into adulthood and are incorporated into the personal myth. We catch a glimpse of self-defining imagery in Margaret Sands's return to the chapel. The religious icons and symbols from her childhood are invested with deep feelings of loathing and regret.'[20]

(2) CHILDHOOD (ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AGE)

'The central themes of power [agency] and love [communion] run as motivational currents through our personal myth in adulthood, and ... their sources may be followed back to the stories we hear, learn, and create in elementary school.'[21]

'As children begin formal schooling, they develop increasingly logical and systematic thought, and they come to appreciate stories as thematically organized wholes. They recognize that story characters are striving to reach certain goals over a period of time. From stories, as well as from other sources, school-age children begin to establish their own motivational patterns. Goals and desires are consolidated into stable dispositions centered on the needs for power [agency] and love [communion]. These patterns of desire will ultimately be reflected thematically in their personal myths. Motivated by a strong desire for intimacy, Margaret has constructed a personal myth that underscores caregiving and helping others. Yet she is still quite ambivalent about establishing long-term intimate relationships with friends or lovers.'[22]

(3) ADOLESCENCE (TEENAGE)

'In adolescence, we create an ideological setting for our personal myth to situate our story in a context of what we believe to be true and good. Adolescence heralds the beginning of mythmaking proper in the human life cycle, as teenagers begin to see their lives in stories, historical terms.'[23]

'We first become self-conscious mythmakers in our late-adolescent years, when we confront head-on the problem of identity in human lives. The adolescent begins by consciously and unconsciously working through an ideological setting for the myth - a backdrop of fundamental beliefs that situates the story within a particular ethical and religious location. Therefore, the transition from adolescence to young adulthood is an especially significant phase in the development of human identity. A fundamental challenge of mythmaking in adolescence and young adulthood is to formulate personally meaningful answers to ideological questions so that one's identity can be built on a stable foundation. People tend to establish the ideological setting in late adolescence and very early adulthood, and for most the setting remains relatively intact and constant for the rest of their years. Margaret's hardheaded agnosticism provides an ideological setting for her personal myth. It remains today an unquestioned backdrop for the plot of her story.'[24]

(4) EARLY ADULTHOOD (AGES APPROX. 20-40)

'... the fashioning and refinement of main characters in personal myth, a process we begin in early adulthood. Main

characters work to personify our basic desires for power and for love. These main characters, or internalized "imagoes", may assume such prototypical guises as the warrior, the sage, the lover, the caregiver, the humanist, the healer, and the survivor, among others. The kind of main characters we script into our self-defining stories help determine the quality of our overall identity. Discontent and malaise in our early adult years may often signal problems in the scripting of our characters. ... Such problems may also bear on issues of human faith and the quest for meaning.'[25]

'Young adults in their twenties and thirties concentrate their mythmaking energies on the creation and refinement of main characters. Our myths and our lives are generally too complex to be populated by a single main character. Myths draw their characters from an individual's imagoes, which are internalized complexes of actual or imagined personas. Many personal myths contain more than one dominant imago, as central protagonists within the self interact and sometimes conflict in the making of identity. We see a vivid example of this in the narrative tension between Margaret the caregiver and Margaret the hell-raising rebel. Indeed, the richest and most dynamic personal myths are populated by a number of conflicting and elaborate imagoes.'[26]

(5) MIDDLE ADULTHOOD AND BEYOND (AGES APPROX. 40-65)

'[In our middle-adult years and beyond,] personal mythmaking may become more integrative ... as we seek to bring opposing parts of our story together into a vitalizing and harmonious whole. We also become concerned at mid-life with the anticipated ending of the life story and the new beginnings that we may be able to generate in our work lives, in family, and in community. Effective parenting, teaching and mentoring, long-term friendships, occupational commitments and achievements, creative contributions in the arts and sciences, volunteer work - all of these activities and a host of others, some grand and some humble, can be part of what I call ... the "generativity script" of personal myths. The generativity script links the individual personal myth to the collective stories and myths of society as a whole and to the enterprise of promoting and improving human life and welfare from one generation to the next. ... The personal myth continues to develop and change through most of our adult years. But some of us, in the last years of our lives, will suspend the making of myth and begin to take final stock of what we have made. ... As I see it, to find integrity in life is to look back upon one's personal myth and determine that, for all its shortcomings and limitations, it is good. The perspective is that of the creator looking back upon the fruits of his or her creation and gracefully accepting what has been made. If the creator rejects the creation, the creator experiences despair. The identity is not worth accepting, and it is too late to create a new one. I suspect that most of us will look back on the creation of our personal myths with a

mixture of acceptance and rejection. Until we reach those postmythic days, however, we wait in suspense for the time when each of us must adopt the role of literary critic, and offer the definitive analysis and review of the identity each of us has labored to write and live.'[27]

'Integrating and making peace among conflicting imagoes in one's personal myth is a hallmark of mature identity in the middle-adult years. All good stories require a satisfying ending. As we move into and through our middle-adult years, we become increasingly preoccupied with our own myth's denouement. Yet all of us are profoundly ambivalent about the sense of an ending. Few of us are eager to die. Mature identity requires that we leave a legacy that will, in some sense, survive us. Many individuals, at this stage in their lives, refashion their myths to ensure that something of personal importance is passed on. As we see in Margaret's story, a child may come to represent the transmission of something good within the self into the next generation. ... Like the religious and cosmic myths that humankind has created across the ages, a personal myth can carry forward something about humankind that is worth preserving and improving. The stories we create influence the stories of other people, those stories give rise to still others, and soon we find meaning and connection within a web of story making and story living. Through our personal myths, we help to create the world we live in, at the same time that it is creating us.'[28]

Diagram 1.2.(3) is intended to show a simplified structure of the life-story model.

Diagram 1.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model



continued

Diagram 1.2.(3): *continued*

(1) Infancy and early childhood

Narrative Tone
unconscious attitudes about hope and despair
e.g. optimistic, pessimistic

Imagery
emotionally charged images
e.g. solemn image of Islam
honorable image of father

(2) Childhood (elementary school age)

Central Themes of Power (Agency) and Love (Communion)

motivational currents or patterns
agentic motives: self-strivings, seeking to / for

conquer, master, control, overcome, create, produce, explore, persuade, advocate, analyze, understand, win;
power, achievement, expansion, etc.

e.g. to control a movement, to expand Islam, etc.

communal motives: other-oriented things, seeking to / for
unite with others, nurture, cooperate, encourage, communicate, share;
longing for contact, love, intimacy, etc.

e.g. to unite Muslims, etc.

(3) Adolescence (teenage)

Ideological Setting

what we believe to be true and good

e.g. Islamic values

continued

Diagram 1.2.(3): *continued*

(4) Early adulthood (ages 20-40)

Main Characters (Imagoes)

acting and thinking as if he or she is the character
agentic characters: described by adjectives;

aggressive, ambitious, adventurous, wise, assertive, autonomous, clever, courageous, daring, dominant, enterprising, forceful, independent, resourceful, restless, sophisticated, stubborn, etc.

e.g. the revolutionary, the hero, the winner, the reformer, etc.

communal characters: described by adjectives;

affectionate, charming, altruistic, enticing, gentle, kind, loyal, sensitive, sociable, sympathetic, warm, etc.

e.g. the friend, the caregiver, the lover, etc.

(5) Middle adulthood and beyond (ages 40-65)

Ending and Generativity

People tend to become increasingly concerned with their own mortality and with what they will be able to leave behind.

looking back
- acceptance -- satisfaction
- rejection -- despair

Sources: McAdams, *The Person* and *The Stories We Live By*. The researcher added some examples relating to the case of Dr al-Turabi.

The factors of identity, such as narrative tone, imagery, ideological setting, motives, and characters are shaped from "psychological" raw materials, such as culture, religion, family heredity, biology, parents' influence, experiences in life, and so on. To quote McAdams:

> 'The tone, imagery, and themes of an adult's life story are not a direct result of experiences from infancy and childhood. Instead, early experience provides "raw materials" or "resources" for the making of identity in adolescence and adulthood. Other resources come from biology and culture. Many different forces and factors, some within the person and some in the person's environment, may help shape identity by providing raw materials for the making of the self. In adolescence, people begin to draw upon the resources at hand to *make their own identities.* Identities are always made in a psychological context, in relationships with others, in the midst of an interpersonal world. Our friends, families, teachers, pastors, and many others influence our identities.'[29]

For example, parents, family, society, culture, and religion are all major sources of images.[30] Religion is an important source of ideological setting.[31] Main characters or imagoes often reflect one's ideology, and are often fashioned on models provided by significant people. To quote McAdams:

> 'Imagoes often reflect personal values and beliefs. Significant aspects of an adult's ideological setting may be clearly expressed in imagoes. A fundamentalist Christian may develop an imago of the evangelist, a character devoted to spreading the Christian gospel to all who have yet to accept it. ... Adults fashion their imagoes on models provided by parents, teachers, siblings, friends, and many other significant people they have known.'[32]

1.2.3 PERSONALITY AND LIFE-STORY

(1) DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY

According to Reber, "personality" is 'a term so resistant to definition and so broad in usage that no coherent simple statement about it can be made.'[33]

In the researcher's approach, however, the term "personality" is used to refer to the "behavioral tendencies" stemming from factors of identity, particularly "motives" and "characters (imagoes)" - terms used in McAdams' life-story model of identity.

The term "personality" is not used in McAdams's life-story model of identity, but the researcher uses the term as the bridge between McAdams' model and the researcher's approach.

(2) EXAMPLES OF PERSONALITY

In the McAdams' model, motives and characters are basically classified into two categories, "agentic" motives and characters and "communal" motives and characters. He describes some examples of behavioral tendencies (personality) which stem from these motives and characters.

(a) Agentic personality

Agentic motives include two main motivations - "power" motivation and "achievement" motivation.[34]

McAdams explains power motives and the behavioral tendencies (personality) derived from them as follows:

> 'The power motive is a desire for feeling strong and having impact on the world.'[35]
>
> 'People high in power motivation show a strong and consistent preference for experiences of feeling strong and having impact on the environment, compared with people low in power motivation. They tend to be highly conscious of prestige and status in life; they are likely to take bold

risks; they are drawn to positions of high leadership and influence; they tend to be quite dominant in social groups; they perceive their own friendship in powerful, agentic terms.'[36]

'"Helping one's friend" is a central activity in accounts of friendship provided by people high in power motivation. ... For power-driven people, the proof of good friendship is the ability to come to the rescue of one's friend.'[37]

According to McAdams, achievement motives and the behavioral tendencies (personality) stemming from them are explained as follows:

'The achievement motive is a desire for feeling competent and doing things better than others do them.'[38]

'People high in achievement motivation tend to prefer and show high performance in tasks of moderate challenge that provide immediate feedback concerning success and failure; they tend to be persistent and efficient in many kinds of performance, sometimes cutting corners or even cheating a little in order to maximize productivity; they tend to exhibit high self control and focus their energies on careful planning for the future; and they tend to be restless, innovative, and drawn towards change and movement. ... [In a research] students high in achievement motivation appear to have more realistic career aspirations, adopting a level-headed and pragmatic manner in career choice. ... [A survey] indicates that men high in achievement motivation report more job satisfaction, evaluate their jobs as more interesting, and prefer work to leisure.'[39]

'People high in achievement motivation show a strong and consistent preference for experiences of feeling competent and doing better in the performance of tasks compared with people low in achievement motivation. They tend to be very efficient and levelheaded in their career pursuits; they are likely to take prudent and moderate risks; they tend to plan carefully for the future; they are innovative; and they derive great satisfaction from their work, in general preferring work to leisure.'[40]

McAdams describes agentic characters as follows:

'[Agentic characters] are characters who seek to conquer, master, control, overcome, create, produce, explore, persuade, advocate, analyze, understand, win. They are described by such adjectives as aggressive, ambitious, adventurous, assertive, autonomous, clever, courageous, daring, dominant, enterprising, forceful, independent, resourceful, restless, sophisticated, stubborn, and wise, among many others.'[41]

(b) Communal personality

Communal motives include two main motivations - "intimacy" motivation and "love" motivation.[42] McAdams does not say much about love motives, perhaps because intimacy and love can not be clearly separated (as power and achievement motivations were). McAdams points out that: 'Intimacy improves love.'[43]

To quote McAdams:

> 'Human communion, research indicates, involves overlapping desires for intimacy and love. Though love and intimacy, each of us is able to relate to others in warm, close, and supportive ways. Some people seem to be more communal in their life motivations than others. They may show markedly high levels of intimacy motivation, revealed in the ways they act and speak with their friends and in social groups, ... Intimacy and love are not precisely the same experiences. But both are born of communion and remain part of an extended family of human experiences, all tied together for their emphasis on human ties.'[44]

The following are descriptions of intimacy motives and the behavioral tendencies (personality) derived from them. To quote McAdams:

> 'The intimacy motive is a recurrent desire for warm, close, and sharing interaction with other human beings. ...
>
> People high in intimacy motivation are described by their friends and acquaintances as especially "loving", "sincere," "natural," and "appreciative," and are rated especially low on adjectives such as "self-centred" and "dominant." In small groups, they tend to promote friendly relations and build group solidarity, sometimes at the expense of their own prestige and status. Rather than dominate others, they prefer to surrender control in many interpersonal situations, adopting the role of the listener or the person who works behind the scenes to promote interpersonal harmony and goodwill. ... People high in intimacy motivation tend to spend more time thinking about other people and their relationships with them. ... In the eyes of the person high in intimacy motivation, the ideal friend is the person with whom you can share the most personal information [i.e. secret], knowing that the friend will listen, accept, and never betray your confidence.'[45]

McAdams explains communal characters as follows:

> 'There are numberless characters who act, think, and feel in communal ways. Oriented towards love and intimacy, these are characters who seek to unite with others in passionate embrace, who love and care for others, who nurture,

> cooperate, encourage, communicate, and share with others. They work to provide settings for love and intimacy, and to cultivate the best in human intercourse. They are described by adjectives such as affectionate, charming, altruistic, enticing, gentle, kind, loyal, sensitive, sociable, sympathetic, and warm, among many others.'[46]

In one's life, agentic motives and characters often coexist with communal motives and characters, although these are quite opposite in nature. Opposite or conflicting elements of characters are, therefore, often found in the same life-story. McAdams points out the complex nature of life-story as follows:

> 'Our myths and our lives are generally too complex to be populated by a single main character. Myths draw their characters from an individual's imagoes, which are internalized complexes of actual or imagined personas. Many personal myths contain more than one dominant imago, as central protagonists within the self interact and sometimes conflict in the making of identity. We see a vivid example of this in the narrative tension between Margaret the caregiver [communal character] and the hell-raising rebel [agentic character]. Indeed, the richest and most dynamic personal myths [life stories] are populated by a number of conflicting and elaborate imagoes [main characters].'[47]

(3) NUCLEAR EPISODES

One's personality - behavioral tendencies stemming from factors of identity, particularly motives and characters - is often expressed in the "nuclear episodes" (McAdams' term), of which a life-story was made.[48] In other words, the clues or signs of personality are starred in life-story.[49]

McAdams explained the term "nuclear episodes" as follows:

> 'As we begin to adopt a historical perspective on the self in adolescence and young adulthood, we select and reconstruct those scenes from our past that are the climaxes of different acts of the life story. I call these scenes *nuclear episodes*. These past episodes represent our subjective memories of particular events, in particular times and places, which have assumed especially prominent positions in our understanding of who we were and, indeed, who we are.'[50]
>
> 'Nuclear episodes often reveal central thematic lines in identity. The superordinate themes of agency and communion run through many accounts of nuclear episodes of continuity and of change. Therefore, narrative accounts of nuclear

> episodes are windows into the organization of human desire. Agentic needs for power and achievement and communal needs for love and intimacy are expressed clearly in many accounts of life-story high points, low points, and turning points.'[51]

According to McAdams, people with strong power motivation tend to recall nuclear episodes characterized by the next four agentic motifs: (1) strength / impact, (2) status / recognition, (3) autonomy / independence, (4) competence / accomplishment.[52] On the other hand, people with strong intimacy motivation tend to recall nuclear episodes characterized by the next four communal motifs: (1) love / friendship, (2) dialogue / sharing, (3) care / support, (4) unity / togetherness.[53]

1.2.4 RESEARCHER'S APPROACH

This sub-section will explain the following three points: (1) how the researcher's approach is going to work and (2) what kinds of material are going to be used, and (3) how the material is used in analyses.

(1) BASIC LOGIC OF THE APPROACH

The approach has two steps: firstly (a) finding out Dr al-Turabi's personality and then (b) assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement. McAdams's model is used in the first step.

(a) Finding out Dr al-Turabi's personality

Diagram 1.2.(4) is meant to show the relations between life-story and personality.

As discussed in Section 1.2.3, one's personality (behavioral tendencies stemming from factors of identity, particularly motives and characters) is often expressed in the nuclear episodes, of which a life-story is made, and in which the clues or signs of personality are featured.

Dr al-Turabi's personality, therefore, will be found by analyzing his life-story.

Diagram 1.2.(4): Relations between life-story and personality



(b) Assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement

Diagram 1.2.(5) is intended to show the researcher's "hypothesis" that Dr al-Turabi's personality has had some impact on the Islamist movement in Sudan, in other words, the movement has reflected Dr al-Turabi's personality.

The researcher, therefore, tries to assess the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement, by analyzing the developments, particularly the key events, of the movements in terms of Dr al-Turabi's personality.

Diagram 1.2.(5): Relations between Dr al-Turabi's personality and the Islamist movement



(2) MATERIAL

In the research, there are two main materials: one is general description of the Islamist movement, and one is Dr al-Turabi's account on his life and the movement. Both materials are dealt with differently and are used for different purposes. For this reason, care is taken to keep the general description of events separate from Dr al-Turabi's account.

(a) Location of the materials

Between Chapter 2 and Chapter 8, the two materials are basically put together in the following chapter structure.

(1) General description
(2) Dr al-Turabi's account
(3) Analyses

Chapter 2, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8, however, involve some exceptional elements and require further qualifications, which will be explained later.

(b) Qualification of the materials

(i) General description

The material under "general description" is subject to the following qualifications.

Contents: developments (particularly key developments) of the Islamist movement, excluding Dr al-Turabi's account
Regarded as: historical information or data
Purpose: to understand the development and details of the events

Chapter 2, however, is exceptional, because the chapter deals with the period before the emergence of the Islamist movement, and focuses only on Dr al-Turabi's personality. The contents of general description in Chapter 2, therefore, cover only aspects related to his family and his life.

Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, the key developments of the Islamist movement, which are chosen by the researcher based on his assessment, are presented in the sections of general description.

(ii) Dr al-Turabi's account

The material under "Dr al-Turabi's account" is subject to the following qualifications.

Contents: Dr al-Turabi's verbal account on his life and the movement (regarded as life-story)
Regarded as: psychological information or data,
Purpose: to understand Dr al-Turabi's personality

(Notes under both general description and Dr al-Turabi's account may include both historical data and psychological data.)

Dr al-Turabi's verbal accounts were obtained in the researcher's interviews and were taped. In the interviews, Dr al-Turabi was allowed to speak "freely" with minimum guidance given by the

researcher. Therefore, Dr al-Turabi talked about his life and the movement continuously as a "story".

In most of the chapters, Dr al-Turabi's accounts obtained in the researcher's interviews are presented as a life-story with minimum modification of the original tape script. Because of this, Dr al-Turabi's accounts include historical information, too. For this reason, some readers may feel the need for further explanation about some statements in Dr al-Turabi's account. The researcher tries to meet this demand through notes.

In Chapter 2, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, use is made of Dr al-Turabi's accounts obtained from published materials. Strictly speaking, these published materials can not be regarded as "life-story", but the researcher still deals with these materials as psychological information, in which he believes some signs of personality will be found.

The contents of Dr al-Turabi's account basically correspond to the contents of general description, but because of the limitations stemming from the nature of interview and published material, Dr al-Turabi's account does not necessarily cover every aspect found in the general description. This occurs particularly in Chapters 5, 7, and 8.

(3) ANALYSES

The research contains analysis in the following two fields: (a) the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality and (b) the analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement. Both types of analysis are given in the sections which follows the general description and Dr al-Turabi's account.

(a) Analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality

The analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality is carried out by using the material of Dr al-Turabi's account.

Although Chapter 2 is devoted to analyzing Dr al-Turabi's personality, because his life-story does not end in Chapter 2 alone but continues up to Chapter 6, and to some extent up to Chapter 8, the analysis of his personality will be continued up to Chapter 8.

(b) Analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement

The analysis of the key developments of the Islamist movement is carried out in order to assess the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement, by using the material of general description and the results of the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality.

The results of the analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality in the earlier chapters will be used in the later chapters for the assessment of the impact of his personality on the movement.

Chapter 2 does not have this kind of analysis.

1.3 CHAPTER PLAN

The purpose and methodology of the study have been discussed in this chapter (Chapter 1).

In Chapter 2, Dr al-Turabi's personality will be analyzed, based on McAdams' life-story model of identity. The chapter covers the origin of the Turabi family (a factor shaping personality) and Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1932 to 1964, which roughly corresponds to the period from early childhood to early adulthood.

Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on Dr al-Turabi's personality alone, Chapters 3 - 8 bring together aspects related to his personality and the development of the Islamist movement which Dr al-Turabi led.

Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, the Sudanese Islamist movement from 1964 to 1995 is divided into five periods and six chapters.

Chapter 3 covers the Islamist movement during the period from the eve of the 1964 October Revolution to the establishment of the May regime in 1969. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1964 to 1969.

Chapter 4 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1969 to the national reconciliation in 1977. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1969 to 1977.

Chapter 5 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1977 to the collapse of the Nimairi (Numayrii) regime in 1985. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1977 to 1985.

Chapter 6 covers the Islamist movement during the period from 1985 to the 1989 military coup. It also covers Dr al-Turabi's life-story from 1985 to 1989.

Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 cover the Islamist movement during the period from 1989 to 1995 at the latest. In these chapters, Sudan is regarded as a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi (see Section 7.1 for the reason). Chapter 7 covers domestic matters and Chapter 8 covers foreign matters. Dr al-Turabi's accounts in these chapters also cover domestic matters and foreign matters respectively.

The final chapter, Chapter 9, contains the conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2:
PERSONALITY BUILDING

CHAPTER 2: PERSONALITY BUILDING

Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the personality of Dr Hassan al-Turabi. The chapter consists of four sections.

Section 2.1 covers general description concerning the origin of the Turabi family (a factor shaping personality) and the chronological developments affecting Hassan and his father, Abdalla (ᶜAbd Allaah). Because Chapter 2 deals with the period before the emergence of the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi, it does not follow the same pattern as the general descriptions in other chapters (see Sub-section 1.2.4.(2)).

Section 2.2 covers Dr al-Turabi's account of the origin of the Turabi family and his life story from 1932 to 1964.

Section 2.3 covers analyses of factors affecting Dr al-Turabi's identity and his personality.

Section 2.4 provides some supportive evidence for the analyses in the previous section.

The usage of "Hassan" instead of "Dr al-Turabi" (especially in Section 2.1 and 2.2) refers to the period from Dr al-Turabi's birth to his obtaining the PhD degree - a period which may be regarded as that from his infancy to his early adulthood.

2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (UP TO 1964)

2.1.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY

(1) TRIBAL ORIGIN

Dr al-Turabi's tribe came from Saudi Arabia about 300 years ago and his tribe belonged to the *Bidiriya* (Bidiiriiya) tribal grouping.[1] According to Macmichael, the *Bidiriya* tribal grouping belongs to the *Jaaliyin* (Jaᶜaliyiin) group, and the *Jaaliyin* group is the largest and

most widely distributed "Arab" tribal group in Sudan.[2] Although the *Jaaliyin* group claims to have *Abbasi* (ᶜAbbaasii) origin - its members claim to be descended from al-Abbas (al-ᶜAbbaas), one of the uncles of the Prophet Muhammad (Muḥammad) and the originator of the *Abbasi* family - there is no evidence to prove it.[3]

The name of Dr al-Turabi's direct ancestor, seven generations back (the researcher will use the phrase "7th grandfather"), can be found in the book entitled *The Book of the Stories of the Holy People, the Good People, the Scholars, and the Poets in Sudan* (known by the name *Tabaqat* (Ṭabaqaat)).[4] This is a critical biography of the famous people who lived under the rule of the *Funj* (Fuunj) sultanate; it records many episodes in the life of Dr al-Turabi's ancestor. Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather was a famous Sudanese *sufi* (ṣuufii: Islamic mystic)[5] called Hamad al-Nahlan bin Muhammad al-Bidiri (Ḥamad al-Naḥlaan bin Muḥammad al-Bidiirii) who was known as Ibn al-Turabi.[6] Diagram 2.1.(1) is intended to show the tribal origin of the Turabi family.

Diagram 2.1.(1): Tribal origin of the Turabi family



(2) FAMILY HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHTS

According to Karrar, Hamad al-Nahlan (Hamad al-Nahlaan al-Turaabii) was a prominent follower of the *Qadiriya* (Qaadiriiya) order[7] which was introduced to Sudan by al-Bahari (al-Bahaarii) in the 16th century.[8] According to Ibn Dayf Allah (Ibn Dayf Allaah), al-Bahari travelled to Taqali (Taqalii) in southern Kordofan (Kurdfaan) and instructed Abdalla al-Hammal (ᶜAbd Allaah al-Hammaal), the grandfather of Hamad al-Nahlan.[9] Diagram 2.1.(2) is meant to show Dr al-Turabi's family heritage in terms of religious thinking.

Diagram 2.1.(2): Family heritage in terms of religious thinking



* = Although the Turabi family originated from the religious line of the *Qadiriya* order, the family after Hamad al-Nahlan seems to have abandoned its association with the *Qadiriya* order (see Dr al-Turabi's account).

The *Tabaqat* records some episodes relating to Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather, Hamad al-Nahlan al-Turabi. According to the *Tabaqat*, he did not accept gifts.[10] He is also known as the first man who declared himself as the *Mahdi* (Mahdii)[11] in Sudan. According to the *Tabaqat*, he travelled to Mecca (Makka) as a pilgrim and there declared himself the *Mahdi*. As a result, he was beaten by the people and was ordered to be killed by the *Funj* king, King Badi (Baadii) II (d.1680). However, partly because he successfully forecast rain and partly because the king died, he was saved.[12] The *Tabaqat* also records an episode of the resistance activity of Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather

against the *Funj* state. According to the record, Hamad al-Turabi lead the people to sabotage the unfair tax collection of the *Funj* state.[13] It is said that he threatened to break the King's head if he tormented Muslims again.[14]

It is interesting to note that Dr al-Turabi's wife is a sister of Sadiq al-Mahdi (Saadiq al-Mahdii) and a great-granddaughter of Muhammad Ahmad (Muhammad 'Ahmad) who declared himself the *Mahdi* in 1881 and established the Mahdist state in Sudan.

2.1.2 CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ABDALLA AND HASSAN

This sub-section covers the chronological developments affecting Abdalla and Hassan. The contents of 2.1.2 are based on the researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi and his elder brother Professor Dafalla al-Turabi (Dafᶜ Allaah al-Turaabii).[15] The contents are presented as historical information and are used to help the understanding of Dr al-Turabi's life story in the next section.

Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla al-Turabi, who served as a family-law judge under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, was transferred to many different places around the country. As a result, Hassan moved with his father during his infancy and childhood. In his adolescence, however, Hassan had to separate from his father because Hassan entered an intermediate school which was located far from his father's working place. Table 2.1.(1) and Diagram 2.1.(1) are intended to show the moves of Abdalla and Hassan.

Table 2.1.(1): Moves of Abdalla and Hasan

Abdalla al-Turabi	Hassan al-Turabi
Wad al-Turabi: Birth Omdurman: Graduation (1924)	
{1} Wad Madani: Start of career {2} several places	
{3} Kassala	{1} Kassala: Birth (1932)
{4} El-Hasaheisa	{2} El-Hasaheisa
{5} El-Nahud	{3} El-Nahud
{6} Umm Ruwaba	{4} Umm Ruwaba: Elementary school (39)
{7} El-Roseires: Remarriage	{5} El-Roseires: Elementary school Mother's death (43)
{8} Abu Hamad: End of career	{6} Wad Madani: Intermediate school (44)
	{7} Rufaa: Boarding Intermediate school
Al-Kamlin: Retirement	{8} Hantoub: Boarding Secondary School(48)
Death (1986)	{9} Khartoum: Gordon Memorial College (51)
	{10} London: University of London (55-57)
	{11} Paris: University of Sorbonne (59-64)
	{12} Khartoum: (1964 -)

(number) = year

Map 2.1.(1): Places of the moves of Abdalla and Hassan



(1) ABDALLA

Abdalla (ᶜAbd Allaah) was born in Wad al-Turabi (Wad al-Turaabii) which was named after Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather and is located 52 miles south-east from Khartoum (al-Khartuum). Abdalla was the first graduate of the village school. Later, he went to Omdurman ('Umm Durmaan) to study Islamic law and graduated from the Islamic higher educational institute (which later became Omdurman Islamic University) in 1924. He wanted to be a teacher, but he was appointed as a family-law judge by the Anglo-Egyptian authority. He started his career in Wad Madani (Wad Madanii), south of Khartoum along the Blue Nile. After serving in several other places, Abdalla was transferred to Kassala (Kasalaa) in Eastern Sudan where Hassan was born in 1932. He was then transferred to El-Hasaheisa (Al-Hasaa Hiisaa), then to El-Nahud (Al-Nahuud) in Western Sudan. After that, he was transferred to Umm Ruwaba ('Umm Rawwaaba) where Hassan started to take his elementary education. When Abdalla moved to El-Roseires (Al-Rusiiris), Hassan had to change his elementary school. In 1943, Hassan's mother, Nafisa (Nafiisa), died at El-Roseires, leaving her husband and 7 children behind. When Abdalla was ordered to move to Abu Hamad ('Abuu Hamad) in Northern Sudan, he decided to remarry. However, when he remarried there was trouble with the family of his second wife, as they did not want her to leave her home area. He therefore decided to marry a third wife. Abdalla brought his third wife with him to Abu Hamad. After his retirement, Abdalla became reconciled with his second wife's family, and then lived with his two wives and children in Al-Kamlin (Al-Kaamliin) near his home town. Abdalla had 7 children (3 male and 4 female) from his first wife Nafisa, 6 children (4 male and 2 female) from the second wife, and 5 children (3 male and 2 female) from the third wife. In 1986, Abdalla died, leaving his two wives and 18 children.[16]

(2) HASSAN

Hassan (Hasan) was born, the third son of Abdalla, at Kassala in 1932. He spent his pre-school age at El-Hasaheisa and El-Nahud. He entered an elementary school at Umm Ruwaba in 1939,[17] then moved to El-Roseires with his family where he later lost his mother (1943).[18] After that, when his father moved to Abu Hamad, Hassan moved to Wad Madani because his intermediate school was located there. He left his home and started a relatively independent life at the age of 12 in 1944. While at school in Wad Madani he lived in his father's friend's house because he had no relatives there. However, he later moved to an intermediate boarding school in Rufaa (Rufaaᶜa).[19] Hassan joined the riot (the Rufaa incident)[20] in 1946 which was led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of the Republican Party / Brothers. After completing his intermediate education, he moved to Hantoub (Hantuub) secondary school in 1948. He skipped the third grade of the school and completed his secondary education in three years, although this normally took four years.[21] After that, he became a student in the law department of the Gordon Memorial College[22] in Khartoum in 1951. The college was officially a part of the University of London at that time, but later became the University of Khartoum (Jaamiᶜat al-Khartuum). After his graduation from the GMC with an LLB (Bachelor of Laws) degree in 1955, he went to London in the summer to start his LLM (Master of Laws) at the University of London. In 1957, he came back to Sudan with an LLM degree, and immediately became a lecturer in the law department of the University of Khartoum. After two years, in 1959, he went to Paris to study for a PhD degree in law at the Sorbonne University. He married Wisal al-Mahdi in 1961, then returned to Sudan for about one year as a break. He finally came back to Sudan with his PhD degree in 1964. It was just before the October revolution which made him famous for the first time. Dr al-Turabi was 32 years old at this time and had a wife and a son.

2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT

Sub-section 2.2.1 includes not only material obtained from researcher's interviews, but also published material. These materials are presented separately, i.e. not in "one continuous story". The published materials are Dr al-Turabi's account, but may be not his life story. They still constitute important psychological information.

In Sub-section 2.2.2, the main text is only composed of the material obtained from researcher's interviews. The material is presented continuously as a life story.

2.2.1 ORIGIN OF THE TURABI FAMILY

At a meeting with American academics, Dr al-Turabi told them about the ethnic identity of the Sudanese people, in a manner which indicated his perception of his own ethnic background. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'Western Sudan is not part of East Africa or North Africa; it is part of West Africa. ... Eastern Sudan is part of East Africa. ... Some of them are probably Arab in descent also, but all of them are colored peoples, unlike the Arabs who are very fair, very different. Even the Egyptians in Sudan look so different from Sudanese. And there is no divide in the Sudan between Arab and African, anywhere.'[23]

As far as the sectarian issue is concerned, Dr al-Turabi in his interview with the researcher said that his direct ancestor, nine generations back (9th grandfather), might have been influenced by the *Qadiriya* order, however his 7th grandfather did not belong to a particular *sufi* order because he preferred to be a scholar rather than a *sufi*.[24]

Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla al-Turabi (ᶜAbd Allaah al-Turaabii) who learned the law of the *Maliki* (Maalikii) school,[25] also preferred to be neutral and did not belong to a particular *sufi* order.[26]

As for Dr al-Turabi himself, he said that he had never regarded himself as belonging to a particular school or sect, such as *Sunni* (Sunnii), *Shia* (Shiiᶜa), *Maliki*, *Hanafi* (Hanafii), *Shafii* (Shaafiᶜii),

and *Hanbali* (Hanbalii) and always respected all of them.[27] Dr al-Turabi said:

> 'The Sudan was *Maliki*, but most of the judges were Egyptians, so they adopted the *Hanafi* school of personal law with a few elements of *Maliki* practice. But now, there is a new code which has borrowed freely from all sources of Islamic jurisprudence, *Sunni*, or *Shi'i*, or whatever with respect to the law of divorce, marriage, parenthood and inheritance.'[28]

With respect to the stories concerning his 7th grandfather, Dr al-Turabi said that like his 7th grandfather his father also did not accept any gift because he wanted to be neutral as a judge and Dr al-Turabi emphasized this point.[29] As for Dr al-Turabi himself, it seems that he also was not very pleased with accepting gifts.[30]

According to Dr al-Turabi, his 7th grandfather was jailed for about 7 years because he criticized some injustices in Makka. Dr al-Turabi said that his own political detention was an "inheritance" of his ancestor.[31]

Dr al-Turabi laid emphasis on the reason for his father's transfer. This was, according to Dr al-Turabi, his father's defiant attitude towards the Anglo-Egyptian authority.[32] The authority wanted to control him, but he always kept his way, did what he believed, and did not obey the authority. For this reason the authority transferred his father as a sort of punishment.[33] Like Dr al-Turabi's 7th grandfather, Abdalla had a strong spirit of resistance against the authorities and foreign intervention.[34]

With respect to Abdalla's remarriage, Dr al-Turabi explained that since the original family of his father's second wife did not agree with her accompanying him to Abu Hamad, his father had to decide to have another wife who could follow him to the town.[35] According to Dr al-Turabi, his father did not necessarily support polygamy, but there was no other choice for him - Abdalla could not have pursued his job with 7 children without a wife.[36]

Dr al-Turabi related this to his own position as follows:

> 'I do not oppose it [polygamy]. My wife herself is the same. She is also not against polygamy at all. She says that she does not mind even if her husband takes another wife. The Koran allows it subject to conditions. If you cannot fulfill the conditions, you should not do it. It is permissible legally, but I have no intention.'[37]

2.2.2 DR AL-TURABI'S LIFE STORY

This sub-section covers Dr al-Turabi's life story from 1932 to 1964, which roughly corresponds to the period from infancy to early adulthood. Dr al-Turabi's accounts are presented as one continuous story, organized in this form by the researcher. For the latter reason, the researcher does not use the form of quotation.

The contents of this sub-section are obtained from the researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi in May 1994.[38] As it was mentioned in Section 1.2.4.(2), the contents are regarded as psychological information ("meaning" is more important than the factual accuracy) in order to understand Dr al-Turabi's personality.

(1) INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD (1932-43)

Hassan (Hasan) was born the third son of Abdalla and Nafisa (Nafiisa) at Kassala on 1 February 1932. Although the official birth certificate was dated 1 January, the real birthday was 1 February. He spent his pre-school age at El-Hasaheisa and El-Nahud. He started his elementary education in Umm Ruwaba at the beginning of 1939 and completed it in El-Roseires at the end of 1943. Because of the move of his family, his elementary education took five years (normally four years). Dr al-Turabi did not remember much about his mother who died in 1943. What he remembered most was his father, his father's image, and his experiences with his father.

Hassan was taught many things by his father, such as Arabic, Arabic literature, the *Koran* (al-Qur'aan), and Islamic jurisprudence. He learned much more Arabic from his father than from any other teachers he had. His father's knowledge of these subjects was very advanced in both quality and quantity. When Hassan was an elementary school pupil, he wrote an Arabic poem for his teacher. The teacher was very pleased with Hassan's poem and memorized it. Hassan used to visit his father at his office after his classes, and used to observe what his father was doing. At that time, the main job of a family-law judge was to reconcile disputes among parties, and not merely to judge

who was wrong and who was right. Therefore, the judge was quite close, emotionally and physically, to the community and was respected by the members of the community. Hassan saw many people almost everyday who came to see his father. Hassan's interest in law and justice was gradually cultivated in this manner.

Abdalla's education of Hassan not only included intellectual knowledge, but also farming. Even during the fast of *Ramadan* (Ramadaan), Hassan used to weed and cultivate the fields with his father from the early morning to sunset. He grew cereals and vegetables. He carried water. He did almost every element of farming work, including breeding domestic animals and milking a goat. He also contributed to building the family house by baking and laying bricks. Hassan spent much time with his father every day, studying and farming together.

Hassan mainly lived in the urban area, but he sometimes lived among the poor farmers near his home town, who had little education (most of them were illiterate or at most educated at the elementary level). Hassan therefore had experience of life in both urban and rural areas, and of living in different parts of the country.

Hassan argued with his father about many things - more so than his brothers did. However, Abdalla was quite pleased with his son's challenges. Hassan always rained questions to his father as well as to his teachers. He always asked "Why ?" and criticized them if he was not satisfied with the answers. He always learned things critically and did not memorize information without evaluating it.

Hassan was critical about his father's treatment towards his sisters because Abdalla did not send his daughters to school.[39] Although Abdalla gave his daughters a minimum education including reading and writing, he did not even allow them to attend his open classes in the house. Hassan felt this was unfair.

(2) ADOLESCENCE (1944-55)

(a) Intermediate education (1944-47)

When Abdalla (ᶜAbd Allaah al-Turaabii) was transferred to Abu Hamad ('Abuu Hamad), Hassan moved to Wad Madani (Wad Madanii) where an intermediate school was located. He left his family and started a relatively independent life at the age of 12, in 1944. At that time, only 40 students (out of several thousand applicants) were allowed to enter the intermediate school. He went to school from the house of a friend of his father, because he had no relatives in Wad Madani. However, he later moved to an intermediate boarding school in Rufaa (Rufaaᶜa) because he felt that schooling from his father's friend's house was uncomfortable.

When Hassan was in Rufaa, he organized a boycott of his class for the first time in his life. He boycotted an Arabic class with his classmates, because they were not satisfied with their Sudanese teacher and were frustrated in the way in which they were taught. Hassan thought that he knew much more about Arabic than his teacher. When they finished their class, they left behind a "boycott declaration", putting their names in a circle in order to avoid recognition of the leader, i.e. Hassan (see Diagram 2.2.(1)).

Diagram 2.2.(1): Signatures of the boycott declaration



Hassan also joined a riot (the Rufaa incident)[40] in 1946 which was led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of the Republican Party / Brothers. In the riot, he joined in the destruction of the local government office building of the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in El-Hasaheisa. He had known Mahmud Muhammad Taha from that time.

Hassan's activities resulted in his suspension from school for a few weeks as a punishment. He was sent to Wad Madani to see the educational authorities.

(b) Secondary education (1948-50)

After the completion of his intermediate education, he moved to Hantoub (Hantuub) and entered Hantoub Secondary School in 1948. At that time, there were only 3 secondary schools in Sudan.

As soon as he entered the school, the communists of the school tried to persuade him to join their group, but failed to do so. Hassan was always arguing with the communists.[41]

When the Palestine War occurred in May 1948, he felt hostile towards the conspiracy made by the British imperialists and the Jews. Some Sudanese joined the war as volunteers, but Hassan did not.

At Hantoub Secondary School, there were a few Sudanese teachers including those who taught Arabic language. Most of the teachers including the headmaster were British and all subjects, except for Arabic language, were taught in English.

Hassan had the ability to understand different viewpoints: the western viewpoint which was taught by his British teachers and the traditional viewpoint which had been taught by his father. He always tried to examine issues from the two different viewpoints. He examined western concepts in terms of traditional viewpoints, and examined traditional concepts in terms of western viewpoints. The two different educational experiences were inseparably integrated within him.

The British authorities of the secondary school had a policy of separate education - the British did not allow their pupils to have much contact with people outside the school, and they always separated the pupils from the village people near the school. Because of this, Hassan had little contact with people outside the school.

Hassan was very active inside the school, arguing about the food, school regulations, and some political matters. He did not understand much about political matters at that time, but he nonetheless frequently organized demonstrations inside the school. He sometimes boycotted his classes. Despite his radical activities in the school, unlike in the Rufaa period he did not receive any severe punishment. Hassan thought the headmaster, Mr Lewis Brown, was a gentleman and a nice man.[42]

He also enjoyed some sports, such as swimming and football. Hassan sometimes played football with Jafar Muhammad Nimairi (Jaᶜfar Muḥammad Numayrii),[43] who was studying at the same secondary school with Hassan and was two years older than him.

He skipped the third grade of the school and completed his secondary education in three years, which normally took four years.

(c) Higher education (1951-55)

Since he obtained very good marks in the examinations of Sudan School Certificate, he could choose any faculty in the GMC (the Gordon Memorial College within the University College of Khartoum).[44] Hassan was interested in medicine, arts, and law, but he finally chose the faculty of law.[45] He started his college life at Khartoum in 1951.

In the college, he received two invitations, one from the Islamic Liberation Movement (the ILM)[46] and the other from the communist movement. Because Hassan was quite well-known among the students for his radical activities (but not in terms of Islamism) in the secondary school, both sides wanted to gain his support. A couple of months later, he decided to join the ILM partly because of his traditional and Islamic background, and partly because of the weakness of the ILM. Hassan initially wondered whether it was worth joining the ILM, because he thought that the level of their knowledge and practice about Islam was less than his. However, when he saw the struggle between the ILM and the communist movement and the weak position of the ILM towards its opponents, he felt that he should help the ILM to confront the strong communist movement.

Hassan neither refused to talk with the communists, nor necessarily acted against them. At the time, there was little difference in the activities of the communist movement and the Islamic movement in the college. For example, the founder of the ILM, Babikir Karrar (Baabikir Karraar), had himself been a member of the communist movement, as he had not been aware of the notion of atheism in communism.[47] The communists in the college mainly advocated anti-imperialism and anti-Western sentiments, and did not mention atheism. Because of this, many students joined the communist movement.

However, when these students discovered that communism involved atheism, many of them suddenly left the communist movement and joined the Islamic one.

In the early 1950s, there were some exchanges between the ILM in the GMC and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. At that time, the communists in the GMC called the ILM a "religious movement". Hassan and other members of the movement rejected such an assessment and asserted that their movement was an "Islamic movement". Although Islam is a religion, they insisted on using the term "Islamic" because the term "religion" had to some extent a negative image (implying "backward" and "reactionary") at that time.

When the 1952 Egyptian revolution occurred, since there existed a strong co-operative relationship between the Free Officers who carried out the military coup and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan and other members of the ILM supported the revolution and the unionist advocacy of the unification between Egypt and Sudan. However, when the conflict between the regime and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood began and Jamal Abdel Nasser (Jamaal ᶜAbd al-Naaṣir) attacked the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan and others began to have strong sympathies with the independence movement in Sudan.

Nasser called the ILM in the GMC a Sudanese "Muslim Brotherhood".[48] The communists in the GMC took advantage of this opportunity, using the term "Muslim Brotherhood" in order to create a negative image about the ILM. However, the ILM was completely independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and it was neither a part nor a branch.[49] The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood tried to establish their branch inside the GMC, but they failed to do so and made a small branch outside the college. Nonetheless, by 1954 because of the successful propaganda by the opponents, most people called the ILM a "Muslim Brotherhood" movement.

In August 1954, the ILM and the branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood held an *Id* (ᶜIid) Congress and officially adopted the name "the Muslim Brotherhood (al-'IKhwaan al-Muslimuun)" for a united organization. Muhammad Khayr Abd al-Qadir (Muḥammad Khayr ᶜAbd al-Qaadir) was chosen as the first leader of the new organization. Despite the negative image of the name, Hassan

agreed to adopt the name because he saw it as expressing an antagonistic attitude to Nasser and a sympathetic attitude to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which had been banned in January.

At the *Id* Congress, Hassan became the actual leader[50] of the new Islamic movement. However, partly because he knew that he was going to go to London next year for his LLM degree, and partly because Abd al-Qadir was older than Hassan, was a graduate of an Egyptian university and had some experience in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan did not claim the initial leadership of the new Islamic movement and gave way to Abd al-Qadir. Up to 1964, Hassan concentrated on his studies.

When Hassan was in the GMC, he studied the literature of famous Islamic thinkers, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali (Muhammad al-Ghazaalii), Muhammad Abduh (Muhammad ᶜAbduh), Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi ('Abuu al-'Aᶜlaa al-Mawduudii), Hassan al-Banna (Hasan al-Bannaa'), and Sayyid Qutb (Sayyid Qutb).[51] He also studied many issues related to the Islamic revivalist movement, especially covering the anti-religious and anti-Islamic approaches on these issues. This was partly Hassan's preparation for the theoretical dispute with the communists, because the communists in the college were very powerful. The challenge by the communists was very stimulating for him, and the debates with them were very useful for him. Hassan felt that the Islamic inclination had come to life within him and had began to move. He graduated from the GMC in 1955.

(3) EARLY ADULTHOOD (1955-64)

(a) London period (1955-57)

In the summer of 1955, Hassan went to London in order to start his postgraduate study in law at the University of London. He was a student at King's College and studied four subjects (jurisprudence, criminal law, constitutional law, and international law)[52] in the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the College.

When Hassan started his LLM at the University of London , Sadiq al-Mahdi (Saadiq al-Mahdii)[53] was already in Oxford. Sadiq had trans-

ferred from the University College of Khartoum[54] to the University of Oxford as a first year student. Despite Sadiq's entrance into the University College of Khartoum in 1953,[55] he escaped from Sudan because of the trouble between the Mahdi family and the police (Dr al-Turabi's account of this is not the same as that given by Sadiq - see note).[56] At that time, the *Umma* ('Umma) Party[57] was opposing the Egyptian regime and the unionist cause. On 1 March 1954, when Muhammad Najib (Muhammad Najiib)[58] visited Khartoum, a series of bloody crashes occurred between the *ansar* ('ansaar)[59], led by the *Umma* Party, and the police.

Despite Sadiq's family heritage in Mahdism,[60] Sadiq's ideas were theoretically inclined to Marxism. His religiosity was less than Hassan's, and Hassan often argued with Sadiq and tried to bring his ideas back to more traditional Islamic ideas. At that time, Hassan was a member of the Inter-Arab Islamic Group[61] and often visited the Islamic centre in London where a regular meeting was held every week.

The London period was very important in terms of the internationalization of Hassan's Islamic activity. He met Muslim activists from many different countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. He met some internationally well-known scholars. He argued with some British people (Muslims and non-Muslims) who visited the mosque. He also made contact with many Muslim students from around the world, including Asia. He helped in bringing together an Algerian Muslim community in London in order to support the cause of Algeria from France.

Hassan became the secretary general of the Sudanese Students Union in Britain, which was a member of the International Students Union. He and his colleagues were invited to the International Students' Congress which was held in Prague (the capital of Czechoslovakia) in August 1956. There, Hassan met Yasir Arafat (Yaasir ᶜArafaat)[62] for the first time. Arafat was the president of the Palestinian Students' League in Cairo.[63] Because Hassan and his friends could speak English quite well and had some experiences in presentation, his group was welcomed by Arafat's group and helped their presentation on the Palestinian cause in the conference.[64]

In the mid-1950s, mainly because of the influence of Jamal Abdel Nasser (Jamaal ᶜAbd al-Naasir) and the Suez War, the Arab nationalist

movement was very popular. There were many Arab nationalists but few Islamists in the student movement. Hassan cooperated with the Arab nationalists, but he also tried to contact others people, such as Africans and Asians. Hassan tried to bring about unity on the basis of "Islam", and not Arab nationalism. This went against the general trend at that time, where the Arab nationalists were limited their contact to only the Arabs.

Hassan's impression of the British people and society in those days were as follows: he found discrimination against his skin color, an anti-Islamic spirit, and an Orientalist bias against Islam. The British were anti-Islam and anti-African, and they did not think of people like Hassan as human beings. The British were very reserved and their society was very exclusive and closed. It was very difficult to make friends with British people. Conversations and relationships with them never developed beyond the surface level.

During Hassan's absence, the new Islamic movement (official name was the Muslim Brotherhood)[65] in Sudan faced an internal crisis. Muhammad Abd al-Qadir (Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Qaadir), the first secretary general of the new Islamic movement, became the victim of a dispute between the ex-ILM wing (inside the college) and the ex-branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (outside the college). As a result, in late 1955, Abd al-Qadir resigned and al-Rashid al-Tahir (al-Rashiid al-Ṭaahir)[66] became the new leader. In December 1955, the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC) was set up by the movement and was led by Omar Bakhit (ᶜUmar Bakhiit: a graduate of an Egyptian university). However, a personal conflict between al-Tahir (a graduate of the GMC) and Bakhit developed, and as a result Bakhit left the movement.

As soon as he came back to Sudan in 1957, Hassan became an assistant lecturer in law at the University of Khartoum and started to teach constitutional law and criminal law. In those days, the staff of the department were almost all British and the subjects were taught in English.[67] Hassan was not satisfied with the westernized nature of Sudanese education and always questioned why he had to teach his subjects in English. He wanted to Arabize education and started to teach criminal law in Arabic, saying there was no regulation about teaching medium. Because of his defiant attitude towards the British members

of staff in his faculty, he could not become the Dean of the Faculty of Law until 1964. The British were always looking for a British Dean and ignored him.

On 17 November 1958, a military coup was carried out by General Ibrahim Abbud ('Ibraahiim ᶜAbbuud). This coup was welcomed by many people, including Hassan himself, because of the impotence of the previous government.

Hassan spent about two years (up to the Summer 1959) in Khartoum. During this period, he started to give lectures on the "liberation of women", for the first time in Sudan. He advocated that women had the same basic rights as men, and the audiences were shocked by his radical ideas about women. His radical attitude towards the liberation of women partly stemmed from his strong feeling over his sisters not receiving official education. Hassan examined the status of women in the early period of the Islamic history, keeping in mind the question "Is it really Islam ?", and found differences between "real Islam" and conventional Islam. As a result, he concluded that many restrictions on Muslim women belonged to conventional Islam and not real Islam. Muslim women in the early times were much more liberated than in the later period - for example, in early Islam, women did participate in the election of the third *Khalifa* (Khaliifa).

During Hassan's stay in Khartoum, he met Wisal al-Mahdi (Wisaal al-Mahdii), a sister of Sadiq al-Mahdi, for the first time. She entered the faculty of law in the University of Khartoum as his student.[68]

Al-Rashid al-Tahir had been one of Hassan's closest friends. Hassan initially thought al-Tahir was democratic, and therefore supported his leadership of the Islamic movement. Hassan thought that the leader should behave in a democratic way. Al-Tahir, however, who was not so democratic, began to act in an individualistic way. Consequently, Hassan had to become the mediator to bring al-Tahir and the other leaders together. Al-Tahir liked political manoeuvres very much[69] and became involved with coup attempts. Hassan suggested to al-Tahir that he should consult with his colleagues about what he was going to do. However, al-Tahir kept his own way. Al-Tahir's individualistic behaviour resulted in Hassan's plan for restructuring the organization.

Preparation for the future was important at this stage of Hassan's life. He was now preparing for his next postgraduate study, in Paris. In fact, he started his preparation when he was in London, learning French at night. After returning to Sudan, he used to attend French language classes at the French Embassy in Khartoum. In those days, because the British in the university were hostile to Hassan, it was quite difficult to obtain permission to study in Paris from the academic committee. Hassan worked on the French wife of the Dean of the School of Science to persuade the committee, and finally he succeeded in obtaining permission. The main reason for his further postgraduate studies abroad was his desire to improve himself by learning new things, such as French law, French language and French culture. He wanted to study French law, because he thought that British law was not very theoretical, and that it was a mishmash of historical cases.

(b) Paris period (1959-64)

Hassan arrived in Paris in the Summer of 1959. At that time, he was the only Sudanese student in Paris. He often visited the Sudanese Embassy and the ambassador. He first took a diploma course in public law at Sorbonne University. Despite his preparation for the French language, the language was still his big problem. Although he was relatively good at "reading" in French, he found oral communication difficult. At the beginning, he could not understand what his teachers were talking about. With effort, he managed to overcome his language problem.

After the completion of the diploma course, he started his PhD in law. He chose "comparative emergency law" as the topic for his PhD thesis. He wanted to compare emergency laws in three countries: Britain, France and America.

As during his London period, Hassan was very active in Islamic activities in Paris. He established the first official Islamic student organization in France, obtaining permission from the Council of Ministers.[70] In those days the student activists in France came from North Africa and were mostly communists, mainly because they were opposed to French imperialism (they did not necessarily approve of all

communist ideas). Hassan met these students as well as some Islamists and Islamic scholars.

In the Summer of 1960, Hassan visited the United States for the first time. His main purpose was to learn more about American law. He stayed there for about two months. He visited many places and institutions - universities, prisons, courts, firms, Indian reservations, and Islamic centres - and met many people. He saw black people's demonstrations and talked with the demonstrators. He argued with many people, including some Orientalists. As a result, he came to know the discrimination against those of Indian and African descent in the United States. He found the conditions of the prisons very bad. He learned many things within just two months. He was very satisfied with his own achievement, because he thought that ordinary people might have taken two years to reach what he achieved in the US.

Hassan's impressions about America were these: American society was very diverse, very open, very simple and naive; American people worked harder than French people; however, they were the most ignorant people in the world: they did not know anything about other countries.

In early 1961, Hassan married Wisal.[71] They held their wedding in Sudan, but quickly went back to Paris and started their new life. In October 1961, their first son was born and they came back to Sudan again later in that year. They stayed in Sudan for about one year, and went back to Paris in early 1963.

When Hassan was in Sudan in 1962, al-Tahir, the leader of the new Islamic movement, was still in a jail - he was imprisoned in November 1959 when he became involved in a coup attempt.[72] Hassan made a great effort towards changing the structure of the organization of the movement. Because the structure of the organization was copied from that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the leader could in theory exercise strong power. Partly because of al-Tahir's individualistic behaviour, and partly because Hassan did not like an autocratic leadership in the movement, Hassan tried to weaken the power of the leader and introduce a collective leadership. He wanted to make the organization more democratic. As a result of Hassan's effort towards changing the structure, al-Tahir was officially replaced as the leader by Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muḥammad Yuusuf Muḥammad) while he was still

in the jail.[73] The power of the new leader was much less than that of his predecessors.

During Hassan's Paris period, he used to go to cinemas, theaters and concerts, partly because he wanted to improve his French, and partly because he loved artistic entertainment. Musical films were one of his favorite entertainments. Despite his long stay in Paris (59-61, 63-64), he had few contacts with French people. Nonetheless, Hassan had some impressions of the French people and society. He found that the atmosphere in France was freer and a bit more chaotic than that in Britain, and that the French, in general, were more friendly than the British.

When Hassan was in Paris, he studied much and read not only legal books, but also other books, such as historical books. He studied and analyzed the Reformation and the French Revolution.[74] Hassan thought that the detailed analyses of these events would be very useful for his future activities. He examined the good points and bad points of these big events in Western history.

He thought that although there were many differences between the two religions (Christianity and Islam), something could be learned from the other's history. He thought that it might be possible to regard the current world-wide Islamic movement as, in a sense, "the Reformation" in Islam. He thought religions sometimes became ill, and the problems that happened in the Christian world might happen in the Muslim world. He also thought that if one wanted to reform Islam, the conflict between the traditionalist and the reformist would be inevitable.

His final return to Sudan was just before the October revolution (1964) which made him famous as a politician. Dr al-Turabi was then 32 years old and had a wife and a son.

2.3 ANALYSES

This section has two sub-sections. The first sub-section gives the researcher's analysis of the factors of identity - narrative tone, imagery, motives, ideological setting, and characters (imagoes). In the second sub-section, the researcher will summarize Dr al-Turabi's personality stemming from the factors of identity, especially motives and characters (imagoes).

2.3.1 FACTORS OF DR AL-TURABI'S IDENTITY

Before moving to the analysis, it may be important to note two points. According to McAdams, there are individual differences in the development of life story,[75] and the sign or evidence of the development in a particular period tends to appear in the later periods.[76]

For example, "ideological setting" was explained in Section 1.2.2 above where the period of adolescence was covered. However the actual development took place over both periods of adolescence and early adulthood. The basis of "narrative tone" is theoretically developed in infancy and early childhood, but the sign of the tone tends to appear in the later periods.

Although Dr al-Turabi's life story was divided into sub-sections and presented in accordance with the theoretical periods of the development, it is not practical to analyze his life story by rigidly sticking to those chronological periods.

(1) NARRATIVE TONE

A life story normally has either an optimistic narrative tone or a pessimistic narrative tone. A story which has an optimistic narrative tone (optimistic story) often involves good things and successful episodes; even though bad things happen the person remains hopeful.[77]

Throughout Dr al-Turabi's life story so far, there were a number of optimistic episodes and no sign of pessimism. In his life story,

the pattern of "efforts and success" appeared again and again. His successful stories seem to indicate his unconscious belief of hope for his future and belief that when he tried to do things he would ultimately succeed.

The episodes of the admission to famous schools or universities and his successful studies in Sudan and abroad seem to indicate an optimistic narrative tone. His successful episode of skipping the third grade in his secondary school may suggest his optimistic attitude and an optimistic narrative tone of the story. In an episode concerning his intermediate school period, despite the punishments he received which stemmed from his radical activities in the school, there was no sign of despondency. He did not change his attitude in his secondary school, but continued radical activities. This episode may also indicate an optimistic narrative tone and his optimistic attitude.

(2) IMAGERY

Dr al-Turabi was very proud of his 7th grandfather and his father. His accounts of these people indicated his strong admiration and respect for them.

His description of his father suggested (or perhaps he wanted to emphasize) that his father was the most important and influential person in his personality building. His life story seems to suggest some "images" of his father, such as the honorable, strict, energetic, and strong father.[78]

The deep commitments of his loved and honorable ancestors and father to Islam, and the Islamic heritages of his family and society appear to have made positive and solemn images of Islamic religion for him.[79]

(3) MOTIVES[80]

With regard to the "motives", it seems that in Dr al-Turabi's life story, his "agentic motives" were much stronger than "communal

motives". His life story, especially covering his adolescence and early adulthood, suggests that he had strong agentic motives, such as "to change or correct what he thought to be wrong", "to achieve his goals", and "to take leadership".

On the other hand, there were some signs of communal motives, such as "to unite" and "to interact with different kinds of people". Hassan's commitment to international student movements and his approach to non-Islamist Arabs and non-Arab Muslims indicate that communal motives were also present.

(4) IDEOLOGICAL SETTING

Dr al-Turabi's life story suggests the important position of Islam in his life. The positive attitude of those who were close to him towards Islam and the positive Islamic heritages surrounding him may have put Islamic values into the centre of his "ideological setting".[81] His pious father, a devotee of Islam, might have played an important role in this respect. His involvement in the Islamic Liberation Movement and his ideological disputes with the communists at the GMC appear to have helped to consolidate his Islamic ideology.

The researcher believes that what Dr al-Turabi learned from the ideologies of famous Islamic thinkers also contributed to his own ideology. The thoughts of those who inspired him, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali, Muhammad Abduh, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb, might have influenced Dr al-Turabi's vision of an Islamic state and the means how to achieve it.[82]

His experiences in Western education (especially from secondary school) may also have contributed to his "ideological setting" to some extent. Although he started from a basis of Islamic values, he did not necessarily refuse things which were different from his basis and sometimes skillfully assimilated them. This tendency was found especially in his secondary school period and his Paris period. As Dr al-Turabi suggested in his life story, his study of past Western experiences, particularly the Reformation and the French Revolution, also seem to have affected his "ideological setting".[83]

(5) CHARACTERS (IMAGOES)[84]

With respect to Dr al-Turabi's "main characters (imagoes)", it appears that there were signs of a number of main characters in his life story.

The accounts of the class boycott in his intermediate school, his participation in the Rufaa incident, and his active involvement in many demonstrations in his secondary school seem to suggest some characters, such as "the critic", "the resistant", "the reformer", and "the revolutionary".

The account of his active involvement in many demonstrations also suggests the character of "the passionate". This is clear from his rather contradictory admission, namely that he did not understand much about political matters, but he nonetheless frequently organized demonstrations. He could become excited / heated easily.

The episode about his idea of signing the names who took part in the class boycott implies his character of "the man behind the scenes".

The stories about his positive involvement in the Islamic movements in Sudan, Britain, and France, indicate his character of "the strong believer".

The episodes about his successful achievements, such as in skipping the third grade in his secondary school, in obtaining LLM and LLD, and in establishing the first official Islamic student organization in France, appear to suggest his character of "the winner".

The account of his active involvement in international student movements (Islamic and non-Islamic) seems to imply his internationalist character - "the internationalist".

The stories about his immediate admission to the GMC and his preparation for the next study in Paris when he was in London suggest his character of "the good planner".

The episode of Hassan's efforts to bring al-Tahir and the other leaders in the movement together indicates a character of "the mediator".

The accounts of an Islamic initiative for the liberation of women in Sudan, his efforts to change the structure of the new Islamic move-

ment, and his passionate study about the Reformation and the French Revolution in Paris, imply his characters of "the reformer" and "the revolutionary".

His stress on "first" in the life story, such as the first official Islamic student organization and the first movement for the women's liberation, appears to suggest another character of "the first person".

2.3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

As the researcher has defined the term "personality", it here means the behavioral tendencies stemming from factors of identity, particularly "motives" and "characters (imagoes)". There may exist some elements of personality which derive from "imagery" and "ideological setting (or ideology)" - e.g. personality stemming from having an Islamist ideology - but the researcher limits the discussion to "motives" and "characters" (as conveyed, for example, by "narrative tone").

As we have found in the previous sub-section, Dr al-Turabi's personality appears to have quite an "optimistic" tendency and to be dominated by strong "agentic" motives and characters. This suggests that Dr al-Turabi will have the following behavioral tendencies:

to be optimistic
to be quite dominant in sōcial groups
to seek positions of high leadership and influence
to be persistent and efficient in many kinds of performance
to focus energies on careful planning for the future
to prefer and show high performance in tasks
to be innovative, and drawn towards change and movement
to be levelheaded
to adopt pragmatic manner to achieve goals
to be restless
to prefer work to leisure
to exhibit high self control
to derive satisfaction from own work
to think that the proof of good friendship is the ability to come to the rescue of one's friends

(see Section 1.2.3)

Dr al-Turabi's life story from 1932 to 1964 showed a number of signs of his main characters (imagoes).

Each "main character" naturally indicates some aspects of personality which can be described by adjectives. For example, "the critic" indicates adjectives such as "critical", "aggressive", and "assertive". "The revolutionary" suggests adjectives such as "radical" and "courageous".

In the same way, the researcher attempts to describe Dr al-Turabi's personality by using adjectives. Table 2.3.(1) shows some of the possible adjectives which may describe Dr al-Turabi's personality, stemming from his main characters found in his life story between 1932 and 1964.

Table 2.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's personality described by adjectives

Main characters (1932-64)	Adjectives
Agentic characters	
the critic	critical, aggressive, assertive
the resistant	defiant, resolute, determined, offensive
the passionate	passionate, zealous
the believer	faithful, pious, serious
the winner	strong, clever, patient, confident, optimistic
the reformer	innovative, progressive, radical, critical, originative, creative
the revolutionary	radical, courageous, critical, explosive
the first person	adventurous, ambitious, assertive proud
the good planner	foresighted, careful, clever
the man behind the scenes	shrewd, careful (see following explanation)

continued

Table 2.3.(1): *continued*

Communal characters	
the mediator	balanced, harmonious, sociable, kind, conciliatory
the internationalist	internationalist, open, cooperative, sociable

McAdams suggests that "The man behind the scenes" is a communal character by saying that: 'Rather than dominate others, they [people high in intimacy motivation] prefer to surrender control in many interpersonal situations, adopting the role of the listener or the person who works behind the scenes to promote interpersonal harmony and goodwill.'[85] The researcher, however, thinks this character can be seen in a different way. In the case of the episode about Hassan's idea of signing the names who took part in the class boycott, this seems to suggest a shrewd (or careful) aspect of his personality involving avoidance of being accused of being the leader of the boycott. The researcher, therefore, has classified this character as an agentic character.

2.4 SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE

This section is going to provide some supportive evidence for the analyses in the previous section, 2.3.

2.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S OWN ASSESSMENT ON HIS IDENTITY

The researcher carried out a survey about Dr al-Turabi's identity by using a questionnaire on 14 May 1994. The term "identity" here is used in a more general sense, compared to McAdams's usage.[86] The following is the questionnaire and Dr al-Turabi's response.

Questionnaire about identity

What do you think about your identity order ?
Could you number the identities from 1 to 8 ?[87]
The strongest is "1".

Categories	Identities	Order	
Class	The intelligentsia	(5)	
Religion	Muslim	(1)	
Ethnicity	Arab / African	(4)	Arab-African
Nationality	Sudanese	(4)	
Tribe	*Bidiriya*	(8)	
Family role	Father	(5)	
Job	Secretary Gene. of PAIC	(5)	
	Leader of NIF[88]	(none)	
Ideology	Islamist	(1)	

Do you think there are some changes in this order throughout your life ?

Dr al-Turabi's comment: 'Yes. The weakness of the identities is a development. Everything except the Muslim and Islamist identities has become weak. The role as the leader of the NIF has completely finished.'[89]

Concerning his class identity, Dr al-Turabi said that he would admit his belonging to the intelligentsia class, but he had been personally opposed to the existence of exclusive classes and had always tried to be a member of the masses.

His religious identity, "Muslim", and ideological identity, "Islamist", were imaginably the strongest.

He chose "Arab-African"~(not "Arab") as his ethnic identity and it was not so strong.

His national identity, "Sudanese", was also not so strong.

His tribal identity was the weakest, although tribal identities of the people in the Middle East are normally quite strong.[90] According to Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii), the *Bidiriya* (Bidiiriiya) tribe has provided many important figures in the Sudanese history, such as Ismail al-Azhari ('Ismaaᶜiil al-'Azharii: a founder of the National Unionist Party), and Suwar al-Dhahab (Suwaar al-Dhahab: ex-Defence Minister and head-of-state, 1985-86).[91]

With respect to his job identity (career identity), he put "5" for "Secretary General of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC)",

but emphasized that the role as the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) had completely finished and was almost "zero". He added that the historical role of the NIF had finished. He told the researcher that he did not want to be associated with a "particular group" and that he wanted to be the leader of the Islamist movement as a whole.

In response to the question concerning the changes in his identity order, Dr al-Turabi clearly suggested that his Muslim and Islamist identities had not changed and had been always the strongest.

Dr al-Turabi's response appears to support the important position and role of his "Islamist ideology" in his life and personality. His response may also indicate his negative attitude against sectarianism.

2.4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY DESCRIBED BY HIS SUPPORTERS

The following descriptions of Dr al-Turabi's personality were given by his close associates, Yassin Omar al-Imam (Yaasiin ᶜUmar al-'Imaam), Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi (ᶜAbd al-Rahiim Mahmuud Hamdii), and Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii) in the researcher's interviews in 1994 and 1995.

(1) YASSIN OMAR AL-IMAM

Al-Imam was born on 7 March 1931. He was initially a member of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), but later joined the early Islamic movement in 1950. He met Hassan in 1951 for the first time. Since the 1964 October Revolution, especially after the establishment of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), he became very close to Dr al-Turabi. At the time of the interview with the researcher, al-Imam was the chief director of the printing section of *Al-Sudan Al-Hadith* newspaper. He described Dr al-Turabi's personality as follows:

> 'Dr al-Turabi is very courageous. He is never afraid of any danger. He never once feared the two military regimes of Abbud and Nimairi. He was one of the first to criticize Abbud's policy in public. Even when he was put in prison by Nimairi, he maintained his dignity. He can adapt to any kind of environment. He has never grumbled about little things. While most of the inmates complained about the prison food,

he never did so. He blankly refused to go out through the small gate of the prison and went out through the main gate. He refused to have his belongings examined by the police when he returned from a short visit outside the prison.

He is very clever. He has a wide and deep knowledge of various kinds of subjects, especially Islam and Arabic. He holds a PhD in Law and speaks English and French fluently. He has a very broad outlook. He is an international thinker. He has never thought only about Sudan. He always thinks about the world.

He has a very strong will and extreme patience. He does what he wants regardless of time or how difficult it will be. If he says he wants to do something, he will keep trying no matter how long it takes. He is very reliable. He will do what he says. He has tremendous powers of persuasion. He can convince people of his opinion.

He has always trusted his friends and supporters. As the leader of the Islamist movement, once he has shown directions and goals of the movement, he gives total freedom to his supporters, and never dictates detailed points. He expects people to find out the best way to achieve goals. He never complains to his supporters about their faults. He always cares about them, even their private problems.

He never works without a plan. He always works within the range of plans and sticks to them. He always consults the members of the movement about his plans. He has never carried out a plan without consulting them. He never speaks first, but always lets other people express themselves before him. He always tries to reach a consensus. He prefers doing this to voting.

He is never satisfied with the present situation. He always seeks a better situation and looks ahead. He likes progressive change, such as reform, innovation, and improvement. He pursues efficiency in all areas. He does not like to copy or repeat what other people have done before. He always tries to create better things.

He likes to choose substance over appearance. He prefers to find the real meaning of words behind the literal sense. He never hesitates to adopt new interpretations of traditional views in accordance with the current situation, if necessary. He was the first Islamist leader to talk about women's rights and liberation.'[92]

(2) ABD AL-RAHIM MAHMUD HAMDI

Hamdi was born on 19 June 1939. He joined the early Islamic movement in 1954. In July 1964, he became a member of the executive bureau of the movement and became close to Dr al-Turabi. He served as the Finance Minister between 1990 and 1993 under the Islamist government.

At the time of the interview with the researcher, he was the chairman of the Khartoum Stock Exchange (KSE). The following statements are Hamdi's views on Dr al-Turabi's personality.

> 'He is very intelligent, has a sharp tongue, and is critical, confrontational and very patient. He is a good planner and hard worker. He is always thinking change and seeks it. He is not a man who is influenced, but a man who influences others. He has capacity. His thinking is mechanistic. His analysis is sharp and precise.'[93]

(3) HASSAN MAKKI

Makki was born in 1950. He joined the Islamist movement around mid-1960s, when he was a student at Hantoub Secondary School. He met Dr al-Turabi in 1966 for the first time. When he was a student at Khartoum University, he was very active in the student branch of the movement. At the time of the interview with the researcher, he was on the teaching staff of the International African University in Khartoum. He described Dr al-Turabi's personality as follows:

> 'He is very patient, intelligent, and courageous. For 30 years, he has been the same person. He has kept the same quality and the same personality. I think he is basically revolutionary, but he acts step by step in order to achieve his goals. In this sense, he may be evolutionary. He is a very good organizer. He never cares doing things from nothing. He values the power of the masses and organizations.'[94]

The views of Dr al-Turabi's close associates on Dr al-Turabi's personality seem to correspond in a great deal with the researcher's analysis in Section 2.3.

Although personality is not rigid, the descriptions above appear to support the idea that the basic personality are quite stable and have remained throughout Dr al-Turabi's life.

CHAPTER 3:
BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT (1964 - 1969)

CHAPTER 3: BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT

Chapter 3 has three sections. The first section, Section 3.1, gives the general description of the key developments concerning the beginning of the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi, which covers the period from the eve of the 1964 October Revolution to the establishment of the May regime in 1969. The involvement of the Islamic movement (see below) in the October Revolution and the leadership struggle in the movement are regarded as the key developments during the period.

Section 3.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account about those described in the previous section.

The final section, Section 3.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

The phrase, "the Islamist movement", will be used to refer to the Islamic movement led by Dr al-Turabi after the October Revolution, especially after he became the official leader of the movement in November 1964.

3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1964-69)

3.1.1 CHRONOLOGY

1964/Su :Al-Turabi returned to Sudan and became a member of the Executive Bureau (EB) of the Islamic movement. Al-Turabi was a lecturer at the Department of Public Law and Administration in the Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum.[1]
1964/ 9/ 9:A symposium on the question of the South was held at the University of Khartoum.
1964/10/14:The Patriotic Women's Front (PWF) was set up.
1964/10/21:A student meeting was held at the University of Khartoum, was attacked by the police, and a student was killed by the police.
1964/10/22:Al-Turabi was in the funeral parade.

1964/10/30:A civilian transitional cabinet was formed.
1964/**/**:Al-Turabi became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum. Al-Turabi became a member of the parliament.
1964/11/25:Al-Turabi was officially elected as the secretary general of the Islamic movement.[2] (beginning of the Sudanese Islamist movement)
1964/12/ 6:The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was set up, and al-Turabi became the secretary general.
1965/early:Al-Turabi quitted his job at the University of Khartoum and started to concentrate on the Islamist movement.
The Islamic Charter written by Dr al-Turabi was published by the movement.
1965/ 2/**:Al-Turabi issued his first communique as the leader of the movement.
1965/ 2/23:Al-Tahir was chosen to represent the movement in the second al-Khalifa cabinet.
1965/ 4/21:The ICF took part in the elections for the first time and won 7 seats.
1965/ 5/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (First Mahjub Cabinet)
1965/ 7/18:Al-Tahir resigned from the movement and joined the National Unionist Party (NUP).
1965/**/**:The movement established the Patriotic Youth Organization (PYO).
1965/11/ 8:The movement started its campaign against the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP).[3]
1965/11/ 9:The movement led demonstrations against the SCP.
1965/11/11:The SCP was banned.
1966/**/**:Al-Turabi resigned as the secretary general of the main body, but remained as a member of the EB and as the secretary general of the ICF.
Struggle and split between "the educationalist school (anti-Turabi)" and "the political school (pro-Turabi)" continued up to 1969.
1966/ 4/**:The ICF launched an anti-government campaign.
1966/ 6/**:Sadiq al-Mahdi formed a cabinet.
1967/ 1/**:Sadiq formed the constitutional commission.
1967/ 5/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (Second Mahjub Cabinet)
1967/ 4/**:Babikir Awadalla, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, resigned in protest against the ban of the SCP.
1968/ 4/**:In the elections, al-Turabi could not get a seat in Al-Masid (near his home town, Wad al-Turabi) constituency.
1968/ 5/**:Mahjub formed a cabinet. (Third Mahjub Cabinet)
1969/ 4/**:Al-Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of both the main body and the ICF (i.e. the whole movement).
1969/ 5/23:An Islamic constitution was basically agreed by the parties and the deal was announced.
1969/ 5/25:A military coup led by Colonel Nimairi[4] occurred. It was seen by the Islamists as a communist coup.
1969/ 5/26:Al-Turabi was put in jail for the first time.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

3.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

To understand the October Revolution and the involvement of the Islamic movement in the revolution properly, it will be useful to know the background and trace the chronological development of the revolution.

(a) Background

The 1958 military coup was originally prompted by the secretary general of the *Umma* ('Umma) Party, Abdalla Khalil (ᶜAbd Allaah Khaliil), who was the prime minister at that time.[5] However, Abdalla Khalil's action had nothing to do with the *Umma* Party. It was Khalil's own decision and he acted as an individual, according to Sadiq al-Mahdi (Saadiq al-Mahdii).[6] The *Umma* party, therefore, started to oppose the military regime and participated in the establishment of a national front in 1960. Ruth First describes the background of the October revolution as follows:

> '[The completion of Egypt's High Dam] created the problem of removing and resettling a population of 50,000 in [Wadi Halfa]. ... [During 1960] the Wadi Halfans had been unanimous in rejecting [the resettlement area chosen by the military regime] out of hand. Demonstrations ensued in Wadi Halfa, supported by others in Khartoum and other towns openly challenging the junta. ... The following year, 1961, the workers on the railways went on strike for higher wages. Trade unions had been declared abolished a month after the army take over, ... The railways workers' union, ... , ignored the ban, brought its 27,000 workers out on strike ... The University of Khartoum became the open target of the regime: the students' union was declared dissolved; student meetings were consistently interfered with by the police, ...

> The government amended the university act to control the institution directly, putting it under the Ministry of Education. ... [In 1963] When the regime refused [the demands of the Gezira tenants], the Gezira farmers responded with a strike ... Both the Umma and the NUP boycotted the [council] elections. The Communist Party contested them in order to use the councils as instruments with which to attack and undermine the regime. ... The atmosphere of repression had become all-pervading. ... In six years ... a national deficit of more than £75 million was accumulated. Expensive schemes misfired when factories were wrongly sited or too hastily planned. The costs of administration soared. ... Corruption, never before entirely absent but never present on a dramatic scale, thrived under the military in a variety of ways: ... By the end of 1963, the Southern protest had taken the form of organized rebellion headed by a guerrilla force, the Anya Nya. ... The war became intense around April 1964, ... During September 1964, a student meeting made outspoken attacks on the government. On 10 October the security authorities banned a discussion circle, and the police dispersed a meeting in the science faculty. ...'[7]

It seems that by October 1964, the discontent and frustration of the people in various parts of society had accumulated.

(b) Revolution

Unfortunately, there are some disagreements among scholars about the exact dates of events which occurred in the revolution.[8] To trace developments, Yusuf Hasan's article will be used, because it was mainly based on Arabic daily newspapers and official broadcasts at the time.[9] To quote Hasan:

> 'Despite the ban, the university students (including both Muslim Brothers and Communists) and others continued to defy the Government. At 8.30 p.m. on 21 October 1964, they assembled in a square within the university precinct, intending to discuss further the southern issue. There they found themselves encircled by police, who ordered them to disperse. On their refusal to move, tear gas was used. The students retaliated by throwing stones, bricks, and empty bottles, and shouting anti-government slogans. Then the police opened fire, killing one student, Ahmad al-Qurashi, and wounding a considerable number of others. ... On 22 October the university was closed, by government order, ... At the same time the Sudanese staff tendered their resignations, ... [demanding] the dismantling of the military regime ... [and] the university's independence. This was in effect the beginning of a civil strike, ... Al-Qurashi's funeral

> procession, joined by tens of thousands of citizens, was an anti-government demonstration of the first magnitude. ... By Friday 23 October, though rioting continued, better organization in the ranks of the demonstrations was noticeable. The university staff, with other teacher, judges, lawyers, engineers, doctors, and the former representatives of the Sudan Trade Union Federation and Gezira Tenants' Association, had now come together as the National Front for Professionals, and called for a general civil strike. At the same time, the traditional parties - the *Umma*, the N.U.P., the Communists, and the Muslim Brothers - revived their old Opposition Front, now styled the National Front of Political Parties. To forestall any rivalry the two groups now began to work together under the name of the United National Front until the revolution was successfully carried out. ... On Saturday 24 October, ... A general strike was ... declared, ... By Sunday the general strike was so effective that the government machinery and general communications had stopped, ... At 8.30 p.m. on Monday 26 October, the President broadcast to the nation the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers. ... Negotiations between the United National Front and representatives of the armed forces ... began on Tuesday 27 October ... by Friday morning, 29 October, all difficulties had disappeared. ... On 30 October 1964 a transitional government, embracing all shades of political opinion, was inaugurated. The Revolution had achieved its immediate objectives with speed and remarkably little bloodshed.'[10]

The 15-member transitional government, which was the first outcome of the revolution, was headed by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa (Sirr al-Khaatim al-Khaliifa), a former Director of Education.[11] It was composed of al-Khalifa, 7 members from the professionals' front, 5 members from the political parties - one member each from the *Umma* Party, the National Unionist Party, the People's Democratic Party, the Islamic movement (Muslim Brotherhood), and the Sudanese Communist Party - and 2 southerners.[12] Since the members of the professionals' front tended to associate themselves with the Communist party, the transitional government had a strongly radical tendency.[13]

Despite the small size of the membership of the Islamic movement - there were only about 2,000 hard-core members of the Islamic movement in 1964[14] - the movement was allocated one ministerial position (an equal number to other parties) in the transitional government. This seemed to be very significant for the movement.

There are different views on the role of the Islamic movement in the October revolution, and many of them are quite different from Dr

al-Turabi's views - his views will be given in the section of Dr al-Turabi's account, Section 3.2. For example, Niblock points out: 'The overthrow of the 'Abbud regime was largely the work of radical political forces.'[15] Yusuf Hasan states that: 'Although every sector of the population participated, the Communists played the most effective role in the organising demonstrations and gatherings.'[16]

(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

After his release from prison in 1963,[17] al-Rashid al-Tahir (al-Rashiid al-Taahir), the former leader of the Islamic movement, had left Khartoum and gone to Gedaref. He was not satisfied with the change which had occurred in the movement, and preferred to stay away from the capital.[18]

On 25 November 1964, Dr al-Turabi was elected as the official leader of the Islamic movement.[19] According to the structure of the organization (see Diagram 3.1.(1)), Dr al-Turabi was elected by the executive bureau, which in turn had been elected by the *shura* (shuuraa) council. The *shura* council had been elected at the convening of the constituent assembly of the Islamic movement. To the knowledge of the researcher, this procedure is not mentioned in any other non-Islamist sources. It may be suspected that the constituent assembly and associated bodies were not formalized institutions, but perhaps more informal meetings convened by Dr al-Turabi.

On 6 December, the Islamic Charter Front was established, which was in charge of politics, and Dr al-Turabi became the secretary general of the ICF.[20] He now held both posts of secretary general of the main body and the ICF. Diagram 3.1.(1)) is intended to show the structure of the organization after 1962.[21]

Diagram 3.1.(1): The structure of the organization (after 1962)



PWF = Patriotic Women's Front
ICF = Islamic Charter Front
( ) = the year of establishment

Source: This Diagram was drawn by the researcher, based on the description written by el-Affendi and later approved by Dr al-Turabi. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 67 and 97. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

Despite Dr al-Turabi's promotion to Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum just after the October Revolution, in early 1965, he resigned in order to devote more time to the Islamist movement.[22]

In April 1965, the ICF took part in the parliamentary elections, and gained 5 seats in the assembly on the basis of the territorial constituencies and 2 seats in the graduates' constituencies.[23] Dr al-Turabi stood in the graduates' constituencies in Khartoum and secured his seat, while al-Rashid al-Tahir stood in the territorial constituencies, Central Gedaref, and was also elected.[24] After the elections, al-Tahir was chosen as the leader of the ICF MPs in the assembly.[25] It is said that the decision to make al-Tahir the leader of the ICF MPs was intended to satisfy his sensitivities regarding the changes in leadership.[26] However, al-Tahir resigned from the movement and joined the National Unionist Party (NUP) in July 1965.[27]

In late 1966, Dr al-Turabi was forced to resign the post of the secretary general of the main body by discontented members, but he

remained as a member of the executive bureau of the main body and the secretary general of the ICF (see Dr al-Turabi's account for further details).[28]

In April 1969, Dr al-Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of both the main body and the ICF.[29]

3.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT[30]

3.2.1 INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Dr al-Turabi came back from France in 1964 with his passion for "freedom" deepened by the history of the French Revolution. He had two liberation plans: the liberation of the country from the military regime of Abbud (ᶜAbbuud) and the liberation of the new Islamic movement, which developed from the ILM, from the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[31]

Dr al-Turabi was a lecturer at the Department of Public Law and Administration in the University of Khartoum. On 9 September 1964, he was invited to a symposium organized by the Society of Social Studies at the University of Khartoum, on the question of the South. The representatives of the military regime were also at the symposium.[32] He advocated that the Southern problem should be solved though the establishment of a regional government, although the Southern social particularity should not be emphasized too much.[33] After the symposium, he was warned by his colleagues in the faculty of agriculture that he had said too much, i.e. something very dangerous to his life and the whole system of the state. The students in the symposium were very moved by Dr al-Turabi's speech. The military regime was shocked. Within a couple of days, a summary of the symposium was published by the Arabic daily newspaper, *Al-Ayyam* (Al-'Ayyaam). Because the newspaper did not write the critical points of what Dr al-Turabi had said, he requested the newspaper to write exactly what he had said and gave a summary of his own speech to the newspaper. However, the newspaper did not publish his statements. The military regime asked Dr al-Turabi's uncle, who was teaching at an Islamic university, to warn his

nephew that he should not say anything further against the regime or he would be imprisoned. Dr al-Turabi did not care about it. The students were highly wrought up and supported him. The students immediately started holding meetings against the regime. His speech in the symposium was the actual start of the revolution.

On 21 October, a students' meeting on the Southern situation held in the University of Khartoum was attacked by the police and many students were shot. Dr al-Turabi asked other people, who had cars, to carry wounded students to the hospital. Dr al-Turabi immediately started to protest against the regime and to mobilize the masses. He shouted anti-regime slogans on the street. As he himself did not have a car, he asked a colleague to take him to the police office to condemn the shootings against the students and ask for the release of the arrested. When he heard that someone had died on that day he thought he had to do something about it. Inside the university, he assembled the whole university staff including foreigners and wrote the first memorandum against the government advocating the independence of the university. Outside the university, he visited influential politicians and asked them to take part in the funeral parade, which was going to be held next morning, and he also called for a general strike. He visited the judiciary where he met the secretary general of the Communist Party for the first time. The communists did not know what was happening at the time.[34] He visited the Gezira Tenants Union and asked the leader, who was a communist, to support the strike, but he refused. He also tried to mobilize the trade unions, but failed to do so. Although the communists and the others later joined the general strike, and helped to form the transitional government, the initiative of the revolution was taken by Dr al-Turabi and the members of the Islamic movement.

Despite his leading role in the revolution,[35] he did not know what the consequences of the revolution would be at that time, and had hardly any plans for the aftermath of the revolution. He did not even expect that a revolution would happen so quickly and so easily. He had an impression that the revolution had "just happened".

During discussions on the new government, Dr al-Turabi, the spokesman of the Islamic movement, visited the Ministry of Defense as a member of a delegation and met Abbud. Abbud did not want any bloody

clashes and promised to hand over power to the civilians. Dr al-Turabi wrote the transitional constitution.

Dr al-Turabi refrained from becoming a minister because the military officers were afraid of him. The officers were saying that if he became a minister he might execute them. Despite the officers' worry, Dr al-Turabi was the only man who defended the officers.[36] Muhammad Salih Omar (Muḥammad Ṣaliḥ ᶜUmar), a member of the Islamic movement, became the Minister of Animal Resources whose rank was the lowest among the ministers. Dr al-Turabi thought that if anyone from the movement could join the government it was enough at this stage, because he knew that they did not have enough experiences and that they were still too young.

After the October revolution, Dr al-Turabi became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum after his British predecessor had run away from Sudan.[37]

3.2.2 LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE[38]

The structure of the organization of the Islamic movement before 1962 was a copy of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the movement had great power and controlled the movement like a dictator. When al-Rashid al-Tahir, who had been the leader of the Islamic movement since 1955, took part in a coup attempt and was imprisoned in 1959, Dr al-Turabi thought that the structure of the organization should be changed. Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muḥammad Yuusuf Muḥammad) became the acting leader of the movement and was later officially chosen as the leader. Dr al-Turabi, meanwhile, committed himself to the re-structuring of the organization, advocated the introduction of the collective leadership, and finally succeeded in reducing the power of the leader. When the new structure was completed in 1962, al-Tahir was still in the prison.

Dr al-Turabi wanted to liberate the Islamic movement from Egyptian influence. He did not want the movement to be seen as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Because of this, he and his supporters had intentionally avoided using the name "the Muslim Brotherhood",

which was officially adopted in 1954, and used other names, such as "the Islamic movement" and "the Islamic current".

He initially wanted to set up an Islamic popular front, but he felt it was premature. He decided to write an Islamic charter to begin with, wanting it to form the basis of the Sudanese state. In December 1964, the Islamic Charter Front was set up. This constituted a first step towards building up a mass movement. Dr al-Turabi wrote *The Islamic Charter* and published it in early 1965.[39]

In April 1965, the ICF participated in the elections and won 3 seats (al-Turabi, al-Tahir, and Muhammad Yusuf) in the elections. Later, two independents (one from the Northern Sudan and the other from the Eastern Sudan), one *sufi* (suufii) leader, and one teacher from the Western Sudan joined the ICF. Therefore the ICF held 7 seats in the parliament. In those days, there were tensions between al-Tahir's supporters and Dr al-Turabi's supporters. Some members of the movement seemed to feel jealous of Dr al-Turabi and advocated that al-Tahir should become the leader of the opposition group. Dr al-Turabi agreed with their claim and al-Tahir became the opposition leader. However, al-Tahir soon decided to withdraw from the movement and joined the NUP. Because of al-Tahir's withdrawal from the movement, the dispute within the movement did not become worse for the moment.

In 1966, the issue of the leadership separation between the main body of the movement and the ICF was raised by members of the anti-Turabi group, who wanted to limit Dr al-Turabi's influence. In short, it was a result of their resentment against Dr al-Turabi. In the 1960s, Jafar Shaikh Idris (Jaᶜfar Shaykh 'Idriis) was the main activist among the discontented members against Dr al-Turabi, who formed an anti-Turabi group and cooperated with al-Tahir. Idris was older than Dr al-Turabi and was strongly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Malik Badri (Maalik Badri), a "discontented member", who became the secretary general of the main body for a short period after Dr al-Turabi had been forced to resign, wanted to put more emphasis on education rather than politics. Muhammad Shaikh Omar (Muhammad Shaykh ᶜUmar), another discontented member, had a disagreement with Dr al-Turabi about the movement's strategy, arguing that the movement was against the government too much.

In April 1969, however, the unification of the leadership between the main body and the ICF was decided and Dr al-Turabi became the leader of the whole movement again. Dr al-Turabi concluded that the initial mixture in the Islamic movement between the ILM and a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood set up outside the GMC in the 1950s was a mistake.

When Colonel Jafar Nimairi (Jaᶜfar Numayrii) carried out a military coup in May 1969, it was completely a surprise to Dr al-Turabi. He was preoccupied by the internal issues and was too busy to find out what had been going on outside the movement. In those days, there were few supporters of the Islamist movement inside the army and they were not organized. Therefore, the information from the army was extremely limited.

3.3 ANALYSES

3.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-64)

It has been established in the previous chapter that Dr al-Turabi developed a strong agentic personality from his infancy to his early adulthood, 1932 - 1964. His agentic personality stems from his agentic motives and characters (imagoes). The main characters (imagoes) which emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his life story up to 1964 are those listed in Table 3.3.(1). It will be noted that most of these characters reflect an agentic personality (marked by (a) in the table), while a smaller number reflect a communal personality (marked by (c) in the table). Table 3.3.(2) lists adjectives (describing personality elements) associated with those characters.

Table 3.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-64)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1964	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 3.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-64)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1964	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1964-69)

Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1964 and 1969 shows strong signs of agentic personality, stemming from agentic motives and characters (imagoes). His account provides both further evidence of previous findings and some new elements of his personality. Among the

previously identified characters (imagoes), "the revolutionary" and "the passionate" seem to be dominant in this period. In addition to this, a newly identified agentic character, "the hero" and "the competitor", strengthen the agentic aspect of this period. If one character is chosen to represent the overall image (or picture) of his account of the 1964-69 period, it will be "the revolutionary". This character indicates an agentic motivation (especially power motivation) and some aspects of personality described by adjectives such as radical, courageous, critical, and explosive. The character is underlying the period and backing other characters, such as "the passionate", "the hero" and "the competitor".

His account of the October Revolution is of particular importance in this phase. Crucial among the previously identified characters is that of "the revolutionary". This comes across in his account of his speech on 9 September 1964. It is clearly Dr al-Turabi's perception that this speech constituted the actual start of the revolution, and that the initiative of the October Revolution was taken by him and the members of the Islamic movement.

Another previously identified character is that of "the passionate", also an agentic character. This is clear from his rather contradictory admission, namely that he led the revolution despite not knowing about the consequences of the revolution. This suggests that he could become excited / heated easily. His account makes us recall the episode about his radical activities in his secondary school - he did not understand much about political matters, but he nonetheless frequently organized demonstrations. Dr al-Turabi seems to have two conflicting characters, "the passionate" and "the good planner" (discussed in Chapter 2) - he could sometimes act just with passion and without plans.

The October Revolution also throws up a new character of Dr al-Turabi, namely that of "the hero" - another agentic character and to some extent related to the character of "the revolutionary". This character indicates aspects of his personality which can be described by adjectives such as "self-projecting" and "overconfident". A "self-projecting" aspect is apparent in his story about his activities and role in the revolution. He claimed and emphasized that he and the Islamists played the heroic (or central) role in the revolution and

other people like the communists did not. His negative account of the communists in the revolution seems to reflect this self-projecting aspect of "the hero". An "overconfident" aspect of "the hero" is apparent in his accounts of the reasons why he did not become a minister in the transitional cabinet (he said the military officers were scared of him) and why he became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum (he said the predecessor ran away).

The story of the leadership struggle also brings out evidence of his agentic personality which seeks "control", "leadership", and "influence". It throws up a new character of "the competitor", indicating adjectives such as competitive, offensive, clever, and shrewd. This is apparent in his account of the leadership struggle between himself and his rivals like al-Rashid al-Tahir and Jafar Shaikh Idris. He seems to have utilized the re-structuring of the organization and the establishment of the ICF to compete for the leadership.

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1964-69)

Table 3.3.(3) summarizes two new characters which have emerged from the 1964 to 1969 period, together with the adjectives which are associated with these characters.

Table 3.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1964-69)

Period	Characters	Possible adjectives
1964 - 1969	the hero (a)	self-centered (a), strong (a), overconfident (a), active (a)
	the competitor (a)	competitive (a), offensive (a), clever (a), shrewd (a)

3.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as radical and critical) stemming from the character of "the revolutionary" (representing the image of his account of the period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the period.

(1) INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Whether or not the Islamic movement played an important role in the October Revolution, two things appear to be clear: one is that the movement positively involved itself in the revolution, and the other is that the movement obtained one ministerial position in the transitional government. Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality seems to have helped to bring about these two developments.

Under a strong emotional pull (passion) towards the "image" of freedom, which was stimulated by his study of the French Revolution, some of Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes), such as "the revolutionary", "the critic", "the hero" and "the passionate" appear to have emerged and become dominant. Dr al-Turabi consciously or unconsciously acted the role of these characters and drove the members of the movement into the revolution. This encouraged the movement's positive participation in the revolution, although the members had little idea of what the consequences would be.

Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality appears to have contributed to the highly conspicuous nature of the activities of the movement (compared to its size - some 2,000 hard-core members). These in turn maximized the "image" of the movement's power and created the illusion of a powerful movement. Because of this, other political forces could not ignore the Islamic movement and allowed it to obtain one ministerial position. Although there were a number of highly educated members in the movement, this achievement appeared to be disproportionate. The success clearly stemmed in part from Dr al-Turabi's personality.

(2) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

It seems that Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality, which seeks "leadership" and "control", was behind the leadership struggle in the 1960s. Among his main characters, "the competitor" appears to have become dominant and have been backed by other characters such as "the critic", "the reformer", "the good planner" and "the winner". He was seeking, consciously or unconsciously, to control the Islamic movement in accordance with what he believed to be right. In order to control the movement (or to win the competition for the leadership), Dr al-Turabi adopted a two-step strategy.

The first strategy was to reduce the power of the secretary general of the movement by reforming the structure of the organization. This occurred when the secretary-generalship was held by al-Rashid al-Tahir (1955- May 62) who was in prison from 1959 to 1963. Dr al-Turabi maintained that the structure, a copy of the Egyptian one, was un-democratic. He strongly criticized this point and persuaded the members of the Executive Bureau (EB) and the secretary general to introduce a collective leadership. He managed this by 1962. Now, the secretary general was almost nominal and could not control the movement.

The second strategy was to increase his own influence. Fortunately the October Revolution offered him a good chance to do this. As a result of his role in the October Revolution, he created a strong image of "the revolutionary" about himself and gained popularity among the members of the movement. On the basis of this popularity, he became the secretary general of the movement in November 1964 (even though the power of the secretary general was now limited). Then he managed to set up the ICF which he could fully control - he became the secretary general of the ICF. It was supposed to be a political wing of the main body, however the ICF seemed to have acted as if it was the whole movement. Dr al-Turabi and his supporters avoided using the official name of the main body, "the Muslim Brotherhood". Through the 1965 general elections, the weight on the main body seems to have shifted more to the ICF. Dr al-Turabi expanded his

influence through the ICF or by using it. In this context, al-Tahir, who was the former secretary general of the movement and the most powerful rival of Dr al-Turabi, and who had once had enormous power in the organization, left the movement. Al-Tahir's departure indicated the strength of Dr al-Turabi's influence within the movement.

The separation of the leadership between the main body and the ICF, which occurred in 1966, seems to have been the last card which the anti-Turabi group could deliver. Because of the pressure raised by the anti-Turabi group, Dr al-Turabi resigned as the secretary general of the main body, but remained a member of its EB. The overall situation concerning the leadership of the whole movement seemed not to change much. The ICF became quite a powerful organization and nobody could challenge Dr al-Turabi's leadership any more. In 1969, Dr al-Turabi became the secretary general of the main body again, and the leadership struggle had virtually ended. Dr al-Turabi won the competition for the leadership of the movement.

CHAPTER 4:
ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND LEARNING PERIOD
(1969 - 1977)

CHAPTER 4: ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND LEARNING PERIOD

Chapter 4 has three sections. Section 4.1, gives the general description of the key developments in the Islamist movement during the period from 1969 to the national reconciliation in 1977. This section focuses on anti-regime struggles and on the internal developments of the Islamist movement.

Section 4.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account about those described in the previous section.

Section 4.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

4.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1969-77)

4.1.1 CHRONOLOGY

1969/ 5/25:Colonel Nimairi came to power following a military coup. It was seen by the Islamists as a communist coup.
1969/ 5/26:Al-Turabi was put in jail for the first time. (1)
1969-70 :The National Front (NF: united opposition front) was formed.
1970/ 1/ 4:Nimairi announced the plan of a single party system and the establishment of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU).
1970/ 3/27-31:Clashes occurred at Aba ('Abaa) island between government troops and oppositions.
1971/ 7/19:A coup led by some communists and sympathizers succeeded in seizing power for about 3 days.
1971/ 7/22:A counter-coup restored Nimairi to power.
1971/10/**:Nimairi officially became the President of Sudan.
1972/ 1/**:The SSU was established by the regime.
1972/ 2/27:The Addis Ababa agreement was agreed.
1972/ 3/18:The Addis Ababa agreement was signed.
1972/11:18:Al-Turabi was freed.
1973/**/**:Al-Turabi went abroad to give lectures.
:Al-Turabi met Sharif Husain al-Hindi.
1973/ 8/**:Al-Turabi returned from abroad.

1973/ 8/30:Al-Turabi was put in jail again. (2)
1973/ 8/31- 9/**:The *Shaban* uprising failed.
1974/ 3/10:Al-Turabi was freed again.
1974-82 :Al-Turabi pursued the second major re-structuring process of the movement's organization.
1974/**/**:Sadiq al-Mahdi was released, went to London, and became the president of the National Front.
1974/**/**:Libya agreed to arm and train the opposition fighters.
1975/ 6/15:Al-Turabi was put in jail again. (3)
1975/ 9/**:An attempted coup occurred.
1976/ 6/**:Reported that an armed operation planned by the NF was ready to act. Osman Khalid and others from the movement were active in Libya.
1976/ 7/ 2:The NF carried out the armed uprising, but failed. The Islamists were forced to re-think their position and strategy.
1976/ 7/**:Al-Turabi's wife, Wisal, was put in jail.[1]
1976/late :Sadiq started to contact the Nimairi regime.
1977/ 4 or 5:Al-Turabi's wife was freed.
1977/ 7/12:A secret meeting between Sadiq and Nimairi took place at Port Sudan.
1977/ 7/**:"National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became public.
1977/ 7/17:Al-Turabi was freed.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

4.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: ANTI-REGIME STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

Between 1969 and 1977, Dr al-Turabi was imprisoned 3 times for approximately 6 years in total: (1) from 26 May 1969 to 17 November 1972, (2) from 30 August 1973 to 9 March 1974, (3) from 15 June 1975 to 16 July 1977.[2] During this period, two major anti-regime operations occurred, the 1973 *Shaban* (Shaᶜbaan)[3] uprising and the 1976 armed resistance.[4] Islamist sources believe that over these years an important development in the Islamist movement occurred[5] while Dr al-Turabi and other prominent members of the movement were together in prison. They studied and discussed their future plans and made their vision clear.[6]

The 1969 military coup led by Nimairi was seen by the Islamists as a communist coup.[7] According to el-Affendi, more than half of the ministers of the first cabinet were regarded as either members of the SCP or pro-communists and the rest were mostly from the left.[8] The traditional forces (the *Umma* Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)) and the Islamists were antagonized by the Nimairi regime. The bulk of the leaders of the Islamist movement were now in prison.[9] Sometime between the coup and March 1970, a united opposition front (the National Front (NF)) which advocated a democratic order with an Islamic orientation, was formed and Sharif Husain al-Hindi (Shariif Husayn al-Hindii) from the DUP became the president of the NF.[10] Sadiq al-Mahdi later (in 1974) went to London and became the president of the NF.[11]

Meanwhile, the *ansar* ('ansaar) led by al-Hadi al-Mahdi (al-Haadii al-Mahdii)[12] in Aba ('Abaa) island became the stronghold of the NF inside Sudan. Some leaders of the Islamist movement who were not in prison joined the *ansar* in Aba island.[13] The *ansar* in Aba island were attacked by government troops in March 1970, and Nimairi used Egyptian MIG fighters to bombard the island. Some four thousand ground troops were sent.[14] During the incident, between five and twelve thousand people died on the island, and al-Hadi al-Mahdi was killed as he tried to escape to Ethiopia.[15]

By July 1971, the central leadership of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) led by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (ᶜAbd al-Khaliiq Mahjuub)[16] had become antipathetic to the regime. On 19 July 1971, some of the communists and communist sympathizers who were associated with the majority group of the SCP carried out a coup and succeeded in seizing power. However, a counter-coup occurred on 22 July and this restored Nimairi to power.[17] Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (the secretary general of the Communist Party) and Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh (Shafii' 'Ahmad al-Shaykh) (the leader of the trade union) were executed as well as the officers who had planned the first coup.[18] As a result, the Communist Party lost its influence dramatically.

In January 1972, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was established.[19] In March 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement was signed[20] and the first civil war between the North and the South ended (1963-72).

After his release in November 1972, Dr al-Turabi met student leaders[21] of the Islamist movement and encouraged them to continue an anti-regime campaign.[22] Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii) was one of the student leaders at the time.[23] Makki visited Dr al-Turabi almost everyday to discuss the situation and receive some advice from him - every time it took about 5 - 6 hours.[24] Dr al-Turabi encouraged Makki to carry out a student uprising, which was to be known as the *Shaban* uprising.[25] Just before the uprising, on 30 August 1973, al-Turabi was put in jail again.

According to Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi (ᶜAbd al-Wahhaab al-'Afandii),[26] the plan of the uprising was this:

(1) first: starting with a student uprising
(2) second: agitating the masses against the Nimairi regime
(3) third: calling for a general strike
(4) fourth: finishing with the involvement of the armed forces.[27]

The final stage (4), involvement of a part of the armed forces, was (according to al-Afandi) supposed to be carried out by Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, Sadiq did not do so and the uprising failed.[28] Since Makki was one of the organizers of the uprising, he was arrested and put in the same jail as Dr al-Turabi.[29]

In March 1974, Dr al-Turabi was freed again. Over the 15 months which followed, he was able to talk regularly to his supporters. Hassan Makki, who was also freed, visited Dr al-Turabi's house almost everyday.[30] Al-Afandi saw Dr al-Turabi in 1975 for the first time, when Dr al-Turabi came to a meeting to give a lecture in the University of Khartoum.[31] In those days, the students demanded concrete action against the regime and the situation was very volatile.[32]

From this period, Dr al-Turabi made new attempts to re-structure the organization of the movement - this time, in order to increase the power of the secretary general. This process was completed by the 1980s.[33]

According to al-Afandi, Dr al-Turabi had rejected armed action as part of an Islamist strategy until the 1969 coup. However, he changed his mind and adopted this strategy after the coup.[34] In June 1975, Dr al-Turabi was imprisoned again.

In July 1976, the NF, including the *Umma* Party, the DUP, and the Islamist movement, carried out an anti-regime armed operation, but this resulted in a complete failure.[35] El-Affendi[36] describes how the operation failed:

> 'Launched on 2 July 1976, the operation went badly wrong. It was plagued with numerous technical problems from the start, and co-ordination between various participants was poor. Workers at the radio station, with memories of two recent failed coups, refused to co-operate, and plans for an alternative radio station did not work. The civilian support the coup leaders counted on did not materialize. There was deep mistrust between various groups after Sadiq, who controlled the bulk of the fighters, said that he wanted a share of power proportionate to his men, and wanted to exclude Turabi from an agreed four-man council that was supposed to rule when the operation succeeded. To make matters worse, the commandos fired indiscriminately on any man in uniform, thus mobilizing the whole army against them. The biggest problem was the accidental early arrival of President Nimeiri, who was due that morning from France. A central part of the plan was to intercept Nimeiri and capture or liquidate him. The error in timing foiled this plan, and the early inconclusive shoot-out around Nimeiri's plane gave the operation away earlier than planned. By early afternoon the operation was effectively foiled, while only small pockets of resistance of demoralized men with no food or water remained. The reinforcements promised from Libya never arrived, since Sadiq and other leaders who were bringing them in turned back when they heard of the failure of the operation on the radio.'[37]

Although the operation itself failed, the Nimairi regime moved towards a national reconciliation. The *Umma* Party, the DUP,[38] and the Islamist movement accepted the reconciliation.[39] In July 1977, "National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became public, and Dr al-Turabi was freed.

4.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT[40]

4.2.1 IN PRISON (1969-72)

When the *ansar* led by al-Hadi al-Mahdi in Aba island were attacked by the government troops in March 1970, Dr al-Turabi sent a message from prison to al-Hadi al-Mahdi to encourage him. Dr al-Turabi wrote in the message that he would support al-Hadi as long as al-Hadi fought for Islam. The message was later found by the government. However, because Dr al-Turabi did not sign the note, when it was found no one realized who wrote it.

When the Addis Ababa agreement was signed on 18 March 1972, Dr al-Turabi was still in prison. Dr al-Turabi did not oppose it strongly, because the agreement was basically similar to his original proposal (he had proposed a regional government for the South). However, he thought that the agreement contained too many concessions to the Southerners. He thought that the reason for the concessions stemmed from a change of Nimairi's foreign policy. In those days, Nimairi had broken with the USSR and was trying to woo the Western block. Dr al-Turabi did not, therefore, give the Addis Ababa agreement his positive support. While Nimairi dealt with the problem of the South by recommending autonomy from the rest of Sudan, Dr al-Turabi argued that the autonomy of the South should be dealt with as part of a coherent program of regional government in the whole of Sudan, and that the South should not be separated from the rest of the country in any sense.

4.2.2 FREE (1972-73)

After his release from prison, Dr al-Turabi visited several countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the US, to give lectures. In London he met Sharif Husain al-Hindi (Shariif Husayn al-Hindii), a DUP leader and the president of the National Front. Dr al-Turabi asked al-Hindi to come back to Sudan to lead the opposition movement inside Sudan, however al-Hindi refused. Dr al-Turabi thought that some leaders, including Sadiq al-Mahdi, preferred to stay in the safe places abroad

and were reluctant to come back to Sudan. Sadiq stayed in Libya for a short time, but for most of his time he remained in the UK.[41] Dr al-Turabi thought: "Whenever something happens in Sudan, I will return to Sudan immediately regardless of the risk". Because of this attitude, he did not stay abroad for long.

4.2.3 IN PRISON (1973-74)

As soon as he returned to Sudan he was put in prison again, shortly before the *Shaban* (Shaᶜbaan) uprising. However, Dr al-Turabi kept in contact with the members of the movement outside the prison and virtually controlled the *Shaban* uprising. Sadiq al-Mahdi was supposed to arrange for some army units to take part in the uprising. Although Sadiq seemed to have made contact with some of the military officers, he did not do anything effective.

4.2.4 FREE (1974-75)

Dr al-Turabi was freed in March 1974. He knew that the security services were shadowing him, but he shook them off and met many people almost daily. He set up various organizations, making plans, regulations, and budgets. He was very active in restructuring the organization of the Islamist movement as well as expanding it.[42]

4.2.5 IN PRISON (1975-77)

The communication between inside the prison and outside the prison was fairly good. An armed operation was being planned by the opposition parties who formed the National Front. Sharif Husain al-Hindi (Shariif Husayn al-Hindii), from the DUP, was the main organizer of the operation. Osman Khalid (ᶜUthmaan Khaalid), Ibrahim al-Sanus ('Ibraahiim al-Sanuus), Mahdi Ibrahim (Mahdii 'Ibraahiim) and Ahmad Abd al-Rahman ('Ahmad ᶜAbd al-Rahmaan) were the main participants from the Islamist movement and Khalid was the leader among them. Ahmad Abd

al-Rahman was active in London and the other three were active in military training in Libya.

On 2 July 1976, the NF carried out an armed uprising, but failed. Although Dr al-Turabi was in a prison, he knew about what was going on and gave some advice on the strategic aspects of the operation. Muhammad Nur Sad (Muḥammad Nuur Saᶜd), a retired army officer, was supposed to bring the armed forces from Libya. But he was an ambitious man who wanted to obtain power in his own hands. Sadiq al-Mahdi could not perceive this. Although they left Libya for Sudan, as soon as they knew from the radio that the operation inside Sudan had gone wrong and the situation was against the NF, they returned to Libya. After the failure of the operation, Dr al-Turabi strongly suggested that the members of the Islamist movement should act independently and should not rely on other parties any more. This decision stemmed from deep disappointment with the other parties.

Although there was good communication between the members of the Islamist movement inside and outside prison and the movement was strongly involved in the operation, Nimairi could not find evidence of the link between the main leaders of the movement who were inside prison and the people who took part in the actual actions, he thought at the time that the Islamist movement had little responsibility for the operation.

Just after the armed operation, because Nimairi feared more unrest, he put Dr al-Turabi's wife, Sadiq al-Mahdi's wife and some other women in prison. They were regarded by the regime as potentially dangerous. Dr al-Turabi's wife (Sadiq's sister) had vengeful thoughts in those days, and could have mobilized the *ansar* and the members and supporters of the Islamist movement.

The government condemned Sadiq al-Mahdi to exile. The Libyan authorities told Sadiq that he should take the responsibility for the failed armed operation as the leader of the National Front. However, Sadiq did not want to take responsibility. He went to Oxford and remained as a postgraduate student. Sadiq later decided to pursue a reconciliation between the regime and the opposition, because he was very afraid of being punished as the leader of the NF. He acted privately (not as the leader of the NF) in order to maintain his security and that of the *ansar*. When the movement towards national reconcilia-

tion became open, Dr al-Turabi told the authorities that unless they released him and his colleagues from prison, he would not accept the reconciliation and would not talk to Nimairi. Then Dr al-Turabi and his colleagues were freed.

4.2.6 FREE (1977-)

When President Nimairi asked Dr al-Turabi to join the SSU, Dr al-Turabi told Nimairi that he would join it on condition that Nimairi would guarantee the freedom of the Islamist movement. As a result, Dr al-Turabi succeeded in obtaining Nimairi's promise that he would guarantee the freedom of the movement.[43] The Islamists decided to take advantage of the reconciliation in order to expand their movement. "Freedom" was the crucial condition to the later development of the Islamist movement.

4.2.7 THE ISLAMISTS INSIDE PRISON

Dr al-Turabi was relatively satisfied with conditions inside prison.[44] He could read any books he wanted, his health was good and his weight increased.[45] Dr al-Turabi never worried about his situation and he enjoyed his prison life.[46] Dr al-Turabi managed to keep in contact with the other members of the Islamist movement outside the prison secretly.[47]

During the prison period, Dr al-Turabi and his colleagues did not waste their time. They studied various topics, such as economy, art, social organization, and international relations. They discussed these inside the prison. They prepared for detailed plans and programs in case they seized power later. Because of this preparation, the Islamist movement could later expand itself rapidly. The experiences in prison were very useful and significant for the movement.

4.3 ANALYSES

4.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-69)

Table 4.3.(1) lists the main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his life story up to 1969. Table 4.3.(2) lists possible adjectives associated with those characters which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality elements.

Table 4.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-69)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1969	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 4.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-69)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1969	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1969-77)

Dr al-Turabi's account of the period from 1969 to 1977 is again dominated by agentic elements of personality. This period is marked by some already identified characters, such as "the critic", "the resistant", "the good planner", "the man behind the scenes", and "the hero". A newly identified agentic character, "the pragmatist", shows another aspect of Dr al-Turabi's personality. Of these characters, "the resistant" seems to lead other characters and to represent the overall image of his account of the 1969-77 period. This character indicates some adjectives like defiant, resolute, determined, and offensive.

Among the previous findings, signs of a "careful" personality which stems from some characters like "the good planner" and "the man behind the scenes" are present in his account. This is clear in the story about his anonymous message which was sent to al-Hadi al-Mahdi and his successful secret contact with the members and supporters of the Islamist movement.

His account of the anti-regime struggles also suggests an aspect of his agentic personality concerning friendship (may be called an "agentic friendship"). People who have a strong agentic personality tend to think that the proof of good friendship is the ability to come to the rescue of one's friend (see Section 1.2.3). This aspect is apparent in his criticism of those who stayed abroad and those who returned to Libya on 2 July 1976. He virtually accused those people of deserting their friends.

Another previously identified character is that of "the hero". This is clear in his negative account about Sadiq al-Mahdi. In Dr al-Turabi's life story, he tends to describe himself as "the hero". Consequently, his rivals were likely to be described as "the incompetent". The negative accounts on Sadiq appear to be also a reflection of a different aspect of his agentic personality. People who have strong agentic personality tend to expect high performance in tasks. The low performances of Sadiq (Dr al-Turabi perceived so) in the failed operations, therefore, seemed to have made Dr al-Turabi feel very frustrated. This in turn resulted in his negative account about Sadiq.

The account about Dr al-Turabi's prison life and the study and discussion inside prison appear to provide further evidence of his "optimistic" personality. He said that he never worried about his situation and he enjoyed his prison life. Despite there was no guarantee of his release, he was preparing for his future by studying and discussing many subjects.

The 1969-77 period also throws up a new character of Dr al-Turabi, "the pragmatist" - an agentic character. This is clear in the story about the deal between Dr al-Turabi and Nimairi, in which the Islamist movement obtained its freedom in exchange for support. The Islamists decided to cooperate with Nimairi in order to achieve their goals.

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1969-77)

The following table shows the new elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality which have emerged from the analysis of his life story covering the period between 1969 and 1977.

Table 4.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1969-77)

Period	Character	Possible adjectives
1969 - 77	the pragmatist (a)	pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a)

4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as defiant, determined, and resolute) stemming from the character of "the resistant" (representing the image of his account of the period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the period. During the period from 1969 to 1977, the bulk of the leaders of the Islamist movement were inside prison. The Islamists, however, showed their determination to press forward their political campaign despite difficult conditions. Their determination seems to have stemmed from Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic character, that of "the resistant".

In the 1969-77 period, the Islamists retained some optimism. Their optimism seems to have been stimulated by Dr al-Turabi's attitude inside and outside prison. This comes across in his followers' comments (see notes). These are full of their admiration and surprise at Dr al-Turabi's determined attitude. Dr al-Turabi's refusal to complain over prison conditions, his efforts to study as much as possible, and his strict religious practices, for example, provided a positive atmosphere inside prison and created confidence among his followers that Dr al-Turabi was the right leader to follow.

Dr al-Turabi's positive thinking and optimistic personality which particularly stem from his character of "the winner" appear to have

also affected the Islamists' belief that the discussion and study inside prison were significant for the development of the Islamist movement. As for Dr al-Turabi, his imprisonment should not become a symbol of "the loser" and should be, at least, a "footstep" for his future victory ("the winner"). Dr al-Turabi, therefore, emphasized the achievement inside prison, saying that the Islamist inmates accumulated various kinds of knowledge, made detailed plans, studied how to govern a country, and so forth.

Concerning the 1973 *Shaban* uprising and the 1976 armed operation, it is clear that Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality had some impact on these anti-regime struggles. Dr al-Turabi's main characters, such as "the resistant" and "the revolutionary" appear to have become dominant in both struggles.

In the 1973 *Shaban* uprising, Dr al-Turabi's role was clear. Dr al-Turabi was the man who encouraged the student activists to carry out the uprising, and the man who virtually controlled the uprising from prison. Since the procedure of the *Shaban* uprising was similar to the development of the October Revolution, it seems that Dr al-Turabi was expecting another "October Revolution". However, the uprising failed. The reason for the failure was, perhaps, Dr al-Turabi's misunderstanding of the true picture of the October Revolution, where he firmly believed that he and the Islamic movement had taken the initiative.

Dr al-Turabi's personality stemming from the characters of "the resistant" and "the revolutionary" seems to have also affected the participation of the Islamist movement in the 1976 armed operation. Compared to the case of the *Shaban* uprising, however, the impact of his personality on this operation itself was less significant. This is because the operation was not under Dr al-Turabi's control but that of the National Front.

The impact of his personality was more apparent on the Islamists' final decision not to "rely on other parties" in order to achieve their objectives. This decision seems to have derived from Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality which seeks "control" and "independence". Dr al-Turabi blamed other parties for the complete failure of the 1976 operation. He appeared to have concluded that the main reasons for the failure stemmed from the fact that he could not control the opera-

tion and that the leaders of the action group of the NF (including Sadiq) were incompetent. Because of this, Dr al-Turabi thought that "the movement should act independently and should not rely on other parties any more."

The armed operation failed and the Nimairi regime survived. However, because the national reconciliation was agreed and the Islamist movement obtained its freedom, which was proven during the next period from 1977 to 1985, the consequence was not too bad for the Islamists. The deal with Nimairi seemed to derive from Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic personality which gave priority to achieving his goal of the expansion of the Islamist movement.

CHAPTER 5:
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NIMAIRI REGIME:
EXPANSION AND PRACTICE
(1977 - 1985)

CHAPTER 5: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NIMAIRI REGIME: EXPANSION AND PRACTICE

Chapter 5 has three sections. Section 5.1, gives the general description of the key developments in the Islamist movement during the period from 1977 to the collapse of the Nimairi regime in 1985. This section focuses on the movement's expansion under the Nimairi regime. The movement's activities concerning education, Islamic legal institutions, and Islamic economic institutions are regarded as the key developments during the period.

Section 5.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account covering the period, although it does not necessarily cover all of the items discussed in the previous section. This stems from the limitations to the researcher's interview.

The final section, Section 5.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

5.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1977-85)

5.1.1 CHRONOLOGY

1977/ 7/**:"National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became public.
1977/ 7/17:Al-Turabi was freed.
1977/ 8/18:The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was established.
1978/ 2/**:Elections to the People's National Assembly were held. Al-Turabi joined the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU).
1978/ 5/10:The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan started operations.
1978-85 :The Islamic economic institutions were growing and becoming diversified in membership.
1978/ 7/**:Al-Turabi became secretary of information and foreign relations at the SSU.
1979/**/**:Al-Turabi became Attorney General until May 1983 and was presidential adviser on legal and foreign

affairs until March 1985.
By 1980 :Nimairi's supporters were limited to the people in the security forces, the south, the SSU, and the Islamist movement.
1980/**/**:Nimairi wrote his book entitled " Why the Islamic Way ? "[1]
1983/ 5/**:Al-Turabi lost his job as Attorney General and obtained the post of legal adviser. Al-Rashid al-Tahir became Attorney General.
1983/ 5-8 :The SPLA was formed.[2] The second civil war between the government and the rebels broke out.
1983/ 6/**:The division of the South into three parts was announced.
1983/ 8/**:The SPLA was officially formed.
1983/ 9/ 8:The introduction of Islamic laws (*sharia*) was announced. This fuelled the civil war.
1983/ 9/**:Al-Turabi became an adviser of the president on foreign affairs.
1983/ 9/25:Sadiq al-Mahdi was imprisoned.
1984/ 4/**:12 special prompt justice courts (staffed by the Islamist movement and others) were established.
1985/ 1/18:Mahmud Muhammad Taha was executed.[3]
1985/ 2/**:Al-Tahir sent an anti-Islamist movement plea to Nimairi.
1985/ 3/ 5:Vice President George Bush met Nimairi in Sudan.
1985/ 3/ 9:Al-Turabi and other leaders of the Islamist movement were arrested.
1985/ 3/26:The National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland (NGSH: anti-Nimairi, anti-Islamist) was formed by the opposition organizations.
1985/ 4/ 6:General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab carried out a military coup. The Nimairi regime collapsed.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

5.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: EXPANSION AND PRACTICE

In July 1977, Dr al-Turabi was released, after the National Reconciliation between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became public. Dr al-Turabi was then appointed by Nimairi, after the 1978 elections, as a member of both the 490-member Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) and the SSU Politbureau.[4] In July

1978, Dr al-Turabi became a secretary of information and foreign relations at the SSU.[5] In 1979 he became Attorney General.[6]

The Islamists had chosen cooperation with Nimairi in order to expand their movement.[7] According to Hassan Makki, the movement's development after the national reconciliation was the most important one in the history of the Islamist movement.[8] The Islamists were trying to put into practice their plans and programmes made inside prison, such as those covering education, Islamic law, and the Islamic economy. On the other hand, the *Umma* Party and the DUP went into opposition again.[9] By 1980, Nimairi's supporters were limited to members of the security forces, people in the south, and members of the SSU and the Islamist movement.[10]

The following sub-sections are intended to show how the Islamists took advantage of the opportunities obtained from Nimairi, expanded their movement, and put their plans and programmes into action during this period.

(1) EDUCATION

Under the Nimairi regime, the Islamists were not so much intent on changing educational programmes as on expanding their support in schools. Gurdon points out two strong sections of Sudanese society on which the Islamist movement stands: 'the first is among the urban based petty traders and small industrialists, who are essentially lower middle class entrepreneurs. ... The second power base is in the Sudanese classrooms and lecture halls, ... '[11]

According to Abbas:

> 'In education, Nimairi's regime gave the NIF[12] a free hand in higher secondary schools in exchange for a task that the NIF was more than willing to perform: keeping campuses quiet, especially Khartoum University. ... The NIF enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political activity in the schools, while other political parties were forced to work underground. The factionalism that bedeviled opposition student groups contributed to the success of the NIF in controlling student bodies, especially the Khartoum University Student Union, for much of the period between 1978 and 1984.'[13]

Like al-Afandi and Hassan Makki, who were recruited to the Islamist movement during their secondary school period, many Sudanese

students were recruited. When they graduated from university, they moved into various fields and sectors in society as elites, such as economic field, political field, and the armed and security forces.[14] The Islamist graduates were getting to hold important positions in society. The more time passed, the more the influence of the movement in elite circles increased. A former minister under President Nimairi said that the expansion of the power of the Islamist movement started from "schools". The Islamists knew the means by which they could obtain the highest return with the lowest efforts.[15]

(2) ISLAMIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Since the independence of Sudan on 1 January 1956, Sudan had not had a permanent constitution, until a permanent constitution was adopted in 1973. Up to 1973, several draft constitution had been under consideration. In 1967-68, the ICF led by Dr al-Turabi had itself proposed a draft Islamic constitution.[16] However, the debate on the constitution was interrupted by the 1969 coup. In 1973, when the first permanent constitution appeared, Article 9 stated that 'the Islamic Law and custom shall be main sources of legislation.'[17] After the National Reconciliation, a law commission was formed and this tried to Islamize the existing laws.[18] The head of this commission was the Attorney General, Dr al-Turabi. However, only one act, the Alms Treasury Act (an Islamic law), was passed by the People's Assembly.[19] In May 1983, President Nimairi sacked Dr al-Turabi as Attorney General and gave Dr al-Turabi the post of legal adviser.[20] Al-Rashid al-Tahir became Attorney General.[21] Nimairi prepared for the new Islamic laws excluding Dr al-Turabi.[22] In September 1983 and the following year, President Nimairi introduced the famous (or notorious) Islamic laws (so-called September Laws based on the *sharia* (shariiᶜa)) and the major change in the Sudanese legal system was finished.[23] The laws

introduced in the years 1983 and 1984 included:

(A) Civil Laws
  (1) The Civil Procedure Act 1983
  (2) The Civil Transactions Act 1984
(B) Criminal Laws
  (1) The Penal Code 1983[24]
  (2) The Criminal Procedure Act 1983
  (3) The Judiciary Act 1983
  (4) The Sources of the Judicial Decisions Act 1983
  (5) The Evidence Act 1983
  (6) The Advocates Act 1983.[25]

El-Affendi describes an aspect of how the Islamist movement had penetrated into the Islamic legal system:

> 'Nimeiri ... declared a state of emergency at the end of April 1984. Twelve special "prompt justice" courts were set up ... to speed up the process of implementation of the new laws [Islamic laws]. These were staffed either by Ikhwan [the Islamist movement] or by other enthusiasts of the new laws. ... The momentum of the new changes ... enabled Ikhwan to get rid of some of their key opponents in the regime.'[26]

Although Dr al-Turabi himself had little "official" power in the government at that time, some strong supporters and members of the Islamist movement, like al-Mikashifi Taha al-Kabbashi (al-Mikaashifii Taha al-Kabbaashii)[27] from the High Court of Appeal, pressed ahead with Islamization plans along the lines which the Islamist movement wanted.[28] Al-Kabbashi described the situation in those days as follows:

> 'Before the introduction of the September laws [Islamic laws][29] there was already a move towards Islamization of laws. The government, for example, banned Sudanese traditional gambling. Dr al-Turabi was strongly involved in the matter.
>
> After the introduction of the September laws, because the Islamists had been waiting for the *sharia*, we all, including Dr al-Turabi, welcomed and supported those Islamic laws. Between September 1983 and March 1984, three people, an Egyptian, Dr Yusuf Ali (Yuusuf ᶜAli), and I, became the leaders of the implementation of the *sharia*. We gathered about 4,000 lawyers from around Sudan and called for their support of the *sharia*. We also used television and radio for our job. In April 1984, I was appointed by President Nimairi as a judge of the High Court of Appeal. I also gave many lectures on the *sharia*.

> In 1985, however, the relations between Nimairi and the Islamists became worse. There were two main reasons for this: firstly the US wanted to prevent the Sudanese economy from being Islamized, secondly Nimairi was fed up with the Islamists' severe accusations against his near relatives.'[30]

As a result of the expansion of the influence of the Islamist movement in the legal system, the invisible conflict between President Nimairi and Dr al-Turabi seemed to have increased. President Nimairi had Dr al-Turabi arrested on 9 March 1985 and started to attack the Islamist movement openly. To quote *The Guardian*: 'Yesterday [24 March 1985], the President again attacked the Brotherhood [Islamist movement], by ordering the revision of all verdicts and sentences passed by courts previously controlled by Brotherhood members.'[31]

Concerning the case of Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the belief that Dr al-Turabi was involved in the case of Mahmud Muhammad Taha is incorrect. Moreover, there seems to exist another confusion. Some believe that an item on apostasy was in the 1983 penal code, but it was not. To quote *Sudan Update*:

> 'In 1985 there was an international outcry when the Nimeiri government used this article [Article 3 of the 1983 Judicial Source Act, known as "free interpretation"] to sentence the leader of the Republican Brothers, Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, aged 76, to death for "apostasy" - a charge for which he had not been tried and which did not exist in the statute book.'[32]

So, despite the non-existence of the apostasy code, the judge[33] used Article 3 to change the charge from sedition to apostasy by his own decision.

(3) ISLAMIC ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Some scholars argue that the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was established under the initiative of the Islamist movement. However, the reality seems to be more complicated.

According to Ahmed, President Nimairi talked with Prince Muhammad al-Faisal Al Saud (Muhammad al-Faysal 'Aal Sa'uud)[34] about establishing an Islamic bank in February 1976,[35] while Dr al-Turabi was still in prison. The FIBS was established in August 1977 and started its operations in May 1978.[36]

Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi (ᶜAbd al-Rahiim Mahmuud Hamdii), who was at the time an economic consultant for Prince al-Faisal at the Saudi investment office, told the researcher as follows:

> 'I advocated the movement's support for Nimairi during my imprisonment between 1969 and 1970, but Dr al-Turabi and other leaders did not agree with me. When I was freed in 1970, I officially resigned from the Islamist movement, although I kept in contact with the movement in private. In 1976, when Prince al-Faisal made a proposal about the establishment of the FIBS, Nimairi accepted the proposal. Nimairi, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Bank of Sudan, and the Speaker of the House of Representative visited me to discuss and pursue the project. I received some advice on legal matters concerning the establishment of the FIBS from Dr al-Turabi in private, but Dr al-Turabi did not play a practical role in establishing the bank.'[37]

How important Dr al-Turabi's role was in developing the idea of the establishment of the FIBS is given different emphasis by different people involved. Ahmad Ali Abdalla ('Ahmad ᶜAli ᶜAbd Allaah), who is currently the secretary general of the *Sharia* Supervisory Board (SSB) of the Bank of Sudan, did say specifically that the "idea" of the establishment of the FIBS came from Dr al-Turabi.[38] He told the researcher:

> 'Dr al-Turabi used to tackle the question of an Islamic economy as a part of the Islamist movement, which could not be avoided in order to establish an Islamic state. Dr al-Turabi was thinking how to transform the existing interest-involved banking system into a no-interest Islamic banking system. Establishing an Islamic bank in Sudan became the first step to realize the idea. Dr al-Turabi's thoughts and ideas were shared with the members of the movement. However, lack of capital inside Sudan was the main obstacle to establish an Islamic bank. Meanwhile, many members of the Islamist movement, some of whom escaped after the 1969 coup from Sudan, were living in the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia. The Islamists improved their relations with the Muslims in those countries and tried to establish an Islamic bank. As the result of their efforts, the FIBS was established as the first Islamic bank in Sudan. I do not attribute everything to Dr al-Turabi alone, but Dr al-Turabi was certainly leading the Islamist movement and the idea came from him.'[39]

After the introduction of the Islamic laws (*sharia*) in September 1983, the procedure of transforming the banking system from an interest-based conventional banking system to a non-interest Islamic banking system was accelerated.[40] A year later, in September 1984, the banking system was Islamized.[41]

The FIBS had a *Sharia* Supervisory Board (SSB) in order to make sure that all activities of the bank corresponded with Islamic laws. To quote Ahmed:

> 'The SSB enjoys a high degree of independence from the bank management. It is appointed by shareholders in the General Assembly. The bank management refers to the SSB for advice on executing operations without contravening *Sharia* rules.'[42]

Some scholars point out a strong connection between the FIBS and the Islamist movement led by al-Turabi in those days (1978 - 1985). For example, Jamal argues that, 'Sudan's Muslim Brethren [the Islamists] found themselves well placed to dominate this system [the Islamic banking system] in Sudan.'[43] Table 5.1.(1) gives the names of senior personnel in the FIBS in the financial year 1984.

Table 5.1.(1): Senior staff of the FIBS (1984)

Board of Directors:
(1) Prince Muhammad al-Faisal Al Saud (Chairman)
(2) Ibrahim al-Tayyib ('Ibraahiim al-Tayyib)[44]
(3) Ahmad Salah Jamjum ('Ahmad Salaah Jamjuum)[45]
(4) Ahmad al-Najar('Ahmad al-Najaar)[46]
(5) Amin Aqil Attas ('Amiin ᶜAqiil ᶜAttaas)[47]
*(6) Bashir Hassan Bashir (Bashiir Hasan Bashiir)[48]
*(7) Musa Husain Daral (Muusaa Husayn Daraar)[49]
(8) Muhammad Salih Baharith (Muhammad Saalih Baahaarith)[50]
*(9) Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad (Muhammad Yuusuf Muhammad)[51]
(10) Abd al-Hamid Abd al-Razaq (ᶜAbd al-Hamiid ᶜAbd al-Razaaq)[52]
(11) Abdalla Omar Nasif (ᶜAbd Allaah ᶜUmar Nasiif)[53]
(12) Omar Abd al-Rahman Azam (ᶜUmar ᶜAbd al-Rahmaan ᶜAzaam)[54]
(13) Abd al-Aziz Abdalla (ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziiz ᶜAbd Allaah)[55]
*(14) Yassin Omar al-Imam (Yaasiin ᶜUmar al-'Imaam)[56]
(15) Yusuf Abd al-Rahman (Yuusuf ᶜAbd al-Rahmaan)[57]

Secretary:
Abbas al-Bakhit Musa (ᶜAbbaas al-Bakhiit Muusaa)[58]

Executive Management:
General Manager:
Al-Baqr Yusuf Mudawi (al-Baaqr Yuusuf Mudawii)[59]

Deputy General Manager:
Al-Hajj Abdalla Khalid (al-Haajj ᶜAbd Allaah Khaalid)[60]

General Manager's Assistants:
* Ahmad Ibrahim al-Turabi ('Ahmad 'Ibraahiim al-Turaabii)[61]
Abdin Ahmad Salama (ᶜAabdiin 'Ahmad Salaama)[62]
* Rabi Hassan Ahmad (Rabiiᶜ Hasan 'Ahmad)[63]

Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB):[64]
Al-Siddiq al-Darir (al-Siddiiq al-Dariir)[65]
Awadalla Salih (ᶜAwad Allaah Saalih)[66]
Siddiq Abd al-Hay (Siddiiq ᶜAbd al-Hay)[67]
* Yusuf Hamid al-Alim (Yuusuf Haamid al-ᶜAlim)[68]
* Hassan Muhammad al-Bayli (Hasan Muhammad al-Baylii)[69]

Sources: The FIBS, *Annual Report: 1984* (Khartoum: 1985), p. 2. The notes on the staff are based on Dr al-Turabi's comments obtained in the researcher's interview on 25 January 1995.
* = Described by Dr al-Turabi as member of the Islamist movement.

Among the staff, Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad, Yassin Omar al-Imam, and Rabi Hassan Ahmad are famous leading figures of the Islamist movement. In addition to this, Bashir Hassan Bashir, Musa Husain Daral, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Turabi, Yusuf Hamid al-Alim, and Hassan Muhammad al-Bayli were described by Dr al-Turabi as members of the Islamist movement (see Dr al-Turabi's comments in the notes). It seems to the researcher that there is no doubt about the strong link between the FIBS and the Islamist movement.

As for the performance of the FIBS, it seems to have done quite well. Ahmed assesses the FIBS as successful by pointing out the spread of its branches and the growth in the size of its deposits over the period 1979-86.[70] According to the annual report for 1984,[71] it listed 9 branches in the capital (Khartoum), 6 branches outside the capital and 3 subsidiary companies.[72]

According to Taha, in 1980 the Islamist movement owned about 500 companies.[73] In 1989 its capital inside the country was more than 500 million dollars, and outside the country about 300 million dollars.[74] However, Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi denied Taha's claim.[75] It is difficult to obtain information which proves which is correct.

On 27 March 1985, when food riots flared in Khartoum, three buildings were heavily damaged: a branch office of the SSU, the Meridian Hotel, and the FIBS.[76] To quote *The Guardian*:

> 'While the students were chanting "we will not be ruled by the World Bank, we will not be ruled by the IMF," the urban

> poor took up a different cry - "we are hungry." The prices of bread and sugar have risen by 33 per cent in the past three days, and fuel went up by between 60 and 75 per cent a fortnight ago. None of these price rises have been formally announced by the Government.'[77]

The FIBS had been criticized by the mass-media on the grounds that it was responsible for the starvation in Sudan.[78] This related to the so-called "*dura* crises" (*dura* (dhura: millet). According to Kurita, the FIBS not only supported the export of *dura* to Saudi Arabia, but also (around 1984) had bought up *dura*.[79] However, Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi, who was at the time the deputy general manager of the FIBS, gave the researcher a different view:

> 'The accusation against the FIBS was a fabrication which was originally conspired by pro-Nimairi state governors. In those days, while the influence of the Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi on the economy was getting strong, that of the pro-Nimairi group was getting weak. The left elements in the SSU were especially frustrated with this situation. The media was practically controlled by ex-communists. Everything was planned by the pro-Nimairi group in order to undermine the reputation of the FIBS and the Islamist movement. All allegations were brought into court and were later proven false. I told the governors that if they could find even "one sack" of *dura*, they should confiscate it and put me in jail. The accusation against the FIBS was completely fallacious.'[80]

The FIBS later claimed that *Al-Ayyam* (the Arabic daily newspaper), which first brought up the issue, had apologized to the FIBS in the press on 3 October 1985.[81]

On 5 March 1985, the then US Vice President, George Bush, visited Nimairi in Sudan and advised Nimairi to do something about the Islamists.[82] On 9 March 1985, Dr al-Turabi was sacked from the government and arrested together with his Islamist colleagues.[83] On 6 April 1985, General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab (ᶜAbd al-Rahman Suwaar al-Dhahab), Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,[84] carried out a military coup and removed President Nimairi from power, while Nimairi was in Egypt.[85]

5.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT[86]

Dr al-Turabi initially had no intention of joining the government.[87] However, because President Nimairi invited him to join the government[88] and the *Shura* (Shuuraa) Council[89] of the Islamist movement suggested to Dr al-Turabi that he should accept Nimairi's invitation, he decided to do so.

Since President Nimairi promised Dr al-Turabi at the beginning that he would guarantee the freedom of the Islamist movement, Dr al-Turabi chose cooperation with President Nimairi as a strategy. Nimairi was always suspicious of Dr al-Turabi, but Dr al-Turabi was concentrating on his own goals. His hidden purpose was to utilize the state system in order to expand the Islamist movement and practice the plans and programmes of the movement.

Regarding to his relationship with the regime, Dr al-Turabi maintained that the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was virtually an Islamic movement and not a socialist one. He sometimes criticized President Nimairi openly. President Nimairi was suspicious about Dr al-Turabi and was afraid of Dr al-Turabi's strong influence inside the government.[90] Although his official post was Attorney General (1979-83), he did many jobs which normally the Foreign Minister did.

As the Islamization of society moved ahead and Dr al-Turabi's influence increased, President Nimairi wanted to concentrate attention on his own role in the development.[91] President Nimairi removed Dr al-Turabi from the post of Attorney General in May 1983 and ordered officials not to come into contact with Dr al-Turabi. However, since many of those officials were former students of Dr al-Turabi, the officials and Dr al-Turabi kept in contact. There were many former students of Dr al-Turabi inside the government. In those days, many new Islamic organizations, such as Islamic banks and Islamic insurance companies, were being formed. Sadiq al-Mahdi had no influence in this field.

The Islamists also increased their influence inside the army. The Islamists had not opposed the army since the national reconciliation, and approached it through the government, particularly through the army's educational frameworks. Dr al-Turabi persuaded Nimairi to Islamize the army. Dr al-Turabi succeeded in introducing religious

programmes in military education. After the breaking out of the second civil war between the government forces and the SPLA led by John Garang in 1983, the Islamists openly supported the army and opposed the SPLA.

Immediately after the departure of the US Vice President George Bush from Sudan, Dr al-Turabi talked with President Nimairi on 6 March 1985. Dr al-Turabi told President Nimairi that he would tell Nimairi openly if there were any disagreements between them and that he would not betray Nimairi as long as Nimairi trusted him. Dr al-Turabi told Nimairi, however, that if Nimairi arrested him, the government would collapse. Nimairi said that he agreed with Dr al-Turabi.

On Friday 8 March, Dr al-Turabi met the President in a mosque as usual for Friday prayer. However, on that occasion, the President not only shook his hand but also held him quite strongly.[92] Dr al-Turabi realized that President Nimairi had decided to arrest him. On 9 March 1985, in the early morning, Dr al-Turabi was arrested and taken to Western Sudan together with other members of the Islamist movement.[93] Dr al-Turabi was then isolated from the other members and put in prison in El-Obeid (Al-'Ubayyid).

When Dr al-Turabi was in prison in El-Obeid, there was a plan to enable his escape. Dr al-Turabi's supporters asked Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi (Muᶜammar al-Qadhdhaafii), the Libyan leader, to help and al-Qadhafi said that he would think about it. Because Dr al-Turabi trusted the members and power of the Islamist movement, he was never afraid for his future.

5.3 ANALYSES

5.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-77)

Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the analysis of his life story between 1932 and 1977 are those listed in Table 5.3.(1). Possible adjectives stemming from those characters,

which may describe Dr al-Turabi's personality, are listed in Table 5.3.(2).

Table 5.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-77)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1977	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the pragmatist (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 5.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-77)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1977	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1977-85)

Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1977 and 1985 shows signs of both agentic and communal elements of personality. Among the previously identified agentic characters, "the hero" and "the winner" are dominant. This period, however, seems to be marked by two newly identified agentic characters, "the expansionist" and "the persuader", and one communal character, "the cooperator". Since 1964 for the first time, a communal character has emerged in the 1977-85 period. This communal character, however, is not purely communal, i.e. it includes both communal and agentic elements. "The expansionist" seems to be the main character representing the image of his account of the period and indicates adjectives such as expansionist, ambitious, active, dominant, and influential. This character is backed by other characters mentioned above.

Signs of his "self-projecting" element of personality are apparent in Dr al-Turabi's account about Nimairi's fear for and jealousy of Dr al-Turabi's influence. This "self-projecting" element of personality stems from one of his main characters, namely "the hero", which is a previously identified agentic character.

Further evidence of his agentic personality is apparent in the account of Dr al-Turabi's strong confidence in the movement when he was imprisoned. He firmly believed that the members of the movement would rescue him from prison if his life was in danger. His strong confidence seems to have stemmed from his character of "the winner", which is described by adjectives such as strong, clever, patient, confident, and optimistic.

His account of the cooperation with Nimairi throws up two new characters of Dr al-Turabi, i.e. those of "the expansionist" and "the cooperator". The former, "the expansionist", is backed by the latter, "the cooperator". In another words, for the purpose of the Islamist expansion he became "the cooperator". These characters are apparent throughout the 1977-85 period. "The expansionist" is an agentic character and "the cooperator" is a communal character. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, however, "the cooperator" appears to include agentic

aspects too. This is because the motivation behind his cooperation is obviously an achievement motivation (agentic motivation).

Another new character to come out is that of "the persuader" - also an agentic character. This comes across in the story that Dr al-Turabi succeeded in persuading Nimairi to Islamize the army. This character seems also to support the character, "the expansionist": Islamizing the army can be seen as a part of the expansion of the Islamist movement.

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1977-85)

Dr al-Turabi's life story covering the period 1977 to 85 has brought forwards some new elements of his personality. Table 5.3.(3) summarizes these new elements.

Table 5.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1977-85)

Period	Characters	Possible adjectives
1977 - 1985	the expansionist (a)	expansionist (a), ambitious (a), active (a), dominant (a), influential (a)
	the persuader (a)	persuasive (a), clever (a), confident (a), eloquent (a)
	the cooperator (c)	cooperative (c), supportive (c)

5.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as expansionist, dominant, and influential) stemming from the character of "the expansionist" (representing the image of his account of the period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the period. The movement's activities concerning educa-

tion, Islamic legal institutions, and Islamic economic institutions under the Nimairi regime are all designed and carried out for the purpose of the expansion of the Islamist movement. Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which seeks for expansion and control clearly affected these activities.

During the period between 1977 and 1985, the Islamist movement was seemingly incorporated into the Nimairi regime. However, the Islamists were actually acting quite independently in the pursuit of their own goals. The Islamists merely used the opportunities provided by Nimairi as a strategy. This strategy seems to have been a reflection of some of Dr al-Turabi's characters, such as "the good planner", "the pragmatist", "the man behind the scenes", "the cooperator", and "the persuader".

The goals of the Islamist movement during this period were clear, i.e. expansion of the movement and practice of their plans.[94] Mustafa Osman Ismail told the researcher how the Islamists expanded their influence on society as follows:

> 'Dr al-Turabi told us that every Islamist movement must go through three stages: spreading ideas, establishing organizations, and establishing an Islamic society.[95] In order to complete the first and second stages, Dr al-Turabi sent his supporters to every field or sector of society and encouraged them to become experts in their fields or sectors, such as media, education, economy, security, army, health, and engineering. Dr al-Turabi made sure that there were at least several specialists who supported Dr al-Turabi and the Islamist movement in every part of society. He was always pushing people towards main aims and objectives. Dr al-Turabi was good at transforming his ideas into other people's ideas. His ideas became the ideas of other people without their noticing it. He was very flexible in choosing means to achieve his goals. His cooperation with Nimairi was just a strategic choice to achieve his main goals. '[96]

Yassin Omar al-Imam also gave the researcher information on how the Islamists achieved their goals, particularly referring to Dr al-Turabi's leadership style which seems to stem from his character of "the man behind the scenes" as follows:

> 'Once Dr al-Turabi gave a mission to a leader of the movement, he made the leader find the best means to complete the mission. Dr al-Turabi trusted the leader and did not instruct in detail. Dr al-Turabi's main task was to point out the important points and the goal of the mission. This

> was Dr al-Turabi's way to train the leaders of the movement.'[97]

It seems that after Dr al-Turabi made his goals clear, he did not necessarily give detailed instructions on how to achieve such goals, and that the members and supporters of the Islamist movement carried out missions on behalf of Dr al-Turabi.

To summarize the situation of the 1977-85 period, it seems that President Nimairi was, metaphorically, on a train which was run by the Islamists and moving towards the goals already set by Dr al-Turabi. Nimairi's plans and actions were effectively utilized by the Islamists in the various fields and sectors in order to achieve the Islamist goals. The establishment of the FIBS and the introduction of the Islamic laws seemed to be such examples. Dr al-Turabi himself did not take part in the actual establishment of the FIBS and the actual introduction of the Islamic laws, however the result turned out as Dr al-Turabi wanted. As far as Dr al-Turabi was concerned, his actual involvements in those events did not mean much, what was important was the achievement of his goals.

CHAPTER 6:
TRANSITION PERIOD AND POWER STRUGGLE
(1985 - 1989)

CHAPTER 6: TRANSITION PERIOD AND POWER STRUGGLE

Chapter 6 has three sections. The first section, Section 6.1, gives a general description of the key developments in the Islamist movement during the period from 1985 to the 1989 military coup. This section focuses on the formation of the National Islamic Front (NIF), its first general elections in 1986, and the power struggle of the parties between 1988 and 1989.

Section 6.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of his main goals during the period and of the key developments described in Section 6.1.

The final section, Section 6.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments, assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

6.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1985-89)

6.1.1 CHRONOLOGY

1985/ 3/26- 4/ 5:Popular uprising against the Nimairi regime.
1985/ 4/ 6:General Suwar al-Dhahab carried out a military coup. The Nimairi government collapsed.
1985/ 4/ 9:Al-Turabi was freed.
1985/ 4/**:The National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed.
1986/ 3/**:The SPLA advanced, taking control of almost the entire south.[1]
1986/ 4/**:The NIF won 51 seats in the elections and became the third biggest party.
1987/ 1/**:*The Sudan Charter* was published.[2]
1987/ 11/**:Ali Osman Muhammad Taha[3] criticized Sadiq al-Mahdi over the cost of the battles of the Sudanese army in the civil war, and called for the resignation of Sadiq from his post as Defence Minister.[4]
1988/ 5/15:The NIF was included in the coalition government for the first time since the introduction of the new multi-party system in 1986. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and Deputy Prime Minister.
1988/ 7/**:Al-Turabi framed a draft Islamic penal code.[5]

1988/11/16:The DUP leader made a peace accord with the leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa.
1988/12/18:The government foiled a coup attempt led by officers who served under Nimairi.
1988/12/21:The Parliament effectively rejected the peace accord of 16 November.
1988/12/28:The DUP withdrew from the government.
1989/ 2/ 1:A new coalition government was formed. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister.
1989/ 2/20:The top army officers gave an ultimatum to the government.
1989/ 3/25:Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi appointed a new cabinet excluding the NIF members.
1989/ 4/**:The freezing of the Islamic law was decided by the new government.
1989/ 6/18:A coup attempt to bring Nimairi back to power was foiled.
1989/ 6/30:Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir successfully carried out a coup and came to power. All political parties were banned. Dr al-Turabi was arrested together with other leading politicians.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

6.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS

In April 1985, the National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed by the Islamist movement.[6] To understand the significance of the formation of the NIF, it would be useful to look back at the situation on the eve of the collapse of the Nimairi regime.

At the end of the Nimairi era, the frustration and resentment of the oppositions were directed against the Nimairi regime and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi. To quote el-Affendi:

> 'The opposition forces grouped together and moved to topple Nimeiri started in earnest. There was one thing these groups agreed on: Ikhwan [the Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi] must be excluded completely from the new order and punished severely for supporting Nimeiri's excesses. ... NGSH was formed on 26 March and grouped together the major political parties and

> key professional organizations and trade unions which led the protest against Nimeiri. It acted as a "parliament for the uprising" and hostility to Ikhwan was a major unifying factor among its disparate components.'[7]

Between late March and early April 1985, a number of mass demonstrations turned into a popular uprising against the government.[8] Although by the time of the uprising many senior leaders of the Islamist movement were already imprisoned by Nimairi,[9] the Islamist movement kept its distance from the popular uprising and remained the only political force which did not join the uprising.[10]

After the collapse of the Nimairi regime, the Islamist movement formed the National Islamic Front. Kurita seems to suggest that the formation of the NIF was a "clever strategy" by the Islamists to survive in the new situation. Kurita points out that despite the Islamists' record of supporting Nimairi and their position on the popular uprising, the movement survived by forming the NIF - in other words, by assuming a different appearance.[11]

To the researcher's knowledge, the organizational structure of the NIF after 1985 was almost identical to the third structure of the Islamist movement after 1974, except that the constituent assembly of the NIF was convened every 3 years (see Diagram A.8.(3) in Appendix (8)).[12] This seems to suggest that the establishment of the NIF was nominal and involved little change in the nature of the movement.

According to el-Affendi, the Islamist movement not only survived, but also showed its strength:

> 'The formation of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in April 1985 represented the culmination of the development of the [Islamist] movement ... That NIF emerged in April, was firmly in place by May, and was able to mount a major challenge to its opponents by the autumn [1985]...'[13]

The strength of the Islamist movement was going to be shown in the 1986 general elections.

After a one-year transitional period led by General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab (ᶜAbd al-Raḥmaan Suwaar al-Ḏhahab), the Transitional Military Council (TMC) gave way to a civilian government.

In April 1986, general elections were held and the multi-party system was restored.[14] 264 seats out of the total 301 seats were contested among the parties.[15] The *Umma* Party won 100 seats and the DUP

63.[16] The NIF won 51 seats (23 out of 28 in the graduates' constituencies and 28 out of 236 in the territorial constituencies) and became the third biggest party in Sudan.[17]

The NIF won about 19 per cent of the total contested seats, 82 per cent of the total seats in the graduates' constituencies, and about 12 per cent of the total seats in the territorial constituencies. Table 6.1.(1) shows the performance of the NIF in the territorial constituencies.

Table 6.1.(1): The 1986 elections: the NIF's performance (territorial constituencies)

province	elected	votes gained	percentage*
Khartoum	13	187981	29.8 %
Eastern	1	79509	18.31 %
Northern	4	113514	30.26 %
Central	4	157374	13.21 %
Kordofan	3	81423	15.23 %
Darfur	2	95099	15.53 %
Upper Nile	0	3149	9.36 %
Bahr al-Ghazal	0	1937	23.43 %
Equatoria	1	5598	6.66 %

* = percentage of the NIF's votes gained in each province

Source: The Sudanese Government, *Election record: 1986* (Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament in Omdurman).

N.B. Because of the civil war, the votes gained in Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria were very limited.[18] These results do not show the true picture of the popularity of the NIF in these provinces.

The NIF's success in the graduates' constituencies shows the strong support among the educated. The NIF's gains in some of the territorial constituencies, such as Khartoum province (29.8 %) and Northern province (30.26 %), shows the relative popularity of the NIF in urban areas.

Table 6.1.(2) gives a comparison between the performances of four parties - the *Umma* Party, the DUP, the SCP, and the NIF - in the territorial constituencies.

Table 6.1.(2): The 1986 elections: comparison between the parties (territorial constituencies)

province	*Umma*	DUP	SCP	NIF
Khartoum	20.71 %	30.48 %	5.60 %	29.8 %
Eastern	22.18 %	43.0 %	1.41 %	18.31 %
Northern	15.24 %	46.24 %	1.6 %	30.26 %
Central	47.17 %	30.54 %	1.21 %	13.21 %
Kordofan	48.43 %	26.39 %	0.15 %	15.23 %
Darfur	61.47 %	16.70 %	0.08 %	15.53 %
Upper Nile	37.12 %	3.83 %	--	9.36 %
Bahr al-Ghazal	31.18 %	--	--	23.43 %
Equatoria	0.31 %	--	--	6.66 %

underline = highest % in the province

Source: The Sudanese Government, *Election record: 1986* (Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament in Omdurman).

N.B. Because of the civil war, the results in Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria do not show the true picture of the popularity of the parties.

Among the four parties, the *Umma* Party was strongest in Central, Kordofan, Darfur, Upper Nile, and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, though the results in the last two provinces do not show the true picture of the popularity of the party. The DUP was strongest in Khartoum, Eastern, and Northern provinces. This appears to show a traditional division in the parties' strongholds: the *Umma* Party - rural areas, and the DUP - urban areas. The NIF failed to obtain the highest percentage except for in Equatoria province where the elections were affected by the civil war. However, the votes of the NIF in Khartoum and Northern provinces were the second highest, after the DUP, and this affected

negatively the seats gained by the DUP. According to el-Affendi: 'DUP suffered erosion of its support in Khartoum, a traditional stronghold, its share dropping from 53 per cent to just over 30 per cent.'[19]

On 26 April 1986, the first Constituent Assembly was held and it elected Sadiq al-Mahdi (Saadiq al-Mahdii) Prime Minister by a majority of 165 votes.[20] In the contest for the Prime Ministership, Ali Osman Muhammad Taha (ᶜAli ᶜUthmaan Muhammad Taha) from the NIF won 49 votes and a communist won 3 votes.[21]

On 6 May 1986, a new 20-man cabinet was announced by the Prime Minister. The new portfolios were allocated between the parties as follows:

Umma :Defence, Energy, Industry, Finance, Cabinet Affairs, Justice, Agriculture, Education, Animal Resources.
DUP :Foreign Affairs, Interior, Trade, Housing, Information, Health.
SPs :Labour, Irrigation, Communications, Local Government.
NGSH :Unity and Peace.

SPs = Southern Parties
NGSH = National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland

Sources: *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 19 May 1986, p. 1.
El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 130 and 135.

The NIF was excluded from the new government and became the largest opposition party in the parliament.

As far as Dr al-Turabi himself was concerned, he did not win a seat. Although this failure has been mentioned in many publications, few have reported the results in detail. Dr al-Turabi stood in Khartoum 7th district, Al-Sahafa and Jabra (al-Sahaafa wa-Jabra: see Map 6.1.(1)).

Table 6.1.(3) shows Dr al-Turabi's performance in the 1986 elections. Hassan Ali Muhammad Shabu (Hasan ᶜAli Muhammad Shabuu), the candidate from the DUP, was elected and Dr al-Turabi came second. Although Dr al-Turabi could not win, he obtained 10,027 votes (43.9 per cent of the total votes).

Table 6.1.(3): The 1986 elections: Dr al-Turabi's performance

Province: Khartoum
District: Khartoum 7th, Al-Sahafa and Jabra (al-Sahaafa wa-Jabra)

	candidate	party	votes	percentage
1)	Bakraa Muhammad Khaliil	Socialist Arab *Bath* (Baᶜth)	44	0.2 %
2)	Jaᶜfar Hasan ᶜAbaas	Gathering of Democrats and Communists	49	0.3 %
3)	Hasan ᶜAbd Allaah al-Turaabii	National Islamic Front	10027	43.9 %
4)	Hasan ᶜAli Muhammad Shabuu	Democratic Unionist	12372	54.0 %
5)	Sayyid 'Ahmad Muhammad Khaliifa	National *Umma*	120	0.5 %
6)	Sulaymaan Dahab Hasiin	United National	251	1.1 %

Source: The Sudanese Government, *Election record: 1986* (Papers held in the parliament library at the parliament in Omdurman).

Map 6.1.(1): Al-Sahafa and Jabra



(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89)

In the late 1980s, the DUP was fearful of the NIF's challenge to win votes in urban areas. The DUP was planning to increase its popularity by using the peace process with the SPLA. On the other hand, the NIF was trying to obtain more popularity by using its commitment to Islamization. The DUP and the NIF were always fighting with each other to obtain more votes in urban areas. The *Umma* Party regarded the issues of peace-making and Islamization as a national issue and did not use them in the party's interests.[22]

On 15 May 1988, the NIF was brought into the coalition government[23] for the first time since the re-introduction of the new multi-party system in 1986. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and Deputy Prime Minister.[24]

On 16 November 1988, the DUP leader made a peace agreement with the leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa. The *Umma* Party basically supported the accord, because the contents were almost the same as the 1986 Koka Dam Declaration,[25] which was made by the *Umma* Party's initiative.[26] The *Umma* Party asked the DUP not to bring the 1988 accord into the parliament until the *Umma* Party made a deal with the NIF.[27] However, the DUP did not wait and brought it into the parliament.[28]

On 21 December 1988, the Parliament effectively rejected the peace accord of 16 November.[29] The *Umma* Party and the NIF voted against the DUP's motion.[30] The *Umma* Party did not oppose the contents of the 1988 accord, but opposed the "timing" and the "way" in which the DUP was handling the issue.[31] This was the reason for the *Umma* Party's opposition against the DUP's motion.[32]

In the same month (December 1988), the coalition government (the *Umma* Party, the DUP, and the NIF) decided to increase the price of sugar. On 28 December, the declaration of the price rise caused a massive demonstration.[33] The DUP thought that the demonstration might trigger the collapse of the government, and decided to withdraw itself from the government before the actual collapse, hoping that the DUP would come to power after the collapse.[34] During that day (28 December), the DUP withdrew from the government.[35] On the other hand, the *Umma* Party remained in the government and tried to calm down the

situation by organizing a conference on the price of sugar.[36] As a result, the government survived, but the DUP was out of the government because of its speculation. The DUP now wanted to rejoin the government.

On 4 January 1989, the *Umma* Party, the DUP, and the NIF held a meeting.[37] The three parties reached an agreement on the issues of peace making and Islamization.[38] Meanwhile, the DUP was concerned with the frustration of the army officers. The DUP related officers hated the NIF and wanted the NIF to be excluded from the government,[39] particularly, General Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil (ᶜAbd al-Majiid Haamid Khaliil), the former Minister of Defence.[40]

When several towns in the South fell into the hands of the SPLA, Sadiq al-Mahdi criticized the army as saying that there were six mistakes in the army's strategy.[41] The generals accepted his criticism.[42]

On 1 February 1989, a new coalition government was formed. The cabinet comprised 10 ministers from the *Umma* Party, 8 from the NIF, and 5 from other political groupings.[43] Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister.[44]

On 20 February 1989, the top army officers gave an ultimatum to the government. The ultimatum, dated 20 February, was signed by 150 officers.[45] It gave the regime 7 days to accept the DUP-SPLA peace accord and to form a broad-based government.[46] The ultimatum stemmed from the common interest between the discontented elements in the army and the DUP.[47]

On 25 March 1989, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi appointed a new cabinet excluding the NIF members.[48] The cabinet comprised 8 ministers from the *Umma* Party, 6 from the DUP, 1 from the Communist Party, 2 from the trade unions, 1 independent, and 5 from other political groupings.[49] In April 1989, the freezing of Islamic law was decided by the new government.[50]

The power struggle between 1988 and 1989 was ended by a military coup. On 30 June 1989, Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir successfully carried out a coup and came to power. Brigadier al-Bashir announced the dissolution of all political parties.[51] Dr al-Turabi was arrested together with the other political leaders during the coup.[52] However, there is strong speculation that his arrest was a

sham in order not to upset other politicians. Hassan Makki meaningfully told the researcher that Dr al-Turabi chose to go to prison for 6 months instead of appearing on TV.[53] Yassin al-Imam said that: 'Dr al-Turabi did what he could, and then he trusted God. If you trust God, after you did what you could, then God will complete things for you.'[54]

6.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT

6.2.1 DR AL-TURABI'S MAIN GOAL

The researcher summarized his assumption about Dr al-Turabi's main goal during the period of 1985-89 and then showed the assumption to Dr al-Turabi himself (14 January 1995). He asked him to correct it, if necessary.

1985-1989
Main goal :
To obtain power
correction: To take over the whole society

Dr al-Turabi corrected the main goal of the period 1985-1989 as "to take over the whole society". He preferred the phrase an "Islamic society" rather than an "Islamic state".[55]

6.2.2 THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS[56]

Dr al-Turabi did not change the name of the Islamist movement from the Islamic Charter Front (or Muslim Brotherhood) to the NIF, but formed a new organization to expand the Islamist movement in the whole of Sudan. The *Umma* Party had supporters mainly in Western Sudan and Northern Sudan and other parties (except for the Southerners) had their supporters mainly in Eastern and Northern Sudan. The Southerners obtained their supports mainly in Southern Sudan.[57] Dr al-Turabi did not want the Islamist movement to be merely a regional

movement, therefore he put "national"[58] - aiming at the whole Sudan. The issue of naming was discussed among the Islamists and Dr al-Turabi's idea was accepted, because the Sudanese Islamists were looking for a name which represented the whole Sudanese nation.

During the period between 1964 and 1985, the name "Muslim Brotherhood" never appeared, there was only the name "Islamic Charter Front (ICF)". After Nimairi fell, the Islamists never used the name "ICF" nor "Muslim Brotherhood". They used the name "Islamic trend ('Ittijaah 'Islaamii)" for a few weeks until the NIF was formed. The name "Muslim Brotherhood" was not officially abolished, but the Islamists did not use it any more. When Dr al-Turabi resigned as the secretary general of the main body in 1966, the Sudanese "Muslim Brotherhood" came to an end, and it remained only in history. It disappeared completely.[59]

With regard to the reason for his defeat in the 1986 elections in Al-Sahafa and Jabra, Dr al-Turabi believed that it was the result of the united action of all the other parties which were against him. Their antagonism stemmed from the achievement of the Islamist movement during the Nimairi period.

6.2.3 POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89)[60]

Around February 1989, senior army officers demanded that the government should supply the army not only with more food and ammunition, but also with more information on the enemy. Sadiq al-Mahdi did not meet the demand of the officers. The officers were frustrated and the soldiers were getting tired.

In those days, many of the high-ranking officers were either came from DUP related families or associated with the DUP. Some of the senior officers, who were close to the DUP, started to advocate their support for the demands of John Garang (i.e. those put forwards in the 1988 peace accord), the leader of the SPLA. The DUP wanted reconciliation with the SPLA, however, the NIF was advocating thoroughgoing fighting against the SPLA. The NIF was an obstacle to the plans of the DUP.

In addition to this, there was another problem for the DUP. In general, the DUP's support came mainly from urban areas and the *Umma* Party's support from rural areas. The DUP was losing its votes in the cities, because the supporters of the DUP were shifting to the NIF. Because of this, the DUP wanted to undermine the NIF.

The DUP wanted to exclude the NIF from the government. They had secretly contacted Sadiq al-Mahdi and were putting pressure on him. With this background, on 20 February 1989 the top army officers gave an ultimatum to the government. Someone from the Mahdi family secretly told Dr al-Turabi that some senior officers had threatened Sadiq and had advised him to exclude the NIF from the government.

Sadiq did not know what to do, but he wanted to remain Prime Minister. This was the only thing clear to Sadiq. Consequently, Sadiq excluded the NIF from the government.

In March 1989, when the NIF was excluded from the government, the government was seeking to cooperate with the communists and abandon the NIF.[61] At that time, there was also pressure from the West on the Prime Minister. By 1989 the implementation of the Islamic laws was already frozen, but in April 1989 there was a move to repeal the Islamic laws themselves. In that time, the NIF carried out many demonstrations on the streets. The plan to include communists in the new government was a good target for the attacks against the government.[62] The newspapers, which were influenced by the NIF, had a strong effect in mobilizing the masses.[63]

During the period between 1985 and 1989, the NIF positively and openly supported the armed forces. The NIF collected contributions for the army. The Islamists visited the troops in the South to entertain the soldiers (i.e. by light entertainment).[64] Osman Khalid (ᶜUthmaan Khaalid) was responsible for these activities in the NIF.

Except for the high-ranking leading officers who were close to the DUP, the bulk of the core officers were very close to the NIF, because Islam was becoming a trend in the army.[65] Throughout Sudanese history, the elites in the government and the armed forces were influenced by particular trends: initially a "nationalist" trend, then a "socialist" trend, and finally an "Islamic" trend. In the 1980s, the elites had grown up with an Islamic trend.[66] Therefore, Dr al-Turabi was confident that even if a coup happened, there would be no

real danger to the NIF, and that after some time, the NIF would appear again.

Dr al-Turabi knew that a coup, in favour of the Islamists, was going to happen, but at the same time, he was also expecting a counter-coup. He denied prior knowledge of the name of the coup leader, but did not deny a close relationship to part of the army.

6.3 ANALYSES

6.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-85)

Table 6.3.(1) lists Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his life story up to 1985. Table 6.3.(2) lists possible adjectives associated with those characters.

Table 6.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-85)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1985	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the pragmatist (a), the expansionist (a), the persuader (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c), the cooperator (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 6.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-85)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1985	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a), influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1985-89)

Dr al-Turabi's account of the period between 1985 and 1989 again provides further evidence of agentic personality. It also throws up two new agentic characters, "the analyst" and "the politician". The main character representing the image of his account of the 1985-89 period is "the competitor", which is an agentic character indicating adjectives such as competitive, offensive, clever, and shrewd. This character relates to other characters, in particular that of "the winner" in the way in which the goal of "the competitor" is "the winner". Dr al-Turabi and the Islamist movement were struggling to win the competition for power.

His account of the formation of the NIF suggests an agentic element of his personality, i.e. an expansionist aspect. This is apparent in his account of the reason for his putting "national" in the name of the new organization. He said that he wanted to expand the Islamist movement in the whole Sudan and did not want the movement

to be merely a regional movement, and for this reason he put "national" aiming at the whole Sudan.

Further evidence of his agentic personality can be seen in his attitude and the contents of his account about his failure in the 1986 elections. As a matter of fact, Dr al-Turabi initially did not mention his failure in the researcher's interview. His account on this was, therefore, in response to a specific enquiry from the researcher. Moreover, his account of his failure in the 1986 elections sounds like an excuse. This appears to be a reaction to his agentic personality which prefers to show high performance and success, and to be "the winner" and "the hero". For Dr al-Turabi, defeat or failure seemed to be an extremely difficult concept to accept.

A new character of Dr al-Turabi, "the analyst" (an agentic character: see Diagram 1.2.(3)), is thrown up from the account of his analytic explanation of a trend among the elites in the government and the army. Dr al-Turabi firmly believed that the current elites grew up with an Islamic trend, and he has repeatedly expressed his view on many occasions.

Another new character thrown up from Dr al-Turabi's account of the 1989 coup is, that of "the politician". This character indicates some agentic aspects of his personality, such as careful, clever, and shrewd aspects which relate to other characters like "the man behind the scenes" and "the good planner". In the researcher's interview, Dr al-Turabi sought to avoid sensitive points. Although he denied the prior knowledge of the coup leader, he did not deny a close relationship to part of the army. His attitude and the contents of his account clearly indicate the character of "the politician".

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1985-89)

Table 6.3.(3) summarizes new elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality which have emerged from the 1985 to 1989 period.

Table 6.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1985-89)

Period	Characters	Possible adjectives
1985 - 1989	the analyst (a)	analytic (a), clever (a)
	the politician (a)	clever (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), ambitious (a)

6.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements (described by adjectives such as competitive, offensive, clever and shrewd) stemming from the character of "the competitor" (representing the image of his account of the period) seem to have affected the underlying nature of the key developments in the period. The 1986 general elections and the power struggle (1988-89) can be seen in the context of a struggle by Dr al-Turabi and the Islamist movement to win the competition for power.

(1) THE FORMATION OF THE NIF AND THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality seeking for "expansion" and "control" and his objective to take over the whole society, seem to have affected the formation of the National Islamic Front. Among his personality elements, "cleverness" and "carefulness" stemming from his characters of "the competitor" and "the good planner" are also apparent in the formation of the NIF.

In short, the NIF was a result of Dr al-Turabi's careful planning in order to succeed in the 1986 general elections, which would become the first big test for the movement in the new situation. In this

respect, the Islamists had to eliminate the movement's "negative image" associated with the Nimairi regime. The Islamists, therefore, tried to refresh its image by adopting a "new" name.

Despite the highly isolated situation of the Islamists before the collapse of the Nimairi regime, the NIF fought relatively well in the 1986 elections. Consequently, the NIF won 51 seats and became the third biggest party in Sudan after the *Umma* party and the DUP. This relative success seems to be attributable to the Islamists' wise strategy, i.e. the formation of the NIF.

(2) POWER STRUGGLE (1988-89)

It seems that Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality (seeking for "power" and "control") was again behind the movement's participation in the power struggle between 1988 and 1989. Among his main characters, "the competitor", "the winner" and "the man behind the scenes" seem to have played important roles in the struggle, especially in the final phase of it.

Since the National Reconciliation, the NIF had been consistently supportive towards the army. This seems to have stemmed from Dr al-Turabi's personality which tends to plan carefully for the future. Dr al-Turabi appeared not to repeat his past unpleasant experiences of the 1969 coup. The NIF's attitude and the educational influence on the students, who later joined the army, created a pro-NIF group among the officers.

When the NIF was excluded from the government in March 1989 and the whole Islamic laws were about to be frozen, the Islamist officers appear to have decided to finish the political instability and chaos by seizing power. The Islamic laws were the most important achievements for the Islamists during the Nimairi period and they were even the "symbol" of their victory. Losing "Islamic law" meant that the Islamists had to become "the loser". Dr al-Turabi's strong character of "the winner" could not allow such a thing. Despite a high risk, the Islamists had to exercise "*tawakkul* (tawakkul: trust in God)"[67] in carrying out a coup.

It seems to the researcher that the original plan and initiation of the coup came from Dr al-Turabi, however, he left detailed points of the plan and the timing of the action to his supporters - this was his leadership style.[68] Therefore, as Dr al-Turabi said, he knew a coup was occurring, but he did not know who was going to carry it out. As a whole, Dr al-Turabi appeared to play the role of "the man behind the scenes". Because the coup resulted in the establishment of an Islamic state, the power struggle ended in the victory of the Islamists.

CHAPTER 7:
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE: CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS (1989 - 1995)

CHAPTER 7: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE: CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS

It is widely believed that Dr al-Turabi has been the real power behind the Sudanese government since 1989. The researcher agrees with this view and regards Sudan as a "state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi". The reasons for this will be discussed in Section 7.1.

The Islamist movement after 1989, thus, includes both Sudanese governmental activities and those of some institutions and organizations in the country. The activities of the Islamist movement after 1989 are covered in two parts - one concerned with domestic matters and one concerned with foreign matters. The domestic matters are dealt with in this chapter (Chapter 7) and the foreign matters are discussed in Chapter 8.

Compared to the previous chapters, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 will contain a larger amount of general description and a rather smaller element covering Dr al-Turabi's account. The reason for the extensive "general description" stems from the researcher's perception that the activities of the Islamic state (or society) after 1989 are important both as an outcome of the thinking and perceptions of the Islamist movement, and as a reflection of the real character of that movement. The establishment of an Islamic state (or society) had, after all, been the main goal for the Islamists and the activities after 1989 have been the results of what the Islamists have wanted to realize. The reason for the lesser emphasis on Dr al-Turabi's account derives from the researcher's perception that the central aspects of Dr al-Turabi's personality have become clear through the previous chapters.

Chapter 7 has four sections. The first section, Section 7.1, gives the reasons why the researcher regards Sudan as a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

Section 7.2 gives the general description of the key developments that have taken place in the Islamist movement since the 1989 coup. The researcher, however, has limited the discussion to the period going up to May 1995, at the latest. Section 7.2 covers Sudan's

domestic policy, and specifically the government's programmes and activities with regard to the political system, Islamic law, Islamic economy, education, and defence.

Section 7.3 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of those items discussed in the previous section, but it does not necessarily cover every aspect of them.

The final section, Section 7.4, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

7.1 THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE

The researcher regards Sudan as a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi. The researcher believes that the activities of the al-Bashir government since 1989 have proven this point. The evidence for Dr al-Turabi's leading role in Sudanese politics can be found in a number of the key activities of the government, such as the introduction of the 1991 Islamic penal code, the Islamization of the Sudanese economy, and Sudanese foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis and the Second Gulf War.

In addition to this, President al-Bashir's recognition of Dr al-Turabi's leading role in Sudanese politics and society supports the researcher's view. In an interview with the researcher on 4 February 1995, President al-Bashir clearly showed his recognition of this role:

> 'In the Islamic movement, Dr al-Turabi's unique leadership has created a new model, combining both tradition and contemporary life. His influence has had a great effect upon current political events and the political history in Sudan, so that he is not only leading Islamic society, but also Islamic "history". He has managed to go one step further than many other movements which tend to focus on historical roots rather than contemporary life. His way of thinking has affected many parts of society, even reaching some of those parties which were previously antagonistic towards the Islamist movement. As a result of his efforts, the process of making an Islamic state has been greatly facilitated.'[1]

7.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-95)

7.2.1 CHRONOLOGY

1989/ 6/30:Brigadier Al-Bashir successfully carried out a coup (the Salvation Revolution)[2] and came to power. All political parties were banned. Al-Turabi was arrested.
1989/10/**:The Popular Defence Force (PDF) became an official institution by the promulgation of the Popular Defence Act.
1989/10-11:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1989/11/**:Details of the Popular Defence Act were released by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
1989/11/30:Al-Turabi was freed from Kober prison and placed under house arrest.
1990/ 3/ 7:Al-Turabi was freed from house arrest.
1990/ 3/**:An attempted coup was reported (announced by the regime).
1990/ 9/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1990/10/**:A new political system of "direct non-party democracy" was approved by the conference for National Dialogue on the Political System.
1990/11/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1990/12/31:Al-Bashir declared that the *sharia* (Islamic law) will be fully and immediately implemented as of the 1st January 1991.
1991/**/**:A "conservative" group (calling itself the Muslim Brotherhood) split from the Islamist movement.
1991/ 3/**:Nine federal states were established by the fourth constitutional decree.
1991/ 3/22:The new Islamic penal code was introduced.
1991/ 4/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1991/ 8/**:An attempted coup was reported (announced by the regime).
1992/**/**:Economic liberalization measures were introduced.
1992/ 3/**:The curfew in Khartoum, which was introduced after the 1989 coup, was shortened by one hour.
1992/ 4/**:An attempted coup led by pro-Nimairi officers was reported (announced by the regime).
1992/ 7/**:An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed).
1993/ 8/**:The IMF suspended its financial support for Sudan.
1993/10/16:The Revolutionary Command Council issued a decree abolishing itself.
1993/10/17:Al-Bashir became formally the president.
1993/10/31:The curfew in Khartoum imposed since the 1989 coup was lifted by President al-Bashir.
1994/ 2/**:The nine federal states were re-divided into twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree.
1994/ 2/ 4:A new advance against the SPLA in the South was reported.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and
Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

7.2.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE BORDERS

The researcher considers the government's policies as regards the political system, law (legal developments), economy, education, and defence as the most significant elements of domestic policy for the purpose of this thesis. All of these are basically designed to Islamize the Sudanese society. The realization of these policies by the Islamist government, therefore, contributes to the consolidation of the Islamist movement within the borders.

The Sudanese government published *The National Charter for the [sic] Political Action* on 7 April 1991. The charter had 70 articles and outlined Sudan's domestic and foreign policies based on Islamism. The researcher quotes some articles later from the charter - but since some English expressions in the charter are grammatically incorrect and are sometimes difficult to understand, he has tried to improve those expressions by adding "[sic: correction or the researcher's interpretation]" to those quotations.

(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The National Charter advocates a new political system. It is an Islamist model of non-party democracy with Islamism.[3] This Islamist model emphasizes an Islamic ideology, "real" popular participation, and consensus in the political system. These elements are going to be brought about through "popular congresses" and a "federal system."

Statements concerning the political system appear in Articles of *The National Charter*, such as Articles 1, 2, 3, 17, and 20. Article 1 indicates the need for a new political system by criticizing both the

socialist model (one-party democracy with socialism) and the capitalist model (multi-party democracy with capitalism). The Islamists have said that in Sudan a multi-party system has failed mainly because of partisan politics, and that a one-party system has failed mainly because of one-man politics.[4] A non-party democracy with Islamism is, therefore, an "Islamic alternative."

An emphasis on Islamic ideology is apparent in Articles 2, 3, and 17. Article 17 states that 'Sudan's political set-up is being founded on the comprehensive political concept of its being a worship and pledge to God' - this probably means that Sudan's political set-up has been established, based on an Islamic faith. In Articles 2 and 3, two Islamic elements, *sharia* (Islamic law) and *shura* (an Islamic concept of consensus), are emphasized.

Another emphasis on popular participation is apparent in Articles 3, 18, and 20. In the new political system, popular congresses and a federal system are seen as two important institutions that can deliver real popular participation and consensus. The Islamists say that in the past there was little space for the people to take part in the decision-making process of the country, and that there lacked consensus.[5]

The following are some extracts from *The National Charter* concerning the political system.

> 1. The conditions experienced by the Sudan and the international and regional relations necessitate that a practical mode of action, in conformity with the principles and values of our people, should be sought; inspired by its history, struggle, characteristics, authenticity and aspirations for a promising future at a time which has witnessed the collapse of the Marxist and socialist system and the imminent disintegration of the liberal capitalist one.

2. The adoption of the Islamic *Sharia* and custom and the Federal System in our country [,] within the framework of comprehensive national unity [,] has been a boosting [sic: has given a boost] to our asset of nationalistic fruitful experience, [and has been] inaugurated and catered for by our faithful sons throughout the decades, revolutions, uprisings and nationalistic struggle.

3. And since the realization of the society of *Sharia* and Custom and the Federal System necessitates popular participation in the system of government based on *Shura* and justice, the masses had to be honestly consulted, ...

17. Sudan's political set-up is being founded on the comprehensive political concept of its being a worship and pledge to God [sic: Sudan's political set-up has been established, based on an Islamic faith]; ...

18. Authority is a trust and a responsibility [sic: is based on trust and the responsibility] of delegation practiced by the people through its different popular congresses ...

20. The popular participation emanates from our keenness to meet our responsibilities towards our Sudanese society through the establishment of a political system that guarantees real popular participation, ...[6]

(a) Non-party democracy with Islamism:
Popular participation and consensus
based on popular congresses

This sub-section focuses on the Sudanese popular congresses through which "real" popular participation and consensus are going to be brought about.

Diagram 7.2.(1) shows the structure of the popular congresses of Sudan.[7] The structure includes legislative and administrative bodies. The judiciary is independent.

Diagram 7.2.(1): Structure of the congresses



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Diagram 7.2.(1): *continued*



S. = Secretariat
(se) = selected (e) = elected
{c} = consultative body {1} = legislative body
{a} = administrative body

Sources: The Sudanese Government, *Sudan's Political System: The Basic Rule [sic: Rules] for the Popular Congress [sic: Congresses]* (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat, n.d.), p. 20; *Sudanow*, June 1991, pp. 7-8; and January 1996, pp. 14-33.

Explanation of the system

The system presented in Diagram 7.2.(1) will be explained in the next part, based on the publications of *Sudan's Political System* and *Sudanow* (June 1991 and January 1996).[8]

(i) Basic Congresses

The Basic Congresses are particularly important in the new political system, because they are seen as a means of ensuring popular participation in the process of decision-making, and contribute to creating popular consensus over important issues.

Under the new system, the whole population is divided into the Basic Congresses, which are consultative and legislative bodies. In this way, all of the population are given an opportunity to express their opinions on important issues and to take part in the process of decision-making.

Each Basic Congress has its Secretariat and its Popular Committee. The members of the Popular Committee are elected by the members of the Basic Congress, and are from among those members. The Popular Committees[9] are administrative bodies.

(ii) Council Congresses

A Council Congress consists of some members of the Basic Congresses (including all the members of the Popular Committees at that level) and 10% complementary members (presumably representatives of various sectors of society). The members of the Basic Congresses (except for the members of the Popular Committees) who go on to the Council Congress are selected by the Basic Congresses (the means of selection is not clear). The 10% complementary members are selected by the governor (Wali (Waalii)) of the state concerned.

Every Council Congress has its Secretariat and its Local Council. The members of the Local Council are elected by the members of the Council Congress. The Council Congresses are consultative and legislative bodies. The Local Councils are administrative bodies.

(iii) Province Congresses

A Province Congress consists of some members of the Council Congresses (including all the members of the Local Councils at that level) and 10% complementary members. The members of the Council Congresses (except for the members of the Local Councils) who go on to the Province Congress are selected by the Council Congresses (the means of selection is not clear). The 10% complementary members are selected by the governor of the state concerned.

Every Province Congress has its Secretariat and its Province Council. The members of the Province Council are elected by the members of the Province Congress. The Province Congresses are consultative and legislative bodies. The Province Councils are administrative bodies.

(iv) State Congresses

A State Congress consists of some members of the Province Congresses (including all the members of the Province Councils), 10% complementary members, and the representatives of the Sectorial Conferences at state level which include Women's, Youths and Students, Social and Cultural, and Economic Conferences. The 10% complementary members are nominated by the governor of the state concerned and are confirmed by the President.

Every State Congress has its Secretariat and its State Assembly. The State Assembly consists of members who are elected by the members of the State Congress and who are elected in the Geographical Constituencies. The State Congresses are consultative bodies. The State Assemblies are legislative bodies. The State Governments are administrative bodies.

The President nominates three candidates for the post of Governor (Wali) of each State. One of them is elected as Governor by the members of each State Assembly. The President also appoints State Ministers for each State Government after consultations with each Governor concerned.

(v) National Congresses

The National Congress consists of some members of the State Congresses (including all the members of the State Assemblies), 10% of complementary members, and the representatives of the National Sectorial Conferences which include Women, Youths and Students, Social and Cultural, Economic, Defence and Security, Diplomatic, Administrative, and Legal Conferences. The 10% complementary members are selected by the President.

The National Congress has its Secretariat and the National Assembly (parliament). The National Congress is a consultative body. The National Assembly is a legislative body. The Federal Government (Council of Ministers) is an administrative body. The President appoints the member of the Federal Government.

The National Assembly consists of 400 members. Among 400, 125 are elected by and from the members of the National Congress (5000 members), and 275 are elected in the 275 Geographical Constituencies.

(vi) The President

The President is elected by Direct Election and his tenure is five years. He is the supreme governor of the country and the supreme commander of the Armed forces and security services. He has the power to appoint, such as a first Vice-President, a second Vice-President, the member of the Federal Government and the State Governments, and commanders of Armed forces and security services. Heading the Federal Government and supervising the performance of the Federal Ministers are examples of his responsibilities.

Sudan Focus, on 15 February 1995 reported the development of the congress system as follows:

> 'President al-Bashir's first democratic elections at a national level are scheduled to begin this March to culminate next year [1996] in the election of a president. Sudan is adopting a presidential system but without a Western style multi-party basis. ... The process to elect state parlia-

ments is already underway at the grass roots level and will move upwards to elect the National Assembly.'[10]

As this new system is in the process of implementation and has not been sufficiently tested, it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness.

(b) Non-party democracy with Islamism: Popular participation and consensus based on a federal system

The significance of a federal system also lies in the concepts of popular participation and consensus. Under the federal system, the country has been divided into many administrative units. In March 1991, nine federal states were established by the fourth constitutional decree.[11] In February 1994, the nine federal states were redivided into twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree.[12] The 26 states now contain more than 70 provinces.[13] The creation of smaller units stems from the perception that smaller units would promote popular participation in politics and decision-making, providing motivation for state building and bringing about development.[14]

Government officials also explained the reasons for the redivision by contending that a smaller unit would be easier to manage.[15] It would therefore be more effective in developing its human and economic potential, and bringing about political, social and economic gains.[16] Moreover, these small administrative areas would help to enhance security, to improve education, health, tax collection, and agricultural out-put, and to help solve the problems of ethnic and cultural diversity.[17] Although the redivision would cost the government about 5 billion Sudanese pounds, the cost was considered as an investment.[18]

Table 7.2.(1) shows the regions and states in Sudan, and Map 7.2 (1) shows the location of these states.

Table 7.2.(1): Regions and states

regions	states
1. Northern	Northern, Nile River
2. Eastern	Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref.
3. Khartoum	Khartoum.
4. Central	Gezira, Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile.
5. Darfur	Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur, Western Darfur.
6. Kordofan	Northern Kordofan, Southern Kordofan, Western Kordofan.
7. Upper Nile	Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity.
8. Bahr al-Ghazal	Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Warab, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes.
9. Equatoria	Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Mountain Sea.

states	capitals
1. Northern (Al-Shamaaliiya)	/ Dongola (Dunqulaa)
2. River Nile (Nahr al-Nayl)	/ Al-Damer (al-Daamar)
3. Read Sea (Al-Bahr al-'Ahmar)	/ Port Sudan (Buurt Suudaan)
4. Kassala (Kasalaa)	/ Kassala (Kasalaa)
5. Gedaref (Al-Qadaarif)	/ Al-Gedaref (al-Qadaarif)
6. Khartoum (Al-Khartuum)	/ Khartoum (al-Khartuum)
7. Gezira (Al-Jaziira)	/ Wad Medani (Wad Madanii)
8. Sennar (Sinaar)	/ Singa (Sinja)
9. White Nile (Al-Nahr al-'Abyad)	/ Rabak (Rabak)
10. Blue Nile (Al-Nahr al-'Azraq)	/ Damazine (al-Damaaziin)
11. Northern Darfur (Shamaal Daarfuul)	/ Al-Fasher (al-Faashir)
12. Southern Darfur (Januub Daarfuur)	/ Nyala (Niyaalaa)
13. Western Darfur (Gharb Daarfuul)	/ Geneina (al-Janiina)
14. Northern Kordofan (Shamaal Kurdfaan)	/ Al-Obeid (al-'Ubayyd)
15. Southern Kordofan (Januub Kurdfaan)	/ Kadugli (Kaaduqlii)
16. Western Kordofan (Gharb Kurdfaan)	/ Al-Fula (al-Fuula)
17. Upper Nile ('Aᶜaalaa al-Nayl)	/ Malakal (Malakaal)
18. Jonglei (Juunqlii)	/ Bor (Buur)
19. Unity (Al-Wahda)	/ Bentiu (Baantiyuu)
20. Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Shamaal Bahr al-Ghazaal)	/ Aweil ('Awiil)
21. Western Bahr al-Ghazal (Gharb Bahr al-Ghazaal)	/ Wau (Waaw)
22. Warab (Waaraab)	/ Warab (Waaraab)
23. Lakes (Al-Buhayraat)	/ Rumbek (Rumbiik)

24. Eastern Equatoria (Sharq al-'Istiwaa'iiya) / Kapoeta (Kabuuytaa)
25. Western Equatoria (Gharb al-'Istiwaa'iiya) / Yambio (Yaambiyuu)
26. Mountain Sea (Bahr al-Jabal) / Juba (Juubaa)

Sources: *Sudanow*, March 1994, pp. 8-11.
Daliil al-Hukum(?) al-'Ittihaadii (The Guide of the Federal Government), February 1994.

Map 7.2.(1): Sudanese states



(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

The Islamization of the legal system is also an important element to Islamize society or create an Islamic state. *The National Charter* clearly advocates that the *sharia* (shariiᶜa: Islamic law) and custom[19] should be the sources of legislation (Article 17). It appears that "custom" was put in the charter as a result of consideration toward non-Muslims in Sudan.[20] However, the *sharia* is regarded as the main component to realize comprehensive justice (Article 25).

The *sharia* includes various kinds of law, such as family law, contract law, and criminal law. However, Islamic criminal law tends to represent the "image" of the *sharia* and it has drawn considerable attention. It is therefore of greatest significance when covering the government's Islamizing policies. For this reason, this section focuses on Islamic criminal law.

After the collapse of the Nimairi government in April 1985, the application of the punishments of the Islamic penal code which had been introduced in 1983 was suspended.[21] On 22 March 1991, a new Islamic penal code was introduced under the al-Bashir government. It applied to all (Muslims and non-Muslims) who lived in the North, and was not applied to the South. Niblock has pointed out that: 'It was almost identical to a draft code which had been drawn up by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi in 1988, while he was serving as attorney-general in the coalition government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi.'[22]

Among the penal codes, three of the most controversial elements - those applying to apostasy, blasphemy, and theft - will be examined in the following part.

(a) Apostasy

In the new penal code of 1991, Article 126 in Part XIII (Offences relating to religions, insulting religious creed) covers the penalty of apostasy. Article 126 runs as follows:

1) There shall be deemed to commit the offence of apostasy, every Muslim who propagates for the renunciation of the

creed of Islam or publicly declares his renouncement there of by an express statement or conclusive act.

2) Whoever commits apostasy, shall be given a chance to repent during a period to be determined by the court, where he insists upon apostasy, and not being a recent convert to Islam, shall be punished with death.

3) The penalty provided for apostasy shall be remitted whenever the apostate recants apostasy before execution.[23]

Despite the inclusion of apostasy in the code, no charges of apostasy have been brought since the introduction of the new penal code in 1991.[24] The Islamist government seems to have been very careful in applying the charge of apostasy (see Dr al-Turabi's personal view "against" apostasy in his account in Section 7.3).

(b) Blasphemy

In the new Islamic penal code, Article 125 in Part XIII covers the penalty of blasphemy:

'Whoever by any means publicly abuses or insults any of the religious, their rights or beliefs or sanctifications or seeks to excite feeling of contempt and disrespect against the believers thereof shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or with fine or with whipping which may not exceed forty lashes.'[25]

The attitude of the Sudanese government towards blasphemy has become clear in the case of Salman Rushdie. Rushdie was sentenced to death on the charge of "blasphemy" by Ayatollah Khomeini because of his notorious novel, *The Satanic Verses*.[26]

The Iranian government maintains that Rushdie should be killed wherever he is. The Sudanese government asserts that, first, the punishment for blasphemy is imprisonment, a fine, or whipping; second, Sudanese Islamic law can not be applied beyond the borders except for some special offences (also see Dr al-Turabi's account about the case of Rushdie in Section 7.3).

Article 6, under the heading of "Offences Committed Outside the Sudan", says:

> 1) The provisions of this act shall apply to every person who commits:-
> a. outside the Sudan an act which makes him a principal or joint offender in any of the following offences:
> i) offences against the state;
> ii) offences relating to the regular forces;
> iii) offences relating to counterfeiting coin or revenue stamps where the offender is found in the Sudan.
> b. ...
>
> 2) A person who has committed outside the Sudan any of the offences punishable in the Sudan, shall not be punished in the Sudan, where it is proved that such person has been tried outside the Sudan before a competent court and has served his sentence, or that he has been declared innocent by such court.[27]

Despite the exaggerated image of an "extreme and dangerous" Sudan, which has been portrayed in the Western media, reality presents a different picture. Compared to pro-Western Pakistan, whose blasphemy code allows the death sentence,[28] Sudan is much more moderate. Compared to Iran, whose spiritual leader can sentence anyone to death wherever the person lives, Sudan adheres to the written law.

(c) Theft

Article 170 in Part XVII (Offences against property) covers the definition of capital theft as follows:

> 1) There shall be deemed to commit the offence of capital theft whoever [sic: has] covertly taken, with the intention of appropriation, any movable property belonging to another, provided that the property shall be taken out of its *hirz* [hirz: see 4] and be of a value not less than the (*nisab* [nisaab: minimum amount]).
>
> 2) Covertness includes covertly violating the *hirz* and the seizure of property openly or forcibly.

3) Property belonging to another includes public property and property of *waqfs* [waqf: endowment] and places of worship.

4) *Hirz* means the place where property is kept or the manner in which the particular property or the similar types thereof are normally kept or that of the custom of the people of the country or the particular profession; and property shall be deemed to be in *hirz* whenever it is guarded.

5) The *nisab* shall be a *dinar* [diinaar: monetary unit] of gold weighing 4.25 grams or its value in money according to what the Chief Justice may determine from time to time, in consultation with the competent bodies.

6) Where a group of people participate in the taking, regard as to the (*nisab*), shall be add [sic: added] to the total of property taken and not to what each of them has individually taken.[29]

Article 171 then covers the penalties of capital theft, including amputation sentencing which has drawn considerable attention. The article runs as follows:

1) Whoever commits the offence of capital theft shall be punished with amputation of the right hand from the joint.

2) Where the offender is convicted for a second time, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than seven years.[30]

There is, however, an article which covers the remittance of the penalty of *had* [hadd: fixed punishment, e.g. amputation] in capital theft. Many criticisms against amputation sentences refer to the fact that the "offender had to steal something to survive". People argue that the harsh economic situation forces vulnerable people to commit crime to survive, and this is not the individuals' fault, but the government's responsibility. Article 172 runs as follows:

1) The penalty of *had* in capital theft shall be remitted in any of the following cases:
   a) where theft has taken place between ascendants and descendants or between spouses or relatives of the prohibited degree (*arham* ['arhaam: close relatives]);
   b) where the offender is in a case of necessity and does not take from that property more than what is sufficient to satisfy his need or the need of his dependents for the sake of food or treatment, and not exceeding the (*nisab*);
   c), d), ... h) ... [31]

According to section 1b, amputation penalty should be remitted if the offender's situation forced him to steal something to survive.

Despite the inclusion of the amputation sentence in the code, the Islamist government has clearly adopted a moderate policy in carrying out such sentences. To quote *News from Africa Watch* (April 1991): 'Fortunately, the severe *hudud* [huduud: plural of *had*] penalties (amputation) passed against convicted criminals since 1985 have been commuted to terms of imprisonment, so there is no "backlog" of prisoners awaiting these punishments.'[32] *The Economist* (June 1995) also reported that: 'In some respects the government's ways are milder than they used to be. Limbs are no longer cut off under *sharia* law; ...'[33]

(3) ECONOMY (ISLAMIC ECONOMY)

Islamizing the Sudanese economy is another important policy of the Islamist government. *The National Charter* outlines an Islamic economy in Articles 31, 32, 35, and 36. These articles are as follows:

> 31. Our economic system is being [sic] based on the foundation [sic: foundations] emanating from creed and religion; since economic endeavour is but a worship and that material benefit is a means for facilitating ways of life for the individual to perform the rites of God as requested, as mankind is combined of spiritual and material needs for humans in a way to make life more prosperous and less difficult.
>
> 32. Our economic system is based on the devotion to God the Almighty as being the Owner of the whole Universe; ...
>
> 35. We are committed to the economic freedom which avails the chance to competition and benefit without letting loose to that competition harmful to the interest of the society. And the government is obliged to combat monopoly and organize economy in a way to realize the lawful objectives without infringement on the individuals interests or causing harm to the legally obtained prosperity. The government shall encourage private ownership and provide all legal guarantees; it could not be confiscated or jeopardized except for the sake of public interest according to the provisions of *sharia* and together with equitable compensation.

> 36. The aspired economic system shall incorporate comprehensive reform of all economic institutions so as to cope with the required social change, replacement of the traditional modes with the Islamic ones, cancellation of usury, adoption of the principle of profit and loss sharing and focussing on the human perspective through the best utilization of manpower and channelling of resources for production, to boost the benefit of the individual and that of society.[34]

Articles 31 and 32 assert that Islamic religion is the foundation of the Sudanese economic system. Article 35 advocates "economic freedom based on competition" and "private ownership" with the condition that these are not harmful to the interests of society.[35] Article 36 then calls for the replacement of the traditional modes with "Islamic" ones - i.e. cancellation of "usury" and the adoption of the principle of "profit and loss sharing". These are the key elements of an Islamic banking system and practically represent an Islamic economic system. This section, therefore, focuses on the Islamization of the Sudanese banking system.

Before the 1989 coup, the Islamization of the banking system was unstable. It effectively involved two steps forwards and one step (maybe two steps) backwards. Many banks which applied Islamic modes of banking after September 1984 dropped the Islamic mode of operation when Nimairi was overthrown in April 1985.[36] With the new Islamist government, however, the Islamization process has been steadily moving forwards.[37] The Islamic central bank, the Bank of Sudan, has been taking an important role in the current Islamization process. To comprehend the process, it is useful to note the brief history of that process in Sudan.

The initial driving force of Islamization was taken by some private Islamic Banks, such as the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) which started its operations in May 1978.[38] It was not the Bank of Sudan, which was established in February 1960 as a Western-style central bank.

In August 1984, the FIBS organised a symposium on the issue of an Islamic banking system.[39] In the symposium, to which representatives of all the commercial banks in Sudan were invited, Dr al-Turabi[40] gave a lecture on the purposes of Islamization of the banking system (see Dr al-Turabi's account in Section 7.3).

After the introduction of the Civil Transactions Act in September 1984, the banking system was supposed to be fully Islamized, but it did not work properly. Ahmed points out that:

> 'In practice, the originally non-Islamic banks' managements did not apply Islamic modes properly because they were dissatisfied with them. These conventional banks applied *mudaraba*, *musharaka*, and *murabaha* only formally in their ledger books and in the reports submitted to the Bank of Sudan. Moreover, policymakers in the Central Bank were also discontented with the procedure of transforming the banking system. They considered it as a mere political decision imposed by the government without being preceded by adequate detailed studies.'[41]

In addition to this, with the collapse of the Nimairi government in April 1985, the full Islamization programme was neglected and 'many commercial banks dropped Islamic modes of operation.'[42]

After the 1989 coup, under the strong guidance of the Islamist government, the full Islamization programme was re-started. From 30 October to 21 November 1989, the National Conference for Economic Salvation (NCES) was held under the initiative of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which called upon the participants to discuss some important issues, such as food security, balanced development and the banking system.[43] The conference submitted recommendations and these were endorsed by the Council of Ministers and NRC on 26 November 1989.[44]

The Secretary General of the *Sharia* (Shariiᶜa) Supervisory Board (SSB) of the Bank of Sudan, Ahmad Ali Abdalla ('Ahmad ᶜAli ᶜAbd Allaah), is the key figure of the current Islamization process. In the researcher's interview in January 1995, Abdalla told the researcher that all the banks in Sudan were given a one-year preparatory period in 1990 to adjust their practice to a full Islamic

mode, and by the end of 1990 no bank was allowed to practise any interest-involved transaction inside Sudan.[45]

The *Sharia* Supervisory Board of the central bank was set up in March 1992[46] and is the main driving force of the Islamization programme. The central SSB controls all other banks through the sub-SSBs in those banks. At the time in January 1995, the central SSB listed the following names as its members:

1. Chairman : Al-Siddiq al-Darir (Al-Siddiiq al-Dariir)[47]
2. Sec. Gen.: Ahmad Ali Abdalla ('Ahmad ᶜAli ᶜAbd Allaah)[48]
3. Member : Sabir Muhammad Hassan (Saabir Muhammad Hasan)[49]
4. Member : Muhammad Hashim Awad (Muhammad Haashim ᶜAwad)[50]
5. Member : Ahmad Majzub Ahmad ('Ahmad Majzuub 'Ahmad)[51]
6. Member : Mustafa Zakariya (Mustafaa Zakariyaa)[52]
7. Member : Muhammad Birayma (Muhammad Birayma)[53]
8. Member : Siddiq Abd al-Hay (Siddiiq ᶜAbd al-Hay)[54]
9. Member : Shaikh al-Jazuli (Shaykh al-Jazuulii)[55]
10. Member : Ahmad Mahjub Hajj Nur ('Ahmad Mahjuub Haajj Nuur)[56]

In the researcher's interview with Dr al-Turabi on 14 January 1995, Dr al-Turabi showed considerable knowledge about each member of the SSB (see notes). To the researcher's knowledge, most of the SSB members had been committed to the Islamic cause and the Islamist movement for a long time. This suggests that Dr al-Turabi has had a strong influence on the banking system in Sudan.

Ahmad Ali Abdalla had known Dr al-Turabi personally since 1966 and admitted to the researcher that the "idea" of the Islamization of the Sudanese economy came from Dr al-Turabi.[57] Abdalla said that Dr al-Turabi was always very serious about how to turn the idea into reality, and his idea resulted in the establishment of the first Islamic bank (i.e. the FIBS) in Sudan.

After the good example of the FIBS, other Islamic banks followed and the experience of Islamic banking increased. These examples and experiences seemed to have contributed to the Islamization of the whole economy in Sudan.

(4) EDUCATION

The government's policy on education is also designed to Islamize the Sudanese society. Although articles in *The National Charter* concerning education only advocate the important roles of education in securing national unity (Article 52) and in social and economic development (Article 53), the researcher believes that "Islamizing society" is the core of the government's education policy. This is apparent in one of the government's policies, namely the "massive expansion" of higher education which has drawn considerable attention. This section focuses on this issue.

In the history of the Islamist movement, education has always been the core strategy of the movement and is still used as a vehicle for social change.[58] It can be said that without great efforts in education the Islamist movement would not have succeeded.

The Islamist movement originally started as a student circle in the GMC and it has now become the driving force of the state. The movement attracted the students both in the secondary schools and in the universities. Those who were influenced by the movement during their school period were later to play important roles in many part of society. At the same time, the Islamists used education to re-educate young officers in the military schools - a strategy which resulted in the expansion of their influence in the army.

As history witnessed, many current leaders who are guiding the society joined the movement as students, and this phenomenon is still continuing. The control over the student union, thus, has always been an important issue.

The policy of massive expansion stemmed from the National Salvation Revolution's declaration on educational reform in higher education in December 1989.[59] Lt.Gen. al-Bashir announced a number of decisions on that occasion. These decisions, as reported by *Sudanow*, were the following:

'1. The doubling of admission numbers to higher educational institutions, as from the next academic year (1990/91).
2. The affiliation of all higher educational institutions.
3. All higher education institutes and colleges are to be put under the appropriate university to allow these universities to offer diplomas and other lower degrees, other than the bachelor degree.
4. The establishment of a Sudanese university for science and technology as of the next academic year, from the nucleus of the present polytechnic institute.
5. The establishment of new universities and giving the new regional ones assistance.
6. The universities and other higher institutes shall work out a plan to increase their financial resources and to be able to cope with the planned extension of higher education.
7. The revision of the admission systems to higher education.
8. The completion during the current academic year of the preparatory studies on the adoption of the Arabic language as the medium of instruction.
9. The amending of the current laws of the universities and other higher education institutes relating to the implementation of these decisions.'[60]

Within half a decade, the number of universities has increased dramatically. From 1990 to 1995, 25 universities were established around the country. New student enrollment increased from 5,000 in 1989 to 30,000 in 1993.[61] Table 7.2.(2) lists the Sudanese universities in existence in May 1995.

Table 7.2.(2): Universities in Sudan (May 1995)

name (town)	establishment
Cairo University, Khartoum branch (Khartoum)	1955 (-1993)
Khartoum University {from GMC}(Khartoum)	1956
Omdurman Islamic University (Omdurman)	1963
Ahfad University for Women (Omdurman)	1966
Juba University (Juba){moved to Khartoum in 1989}	1975
Gezira University (Wad Madani)	1978
	——1990—
Bahr al-Ghazal University (Wau)	1990
Eastern University (*)	1990
Umdom University (*)	1990
First of September University (Darfur)	1990
Kordofan University (El-Obeid)	1990
Northern University (*)	1990
Koran University (Omdurman)	1990
Sudanese University for Science and Technology {from Khartoum Polytechnic Institute}(Khartoum)	probably 1990
Upper Nile University (Malakal)	1990
	——1991—
Sudan Open University {by media}	probably 1991
Kassala University (Kassala)	1991
International African University, {from African Islamic Centre} (Khartoum)	1991
Malakal University (Upper Nile)	probably 1991
Wau University (Bahr al-Ghazal)	probably 1991
Zalingay University (Zalingay)	1991
Al-Fashir University (Al-Fashir)	1991
Al-Imam Al-Mahdi University (Kosti)	1992
Al-Azhari University (Omdurman)	1993
Nilein University {from Cairo Univ.}(Khartoum)	1993
	——1995—
Dalang University (Dalang)	1995
Dongola University (Dongola)	1995
Niyala University (Niyalā)	1995
Nile Valley University {from Atbara Mechanical College}(Atbara)	1995
Red Sea University (Port Sudan)	1995
Sennar University (Sennar)	1995

(*) = The town is unknown to the researcher

Sources: Personal contact with Dr Bashir al-Shaikh (Bashiir al-Shaykh), Principal of the University of Khartoum, in May 1995.
Sudanow, June 1990, p. 15; March 1992, p. 40; and March 1993, p. 19.

There exist some confusion and problems in this massive expansion. Some have pointed out that because of insufficient staffing and poor

facilities there has been a drop in the quality and standards of education.[62] This raises the question as to why the government is carrying out this policy with virtually no resources. The answer to this can be found in an interpretation that the main purpose (or perhaps hidden aim) of the policy is to create government supporters, massively and quickly. The regime is inculcating the young elite with its Islamist values through universities. The government's main concern seems to have been the acceleration of the Islamization of society, and not the quality and standards of education.

(5) DEFENCE

The government's policy on defence is another important element in Islamizing society. Articles 12, 54, 55, and 63 in *The National Charter* relate to the matters of defence and national unity (the most important concepts underlying defence). Article 12 points out the importance of national unity. Article 54 advocates that the country's defence is the responsibility of all the Sudanese. Article 55 says that the armed forces are the protectors of the unified peoples of Sudan. In addition to this, ordinary people are expected to share the responsibility of defence through popular defence (i.e. the Popular Defence Force), and should be trained and armed (Article 63). Article 54 points out that discouragement of unity, sovereignty and integrity should be regarded as treason, and *jihad* should be regarded as an instrument to be used against every internal / external threat - the war in the South is regarded as a *jihad*. The following are the articles mentioned above.

> 12. We stipulate that national unity is a vital affair in facing internal and external challenges and [is] necessary for realization of security, stability and welfare of the people of the Sudan ...
>
> 54. The country's defence and safeguard of its unity, sovereignty and integrity is the responsibility of all the Sudanese; discouragement shall be regarded as treason for the country, the nation, its belief and its Islamic belonging. And *jihad*, in the respect, shall be regarded as binding, to safeguard the society against every internal or external threat.

> 55. The Armed Forces is the protector for [sic: are the protectors of] the unified peoples of the Sudan and its assignment is to protect the country and its frontiers; its faith to the people and allegiance to its soil shall be regarded as genuine protector for its Constitution, unity, values, heritage and progress.
>
> 63. The training and armament [sic] of the people is prerequisite to the consolidation of the *jihad*'s values and confirmation of the basic role of the Popular Defence in backing the Armed Forces and the other regular forces.[63]

The issues of the regular army (armed forces), the Popular Defence Force (popular defence), and the war in the South are regarded important in terms of national defence. For this reason, this section focuses on these issues.

(a) Regular army

Controlling the armed forces is an important step towards Islamizing society, because without the security of the regime any other policies of Islamization will be shattered. Sudanese history clearly demonstrated the critical role of the armed forces, especially the army, in affecting political stability. The immediate task of the new government after the 1989 coup was, therefore, to establish control over the armed forces.

During the first several years (1989-92), many cases of attempted counter-coups were reported. This seems to indicate that the government had a problem with the army, but it also suggests the effectiveness of the policy which they adopted, because the government survived those counter-coup attempts. The following list shows the "reported" cases of attempted counter-coups after al-Bashir's coup.

** Reported cases of attempted coups **

[1989]		
1989	Oct.-Nov.	: (unconfirmed by the regime)[64]
[1990]		
1990	March	: (announced by the regime)[65]
1990	September	: (unconfirmed by the regime)[66]
1990	November	: (unconfirmed by the regime)[67]

[1991]			
1991	April		: (unconfirmed by the regime)[68]
1991	August		: (announced by the regime)[69]
[1992]			
1992	April	by pro-Nimairi elements	: (announced by the regime)[70]
1992	July		: (unconfirmed by the regime)[71]
[1993 - 1995]		none	

Immediately after the 1989 coup and since then, many officers in the armed and security forces were dismissed. To quote the *EIU Country Report: Sudan* (no.3, 1989): '... Revised estimates for the number of men who had been forced to retire were 350 for the army, 370 for the police, eleven for the prisons and all the top ranks in the fire brigade and game parks service. ...'[72] To quote *Sudan Democratic Gazette* (September 1991 issue):

> 'Two years after taking power the Islamic Fundamentalist junta in Sudan has almost completed its purge of the Sudanese armed forces and civil service. Figures so far available show that at least 3,000 officers have either been executed, imprisoned, detained or dismissed. This number does not include non-commissioned officers and men, of whom tens of thousands fall into the same four categories of execution, imprisonment detention or dismissal.'[73]

The government seems to have taken advantage of the coup attempts to eliminate oppositional officers from the armed and security forces and consolidate its power. As a result, the proportion of the officers in the armed forces who support the Islamist movement increased. The crucial point here is the linkage between a more Islamist army and one which is less liable to coup attempts.

To the researcher's knowledge, no coup attempts were reported between 1993 and 1995. This seems to be an indication that the government has succeeded in establishing control over the armed forces. It therefore appears now to be quite difficult for the opposition to implement a successful military coup against the Islamist regime.

(b) Popular Defence Force

The significance of the Popular Defence Force is that the government can mobilize society through the PDF for their purposes. The main purpose is that of "changing society", in other words Islamizing society. The PDF is used as a "re-educational institution" for this purpose. Although *The National Charter* points out that the basic role of the popular defence is as a "backing" for the armed forces, the researcher believes that the central role of the "new" PDF after 1989 lies in Islamizing society.

The origin of the Popular Defence Force can be found in the 1985 - 1986 period.[74] In those days, the government was using militias in order to reverse the trend in which the army had continuously lost territory to the SPLA. The militias were recruited from particular groups, such as the Massariya (al-Massaariiya) and Baqqara (al-Baqqaara).[75] Its main role was to reduce the burden on the army and to complement it.

The PDF became an official institution in October 1989 by the promulgation of the Popular Defence Act.[76] It appeared that the PDF aimed at a militarization of the "whole population" and was a part of the process of changing society. The government wanted to change people's way of thinking and attitude, and the PDF was used in this as a re-educational institution. *Sudanow* reported President al-Bashir as saying that:

> 'It [the PDF] is designed to provide the Sudanese people with the opportunity to receive comprehensive training, broad enough to engender a profound remolding and re-education of the Sudanese nation on new lines. Military instruction will form a part of this training, which will embrace almost every aspect of life in an effort to imbue the Sudanese people with the values and qualities of patience, perseverance, dignity, ambition, solidarity and sacrifice. These values and qualities are indispensable if Sudan is to be transformed into a state of abundance, peace and prestige. Equipped with these, Sudan will certainly follow the right path in the jungle of international politics.'[77]

The researcher, however, suspects that there exist two other hidden aims for the PDF. The first aim is to reduce the impact and power of the army over political issues, and the second aim is to resist a possible military intervention by foreign forces.[78]

The PDF now contributes to the decentralisation of power of the army. To quote *Sudan Focus*:

> 'One achievement the NSR is particularly proud of is the establishment of huge security and military organizations, motivated by a new security drive in which the power of the military figures less and less. A policy to militarise the civilian population has led to the creation of a large Popular Defence Force (PDF). ... it is widely believed that the army's victories in the south and southern Kordofan were only made possible by the support of the PDF.'[79]

The dependence of the army on the PDF makes the impact and power of the army over political issues weak. This means that even if some officers in the army, who oppose the Islamist line, want to carry out a successful military coup, the weakened position of the army makes it more difficult to control the coup environment.

With regard to the second aim which the researcher suspects, i.e. to resist a possible military intervention by foreign forces, it is evident that since Sudan's independence, the Sudanese have always felt a fear of military intervention, initially by the Egyptians and now by American allies. Some real cases, such as the Second Gulf War and the Somali operation have perhaps given this Sudanese feeling some realism. The Sudanese know the inferiority of their military equipment, thus they have to complement it with a strong fighting spirit and large numbers of fighters (i.e. the whole population).

In 1990, several issues of *Sudan Update* gave accounts of the PDF. To quote *Sudan Update*:

> 'The leadership of the PDF has prepared a plan for ... the training of all the Sudanese people to carry arms in five years' time, announced the commander of the PDF. ... Addressing a graduation ceremony of more than a thousand PDF infantry troops in Bahr al-Arab ... [the commander] affirmed their commitment to complete the training of 150,000 of PDF before [30th June 1991].'[80]
>
> 'Students admitted to higher institutes and universities this year are to undergo military training at the PDF camps ... from 1 December 1990 to 1 February 1991, ... As for girls, the PDF administration will organise the training programme ...'[81]

Training in the PDF became compulsory to newly admitted university students and government officials. Groups of government officials and employees who came from a similar field were put in a

camp to take training sessions - both military and non-military ones. Those trained in a camp could voluntarily take part in actual fighting at any time. There also seems to be a by-product - a Sudanese university teacher told the researcher that: "The PDF provides some opportunity for people to know each other who have never met before, and to share common problems and solutions concerning their jobs."[82]

In addition to the PDF, there exists "National Service" in Sudan. This does not mean military service, but various kinds of service for society, such as medical services, which are normally allocated to the medical doctors and students. *Sudan Update* reported that: 'It has been decided to make national service compulsory for every Sudanese between 18 and 30 years of age for a period of 36 month.'[83] This national service appears to be used similarly to the PDF as a re-educational institution for changing society.

(c) War in the South

For the purpose of the Islamization of the South, the Islamist government has been making great efforts to gain control over the South, where a civil war (the Second Civil War) has been taking place since 1983 between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government forces. In order to gain control over the South, the government has been using the armed forces and the PDF in fighting. The war efforts of the Islamist government in the South are regarded as part of *jihad*. Between 1989 and 1994, the government seems to have sought to resolve the problem in the South mainly by force.

Diagram 7.2.(2) is intended to show the development of the Second Civil War from 1989 up to 1994.[84]

Diagram 7.2.(2): The Second Civil War (1989-94)



SPLA = Sudan People's Liberation Army:
Aug. 1983, John Garang.
PDF = Popular Defence Force: 1985-86 / 1989, government.

SPLA-M = Sudan People's Liberation Army - Mainstream:
Aug. 1991, John Garang, Dinka domination.
SPLA-U = Sudan People's Liberation Army - United:
Aug. 1991, Riak Machar and Lam Akol, Nuer domination.
Forces of Unity: Sep. 1992, William Nyuon, joined SPLA-U in 1993.
PRMSS = Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan:
Aug. 1993, Alfred Lado Gore, Equatoria tribes.
SSIM = Southern Sudan Independent Movement:
Sep. 1994, Riak Machar.
SPLA-U Sep. 1994, Lam Akol claimed.

After the 1989 coup, the power of the SPLA started to decline rapidly with a number of splits and internal disputes (see Diagram

A.9.(1): Civil wars in Sudan in Appendices). The government took advantage of this situation and increased its controlled areas.

On 8 February 1994, *The Independent* reported the decline of the SPLA and the advance of the government troops in the following terms:

> 'Barring divine intervention, the Sudanese army will shortly retake the last towns in the south held by rebel forces, establish its presence along the roads linking them and cut the rebels off from Uganda, their haven and supply route. ... Two years ago the SPLA controlled most of southern Sudan, but a calamitous split in the movement in 1992 allowed the government to retake almost all the towns and roads.'[85]

Map 7.2.(2) is meant to show the increase of the government controlled areas during the period between August 1992 and February 1994.

Map 7.2.(2): Increase of government-controlled area

August 1992 February 1994



Sources: *The Guardian*, 28 August 1992 (photocopy);
El Pais, 6 February 1994.

As Map 7.2.(2) shows, the government achieved some success in their military campaign in the South. This success, however, seems to have caused outside opinion to view the war increasingly as a "religious war" and created a negative image of religious persecution by the government.

Sudan consists of about 73% Muslims, about 18% animists, and 9% Christians.[86] Many Christians and Southerners live in the North peacefully together with the Muslims, and many Muslims live in the South, too. However, between 1989 and 1994, there was a strong tendency for observers, particularly in the Western media, to portray the Sudanese civil war as a religious war between the "Northern Muslims" and the "Southern Christians".

This tendency seemed to stem partly from the SPLA's strategy. Despite the fact that the Second Civil War between the government troops and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had actually started before the introduction of the 1983 Islamic Laws (*sharia*),[87] the SPLA often claimed that the Islamic Law was the main cause of the civil war. It seems that the SPLA wanted to exploit the view of religious war, in order to obtain sympathy and support from the Christian West.

Meanwhile, the government tried to discourage the view of religious war, despite the usage of the term, *jihad* - a religious term in Islam. From 1989 to 1994, while the government was continuing its war efforts, it also undertook a dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims in Sudan.

In May 1991, the chairman of the RCC's political committee, Brig. Pio Yukwan, told the religious leaders of both Muslims and Christians at a meeting that: 'Religion should not be a factor of division between the Sudanese.'[88] This statement was made in order to launch an inter-religious dialogue and to promote mutual understanding between the Muslims and Christians in Sudan.

In October 1994, on the occasion of an inter-religious dialogue conference in Khartoum, the establishment of the Inter-Religious Dialogue Association (IRDA) was decided in order to promote the religious dialogue between the Muslims and Christians in Sudan.[89]

7.3 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT

Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, the texts of Dr al-Turabi's account were put together exclusively from the researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi. Because of this, the researcher did not use the form of quotation in those sections.

In this chapter and Chapter 8, however, the texts of Dr al-Turabi's account are composed of two types of material - one obtained from the researcher's interviews with Dr al-Turabi, and one from published materials. For this reason, the researcher uses the form of quotation.

Because information on the general description of events is more detailed and extensive in this period, there has been less possibility to cover every aspect of it within the framework of Dr al-Turabi's account.

7.3.1 DOMESTIC POLICY

The researcher summarized his assumptions about Dr al-Turabi's goals after 1989. The researcher then showed the assumption concerning domestic matters to Dr al-Turabi himself and asked him to correct it, if necessary.

1989-
Main goal:
(concerning domestic matters)
To consolidate the position of the Islamist movement in Sudan
correction: To realize all plans and strategies for an Islamic society

Dr al-Turabi corrected the main goal concerning domestic matters after 1989 as "to realize all plans and strategies for an Islamic society".[90]

In his short-term plans, Dr al-Turabi explained his goal to the researcher that:

> 'The basic pattern of the development of the Islamist movement is a continuous cycle of two developments - horizontal

development and vertical development. Horizontal development means quantitative development and vertical development means qualitative development.'[91]

Diagram 7.3.(1) is meant to show Dr al-Turabi's idea about the development of the Islamist movement.[92] "Stage 1" refers to the development of the movement up to 1989, i.e. a small Islamist movement (including a political party) expanded and succeeded in establishing an Islamic state. "Stage 2" refers to the period after 1989, i.e. the movement has been consolidating itself within the state borders (this is discussed in the later sections of this chapter). "Stage 3" refers to the movement's development in the near future, i.e. the movement will expand beyond the borders. The preparation for "Stage 3" has already started and can be seen in the Sudanese foreign relations (see Chapter 8).

Diagram 7.3.(1): Development of the movement



Dr al-Turabi gave a further explanation of the task of Stage 2 as follows:

'The principles of the Islamist movement has now been established in Sudan, this completed a horizontal development, i.e. a quantitative development inside Sudan.

The next short-term plans, therefore, would pursue a vertical development, i.e. a qualitative development of society. In this stage, it is important to improve the quality of society based on Islamic values. These include the qualitative improvement of production, human relations, political life, economic life, and religious life. In such

> society, people will care more about others, not only themselves and their own families. Democracy, though not Western democracy, will be more prevalent. The integration of science, art, and religion will increase. As for education, the level of Sudan will reach an international standard within 10 years and this will not be so difficult.'[94]

In 1994, Dr al-Turabi told *Mideast Mirror* about Sudan's efforts for a qualitative development as follows:

> 'Sudan now has an Islamic state which is debating from an Islamic perspective such issues as the structure of government, the electoral system, the constitution, the appropriate form of *shura* (consultation), how Islam can inform economic development, what institutions are needed to do so, and what does it mean to have an Islamic bank or insurance firm. The debate also covers questions such as Islamic justice, and how best to develop music and the arts.'[95]

Dr al-Turabi wanted to make Sudan an ideal model of an Islamic society. In the interviews with the researcher in January 1995, Dr al-Turabi said that:

> 'The Islamic take-over of power in 1989 constituted only a beginning towards the creation of a real Islamic society. We have to show a good model of an Islamic society to the world. Showing a good example is important. We will show a real democracy. We will show economic development.'[96]

In the interview with the researcher, Dr al-Turabi emphasized "society" and distinguished government from society. It is, therefore, useful to note Dr al-Turabi's views on the role of government in society.

On 10 May 1992, Dr al-Turabi was invited to a one-day debate with a group of American academics of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, which took place in Florida, in the United States. In the debate, Dr al-Turabi talked about Islam, government, politics, the West, and the Sudanese efforts to create a real Islamic society. Dr al-Turabi's account was taped and was published in Arthur Lowrie's edited book: *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West.*

The following are quotations from Dr al-Turabi in Lowrie's book which provide background to his conception of the role of government and society in an Islamic society.

> 'The authority of government is limited because *sharia* is the higher law. ... The Koran entrusts authority to the people and not to the government.'[97]

'Islam has always accommodated and gradually integrated society through social action and through social institutions rather than government, and that will remain the case in the Sudan.'[98]

'It is quite true that in the short term, we need a strong government in the Sudan. One of our problems is that we have always had a weak coalition government without sufficient authority to bring about a measure of discipline, to take steps which are not extremely popular, and to resist the immediate popular reaction in pursuit of satisfaction of society. But the consensus I am seeking, I don't wish to bring about through authority because that won't be consensus.'[99]

'The government now is doing many things simply as leadership, and it will probably withdraw.'[100]

7.3.2 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the debate in Florida, Dr al-Turabi denied the criticism that Islamic movements were not democratic. He pointed out that Islamists' common objections to democracy stemmed from their judging democracy by association with the West not by its concept. It appears that Dr al-Turabi supported the concept of democracy, but not a Westernized democracy. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

'There has been in Islamic literature quite an argument about whether or not we should adopt a notion [such as democracy], even if we like the notion, ... Some of the objections to democracy are just to the foreign word itself, ... people [Islamists] also judge democracy by association, not by what it essentially means grammatically -- government by the people -- but by what it has come to mean in the West. Along its historical course in the West, it has become associated with secularism, and that is definitely anathema to Islamic movements; with politics which is amoral if not immoral, and that's definitely something objectionable; and with cutthroat competition for power, and that doesn't sound very religious, does it ? ... If you scrutinize the model of the [Islamist] movement itself, it's highly democratic [in its real meaning].'[101]

In 1990, Dr al-Turabi in an interview published in *Sudan Update* criticized both multi-party and single-party systems. *Sudan Update* reported this as follows:

'The leader of the Islamic fundamentalists in Sudan [Dr al-Turabi] claimed that although Sadiq al-Mahdi had ruled the Sudan under the multi-party "democratic" system, this type of

> democracy had failed and did not benefit the Sudanese people. He also referred to the one-party system as a failure under Nimeiri.'[102]

Dr al-Turabi again emphasized his views on political systems in the Florida debate. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'I don't think that parties are essential to the democratic process ... They [Sudanese people] were asked what the best political order was, and they knew that a multi-party system in the Sudan would not be democratic because political parties or a government governed by the House of *Khatmiyyah* and the House of the *Mahdi* was a dynastic thing. ... People would vote for the *Mahdi*, because of his great-grandfather, because of his [great-grandfather's] achievement in the 19th century. ... People don't ask their *sheikh* questions. ...
>
> I'm not a believer in a single party myself. In our own movement, I avoid the movement is becoming a *madhhab* [madhhab: religious creed] or a single school of law.'[103]

As far as the issue of federalism is concerned, Dr al-Turabi has been consistently advocating decentralized political system and federalism for a long time. *Sudan Update* of 20 April 1990 reported a talk by Dr al-Turabi as follows:

> 'Dr Turabi told his audience that the NIF was the only hope for the Sudan and would continue to rule the country to prepare the ground and transform the Sudan into an Islamic state embodying federalism.'[104]

In the Florida debate, 1992, Dr al-Turabi explained the situation in Sudan concerning decentralization and federalism as follows:

> 'The Islamic [Islamist] movement in the Sudan is a highly decentralized movement, not only regionally with headquarters and branches and chapters, but also functionally. ...
>
> Of course, you don't want to decentralize the country to the point that centrifugal forces will shatter it. But, still, federalization is sought not only for the South but for all parts of the Sudan, for Darfur, for Kordofan, for Jezira and so forth. Meanwhile, government is actively trying to insure the balance of these centrifugal forces by building roads and communications systems so that people could feel that they are autonomous administratively but united politically. ...
>
> Normally in the Sudan, a military takeover would last about three years before they ever think of decentralizing power. It took Aboud five years to think of decentralizing his power by setting up a central parliament and allowing each province to go its own way to some measure. But in the Sudan now, almost two years after the event [the 1989 coup], there has already been a high degree of reorganization. They are embarking on the federalization of the Sudan, and that

> means that power would have to be distributed and shared by all the different regions, not by local military commanders but also by local councils and local parliaments. There is a very powerful local government program now being implemented.'[105]

In February 1994, the nine federal states were re-divided into twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree. Dr al-Turabi made a statement concerning this decentralization policy which implied that he had some responsibility for it. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Sudanow*):

> '"The current division of states is not final, and more decentralization is expected in the future if so required", announced Dr Hassan Abdalla Al-Turabi before a symposium held by the Federal Government Committee at the TNA. He added that the current division of the provinces would be under constant review, and called on the TNA to bear in mind the geographical and economic factors as well as manpower and natural resources, transportation and regional considerations. In this connection, Dr Al-Turabi suggested that poorer states would be well advised to seek integration with richer ones.'[106]

7.3.3 LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mideast Mirror of August 1994 reported that Dr al-Turabi had proudly claimed that Sudan was the only country in the world with a decentralized legal system. This is another aspect of decentralization which Dr al-Turabi covered relating to the Sudanese legal system. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Mideast Mirror*):

> '[Sudan] is the only country in the world with a decentralized legal system, under which adherents of each religion abide by their own faith's family and personal status laws, where Islamic law does not apply to non-Moslems even though 85 percent of Sudanese are Moslems.'[107]

Dr al-Turabi also told in the Florida debate about the Sudanese family law and the civil law as follows:

> 'Family law is part of religion. It's personalized in the Sudan. ... Of course, the civil law is universal; you cannot personalize it; you cannot regionalize or federalize it because a contract law is a contract law all over the country.'[108]

Concerning the new Islamic penal code (criminal law) introduced on 22 March 1991, Dr al-Turabi explained the situation in Sudan to the Florida conference as follows:

> 'Criminal law has also been decentralized. ... There is a national code, but the South, because it is predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims, is absolved from the Islamic punishment. ... In the North there will be some non-Muslims but they are told that it is a dry country. You have to accept this fact if you are living in the North.'[109]

Dr al-Turabi expressed his personal views on "apostasy" and the execution of Mahmud Muhammad Taha in the Florida debate as follows:

> 'The limit ... is the question of apostasy, if someone deliberately and professedly says that I'm no longer a Muslim. The traditional view in the time of the Prophet was he was left alone, unless he actually changed sides and joined the other side in the state of war between Mecca and Medina. Then it was legitimate to deal with him just like an enemy alien, in battle he can be killed like anybody else. Later on, the Muslims somehow theoretically came to adopt the view that apostasy is punishable by death. ...
>
> Now, people have to address this problem: whether apostasy should be established as a capital crime punishable by capital punishment ? It was solved very differently in Sudan; to become punishable it has to be more than just intellectual apostasy. It would have to translate into not only sedition but actually insurrection against society. So this is how it is defined. ... If you read the definition itself, it is just like treason; it reads like treason. ...
>
> I personally have views which run against all the *madhhabs* [religious creeds] on the status of women, on the testimony of non-Muslims, on the law of apostasy, and people argue with me and some people probably think I border on apostasy. ...
>
> [With regard to the case of Mahmud Muhammad Taha] Apostasy was not in the penal code, ... But the judge said that ... it didn't have to be in the penal code. This is no longer the case. The penal code tells you that you have to refer to the text. Everything is contained inside the text and not beyond the text. But under Nimeiri, the code was poorly drafted; it was drafted in three days, and it was the old penal code with just insertions of five or six provisions. I would say that this was definitely a bad decision.'[110]

Concerning another point in the Islamic penal code, Dr al-Turabi gave his view on the application of "blasphemy" to the Rushdie case. In August 1994, Dr al-Turabi was reported in the newspaper, *Asharq Al-Awsat* (Al-Sharq Al-'Awsat) as saying that: 'The judgements of Islamic

law [blasphemy code] do not apply to individuals [e.g. Rushdie] who live abroad.'[111]

7.3.4 ECONOMY

In August 1984, at a symposium organized by the FIBS, Dr al-Turabi, Presidential Adviser at the time, gave a lecture on the purposes of the Islamization of banking system. In his lecture, Dr al-Turabi said that:

> 'Where Islamic legislation is concerned, life's complexities cannot be divided into their various socio-economic and political aspects; they are all parts of the nations's drive towards the worship of God. Bearing this in mind, politicians should work closely with economists, ...'[112]

In the Florida debate, 1992, Dr al-Turabi mentioned the Islamic economic system as follows:

> 'The Islamic economic system is one of freedom. Society is autonomous when it comes to production and when it comes to ownership and property. In theory, property belongs to God, not to the government and not to the individual, but it's individuals who are the trustees of it.'[113]

In the same debate, Dr al-Turabi explained the Sudanese economic privatization by denying the role of International Monetary Fund (IMF) in it. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'The *sharia* itself is a limitation on government. This explains perhaps why [limited] government in the Sudan, inspired by this model [of Islam], is now privatizing, even the economy.
>
> This is not because the IMF has imposed this model; the IMF is still at loggerheads with the Sudan over many issues. In fact, if this privatization were introduced as IMF-inspired, it would have immediately provoked a reaction. You know how IMF measures are responded to in all parts of the world.
>
> In the Sudan, there has been complete price decontrol, complete not gradual; complete withdrawal of subsidies from petroleum, from sugar, from bread; and complete floating of the pound, not just a devaluation; all without a reaction. ...'[114]

7.3.5 EDUCATION

In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi indicated the role of education in society as follows:

> 'I plead with everybody [in the Islamic movements] that we aren't a political movement exclusively. We are a religious movement for the education and spiritual development of the individual, and we have much more substantial achievements in the field of reforming society, in changing individuals and in moral education than in politics.'[115]

On the occasion of the Native Administration Conference which was held in January 1995 over a three-week period. Dr al-Turabi described the conference as a re-educational training session. In the researcher's interview, Dr al-Turabi indicated the role of education in the context of changing society as follows:

> 'More than a thousand representatives of all the Sudanese tribes have participated in the conference. It has not been a three day conference, but rather one of three "weeks", and it has actually been an re-educational programme. The government is teaching the tribal leaders about a new spirit, as opposed to an old tribalism, and a new spirit in the economic, moral, religious, cultural and military fields. Changing society, that is, changing *sufis*, tribal leaders, students, women and so on is very important.'[116]

Dr al-Turabi showed his emphasis on education and society, by saying that: 'In the hereafter, if I believe I am going to be rewarded, I think 90% of my reward will be for my work in society and education.'[117]

In January 1995, Dr al-Turabi told the researcher his optimistic perspective on the Sudanese education level: 'As for education, the level of Sudan will reach an international standard within 10 years and this will not be so difficult.'[118]

7.3.6 DEFENCE

Dr al-Turabi explained in the Florida debate how the army became supportive towards the Islamists as follows:

> 'What most people didn't know is that the army, like the rest of the modern sector in the Sudan, had [sic: has] gone Islamic. Officers just represent the other elites ... Abboud was a nationalist ... Nimeiri, the socialist, ... So today it was bound to be an Omar Beshir. If you pick a random sample from the army, most of them would be Islamists, because of where they come from. Candidates are taken from schools and most schools are dominated by Islamists.'[119]

Dr al-Turabi explained, in the Florida debate, his views about the relations between the army and ordinary people and the role of army in society and in political instability. His views indicate his ideas of the foundation of the Popular Defence Force and the future of the army. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'It is unfortunate that in our country the military became a separate profession. This is not typical of Islamic society. In Islamic society, the military is not a separate profession from the people. Everyone should be trained and then in times of emergency, people should be called upon, and you can mobilize an army of millions. Of course, you always need a small standing army to preserve technology and discipline.
>
> I think the best idea is to dissolve the army, just dissolve the army in society, so to speak. The idea of a popular defense force goes some way to do that. But people should organize for their own defense. If the army needs to broaden its base, then it can call upon these forces. Otherwise, these forces are people who are engaged in their daily occupations and go only when they are needed.
>
> ... But in the Sudan, in particular, there has been quite a gap between military and civilian, and this explains perhaps some of the political instability and the military take-over; after a while the civilians become very jealous -- and it's mostly the civilian elites who initiate the uprising --, and the people follow them although most of the uprisings not necessarily popular. ... We want to overcome this.'[120]

In the researcher's interview in January 1995, Dr al-Turabi described the battles in the South as part of *jihad*.[121] It appears that Dr al-Turabi saw the war as a defensive war, because he explained the meaning of *jihad* in the Florida debate as follows:

> 'The word *jihad* is actually a reciprocal word in its verbal formation; it means a struggle against the other, so it is essentially a defensive enterprise and not an offensive one.'[122]

7.3.7 DR AL-TURABI'S SATISFACTION WITH THE SITUATION IN SUDAN IN JANUARY 1995

In the researcher's interview with Dr al-Turabi in January 1995, Dr al-Turabi expressed his satisfaction with the current situation in Sudan in relative terms:

> 'If I look ahead, there still exists a gap between an idealistic situation of an Islamic society and reality. Therefore, I think that it is not enough and Sudan should move ahead. However, if I look back, I feel that Sudan has traveled quite a distance. Sudan is better, especially compared to other Muslim dominated countries which should have been in more advanced stages in terms of an Islamization of the society because of their richness in Islamic legacies and material. The progress of Sudan is much faster and Sudan is in a more advanced stage than those countries.'[123]

7.4 ANALYSES

7.4.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-89)

Table 7.4.(1) lists Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's life story covering the period between 1932 and 1989. Table 7.4.(2) lists possible adjectives (describing personality elements) associated with those characters.

Table 7.4.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1989	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the pragmatist (a), the expansionist (a), the persuader (a), the analyst (a), the politician (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c), the cooperator (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 7.4.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1989	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a), influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a), analytic (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1989-95)

As was mentioned, Dr al-Turabi's account in Chapter 7 is not a life story. However, it still contains psychological information indicating Dr al-Turabi's personality elements. His account, related to the domestic matters of the Islamic state covering the period between 1989 and 1995 at the latest, clearly gives further evidence of previous findings and new elements of his personality.

Further evidence backs the previous findings - Dr al-Turabi's account again shows strong signs of agentic personality. The character which represents the overall image of his account of this chapter seems to be "the reformer". It indicates some aspects of personality described by adjectives, such as innovative, progressive, radical, critical, originative, and creative. This main character strengthens the underlying motivation of reform (agentic motivation) in the period, and backs some of the previously identified characters like "the analyst" and "the man behind the scenes".

Of many agentic elements of personality, innovative and progressive elements of personality stemming from Dr al-Turabi's character of "the reformer" are apparent in his account of short-term plans. This is clear in his emphasis on changing society and his preference for a "stage" approach or "step by step" approach to changing society.

Among previously identified characters, Dr al-Turabi's character of "the analyst" is apparent in his analytic accounts about the concept of democracy and the role of army. This character to some extent relates to another character, "the reformer", because the purpose of analysis is reform. In this sense, it can be seen that the latter, "the reformer", is backed by the former, "the analyst".

Another previously identified character is that of "the man behind the scenes". This comes across in Dr al-Turabi's statement concerning decentralization policy. Despite him having no official position in the government, he was talking as if he had some responsibility for it. His attitude implies that he influenced the government policy from behind the scenes. As mentioned before, in the case of Dr al-Turabi, this character should be seen as an agentic character.

Evidence of Dr al-Turabi's "radical" element of personality, which again stems from his agentic character of "the reformer", is apparent in the account about his personal views against some religious creeds. He said that he was personally against the religious creeds on the status of women, the testimony of non-Muslims, and the law of apostasy.

Moreover, his agentic personality which seeks for autonomy and independence is apparent in his emphasis that the IMF had nothing to do with the Sudanese economic policy. His account seems to also indicate another agentic element of personality - i.e. a defiant element.

Further evidence of his agentic personality is clear in the account of his satisfaction with the situation of Sudan. His agentic personality, in this case, stems from his achievement motivation towards Islamizing society. He expressed his satisfaction with the Islamization of Sudan by comparing other Muslim countries. People high in achievement motivation tend to derive satisfaction from own work - for Dr al-Turabi, Islamizing Sudan was his own work. People high in achievement motivation also tend to show a strong and consistent preference for experiences of feeling competent and doing better in the performance of tasks - in this case, the task was to Islamize society.

A new character identified from the 1989 to 1995 period is that of "the law-abider", suggesting a law-abiding element of personality. This character has become apparent in his accounts about the case of Mahmud Muhammad Taha and Salman Rushdie. He said that Taha should not have been executed, because at that time "apostasy" was not in the penal code. He also said that the Sudanese "blasphemy" code could not be applied to Rushdie who was not in Sudan. His accounts clearly show a law-abiding element of his personality.

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1985-95)

The following table shows the new findings of Dr al-Turabi's personality elements which have emerged from the analysis of his account concerning domestic matters of the Islamic state from the 1989 to 1995 period.

Table 7.4.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95) emerged from the analysis of his account concerning domestic matters

Period	Characters	Possible adjectives
1989 - 95	the law-abider (a)	law-abiding (a), rigid (a), reasonable (a)

7.4.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements stemming from the character of "the reformer" (representing the image of his account in Chapter 7) seem to have affected the overall direction of government policy in the period. Government policy as regards the political system, legal developments, economy, education, and defence can be seen as a "reform" towards the Islamization of society.

(1) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

There is little doubt that the adoption of the new political system of "direct non-party democracy" and federalism was a result of Dr al-Turabi's strong influence.

Stemming from some agentic characters such as "the reformer" and "the critic", Dr al-Turabi's critical attitude towards non-Islamic or un-Islamic things appear to have affected the adoption of "non-party democracy". Dr al-Turabi was not satisfied with Western style democracy (i.e. the multi-party system) and wanted to establish a more suitable democratic system for the Sudanese people, based on Islamic culture and values. In his account, Dr al-Turabi pointed out some un-Islamic aspects of Western democracy. Dr al-Turabi also argued that the two traditionally most powerful political parties in Sudan, the *Umma* Party and the DUP, were not democratic. He contended that people

voted for their leaders without thinking and the leaders of both parties were hereditary. For this reason, Dr al-Turabi concluded that the Western style multi-party system was not appropriate in Sudan.

In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which seeks autonomy and independence seems to have also partly affected the policy of non-party democracy. In general, he rejects patterns which are the works of others, therefore he tends to seek or create "new" things, "different" things, or "own" things on which he can exercise his full influence. For Dr al-Turabi, the "non-party democracy" was an Islamist version (or his version) and it was neither a Capitalist nor a Socialist version.

Dr al-Turabi's consistent advocacy of federalism backed by his strong will (determination) and patience seems to have affected the government's policy of federalism. His idea of federalism can be traced back to 1964. Since then, he had been advocating that a federal government system was the only solution for the Sudanese problems. The researcher recalls the description of Dr al-Turabi's personality given by Yassin Omar al-Imam, Dr al-Turabi's close friend and leading figure in the movement since 1960s. Al-Imam said that: 'Dr al-Turabi has a very strong will and extreme patience. He does what he wants regardless of time or how difficult it will be. If he says he wants to do something, he will keep trying no matter how long it takes.'

(2) LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS

There is little doubt that Dr al-Turabi had a strong influence in the legal field. Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality, his emphasis on the unity of Sudan, and his step by step approach seem to have all affected the inclusion of the word "custom" in the declaration concerning the basis of the Sudanese law - i.e. "the Sudanese law is based on the *sharia* (Islamic law) and custom." It seems that it was necessary for the government to include the word in order to Islamize society gradually with unity. Because of the inclusion of the word "custom", however, some Islamists (e.g. members of *Hizb al-Tahrir* (Hizb al-Tahriir)) were critical, and said that Sudan was not a

true Islamic state, advocating that a true Islamic state must be based on "only" the *sharia*.

A further sign of the influence of Dr al-Turabi's personality is apparent in the contents of the Sudanese criminal law and the government's attitude towards some actual cases, such as the case of Salman Rushdie and the suspension of *hud* penalty for theft. His personality elements stemming from his character of "the reformer" seem to have affected the relatively moderate punishments for blasphemy (the more "conservative and fundamentalist thoughts in Islam" tend to justify severe punishments). Sudan does not adopt the death penalty for blasphemy, while some countries like Pakistan and Iran do. Dr al-Turabi's law-abiding element of personality appears to have affected the government's attitude towards the case of Salman Rushdie. The Sudanese government has never said that Rushdie should be killed wherever he is. The government appears to stick to the written text of the law strictly - the Sudanese blasphemy code does not include death penalty and it can not be applied to someone who lives outside Sudan. Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality appears to have also affected the government's policy over the suspension of *hud* penalty (i.e. amputation) for theft - amputation always draws strong criticism from some Western countries. To the researcher's knowledge, during the period between 1989 and 1995, no amputation sentence was carried out.

Despite the image of an extreme and dangerous Sudan, which has been portrayed in the Western media, the reality seems to present a more moderate picture. This has much to do with Dr al-Turabi's personality.

(3) ECONOMY

As we have found in Section 7.2, Dr al-Turabi's strong influence on the "reform" of the economy (i.e. the Islamization of the Sudanese economy) is clear. His commitment to Islam and his strong agentic personality which seeks high performance in tasks (in this case, "doing better" than others in terms of Islamization) seem to have been behind the Sudanese case.

This comes across in the attitude of the Sudanese Islamists towards the Islamization of economy. They have been more "serious" than any other Islamists in the world. Despite low performance in real economic development, they claim and emphasize that Sudan's economy is truly Islamic. They are very proud of their achievement in Islamizing economy - even the Iranians do not emphasize the Islamic aspect of their economy any more. This uniqueness appears to derive from Dr al-Turabi's personality.

(4) EDUCATION

Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality stemming from his character of "the reformer", based on his strong achievement motivation towards Islamizing society, seems to have affected Sudan's commitment to a massive expansion of higher education after 1989, which is another unique point. To the researcher's knowledge, there were only 6 universities before 1989, but 30 universities in May 1995. There may be some cases of nominal promotion from the status of college or institute to the status of university, but the figure seems to show, at least, the government's enthusiasm for this policy.

Dr al-Turabi's account of education showed how he valued education highly and saw education as the important tool for changing society, in other words, Islamizing society. Despite insufficient staffing and poor facilities, the government has been enthusiastic in the educational expansion. It seems that they are creating massive governmental support by inculcating young elites with Islamist values through universities. The government's main concern seems to be more over quick Islamization of elites than over the quality and standards of higher education.

(5) DEFENCE

The combination of Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which seeks for control and his analytic approach towards the army appear to have affected the government's success in controlling the army.

Although many cases of attempted counter-coups were reported between 1989 and 1992, no coup attempts were reported between 1993 and 1995. It seems that the government exploited those coup attempts to "reform" the army, i.e. the elimination of the anti-Islamist elements from the army. In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's analytic account about the army, in which he described the possible reason for the political instability and the military take-over, suggests the Islamists' clear policy and vision concerning the army.

As with the case of education, Dr al-Turabi's agentic personality stemming from his character of "the reformer", based on his strong achievement motivation towards Islamizing society, seems to have strongly affected the creation of the new PDF. His careful and analytic elements of personality which can be seen in his accounts about the army and the PDF appears to have also shaped the nature of the PDF. The government has been using the PDF mainly as a re-educational institution for the purpose of the Islamization of society. The government can mobilize the whole population through the PDF for their purposes - both military and non-military purposes.

Another influence of Dr al-Turabi's personality can be seen in the Islamists' commitments with regard to both the civil war in the South and inter-religious dialogue between Muslims and Christians in Sudan. His agentic elements of personality which seek to conquer (e.g. aggressive and offensive elements) may have affected the military campaign in the South. The combination of his other agentic elements of personality (e.g. clever and calculative elements) and some communal elements of personality which seek for unity and communication seems to have affected the government's policy over discouraging the view of religious war by promoting the inter-religious dialogue.

CHAPTER 8:
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE: EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER (1989 - 1993/ some up to 95)

CHAPTER 8: THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A STATE: EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER

One of the areas of concern to the Islamist movement in Sudan since 1989 has related to the outside world. It is very important, therefore, to analyze how Sudan's relations with the outside world have developed over the period, identifying in particular the specifically Islamist dimensions of foreign policy.

Chapter 8 has three sections. The first section, Section 8.1, gives a general description of the key developments of the Islamist movement in the external field after 1989. The researcher, however, has limited the discussion in this section to the period going up to the end of 1993. Where there is material of particular relevance falling in the years since 1993, this is mentioned - as occurs in section 8.1.2.(3). Section 8.1 includes Sudan's foreign policy, its international relations with other countries and the activities of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC).

Section 8.2 gives Dr al-Turabi's account of those matters discussed in the previous section, but does not necessarily cover every aspect of them.

The final section, Section 8.3, gives the researcher's analyses of Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments of the movement assessing the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on these developments.

8.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION (1989-93/ SOME UP TO 95)

8.1.1 CHRONOLOGY

1989/ 6/30:Brigadier al-Bashir successfully carried out a coup and came to power.
1990/ 8/02:Iraq invaded Kuwait.
1991/ 1-2 :The Second Gulf War occurred.

1991/ 4/25-28:The First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) was held in Khartoum.
1991/ 5/21:Ethiopia's President Mengistu was ousted.
1991/10/30:The Madrid Talks began.
1991/11/16-17:The First Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference was held.
1992/ 1/**:In Algeria, the second round of elections were canceled.
1992/ 4-5 :Al-Turabi toured Western Europe and North America.
1992/ 5/26:Al-Turabi was attacked by a Sudanese (former *Karate* champion) in Canada.
1992/**/**:The UN General Assembly issued a condemnation on Sudan's human rights record.
1992/12/ 9:US troops landed Somalia.
1993/ 2/10:Al-Bashir met the Pope in Khartoum.
1993/ 4-5 :A conference on religious dialogue was held.
1993/ 8/ 9:The IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights.
1993/ 8/17:America added Sudan to the list of countries which support terrorism.
1993/ 9/13:The peace accord between Israel and the PLO was signed.
1993/10/13:Al-Turabi met Pope John Paul II for the first time in the Vatican City.
1993/10/21:The reconciliation between John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream and Riak Machar's SPLA-United, which was mediated by the US, finally failed.
1993/late 11:Al-Turabi met President Rabbani in Afghanistan.
1993/12/ 2-4:The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum.
1993/12/29:The archbishop of Canterbury refused the invitation of the Khartoum regime to visit Sudan.
1993/12/30:Sudan expelled the British ambassador in Khartoum.
1994/ 1/ 4:The Sudanese ambassador in London was expelled.
1994/ 3/**:The first peace talks with the SPLM, under the patronage of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD), were held.
1994/ 8/14:Carlos, the notorious international terrorist, was arrested by the Sudanese police in Khartoum, extradited to France, and was arrested by the French police on 15 August.
1994/10/ 8-10:The Second Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference was held in Khartoum.
1995/ 3/ 3:The American Marines withdrew from Somalia.
1995/ 3/30- 4/ 2: The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

Sources: See Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations and Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95).

8.1.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS: EXPANSION BEYOND THE BORDER

(1) THE FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY

The researcher believes that the foreign policy of the Islamist government is basically designed to expand the regime's influence beyond Sudan's borders. Although *The National Charter* does not make this point clear, the (apparently hidden) expansionist policy seems to be the core of Sudan's foreign policy, and is backed by the concept of the *umma* which Dr al-Turabi talked about (see Dr al-Turabi's account in Sections 7.3 and 8.2).

Article 70 in the charter proclaims a non-interference policy, but perhaps this carries no more and no less weight than similar policies proclaimed by Western states. US foreign policy, after all, is not one of true non-interference. In a sense, Sudan's expansionist policy can be seen as part of self-defence to protect the regime's Islamist values and programmes.

Chapter 8 focuses on the regime's efforts to expand its influence in two dimensions. The first dimension covers the relationship between the Sudanese Islamist government and governments of neighboring and other Middle Eastern countries. The second one covers the (government-backed) activities of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.

The articles concerning Sudan's foreign policy (Articles from 64 to 70) in *The National Charter* lay down the principles guiding foreign policy. Articles 67 and 70 indicate Sudan's strong concern over the Palestine issue and the position of neighboring countries. The following are Articles 64, 65, 67, and 70 of the charter:

> 64. The Sudan is part and parcel of the Islamic, Arab and African nations endeavouring to realize Arab, African and Islamic unity; its foreign policies and international relations are being established on the basis of commitment to the principles of freedom, justice and peace and combat of all forms of oppression, racial discrimination and hegemony and also on the endeavour to realize welfare and prosperity of all mankind and utilize our foreign policy in consolidating of [sic] our efforts in building the country and boosting of [sic] its progress, security and stability.

> 65. The foreign policy shall confirm the basic principles concerning the country's higher policies in a way to serve [sic: that serves] the internal policy aiming for the country's dignity, unity, independence and catering of public interest according to the experienced realities.
>
> 67. The Sudan is strongly backing and really consolidating all Arab, African and Islamic issues headed by the people of Palestine's liberation [sic] and eradication of the South Africa's racist regime.
>
> 70. The Sudan shall comply with the international and regional pledges, agreements and charters, and shall function through the international and regional organization to realize justice, mutual cooperation, good neighbourliness on the basis of mutual respect, benefit and non-interference in others' internal affairs and shall specifically undertake to promote political, economic and cultural relations with all countries of the neighbourhood to realize the security, peace and prosperity of its nations.[1]

(2) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There is evidence that the Sudanese Islamist government, between 1989 and 1993, was trying to expand its influence beyond Sudan's borders - in the neighboring region and in the Middle East. To achieve this goal, Sudan adopted different methods according to the political position of the regime in the country concerned, the proportion of Muslims in the country (and the strength of the Islamist movement there), and the geographical location of the country. Of all, "political position" was the most important element and related to a number of different attributes: the country's attitude towards Sudan; its policy towards Islamism; its policy towards the Sudanese opposition (particularly the SPLA); and its relationship with the United States. The United States was particularly important due to having the power to influence a government's policy, and taking an antagonistic position against the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.[2]

The Islamist government seems to have adopted more direct means against clearly anti-Sudanese (or anti-Islamist) regimes than less anti-Sudanese regimes, and towards the neighboring countries rather than some Middle Eastern countries. Sudan's relations with other countries were greatly affected by this dimension.

This section is divided into two sub-sections: (a) Sudan and its neighbors, and (b) Sudan and the Middle East. The following list shows the countries concerned.

Sub-section (a): Sudan and its neighbors

(i) Egypt, (ii) Libya, (iii) Chad, (iv) CAR, (v) Zaire, (vi) Uganda, (vii) Kenya, (viii) Ethiopia, (ix) Eritrea, (x) Saudi Arabia.[3]

Although Saudi Arabia is separated from Sudan by the Red Sea, all of these countries are classified as Sudan's immediate neighbors.

Sub-section (b): Sudan and the Middle East

(i) Algeria, (ii) Iran, (iii) Iraq, (iv) PLO, (v) Tunisia, (vi) Yemen.[4]

The listed countries and the PLO are covered on the basis of being considered important in terms of Sudan's regional foreign relations.

(a) Sudan and its neighbors

(i) Egypt

Egypt, throughout history, has been the most important country to Sudan. Egypt's geographical location, bounded by Sudan to the south, and its high Muslim composition (more than 80% of the population are Muslims)[5] provided an important basis for the Egyptian-Sudanese relations. Since Sudan's independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1956, however, the relationship between Sudan and Egypt has not improved very much. When al-Bashir came to power in 1989, there were already some seeds of tension between the two countries. Egypt's anti-Islamist position was one of them. After the assassination of President Anwar Sadat ('Anwar al-Saadaat) by the Egyptian Islamists in 1981, the regime led by President Husni Mubarak (Husnii Mubaarak) made its anti-Islamist position clear. Egypt's good relationship with America was another seed of tension. In the 1980s, US aid became essential to the Egyptian economy.[6] The border dispute over the

Halaib (Halaayb) region which started in 1958[7] was another source of tension. The protection Egypt offered to Nimairi after April 1985 was another - Nimairi antagonized the NIF during the final period of his rule.

Sudan's efforts to expand its influence regionally between 1989 and 1993, seem to have resulted in increasing tension between Sudan and Egypt. This tension can be seen in four aspects of the relationship between the two countries - these are Egyptian concern over Sudanese attempts to spread Islamism (Dr al-Turabi's influence on Egyptian Islamists), the Southern issue (Egypt's influence on the SPLA), the impact of the Gulf Crisis (Sudan's pro-Iraqi position during the crisis), and the Halaib (Halaayb) issue (the border dispute).

The Egyptian regime had a strong concern over Sudanese attempts to spread Islamism in Egypt. Dr al-Turabi's influence on Egyptian Islamists who oppose the regime of President Mubarak appear to have provoked the Egyptian president. President Mubarak often blamed Dr al-Turabi for his influence on Egyptian Islamists. In August 1991, for example, President Mubarak criticized Dr al-Turabi in the following terms: 'The problem is Hassan, who is playing a very dangerous game.'[8] In September 1991, President Mubarak again accused Dr al-Turabi of undermining the relationship between Egypt and Sudan.[9] Around April 1992, President Mubarak publicly blamed Dr al-Turabi for the problems in the relations between Egypt and Sudan.[10]

In addition to this, the Egyptian government was accusing the Sudanese government of not only supporting the Egyptian Islamists, but also of sending Sudanese Islamists into Egypt. *Sudan Update* of 30 September 1992 reported that the Egyptian government feared that Egyptian and Sudanese Islamists would establish *de facto* Islamic liberated areas in Southern Egypt.[11]

Egypt's interference in Sudan's Southern issue (Egypt's influence on the SPLA) was another source of tension. Egypt appears to have tried to undermine the Sudanese Islamist regime by supporting the SPLA. The Sudanese government, in any case, frequently accused Egypt of helping the Sudanese rebels. For example, *Sudan Update* of 1 June 1990 reported that the Sudanese government accused the Egyptian government of receiving a delegation from the SPLA-Mainstream.[12] In July 1990, *Sudan Update* reported John Garang as saying that President

Mubarak was a pragmatist and a likable person.[13] *Sudan Update* of 30 September 1992 again reported that the Sudanese government had accused the Egyptian government of helping Sudanese rebel activities in Southern Sudan.[14]

During the Gulf Crisis (started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990), the tension between Egypt and Sudan became extremely high. This high tension was mainly caused by the difference between the political positions of the two countries towards Iraq (and presumably America) - Sudan was pro-Iraq (and anti-America) and Egypt was anti-Iraq (and pro-America).

A military threat was then raised from the Egyptian side. On 27 September 1990, President Mubarak warned Sudan that: 'Egypt would not hesitate to take out any Iraqi missiles positioned in Sudan.'[15] This statement was the reaction to the local media reports which said that Sudan obtained missiles from Iraq in order to threaten the Aswan High Dam.[16] Although Egyptian military invasion did not occur, the Second Gulf War (January - February 1991) and the Somali operation (December 1992 - March 1995) made the Sudanese feel such an intervention more realistic.

The Halaib (Halaayb) issue was the oldest source of tension between Egypt and Sudan. The tension created in the other dimensions discussed above seems to have fuelled the border dispute. In January 1992, Sudan gave a licence of oil exploration to a Canadian company in the Halaib region, and this triggered off a new round of border dispute.[17]

On 4 April 1992, a Sudanese police station in the Halaib region was attacked by Egyptian military men and two Sudanese policemen were killed.[18] President Mubarak said in a message to Lt.Gen. al-Bashir that it was an "individual and unintended incident."[19] Early in September 1992, an Egyptian army unit was sent into the Halaib region; and this was considered as an annexation attempt.[20] In December 1992, the Sudanese Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Chairman of the UN Security Council stating allegations against the Egyptian government over the Halaib region.[21] In response to the Sudanese action, the Egyptian Foreign Minister said that:

> 'Egypt had not ceased to exercise its sovereignty since the signing of the 1899 accord and affirmed that the current

> Egyptian [military] presence in the area north of the 22nd parallel was to protect Egypt's borders against incursion, particularly by terrorist groups whose activity has expanded recently.'[22]

In January 1993, Professor Ahmad Ali Hakim ('Ahmad ᶜAli Haakim), said that historical evidence proved that Halaib was Sudanese and 'the Egyptian government had previously approved the transfer of the administration of Halaib to Sudan.'[23] In addition to this, a Japanese archaeological mission had carried out its research and pointed out that: 'The prevailing Beja culture in Halaib confirms that the area belongs to Sudan culturally.'[24]

The Guardian of 19 February 1993 reported that: 'In the last two months, Egypt's military presence has grown to an estimated 2,000 men.' From 22 to 26 February 1993, the third session of the Egyptian-Sudanese committee on the Halaib region was held in Khartoum.[25] In June 1993, the Sudanese government demanded the withdrawal of the Egyptian military forces from the Halaib region before the Organization of African Unity Summit Conference which was going to be held on 28 June.[26]

At the end of 1993, the border dispute was still continuing. Egypt's growing military presence in the Halaib region and the military threat raised by Egypt during the Gulf Crisis seem to have created a great threat to the Sudanese regime. Table 8.1.(1) is intended to show the military balance between Egypt and Sudan. The gap between the military equipment of Sudan and Egypt is obvious. The military balance suggests that Sudan would have little chance in defeating Egypt in a conventional battle.

Table 8.1.(1): Military balance between Sudan and Egypt (1993-94)

	Sudan	Egypt
Total Armed Forces (active)	72,800	430,000
Army		
Main Battle Tanks (MBT)	250	3,167
	20 M-60A3	700 M-60A1 747 M-60A3 80 M1A1
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL)	100	275
Air Force		
Combat Aircraft	51	546
	8 MiG-21 3 MiG-23	100 MiG-21 110 F-16A,C
Armed Helicopters	2	74

M-60A1, M-60A3, M1A1 = types of tanks
Mig-21, Mig-23, F-16A,C = types of aircraft

Source: The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 113-115 and 129.

(ii) Libya

Libya's geographical position, bordered to the south-east by Sudan, and its mostly Muslim population (most of them are *Sunni* Muslims)[27] provided an important basis for Libyan-Sudanese relations. The political position of Libya led by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi (Muʿammar al-Qadhdhaafii) was more or less sympathetic towards the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi, on the grounds that both sides were anti-American when al-Bashir came to power. Libya supported the 1976 armed operation organized by the Sudanese opposition (including the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi) against the Nimairi regime which was seen as being pro-American. In the 1980s, the US already regarded Libya as one of the states which supported international terrorism.[28] The US increased its pressure on Libya and imposed an eco-

nomic embargo in 1986.[29] Thus, there was the foundation for a good relationship between Libya and Sudan.

The Sudanese-Libyan relationship, between 1989 and 1993, can be divided into two phases: initial enthusiasm for Sudanese-Libyan integration, followed by a subsequent cooling down of that enthusiasm after mid-1992. The latter seems to have stemmed from Libyan skepticism about Sudan's expansionist policy and Dr al-Turabi's real intention behind the integration.

The enthusiasm for the Sudanese-Libyan integration can be traced back to about a month after Omar al-Bashir's coup. The dialogue about the future co-operation between the two countries was reported in early August 1989.[30] The integration process between the two countries officially started seven months later. In March 1990, Col. Qadhafi and Lt.Gen. al-Bashir signed a declaration of integration between Libya and Sudan - the declaration envisaged the integration of the two countries' political, economic, defence, social, and foreign policies.[31] On 1 September 1990, another step towards Sudanese-Libyan integration was made. Libya and Sudan reached an agreement on forming a general secretariat for the integration.[32] The following day, on 2 September, an agreement on security cooperation was reached.[33] On 20 October 1990, Qadhafi arrived in Sudan to address the concluding session of the National Dialogue Conference which adopted the Libyan-style political system.[34] In early March 1991, the Sudanese Minister of Justice announced that an agreement on judicial integration between the two states had been concluded in Tripoli.[35] In November 1991, the Secretary-General of the Sudanese-Libyan integration committee announced that the integration process was moving ahead steadily as planned.[36] He also confirmed that Libya was supplying Sudan with approximately 6,100 tonnes of oil products monthly.[37] In February 1992, the Libyan Secretary for the Sudanese-Libyan Integration Affairs told a Sudanese media delegation in Tripoli that:

> 'We have two options: either integration for economic progress, or to remain weak and backward. ... The integration process is proceeding through three main channels. The first is political, the second is economic and the third is legal. ... The volume of trade between the two countries has increased enormously. Libyan exports to Sudan over the last ten months have amounted to US$ 45 million in the private sector alone despite the existence of transportation diffi-

culties. ... Libya had received various Sudanese products notably sesame, sugar, meat, gum arabic and fodder.'[38]

Despite the initial enthusiasm for the Sudanese-Libyan integration, from mid-1992 until the end of 1993 there was little evidence of progress in the integration project.[39] The cooling down of the enthusiasm seems to have started from the Libyan side and stemmed from Libyan skepticism about Sudanese intentions. Sudanese intentions over integration were initially seen as economic, i.e. to ease Sudan's desperate economic situation, gaining cash, food and oil from Libya.[40] However, the Libyans later suspected that the real intentions of the Sudanese government were of an Islamist nature.

The Libyans feared that if the integration went ahead, Libya would be controlled by the Sudanese Islamists. The Libyan government was basically secularist and the Libyans were not keen on creating an Islamic state like Sudan. This was apparent in the following reports. Around mid-1991, it was reported that Col. Qadhafi had accused Dr al-Turabi of destabilizing Libya by sending trained Islamist fighters.[41] In late 1991, there was speculation about Lt.Gen. al-Bashir's visit to Libya - it was said that al-Bashir went there to apologise to Col. Qadhafi for Dr al-Turabi's speech (see note).[42]

The relationship between Sudan and Libya from 1989 up to the end of 1993, as a whole, was relatively good. Sudan maintained its full support for Libya and opposed UN sanctions against Libya. In December 1993, the Second PAIC adopted a resolution on Libya as follows:

'The conference declared its support for Libya, following multi-faceted attacks on her sovereignty, and urged Arab and Islamic countries to ignore the embargo imposed on the country.'[43]

(iii) Chad[44]

Chad, bordered to the east by Sudan, has a population of which almost 50% are Muslims who live in the north, about 7% who are Christians, and most of the remainder hold animistic beliefs.[45] By 1989, the political position of Chad led by President Hissene Habre was anti-Libya and pro-America, while that of the Sudanese Islamists was pro-Libya and anti-America. In the late 1980s, there was fighting between Libya and Chad, and the US supported the latter.[46] Since Sudan shares a long common border with Chad, Chad's political position constituted a potential threat to the Islamist Sudan. In addition to this, there were many Muslims in Chad whom Sudan could influence. Therefore, there existed the foundation for a bad relationship between Chad and Sudan.

Sudan's efforts to create a more pro-Sudanese regime in Chad after 1989, created tension between Habre's regime and al-Bashir's Islamist regime. By the late 1990, the relationship between the two governments deteriorated. In December 1990, however, the Habre regime collapsed and a pro-Sudanese government was established. After December 1990, therefore, the relationship between the new Chadian government and the Sudanese government improved.

In late 1989, for example, the Habre government accused the Sudanese and Libyan governments of supporting the Chadian opposition.[47] It is said that the Chadian opposition was fighting with some Libyan forces, the so-called "Islamic Legion", against the Chadian government forces inside Sudanese territory, in Darfur region.[48] On the other hand, Sudan accused Chad of supporting the SPLA.[49]

Sudan's efforts, however, seem to have finally resulted in the overthrow of the Habre regime and in the establishment of a pro-Sudanese regime. By the end of November 1990, the Chadian government forces were defeated by the Patriotic Salvation Movement, the Chadian

opposition, and on 1 December 1990, Chad's President, Hissene Habre, fled to Cameroon.[50] In late December 1990, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir visited Ndjamena, the Chadian capital, and was reported as saying that Sudan would give all possible assistance to the new government under President Idriss Deby.[51] Between December 1990 and December 1993, the relationship between Chad and Sudan was relatively good and friendly.

(iv) CAR[52]

The Central African Republic (CAR), bounded by Sudan to the east, has a population of which about one-third are Christians and the remainder hold animist beliefs[53] - there is no report of a Muslim community which the Sudanese Islamists could influence. When al-Bashir came to power in 1989, the CAR had strong ties with France (the former colonial power), but not with the US. At that time, there was no specific foundation for tension between the CAR and Sudan.

Between 1989 and 1993, the CAR's political position towards the Sudanese Islamist government was not hostile. This was perhaps in part due to the non existence of a Muslim community in the CAR which Sudan could influence. During the period, there was little news of tension between Sudan and the CAR, and the relationship between the two countries was relatively good.

(v) Zaire[54]

Zaire, bordered by Sudan to the north, has a population which mainly follow traditional African beliefs[55] with small groups of Christians and Muslims.[56] The political position of the Zairian regime led by Mobutu Sese Seko seems to have been affected by some Western powers, such as the US, France, and Belgium. After 1986, there was growing

international pressure on the Mobutu regime concerning the violation of human rights.[57] In June 1989, Mobutu visited the US and returned with a loan of US$20 million from the World Bank.[58] There is some evidence, therefore, that when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, Mobutu was able to take advantage of the situation and improve relations with the US.

During the period from 1989 to 1993, although the Sudanese Islamist government pointed out some connection between the Zairean government and the SPLA in 1990,[59] the stance of Zaire was relatively neutral. The Zairean regime seems not to have seriously contacted the SPLA. The Sudanese government appears also not to have seriously conducted its expansionist policy towards Zaire. Perhaps for these reasons, the relationship between Sudan and Zaire, between 1989 and the end of 1993, was relatively good.

(vi) Uganda[60]

Uganda, bordered by Sudan to the north, has a population of which more than 60% are Christian with a small Muslim minority.[61] The political position of the Ugandan regime led by Yoweri Museveni was marked by its strong support for the SPLA. It was reported that the Ugandan government and the SPLA had reached an agreement on the secret military cooperation on 29 March 1989.[62] Thus, when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan in June 1989, there was a foundation for tension between Uganda and Sudan.

Between 1989 and the end of 1993, the relationship between Sudan and Uganda was very bad. While the Sudanese government frequently accused the Ugandan government of supporting the SPLA, the Ugandan government criticized the Sudanese counterpart for spreading Islamism into Uganda. Despite the official agreement of non-interference reached by April 1990,[63] the governments of Uganda and Sudan both seem to have been secretly supporting each other's opposition.

Sudan's accusation against Uganda of supporting the SPLA, for example, appeared in August 1992. According to Sudanese military sources, the Ugandan government helped Garang who was supervising the operations of his SPLA faction from Uganda.[64] In October 1992, Uganda was reported as denying Sudanese allegations that Uganda had sent its soldiers to the border in order to support the SPLA.[65] In addition to this, it was reported in February 1993 that Uganda was continuing to supply arms and ammunitions to Garang's SPLA.[66] In August 1993, *The Guardian* also reported Uganda's supply to the SPLA.[67] On the other hand, *Africa Confidential* of 26 October 1990 pointed out that the Sudanese government was arming the Ugandan opposition, the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA: not Islamic), in the North of Uganda.[68]

Uganda's accusation against Sudan, on the other hand, was mainly related to the Islamist dimension. During that period, the Ugandan regime was strongly concerned with the Islamist activities in the Ugandan territory. In July 1990, Radio SPLA reported that the Ugandan government accused a number of Sudanese Islamists, who were working with the Islamic *Dawa* (Daᶜwa) Organization[69] in Uganda, of interfering in Ugandan internal affairs.[70] These individuals were expelled.[71] In February 1993, it was reported that Uganda had sought support from the West to prevent "Eastern Black Africa" from been conquered by Islam.[72] However, because Uganda's efforts had gained little result, President Museveni decided to negotiate directly with the Sudanese government, even offering assistance to the negotiations between the Sudanese government and Garang's SPLA faction.[73]

(vii) Kenya[74]

Kenya is bordered by Sudan to the north, and most of the Kenyan population follow traditional African beliefs, though there is a significant Christian community and a smaller Muslims community.[75] The political position of the Kenyan regime led by Daniel Arap Moi towards

Sudan seems to have been affected by the regime's bad relations with other neighbours. In the late 1980s, Kenya had problems with Ethiopia and Uganda[76] - both countries share longer borders than Sudan. When al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, Kenya had too many problems elsewhere to be able to support the SPLA positively.

Between 1989 and 1993, there was tension between Sudan and Kenya. The Sudanese government accused the Kenyan government of supporting the SPLA,[77] while the Kenyan government accused Sudan of supporting the Kenyan Islamic Party and of spreading Islam in Kenya and eastern Africa.[78] Despite each other's accusations, the tension between the two countries remained at a relatively low level. In addition to this, Kenya appears to have been more interested in the role of mediation between the Sudanese government and the SPLA.

The relatively low tension between the two countries seems to have stemmed from the relatively low level of interference of the two governments towards each other's opposition - especially from the Kenyan side. In June 1991, it was reported that Kenya was taking a strictly neutral stand in terms of the Sudanese civil war.[79] On 23 March 1992, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir announced that the Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi, had agreed to a non-aggression pact when the Kenyan President visited Khartoum on 20 March.[80]

Meanwhile, Kenya showed interest in mediating in the conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA. On 13 June 1990, the Sudanese ambassador to Zimbabwe was reported as saying that Kenya and Nigeria had shown their interest in mediating in the conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA.[81] In March 1993, the Speaker of the Sudanese Transitional National Assembly (TNA) thanked Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi and two other presidents, Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida and Uganda's President Museveni, for their role in the peace efforts between the Sudanese government and the rebels.[82]

(viii) Ethiopia[83]

Ethiopia, bordered by Sudan to the west, has a population of which great majority are Christians (Ethiopian Orthodox) and small minorities are Muslims and followers of animist beliefs.[84] In the 1980s, the pro-Soviet Mengistu government was fighting against its rebel forces, such as the Eritrean Poeple's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF). While the Mengistu government was supporting the Sudanese rebels (the SPLA), the successive Sudanese governments had been supporting the Ethiopian opposition (including the EPLF and TPLF) since 1984.[85] Thus, when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan in 1989, there was already high tension between Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Ethiopian-Sudanese relationship, between 1989 and 1993, can be divided into two phases: the first phase, from 1989 until the fall of President Mengistu's government in May 1991, in which the relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia deteriorated; and the second phase, from May 1991 to the end of 1993, in which the relationship improved.

In the first phase, both governments were supporting each other's opposition.[86] In October 1989, Sudan accused Ethiopia of supporting the SPLA, when the SPLA captured the town of Kurmuk (Kurmuk) on the Ethiopian border.[87] However, in May 1991, President Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe and his government collapsed.[88] As a result, the SPLA lost its main supply source.[89] *The Daily Telegraph* of 30 May 1991 reported that Lt.Gen. al-Bashir congratulated the leaders of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) on their victory over Mengistu.[90]

In the second phase, between May 1991 and December 1993, Sudanese-Ethiopian relations improved. In June 1991, the leader of the EPRDF, Ata Meles Zenawi, became the interim president of Ethiopia.[91] After a three-year long suspension of services, on 9 November 1992, the air-contacts between Sudan and Ethiopia were reopened as a sign of the improvement of relations.[92] To the researcher's knowledge, the relationship between the two countries, from 1992 up to the end of 1993, was friendly.

(ix) Eritrea[93]

Eritrea, bounded to the north-west by Sudan, has a population of which the bulk are Christians or Muslims and the remainder are followers of the traditional African religions.[94] Until Eritrea's independence in May 1993, this region was part of Ethiopia. Therefore, the relationship between Eritrea and Sudan here means the relationship between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF: including both Christians and Muslims)[95] and Sudan. At the time of the late 1980s, the EPLF was fighting against the pro-Soviet Mengistu government and backed by successive Sudanese governments.[96] According to *Sudanow*, 'Sudan has hosted Eritrean liberation movements since 1984.'[97] When al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, therefore, the foundation was there for a good relationship between the EPLF and Sudan.

From 1989 up to Eritrea's independence in May 1993, the relationship between the EPLF and the Sudanese Islamist regime was very good. After Eritrea's independence, however, the Eritrean-Sudanese relationship deteriorated. Eritrea's fear of the Sudan's influence on the Eritrean Islamists was the main cause of the deterioration.

The initial good relationship between the EPLF and Sudan stemmed mainly from Sudan's continuous support of the EPLF and its cause. *Sudanow*, the Khartoum-based monthly magazine (practically controlled by the Islamist government), pointed out that: 'President Isias Afwerki is well aware of the role played by the present Sudanese government in bringing him to power.'[98] Between 1989 and 1993, there were some events which provided evidence of this good relationship. For example, in early January 1992, joint military maneuvers between the Eritrean and Sudanese navies were held in the Red Sea.[99] On 10 January 1992, Dr al-Turabi arrived at Asmara and was welcomed by the Eritran radio as a friend of the Eritrean revolution and people.[100] Dr al-Turabi was officially received by the secretary to the general secretariat of the Eritrean interim government.[101]

Between 23 and 25 April 1993, the UN-supervised referendum on independence was held and the Eritrean people chose national independence.[102] *Sudan Focus* stated that while Egypt was against the independence of Eritrea, Sudan strongly supported it.[103] 24 May was chosen as the independence day and Eritrea joined the UN on 28 May 1993.[104] Lt.Gen. al-Bashir and a high delegation from Sudan took part in the celebration of the Eritrean independence.[105]

After Eritrean independence, however, the Eritrean president, Isiyas Afwerki, turned his back on Sudan. This seems to have stemmed from Afwerki's fear of Sudan's influence on the Eritrean Islamists. In December 1993, President Afwerki, accused the Sudanese government and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi of supporting an Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean *Jihad*, in military training and cross-border military attacks.[106] Although Sudan refuted the Eritrean accusation, this row seems to have become the turning point of the relations between the two countries. It was clear that the Sudanese government was upset about Eritrea's antagonistic attitude towards Sudan which helped Eritrea's independence. The relationship between Sudan and Eritrea became very bad. *Sudan Focus* pointed out President Afwerki's concern about the Islamist element in Eritrea as follows:

> 'President Afwerki is doubtless aware of the impact of Islam on his country's politics. Ever since his days as a freedom fighter with the EPLF, the front - despite its notable Muslim contingent - has been viewed with suspicion by many within the Eritrean Muslim community. Indeed this even led to frequent inter-fighting between the EPLF and the Eritrean Jihad during the liberation war. While the Muslim population in Eritrea is believed to outnumber other communities there, president Afwerki is criticised by his Muslim opponents for knowingly forming a Tigre (predominantly Christians) dominated government.'[107]

(x) Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's geographical position, facing Sudan across the Red Sea, and its exclusively Muslim composition (about 85% of the population are *Sunni* Muslims and about 15% are *Shia* Muslims),[108] provided an important basis for Saudi-Sudanese relations. In June 1982, Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz (Fahd ibn ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziiz) became the king of Saudi Arabia.[109] Despite Saudi Arabia's strong Islamic tradition, the Saudi government's anti-Islamist and pro-American position became clear in the 1980s. During the Iran-Iraq war, mainly because of the regime's fear of the spread of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the Saudi government backed Iraq together with the US.[110] When al-Bashir came to power in Sudan in 1989, therefore, there was a potential tension between Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

Before the Gulf Crisis, started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the tension between the Sudanese Islamist government and the Saudi government was relatively low. After August 1990, however, the relationship between Sudan and Saudi Arabia deteriorated. Sudan's opposition to the Western interference in the Gulf Crisis, which caused Sudan's pro-Iraqi stance, and Dr al-Turabi's influence on the Saudi Islamists who also opposed the Western interference, seemed to be the main causes.

In August 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi attitude - clearly in favour of the Americans - provoked anti-Saudi sentiment among the Sudanese Islamists. It was reported that anti-Saudi demonstrations took place in Khartoum, which caused considerable damage to the premises of the Saudi embassy, with demonstrators shouting anti-American, anti-Egyptian and anti-Saudi slogans.[111] On 6 September 1990, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir made the position of Sudan on the Gulf Crisis clear: (1) The problems between Muslim countries should be solved among the Muslim countries; (2) The problems should be solved through dialogue.[112] In the same month, Dr al-Turabi, was reported as having visited Saudi Arabia in secret.[113] This was seen as Dr al-Turabi's attempt to stop Western interference, but failed. Sudan's pro-Iraqi position resulted in the losses of foreign aid. In October 1990, it was reported that Sudan's losses, because of the Gulf Crisis,

were more than 1.7 billion US dollars and Sudan had become one of the ten states most affected by the crisis.[114]

The Second Gulf War occurred between January and February 1991, and the Iraqi forces were defeated by the US-led forces. The war raised strong anti-Western (particularly anti-US) sentiment among the Islamists around the world. Dr al-Turabi took advantage of this sentiment and held the First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) in Khartoum in April 1991. The conference strongly criticized the Western interference in the Arab and Islamic affairs.

It was evident that the Saudi monarch was increasingly concerned about Sudan's influence on the Saudi Islamists and the growing Islamist activities both inside and outside the kingdom. Dr al-Turabi's account suggested his strong influence on the Saudi Islamists (see Section 8.2). In June 1991, a number of Sudanese Islamists were reported to have been expelled from Saudi Arabia.[115] *Middle East International* of 11 June 1993 reported that the Saudi King made his strongest speech yet against Islamist terrorism at the *id* (ᶜiid) speech.[116]

After the war, the Saudi Islamists, who were opposing the Saudi government, apparently become more active. In May 1993, the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) was set up in Riyadh by a group of Saudi notables who were known Islamists, but promptly banned by the Saudi authorities.[117] According to *The Economist*, the aim of the CDLR was 'to act as an independent human-rights commission and, more important, to enforce what the founders saw as declining Islamic standards in the wake of the Gulf war.'[118]

Meanwhile, the Saudi government seems to have also supported the Sudanese rebels in order to undermine the Sudanese Islamist government. In October 1990, the Sudanese government accused the Saudi government of receiving a number of Sudanese rebel leaders and of granting them a large amount of financial support.[119] In late May 1992, al-Bashir accused Saudi Arabia of assisting the rebel SPLA.[120]

(b) Sudan and the Middle East

(i) Algeria

Algeria has a mostly Muslim population,[121] which provides a strong incentive for the Sudanese Islamists to approach. In the late 1980s, the anti-Islamist position of the Algerian regime led by Chadli Bendjedid (Shaadhilii bin Jadiid) was clear.[122] In 1987 and 1988, clashes between Algerian Islamists and the security forces were reported.[123] In the opposition, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist movement, was one of the most powerful groups. When al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, therefore, there was a foundation for tension between the Algerian regime and the Sudanese regime in terms of Islamism.

Between 1989 and 1993, there was evidence of a strong link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Algerian Islamists. This link was tolerated by the Algerian regime for the first several years, but eventually raised tension between the Algerian government and its Sudanese Islamist counterpart, especially after 1992.

The Islamist link between Algeria and Sudan was apparent in a number of reports produced during the period. For example, in April 1991, it was reported that an Algerian Islamist took part in the First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference held in Khartoum.[124] On 5 January 1992, *Sunday Telegraph* reported that: 'A sum of $12 million donated by both Iran and rich Gulf-based Islamic businessmen has been deposited in the Faisal Islamic Bank in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to help the FIS.'[125] Between 2 and 4 December 1993, the Second PAIC was held in Khartoum and a delegation from the FIS was reported to have participated the conference.[126]

The Algerian regime's crackdown on the Islamists started in 1991, when the regime was making a commitment to the parliamentary elections which were actually the first free elections in the Arab world - except for some cases in Lebanon.[127] The Islamists were taking part in the elections, and in December 1991, the FIS had won the first

round.[128] Fearing the high probability of the Islamists' victory in the second round of elections which were due to be held on 16 January 1992, the Algerian army moved in on 11 January 1992, and next day, the second round of elections were cancelled.[129] The FIS was banned and thousands of its members were put in jail.[130] *The Economist* reported that most of the Algerian Military and middle-class people regarded the FIS as a plague to be eliminated.[131]

The Algerian government started to accuse Sudan of supporting the Algerian Islamists after the cancellation of the elections in January 1992. In March 1993, the Algerian government recalled its ambassador from Khartoum accusing Sudan of supporting the Algerian Islamists together with Iran.[132] Between 1992 and 1993, the relationship between the Sudanese government and the Algerian government was basically not very good.

The French government, which had strong interests in Algeria, however, had noticed that Dr al-Turabi's influence over the Algerian Islamists could be utilized in order to calm the situation in which the fighting between the Algerian security forces and the Algerian Islamists was escalating. This seems to have resulted in the Second PAIC's resolution on Algeria which called for a dialogue in Algeria between the Islamist groups and other political groups.[133] To the researcher's knowledge, however, this did not actually improve the situation in Algeria during the period - but it did improve the relations between Sudan and France, especially in 1994.[134]

(ii) Iran

Iran has a population of which the great majority are *Shia* Muslims, the large minority are *Sunni* Muslims, and the smaller minorities are Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians.[135] The political position of the Iranian regime in 1989 was pro-Islamist, anti-America, and anti-Iraq.[136] Iran became an Islamic state by a popular Islamic revolution in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the US supported Iraq

in order to stop the spread of the Iranian Islamic revolution to the Gulf region. According to Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, of all Arab countries Syria alone supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.[137] However, Sudan led by Sadiq al-Mahdi seems to have been sympathetic towards Iran during the war. This comes across in the following report. In early September 1989, an Iranian daily newspaper pointed out that: 'Sadiq al-Mahdi had invested in a policy of cordiality with the Islamic Republic, and could never bring himself to do anything by way of appealing to the US, Iraq, and the reactionary regimes in the region'.[138] When al-Bashir came to power, therefore, there was the foundation for a good relationship between Iran and Sudan.

Contrary to expectations, the relationship between Iran and Sudan from 1989 to 1993 was relatively cool (also see Dr al-Turabi's account in Section 8.2). This was apparent in the 1989-90 period in which Iran and Sudan quarrelled, and in 1993 when Sudan experienced serious oil shortages. Sudan tried to improve the relations with Iran, particularly during the period between 1990 and 1992, and succeeded to some extent, but the relatively cool relations remained. Despite this, allegations of the strong link between the Iranian Islamists and the Sudanese Islamist were sometimes reported .

The initial quarrel and rather cool relations between Iran and Sudan, between 1989 and mid-1990, seemed to have stemmed mainly from Iran's misunderstanding of the nature of the new Sudanese regime. Iran appears to have thought that the position of al-Bashir's regime was anti-Islamist - Dr al-Turabi and other leading Islamists had been arrested at that time (the researcher believes this arrest was a sham). In August 1989, a commentary on Iranian television criticized the goals of al-Bashir's new government, saying that they were "ambiguous".[139] In protest to this commentary, on 27 August 1989, the Sudanese Information Minister announced that Sudan recalled its ambassador to Iran.[140] In early September 1989, an Iranian daily newspaper criticized al-Bashir for visiting Iraq (August 1989)[141] in order to please Saddam Husain's Iraqi regime.[142] On 25 April 1990, the Iranian radio criticized al-Bashir for resorting to suppressive measures to

control Sudan, concerning the coup attempt which took place in Sudan in March.[143]

Due to Sudan's efforts, the relationship between the two countries improved a little. It came after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The pro-Iraq stance of Sudan resulted in Sudan's financial difficulties and this might be one of the reasons why Sudan started to woo Iran. In late September 1990, it was reported that Sudan was totally dependent on Iran, Iraq and Libya for its necessary money and oil.[144] In October 1990, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Col. Sulayman (Sulaymaan), said in Iran that: 'We recognise the Islamic republic of Iran as the hope of the Islamic *umma* and the leading force in achieving victory for the oppressed forces.'[145] In December 1990, it was reported that the Chairman of the RCC, Lt.Gn. al-Bashir, visited Iran and expressed his government's intention to use Iran's experience in Islamization as source of inspiration.[146] Both of the statements by Sulayman in October 1990, and al-Bashir in December 1990 sounded flattering, but it appeared that Sudan's wooing Iran gained some positive results, which followed from 1991 as financial and trade agreements. On 13 December 1991, the Iranian President, Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, arrived in Khartoum heading a large delegation of 157, 80 of whom were military and intelligence personnel.[147] On this occasion, Iran agreed to a loan of 250 million US dollars for Sudan to buy arms from China.[148] On 15 January 1992, *Teheran Radio* reported that, as part of a trade package, 100,000 tonnes of oil would be exported to Sudan on a monthly basis.[149]

The seemingly good relations between the two countries from 1990 to 1992, appears to have provoked the worry of Western and pro-Western countries, and have raised speculation about the strong relations between Sudan and Iran. There was a tendency for Western and pro-Western countries to link Iran with anything against their interests, including terroristic activities occurred in those countries. In March 1992, the Sudanese opposition in Cairo accused Iran of sending its troops to assist the Sudanese government.[150] On 10 October 1993, *Sunday Telegraph* reported an allegation that Iranians were training

Somalis in Sudan.[151] On 14 October 1993, *Al-Hayat* reported an allegation made by a London-based institute that Iran had transferred a huge amount of money through Dr al-Turabi to finance Islamist activities around the world.[152]

Despite the strong speculation and expectation of the observers, the relationship between the two countries seems not to have improved beyond more than a pragmatic level. This was apparent in the following reports. In March 1993, it was reported that because of the serious oil shortages a number of Sudanese officials visited Iran seeking for Iran's help, but the negotiations had collapsed and Sudan could not receive anything.[153] Iran demanded that a European country should be the guarantor of the payment for the Iranian oil.[154] This suggested that Iran was quite pragmatic and was not keen on helping another Islamic state at its own expense. To quote *The EIU Country Report*:

> 'Tehran's pragmatic faction, led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Iranian president, appears to want to distance itself from an almost universally-reviled regime, and, in turn, gradually reverse its own international isolation. Khartoum's efforts towards closer ties with Iran, far from being ideological in nature, are largely economic. Its main hope is a restoration of oil supplies from Iran, which have dried up since January [1993], reportedly because Tehran is demanding advance payment before any further oil supplies are released to Khartoum.'[155]

(iii) Iraq

Iraq has a large Muslim population (about 95% of total) of which more than half belong to the *Shia* sect.[156] Despite the high Muslim composition, the Iraqi regime led by President Saddam Husain (Saddaam Husayn) was basically pursuing a secular line of policy. In 1989, the political position of the regime was in short anti-Iran, pro-America, and anti-Islamist. This position mainly stemmed from the war with Iran. Iraq was backed by the US and many other countries, and fought to undermine the Islamic state, Iran. As mentioned in the section of Iran, Sudan led by Sadiq al-Mahdi (before al-Bashir came to power)

seems to have been sympathetic towards Iran. When al-Bashir came to power, therefore, there was a potential for tension between Iraq and Sudan.

Despite the potential tension, Sudanese-Iraqi relations between 1989 and 1993 were good. This was attributable to two different strategies pursued by the Sudanese government. The first strategy, adopted between 1989 and 1990, involved an attempt to improve relations with Iraq in order to obtain some financial and military support from Iraq. Unfortunately, this strategy did not work properly because of the Gulf Crisis started by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the Iraqi defeat in the Second Gulf War. The Sudanese Islamist regime, therefore, initiated a second strategy of Islamist expansion during the Gulf Crisis, taking advantage of the Islamists' opposition to Western interference in the Gulf. Sudanese policies towards Iraq after the Gulf Crisis were clearly put more emphasis on the Islamist basis than on gaining financial and military support from the outside world, in so far as on the latter grounds they would have sided with the UN in the Second Gulf War.

Sudan's first strategy involved its attempts to improve relations with Iraq for the purpose of obtaining some financial and military support from Iraq. There was little doubt that Sudan saw Iraq as a great Arab power in the region. Sudan's attempts to improve relations with Iraq come across in the following report. In August 1989, before his visit to Iraq Lt.Gen. al-Bashir made a statement that the previous Sadiq al-Mahdi government's attitude towards Iraq was wrong and the relationship between Sudan and Arab countries was miss-evaluated.[157]

The first strategy was interrupted because of the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Gulf Crisis began. On the same day, the UN Security Council passed a resolution which demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops.[158] On 6 August 1990, the UN Security Council imposed the toughest sanctions in its history on Iraq.[159] On 8 August 1990, President Saddam Hussein announced the annexation of Kuwait.[160] On the same day, President Bush warned Hussein that there would be war if Hussein crossed the line which had been drawn in the sand by the first US troops who had arrived in Saudi Arabia.[161]

As the Western pressure on Iraq increased, the Sudanese Islamist regime started to adopt the second strategy of Islamist expansion, taking advantage of the Islamists' opposition to Western interference in the Gulf. Firstly Sudan made its pro-Iraqi position clear. On 4 August 1990, in the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) (Dr al-Turabi is anti-ICO, see note),[162] Sudan, together with Jordan, Mauritania, Yemen and the PLO abstained from voting in a resolution condemning Iraq and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Iraq's forces - Libya and Djibouti did not participate in the vote.[163] In addition to this, on 6 September 1990, the Sudanese government made its position towards the Gulf Crisis clear. To quote *Sudanow*:

> 'We believe that the safety and security of the two holy shrines and the surrounding areas as well as other sites of Islam are among our fundamental responsibilities. ... we stand against the foreign armies' presence to protect the Islamic holy lands. ... We insisted that dialogue within the Arab world should be adopted as the basis for solving the problem, which results from differences between the members of the same family. We were encouraged and supported in our efforts to halt the escalation towards war and to hold negotiations. ... We believe in the possibility of reaching a solution to the differences which have arisen among our brothers in the Gulf.'[164]

The Sudanese advocated the two points: (1) The problems between Muslim countries should be solved among the Muslim countries and (2) The problems should be solved through dialogue.

Despite Sudan's efforts, the Gulf Crisis moved towards a war. On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait if Hussein did not withdraw by 15 January 1991.[165] In the early morning of 17 January 1991, the US-led UN forces attacked Iraqi targets by air and the Second Gulf War started.[166] On the same day, the Sudanese government issued a statement saying that: 'Although Sudan rejected the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, ... the concentration of foreign troops was part of a policy of imposing "hegemony to safeguard foreign interests and to ensure Israeli military superiority".'[167] On 24 February 1991, ground operations began, and the next day, the Iraqi troops started to withdraw from Kuwait.[168] On 27 February 1991, President Bush declared the liberation of Kuwait and the defeat of Iraq.[169] It was believed that the Americans had taken

advantage of the war in order to reduce Iraqi military capability which had become a great threat to the national interest of the US.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese Islamists were attempting to create their own international Islamist movement covering the whole world (the strategy of Islamist expansion - a step towards the creation of the *umma*), criticizing the ICO as un-Islamic. This resulted in the opening of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) organized by Dr al-Turabi (see Section 8.1.2.(3)). Between 25 and 28 April 1991, Dr al-Turabi convened the First PAIC in Khartoum. In early December 1993, the Second PAIC was held and a resolution was passed concerning Iraq. To quote a summary of the resolution:

> 'The conference commended the steadfastness of the Iraqi people in the face of the allied embargo, condemned the aggression inflicted on Iraq by the ex-colonial powers, and called for the formation of a delegation to prove avenues of reconciliation between Iraq and Iran.'[170]

The Islamist regime seems to have put more emphasis on the Islamist basis than on gaining financial and military support from the outside world. This is apparent in the fact that the Sudanese government did not change its pro-Iraqi position, despite the huge losses stemming from its position - Sudan suffered from severe economic and political difficulties. It was reported in late September 1990 that:

> 'The regime's decision to side with Iraq ignores the fact that over the past twenty years or so, over 50% of Sudan's foreign aid came from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and a further large percentage from other Gulf States linked with Kuwait through the Gulf Cooperation Council. Sudan is now totally dependent for financial assistance and oil from Iraq, Iran and Libya.'[171]

On 22 October 1990, Sudan's losses as a result of the Gulf Crisis were reported to reach more than 1.7 billion US dollars.[172] Sudan was classified as one of the most affected countries, according to the report. On 12 November 1990, it was reported that at least 27,000 Sudanese working in Iraq and Kuwait had returned home and about 150,000 more were expected to follow as the result of the Gulf Crisis.[173]

(iv) PLO

Most of the Palestinians are Muslims, but there are also many Christians.[174] In November 1988, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat (Yaasir ᶜArafaat), accepted UN Resolution 242, which involved the renunciation of terrorism and the recognition of Israel.[175] The PLO was not the government of the Palestinians, but it acted as such. The political position of the PLO remained basically anti-Israeli and anti-American. Although the PLO was a nationalist organization and not an Islamist one, the Sudanese Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi had been supporting the PLO for a long time. When al-Bashir came to power, therefore, there was the foundation for a good relationship between the PLO and Sudan.

During the period between 1989 and 1993, the relationship between Sudan and the PLO was very good. The Sudanese Islamist regime was consistently supporting the Palestinians, both nationalists (e.g. the PLO) and Islamists (e.g. *Hamas* (Hamaas)). There was evidence of a strong link between Sudan and both the PLO and *Hamas*. For example, on 6 September 1991, Arafat held talks with *Hamas* at Khartoum.[176] On 7 September 1991, Lt.Gen. al-Bashir met the delegation of *Hamas*, which expressed its appreciation for Sudan's continuous support for the Palestinians.[177] On 31 October 1993, the PAIC announced that both *Hamas* and *Fatah* (Fath: the main group of the PLO) were invited to the Second PAIC due to be held in early December 1993.[178]

Despite the different natures of the leadership of Dr al-Turabi and Chairman Arafat - Dr al-Turabi as an Islamist and Chairman Arafat as a nationalist - the relationship between the PLO and Sudan was very strong. This seems to have stemmed from two main factors: one was their common stance opposing Israeli occupation, and the other was Dr al-Turabi's influence. The latter also had two factors: one was the long-lasting friendship between Chairman Arafat and Dr al-Turabi, and the other was Dr al-Turabi's idea - he wanted to absorb Arab nationalists into a broader Islamist movement (see Sections 8.1.2.(3) and 8.2).

During the Gulf Crisis and the Second Gulf War, the PLO took a pro-Iraqi stance together with Sudan,[179] and Arafat frequently visited Khartoum. This is apparent in the following reports. In the meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation, on 4 August 1990, the PLO abstained from voting in a resolution which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.[180] On 13 August 1990, Arafat stayed several hours in Khartoum.[181] On 18 February 1991, Arafat stopped over at Khartoum.[182]

After the Second Gulf War, on 30 October 1991, the Madrid peace talks started. This move resulted in the peace accord between Israel and the PLO signed on 13 September 1993. *Hamas* made its opposition to the peace accord clear. On the same day, the representative of *Hamas* in Khartoum said that the peace accord would be the worst disaster to the Palestinians.[183] Although Dr al-Turabi and the Sudanese government were not very happy about the peace process between the PLO and Israel, they avoided criticism of the PLO. On 14 September 1993, the Sudanese Foreign Minister said that: 'The Sudanese people respect the will of the Palestinian people.'[184]

The Sudanese Islamists basically opposed the peace process, however, they were always supporting the PLO (see Dr al-Turabi's account in Section 8.2) and taking a mediatory role between the PLO and *Hamas*. Sudan's commitment to the mediatory role was evident, for example, in the Khartoum meeting between the PLO and *Hamas* in September 1991, and the PAIC's invitation to both *Hamas* and *Fatah* to the Second PAIC. The resolution of the Second PAIC concerning the Palestinian issue clearly showed the position of the Sudanese Islamists. To quote a summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC:

> 'The Palestinian issue is a crucial one for both Arabs and Muslims. The conference reaffirmed its commitment to the Palestinians' right of self-determination and an independent state with its capital Jerusalem, as well as their inherent right to strive for repossession of occupied Palestinian territories. The conference therefore rejected the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, because it is not in line with Muslim aspirations. Full support was given to the unified *jihad* and resistance demonstrated throughout the Palestinian uprising; other Palestinian factions were urged to respect these aspirations and resolve their differences through serious dialogue, to

avoid inter-factional feuding and assassinations.

The conference called upon all Islamic and Arab governments to refrain from normalizing relations with Israel, appealed for wide support for the Palestinian uprising, and also commended the efforts of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Dr Turabi, in establishing a dialogue between the various Palestinian factions and thus bringing them together in a united front against Israel.'[185]

(v) Tunisia

Tunisia has a population of which the great majority are Muslims and small minorities are Christians and Jews.[186] Despite the strong Islamic tradition, the Tunisian government led by Habib Bourguiba (Habiib buu Ruqayba) had been pursuing a secular policy since 1957.[187] Between 1986 and 1987, President Bourguiba (presidency: 1959-1987) made its anti-Islamist position clear. Zayn al-Abidin Ben Ali (Zayn al-ᶜAabidiin bin ᶜAli) was appointed by Bourguiba to lead the anti-Islamist campaign.[188] Many Islamists were arrested, including the members of the *Nahda* (Nahda) movement led by Rashid al-Ghanushi (Raashid al-Ghanuushii). Although Ben Ali was initially less hostile to the Islamists than Bourguiba,[189] the Tunisian regime led by Ben Ali after the 1987 bloodless coup kept its anti-Islamist position. Therefore, when al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, there was a foundation of tension between Tunisia and Sudan.

From 1989 to the end of 1993, the strong link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Tunisian Islamists was obvious. The Tunisian government had frequently accused the Sudanese Islamists of supporting the Tunisian Islamists who were opposing their government. Mainly because of this reason, the relationship between the two governments deteriorated.

The strong link between the Islamists of Tunisia and Sudan was apparent in the following reports related to Rashid al-Ghanushi. About a month after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 6 September 1990, *The Independent* reported that al-Ghanushi, who had been visiting Sudan

in the previous week, had called upon the Muslims in the world to mobilize and declare *jihad* against the foreign forces building up in the Gulf region.[190] According to the report, al-Ghanushi criticized the US for supporting the Zionist entity and criticized Egypt for becoming the faithful guardian of the US.[191] *Sudanow* also reported that al-Ghanushi took part in the First PAIC (April 1991) and called for Islamic unity and *jihad* against what he called as "Satanic international alliance."[192]

Tunisia's accusation against Sudan also came from al-Ghanushi related incidents. On 11 June 1991, it was reported that the Tunisian Interior Minister accused al-Ghanushi of using a Sudanese passport and of having been planning a coup against the Tunisian government.[193] In October 1991, the Tunisian government had decided to recall its ambassador from Khartoum, criticizing Sudan for the continuous support to al-Ghanushi's *Nahda* movement.[194] In early August 1992, *Al-Hayat* reported that the Tunisian government had decided to close its embassy in Khartoum and accused Sudan of training Islamists from the *Maghrib* (al-Maghrib) countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia).[195]

The disadvantage of the Sudanese government became clear. In October 1991, Dr al-Turabi was reported as admitting that the Sudanese authorities had issued a diplomatic passport to al-Ghanushi.[196] A Sudanese diplomat also told the researcher that Sudan had issued a Sudanese passport to al-Ghanushi.[197] During the year of 1993, the tension between the Sudanese and Tunisian governments remained the same.

(vi) Yemen

In 1989 the process of unification between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR: North Yemen, tribal society) led by Ali Abdalla Salih (ᶜAli ᶜAbd Allaah Saalih) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY: South Yemen, Marxist country) led by Ali Salim al-Bayd (ᶜAli Saalim al-Bayd) was taking place. The population of both the YAR and the PDRY was almost entirely Muslim,[198] and in the YAR particularly there

were many Islamists. This provided an important basis for the Sudanese Islamists to approach. When al-Bashir came to power in Sudan, there were no specific signs of tension between Sudan and both the YAR and the PDRY.

From Yemen's unification in May 1990 up to December 1993, the relationship between Yemen and Sudan was relatively good. Despite the link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Yemeni Islamists during this period,[199] the relationship between the two governments remained almost the same.

The relatively good relationship between Yemen and Sudan is apparent in the following reports. Republic of Yemen Radio reported, between 4 and 11 May 1991, that Sudan and Yemen held economic and trade talks in Sana, Yemen.[200] On 11 September 1993, it was reported that the Yemeni delegation arrived at Khartoum for the sixth session of the joint ministerial committee between Yemen and Sudan.[201] In September 1991, Sudan and Yemen jointly denied allegations made by Sudanese opposition sources in Yemen who accused the Sudanese authorities of sending Islamists to Yemen in order to attack the Sudanese opposition.[202]

There was a link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Yemeni Islamists during the 1990-93 period. This Islamist link, however, did not damage the relationship between the two governments. This seems to have stemmed mainly from the good relationship between President Ali Salih and the Yemeni Islamists. The Islamist *Islah* ('Islaah: restoration) party, which joined the ruling coalition through the peninsula's first free multi-party elections in April 1993,[203] was apparently supportive towards President Ali Salih.

(3) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)

The foreign policy of the Islamist government is basically designed to expand the regime's influence beyond Sudan's borders. This policy is carried out partly through non-governmental organizations (NGO). The Popular Arab and Islamic Conference led by Dr al-Turabi, technically a NGO, is the main body and vehicle to support Sudan's foreign policy of Islamist expansion. Effectively, the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi expands beyond Sudan's borders with the support and protection of the government. The relationship between the government and the PAIC indicates the fusion between "state" and "Islamist movement", which constitutes the reason why Sudan can be seen as a state-form Islamist movement.

Between 1991 and 1995, the PAIC was held three times; the First PAIC was held in April 1991, shortly after the Second Gulf War; the Second PAIC was held in December 1993, after the historic peace agreement between Israel and the PLO; and the Third PAIC was held in March-April 1995. The PAIC contributed to the expansion of the influence of both Dr al-Turabi and the Sudanese government beyond Sudan's borders. During this period, Dr al-Turabi was the elected Secretary General of the PAIC, and the conference played a unique role in mediating and uniting the different groups and movements around the world. The conference was essentially "Islamist", but it included non-Islamist elements (which caused some confusion among participants in the Third PAIC).

The First PAIC was held in Khartoum between 25 and 28 April 1991, only a couple of months after the Second Gulf War between Iraq and US-led UN forces. The conference constituted evidence that the policy of Islamist expansion was at the core of Sudan's foreign policy. This came across in the way that Sudan was maintaining its pro-Iraqi position, despite the enormous pressures (both economic and political) and huge losses (mainly foreign aid) stemming from its position. The regime valued the PAIC, so it maintained a pro-Iraqi position for the purpose of obtaining support from people who opposed Western interference. How Sudan valued the PAIC was apparent in a statement in *Sudan News* which described the conference as 'a major event in Muslim

history' and 'the most significant event since the collapse of the Caliphate.'[204] *Sudan News* was published by the Sudan Information Office in the Sudanese embassy in London. *Sudan News* also reported:

> '[The PAIC] was the first occasion where representatives from mass movements from all over the Muslim world came together in one place. All major movements in the Muslim world from Malaysia to Morocco were represented. ... [The participants came from] Egypt, Jordan, Syria, PLO, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, Malaysia, Pakistan, Britain, America, ex-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, ... [and so on].'[205]

Dr al-Turabi's success in organizing the conference largely stemmed from the resentment and frustration of the people in the Arab and Islamic world against Western interference in the Gulf and against the subsequent Second Gulf War. Dr al-Turabi sought to use the conference as an opportunity to unite world movements which had similar feelings against western domination and influence.

The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum between 2 and 4 December 1993, after the historic accord between Israel and the PLO signed in Washington in September 1993. Over 500 delegates from almost 85 countries around the world, including Africa, Asia and Europe, participated in the conference.[206] This conference was marked by its rather delicate position on the peace accord. The PAIC basically opposed the peace process between Israel and the PLO. This was evident in the resolutions of the Second PAIC which rejected the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.[207] However, Dr al-Turabi had avoided criticizing the Palestinian-Israeli peace accord in his speech at the opening session.[208] Dr al-Turabi's attitude seems to have been a reflection of his careful consideration for his close friend, Chairman Arafat. In addition to this, the conference provided an opportunity for dialogue between *Hamas* (the main Islamist group which opposed the peace accord) and *Fatah* (the main group of the PLO).[209] The conference called for serious dialogue between different Palestinian groups in order to avoid inter-factional fighting.[210]

The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum from 30 March to 2 April, 1995. The conference convened over 300 delegates from more than 80 countries around the world.[211] The third PAIC focused on three issues: the Western attack against Islam, the status of minorities in the world, and the Palestinian question.[212] The conference, however,

drew people's attention to a rather different point - the nature of the membership. The third conference witnessed some confusion among the delegates in their understanding of the "title" of the conference which reflected the nature of the membership. *Sudan Update* reported an incident in which Shaikh Muhammad Bashir (Shaikh Muhammad Bashiir), an African Muslim from Benin, proposed the removal of the word "Arab" from the title of the conference, claiming that it would create racial discrimination among the Muslims.[213] This proposal was supported by other non-Arab delegates and the majority voted in favour of changing the title.[214] Dr al-Turabi, however, postponed any changes until next year.[215] It is clear that the non-Arabs interpreted the word "Arab" as "Arab Muslims", and felt the use of the word unfair because there were "African Muslims", "Asian Muslims", and so on. However, the word "Arab" in the PAIC did not originally mean "Arab Muslims", but "non-Islamist Arabs".

The PAIC was essentially Islamist, but it had been including non-Islamist elements, i.e. non-Islamist Arabs, since the first conference. *Asharq Al-Awsat* (Al-Sharq Al-'Awsat) reported, on the occasion of the First PAIC, that: 'Some days ago a strange gathering was convened in Khartoum that brought together a number of atheists and fundamentalists.'[216] When Dr al-Turabi was planning to convene the First PAIC, he was already thinking about including Arab nationalists, Nasserites, and Arab leftists whose first identities were not Islamist, but Arab.[217] Without recognizing Dr al-Turabi's plan to absorb non-Islamist Arabs into a wider Islamist movement led by himself, it would be difficult to understand the rather strange membership of the conference. Because a change from 'Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC)' to 'Popular Islamic Conference (PIC)' would result in the exclusion of non-Islamist Arab members, such a change would not be acceptable to Dr al-Turabi.

8.2 DR AL-TURABI'S ACCOUNT

8.2.1 FOREIGN POLICY

The researcher summarized his assumptions about Dr al-Turabi's goals after 1989. He then showed the assumptions concerning foreign matters to Dr al-Turabi himself and asked him to correct it, if necessary.

1989-
Main goals:
(concerning foreign matters)
To secure the stability of Sudan in Africa
correction: To relate Sudan to Africa

To expand the influence of the Islamist movement around the world
correction: *none*

Dr al-Turabi corrected one of the main goals concerning foreign matters as "to relate Sudan to Africa" and added: 'In the past, Sudan was mostly looking towards the Middle East, but now Sudan is looking towards both the Middle East and Africa.'[218] It is important to note that "Africa" here means Sudan's neighbours on the African continent, particularly Egypt, Libya, Chad, the CAR, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. He did not correct the other goal, "to expand the influence of the Islamist movement around the world". Dr al-Turabi's goals concerning foreign matters after 1989 will be simplified as "to expand the Islamist movement beyond the borders".

In his own explanation of his long-term plans, Dr al-Turabi explained his goals to the researcher as follows:

> 'The long-term plans would pursue horizontal development.[219] One might say that this is "expansionism", but it is completely different from that of imperialists. Opening towards the world is the most important point at this stage. Geographical distances between states, i.e. whether states are geographically close or not, do not matter, because today's transport and media have virtually shortened the distances between states. The goals of the *umma* are, for example, to establish a collective defence of Muslims, to increase the understanding of non-Muslims about Muslims, and so on.
>
> Since things happen faster these days, the creation of a single Islamic community will not take too long. The current

> terrible situation in most of the Islamic world will also contribute to the speed-up of such a development, because only a "shock" will wake up people. Without a shock, people will not think seriously. To take an analogy, unless one's illness becomes worse one will not think to see a doctor seriously. In this sense, the current bad situation surrounding Muslims is perhaps good for us. People in the Arab world and Africa are getting aware of their situation. The Western people always try to keep these people as a sub-human group, and use them as consumers who buy Western goods. Some foolish people are trying to suppress us, but the more they suppress us, the more we increase our frustration and an explosion is inevitable. The change of the world by such an explosion will be much faster than that by the normal evolution.'[220]

The establishment of the *umma* seems to be the core of Dr al-Turabi's long-term plans. *Sudanow* reported Dr al-Turabi's description of the *umma* as involving one international community with open frontiers, a homogeneous order, and a limit to central political authority as opposed to the Western concept of nation-state, having rigid borders and a paramount national interest.[221] Dr al-Turabi warns against "narrow clannishness" and "chauvinist nationalism".[222] However, Dr al-Turabi's approach is at the same time realistic, as he does not seek to rush to eliminate the existing borders. For him, the existing borders are not an immediate problem. It may be easier to understand this with reference to the European Union, where borders are gradually becoming less significant. Dr al-Turabi similarly envisages a gradual approach in the Islamic world.

Dr al-Turabi pointed out that in the *umma* there should be administrative decentralization, and a variety of denominations in Islam should be tolerated, as long as an essential minimum of Arabic and a common standard of the *sharia* were kept. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Sudanow*):

> 'Nationality and religious denomination are not absolute standards of discrimination. There are higher religious and human values that guarantee equal status and basic rights of human beings without regard to domicile or denomination. ... The Islamic commonwealth [the *umma*] should not be constituted as a monolithic structure, and should observe administrative decentralization ... The sources and the general principles of Islamic jurisprudence are universal, but no particular school of law need prevail throughout the Muslim world. There is no standardization of language or cultural forms as long as an essential minimum of Arabic is assured everywhere

> and that social life-styles observe the common standards of the "*sharia*".'[223]

Another key element in Dr al-Turabi's long-term plans was his challenge to the world order. He wanted to "correct" the world order which is currently controlled by some powerful Western countries, because he believed that "justice" hardly existed.[224] He pointed out that: 'The United Nations is undemocratic and unfair. The world media is also unfair.'[225] In the Florida debate, May 1992, Dr al-Turabi gave his view of the existing world order in the following words:

> 'Those who enjoy an advantage now under the present world order in economic relations between North and South, in the United Nations structure, in the area of monopoly of information or technology or armaments, will see that Islam constitutes a challenge, because if it seeks justice, then it seeks to have someone concede a little bit so that we ultimately reach an equitable equation. ...
>
> We just seek to correct the world order. We just seek to express our Islamic values. I personally have been advising governments and Islamic movements to exhaust all means of peaceful dialogue [to correct the world order] because, as a religion, Islam is better expressed peacefully.'[226]

At a practical level, Dr al-Turabi's criticism of the UN was reported in *Impact International* of May 1995 issue. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Impact International*):

> 'The UN is supposed to be an organisation of equal and sovereign states, but it has been turned into a hand-maiden of the Veto powers. Surely this arbitrary power has to go and the UN turn into an organisation that is based on equality of rights and equality of participation. It is not realistic for the UN to try to become a world government and impose Euro-American social, economic, financial, military and political regimes over every other member state. ...
>
> The role and the structure of the Security Council ... are very much dated. The UN's powers should instead vest in the General Assembly of the world nations. Similarly the International Court of Justice could be strengthened.'[227]

8.2.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As mentioned before, Dr al-Turabi's account does not necessarily cover every aspect of the general description. In this sub-section, his account does not cover all the countries discussed in Section 8.1.2.(2).

In the researcher's interview, 17 May 1994, Dr al-Turabi gave the following account of the international role he wanted to pursue:

> 'It is time to create a close relationship among the Muslims in the world, improve the quality of our life, to defend ourselves, to promote peace, and so forth. I will visit everywhere in the world - Africa, Europe, central Asia, Asia, America and so on. I believe that all kinds of people would come to listen to me.'[228]

(1) SUDAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS

In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi described the general nature of the relationship between Sudan and neighboring countries, as he saw it in May 1992:

> 'I know most of the heads of states in the Arab world and in Africa, especially those who are neighbors of the Sudan. ...
>
> The Sudan, on the whole, is probably leaning now more to Africa than to the Arab world: (a) because relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt are a little bit cold now, to say the least and (b) because the Sudan has an open frontier now, a very cordial relationship people-to-people, not only government-to-government, with Ethiopia and Eritrea. And relations have improved dramatically with Uganda, with Kenya and with Central Africa. Chad, of course, is only the extension of the Sudan, or Sudan is extension of Chad. ... So the Sudan is probably now in its foreign relations closer to Africa than to the Arab world. ...
>
> Well, we are a threat in the sense that we export our [Islamic] model by radiation. We don't have sufficient money to actually go; we don't have a military force that can by conquest expand the territory of Islam.'[229]

(a) Egypt

Between 1989 and 1993, there was increasing tension between the Egyptian government and the Sudanese government. Egypt's anti-Islamist position and Egypt's strong concern over Sudanese attempts to spread Islamism fuelled the tension. In this context, Dr al-Turabi criticized, in the Florida debate, the attitude of President Mubarak of Egypt and his government towards Sudan and Islam:

> 'I think the reason why Egypt is so anxious and so frightened [about Sudan] is because they see the fragility of their own set-up. Egypt is twice as powerful as the Sudan. Economically, it's 50 times more powerful than the Sudan. Its army is 100 times bigger than Sudan's. Why should Egypt fear the Sudan so much ? They are almost panicking. It's because they see that the situation is very precarious and that Islam can really prove their undoing. But this is only so at the level of government. ... Hosni Mubarak definitely has an obsession with Islam, he was there close to Sadat when he was shot; he thinks that Islam is a personal threat, not a political threat to him, and he is obsessed with it. But if the regime changes - the Egyptians may feel that it would be wiser to allow Islam to express itself and for the state to give some leadership in expressing the values of Islam and Islamizing some of the institutions.'[230]

(b) Ethiopia / Eritrea

Between 1989 and 1993, the Ethiopian-Sudanese relationship was greatly affected by Sudan's support for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the fall of Mengistu's government. Up to May 1991 the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan were each supporting the other's opposition, and this resulted in a bad relationship between the two countries. In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi briefly mentioned Ethiopia, referring to Mengistu's fall. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'At one time, Ethiopia had an interest in destabilizing the North [Sudan] as reciprocation for the North hosting all those Eritreans and for probably sympathizing with the cause of an independent Eritrea. Once Mengistu fell, it made quite a difference, and the South [Sudan] now [May 1992] is not holding together as one South.'[231]

(c) Saudi Arabia

Before the Gulf Crisis (August 1990 - January 1991), which was created by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was little overt tension between the Sudanese Islamist government and the Saudi government. After August 1990, however, the relationship between the two governments deteriorated. Sudan's opposition to Western interference in the Gulf Crisis, which caused Sudan's pro-Iraqi stance, and Sudan's influence on the Saudi Islamists (opposition to their government) seem to have been the main causes.

Dr al-Turabi, in the Florida debate, described his activities in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Crisis. In the debate, he implied Western conspiracy against the Arab solution of the crisis. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> '[King Fahd] told me he thought that Saddam was not going to extend his military onslaught into Saudi Arabia; he was quite sure about that. He was told otherwise, of course, by his American advisors. And I asked him: "Did you invite them ?" And he said: "Well I did not, but they would have come anyway. And it would have been very bad if I did not invite them." ...
>
> An Arab solution was feasible; I have absolutely no doubt about it. I spoke personally, and we spoke as a delegation, to Saddam Hussein. And I spoke personally also and in a group to King Fahd. Both of them were open to it, except that later on, the Saudis told me -- not just any Saudis, Saudis who matter -- that they were advised not to allow Saddam, ..., to get away. They were told to abstain from any Arab initiative and not to entertain any such Arab solution.'[232]

In the same debate in Florida, Dr al-Turabi described his views about the situation in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. He criticized the Saudi Arabian government's attitude towards Islam and predicted a considerable rise in Islamist activities against the Saudi monarchy. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'After the Gulf war, things have changed a lot. ... Especially in Saudi Arabia, the whole religious legitimacy of the regime has been destroyed. All religiously oriented people, ... all of them criticize the regime as irreligious. It is dynastic. The banking system is based on *riba*. The laws are in fact secular, although they call them by different names, not to expose their secularity. ... All this has suddenly come to public consciousness now, even though most people have known it all along. ...

> I have been receiving many Islamists because there is so much propaganda hostile to Hasan Turabi ... that I have become a curiosity for those who don't know me. ... So many [Saudi] people are coming to the Sudan, and we get all the reports we need about Saudi Arabia. We get all the leaflets, all the books, all the sermons on tape, and it is something most unusual. ...
>
> The Saudi family is the base of society through marriages, tribal affiliation, and alliances, and although it disposes of a lot of money so it can bribe people into silence. ... King Fahd is in quite a mess; he doesn't know what to do. ... Between the Islamists and the monarchy itself the confrontation is not so pronounced, but it's all over the place, in mosques and through freely distributed leaflets, which you'll find every morning on your fax machine. ... This is a very safe way of distributing leaflets, which the Saudis are capable of because everybody has a fax machine. ...
>
> I don't think that Saudi Arabia is going to change regimes tomorrow or after tomorrow. But the process is in motion, and it will take its course sooner or later; I have no doubt about that.'[233]

(2) SUDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(a) Algeria

Between 1989 and 1993, there was a strong link between the Sudanese Islamists and the Algerian Islamists. This link was tolerated by the Algerian secular government for the first several years, but eventually raised tension between the governments of Algeria and Sudan, especially after 1992 when the second round of elections, in which the Algerian Islamists were going to win, was cancelled.

On 20 December 1991, before the first round of the Algerian parliamentary election (26 December), Dr al-Turabi predicted Algerian future. According to *Sudan Update*, Dr al-Turabi said that Algeria would become another Islamic republic and advised it to seek unity with the Islamic Republic of Iran.[234]

In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi expressed his views concerning the Islamist movement in Algeria as follows:

> 'The [Islamist] movement, ... in Algeria, didn't just erupt three years ago. The movement has a long background, but people only noticed it when it became political. ...

> I've been to Algeria, and I have never seen more religiosity. If you are late one minute after the first call for the morning prayers, you would never find a place in the mosques. ...
>
> It is not at all just a political movement of support for political Islam or rejection of political post-independence Algeria; it is a religious movement at the personal level. People are praying all night and all day. They are closer to the Koran.'[235]

On 3 December 1993, *The Independent* reported Dr al-Turabi as saying about Abbasi Madani (ᶜAbbaasii Madanii), the leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS):

> 'I spoke to Abassi Madani before the elections in Algeria. I met him in the Middle East, once in Algeria itself. And I asked him: "What's your programme like ? What are you going to do after the elections ? Have you started a dialogue with the French ? Have you begun talking to other European states ? And he just said: "No, no, we just want to win the election."'[236]

Dr al-Turabi criticized the Western influence on the Algerian government, whose army interrupted the second round of elections in January 1992. To quote *Mideast Mirror* of 31 August 1994:

> 'It seems unfortunately that the West does not believe in democracy as an absolute global value. If it is a democracy that ushers in Islam, the West is prepared to curb it. This is what happened repeatedly in Turkey, and is currently happening in Algeria.'[237]

In December 1994, *The Guardian* reported a Western accusation against Sudan that Sudan was supporting the Algerian rebels.[238] According to the report, Dr al-Turabi had replied to the accusation by saying that the charges were US inventions in order to destroy Sudan.[239]

(b) Iran

Contrary to the expectations of some observers, the relationship between the two Islamic states, Iran and Sudan, from 1989 to 1993 was relatively cool. Despite this, allegations of a strong link between the two Islamic states were sometimes reported.

Dr al-Turabi expressed his rather low opinion about the role of the Iranian revolution in the current pan-Islamic movements. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Sudanow*):

> 'Islam appeared on the world scene as the prevalent popular force in contemporary Islamic societies. ... The Iranian Revolution was a land-mark in this new development. But the Gulf War [1991] did more than anything else to arouse the Muslim masses and give impetus to the international manifestation of pan-Islam.'[240]

In response to the allegations of a strong link between Iran and Sudan, Dr al-Turabi denied, in the Florida debate, the presence of Iranian forces in Sudan or any strong relationship between the two countries. He also pointed out that there would be little for Sudan to learn from Iran. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'Well 5,000 Iranian guards. The latest figure is 180,000 ! They are fighting the war in the South ! ... No, honestly, I'll tell you the truth; I hope you'll believe me. I don't know if there is a Military Attache in the Iranian Embassy. But there is not a single military, there are no technicians, and we don't buy arms from Iran. ... The only thing that is bought from Iran is vehicles. ...
>
> The Sudan enjoys much more intensive relations with China than Iran, and with Pakistan and Malaysia. ... It's not really a very significant relationship with Iran. ... I have no problem with dealing with Iran personally. I've always worked towards closer relationship with the *Shia* to overcome the sectarian divide that has plagued the Muslims for more than 1400 years. Actually, I would have liked to see better relations between Sudan and Iran. But for the present, it doesn't amount to a great deal. ...
>
> With respect to the experience of Iran, the Sudanese movement is 40 years old. That goes way beyond Khomeini, and we don't feel that we have much to learn from Iran really. Speaking to them, I don't think that they have developed Islamic banking better than in the Sudan, or even anything close to how Islamic banking has developed in the Sudan, or even the change of the legal system or educational system. ... There are hardly any Sudanese studying in Iran. ... There are more Sudanese in America, students and otherwise, than in Iran.'[241]

(c) Iraq

During the period from 1989 to 1993, the relationship between the Sudanese Islamist government and the basically "secular" Iraqi government was good. This stemmed mainly from Sudan's strategy of Islamist expansion, not from its sympathy for secular Iraq. Sudan maintained a pro-Iraqi position to unite Arabs and Muslims who opposed Western interference to the region for the purpose of creating the *umma*. Dr al-Turabi was clearly trying to bring together the Islamist movements in the world in a challenge to the West.

During the Gulf Crisis, 1 October 1990, Dr al-Turabi warned the West in a press conference at Amman, Jordan, that:

> 'In the case of the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, the members of Islamic movements would join Iraq and participate in the war effort through demonstrations, fighting and attacks on foreign interests around the world.'[242]

The Independent of 2 October 1990 reported Dr al-Turabi as saying that there existed some flexibility in the Iraqi position, but they would determine to go to war if necessary.[243]

Dr al-Turabi's account in the Florida debate clearly indicates the real reason why Sudan supported Iraq - Sudan's pro-Iraqi position stemmed mainly from its own strategy of Islamist expansion, not from its sympathy for secular Iraq. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'Actually, before the advent of the foreign forces in Arabia, sympathies were against Saddam; all Islamic movements pronounced against the occupation of Kuwait. They didn't care very much for Kuwait, of course, because Kuwait is not something that is very popular in the Muslim world. They have so much money, and they have abused that money. And the conduct of their rulers is known to be very bad. ... But formally, everybody pronounced against the initiative of Saddam. But that was completely transformed. ...
>
> Saddam Hussein is known not to be an Islamist, and he's famous, infamous actually, in the Muslim world as being very hostile to the Islamic movement. ... So nobody admired him because of Islam and nobody fell into his slogans of *Jihad*. ... But people like Saddam Hussein, and even people like Qaddhafi, sometimes represent resistance, ... an assertion of Arab identity and a rejection of being assimilated, dominated or integrated into the West. So it is only this

> aspect which moves the Muslims. ... [The war] was seen in a broader context of a confrontation with the West. People thought that ulterior motives were more important than the pretext of protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait. ...
>
> I'm sure Islamists can speak to Saddam today, and he owes them something. We approached him on many other issues. ... He was going to ban religious parties; we advised him that this would be proof that he was hypocritical after he had raised all those slogans. He ultimately changed the formula; he is not banning religious parties, *per se*, any more.'[244]

In an interview with the researcher, Dr al-Turabi described Saddam Husain's personality in terms of him being loyal to his friends, but very cool and cruel to his enemies.[245]

(d) PLO

During the period between 1989 and 1993, the Sudanese Islamists consistently supported the Palestinians, both nationalists (e.g. the PLO) and Islamists (e.g. *Hamas*). Although, the Sudanese Islamists basically opposed the peace process between Israel and the PLO, they still supported the PLO and took a mediatory role between the PLO and *Hamas*.

In the Florida debate, May 1992, Dr al-Turabi expressed his views about the role of Islamists in the Palestinian cause as follows:

> 'In the short term, I have to be a realist. I don't see what the Islamic movement can do for Palestine. But there is no question that Islamists all over the world feel a very intense association with the Palestinian cause and feel that Jerusalem belongs to all the Muslims and not just to Arabs. ... I am sure that if Islamic movements ultimately become Islamic states, and if all Islamic states in concert tried to do something about the Palestinian cause, definitely, it will change the balance ... and it would have an impact on the destiny of Palestine.'[246]

In the same debate, Dr al-Turabi explained the position of the Sudanese Islamists towards the Madrid talks.[247] Although he, and the Sudanese Islamists, were not very happy about the talks between the PLO and Israel, they avoided criticizing the PLO.

> 'For one people to oust another people completely and to occupy their territory was considered not legitimate. ... I'm sure that no one who is fair would have accepted it [Israeli occupations]. People say it's practical; it happened, and it's in everyone's interest to forego the past and try to work out a solution.

> [The Palestinian] Islamists have not been involved [in the Madrid talks]; they are not negotiating. The Sudan, as an Islamic state, has said no to the Madrid talks. But do you realize that it was the only Arab state that said no ? Do you realize that Yasser Arafat, as an act of necessity, couldn't say no ? So they [the Sudanese Islamists] felt that we should not try to be better than Yasser Arafat himself or to embarrass him, or to undercut him. Having said our word, we kept silent; we had made our opposition clear and that was it.'[248]

Dr al-Turabi's commitment to the mediatory role between the PLO and *Hamas* is apparent. In early January 1993, Dr al-Turabi announced that Arafat's *Fatah* (Fath: PLO's main faction) and *Hamas* agreed to set up joint committees in order to boost the *intifadah* ('Intifaada: Palestinian uprising) in the occupied territories.[249] Dr al-Turabi also praised Arafat for his efforts to promote Palestinian unity.[250]

After Israel and the PLO signed the peace accord on 13 September 1993, Dr al-Turabi again expressed his basic position towards the peace process between Israel and the PLO. *Sudan Update* of 22 October 1993 reported Dr al-Turabi as saying that the Palestinian-Israeli accord did not mean real peace, but submission.[251] However, Dr al-Turabi called for people not to sabotage it.[252]

On 3 December 1993, the middle day of the three-day conference of the Second PAIC, *The Independent* reported Dr al-Turabi's views about the peace accord. He repeated his basic position towards the development between Israel and the PLO - he opposed the peace process, but avoided criticizing the PLO as they were acting on the basis of necessity, and he called for unity among the Palestinians. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *The Independent*):

> 'I [Dr al-Turabi] personally know Arafat very well. He is a close friend of mine. ... He spoke to me before he signed [the PLO-Israel accord]. He came here to Sudan. And I am now putting his case to the others - not as something that is right, but as something of necessity.
>
> What could Arafat do ? He ran out of money. His army stopped. There were the refugees, the 10,000 prisoners in Israeli jails. Even a municipality is better than nothing. ...
>
> Look, I know what the Palestinian opposition are saying. ... I know that what Arafat has accepted is even less than the so-called international resolutions that demand a total

> Israeli withdrawal. But I say to both Palestinian parties: "Don't convert your political controversy into political violence and conflict into civil war." They can talk to each other. ...'[253]

The Second PAIC adopted a resolution on the Palestinian issue and the peace accord between the PLO and Israel.[254]

(e) Tunisia

From 1989 to 1993, a strong link between the Islamists of Tunisia and Sudan was evident. The Tunisian government tightened its security measures against the Islamists who were opposing their government, and frequently accused the Sudanese Islamists of supporting the Tunisian Islamists. In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi criticized the anti-Islamist policy of the Tunisian government as follows:

> 'Look at Tunisia, for example; it's just a security apparatus. And a security apparatus cannot determine the future of a whole country.'[255]

8.2.3 POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)

The activities of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference can be seen in the context of Sudan's policy of Islamist expansion. The PAIC was effectively a vehicle to expand Sudan's version of Islamism beyond Sudan's borders. The positive response which Dr al-Turabi gained from some circles when he organized the First PAIC stemmed from the resentment and frustration of people in the Arab and Islamic world over Western interference in the Gulf and over the subsequent Second Gulf War. Dr al-Turabi sought to use the conference as an opportunity to unite world movements (including both Islamist and non-Islamist movements) which had similar feelings against western domination and influence.

Dr al-Turabi told the researcher of an episode concerning his initial efforts to organize the First PAIC.

> 'Before the [Second Gulf] war, I toured many countries including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran as a private person. Saudi Arabia tried to prevent me from organizing the First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, because the Saudis feared that I would unite Islamic movements around the world being against Saudi stance on the Gulf Crisis. The Saudis tried to bribe me with money. I refused their offer. The US, then, criticised Saudi Arabia for receiving me.'[256]

In the Florida debate, Dr al-Turabi explained how he succeeded in organizing the First PAIC, emphasizing the significance of the Second Gulf War. He emphasized the participation of the African Muslims, and the inclusion of non-Islamist elements into the basically Islamist conference. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in Lowrie):

> 'I personally owe a lot to the Gulf war, because without it I could not have organised the "Popular Arab and Islamic Convention," which has now become an institution.
>
> It was the first time that we could persuade so many Africans [African Muslims] to join Arabs and Asians. Arabs and Asians used to come to Islamic conferences a great deal; they had known each other for many years. But Africans came in strongly for the first time, and Europeans, the British Islamic Party, people from America, from Eastern Europe; for the first time they attended such conferences.
>
> One other very significant development is that many Arab nationalists, many Nasserites, many Arab leftists, excluding the hard core communists who chose to stick with their communism in spite of all the developments, but most of the leftists and the nationalists came to that conference. And they accepted to join a conference which is essentially Islamic and to assign the post of Secretary General to someone like myself who is known to be Islamist. ...
>
> They [Arab nationalists, Nasserites and leftists] have been disillusioned by their own record in government and in the economy. They achieved very little. ... They knew it. ... It's now not only a dialogue between Islamists and nationalists as it used to be, but it's almost positive cooperation.'[257]

On 30 March 1995, Dr al-Turabi addressed the participants at the opening session of the Third PAIC in the Friendship Hall. He described the PAIC as the unity of the Muslim nation and the will of

an independent *umma*.[258] He also stated that the PAIC was a true and direct representation of the Muslim people.[259]

In his address at the Third PAIC, Dr al-Turabi repeated his position and criticism against the West. He pointed out that "Human Rights" were used as a pretext to attack Islam, and that some NGOs were deliberately working against Islam.[260] He called for the restructuring of the United Nations because it was unfair. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *New Horizon*):

> 'We should work for the restructuring of the United Nations with a view to introducing a system comprising free platforms, egalitarian procedures and global representation. ... Today there is one dominantly [sic: dominant] power in the world, that of the USA, in favour of Israel, resulting from past relations and cooperation and response to Zionist pressure inside the USA and the western democracies.'[261]

Dr al-Turabi also criticized the current development of the normalization between Israel and the Arab states as being false and submissive, and called upon the Arabs to seek real peace among themselves instead of relying on the initiative of the West.[262]

After the Third PAIC, Dr al-Turabi evaluated positively the achievements of the PAIC in terms of the expansion of its influence. To quote Dr al-Turabi (in *Impact International*):

> 'The 3rd PAIC had a much wider geographical representation than before. ... The most important thing is that this Conference is developing into a structure and branching out in the various allied field of activity. ... I am sure the Conference will continue to evolve in relation to the challenges that face the Muslim world. ... The Conference served as a truly free and common platform for all issues of Islamic concern.'[263]

8.3 ANALYSES

8.3.1 DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY

(1) PREVIOUS FINDINGS (1932-89)

Table 8.3.(1) (the same as Table 7.4.(1)) lists Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) which have emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his life story up to 1989. Table 8.3.(2) (the same as Table 7.4.(2)) lists possible adjectives associated with those characters.

Table 8.3.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-89) (the same as Table 7.4.(1))

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1989	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the pragmatist (a), the expansionist (a), the persuader (a), the analyst (a), the politician (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c), the cooperator (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 8.3.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-89) (the same as Table 7.4.(2))

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1989	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a), influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a), analytic (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)

(2) ANALYSIS OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT (1989-95)

Similarly to Chapter 7, Dr al-Turabi's account in Chapter 8 is not a life story. However, his account concerning foreign matters covering the period between 1989 and 1995 at the latest, provides further evidence of previous findings and some new elements of his personality.

Among the previously identified personality elements, agentic elements are again dominant in his account. The main character representing the image of his account of this chapter is that of "the expansionist", indicating adjectives such as expansionist, ambitious, active, dominant, and influential. This character is backed by other characters, in particular those of "the challenger" (a newly identified agentic character) and "the internationalist" (a communal character).

Dr al-Turabi's strong agentic personality which seeks expansion is clear in his main goals concerning foreign matters after 1989 and his

long-term plans. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, this "expansion" means the expansion of the Sudanese Islamist movement beyond Sudan's borders - i.e. towards African neighbours and towards the rest of the world. Dr al-Turabi said that opening towards the world was the most important point.

Another example of an agentic element of personality is clear in his accounts which show his sense of superiority in terms of the achievement of the Sudanese Islamist movement. His sense of superiority comes across in his criticism against Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularly against President Mubarak and King Fahd. This is apparent in his strong confidence of him doing better than other leaders in dealing with Islam. This aspect is also clear in his account of the conversation with Abbasi Madani which suggests Dr al-Turabi's sense of superiority to Madani in terms of the planning and programme of the Islamist movement. Further evidence of his sense of superiority appears in the case of Iran. He said in his account that: 'With respect to the experience of Iran, the Sudanese movement is 40 years old. That goes way beyond Khomeini, and we don't feel that we have much to learn from Iran really.' In his accounts, Dr al-Turabi proudly pointed out that Sudan was in a more advanced stage than Iran and Saudi Arabia in terms of the Islamization of society.

Further evidence of agentic elements is apparent in his criticism against the West and the UN. This seems to stem from some of his main characters, such as "the critic" and "the reformer". The criticism is often associated with the Western hegemony over the Muslim nations in general. In this context, he strongly accused the West of treating the Muslims unfairly, doing them injustice, and being responsible for the bad situation of the Muslims.

There are several accounts indicating one previously identified character, namely that of "the analyst". This is apparent in his analytic accounts of the future of Saudi Arabia and of Saddam Husain. Dr al-Turabi firmly believed that the Saudi Islamists would change the political situation in the country sooner or later. Dr al-Turabi's unemotional analysis of the Iraqi president indicates the true picture of a rather cool relationship between Dr al-Turabi and President Husain.

Another previously identified character is that of "the pragmatist". This is apparent in his account of relatively good relations with "communist" China - the communists had been Dr al-Turabi's enemy. In addition to this, Dr al-Turabi's account about his position toward the development between Israel and the PLO - he opposed the peace process, but refrained from accusing Arafat and the PLO on the ground of "necessity". His acceptance of the concept of necessity seems to stem from his pragmatic personality.

Dr al-Turabi's support for Arafat seems to have also derived from his agentic friendship. For an agentic person, a good friendship is the ability to come to the rescue of one's friend. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, he appears to have been obliged to support Arafat who was one of his closest friends and had many problems. This element also comes across in his account of the goals of the *umma* - one of them is 'to establish a collective defence of Muslims.' As for Dr al-Turabi, "to create the *umma*" partly means "to come to the rescue of his fellow Muslims".

His optimistic personality and an aspect of positive thinking have repeatedly emerged in his account from 1932. Further evidence of this element appears in his following account: 'the current bad situation surrounding Muslims is perhaps good for us.' In his life story and accounts, he tended to take advantage of seemingly negative events, such as his prison life during the 1970s, and extracted maximum returns from them.

Among the previous findings, his relatively invisible communal elements of personality, which seek unity and cooperation, are also present. This is apparent in his accounts about the *umma* and the PAIC. In his accounts since Chapter 2, Dr al-Turabi has repeated his opinion against sectarianism, and has been taking a mediatory role between different groups. It is important, however, to note that his communal elements of personality are almost always affected by his agentic motivations.

Concerning the new findings during the 1989 - 95 period, one new character is thrown up, i.e. that of "the challenger" - an agentic character. This comes across in Dr al-Turabi's accounts of his long-term goals and plan, and of how he succeeded in organizing the PAIC for the first time. Dr al-Turabi said that he wanted to "challenge"

and correct the world order, which was currently controlled by some powerful Western countries, because he believed that "justice" hardly existed. The First PAIC was also held in the context of the challenge against the Western hegemony over the Arab Islamic world. Without such a context, Dr al-Turabi could not have united Islamist as well as non-Islamist Arab movements around the world.

(3) NEW FINDINGS (1985-95)

Table 8.3.(3) summarizes new elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality which have emerged from the analysis of his account concerning foreign matters of the Islamic state from the 1989 to 1995 period.

Table 8.3.(3): New elements of Dr al-Turabi's personality (1989-95) emerged from the analysis of his account concerning foreign matters

Period	Characters	Possible adjectives
1989 - 1995	the challenger (a)	challenging (a), defiant (a), courageous (a), critical (a), patient (a), energetic (a)

8.3.2 THE IMPACT OF DR AL-TURABI'S PERSONALITY ON THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Dr al-Turabi's personality elements stemming from the character of "the expansionist" (representing the image of his account in this chapter) seem to have affected the overall direction of the government's foreign policy after 1989. This policy should be understood within the concept of the *umma* (as Dr al-Turabi conceived it), because Sudan is a state-form Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi. Dr al-Turabi explained his strategy on the development of the Islamist movement (see Section 7.3), in terms of the movement shifting from "stage 2" to "stage 3" (the stage of the *umma*).

(1) INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the Islamist dimension, Dr al-Turabi's personality had a strong impact on Sudan's relations with other countries. His agentic personality elements which seek expansion, influence, and control, especially in terms of Islamism, seem to have negatively affected Sudan's relations with the governments of Egypt, Libya, Uganda, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Tunisia. The tension between the Sudanese government and those governments was often associated with Dr al-Turabi's relation to and influence on the Islamist oppositions in those countries. Those countries accused the Sudanese government and sometimes Dr al-Turabi personally, of spreading Islamism and of supporting the Islamist oppositions in their countries. Even Libya was sceptical of Dr al-Turabi and concerned about his influence on the Libyan Islamists. Dr al-Turabi's clear goals and strong agentic personality seem to support these accusations.

There was also evidence of the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on Sudan's relations with other countries in other dimensions. For example, Dr al-Turabi's sense of superiority in terms of the Islamization of society, which stems from his agentic personality, appears to have resulted in the rather cool relations between Sudan and Iran. Dr al-Turabi's pragmatic element of personality seems to have affected Sudan's good relations with the PLO. Dr al-Turabi's agentic friendship towards Yassir Arafat appeared to have also affected such relations. While Sudan was opposing the development between the PLO and Israel, Sudan was always supportive towards Arafat and the PLO. Dr al-Turabi's agentic elements of personality which largely stem from his character of "the challenger" appear to have affected Sudan's pro-Iraq stance since the Gulf Crisis. Sudan's pro-Iraqi position projected Sudan as a defiant challenger against the Western hegemony over the Arab and Islamic world. Dr al-Turabi used this image of Sudan as the basis of the First PAIC.

(2) POPULAR ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (PAIC)

Dr al-Turabi's agentic and communal elements of personality which derive from some of his main characters: "the expansionist", "the challenger", "the critic", "the believer", "the mediator", and "the internationalist", seem to have affected the establishment and activities of the PAIC. There is little doubt that the PAIC was established to expand the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi to the world. The PAIC is one of Dr al-Turabi's vehicles for creating an Islamic community, the *umma*, in the context of challenging the Western powers whom Dr al-Turabi believes are the main sources of injustice in the world order. Dr al-Turabi's communal elements of personality (affected by agentic motivations) seem to have also influenced the PAIC's activities of mediating and uniting different groups and movements around the world. In his account, Dr al-Turabi pointed out the inclusion of African Muslims and "non-Islamist" Arabs in the PAIC as significant.

CHAPTER 9:
CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to understand the Islamist movement in Sudan. Compared to other Islamist movements in the world, the Sudanese Islamist movement has had some unique aspects. The researcher believes that the uniqueness of the Sudanese movement stemmed from Dr Hassan al-Turabi's personality. For this reason, the researcher chose a "psychological approach" based on personality psychology. The researcher chose McAdams' life-story model of identity as the basic theoretical foundation of the analysis of Dr al-Turabi's personality. The researcher then developed his own approach by using the life-story model. One of the unique aspects of the researcher's approach is the distinction between historical information (general description) and psychological information (Dr al-Turabi's account). The significance of the latter lies in its psychological "meaning" rather than its historical facts. Most of Dr al-Turabi's accounts are regarded as psychological information and are used to understand his personality alone.

It has become clear that, between 1932 and 1995, Dr al-Turabi's personality was built around his Islamist identity, and was dominated by a strong agentic trend. This agentic trend is apparent in his predominantly agentic characters (imagoes) which had emerged from the study of Dr al-Turabi's personality from his account covering that period (see Table 9.1.(1) and Table 9.1.(2)). Although there were some communal characters, it is important to note that Dr al-Turabi's communal characters had some agentic aspects. This seems to have stemmed from his strong agentic motivations, namely power motivation and achievement motivation. The character of "the cooperator", for example, is originally a communal character. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, however, this character could not be regarded as purely communal, because he played the role of "the cooperator" in order to achieve his goals, i.e. the expansion of the Islamist movement.

Table 9.(1): Dr al-Turabi's main characters (imagoes) (1932-95)

Period	Main characters (imagoes)
1932 - 1995	the critic (a), the resistant (a), the passionate (a), the believer (a), the winner (a), the reformer (a), the revolutionary (a), the first person (a), the good planner (a), the hero (a), the competitor (a), the pragmatist (a), the expansionist (a), the persuader (a), the analyst (a), the politician (a), the law-abider (a), the challenger (a), the man behind the scenes (a), the mediator (c), the internationalist (c), the cooperator (c)

(a) = classified as agentic
(c) = classified as communal

Some elements are classified based on McAdams' assessment, but some are classified based on the researcher's own assessment.

Table 9.(2): Possible adjectives which describe Dr al-Turabi's personality (1932-95)

Period	Possible adjectives
1932 - 1995	critical (a), aggressive (a), assertive (a), defiant (a), resolute (a), determined (a), offensive (a), passionate (a), zealous (a), faithful (a), pious (a), serious (a), strong (a), clever (a), patient (a), confident (a), optimistic (a), innovative (a), progressive (a), radical (a), originative (a), creative (a), courageous (a), explosive (a), adventurous (a), ambitious (a), proud (a), foresighted (a), careful (a), shrewd (a), self-projecting (a), overconfident (a), active (a), competitive (a), offensive (a), pragmatic (a), flexible (a), calculative (a), expansionist (a), dominant (a), influential (a), persuasive (a), eloquent (a), analytic (a), law-abiding (a), rigid (a), reasonable (a), challenging (a), energetic (a), balanced (c), harmonious (c), sociable (c), kind (c), conciliatory (c), internationalist (c), open (c), cooperative (c), supportive (c)

Among Dr al-Turabi's main characters, there were some particularly dominant characters in different periods of his life, i.e. his dominant characters changed over the different periods. For example, while some characters like "the revolutionary" and "the competitor" were dominant in the 1964-69 period (Chapter 3), "the resistant" and "the critic" became more dominant in the 1969-77 period (Chapter 4). While characters like "the expansionist" and "the hero" were dominant in the 1977-85 period (Chapter 5), "the competitor" and "the winner" became more dominant in the 1985-89 period (Chapter 6). In the 1989-95 period (Chapters 7 and 8), characters like "the reformer" and "the expansionist" were more dominant.

In addition to this, the image of Dr al-Turabi's account of each period (or chapter) was represented by one particular character. "The revolutionary", for example, represented the image of Dr al-Turabi's account of the 1964-69 period, and "the resistant" for the 1969-77 period. These characters help us to understand the overall development of the Islamist movement from 1964 to 1995. The Islamist movement had been developing on the line of the images of "the revolutionary" (1964-69) - "the resistant" (1969-77) - "the expansionist" (1977-85) - "the competitor" (1985-89) - "the reformer" and "the expansionist" (1989-95). Table 9.1.(3) lists the characters representing the image of Dr al-Turabi's account of each period between 1964 and 1995.

Table 9.(3): The characters representing each period

Period	Heading of chapter	Main character
1964-69 Chap. 3	Beginning of the Islamist movement	the revolutionary (a)
1969-77 Chap. 4	Anti-regime struggle and learning period	the resistant (a)
1977-85 Chap. 5	The Islamist movement within the Nimairi regime: expansion and practice	the expansionist (a)
1985-89 Chap. 6	Transition period and power struggle	the competitor (a)
1989-95	The Islamist movement as a state:	
Chap. 7	Consolidation within the borders	the reformer (a)
Chap. 8	Expansion beyond the border	the expansionist (a)

Through the assessment of the impact of Dr al-Turabi's personality on the movement, the strong relationship between Dr al-Turabi's personality and the key developments of the movement has become clear. For example, his characters, such as "the revolutionary" and "the passionate" affected the positive involvement of the movement in the October Revolution. His strong agentic elements of personality which derived from his main characters, such as "the resistant", "the revolutionary", and "the man behind the scenes" affected the movement's anti-regime struggles. His agentic elements of personality stemming from his strong motivation towards the expansion of the Islamist movement, affected the movement's cooperation with Nimairi. His personality elements stemming from his character of "the reformer" affected the relatively moderate contents of the Sudanese criminal law. His strong commitment to the creation of the *umma* and his personality elements stemming from his characters like "the expansionist" and "the challenger" affected the quality of the international relations between Sudan and other countries.

To conclude, it would be possible to say that Dr al-Turabi's personality, to a great extent, determined the activities of the Islamist

movement in Sudan. The researcher hopes and believes that his psychological approach (which may be called a "socio-political personality analysis") has contributed to a better understanding of the Islamist movement in Sudan.

Page

Notes 252

Chapter 1 253

Chapter 2 255

Chapter 3 261

Chapter 4 264

Chapter 5 268

Chapter 6 274

Chapter 7 278

Chapter 8 284

Notes: Chapter 1

1. See "Definitions".

2. Al-Mu'tamar al-Shaᶜbii al-ᶜArabii al-'Islaamii

3. *The Independent*, 3rd December 1993.

4. See "Definitions".

5. Interview with Dr Anoushiravan Ehteshami at his office in Durham, 28 August 1995.

6. The term "psychobiography" is used in Jeanne N. Knutson (ed.), *Handbook of Political Psychology* (London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 24.

7. Dan P. McAdams, *The Person: An Introduction to Personality Psychology*, second edition (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), p. 790.

8. McAdams, *The Person*, p. 754.

9. Personal contact with Professor Dan P. McAdams in a letter, 4 August 1994. Professor McAdams is one of the leading personality psychologists in the US and currently teaching at Northwestern University, Illinois.

10. Dan P. McAdams, *The Stories We Live by: Personal Myths and Making of the Self* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), p. 11.

11. *Ibid.*

12. McAdams, *The Person*, p. 770.

13. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 29.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

16. McAdams, *The Person*, p. 759.

17. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 20.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

19. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 13.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

29. McAdams, *The Person*, pp. 754-755.

30. McAdams, *The Stories*, pp. 60-64.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

33. Arthur S. Reber, *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 533.

34. McAdams, *The Stories*, pp. 71-72.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-285

38. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 287-288.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-297.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

Notes: Chapter 2

1. Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi (Wisaal al-Turaabii) at her house in Khartoum, 25 May 1994. Barclay supports this statement as he says that: 'Most of the Arabs claim affiliation with tribes which presumably entered the Sudan several hundred years ago, e.g., the Ja9aliyiin [Jaᶜaliyiin] tribes.' H.B. Barclay, 'An Ethnographic Study of an Arab Sudanese Village in Suburban Khartoum', PhD thesis in 1961 (London: University Microfilms, 1980), p. 175.

2. H.A. Macmichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan*, vol.1, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1922), p. 197.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Muhammad al-Nuur bin Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat fii Khusuus al-'Awwaliya' wa-al-Saalihiin wa-al-ᶜUlamaa' wa-al-Shuᶜraa' fii al-Suudaan (The Book of the Stories of the Holy people, the Good people, the Scholars, and the Poets in Sudan) (Al-Khartuum: Jaamiᶜat al-Khartuum, 1985).

5. *sufi* (suufii): 'Islamic mystic. The term should not be used, or appropriated, by those mystics who are not Muslims or who do not root their mysticism in the Koran [al-Qur'aan]. ... it derives from the Arabic word *suf* [suuf] meaning 'wool', in reference to the garments of the early Muslim ascetics.' Ian R. Netton, *A Popular Dictionary of Islam* (London: Curzon Press, 1992), p. 236.

6. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 160.

7. The *Qadiriya* is a major *sufi* order named after Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (ᶜAbd al-Qaadir al-Jiilaanii) who established a reputation by his preaching in Baghdad (Baghdaad) in the 12th century. Netton, *A Popular Dictionary*, p. 201.

8. Ali S. Karrar, *The Sufi Brotherhood in the Sudan* (Illinois: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 21-23.

9. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p.128. " Wa-qiil saafara ilaa taqalii wa-sallaka fii-haa ᶜAbd Allaah al-Hammaal jadd al-Shaykh Hamad walad al-Turaabii. " "Sallakā" is the second-form verb and means "he clarified". "Jadd" means "grandfather".

10. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 162.

11. The *Mahdi* is 'literally, "the One who is Rightly Guided" ... [and] is a figure of profound eschatological significance in Islam and a title often claimed by diverse leaders throughout Islamic history.' Netton, *A Popular Dictionary*, p. 156.

12. Ibn Dayf Allaah, Kitaab al-Tabaqaat, p. 164.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-173.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

15. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi at his Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) office in Khartoum, 7, 9, 14, and 16 May 1994, and an interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi at his office in the University of Khartoum, 24 January 1995.

16. See Appendix (1): The Turabi family.

17. See Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan.

18. Dafalla (Hassan's brother) came to Wad al-Turabi with his mother in 1943. When she died of a pregnancy related illness in a hospital near Wad al-Turabi, Hassan and his father were in El-Roseires. Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.

19. Hassan's eldest brother, Muhammad (Muhammad), was a teacher in Rufaa. *Ibid.*

20. See Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident.

21. When Hassan was in the second grade of the secondary school, Dafalla was a lecturer at the faculty of engineering in the Gordon Memorial Collage. Dafalla advised Hassan that the faculty of law at the GMC took new students every two years, and unfortunately there would be no recruitment in two years' time, therefore if he wanted to study law as soon as possible he must finish his secondary school in one year's time, otherwise he had to wait another year. Hassan asked the headmaster of the secondary school, Mr Lewis Brown, to allow him to skip the third grade. Mr Brown gave Hassan his permission, but told Hassan that he should do it on his own responsibility. Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.

22. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC.

23. Arthur L. Lowrie (ed.), *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr Hasan Turabi* (Florida: the World & Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993), pp. 66-67. This round table was actually held on 10 May 1992.

24. Interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi, 7 May 1994.

25. The *Maliki* school is one of the four main law schools of *Sunni* Islam, named after the founder Malik b. Anas (Maalik b. 'Anas). Netton, *A Popular Dictionary*, p. 159.

26. Interview with Dr al-Turãbi, 7 May 1994.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 46.

29. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 7 May 1994.

30. Although Dr al-Turabi did not reject the researcher's small gift, he reluctantly accepted it mentioning his father's behaviour. This happened when the researcher held out a small gift in front of him before starting the first interview on 7 May 1994.

31. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 7 May 1994.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 May 1994.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 25 January 1995.

38. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 7, 9, 14, and 16 May 1994.

39. According to Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, his father did not necessarily oppose female education. In those days, educational oppertunities were very limited not only for girls, but also for boys. Although his sisters could not receive official education, all of his half sisters (daughters of his father's second wife and third wife) received college level education. Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, 24 January 1995.

40. See Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident.

41. This was his first encounter with communist ideology. The second encounter was in his college period. The beginning of the development of Dr al-Turabi's antagonistic attitude against the communists will be examined in (c) Higher education.

42. Lewis Willian Brown (1908-1994) was the headmaster of Hantoub Secondary School from 1946 to 1956.

43. Nimairi later carried out the 1969 military coup and became the President of Sudan.

44. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC.

45. The faculty had different departments. Hassan chose one of the departments of Western law, but also attended an optional course in the department of Islamic law. He was awarded a prize for work in Islamic law during the period from January 1954 to March 1955. *The University College of Khartoum incorporating the Gordon Memorial College and the Kitchener School of Medicine: Report and Accounts (to 31st December,1955)* (London: Blades East & Blades), p. 19.

46. The Islamic Liberation Movement (the ILM) was set up by Babikir Karrar (Baabikir Karraar) in 1949.

47. According to Dr al-Turabi, after the establishment of the ILM, Karrar rejected communism because of its atheism, but he did not abandon his socialist ideas. He later left the Islamic movement in the college and formed a socialist-oriented organization.

48. The researcher has not found any other reference to this statement of Nasser's.

49. Dr al-Turabi emphasized this point.

50. The "actual leader" was Dr al-Turabi's perception. He became the leader of the movement in 1964.

51. Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) Iran,Iraq,etc; a great Islamic philosopher: Abduh (1849-1905) Egypt; a famous reformer: Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) India,Pakistan; the founder of the Islamic Society: Al-Banna (1906-1949) Egypt; the founder

of the Muslim Brotherhood: Qutb (1906-1966) Egypt; a major ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations.

52. The law studied was, of course, western law and not Islamic law.

53. Sadiq is Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi's great grandson. He was born on 25 December 1936 and later became the prime minister.

54. See Appendix (4): Development of the GMC. The University of Khartoum was established in 1956.

55. Dr al-Turabi said that he met Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1954 for the first time when Sadiq was in the University College of Khartoum as a first year student.

56. According to Sadiq al-Mahdi, the reason for the transfer was administrative trouble with the college authority and not the problem Dr al-Turabi mentioned. Sadiq entered the school of science in the college in 1953, but did not attend the first and second terms and attended only the third term. When the third term ended in 1954, despite the initial agreement between the college authority and Sadiq that he could move to the second year, the authority told him that he had to repeat the first year. However, the authority offered an alternative of going to Oxford. Sadiq accepted the offer, took the entrance examination of the University of Oxford, and entered the university in 1954. Interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi at his house in Omdurman, 19 January 1995.

57. The *Umma* Party was led by Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (ᶜAbd al-Rahmaan al-Mahdii) up to 1959 and by Siddiq al-Mahdi (Siddiiq al-Mahdii) up to 1961. The party then split into two sections. One was led by al-Hadi al-Mahdi (al-Haadii al-Mahdii) up to 1970 and the other by Sadiq al-Mahdi. After the death of al-Hadi, the party was re-united and has been led by Sadiq up to the time of writing. The core of the party is the al-Mahdi family.

58. Najib was the initial leader of the free officer movement which carried out the military coup and overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. He brokered the establishment of the National Unionist Party (NUP) in Sudan in October 1952. The NUP supported the union between Egypt and Sudan.

59. The Arabic word 'Ansaar means "followers". In Sudan, the term particularly refers to the followers of the al-Mahdi family.

60. The Mahdist movement in Sudan was a powerful Islamic movement which started when Muhammad Ahmad (Sadiq's great grandfather) declared himself as the Mahdi in 1881 and resulted in the establishment of the Mahdist state.

61. The group was composed of members of various nationalities, such as Iraqi, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Sudanese.

62. In the early 1950s, Arafat was an undergraduate student at the University of Cairo and was studying civil engineering. He later formed *Fatah* (Fath) in 1959 and became the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1969.

63. Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution* (London: W.H. Allen, 1990), p. xxiii.

64. Gowers and Walker support general idea. 'None of the three Palestinians [Arafat, Zoheir al-Alami and Salah Khalaf] could speak much English, ...' *Ibid.*, p. 24.

65. The official name of the movement was the Muslim Brotherhood adopted in 1954. However, Dr al-Turabi avoided the use of this name, because he did not want the movement to be seen as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. See Sub-section (c) Higher education.

66. Al-Rashid (two years senior to Hassan) graduated from the faculty of law at the GMC in 1955, joined the National Unionist Party in 1965, and later became the attorney general under the Nimairi regime in 1983.

67. There were very few Sudanese staff in the university.

68. Hassan and Wisal were married later in 1961, and she has been Hassan's only wife. Mrs al-Turabi described Hassan as having been a very intelligent teacher. According to her, he was quiet, but quite strict, and he did not accept any kind of stupidness and laziness. Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 20 April 1994.

69. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub (Muhammad 'Ahmad Mahjuub), a former Prime Minister (65-66,67-68,68-69), wrote in his autobiographical book that: 'A young lawyer, Rashid Tahir Bakr, had been trained in my Chambers and I had made him my junior partner.' Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, *Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Politics* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1974), p. 183.

70. Some may have objection to this, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account and is a part of his "life story".

71. According to Wisal, the marriage between Hassan and her was semi-arranged by her mother and brother (Sadiq). During Hassan's London period, Wisal's mother met Hassan in Britain when she visited her son, Sadiq, who was in Oxford. Wisal's mother was very much impressed by Hassan, and when she came back to Sudan, she told Wisal that Hassan was a very pious man and often quoted the Koran. In those days, in general, members of the Mahdi family chose their partners within the family group. However, at that time, Sadiq believed it right that a well-educated and brilliant Sudanese man should be able to marry a woman from the Mahdi family. This idea was accepted by other family members, partly because such an inter-family marriage might strengthen the Mahdi family. Interview with Mrs al-Turabi, 20 April 1994.

72. Al-Tahir was released in 1963.

73. According to Dr al-Turabi, after al-Tahir's imprisonment, Muhammad was unofficially undertaking the leadership role. He served until 1964 as the official leader.

74. See Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution.

75. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 90.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

78. Parents are important sources of images. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

79. Family, society, and culture are all major sources of images. Religion is also an important source of images. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-64.

80. See Diagram 1.2.(3): A simplified structure of the life-story model. Also see Section 1.2.3.

81. Religion is an important source of ideological setting. McAdams, *The Stories*, pp. 80-82.

82. See Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations.

83. See Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution.

84. Main characters or imagoes often reflect one's ideology, and are often fashioned on models provided by significant people. In the case of Dr al-Turabi, a character like "the reformer" may be a reflection of his ideology. Another character like "the mediator" may be fashioned on the model provided his father. "The believer" may be a result of the influences of both ideology and his father. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 130. Also see Diagram 1.2.(3) and Section 1.2.3.

85. McAdams, *The Stories*, p. 288.

86. According to McAdams, a person's identity is the story itself. See McAdams, *The Person*, p. 759.

87. In practice, the same numbers were allowed to be used, e.g., there might be three "1"s.

88. PAIC stands for the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference. See Chapter 8. NIF stands for the National Islamic Front. See Chapter 6.

89. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.

90. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East* (US: Harper Collins, 1990), pp. 92-93 and 103.

91. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki at his home in Khartoum, 21 May 1994.
92. Interview with Mr al-Imam at his office in Khartoum, 6 February 1995.

93. Interview with Mr Hamdi at his office in Khartoum, 9 January 1995.

94. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.

Notes: Chapter 3

1. Hassan's name was already on the list of the teaching staff of the university calendar 1962-1963 as well as the calendar 1964-1965. *University of Khartoum Calendar 1962-1963* (Government Printing Press), p. 42; and *University of Khartoum Calendar 1964-1965*, p. 45.

2. The term "the Islamist movement" is used to refer to the Islamic movement led by Dr al-Turabi after November 1964.

3. According to Dr al-Turabi, the youth leader of the movement, Ali Abdalla Yaqub (ᶜAli ᶜAbd Allaah Yaᶜquub), took the initiative of the anti-communist campaign in November 1965. At that time, Dr al-Turabi was in the Blue Nile region and later came back to Khartoum to join the campaign. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.

4. Nimairi (Numayrii) later promoted himself up to Field Marshal. See Appendix (7): Military ranks.

5. In detail, see Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 217-220.

6. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995. According to him, there was a disagreement concerning the coalition of the government between his father, al-Siddiq al-Mahdi (al-Siddiiq al-Mahdii), who was the leader of the *ansar* ('ansaar) which included the *Umma* Party, and Abdalla Khalil. While al-Siddiq al-Mahdi adovocated the coalition with the National Unionist Party (NUP), Abdalla Khalil insisted the coalition with the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

7. Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun:Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), pp. 246-253.

8. For example, Khalid states the date on which a student was shot dead as "19 October 1964", while many other scholars state "21 October 1964". See Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve* (London: Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 201

9. When Yusuf Hasan wrote his article in 1967, he was the Director of the Sudan Research Unit at the Faculty of Arts in the University of Khartoum. He used several Arabic daily newspapers as the sourses. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, 'The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964',in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.5, no.4, 1967, pp. 491-509.

10. *Ibid.*

11. First, *The Barrel*, p. 261.

12. *Ibid.* Also see Niblock, *Class and Power*, p. 227.

13. Niblock, *Class and Power*, p. 227.

14. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Gray Seal, 1991), p. 89.

15. Niblock, *Class and Power*, p. 225.

16. Hasan, 'The Sudanese Revolution', p. 507.

17. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 78.

18. The US Government, *Near East/South Asia Report: Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Sudan 1944-1969* (US: JPRS Publications, 1985), p. 73. This is an English translation of
Hasan Makkii, Harakat al-'Ikhwaan al-Muslimiin fii al-Sudan, 1944-1969 (The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Sudan, 1944-1969) (Al-Khartuum: Jaamic at al-Khartuum, 1982).

19. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 76.

20. *Ibid.*

21. The researcher regards the ICF as a branch organization of the movement since its establishment. The diagram was comfirmed by Dr al-Turabi himself in the researcher's interview on 16 May 1994. However, it seems that el-Affendi regards the ICF, at least between 1964 and 1966, as more than a branch organization. See el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 67 and 86. Also see Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure.

22. Interview with Mr Yassin al-Imam, 6 February 1995. According to al-Imam, Dr al-Turabi and himself moved around Sudan for several months, calling for people to participate in the ICF. Dr al-Turabi drove a car, which belonged to the ICF, and met many people in many places. Al-Imam was impressed with Dr al-Turabi's adaptability to the different environments.

23. The US Government, *Near East*, p. 76. This is Hassan Makki's description. Dr al-Turabi gives a more detailed breakdown of what happened (see Dr al-Turabi's account).

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

26. *Ibid.*

27. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 78. According to el-Affendi, the main reason for al-Tahir's resignation was 'his opposition to all the major political stances of the ICF.' *Ibid.* Yassin Omar al-Imam also pointed out that al-Tahir was acting as if he was opposing to all the official policies of the movement. According to al-Imam, for example, al-Tahir opposed earlier elections, while the policy of the movement preferred earlier elections. Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.

28. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 86.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

30. The contents of this sub-section are Dr al-Turabi's views and perception of the development of the movement between 1964 and 1969. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 May 1994.

31. The issue of the liberation of the Islamic movement from the Egyptian influence will be discussed in the next section.

32. The symposium was officially permitted by the military regime. According to el-Affendi: 'The regime decided that all restrictions on free speech would be lifted for this debate.' El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 71.

33. According to Makkii: '[Dr al-Turabi] said "The issue of the south is a constitutional one in the first place and aggression exists against the freedom of other people in the north and in the south alike. However, specific circumstances have caused the situation in the south to escalate to a military rebellion."' The US Government, *Near East*, p. 69. In addition to this, to quote Alier: 'The view expressed in those debates was that the problem of the South could not be solved without first establishing a democratic system of government in the country as a whole.' Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan*: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), p. 25.

34. Some may object to this point, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

35. Makkii describes Dr al-Turabi's role in the revolution as follows: 'The events of October elevated the status of the adherents of Islam, because the main roles devolved upon them. Al-Turabi's stock also rose and his name became brilliant, starting with the symposia, his support for the students under the circumstances of the first revolution and his supervision of the transport of the wounded, proceeding through his leadership of the Professors' Council in the parade of mourning, the collective resignation, his contacts with the politicians and his maneuvers, and up to the military figures' fall from power, which resulted in the expansion of political opportunity on his behalf.' The US Government, *Near East*, p. 70.

36. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

37. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

38. The contents of this sub-section are based on the interviews with Dr al-Turabi on 14 and 16 May 1994.

39. According to Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii), *The Islamic Charter* (with no publication details) was published twice in early and late 1965. The charter had four chapters and Chapter Two stated 'the nature of the government would be Koranic.' The US Government, *Near East*, p. 74.

Notes: Chapter 4

1. Wisal was imprisoned once in 1970, when Nimairi attacked Aba island. So her imprisonment in 1976 was for the second time. According to Wisal, because she was a sister of Sadiq al-Mahdi and the wife of Dr al-Turabi, Nimairi feared her potential capability to mobilize the *ansar*, the *Umma* Party, and the Islamist movement. She was sent to a jail in Omdurman and stayed for 9 and a half months from July 1976. Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.

2. The dates are based on Dr al-Turabi's official prison record. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 25 January 1995.

3. *Shaban* is one of the names of a Muslim calender month.

4. Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi was imprisoned in 1969 together with Dr al-Turabi. According to him, inside the prison he advocated cooperation with Nimairi, but the other members rejected it. Hamdi was released from the prison in 1970 and officially resigned from the movement. Interview with Mr Hamdi, 9 January 1995.

5. Interview with Mr Amin Hassan Omar at his office in Khartoum, 5 May 1994, and interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

6. *Ibid.*

7. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 104.

8. *Ibid.* Woodward also pointed out the strong link between the coup and the SCP: 'Relations did indeed begin quite well, with the SCP represented in the new Revolutionary Command Council and the latter appointing a number of prominent party figures to the cabinet, ...' Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898 - 1989: The Unstable State* (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990), p. 138.

9. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 105.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 109. However, Sadiq al-Mahdi said that he was the head of the NF from the begining and al-Hindi was his deputy. Interview with Mr al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

12. Al-Hadi al-Mahdi was Sadiq al-Mahdi's uncle. From October 1961 to March 1970, al-Hadi and Sadiq were competing with each other for the leadership of the *Umma* party and the *ansar*. As a result, al-Hadi led the Hadi sect and Sadiq led the Sadiq sect.

13. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 105.

14. Mahgoub, *Democracy*, p. 237.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

16. According to Niblock, there were two different groups within the Communist party, "conditionalists" and "cooperators". The former, the majority group, led by Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub (ᶜAbd al-Khaliiq Mahjuub) insisted on conditional support for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The latter, the minority

group, led by Muawiya Ibrahim (Muᶜaawiiya 'Ibraahiim) called for unconditional support for the RCC. In 1970, the RCC was trying to eliminate the "conditionalists". Niblock, *Class and Power*, pp. 253-254.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

18. *Ibid.*

19. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 107. Nimairi always said the SSU was not a party. Tim Niblock, personal communication.

20. Niblock, *Class and Power*, p. 277.

21. Ahmad Osman Makki ('Ahmad ᶜUthmaan Makkii), Hassan Makki (Hasan Makkii), Babikir Musa (Baabikir Muusaa), and Mustafa Osman Ismail (Mustafaa ᶜUthmaan 'Ismaaᶜiil) were among them. Interview with Mr Babikir Musa at his office in Omdurman, 19 January 1995, and interview with Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail at his office in Khartoum, 22 January 1995.

22. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.

23. When Makki entered the University of Khartoum in 1970, Dr al-Turabi was in jail. Makki and other members thought that it was their duty to gain Dr al-Turabi's release from jail. They carried out demonstrations and strikes in March 1971. As a result of these activities, Makki and his colleagues were dismissed from the university. However, later in the year, they were allowed to re-start their student careers. Makki was elected a member of the executive committee of the student union. In 1972, Makki met Dr al-Turabi as a leader of the student movement. *Ibid.*

24. Makki told the researcher that he was impressed by Dr al-Turabi's patience and optimism, and remembered Dr al-Turabi's words: "There is a job to do." Makki also told the researcher of an epidode relating to Dr al-Turabi. One day before the 1973 uprising, Makki had an appointment with Dr al-Turabi and visited a place in Omdurman. When he and his friend, Ahmad Osman Makki ('Ahmad ᶜUthmaan Makkii), arrived at the place to meet, an old dirty taxi came. When they saw inside the taxi, they realized that the driver was Sadiq al-Mahdi and Dr al-Turabi was sitting on the seat next to Sadiq. Dr al-Turabi was a man who moved around by himself and not a man who just stayed and used other people. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.* A former minister under Nimairi did not remember this uprising. Interview with a former minister, 18 July 1994. There are many publications covering the period between 1969 and 1977, but few describe the details of the event, except for the publications written by the Islamists themselves.

26. Al-Afandi participated in the *Shaban* uprising when he was a secondary school student and was detained a day. Interview with Dr Abd al-Wahhab al-Afandi at his office in London, 20 April 1994.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. Interview with Dr Makki, 21 May 1994.

30. *Ibid.* Makki said that he felt he became part of al-Turabi's family.

31. Interview with Dr al-Afandi, 20 April 1994.

32. *Ibid.*

33. See Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure and Diagram A.9.(3): The third structure (after 1974).

34. Interview with Dr al-Afandi, 20 April 1994.

35. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 109.

36. Al-Afandi uses the spelling "el-Affendi" in his publications. See Preface for the rules of spelling employed in this thesis.

37. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 109-110.

38. While Muhammad Osman al-Mirghani (Muhammad ᶜUthmaan al-Miirghanii) supported Nimairi, Sharif al-Hindi did not support Nimairi. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995. Also see el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 113.

39. According to Sadiq al-Mahdi, after the national reconciliation in 1977, the *Umma* Party and the DUP changed their mind and decided to oppose the Nimairi regime again, while the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi decided to support Nimairi. The *Umma* Party initially agreed to support Nimairi, on condition that he adopted a democratic programme. However, because Nimairi did not meet the condition, the *Umma* Party decided to oppose him. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995

40. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

41. According to el-Affendi, Sadiq went to London in 1974. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 109.

42. See Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure and Diagram A.9.(3): The third structure (after 1974).

43. According to a former minister under Nimairi, some people argued that the Islamist movement should not continue to exist as an organized body if the Islamists joined the SSU. However, Nimairi did not listen to them. Interview with a former minister at Durham in Britain, 18 July 1994.

44. Dr al-Turabi described the conditions inside prison as follows: 'There was no torture to it; actually, it was very comfortable, except for the fact that your freedom is curtailed. But it was very pleasant there in every respect. We had air conditioner, we had everything; we had TV, access to our families and food from home.' Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 94. Dr al-Turabi's wife, who was also put in jail in July 1976, expressed a similar impression. She told the researcher that life outside the prison was too busy for her to do her private things, and that life inside the prison was quite comfortable and she could have time for herself. Therefore, she said as a joke that she wanted to go to prison again. Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.

45. According to Hassan Makki, Dr al-Turabi always got up at 3 o'clock in the morning for the first prayer, then he called for the other people at 5 o'clock

for the second prayer, and then he started to memorize the *Koran* (al-Qur'aan). Interview with Dr Makki, 21 May 1994.

46. Hassan Makki described Dr al-Turabi's behaviour in the prison as follows: 'One day in the prison, some political prisoners, especially the communists, called for a strike demanding an improvement of the conditions of the prison. However, Dr al-Turabi rejected such a strike saying: "We are not in a hotel." Dr al-Turabi never showed any signs that he was bored in the prison.' *Ibid.* According to Yassin Omar al-Imam, Dr al-Turabi maintained his dignity when he was in prison. Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.

47. According to Yassin al-Imam, Dr al-Turabi refused to go out through the small gate of the prison and went out through the main gate, and refused to have his belongings examined by the police when he returned from a short visit outside the prison. Al-Imam's statement suggests that even during the period of imprisonment, Dr al-Turabi sometimes went out from the prison. *Ibid.*

Notes: Chapter 5

1. Niblock describes Nimairi's Islamic undertaking in the 1980s as "Islamist". In this chapter, however, the term "the Islamists" is used to refer only to the members of the movement led by Dr al-Turabi. See Tim Niblock, 'Islamic movements and Sudan's political coherence' in Derek Hopwood (et al. eds.) *Sudan: History, Identity, Ideology* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), p. 253.

2. The origin of the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA) led by John Garang can be traced back to May 1983, when Battalion 105 in Bor - one of the forces that had been absorbed of Anya-nya into the goverment forces after the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, was attacked by some of other government forces ordered by President Nimairi. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, pp. 241-245. John Garang, (Mansour Khalid (ed.)), *John Garang Speaks* (London: KPI, 1987), p. 32. Also see Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan.

3 Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of the Republican Brothers, was executed on a charge of "apostasy". He had been criticizing the Islamic laws introduced by President Nimairi in September 1983.

4. Mohammed Beshir Hamid, *The Politics of National Reconciliation in the Sudan* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Univ., 1984), p. 11.

5. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 114-115.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995, and interview with Dr Mustafa Ismail, 22 January 1995.

8. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.

9. According to el-Affendi, Sadiq al-Mahdi withdrew his support for Nimairi by 1978. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 120. According to Hamid, the DUP pro-Hindi group had agreed to support the national reconciliation through the London agreement in April 1978. Hamid, *The Politics*, p. 12. The position of the DUP is very complicated, and it is not clear exactly when the DUP (pro-Mirghani group and pro-Hindi group) withdrew their support.

10. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 119.

11. Charles Gurdon, *Sudan at the Crossroads* (London: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1984), p. 68.

12. The name "NIF" (the National Islamic Front) was adopted by the Islamist movement in May 1985 (after the fall of Nimairi's regime), therefore, strictly speaking, Abbas's usage of "NIF" here is not accurate.

13. Ali Abdalla Abbas, 'The National Islamic Front and the Politics of Education' in *Middle East Report*, vol.21, no.5, 1991, p. 23.

14. The Islamists learned the importance of the role of the army in their politics from their earlier experience of coups, such as those led by Ibrahim Abbud (1958) and Jafar Nimairi (1969). Consequently, the Islamists started to seek support in the army after 1977. The basic strategy of penetrating into

the armed and security forces was the same as those in the other fields, i.e. education. During the Nimairi period, the Islamists used educational and training institutions to their advantage to re-educate young army officers. See Masaki Kobayashi, 'The Difference between Algeria and Sudan' in *Sudan Focus* (London-based monthly newsletter), 15 May 1995, p. 8.

15. Interview with a former minister, 18 July 1994.

16. Safiya Safwat, 'Islamic Laws in the Sudan' in Aziz al-Azmeh (ed.) *Islamic Law* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 240.

17. The Sudanese Government, *The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan* (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1973), p. 3.

18. Safwat, 'Islamic Laws', p. 241.

19. *Ibid.*

20. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 126. According to Lowrie, Dr al-Turabi was presidential advisor on legal and foreign affairs until March 1985. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 11.

21. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 125. In March 1985, al-Tahir was promoted to vice-President and Awad al-Jid (ᶜAwad al-Jiid) became Attorney General. *The Guardian*, 25 March 1985.

22. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 122.

23. Until 1980 the Sudanese legal system consisted of two major parts: the civil section and the Islamic law (*sharia*) section. There were the civil judges and the *sharia* judges and the former was, in those days, superior in numbers and status to the latter. In 1980, an attempt to unify these two parts started, but was interrupted by the introduction of the Islamic laws in 1983. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, *Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p. 73.

24. According to Dr al-Turabi, '... under Nimeiri, the [penal] code was poorly drafted; it was drafted in three days, and it was the old penal code with just the insertion of five or six provisions.' Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 44.

25. Safwat, 'Islamic Laws', p. 241.

26. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 124.

27. Al-Kabbashi joined the Islamist movement in the 1960s, when he was in his secondary school. He graduated from the Department of Islamic Law at the Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum in 1971. He took part in the 1973 *Shaban* uprising and supported the 1976 armed operation. In 1981, he obtained his PhD at the Faculty of *Sharia* in Makka University, Saudi Arabia. Between April 1984 and March 1985, he served as a judge of the High Court of Appeal. Interview with Dr al-Mikashifi Taha al-Kabbashi at his office in Khartoum North, 2 February 1995.

28. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 125.

29. The Islamic laws were first introduced in September, therefore these Islamic laws are sometimes called "September laws".

30. Interview with Dr al-Kabbashi, 2 February 1995.

31. *The Guardian*, 25 March 1985.

32. *Sudan Update*, 20 December 1989, p. 1.

33. 'Like all those special criminal courts established under the Judiciary Act of 1984, the court was manned by a single judge appointed by the President [Numayrii] ... The judge conducting this particular trial which was to include Ustadh Mahmoud himself ... was Hassan Ibrahim al-Mahalawy, a fresh graduate who had less than three years of practical judicial experience.' Quoted from Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im trans.), *The Second Message of Islam* (New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1987), p. 13 (note 18).

34. The way of the presentation of the names follows the annual report of the FIBS. Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, *Annual Report 1984* (Khartoum: 1984) Faysal bin ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziiz (d.1975) was the king of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975 and was a brother of the current king Fahd bin ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziiz. Prince Muhammad al-Faysal is a son of Faysal bin ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziiz.

35. Osman Ahmed, 'Sudan: The Role of the Fisal Islamic Bank' in Rodney Wilson (ed.), *Islamic Financial Markets* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 78.

36. Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan, *Annual Report 1985* (Khartoum: 1985). According to Dr al-Turabi: 'It [Saudi Arabia] has been the one country that has refused to allow a single Islamic bank to operate; ... Because if you allow a single Islamic bank in Saudi Arabia, you will have awakened everybody to the fact that all the banks are not Islamic, ...' Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 58.

37. Interview with Mr Hamdi, 9 January 1995.

38. Interview with Dr Ahmad Ali Abdalla at his office in Khartoum, 10 January 1995.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Section 110 in "The Civil Procedure Act 1983" prohibits "interest". Safwat, 'Islamic Laws', p. 242.

41. Ahmed, 'Sudan', p. 77. "The Civil Transactions Act 1984" was the main source of this Islamization. Safwat, 'Islamic laws', p. 242.

42. Ahmed, 'Sudan', p. 79.

43. Abbashar Jamal, 'Funding Fundamentalism: the Political Economy of an Islamist State' in *Middle East Report*, vol.21, no.5, 1991, p. 16.

44. Sudanese pro-Islamist business man. Active in London.

45. Saudi pro-Islamist businessman. Ex-Minister.

46. Egyptian economist. Specialized in Islamic banking.

47. Saudi Arabian. Deputy Secretary General of the Islamic League (al-Raabita al-'Islaamiiya).

48. Sudanese businessman. Member of the Islamist movement.

49. Sudanese banking official in Eastern Sudan. Member of the Islamist movement. Currently, member of parliament (MP).

50. Saudi businessman.

51. Sudanese lawyer. Ex-Speaker of the parliament. One of the founders of the Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM). Leading member of the Islamist movement.

52. Dr al-Turabi did not know about Abd al-Razaq.

53. Pro-Islamist Saudi Arabian. The leader of the Islamic League. Deputy Chairman of the *Shura* Council (Majlis al-Shuuraa) in Saudi Arabia.

54. Pro-Islamist Egyptian. Business consultant.

55. Pro-Islamist Saudi Arabian. Ex-Chancellor of Riyadh University in Saudi Arabia.

56. Sudanese Islamist. Leading member of the Islamist movement.

57. Dr al-Turabi did not know about Abd al-Rahman.

58. Sudanese public administrator. Leading a football team.

59. Pro-Islamist banker.

60. Businessman.

61. Dr al-Turabi's nephew. Member of the Islamist movement. Chemist and businessman. Currently, member of parliament (MP).

62. Economist and businessman.

63. Sudanese Islamist. Leading member of the Islamist movement. He was extremely active, when he was the deputy leader of the student movement. Currently, running an Islamic insurance company.

64. The members of the SSB in the financial years 1984, 1985, and 1986 were exactly the same. The FIBS, *Annual Report: 1984, 1985, and 1986.*

65. Sudanese Professor in the Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum. Pro-Islamist *sharia* specialist.

66. Sudanese Mufti (Muftii: official expounder of Islamic law).

67. Sudanese Mufti.

68. Sudanese *sharia* specialist. Member of the Islamist movement.

69. Al-Bayli was Dr al-Turabi's student at the University of Khartoum. Member of the Islamist movement. Currently, head of the legal commission in the parliament.

70. Ahmed, 'Sudan', pp. 81-86.

71. The financial year 1984 ended on 25 September 1984. It reports the annual general meeting of the shareholders which was held on 1 March 1985 at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum. The FIBS, *Annual Report: 1984.*

72. These subsidiary companies are: Islamic Insurance Company, Islamic Company for Trade and Services, and Real Estate Development Co.. *Ibid.*

73. Haydar Taha, al-'Ikhwaan wa-al-ᶜAskar (the Brotherhood and the Army) (Al-Qaahira: Markaz al-Hadaara al-ᶜArabiiya, 1993), p. 55. Because the sources about these figures are not given, Taha's statements might be exaggerated.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Interview with Mr Hamdi, 9 January 1995.

76. The food riots started on 26 March in Omdurman. *The Guardian*, 28 March 1985.

77. *The Guardian*, 28 March 1985.

78. Yoshiko Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan ni Okeru Taisei Hendo to Minzoku Keisei' (The Change of the Establishment and the Formation of the Nation in the Modern Sudan) (Tokyo University PhD thesis, 1993), p. 400.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Interview with Mr Hamdi, 19 January 1995.

81. The FIBS, *Annual Report: 1985* (Khartoum: 1986), p. 4.

82. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 128; and *The Guardian*, 6 March 1985. Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi also told the researcher that it was true that Bush influenced Nimairi's decision to arrest Dr al-Turabi. 'When the Islamic laws were introduced, the US thought Nimairi was becoming dangerous and sent a message to Nimairi through the IMF that if Sudan wanted support from the IMF, the government should do something about the Islamic laws. The US hated Islamic laws, particularly the laws concerning economy. Then, Bush came with a clear ultimatum and threatened Nimairi. Bush said to Nimairi that unless Nimairi got rid of the Islamic laws and kept distance between himself and the Islamists, the US would stop its aid to Sudan.' Interview with Mr Hamdi, 9 January 1995.

83. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p.129; and *The Guardian*, 12 March 1985.

84. *The Guardian*, 25 March 1985.

85. Since then, Nimairi has been living in Egypt.

86. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994 and 14 January 1995.

87. Hassan Makki also told the researcher that as far as Dr al-Turabi was concerned, the freedom of the movement was more important than power-sharing with the regime. Interview with Dr Makki, 21 May 1994.

88. It appears that Dr al-Turabi believed that the reason for Nimairi inviting

him to join the regime was that: 'Numeiri [Nimairi] wanted me inside to prevent me operating against him outside.' *The Guardian*, 17 April 1985.

89. The Arabic of "the *Shura* Council" is "Majlis al-Shuuraa" and it means "the council of consultation". See Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure.

90. According to Abd al-Rahim Mahmud Hamdi, during the period between 1977 and 1985, Dr al-Turabi's influence "inside" the government was limited, and it is sometimes overestimated by some observers. Interview with Mr Hamdi, 9 January 1995.

91. Abd al-Rahim Hamdi told the researcher that Nimairi was a man who was jealous of other people for their influence. 'Dr al-Turabi knew Nimairi's personality, therefore, Dr al-Turabi focused his activities outside the governmental sphere. Dr al-Turabi exerted considerable efforts to establish a variety of Islamist organizations, such as the youth movement, the student movement, and the women's movement.' *Ibid.*

92. According to Wisal al-Turabi, Dr al-Turabi was invited by the President of Tunisia and was going to give some lectures in Tunisia. Dr al-Turabi was going to leave Sudan on Saturday 9 March. Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi, 25 May 1994.

93. According to Wisal, the head of the security apparatus, Omar Muhammad al-Tayyib (ᶜUmar Muhammad al-Tayyib), gave President Nimairi false information that Dr al-Turabi was planning to assassinate Nimairi. She also heard that Nimairi was going to kill Dr al-Turabi and other Islamists who were arrested. *Ibid.*

94. The researcher checked this point with Dr al-Turabi on 14 January 1995.

95. Dr al-Turabi's idea concerning a three-stage development of the Islamist movement and his emphasis on society appear to have stemmed from thoughts of his inspirations, such as Ghazali, al-Mawdudi, and al-Banna. See Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations.

96. Interview with Dr Ismail, 22 January 1995.

97. Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.

Notes: Chapter 6

1. See Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan.

2. The 1987 *Sudan Charter* was written by a group led by Dr al-Turabi. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994. Also see the National Islamic Front, *Sudan Charter* (Khartoum: 1987) in Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and Gunnar M. Sorbo (eds.) *Management of the Crisis in the Sudan* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1989), pp. 133-144.

3. Ali Osman Muhammad Taha (ᶜAli ᶜUthmaan Muhammad Taha) is known as the deputy leader of the Islamist movement. He was Minister of Social Planning and is currently (1995) Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4. Sadiq was Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

5. See Hasan al-Turaabii, Mashruuᶜ al-Qaanuun al-Jinaa'ii al-Suudaan (The Issue of Sudanese Criminal Law) (Al-Khartuum: Waziir al-ᶜAdal wa-al-Naa'ib al-ᶜAam, 1988).

6. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 131. Kurita, however, says that the formation of the NIF took place in May 1985. Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', p. 407.

7. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 129-130.

8. Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', p. 404.

9. By mid-March 1985, Nimairi had antagonized the Islamists led by Dr al-Turabi. See Chapter 5.

10. Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', p. 408.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Also see el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 144.

13. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 131.

14. *The Guardian*, 6 May 1986.

15. *Sudanow*, June 1986, p. 8.

16. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 141.

17. *Ibid.*

18. To quote *EIU Country Report: Sudan*: 'Inevitably, the civil war prevented elections from taking place in large areas of southern Sudan. The government was eventually forced to concede that they could not take place in 37 southern constituencies because of the security situation. Large parts of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile regions, as well as some parts of Equatoria, were affected. At the same time, the number of registered voters in the other southern constituencies was very small. One Sudanese observer calculated that the total for the whole of the south was only equal to two northern constituencies. One graduate's seat for Bahr al-Ghazal was won with 158 votes. This compares with 10,315 votes cast for a single seat in Khartoum.' *EIU*

Country Report: Sudan, no.2, 1986, p. 5.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Sudanow*, June 1986, p. 8.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

23. *The Guardian*, 13 June 1988.

24. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

25. The Koka Dam Declaration: see Garang, *John Garang Speaks*, pp. 145-147. The declaration states that: 'Repeal of the "September 1983 Laws" and all other laws that are restrictive of freedoms.'

26. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

27 .*Ibid.*

28 .*Ibid.*

29. *The Guardian*, 23 and 29 December 1988.

30. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

31 .*Ibid.*

32 .*Ibid.*

33. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

34 .*Ibid.*

35. *The Guardian*, 31 December 1988.

36. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

37. *Ibid.*

38 .*Ibid.*

39 .*Ibid.*

40 .*Ibid.*

41 .*Ibid.*

42 .*Ibid.*

43. *Sudan Studies*, no.6, June 1989, p. 23.

44. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

45. *The Guardian*, 23 and 27 February 1989.

46. *Sudan Studies*, no.6, June 1989, p. 23.

47. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

48. *Sudan Studies*, no.6, June 1989, p. 24.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', p. 411.

51. *The Guardian*, 1 July 1989.

52. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 190.

53. Interview with Dr Hassan Makki, 21 May 1994.

54. Interview with Mr al-Imam, 6 February 1995.

55. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

56. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994, 14 and 25 January 1995.

57. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

58. The word "national" here is the translation of the Arabic word *qawmi* (qawmii). The National Islamic Front = Al-Jabha al-'Islaamiiya al-Qawmiiya.

59. There is an Islamic group called the "Muslim Brotherhood" in current Sudan. This group was once part of the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 119.

60. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

61. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

62. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

63. To quote *The Guardian*: '... the NIF boasts of ... its influence in the Islamic business world, control of student unions and the support of half Khartoum's 10 daily newspapers. The NIF fielded 750,000 supporters at a recent demonstration in support of Sharia, ... the Islamic movement was the only political group to stand up for the army. ... the NIF has won solid support [of the army].' *The Guardian*, 21 March 1988. This article was written about a year before the 1989 coup, however it is useful in understanding the influence of the NIF at that time.

64. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

65. Some may object to this statement, but this is Dr al-Turabi's account.

66. Dr al-Turabi expressed his confidence on this point in 1992: 'If you pick a random sample from the army, most of them would be Islamists.' Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 22.

67. Dr al-Turabi described *tawakkul* as: 'You do your duty and leave the rest to Allah. The Sudanese experience is an experience of *tawakkul* and we have

found it to be the best resource.' *Impact International*, May 1995, p.14.

68. See Section 5.3.2.

Notes: Chapter 7

1. Interview with President Omar al-Bashir at the Presidential Palace in Khartoum, 4 February 1995.

2. Government officials call the coup the " 'Inqaadh (Salvation) Revolution. "

3. A political system of "direct non-party democracy" was approved by the Conference for National Dialogue on the Political System in October 1990. *Sudan Update*, 19 October 1990, p. 3.

4. *Sudanow*, January, 1996, p. 10.

5. *Ibid.*

6. The Sudanese Government, *Sudan's Political System: The National Charter for the Political Action*, (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat, 1991), pp. 4-10.

7. See Appendix (10): Original diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses.

8. The Sudanese Government, *Sudan's Political System: The Basic Rule for the Popular Congress* (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat, n.d.), pp. 4-8; *Sudanow*, June 1991, pp. 7-8; and January 1996, pp. 14-33.

9. According to *The Guardian* of 29 March 1990, the Popular Committee seems to have a special role. To quote it: 'Newly established "popular committees" were initially presented as friendly neighbourhood bodies, but they quickly assumed a security role, empowered to eavesdrop and arrest.'

10. *Sudan Focus*, 15 February 1995, p. 4.

11. *Sudanow*, March 1994, p. 8.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

13. *Sudan Focus*, 15 July 1994, p. 3.

14. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.1, 1994, p. 3.

15. *Sudanow*, March 1994, pp. 8-9.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.1, 1994, p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*

19. The Sudanese Islamist government had claimed itself an Islamic state, but some Islamists object this description. The British branch of *Hizb al-Tahrir* (Hizb al-Tahriir: the party of liberation), a radical Islamist group, has claimed that Sudan was not a real Islamic state, because Sudan adopted "custom" a possible source of legislation. See *Al-Waie* (Al-Waᶜy), May 1994, pp. 3-4. *Al-Waie* is an Arabic monthly magazine.

20. See Dr al-Turabi's account.

21. *Sudan Update*, 20 December 1989, p. 1.

22. Tim Niblock, 'Universalism and Cultural Relativity in Human Rights: Can Universalistic Norms and Islamic Cultural Traditions be Reconciled ?' in *Religion and Human Rights: the Case of Sudan* (London: Sudan Human Rights Organisation, May 1992), p. 35.

23. *The Criminal Act 1991* (no publication details), p. 38. This is an English translation of Al-Qaanuun al-Jinaa'ii li-Sunna 1991.

24. According to *News from Africa Watch*, no charges of apostasy were also brought in the period between April 1985 and April 1991. *News from Africa Watch*, 9 April 1991, p. 7.

25. *The Criminal Act 1991*, p. 38.

26. *The Guardian*, 4 April 1995.

27. *The Criminal Act 1991*, pp. 5-6.

28. *The Times*, 11 February 1995.

29. *The Criminal Act 1991*, p. 53.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *News from Africa Watch*, 9 April 1991, p.9.

33. *The Economist*, 24 June 1995, p. 23.

34. The Sudanese Government, *The National Charter for the Political Action*, (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat, 1991), pp. 13-14.

35. This seems to be generally accepted as an element of an Islamic economy. See Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema, *Islamic Economic Systems* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 76 and 94.

36. Ahmed, 'Sudan', p. 77.

37. In the researcher's interview, Sadiq al-Mahdi expressed a critical view of Sudan's Islamization of the economy. See Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

38. See Chapter 6.

39. *Sudanow*, October 1984, p. 29.

40. He was, at that time, Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs.

41. Ahmed, 'Sudan', p. 77.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Sudanow*, December 1989, p. 11.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Interview with Dr Ahmad Ali Abdalla, 10 January 1995.

46. *Ibid.*

47. A senior lecturer in Islamic Law when Dr al-Turabi was a lecturer in Public Law and Administration in the Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum in the early 1960s. He has been a prominent supporter of an Islamization programme. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995. His name was also on the 1984 name-list of the SSB of the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan.

48. Joined the Islamic movement around 1960 when he was an intermediate school student. He met Dr al-Turabi for the first time in 1966. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum in 1970. He joined the Tadamon Islamic Bank in January 1983. He became the Secretary General of the central SSB in March 1992. Interview with Dr Ahmad Abdalla, 10 January 1995. Dr al-Turabi said that Dr Abdalla was the brightest leader in the field of Islamic banking. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

49. Joined the Islamist movement when he was a student. He worked at the IMF before. Currently the govenor of the central bank. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

50. Joined the Islamist movement, but left it later. The chairman of the Tadamon Islamic Bank in 1984. Currently a Professor of Economics at the University of Khartoum. Dr al-Turabi said that Professor Awad still regarded himself as an Islamist. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

51. Joined the Islamist movement in 1973. Interview with Dr Ahmad Majzub Ahmad at the Bank of Sudan, 25 January 1995. Dr al-Turabi described him as a young Islamist who was Minister of Finance in Sennar (Sinnaar) State. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

52. Joined the Islamist movement in the mid-70s. Interview with Dr Zakariya at the Bank of Sudan, 25 January 1995. Dr al-Turabi said that Dr Zakariya was not a well-known person. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

53. Joined the Islamist movement in the mid-1980s. Interview with Dr Birayma at the Bank of Sudan, 25 January 1995. Dr al-Turabi said that Dr Birayma was teaching at Gezira University in Wad Madani, and he had become famous through his commitment to "Islamization of knowledge". Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

54. A member of the Islamist movement and a *sharia* judge. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995. His name can be found in the 1984 name-list of the SSB of the FIBS.

55. A DUP member and a grand judge. Dr al-Turabi said that Shaikh al-Jazuli had no interest in the Islamist movement. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

56. One of the leading members of the Islamist movement and well-known strong Islamist. Currently a Professor at International African University. Dr al-Turabi said that Professor Hajj Nur graduated from Khartoum University, and he

was imprisoned with other Islamists. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

57. Interview with Dr Abdalla, 10 January 1995.

58. *Sudanow* pointed to the role of education as a vehicle for social change. December 1993, p. 29.

59. *Sudanow*, February 1990, p. 6. In the meantime, the reform of Sudan's general education system started in September 1990. *Sudanow*, January 1992, p. 41.

60. *Sudanow*, February 1990, p. 6.

61. *Sudan Focus*, 15 July 1994, p. 3.

62. *Ibid.*

63. The Sudanese Government, *The National Charter*, pp. 7-20.

64. *Sudan Update*, 3 November 1989, p. 2.

65. *Sudan Update*, 20 April 1990, p. 1. The report suggests a link between the coup attempt and the *Umma* Party, but *Sudan Focus* of 15 July 1994 says that it was planned by pro-*Bath* (Baᶜth) Party officers.

66. *Sudan Update*, 5 October 1990, p. 4.

67. *Sudan Update*, 19 November 1990, p. 5.

68. *Sudan Update*, 22 April 1991, p. 1; and *The Guardian*, 1 May 1991.

69. *Sudan Update*, 7 September 1991, p. 1.

70. *The Guardian*, 18 April 1992.

71. *Sudan Update*, 29 July 1992, p. 2.

72. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.3, 1989, p. 10.

73. *Sudan Democratic Gazette*, September 1991, p. 7. This monthly newsletter is opposed to the Islamist government, thus the figures may be overestimated.

74. See Appendix (9): Civil Wars in Sudan.

75. *The Guardian*, 13 June 1986.

76. *Sudan Update*, 20 October 1989, p. 1.

77. *Sudanow*, December 1993, p. 28.

78. Dr al-Turabi's account seems to support the researcher's view. See Dr al-Turabi's account.

79. *Sudan Focus*, 15 July 1994, p. 3. *Sudan Focus* is a pro-government monthly newsletter.

80. *Sudan Update*, 19 November 1990, p. 6.

81. *Sudan Update*, 5 December 1990, p. 4.

82. Interview with a Sudanese university teacher, 11 March 1995.

83. *Sudan Update*, 8 April 1991, p. 5. The situation of the national service is this: 'The graduates from the secondary schools will take two years, and those from higher institutions will take one and a half years. These people will be allocated to different fields related to the peoples' interests. They will work with little payment. The National Service is different from military service.' Interview with Dr Muhi al-Din Abdalla (Muḥii al-Diin ᶜAbd Allaah), Associate Professor at the Sudan Academy for Administrative Sciences, in Durham, 25 September 1995.

84. See Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan, for detailes on the First Civil War and for more information on the two civil wars.

85. *The Independent*, 8 February 1994.

86. Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett (eds.), *The Times Guide to the Middle East* (London: Times Books, 1991), p. 241.

87. The core of the SPLA had already come together in May 1983, and the SPLA itself was officially formed in August 1983. The Islamic Law was introduced in September 1983.

88. *Sudan Update*, 4 June 1991, p. 4.

89. *Impact International*, December 1994, p. 18.

90. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

91. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

92. *Ibid.*

93. The Arabic word *umma* ('uṃma) means community, people or nation. In this case, it means a single Islamic community.

94. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

95. *Mideast Mirror*, 31 August 1994, pp. 26-27.

96. Interviews with Dr al-Turabi, 14 and 25 January 1995.

97. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 25.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

102. *Sudan Update*, 20 April 1990, p. 2.

103. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 26 and 83.

104. *Sudan Update*, 20 April 1990, p. 2. Because Dr al-Turabi, nowadays, prefers not to use the term "NIF", there exists some doubts to whether he actually used the term.

105. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 32-33 and 50.

106. *Sudanow*, March 1994, p. 11.

107. *Mideast Mirror*, 31 August 1994, p. 28.

108. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 34.

109. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44. In the researcher's interview, Sadiq al-Mahdi expressed his view about apostasy. See Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

111. *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 6 August 1994.

112. *Sudanow*, October 1984, p. 29.

113. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 50.

114. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

116. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

117. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 52.

118. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

119. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 22.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

121. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 25 January 1995.

122. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 29. Sadiq al-Mahdi had the same view about the "meaning" of the word *jihad*, but he disagreed with the war being called *jihad*. See Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

123. Interview with Dr al-turabi, 14 January 1995. Sadiq al-Mahdi also expressed his views about the situation in Sudan. See Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi.

Notes: Chapter 8

1. The Sudanese government, *The National Charter*, pp. 21-22.

2. Concerning US foreign policy towards Sudan, the US's anti-Islamist position became clear in March 1985, when the US influenced Nimairi's decision to eliminate the Islamist elements from the government, and this position has not changed. Between 1989 and 1993, it was evident that the domestic and foreign policies of the Sudanese Islamist government were against US interests and annoying the US. See Masaki Kobayashi, 'US Counter-Terrorist Policy and the Case of Sudan' in *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies (JAMES)*, no.11, 1996, pp. 287-304.

3. The order is given in counterclockwise order, around Sudan.

4. The order is alphabetical. The PLO is not a country, but it is included here, because it is a significant political actor in the Middle East.

5. *The Europa World Year Book 1994* (London: Europa Publication Limited, 1994), p. 1020.

6. *Third World Guide 93/94* (Uruguay: ITM, 1992), p. 262.

7. The border dispute of the Halaib region started in 1958. The Egyptian government has been insisting that the border is in fact along the 22nd Parallel and that all land north of that line is Egyptian. On the other hand, the Sudanese government has maintained its position about the border that Sudan has administrated the Halaib region since independent (1956) and the former British colonial administration does not bind Sudan's position. See Mahgoub, *Democracy*, pp. 177-179; and *The Guardian*, 19 February 1993.

8. *Sudan Update*, 21 August 1991, p. 2.

9. *Sudan Update*, 24 September 1991, p. 6.

10. *Sudan Update*, 5 May 1992, p. 2.

11. *Sudan Update*, 30 September 1992, p. 3.

12. *Sudan Update*, 1 June 1990, p. 3. Although Egypt has been against the idea of independence of Southern Sudan, the position of the SPLA-Mainstream did not undermine Egypt's interests in this point. This is because John Garang, the leader of the SPLA-Mainstream, was advocating the "united Sudan" or "Sudan's unity" at least up to mid-1993. However in October 1993, Garang agreed the idea of "self-determination" for southern Sudan in Washington. Although the Washington Declaration collapsed because of the "title" dispute between Garang and Machar, Garang lost his policy coherency for the first time. In July 1994, Garang made an agreement affirming Sudan's unity with the DUP. He also started a negotiation concerning to self-determination with the *Umma* Party. *Sudan Focus*, 15 August 1994, p. 2.

13. *Sudan Update*, 27 July 1990, p. 1.

14. *Sudan Update*, 30 September 1992, p. 3.

15. *Sudan Update*, 5 October 1990, p. 3.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Sudan Focus*, 15 October 1994, pp. 1-2.

18. *Sudan Update*, 17 April 1992, p. 2.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Sudan Update*, 4 November 1992, p. 2.

21. *Sudan Update*, 16 January 1993, p. 3.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Sudan Update*, 31 January 1993, p. 4.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Sudan Update*, 28 February 1993, p. 3.

26. *Sudan Update*, 20 June 1993, p. 2.

27. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 387.

28. The US government, *Patterns of International Terrorism:1980* (Washington: National Foreign Assessment Center, June 1981), p. 9. Also see Kobayashi, 'US Counter-Terrorist Policy', pp. 1-18.

29. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 388.

30. *Sudan Update*, 11 August 1989, p. 3.

31. *Sudan Update*, 16 March 1990, p. 1.

32. *Sudan Update*, 7 September 1990, p. 2.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *EIU Country Report: Libya*, no.1, 1991, p. 10.

35. *Sudan Update*, 22 March 1991, p. 3.

36. *Sudan Update*, 25 November 1991, p. 3.

37. *Sudan Update*, 16 December 1991, p. 5.

38. *Sudanow*, March 1992, p. 10.

39. *EIU Country Profile: Libya, 1994/95*, p. 8. However, according to a Libyan official, the integration process is still going on. (Personal communication on 1 October 1994.)

40. *EIU Country Report: Libya*, no.1, 1991, p. 10.

41. *Sudan Update*, 4 June 1991, p. 5.

42. *Sudan Update*, 16 December 1991, p. 4. It is said that Dr al-Turabi said in an Islamist meeting that Qadhafi should understand Sudan had a much larger population than Libya and the Sudanese were more educated.

43. See Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

44. 'Chad became a self-governing state within the French Community in 1958, independence following in August 1960.' Alan Palmer, *The Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth-Century History 1900-1991* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 84. 'Since 1963 there has been considerable rebellion and unrest in the North. In 1990 the government [President Hissene Habre since 1982] was overthrown and the new president Idriss Deby, promised democratic reform.' Alan Isaacs and *et al.* (eds.), *The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 149.

45. *The Europa World Year Book 1994* (London: Europa Publication Limited, 1994), p. 735.

46. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 208.

47. *Sudan Update*, 1 December 1989, p. 3.

48. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.4, 1989, p. 13.

49. *Sudan Update*, 1 December 1989, p. 3.

50. *EIU Country Report: Libya*, no.1, 1991, p. 12.

51. *Sudan Update*, 10 January 1991, p. 3.

52. The Central African Republic became independent from France in 1960. The CAR is a member of the French Community. Isaacs, *The Macmillan*, p. 147. In 1981, General Andre Kolingba came to power by a military coup. In the 1986 and 1987 elections, Kolingba was elected president. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 205.

53. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 725.

54. 'In 1908 it was annexed by Belgium, becoming the colony of the Belgian Congo. Independence was obtained in 1960, as the Republic of the Congo. ... In 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko seized power and in 1971 the Congo was renamed Zaire. In 1977 and again in 1978 an invasion force entered Shaba (formerly Katanga) province from Angola and on the second occasion the massacre of Europeans in Kolwezi brought French and Belgian force to Zaire.' Isaacs, *The Macmillan*, p. 786.

55. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 3367.

56. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 618.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 619.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Sudan Update*, 16 February, p. 2; and 16 March 1990, p. 2.

60. 'It became an independent state within the British Commonwealth in 1962

and the following year a republic was established with Obote as prime minister. In 1971 the government was overthrown in a military coup that brought Gen. Idi Amin to power. His repressive regime was overthrown in April, 1979, by Ugandan exiles aided by Tanzanian troops. In 1986, in the latest in a series of coups, Yoweri Museveni came to power.' Isaacs, *The Macmillan*, p. 736.

61. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 2983.

62. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1990, p. 3.

63. *Sudan Update*, 2 February, p. 2; and 20 April 1990, p. 2.

64. *Sudan Update*, 7 August 1992, p. 2.

65. *Sudan Update*, 19 October 1992, p. 3.

66. *Sudan Update*, 28 February 1993, p. 4.

67. *The Guardian*, 10 August 1993.

68. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1990, p. 3.

69. The Khartoum-based Islamic *Dawa* Organisation (IDO) was set up in 1980. To quote *Sudan Focus*: 'The IDO was intended by its founders, scholars from various parts of the Muslim world, to work as a vehicle for conveying the message of Islam to non-Muslims using a rational approach in lay terms.' *Sudan Focus*, June 1994, p. 4.

70. *Sudan Update*, 27 July 1990, p. 3.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Sudan Update*, 28 February 1993, p. 4.

73. *Ibid.*

74. 'Kenya gained independence in 1963 and in 1964 became a republic within the British Commonwealth, with Jomo Kenyatta as its first president.' Isaacs, *The Macmillan*, p. 397. 'On Kenyatta's death (22 August 1978) the Presidency passed to Daniel arap Moi ..., who had served as Vice-President for the previous eleven years. [Moi was elected as the President, November 1979.] ... President Moi's repressive monopoly of power was challenged in February 1991 by the establishment of a National Democratic Party, led by ... Oginga Odinga.' Palmer, *The Penguin*, p. 231.

75. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1686.

76. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 363.

77. *Sudan Update*, 17 April 1992, p. 3.

78. *Sudan Update*, 19 October 1992, p. 3.

79. *Sudan Update*, 24 June 1991, p. 2.

80. *Sudan Update*, 17 April 1992, p. 3.

81. *Sudan Update*, 29 June 1990, p. 7.

82. *Sudan Update*, 16 March 1993, p. 1. These efforts resulted in the Second Abuja peace talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, during April-May 1993.

83. 'A nation that has flourished since biblical times, maintaining its independentence despite incrusions from Portuguese (1528-1633) and Italians (1882-1941).' Palmer, *The Penguin*, p. 141. 'In 1941 the Allies liberated Ethiopia and Haile Selassie returned to the throne. ... Haile Selassie [the Ethiopian emperor] was deposed in 1974 and a provisional military government came to power.' Isaacs, *The Macmillan*, p. 253. 'In 1977, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power by a coup. 'The Tigre rebels, reconstituted as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, were involved in ten weeks of heavy fighting at the close of 1989 and into 1990. A sustained offensive in March and April led to the flight of Mengistu on 21 May [1991], the downfall of his regime, and the entry of Democratic Front forces into Addis Ababa on 28 May 1991.' Palmer, *The Penguin*, pp. 141-142.

84. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1083.

85. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.1, 1990, pp. 16-17. Also see *Sudanow*, March 1995, p. 15.

86. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.1, 1990, pp. 16-17.

87. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.4, 1989, p. 12.

88. *Sudan Update*, 22 May 1991, p. 2.

89. See Appendix (9): Civil Wars in Sudan.

90. *Sudan Update*, 4 June 1991, p. 3.

91. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 271.

92. *Sudan Update*, 18 November 1992, p. 3.

93. 'By the end of 1989, the EPLF controlled the port of Massawa and almost all of Eritrea. ... In May 1991, the former Ethiopian president suddenly fled to Zimbabwe, apparently overwhelmed by the success of the Eritrean guerrillas, the success of other regional opposition group and the loss of Soviet support. This allowed the EPLF rebels to enter Asmera ... after 30 years of fighting. ... At the end of May, the EPLF announced the formation of a Provisional Government.' ITM, *Third World Guide 93/94* (Uruguay: ITM, 1992), p. 268. 'The UN-supervised referendum on independence was held between 23 and 25 April 1993; of the 1,102,410 Eritreans who voted, 99.8% endorsed national independence. The anniversary of the liberation of Asmara, 24 May, was proclaimed Independent Day, ...' *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1064.

94. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 268.

95. *Sudan Focus*, December 1994, p. 3.

96. *Sudanow*, March 1995, p. 15.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Sudanow*, March 1995, p. 15.

99. *Sudan Update*, 27 January 1992, p. 3.

100. *Ibid.*

101. *Ibid.*

102. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1064.

103. *Sudan Focus*, 15 October 1994, p. 2.

104. *Ibid.*

105. *Sudan Update*, 6 June 1993, p. 2.

106. *Sudan Focus*, March 1994, p. 3.

107. *Sudan Focus*, December 1994, p. 3.

108. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 2556.

109. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 516.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 517.

111. *Sudan Update*, 24 August 1990, p. 1.

112. *Sudanow*, September 1990, pp. 9-10.

113. *Sudan Update*, 25 September 1990, p. 2.

114. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1990, p. 2.

115. *Sudan Update*, 24 June 1991, p. 3.

116. *Sudan Update*, 20 June 1993, p. 1.

117. *The Economist*, 8 October 1994, p. 71; and 18 March 1995, p. 26.

118. *The Economist*, 8 October 1994, p. 71.

119. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1990, p. 3.

120. *Sudan Update*, 4 June 1992, p. 4.

121. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 310.

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Sudanow*, May 1991, p. 10. It is not clear whether this delegation was from the FIS.

125. *Sudan Update*, 13 January 1992, p. 1.

126. *The Independent*, 3 December 1993.

127. *Chronicle of the year 1991*, p. 106; *The Economist*, 11-17 January 1992, p. 59; and 4 April 1992, p. 13.

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Chronicle of the year 1992*, pp. 7-8; *The Economist*, 11-17 January 1992, p. 59; and 4 April 1992, p. 13.

130. *The Economist*, 11-17 January 1992, p. 59; and 4 April 1992, p. 13.

131. *The Economist*, 20 February 1993, p. 62.

132. *Sudan Update*, 31 March 1993, p. 4.

133. *Sudanow*, January 1994, p. 18. Also see Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

134. See *Sudan Focus*, 15 August 1994, p. 8; *The Economist*, 20 August 1994, p. 30; *The Independent*, 16 August 1994; and *Middle East International*, 23 September 1994, pp. 19-20.

135. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1486.

136. Ayatollah Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, on the next day President Ali Khamenei was chosen as Iran's spiritual leader to succeed Khomeini, and by August Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected President. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1488.

137. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, *The Times Guide*, pp. 263-264.

138. *Sudan Update*, 22 September 1989, pp. 3-4.

139. *Sudan Update*, 8 September 1989, p. 3.

140. *Ibid.*

141. *Ibid.*

142. *Sudan Update*, 22 September 1989, p. 3.

143. *Sudan Update*, 4 May 1990, p. 3.

144. *Sudan Update*, 5 October 1990, p. 6.

145. *Sudan Update*, 19 October 1990, p. 2.

146. *Sudan Update*, 17 December 1990, p. 2.

147. *Sudan Update*, 16 December 1991, p. 2.

148. *The Guardian*, 11 February 1992.

149. *Sudan Update*, 27 January 1992, p. 3.

150. *Sudan Update*, 19 March 1992, p. 1.

151. *Sudan Update*, 22 October 1993, p. 3.

152. *Ibid.*

153. *Sudan Update*, 31 March 1993, p. 4.

154. *Ibid.*

155. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.4, 1993, p. 21.

156. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 1504.

157. *Sudan Update*, 8 September 1989, p. 3.

158. Michael Dockrill, *The Collins Atlas of Twentieth Century World History* (Glasgow: Harper Cpllins, 1991), p. 115.

159. *Chronicle of the year 1990*, p. 67.

160. *Ibid.*

161. *Ibid.*

162. Dr al-Turabi, the founder of the PAIC, criticized the ICO for becoming contradictory to Islam. *Sudan Update* 4 November 1992. He also criticized the ICO for being politically impotent and totally unrepresentive of the true spirit of Muslim community. *Sudanow*, May 1992, p. 12.

163. *Sudan Update*, 10 August 1990, p. 1.

164. *Sudanow*, September 1990, p. 10.

165. *Chronicle of the year 1990*, p. 99.

166. The operation, Operation Desert Storm, actually started on 16 January 1991. *Chronicle of the year 1991*, pp. 7-8.

167. *Sudan Update*, 24 January 1991, p. 1.

168. *Chronicle of the year 1991*, p. 23.

169. *Ibid.*

170. *Sudanow*, January 1994, p. 18. Also see Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

171. *Sudan Update*, 5 October 1990, p. 6.

172. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1990, p. 2.

173. *Sudan Update*, 19 November 1990, p. 6.

174. *Third World Guide 93/94*, p. 467.

175. Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, *The Times Guide*, p. 21.

176. *Sudan Update*, 24 September 1991, p. 7.

177. *Ibid.*

178. *Sudan Update*, 10 November 1993, p. 3.

179. J. Gow (ed.), *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community* (London: Brassey's, 1992), pp. 65 and 68.

180. *Sudan Update*, 10 August 1990, p. 1.

181. *Sudan Update*, 24 August 1990, p. 1.

182. *Sudan Update*, 4 March 1991, p. 2.

183. *Sudan Update*, 8 October 1993, p. 3.

184. *Ibid.*

185. *Sudanow*, January 1994, pp. 17-18. Also see Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

186. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 2931.

187. Derek Hopwood, *Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia: The Tragedy of Longevity* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 83.

188. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

189. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

190. *Sudan Update*, 7 September 1990, p. 2.

191. *Ibid.*

192. *Sudanow*, May 1991, p. 8.

193. *Sudan Update*, 24 June 1991, p. 3.

194. *Sudan Update*, 25 October 1991, p. 3.

195. *Ibid.*

196. *Sudan Update*, 5 November 1991, p. 3.

197. Interview with a Sudanese diplomat, 2 December 1994.

198. *The Europa World Year Book 1994*, p. 3328.

199. *Sudan Update*, 13 May 1991, p. 2.

200. *Sudan Update*, 4 June 1991, p. 6.

201. *Sudan Update*, 8 October 1993, p. 3.

202. *Sudan Update*, 10 October 1991, pp. 3-4.

203. *The Economist*, 26 June 1993, p. 64. The ruling coalition was previously consisted of the two parties, the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP).

204. *Sudan Update*, 13 May 1991, p. 2.

205. *Ibid.*

206. *Sudanow*, January 1994, p. 17.

207. *Sudanow*, January 1994, pp. 17-18. Also see Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

208. *The Guardian*, 4 December 1993.

209. *Sudan Update*, 10 November 1993, p. 3.

210. *Sudanow*, January 1994, pp. 17-18. Also see Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

211. *New Horizon*, 31 March 1995.

212. *Ibid.*

213. *Sudan Update*, 3 April 1995, p. 2.

214. *Ibid.*

215. *Ibid.*

216. *Sudan Update*, 13 May 1991, p. 2.

217. See Dr al-Turabi's account in Section 8.2.

218. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

219. See Section 7.3 in Chapter 7.

220. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

221. *Sudanow*, May 1992, p. 11.

222. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

223. *Ibid.*

224. *Ibid.*

225. *Ibid.*

226. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 30 and 60-61.

227. *Impact International*, May 1995, p. 15.

228. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1995.

229. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 60, 68, and 72.

230. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91.

231. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

232. *Ibid.*, pp. 55 and 82.

233. *Ibid.*, pp. 21 and 57-59.

234. *Sudan Update*, 13 January 1992, p. 1.

235. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 16 and 92.

236. *The Independent*, 3 December 1993.

237. *Mideast Mirror*, 31 August 1994, p. 27.

238. *The Guardian*, 28 December 1994.

239. *Ibid.*

240. *Sudanow*, May 1992, p. 11.

241. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 71.

242. *Sudan Update*, 5 October 1990, p. 3.

243. *The Independent*, 2 October 1990.

244. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 54-55 and 82.

245. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

246. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 79.

247. The Madrid talks began in October 1991 in order to seek peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

248. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 79.

249. *Sudan Update*, 16 January 1993, p. 3.

250. *Ibid.*

251. *Sudan Update*, 22 October 1993, p. 4.

252. Ibid.

253. *The Independent*, 3 December 1993. Arafat supposed to participate in the conference, but he did not. *The Economist*, 11 December 1993, p. 70.

254. See Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC.

255. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 89.

256. *Ibid.* Dr al-Turabi said in a meeting held in Florida that he traveled the whole Muslim world including Pakistan to discuss the Gulf Crisis. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, p. 55.

257. Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, pp. 56-57.

258. New Horizon, 31 March 1995.

259. *Ibid.*

260. *Ibid.*

261. *Ibid.*

262. *Ibid.*

263. *Impact International*, May 1995, p. 14.

Page

Appendices 296

Appendix (1): The Turabi family 297
Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan 299
Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident 300
Appendix (4): Development of the GMC 301
Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations 302
Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution 308
Appendix (7): Military ranks 310
Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure 311
Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan 314
Appendix (10): Original diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses 323
Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi 324
Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC 328

Appendix (1): The Turabi family

The following diagram shows the members of the Turabi family.

Diagram A.1.(1): The Turabi family



Sources: Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi at her house in Khartoum, 25 May 1994.
Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi, at his office in Khartoum, 24 January 1995.

Dr al-Turabi's father, Abdalla (ᶜAbd Allaah), had three wives and 18 children. Dr al-Turabi was born as his third son. Dr al-Turabi's father and mother are dead, but his father's second and third wives are alive.

Dr al-Turabi's eldest brother, Muhammad (Muḥammad), is a lecturer in Arabic at the International African University in Khartoum and his

second brother, Dafalla (Dafᶜ Allaah), is a professor in engineering at Khartoum University. Dr al-Turabi's half brother, Muawiya (Muᶜaawiya), is working in Saudi Arabia and another half brother, Abd al-Khalif (ᶜAbd al-Khaalif) is dead. Abd al-Khalif joined the Popular Defence Force (PDF) and died in a battle in the South on 22 February 1994, while he was a student at the faculty of engineering in the University of Khartoum.

Dr al-Turabi himself has a wife and 6 children (3 male and 3 female). According to Dr al-Turabi, his children have not normally used their family name "al-Turabi" in their schools, because the usage of the name causes either too much trouble or too much respect. Some of his brothers and sisters have been doing the same thing, he added. To the researcher's knowledge, none of Dr al-Turabi's brothers or sons has a high ranking official position in either the current regime or the security apparatus.

Notes:

1. The official birthday is 1 January 1927, but the real birthday is 1 June 1927.

2. The official birthday is 1 January 1932, but the real birthday is 1 February 1932.

Appendix (2): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan

The table indicates the educational situation from the 1930s to the 1950s in Sudan. The attendance numbers in schools indicate the fact that Hassan was brought up in a good environment and a privileged home. The numbers also indicate that girls rarely attended schools in those days.

Table A.2.(1): Attendance numbers in schools in the northern Sudan

		1936	1939	1944	1948
Elementary education : (1939-43)	boys	12,402	n.a.	19,381	26,074
	girls	2,927		6,681	n.a.
Intermediate education : (1944-47)	boys			1,847	2,255
	girls			114	313
Secondary education : (1948-50)	* boys				801
	girls				37

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Higher education : (the GMC) (1951-55)	317	492	531	601	580

(year) = Hassan's study period
* excluding the number of Junior secondary education

Source: Mohamed O. Beshir, *Educational Development in the Sudan, 1898-1956*, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 202 and 208.

Appendix (3): The Rufaa incident

The Rufaa (Rufaaᶜa) incident was a riot which occurred in 1946, and was led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Mahmuud Muhammad Taha), the leader of the Republican Party / Brothers. The riot resulted in the destruction of the local government office building of the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in El-Hasaheisa.

The reason for Taha's action against the Anglo-Egyptian authority was complicated. An-Na'im (al-Naᶜiim) explains the reason in the introduction of his translation of *The Second Message of Islam*, a book which was originally written by Mahmud Taha. To quote an-Na'im:

> 'In that year [1946] the colonial government of Sudan added section 284A to the Sudan Penal Code forbidding the practice of a severe type of female circumcision known as Pharaonic circumcision (removing all the external genital organs of girls). While vigorously opposed to the practice itself, the Republican Party resisted the introduction of penal measures as not only ineffective, but actually counter-productive. The organization maintained that such deep-rooted social customs could not be changed by imposing criminal sanction;...'[1]

Taha opposed the authorities because he did not like the "way" in which they were acting. He used force to oppose them. To quote an-Na'im again:

> 'Following speeches on the issue at a Friday prayer meeting in the main mosque of the town [Rufaaᶜa], Ustadh Mahmoud [Mahmuud Taha] led thousands of men across the Blue Nile into the administrative center of the district, Hassaheissa [al-Hasaa Hiisaa], and succeeded in freeing the accused woman on the spot.'[2]

Notes:

1. Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im (trans.)), *The Second Message of Islam* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 3.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Appendix (4): Development of the GMC

The following diagram is intended to show the development of the Gordon Memorial College from 1902 to 1956.

Diagram A.4.(1): Development of the GMC



1902/Nov./8 : The Gordon Memorial College was opened by Lord Kitchener.
1924 : The GMC was made a wholly secondary institution. The primary and military schools were removed.
1945 : The new GMC, with the status of a university college (higher education), was born. Its secondary element was transferred to Wadi Seidna (1945) and to Hantoub-(1946).
1951/Sep./1 : The ordinance establishing the University College of Khartoum came into force. The GMC and the Kitchener School of Medicine were incorporated into the University College of Khartoum, which was affiliated to the University of London.
1956 : The University of Khartoum was established.

Sources: *Gordon Memorial College Calendar 1950* and *University College of Khartoum Calendar 1952 - 54* (Khartoum: Middle East Press) in Sudan Archive, Durham.

Appendix (5): Dr al-Turabi's inspirations

When Hassan was in the GMC (1951-55), he studied the literature of famous Islamic thinkers, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali (Muḥammad al-Ghazaalii), Muhammad Abduh (Muḥammad ᶜAbduh), Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi ('Abuu al-'Aᶜlaa al-Mawduudii), Hassan al-Banna (Ḥasan al-Bannaa'), and Sayyid Qutb (Sayyid Quṭb). The researcher asked Dr al-Turabi whether he was particularly influenced by any one of them. He replied: 'It is very difficult to say, because each person had unique aspects. For example, al-Ghazali was a traditional scholar, but he was very open towards contemporary issues; Abduh had experiences of Western culture; Mawdudi was very objective; al-Banna was partly *sufi* and partly Islamist; Qutb was socialist in his earlier period.'[1]

The following are brief examinations of the similarities in ideologies between these Islamic thinkers and Dr al-Turabi.

(a) Ghazali (1058-1111), Iran, Iraq, etc.

According to Rahnema:

> 'Ghazali identified the clergy and the ruling class as the two forces that perpetuated the plight of the people. ... Ghazali abandoned any thought of armed resistance or revolution against a tyrannical ruler. Ghazali separated the first stage, of reawakening Islamic fervour, from the second stage, of radical political action and change. While he rejected revolutionary change as a means of redressing socio-political problems, he considered intellectual dissent and reform as permissible and necessary.'[2]

Dr al-Turabi seems to share Ghazali's critical attitude towards the clergy and his emphasis on re-education of the people, intellectual dissent, and intellectual reform. Dr al-Turabi says that: 'the *ulama* should have a role in the procedure, not as the ultimate authority determining what the law is, but as advisors in the *shura* to enlighten the Muslims ...'[3] He also advocates the gradual development of the Islamist movement towards an Islamic state, as he separates "horizontal development (stage 1)" and "vertical development (stage 2)". According to Dr al-Turabi, the current Sudanese state was in "stage 2".[4]

(b) Abduh (1849-1905), Egypt

According to Haddad:

> 'Abduh was a man of complexity and even contradiction. ... Because his thought was a combination of the new and the old, at times it appeared convoluted and vague. Deeply critical of much Islamic orthodoxy prevalent at the time, he in fact departed little from tradition in his writings and did manage to work with the religious establishment. Dedicated to change, he was in the end not a radical reformer but an educator who felt keenly the need for consensus. ... In many ways his work amounted to a re-interpretation of Islam for the modern world. ... It is also clear that he was impressed with the role that democracy plays in providing public constrains on the ruler, hence his emphasis on *shura*. ... Abduh's efforts to infuse the Islamic heritage with modern ideas ... '[5]

El-Affendi points out that: 'He [Dr al-Turabi] sits astride modernity and tradition, pragmatism and idealism, calculation and faith.'[6] Dr al-Turabi emphasizes the re-evaluation of *fiqh* (fiqh: traditional Islamic law) and positive application of *ijtihad* ('ijtihaad: interpretation). This appears in his books, such as *The Method of the Islamic Jurisprudence and the Islamic Legislation* and *The Issues of Reform: A Fundamental Methodological Direction.*[7] Dr al-Turabi's acceptance of the ideal of democracy and his emphasis on *shura* (shuuraa: consultation), which was made clear in his book, *The Issues of Freedom and Unity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue of Religion and Art*,[8] may be one of the results of Abduh's influence.

(c) Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979), India, Pakistan

According to Nasr:

> 'In fact, what distinguishes Mawdudi from the host of other Islamic thinkers is his preoccupation with the administrative functioning and the constitution of the Islamic state. It was his aim to provide that the Islamic state above and beyond an ideal would be a viable entity, superior indeed to western and socialist models. ... In defining the shape of the Islamic state Mawdudi borrowed widely and indiscriminately from the West. The Islamic state would be run by a modern machinery of government: an elected president, a parliament, and an omnipotent judiciary. The rela-

> tions between these branches would be governed by checks and balances meted out in a constitution. The success of the Islamic state would hinge on its legitimacy in the eyes of society. It was for this reason that Mawdudi, unlike most Islamic revivalist thinkers who followed him, favoured Islamization of society before the creation of the state. It was for this reason that Mawdudi placed a great deal of emphasis on education, and viewed Islamic revolution as a piecemeal effort. ... Mawdudi's view of the Islamic state as a viable system as well as a democracy ... Mawdudi viewed the Islamic state as a democracy ... The Islamic state should not be the enforcer of the Shari'a but the implementor of the will of the people. Ideally, popular will should demand implementation of the Shari'a, ... Mawdudi argued that the *hudud* punishments could be implemented only if a society was thoroughly Islamized - ...'[9]

Dr al-Turabi prefers the phrase "Islamic society" to "Islamic state".[10] He emphasises "society" and "education". Although the current Sudanese government was established by a military coup, it seems that Dr al-Turabi basically believes Mawdudi's approach is the best. This may explain the reason why the current Sudanese government has adopted the policy of "massive expansion" of higher education. If people can be changed through education to accept the Isdlamic state, the state will become more stable. The current government's approach towards *hudud* punishments is also quite moderate. To quote *The Economist*: 'Limbs are no longer cut off under *sharia* law.'[11] These Sudanese policies might be one of the reflections of Mawdudi's thoughts.

(d) Al-Banna (1906-1949), Egypt

According to Commins:

> 'While admitting that Islam validates parliamentary democracy, Banna rejected any role for a multiparty system in an Islamic state. ... Egypt's experience had shown that a multiparty system violates the fundamental Islamic value of national unity by sowing divisiveness. Indeed, Banna regarded Egypt's political parties as factions based on differences among prominent personalities. He called for the dissolution of all parties and the formation of a single party to unify the nation, lead to independence, and strive for internal reform. (p.136) ... For all of Banna's devotion to organization and action, he seems to have intentionally left vague his vision of how to transform Egypt into an Islamic order. Yet he did describe the process in general

terms. The first stage involved propagating the message through public lectures, speaking on ceremonial occasions, and publishing. In the second stage, the Brothers moved into action with groups like the rovers, who developed physical and martial skills in addition to further refining their religious discipline. The final stage would bring the Brothers' mission to fruition with the inauguration of an Islamic order. He warned the Egyptian government that when all peaceful means had failed, the Brothers would resort to force and seize power to install an Islamic regime. Banna stated that the Brothers did not choose violent upheaval, but a revolt would inevitably result from the pressure of circumstances burdening the Egyptian people.'[12]

Like al-Banna, Dr al-Turabi has come to his conclusion that Western democracy, i.e. the multi-party system did not suit Sudanese society. In his contribution to the book published in 1983, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, he wrote: 'While there may be a multiparty system, an Islamic government should function more as a consensus-oriented rather than a minority/majority system with political parties rigidly confronting each other over decisions.'[13] Although, Dr al-Turabi basically prefers "dialogue" to "violence", as he wrote in his book, *The Issues of Freedom and Unity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue of Religion and Art*,[14] like al-Banna, he did not necessarily stick to non-violent strategies.

(e) Qutb (1906-1966), Egypt

According to Tripp:

'As an Egyptian whose country had been for most of his life under British control, he had little difficulty in identifying the specific enemy. However, it appears that his experience of living in the United States, where he was sent by the Ministry of Education during the years 1948-1950, caused him to see the enemy as a more generic and, in some respects, more intrusive one. British imperialism was characterized merely as one aspect of a more wide-ranging and sinister form of collective enmity - that of the secular, materialist, individualist and capitalist West. ... In his view, Islam seemed to have an answer to all current social and political problems, ... (p.158) ... it was during this [prison] period [1954-1964] of confinement and hardship that Sayyid Qutb was to write most of the works for which he subsequently became famous. ... (p.160) ... During the ten years of his imprisonment, the installments of this extensive Qur'anic commentary were to appear regularly, representing, over time,

> the development of Qutb's thoughts about Islam. ... (p.161) ...'[15]

Dr al-Turabi also visited the United States for the first time during his Paris period (1959-64). He stayed in the US for about two months and saw the society through his own eyes.[16] He said that the Americans were the most ignorant people in the world.[17] Like Qutb, Dr al-Turabi was imprisoned for a long time - from 1969 to 1977 (not continuously) - and he also did not waste his time and studied a lot. Qutb's attitude in the prison might have influenced Dr al-Turabi.

Rahnema points out some common tendencies among the Islamic thinkers, such as al-Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb, who did not receive a formal Islamic training. He says that:

> 'The "outsiders", those without an official Islamic training, were less bound by certain axiomatic, jurisprudential principles, less confined to a specific procedural framework, more inclined towards innovation and more critical of the official clergy. For them a synthesis between Islamic concepts and modern values was possible and necessary.'[18]

Dr al-Turabi also studied Islam mainly with his father and did not have a formal Islamic training. His attitude seems to share this common tendency - his call for *tajdid* (tajdiid: re-evaluation) of *fiqh* (fiqh: traditional Islamic law) and positive application of *ijtihad* ('ijtihaad: interpretation), his strong motivational current of innovation and progressive change, and his critical attitude towards *ulama* (ᶜulamaa') as the official clergy of a state.

Notes:

1. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 May 1994.

2. Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 5-6.

3. Hassan al-Turabi, 'The Islamic State' in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 245.

4. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 17 May 1994.

5. Yvonne Haddad, 'Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform' in Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 59.

6. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Gray Seal, 1991), p. 179.

7. Hasan al-Turaabii, Manhajiiyat al-Fiqh wa-al-Tashriiᶜ al-'Islaamii (The Method of the Islamic Jurisprudence and the Islamic Legislation) (Al-Khartuum: Daar 'Iqra', 1987).

8. Hasan al-Turaabii, Qadaayaa al-Hurriiya wa-al-Wahda; al-Shuuraa wa-al-Diimuqraatiiya; al-Diin wa-al-Fann (The Issues of Freedom and Unmity; Consultation and Democracy; the Dialogue of Religion and Art) (Jidda: al-Daar al-Saᶜudiiya, 1987).

9. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism' in Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 106-107.

10. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 14 January 1995.

11. *The Economist*, 24 June 1995, p. 23.

12. David Commins, 'Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)' in Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 136, 148, and 149.

13. Al-Turabi, 'The Islamic State', p. 245.

14. Al-Turaabii, Qadaayaa al-Hurriiya, p. 85.

15. Charles Tripp, 'Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision' in Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 158-161.

16. Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 9 May 1994.

17. Ibid.

18. Rahnema, *Pioneers*, p. 9.

Appendix (6): Reformation and French Revolution

The researcher believes that the influence of Dr al-Turabi's knowledge of historical Western movements, i.e. the Reformation and French Revolution, had some influence on his "ideological setting".

(a) Reformation

The Reformation was the religious and political reform movement in the 16th century Europe. It is said that it started in 1517 when Martin Luther (1483-1546) criticized the Catholic Church openly. To quote *The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia*:

> 'A religious movement in 16th-century Europe that began as an attempt to reform the Roman Catholic Church and ended with the establishment of independent Protestant Churches. The Reformation began on 31 October, 1517, when Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses on the door of the castle church at Wittenburg. Luther's attack on the sale of indulgences and, subsequently, on papal authority and the sacraments (save baptism and the Eucharist) was condemned by the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor but gained the support of several German princes. The consequent conflict was not resolved until 1555. In Switzerland, the Reformation was initiated by Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) in Zurich in 1520, spreading to Basle, Berne, and also to Geneva, where it was led by John Calvin. In France, where Protestants were called Huguenots, the Reformation became involved in a political struggle for control of the Crown, giving rise to the Wars of Religion, and in the Low Countries it fired the Revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule. In England, the Reformation had three stages. Under Henry VIII papal authority in England was destroyed. Thomas Cromwell's legislation (1529-36) culminated in Henry's divorce from Catherine of Aragon and the Act of Supremacy (1534), which proclaimed the king supreme head of the English Church; in 1536 the dissolution of the monasteries was authorized. Under Edward VI Protestanism was established by the 1552 Book of Common Prayer, the accompanying Acts of Uniformity, and the 42 Articles (1553). Protestanism finally became the established Church of England under Elizabeth I and a new Act of Supremacy was passed (1559). In Scotland, the Reformation was influenced by John Knox and Presbyterianism was established in 1592.'
>
> Alan Isaacs and *et al.* (eds.), *The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia*, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 604-605.

(b) French Revolution

The French Revolution normally refers to a series of events which occurred from 1789 to 1799. The popular revolution resulted in the destruction of the monarchy and feudal system. The French Revolution is often associated with the ideas of "freedom and equality". To quote *The Macmillan Concise Encyclopedia*:

> 'The overthrow of the French monarchy as a reaction to the corrupt, feudal, and incompetent government of the Bourbon kings. In 1789 Louis XVI was forced to summon the States General but its Third Estate, opposing aristocratic attempts to dominate proceedings, formed its own National Assembly. Riots followed, the Bastille was stormed, the king was mobbed at Versailles, and the Assembly (from July the Constituent Assembly) promulgated the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Feudalism was abolished and in September, 1791, a new constitution was accepted by the king following his thwarted attempt to flee France (the flight to Varennes). However, his continuing uncooperativeness fostered the growing republicanism of what became the Legislative Assembly (October,1791) and then the National Convention (September,1792). The Convention proclaimed a republic and in January, 1793, Louis was executed. The moderate Girondins, discredited by France's war reverses, were now ousted by the Jacobins and power passed to the Committee of Public Safety. Under Robespierre the Committee conducted a Reign of Terror in which thousands of suspected antirevolutionaries were executed. His extremism, however, brought his downfall (1794) and led to the establishment of the Directory (1795), which struggled for four years with economic crises until Napoleon's coup d'etat (1799) brought the Revolution to an end.'
>
> (*Ibid.*, p. 283.)

Appendix (7): Military ranks

The following table is intended to show the Sudanese military ranks with Arabic names, English names, and ranking-marks.

Table A.7.(1): Military ranks

	Mark	Arabic	English	e.g.
1	(X []	failaq		
2	X *** []	mushiir	Field Marshal	Nimairi
3	X ** []	fariiq 'awwal	General	
4	X * []	fariiq	Lieutenant General	al-Bashir
5	X []	liwaa'	Major general	
6	*** []	ᶜamiid	Brigadier	al-Bashir
7	** []	ᶜaqiid	Colonel	Nimairi, Garang
8	* []	muqaddam	Lieutenant colonel	
9	[]	raa'id	Major	
10	***	naqiib	Captain	
11	**	mulaazim 'awwal	First lieutenant	
12	*	mulaazim	Second lieutenant	

Sudanese Military Ranking-Mark (e.g. Lieutenant General)



Appendix (8): Changes of the organization's structure

Diagrams A.8.(1), A.8.(2), and A.8.(3) show the first, the second, and the third structure of the organization of the Islamic / Islamist movement respectively. These diagrams were drawn by the researcher, based on the description written by el-Affendi, and later confirmed by Dr al-Turabi.

To the researcher's knowledge, these structures are not mentioned in any other non-Islamist sources. It may be suspected that the constituent assembly and associated bodies are not formalized institutions, but perhaps more informal meetings convened by Dr al-Turabi.

Diagram A.8.(1): The first structure



Sources: El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, p. 67.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

Diagram A.8.(2): The second structure (after 1962)



continued

Diagram A.8.(2): *continued*

PWF = Patriotic Women's Front
ICF = Islamic Charter Front
( ) = the year of establishment

Sources: El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 67 and 97.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

Diagram A.8.(3): The third structure (after 1974)



SWVR = the Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance
YSC = the Youth Society for Construction
ASM = the Association of Southern Muslims
ASU = the Association of Sudanese Ulama
IDO = the Islamic *Dawa* (Da^{c}wa) Organization
NLAS = the Namariq Literary and Artistic Society

Sources: El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, pp. 111-112 and 115.
Interview with Dr al-Turabi, 16 May 1994.

The process of the first re-structuring of the organization began after the imprisonment of al-Rashid al-Tahir in November 1959 and was

completed in 1962. The main differences between the first structure and the second structure can be found in the form of the leadership and the power of the leader. While the leader in the first structure constituted the single leadership and his power was quite strong, the power of the secretary general in the second structure was weak and almost nominal because of the introduction of collective leadership.

The process of the second re-structuring of the organization began in 1974 and was completed by the 1980s. The main changes of the structures between the second structure and the third structure were the promotion of the status of the ICF and the fact that the secretary general now had more power and more independence than before. Prior to the change, the ICF was just a branch organization of the movement, but after the change, the ICF now became part of the main body. With regard to the secretary general, before the change the post was almost nominal and was elected by the members of the executive, however after the change the secretary general was elected independently and had more practical power.

These changes of the organization's structure were attributable to Dr al-Turabi's efforts. He seemed to be seeking, consciously or unconsciously, to control the Islamic movement. In the process of the first re-structuring, Dr al-Turabi wanted to liberate the movement from the Egyptian influence. Dr al-Turabi won in the leadership struggle and obtained the full autonomy of the movement. In the process of the second re-structuring, Dr al-Turabi increased the power of the secretary general and made sure of his control over the whole movement.

Appendix (9): Civil wars in Sudan

Diagram A.9.(1) is intended to show the development of the civil wars in Sudan.

Diagram A.9.(1): Civil wars in Sudan



Diagram A.9.(1): *continued*



SPLA = Sudan People's Liberation Army:
Aug. 1983, John Garang.
PDF = Popular Defence Force: 1985-86 / 1989, government.

SPLA-M = Sudan People's Liberation Army - Mainstream:
Aug. 1991, John Garang, Dinka domination.
SPLA-U = Sudan People's Liberation Army - United:
Aug. 1991, Riak Machar and Lam Akol, Nuer domination.
Forces of Unity: Sep. 1992, William Nyuon, joined SPLA-U in 1993.
PRMSS = Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan:
Aug. 1993, Alfred Lado Gore, Equatoria tribes.
SSIM = Southern Sudan Independent Movement:
Sep. 1994, Riak Machar.

SPLA-U Sep. 1994, Lam Akol claimed.
SPLA-U Feb. 1995, William Nyuon claimed.

(a) The origins of the Popular Defence Force (PDF)

The origins of the PDF can be found in the 1985 - 1986 period, under the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab (ᶜAbd al-Rahmaan Suwaar al-Dhahab), developing further under the civilian government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi after 1986.

In the mid-1980s, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang and backed by Ethiopia was increasing its control over areas of the South. An article in *The Guardian* on 14 March 1986 reported: 'During the past year, the SPLA has gradually taken the entire south, except for the main towns.'[2] Map A.9.(1) shows the areas controlled by the SPLA in March 1986.[3]

Map A.9.(1): SPLA-controlled areas in March 1986



Source: *The Guardian*, 14 March 1986. (photocopy)

Another article in *The Guardian* reported: 'The northern army [government forces] has suffered heavy defeats and mass defections many times over the past two years in the war in the south.'[4] It continued: 'For some months Khartoum has been arming southern groups such as the Messariya, Baggara, Murle and, most recently, Acholi [ex-Ugandan government troops], to fight with, or for, the government forces against the SPLA.'[5] To quote Alier:

> 'The militia and the Murhallin were organized on the same basis as Anya-nya II. The militias operate in some parts of Equatoria, notably among the Mundari, Acholi and Madi and in Western Bahr El Ghazal, among the Fertit tribes. Their most notable operations have been against the unarmed civilians

> suspected of collaboration with the SPLA. Wau, ... was in 1987 divided into two war zones: one for the Dinka and Jur civilian population and their police force and the other for the Fertit population, its militia and a guard of the Sudan army. ... The Murhallin, meaning those constantly on the move, are recruited from the Baggara tribes of Southern Kordofan, Southern Darfur, Western Bahr El Ghazal. ... The Murhallin of 1988, usually armed with rifles, regularly took advantage of unarmed local populations in Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. Though handicapped in the past by lack of ammunition, the [second] civil war brought to the Murhallin a source of ammunition, training and modern rifles from the Sudan government. A considerable number of retired officers and NCOs from the Baggara were re-employed from 1986 to assist the Murhallin.'[6]

Anya-nya II started to fight against the SPLA some time in 1983. It continued to do so until the integration between the SPLA and Anya-nya II in 1988.[7] During the period from 1985 to 1986, the government used Anya-nya II and the tribal militias, such as the Fertit militias and the Baggara militias, to fight against the SPLA. The main reason for the employment of these militias seems to stem from the continuous defeat of the government troops. The government troops were losing their control of areas of the South day by day, therefore it seemed that the government should use whatever means might be available to reverse the trend.

The tribal militias were re-organized as the Popular Defence Force and became an official institution in October 1989.[8]

(b) The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its split

After the 1989 coup, the power of the SPLA started to decline rapidly with a number of splits and internal disputes (see Diagram A.9.(1): Civil wars in Sudan).

About a half month before the 1989 coup, Col. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA, expressed his hope for power. To quote *The Observer*:

> 'HAVING won control over much of southern Sudan at the point of a gun, Colonel John Garang, ... spoke in London last week of how his organisation could gain democratic power over the whole country, ... [John Garang] suggested that pressures on the Government from the army, arising from the economic crisis and the civil war, were such that an early resolution

> of the conflict seemed possible. He sketched a political future in which the SPLA, under a new constitution, could form the biggest party in the Sudanese parliament. In coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party (currently part of the Government), he said they would then be able to form a government.'[9]

To review the political situation in early 1989, the ultimatum of the top army officers in February 1989 was secretly backed by the DUP.[10] In March 1989, the DUP returned to the government and the NIF was excluded. It seems that John Garang and the DUP had made a secret deal on the issue of power sharing. In these circumstances, Garang could express his hope for power, however, his hope was destroyed soon by the Islamist coup. It appeared later that the SPLA had reached its peak.

In May 1991, the Mengitsu government of Ethiopia which had been supporting the SPLA collapsed. Although Col. John Garang denied the negative effects of Mengitsu's fall on SPLA activities,[11] it seems to have caused much damage to them. The SPLA lost its headquarters in Addis Ababa, its radio station and supply routes from Ethiopia.[12]

In August 1991, Commander Riak Machar split away from Col. Garang.[13] This was the first major split and the beginning of the decline of the SPLA/M.

In November 1991, cooperation between Machar's faction and some Anya-nya II groups, which still remained with the government after the 1988 SPLA-Anya-nya II integration, was rumored.[14]

In March 1992, Garang accused Machar of helping the government.[15]

In June 1992, William Nyuon, Garang's deputy, united the delegations of the two SPLA/M factions during the Abuja peace talks.[16]

In September 1992, Nyuon broke with Garang,[17] and called his own group "Forces of Unity".[18]

In October 1992, Achol Marial quitted Machar's Nasir faction and 'called on Southerners "to do something about the present four key players - Garang, Riek, Lam and William."'[19]

In December 1992, Alfred Lado Gore, veteran Southern politician and ex-Garang ally, left Garang's movement.[20]

In March 1993, in order to oppose Garang's Torit faction, a unifying attempt between Nyuon's SPLA Forces of Unity and Machar's Nasir faction had been taken.[21] This attempt later resulted in the formation of the SPLA-United.[22]

In August 1993, Alfred Lado Gore set up his own movement called the Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan (PRMSS).[23]

In October 1993, the US tried to intervene between Garang's Torit faction (or SPLA-Mainstream) and Machar's SPLA-United. The US prepared the Washington Declaration. Although the two leader agreed the contents of the declaration, both of them disagreed their "titles" on the declaration. Garang refused to sign the declaration as the leader of the SPLA-Mainstream, but signed on his own copy of the declaration as the leader of the "whole SPLA". Machar refused to accept Garang as the leader of the whole SPLA and also signed on his own copy after he had crossed out the word "United". Each copy had no counter-signature , thus the Washington Declaration failed.[24]

On 8 February 1994, *The Independent* reported the decline of the SPLAs and the advance of the government troops, as follows.

> 'Barring divine intervention, the Sudanese army will shortly retake the last towns in the south held by rebel forces, establish its presence along the roads linking them and cut the rebels off from Uganda, their haven and supply route. ... Two years ago the SPLA controlled most of southern Sudan, but a calamitous split in the movement in 1992 allowed the government to retake almost all the towns and roads.'[25]

Map A.9.(2) is meant to show the drop of SPLA controlled areas.

Map A.9.(2): Drop of SPLA-controlled area

August 1992 February 1994



Sources: *The Guardian*, 28 August 1992 (photocopy);
El Pais, 6 February 1994.

In April 1994, Lam Akol, Machar's former ally, broke with Machar.[26]

In September 1994, Machar's SPLA-United announced the change of its name. The new name was the Southern Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM). Akol claimed that he was the leader of the SPLA-United.[27]

In February 1995, William Nyuon announced that the Southern Sudan Independence Movement had dismissed Machar from the movement, and the SSIM would return to its previous name "the SPLA-United".[28]

One of the main reasons for the split of the SPLA stems from tribalism. Garang's faction is dominated by the Dinka tribe, Machar's faction is dominated by the Nuer tribe, and Alfred Gore's PRMSS is dominated by the Equatoria tribes.[29] Another main reason seems to be leaders' personal desire for power. Their tribalism and personal desire come before their support for the southern cause. Since the first split in 1991, these factions have been busy fighting each other and have lost much - territories, external support, and internal support.

Meanwhile, the Islamist government seems to have improved the conditions in the South under the federal government system. *Sudan News*

of 8 March 1995 reported that the rebels led by Lt. Zakaria Achol had surrendered, and because of this, Yarol Province in Lakes State had gained comprehensive stability which allowed people to live peacefully and to cultivate their land.

Notes:

1. The civil war broke out in Southern Sudan in 1955 and it developed into organized guerrilla warfare in 1963. *Sudanow*, July 1990, p. 3.

2. *The Guardian*, 14 March 1986.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *The Guardian*, 13 June 1986.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan*: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), pp. 255-256.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-255.

8. *Sudan Update*, 20 October 1989, p. 1.

9. *The Observer*, 18 June 1989.

10. Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi, 19 January 1995.

11. *The Guardian*, 29 June 1991.

12. *Middle East International*, 14 June 1991.

13. *The Guardian*, 30 August 1993.

14. *Sudan Update*, 25 November 1991, p. 2; and 16 December 1991, p. 1.

15. *Sudan Update*, 30 March 1992, p. 1.

16. *Sudan Update*, 19 October 1992, p. 2. Peace talks between the two parts of the SPLA and the Sudanese government were held in Nigeria.

17. *The Observer*, 10 January 1993.

18. *Sudan Update*, 31 March 1993, p. 1.

19. *Sudan Update*, 18 November 1992, p. 1.

20. *The Observer*, 10 January 1993.

21. *Sudan Update*, 31 March 1993, p. 1.

22. *The Guardian*, 2 November 1993.

23. *EIU Country Report: Sudan*, no.4, 1993, p. 19.

24. *Sudan Update*, 10 November 1993, p. 2.

25. *The Independent*, 8 February 1994.

26. *Sudan Focus*, May 1994, p. 2.

27. *Sudan Update*, 13 October 1994, p. 2.

28. *Sudan News*, 28 February 1995, p. 4.

29. *Sudan Update*, 22 October 1993, p. 3.

Appendix (10): Original diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses

The following diagram is a photocopy of the original diagram of the Sudanese popular congresses.

Diagram A.10.(1): Congresses



Source: The Sudanese Government, *Sudan's Political System: The Basic Rule [sic: Rules] for the Popular Congress [sic: Congresses]* (Khartoum: National Congress Secretariat, n.d.), p. 20. (photocopy)

Appendix (11): Sadiq al-Mahdi's account of the position of the *Umma* Party and the Islamist movement led by Dr al-Turabi

Former Prime Minister and Dr al-Turabi's former ally, Sadiq al-Mahdi, in an interview with the researcher on 19 January 1995, expressed his frustration about the current situation and made clear his resentment at some governmental actions and policies.

First, he did not see the military take-over as a necessary vehicle for an Islamic program. Second, he was not satisfied with the current legal system, especially with the criminal laws. Third, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Islamization of the banking system. Fourth, he believed that *jihad* should be a defensive instrument, thus he did not call what was happening in the South a *jihad*. Fifth, he criticised the government's stance towards non-Muslims. Finally, he was not satisfied with the government's attitude towards the UN.

The following is the text of Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi's statement to the researcher, given in an interview at his house in Omdurman, 19 January 1995.

> 'You will find that opinion in the Muslim world is divided between two schools of thought: those who can be described as secularists and those who can be described as Islamizers. The secularists can be divided broadly into two groups: those who really speak in terms of a Western agenda and those who speak broadly in terms of a communist agenda. Within those two groups, the Western agenda and the communist agenda, there are many shades and differences, but they are broadly those two. The Islamizers can be divided into, I believe, three main groups: those who may be called the authenticators, those who may be called the fundamentalists and those who may be called the modernizers. Within those groups, there are also many sub-divisions and shades of opinions. I shall not go into that.
>
> I believe that Dr Hassan al-Turabi, in terms of his thinking, in terms of his education, in terms of his own expressed opinion, must be labelled a modernizer. However, the party he leads, the group he heads, must be labeled fundamentalist, because their opinions are really based on the literature that has been published by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and their sub-groups. Therefore, you will find in the whole performance of this movement a kind of contradiction, a built-in schizophrenia.
>
> We consider the Mahdist movement as belonging to the authenticators. The authenticators are those who are radi-

cal, but would have nothing to do with the West, or foreign opinion. They are radical reformers, but they believe that reform must come from within and will not admit any reform based on any inspiration from external elements. This is the original Mahdist message. However, this original message has been to some extent moderated by the second *imam* ['imaam: leader] of the movement who has used certain methods, ideas that have developed the Mahdist position into one of moderate modernizer. This position has been further developed by myself in terms of books and so on that you can refer to, but however I only mention all this, because I want to say where the points are on which we agree with Hassan al-Turabi and his movement, and those on which we disagree.

Basically, we have agreed on a strategy against communism in the Sudan and we believe that we have achieved a lot in terms of fending off communism in Sudan because in the late 50s, and in the mid-60s, communism was a real threat in Sudan, and this coalition between us has helped deter this communist ambition. That is the first point of agreement between us.

The second is that both our movements had at that time realized that it is in the interest of Islam and in the interest of Islamization that we oppose dictatorship. And so, up to 1977, our real strategy was that of opposing military dictatorship as such, whatever labels it takes. And that led to our cooperation very closely in the overthrow of the first dictatorship which ruled Sudan between 1958 and 1964, and also our cooperation against the second dictatorship between 1969 up to 1977. From then on, our views differed.

Also, we have cooperated about the issue of new ideas to deal with the Southern problem. This cooperation prevailed from 1958 up to 1977, when our views diverged. I am going to say how they diverged later.

Also, up to 1983 we broadly agreed about the issue of Islamization. However, in 1983, Nimairi introduced what he called his Islamic program. Over that issue, our views radically diverted. They [al-Turabi etc.] considered it genuine Islamization, we considered it fake and irresponsible and an abomination. From then on, our views have diverged.

As far as the differences are concerned, a key issue was over the attitude towards dictatorship. From 1977 onwards they thought that they could serve Islam by cooperating with the dictator. So they called Nimairi *imam*, accepted his Islamization program and climbed on his bandwagon. We rejected that and considered Nimairi a fake and an impostor. From then on, their views on the possibility of cooperating with dictatorship developed. They either themselves initiated the coup of 1989 or cooperated with it. It is not important what happened historically. The fact is that from 1977 onwards, they have accepted dictatorship as a possible vehicle, as a necessary vehicle for an Islamic program, but we have totally rejected that and still do so. We believe that the Islamic program has got to come by democratic methods. So, this is a fundamental point of difference.

A second fundamental point of difference is that we believe that a fundamentally new formulation of Islamic regulations, which is aware of Islam's authentic position and aware of modern conditions, is necessary. They, however, have accepted the general traditional position in Islamic punishment. For instance, you could kill someone, could execute someone for apostasy. We say that there is no worldly punishment for apostasy. Apostasy is not *had* [hadd: fixed punishment], but they think it is *had*. We say no. There are so many such ideas of points of divergence over criminal law.

They also consider certain Islamic financial instruments, like *murabaha* [muraabaha],[1] as legitimate measures to be applied in modern banking systems. We believe this is rubbish. Those measures are suitable to conditions of rural economy, but in the modern economy, they are irrelevant and pointless. In fact, they lead to counter-productive results. So, we believe all this business of their Islamization of the banking system is rubbish and must be scrapped.

Also, we differ fundamentally on the issue of *jihad* [jihaad: holy war]. We believe that *jihad* is a defensive instrument and that the word *jihad* has a wide application to mean all kinds of exertion, and it only comes to fighting when you are under attack. Otherwise, there is no point in it. So we don't call what's happening in the South, *jihad*. They call it *jihad*. This is the point of fundamental difference.

Also, a point of fundamental difference is in relation to the external world. They somehow subscribe to a traditional view which regards the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims as essentially hostile. So, you have two worlds: the world of peace meaning the world of Islam, and the world of war meaning the world of non-Muslims. We say rubbish. There is a basis in Islam for relations with non-Muslims based on peace as the norm. This is well authenticated in the *Koran*. The verse is [..... a Koranic verse .....]. God does not prohibit you, or deter you from cooperating and sympathizing with people who have not been aggressive against you and have not dealt with you in an unjust way. Anyway, that is a point of major difference.

Another point of major difference is the point of dealing with religious minorities, particularly in the South. They say we, as Muslims, decide what is Muslim policy and give the Southerners what are their rights within what we have already decided. We say no. We decide, yes, what is Muslim policy, but we must realize that in the context of the nation state in which we coexist with other minority groups, we have got to discuss with them their rights and agree upon those rights and then, accommodate our position, accommodate their position in our position. And therefore, we are prepared to halt any process of Islamization until we have assured the non-Muslim minority of the Sudan about their status as citizen status and we believe this is important, because if you say we will decide for you and you take it or leave it, they may say we leave it and so secession follows. This is what we believe is now happening.

Also, we are, as Muslims, genuinely capable of entering into external relations based on peace and cooperation with Muslim and non-Muslim alike. We say that there is no problem in our commitment to the UN charter, the UN charter for human rights, and so on. Their position in this respect, we believe, is ambivalent. When they talk to Western opinion, they talk in terms of our ideas, but when they actually work out their position, they work it on the traditional agenda of considering non-Muslims as basically enemies. And this is a matter which we think is most fundamental to the Muslim position.

This is really a summation in our view of the whole points relating to Turabi's position, relating to his party's position relating to our position.'

Note:

1. 'Strictly, a means of making a profit. It is an arrangement to provide financing for trading purposes in which a bank buys a commodity and sells it on at an agreed mark up or profit. The system was devised to meet the requirements of classical doctrine and has since been extended to cover a variety of financial transactions, the mark up or profit being described as administrative costs, development charges, etc.' Patrick Bannerman, *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 253.

Appendix (12): A summary of the resolutions of the Second PAIC

The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum, 2-4 December 1993. The following are the quotations of a summary of the resolutions of the conference from *Sudanow* (January 1994, pp. 17-18; Eiman A.El Boushi (trans.)). (Italic and notes: by the researcher)

Palestine

The Palestinian Issue is a crucial one for both Arabs and Muslims. The conference reaffirmed its commitment to the Palestinians' right of self-determination and an independent state with its capital Jerusalem, as well as their inherent right to strive for repossession of occupied Palestinian territories. The conference therefore rejected the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, because it is not in line with Muslim aspirations. Full support was given to the unified *Jihad* and resistance demonstrated throughout the Palestinian uprising; other Palestinian factions were urged to respect these aspirations and resolve their differences through serious dialogue, to avoid inter-factional feuding and assassinations.

The conference called upon all Islamic and Arab governments to refrain from normalizing relations with Israel, appealed for wide support for the Palestinian uprising, and also commended the efforts of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Dr. Turabi, in establishing a dialogue between the various Palestinian factions and thus bringing them together in a united front against Israel.

Bosnia Herzegovina

Regarding the tragedy in Bosnia Herzegovina, where Serbs and Croats[1] are attempting to eradicate Islam from Europe, the conference arrived at the following resolutions:

1) Arabs and Muslims must back the people of Bosnia Herzegovina through:
(a) Boycotting British and American commodities for a week as an expression of resentment. The union of Islamic and Arab ports should also cease loading and unloading shipments bound for the Adriatic.

(b) Boycotting the republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.
(c) Contributing $1 per person for the people of Bosnia Herzegovina.

2) Requesting the U.N. to exempt the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed upon the former republics of Yugoslavia.
3) Lobbying the Security Council to enforce a strict embargo on Serbia and Montenegro.

Somalia

The conference denounced the UN for sanctioning unjustifiable intervention in the Horn of Africa, and called upon all Somali factions to cease feuding and form a united front to guarantee peace and confront the enemies of Somalia. The conference commended Arab and African efforts to rehabilitate a nation ravaged by armed conflict. It also called upon all peoples and governments to assist the Somali people by providing food and medicine, and helping them to achieve stability in the country.

Afghanistan

The conference called for a halt to in-fighting between *Mujahideen* [fighters] factions to prevent bloodshed between Muslims, and enable reconciliation paving the way for an Islamic state in the country.

The conference also announced that it is to set up a committee, chaired by the Secretary-General of the conference, to bring about reconciliation between Afghan leaders. It appealed to all Muslims to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

Sudan

The Islamic Project underway in the Sudan has become a symbol of Muslim aspirations. All Muslims should support Sudan by, among other things, opposing attempts to impose sanctions and isolate the country internationally.

The conference urged Muslims to counter any resolutions adopted against Sudan, and called upon Arab and Islamic institutions to support the unity of Sudan and its Islamic Project.

Iraq

The conference commended the steadfastness of the Iraqi people in the face of the allied embargo, condemned the aggression inflicted on Iraq by the ex-colonial powers, and called for the formation of a delegation to probe avenues of reconciliation between Iraq and Iran.

Libya

The conference declared its support for Libya, following multi-faceted attacks on her sovereignty, and urged Arab and Islamic countries to ignore the embargo imposed on the country.

Yemen

The conference recommended the formation of a delegation to resolve differences between the people of Yemen and to seek to maintain unity.

Lebanon

The conference supported the struggle of the Lebanese people against the Israeli occupation, and urged Arabs and Muslims to provide assistance to the people of Lebanon in order to counter the aggression perpetrated against them.

Kashmir

The conference called upon the government of India to comply with UN resolutions regarding the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and respect for the human rights of Kashimiri Muslims.

Azerbaijan

The conference condemned Armenia's attack on Azerbaijan and called for the immediate withdrawal of Armenia from all territories it has occupied in Azerbaijan. It strongly urged Muslim countries to suspend all cooperation with Armenia until it complies with these requests.

Muslim minorities

Concerning Muslim minorities in Asia, Africa, Europe, the conference advocated:

1) The right to self-determination of the Muslim minority in Burma, to enable them to practice Islam freely.
2) The Tajik Mujahideen and the people of Tajakistan generally.
3) Muslim minorities in Mitani, Kosovo, Senjak and the Muro *Jihad* Movement.

Arab and Muslim unity

The conference committed itself to:

1) *Shura* (consultation), upholding human rights, the unity of the constituent peoples of each country and protecting people from fundamentalism[2] which results from the suppression of freedoms.
2) Forming a committee to set up a dialogue in Algeria between the Islamic movement and other political groups.
3) On-going dialogue between Arab nationalists, Islamists and all other Arab and Islamic movements to consolidate ties between nations in an ever-changing world.
4) Womens' rights, as guaranteed in Islam.
5) Establishing a dialogue between different Islamic tendencies to strengthen Muslim unity.

6) Educating future generations according to the model of the first three generations of Muslims, to imbue them with a love of their country and wholehearted adherence to the Islamic virtues of *Nafl* (Supererogation in prayers and charity), *Ihsan* (worshipping God as if He can be seen) and *Jihad*.
7) Establishing Arab and Islamic institutions under the tutelage of the conference to carry out its various activities.

Islamic-christian dialogue

The conference is greatly concerned with Islamic-Christian dialogue, and will work tirelessly in Islamic Arab countries and elsewhere to unify the views and efforts of people of faith against secularism. The conference called upon Church leaders the world over to enter into dialogue with Muslims. It wants the Islamic-Christian dialogue to attract people to religion through the high moral values and the nobility that it confers on all humans, irrespective of race, colour or religion.

Notes:

1. At that time, when the resolutions were adopted, the Croats were fighting against the Bosnian Muslims, but later in 1994 the cease-fire was agreed between the Croats and the Muslims.

2. The term "fundamentalism" here seems to mean "extremism".

Page

Abbreviations 334

Glossary of Arabic terms 337

Chronology 340

Abbreviations

A

ADAR = Association for Dialogue Among Religions

ASM = Association of Southern Muslims

ASU = Association of Sudanese *Ulama*

B

C

CDLR = Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights

CIPF = Council for International People's Friendship

D

DUP = Democratic Unionist Party

E

EPLF = Eritrean People's Liberation Front

EPRDF = Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

F

FIBS = Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan

FIS = Islamic Salvation Front

FOP = Front of Opposition Parties

G

GIA = Armed Islamic Group

GMC = Gordon Memorial College

H

I

ICF = Islamic Charter Front

ICO = Islamic Conference Organisation

IDO = Islamic *Dawa* Organization

IFC = Islamic Front for the Constitution

IGADD = Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development

ILM = Islamic Liberation Movement

IMF = International Monetary Fund

IRDA = Inter-Religious Dialogue Association

J

K

KSE = Khartoum Stock Exchange

L

LCMF = Legitimate Command and Modern Forces

M

N

NCES = National Conference for Economic Salvation
NDA = National Democratic Alliance
NGSH = National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland
NIF = National Islamic Front
NLAS = Namariq Literary and Artist Society
NRC = National Revolutionary Council
NSCC = New Sudan Council of Churches
NSR = National Salvation Revolution
NSRCC = Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation
NUP = National Unionist Party

O

OAU = Organization for African Unity
OLF = Oromo Liberation Front
OLS = Operation Lifeline Sudan

P

PAIC = Popular Arab and Islamic Conference
PCID = Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue
PDF = Popular Defence Force
PDF = Peace and Development Foundation
PDP = People's Democratic Party
PLO = Palestine Liberation Organization
PPF = Popular Police Force
PRMSS = Patriotic Resistance Movement of South Sudan
PTUC = Patriotic Trade Unions Congress
PWF = Patriotic Women's Front

Q

R

RCC = Revolutionary Command Council

S

SCP = Sudanese Communist Party
SFDA = Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SHRO = Sudan Human Rights Organization
SNA = Somali National Alliance

SNM = Somali National Movement
SPLA = Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-M = SPLA Mainstream
SPLA-U = SPLA United
SPLM = Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSB = *Sharia* Supervisory Board
SSIM = Southern Sudan Independent Movement
SSU = Sudanese Socialist Union
SUNA = Sudan News Agency
SWVR = Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance

T

TMC = Transitional Military Council
TNA = Transitional National Assembly
TPLF = Tigray People's Liberation Front

U

UP = *Umma* Party
USC = United Somali Congress

V

W

WCC = World Council of Churches

X

Y

YSC = Youth Society for Construction
YSP = Yemen Socialist Party

Z

Glossary of Arabic terms

A

ansar ('ansaar): followers of the Mahdi

arham ('arhaam): close relatives, relatives of the prohibited degree

ashraf ('ashraaf): descendants of the prophet Muhammad

B

Bidiriya (Bidiiriiya): a tribal name

C

D

dawa (daᶜwa): call, invitation

dinar (diinaar): a monetary unit

* *dura* (dhura): millet

E

F

* *Fatah* (Fath): the main group of the PLO

Fuunj Sultanate (Saltana al-Fuunj): a 16th century sultanate established in Sudan

G

H

had (hadd): fixed punishment

Hanafi (Hanafii): one of the four main law schools of *Sunni* Islam

Hanbali (Hanbalii): one of the four main law schools of *Sunni* Islam

Hamas (Hamaas): an Islamic movement

hirz (hirz): place where property is kept

* *Hizbolla* (Hizb Allaah): an Islamic movement

hudud (huduud): plural of *had*

I

Ikhwan ('Ikhwaan): the shortened term of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-'Ikhwaan al-Muslimuun)

id (ᶜiid): feast

Id al-Fitr (ᶜIid al-Fitr): the feast of breaking the *Ramadan*

ihsan ('ihsaan): performance of good deeds

ijtihad ('ijtihaad): interpretation, independent judgment in a legal or theological question

imam ('imaam): leader

J

Jaaliyin (Jaᶜaliyiin): an ethnic group name

jihad (jihaad): holy war, efforts for the sake of God

K

* *Koran* (al-Qur'aan): the holy book of Islam

L

M

madhhab (madhhab): religious creed

Mahdi (al-Mahdii): the man who is believed to appear before the end of the world and rightly guide the people

Maliki (Maalikii): one of the four main law schools of *Sunni* Islam

majlis al-shura (majlis al-shuuraa): the council of consultation

* *mujahideen* (mujaahidiin): fighters

murabaha (muraabaha): an Islamic financial instrument

N

Nahda Movement (Haraka al-Nahda): an Islamic movement

nafl (nafl): supererogatory performance

nisab (nisaab): minimum amount

O

P

Q

R

Ramadan (Ramadaan): the month of fasting, the 9th month of the Muslim year

riba (ribaa): usury, interest

S

Shaban (Shaᶜbaan): the 8th month of the Muslim year

Shafii (Shaafiᶜii): one of the four main law schools of *Sunni* Islam

Shia (Shiiᶜa): a big branch of Islam

shura (shuuraa): consultation

sufi (suufii): Islamic mystic

Sunni (Sunnii): the main branch of Islam

sharia (al-shariiᶜa): Islamic law

T

tajdid (tajdiid): re-evaluation, renewal, reform

tawakkul (tawakkul): trust in God

tawhid (tawḥiid): unification, union

U

ulama (ᶜulamaa'): scholars, experts, the clergy

umma ('umma): Islamic community

Umma Party (Ḥizb al-'Umma): a political party

V

W

wali (waalii): governor

waqf (waqf): endowment

X

Y

Z

* = English spelling is customary usage. See Spelling System in Preface.

Chronology

Table C.(1) shows the sources of the chronology and the meaning of the abbreviations used in the chronology.

Chronology (1932-95), Table C.(2), includes selected events of Dr al-Turabi's life and family, the Islamist movement, Sudan, and the world. The selected events of the world are indicated by brackets attached to the dates, e.g. (1948/M5).

Table C.(1): Sources and abbreviations

A = El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, 1991.
AL = Alier, *Southern Sudan*, 1990.
C = *The Church Times*.
D = Dockrill, *The Collins Atlas*, 1991.
E = *The Economist*.
EU = *The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Report: Sudan*.
EUP = *The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile: Sudan, 1993/94*.
F = The FIBS, *Annual Report: 1985*.
G = *The Guardian*.
GO = Gowers & Walker, *Behind the Myth*, 1990.
H = Hamid, *The Politics*, 1984.
I = *The Independent*.
ID = Interview with Professor Dafalla al-Turabi.
IM = *Impact International*.
IS = Interview with Mr Sadiq al-Mahdi.
IT = Interview with Dr Hassan al-Turabi.
IW = Interview with Mrs Wisal al-Turabi.
IY = Interview with Mr Yassin al-Imam.
K = Kurita, 'Kindai Sudan', 1993.
KH = Khalid, *The Government*, 1990.
L = Lowrie, *Islam, Democracy*, 1993.
M = Mitchell, *The Society*, 1969.
MA = Mahgoub, *Democracy*, 1974.
MD = *Middle East Economic Digest*.
ME = *Middle East International*.
NR = Niblock, 'Universalism', 1992.
NC = Niblock, *Class and Power*, 1987.
O = *The Observer*.
R = *The Reuter*.
SD = *Sudan Democratic Gazette*.
SF = *Sudan Focus*.
SN = *Sudanow*.
SS = *Sudan Studies*.
SU = *Sudan Update*.

SW = *Summary of World Broadcasts.*
T = *The Times.*
TA = Taha, *The Second Message*, 1987.
TU = Al-Turaabii, Al-Haraka, 1990.
US = US Government, *Near East*, 1985.
W = Warburg, *Historical Discord*, 1992.
WG = ITM, *Third World Guide 93/94.*
WO = Woodward, *Condominium*, 1979.

The order of the dates: year/month/day
Sp = Spring Su = Summer Au = Autumn Wi = Winter
** = the researcher does not have the information

The sources of the statements are mentioned in { }.
The order of the dates in { }: {day/month/year}
Examples: {NC.254} = Niblock, *Class and Power*, p.254.
{G.8/3/84} = *The Guardian*, 8 March 1984.
{IM.12/94.15} = *Impact International*, December 1994, p.15.

Publication details: See bibliography

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Table C.(2): Chronology (1932-95)

1932/ 2/ 1: Hassan al-Turabi was born in Kasalaa, Eastern Sudan {IT.7/5/94}.

1936/12/25: Sadiq al-Mahdi was born {IW.25/5/94}.

1939/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered an elementary school in Umm Ruwaba {IT.7/5/94}.

1939/ 7/25: Wisal al-Mahdi was born {IW.25/5/94}.

1943/**/**: Al-Turabi's mother died in El-Roseires {ID.24/1/95}.

1944/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered an intermediate school in Wad Madani {IT.7/5/94}.

1944/**/**: Al-Turabi moved to a boarding school in Rufaa {IT.7/5/94}.

1946/**/**: Al-Turabi joined the riot (the Rufaa incident) which was led by Mahmud Muhammad Taha {IT.7/5/94}.

1948/ 1/**: Al-Turabi entered a secondary school in Hantoub {IT.7/5/94}.

(1948/ 5): The Palestine War occurred {D.99,133}.

1949/ 3/**: The Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM) was set up by Babikir Karrar {A.65}{NC.132}.

1951/ 7/**: Al-Turabi entered the Gordon Memorial College (GMC) {A.75}.

1951/Au : Al-Turabi became a member of the ILM movement {K.370}.

1952-53 : The ILM's inner struggle and the 1953 dispute {A.65}.

1954/ 1/13: The Egyptian cabinet decided to dissolve the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood {M.126}.

1954/ 3/ 1: Clash between the police and the *Ansar* occurred {WO.142}.

1954/ 8/21: The *Id* Congress was held {A.52}. The ILM and the branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were united. The new Islamic movement adopted the name "Muslim Brotherhood" {A.52}. Abd al-Qadir became the leader of the movement {A.52}.

1954 : The Islamic movement became close to the *Umma* party {A.55}.

1954/**/**: Al-Turabi became the leader of the University branch of the Islamic movement {A.63}.

1954/11/**: Abdel Nasser became the president of Egypt.

1955/ 3/**: Al-Turabi graduated from the Faculty of Law at Khartoum University {L.11}.

1954/**/**: Sadiq entered Oxford University as an undergraduate student {IS.19/1/95}.

1955/Su : Al-Turabi went to London (London University) to get a LLM degree {IT.9/5/94}.

1955/**/**: Al-Qadir resigned his post as the leader of the Islamic movement and al-Rashid al-Tahir became the leader {A.53}.

1955/12/**: The Islamic movement formed the Islamic Front for the Constitution (IFC: a pressure group) {A.57}.

1956/ 1/ 1: Sudan became independent {D.133}.

1956/**/**: The GMC became the University of Khartoum {NC.128}.

1956/**/**: The Islamic movement set up its newspaper {A.68}.

1956/ 8/**: The International Students' Congress was held in Prague {GO.23}.

(1956/10): The Suez War occurred {D.133}.

1957/ 2/**: The government rejected an Islamic constitution {A.58}.

1957/ 2/20: The government issued a concessional statement in favour of Islam {A.58}.

1957/middle: Al-Turabi came back to Sudan and rejoined the executive bureau of the Islamic movement {A.63}. Al-Turabi became an assistant lecturer in law at Khartoum University {IT.9/5/94}.

1958/11/17: A military coup was carried out by Ibrahim Abbud {NC.217}.

1959/Su : Al-Turabi went to Paris to obtain a PhD degree at Sorbonne University {IT.9/5/94}.

1959/11/ 9: Al-Tahir was involved in a coup attempt and was imprisoned {A.61 and 157}.

1960/Su : Al-Turabi first visited the United States for two months {IT.9/5/94}.

1961/early: Al-Turabi married Wisal (Sadiq al-Mahdi's sister) {IT.9/5/94}.

1961/10/20: Al-Turabi's first son was born {IW.25/5/95}.

1961/Wi : Al-Turabi came back to Sudan as a break {IT.9/5/94}. Al-Turabi became a representative of the Islamic movement at the meetings of the Front of Opposition Parties (FOP) {A.63}.

1962/ 5/**: Al-Tahir was replaced as the movement leader by Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad {A.64}. A collective leadership was emphasized {A.64}.

1963/ 1/**: Al-Turabi went back to Paris to complete his PhD {IT.9/5/94}.

1963/**/**: Al-Tahir was released {A.78}.

1964/Su : Al-Turabi returned to Sudan and became a member of the Executive Bureau (EB) of the Islamic movement {A.75}. Al-Turabi became a lecturer at the Department of Public Law and Administration in the

Faculty of Law in the University of Khartoum {IT.14/5/94}.

1964/ 9/ 9: A symposium on the question of the South was held at the University of Khartoum {IT.14/5/94}.

1964/10/14: The Patriotic Women's Front (PWF) was set up {A.97}.

1964/10/21: A student meeting was held at the University of Khartoum. The meeting was attacked by the police and a student was killed by the police {A.71}.

1964/10/22: Al-Turabi was in the funeral parade of the student killed by the police {IT.14/5/94}.

1964/10/30: A civilian transitional cabinet was formed {A.72}.

1964/**/**: Al-Turabi became the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Khartoum {L.11}. Al-Turabi became a member of the parliament {L.11}.

1964/11/25: Al-Turabi was officially elected as the secretary general of the Islamic movement {A.76}. (beginning of the Sudanese Islamist movement)

1964/12/ 6: The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was set up, and al-Turabi became the secretary general {A.76}.

1965/early: Al-Turabi resigned from his job at the University of Khartoum and started to concentrate on the Islamist movement {IY.6/2/95}. *The Islamic Charter* written by Dr al-Turabi was published by the movement {US.74}.

1965/ 2/**: Al-Turabi issued his first communique as the leader of the Islamist movement {US.72}{A.76}.

1965/ 2/23: Al-Tahir was chosen to represent the movement in the second al-Khalifa cabinet {A.78}{K.337}.

1965/ 4/21: The ICF took part in the elections for the first time and won 7 seats {US.76}{NC.228}.

1965/ 5/**: Mahjub formed a cabinet (First Mahjub Cabinet) {NC.229}.

1965/ 7/18: Al-Tahir resigned from the movement and joined the National Unionist Party (NUP) {A.78}.

1965/ 8/30: Al-Turabi's second son was born {IW.25/5/94}.

1965/**/**: The movement established the Patriotic Youth Organization (PYO) {A.98}.

1965/11/ 8: The movement started its campaign against the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) {K.370}.

1965/11/ 9: The movement led demonstrations against the SCP {K.370}.

1965/11/11: The SCP was banned {K.371}.

1966/**/**: Al-Turabi resigned as the secretary general of the main body, but remained as a member of the EB and as the secretary general of the ICF {A.86}. Struggle and split between "the educationalist school (anti-Turabi)" and "the political school (pro-Turabi)" continued up to 1969 {A.87-89}.

1966/ 4/**: The ICF launched an anti-government campaign {A.79}.

1966/ 6/**: Sadiq al-Mahdi formed a cabinet {NC.229}.

1966/11/12: Al-Turabi's first daughter was born {IW.25/5/94}

1967/ 1/**: Sadiq formed the constitutional commission {A.79}.

1967/ 5/**: Mahjub formed a cabinet (Second Mahjub Cabinet) {A.84}.

1967/ 4/**: Babikir Awadalla, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, resigned in protest against the ban of the SCP {A.83}.

(1967/J6): The June War occurred {D.135}.

1968/ 4/**: In the elections, al-Turabi did not win a seat in Al-Masid (near his home town, Wad al-Turabi) constituency {IT.16/5/94}.

1968/ 5/**: Mahjub formed a cabinet (Third Mahjub Cabinet) {K.338}.

1968/12/14: Al-Turabi's second daughter was born {IW.25/5/94}

1969/ 4/**: Al-Turabi was re-elected to the leadership of both the main body and the ICF (i.e. the whole movement) {A.88 and 159}.

1969/ 5/23: An Islamic constitution was basically agreed by the parties and the deal was announced {A.102}.

1969/ 5/25: A military coup led by Colonel Nimairi occurred. It was seen by the Islamists as a communist coup {A.104}.

1969/ 5/26: Al-Turabi was put in jail for the first time {IT.25/1/95}.

1969-70 : The National Front (NF: united opposition front) was formed {A.xiii}.

1970/ 1/ 4: Nimairi announced the plan of a single party system and the establishment of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) {NC.254}.

1970/ 3/27-31: Clashes occurred at Aba island between government troops and oppositions {MA.238}.

1971/ 7/19: A coup led by some communists and sympathizers succeeded in seizing power for about 3 days {A.112}.

1971/ 7/22: A counter-coup restored Nimairi to power {NC.256}.

1971/10/**: Nimairi officially became the President of Sudan {K.388}.

1972/ 1/**: The SSU was established by the regime {A.107}.

1972/ 2/27: The Addis Ababa agreement was agreed {NC.277}.

1972/ 3/18: The Addis Ababa agreement was signed {NC.277}.

1972/11:18: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/1/95}.

1973/**/**: Al-Turabi went abroad to give lectures {IT.16/5/94}. Al-Turabi met Sharif Husain al-Hindi abroad {IT.16/5/94}.

1973/ 8/**: Al-Turabi returned from abroad {IT.16/5/94}.

1973/ 8/30: Al-Turabi was put in jail again {IT.25/1/95}.

1973/ 8/31- 9/**: The *Shaban* uprising failed {A.108}.

(1973/010): The October War occurred {D.135}.

1974/ 3/10: Al-Turabi was freed again {IT.25/1/95}.

1974-82 : Al-Turabi pursued the second major re-structuring process of the movement's organization {A.111}.

1974/**/**: Sadiq al-Mahdi was released, went to London, and became the president of the National Front. {A.109}.

1974/**/**: Libya agreed to arm and train the opposition fighters {A.109}.

1975/ 6/15: Al-Turabi was put in jail again {IT.25/1/95}.

1975/ 8/15: Al-Turabi's third son was born {IW.25/5/94}.

1975/ 9/**: An attempted coup occurred {A.109}.

1976/ 6/**: Reported that an armed operation planned by the NF was ready to act {A.109}. Osman Khalid and others from the movement were active in Libya {A,109}.

1976/ 7/ 2: The NF carried out the armed uprising, but failed {A.109}. The Islamists were forced to re-think their position and strategy {A.165}.

1976/ 7/**: Al-Turabi's wife, Wisal, was put in jail {IW.25/5/94}.

1976/late : Sadiq started to contact the Nimairi regime {A.112}.

1977/ 4 or 5: Al-Turabi's wife was freed {IW.25/5/94}.

1977/ 7/12: A secret meeting between Sadiq and Nimairi took place at Port Sudan {H.5}.

1977/ 7/**: "National Reconciliation" between Nimairi and the main part of the opposition became public {IT.16/5/94}.

1977/ 7/17: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/1/95}.

1977/ 8/18: The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (FIBS) was established {F.1}.

1978/ 2/**: Elections to the People's National Assembly were held {H.11}. Al-Turabi joined the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) {H.11}.

1978/ 5/10: The Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan started operations {F.1}.

1978/**/**: Oil was discovered in Bentiu {AL.216}.

1978-85 : The Islamic economic institutions were growing and becoming diversified in membership {A.117}.

1978/ 7/**: Al-Turabi became secretary of information and foreign relations at the SSU {A.114}.

1978/ 8/ 5: Al-Turabi's third daughter was born {IW.25/5/94}.

1979/**/**: Al-Turabi became Attorney General until May 1983 and was presidential adviser on legal and foreign affairs until March 1985 {A.115}{L.11}.

By 1980 : Nimairi's supporters were limited to the people in the security forces, the south, the SSU, and the Islamist movement {A.119}.

1980/ 8/**: Oil was discovered in commercial quantities {EUP.23}.

1980/**/**: Nimairi wrote his book entitled " Why the Islamic Way ? " {A.121}.

1983/ 5/**: Al-Turabi lost his job as Attorney General and obtained the post of legal adviser {A.126}. Al-Rashid al-Tahir became Attorney General {A.125}.

1983/ 5-8 : The SPLA was formed {AL.245,251}. The second civil war between the government and the rebels broke out {AL.245,251}.

1983/ 6/**: The division of the South into three parts was announced {A.121}.

1983/ 8/**: The SPLA was officially formed {G.8/3/84}.

1983/ 9/ 8: The introduction of Islamic laws (*sharia*) was announced {A.122,126}. This fuelled the civil war.

1983/ 9/**: Al-Turabi became an adviser of the president on foreign affairs {A.126}.

1983/ 9/25: Sadiq al-Mahdi was imprisoned {A.123}.

1984/ 4/**: 12 special prompt justice courts (staffed by the Islamist movement and others) were established {A.124}.

1985/ 1/18: Mahmud Muhammad Taha was executed {TA.16}{A.128}.

1985/ 2/**: Al-Tahir sent an anti-Islamist movement plea to Nimairi {A.125}.

1985/ 3/ 5: Vice President George Bush met Nimairi in Sudan {G.6/3/85}{A.128}.

1985/ 3/ 9: Al-Turabi and other leaders of the Islamist movement were arrested {A.129}.

1985/ 3/26: The National Gathering for the Salvation of the Homeland (NGSH: anti-Nimairi, anti-Islamist) was formed by the opposition organizations {A.130}.

1985/ 3/26- 4/ 5: Popular uprising against the Nimairi regime {K.404-405}.

1985/ 4/ 6: General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dhahab carried out a military coup {NC.290}. The Nimairi regime collapsed.

1985/ 4/ 9: Al-Turabi was freed {IT.25/1/95}.

1985/ 4/**: The National Islamic Front (NIF) was formed {A.131}.

1986/ 3/**: The SPLA advanced, taking control of almost the entire south {G.14/3/86}.

1986/ 4/**: The NIF won 51 seats in the elections and became the third biggest party {A.141}.

1986/late : Al-Turabi's father died {ID.24/1/95}.

1987/ 1/**: *The Sudan Charter* was published {NR.31}{A.176}.

1987/11/**: Ali Osman Muhammad Taha criticized Sadiq al-Mahdi over the cost of the battles of the Sudanese army in the civil war, and called for the resignation of Sadiq from his post as Defence Minister {R.25/11/87}.

1988/ 5/15: The NIF was included in the coalition government for the first time since the introduction of the new multi-party system in 1986 {G.13/6/88}. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and Deputy Prime Minister {IT.17/5/94}.

1988/ 7/**: Al-Turabi framed a draft Islamic penal code {NR.35}.

1988/11/16: The DUP leader made a peace accord with the leader of the SPLA in Addis Ababa {G.18/11/88}.

1988/12/18: The government foiled a coup attempt led by officers who served under Nimairi {G.23/12/88}.

1988/12/21: The Parliament effectively rejected the peace accord of 16 November {G.23,29/12/88}.

1988/12/28: The DUP withdrew from the government {G.31/12/88}.

1989/ 2/ 1: A new coalition government was formed {SS.6/89.23}. Dr al-Turabi became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister {IT.17/5/94}.

1989/ 2/20: The top army officers gave an ultimatum to the government {G.23,27/2/89}.

1989/ 3/25: Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi appointed a new cabinet excluding the NIF members {SS.6/89.24}.

1989/ 4/**: The freezing of the Islamic law was decided by the new government {K.411}.

1989/ 6/18: A coup attempt to bring Nimairi back to power was foiled {G.20/6/89}.

1989/ 6/30: Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir successfully carried out a coup and came to power {G.1/7/89}. All political parties were banned {G.1/7/89}. Dr al-Turabi was arrested together with other leading politicians {A.190}.

1989/10/**: The PDF became an official institution by the promulgation of the Popular Defence Act {SU.20/10/89.1}.

1989/10-11: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed) {SU.3/11/89.2}.

1989/11/**: Details of the Popular Defence Act were released by the RCC {SU.17/11/89.1}.

1989/11/30: Al-Turabi was freed from Kober prison and placed under house arrest {SU.1/12/89.4}{SU.20/12/89.4}.

1990/ 3/ 7: Al-Turabi was freed from house arrest {IT.25/1/95}.

1990/ 3/**: An attempted coup was reported (announced by the regime) {SU.20/4/90.1}.

(1990/ 8/ 2): Iraq invaded Kuwait {D.115}.

1990/ 9/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed) {SU.5/10/90.4}.

1990/10/**: A new political system of "direct non-party democracy" was approved by the conference for National Dialogue on the Political System {SU.19/10/90.3}.

1990/11/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed) {SU.19/11/90.5}.

1990/12/31: Al-Bashir declared that the *sharia* law will be fully and immediately implemented as of the 1st January 1991 {SD.1/91.4}.

(1991/ 1-2): The Second Gulf War occurred {D.115}.

1991/**/**: A "conservative" group (calling itself the Muslim Brotherhood) split from the Islamist movement {G.4/1/94}.

1991/ 3/**: Nine federal states were established by the fourth constitutional decree {SN.3/94.8}.

1991/ 3/22: The new Islamic penal code was introduced {NR.35}.

1991/ 4/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed) {G.1/5/91}{SU.22/4/91.1}.

1991/ 4/25-28: The First Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) was held in Khartoum {SU.13/5/91.2}.

(1991/ 5/21): Ethiopia's President Mengistu was ousted {SU.22/5/91.2}.

1991/ 8/**: Riak Macher broke away from John Garang's SPLA {G.30/8/93}.

1991/ 8/**: An attempted coup was reported (announced by the regime) {SU.7/9/91.3}.

(1991/10/30): The Madrid Talks began {WG.469}.

1991/11/16-17: The First Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference was held in Khartoum {IM.12/94.15}.

1992/**/**: Economic liberalization measures were introduced {EU.4th/93.6}.

(1992/ 1): In Algeria, the army moved in and the second round of elections were canceled {E.4/4/92.13}.

1992/ 3/**: The curfew in Khartoum, which was introduced after the 1989 coup, was shortened by one hour {SU.19/3/92.2}.

1992/ 4/**: An attempted coup led by pro-Nimairi officers was reported (announced by the regime) {G.18/4/92}.

1992/ 4-5 : Al-Turabi toured Western Europe and North America {IT.17/5/94}.

1992/ 5/26: Al-Turabi was attacked by a Sudanese (former *Karate* champion) in Canada {SW.29/5/92}.

1992/ 5-6 : Abuja I (peace talks) was held in the Nigerian capital {SU.20/5/92.1}{SU.4/6/92.1}.

1992/ 7/**: An attempted coup was reported (unconfirmed) {SU.29/7/92.2}.

1992/ 9/**: William Nyuon broke away from John Garang's SPLA {O.10/1/93}.

1992/**/**: The UN General Assembly issued a condemnation on Sudan's human rights record {ME.4/2/94.18}.

(1992/12/ 9): US troops landed Somalia {G.10/12/92}.

1993/ 2/10: Al-Bashir met the Pope in Khartoum {E.6/2/93}.

1993/ 4/26-30: A conference on religious dialogue was held {SU.21/4/93.3}{ME.4/2/94.19}.

1993/ 4-5 : Abuja II was held {SF.15/7/94.8}.

1993/ 8/ 9: The IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights {SU.3/9/93.2}.

1993/ 8/17: America added Sudan to the list of countries which support terrorism {SN.9/93.8}.

(1993/ 9/13): The peace accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was signed {T.14/9/93}.

1993/10/13: Al-Turabi met Pope John Paul II for the first time in the Vatican City {IT.17/5/94}.

1993/10/16: The Revolutionary Command Council issued a decree abolishing itself {EU.4th/93.8}.

1993/10/17: Al-Bashir became formally the president {EU.4th/93.9}.

1993/10/21: The reconciliation between John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream and Riak Machar's SPLA-United, which was mediated by the US, finally failed {SU.10/11/93.1-2}.

1993/10/31: The curfew in Khartoum imposed since the 1989 coup was lifted by President al-Bashir {SU.10/11/93.3}.

1993/late 11: Al-Turabi met President Rabbani in Afghanistan {EU.4th/93.21}.

1993/12/ 2-4: The Second PAIC was held in Khartoum {SN.1/94.17}.

1993/12/29: The Archbishop of Canterbury refused the invitation of the Sudanese regime to visit Sudan {C.31/12/93}.

1993/12/30: Sudan expelled the British ambassador in Khartoum {ME.7/1/94.10}.

1994/ 1/ 4: The Sudanese ambassador to the UK was expelled {ME.7/1/94.10}.

1994/ 2/**: The nine federal states were re-divided into twenty six states by the 10th constitutional decree {SN.3/94.8-9}.

1994/ 2/ 4: An attack on the *Ansar al-Sunna* in an Omdurman mosque and a new advance against SPLA in the South were reported {ME.18/2/94.15}.

1994/ 3/**: The first peace talks with the SPLM, under the patronage of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD), were held {SF.15/7/94.8}.

(1994/ 4): The civil war between ex-North Yemen and ex-South Yemen broke out {ME.13/5/94.3}.

1994/ 8/14: Carlos, the notorious international terrorist, was arrested by the Sudanese police in Khartoum, extradited to France, and was arrested by the French police on 15 August {I.16/8/94}.

1994/ 9/ 5-13: The UN population conference was held in Cairo. The Vatican took part in the conference, but Sudan boycotted it {MD.9/9/94.20}.

1994/10/ 8-10: The Second Inter-Religious Dialogue Conference was held in Khartoum {IM.12/94.15}.

(1995/ 3/ 3): The Americam Marines withdrew from Somalia {T.4/3/95}.

1995/ 3/30- 4/ 2: The Third PAIC was held in Khartoum {SU.3/4/95.2}.

Page

Bibliography 354

Arabic 355

English (by author) 356

English (by organization and government)..... 360

English (title only) 361

Japanese 362

Newspapers 362

Magazines, Newsletters and other publications 362

Interviews 363

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