



Durham E-Theses

Crusading proposals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

Leopold, Antony Richard

How to cite:

Leopold, Antony Richard (1998) *Crusading proposals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/977/>

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

**CRUSADING PROPOSALS OF THE LATE THIRTEENTH
AND EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURIES**

Antony Richard Leopold

Submitted to the University of Durham for the degree of PhD
February, 1998.



- 2 J L 10 8

ABSTRACT

Crusading proposals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries

Antony Richard Leopold

Submitted to the University of Durham for the degree of PhD, 1998

In the period lasting from shortly before the fall of Acre to the cancellation of Philip VI's crusade in 1336, a plethora of treatises was written offering advice on how the Holy Land could be recovered. Historians have viewed them as a novel and distinctive feature of the crusade in this period, and they have usually been treated as a homogeneous group. However, they were written by a diverse group of authors, from monarchs to merchants, whose motives in writing varied across the period. This thesis gives a comprehensive examination of the proposals both to explore their differing origins and purpose, and to evaluate their content.

The earliest proposals were advisory treatises written for the papacy, belonging to a tradition of advice requested by popes who took the lead in organising new expeditions which dates to the time of Innocent III. The style of these works was adopted by later authors who sought to combine practical advice with promotion of the crusade, or, in a few cases, to discuss a range of other issues beyond the crusade. The proposals covered all aspects of crusading, concentrating on crusade strategy but also dealing with the preparations needed to launch a crusade in Europe, such as recruitment and finance, and with spiritual issues, aspects of their advice which have been neglected. The range of issues included by the authors illustrates their differing concerns. Their advice drew heavily on existing practices and lacked originality, but in some areas, it is possible to discern the influence of the early proposals on those which followed. The survival of manuscripts of some proposals in the later part of the century raises the possibility that they had some impact on crusades launched during this period, and on the proposals written at the beginning of the fifteenth century.

No part of this work (which falls within the statutory word limit) has previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other university.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information from it should be acknowledged. At the discretion of the librarian of the University of Durham, this thesis may,

- i. be made available to bona fide scholars.
- ii. be photocopied wholly or in part for consultation outside Durham.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements		ii
Abbreviations		iii
Introduction		1
Chapter I	Authors and proposals	10
Chapter II	Preparations for the crusade	70
Chapter III	Spiritual aspects of crusading	113
Chapter IV	Enemies, allies and preliminary strategy	145
Chapter V	The general passage	189
Chapter VI	Planning for a new Jerusalem	236
Chapter VII	Later proposals and crusades	259
Conclusion		275
Bibliography		282

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My greatest debt of thanks is to Dr Alan Forey, who has patiently supervised this project from the beginning. In addition to his constant guidance, the contents of his bookshelves have been a vital addition to the resources at Durham. I am also very grateful to Dr Len Scales and Professor David Rollason for commenting on a portion of this work in draft. I am obliged to Mr Alan Piper who provided assistance with certain problems of palaeography and to Ulrich Fischer who assisted with translation from German. This project could never have been undertaken without a grant from the British Academy, for which I am very grateful. I have valued the historical insights and friendship of my postgraduate colleagues Imogen Anderson, Mark Arvanigian, fellow crusader Jeff Neal, and Isabelle Charmantier (who also kindly obtained material from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris). Many others, too numerous to mention, have helped to make my time in Durham very enjoyable. Finally, I am indebted to my sister and mother for their encouragement and support, both emotional and financial, for what must have seemed an endless project.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AOL</i>	<i>Archives de l'Orient Latin</i>
<i>BEC</i>	<i>Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes</i>
<i>BIHR</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</i>
<i>CCCM</i>	Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Medievalis (Turnhout, 1951-)
<i>Crusade and Settlement</i>	<i>Crusade and Settlement</i> , ed. P. W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985)
<i>Cyprus and the Crusades</i>	<i>Cyprus and the Crusades</i> , ed. N. Coureas and J. Riley-Smith (Nicosia, 1995)
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
<i>Golubovich</i>	<i>Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente francescano</i> , ed. G. Golubovich, 5 vols. (Quaracchi, 1906-27)
<i>HLitt</i>	<i>Histoire Littéraire de la France</i> (Paris, 1733-)
<i>MGH</i>	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i> , ed. G. H. Pertz <i>et al.</i> (Hannover, Weimar, Berlin, Stuttgart, Cologne, 1826-)
<i>SRG</i>	<i>Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum</i> (Hannover, 1839-)
<i>SS</i>	<i>Scriptores</i> , 32 vols. (Hannover, Leipzig, 1826-1934)
<i>Migne, PL</i>	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina</i> , ed. J. P. Migne, 217 vols. (Paris, 1844-64)
<i>PPTS</i>	Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 14 vols. (London, 1896-1907)
<i>RHC</i>	<i>Recueil des Historiens des Croisades</i>
<i>Arm.</i>	<i>Documents arméniens</i> , 2 vols. (Paris, 1869-1906)
<i>Occ.</i>	<i>Historiens occidentaux</i> , 5 vols. (Paris, 1844-95)

<i>RHGF</i>	<i>Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France</i> , ed. M. Bouquet <i>et al.</i> , 24 vols. (Paris, 1737-1904)
<i>RHSE</i>	<i>Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen</i>
<i>ROL</i>	<i>Revue de l'Orient latin</i>
RS	(Rolls Series) <i>Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores</i> (London, 1858-98)
Setton	<i>A History of the Crusades</i> , ed. K. M. Setton, 2nd edn., 6 vols. (Madison, 1969-90)
<i>TRHS</i>	<i>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society</i>

Owing to the frequency with which the proposals are cited in the footnotes, they are referred to in a very abbreviated manner, and are listed here. Full titles are given in the first reference and the bibliography.

Charles II	Charles II of Anjou, 'Le conseil du Roi Charles', ed. G. I. Bratianu, <i>RHSE</i> 19 (1942)
'Directorium'	'Directorium ad passagium faciendum', <i>RHC Arm.</i> 2
Dubois	Pierre Dubois, 'De recuperatione Terre Sancte', ed. and tr. W. Brandt as <i>The Recovery of the Holy Land</i> (New York, 1956)
Durant	William Durant, 'Informatio brevis', ed. G. Dürrholder, <i>Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII</i> (Strasbourg, 1913)
Fidenzio	Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae', Golubovich 2
Galvano	Galvano of Levanto, 'Liber sancti passagii', ed. C. Kohler, <i>ROL</i> 6 (1898)
Hayton	Hayton, 'Flos historiarum terre orientis', <i>RHC Arm.</i> 2
Henry II	Henry II of Cyprus, 'Consilium', ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie in <i>Histoire de l'Île de Chypre</i> , vol. 2 (Paris, 1852)

- Hospitallers 'Tractatus dudum habitus', ed. B. Z. Kedar and S. Schein, *BEC* 137 (1979)
- 'Memoria' 'Memoria Terre Sancte', ed. C. Kohler, *ROL* 10 (1903-4)
- Molay James of Molay, 'Consilium super negotio Terre Sancte', ed. E. Baluze, *Vitae Papae Avenionensium* (Paris, 1693)
- Nogaret William of Nogaret, 'Quae sunt advertenda', ed. E. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale* 20 (1862)
- Sanudo Marino Sanudo Torsello, 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hannover, 1611)
- 'Via' 'Via ad Terram Sanctam', ed. C. Kohler, *ROL* 10 (1903-4)
- Villaret Fulk of Villaret, 'Hec est informatio', ed. J. Petit, *BEC* 9 (1899)
- William Adam William Adam, 'De modo sarracenos extirpandi', *RHC Arm.* 2
- William le Maire William le Maire, 'Livre de Guillaume le Maire', ed. C. Port, *Mélanges Historiques*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1877)

INTRODUCTION

'There are many who, although they lament the evils which the Saracens inflict on Christians, offer no advice on how to resist them' (Humbert of Romans, *Opus Tripartitum*).

Sixteen years after Humbert made this complaint, there began an outpouring of treatises offering advice on how the Holy Land could be recovered, lasting from shortly before the fall of Acre in 1291 to the cancellation of Philip VI's crusade in 1336. Prior to this, contemporary non-descriptive writing on the crusades tended to be mostly theological, concerned with questions surrounding the justification of the movement, or the morals and intentions of its participants. In contrast, the literature of this later period was practical in tone, offering concrete advice on how a recovery expedition should proceed, often supported by information about current conditions in the east and the events of earlier crusades. The proposals were written by a diverse group of men, including monarchs, nobles, prelates, masters of the military orders, mendicants, doctors and a merchant. The works they produced covered all aspects of the crusade, strategic, financial and spiritual, and range from sober proposals for the recovery of Jerusalem to extravagant schemes for the utter defeat of Moslems and Greeks. These works have been viewed by historians as the most distinctive feature of crusading in the decades after the fall of Acre, but there has been no study giving comprehensive treatment to all the proposals and their ideas. In addition, the differing origins and purposes of the works largely remains to be analysed.

Most of these proposals are well-known to historians, and some were first printed centuries ago. Bongars included Sanudo's *Liber secretorum* and Dubois's *De*

recuperatione Terre Sancte in his collection of sources printed in 1611.¹ The majority of the recovery treatises were published in the late nineteenth century, a golden age for research into sources for the history of the crusades. Three of the longer works were printed in the *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades* under the aegis of the Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres. The proposals of the Armenian prince Hayton, along with the *Directorium* and William Adam's *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* were published in the second volume of the *Documents Arméniens*, even though the editor admitted that the last two were 'entièrement étrangers' to Armenian history.² The activities of the Société de l'Orient Latin, founded in 1875, also contributed to knowledge of the later crusades through its publications the *Archives de l'Orient Latin* and the *Revue de l'Orient Latin*. Kohler published the *Via*, the *Memoria* and the treatise written by Galvano of Levanto in the pages of the latter. Other proposals have been printed in a variety of journals and collections in the succeeding years, but a few remain largely unknown or unpublished. The treatise written by the bishop of Leon has received little attention since the study of Delaville le Roulx, and the additions and alterations made to an unpublished version of Nogaret's proposal remain to be detailed. The proposals written by Guy of Vigevano and Roger of Stanegrave have yet to be published, although an edition of the latter is in preparation.

Most of the proposals have received little individual attention since their publication. Kohler's conclusions about the authorship of the *Via* and *Memoria* have been unquestioned since he published the two works in 1903-4. More consideration has been given to the question of the *Directorium's* author since Kohler's lengthy introduction to the work and his articles written to support his contention that William Adam was the author. However, the contents of the proposal have received no detailed attention since the study by Charles Beazley, which did little more than

¹J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, 2 vols. (Hannover, 1611). The *Liber secretorum* occupies pp. 1-288, the *De recuperatione* (edited as an anonymous work) pp. 316-61.

²*RHC Arm.* 2, p. iii.

summarise the work.³ The more charismatic figures among the theorists have attracted a greater degree of interest. Magnocavallo has written a detailed monograph on Marino Sanudo, who has also been the subject of studies by Laiou and Tyerman assessing his activities and impact on crusade planning in the period.⁴ The works of the prolific Ramon Lull transcended the crusade and have become a field of study in their own right. Hillgarth has studied Lull's life and influence, giving a detailed account of the evolution of his ideas on the crusade and his involvement in the politics of his day.⁵ Others have been more interested in Lull's changing attitudes towards crusade and mission over the period.

The first author to examine all the proposals together was Delaville le Roulx, who wrote a study of the crusading movement in the fourteenth century.⁶ His treatment of the first half of the century consisted of giving a brief description of the contents of each proposal in turn, but he offered no analysis of the development of ideas through the period, nor any explanation of the origin of these works. Delaville le Roulx's work was closely followed in a study by the Egyptian scholar, Atiya, whose *Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* became the standard work on the subject in English.⁷ He too simply outlined the contents of each plan, giving greatest attention to the longer works, such as the *Liber secretorum* and the *Directorium*, and ignoring the treatise of the bishop of Leon. His work contains numerous errors, exposed in a lengthy and critical review by Pall, including the claim that the *Directorium* was written by an author named 'Burcard', despite Kohler's conclusive demonstration that

³C. R. Beazley, 'Directorium ad Faciendum Passagium Transmarinum', *American Historical Review* 12 (1905-6), pp. 810-57; 13 (1907-8), pp. 66-115.

⁴A. Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio e il suo progetto di crociata* (Bergamo, 1901); A. Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks, the background to the Antitürkish League of 1332-1334', *Speculum* 45 (1970), pp. 374-93; C. J. Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade: lobbying in the fourteenth century', *TRHS* 32 (1982), pp. 57-73.

⁵J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1971).

⁶J. Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIVe siècle: expéditions du maréchal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886).

⁷A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938).

this was not the case.⁸ In addition, in a chapter on projects emanating from Philip IV's France, he describes Pierre Dubois as 'foremost among the king's advisors' on the crusade, and so assumes that his proposal reflected French policy. He groups the proposals arbitrarily, dealing with the *Via* and *Memoria* in a section on pilgrim literature. He classed Hayton together with Durant and Adam (whose work is wrongly dated) as representing 'The Church', and described all three as 'clergy of high standing'.⁹ Atiya made no attempt to judge from the content of proposals or the intent of the authors whether they merited being grouped together in such a fashion.

Delaville le Roulx and Atiya were the first historians to give any estimation of the theorists' purpose in writing proposals. Both regarded the authors as 'enthusiasts' and their works as propaganda, written against a background of apathy in Europe.¹⁰ Atiya argued that 'the distinctive feature of the first three or four decades of the fourteenth century is the abundance of propagandists who exhorted all good Catholics to uphold the cause of holy war'. He contrasted this with the second half of the century, viewed as a period of activity when crusades were sent to Smyrna, Alexandria and Nicopolis and 'men's minds turned to action instead of the exhortation of others', implying that this accounted for the absence of such works from the later period.¹¹ This assessment of the proposals has proved to be durable. Setton believed that they were received by an unsympathetic and gluttonous audience, and 'were read (when they were read) largely by high prelates and rich merchants sipping fine wines and munching confections'.¹²

⁸C. Kohler, introduction to the *Directorium*, *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. cxliii-cxlviii; F. Pall, 'Les Croisades en Orient au Bas Moyen Âge: Observations critiques sur l'ouvrage de M. Atiya', *RHSE* 19 (1942), pp. 527-83.

⁹Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 47-71, 184-5.

¹⁰Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 17.

¹¹Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 128.

¹²K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 109.

Recently, historians have taken a different view of the background against which the proposals were written. In a study of the crusade between the councils of Lyons (1274) and Vienne (1311), Schein described efforts made to launch a recovery expedition and assessed the attitude of Europeans, contending that there was 'a sustained and vivid interest in the fate of the Holy Land' in this period.¹³ Housley and Tyerman have examined the crusade plans of the papacy and French crown in the period between Vienne and the outbreak of the Hundred Years War.¹⁴ These illustrations of the series of unsuccessful attempts to organise a new expedition in the early part of the fourteenth century has firmly disproved the view that this period was one solely of propaganda. However, the role played by the treatises in these crusading efforts remains unclear, as does their relation to the European background. Schein still accepted Delaville le Roulx's characterisation of the proposals, arguing that they were 'intended as propaganda'.¹⁵ Housley has recognised that many of the works were intended to be advisory, some of them written at papal request, and concludes that the series of recovery treatises 'ceases to be the outpourings of eccentric enthusiasts...and becomes a literature expressing, in refined and thoughtful terms, the firm aspirations of many contemporaries'.¹⁶ However, not all the proposals were written at papal request, and authors' motives varied over the period. The timing of the proposals, which were clustered in certain periods, and their sudden proliferation after the fall of Acre also remains to be explained.

¹³S. Schein, *Fideles Crucis* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 264-5.

¹⁴N. Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations of 1322', *Papers of the British School in Rome* 48 (1980), pp. 166-85; C. J. Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', *EHR* 100 (1985), pp. 25-52; id. 'Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land', in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 170-81; id. 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', *BIHR* 57 (1984), pp. 15-34.

¹⁵Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 92-3.

¹⁶N. Housley, *The Later Crusades: from Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 23, 383; id. 'The crusade movement 1274-1700', *Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, ed. J. Riley-Smith (Oxford, 1995), pp. 261-3.

It is thus necessary to reassess the motives of the authors who wrote these works, and to examine them individually to give a more nuanced account of the origins and purpose of the recovery treatises. The authors were a disparate group, ranging from monarchs to merchants, and it is likely that their intent in writing was equally diverse. Schein's study ends in 1314, precluding any evaluation of the *Directorium* and the works of William Adam and the bishop of Leon. Consequently, these have not been studied since the time of Delaville le Roulx and Atiya, and no attempt has been made to judge whether their authors had the same intent as earlier writers. The first chapter of this thesis examines all the crusade proposals written between 1290 and 1336 to assess the intent of their authors and also to illustrate similarities of purpose among certain writers. The background against which the proposals were written is outlined to explain the timing of the works and their antecedents are traced through the thirteenth century to elucidate their origin. In addition, an assessment of their likely circulation is given, based on surviving manuscripts, to judge the extent to which the ideas of the theorists could influence both other authors and those involved in crusade planning.

Later chapters of the thesis seek to examine the content of the proposals in detail to illustrate their similarities and differences, both in the issues they addressed and their specific recommendations, and also to assess the originality of their advice. There is no comprehensive study of all the subjects raised in these proposals, and earlier studies have generally neglected their views on spiritual affairs and the organisation of the crusade in Europe. The second chapter assesses their treatment of preparations for the crusade, such as the pacification of Europe, recruitment, leadership and finance. Given the absence of any successful expeditions, these were arguably serious obstacles to crusading, and it is necessary to judge whether the theorists confronted them successfully. The third chapter explores treatment of spiritual issues such as conversion and motives for crusaders. By examining the extent to which authors considered such problems, it is possible to explore the differing priorities of the theorists and to discern whether there was a 'European'

approach to the crusade which differed from that of authors based in the east, or a distinctive approach taken by churchmen, both secular and regular.

Studies on the proposals have generally concentrated on their strategic advice, which is natural given that they are dominated by this issue. Individual aspects of their thinking have been discussed in three recent papers on the role of Cyprus,¹⁷ and in Laiou's account of Andronicus II's foreign policy.¹⁸ The first author to offer some analysis of the proposals and their relation to one another was Bratianu. In his extended introduction to Charles II's plan, he argued that the work was of far greater significance in establishing the outlines of the strategy of a new crusade than the later works of authors such as Dubois or Sanudo.¹⁹ In her discussion of the proposals, Schein follows Bratianu in arguing that the works of later authors such as Sanudo were considerably less important than those written immediately after the fall of Acre, but, correctly redating Charles's project, she places greater emphasis on the projects of Fidenzio of Padua and Ramon Lull. She argues that these first proposals were 'models which were to dominate the whole period', and claims that later works made no significant advances on their ideas.²⁰ This implies a greater uniformity of opinion than a study of the proposals reveals, and suggests that discussion of crusade strategy became increasingly sterile and lacking in originality as the period progressed. A detailed examination of the theorists' recommendations on crusade strategy is given in the fourth and fifth chapters with the aim of tracing the development of their ideas over the period, and showing the variety of their approach. Their impact on each other and on crusades

¹⁷M. Balard, 'Chypre, les républiques maritimes italiennes et les plans de croisade (1274-1370)', in *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 97-107; A. J. Forey, 'Cyprus as a base for crusading expeditions from the west', *loc. cit.*, pp. 69-79; N. Housley, 'Cyprus and the crusades 1291-1571', *loc. cit.*, pp. 187-206.

¹⁸A. E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: the foreign policy of Andronicus II 1282-1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

¹⁹G. I. Bratianu, 'Le conseil du Roi Charles: essai sur l'internationale Chrétienne et les nationalités à la fin du moyen âge', *RHSE* 19 (1942), pp. 293-6, 310-13.

²⁰Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 92-3, 200-1.

planned in Europe is evaluated to judge the extent to which later works were influenced by their predecessors.

Certain theorists offer advice on the establishment of a new kingdom of Jerusalem, covering government, defence and colonisation, and their views have been detailed in two articles.²¹ The sixth chapter covers these issues to judge which authors dealt with such questions and their motives for doing so. Copies of certain crusading proposals were made throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a period which witnessed a number of crusades. In addition, although the proposals were often viewed as unique to the period between 1290 and 1336, a small number of later works survive from the beginning of the fifteenth century. Hitherto, the proposals have not been discussed in the context of the remainder of the fourteenth century, with the exception of Atiya's assumption that they were responsible for inspiring the crusades of the second half of the century. The seventh chapter of the thesis seeks to discuss the reasons why no further proposals were written after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War and explain why there was continued interest in some, but not all, of the treatises. In addition, it seeks to explore the possibility of a link between the proposals of the first half of the fourteenth century and the crusades and treatises belonging to the period after 1336.

One final problem remains: the definition of a 'recovery treatise' or 'crusade proposal'. It is my contention that the proposals under consideration include examples of different types of literature. Some were born from a tradition of advice requested by the papacy, others offered unsolicited advice, while a few were promotional in intent. Hence, it could be argued that a range of other advice could be included in this discussion: for example the responses made by the college of cardinals to Charles IV's proposed crusade, the further set of plans made by Charles of Valois at the same time, or the Venetian reply to a set of specific questions issued

²¹A. J. Forey, 'The military orders in the crusading proposals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries', *Traditio* 36 (1980), pp. 317-45; S. Schein, 'The future *Regnum Hierusalem*: a chapter in medieval state planning', *Journal of Medieval History* 10 (1984), pp. 95-105.

by Philip VI in 1331. Similarly, in 1291-2, church councils across Europe discussed the crusade and sent a list of recommendations to the curia, while reports of verbal advice survive from the councils of Lyons and Vienne. For the purposes of this study, a recovery treatise is defined as a written proposal, by one or more authors, outlining a plan for a hypothetical crusade conceived by the author. The crusade proposals differ from other forms of advice given in this period because the crusades they planned were original creations of the author(s). Hence, the responses of the church councils merit consideration since they determined the content of their discussions. In contrast, the cardinals were responding to a set of existing plans drawn up by Charles IV while the Venetians were answering a specific set of questions on the crusade. Naturally, the ideas contained in other pieces of advice and the crusading plans made in European and eastern courts are used to elucidate the opinions contained in the proposals, to examine how they related to the environment in which they were written, their impact, and the precedents for their ideas.

I. AUTHORS AND PROPOSALS

The crusade proposals of the period between the pontificate of Nicholas IV and the outbreak of the Hundred Years War were written by men from varying backgrounds, both religious and secular, some from western Europe and others from the eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, they shared certain characteristics, notably their practical approach to the crusade, and hence they have been viewed as forming a 'new literary genre', implying that their authors were linked by similar aims and ideas.¹ Historians from the time of Delaville le Roulx have grouped the proposals together as works of propaganda, written to promote the crusade against a background of apathy in Europe. However, an examination of the origins of these treatises indicates that the authors wrote for differing reasons. A number were responding to a request for advice issued by the pope, directed either to the author in person or to Christendom in general. This explains why the majority of the proposals were clustered in the pontificates of Nicholas IV and Clement V, the two popes who worked hardest to launch an expedition and who called for advice as part of their preparations. Rather than being *excitatoria*, these proposals belong more properly to a tradition of advisory material prepared for the pope in the early stages of a crusade. The search for advice reflected growing caution in the west towards the organisation of a crusade, caused by recognition of the difficulties and expense involved. Other crusade proposals were unsolicited, but it is notable that many of these were written during periods when a new expedition seemed imminent. Rather than being propaganda prompting activity, these works were reacting to measures taken in Europe. Only a few proposals were genuinely propagandist in their intent, aiming to promote the idea of a crusade regardless of circumstances. This category

¹Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 91.

comprises the treatises of Ramon Lull and Marino Sanudo, who made considerable efforts to advance their ideas. Finally, the works of Pierre Dubois and Galvano of Levanto used the crusade as a pretext to cover broader issues relating to the politics of France or the papacy.

Antecedents of the recovery treatises

Two of the earliest proposals were written when the pope requested advice on the recovery of the Holy Land in bulls issued after he heard news of the fall of Acre.² This may imply that the proliferation of these works was caused by shock at the loss of the Holy Land. However, there were earlier occasions when such an appeal for advice, or outburst of literature, might have been expected. In 1187, the fall of Jerusalem was a profound shock to Europe, and in 1244, the city was lost for the final time to the Khorezmian Turks, but there was no appeal corresponding to that of 1291 in either case. In 1187, once the pope had appealed to the rulers of Europe in *Audita Tremendi* and despatched prelates to rouse support, he left preparations for the crusade in the hands of the monarchs themselves.³ The second fall of Jerusalem, and subsequent defeat at La Forbie, did not have a similar impact on Europe because conditions there were unfavourable to a crusade, chiefly because of the conflict between Frederick II and Innocent IV. In 1244, Louis IX made the decision to undertake a crusade himself, without any papal prompting. Indeed, while Innocent gave his full assistance to the king in raising funds, it appears that he did not whole-heartedly support the crusade because he had hoped that Louis would remain in the west as a counter-balance to the Hohenstaufen threat.⁴

²*Registres de Nicolas IV*, ed. E. Langlois (Paris, 1886-91), nos. 6791-5; Bartholomew Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. R. Luard (RS: London, 1859), pp. 200-3.

³S. Painter, 'The Third Crusade: Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus', Setton 2, pp. 47-9; E. N. Johnson, 'The crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI', Setton 2, pp. 87-90.

⁴J. R. Strayer, 'The crusades of Louis IX', Setton 2, pp. 489-92; W. C. Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade* (Princeton, 1979), pp. 26-7; M. Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy 1244-1291* (Leiden, 1975), pp. 74-5.

While Nicholas's call for advice was an immediate reaction to the disaster of 1291, there were long precedents for such an appeal which can be traced to the late twelfth century, when Innocent III and Gregory X issued similar requests in 1198, 1215 and 1274.⁵ On each occasion, popes made these appeals because they were taking personal responsibility for arranging the crusade, either through choice or necessity. When the organisation of expeditions was in the hands of secular rulers such as Louis IX, there was no corresponding necessity for the papacy to be familiar with the situation in the east. Secular leaders commonly relied on information provided by the inhabitants of the crusader states before determining the best course of action. Before he left for the east, Theobald of Champagne received a letter from the barons and clergy of Jerusalem advising him to ignore the current truce, and to stop in Cyprus where he could rest and deliberate with local prelates and nobles before deciding where to attack (advice the count ignored).⁶ This is the only record of advice being sent to Europe in this way, and there is no evidence to suggest that it was sent at Theobald's own request. It appears that most crusaders took counsel after they arrived in the east. Theobald and Richard of Cornwall both deliberated with local leaders at Acre before finalising their plans, as did Prince Edward in 1270.⁷ In 1249, when Louis IX arrived in Cyprus, several representatives from the crusader states travelled there to consult with him.⁸ There is no evidence to show that secular crusaders usually took pains to inform themselves of the situation in the east before they left Europe, but the nobles of the fourth crusade had two meetings

⁵This approach has been adopted recently by Housley, 'The crusade movement 1274-1700', pp. 261-3.

⁶R. Röhricht, *Regesta regni hierosolymitani* (Innsbruck, 1893-1904), no. 1083.

⁷S. Painter, 'The crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, 1239-41', Setton 2, pp. 473-4; R. Röhricht, 'Études sur les derniers temps du royaume de Jérusalem: La croisade de prince Édouard d'Angleterre (1270-1274)', *AOL* 1 (1881), p. 622.

⁸Strayer, 'The crusades of Louis IX', pp. 493-5; 'Les gestes des chiprois', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 725, 741. It seems likely that Louis was already planning to attack Egypt before he arrived in Cyprus since there was little reason to stay on the island if he were planning to continue to the Holy Land.

in France to discuss strategy before they despatched envoys to Venice to arrange their transport requirements.⁹

The first papal request for advice on the crusade was issued by Innocent III. He held forceful views on the temporal power of the papacy, and was determined to take full responsibility for the new crusade himself. Hence, he did not send the encyclical of August 1198 announcing the crusade to kings or other rulers. Innocent had little choice since when he issued the bull, England and France were at war over Angevin possessions in France, and Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick were disputing the imperial succession.¹⁰ Innocent clearly believed that he needed to be familiar with conditions in the east if he were to take a leading role in the preparation of a new crusade. In 1199, shortly after announcing the new expedition, he wrote to the patriarch of Jerusalem, the bishop of Lydda and the masters of the military orders, asking them to keep him informed about the situation in the Holy Land. A letter from the patriarch shows that Innocent was particularly keen to know the names and strength of Moslem military leaders.¹¹

While this is the first recorded request for information from the east, the letters he received were part of an important tradition of correspondence from the crusader states to the west. These letters were quite different from the recovery treatises in style and intent. They often included detailed reports of the situation in the east, but placed particular emphasis on defeats and crises. Their purpose was usually to entreat help for the Holy Land, and they were often brought to the west by embassies appealing for military or financial aid. In 1149, Andrew of Montbaud, a Templar, wrote to the master of the order about the troubles besetting Antioch and

⁹D. E. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade* (Leicester, 1978), p. 6. It appears that the decision to attack Egypt was taken only during discussions with the Venetians.

¹⁰Migne, *PL* 214, cols. 308-12; Queller, *The Fourth Crusade*, p. 1.

¹¹Röhrich, *Regesta*, nos. 760, 762; P. A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade* (Amsterdam, 1940), pp. 8-9.

asked him to pass the news on to the pope and other European leaders.¹² Edward I received several such letters from the heads of the military orders during the thirteenth century.¹³ While some of this correspondence simply brought news from the east, most was written to urge help from the west. Unlike the recovery treatises, these letters contained no advice on the most effective way of defeating the enemy since this could be given when an army arrived in the east. The recovery treatises generally lacked this exhortatory intent, and the closest equivalents in the later period are appeals for aid sent from Cyprus and Armenia, and Marino Sanudo's correspondence warning of the Turkish threat in the late 1320s and 1330s.¹⁴

The letter Innocent received from the patriarch of Jerusalem recommended against sending a crusade to the east, arguing that diplomacy with the Moslem leaders would suffice to gain all Syria, but the pope chose to ignore this advice.¹⁵ Innocent's efforts to control the crusade's direction were unsuccessful, and it was diverted to Constantinople against his wishes. Consequently, when he planned a new expedition in 1213, he was more determined than ever to retain control. Innocent called a general council to discuss the new crusade and in his summons, requested written advice 'circa subventionem necessarium terrae sanctae'.¹⁶ The pope died before the crusade left for the east, and no written advice survives from

¹²Röhricht, *Regesta*, nos. 26, 27, 1221, 1251, 1290, 1325, 1387; R. C. Smail, 'Latin Syria and the west, 1149-1187', *TRHS* 19 (1969), pp. 1-20; J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West 1119-1187* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 104-6; H. F. Delaborde, 'Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre-Sainte à Charles d'Anjou', *ROL* 2 (1894), pp. 206-15.

¹³C. Kohler and C. V. Langlois, 'Lettres inédits concernant les croisades (1275-1307)', *BEC* 52 (1891), pp. 53-61. These letters contained only news rather than appeals for help, although after describing the battle of Hims in a letter of 5 March 1282, the master of the Hospital reported that the Mamluk forces had been weakened in the battle, but help from the west was needed if the Christians were to take full advantage of this.

¹⁴Letters of Sanudo, ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, vol. 2, pp. 289-316; A. Cerlini, 'Nuove lettere di Marino Sanudo il Vecchio', *La Biblofilia* 42 (1940), pp. 321-59; L. Dorez and C. de la Roncière, 'Lettres inédites et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l'Ancien, 1334-1337', *BEC* 56 (1895), pp. 21-44; F. Kunstmann, 'Studien über Marino Sanudo den Aelteren', *Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 7 (1853), pp. 753-819.

¹⁵Röhricht, *Regesta*, no. 762.

¹⁶Migne, *PL* 216, col. 825.

the fourth Lateran council, but it seems likely that the decision to attack Egypt was taken there. The crusaders did consult at Acre, but apparently only on whether to attack Alexandria or Damietta, suggesting that Egypt had already been chosen.¹⁷ Innocent's pontificate set a precedent for the use of written memoirs at general church councils, and for papal appeals for advice on the crusade: the wording of his request was closely followed by Gregory X and Clement V.¹⁸

The next pope to request advice on the crusade was Gregory X, who was elected pope after a lengthy interregnum on 1 September 1271, amid high expectations that he would take the lead in organising aid for the beleaguered crusader states. The crusades of the intervening years had been undertaken at the initiative of secular leaders: Theobald of Champagne, Richard of Cornwall and Louis IX. After the death of Louis in Tunisia, there was no longer a European prince with the stature to take responsibility for the crusade, so this task devolved to the pope. The need to assist the Holy Land had become acute during the 1260s when Baybars had systematically reduced Christian territories, capturing several important towns and castles in the north before taking Antioch in 1268.¹⁹ This urgency was an important factor behind the cardinals' decision to compromise on the legate Theobald Visconti as the new pope. They announced that he had been elected to the Holy See to take charge of providing assistance for the crusader states. He

¹⁷*Chronique d'Ernoul et Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), pp. 414-15; Oliver of Paderborn, *The Capture of Damietta*, tr. J. J. Gavigan (Philadelphia, 1948), p. 22, states that the decision was taken at the council; *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), p. 100, reports that Oliver himself persuaded the army to attack Egypt. See J. Powell, *The Anatomy of a Crusade 1213-1221* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 137-8.

¹⁸*Registres de Grégoire X*, ed. J. Guiraud (Paris, 1892-1906), no. 160; *Regestum Clementis Papae V*, ed. Monachi Ordinis S. Benedicti (Rome, 1885-92), nos. 3626-7; Throop, pp. 10-11.

¹⁹S. Runciman, 'The crusader states, 1243-1291', *Setton* 2, pp. 575-80; R. Röhrich, 'Etudes sur les derniers temps du royaume de Jérusalem: Les combats du sultan Bibars (1261-1277)', *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 370-400.

was there on pilgrimage when he learnt of his election, and his knowledge of the Holy Land and its tribulations was cited as a reason for his choice.²⁰

Gregory swiftly demonstrated his commitment to the Holy Land by sending small contingents of men there in 1272 and 1273, but his chief preoccupation was the organisation of a general passage.²¹ The search for advice on the crusade was a significant aspect of his preparations. Clearly believing that his own knowledge of the east was insufficient for his task, he asked Philip III of France to send 'aliquos viros idoneos experientiam armorum habentes' to the Holy Land to report on conditions there.²² In his summons to a general council of the church, issued on 31 March 1272, he requested written advice on the three questions to be discussed: the crusade; the possibility of ending the schism between Latin and Greek churches; and the reform of the church. A subsequent bull of 11 March 1273 reiterated the appeal for advice, but in this instance on the morals of Christendom, both clerical and lay, with no specific reference to the crusade.²³ Gregory needed his crusade to be a success after the recent disappointments of Louis IX's crusades. Before his election he had witnessed the fruitless campaigning of Prince Edward's small army at first hand, and was determined that his own expedition should not be equally ineffectual. Hence he placed great importance on carefully preparing the expedition, and the commission of written reports on the east is a reflection of this.

Four works written in response to Gregory's appeals survive, all of which are considerably less practical in tone than those produced after the fall of Acre. One, written by the Dominican William of Tripoli, appears to have been written in answer to a personal appeal from Gregory before he was elected to the Holy See. The

²⁰*Annales Ecclesiastici ab anno 1198 usque ad annum 1565*, ed. O. Raynaldus et al. (Lucca, 1738-59), vol. 22, p. 279.

²¹'Estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer', *RHC Occ.* 2, pp. 462-3; Throop, pp. 229, 273-4.

²²*Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. 22, p. 336; Throop, pp. 15-16.

²³*Registres de Grégoire X*, nos. 160-1, 220; Throop, pp. 17-22.

memoir is addressed to 'Thealdo Leodiensis ecclesiae archidiacono', and the dedication implies a personal request.²⁴ The work included a life of Mohammed and an account of the rise and conquests of Islam, particularly under Baybars. However, Gregory cannot have been pleased with William's conclusion that, according to a Moslem prophecy, the downfall of Islam was imminent and that missionaries, rather than crusaders, should be sent to the east.²⁵ A second memoir, the *Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae*, was written by a Franciscan, Gilbert of Tournai, and concentrated on the morals of the west, probably in response to Gregory's later call for advice.²⁶ Bishop Bruno of Olmütz sent a memoir which was essentially an appeal for a crusade against the Slavs and which contained no advice on the crusade to the Holy Land. He argued that peace was an essential precondition of a crusade but that this could only be achieved by subjugating the enemies on Christendom's north-eastern border under strong and united leadership, by which he meant his patron, the king of Bohemia.²⁷

The treatise which most closely answered Gregory's call for advice on the three subjects of crusade, schism and church reform, was the *Opus tripartitum* written by Humbert of Romans. Humbert was a former master of the Dominicans who had earlier produced two works on preaching: the *Liber de eruditione praedicatorum*, and the *De praedicatione sanctae crucis contra Saracenos* which dealt exclusively with preaching the cross.²⁸ His experience and knowledge of preaching clearly influenced the content of his discussion, which included a lengthy

²⁴William of Tripoli, 'De statu saracenorum', ed. H. Prutz in *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1883), pp. 575, 589; Throop discusses the timing of Gregory's appeal (pp. 115-19).

²⁵William of Tripoli, 'De statu saracenorum', pp. 589-90.

²⁶Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', ed. A. Stroick, *Archivum Franciscum Historicum* 24 (1931), pp. 35-62.

²⁷Bruno of Olmütz, 'Relatio de statu ecclesiae in regno alemaniae', *MGH Legum Sectio IV: Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum* 3, ed. J. Schwalm (Hannover, 1904-6), no. 620, pp. 589-94; Throop, pp. 105-8.

²⁸E. T. Brett, *Humbert of Romans: His life and views of thirteenth-century society* (Toronto, 1984), pp. 153-75.

rebuttal of the arguments used by those who opposed the idea of a new crusade. This exposition of the arguments against crusading and Humbert's criticism of the apathy of many towards the Holy Land have been used to argue that there was great hostility towards the idea of crusading in the later thirteenth century.²⁹ Humbert argued that zeal and devotion were necessary to defeat the Saracens but he also placed great importance on the provision of advice, criticising those 'qui licet doleant super malis, quae Saraceni inferunt Christianis, tamen nihil apponunt consilii ad resistendum eis'.³⁰ Careful thought, rather than hasty action, played a prominent role in Humbert's recommendations for the crusade, which included the need to refer to histories, 'quia per hujusmodi facta praeterita in multis instruitur cogitatio praesens quid sit faciendum in futuro'. He proposed that the pope seek the advice of expert and zealous men, and suggested that practical advice, particularly from nobles and laymen, be written down before the general council was convened.³¹ The second section of his treatise discussed the schism between the Latin and Greek churches and he concluded by addressing reforms needed in the church.³²

The style of these memoirs differs greatly from those written after the fall of Acre. The latter dealt chiefly with strategic aspects of the crusade while the treatises written for the council of Lyons were more concerned with theological and ideological matters. Schein contends that the fall of Acre was decisive in bringing the shift to more pragmatic works.³³ This is partly true since it was only after the loss of the Holy Land that there was any need for a complete crusade plan in

²⁹Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', ed. A. Brown in *Appendix ad Fasciculum rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum* (London, 1690), pp. 191-201; Throop, pp. 162-83; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 5. E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095-1274* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 219-20, gives an alternative view.

³⁰Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 185-90.

³¹Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 204-6.

³²Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 207-23 (schism); 223-9 (church reform).

³³Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 91-2.

advance of an expedition. However, there are other reasons: Gregory's appeal for information was addressed only to the clergy and covered other subjects besides the crusade, such as the morality of Christendom. In addition, all four authors were churchmen, and three of them mendicants, so the emphasis on less practical matters appears unsurprising. However, this explanation alone is inadequate because Fidenzio of Padua, who authored the first 'true' recovery treatise, was a Franciscan. The differing experiences of the authors were significant: while Fidenzio had lived and travelled widely in the east, the earlier authors, with the exception of William of Tripoli, had no knowledge of the region and could not be expected to advise on the course of the crusade in the east. Humbert was involved with the organisation of the crusade in the west and his work reflects this. The emphasis on the faults of the west in the proposals written for the council of Lyons may indicate the authors' opinion of what caused the difficulties of the crusader states. After Louis IX's return to France in 1254, only Edward I had led a crusade to the Holy Land, and this was only a small force. The gradual deterioration of the condition of the crusader states could be viewed as stemming ultimately from a western failure to organise aid, explaining the authors' preoccupation with conditions in Europe, and the exhortatory element in the *Opus tripartitum*.

Although the treatises written for the council of Lyons were less pragmatic than the later works, Gregory X did demand practical advice on the crusade in 1274. He invited European rulers and representatives from the Holy Land to Lyons to discuss the crusade in person, explaining why the appeal for written advice was directed only to clerics.³⁴ Advice on strategy was given verbally, rather than in writing. The main report on the council proceedings comes from James I of Aragon, who was chiefly concerned with recounting his own words and the high esteem in which all held him. Discussions centred on measures needed to ensure the

³⁴*Registres de Grégoire X*, no. 161; James I reported that he received a letter from Gregory requesting him to go to Lyons to give 'counsel and aid in the business of the Holy Land beyond sea' (*The Chronicle of James I of Aragon*, tr. J. Forster and P. de Gayangos (London, 1883), vol. 2, p. 638).

immediate defence of the crusader kingdom. The king himself recommended that a force of five hundred knights and two thousand foot be sent to bolster the defensive forces of the kingdom until a full crusade was sent two years later.³⁵ Delegates of other European rulers were present since James records that he urged 'those who are here in representation of kings and princes' to match his own offers of help, but his chronicle does not record any of their statements.³⁶ Representatives from the Holy Land were also present at the council, but James only recorded the words of the master of the Templars, William of Beaujeau, who also favoured immediate assistance for the Holy Land, although using a smaller force than that envisaged by the Aragonese king.³⁷ William regarded a new expedition with caution, stressing that 'great consideration' was required, and his views were echoed by the representative of the French king, Erart de Valeri.³⁸

Gregory issued the *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei* at the council and reported that the contents were informed by the advice he received there.³⁹ However, many of the measures announced for the crusade were common to earlier bulls, including the ban on trading with the Moslems, the proclamation of a general peace, the appeal

³⁵*The Chronicle of James I of Aragon*, vol. 2, pp. 646-7.

³⁶*The Chronicle of James I of Aragon*, vol. 2, p. 647.

³⁷'Estoire d'Eracles', p. 464; Marino Sanudo, 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', ed. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, vol. 2, p. 225. The representatives from the east included the master of the Hospital; the seneschal of the kingdom, John de Grailly; the archbishop of Tyre and the bishop of Jaffa. Sanudo wrote: 'hiis maxime Papa diligenter attendit, quia illuc accedere personaliter intendebat' (p. 225). The only surviving advice given at the council was a report by the Hospitallers which is chiefly concerned with arguing that the military orders should remain free from ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and contains no advice on the crusade (H. Prütz, *Entwicklung und Untergang des Tempelherrenordens* (Berlin, 1888), pp. 313-14, wrongly dated to 1291; P. Amargier, 'La défense du Temple devant le concile de Lyon en 1274' in *1274, Année Charnière: mutations et continuités* (Paris, 1977), pp. 495-501; see H. Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders 1128-1291* (London, 1993), p. 122).

³⁸*Chronicle of James I of Aragon*, vol. 2, pp. 648-50. It is difficult to accept Throop's claim that the master of the Templars and Erart de Valeri agreed that 'a general crusade was completely futile' (p. 233). Erart's outburst ('Sire, this is a serious matter...') seems aimed more to impress on James the magnitude of the task after another of the king's bombastic outbursts (that ten of his ships could put to flight twenty of the enemy).

³⁹Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 196-9: 'nos autem auditis eorum consiliis, ipsorum voluntates et affectus laudabiles, quos ostendunt de terre liberatione predicte merito commendamus'.

for bequests to the Holy Land, and the provision of chests for collecting gifts in churches. However, Gregory took new measures to finance the expedition, reforming the collection of the ecclesiastical tithe and instituting a general tax of one silver penny on all Christians, which recalls a similar suggestion by Gilbert of Tournai.⁴⁰ In the aftermath of the council, he worked to organise the general passage by doing his utmost to pacify Europe and persuade rulers to take the cross, with some success. He also followed the advice of James I and the master of the Temple by sending a force of knights and bowmen to reinforce the crusader states, although it was considerably smaller than either man had proposed at the council.⁴¹ Gregory's death in January 1276 effectively ended any chances of the crusade being successfully launched since he had taken the initiative in all aspects of its organisation. The popes who followed him were all too short-lived to continue the momentum Gregory had created, and it was not until the pontificate of Nicholas IV, who was present at the council as a cardinal, that there were similar determined preparations for a crusade to the east. As Jerome of Ascoli, Nicholas had been a trusted servant of Gregory X, undertaking the vital task of negotiating with the Greeks over the schism, and it seems very likely that he was greatly influenced by the manner of Gregory's preparations for the crusade.⁴²

The pontificate of Nicholas IV: the first proposals

Gregory's pontificate was not only important in providing a recent precedent for Nicholas IV's appeal. Gregory made a personal request for advice at the council which eventually led to the proposal regarded as the first recovery treatise. The Franciscan author of this work, Fidenzio of Padua, reported: 'felicis recordationis dominus papa Gregorius...michi mandavit in concilio Lugdunensi ut in scriptis

⁴⁰Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 197-8; Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', p. 40.

⁴¹Throop, pp. 249-52, 270-4; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 44-6.

⁴²*Registres de Grégoire X*, nos. 195, 320 (stating that he wished Jerome to attend the council).

ponerem qualiter Terra Sancta acquiri posset de manibus infidelium'.⁴³ The order was not fulfilled for sixteen years, but if Fidenzio's recollection of Gregory's request is accurate, it implies a demand for more practical advice and information than that produced for the council of Lyons. Fidenzio's work, the *Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae*, was written shortly before the fall of Acre.⁴⁴ While the author was engaged in its lengthy preparation, the predicament of the crusader states gradually deteriorated, partly because of the inhabitants' propensity for internecine struggle. The Mamluks gradually reduced Christian possessions, capturing Marqab in 1285, Latakiah in 1287 and Tripoli in 1289. No help arrived from Europe as energies were consumed by the struggle over Sicily, in which the papacy became deeply entangled. Martin IV diverted money intended for the Holy Land to the Sicilian war, and offered crusading indulgences for both this and the French campaign against Aragon in 1285.⁴⁵

Soon after Fidenzio finally completed his work, the remaining Christian possessions on the mainland fell to the Mamluks. He gave no explanation for the lengthy delay in completing the work, but it has been argued that he spent the time travelling in the east gathering information.⁴⁶ Fidenzio was already well-fitted to write by his knowledge of Arabic and his long and active career in the east. He was the Franciscan vicar of the Holy Land in 1266, travelled with Baybars's army after the fall of Antioch (1268) to assist Christian captives, and was again present in the Moslem camp soon after the fall of Tripoli.⁴⁷ His work opens with a short history of the Holy Land, which criticises both the behaviour of the eastern Franks and the

⁴³Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae', Golubovich 2, p. 9.

⁴⁴The latest event mentioned is the Mamluk attack on Armenia in February 1290, but Acre was clearly still Christian when the work was completed (Fidenzio, pp. 25, 47, 54).

⁴⁵Runciman, 'The crusader states, 1243-1291', pp. 583-95; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 62-7.

⁴⁶Golubovich, introduction to Fidenzio, p. 5.

⁴⁷Fidenzio, pp. 21-6, 29. There is little information about Fidenzio outside his own work, other than three references in the records of the Franciscans (Golubovich, introduction to Fidenzio, pp. 1-2).

failure of the west to give assistance to the Holy Land. The history was not an essential or integral part of the proposal, and there are no explicit links between the history and the crusade plan. However, it could be used to draw lessons for the crusade and a future kingdom of Jerusalem, and in addition served to demonstrate the author's knowledge of the east, giving weight to his opinions. This section contains an account of Islam which described the life of Mohammed and listed various faults of the faith. This was intended to emphasise the danger posed to Christianity by the Moslems and the need to defeat them by military means because of their resistance to conversion attempts.⁴⁸ Fidenzio's religious vocation is evident from the moral tone which pervades both the history and the crusade plan, particularly in the list of qualities necessary for the crusade leader and members of the army. However, his work contains much practical advice on the crusade, centred on the strategy and tactics to be adopted in the east, rather than on preparations necessary in the west.⁴⁹ Hence, his proposal has much more in common with the treatises written after the fall of Acre than with those written for Lyons.

The *Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae* may not have been the first of the more practical treatises. An anonymous work, possibly written prior to the fall of Tripoli, survives in two versions, an early French copy and a later Latin translation.⁵⁰ The two works have different introductions, and the later translation omits a section on the Mongols. One paragraph is out of position in the earlier version, but not in the translation, indicating that the latter was made from a lost manuscript.⁵¹ Kohler argues that there was an earlier common text, now lost, dating from before 1289, and that the authors of the two surviving versions added their own introductions to this original plan. He contends that the common text predates the

⁴⁸Fidenzio, pp. 9-27.

⁴⁹Fidenzio, pp. 27-60.

⁵⁰Published by C. Kohler as 'Deux projets de croisades en Terre Sainte', *ROL* 10 (1903-4), pp. 425-34 (*Via ad Terram Sanctam*), 435-57 (*Memoria Terre Sancte*).

⁵¹'Via', p. 428; compare 'Memoria', pp. 450-1.

fall of Tripoli because it discusses the possibility of landing the crusade both there and at Acre. The author rejects both on the grounds that their ports were not good enough to allow many ships to winter, and that the Moslems held many castles and fortifications nearby, preventing foraging.⁵² There is no reference to the fall of either city or their subsequent destruction by the Moslems, implying that the ports were still in Christian hands when the work was written. However, there is also no reference to the possibility of assistance from the crusader states, nor does the crusade plan take any account of the need to defend existing possessions, so the work cannot be dated conclusively prior to 1289.

The earlier surviving version of this text is the *Via ad Terram Sanctam*, written in French, and probably completed before 1293: in the introduction to the *Via*, the author demonstrates the weakness of the Mamluks by reporting that the sultan, Malik al-Ashraf Khalil (1290-3), has killed many of his emirs.⁵³ There is no mention of the sultan's murder, nor of the subsequent upheavals which saw his successor, an-Nasir, deposed and reinstated twice. A reference to the Templars indicates that the introduction was written prior to 1307.⁵⁴ Kohler assumes that the writer of the *Via* added this introduction to the first version of the text, along with a short section on the Mongols which is not included in the *Memoria Terre Sancte*, the later Latin translation. However, it is possible that the *Via*, including the introduction, was a full copy of the original version of the text, and that the 'additions' identified by Kohler were in reality parts of the original suppressed by the author of the *Memoria*. This certainly appears true of the 'addition' discussing the possibility of alliance with the Tartars: the author of the *Memoria* was opposed to

⁵²'Via', pp. 427-8; 'Memoria', p. 451.

⁵³'Via', pp. 425-6.

⁵⁴'Via', p. 430. The single extant manuscript for the *Via* is dated to the beginning of the fourteenth century, again suggesting an early date (p. 423). Tyerman dates the work between 1289 and 1307 (*England and the Crusades 1095-1588* (Chicago, 1988), p. 238); Schein refers to both the *Via* and the *Memoria* as works influenced by Hayton, thus placing both after 1307, but gives no grounds for this date (*Fideles Crucis*, p. 215).

this idea, and seems to have omitted this section.⁵⁵ The introduction to the *Via* is slightly different in style from the remainder of the work, being the only section to discuss religious issues, but not so much that it can be definitely assumed to be by another writer, again suggesting that the work was written by one author. The later translation, the *Memoria*, has a lengthy introduction added in place of the one in the *Via*. The suppression of a reference to the Templars indicates that this was made after 1307, but since the author was present to hear the sermon given by Gregory X at Acre in 1271, it is unlikely to be considerably later.⁵⁶ The introduction was written in the west, probably by a cleric, as it is concerned with the spiritual state of crusaders and the church's role in promoting the crusade and raising money.⁵⁷

The author of the original text remains anonymous, as do the later author(s), but was probably from the east. Kohler claimed that he was a westerner writing in the east. He argued that the use of the phrase 'nos gens' to refer to the crusaders suggested that the author came from the west, but the phrase appears to indicate Christians in general: in one instance, it is clearly contrasted with 'lur gens', the Tartars. The reference to crusaders as 'ceaus d'outre mer' implies that the work was written by an easterner, rather than simply written in the east.⁵⁸ The introductory paragraph of the *Via* was also written by an easterner, since the author describes western lords as 'grans seignors d'outre mer', reinforcing the likelihood that this work was written by a single author.⁵⁹ Kohler speculates that the prominence given to the English as potential crusaders implies that the author was of this nationality,

⁵⁵'Via', pp. 431-2; 'Memoria', pp. 447-8. The *Memoria* jumps abruptly from suggesting that the army attack Damascus into describing the route from Gaza to Cairo, whereas the *Via* discusses how Syria could be conquered with Mongol assistance, then introduces the description of the route from Gaza into Egypt (p. 454; compare 'Via', pp. 431-2). Elsewhere the original author argued that Armenia was a good location for the crusade because of the ease of contacting the Tartars, and this reference is not suppressed in the *Memoria* (pp. 429-30, 453).

⁵⁶'Memoria', pp. 435-6, 453 (compare 'Via', p. 430).

⁵⁷'Memoria', pp. 435-48. The introduction refers to Jerusalem as 'ultra mare' (p. 440).

⁵⁸Kohler, 'Deux projets de croisade', p. 418; 'Via', pp. 426, 431.

⁵⁹'Via', p. 425.

but since Edward I was the last western prince to visit the Holy Land, this is not too surprising. The prominent reference to the English has led to speculation that Otho de Grandson was the author, but if the original text were written before the fall of Tripoli, Otho would still have been in England. His travels to Armenia and contacts with Hayton have been used as evidence for his authorship, but if the earliest date for the text is accepted, this too would be irrelevant since Otho did not visit Armenia until 1292.⁶⁰ If the original text of the proposal were written before 1289, it is significant that a work of similar practical style should predate that of Fidenzio, and be produced in the east independently of the papal call for advice. However, it seems more likely that the *Via* is the earliest version of the text, and was written soon after the fall of Acre by an eastern author, probably from Armenia.

Before he instigated any military response to the fall of Acre, Nicholas IV issued two bulls, *Dirum amaritudinis* (13 August 1291) and *Dura nimis* (18 August 1291), which included an appeal for advice on how to recover and retain the Holy Land. Like Gregory, he was keen for advice from the clergy, and so called provincial councils to discuss and report on the Holy Land and the question of the military orders.⁶¹ The councils met in late 1291 or early 1292 to discuss these questions, but few of their reports survive. Those which do show that the prelates were unanimously in favour of merging the military orders, and most were concerned that the goods of the orders be used for the crusade.⁶² The advice of the provincial councils was reminiscent of that sent to the council of Lyons in its concern for the organisation of the crusade in Europe rather than the east, but did not include the more theoretical issues addressed in the earlier memoirs. The reports were much more practical, and some gave consideration to strategic issues. The

⁶⁰Kohler, 'Deux projets de croisade', pp. 417-20; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 236-8.

⁶¹*Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6791-5; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 200-3.

⁶²*Councils and Synods with other documents relating to the English Church*, vol. 2, ed. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford, 1964), pp. 1099, 1108, 1113; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 213-15; *Sacrosancta concilia*, ed. P. Labbei and G. Cossart (Venice, 1728-33), vol. 14, cols. 1194-5, 1197-8; John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', *MGH SS*, vol. 25, pp. 580-1.

council of Sens drew attention to the importance of Cyprus in controlling shipping routes in the Mediterranean, and urged the end of the schism for military rather than religious reasons.⁶³ The councils' recommendations for the crusade were broadly similar and contained few innovative ideas, concentrating on the pacification of Europe and the funding of an expedition. A number were keen to see an emperor elected, under whom the Germans and Italians could crusade, although leadership was generally assigned to either Philip IV or Edward I, depending on the nationality of the council.⁶⁴

Nicholas also sought advice from secular rulers and laymen, and the first to reply was the Majorcan mystic and philosopher, Ramon Lull. He wrote a short letter to the pope, dated Rome 1292, advising on the recovery of the Holy Land, and followed this with the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, written in the same year.⁶⁵ These were the first of several treatises and petitions which this prolific and dedicated author wrote on the crusade. Unlike authors such as Fidenzio of Padua and Charles II of Anjou, Lull's writings were genuinely propagandist in their intent. Born in Majorca in 1232-3, Lull experienced a series of visions in 1263 which convinced him to renounce his old life and dedicate himself to God. He decided that his particular mission was to work for the conversion of the Moslems, and he wrote numerous treatises to promote this goal.⁶⁶ In his early years he fell under the influence of the Dominican Ramon de Penyafort, who instilled in Lull a belief in the importance of public disputation and knowledge of oriental languages to facilitate

⁶³G. Digard, *Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siège de 1285 à 1304* (Paris, 1936), vol. 2, pp. 281-3.

⁶⁴Digard, *Philippe le Bel*, vol. 2, pp. 281-3; *Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, pp. 1105-13; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 210-15; *Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 14, cols. 1197-8; John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', pp. 580-1.

⁶⁵Ramon Lull, 'Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV pro recuperatione Terrae Sanctae', ed. J. Rambaud-Buhot, in *Beati Magistri R. Lulli opera latina*, vol. 3 (Palma de Mallorca, 1954), pp. 96-8; 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', ed. Rambaud-Buhot, *loc. cit.* pp. 99-112.

⁶⁶In a work written in 1311 he reported 'laboravi diu...ut puer nobis natus, Iesus, in terris a gentibus laudaretur, et gentes salutem reciperent animarum' ('Liber natalis pueri parvuli Christi Iesu', ed. H. Harada, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 7, CCCM 32 (1975), p. 72).

preaching. Following Penyafort's advice, Lull decided to remain on Majorca to teach himself Latin, Arabic and scholastic thought, a process which took nine years, clear evidence of his dedication and practical approach to his vocation.⁶⁷

Lull viewed the crusade as being one of the tools which could be used in spreading Christianity, just as the creation of schools to teach oriental languages to preachers was another expedient. Each of his treatises on the crusade contains arguments to be used to demonstrate that Christianity is the true faith, and to expose the errors of Islam, Judaism, and various heresies.⁶⁸ Before the fall of Acre, Lull expressed a clear preference for preaching to convert the Moslems, rather than sending a crusade against them, in works such as the *Llibre de Contemplació en Déu* and the *Doctrina Pueril*, although in the *Ars Iuris* he adopted Innocent IV's ideas on the use of force if preaching were resisted.⁶⁹ This changed, apparently with the fall of Acre, since the *Epistola* to Nicholas IV is his first work to support military action against the Moslems. His discussion of military matters was rather confused, but favoured the use of galleys to intercept trade and destroy the coastline. However, he remained committed to peaceful methods, proposing that some brothers of a united military order be trained in languages and furnished with books to enable them to preach effectively to the peoples of the east.⁷⁰ In the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles* his military ideas were more developed, and the work was considerably more coherent. He gave strong emphasis to the role of a navy in blockading the Moslems across the whole Mediterranean under three admirals based in Spain, the Byzantine empire, and the Holy Land, showing his broad view of the struggle

⁶⁷Hillgarth, pp. 1-5; Ramon Lull, 'Vita coetanea', ed. H. Harada, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 8, CCCM 34 (1980), pp. 272-8.

⁶⁸Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 102-5; 'Liber de fine', ed. A. Madre, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 9, CCCM 35 (1981), pp. 265-9; 'Liber de acquisitione', ed. P Longpré as 'Le Liber de Acquisitione Terrae Sanctae du bienheureux Raymond Lulle', *Criterion* 3 (1927), pp. 271-6.

⁶⁹Hillgarth, pp. 50-1; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 102-3; B. Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission* (Princeton, 1984), pp. 190-5.

⁷⁰Lull, 'Epistola', pp. 96-8.

against Islam.⁷¹ Lull retained his commitment to peaceful methods, proposing the establishment of language schools, a constant feature of all his work on the crusade.⁷² Lull was more than just a theorist, and he demonstrated his belief in conversion through preaching by travelling to Tunis to engage in public disputations the year after he completed the *Tractatus*.⁷³

The other author to respond to Nicholas IV's call for advice was Charles II of Anjou, who had a personal interest in the kingdom of Jerusalem, which he claimed through his father's purchase of Maria of Antioch's rights to the crown in 1277. The title was disputed by Hugh III of Cyprus, but Charles I enforced his claim by sending Roger of San Severino as his bailie.⁷⁴ Charles I died in 1285, but his son was unable to assert the claim since he had been captured in an ill-advised naval attack on the fleet of Roger of Lauria the previous year, and remained in prison until late 1288.⁷⁵ In his treatise, Charles II signed himself 'Roys de Jherusalin et de cession', hence claiming two crowns whose kingdoms he had lost.⁷⁶ The recovery of the latter was the chief concern of his reign, and this consumed most of his energies. He received considerable financial and political assistance for his campaigns from a series of popes, particularly Boniface VIII, and, after agreement was reached over Sicily, he also used papal assistance in gaining the throne of Hungary for his grandson Charles Robert.⁷⁷

⁷¹Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 99-100; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 102-3.

⁷²Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 100-12.

⁷³Hillgarth, p. 26.

⁷⁴Gestes des chiprois', p. 777; Runciman, 'The crusader states, 1243-1291', pp. 585-6.

⁷⁵Gestes des chiprois', p. 791; É. G. Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples* (Paris, 1954), pp. 157-8, 167-72.

⁷⁶Charles II of Anjou, 'Le conseil du Roi Charles', ed. G. I. Bratianu, *RHSE* 19 (1942), p. 353. Bratianu argued that the work was 'le premier et le plus important' to reach Nicholas IV after the fall of Acre (pp. 293-4), but Schein has correctly redated the work to the papal interregnum, 1292-4 (*Fideles Crucis*, p. 108).

⁷⁷Léonard, pp. 196-9.

The pursuit of other goals in this period and his opportunistic attitude towards the kingdom casts doubt on Bratianu's assertion that 'ce monarque...était bien le seul à s'occuper sérieusement de la guerre contre l'infidèle et de la délivrance des Lieux Saints'.⁷⁸ Both the proposal he wrote, and his promise to go on crusade in person, can be taken as an effort to retain papal support for his attempts to regain the kingdom of Sicily.⁷⁹ His proposal clearly demonstrates that he was prepared to relinquish his claim to the kingdom of Jerusalem. He recommended that the crusade be carried out under the auspices of a unified military order, whose leader was preferably to be the son of a king, and who would receive the crown of Jerusalem after the crusade.⁸⁰ After he wrote the proposal, he negotiated with the Aragonese over Sicily and was prepared to use his title to Jerusalem as a bargaining counter in return for more tangible gains.⁸¹ However, in 1300, when news of the supposed Mongol conquest of Jerusalem suggested that there was a chance to gain the kingdom with minimal effort, Charles appointed a Syrian noble as his vicar to assert his claim, showing his opportunism. His lack of commitment is shown by his failure to attempt to recover the crusader states after the conflict over Sicily had been temporarily halted by the treaty of Caltabellota in 1302.⁸² His pragmatism was evident in the cautious attitude he adopted in his treatise. His approach, characterised by Delaville le Roulx as 'des conseils de la plus vulgaire prudence',

⁷⁸G. I. Bratianu, 'Autour du projet de croisade de Nicholas IV: la guerre ou le commerce avec l'Infidèle', *RHSE* 22 (1945), p. 250.

⁷⁹Bratianu, 'Autour du projet de croisade', p. 250, n. 3.

⁸⁰Charles II, p. 356

⁸¹N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades: the papal-Angevin alliance and the crusades against Christian lay powers, 1254-1343* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 94-5.

⁸²N. Housley, 'Charles II of Naples and the kingdom of Jerusalem', *Byzantion* 54 (1984), pp. 530-5. Caltabellota brought around ten years of uneasy peace, but Charles's interests switched to Piedmont rather than the east (D. Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200-1500* (London, 1997), pp. 112-13, 157).

involved a lengthy blockade before the launch of a full passage, and included advice on the retention and colonisation of a future kingdom of Jerusalem.⁸³

The final proposal written in the initial burst of literature was written by a Genoese doctor attached to the papal court, Galvano of Levanto. His *Liber sancti passagii* was probably completed during the papal interregnum between 1292 and 1294. The treatise was addressed to Philip IV rather than the pope, and was probably not written in response to Nicholas's call for advice, but was born from the author's own enthusiasm for the crusade. The work exhorts the French king to recover the Holy Land, appealing to his piety and urging him to emulate the deeds of Charlemagne. Only the second section discusses the crusade, but offers no practical advice.⁸⁴ The lengthy first part of the work is a treatise on the government of princes, which draws on the principles of the game of chess. Several chapters discussed the qualities needed by a king, such as prudence, strength and discretion, and the importance of peace and justice. Other chapters dealt with the role of the queen, or drew lessons from the function of the other chess pieces, including the bishop, rook and pawns.⁸⁵ Rather than being one of the advisory treatises, it belongs to a wider tradition of political literature discussing the role of a monarch, but illustrates the importance of the crusade in notions of kingship at this time. The work was addressed to Philip IV long before he became interested in the crusade. Soon after his coronation he is reputed to have said 'from this land comes nothing but trouble', and he asked Nicholas IV to relieve him of the custody of the Holy Land in 1290, shortly before the Mamluks took the problem out of his hands.⁸⁶ However, the treatise does demonstrate that, even before the propaganda of the

⁸³Charles II, pp. 353-61; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, p. 17.

⁸⁴Galvano of Levanto, 'Liber sancti passagii Christicoliarum contra Saracenos pro recuperatione Terrae Sanctae', ed. C. Kohler as 'Traité du recouvrement de la Terre Sainte adressé, vers l'an 1295, à Philippe le Bel par Galvano of Levanto, médecin génois', *ROL* 6 (1898), pp. 364-9.

⁸⁵Galvano, pp. 362-3 (only the chapter headings are given for this section).

⁸⁶S. Schein, 'Philip IV and the crusade: a reconsideration', in *Crusade and Settlement*, p. 122.

French crown began to make serious use of the crusade, the monarchy still held a leading position in the minds of some contemporaries, largely due to the memory of Saint Louis.

Nicholas IV made great efforts to launch a crusade, but he died before his plans could come to fruition. The manner of his preparations for the crusade are strongly reminiscent of those of Gregory X. Both popes sought advice from clergy and laity, both made great personal efforts to bring peace to Europe, and both planned to send a large general passage to the Holy Land. Historians have recently recognised that there is a unity to the period between the councils of Lyons and Vienne, but the fall of Acre and the pontificate of Nicholas IV did mark a definite break with the past because the loss of the crusader states caused such a change to the situation in the east.⁸⁷ Combined with a growing realisation of the prohibitive cost of crusading, this brought much greater caution to the preparation of expeditions, and it became important to have a firm strategy arranged before the crusade left Europe.

Boniface VIII to Clement V

The pontificates of Boniface VIII, and of his successor Benedict XI, marked a hiatus in the production of proposals on the crusade which lasted for over ten years. One reason for this absence of advice is that neither Boniface nor Benedict issued a request for written information as had Nicholas IV, but there were also no unsolicited treatises sent either to the papacy or to secular leaders (although naturally there is a possibility that such works have been lost). This did not correspond to a total failure of the papacy to work for the recovery of the Holy Land, since Boniface was apparently motivated by a genuine desire to launch a new crusade in his early years. He worked towards the pacification of Europe, mediating

⁸⁷A. Luttrell, 'The crusade in the fourteenth century', in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J. Hale *et al.* (London, 1965), pp. 126-7; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 9-10; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 5.

in the quarrels between England and France, and the war over Sicily.⁸⁸ Embargoes against trade with the Mamluks were reissued, and the pope apparently worked to create a fleet using ships provided by the military orders and Aragon.⁸⁹

There was one illusory opportunity to recover the Holy Land in the period, when the Mongols briefly occupied Syria in late 1299. When news reached the west it resulted in high hopes, and serious attempts were made in the east to organise a joint campaign with the Tartars. Both military orders and the king of Cyprus played important roles in the military response, and all acted independently of any help from the west. They attempted to establish bridgeheads on the mainland at Botron and Jubail, but were foiled by the Moslems, and a fleet sent from Cyprus could do little other than launch desultory raids on the coast.⁹⁰ In 1301, a force was sent to Tortosa to link with the Mongols, but the latter failed to arrive. A Templar garrison was left on Ruad, but was besieged and captured by a large Mamluk force in 1302.⁹¹ In marked contrast, leaders in the west sought to take advantage of an opportunity to acquire the crown of Jerusalem with minimal effort and expense: Charles II appointed a nobleman as his vicar while James II wrote to Ghazan to offer men and ships in return for a share of the Holy Land and access to the Holy Places.⁹² The pope exhorted *crucesignati* to fulfil their vows and pointed out the shame of the Holy Land being recovered by pagans and not Christians, but made no effort to organise a force to send east.⁹³ The actions taken in the east and west in response to

⁸⁸Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 149.

⁸⁹*Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St Jean de Jérusalem 1100-1300*, ed. J. Delaville le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), vol. 4, nos. 4177, 4260, 4515.

⁹⁰'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 848-9; Sanudo, pp. 241-2; P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 104-6.

⁹¹'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 849-50; Sanudo, p. 242.

⁹²Housley, 'Charles II of Naples and the kingdom of Jerusalem', pp. 530-5; *Acta Aragonensia*, ed. H. Finke (Berlin, 1908-22), vol. 3, no. 42.

⁹³S. Schein, 'Gesta Dei per Mongolos: the genesis of a non-event', *EHR* 95 (1979), pp. 805-19.

the news of the Mongol conquest were largely independent of each other, and there was no real effort at co-ordination.

Boniface's work for a recovery crusade contrasted with his readiness to direct resources away from the Holy Land, apparent from the early years of his pontificate. He attempted to interest Frederick III in the conquest of Constantinople as an alternative to Sicily, and allowed James II of Aragon to finance the Sicilian war with fines levied on merchants trading with the sultan.⁹⁴ Later, funds intended for the east were diverted to the pope's crusades against the Colonna and Sicily, although these were always portrayed as being for the ultimate benefit of the Holy Land.⁹⁵ After Boniface's reign ended in humiliation at Anagni, his successor, Benedict XI, gave support to Charles of Valois' plans for a crusade against Constantinople, again in the context of aid for the Holy Land.⁹⁶ Clement V continued to support a crusade to Constantinople, but he also worked hard to organise a passage to the east, succeeding in sending the Hospitaller passage of 1309. His pontificate marked the zenith of treatise writing in this period. Proposals were written by a variety of authors, many responding to the call for written advice for submission to the council of Vienne, but others, such as Dubois and Lull, writing unsolicited works aimed at promoting the crusade in some way.

Lull wrote a number of short works in this period to advance his ideas on the crusade. He sent a petition to Rome on the elevation of Pope Celestine V, entreating the pope to act on the crusade. He proposed that the pope 'fieret Decretum ad conquirendum terras infidelium, et Sanctam Terram ultramarinam, et hoc per vim armorum'. Despite this clear call for military action, Lull retained the emphasis on preaching to the Moslems and also the Tartars, since he feared the consequences for

⁹⁴T. S. R. Boase, *Boniface VIII* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 224-5; *Les Registres de Boniface VIII*, ed. G. Digard *et al.* (Paris, 1884-1935), no. 2397.

⁹⁵Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 157-8, 161; Boase, *Boniface VIII*, pp. 177-85.

⁹⁶*Les Registres de Benoît XI*, ed. C. Grandjean (Paris, 1905), nos 1006-8; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 202-3.

Christianity if pagans were converted to Islam rather than Christianity.⁹⁷ Celestine's pontificate was very short-lived, but Lull sent a petition to his successor, Boniface VIII. The later petition placed greater emphasis on bringing the Greeks back to the Roman Catholic faith, but otherwise the two works were very similar, as is to be expected from two works written in such proximity.⁹⁸ Lull's petitions were unique pieces of work in this period since they were aimed at spurring the pope to organise a crusade, whereas most recovery treatises were written to give advice. No corresponding letters survive to Benedict XI or Clement V, and Lull may have ceased his activity because he believed that his ideas would receive no support from the papacy.

Lull's next work was the *Liber de fine*, written in 1305 and handed to James II of Aragon. He persuaded James to pass the treatise on to the pope and it is also possible that a copy was sent to the king of France.⁹⁹ This proposal rejected a passage to the east and concentrated exclusively on sending a crusade from Spain to North Africa, hence it could only appeal to the Aragonese king. Lull proposed that a 'bellator rex' lead the army as head of a united military order, and he probably intended that James would take this role.¹⁰⁰ This suggests that Lull was impressed by James's interest in the crusade, shown by the king's letters to the Ilkhan of Persia and the kings of Cyprus and Armenia expressing his intention to go to the east. The king had offered himself and his goods for the crusade and had been appointed as captain-general of the church in 1296. In addition, Lull wrote at a time when a crusade in Spain seemed likely, given the recent rapprochement between Castile and

⁹⁷Ramon Lull, 'Petitio Raymundi (pro conversione infidelium) ad Coelestinum V', Golubovich 1, pp. 373-5; Lull, 'Vita coetanea', pp. 293-4.

⁹⁸Ramon Lull, 'Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium', ed. H. Wieruszowski in 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu', *Estudis Franciscains* 47 (1935), pp. 100-3.

⁹⁹Hillgarth, pp. 64-5, 72-3.

¹⁰⁰Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 269-72, 276-80.

Aragon and the provocation of a major raid from Valencia in 1304.¹⁰¹ His rejection of a direct attack on the Holy Land is significant in the light of his visit to the east in 1301, undertaken after he heard reports of Ghazan's supposed conquest of Jerusalem. He stayed in Cyprus, where he met King Henry II and the master of the Temple, then went on to visit Armenia and possibly the Holy Land itself.¹⁰² It is striking that both of the proposals he wrote after this journey eschewed a direct crusade to the east in favour of the routes through either Africa or Constantinople, suggesting his experience of attempts to link with the Mongols left him disenchanted with the prospects of crusade to the Holy Land.

The next group of proposals were advisory treatises, arising from Clement V's plans for an expedition to the east, which he began arranging soon after his election. Clement discussed the passage with Philip IV in 1305-6, and decided to summon the heads of the two military orders for a meeting in late 1306.¹⁰³ It appears that the proposal written by the master of the Hospital, Fulk of Villaret, was completed before the pope sent this request.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, it is possible that Clement summoned the two masters to discuss Fulk's treatise. Fulk was well-placed to advise on the crusade, having had long experience of the east despite only attaining the position of master shortly before writing his proposal. He was the first admiral of the Hospitallers in 1299, before rising to be grand commander (1301) and lieutenant of the master (1303), his rapid rise no doubt due to the influence of William of Villaret, Fulk's uncle and predecessor as master. As master, Fulk worked to develop the order as an independent power in the eastern Mediterranean by conquering Rhodes (1306-10) and making serious attempts to enforce the naval

¹⁰¹Hillgarth, pp. 66-8; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 171, 188-9.

¹⁰²Lull, 'Vita coetanea', pp. 294-6; Hillgarth, p. 58.

¹⁰³N. Housley, 'Pope Clement V and the crusades of 1309-10', *Journal of Medieval History* 8 (1982), p. 50; *Regestum Clementis Papae V*, no. 1033 (dated 6 June 1306).

¹⁰⁴Fulk of Villaret, 'Hec est informatio', ed. J. Petit as 'Mémoire de Foulques de Villaret sur la croisade', *BEC* 9 (1899), pp. 602-3: the work was found in the *Miscellanea Vaticana* under 1305-6 (n. 4) and Fulk reports that 118 years had elapsed since the fall of Jerusalem (in 1187).

blockade of Egypt.¹⁰⁵ Concern for the latter policy was evident in the plan he produced in 1305, which recommended a lengthy maritime blockade of the Mamluks followed by a year of raids before a general passage was sent. His proposal treated the crusade comprehensively, covering recruitment and finance as well as strategy, and also contains some element of exhortation, urging the pope to follow the example of Urban II in preaching the crusade.¹⁰⁶ Fulk's activities nearly bankrupted the order and left financial difficulties unresolved until the 1330s, and his rule as master proved so unpopular that brothers of his order attempted to assassinate him in 1317 before having him deposed in 1319.¹⁰⁷

The Hospitallers produced two further documents on the crusade in this period, and Fulk was clearly involved in both. The first was written 'per magistrum et conventum Hospitalis et per alios probos viros qui diu steterunt ultra mare', and was probably completed before Fulk's visit to the curia in 1307, in response to the pope's request for advice.¹⁰⁸ This work placed much greater emphasis on the activities of the crusade in the east, presumably at papal request, and does not deal with issues such as finance. The plan was similar to that proposed in Fulk's first treatise, but favoured using the blockading fleet to launch aggressive assaults on Mamluk territory throughout the five-year period preceding the crusade, which was to be in only two stages. This suggests that Fulk simplified his earlier ideas in consultation with his convent.¹⁰⁹ The other work is the *Devisé des chemins de Babiloine*, recently redated to 1307, which is a report on conditions in Egypt rather

¹⁰⁵A. Luttrell, 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret, Master of the Hospital, 1305-1319', in id. *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992), p. 73; Henry II of Cyprus, 'Consilium', ed. M. L. de Mas-Latrie in *Histoire de l'île de Chypre* (Paris, 1852-61), vol. 2, pp. 119-20; *Cartulaire général*, ed. Delaville le Roulx, nos. 4515, 4727; J. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c. 1050-1310* (London, 1981), pp. 209, 220-6.

¹⁰⁶Villaret, pp. 603-10.

¹⁰⁷Luttrell, 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret', p. 74.

¹⁰⁸B. Z. Kedar and S. Schein, 'Un projet de passage particulier proposé par l'ordre de l'Hôpital 1306-1307', *BEC* 137 (1979), p. 221

¹⁰⁹Hospitallers, pp. 221-6.

than a proposal for a crusade. It is very limited in scope, simply listing the strength of Mamluk forces in Egypt and Syria and giving a detailed account of the routes and distances of various possible journeys in Egypt. The quality of the information indicates that the work was based on Moslem sources. Details on the army probably came from a survey carried out in 1297-9, and the description of routes in Egypt from an administrative manual.¹¹⁰ This suggests that the Hospital was involved in gathering intelligence about the Mamluks, and shows that, although an assault on Egypt did not form part of their plans, the order was working to prepare for all eventualities.

The master of the Templars, James of Molay, responded to Clement's appeal with a proposal written in 1307.¹¹¹ His advice was very different in character to that of the Hospitallers, and has been seen as a more traditional or reactionary attitude to the crusade.¹¹² However, James had long experience of war in the east, where he had lived since the mid-1270s, and he had been master of the order since 1293.¹¹³ His first action as master was to have galleys prepared to aid Cyprus, suggesting that he was well-aware of the importance of sea-power to the Christians. He acted positively, if perhaps unwisely, in response to the Mongol attacks, leaving a Templar garrison on the island of Ruad.¹¹⁴ James appears to have been greatly affected by the surrender and imprisonment of this garrison since his proposal

¹¹⁰'La Devise des chemins de Babiloine', ed. H. Michelant and G. Raynaud, *Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions de la Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1882; reprinted Osnabrück, 1966), pp. 239-52; R. Irwin, 'How many miles to Babylon? The *Devise des chemins de Babiloine* redated' in *The Military Orders*, ed. M. Barber (Aldershot, 1994) pp. 57-63.

¹¹¹James of Molay, 'Consilium super negotio Terre Sancte', in *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, ed. E. Baluze, vol. 3 (Paris, 1693), edition ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914-27), pp. 145-6: 'Pater sancte, queritis quid michi videtur melius faciendum...'

¹¹²Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 201-2.

¹¹³*Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclesiastique* (Paris, 1951-), vol. 26, cols. 698-701. An Aragonese document suggests that Molay was acting as master of the order in 1292 (A. J. Forey, *The Templars in the Corona de Aragón* (London, 1973), pp. 405-6).

¹¹⁴M. Barber, 'James of Molay, the last Grand Master of the Templars', *Studia Monastica* 14 (1972), pp. 94-102; 'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 848-9.

vehemently rejected the use of small forces in the east in favour of a full general passage.

Clement V took the opportunity to request advice from Hayton of Gorigos, a leading member of the Armenian royal family, when the latter arrived in the west as part of an embassy from Cyprus. Hayton was well-placed to give information about the east to the pope. He had travelled widely and had close dealings with the Mongols, claiming to have personally witnessed the enthronement of two khans, probably when on official business of Armenia.¹¹⁵ He also played a leading role in internal affairs of the kingdom, governing for two years from 1299, with assistance from the military orders and Otho de Grandson, when strife between claimants to the throne threatened stability. He renounced his political life in 1305 to become a monk in the Premonstratensian abbey of Bellapais in Cyprus, but was sent to Europe by Amaury of Lusignan to seek papal acceptance of the coup against Henry II.¹¹⁶ At Clement's request, Hayton produced the *Flor des estoires de la terre d'orient*, claiming that he had dictated the entire work without notes. The work was completed in August 1307, which seems remarkably swift if Hayton had only arrived at Poitiers in the spring.¹¹⁷

The work is in four books, the first three of which gave a detailed account of the geography and history of the east, concentrating especially on the rise of the Mongols and their relations with Armenia. These were originally written in French, while the proposal was a slightly later addition, written in Latin but translated into French and attached to the history. It is likely that Hayton presented the first three books to Clement V, who then asked him to produce advice on the crusade.¹¹⁸ The

¹¹⁵Hayton, 'La flor des estoires de la terre d'orient', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 149, 252.

¹¹⁶Hayton, pp. 206, 327, 330; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 119.

¹¹⁷Hayton, pp. 252-3.

¹¹⁸Kohler discusses the composition of the work in his introduction, pp. lxi-lxvii. References to the first three books are taken from the earlier French text (pp. 113-219), except for chapter 44 which survives in full only in the Latin translation (pp. 326-34). References to the crusade proposal (book 4) are taken from the earlier Latin text (pp. 340-63).

first three books make no reference to the fourth, whose contents do not fit with the title, and the proposal makes no reference to the history. The two sections were clearly separate, but were viewed as a single work from an early date, since fourteenth century manuscripts contain all four books.¹¹⁹ It is unclear whether they were joined at Hayton's own request. While there are no explicit links with the proposal, the historical section gave weight to his opinions by showing his knowledge of the east, and also supported a number of his arguments on the possibility of an alliance with the Mongols, which was the central aspect of his plan. Hayton was convinced that co-operation with the Ilkhans of Persia should form the basis of any attempt to recover the Holy Land, and he was keen to emphasise the role that Armenia could play in this. He also favoured using Armenia as a base for the crusade and his plans appear to have had the ulterior motive of bringing western assistance to the kingdom to protect it from the ravages of the Mamluks.

Two proposals were written independently of the papacy in this period, both of them linked with the ambitions of the French royal family. The first was the *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, written in 1306 by Pierre Dubois, a French propagandist and lawyer.¹²⁰ Although his memoir was a crusade proposal, it dealt with a range of other topics that interested the author, and derived from the tradition of pamphleteering that built up around the court of Philip IV. These works were intended to stir support for royal policies and to attack the king's enemies, particularly Boniface VIII. A number emanated from the court itself, notably those by William of Nogaret, but Dubois never penetrated beyond the outer fringes of the royal circle, and his works were probably intended to ingratiate himself with the

¹¹⁹The exception is Florence, biblioteca nazionale II.ii.327 which contains lengthy fragments of the first three books only (Kohler, introduction to Hayton, pp. cv-cvi).

¹²⁰Pierre Dubois, 'De recuperatione Terre Sancte', ed. and tr. W. Brandt as *The Recovery of the Holy Land by Pierre Dubois* (New York, 1956), introduction, pp. 4-6, 13. The work was originally edited by C. Langlois, *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte* (Paris, 1891). A new edition of the Latin text reproduces Langlois's text rectifying the few errors identified by Brandt, and includes a lengthy introduction chiefly intended to compare the ideas of Dubois with Dante's *Monarchia*. *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte: dalla "Respublica Christiana" ai primi nazionalismi e alla politica antimediterranea*, ed. A. Diotti, Testi Medievali di interesse Dantesco, 1 (Firenze, 1977).

court.¹²¹ He produced several other pamphlets in the early fourteenth century on subjects of current interest, such as the dispute between Philip IV and the papacy, the crusade, and the fall of the Templars.¹²² All his works were characterised by zealous support for the French crown, and drew on the propaganda that built up around the monarchy of Philip IV in which the crusade played a prominent role.¹²³

The contents of the *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* illustrate the broader political concerns of its author. The treatise was written in two parts, the first addressed to Edward I, although there is no indication that he ever received a copy. This comprised a lengthy and rather inconsistent plan to recover the Holy Land, containing long discourses on other subjects. Some of these, such as the education of settlers for the Holy Land and its legal system, were personal interests of the author, but his comments on the power of the papacy and church reform clearly drew on his involvement in political controversies.¹²⁴ The second part was addressed solely to Philip IV and comprised a plan which subsumed the crusade in a plot to establish French world domination by handing the temporal lands of the church to the French king, and establishing members of his family on the thrones of the empire, Sicily, Sardinia, Constantinople and Jerusalem. This too digressed into other areas, such as the French military system and the debasement of the coinage.¹²⁵ A treatise written in 1308, *Pro facto Terre Sancte*, concentrated on the possibility of placing the king of France on the imperial throne, to secure a land

¹²¹Brandt, introduction, pp. 47-8; J. Rivière, *Le Problème de l'Eglise et de l'Etat au temps de Philippe le Bel* (Paris, 1926), pp. 122-9.

¹²²Pierre Dubois, 'Remonstrance du peuple de France', ed. E. Boutaric, *Notices et Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques*, 20 (1862), part 2, pp. 175-9; 'De facto Templariorum', *loc. cit.*, pp. 180-1; 'Pro facto Terre Sancte', *loc. cit.*, pp. 186-9; 'De torneamentis et justis', ed. C. V. Langlois as 'Un mémoire inédit de Pierre Du Bois, 1313', *Revue Historique* 41 (1889), pp. 84-91.

¹²³Schein, 'Philip IV and the crusade', pp. 121-6; Tyerman, 'Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 170-6.

¹²⁴Dubois, pp. 69-165.

¹²⁵Dubois, pp. 167-8.

route to the east and allow Germans to be involved in the crusade and colonisation of the Holy Land.¹²⁶ In 1308, Dubois wrote another short treatise which urged the destruction of the Templars, now that Philip was clearly set on this path, and added the crowns of Cyprus and Egypt to the burgeoning collection he planned for the French royal family.¹²⁷ His plans often went far beyond what the king could afford to contemplate, but he did support some aspects of French policy, such as Charles of Valois's proposed crusade to Constantinople.¹²⁸ The breadth of subject matter encompassed in the *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* demonstrates that Dubois saw the crusade plan as an opportunity to present his views on a range of other topics, and it has been argued that the plan was simply a pretext for Dubois to write on other subjects.¹²⁹ However, it seems that Dubois was genuine in his desire to see a new crusade given his known piety, the great detail of his crusade plan and the number of his works which discussed the recovery of the Holy Land, however obliquely.

Another work produced in the same period was loosely connected with French crusading aspirations towards Constantinople, a subject discussed by a number of theorists. In 1308, a description of the lands of eastern Europe was written by an unknown author, probably a friar.¹³⁰ While not strictly a crusade proposal, it merits consideration because the author clearly hoped to encourage

¹²⁶Dubois, 'Pro facto Terre Sancte', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 186-9.

¹²⁷Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', ed. and trans. Brandt, *The Recovery of the Holy Land*, pp. 199-207.

¹²⁸Dubois, pp. 156-7, 175-7.

¹²⁹Diotti, *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, introduction p. 42: 'insomma, tematicamente e psicologicamente, senza dubbio la crociata è il pretesto, o almeno lo scapo molto secondario dell'opera, non certa la motivazione più profonda'.

¹³⁰*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, ed. O. Górka (Cracow, 1916). The author was clearly from a religious background: he was familiar with the books of the New Testament and complained of the persecution of Catholics in Serbia (pp. 3, 10, 14, 19, 36). Many of the east Europeans are described as 'scismatici', while the author described the Albanians as neither fully Catholic nor fully schismatic, suggesting knowledge of the various liturgies (pp. 24, 28-9, 41). The work is discussed by N. Iorga, 'Encore un traité de croisade (1308): ses renseignements sur l'Europe orientale', *Bulletin de l'Institut pour l'Etude de l'Europe sud-orientale* (1921), pp. 59-64. Laiou suggests that the work was completed in later 1308 (*Constantinople and the Latins*, p. 355).

Charles of Valois in his plans for an attack on Constantinople by demonstrating the ease with which the European provinces of the Greek empire could be captured. In addition to describing the lands of eastern Europe, the author emphasised the weakness and ineffectiveness of the Byzantine army and emperor, and stated that 'ad presens est melius tempus ad ipsum imperium [per dominum] karolum recuperandi', claiming that this could be achieved within a year.¹³¹ The author also sought to persuade Charles to invade Serbia, describing the persecution suffered by preachers in the region, and stressing the cruelty of the inhabitants.¹³² By the time the *Descriptio* had been completed, Charles of Valois's plans had already suffered a serious blow from the death of his wife, Catherine of Courtenay, the source of his claim. Charles had worked hard to secure an alliance of several powers against the Greeks, including the Catalan company and Venice, and had papal support in the form of crusade tithes and the excommunication of the emperor. An expedition was prepared to set out in 1307-8, but the death of his wife, and Philip's refusal to allow French knights to leave the kingdom or to hand over money, effectively ended the project.¹³³

As Charles's project to attack Constantinople faltered, Clement V organised a passage to the east under the Hospitallers, which was to defend Armenia and Cyprus, intercept trade, and prepare for a general passage, but was diverted by Fulk of Villaret to complete the conquest of Rhodes.¹³⁴ While this was in preparation, James II of Aragon was working with the Castilians to organise an expedition against the Moslems of Granada. Clement V was reluctant to support his plans, and it took sustained diplomacy by the Aragonese king to have crusading indulgences granted. The Christian armies attacked Algeciras and Almería in August 1309, but

¹³¹*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 9, 22-5.

¹³²*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 29-37.

¹³³Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 201-12, 233-5.

¹³⁴*Regestum Clementis Papae V*, no. 2988; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 228-32; Housley, 'Pope Clement V', pp. 29-43.

both sieges ended in failure.¹³⁵ This crusade occasioned Ramon Lull's final recovery treatise, the *Liber de acquisitione*. In this he combined the plan for a crusade through Spain and Africa, first proposed in the *Liber de fine*, with a crusade to the Holy Land through Constantinople, earlier suggested in the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*. The proposal, sent to the pope, was likely to have had a much wider appeal than the *Liber de fine*, particularly to supporters of Valois plans. Hillgarth viewed Lull's re-adoption of the plan to send the crusade through Greek lands as 'part of a general acceptance of French policy in 1308-9' following closer contacts with the French court. His recognition of Philip IV's suppression of the Templars in the *Liber de acquisitione* was further evidence of this.¹³⁶ However, Lull devoted more attention to the crusade against Granada, and the timing of the work suggests that he was motivated more by the planned Aragonese-Castilian crusade than Charles of Valois's projects for Constantinople. When the *Liber de acquisitione* was written, the latter plans had been effectively abandoned, but it is interesting that Lull favoured this idea over the strategy planned for the Hospitaller passage.

The *Liber de acquisitione* was completed in March 1309, three months after the treaty of Alcalá de Henares was agreed by James II of Aragon and Ferdinand IV of Castile, formally arranging a joint offensive on Granada. The Nasrids of Granada had mounted a major raid on Valencia in 1304 for which retaliation was always likely, especially when relations between the two Christian kingdoms eased with the peace of Agreda in the same year. Military preparations for the crusade began in 1307 and the Nasrids were alerted to the coming campaign by Aragonese naval activity in early 1309.¹³⁷ Lull was clearly well aware of preparations for the crusade

¹³⁵C. L. Chamberlin, ' "Not all martyrs and saints": the Aragonese-Castilian crusade against Granada, 1309-1310', *Comitatus* 23 (1992), pp. 26-7; Housley, 'Pope Clement V', pp. 32-7.

¹³⁶Hillgarth, pp. 85-6, 100-6; Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 266: this was the reason he gives for writing a new treatise on the recovery of the Holy Land.

¹³⁷C.-E. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles* (Paris, 1966), pp. 387-9, 394, 400-4; V. Salavert y Roca, *Cerdeña y la expansión Mediterránea de la corona de*

from his contacts with ambassadors and correspondents of James II. Christian Spinola reports that Lull planned to visit the curia to persuade Clement V to support the Granada crusade and nominate James as the leader, and Lull was later given financial assistance for his expenses.¹³⁸ The content of the *Liber de acquisitione* indicates that Lull expected an attack on Granada. He gave this little attention in his work, but discussed at length how to capture Ceuta, on the North African coast, suggesting that he wrote the work to urge the Spanish kings to continue their crusade beyond the Iberian peninsula. His efforts were frustrated when the Merinids of Morocco captured Ceuta themselves in July 1309.¹³⁹

The final series of proposals written during the pontificate of Clement V were produced for the council of Vienne, announced in 1308 to deal with three subjects: the Templars, the crusade and reform of the church. The council began in 1311, but was dominated by proceedings against the Templars, who were formally suppressed on 22 March 1312 under heavy pressure from the French king.¹⁴⁰ The gathering at Vienne recalls the second council of Lyons convened by Gregory X and was the final attempt by a pope to launch a crusade at such a council, in the manner used during the thirteenth century. Clement followed the precedent set by Gregory in 1274 by appealing for advice on the crusade, and he received works from a variety of sources. The tireless Lull sent a petition to the council which recapitulated many of his ideas on the crusade, calling for the establishment of schools to teach oriental languages, the union of the military orders and reiterating his 1309 proposal for a joint crusade to Spain and Constantinople.¹⁴¹ It seems likely

Aragón 1297-1314 (Madrid, 1956), vol. 2, p. 434 (a letter from James II to Granada explaining that his navy was being readied for use against Sardinia).

¹³⁸Hillgarth, pp. 67-9; *Acta Aragonensia*, vol. 2, no. 556.

¹³⁹Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', pp. 269-70; Chamberlin, 'Not all martyrs and saints', pp. 25-6.

¹⁴⁰M. Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 223-30.

¹⁴¹Ramon Lull, 'Petitio Raymundi in concilio generali ad adquirendam Terram Sanctam', ed. Wjerszowski in 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu', pp. 104-9.

that Lull's closer relations with Philip IV helped him see one of his dreams realised when Clement V announced the creation of schools to teach oriental languages at various European universities.¹⁴²

William of Nogaret produced a memoir for the council which probably reflected the priorities of the French court in its attitude to the crusade. Nogaret, a lawyer from Languedoc, was a prominent and able member of Philip IV's council, ennobled in 1299 and later appointed keeper of the royal seal. He played a key role in the struggle between crown and papacy, most notably at Anagni, where he led the notorious attack on Boniface VIII in September 1303. Nogaret was excommunicated for his actions by Benedict XI and was not absolved until 1311, despite producing several pamphlets attacking Boniface to justify his actions.¹⁴³ Nogaret also played an important role in the suppression of the Templars, taking charge of the arrests in 1307, and leading the royal investigation into the order.¹⁴⁴ His actions throughout his career demonstrate extreme loyalty to Philip IV, and his proposal, dismissed by Schein as one of the more theorising works, is a useful insight into the concerns of the French monarchy. Nogaret concluded that the crusade was unlikely to be sent for several years, and he dealt chiefly with preparations, particularly finance, to which he devoted the majority of his treatise, reflecting the importance placed on this by the French crown.¹⁴⁵

Another version of this proposal exists written after that published by Boutaric.¹⁴⁶ The copyist made certain omissions, some of which were re-inserted,

¹⁴²Hillgarth, pp. 127-8.

¹⁴³Boase, *Boniface VIII*, pp. 345-9, 357-8, 364; E. Renan, 'Guillaume Nogaret, Légiste', *HLitt* 27 (1877), pp. 251-61, 267-8, 307; *Registres de Benoît XI*, nos. 1253-4, 1276.

¹⁴⁴Renan, 'Guillaume Nogaret', pp. 290-5; Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, pp. 179-81.

¹⁴⁵William of Nogaret, 'Quae sunt advertenda pro passagio', in 'Notices et extraits des documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de France sous Philippe le Bel', ed. E. P. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 20 (1862), pp. 199-205; Paris, Archives Nationales, J 456, no. 36/2 bis.

¹⁴⁶AN J 456, no. 36/2.

evidence that this version post-dates the printed one.¹⁴⁷ Elsewhere, sections of the text are deleted, some being replaced, and other additions made. A number of these corrections were struck through which suggests that the work was revised twice. The effect of the changes is to tone down the content of the work, reducing the emphasis on the church's role in funding the crusade and on the financial contribution to be made by the military orders, presumably to make it more acceptable to the prelates and pope at Vienne. The deleted corrections appear to have had the opposite effect: an early addition stated that the king would deliberate to decide the timing of the crusade, but this was changed to 'concordetur et ordinetur per ecclesiam et regem predictum'.¹⁴⁸ It is impossible to judge whether Nogaret himself made any of the changes or whether another of the king's advisors decided to moderate the content of the work, nor can it be shown which version, if any, was presented to the council.

The only advice from Christians living in the east was delivered by two envoys of Henry II, king of Cyprus. Henry had been crowned king of Jerusalem in Tyre in 1286, but spent little time in the kingdom before it finally fell in 1291. However, as king of Cyprus, he was heavily involved in military activity against the Moslems, both in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Acre, and in the failed attempt to link with the Mongols in 1300. Henry also took action to intercept trade with the Mamluks, but the depth of his commitment to aggressive measures has been questioned. Trade with the Moslems from Famagusta flourished suggesting that Henry was partly concerned with the prosperity of his own kingdom.¹⁴⁹ The strategy he used against the Mamluks formed the basis of his advice to the council,

¹⁴⁷AN J 456, no. 36/2; Nogaret, p. 205: 'Item quod civitates Veneciarum, Janue, Pisis et alie similes [eficaciter inducantur ne] sint ad impedimentum negocii...'. The section in brackets is omitted but inserted above the line.

¹⁴⁸The deleted addition reads 'statuentur prout domino regi francie deliberat' cum suis baronibus videbitur statuend' ' (AN J 456, no. 36/2).

¹⁴⁹Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 101-5, 112, 133-4; J. Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Egypte (fin XIIIe-début XIVE siècles)', in *Croisades et Etats latins d'Orient* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992), pp. 126-33.

which favoured a naval blockade, followed by a passage to Egypt. He expressed similar views in a later memorandum to the curia written in 1323.¹⁵⁰

The final proposal received at the council was written by the French bishop, William le Maire, who sent advice on the three subjects of crusade, church reform and the suppression of the Templars, illustrating how advice on the crusade could form part of wider discussions on problems facing the church. His memoir is one of only two surviving that deals with the Templars, the other being written by the future Pope John XXII, Jacques Duèze.¹⁵¹ Advice on church reform was given by William Durant in his two treatises written for the council.¹⁵² Like most other European prelates in the period, William le Maire's advice on the crusade only considered preparations for an expedition, since he believed that the subject was best dealt with by those who were experienced in worldly and military matters. He did not expect a passage for ten to twelve years because of the divisions of Christendom and he recommended that the intervening period be used to preach the crusade widely and raise funds, especially from the possessions of the military orders and secular sources.¹⁵³

The council made few concrete preparations for a crusade outside the field of finance and measures taken against merchants who traded with the enemy, but the pope extracted a promise from Philip IV to take the cross. The king did this on 5 June 1313 at a large ceremony in Paris, where his sons, several nobles, and Edward II of England also became *crucesignati*. Soon afterwards, the suppression of the Templars was sealed by the execution of the last grand master, James of Molay, in

¹⁵⁰Henry II, pp. 118-25; *Lettres secrètes et curiales du Pape Jean XXII (1316-1334) relatives à France*, ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet (Paris, 1906-72), no. 1690.

¹⁵¹Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, pp. 223-4.

¹⁵²C. Fasolt, *Council and Hierarchy: the political thought of William Durant the Younger* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 1-4. These two works, the *Tractatus Maior* and the *Tractatus Minor* have been usually treated as a single work (the *Tractatus de modo celebrandi concilii*).

¹⁵³William le Maire, 'Livre de Guillaume le Maire', ed. C. Port, *Mélanges Historiques: Choix de documents*, vol. 2, *Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1877), pp. 474-6.

Paris on 18 March 1314.¹⁵⁴ In the months after Molay's death, Clement V and Philip IV both died, depriving the crusade of its two leading figures. Attempts to implement the crusade ordained at Vienne dominated plans made over the next decade, but the deaths of 1314 brought a definite shift in the movement. Throughout his pontificate, Clement had been at the fore of attempts to organise crusades to the Holy Land, from the Hospitaller passage of 1309 to the general passage planned at Vienne, but he depended on the willingness of the French king to support his plans. After Clement's death, the initiative in launching a crusade passed away from the papacy to the French court.

French crusading plans

In the period after Vienne, the French court came to dominate plans for a new crusade. Consequently, popes issued no further requests for advice, which largely explains the greatly reduced number of treatises in this period. Philip IV's successors took an active role in attempting to launch a passage, and still sought advice to inform their plans, but the chief issue in the later period was finance, on which all the French efforts foundered. This period is characterised by protracted and often bitter negotiations with the papacy over raising funds for the crusade. This caused suspicion of French motives among hostile contemporaries, although recently historians have taken a more charitable view of royal intentions.¹⁵⁵ On seizing the regency of France in 1316, Philip V immediately affirmed his desire to leave on crusade, and sent proposals to the pope later the same year. In 1318, he appointed a leading French noble, Louis of Clermont, the grandson of Louis IX, to

¹⁵⁴N. Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 14-15; Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, pp. 241-2.

¹⁵⁵See for example Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', pp. 15-34; id., 'Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 170-81; Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 166-85.

lead the initial passage.¹⁵⁶ Louis requested advice from the citizens of Marseilles, where several galleys were being built for the passage. Much of the response consisted of a detailed description of a projected fleet, but also incorporated a short crusade plan.¹⁵⁷ This proposal clearly envisaged a very limited expedition, since even the main passage appears to have been intended only to launch raids.

Despite these preparations, and Philip's stated intention to leave in 1318, by 1319 only ten galleys had been constructed, and these were diverted by John XXII to the siege of Genoa where all were lost.¹⁵⁸ Continued unrest in Flanders hampered the king's plans, but he remained engaged in discussions with the pope over funding throughout his reign. Philip was careful to be fully prepared and he called three assemblies in Paris to advise on the crusade between 1319 and 1321, to which he invited a number of men connected with the east. These included Fulk of Villaret and three other Hospitallers; John of Joinville's son; veterans of the east; and bishop William Durant of Mende.¹⁵⁹ William had attended both the council of Vienne and the subsequent French council of 1313, and he remained involved in the crusade throughout his life. He received letters from Sanudo, although he apparently never wrote back, and died on Cyprus returning from a mission to the Holy Land in 1330.¹⁶⁰ He wrote a treatise on the crusade, probably after the council of 1319, which presumably reflects both his own views, and ideas he received from others in discussions at the various councils he had attended.¹⁶¹ The work was intended to

¹⁵⁶Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', pp. 18-20; C. de la Roncière, 'Une escadre franco-papale', *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 13 (1893), pp. 399-400.

¹⁵⁷'Informationes Massilie pro passagio transmarino', ed. A. de Boislisle as 'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon (1316-1333)', *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France* (1872), pp. 248-50.

¹⁵⁸Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, p. 22.

¹⁵⁹Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', pp. 20-6.

¹⁶⁰P. Viollet, 'Guillaume Durant le Jeune, évêque de Mende', *HLitt* 35 (1921)', pp. 52, 57-60; letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 294-7.

¹⁶¹William Durant, 'Informatio brevis', ed. G. Dürrholder in *Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII 1316-1334* (Strasbourg, 1913), pp. 104-10. Tyerman has argued convincingly that the proposal was written at the time of this later council, rather than the one which met to discuss the

advise the French king on the crusade, but it is unclear whether Durant was reacting to a request or writing at his own initiative. His proposal reiterated many of the common themes of recovery literature but he placed a very ecclesiastical slant on his work, stressing the need for prelates to go on crusade to lead by example, and the importance of missionary work in conjunction with the crusade. In addition, he used the proposal to make brief reference to political issues, including the behaviour of royal officials and the debasement of the coinage.¹⁶²

While these French plans were in progress, a proposal was written for the curia by a Dominican missionary, William Adam, probably unsolicited.¹⁶³ Atiya wrongly dated this to 1313, believing that Raymond of Farges, the cardinal to whom the work is dedicated, died in 1314-15. However, the cardinal died in 1346, and internal evidence from the proposal demonstrates that it was written after the death of Clement V, probably in 1316-17.¹⁶⁴ Adam had spent many years preaching and travelling in the east, by his own account ranging through the eastern areas of the Byzantine empire, Persia, India, and Ethiopia.¹⁶⁵ On his travels he acquired a deep understanding of the politics of the near east, and he gave an accurate account of relations between the Byzantines, Mongols of the Golden Horde, Mamluks and Ilkhans of Persia.¹⁶⁶ Although he had dedicated his life to preaching, Adam was convinced of the necessity of military action against the Mamluks.¹⁶⁷ He favoured

crusade in January 1313 ('Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-1320 and the crusade', pp. 27-9; compare Viollet, 'Guillaume Durant le Jeune', p. 31; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 249; Fasolt, *Council and Hierarchy*, pp. 305-6).

¹⁶²Durant, pp. 104-10.

¹⁶³William Adam, 'De modo sarracenos extirpandi', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 521-55.

¹⁶⁴Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 65-6; William Adam, p. 533 ('felicis recordationis Clementis pape V'); p. 534 (a reference to a Mongol embassy stopped by the deaths of both the pope and the Ilkhan, which can only refer to Clement V and Oljeitu, who died in 1314 and 1316 respectively; see introduction pp. clxxxix-cxc).

¹⁶⁵William Adam, pp. 537-8, 551-5.

¹⁶⁶William Adam, pp. 530-5

¹⁶⁷William Adam, pp. 549-55.

sending the crusade to attack Constantinople before the Holy Land, due to his fierce antipathy towards the Greeks. Adam's proposal was intended both to offer advice on the crusade, but also to promote the idea at the curia, where a new pope, John XXII, had only been recently chosen. Whereas those proposals written purely to advise on the crusade tended to be concise and practical, Adam had a more literary style, reflected in his fierce denunciations of the Greeks and merchants who traded with the Mamluks, and his emotive accounts of the treatment of Christian slaves by Moslems in the east.

While Philip V was preparing his final assembly on the crusade, another author completed perhaps the most well-known recovery treatise and presented a copy to the pope. Marino Sanudo Torsello handed a manuscript of the *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis* to John XXII on 24 September 1321, fifteen years after he had begun work on the treatise.¹⁶⁸ Born into a Venetian merchant family related to the Sanudi of Naxos, Marino Sanudo travelled widely in the east from an early age, and devoted his energies and finance to promoting the crusade in Europe.¹⁶⁹ He surpassed Lull in his dedication to disseminating his ideas through correspondence and personal contacts, but was only interested in the crusade, not conversion. He began his work in 1306, and produced the first version, the *Conditiones Terre Sancte* in 1309. This was later developed to be the first book of the *Liber*, and dealt with the economic blockade of Egypt which he regarded as the key to Moslem power. The second book, completed in 1312, described the conquest of Egypt and the capture of the Holy Land, which Sanudo believed could be accomplished without difficulty once Egypt was in Christian hands.¹⁷⁰ The third book of the *Liber secretorum* was finished by 1321 and comprised a lengthy history of the Holy Land, along with a short account of the geography of the east with maps. This was

¹⁶⁸Sanudo, pp. 1-2; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade', pp. 57-8.

¹⁶⁹Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 21-33.

¹⁷⁰Sanudo, pp. 3, 26-33, 34-58, 91-2.

explicitly aimed at illustrating lessons for the maintenance of a future kingdom of Jerusalem by recalling the errors made by earlier inhabitants.¹⁷¹ It was thus more integrated with the proposal than similar historical sections in other works, although the great length of this book suggests that Sanudo included it due to his interest in the subject. This is reflected in his other surviving works, the history of 'Romania', and his brief addition to Villehardouin's account of the conquest of Constantinople.¹⁷² Sanudo continually revised the *Liber secretorum*, adding marginal notes to take account of new developments which were included in the body of the text in later versions.¹⁷³

Sanudo handed two copies of the *Liber secretorum* to the pope at Avignon, then visited Charles IV, giving him a copy of the proposal and an appeal for a crusade written in French.¹⁷⁴ While at Avignon, he witnessed some of the negotiations held between the papacy and the French crown over the financing of a crusade. Charles's attempts to launch a new expedition continued those of his predecessor and followed the same pattern of intensive negotiations over finance. However, the deteriorating situation in the east brought greater urgency to these plans. Armenia was under serious threat and John XXII's immediate concern was to arrange a passage to defend it. Charles proposed a crusade in three stages, the first of which was to sail at once to assist Armenia, the second to begin soon after, while the general passage was to follow in the distant future.¹⁷⁵ The pope requested advice from his cardinals on this plan and several responses survive, most of which simply

¹⁷¹Sanudo, p. 262.

¹⁷²Marino Sanudo, 'Istoria del Regno di Romania', ed. C. Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin, 1873), pp. 99-169; R. I. Wolff, 'Hopf's so-called 'fragmentum' of Marino Sanudo Torsello', in id. *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (Variorum reprint: London, 1976), pp. 149-59.

¹⁷³London, BM add. 27376, f. 10v: has a marginal note advising that a force be sent to protect Armenia. This is incorporated into the text in later versions, such as that used by Bongars (p. 38).

¹⁷⁴Sanudo, pp. 1-2, 5-6; Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 83-7.

¹⁷⁵J. Petit, *Charles de Valois* (Paris, 1900), pp. 393-400; Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 22-3; id. 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 171-4.

criticised the plans without offering alternatives.¹⁷⁶ Envoys from the kings of Cyprus and Armenia also advised on the crusade. The king of Cyprus favoured the same policy he first laid out in 1311, while the king of Armenia was unsurprisingly concerned about the impact a small passage would have on his country, fearing that it would achieve little more than provoking the Mamluks into further attacks.¹⁷⁷ A fifteen-year truce signed in 1323 removed the pressing need for an expedition, and the crusade was abandoned when negotiations between the French and the papacy broke down because of the latter's concerns over Italy and the former's clashes with England.¹⁷⁸

In this period a proposal was written by Garcias d'Ayerbe, bishop of Leon, which survives in two versions, Latin and French.¹⁷⁹ The bishop is a shadowy figure, moving from Saragossa to Leon in November 1317, and remaining there until his death in September 1332. He was threatened with excommunication after failing to pay a debt to certain merchants under oath in 1319, but there is no evidence to explain his interest in the crusade.¹⁸⁰ The author's recommendation that the king of Navarre's daughter marry the young King Alphonse of Castile, since there were no French princesses available, dates the work to 1323-8, which fits the

¹⁷⁶*Lettres Secrètes du Pape Jean XXII*, nos. 1693-1709; Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 173-7.

¹⁷⁷*Lettres Secrètes du Pape Jean XXII*, nos. 1690-1.

¹⁷⁸Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 180-2.

¹⁷⁹Paris, BN lat 7470, ff. 123v-129v; Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, 1654, ff. 151-162v. The Sainte-Geneviève manuscript also contains a short historical piece covering the Moslem capture of Majorca and Sicily, and how they lost both islands, and a translation of the later parts of William of Tripoli's *De statu saracenorum* (ff. 155-162).

¹⁸⁰*Lettres communes du pape Jean XXII d'après les registres di. s d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. G. Mollat, 16 vols. (Paris, 1904-47), nos. 5858, 10034, 43527, 52343; *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclesiastique*, vol. 5, col. 1279. The bishop is given as the author of the treatise in the table of contents (BN lat 7470, f. 1v: 'episcopi Legionen'). The reference to raising troops from Spain, and to the possibility of marriage alliances among the French and Spanish kingdoms suggests an author from that region.

date of the earlier Latin manuscript.¹⁸¹ The work opens with a brief history of the Holy Land and the crusades from the Roman period up to the fall of Acre. The author described the apocryphal expedition of Charlemagne, which he classed as the first crusade, then briefly recounted the second and third crusades, placing great emphasis on the treachery of the Greeks. He also gave a brief account of Louis IX's first expedition and the crusade of Edward of England. The information in the history has no particular relevance to the plan, and there are no links between the two sections.¹⁸² It is not possible to assess whether the bishop wrote the work in response to a request, or from his own initiative. The French version of the text is a later translation, made by a scribe with limited knowledge of the crusades, who made errors which indicate that this could not be the earlier version.¹⁸³

The final attempt of the period to organise a crusade in the west came in the reign of Philip VI, the first Valois king. He had taken the cross twice before he gained the throne, in 1313 and 1326, and his concern for the crusade was well-known in France. As the first king of a new dynasty, he was concerned to continue Capetian crusading traditions, and succeeded by following the custom of protracted and suspicious negotiations with the papacy over finance. These continued for several months until the crusade, again to be in three stages, was formally announced in 1333.¹⁸⁴ Shortly after, Philip committed ships intended for the first stage of his passage to the naval league against the Turks created in 1332. When Philip had asked for Venetian advice on the crusade, they favoured enforcing the

¹⁸¹BN lat 7470, f. 129v; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, p. 79 n. 4. The manuscript contains miniatures which show the French king with the arms of France and Navarre, placing it in the reigns of Philip IV, Philip V or Charles IV.

¹⁸²BN lat 7470, ff. 123v-126 (historical introduction); 126-129v (proposal).

¹⁸³'Godofredus latoringie' is changed to 'le duc de lorraine, Godefroy de bullon' (BN 7470, f. 124v; Sainte Geneviève, 1654, f. 151v); elsewhere, Conrad of Germany ('Corradus') becomes 'Conat' and Alphonse of Castile ('Alfensum') becomes 'Aufor', while the fall of Acre is dated to 1280 in the translation rather than 1290 (BN 7470, ff. 125v-126, 129v; Sainte-Geneviève, 1654, ff. 152, 153, 155).

¹⁸⁴Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 23-4; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 25-52.

blockade on Egypt, but also taking action against the Turks, perhaps influencing the king's decision.¹⁸⁵ The creation of this league marks a move away from European-based plans for the recovery of the Holy Land towards defensive measures against the Turks by Christian powers with a stake in the eastern Mediterranean, such as the Venetians, Hospitallers and Byzantines. Philip's promised ships were never sent and the league's victory over the Turks at Adramyttium in 1334 was achieved without French help. Philip VI's crusade became entangled in growing hostility between France and England, and in 1336 it was cancelled by the new pope, Benedict XII.¹⁸⁶

The king received two unsolicited proposals on the crusade, although the later of these, written in 1335, gave no advice on the practicalities of planning a crusade. The author, Guy of Vigevano, was the queen's doctor, and had previously been the doctor of Emperor Henry VII. His proposal, the *Texaurus Regis Francie*, has two sections. In the first he used his medical expertise to advise the king on how to maintain his health while he was in the east, covering such issues as food, drink, rest, and the well-being of eyes, ears, and teeth.¹⁸⁷ The second part of his treatise detailed a series of inventions, all illustrated, which the author had devised, including transportable siege towers, a wind powered cart for flat plains, and a device to help horses float across rivers.¹⁸⁸ Vigevano's chief interest was in medicine rather than crusading, and he composed a treatise on anatomy in 1345, again well-illustrated.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, ed. G. M. Thomas, vol. 1 (Venice, 1880), nos. 109-10.

¹⁸⁶Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 44-5.

¹⁸⁷Paris, BN lat. 11015, ff. 32-41. The *Texaurus* has been translated: A. R. Hall, 'Guido's *Texaurus*, 1335', in *On Pre-Modern Technology and Science: A Volume of Studies in Honor of Lynn White jr.*, ed. B. S. Hall and D. C. West (Malibu, 1976).

¹⁸⁸BN lat. 11015, ff. 41-54v.

¹⁸⁹E. Wickersheimer, *Anatomies de Mondino dei Luzzi et de Guido de Vigevano*, Documents scientifiques du XVe siècle, 3 (Paris, 1926).

Earlier, in 1332, the king received the *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, written by an anonymous Dominican author.¹⁹⁰ Although the treatise opens with a list of reasons why Philip should go on crusade, the author only wrote because the king was known to be preparing an expedition, and his aim appears to have been to persuade the king to direct his crusade against the Byzantine empire. The proposal was discussed by a council created by Philip to plan the crusade, and the ideas it contained were rejected.¹⁹¹ The author of the *Directorium* was once identified as Burcard, but Kohler conclusively demonstrated that this name was only associated with the work from the time of a French translation made in 1455, and argued that the author was William Adam.¹⁹² The similarities between the lives of Adam and the author of the *Directorium* are striking: both had been in Constantinople in 1307 and in Persia at the time of Clement V's death; both had visited the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean and claimed to know enough about Ethiopia to write a separate book; and both had dealings with the Genoese Zaccaria family, the lords of Chios.¹⁹³ Both had a severe dislike of the Greeks, and recounted identical stories to demonstrate their treachery, and both were strongly opposed to sending the crusade by sea, using similar language to describe the problems of sea-sickness.¹⁹⁴ There are also stylistic similarities between the two works, such as the rhetorical language used to attack the Greeks and Moslems, and the use of numbered sub-divisions when listing arguments. William Adam was made archbishop of Antivari in 1324, and the

¹⁹⁰'Directorium ad passagium faciendum', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 367-517.

¹⁹¹Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 7-11.

¹⁹²Kohler, introduction to the *Directorium*, pp. cxliii-clxiii; C. Kohler, 'Quel est l'auteur du *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*?', *ROL* 12 (1911), pp. 104-11. His conclusions are accepted by D. Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the crusades, 1261-1354', *Setton* 3, p. 52, n. 84; L. Bréhier, *L'Église et l'Orient au Moyen Age: les croisades*, 5th edn. (Paris, 1928), p. 257. In contrast, Atiya ignores Kohler's arguments to favour 'Burcard' as the author (*The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 97-8).

¹⁹³William Adam, pp. 531-3, 537, 550-1, 555; 'Directorium', pp. 387-8, 447-50.

¹⁹⁴William Adam, pp. 539, 541-2, 545-8; 'Directorium', pp. 413, 432-5, 439-41.

author of the *Directorium* had a detailed knowledge of this region and the problems faced by Dominican preachers there.¹⁹⁵

However, the evidence for William Adam's authorship is only circumstantial, and not all historians accept Kohler's arguments. The author of the *Directorium* reported that he was one of two Dominicans sent by John XXII to negotiate with the Armenian church over union, and to create schools to teach Latin to Armenian boys.¹⁹⁶ This mission was sent in June 1318 and was placed under Raymond Etienne, a little known Dominican who was later made archbishop of Ephesus.¹⁹⁷ Kohler argues that Adam went on this mission and was rewarded with the bishopric of Smyrna, to which he had been transferred by 1322, but there is no positive evidence for this conclusion.¹⁹⁸ Golubovich contends that it is unusual that Adam should not be named in the papal letter, since he was a suffragan bishop, and presumably senior to Raymond Etienne. He suggests that the author of the *Directorium* may well have been Etienne himself.¹⁹⁹ The French council which discussed the work in 1333 described the author as 'ung sages prelas, qui jadis fu de l'ordre des Prescheurs, et a present arcevesque d'un arceveschié en l'empire de Constantinoble et es marches de la', which could refer equally to either Ephesus or Antivari.²⁰⁰ The two men may have known each other: both had lengthy experience

¹⁹⁵C. Kohler, 'Quelques documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam, archevêque de Sultanieh, puis d'Antivari et à son entourage (1318-1346)', *ROL* 10 (1903-4), pp. 42-6, 50; 'Directorium', pp. 482-5.

¹⁹⁶'Directorium', pp. 487-9.

¹⁹⁷Golubovich 3, pp. 404-5. Both Atiya and H. Omont ('Guillaume Adam, missionnaire', *HLitt* 35, pp. 279-83) discount Adam's authorship in the belief that the author of the *Directorium* was referring to a mission to Armenia of 1323, which Adam could not have accompanied since he remained at Avignon. However, the mission on which Adam was sent was to preach to Armenians in Persia (Kohler, 'Quelques documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam', pp. 34-5), and the terms of John XXII's instructions in 1318 demonstrate that the author of the *Directorium* was referring to this mission (*Lettres communes du pape Jean XXII*, no. 8202).

¹⁹⁸Kohler, introduction to William Adam, p. clxxxiii; id. 'Quelques documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam', p. 29.

¹⁹⁹Golubovich 3, p. 405, n. 3. His view is followed by Sinor, 'The Mongols and western Europe', *Setton* 3, p. 543.

²⁰⁰Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 11.

of preaching in the east, and William Adam was ordered to take the pallium to Raymond in Ephesus when Adam was transferred to Sultanieh.²⁰¹ This may have given Raymond the opportunity to become acquainted with Adam's ideas on the crusade. The similarity of the ideas and information contained in the *Directorium* and Adam's *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* is such that, if they were not written by the same man, the author of the *Directorium* drew heavily on William Adam's work, and may have known him. However, given Adam's proven interest in the crusade, it seems more likely than not that he was the author, rather than Raymond Etienne.²⁰²

Edward III was invited to join Philip VI's planned crusade to the Holy Land, and initially agreed to accompany the French king. Edward's involvement in Scotland precluded him from playing any part in the crusade, and contributed towards the escalation of hostilities between France and England which caused the pope to cancel Philip's project in 1336. Soon after agreeing to join Philip VI, Edward received a treatise giving advice on the crusade from a Hospitaller knight, Roger of Stanegrave, who had been released from Moslem imprisonment and had travelled home to raise the ransom.²⁰³ His work, *Li charboclois d'armes du conquest precious de la terre sainte de promission*, described his experiences in the east, and combined exhortation with concrete advice and information, both geographical and military. The author favoured sending the crusade to Alexandria, which is described in considerable detail, and argued that the fleet should halt at Rhodes.²⁰⁴ In its origins and aim it was similar to the *Directorium*, being written by a crusade enthusiast and addressed to a monarch who had a stated intention of

²⁰¹Kohler, 'Quelques documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam', pp. 32, 36-7 (for Raymond's long career as a preacher).

²⁰²Most historians simply describe the author as an 'anonymous Dominican' (Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', p. 35; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 34). Since Adam's authorship cannot be demonstrated convincingly, I will refer to 'the author of the *Directorium*'.

²⁰³Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 247-52; London, BM, Cotton Otho, D V, ff. 2v-3.

²⁰⁴BM, Cotton Otho, D V, ff. 1-15. The manuscript was badly damaged in a fire and it is difficult to establish the exact details of the plan.

travelling to the east. However, the exhortatory content of the work was much more pronounced, and recurs throughout, using both religious and chivalric arguments.

Impact and circulation of the proposals

An assessment of the impact of the crusade proposals has to deal both with the question of the extent to which they affected later works, and their effect on crusading policies among European rulers. Since many of the proposals were commissioned by the papacy, it is clear that the audience was not limited to greedy prelates and merchants, but that the proposals were read by those involved in crusade planning. Whether all received the same detailed attention given to Sanudo's proposal by the group of four experts convened by Pope John XXII is perhaps doubtful, but this was not the only work to be carefully appraised, as the report on the *Directorium* produced by Philip VI's crusade council demonstrates.²⁰⁵ An examination of the numbers of manuscripts surviving from the immediate period in which the proposals were written indicates that these works circulated beyond their initial recipients. It is possible to assess which proposals were likely to be more widely available in the period by using the number and date of extant manuscripts, although it would be dangerous to base firm conclusions on the random survival of documents.

Some proposals survive in a number of manuscripts dating from this period which indicate that they circulated beyond the papal curia, often in connection with the crusading plans of the Capetian and Valois kings of France. A number exist in a collection in the French Archives Nationales, which includes the advice of Henry II of Cyprus, James of Molay, William of Nogaret and the invasion plan of England produced by Benito Zaccaria. Molay's plan was originally written for the pope, and Henry's advice was given at the council of Vienne, demonstrating that such works were copied or passed around to other interested parties. Another collection of

²⁰⁵Sanudo, pp. 1-2; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 7-11.

treatises includes the Hospitaller proposal of 1306-7, the *Devises des chemins de Babiloine*, produced around the same time, together with the later plans of William Durant and the bishop of Leon. Internal evidence from the manuscript indicates that these works were collected during the reign of Charles IV, shortly after the bishop of Leon wrote his advice.²⁰⁶ Another group, comprising Hayton's *Flos historiarum*, the *Anonymi Descriptio* and the *Memoria*, was also produced between 1310 and 1330.²⁰⁷ It was French practice during the reign of Philip VI to use archive material in connection with crusading plans, hence copies were made of the accounts of Louis IX's expedition and of the advice given to Louis of Clermont by the citizens of Marseilles.²⁰⁸ It is also possible that the French translation of the manuscript containing the proposals of the Hospitallers, Durant and the bishop of Leon, was done at this time.²⁰⁹ The existence of a letter written to a relative of the French king with the copies of Hayton, the *Memoria* and the *Anonymi Descriptio* suggests that the royal court was responsible for this collection and probably the others. This indicates that the French had access to the theorists' ideas when they formulated their crusade plans.

Beyond the groups of proposals which survive together in collections, the only works which can be shown to have existed in a number of manuscripts in the early fourteenth century were the *Liber secretorum* and Hayton's *Flos historiarum*. The number of manuscripts of the former, most of which date from the fourteenth century, is surely a testament to Sanudo's tireless work in promoting the crusade. Hayton's proposal exists in numerous copies, many of which date from early in the century, suggesting that his work was well-known in the period. The anonymous author of the *Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, writing in 1308, reported that 'de asia

²⁰⁶Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 79-80, n. 4.

²⁰⁷Górka, introduction to *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. xxxix-il.

²⁰⁸Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', p. 35.

²⁰⁹Sainte-Geneviève, 1654.

minori dominus de kurco [Gorigos] satis plene tractavit', illustrating the speed with which his work became known, and suggesting that it was widely available to other theorists and crusade planners.²¹⁰

The majority of proposals survive only in unique manuscripts, which might suggest that they were less influential. The treatises of Charles II, Dubois, Fidenzio, Fulk of Villaret, James of Molay, William of Nogaret, and the *Via* are all found in single manuscripts, all dated to the early fourteenth century. However, this gives a misleading impression since it is clear that the unique manuscripts in which several proposals survive were not the original versions, while some works were passed on by their recipients to other interested parties. Lull's *Liber de fine* was given to the pope by an enthusiastic James II, and was probably sent to the French king, while Fulk of Villaret had opportunities to transmit his ideas at the French council of 1319.²¹¹ Although Galvano of Levanto's memoir was addressed to the French king, a copy was sent to the pope, either by the author or by the king. A lost copy of the work was listed in the papal library from 1295.²¹² Charles II's project survives in a collection of documents drawn up before 1303 by William of San Stefano, the preceptor of the Hospitallers in Cyprus, which implies that his proposal existed in several copies, now lost, at an early date.²¹³ This illustrates that even those works which survive in unique manuscripts may have circulated widely enough to have had some influence.

Ideas contained in a proposal did not necessarily spread through knowledge of the written work itself. The two propagandists of the period, Sanudo and Lull, were keen to disseminate their ideas and worked actively towards this end. Lull's

²¹⁰*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, p. 2.

²¹¹Hillgarth, pp. 64-5, 72-3; Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-1320 and the crusade', p. 23; Luttrell, 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret', p. 74.

²¹²Kohler, 'Un traité du recouvrement de la Terre Sainte', p. 355.

²¹³A. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers' historical activities, 1291-1400', in id. *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291-1400* (Variorum reprint: London, 1978), pp. 3-4.

promotion of the crusade involved personal discussions with the pope and other leaders to expound his ideas. He spent time in Barcelona at the court of James II of Aragon and received money from the king after presenting him with the *Liber de fine*. Lull was present at a conference at which the crusade was discussed by the king, his uncle James II of Majorca and the pope.²¹⁴ He also made two visits to the papal court to petition Celestine V and later Clement V, although he left on the latter occasion 'quae quidem supplicatio tam domino papae quam et cardinalibus modicum fuit curae'.²¹⁵ Sanudo too promoted his ideas at foreign courts, distributing copies of his work to influential figures whenever possible. He visited the curia at Avignon in 1323 to introduce the Armenian ambassadors to the pope and cardinals, then took them to visit the French king and certain nobles at his own expense.²¹⁶ Sanudo spent the remainder of his life in Venice, but was a prolific correspondent, writing to the pope; the Byzantine emperor; the kings of Armenia, Cyprus, France and Sicily; the count of Hainault; and various ecclesiastics.²¹⁷ However, he remained keen to discuss his ideas in person, 'quia scriptura est quasi lingua mortua, et ore tenus loqui est lingua viva'.²¹⁸ In the years after completing the *Liber*, Sanudo continued his promotion of the crusade, but he began to voice growing concern over the precarious state of Armenia and the rise of the Turks in letters written in the late 1320s and early 1330s. He began working to promote a western offensive against the Turks in conjunction with the Byzantines, and to bring about an easing of relations between the west and the Greeks.²¹⁹

²¹⁴Hillgarth, pp. 64-5.

²¹⁵Lull, 'Vita coaetanea', pp. 293-4; Hillgarth, p. xxiv.

²¹⁶Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, p. 298.

²¹⁷Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 289-316; Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp. 753-819; Cerlini, 'Nuove lettere di Marino Sanudo il Vecchio', pp. 321-59; Dorez and de la Roncière, 'Lettres inédits', pp. 34-44.

²¹⁸Kunstmann, 'Studien', p. 798.

²¹⁹Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 299-303; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks', pp. 380-92.

Other theorists did not promote their ideas in the same way as Lull and Sanudo, but their views could circulate among the community of men who were interested in the crusade in this period, and who had many opportunities to meet at the curia and the French court, where crusades were planned, or in Cyprus. This group included refugees from Latin Syria, whose presence at European courts, especially Cyprus, is documented; propagandists such as Lull and Sanudo; enthusiastic nobles such as Otho de Grandson and Louis of Clermont; and those who were involved in crusade planning such as representatives of the military orders.²²⁰ There were opportunities for closer contact among those theorists based in the east. The Templars maintained close relations with Charles II of Sicily, and William of Villaret, who preceded Fulk as master of the Hospitaliers, was a counsellor of the Sicilian king. The masters of military orders and the king of Cyprus led the response to the Mongol invasion of Syria in 1299, after receiving letters from Ghazan. The force sent to Tortosa under Henry's brother Amalric included Cypriots and members of both orders.²²¹ Given such co-operation, it seems inconceivable that these men would not discuss the crusade together. The existence of such an environment would allow theorists' ideas to spread both among themselves and those involved in organising crusades.

There are examples of definite contacts made between theorists which would allow authors to influence each other. Both Tyerman and Hillgarth describe the household of Mahaut, countess of Artois, where Dubois ended his career. The countess's doctor was Thomas le Myésier, who devoted much of his life to propagating the works of Ramon Lull by compiling the *Electorium Magnum* and the *Breviculum*. In addition, Mahaut's chief councillor, Thierry de Hireçon was a companion of William of Nogaret.²²² These contacts were made after Dubois's

²²⁰Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 109; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade', pp. 58-9.

²²¹Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 104-5, 112; 'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 848-50.

²²²Hillgarth, pp. 169-70; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade', pp. 59-60.

career as a propagandist had ended, but there is evidence that theorists made contact with each other while they were actively involved in writing. Lull visited Cyprus in 1302, in the aftermath of the Mongol invasion of Syria. He beseeched the king, Henry II, to be allowed to preach on the island, and to move on 'ad soldanum, qui Saracenus est atque ad regem Aegypti et Syriae, ut eos sancta fide catholica informaret. Rex autem de his omnibus non curavit'. Afterwards he went to Famagusta where he was more warmly received by James of Molay, with whom he stayed while recovering from illness.²²³ There is also a possibility that Lull met Charles II of Anjou on a visit to Naples in 1294. He received permission from the royal authorities to evangelise the Moslem community at Lucera, and later, Moslem prisoners in the Castell dell'Oro.²²⁴ While the prospect of a meeting between the two, either in Rome or Naples, can only be speculation, it is interesting that Charles II proposed a warrior king be placed at the head of a united military order, an idea also found in Lull's letter to Nicholas IV.²²⁵

Sanudo had an impressive list of contacts, amongst whom numbered William Durant, although their contacts post-dated the bishop's proposal. In a letter to Durant written in 1326, he complained 'quod, licet vobis pluries scripserim...nullam huc usque, unde doleo, responsionem accepi'.²²⁶ Sanudo journeyed widely in the east while he completed the *Liber secretorum*, which he reported had been written while he travelled 'quandoque in Cyprum, quandoque in Armeniam, quandoque in Alexandriam, quandoque in Rodum'.²²⁷ Given his prowess at gaining access to

²²³Lull, 'Vita coetanea', pp. 295-6.

²²⁴M. D. Johnston, 'Ramon Llull and the compulsory evangelisation of Jews and Muslims', *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages. Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns S. J.*, ed. L. J. Simon (Leiden, 1995), p. 21.

²²⁵Charles II, p. 356; Lull, 'Epistola', p. 97. Charles's proposal was completed during the papal interregnum, which ended in July 1294. If it were influenced by Lull's ideas, the work had to be completed very shortly before Celestine's election.

²²⁶Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, p. 294.

²²⁷Sanudo, p. 3.

European rulers, it seems likely that he met Henry II. He reports the incident between the Hospitallers and Genoese caused when the former captured a Genoese ship, a story included in Henry II's proposal.²²⁸ He certainly had close relations with the master of the Hospitallers. In his *Istoria del Regno*, he reported that he knew Fulk of Villaret 'che fù poi Maestro dell'Ospedal, che sapeva meglio metter guerra, e discordia trà li Turchi infedeli, e lor Vicini, che tutti li uomini del Mondo, con cui io fui lungamente in Rodi'.²²⁹ In this work the Venetian alluded to discussions with several other men who were well-acquainted with the east, who were able to provide him with information useful both for his histories and also for his crusade plans, including Roger of Lauria, the renowned admiral; Eudes de Poilechevin, Charles II's bailie in the kingdom of Jerusalem; and Andrea Caffaro, a renowned Genoese pirate.²³⁰

The existence of an environment in which the crusade was widely discussed and where theorists had many opportunities to meet other authors and interested parties prevents any clear assessment of the influence of an individual proposal. The only theorist who can be shown to have definitely used an earlier proposal is Marino Sanudo, who used Hayton's *Flos historiarum* in the history of the Holy Land contained in book three of the *Liber secretorum*.²³¹ The initial redaction of this book relied solely on James of Vitry's *Historia orientalis*, but in the second redaction he expanded his sources to include William of Tyre, Vincent de Beauvais and Hayton.²³² This is evident in Sanudo's description of the Armenian mission to Mongke Khan, in which he reports the same seven demands to the khan from the

²²⁸Henry II, pp. 119-20; Sanudo, p. 31.

²²⁹Sanudo, 'Istoria del regno', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, p. 167.

²³⁰Sanudo, 'Istoria del regno', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, pp. 114, 133, 165.

²³¹If the author of the *Directorium* was not William Adam, then he definitely used the *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* for information about the Greeks and Serbs.

²³²Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 143-6.

ambassadors as Hayton, and also that Hulagu was sent to conquer the Holy Land.²³³ In the first two books, Sanudo made an alliance with the Mongols an integral part of his plan, even including the cost of sending an embassy to the khan in the total cost of the crusade, and referring to the alliance in the letter to the king of France which accompanied the treatise.²³⁴ However, these books were completed before he added the information from Hayton's treatise to the history, suggesting that there was no direct influence over the content of his plan. Sanudo's use of Hayton is exceptional in being clearly proven, although there is a possibility that he also used the *Memoria*.²³⁵ The similarity of ideas contained in the proposals usually prevents a clear conclusion on the source of any individual's theories. Such information could be obtained either directly from another proposal, many of which seem to have been available throughout the period, or through personal contacts with theorists or other interested parties.

Conclusion

Throughout the period from the fall of Acre to the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, the proposals written on the crusade were composed against a background of active preparations for an expedition, and indeed, formed part of those preparations. Although all were concerned with the crusade, they were disparate in intent and style, and do not form a coherent genre. Some included histories in their works, although these were mostly discrete sections which were not essential to the crusade plan. The great majority of the treatises written before the death of Clement V were at papal request, to assist the pope in his planning of a crusade. When precedents for papal appeals for advice are traced back into the thirteenth century it is clear that these were issued when the pope took the initiative

²³³Sanudo, pp. 235-8. Compare Hayton, pp. 164-7.

²³⁴Sanudo, pp. 2, 7, 36-7, 92, 95.

²³⁵See chapter five.

in organising a crusade, from the time of Innocent III to the council of Vienne in 1311-2. These proposals were characterised by their concise style and concentration on the issues upon which the pope requested advice. Hence, Charles II discussed the recovery and maintenance of the Holy Land and the amalgamation of the military orders, just as Nicholas IV had requested in the two bulls he issued on hearing of the fall of Acre. A similar terse style is evident in the proposals of the masters of the two military orders and the works submitted at Vienne, including that of Nogaret. His proposal, and that of Henry II, were as much policy documents for their respective kingdoms as crusade plans.

After the death of Clement V, impetus for the crusade passed to the French court, where advice was requested, but often given verbally at councils held on the crusade. All of the surviving proposals were unsolicited and many were written by authors from religious backgrounds hoping to persuade the French king to direct his crusade against the Greeks. While they resemble the earlier proposals in their pragmatic approach to the crusade, these were longer works and more literary in their style and language. Although all were written when there seemed to be a realistic prospect of a crusade, they contain an element of exhortation absent from the earlier works, and were written because of the authors' interest in the crusade, rather than involvement in crusade planning. The two genuine propagandists of the period, Sanudo and Lull, promoted the crusade regardless of circumstances. After he became convinced of the necessity of a crusade, Lull adopted the style of a crusade proposal for his longer works on the subject, combining religious and military advice. However, he also sent shorter petitions to the curia to promote his ideas. The centrepiece of Sanudo's activity was his lengthy proposal, but he relied on correspondence and personal contacts to exhort the crusade rather than the content of his plan. The works of Pierre Dubois and Galvano of Levanto use the crusade as a pretext to discuss other subjects and the latter in particular has few similarities with the other proposals. Dubois's main work took the form of a crusade

proposal, but the ideas it contained had many similarities with his other pamphlets, and in its promotion of the French crown, had the same intent.

II. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRUSADE

The advice given by the crusade theorists covered all aspects of crusading but most authors concentrated on the strategy to be used in the eastern Mediterranean. A number of authors also touched on the organisation and preparation of crusades, but, unlike the treatises written for the council of Lyons, the proposals written after the fall of Acre were not generally concerned with the European dimension of the crusade. This is unsurprising given the background of the authors, several of whom were based in the east and centred their advice on the military issues with which they were most familiar. The proposals were written during a period of continued interest in the crusade during which several attempts were made to organise an expedition. However, with the sole exception of the Hospitaller *passagium* of 1309-10, none of the planned crusades to the Holy Land materialised, suggesting that the obstacles to a recovery expedition lay in Europe. Chief among these were the conflicts and territorial ambitions of European rulers, which were given higher priority than the recovery of the Holy Land and hence diverted energy and resources away from a potential crusade. In addition, the cost of warfare was increasing, placing great strain on existing methods of raising and collecting funds, and there was growing awareness of this increase among potential crusaders. Most of the theorists gave some attention to the need to pacify Europe prior to the crusade, but only a few authors considered problems of recruitment and finance, suggesting that they did not consider these to be impediments to a crusade. Those writers who examined these issues in most detail were commonly based in the west, and it is notable that the proposals of Henry II, James of Molay and the Hospitallers made no reference to these matters. The writers' recommendations drew on their often limited knowledge of previous crusading practice, and their

treatment of crusade preparation and finance lacked the understanding and depth evident in discussions of strategic issues.

Peace

The most common piece of advice given on crusade organisation was that peace be established in Europe to enable an expedition to be sent to the Holy Land. The existence of conflict in Europe was blamed by many commentators for the west's failure to assist the crusader states in the years leading to the fall of Acre, and was also viewed as a major impediment to a recovery crusade. Few writers based in the east discussed the issue, the exceptions being Fidenzio of Padua and the anonymous author of the *Directorium*, both of whom were friars. Fidenzio was particularly critical of western rulers, complaining that 'reges Xpistiani ad invicem bellant, invicem se destruunt et consumant', and he regarded their wars as contributing heavily to the downfall of the crusader states.¹ His forceful views on this subject were probably caused by spending time in the east during a period when the crusader states came under sustained Moslem pressure yet received little western assistance, largely due to the wars over Sicily. With crusading funds and privileges being granted for these conflicts, Fidenzio's criticism is understandable and was shared by other inhabitants of the Holy Land. Ricaut Bonomel, a Templar living in the crusader states, complained about the grant of indulgences for the Angevin wars.² Similar condemnation of European warfare was expressed in the west. The anonymous western author of the *De excidio urbis Acconis* blamed the fall of Acre on the ruling classes of Europe, while several chroniclers reproached the papacy and rulers of Europe for being preoccupied with affairs other than the Holy Land.³

¹Fidenzio, p. 16.

²V. de Bartholomaeis, *Poesie Provenzali Storiche relative all'Italia*, vol. 2, *Fonti per la storia d'Italia, scrittori secoli XII-XIII*, 72 (Rome, 1931), p. 224; also printed by A. de Bastard, 'La colère et la douleur d'un templier en Terre Sainte (1265): «Ir'e dolors s'es dins mon cor asseza»', *Revue des Langues Romanes* 81 (1974), pp. 356-7; Throop, pp. 62-3.

³Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 116, 132.

This view is implicit in some church council reports of 1291-2 and a number of proposals, which argued that peace in Europe was needed to ensure the success of a new crusade.⁴ Their discussion of this subject was mostly superficial, and some gave little more than a plea for peace to be established with only minimal advice on how this might be achieved.⁵ Others noted specific conflicts which had to be resolved before a crusade could be attempted, concentrating on Sicily and Italy, where warfare often drew in other European powers, including the papacy. According to one chronicler, French church councils recommended that the Sicilian war be ended before the crusade was preached.⁶ The protracted struggle over the fate of Sicily prevented a crusade to the Holy Land in the 1280s, and the peace of Caltabellotta did not provide a permanent solution. The bishop of Leon noted continued conflict over Sicily in the 1320s, reporting that it was vital to make peace between France, Aragon, Castile and Frederick of Sicily, and proposing that this should be achieved through marriage alliances.⁷ Sanudo referred to the Sicilian war in his correspondence, arguing in one letter 'quod Acon et residuum Terrae Sancte propter hoc amissum est'.⁸ The chaotic state of the Holy Roman Empire was viewed as another impediment to a crusade. Pierre Dubois reported that constant warfare over succession in the empire had deprived crusades of many troops and he suggested that this could be ended by handing the throne to the king of France.⁹ His interest in the empire was mainly due to his desire to see French hegemony in

⁴Digard, *Philippe le Bel*, vol. 2, pp. 281-2; *Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, pp. 1105, 1110-11; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 211-15; 'Directorium', pp. 402-3; Durant, pp. 104-5; Galvano, p. 366 (the chapter on peace is lost, but the title survives); Charles II, p. 361; Nogaret, p. 200.

⁵*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1110.

⁶William of Nangis, 'Chronicon', *RHGF* 20, p. 574; see also John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', pp. 580-1, who reported that it was particularly important to make peace with the Sicilians, Aragonese and Greeks.

⁷BN lat. 7470, f. 129v.

⁸Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, p. 305.

⁹Dubois, pp. 80-1, 172-3; 'Pro facto Terre Sancte', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 186-9.

Europe and illustrates his readiness to use the crusade as a pretext for the advancement of the Capetians.

A number of theorists viewed northern Italy as a particularly bellicose area. In the *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, Dubois singled out the Italian trading powers for criticism, arguing that their 'incessant quarrels and maritime wars' had 'frequently hindered the recovery and maintenance of the Holy Land'.¹⁰ Many others lamented the Italian trading cities' lack of commitment to the crusade in this period, although criticism was usually directed at their refusal to curtail trading links with the Moslems. Their internecine struggles, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, contributed to the destabilisation and disunity of the crusader states, and they had particular impact on planned crusades because Italian shipping was essential for transport to the east. Hence, the author of the *Directorium* argued that it was necessary to end the war between the Catalans and the Genoese, which began in 1331, since both were needed to give maritime assistance to the crusade.¹¹ Marino Sanudo made frequent reference in his letters to the conflicts raging in northern Italy, viewing them as a major obstacle to the organisation of a crusade. He was particularly concerned with the war occasioned by Louis of Bavaria's attempts to secure imperial coronation, but also referred to a number of smaller conflicts between cities, comparing them to the divisions of ancient Rome between the followers of Sulla and Marius.¹² He emphasised the involvement of the papacy in these conflicts, criticising Nicholas III for acquiring lordships in Italy, and he drew attention to the heavy expenditure incurred, arguing that this money would be better spent on the crusade.¹³

¹⁰Dubois, p. 78.

¹¹'Directorium', pp. 402-3.

¹²Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp. 756-69. See also letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 290-3.

¹³Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 305, 308-9, 311.

After condemning the divisions of Europe, Sanudo concluded that its rulers needed to follow the example of Christ's humility.¹⁴ This letter was written to a cardinal, and it is notable that many of his appeals for peace survive in letters to prelates or to the pope, although one appeal was included in a 'template' letter addressed to unnamed prelates and princes.¹⁵ It appears that Sanudo regarded the pacification of Europe as a task for the papacy, the only institution with the theoretical authority to impose peace throughout Christendom. This opinion was shared by other theorists: Nogaret believed that a common peace should be announced and that anyone who disturbed it should be cursed by the church.¹⁶ This was no advance on thirteenth-century papal practice, when a call for peace, often for a fixed number of years, was invariably included in crusade bulls. *Ad liberandam* (1215) and *Afflicti cordi* (1245) both demanded four years of peace, while in the *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei* (1274), Gregory X required that peace last for six years.¹⁷ Such calls had proved ineffective in the past and clearly needed to be reinforced by action. Charles II recognised this and recommended that the pope ordain a general council to which all secular princes would be summoned, where peace would be made between princes, barons and communes "par raison et par le profit de la terre sainte", although he did not specify how.¹⁸ There was a precedent for this idea at the fourth Lateran council, whose stated aims included 'sopiendas discordas, et stabiliendam pacem'.¹⁹

William Durant argued that responsibility for making peace should be shared between the king of France and the papacy, and also suggested that those who might

¹⁴Kunstmann, 'Studien', p. 785.

¹⁵Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 289-91, 305-7.

¹⁶Nogaret, p. 200.

¹⁷Purcell, *Papal crusading policy*, pp. 194, 198.

¹⁸Charles II, p. 361.

¹⁹Migne, *PL* 216, col. 824.

pose a threat to the French should leave for the east before them.²⁰ Other theorists, many of whom were writing for the pope, did not view the pacification of Europe as a task for a secular leader. Durant's ideas reflect his position as a bishop who maintained close relations with both pope and French king, but were also a more pragmatic assessment of the manner in which peace might be achieved. Sweeping papal decrees would be ineffective if there was no desire for peace among European rulers, and earlier crusaders, such as Richard I and Louis IX, had always been careful to ensure the security of their kingdom themselves.²¹ Philip VI's report to the pope, which detailed the steps he had taken to prepare for an expedition in the 1330s, illustrates that the leader of the crusade still had to take responsibility for ensuring that his kingdom was at peace while he was away. Philip placed great emphasis on his attempts to make peace with his neighbours, stating that 'il s'est travaillé en toutes les manières qu'il peu de mettre paix entre les crestiens'. His own relations with England were naturally his prime concern, but he also worked to resolve conflicts in which he had no direct involvement, such as those between Robert of Naples and Frederick of Sicily, and between Genoa and the kings of Aragon and Majorca, indicating that he viewed the pacification of Europe as his task as crusade leader.²²

Alone among the theorists, Pierre Dubois made some novel suggestions about how a general peace might be established in Europe, both among individual knights and between states. He proposed that all nobles swear to preserve the peace, and that those who committed an act of aggression would incur the loss of their lands and be exiled to the Holy Land, where they would be placed in the vanguard of

²⁰Durant, p. 104.

²¹Painter, 'The Third Crusade', pp. 48-9; Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, pp. 14-34.

²²E. Boutaric, 'Ce sont les diligences que li Roys a faites pour le Saint Voyage', *Revue des Sociétés Savantes des Départements* 4th ser. 5 (1867), pp. 435-6. This document is wrongly dated to 1329 by the editor. Tyerman gives March 1336 ('Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', p. 46). The *Directorium* also recommended that the conflict between Robert and Frederick be ended (pp. 403-4).

the Christian army. There was a clear precedent for his ideas in the eleventh century Peace of God movement, which sought to bring peace to the nobility through oaths.²³ However, Dubois preferred to have his peace enforced by military means, since he recognised that 'temporal punishment, although incomparably milder than eternal punishment, will be feared more'.²⁴ In the case of nobles, the king would 'take steps' to prevent anyone from bringing provisions or arms into the lands of a warmaker, who would be starved out by having his crops taken or destroyed. Those who provided assistance in the blockade would receive a plenary indulgence. With typical optimism, Dubois expected that once this machinery was in place, no one would dare commit an act of aggression for fear of this punishment as their families would try to dissuade them.²⁵ However, he did not address the difficulties of enforcing such a blockade in the heart of France if nobles proved disinclined to peace or if the king did not support the idea. For kingdoms or cities which answered to no overlord, Dubois recommended that an international panel of judges be assembled to hear any dispute, with the papacy having the final decision if there was any dissent over the ruling.²⁶ There had been previous instances of international arbitration, for example when Boniface VIII mediated between Edward I and Philip IV in 1299, and both Edward I and Louis IX had also acted as arbitrators in disputes.²⁷ However, arbitration was usually voluntary and Dubois gave no indication as to how warring parties, particularly in an international dispute, could be forced to accept mediation. Nonetheless, his proposal of a permanent body to enforce the resolution of disputes was an original idea, and, despite its flaws, was

²³Dubois, pp. 74-5; Brandt, introduction to Dubois, p. 53, n. 14; H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'The Peace and Truce of God in the eleventh century', *Past and Present* 46 (1970), pp. 42-67.

²⁴Dubois, p. 75.

²⁵Dubois, pp. 75-8.

²⁶Dubois, pp. 78-80.

²⁷Brandt, introduction to Dubois, pp. 53-4; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 231; Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, pp. 27-9.

the only serious attempt by a theorist to suggest a method by which peace could be brought to Europe.

Alone among the theorists, Hayton argued that the time was ideal to launch a crusade since 'omnes reges et principes christiani et communia sunt inter se invicem in statu pacifico et quieto, nec aliqua procella odii vel scandali perturbantur'.²⁸ While his description of Europe in 1307 was very charitable, the situation at this time seemed slightly more favourable than at the turn of the century. The war over Sicily had been temporarily halted in 1302 by the peace of Caltabellotta and French military activity in Flanders had ceased after conventions agreed in 1305. However, Edward I was preparing another invasion of Scotland, in the same year that the *Flos historiarum terre orientis* was completed, although he died before he could leave. Hayton had only recently arrived in the west from Cyprus, and was perhaps not fully aware of conditions there. Any peace was only illusory since a year later the Holy Roman Emperor was assassinated and rebellion erupted in Ferrara. Four years after Hayton completed his proposal, William le Maire argued that the time had not yet come for a crusade, partly because of 'dissensiones, emulationes et scismata'.²⁹ It is possible that Hayton's favourable view of Europe was an attempt to hasten the despatch of an expedition that could bring aid to Armenia.

The relationship between peace and crusade suggested in the *Memoria* ran counter to ideas current in the fourteenth century. While most authors viewed the lack of peace as an obstacle to the crusade, the *Memoria* regarded the crusade as a solution to the lack of peace. The author claimed that if the pope ordered a subsidy for the crusade, people would be greatly moved and cease all discord, although reaction to the tenths granted in 1274 and 1291 suggests that this was unlikely.³⁰ The *Memoria's* views were echoed by Sanudo, who argued in a letter of 1324 that if

²⁸Hayton, p. 350.

²⁹William le Maire, p. 474.

³⁰'Memoria', p. 440.

the pope organised a crusade, 'per quorum negotiorum inchoationem cessarent lites et iurgia, spulationes et homicidia'.³¹ This recalls Otto of Freising's comment on the proclamation of the second crusade: 'suddenly almost the entire West became so still that not only the waging of war but even the carrying of arms in public was considered wrong'.³² In the early years of the movement, a crusade was seen as a potential solution to endemic violence: the aggression inherent in European society was to be turned outwards against the Moslems. All the reports of Urban's sermon mention that knights should cease waging 'privatum certamen contra fideles', and instead become 'militia Christi'.³³ Although Urban attempted to make peace before the crusade by affirming the Truce of God, this was not seen as a prerequisite of the crusade.³⁴ Such ideas were no longer tenable in the fourteenth century when it was clear that calling a new crusade would not motivate the warring factions of Europe to make peace.

In the mid-fourteenth century, the crusade was again seen as a means of bringing peace to Europe, in this instance by removing bands of troublesome mercenaries from France and Italy. Froissart reported that John II of France took the cross in 1363 both to fulfil his father's vow, and 'pour traire hors dou royaume de France toutes manières de gens d'armes, nommés Compagnes, qui pilloient et destruissoient sans nul title de raison son royaume'.³⁵ In May 1363, Urban V wrote to routiers and their captains appealing to them to turn their attentions towards the infidel. One captain, Arnaud of Cervole planned to take his band through the empire to fight the Turks, but passage was refused, and most preferred to take opportunities

³¹Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, p. 290.

³²Otto of Freising, *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, trans. C. C. Mierow (New York, 1953), p. 78.

³³Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', *RHC Occ.* 3, p. 324; Robert of Rheims, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', *RHC Occ.* 3, p. 728; Guibert of Nogent, 'Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos', *RHC Occ.* 4, p. 138; Baldric of Dol, 'Historia Jerosolimitana', *RHC Occ.* 4, pp. 14-15.

³⁴Cowdrey, 'The Peace and Truce of God', p. 57; *Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 12, col. 830.

³⁵Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1869-1966), vol. 6, p. 83.

to fight in Spain.³⁶ Interest in directing the mercenaries against the infidel could only be maintained while there was no business for them in Europe, and the reopening of hostilities in France ended hopes of ridding the country of the companies. These plans differed from the proposal in the *Memoria* since the crusade was seen as a means of removing specific groups of soldiers, rather than pacifying the whole of Europe, and these attempts were made only during a period of truce in the Hundred Years War.

The *Memoria's* view that a crusade could pacify Europe in this period was unusual, and the majority of theorists believed that there could be no crusade unless peace was established first. However, their treatment of the problem was superficial. While they identified the obstacle presented by warfare in the west, they could offer no solution to the unwillingness of Europe's rulers to give the Holy Land precedence over their own concerns. Conflict had existed in the west throughout the crusading period, but was not necessarily an insuperable impediment to the organisation of a crusade. In the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, some rulers had been prepared to sacrifice royal interests for the sake of the Holy Land: at the time of the third crusade, Richard I and Philip II briefly reconciled their differences to allow both to go to the siege of Acre. By the thirteenth century, it was highly unusual for a ruling monarch to place the crusade ahead of royal interests. Louis IX was the only western ruler to leave his kingdom on crusade for a significant length of time in this period, a tribute to his confidence in his own position and the security of his realm. It is notable that his decision to leave on a second crusade was not welcomed by his subjects.³⁷ He was clearly an exceptional case, since no other

³⁶N. Housley, 'The mercenary companies, the papacy and the crusades, 1356-1378', *Traditio* 38 (1982), pp. 270-7.

³⁷Joinville, *La Vie de Saint Louis*, ed. N. L. Corbett (Sherbrooke, 1977), p. 236; 'Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean du Vignay', *RHGF* 23, p. 39: the barons were 'tous desprouveus'.

ruling monarch was prepared to give the crusade priority above domestic responsibilities, despite Louis's own efforts to persuade others to join his crusade.³⁸

After the council of Lyons, the attitude of western monarchs was a major impediment to the organisation of a crusade, in particular those upon whom great expectations rested, such as Edward I. A crusader before he attained the throne, he was regarded afterwards as 'le prince de crestienté qui plus avés à cuer le fait de la Terre Seinte et qui plus avés démontré par euvre'.³⁹ He received several appeals from both the papacy and the inhabitants of the crusader states, and clearly had a genuine interest in the Holy Land. However, he never placed this ahead of his claims in Wales, Scotland and France, a stance supported by contemporary writers.⁴⁰ Philip IV, who also attracted crusading aspirations, similarly failed to go on crusade. The impact of such changing attitudes was reinforced by the ability of a monarch to prevent his subjects leaving on crusade, illustrated by Philip's refusal to allow Charles of Valois to leave for Byzantium, or to take the money he had been allocated.⁴¹ In dealing with the problem of peace, the theorists centred their few attempts to find a solution on the papacy, not realising that the true impediment lay with secular rulers. The failed attempts of Gregory X and Nicholas IV to launch a crusade demonstrated that, regardless of papal efforts, nothing could be achieved if there was no political will among the rulers of Europe.

Recruitment

Theorists viewed likely participation in the crusade with optimism. Dubois believed that if peace were established, 'warriors will stream from every direction toward the Holy Land', indicating that he believed there would be no difficulty in

³⁸Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, pp. 27-34.

³⁹Kohler and Langlois, 'Lettres inédits', pp. 59-60.

⁴⁰S. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade 1216-1307* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 232-9; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 230-40.

⁴¹Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, p. 234.

recruiting men to fight in the east.⁴² Other contemporary observers did not share this confidence. Humbert of Romans listed reasons why many were reluctant to go on crusade and gave a detailed refutation of arguments used by those who opposed crusading.⁴³ Throop made much use of this work, together with criticism of the crusade by troubadours, to contend that Europe was 'profoundly discouraged, sceptical, and disgusted' with the crusade, and that there was 'indifference and hostility' among the knightly classes.⁴⁴ Throop overstated his case, by claiming outright opposition to the crusade, but Humbert's proposal that telling reasons be set down in suitable and brief form to be used to convince men at the proper time suggests that he expected preachers to face apathy or reluctance to take the cross.⁴⁵ A later manual of preaching by John Bromyard also stressed the likely difficulties of stirring interest in a new crusade. Bromyard listed reasons offered by those who would not go, such as fear of imprisonment, expenses and fighting, in each case giving arguments for preachers to use against them.⁴⁶ The grant of indulgences for attending sermons also suggests that there was difficulty in raising interest in the crusade in this period.⁴⁷

However, there are indications that interest in the crusade and the Holy Land remained strong. Much of the criticism detailed by Throop had existed throughout the crusading period, and was not as fundamental as he claimed.⁴⁸ The Holy Land featured in bequests and propaganda, and popular reaction to the Hospitaller crusade

⁴²Dubois, p. 78.

⁴³Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 191-8; Throop, pp. 147-83 (includes analysis of Humbert's *De Praedicatione Crucis*).

⁴⁴Throop, pp. 183, 206-13, 284; followed by Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 109.

⁴⁵Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 205-6.

⁴⁶J. Bromyard, *Summa Praedicatorum omni eruditione refertissima explicans praecipuos catholicae disciplinae sensus et locus*, vol. 1 (Venice, 1586), ff. 164-165.

⁴⁷Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 62-3.

⁴⁸Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, esp. pp. 190-220.

of 1309 suggests a broad appeal.⁴⁹ Interest was strong among members of the knightly classes, as illustrated by the involvement of many nobles in crusading projects aimed at the recovery of the Holy Land and other goals, and the important role played by the crusade in the chivalric ethos.⁵⁰ A few theorists clearly anticipated widespread support for a new crusade. William Adam claimed that 'desiderat enim passagium omnis hominum condicio, gradus, sexus et etas', while Dubois expected that, once preparations were set in motion, men would be keen to fight.⁵¹ It is doubtful whether they were well-informed about attitudes to the crusade in Europe, and Adam's statement was intended to induce the pope to begin organising a crusade. Despite interest in the Holy Land, warfare in Europe provided more profitable outlets for military zeal, while there were other theatres of crusading which offered similar spiritual benefits, and it is questionable whether an arduous passage to the Holy Land could easily draw men away from these. Although some theorists planned limited crusades which would obviate the need for widespread recruitment, others, such as Fidenzio of Padua and James of Molay, conceived the crusade as an enormous enterprise, involving thousands of troops. They gave no advice on how such numbers could be recruited, which is typical of the theorists' general failure to address this issue.

Few authors considered the recruitment of crusaders, and, with the exception of Dubois, they covered the issue in only a few sentences, in marked contrast to the lengthy discussions of strategy typical of the treatises. Ideas on recruitment tended to very simplistic and 'traditional', based on preaching the cross and offering indulgences. By the thirteenth century, these methods were directed at raising money rather than men, suggesting that most theorists had little notion of the

⁴⁹C. J. Tyerman, 'The Holy Land and the crusades of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 105-12; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 233-8, 264-8; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 394-403.

⁵⁰M. Keen, 'Chaucer's Knight, the English aristocracy and the crusade', in *English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. V. J. Scattergood and J. W. Sherborne (London, 1983), pp. 45-62.

⁵¹William Adam, pp. 533, 535-6; Dubois, p. 78.

increasingly 'professional' manner of recruitment for crusades, exemplified by the army taken to the east by Prince Edward, which was largely raised through contracts.⁵² Several authors were based in the east, and hence had neither experience nor interest in the manner in which crusades were organised in Europe. The three friars were all missionaries, and were accustomed to preaching the faith to the infidel rather than the cross to the faithful. The theorists' adherence to older methods of recruitment is striking since these were not appropriate to the type of crusade they were advocating. Both Charles II and Fulk of Villaret proposed predominantly naval expeditions with limited numbers of men, implying a professional force, yet both suggested that the pope should raise men through preaching.⁵³

Fulk of Villaret favoured the use of preachers because he considered it important to follow the example of the first crusade to have similar success. Fulk recalled that Urban had preached to the people and offered indulgences in person, and he argued that the current pontiff should follow this example and preach the crusade personally.⁵⁴ Urban launched the crusade at Clermont and remained in France for a further eight months, presumably to preach. However, he also delegated responsibility, ordering the bishops present at Clermont to preach the cross.⁵⁵ Charles of Anjou recognised that responsibility for preaching would be spread, arguing that preachers be used to exhort people to go on crusade, a suggestion also found in the works of Dubois and William le Maire.⁵⁶ It is possible that the theorists had in mind the inspirational figures who had preached crusades in the twelfth century, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Fulk of Neuilly and Oliver of

⁵²Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, pp. 113-24.

⁵³Charles II, p. 357; Villaret, pp. 604-5.

⁵⁴Villaret, pp. 604-5.

⁵⁵Baldric of Dol, 'Historia Jerosolimitana', p. 15.

⁵⁶Charles II, p. 357; Dubois, p. 159; William le Maire, p. 474.

Paderborn. However, when the proposals were written, the organisation of crusade preaching was in the hands of the mendicant orders, and its aim was less to recruit men than to raise money.⁵⁷ Recruitment for the crusades of the later thirteenth century was undertaken by their leaders, Louis IX and Edward of England, and they were organised in a manner which cannot be differentiated from service in a royal campaign in Europe.⁵⁸

Fulk of Villaret was keen for the pope to appeal to the 'plebem Christi', which implies a desire to encourage popular participation on the crusade, again drawing on the example of the first crusade.⁵⁹ This suggests that his opinion of that expedition was coloured by the traditions built around Peter the Hermit, viewed by many medieval chroniclers as the instigator and leader of the crusade. In fact, the popular crusade launched by Peter's preaching contained many knights of some status, and was not a model for success, being annihilated in Asia Minor after suffering heavy losses during its troubled crossing of Europe.⁶⁰ The presence of a popular element on the crusade was seldom welcome, and Villaret's ideas ran counter to all previous crusading practice and the opinions of other writers. Attempts to limit participation to those deemed suitable probably dated to the sermon at Clermont, when Urban is reported to have tried to dissuade those who were 'senes aut imbecilles et usui armorum minime idonei' from joining.⁶¹ In a subsequent letter to the community at Vallombrosa, he emphasised that his appeal had been made to knights and he expressly forbade clerics to go without

⁵⁷C. T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant friars and the cross in the thirteenth century* (Cambridge, 1994).

⁵⁸Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, pp. 113-32; Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 128-31; Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, pp. 65-9.

⁵⁹Villaret, p. 604.

⁶⁰Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', *RHC Occ.* 4, pp. 272-89; J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 51-2.

⁶¹Robert the Monk, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', p. 729.

permission.⁶² The difficulty and expense of crossing to the east by sea ensured that from the time of the third crusade, few genuinely poor could go. Consequently, this was no longer viewed as a potential problem, and only one theorist, Fidenzio of Padua, commented on the troubles caused by ill-equipped crusaders. In the history prefacing his proposal, he complained of those who came to the Holy Land empty-handed, with no weapons.⁶³ The Venetians, advising Philip VI on the crusade in 1332, warned of the likelihood that an expedition might be joined by 'multis aliis uilibus et imbellibus personis', claiming that these were not 'alicuius utilitatis, sed potius impedimenti et confusionis'.⁶⁴ Their concerns were caused by the occasional outbursts of popular pro-crusade fervour in the period, notably the 'crusade of the poor' of 1309, linked with the Hospitaller crusade, and the *Pastoureaux* of 1320, both of which faced strong opposition from the papacy and nobility.⁶⁵

Dubois suggested that the pope should appeal to all prelates and lay princes to provide troops. These were to remain in national groups to maintain morale, and would be given a rousing send-off, marching through the streets and playing trumpets to induce others to follow.⁶⁶ He believed that these volunteers would be supplemented by forcing people to go on crusade as a punishment. Those who broke the oath to keep the peace would be sent to the Holy Land where they would settle frontier areas, and fight in the vanguard of the army, as befitted their bellicosity.⁶⁷ There were some precedents for his ideas. On one occasion, exile to the Holy Land was included in the provisions of the Peace of God movement in the

⁶²W. Wiederhold, 'Papsturkunden in Florenz', *Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse*, 1901, p. 313.

⁶³Fidenzio, p. 13.

⁶⁴*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 110.

⁶⁵Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 144-6; N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary millenarians and mystical anarchists of the middle ages*, 3rd edn. (London, 1970), pp. 102-4; M. Barber, 'The Pastoureaux of 1320', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32 (1981), pp. 143-66.

⁶⁶Dubois, pp. 83-4, 159.

⁶⁷Dubois, pp. 75, 85.

eleventh century, but this was probably for penitential reasons rather than to perform military service.⁶⁸ In the thirteenth century there were instances when men were sentenced to serve in the Holy Land as a penance imposed by both secular and ecclesiastical authorities. In 1310, Philip IV remitted the punishment of men convicted of murder on condition that they took the cross.⁶⁹ A list of crimes for which the cross could be imposed as penance was created in 1250, and the list extended in 1263 and again in 1274.⁷⁰ However, in the great majority of these cases, the sentence was commuted to a payment, just as voluntary crusading vows were redeemed. Dubois was the only theorist to favour forcing criminals to go on crusade. The notion ran counter both to the voluntary nature of the vow required for an indulgence, and also ignored the concerns of other commentators about the behaviour of crusaders and settlers. The presence of criminals in the Holy Land had been criticised by both James of Vitry and Burchard of Mount Sion, the latter complaining that children of criminals continued the family tradition of crime.⁷¹

While most theorists who discussed recruitment preferred volunteer crusaders, a few argued that the expedition should use professional soldiers to complement them, such as knights of the military orders. While the advantages provided by a military order were also discussed in the context of the maintenance of the Holy Land, they were relevant for the crusade itself. Theorists were particularly drawn to the element of constancy that they believed a military order could bring both in manpower and discipline.⁷² Charles II and Ramon Lull both assumed that a united military order could swiftly replace those who died, but

⁶⁸Brandt, introduction to Dubois, p. 53, n. 14.

⁶⁹Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, pp. 94-5; Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 155-6; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 114-18.

⁷⁰Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, pp. 21-2.

⁷¹*La traduction de l'Historia Orientalis de Jacques de Vitry*, ed. C. Buridant (Paris, 1986), pp. 131-2; Burchard of Mount Sion, *Description of the Holy Land* (PPTS 30: London, 1896), pp. 102-3.

⁷²See chapter six.

neither had any conception of the likely problems of recruiting new members, or training them sufficiently to reap the benefits of their discipline.⁷³ An alternative would be to supplement *crucesignati* with paid mercenaries, who could provide similar benefits in discipline and period of service to military orders. There was support for this idea from theorists of differing backgrounds. Fulk of Villaret believed these should be used to remedy any deficiency in numbers (perhaps implying that he thought it might not be possible to raise sufficient men). The captain was to assess the size of his force and recruit 'stipendiarii, balistarii, equites, pedites et alie gentes armorum' according to need.⁷⁴ Similarly, Charles II wrote that money should be raised for the crusade and 'de cest avoir lon porchassent vigoros chevaliers et gens darmes bons et sufficiens'.⁷⁵ The bishop of Leon argued that a preliminary expedition to the Holy Land should be undertaken by mercenaries, who were to gain a foothold in the mountains of Syria until the full crusade arrived.⁷⁶

The greatest reliance on professionals was proposed by Marino Sanudo, who insisted on using Venetians and north Europeans who were accustomed to maritime warfare. There was to be no participation of volunteer crusaders until after an initial passage of mercenaries had established control of the Egyptian shore, because '*soldati melius mandatis Capitanei attendant et obedient quam Crucesignati*'.⁷⁷ Such a complete reliance on professional soldiers was rare, but had been suggested by Gilbert of Tournai, who recommended that the defence of the Holy Land be entrusted to a permanent force of mercenaries.⁷⁸ Although both the papacy and western monarchs supported small standing forces in the east during the later

⁷³Charles II, p. 358; Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 270-2.

⁷⁴Villaret, pp. 604, 607.

⁷⁵Charles II, pp. 357-9.

⁷⁶BN lat. 7470, f. 127v.

⁷⁷Sanudo, pp. 48-9, 74-5.

⁷⁸Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', p. 40.

thirteenth century, clear references to the use of mercenaries on crusade were rare. Oliver of Paderborn notes the presence of 'Gallic and Germanic mercenaries' serving under Pelagius at Damietta during the fifth crusade, but it is usually impossible to make an absolute distinction between mercenaries and crusaders, as many of the latter received some payment.⁷⁹ However, it is notable that those theorists who proposed the use of paid troops made a clear distinction between these and *crucesignati*, and all envisaged that the latter would play a role in a future crusade, illustrating that they continued to view the recovery of the Holy Land as more than just a military objective. Sanudo, who envisaged this role to be small, was the only theorist to suggest methods of recruitment appropriate to the crusade he planned. Other authors to discuss the subject favoured using older methods of raising troops, with which they were more familiar, regardless of their suitability for the multi-stage crusades they favoured.

Leadership and organisation

The theorists gave scant attention to the issue of the leadership of the crusade, particularly of the crusading army itself. This was generally discussed in the context of the role to be played by a unified military order on the expedition, or of the future kingdom of Jerusalem, since it was expected that the leader of the crusade should become the ruler of the newly-conquered kingdom. Only Fidenzio of Padua and the anonymous Hospitaller treatise give advice about who should lead the army without touching on these other concerns. More authors reveal their views on the wider dimension of overall control and direction of the crusade. Their ideas were seldom revealed explicitly, but can be inferred from discussions of the preliminary measures needed before an expedition. As is evident from their treatment of the establishment of peace and the organisation of recruitment, most writers who dealt with these issues generally expected the papacy to take a leading

⁷⁹Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 63-4.

role in the organisation of the crusade in Europe. However, a number also expected the pope to retain control of military aspects of the expedition, either by sending a legate to accompany the army, or by taking responsibility for the organisation of preliminary forces.

A few theorists believed that the impetus for a new crusade should come from the papacy, which should also have overall direction of the crusade. The author of the *Memoria*, a western cleric with a deeply pious view of the crusade, stated that an expedition would be unsuccessful 'nisi illud Ecclesia sancta ex principali moveat'.⁸⁰ William Adam implied that the pope was to blame for the failure of the west to send an expedition to the east, stating that it was not the fault of the body if the head did not instruct it to act, and he urged the pope to take the lead in calling a crusade. Similarly, both Charles II and the Hospitallers argued that the pope should launch a new expedition to the east at a general council.⁸¹ It is possible that the former implied criticism of Nicholas IV's failure to do this. These authors had very traditional views of papal power to launch a crusade, which was undermined in this period by the pope's dependency on the co-operation of European monarchs, particularly the king of France. This was underlined by the failure of Gregory X and Nicholas IV to successfully launch a crusade despite their efforts. While it remained true that the pope alone could announce a crusade, some were organised at the instigation of secular rulers, particularly in the Baltic and Spain, but also to the Holy Land, as was the case with Louis IX.⁸² Molay's argument that the pope should organise the passage by treating with the powerful rulers of Europe was

⁸⁰'Memoria', p. 438. The author's attitude to the crusade is further demonstrated by his insistence on crusaders having pure intentions, and using their own finances (see chapter five).

⁸¹William Adam, pp. 535-6; Charles II, p. 361; Hospitallers, p. 224.

⁸²Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 92-3. The crusade of Richard of Cornwall is another example of an expedition to the east undertaken at the initiative of the crusader rather than the pope.

a more accurate view of papal activities in the period, since the papacy no longer had the authority to dictate the organisation of a new crusade.⁸³

A few theorists referred to the crusading privileges that only the pope could grant, but they were clearly of little significance to most authors. Fulk of Villaret and William Adam mentioned the grant of indulgences, but aside from these two references, theorists showed no interest in the instruments of the crusade.⁸⁴ The indulgence had been a defining feature of the crusade from its outset, when Urban II granted remission of enjoined penance at Clermont. It developed into an important instrument of papal policy, but as the practice of vow redemption and the grant of partial indulgences became more widespread, the indulgence became more important in financing than recruiting.⁸⁵ Another distinguishing feature of the crusade was the temporal privileges offered to *crucesignati*, but these too were given scant attention by the theorists. Only Durant made an oblique reference to these when he argued that it was important for rulers to ensure that the goods of crusaders were not taken, in effect, urging them to uphold the papal protection extended to the property of crusaders.⁸⁶ It is notable that the only authors to mention these aspects of the crusade were from religious backgrounds. Other authors viewed the crusade as little more than a military operation, and had little appreciation of the apparatus which made the crusade distinctive.

A few authors believed that the pope's authority over the crusade should extend to the expedition itself. Clearly the provision of detailed strategic advice to the curia was done in the expectation that the pope would determine the overall course of the expedition. However, Fulk of Villaret suggested that the passage be

⁸³Molay, p. 147.

⁸⁴Villaret, pp. 604, 609; William Adam, p. 536; see also Durant who also mentions such preparations (p. 110).

⁸⁵The indulgence as an instrument of papal policy is discussed by Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 36-98.

⁸⁶Durant, p. 107.

accompanied by a papal legate, who would play Adhemar to the military leader's Peter the Hermit (who Fulk believed was the leader of the first crusade), although he did not define their respective roles.⁸⁷ Similarly, Hayton suggested that a legate be sent with a fierce captain to command the preliminary passage, while in the *Epistola* and *Tractatus*, Lull recommended that the pope send a legate with military orders when they were deployed in the east, presumably to curtail independent behaviour.⁸⁸ None of these authors had ties to western monarchs (although Lull developed these later), which may explain why all favoured such an important role for the papacy in the crusade. Earlier crusades demonstrated that legates had very little authority over the expeditions they accompanied, with Adhemar being a noted exception. Regardless of papal wishes, it was impossible to have any degree of control over an army from such distance.

Few writers expected that overall direction of the crusade would lie in the hands of a secular monarch. Some proposals were addressed to monarchs in the hope that they would lead a new expedition to the Holy Land. Most were directed to the French king, all but one of these written by Frenchmen. James II of Aragon was given the *Liber de fine* by Ramon Lull, although the work lacked wide appeal, while Sanudo addressed letters or copies of the *Liber secretorum* to a number of princes and nobles in the hope of rousing interest. Galvano of Levanto, who also sent a proposal to Philip IV, suggested that the king should lead the crusade but remain obedient to the pope.⁸⁹ Only Dubois expected that the king should take full control of the crusade, although he did not want the king to lead the crusade in person lest he die abroad.⁹⁰ Dubois's uncompromising suggestions on the subjection of the papacy reflect his strong support of the Capetian monarchy, and drew on the anti-

⁸⁷Villaret, p. 605.

⁸⁸Hayton, p. 355; Lull, 'Epistola', p. 97; 'Tractatus', p. 101.

⁸⁹Galvano, p. 365.

⁹⁰Dubois, p. 196.

papal literature produced at the French court. Nogaret held similar views to those of Dubois, but had to tailor his work for an audience of prelates at Vienne.

Consequently he emphasised the joint role of church and king, arguing that the church should be 'ordinatrix, mater et magistra'.⁹¹ Given his loyal support for the French crown against the papacy, this appears to be a rhetorical flourish designed to disguise the fact that the church was to be chiefly in charge of funding a French crusade. Changes to his proposal moderated the tone further to avoid offending his audience. One initial change to the proposal suggested that responsibility for setting the time of the expedition should rest solely with the French king, but this was later changed to a joint role for church and state. Another alteration stated that responsibility for the conservation of the Holy Land should be shared.⁹²

Despite the failure of the empire to provide recent support for the Holy Land, the belief that leadership of the crusade was an imperial duty remained strong. Several of the church councils, which met during an imperial interregnum, concluded that it was necessary to appoint an emperor who would unite all his subjects in a crusade to the east.⁹³ Gregory X worked to arrange the election of a new emperor at the council of Lyons in 1274 in the hope that his chosen candidate would then lead a crusade. Those seeking the office were keen to establish their credentials as crusade leaders. Bruno of Olmütz's memoir supporting Ottokar of Bohemia emphasised the need for a strong crusading prince, albeit to fight initially against the Slavs, while Rudolf of Habsburg avowed his desire to go to the Holy Land in letters to the pope and cardinals.⁹⁴ Charles I of Anjou claimed that, if a

⁹¹Nogaret, p. 200.

⁹²Nogaret, p. 200; AN, J 456, no. 36/2: 'advertendum cum omni cura et sollicitudine vigilandum quod ipsa terra conservetur' becomes 'inter cetera que debent ecclesia et rex advertire cum omni cura et sollicitudine curare debent quod ipsa terra conservetur'.

⁹³John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', p. 581; *Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, pp. 1105, 1110; Digard, *Philippe le Bel*, vol. 2, p. 282; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 211.

⁹⁴Bruno of Olmütz, 'Relatio de statu ecclesiae in regno alemaniae', pp. 590-1; L. E. Scales, 'Alexander of Roes: Empire and Community in Later Thirteenth Century Germany' (unpub. Manchester PhD, 1993), pp. 100-4.

crusade were to be launched successfully, the French king had to receive the imperial crown.⁹⁵ Dubois adopted a similar suggestion in his crusade plan, arguing that the throne should be handed to the French king and made hereditary.⁹⁶ There was a remote possibility that such ideas might have had some support in the empire. In a letter of 1327, Sanudo reported that the preceptor of the Hospitallers in Germany had informed him that Germans would give the imperial crown to the king of France so that they had a good prince.⁹⁷

The theorists offered little indication about the leadership of the expedition itself. Authors such as Galvano of Levanto, Nogaret, and the author of the *Directorium* expected the French king to command the crusade, while Lull intended the 'bellator rex' (probably James I of Aragon) to do this. The Hospitallers believed that the leader of the army should be well-versed in the manner of warfare used in the east, and preferably know Moslem lands, presumably because of their experience of western crusade leaders who were unable to adapt to war in the east.⁹⁸ The only authors to give any significant discussion of the leader were Sanudo and Fidenzio, both of whom listed a number of qualities which they believed were vital. Fidenzio argued that he be powerful and well-respected by other princes; rich enough to pay for the crusade; and honest, just, wise, generous, diligent and a good Christian.⁹⁹ Many of these were qualities of an ideal king, and it has been argued that they were drawn from Fidenzio's view of the sultan.¹⁰⁰ Sanudo argued that the leader should be generous, careful, not contemptuous of the enemy and ready to take advice.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵'Relatio nuntiorum regis franciae', *MGH Legum Sectio IV: Constitutiones et Acta Publica*, 3, no. 618, pp. 585-8.

⁹⁶Dubois, pp. 172-3.

⁹⁷Letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, p. 310.

⁹⁸Hospitallers, p. 222.

⁹⁹Fidenzio, pp. 41-5. He made similar recommendations for the commander of the fleet (p. 50).

¹⁰⁰N. Daniel, *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 2nd edn. (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 192-3.

¹⁰¹Sanudo, p. 95.

These discussions were conducted in an abstract manner, and the theorists made no suggestions as to who might be suitable. Indeed, it seems unlikely that anyone could be found among the princes of Europe able to fulfil such stringent criteria.

Finance

The chief concern of those who considered going on crusade in this period was the cost. Fighting in the east, remote from sources of supplies and with heavy reliance on naval transport, was inherently expensive, while changes to the manner in which wars were fought in the fourteenth century added to costs. Since monarchs were not prepared to sacrifice their interests to the crusade, there was greater pressure on the church to provide funding. The detailed negotiations on the crusade conducted between the papacy and successive French kings in the early fourteenth century centred on the question of finance, the source of much acrimony and often the cause of their failure. Rulers such as Charles IV and Philip VI were adamant that they would not be able to launch a crusade without ecclesiastical finance, while the papacy was equally determined not to hand money to the French without clear evidence that it would be spent on a crusade.¹⁰² The majority of the crusade proposals predate these negotiations but their failure to discuss finance stands in marked contrast to prevailing concerns at the courts of potential crusade leaders. The proposal which gave most attention to this question was written by William of Nogaret, a close advisor of Philip IV who was involved in French crusading policy.¹⁰³ The other authors to offer detailed advice on this subject were Fulk of Villaret, the author of the *Memoria* and William le Maire, all of whom had some knowledge of the methods used by the papacy to raise money from the church. Few other theorists touched on this subject, and none were able to suggest solutions to the problems of crusade funding.

¹⁰²Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 166-85; Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 25-52. The papal attitude towards the Spanish was equally firm.

¹⁰³Renan, 'Guillaume Nogaret', pp. 290-5.

The importance placed on finance in the planning and organisation of crusades was a result both of the escalating cost of warfare, and greater awareness of this. It is difficult to quantify the increase in the expense of paying individual knights or foot soldiers, but Nogaret claimed that this had doubled: 'hodie vix haberentur centum milites pro stipendiis vel expensis, pro quibus consueverant haberi ducenti'.¹⁰⁴ Improvements in the organisation of armies enabled their composition to be more precisely established, and more specialists were recruited in fields such as siege warfare, again augmenting costs.¹⁰⁵ Accounts from Philip III's expedition to Aragon in 1285 show that he spent over 14,600 *livres Tournois* on carpenters and other artisans, which represents a much greater proportion of the total expenditure than was the case on Louis IX's first crusade.¹⁰⁶ Campaigning in the eastern Mediterranean was particularly expensive because of the expenditure required on shipping. The fourteenth century estimate of Louis IX's expenses states that he spent just over 32,026 *livres Tournois* on his navy between 1250 and 1253, but total expenditure on this was undoubtedly higher. He chartered sixteen ships from Genoa costing 50,000 *livres Tournois*, and a further twenty from Marseilles.¹⁰⁷ This total still falls far short of Philip III's expenditure of 260,000 *livres Tournois* on his navy when he attacked Aragon, which was a much higher proportion of total costs, despite the campaign being much shorter and considerably closer to France, suggesting that the price of shipping was rising rapidly.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴Nogaret, p. 200; 'vel trecenti' added in the later version (AN J 456, no. 36/2).

¹⁰⁵Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, pp. 160-1. Several theorists insist on the participation of skilled engineers: Lull, 'Liber de fine' (p. 284-5), 'Liber de acquisitione' (p. 267); Durant (p. 108); Sanudo, (pp. 75-80). In addition, several other theorists favoured the use of a small force of galleys manned by knights and foot to raid the Mamluk coastline, which implies the use of professional forces.

¹⁰⁶*RHGF* 21, pp. 513-17.

¹⁰⁷*RHGF* 21, p. 515; L. T. Belgrano, 'Une charte de nolis de S. Louis', *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 231-6; Strayer, 'The crusades of Louis IX', p. 492.

¹⁰⁸*RHGF* 21, p. 517.

Most of the plans demonstrate that their authors had little appreciation of the likely cost of crusading. Fidenzio of Padua suggested that the Christians should take between twenty and thirty thousand knights and as many foot soldiers as possible, while James of Molay recommended between twelve and fifteen thousand knights and forty to fifty thousand archers.¹⁰⁹ Both men viewed the crusade as a Europe-wide general passage and significantly, neither made any suggestions on the financing of their plans.¹¹⁰ The impracticality of their figures is revealed by the financial difficulties faced by Edward of England after contracting with Louis IX to take a force of only 225 knights to the east in return for 45,000 *livres Tournois*.¹¹¹ In 1309, the crusades of James II of Aragon and the Hospitallers also brought financial difficulties, which were particularly severe in the case of the latter.¹¹² The common suggestion that large numbers of ships should enforce a maritime blockade of Egypt illustrates that the great majority of the authors had no conception of the expense involved in naval warfare.¹¹³

Only two works included any attempt to estimate the likely costs of the crusade. Marino Sanudo gave a very detailed costing in the *Liber secretorum*, giving figures for the daily food requirements of each man, and estimating total costs for men, horses and ships. He calculated that a blockade of Egypt undertaken by 250 men for nine months would cost 70,000 florins, while the initial passage would cost 700,000 florins for each of three years. The full general passage to Egypt was estimated at five million florins over two years.¹¹⁴ These figures are

¹⁰⁹Fidenzio, p. 28; Molay, p. 146.

¹¹⁰Fidenzio suggested that a wealthy leader should support the army (p. 42).

¹¹¹Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade*, p. 117.

¹¹²Dufourcq, *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib*, p. 405, n. 2; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John*, pp. 225-6; A. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306-1421', Setton 3, pp. 290-1.

¹¹³Dubois ('Opinio cujusdam', p. 201) and Charles II (p. 355) both suggested one hundred galleys, while Fidenzio favoured fifty (pp. 46-8).

¹¹⁴Sanudo, pp. 30, 36, 92.

lower than those produced by Charles IV during negotiations with the papacy. The king estimated that the annual cost of his *passagium particulare* would be 1,600,000 *livres Tournois*, a figure reduced by the pope to 1,200,000 *livres* per annum.¹¹⁵ Cardini argues that Sanudo's figures were deliberately low, to encourage the pope to finance the crusade, but they still represented an enormous expense.¹¹⁶ The only other work to include information on the financing of the crusade is the *Informationes civitatis Massilie*, written for Louis of Clermont, which is more of a projected contract than a proposal. It provides a detailed list of likely naval requirements and their costs: ships ('naves') would be 5,000 *livres Tournois*, galleys 1,000 *livres* and 'huissiers' 1,200 *livres* with the crew costing more.¹¹⁷ Marseilles did not win the contract for the ships, which were ordered from Narbonne, but five ships were later bought there, three at 1,400 florins and the other two at 1,100 and 800 florins.¹¹⁸

Fidenzio of Padua believed that the leader of the crusade should pay for the expedition himself, rather than use the money of others, but he was the only theorist to hold this opinion. The leader should be rich, 'quod ipse possit stipendiare multos Xpistianos sua propria pecunia', and Fidenzio fiercely criticised those men who were wealthy enough to go on crusade but refused unless they were given 'larga stipendia sacrosancte ecclesie', money which they squandered on reckless living.¹¹⁹ Similarly, Lull reported that some Christian princes had their eye on church tithes, which they

¹¹⁵Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', p. 180. This figure contrasts with the estimated total cost of just over 1,530,000 *livres* for Louis IX's six year crusade, clearly demonstrating the burgeoning costs of warfare (*RHGF* 21, p. 515; Strayer contends that this fourteenth century figure was an underestimate of Louis's true expenditure: 'The crusades of Louis IX, p. 494).

¹¹⁶F. Cardini, 'I costi della crociata. L'aspetto economico del progetto di Marin Sanudo il Vecchio (1312-1321)', in *Studi in Memoria di Federigo Melis*, vol. 2 (Naples, 1978), pp. 179-210.

¹¹⁷'*Informationes Massilie*', pp. 253-5.

¹¹⁸De la Roncière, 'Une escadre franco-papale', pp. 400, 412-13.

¹¹⁹Fidenzio, p. 42.

then used on worldly affairs.¹²⁰ Fidenzio's view of crusading was uncompromising and anachronistic in this period, but reflects his religious background. The huge expense of crusading in the later period made it impossible for an individual, even a ruling monarch, to finance the crusade without assistance. At the time of his crusade, Louis IX had an estimated annual royal income of 250,000 *livres Tournois*, but his estimated costs exceeded 1,500,000 *livres* over the six years he stayed in the east.¹²¹ The *Memoria* appears to imply that crusaders should be willing to finance themselves, reporting that Godfrey of Bouillon had failed to reach Jerusalem twice because he was relying on the money of others. However, the implication may be that the money was either stolen or extorted ('mala acquisita'), and the author later supports the use of ecclesiastical finance.¹²²

With the exception of Fidenzio, theorists accepted that it was necessary for the church to provide funding, embracing the practice used from the beginning of the thirteenth century. The author of the *Memoria* proposed that crusaders use the 'manna' of the church, while Nogaret argued that Philip IV needed a large ecclesiastical subsidy, 'sine quo rex ipse commode complere onus ipsum non posset'.¹²³ However, Fidenzio's resistance to the use of ecclesiastical finance, and his suspicion of the motives of secular leaders, was shared by others, particularly those who had to contribute money. It is notable that when discussing finance, the church councils of 1291-2 were keen that crusaders should use their own funds alongside money from the church, while William Durant proposed a number of exemptions from contributions to the crusade for the clergy.¹²⁴ Another prelate,

¹²⁰Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 272.

¹²¹Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, p. 79; Strayer, 'The crusades of Louis IX', p. 491.

¹²²'Memoria', pp. 436-8.

¹²³'Memoria', p. 438; Nogaret, p. 199.

¹²⁴*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1112; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 213 (French prelates complaining that they were 'non modicum onerati' by papal demands); Durant, pp. 106-8.

William le Maire insisted that control of finance remain with the church, and that no new tithes should be imposed.¹²⁵ At the council of Lyons, Gilbert of Tournai had argued that taxation of the church was one cause of the failure of the crusades, and there is plenty of evidence for resistance to the imposition of clerical taxation.¹²⁶ However, Fidenzio's stance is notable because, as a preacher based in the east, he had no particular interest in the taxation of the church, unlike William le Maire, William Durant, and the prelates sitting on church councils in 1291-2.

Theorists expected that the crusade would be largely funded by the church and their advice concentrated on the money that could be raised from this source. Their proposals relied on existing methods of raising church finance and had little originality. Several, including William Adam, Charles II, Ramon Lull, and William le Maire, suggested that money be raised by a clerical tithe.¹²⁷ While William Durant did not explicitly propose that a tithe should be levied, his discussion implies that he expected this to be done as a matter of course.¹²⁸ Clerical tithes were a major source of revenue for the papacy, always strongly linked with the crusade, and were announced in the bulls issued at the two councils of Lyons, in 1245 (a triennial twentieth) and 1274 (a sexennial tenth), and Vienne in 1312.¹²⁹ The imposition of a crusading tithe on the church was routine practice, and the theorists' advice superfluous. None addressed the problems caused by the collection of tithes, which was slow and erratic, leaving crusaders with lengthy delays before they received sufficient funds.

¹²⁵William le Maire, pp. 475-6.

¹²⁶Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', p. 39; W. E. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1934), vol. 1, p. 75; id. *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), pp. 241, 250-3, 276-8. Clerical complaints were not viewed sympathetically by Humbert of Romans ('Opus tripartitum', pp. 198, 205).

¹²⁷William Adam, p. 536; Charles II, p. 35; Lull, 'Epistola', p. 97; 'Liber de fine', p. 271; William le Maire, pp. 475-6.

¹²⁸Durant, p. 107: he argues that prelates going on to the east should be exempt from a tithe.

¹²⁹Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 188-9, 197; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 242-3.

In the initial version of his proposal, Nogaret suggested that all ecclesiastical properties support a certain number of troops during the crusade. Tithes would also be levied before the crusade, and Nogaret recommended that a new valuation of church lands was necessary to ensure that the tithe paid was of full value.¹³⁰ This reflected the desire of the author, and the French court in general, to maximise revenue from the church, but it was already standard practice to revalue ecclesiastical property with successive impositions of tithes. Valuations were originally self-assessed, then responsibility passed to papal assessors and their deputies from 1228, although there may have still been scope for raising more revenue. In his discussion of the valuation of the English church in 1291, Lunt argued that the figure was below the current value of the lands, although not greatly.¹³¹ In the revised version of Nogaret's proposal, this section was deleted, and replaced by a demand for a single or double tithe, another example of the tone of his work being moderated.¹³²

In the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, Ramon Lull apparently proposed the use of subsidies for the crusade, stating prelates, canons, monks and other clerics should give an 'auxilium' from their goods.¹³³ The terminology he uses is clearly different from his descriptions of tithes ('decimam ecclesie') in the *Epistola* and the *Liber de fine*.¹³⁴ He does not mention tithes in the *Tractatus*, which suggests that Lull simply confused his terminology, since he does not appear to be well-versed in the financing of crusades. Voluntary subsidies had a much longer history than mandatory taxes, but were not associated with the Holy Land, often being requested for papal poverty or oppressions in Italy. Of subsidies requested in

¹³⁰Nogaret, p. 203.

¹³¹Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 1, pp. 72-5; W. E. Lunt, *The Valuation of Norwich* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 157-67.

¹³²AN, J 456, no. 36/2.

¹³³Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 101.

¹³⁴Lull, 'Epistola', p. 97; 'Liber de fine', p. 271.

England, only one, in 1272, was for the Holy Land, although two were requested for the Latin Empire of Constantinople.¹³⁵ A request for a gift from the church towards the crusade was also included in the corrections to Nogaret's proposal, in place of a demand for the rents of rural priories where there was no worship. The author suggested that prelates be exhorted in general and provincial councils to make a donation to the Holy Land, in addition to paying tithes.¹³⁶

Three of the theorists, Nogaret, Villaret and the author of the *Memoria* were aware of other methods used by the church to raise finance. They suggested drawing upon a wider range of existing sources of funds, including annates and the fruits of vacant benefices, which were not then used extensively to raise money for crusading. Nogaret argued that 'annalia' be conceded to Philip IV, while the author of the *Memoria* suggested that the pope assign the fruits of one year of a benefice to the passage.¹³⁷ Annates had been levied in England for the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1246, and were granted to Henry III in 1256 for his crusade, but their use for the crusade only became established practice during the pontificate of John XXII, following a grant made to the French in 1317.¹³⁸ Villaret argued that the first year's revenues of all vacant benefices be assigned to the crusade for seven years and Nogaret also argued that these funds be granted to the crusade.¹³⁹ Nogaret reflected the position of the French court, but it is interesting that the others were so keen to plunder the church for money for the crusade. The enthusiasm of the authors blinded them to the fact that the church had alternative demands on its finance and led them to assume that more money was available than was the case.

¹³⁵Lunt, *Financial Relations*, pp. 194-6, 228-30.

¹³⁶AN J 456, no. 36/2.

¹³⁷Nogaret, p. 204; 'Memoria', p. 439. Nogaret's suggestion was struck out in the other version of his advice (AN J 456, no. 36/2).

¹³⁸Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 1, pp. 93-5; vol. 2, p. 317; *Lettres sècrites et curiales de Jean XXII*, nos. 23, 27; Housley, *The Avignon Papacy*, p. 20.

¹³⁹Villaret, p. 608; Nogaret, p. 204. In 1306, the levy was of 'the ecclesiastical fruits, rents and revenues of the first year of all benefices at present vacant' (Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 2, p. 318).



Fulk of Villaret argued that money from clerics who died intestate, or unable to make wills, should be assigned to the passage. The right to take the goods of intestate clerics was usually exercised by prelates or local nobles, but Henry III was granted a portion of the goods of English intestates for his proposed crusade to Sicily in 1256. Papal claims to this revenue in the late thirteenth century met with such opposition that it only became an established source of revenue after 1327, so Villaret was again anticipating the use of certain funds for the crusade.¹⁴⁰ Dubois favoured using the money of intestates, but extended the idea to argue that all beneficed clergy should be forced to bequeath a quarter of their goods to the fund for the crusade, while a portion of the estates of all dead prelates and cardinals should be exacted.¹⁴¹ Nogaret also argued that money from wills be granted to the crusade, but it is unclear whether he referred only to the clergy or included the laity. Since he concentrated on ecclesiastical sources of funding, it seems probable that he only intended to refer to the clergy.¹⁴² It is clear that both Dubois and Nogaret were seeking to maximise the contribution made by all sections of the church to the crusade, but neither considered the probability of opposition to their ideas.

In addition to exploiting the existing impositions on the church, some of theorists believed that money could be directed to the crusade from the profits of the reform or reorganisation of certain elements of the church. Fulk of Villaret suggested that the revenue of vacant prebendaries in churches with canons should be assigned to the crusade, leaving up to one tenth of the number of canons vacant, with no one being assigned to these posts. Similarly, the author of the *Memoria* argued that one prebendary from each collegiate church should be allocated to the Holy Land.¹⁴³ Humbert of Romans had earlier suggested that the number of offices

¹⁴⁰Lunt, *Financial Relations*, pp. 506-13; see also Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 2, p. 390.

¹⁴¹Villaret, p. 609; Dubois, p. 102.

¹⁴²Nogaret, p. 203.

¹⁴³Villaret, pp. 608-9; 'Memoria', pp. 439-40.

in cathedral churches be reduced, and the excess be given to the crusade.¹⁴⁴ More clearly linked to reform was Villaret's proposal that those who held multiple benefices without papal leave should be forced to hand over all but one to the Holy Land, with possible exceptions for holiness or service to the church. In addition, those absent without papal licence should have their revenues granted to the crusade.¹⁴⁵ Criticism of pluralism and absenteeism is not unusual in this period, and is found in Dubois's treatise, but Villaret viewed these as potential sources of revenue, more than abuses that needed to be reformed.¹⁴⁶ There were precedents for his proposal to extract money from non-resident clerics. In 1245, a subsidy for the Latin Empire of Constantinople included the provision that clerks who were not at their benefices for over six months in the year should pay half their revenues, although crusaders were exempt. The same provision was included in a request to the French clergy for an aid to the Latin Empire in 1262.¹⁴⁷

Another area for reform viewed as potentially profitable by Nogaret and Dubois was the monasteries, although it seems unlikely that these institutions possessed as much excess income as the Frenchmen suspected after royal and papal taxation. Many monasteries in Britain cut their recruitment in this period in an attempt to balance their numbers with their shrinking resources.¹⁴⁸ Nogaret argued that the requirements of monasteries and priories be assessed, and excess funds allocated to the king for his crusade. He claimed that monasteries were given money by their founders, but they often had few 'servitores' and provided no hospitality, so the wasted money could be made available for the crusade.¹⁴⁹ In the revised version

¹⁴⁴Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 205.

¹⁴⁵Villaret, p. 609.

¹⁴⁶Dubois, pp. 90-4.

¹⁴⁷Lunt, *Financial Relations*, pp. 228, 250.

¹⁴⁸J. Burton, *Monastic and Religious Orders in Britain 1000-1300* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 266-7.

¹⁴⁹Nogaret, pp. 203-4.

of his treatise this paragraph was entirely deleted and replaced by a section discussing the collection of money left to the Holy Land, suggesting that his original ideas were considered too extreme.¹⁵⁰ Dubois suggested that unnecessary conventual priories be dissolved and the monks congregated back in their abbeys. The property accruing from this would be assigned to the crusade.¹⁵¹ Dubois's motivation for this wholesale change was primarily to end abuses in the church, while Nogaret was concerned with seeking another area where the church could be pressed for funds. There were precedents for the use of money from failing institutions for crusading. Humbert of Romans's *Opus tripartitum* proposed that monasteries with no chance of reform should have their income used for the crusade.¹⁵² Military orders were granted revenues from failing institutions in the Holy Land, as when the Hospitallers were granted the monastery of Mount Tabor near Nazareth, with the expectation that the monks would be dispersed to other institutions, and the Hospital take over their lands and revenues.¹⁵³

Nogaret and Dubois both suggested that the resources of the military orders be used for the crusade. Both were closely linked with the French court, but while the positions they adopted on the issue were similar to that taken by the French king in negotiations at Vienne, both went significantly beyond Philip IV's demands. Nogaret argued that all the property and moveable goods of the Templars should be given to Philip IV to finance his passage, with the exception of necessary expenses for the celebration of divine office in their churches, and for supporting those in prison.¹⁵⁴ He used his proposal as part of the continued propaganda attack on the Templars, giving great prominence to their lands and goods as a source of crusade

¹⁵⁰AN, J 456, no. 36/2.

¹⁵¹Dubois, pp. 113-14.

¹⁵²Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 205.

¹⁵³A. J. Forey, *The Military Orders* (London, 1992), p. 111.

¹⁵⁴Nogaret, p. 202. This was retained in the revised version of the proposal, although the phrase 'et regi traduntur' was removed (AN J 456, no. 36/2).

funding, and using fierce language against them.¹⁵⁵ William le Maire's proposal directly contradicted Nogaret's position by insisting that Templar lands be held by the church, and under no circumstances find their way into secular hands, an opinion which probably reflected that of other prelates.¹⁵⁶ The king's motives have often been viewed as financial, even by contemporaries, but it has been recently argued that Philip had been genuinely persuaded of the Templars' guilt by advisers, including Nogaret, who played on his growing piety after his wife's death.¹⁵⁷

Nogaret also went beyond royal policy by extending his attack to the other military orders, proposing that their lands should be valued to ensure that they provided an adequate number of men, and that any 'spare' revenue be used for the crusade.¹⁵⁸ This suggestion was removed in the revised version of his work, leaving only the injunction that the orders use all their men and resources for the Holy Land.¹⁵⁹ Nogaret's implication that the military orders' aid for the Holy Land failed to match their resources was common in this period. Several of the church councils which met in 1291-2 believed that the lands of the orders should be assessed to ensure that they maintained an appropriate number of men in the east.¹⁶⁰ The resources of the military orders were consistently overestimated by authors such as Matthew Paris, who believed that the Templars and Hospitallers held 28,000 manors between them.¹⁶¹ Dubois claimed that confiscation of the orders' property in the

¹⁵⁵Nogaret, p. 199: 'abhominacio Templariorum'.

¹⁵⁶William le Maire, p. 475.

¹⁵⁷R.-H. Bautier, 'Diplomatique et histoire politique: ce que la critique diplomatique nous apprend sur la personnalité de Philippe le Bel', *Revue Historique* 259 (1978), pp. 17-23; *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, ed. H. Finke (Münster-i.-W., 1907), vol. 2, no. 34; M. Barber, *The New Knighthood* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 297-9. Compare Barber's *The Trial of the Templars*, pp. 227-38.

¹⁵⁸Nogaret, pp. 199, 202.

¹⁵⁹AN J 456, no. 36/2.

¹⁶⁰*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1113; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 213-15.

¹⁶¹Forey, 'The military orders in the crusading proposals', pp. 325-6.

west would release 800,000 *livres*, making it 'evident how they have hitherto, for the sake of this income, betrayed the Holy Land and failed in their duty towards it'. This view was echoed among the prelates at the council of Vienne where it was argued that the Hospitallers should not be given Templar lands because they would not use the revenues properly.¹⁶² Dubois was less close to the French court and it is notable that in the memoir composed shortly before the arrest of the Templars, his criticism extended to all the military orders, while the Templars were singled out only in the proposals written in 1308, once he was sure of royal policy in this area.¹⁶³ In the *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* he recommended that all the military orders be united into one single order and all their property assigned to the crusade. The new order would live off property in Cyprus and the Holy Land, and receive provision from elsewhere until the Holy Land had been conquered.¹⁶⁴ In the later work he proposed that revenue from Templar lands 'might well be devoted to the aid of the new order', but also suggested that the lands be held in 'perpetual lease', with their revenue available if there was an emergency in the east.¹⁶⁵

In addition to ecclesiastical sources, the theorists believed that lay funds should be tapped. Since there were fewer precedents for this, some of their ideas were more original. Church funds were the most important source of money for the crusade, but the laity also provided finance, generally on a voluntary basis. Certain theorists proposed that mandatory taxes should be imposed, suggesting that they believed large amounts of money were needed for a crusade and could be raised in this way. Charles II recommended that those who did not have sufficient money to go on crusade, or preferred to remain at home, should pay a 'raencon de la crois'. A similar idea was mooted at the provincial council held at Canterbury in 1291, where

¹⁶²Dubois, p. 82; Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, nos. 145-6; Forey, 'The military orders in the crusading proposals', pp. 325-6.

¹⁶³Dubois, 'De facto Templariorum', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 180-1.

¹⁶⁴Dubois, pp. 81-2.

¹⁶⁵Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', pp. 201-2.

it was proposed that a subsidy should be imposed on laymen who did not go on crusade.¹⁶⁶ Gregory X had planned that all the laity be taxed for the crusade, but was unable to institute the plan before his death. In 1223, Honorius III requested that both the emperor and the king of France order each house in their lands to pay one penny of Tours for each of three months.¹⁶⁷ As the request suggests, the pope lacked the power to levy such taxes throughout Christendom without royal assent, a problem the theorists did not recognise. Crusading monarchs imposed taxes in their own kingdoms for an expedition, but could face resistance. Although Richard I successfully levied the so-called 'Saladin' tithe on all his possessions, Philip II was forced to abandon attempts to collect a similar levy due to fierce opposition.¹⁶⁸

Two of the theorists believed that alms and subsidies from the laity should still be used, but that the church should be more active in soliciting them. The author of the *Memoria* argued that all priests who heard confession on Good Friday should urge penitents to pay one penny for the defence of the Holy Land in return for an indulgence. This could be extended to other Fridays throughout the year, while an indulgence could also be granted for those who left half, or one third, of their money to the crusade in their wills.¹⁶⁹ Villaret proposed that prelates should urge the sick to leave money for the Holy Land in return for remission of sins.¹⁷⁰ Appeals for gifts and bequests were common, and the theorists' advice again offered little originality. Innocent IV urged bishops to appeal for bequests for the crusade in England in 1246, in return for indulgences, and Nicholas IV made a similar request in 1291.¹⁷¹ A more contentious method of raising money was the redemption of

¹⁶⁶Charles II, p. 357; *Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1106.

¹⁶⁷Lunt, *Financial Relations*, p. 191.

¹⁶⁸Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, pp. 75-7.

¹⁶⁹'Memoria', p. 439.

¹⁷⁰Villaret, p. 609.

¹⁷¹Lunt, *Financial Relations*, pp. 435, 452-7.

vows to go on crusade. Fulk of Villaret argued that those unwilling to go on crusade should be allowed to redeem their vow, and both Nogaret and Charles II suggested that money could be raised from this source.¹⁷² In the thirteenth century, the practice of redeeming vows became increasingly common, particularly in the pontificate of Innocent IV, when it became an important instrument of fundraising for the papacy.¹⁷³ As the theorists were all supporters of the crusade, it is to be expected that they had no qualms about using vow redemptions as a source of finance, but the practice was the subject of some fierce contemporary criticism. Matthew Paris claimed that friars preaching in England signed people with the cross regardless of age, sex or condition, then forced them to pay to have the vow redeemed. Gilbert of Tournai complained of this practice and criticism is also found in the works of some troubadours.¹⁷⁴ However, many took the cross in this period with the sole intention of gaining an indulgence by giving money rather than fighting.

The theorists proposed other methods of raising money for the Holy Land, some of which were very traditional, others more original. Nogaret urged crusaders to refrain from superfluous expenditure, using the money saved for the crusade. This had been proposed at the council of Lyons in 1245, but such sumptuary measures were usually inspired more by morals than money.¹⁷⁵ Both Villaret and Humbert of Romans aimed similar suggestions at the church, arguing that gold and silver plate used for purposes other than holy communion should be handed over to

¹⁷²Villaret, p. 609; Nogaret, p. 204; Charles II, p. 357.

¹⁷³Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 1, p. 117; vol. 2, pp. 512-13; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 119-22.

¹⁷⁴Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H. R. Luard (RS: London, 1872-83), vol. 5, p. 73; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 127-8; Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', pp. 39-40; Throop, pp. 82, 91-3.

¹⁷⁵Nogaret, p. 200; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 188. Gregory VIII included similar provisions against expense and ostentation in *Audita Tremendi* (Migne, *PL* 202, col. 1542).

the crusade.¹⁷⁶ Villaret proposed that funds be raised from another long-established source, the Jews, arguing that it was fitting that those responsible for the crucifixion be forced to aid the passage. At least a tenth should be taken, and Villaret felt that half would not be excessive.¹⁷⁷ There was a long tradition of raising money from the Jews by monarchs, and Villaret's suggestion also reflects the tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment associated with the crusades. More interesting was Charles II's proposal that 'toutes uentes et achas qui feront par le monde que li dismes de dyeu qui en est bailies puisse uenir en la main dou dit maistre'. The idea of imposing a tithe on commerce is unique among the theorists, and seems to be without precedent. Charles also suggested that arms and war-horses of prelates and knights who died should be handed over to the leader of the passage.¹⁷⁸ There was some precedent for this in bequests of arms and horses to military orders by nobles.¹⁷⁹ These ideas, some original and many unworkable, testify to the awareness of a few theorists that it would be necessary to draw on a wide range of sources to raise funds for the crusade.

Despite their suggestions for potential sources of funding for the crusade, the theorists failed to discuss other difficulties, notably the problems of collection. Only two authors, Charles II and William le Maire, addressed this question. Charles II, who favoured entrusting the recovery of the Holy Land to a united military order, proposed that money be collected by a member of that order together with a papal legate.¹⁸⁰ This was no advance on current practice since papal legates commonly administered the collection of crusade taxes and the military orders often played a supporting role. William le Maire was strongly in favour of placing the collection of

¹⁷⁶Villaret, p. 609; Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 205.

¹⁷⁷Villaret, p. 610.

¹⁷⁸Charles II, p. 357.

¹⁷⁹Forey, *The Military Orders*, p. 112.

¹⁸⁰Charles II, p. 360.

money in the hands of prelates. He argued that money should be collected in every diocese by the bishop, and stored in secure chests in cathedral churches, along with the alms of the faithful. The use of chests to collect and store alms was also proposed by Dubois and Villaret. This was a long established measure, first ordered by Innocent III in 1199, and chests continued to be used for storing donations and alms to the end of the fifteenth century.¹⁸¹

The control of crusading revenue was a contentious issue in this period, dominating negotiations between the French crown and the papacy, but it was not dealt with by theorists. Certain authors distrusted secular leaders, and those authors who favoured the creation of a joint order usually argued that it should be placed in charge of funds.¹⁸² In negotiations with the papacy, French kings were keen to receive funds from the church both in France and elsewhere, and it might be expected that Nogaret would support this stance. However, he implied that control of revenue would be shared, stating that money should be handed '*ad custodiam quousque legitime in premissis expendantur in regno Francis, apud personas et locas quas Ecclesia dominusque rex duxerint eligendas*'. Nogaret may have tailored his proposal for the prelates of the church council, since elsewhere he argued that the revenues of the Temple be handed over to the French king.¹⁸³ The revised version of his proposal changed the emphasis on the control of crusading revenue, placing greater stress on the king's responsibility to use money properly. One addition states that the king should be careful not to divert money to other projects.¹⁸⁴ Another revision altered a section on the control of money for the crusade so that it read: '*predicta omnia subsidia per collectores ydoneos colligantur, cum sufficienti potestate Ecclesie, ponanturque in locis tutis in regno francie...et per personas tutas*

¹⁸¹William le Maire, pp. 475-6; Villaret, p. 609; Dubois, p. 75; Lunt, *Papal Revenues*, vol. 2, pp. 84-5.

¹⁸²Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 271-2; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 271; Charles II, pp. 356-7.

¹⁸³Nogaret, p. 202.

¹⁸⁴AN J 456, no. 36/2.

et ydoneas custodiantur fideliter', until the time of the passage.¹⁸⁵ Dubois, who was entirely unfettered by any need to be diplomatic, urged that all temporal revenues of the church be handed to the control of the French crown, and used for the crusade.¹⁸⁶

Conclusion

The failure of the theorists to address the problem of collection and control of finance for the crusade is symptomatic of a general inability to understand the significance of the measures required in the west to organise a successful expedition. Schein's dismissal of Nogaret's treatise as one of 'the more theorizing treatises', classifying it alongside the chess-inspired musings of Galvano of Levanto, ignores the fact that Nogaret's concentration on the question of finance reflected concerns at the French court.¹⁸⁷ A number of the authors addressed the issues of finance, recruitment and peace, and, while the majority came from the west, it is not possible to clearly demonstrate that these issues were of interest only to European-based authors. Although Henry II, James of Molay and Hospitallers only discussed military matters, Fulk of Villaret's proposal gave a comprehensive treatment of the crusade, but his 'old-fashioned' view of preaching indicates his unfamiliarity with the subject. Of the authors based in the west, a few had knowledge of the preparations, particularly financial, involved in crusading, but none had the specialist knowledge of Nogaret. His proposal is in one respect similar to that of Henry II of Cyprus: he gave advice only on matters in which he was an authority, dealing with finance where Henry dealt with strategy. Nogaret's work was exceptional in its detailed coverage of crusade preparations, and other authors gave only superficial treatment of the issue. This is unsurprising since many of the authors had little interest or experience in the measures used to launch a crusade in

¹⁸⁵AN J 456, no 36/2. The original simply stated '...cum sufficienti potestate Ecclesie, tradanturque regi Francie' (Nogaret, p. 205).

¹⁸⁶Dubois, pp. 168-9.

¹⁸⁷Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 92.

the west, and most were writing in the expectation that a crusade would be launched, expecting the papacy and western rulers to organise this in the same manner as before.

The advice offered on the issues of peace, recruitment and finance drew heavily on earlier practice, and shows that many authors viewed the crusade as a papally-directed enterprise. While authors recognised the obstacle that warfare in Europe presented to the crusade, most suggested that it was the responsibility of the pope to impose peace on Europe, and none were able to suggest solutions to the problem posed by the unwillingness of European rulers to place the crusade before their own ambitions. The authors who discussed recruitment again placed great responsibility on the pope, and were clearly ignorant of the manner in which recent crusades had been organised. Most theorists concentrated their suggestions on finance on ecclesiastical sources, usually relying on existing methods, and advice failed to deal with problems of collection and control. As in the question of peace and recruitment, it is less well-informed authors such as Dubois who tended to make more innovative, albeit more impractical, suggestions. The limited attention given to organisation indicates that most theorists expected the success or failure of the crusade to rest on its activity in the east rather than on preparations in the west, but a few considered spiritual factors to be important.

III. SPIRITUAL ASPECTS OF CRUSADING

The recovery treatises concentrate their advice on practical measures to ensure the success of the crusade, both organisation in Europe and strategy in the east. However, a number of proposals argued that spiritual preparations were necessary to guarantee victory. Following the belief that success and failure in war were determined by God rather than man, they argued that the Holy Land had been lost because of the sins of Christendom, and that pure motives and good behaviour among crusaders were preconditions of success. Certain proposals also discussed other spiritual aspects of the crusade, such as the factors which should motivate a crusader. In addition, while many authors simply treated the crusade as an expedition to recover temporal possession of the Holy Places, others regarded the crusade as having a further goal, such as the conversion of the Moslems.

Such ideas do not fit with the general tenor of these works and serious interest in such subjects was limited to authors of religious backgrounds. Fidenzio of Padua, William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* were all friars who lived as missionaries in the east, while William Durant was a European prelate whose interest in ecclesiastical matters was demonstrated by his two works written for the council of Vienne.¹ There were exceptions, such as Galvano of Levanto and Dubois, but the former, who was attached to the papal court, was clearly inclined to mysticism, while Dubois's proposal was very wide-ranging in scope, and his references to religious matters were very naïve ('wicked angels'). Generally, the 'men of action'², such as Charles II of Anjou, Fulk of Villaret, James of Molay, Henry II of Cyprus and Nogaret, had no concern with such issues, but 'religious'

¹Fasolt, *Council and Hierarchy*, pp. 1-4.

²The phrase is Atiya's (*The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 47).

language and ideas are found in most of these works.³ The proposal prepared by the Hospitallers gave some attention to the motivation of crusaders, while Sanudo's history of the Holy Land contains several instances where religion is used to explain the cause of events, which is at odds with the pragmatic style of the first two books. There was little novelty in ideas on spiritual matters with the exception of the works of Ramon Lull, which reflect the philosophical ideas of his *Art*. Other theorists drew on earlier thinking, particularly ideas contained in crusade bulls and preaching, and, to a lesser extent, the writings of canonists such as Innocent IV.

Promotion of the crusade

As shown earlier, the majority of the proposals were written to give advice on the crusade at papal request, but despite their advisory nature, a number contained an element of promotion in the form of lists of reasons which should impel Christians to work for the recovery of the Holy Land. These were included both in works aimed at promoting the crusade, such as the *Via, Memoria* and *Directorium*, and in some works written specifically at papal request, notably the Hospitaller proposal, and the works of Hayton and Fidenzio. The lists of motives were invariably short and self-contained, often being placed at the beginning of a work. Hence William Adam opened his treatise with an impassioned prologue lamenting the oppression of Christians in the east and Moslem possession of the Holy Land.⁴ The lists had many similarities, concentrating on religious themes such as the special nature of the Holy Land. The pope was surely aware of such reasoning, and had presumably requested advice because he intended to organise a crusade, so these lists seem superfluous. The *Directorium*, which included motives for Philip VI to go on crusade, was addressed to the king in response to his preparations for a crusade, again making the list apparently redundant. When

³The treatise written by the bishop of Leon makes no reference to spiritual issues.

⁴William Adam, pp. 521-3.

Humbert of Romans included arguments to promote the crusade in the *Opus tripartitum* in 1274, he intended that they would be used by preachers to rouse support for the crusade.⁵ This is clearly not the case in the later works, whose authors were usually experts on the military side of crusading, rather than in preaching. The proposals were written against a background in which the prospect of a crusade being launched appeared very real. Their purpose was to advise the leaders of the movement on how to organise a crusade when it was launched, rather than to persuade them to organise one. The audience for the works was very specific, limited to the papacy and the rulers of Europe, and, while it is possible that their authors expected them to circulate more widely, this would only be around the courts of Europe. The treatises are not designed to have an emotional impact in the same way as material for preaching the cross. While these lists of motives appear to be exhortatory, they followed the standard phraseology of papal bulls and other crusading literature, and it may be wrong to read too much significance into them. The advice given to Philip VI by the Venetians, always regarded as having an entirely mercenary attitude towards the crusade, opened with religious language, suggesting that the crusade could never be viewed in entirely practical terms.⁶ However, in some of the treatises, particularly those written after 1314, the lists were more than simply formulaic, and were included as a reminder to Europe's rulers of the importance of the task, given that their preparations had produced so few results.

Neither of the two genuine propagandists of the period, Ramon Lull and Marino Sanudo, relied on exhortation in their treatises to promote the crusade. This was partly because both men promoted their ideas in person at the courts of Europe, while Sanudo in particular worked through correspondence.⁷ Consequently, Sanudo

⁵Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 205-6.

⁶*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 110.

⁷Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks', pp. 374-93; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade', pp. 57-73; Hillgarth, pp. 46-129.

made no attempt to put the case for an expedition in the *Liber secretorum* itself. Disseminating copies of his work served to further discussion on the subject, while his detailed plans were intended to show how an expedition could be successful, and hence improve the likelihood that rulers would work for this aim. In his letters, he used more emotive language, for example when appealing for aid for the Holy Land or Armenia, or for peace in Europe.⁸ Ramon Lull clearly regarded his ultimate goal, the conversion of the entire world to Christianity, as a self-evident duty of all Christians, and consequently he was more concerned to demonstrate how this could best be done, rather than explaining why it was necessary. He only justified his plans in two works. The *Liber de fine* contains a short opening in which Lull reported that 'mundus in malo statu diu permanserit', because there were few Christians and many infidels. The latter were growing in number and lands, and 'ad dedecus caelestis curiae possident Terram Sanctam'.⁹ In the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles* he included a section explaining why his recommendations should be followed, referring to Moslem occupation of lands which rightfully belonged to the Christian church and specifically to the loss of the Holy Land, and arguing that their conversion was essential for the exaltation of God.¹⁰

Those theorists who described reasons to go on crusade used broadly similar arguments, drawing on themes and motifs which had featured in crusade bulls and preaching throughout the history of the movement. Some authors had limited knowledge of the thinking of certain canonists on the holy war, notably Innocent IV, but their ideas lacked such sophistication. Only two of the theorists referred specifically to the 'just cause' of the Christians, although this idea was implicit in several other works. Hayton reported that 'Christiani justam habent rationem et causam guerram movendi' against the Saracens, citing their occupation of the Holy

⁸For example, letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 289-90; 305-11; Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp. 755-89.

⁹Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 250.

¹⁰Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 105.

Land and atrocities against Christians.¹¹ Fidenzio also referred to the just cause of the Christians, again referring to the illegal occupation of the Holy Land. However, Fidenzio used this to argue that Christians should fight fiercely in the east, rather than to demonstrate the need for a crusade. Other reasons for the crusaders to be strong in battle were the opportunity to wipe out the ignominy of Moslem possession of the Holy Places; to attain eternal glory; and, more pragmatically, to avoid capture and death.¹²

While other authors made no specific reference to the concept of the just cause, this was implicit in their reasoning, and they used similar arguments to those deployed by Hayton and Fidenzio. The most significant and powerful motive to go on crusade was the pivotal place of Jerusalem and the Holy Land in Christianity, and the consequent shame that its possession by the infidel brought to all believers. The special character of the Holy Land was cited by a number of authors, all of whom reported that it had been sanctified through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, which had brought salvation to all Christians.¹³ In his justification of the crusade, Innocent IV used similar language to emphasise the unique importance of the Holy Land, 'que consecrata est nativitate, habitacione et morte Iesu Christi'.¹⁴ The author of the *Directorium* further accented the importance of the region by recounting that the Catholic church originated there through the preaching of the Apostles and the coming of the Holy Spirit.¹⁵ The special nature of the Holy Land had been stressed long before Innocent IV's work, and was used by crusade preachers from the time of the first crusade. Although Urban II's words at Clermont in 1095 are now lost and

¹¹Hayton, p. 340.

¹²Fidenzio, pp. 30-1.

¹³'Directorium', pp. 389-90; Galvano, p. 367; Hayton, p. 340; 'Memoria', p. 435; 'Via', p. 425; Hospitallers, p. 221.

¹⁴Innocent IV, *Apparatus preclarissima iuris canonici illuminatoris domini Innocentii pape IIII. super .v. li[bris] decre[ta]lium] et super decretalibus per eudem domini Innocentii editis*, ed. D. Thomas (Lyons, 1525), f. 164v.

¹⁵'Directorium', pp. 390-1.

his intentions over Jerusalem in dispute, some accounts of his sermon describe the city and its fate in similar terms to those used by the proposals. In the version of Robert the Monk, who was present at the council, Urban stated that Jerusalem was sanctified by Jesus's passion and redeemed by his death, while Guibert of Nogent's account described the city as the fount from which Christianity flows.¹⁶ The idea of the sanctification of the Holy Land continued to be an important feature of crusade preaching, and is found in the *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei*, issued by Gregory X at the council of Lyons in 1274, and Humbert of Romans's *Opus tripartitum*.¹⁷ Fidenzio and the author of the *Directorium* were both friars and hence were likely to be familiar with the language of crusade preaching. Fidenzio held high office in his order and was present at the council of Lyons, so he may have been familiar with the content of papal bulls. In contrast, Hayton and Galvano both came from secular backgrounds suggesting that such concepts were widely disseminated through crusade preaching.

The potency of Jerusalem as a symbol of Christianity was such that the Hospitallers made an explicit association between the earthly and heavenly Jerusalem. They claimed that, through baptism, all Christians had a share in Jesus's patrimony and kingdom, and stated that the day of judgement would take place 'en la susdite Terre sainte'.¹⁸ The *Via ad Terram Sanctam* also refers to the 'celestial Jerusalem' to reinforce the importance of the terrestrial city, but distinguishes the two.¹⁹ The importance of Jerusalem was intensified by the claim in the Book of Revelations that the Second Coming would occur there, and that Christ would rule a kingdom on earth for one thousand years, an idea which appears to be the inspiration

¹⁶Robert the Monk, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', p. 729; Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', p. 138.

¹⁷Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 196; Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 205-6.

¹⁸Hospitallers, p. 221.

¹⁹'Via', p. 425: the author reports that Jesus spilt his blood in the earthly city so that all would be called 'a sa sainte gloire en sa sainte cité de la celestial Jerusalem'.

for the Hospitallers' account.²⁰ There was an earlier crusading precedent for the conflation of the earthly and heavenly cities when, during the first crusade, many of the poor viewed Jerusalem as more than just a symbol of the celestial city. Visions of a city in the sky were prevalent on the popular crusade, and even the leaders of the knightly armies wrote to Urban II from Antioch calling him to 'open the gates of both Jerusalems'.²¹

The theorists asserted that the Holy Land rightfully belonged to Christians, commonly using the concept that it was the inheritance of Christ. The author of the *Via ad Terram Sanctam* described the Holy Land as the 'heritage' of God, while the Hospitallers called it the 'patrimoine de Ihesu Crist'.²² This notion was very widespread, and appears to date back to the time of the first crusade, when it is claimed that many ordinary crusaders held 'a literal interpretation of the concept of Jerusalem as the heritage of Christ'.²³ The phrase can be found in a sermon of Martin of Pairis for the fourth crusade, and in several thirteenth century bulls on the crusade.²⁴ Some theorists, including Hayton and the author of the *Directorium*, extended this reasoning to view the Holy Land as the inheritance of all Christians. The author of the *Memoria* argued that it had been promised to the 'filiis Israel', a phrase which he contended referred to the faithful.²⁵

Fidenzio of Padua clearly followed this reasoning, arguing that the Holy Land should belong to Christ 'de jure', and he emphasised that the Moslems did not

²⁰Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*, pp. 13, 25; Revelations, ch. 21.

²¹Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*, pp. 63-5; Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, p. 119.

²²'Via', p. 425; Hospitallers, p. 221.

²³J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Ideas and Reality 1095-1274* (London, 1981), p. 7.

²⁴Gunther of Pairis, 'Historia captae a Latinis Constantinopoleos', Migne *PL* 212, col. 227 ('haereditatem suam'); Migne, *PL* 215, col. 1500 ('ipse de sua haereditate...pulsus exsulat'); Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 196 ('Terre Sancte, que funiculus est hereditatis dominice').

²⁵Hayton, p. 340; 'Memoria', p. 435; 'Directorium', p. 389.

possess the Holy Land 'justo titulo'.²⁶ Fidenzio also asserted Christian claims over all lands which had once been in their possession, effectively referring to lands which had formerly been Roman. He believed that to demonstrate there was a just cause for the crusade, the Moslems should be asked to hand over 'totam Terram Sanctam que fuit Xpistianorum, sub qua comprehenditur Egiptus et tota Terra Sancta usque ad Eufratem'. Elsewhere he referred to 'imperatores romani Xpistiani', and wrote of the loss of Turkey, Armenia, Damascus, Jerusalem, Egypt and Carthage.²⁷ His reference to these territories suggests he had some knowledge of canonistic arguments on this subject. Ramon de Penyafort and William of Rennes both denied that the Moslems had any right of jurisdiction over lands previously held by Christians.²⁸ The most influential thinker was Innocent IV, who argued that it was right for the pope to attempt to recover the Holy Land and have it under his jurisdiction because it had been conquered by the Roman emperors in a just war, and also that 'haec ratio sufficit in omnibus aliis terris, in quibus Imperatores Romani iurisdictionem habuerunt'.²⁹ Innocent was particularly concerned with asserting the right of the papacy to inherit the lands of the Roman Empire, and hence referred to the Donation of Constantine.³⁰ Ramon Lull also believed that the crusade should be directed against Moslem territories outside the Holy Land, and implicitly referred to the Donation in his *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, in which he argued that the world should be subjugated to the Roman church. In the same work, he argued that the capture of Moslem lands would facilitate preaching.³¹ This recalls Innocent

²⁶Fidenzio, p. 31. Innocent IV stated that the Holy Land was possessed by the Moslems 'illicite' (*Apparatus*, f. 164v).

²⁷Fidenzio, pp. 16, 50. Sanudo (pp. 31-2) emphasised that Egypt had once been Christian.

²⁸F. H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 198-200.

²⁹Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, f. 165.

³⁰Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, f. 165; J. Muldoon, *Popes Lawyers and Infidels* (Liverpool, 1979), p. 7; Russell, *Just War*, p. 200.

³¹Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 101-2, 105-6.

IV's argument that it was licit to punish the Moslems for refusing to allow Christian preachers into their lands, although Innocent believed that it was right to attack the Moslems since they were breaching natural law whereas Lull argued for the capture of other lands for expediency.³² This was closer to Humbert of Romans's suggestion that Moslems would be more easily converted under Christian rule since they could be forced to listen to preachers.³³ Neither Fidenzio nor Lull took great pains to justify extending the crusade beyond the Holy Land, and their arguments were much less sophisticated than those of the canonists. None of the other theorists who favoured the capture of other Moslem territories gave any theological justification for such actions, suggesting that for most writers, the strategic requirements of a crusade provided sufficient pretext.

In addition to arguing that the Holy Places belonged to Christians by right, the theorists stressed the shame to Christianity that they were in the hands of unbelievers, and complained that the Moslems were defiling these areas. This criticism is primarily religious in tone, and centres on the desecration of these areas by the practice of Islam there. Roger of Stanegrave complained that churches in the Holy Land were in terrible condition and that idolatry was practised there.³⁴ The Hospitallers report that the Saracens 'estoint le soint non de Ihesu Crist et essaucé lour mescreandize [en] touz les sains lieux', while Galvano reports that the Saracens blaspheme the name of Jesus there.³⁵ Such arguments can be traced back to the beginning of the movement and Urban II's sermon at Clermont, and are again found in other crusade bulls. It is notable that, in contrast to the graphic accounts of Moslem outrages found in some versions of Urban's sermon, the proposals are fairly mild in their criticism of the Moslems, probably because knowledge of the enemy

³²Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, f. 165.

³³Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 195-6.

³⁴BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 6v.

³⁵Hospitallers, p. 222; Galvano, pp. 367-8; see also William Adam, p. 522; 'Directorium', p. 392.

had improved by this period. The author of the *Via* wrote that the Saracens 'ont tantes habominacions faites en ses sains leus', while Galvano of Levanto reported that the Holy Places were used as stables.³⁶ This comment recalls Baldric of Dol's account of Urban's sermon, when the pope laments 'ecclesiae in quibus olim divina celebrata sunt mysteria...ecce animalibus eorum stabula praeparantur!'. Ricoldo of Monte Croce, writing of the fall of Acre in 1291, also claimed that the Holy Places were used as stables, a form of humiliation which clearly struck a deep chord among Christian writers.³⁷

Four authors included strong denunciations of the Moslems for exhortatory purposes. The fiercest criticism is found in the *Directorium*, whose author hurls a lengthy string of insults ('instrumenta dyaboli, vasa Luciferi, templum nequicie...') and accuses Moslems of crimes ranging from blasphemy and persecution of Christians to abusing their wives and maltreating animals.³⁸ William Adam, who is regarded as being extreme in his view of Islam, used similar accusations of sexual perversion when denouncing the trade in slaves to Egypt, a common feature of western attacks on Islam.³⁹ Fidenzio of Padua gave an extended account of Islam in the history of the Holy Land which prefaced his plan for the crusade. He included a description of the rise of Mohammed written with similar aims to the earlier works of authors such as Guibert of Nogent and Petrus Alfonsi: to discredit the prophet and hence Islam. Fidenzio recounted that, with the help of Sergius, a Nestorian monk, Mohammed pretended to be a prophet to win power over the Arabs, who were simple idolaters. He also reported that Mohammed claimed on his deathbed that he would be taken up to heaven three days after he died, but by the fourth day his body

³⁶*Via*, p. 425; Galvano, p. 365.

³⁷Baldric of Dol, 'Historia Jerosolimitana', p. 13; Ricoldo of Monte Croce, 'Epistolae V commentariae de perditione Acconis 1291', ed. R. Röhrich, *AOL* 2 (1884), p. 279.

³⁸'Directorium', p. 391.

³⁹William Adam, pp. 524-5; N. Daniel, *Islam and the West: the making of an image* (Edinburgh, 1960), p. 144. See also 'Directorium', p. 391.

was thrown away because of the foul smell.⁴⁰ The reference to Sergius indicates that Fidenzio based his account on the *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum* of Peter the Venerable.⁴¹ Fidenzio also listed a series of Moslem faults, giving examples and quotes from the Koran to illustrate their cruelty, greed and untrustworthiness.⁴² Sanudo too gave an account of Mohammed's life, largely drawn from James of Vitry's history, which emphasised that he was a pseudo-prophet who relied on deception and the simplicity of the Arabs, and giving a similar account of his death to that of Fidenzio.⁴³ It is notable that, with the exception of Sanudo, all the authors who included attacks on the Moslems were mendicants based in the east, who were chosen and surely trained to preach against Islam. In contrast, other theorists seem unmindful of the religious dimension of the crusades, and many treat the Moslems as a purely military enemy.

Another potential reason for a crusade was to avenge the spilling of Christian blood, an idea mentioned by both Hayton and the author of the *Memoria*. The latter referred to the shedding of blood when the Holy Land was lost, while Hayton, more vaguely, talked of the injuries and shame inflicted on Christians in earlier times.⁴⁴ Sanudo referred to the cruelty inflicted on Christians at Acre when the Holy Land was lost.⁴⁵ All were referring to western knights, but William Adam used the plight of eastern Christians in the same way, opening his proposal by describing the weeping 'vox oppressi populi Chrisitani, vox deceptorum sarracena servitute'. In the proposal itself, he gives an emotive description of the vast numbers of Greeks

⁴⁰Fidenzio, pp. 16-19; Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', pp. 127-30; Petrus Alfonsi, 'Dialogus Petri cognomento Alphonsi, ex Judaeo Christiani et Moysi Judaei', Migne, *PL* 157, cols. 599-601, 605.

⁴¹J. Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 129, 206.

⁴²Fidenzio, pp. 20-5.

⁴³Sanudo, pp. 124-7; *La Traduction de l'Historia Orientalis de Jacques de Vitry*, pp. 63-72.

⁴⁴Hayton, p. 340; 'Memoria', p. 435.

⁴⁵Sanudo, p. 31.

captured by Turks and living as slaves in the east, often abandoning their faith to become more zealous than native Moslems.⁴⁶ This is used both to demonstrate that a crusade was essential, and to support Adam's belief that it should be directed through Constantinople and Asia Minor. A similar lament on the fate of Christians after the fall of Acre is found in the letters of Ricoldo of Monte Croce, but Sanudo was the only other theorist to express concern for the eastern Christians in this period.⁴⁷ He described the enslavement of Greeks in Asia Minor, and the danger to Christians living in both Asia, particularly Armenia, and Africa.⁴⁸ Reports of Urban II's sermon at Clermont suggest that he used the plight of Christians in the east to rouse people to go on crusade. Robert the Monk gives a particularly gruesome account of the unpleasant deaths invented for them by the Moslems.⁴⁹ However, with the exception of Adam and Sanudo, such sentiments are not found among the works of the theorists. After two centuries of crusading, the rift between Latins and Greeks had deepened irrevocably, and the fate of oriental Christians could no longer motivate knights from the west to go on crusade. In the fourteenth century, a crusade was more likely to be suggested to conquer or convert the eastern Christians than to help them.

The Hospitallers portrayed the need to recover the Holy Land as being a duty of all Christians. Their proposal makes an explicit juxtaposition between the suffering and death of Jesus, and the pain that Christians should be ready to endure in this life if they are worthy to carry His name, and have a share in His kingdom. Those who die in his service can say: 'nous avons payé nostre dete et deservi la grace que il nous fait de son patrimoine'.⁵⁰ A similar idea is implicit in Galvano of

⁴⁶William Adam, pp. 522, 543-4.

⁴⁷Ricoldo of Monte Croce, 'Epistolae', pp. 264-96 *passim*.

⁴⁸Sanudo, pp. 29-32.

⁴⁹Robert the Monk, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', pp. 727-8.

⁵⁰Hospitallers, p. 222.

Levanto's work. He wrote to urge Philip IV to fulfil his crusade vow and stated that he should be ready to spill his own blood in the service of Jesus, using language clearly reminiscent of his description of Jesus's own suffering. This implication of duty is also found in the *Via*, whose author writes that it is shameful that Christians do nothing to recover the land where Jesus died to save them from the torments of hell.⁵¹ The idea of the crusade as a duty or service to God was not original, and was another common theme in crusade preaching, found in Innocent III's bull *Quia maior*, used as the basis for much preaching of the fifth crusade.⁵²

The Hospitallers emphasised the opportunity to gain personal salvation on the crusade. They reported that 'le plus prochainne voie que chascuns crestiens puet avoir pour aler ou royaume desus dit est que il mete son corps et son ame avec toutes les graces que Diex li a donnees a deliverer la dite sainte terre'.⁵³ Fidenzio too referred to the opportunity to acquire the 'coronam eternam', since those who died fighting in a state of penance would have remission of all sins. Similarly, Roger of Stanegrave reported that the way to salvation lay through the cross.⁵⁴ Humbert of Romans had used this argument in the *Opus tripartitum* as one of the seven factors which should motivate a Christian to fight for the recovery of the Holy Land. Humbert also argued that the spiritual and material benefits offered to *crucesignati* by the church should also motivate people to take the cross.⁵⁵ With the exception of the Hospitallers and Fidenzio, the spiritual rewards of crusading were not considered as significant motives by the later theorists.

The *Directorium* lists motives for Philip VI to go on crusade, many of which were religious, but because the author was writing for a secular ruler, he opens by

⁵¹Galvano, p. 365; 'Via', p. 425.

⁵²M. Villey, *La Croisade: essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique* (Paris, 1942), pp. 117-18; Migne, *PL* 214, col. 810; *PL* 216, col. 817.

⁵³Hospitallers, pp. 221-2, note g (the later text is clearer at this point).

⁵⁴Fidenzio, p. 31; BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 6v.

⁵⁵Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 205-6.

appealing to Philip's duty to follow the example of his ancestors. The king is described as 'scutum fidei, brachium Ecclesie, malleus et petra durissima crucis et fidei'. French rulers had acquired honour among men, and glory with God through their good works for the faith, and had fought heresy in their own kingdom, and 'in peste saracenicā de Aquitanie, Provincie, Yspanie ac Terre Sancte finibus efugata'.⁵⁶ Such an appeal to emulate the glorious feats of ancestors again dated back to the beginning of the crusades. According to Robert the Monk, Urban II reminded the crowd at Clermont of the deeds of Charlemagne against the pagans, and urged them to follow his example, while Eugenius III reminded Christians of the achievements of the knights of the first crusade.⁵⁷ Humbert of Romans also used this argument in the *Opus tripartitum*, referring to the deeds of Charlemagne and Godfrey of Bouillon.⁵⁸ The French royal family had a very impressive tradition of crusading, with three ruling monarchs, Louis VII, Philip II and Louis IX going to the Holy Land. The later Capetians, particularly Philip IV, made much use of this in propaganda to assert their position as the leaders of the crusade movement.⁵⁹ It is partly as a result of such self-promotion that the *Directorium* was written for the French king, though it should be noted that the author was probably French.⁶⁰

Over half of the theorists gave some discussion of motives for men to go on crusade even though their works were advisory rather than promotional. A few proposals entirely lacked this aspect, notably those by Charles II, Henry II and James of Molay, but even the last two described the Holy Land in similar language

⁵⁶'Directorium', pp. 379-80.

⁵⁷Robert the Monk, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', p. 728; Migne, *PL* 180, col. 1065.

⁵⁸Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 206.

⁵⁹Tyerman, 'Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 170-81.

⁶⁰Kohler, introduction to the *Directorium*, p. cxlvi.

to that used by the other authors.⁶¹ There is no distinction between those works written at papal request or those aimed at promoting the crusade: each group contains proposals both with and without a discussion of the question of motives. Although lacking the emotive language of *excitatoria*, they relied on themes common to other exhortatory literature, such as crusade bulls or sermons, and had little originality. While some authors were probably aware of the tenor of canonistic arguments, they were not particularly concerned with justifying the crusade, and hence used rather unsophisticated reasoning in comparison. With the exception of the works by Galvano of Levanto and Roger of Stanegrave, none of the works were truly exhortatory in tone, and limited their treatment of motivation to a short discrete section, rather than having it recur throughout the work. Roger was exceptional in his emphasis on secular motives to go on crusade, largely because he wrote for Edward III. He mentioned the opportunity to win renown in the Holy Land, and discussed courage and cowardice, relating the story of Sir Lancelot and the deeds of Charlemagne.⁶²

Eschatology

One author, Fidenzio of Padua, hoped to urge participation in the crusade by proving that it was pre-destined to be successful. This use of eschatology is very rare among the proposals. Fidenzio describes the 'Liber Clementis', a prophetic work written in Arabic containing prophecies revealed by Jesus to Peter, which the latter passed on to his own disciple, Clement. Fidenzio received the book from a Syrian Christian in Tripoli shortly before the fall of Antioch, which he claimed was foretold in the book. According to Fidenzio, the 'Liber Clementis' stated that a 'catulus leonis' would free the Christians from the dominion of the Saracens ('filii

⁶¹James of Molay, p. 147 ('pro restauratione Terre Sancte Christi sanguine resperse'); Henry II, p. 118 (Henry was moved to write his advice 'ratione fidei...tum etiam ratione regni sui Jerosolimitani, de quo exheredatus per Sarracenos existit').

⁶²BM, Cotton Otho D V, ff. 6v, 12v-13.

lupi'), who would be forced back to the desert whence they came and be subjugated forty times more than they had oppressed the Christians. Thereafter, forty Christian kings would rule Jerusalem in peace, until the inhabitants provoked the Lord with their behaviour and were given over to Antichrist.⁶³

The Book of Clement was earlier used by the legate Pelagius on the fifth crusade. The incident is reported by both Oliver of Paderborn and James of Vitry, the latter giving the title as 'Revelationes beati Petri apostoli a discipulo eius Clemente in uno volumine redacte'.⁶⁴ Oliver recounted that the book was written in Arabic and was read aloud to the crusaders through an interpreter at the siege of Damietta. It covered the state of the world up to the time of Antichrist, and contained prophecies which were explained as referring to the capture of Damietta, and promising the fall of Alexandria and Damascus. Two kings, one from the west and one from the east, were to bring about the extermination or conversion of all Saracens.⁶⁵ As reported, the contents of the book were similar, but not identical, to those recounted by Fidenzio, and it is probable that these were two versions of a well-known prophetic work. The ideas in the 'Liber Clementis' belong to a widely diffused tradition of eastern Christian apocalyptic which had developed from the prophecies of 'Pseudo-Methodius'. These originated in the seventh century and taught that Islam would fall and salvation come from a powerful Christian ruler, originally associated with the Byzantine emperor. The prophecy ended with the coming of Antichrist, and has some similarities with accounts of the 'Liber Clementis'.⁶⁶

Fidenzio's work predates an brief outburst of eschatology in chronicles and other works caused by the fall of Acre and the papal jubilee of 1300. Some viewed

⁶³Fidenzio, pp. 26-7.

⁶⁴*Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, p. 153.

⁶⁵Oliver of Paderborn, p. 72.

⁶⁶B. McGinn, *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1979), pp. 70-3, 149-50.

these events as presaging the imminent approach of the Last Days and the birth of Antichrist. One manuscript of the anonymous *De excidio urbis Acconis*, written in the aftermath of the fall of Acre, included two prophecies, the 'Vision of Tripoli' and the 'Prophecy of Merlin', the first of which predicted the peaceful conversion of the Moslems and a crusade to Jerusalem before the appearance of Antichrist.⁶⁷ There is evidence for continued interest in prophecy in the early fourteenth century, when copies were made of the later part of William of Tripoli's *De statu saracenorum*. These were included in manuscripts containing the crusade proposals of the Hospitallers, the bishop of Leon and William Durant, along with the *Devise*.⁶⁸ William's work does not sit easily alongside the crusade proposals since he argued that a crusade was unnecessary as the Moslems were on the verge of converting to Christianity. According to William, the Koran stated that Islam had conquered the Romans but that the conquered would be victorious. Islam would fall when the line of Mohammed ended, which he believed had occurred when the Mongols killed the caliph of Baghdad in 1258.⁶⁹ Two other theorists referred to Moslem prophecies, but unlike William of Tripoli, used these to argue that a crusade was necessary and would be successful. William Adam reported that the Moslems believed several prophecies which stated 'quod...eorum secta pestifera terminari et per nostros totaliter annullari'. In consequence, whenever the Moslems heard of an impending crusade, such as the one planned by Clement V, they prepared themselves to flee rather than to fight. A very similar account of this prophecy and Moslem fear of a crusade was given by the author of the *Directorium*.⁷⁰ With these few exceptions, references to prophecy by the theorists are very rare, and are made only by the friars.

⁶⁷S. J. Van den Gheyn, 'Note sur un manuscrit de l'*Excidium Acconis*, en 1291', *ROL* 6 (1898), pp. 550-6; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 117-21.

⁶⁸BN lat. 7470. A later French translation exists in Sainte-Geneviève, 1654.

⁶⁹William of Tripoli, 'De statu saracenorum', p. 589.

⁷⁰William Adam, p. 533; 'Directorium', pp. 513-14.

Spiritual preparations

Literature on the crusades throughout the history of the movement was grounded on the supposition that victories were granted by God, while the sins of both crusaders, and Christendom in general, were responsible for military defeat. The explanation was used in twelfth century papal bulls to account for the loss of Edessa and the disasters of 1187, and it was a feature of contemporary interpretations of the failure of the second crusade.⁷¹ This explanation, characterised by the phrase 'nostris peccatis exigentibus', was also used by Nicholas IV to account for the fall of Acre in a letter to the French clergy.⁷² The theorists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries generally took a very practical view of the measures needed to ensure the success of a crusade. However, none rejected the notion that the destiny of a crusade lay in the hands of God rather than its participants, and several argued that both crusaders and Christians generally had to make spiritual preparations to ensure success.

Few of the theorists attempted to account for the fall of Acre and the loss of the crusader states, but those who did turned to the explanation of Christian sins. William Adam reported that there were no Christian possessions on the coast between Constantinople and Alexandria because of 'peccatis exigentibus populi christiani'. Henry II also used this interpretation, and William le Maire claimed that the Holy Land was lost 'propter scelera et transgressiones populi Christiani'.⁷³ The author of the *Directorium* directed his criticism specifically at the inhabitants of the Holy Land, claiming that they had been expelled from their inheritance in favour of the Saracens because they were 'peccatores, immo plus quam peccatores infideles'. He severely censured their behaviour, accusing the prelates of avarice, vanity and

⁷¹Migne, *PL* 180, col. 1065; *PL* 202, cols. 1539-40; G. Constable, 'The second crusade as seen by contemporaries', *Traditio* 9 (1953), pp. 266-74. This is also evident in Oliver of Paderborn's account of the fifth crusade, and the letters of James of Vitry (Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 43, 46-51, 88-9; *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, pp. 100, 106, 119).

⁷²Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 210.

⁷³William Adam, p. 536; Henry II, p. 124; William le Maire, p. 474.

luxurious living, monks of disobedience, and the common people of injustice.⁷⁴ His opinion of the inhabitants of the Holy Land was shared by other writers of the period, such as Thadeo of Naples and certain European chroniclers.⁷⁵ Similar sentiments are found in the historical section of Sanudo's *Liber secretorum*, in which he stated 'sciat mundus quod peccatum de Terra Sancta expulit Christianum'. He criticised the inhabitants and reported that those who fled to Cyprus after the fall of Acre, 'secum in conscientia portaverunt sarcinam peccatorum, et causam desolationis praefatae'.⁷⁶

Fidenzio of Padua, who completed his treatise shortly before the fall of Acre, attempted to account for the gradual loss of Christian territories over the previous decades. At the head of the reasons he identified was sinfulness, which 'magna fuit causa perditionis Terre Sancte'.⁷⁷ However, Fidenzio also sought more practical explanations for gradual expulsion of the Christians from their possessions in the Holy Land. He argued that the Christians were effeminate and unprepared for battle, citing an incident at Ayas when over two hundred merchants were reputedly put to flight by a single Saracen. He also criticised them for imprudence, arguing that Tripoli was lost because the city's defenders chose to fight a stronger force when they had an opportunity to make peace with the Moslems. In addition, he reproached the kings of the west and the papacy for failing to aid the Holy Land, a criticism echoed in some contemporary chronicles.⁷⁸ The use of such practical explanation for the loss of the crusader states was unique among the theorists, although the plans produced by many authors suggest that they had a practical rather

⁷⁴'Directorium', p. 397.

⁷⁵Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 121-4, 128-32.

⁷⁶Sanudo, pp. 231-2.

⁷⁷Fidenzio, pp. 12-13.

⁷⁸Fidenzio, pp. 13-16; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 132-3.

than spiritual view of the cause of Christian defeats, ascribing them by implication to the overwhelming military superiority of the Mamluks.⁷⁹

The natural corollary of the view that the sins of Christendom were ultimately responsible for the fall of Acre was that, if the Holy Land were to be recovered, errant behaviour had to be corrected. As the author of the *Directorium* emphasised, the Lord did not wish to hand over holy things to dogs, nor cast the precious pearl of the Holy Land before swine. He argued that crusaders had to mend their ways since only those who were worthy could enter the Promised Land, just as when the Israelites fled Egypt.⁸⁰ Similarly, Fidenzio considered the behaviour and character of crusaders to be important. He listed a series of qualities which he believed members of the army should have, including love, chastity, humility, piety, sobriety, respect for law and absence of worldliness, using biblical *exempla* to argue that these would bring spiritual benefits. For example, a charitable or chaste crusader would be fortified by God, while humility brought wisdom.⁸¹ The prelates of the council held at Canterbury in 1292 expressed similar concerns in its report to Nicholas IV.⁸² This preoccupation with behaviour, particularly among churchmen, was a feature of earlier crusades and was viewed as influencing the fate of an expedition. When the army of the first crusade was at Antioch, Adhemar removed all women from the camp, including wives, to avoid temptation after a priest reported that Jesus had complained to him of crusaders' behaviour in a vision.⁸³ Similarly, on the fifth crusade, Oliver of Paderborn blamed the drunken and lecherous behaviour of crusaders at Damietta for the subsequent failure of the

⁷⁹Charles II, p. 353.

⁸⁰'Directorium', pp. 394-5. The same biblical *exemplum* was used by St Bernard to explain the failure of the second crusade (Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, p. 79).

⁸¹Fidenzio, pp. 35-40.

⁸²*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1111.

⁸³*Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. and tr. R. M. T. Hill (Oxford, 1962), p. 58.

expedition.⁸⁴ Such injunctions were included in the crusading bulls of Eugenius III and Gregory VIII, which warned crusaders against wearing ostentatious clothing and bringing dogs and birds with them.⁸⁵

William Durant believed that the clergy could be used to influence behaviour on the crusade. He argued that they should not be sent to fight, but could assist the army through 'vite exemplo, predicacionis et exhortationis verbo, orationis et devotionis studio, consilio'.⁸⁶ The council of Canterbury was less concerned with behaviour, but believed that the pope should send a legate to accompany the army to maintain faith among crusaders.⁸⁷ The use of the clergy in this way had been promoted by Innocent III in *Ad liberandam* in very similar terms to those used by Durant. The pope wrote that clerics on the fifth crusade should devote themselves to prayer and exhortation to teach the crusaders by word and example.⁸⁸ In earlier crusades, particularly the first, the clergy played a prominent role, organising prayers and processions, notably at the battle of Antioch and the siege of Jerusalem. The *Gesta Francorum* also reports that during the popular crusade, bishops and priests encouraged the army when it was besieged by the Turks.⁸⁹ The army of the fourth crusade was summoned to a sermon before the attack on Constantinople, while clergy lay prostrate before the True Cross to pray for victory at Damietta.⁹⁰ On crusades of the later thirteenth century, the role of the clergy was much less

⁸⁴Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 65, 88.

⁸⁵Migne *PL* 180, col. 1065 (*Quantum praedecessores*); *PL* 202, col. 1542 (*Audita tremendi*).

⁸⁶William Durant, p. 106.

⁸⁷*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1111. Fulk of Villaret (p. 605) also recommended that the pope send a legate as his representative, in addition to appointing a secular leader for the expedition.

⁸⁸Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 187-8.

⁸⁹*Gesta Francorum*, pp. 4, 67-8, 90.

⁹⁰Robert of Clari, *The Conquest of Constantinople*, tr. E. H. McNeal (New York, 1936), p. 94; Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 26-7.

prominent, and it is notable that the only theorists to favour this form of clerical participation in the crusades were prelates.

Another aspect of the spiritual state of crusaders was their motives for going to the Holy Land. The author of the *Memoria* emphasised the importance of a crusader having pure intentions if he were to reach Jerusalem, and that no one should go 'ductus ex concupiditate terrenarum rerum'. He argued that this required the crusader to pay his own costs, and illustrated this by recounting that on the first crusade, 100,000 horse and 600,000 foot left Constantinople, but only 1,500 horse and 20,000 foot reached Jerusalem since only these had pure motives.⁹¹ This represented a very uncompromising view of participation in the crusades, harking back to the first century of the movement, when the papacy took the stance that any spiritual privileges depended on the intention of the crusader. Hence, Urban II granted a remission of penance to those who made the journey 'pro sola devotione, non pro honoris vel pecuniae adeptione', while Eugenius III granted the same remission of sins for those who went inspired by devotion.⁹² By the time of the fifth crusade, there was less emphasis on this, and professional soldiers were occasionally used in the east. However, it was necessary for a crusader to be confessed if he were to receive the benefit of the indulgence. Dubois followed this line by arguing that crusaders should be 'truly penitent and confessed' before they went on crusade.⁹³ However, other theorists betrayed no concern with such issues, and in discussions of crusaders they were more concerned with numbers and military ability than their spiritual state.

In addition to improving the behaviour of crusaders, some theorists believed that it was necessary to have the spiritual support of all Christendom, usually in the form of prayer, to ensure success. The author of the *Directorium* believed that help

⁹¹'Memoria', pp. 436-8.

⁹²*Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 12, col. 830; Migne, *PL* 180, cols. 1064-6.

⁹³Dubois, p. 195.

from God should be implored by prayers in all churches throughout the world, allowing Christians to show their devotion, whatever their means. He gave examples from the bible of the efficacy of prayer, as did Fidenzio of Padua, although the latter was more concerned that the crusaders themselves pray regularly.⁹⁴ The role of prayer was particularly stressed by prelates. William Durant recommended that masses and special intercessions be ordained by the pope throughout the whole church.⁹⁵ Such ideas had earlier been raised at the provincial church councils held at Lyons, Canterbury and Rheims in 1292. The English prelates gave particularly detailed recommendations for the spiritual well-being of Christendom. They proposed that each parish should be roused to aid the Holy Land by preaching and by one special mass each week at which prayers were to be said in memory of the Holy Land. Moreover, the pope should ordain prayers, alms, fasts and processions throughout the whole church.⁹⁶ Their proposals had some similarities with those of Innocent III's *Quia maior*, which gave considerable attention to such preparations.⁹⁷

Pierre Dubois believed that the 'earnest prayers of the universal Church' were necessary to ensure the recovery of the Holy Land, but he thought that the church needed to be reformed for these to be effective. His detailed discussion of the practicalities of this is another example of the wide-ranging nature of his treatise. He criticised the worldliness and avarice of prelates, arguing that they should lose their temporalities, and he also believed that measures were needed to re-establish monastic discipline.⁹⁸ While those authors who addressed this subject before the fall of Acre, such as Humbert of Romans, were clearly motivated by spiritual concerns,

⁹⁴'Directorium', pp. 393-4; Fidenzio, pp. 40-1.

⁹⁵William Durant, p. 110.

⁹⁶*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, pp. 1107, 1109-10; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 211; John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', p. 580. There is no mention of spiritual measures in reports from the councils of Sens, Milan or Salzburg.

⁹⁷Migne, *PL* 216, cols. 820-1.

⁹⁸Dubois, pp. 88-113.

Dubois was also concerned with the financial benefits which could accrue to the French crown. Many of his recommendations were linked to the struggle between the papacy and French crown, and similar ideas are found in some of his other pamphlets.⁹⁹ His is the only proposal written in this period to address church reform in conjunction with the crusade, but the link between the two dates back into the thirteenth century. When Gregory X summoned the council of Lyons, he called for advice on the three subjects of the crusade, church reform and the union of the Latin and Greek churches. Humbert of Romans dedicated one section of his *Opus tripartitum* to the reform of the church, while Gilbert of Tournai's *Collectio de scandalis ecclesie* was dominated by the subject.¹⁰⁰ By the time of the council of Vienne, held in 1311-12, interest in church reform appears to have waned. Clement V requested advice on the crusade, the Templars and the reform of the church, but only the memoirs of William Durant and William le Maire addressed the last issue. The latter treated the subject separately from the crusade, and there was no conception that reform was a prerequisite of a successful crusade.¹⁰¹ Other proposals written for the council, by Nogaret, Henry II and Lull, restricted their discussion to the crusade, demonstrating that for the majority of the theorists, such religious considerations were not important.

A few authors implied that the schism between the Greek and Latin churches was a spiritual obstacle to the success of a crusade.¹⁰² William Adam was a passionate advocate of an attack on Constantinople, and suggested a number of religious arguments in support. He claimed that 'plus tenemur Grecos invadere

⁹⁹Dubois, 'De facto Templariorum', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 180-1; 'Pro facto Terre Sancte', *loc. cit.*, pp. 188-9.

¹⁰⁰Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 223-9; Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', pp. 35-62.

¹⁰¹William le Maire, pp. 476-88. Similarly, Humbert of Romans made no link between the crusade and the reform of the church or the end of the schism. The three sections are entirely discrete and contain no references to each other.

¹⁰²The military and strategic aspects of this question, and the background of attempts to organise the recovery of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, are discussed below in chapter five.

quam Saracenos', since the Greeks had once been part of the church but had since left. Hence they needed correction, just as a father would correct an errant son, through love.¹⁰³ The idea of the punishment of heresy as an act of charity was first suggested by Augustine, who regarded it as imposing beneficial discipline, and canonists had little difficulty justifying crusades against heretics such as the Cathars.¹⁰⁴ The author of the *Directorium*, who shared Adam's views, concentrated on practical arguments to support the case for an invasion of Greek territories, since he wrote for a secular ruler, but he also claimed that success would bring the Greeks back to the Catholic fold.¹⁰⁵ The descriptions of the Greeks used by both of these authors suggest that it was personal animosity that motivated their desire to see the Byzantine empire invaded, rather than religious considerations. Most in this period viewed the recovery of the Greek empire as a political end in itself, even if it was usually presented as a necessary step on the road to Jerusalem. However, both Dubois and Sanudo recommended that the Greeks should be attacked after the crusaders had recovered the Holy Land. Dubois was motivated by his desire to see French hegemony over the east, but Sanudo was apparently motivated both by the opportunity to control the Mediterranean and by religious concerns. His letters indicate that he was keen to see a peaceful union of the churches, and in the *Liber secretorum* he expressed the hope that the four patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch could be restored to the church.¹⁰⁶

Ramon Lull regarded heretics and schismatics within Christendom as being equally dangerous to the church as alternative faiths such as Judaism and Islam, and he consequently devoted much attention to producing arguments to be used against

¹⁰³William Adam, pp. 544-5.

¹⁰⁴Russell, *Just War*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁵'Directorium', pp. 441-6, 462-73.

¹⁰⁶Dubois, pp. 156-7; Sanudo, p. 94; letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 301-2.

them.¹⁰⁷ This was not always presented as a necessary precursor to the crusade, but in an early work, the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, he argued that the pope should go to Constantinople to preach to the Greeks. If he failed to convert them, military force would be used, but if not, all would march together against the Moslems.¹⁰⁸ In the *Liber de acquisitione* he argued that it was necessary for Rome and Constantinople to stand together against the Moslems, but also suggested practical military advantages which would come from union of the churches.¹⁰⁹ Lull viewed the destruction of heresy and the end of the schism as an objective in itself, as part of his desire to see the entire world converted to Latin Christianity, and it was this, rather than the crusade, which motivated his ideas. Few other authors were concerned with the spiritual dimension of the Greek schism, and spiritual preparations were generally given only minimal consideration by the theorists, with most attention being given by religious authors.

Crusade and conversion

The purpose of crusades to the east was viewed, by the papacy at least, as being the recovery or defence of the Holy Land. Despite occasional incidents of the conversion of Moslems, whether forcible or otherwise, this was never presented as an aim of crusading, although Innocent IV argued that one pretext for a crusade would be a refusal by the Moslems to allow preaching in their lands.¹¹⁰ Most of the theorists were similarly unconcerned with such questions, and simply viewed the crusade purely as an expedition to recover temporal possession of the Holy Places. A few authors implied a more ambitious goal, arguing for either the conversion or destruction of the enemy. The Hospitallers stated that their recommendations should

¹⁰⁷Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 260-6; 'Liber de acquisitione', pp. 274-6.

¹⁰⁸Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 100.

¹⁰⁹Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 268.

¹¹⁰Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, f. 165.

be followed to ensure 'le recouvrement de la Terre Sainte et la destruction des mescreans Sarrazins', while Molay stated that the aim of a passage was 'pro destructione inimicorum fidei christiane et pro restauratione Terre Sancte'.¹¹¹ It is unclear whether these authors hoped for the termination of Moslem political power in the region, or the complete annihilation of Islam. Unlike other works, neither of the proposals contain any suggestion that the 'destruction' of Islam should be seriously attempted through conversion or further conquest, and it seems likely that the phrase, which is often found in crusade bulls and similar literature, was not intended as a literal aspiration.

A few theorists were concerned with the destruction of the Islamic faith through the conversion of Moslems. Pierre Dubois saw the primary aim of the crusade as the recovery of the crusader states, preferably under French domination, but he believed that the inhabitants of a newly conquered Holy Land should work to convert the Moslems to Christianity. One idiosyncratic idea was to educate attractive girls, dress them well using funds collected for the Holy Land, then pass them off as daughters of princes and marry them to Saracen chiefs and Greek clerics. The women would adhere to the Latin faith and teach their husbands and children, while their masses and chants would attract others. Dubois believed that these women should be educated in the arts of medicine and surgery to enable them to influence eastern women through their skills. He also argued that the eastern practice of polygamy would attract women to Christianity, and give the Catholic wives of easterners great incentive to convert their husbands since, once converted, the men would have to abandon all but one wife, and these women 'would rather have a man to herself...than that seven or more wives should share one husband'.¹¹²

¹¹¹Hospitallers, p. 224; Molay, p. 147.

¹¹²Dubois, pp. 118-20, 124.

His plan did not account for official disapproval of marriages between Christians and Moslems, although these did take place.¹¹³

In contrast to Dubois, Marino Sanudo advocated either the conversion or the destruction of the Moslems, and wrote that after they were subjugated by a Christian army, they should be converted 'Christianorum gladio persequente'.¹¹⁴ Despite the attitude of the papacy, a few crusaders and writers clearly did view conversion as an aim. When the army of the second crusade stood outside Constantinople debating whether to capture the city, one of the crusaders stated that their purpose was to visit the Lord's Sepulchre and 'nostra crimina...paganorum sanguine vel conversione delere'.¹¹⁵ Similarly, Pelagius is reported to have urged the army of the fifth crusade into battle asking God for aid 'so that we may be able to convert the perfidious and worthless people'.¹¹⁶ There were some examples of forced conversion in the east, as when James of Vitry converted young children captured after the attack on Mount Tabor and again, after the capture of Damietta.¹¹⁷ However, this was more common in the Baltic, where conversion was an avowed aim of the crusade. Bernard of Clairvaux urged support for a crusade against the Wends in a letter of 1147, which called for Christians to annihilate or convert the pagans, an appeal which went far beyond the intentions expressed by Eugenius III in his bull.¹¹⁸

That all these authors wrote recovery treatises demonstrates that they were in favour of sending a crusade against the Moslems rather than preaching to convert

¹¹³J. A. Brundage, *Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe* (Chicago, 1987), pp. 195-6, 238.

¹¹⁴Sanudo, pp. 1, 91.

¹¹⁵Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. and tr. V. G. Berry (New York, 1948), p. 70.

¹¹⁶Anonymous account, quoted in B. Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European approaches to the Muslims* (Princeton, 1984), p. 72.

¹¹⁷Oliver of Paderborn, pp. 16, 48.

¹¹⁸H.-D. Kahl, 'Crusade eschatology as seen by St Bernard in the years 1146 to 1148', in *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, ed. M. Gervers (New York, 1992), pp. 42-4.

them. It is striking that one Franciscan, Fidenzio of Padua, and two Dominicans, William Adam and the author of the *Directorium*, took this line since all had devoted themselves to missionary work in the east. Fidenzio was clearly disillusioned by the difficulties of preaching to the Moslems, since he wrote that Islam had a great hold over its followers, and even proved attractive to many Christians. He also reported that they refused to listen to Christian preachers and killed those who spoke out against Mohammed.¹¹⁹ Despite growing realisation of the futility of preaching, William Durant suggested that men should be sent to the east to preach to the Moslems before the launch of a crusade, although he seemed more concerned that refusal to accept the Holy Spirit would give the army just cause for a crusade, implying that he expected them to fail.¹²⁰ The council of Canterbury recommended that 'spiritual warriors' be sent to preach in Arabic before a crusade, expressing the hope that martyrdom of the preachers might sway the Moslems, although there was no evidence from previous attempts that this would be the case.¹²¹ Indeed, it has been claimed that this period saw a realisation that preaching was 'more conducive to filling heaven with Christian martyrs than the earth with Moslem converts'.¹²²

Among the theorists, only Ramon Lull was a committed supporter of missionary work above the crusade as a means of spreading Christianity, as three visits to North Africa illustrate.¹²³ Lull's ultimate goal was the conversion of the entire world to Latin Christianity, and he included arguments to use against heretics, schismatics, Jews, Moslems and Tartars in all of his works on the crusade. He recognised that the Moslems were particularly intractable but still held out hope of

¹¹⁹Fidenzio, pp. 21-3. Compare Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', pp. 188, 200.

¹²⁰William Durant, p. 110.

¹²¹*Councils and Synods*, vol. 2, p. 1110.

¹²²Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*, p. 155.

¹²³Hillgarth finds no contemporary evidence for the legend of Lull's martyrdom (p. 134, n. 369).

success. In the *Liber de acquisitione* he argued that many wise Saracens were unconvinced by Islam, and could be converted to Christianity, thus providing an example to the rest.¹²⁴ He believed that Moslem captives should be educated in a Christian environment before being sent back to convert their fellows, and attempted to put these ideas into practice in Naples in 1294, when he preached to prisoners in the Castell dell'Oro.¹²⁵ His attitude towards the crusade changed over the period, but he viewed it as a tool of missionary activity, more than an expedition to recover the Holy Places. Soon after the fall of Acre he wrote 'principare contra infideles disputando et concordando in dignitatibus Dei et in rationibus necessariis plus importat quam bellare'.¹²⁶ However, Lull recognised that the crusade would facilitate missionary work. He proposed that crusading armies contain preachers, and he intended his new, unified military order to have a strong missionary role.¹²⁷ In the *Liber de fine* he suggested that the threat of a crusade could be used to induce conversion, arguing that Saracen emirs in Africa could be confirmed in their possessions if they converted to Christianity, but would face perpetual warfare if not.¹²⁸ This is a rare occasion when Lull gave an explicit account of the role to be played by the crusade in the conversion of the Moslems. On another occasion, in a work of the late 1270s, the *Ars Iuris*, Lull urged a crusade if the Moslems refused to allow preaching, adopting Innocent IV's justification of the crusades.¹²⁹

Lull's ideas on the respective roles of preaching and crusade shifted throughout his career as a writer, but there is an underlying preference for peaceful

¹²⁴Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', pp. 272-3. William of Tripoli also argued that 'Sarracenorum sapientes' were close to the Christian faith ('De statu saracenorum', pp. 595-6).

¹²⁵Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 104; Johnston, 'Ramon Llull and the compulsory evangelisation of Jews and Muslims', pp. 19-21.

¹²⁶Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 110.

¹²⁷Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 282-4.

¹²⁸Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 283.

¹²⁹Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*, pp. 192, 225-8.

means where possible. Consequently, he stands out from the other theorists of the period who were committed to acquiring the Holy Land by force. Lull had a much broader view of the struggle against the Saracens, and saw it in terms of a struggle between faiths rather than armies. Consequently, all his plans discussed the crusade in several theatres of war, not only the Holy Land but Spain, North Africa and 'Romania'. Other theorists generally addressed the crusade as a military problem, particularly, although not exclusively, those who were based in the east. The primary goal of the crusade was the recovery of the Holy Land, and, with the sole exception of Lull, all those who were concerned with conversion regarded it as a secondary matter, a postscript to the crusade.

Conclusion

The proposals written to advise on the crusade at the request of the pope generally had little concern with spiritual issues, and were restricted to practical matters. One exception to this is Fidenzio of Padua's *Liber recuperationis Terre Sancte* which is infused with a strong moral tone throughout, and which placed great emphasis on the behaviour and spiritual state of crusaders. Fidenzio's religious background, as the Franciscan vicar-general of the Holy Land, accounts for this perspective, but it is notable that much of his proposal is dominated by carefully worked-out plans for a military expedition. The same is true of the works by the other friars, William Adam and the author of the *Directorium*, which have similar religious overtones but an ultimately practical approach to the crusade. This approach is common to all the recovery treatises of the era, including those written by the bishops, William Durant and Garcias d'Ayerve, and the responses of the provincial church councils to Nicholas IV in 1291. The only proposal which is dominated by religious ideas is that written by Galvano of Levanto, which contained no practical advice on the conduct of an expedition. This is an exceptional treatise which has few, if any, similarities with the main corpus of work produced by the theorists. In general, it is impossible to identify any distinct groups among the

theorists on the basis of their approach to spiritual aspects of the crusade. These were common both to works written purely for advisory purposes and to works aimed at promoting the crusade, and it is rare to find any proposal which is entirely devoid of such sentiment. Those who did address these matters gave them low prominence, and they cannot be meaningfully compared with *excitatoria*, or with the theological works of canonists. Their ideas on these issues were invariably drawn from earlier authors, and particularly from papal bulls on the crusade, and showed no originality of thinking.

IV. ENEMIES, ALLIES AND PRELIMINARY STRATEGY

The proposals were written primarily to provide advice on the strategy to be adopted by a recovery expedition, and this subject dominates their content. Some of the authors, such as the masters of the military orders and the king of Cyprus, were asked to give advice because of their long experience of war in the east, but even prelates living in the west felt able to comment on this subject, often at length. The care with which authors outlined a strategy for their proposed crusade reflected awareness of the changed situation in the east after 1291. The fall of Acre demonstrated that the Mamluk sultanate was an impressive military power and presented an enormous obstacle to the recovery of the Holy Land. Soon after 1291, Charles II wrote that it would be folly to attempt a crusade while the sultan was so powerful.¹ Consequently, strategic thinking in this period tended to favour measures designed to improve the position of the crusaders relative to their enemy with minimal military confrontation, by using a preliminary campaign against the Mamluks to damage their economy and hence their military power. Many of the authors who were familiar with the east also provided some evaluation of the Mamluks to explain their favoured strategy and others raised the possibility of using an alliance with the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia to strengthen the Christians prior to a crusade.

The theorists' proposals for preliminary measures against the Moslems have a superficial homogeneity absent from their discussions of the routes and destination for the final crusade. Schein has argued that the first three proposals, written by Fidenzio, Lull and Charles II between 1291 and 1294, 'became models which were to dominate the whole period [1291-1314]'. Later works 'were to repeat earlier

¹Charles II, p. 353.

ideas, and though some showed changes, basically they were to be variations of the same theme'.² There was certainly a strong consensus among the writers that plans should centre on a naval blockade to deny the Mamluks imports of certain goods, but the details of this plan ranged from simply intercepting trade to raiding the Mamluk coast to devastate or capture land. It is possible to distinguish between uninformed writers who adopted the plan because it was the prevailing opinion, and those who were acquainted with the east who used their knowledge to explain and refine the scheme. A few proposals clearly had some impact on crusade plans prepared at the curia or French court, but generally the theorists' thinking tended to be more aggressive than that of the papacy, which was primarily concerned with the defence of existing possessions in the east.

The Mamluks

A number of the theorists attempted to assess the strength of the enemy they faced, to draw conclusions for the direction of a future crusade. The great majority of these men were familiar with the east, though not necessarily with either the Mamluks or with military affairs. William Adam and the author of the *Directorium*, Dominican preachers who had travelled widely in Asia and the Indian Ocean, regarded the inhabitants of Egypt with contempt, as effeminate and militarily inept, attitudes conditioned more by their antipathy towards eastern peoples than by first-hand observations.³ Pierre Dubois, who was equally ignorant of the Mamluks, believed that their power derived from advice received from 'wicked angels' who dwelt in the Holy Land.⁴ Other authors preferred to base their appraisal of the Mamluks on their military strength. The theorists variously estimated the size of their army or gave an assessment of its calibre as a fighting force. Two authors

²Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 93.

³William Adam, p. 533; 'Directorium', p. 513 (which argued that only the Greeks and Egyptians were worse at warfare than the Turks).

⁴Dubois, pp. 70-4.

described the arms and tactics of the enemy in some detail, arguing that Mamluk ascendancy made it necessary for the Christians to adapt their way of fighting to war in the east.

Both Henry II and Marino Sanudo gave the same total figure for the enemy army of 60,000 horse, and both reported that of these, a third were good soldiers, a third mediocre and a third worthless. Henry II claimed to have received this information from old men of Syria, but it is difficult to accept that these figures came from a well-informed source.⁵ It is possible that the differing qualities of men were originally intended to represent different types of troops in the sultan's army, which included highly trained royal mamluks, the lower-status mamluks of the emirs, and the light armed *halqa*. However, the high, rounded numbers, and their division into equal categories suggest that the figures were concocted in a manner common to many medieval writers. The fact that the two authors give precisely the same figure implies either that one used the other's work, or that the information comes from a common source. If the former is the case, it seems likely that Sanudo had taken his figure from Henry's proposal. This was completed in 1311, while Sanudo began the second chapter of the *Liber secretorum* in December 1312.⁶ The 'antiquos de Syria' from whom Henry received the information were probably refugees from the Latin states, many of whom fled to Cyprus after the fall of Acre in 1291. Sanudo travelled widely in the east in the period between 1312 and the completion of the *Liber secretorum*, and visited Cyprus where he may have heard this figure from other exiles or perhaps from the king himself.⁷ The two authors use the figures in different ways. Sanudo emphasised the strength of the sultan's army and stated that in addition to the 60,000 horsemen, the sultan had many good archers

⁵Henry II, p. 124; Sanudo, p. 38.

⁶Sanudo, p. 34. The earlier version of the first book of the *Liber secretorum*, the *Conditiones Terrae Sanctae* was written in 1306-9, but only discussed the blockade and made no reference to the planned crusade (Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 54-64).

⁷Sanudo, p. 3; Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, p. 82.

in Syria, although he claimed that Syria had been harried by the Tartars and Armenians.⁸ Henry II took the figure of 60,000 to be an ideal total for all the sultan's territories and argued that the depredations of the Mongols had weakened the army and reduced its numbers.⁹

Four other authors attempted to calculate the size of the sultan's army. Fidenzio of Padua gave a figure of at least 40,000 horse, while James of Molay estimated the army in Syria alone to consist of around 15,000 horse and 50,000 foot.¹⁰ Neither author gives any indication of the source of his information, but Fidenzio had spent some time with the sultan's army, conversing with soldiers, and hence had an opportunity to question them on military matters. Both men use these high figures to argue that the crusade army should be similarly large and their inflated figures suggest that they had a rather poor grasp of the true size of armies. Roger of Stanegrave, who had been imprisoned in Egypt, claimed that the sultan had 20,000 children between the ages of eight and eighteen in training, and that the army totalled 150,000 men, an enormous figure which suggests that his information was unreliable.¹¹ Only Hayton was well informed about the Mamluk army. He estimated that the sultan's army included around 20,000 men in Egypt and 5,000 men in Syria, in addition to Bedouin and Turks. His total figure of 25,000 is strikingly similar to that given by the *Devises des chemins de babiloine*, although the division of the forces is different. The *Devises* gives a total of 24,900, with 15,000 in Egypt and 9,900 in Syria.¹² This report was compiled by the Hospitallers based on an internal report on the Mamluk army made in 1297-9.¹³ Aside from the *Devises*,

⁸Sanudo, pp. 26, 38.

⁹Henry II, pp. 124-5.

¹⁰Fidenzio, p. 28; Molay, p. 146.

¹¹BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 5.

¹²Hayton, pp. 341-2; 'Devises des chemins de Babiloine', pp. 240-1.

¹³Irwin, 'How many miles to Babylon? The *Devises des Chemins de Babiloine* redated', pp. 59-63.

information on the size of Mamluk armies is difficult to find, and many estimates from eastern chroniclers appear as wild as the Christian figures: under Qalawun, estimates of the number of royal mamluks range from 6,000 to 10,000.¹⁴ Despite the similarity of the total figures given by Hayton and the *Devisé*, the different division between Egypt and Syria indicates that Hayton obtained his information from a separate, but well-informed, source.

Fidenzio of Padua and Ramon Lull both gave a more detailed account of the quality of the Mamluk army than the simplistic tripartite division used by Henry II and Sanudo. Fidenzio was in a particularly strong position to discuss the army as he had twice spent time with the sultan's forces, on both occasions after Moslem victories, at Antioch (1268) and Tripoli (1289).¹⁵ Although a religious man, he was knowledgeable about military affairs and was impressed with the Mamluks, stating that many of the men 'sunt valde strenui in armis et fortissimi bellatores'. Fidenzio clearly believed that the Moslems were superior in fighting quality to the Christians, and that the latter had much to learn from them in military matters. He was greatly impressed by the organisation of the army, which he reported was divided and subdivided into precise units.¹⁶ Ramon Lull did not have the same first-hand experience of the Mamluks as Fidenzio, but he travelled to the east in 1301, where he met the master of the Temple and King Henry of Cyprus.¹⁷ In the two crusading proposals written after this visit he listed the respective military advantages of Christians and Moslems, presumably based on information he received in the east. In the *Liber de fine* he argued that the disposition of the Mamluk army was one of only three advantages they had over the Christians, whom he advised to adopt this

¹⁴D. Ayalon, 'Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army', in id. *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt* (Variorum reprint: London, 1977), pp. 70-1, 204, 223-4.

¹⁵Fidenzio, pp. 21, 29: 'nam cum Sarraceni cepissent Antiochiam, ego ivi ad exercitum ipsorum, si forte possem de Xpistianis captivis aliquid boni facere.'

¹⁶Fidenzio, pp. 28-31.

¹⁷Lull, 'Vita coetanea', pp. 294-6; Hillgarth, p. 58.

practice.¹⁸ The precise division of armies into units of tens, hundreds and thousands clearly had some appeal to the medieval mind since Dubois recommended this for the Christian army, while Hayton, John of Plan Carpini and Marco Polo all reported the Mongol practice of organising their army in this way with approval.¹⁹

Fidenzio described the arms used by the Moslem forces, and the manner in which they were used, drawing on knowledge acquired while travelling with the Mamluk army. The most powerful Saracen horsemen were armed with bows, a sword and a hammer, which they were well-trained to use. Their archers only wore leather jerkins, and their horses were unprotected, but consequently faster.²⁰ He reported that the Mamluk army exercised regularly, a reference to the training in horsemanship and other skills which was a feature of the army. Baybars in particular promoted this, and it may be no coincidence that Fidenzio had accompanied the Mamluk army during his reign.²¹ Lull also assessed the arms and armour used by both sides and concluded that Christian swords and bows were superior to their Moslem counterparts, and that their lances, the weapons of the heavy cavalry, were particularly feared.²² Lull's more favourable opinion of Christian arms and tactics may be due to his knowledge of Spain where Christians were more successful.

Both Fidenzio and Lull described the tactics used by the Moslems and concluded that the crusaders needed to adapt their method of fighting to succeed in the east. Fidenzio argued that the latter should learn from their enemy: 'discant ergo

¹⁸Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 280. The other advantages were their light horsemen and Turkish bows.

¹⁹Dubois, p. 85; Hayton, pp. 149-50; John of Plan Carpini, 'History of the Mongols' in C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission* (London, 1955), pp. 32-3; Marco Polo, *The Travels*, tr. R. Latham (London, 1958), p. 81.

²⁰Fidenzio, pp. 28-9, 58. On the arms of the Mamluks, see R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War (1260-1281)* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 215-18.

²¹Fidenzio, p. 28; Amitai-Preiss, p. 73. Roger of Stanegrave also referred to military exercises, relating that young mamluk slaves spent three days per week in training (BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 5).

²²Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 278-81; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 267.

fideles ab infidelibus'.²³ He suggested that the crusaders make greater use of archers, and attack the unprotected horses of the Mamluks, while taking care not to be fooled by their stratagem of feigned retreats, which had proved successful at several engagements, including the victory over Theobald of Champagne near Gaza in November 1239.²⁴ Similarly, Lull believed that the Moslems held an advantage over Christians because of their mobile manner of fighting. He proposed that the crusaders should learn the Saracen method of warfare in North Africa and Turkey, and recruit light-armed horsemen to counter it, suggesting the 'almugavares' of the Iberian peninsula.²⁵ While both authors viewed the Moslems as superior fighters, they were keen to demonstrate that the crusaders could be victorious if they altered their tactics. In contrast, Charles II judged that the sultan's preferred tactic of drawing an invading army into the interior of the country would bring defeat to a crusading army.²⁶

Hayton gives a detailed description of the Mamluk army evidently based on accurate information about its organisation. This may have come from Armenian contacts with the Ilkhans, who used spies against the Mamluks.²⁷ He reported that the army was permanently based in Cairo, which allowed it to be called up very quickly, and described the system of payment and recruitment, by which an emir was given money by the sultan to raise a fixed number of troops. Hayton believed that this weakened the army because the emirs bought the cheapest men available and pocketed the money they saved. He reported that the Syrian army lived off lands and rents it received, demonstrating his awareness of the allocation of revenues of rural areas to emirs, known as *iqta'at*, with which they were to maintain

²³Fidenzio, p. 30.

²⁴Fidenzio, pp. 29-30.

²⁵Lull, 'Epistola', pp. 97-8; 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 101; 'Liber de fine', pp. 278-9; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 267.

²⁶Charles II, pp. 353-4.

²⁷M. M. Ziada, 'The Mamluk Sultans to 1293', Setton 2, pp. 755-6; Amitai-Preiss, pp. 72, 152-6.

their household and purchase mamluks.²⁸ Although well-informed, Hayton's report was coloured by a desire to promote the idea of an alliance with the Mongols, and he tended to emphasise or exaggerate Mongol successes. He was thus rather disparaging about the quality of the sultan's army, reporting that it had been weakened as a result of warfare against the Ilkhans.²⁹

A few writers argued that the Mamluks were debilitated by their internal political divisions. Henry II stated that the creation of a new sultan was habitually accompanied by great strife, and that the current sultan had killed many of his emirs.³⁰ Hayton reported that the sultan perpetually feared plots, and related that four previous sultans had been killed by the sword, two poisoned and two exiled. The current sultan had been deposed once, and lived in constant expectation of being killed.³¹ The sultan in power when both Hayton and Henry II wrote, an-Nasir Muhammad, had been deposed in 1294 and reinstated in 1299, and after Hayton completed his work, an-Nasir resigned the sultanate in 1309, before enjoying an uninterrupted reign from 1310 until his death in 1341. The early years of his reign were marked by severe internal disorder and it is unsurprising that Hayton and others drew the conclusion that the Mamluk state was weakened.³² In theory, sultans were chosen by the assent of all the emirs in a council, and there was no hereditary right of succession, which allowed for opposition to each new accession. A new sultan had to reward emirs who had supported his accession, and usually secured himself by using his own personal mamluks in the royal corps. Naturally this led to disaffection among those replaced, and frequent bloodshed. The sultanate appeared highly unstable, and the opinion of outside observers is understandable, yet

²⁸Hayton, p. 342; Amitai-Preiss, p. 72.

²⁹Hayton, p. 351.

³⁰Henry II, p. 125.

³¹Hayton, pp. 341, 353-4. This description is largely accurate with the exception of Qalawun, who probably died of natural causes rather than poison.

³²See also William Adam, p. 533.

the regime lasted into the sixteenth century, and proved surprisingly durable, due to a highly developed administration and excellent military capabilities.³³

Those writers who discussed the enemy drew differing conclusions about the relative strengths of the Moslems and Christians, and about the consequences this had for the crusade. Charles II believed that the sultan's recent victories over both Christians and Mongols demonstrated that it would be foolish to launch a crusade immediately.³⁴ In contrast, Fidenzio of Padua and James of Molay both felt that large Moslem numbers could be countered by an equally large crusading army, while Fidenzio and Lull believed that crusaders could be successful if they adapted their tactics to conditions in the east.³⁵ Hayton and Henry II both believed that the Mamluks were not as strong as they seemed because of their internal difficulties and the effects of their war with the Ilkhans, and the former felt that conditions in 1307 were favourable for an attack.³⁶ Their common aim was to show that, while the sultan was undoubtedly powerful, he was not invincible. While Charles II believed that it was necessary to weaken the Mamluks prior to the crusade, Fidenzio, Lull and Molay all favoured an immediate general passage. Henry II and Hayton both favoured using economic warfare against the enemy before the crusade, and Hayton in particular believed that it was necessary to find an ally in the east to bolster Christian forces.

The search for allies

Forming an alliance with an eastern power was one potential method of strengthening the Christians against the Mamluks, and the natural choice was the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia. Those theorists who discussed the issue usually had some

³³Ziada, 'The Mamluk sultans', pp. 487-8, 491-2.

³⁴Charles II, pp. 353-4. Nogaret also favoured delaying a crusade for similar reasons (p. 200).

³⁵Fidenzio, p. 28; Molay, p. 146; Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 100; 'Liber de fine', pp. 278-81.

³⁶Hayton, pp. 351-4; Henry II, p. 125.

awareness of the reasons why the Mongols sought an alliance with the west, but were less familiar with previous attempts at co-operation. The idea of allying with them had a long history, and the possibility was explored by several popes during this period, but the most recent serious attempt, in 1300, was either ignored or glossed over by theorists. There was a variety of opinion among authors about the concept of an alliance with the Mongols, ranging from Hayton's enthusiastic support to the outright opposition of the *Memoria*, with several authors ignoring the prospect entirely. Of those who discussed the idea, only Hayton and William Adam had much knowledge of the Mongols, and the former is often guilty of distorting his information to support his cause. Others, particularly in the west, were largely ignorant of the Mongols and relied on literary sources.³⁷

Theorists recognised that the Ilkhans were drawn to an alliance with Christians because of their long-running war against the Mamluks, initiated by the Mongol capture of Persia and subsequent invasion of Syria. The bishop of Leon reported that the Tartars hated the Saracens because of the many struggles they had with them, while Fidenzio claimed that the Tartars desired to avenge the shame of their violent expulsion from the kingdom of Damascus.³⁸ In the historical section of his work, Hayton gave a detailed account of the wars between the Ilkhans and the Mamluks, often exaggerating the success and strength of the Mongols. He blamed a defeat in 1277 on treachery, and reported that the Mongols subsequently annihilated the rearguard of a Mamluk army, a story not found elsewhere.³⁹ With his greater knowledge of the east, Hayton was able to show that the Ilkhans were particularly keen to join the Christians because they faced other enemies besides the Mamluks. He reported that Oljeitu was threatened by two neighbouring Mongol khans, Toqtaï

³⁷Brandt, introduction to Dubois, p. 15, n. 4.

³⁸BN lat. 7470, ff. 127-128; Fidenzio, p. 57, referring to the heavy Mongol defeat at Ain Jalut (1260).

³⁹Hayton, pp. 179-80.

of the Golden Horde and Chepar of the Chagatai khanate.⁴⁰ Of these, the greater menace came from the Golden Horde, with whom the Ilkhans had been at war since 1261-2. Hayton reported that Ghazan's forces withdrew from Syria in 1300 in response to an attack from Baidu of the Golden Horde.⁴¹ The dispute between the two khanates originated in the Ilkhan Hulagu's disputed possession of areas in the north of modern Iran claimed by Berke, and was worsened when the two supported rival candidates for the Great Khanate after the death of Mongke in 1259. Berke was a convert to Islam and may have been angered by the attack on Baghdad and the death of the caliph.⁴²

Hayton was rare in distinguishing individual khanates: most theorists simply wrote of 'the Tartars'. The only other author sharing this depth of knowledge was William Adam, who was aware of contacts between the Mamluks and the khanate of the Golden Horde which seriously threatened the Ilkhans. According to Adam, these two powers exchanged embassies and made pacts, and the khans sent young slaves of both sexes to the Mamluks.⁴³ Baybars initiated contacts with the Golden Horde after war had broken out between the two Mongol khanates but the distances involved precluded them from concerted military action. Adam also reported that the Saracens sent fakirs to the Golden Horde, suggesting that there was a religious dimension to their contacts.⁴⁴ The exchange of embassies began during the reign of Berke, a convert to Islam. Mamluk letters spoke of the Islamic kinship of khan and sultan, and emphasised Berke's duty to prosecute the jihad against Hulagu. Contacts continued after the accession of Mongke Temur, a non-Moslem, and there is little suggestion that the Mamluks sought to inject a religious element into these

⁴⁰Hayton, pp. 176, 213-16.

⁴¹Hayton, pp. 196-8.

⁴²Amitai-Preiss, pp. 78-9.

⁴³William Adam, pp. 530-4. He may well be the only contemporary western source for these links.

⁴⁴William Adam, p. 531.

exchanges, despite the reference to fakirs. Certainly, any attempt was unsuccessful as the Golden Horde only converted to Islam in the mid-fourteenth century, after the Ilkhans of Persia.⁴⁵

To some theorists, the Ilkhans' history of contacts with the west suggested that they would be amenable to an alliance. Hayton completed his proposal shortly after an embassy arrived at the curia from Oljeitu offering assistance in capturing the Holy Land, and he urged the pope to accept.⁴⁶ Both William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* recalled the letters sent to Louis IX at the time of his first crusade as evidence of the Mongols' friendly attitude towards Christians.⁴⁷ These letters, brought by an embassy to Cyprus in December 1248, initially seemed promising, but the death of the great khan Guyuk ended any prospect of co-operation. The ambassadors reported that a warlord of the Great Khan, Eljigidei, had been baptised and was coming to the west to assist in the reconquest of the Holy Land, and requested that Louis attack Egypt. It has been argued that the intention was to remove the Christian army from Syria, allowing the Mongol forces free rein, while keeping the Egyptians occupied.⁴⁸ Subsequent contacts with the west were less well-known to the theorists, but were equally unproductive. In 1263, Hulagu suggested to Louis IX that Christians use their naval power in a defensive position to prevent any Mamluks escaping the Mongols, again to ensure that Mongol forces were free to act in Syria.⁴⁹ In 1271 there was a more promising attempt at military co-operation when Abaga replied to a letter from Edward of England agreeing to send his commander, Samaghar, with a large force. In the event, only a small party

⁴⁵Amitai-Preiss, pp. 81-2, 85; Sinor, 'The Mongols and western Europe', pp. 528-9.

⁴⁶Hayton, p. 351.

⁴⁷William Adam, p. 535; *Directorium*, p. 504.

⁴⁸P. Jackson, 'The crisis in the Holy Land in 1260', *EHR* 95 (1980), p. 483.

⁴⁹P. Meyvaert, 'An unknown letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator* 11 (1980), p. 529; J. Richard, 'Une ambassade mongole à Paris en 1262', *Journal des Savants* (1979), pp. 295-303.

was sent which raided northern Syria before retreating in the face of the Mamluk army. Abaga sent an apology to Edward in 1277 for not providing sufficient aid.⁵⁰ Mongol envoys were also present at the council of Lyons in 1274, but, although they were keen for a military alliance, discussions centred on the question of conversion.⁵¹

In his history of the Mongols, Hayton gave a detailed account of relations between the Ilkhans and Christians which supported ideas in the proposal. He distorted information to give a favourable impression of both the Mongol attitude to the west, and the role of Armenia in facilitating exchanges between them. He claimed that Hulagu's invasion of Syria was occasioned by a request made to the great khan, Mongke, by an Armenian embassy. While Hayton claimed that the embassy had been well-received, and that the khan had promised to convert to Christianity, other accounts suggest that Mongols simply ordered the personal submission of the Armenian ruler.⁵² He also claimed that the Ilkhans intended to capture the Holy Land and hand it over to Christians. Consequently, in his account of Hulagu's invasion of Syria he was at pains to demonstrate that the Mongols favoured the Christian rulers of Armenia and Antioch with lands and gifts. He passed over the brief Mongol occupation of Jerusalem, which is indicated in several eastern sources, since this undermined his assertions.⁵³ Although Hayton's claim seems improbable, Joinville believed that Hulagu had promised to hand over the

⁵⁰Sanudo, pp. 224-5; Amitai-Preiss, pp. 98-9. Hayton's short account of Edward's crusade makes no reference to his contacts with the Ilkhans, referring only to the failed assassination attempt (p. 228).

⁵¹J. Richard, 'Chrétien et Mongols au concile: la Papauté et les Mongols de Perse dans la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle', in 1274, *Année Charnière: mutations et continuités*, pp. 36-44.

⁵²Hayton, pp. 163-8; J. A. Boyle, 'The journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the court of the Great Khan Möngke', *Central Asiatic Journal* 9 (1964), p. 178; S. Der Nersessian, 'The Armenian Chronicle of the Constable Smpad or of the "Royal Historian"', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13 (1959), pp. 161, 164.

⁵³Hayton, pp. 170-4; Jackson, 'The crisis in the Holy Land', p. 485. Hayton also fails to report the capture of Syrian cities, again including Jerusalem, in Ghazan's attack of 1299-1300 (pp. 191-5); Sempad, 'Chronique du royaume de la petite Arménie', *RHC Arm.* 1, pp. 659-60; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 163 n. 62.

Holy Land in his letter to Louis IX, although the letter itself is very vague. The promise was made by the Mongol embassy to the council of Lyons in 1274, and again in a letter of Arghun in 1289.⁵⁴

The attitude of the theorists towards an alliance changed through the period. The first authors to favour this plan, Fidenzio of Padua and the author of the *Via*, both completed their proposals against a fairly promising background of contacts with the Ilkhans. In a letter of 1289 to Philip IV, Arghun sent details of a time and place where the armies could meet, and in a memoir attached to the letter, the khan's envoy promised that horses and provisions would be provided if necessary.⁵⁵ The khan also corresponded with the pope, and Fidenzio knew of his promise to provide assistance if a Christian army came to the east. He expected the Mongols to honour this undertaking if the crusade was directed to Armenia or Antioch.⁵⁶ The author of the *Via* included a short section of advice on how the crusade should proceed if an alliance was made, indicating that he viewed this as a distinct possibility. He advised that the two armies attack from northern Syria but remain at least one day's journey apart.⁵⁷ Possibly as a result of Fidenzio's advice, Nicholas IV sent an appeal to the Ilkhan (dated 23 August 1291) requesting assistance, his first letter to the khan which did not deal exclusively with religious issues.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, p. 110; Meyvaert, 'An unknown letter of Hulagu', p. 258, and note 80; J. B. Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun avec l'occident', *ROL* 2 (1894), p. 604: 'si tu tiens parole et envoies les troupes à l'époque fixée...lorsque nous aurons pris à ce peuple Jérusalem, nous te la donnerons'.

⁵⁵Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun', pp. 604, 610-13.

⁵⁶Fidenzio, p. 57.

⁵⁷*Via*, p. 431.

⁵⁸Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun', pp. 581-4, 595-6, 619-23. Schein argues that this letter was the first time that the papacy accepted Mongol offers of military assistance (*Fideles Crucis*, pp. 88-9). However, the letter, which was sent to several Asian rulers, including the emperors of Byzantium and Trebizond and the king of Georgia, was a general appeal for help, making no specific reference to the Mongols or to their offers of assistance. Another letter of 23 August to the khan's son only discussed spiritual issues suggesting that Nicholas's attitude to the Mongols was unchanged.

The Ilkhans were still regarded as potential allies at the close of the thirteenth century by rulers such as James II of Aragon, but they made no further contact with the west until 1299.⁵⁹ In that year, Ghazan invaded Syria and sent messages to the heads of the military orders and to the king of Cyprus calling them to join him. They delayed sending a force until after Ghazan had left Syria, but he sent another message in 1300 promising to return. A Christian force was sent to occupy Tortosa but the Mongols were delayed by rains, and the Christians soon returned to Cyprus leaving only a small Templar garrison on the island.⁶⁰ This event was mentioned by both Hayton and the author of the *Directorium* to demonstrate the willingness of the Ilkhans to co-operate with Christians.⁶¹ High expectations were aroused in Europe, but the failure demonstrated the difficulties of concerted action with the Mongols.⁶² It is striking that Henry II, Fulk of Villaret and James of Molay, all of whom were involved in the Christian response, made no reference to the possibility of co-operation with the Mongols, suggesting that all were disillusioned by this failure.⁶³

After this date, the idea of an alliance with the Ilkhans played a diminishing role in crusade planning. Although Clement V maintained contacts with Oljeitu and hoped to encourage to the khan to assist a crusade, his crusade plans, notably in 1309, included no provision for an alliance.⁶⁴ The question was apparently not

⁵⁹*Acta Aragonensia*, vol. 2, no. 459.

⁶⁰'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 848-50; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 104-5.

⁶¹'Directorium', p. 504; Hayton, pp. 196-203. Hayton's account is rather inaccurate, magnifying the role of the Armenian king in communication between Ghazan and the Christians, and not mentioning the khan's letters. This may be because Hayton was away with the small Armenian force that was accompanying the Mongols and was hence unaware of them (pp. 321-4). There is also no reference to the second attempt at concerted action in 1300.

⁶²Schein, '*Gesta Dei per Mongolos*: the genesis of a non-event', pp. 805-19.

⁶³Henry II did not propose an alliance with the Mongols, but argued that the Mamluks would be deterred from moving forces out of Syria by their fear of a Mongol attack (p. 124).

⁶⁴Clement contacted Oljeitu in 1308, promising to inform him when a new crusade was sent (*Regesta Clementis Papae V*, no. 3549).

raised at the council of Vienne, and formed no part of Capetian plans. However, the idea continued to find support among theorists, and this may be due in part to the influence of Hayton, who made the Mongol alliance an integral part of his proposal. In this he took a more sober view of the prospect of alliance with the Ilkhans than in the historical sections of his work, recognising that they might be unwilling to join the Christians. Nonetheless, he believed that even a small number would be helpful in foraging and spying, while their presence would deter Bedouin and Turcomans from assisting the sultan. He optimistically proposed that a preliminary passage could be sent to the east to receive Syrian cities captured by the Mongols to defend them until the coming of a general passage.⁶⁵ His strong support for this idea was probably due to his personal contacts with the Mongols as a representative of the kingdom of Armenia, in which capacity he had witnessed the enthronement of two khans.⁶⁶

William Adam also made an alliance with the Ilkhans an important element of his plans and he too had personal experience of the Mongols after travelling widely in Persia.⁶⁷ Other authors to follow this line tended to have little knowledge of the east, and made only brief references to co-operation. Nogaret argued that the Tartars and other eastern nations should be brought into an alliance before a crusade was launched, while Sanudo suggested that the Mongols could attack Syria while the Christians invaded Egypt.⁶⁸ The possibility of joint action became remote after the Ilkhans and Mamluks made peace in 1323, but the durability of the idea was such that two later theorists, the bishop of Leon and the author of the *Directorium*,

⁶⁵Hayton, pp. 355-8, 361.

⁶⁶Hayton, pp. 148-9.

⁶⁷William Adam, p. 533. Schein classes Adam as one of the writers influenced by Hayton, but his plans contain sufficient original ideas and information about the east to suggest that he developed his ideas independently (*Fideles Crucis*, p. 215).

⁶⁸Nogaret, p. 200; Sanudo, p. 36.

incorporated it into their plans, indicating their ignorance of eastern affairs.⁶⁹ It also resurfaced in preparations made by Philip VI for his crusade: his report to the pope in 1336 mentioned a letter to the khan of Persia.⁷⁰ Only the author of the *Memoria* openly opposed the idea, arguing that it would be impossible to ally with the Mongols because they were a proud race who despised all others. He added that Genghis Khan had divided up the world between his three sons, one of whom was to conquer Asia, another Europe and the third Africa.⁷¹

Ramon Lull was the sole theorist to be concerned with the religious dimension of contacts with the Mongols. He feared that, because of their simplicity, the Mongols were susceptible to being converted to Islam, and that this could lead to the destruction of Christendom. Hence, he argued that it was vital to convert the Mongols to Christianity first, so they could help to crush the Moslems.⁷² Their conversion formed part of Lull's desire to see the entire world becoming Christian and is typical of his work. Conversion was a consistent feature of papal dealings with the Mongols, although the attitude of individual popes varied. In 1264, Urban IV insisted that Hulagu be baptised before an army was sent from the west, but Gregory X, while retaining the emphasis on religion, did not make conversion a precondition of co-operation.⁷³ In contrast, Nicholas IV largely restricted his correspondence with Arghun and his family to religious issues.⁷⁴

No other theorist was interested in conversion but Hayton clearly believed it important to emphasise their credentials as potential converts in his history, perhaps

⁶⁹BN lat. 7470, ff. 127-128; 'Directorium', p. 504.

⁷⁰Boutaric, 'Ce sont les diligences que li Roys a faite pour le Saint Voyage', p. 436.

⁷¹'Memoria', p. 447. A similar story is found in John of Plan Carpini's account of his journey in the east (Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 43) and Hayton's history of the Mongols (p. 157).

⁷²Lull, 'Epistola', p. 90; 'Liber de fine', pp. 266-8; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 278.

⁷³Amitai-Preiss, pp. 95-100. Clement IV also ignored the issue of conversion, but probably because he had been led to believe that the khan had already converted.

⁷⁴Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun', pp. 581-4, 595-6, 619-23.

because he was writing for the pope. He reported that Mongke Khan and his people had been baptised at the request of the king of Armenia, and that Kubilai Khan was another convert.⁷⁵ Baidu was also reported to be a Christian, and even those khans who were pagan or Moslem are portrayed as having a benevolent attitude towards Christianity, usually manifested in the rebuilding of churches.⁷⁶ This impression of the Ilkhans as favourable to Christians was partly due to their policy of religious toleration, and their recognition that, regardless of faith, the west was their only potential ally against the Mamluks. Both Arghun and Ghazan were Moslems yet were inclined towards an alliance with the west. The Ilkhans appear to have deliberately fostered the impression that they were keen to convert in their embassies in the hope of securing Christian assistance, playing on the optimistic responses of the west to such reports of conversion, both Mongol and Moslem.⁷⁷

There were other potential allies in the east in addition to the Ilkhans but they were of less importance. The Georgians, a Christian people under Mongol domination, were occasionally included as potential allies alongside the Ilkhans. Hayton and Fidenzio both advised the pope to write to their king to seek aid from his people, and William Adam believed that they would form part of an alliance with the Mongols.⁷⁸ Clearly the Georgians were viewed as potential allies largely on the grounds of their Christianity, and it appears that the theorists knew little of them. William Adam reported that the king of Georgia was always named David, a detail found in Marco Polo, and he claimed that they were essential to the success of the Mongols.⁷⁹ He rated them as the best soldiers in the east, and Fidenzio too

⁷⁵Hayton, pp. 160-1, 164-6. Kubilai's conversion was reported by envoys to the west in 1277, and this may be the source of Hayton's information (Amitai-Preiss, p. 101).

⁷⁶Hayton, pp. 188-91.

⁷⁷Amitai-Preiss, p. 104; E. Tisserand, 'Une lettre de l'Ilkhan de Perse Abaga adressée en 1268 au Pape Clément IV', *Muséon* 59 (1946), p. 556.

⁷⁸Hayton, p. 358; Fidenzio, p. 58; William Adam, p. 534.

⁷⁹Marco Polo, p. 35; William Adam, pp. 534-5.

claimed that they were fierce warriors. Nicholas IV included the king of the Georgians in his appeal for assistance in 1291, perhaps because in 1288, Arghun's envoy had promised Philip IV that the two kings of Georgia would be summoned with 20,000 horsemen.⁸⁰ Philip VI wrote to them as part of his preparations in the 1330s.⁸¹ Discussions of the Georgians have some echoes of the Prester John legend, notably the belief in their great numbers and fighting prowess, and use of the name 'David'.⁸² However, none of the theorists referred to Prester John, whose legend was fading in this period before it grew up again in connection with the Christians of Ethiopia.⁸³

Both Sanudo and Hayton viewed the Nubians as a potential source of help against the Mamluks. They argued that they would assist the crusaders by attacking Egypt from the south while the crusade attacked other areas of the sultanate. Hayton was clearly discussing the Christians of Ethiopia, but it is unclear whether Sanudo intended to refer to the Ethiopians or to inhabitants of the Christian kingdoms to the south of Ethiopia, in what is now Sudan.⁸⁴ William Adam had planned to visit Ethiopia to preach, but he made no mention of its potential as an ally of the crusade, only lamenting the lack of western contacts with its people. Both Hayton and the *Directorium* reported that Ethiopians sometimes attacked Egypt, and the latter reported one of their prophecies which stated that they would one day defeat the Egyptians and Arabs, and destroy the tomb of Mohammed at Mecca.⁸⁵ Fidenzio reported that help was available from the Maronite Christian population of the

⁸⁰Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun', pp. 610-13.

⁸¹Boutaric, 'Ce sont les diligences que li Roys a faites pour le Saint Voyage', p. 436.

⁸²R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 45-6: at the time of the fifth crusade, the legate reported Mongol attacks as being led by 'King David, vulgarly called Prester John'.

⁸³Both Joinville and Marco Polo reported that Prester John was a previous overlord of the Tartars who had been defeated and killed (*La vie de Saint Louis*, pp. 181-4; Marco Polo, pp. 76-8).

⁸⁴Sanudo, p. 36; Hayton, p. 358.

⁸⁵Hayton, p. 352; 'Directorium', p. 388.

region around Tripoli. He claimed that if a crusade were sent there, they could be roused to provide assistance, but he rejected this route because of other considerations. Similarly, Hayton believed that there were 40,000 foot soldiers there, all fine archers, who would be sufficient to help a preliminary passage rebuild the city of Tripoli and hold the surrounding area. In his history, he relates that Christians there attacked Moslems fleeing from the defeat at Hims in 1299, information also recorded in the *Gestes des chiprois*.⁸⁶ Unlike Fidenzio, Hayton arranged his proposal to take advantage of the possibility of assistance from native eastern Christians, just as his plans were made in the expectation of assistance from the Ilkhans of Persia. William Adam also based his strategy on Mongol help but other theorists viewed the prospect of aid from eastern powers as only a remote possibility which could not be relied upon.

Mamluk Trade

For most theorists, the concept of finding an ally in the east was peripheral to the main thrust of strategic thinking in this period, which centred on measures to weaken the Mamluks prior to the departure of a crusade. Most believed that crusaders should capitalise on their naval power and exploit two perceived weaknesses of the Mamluks. The first was the enormous extent of their territory, believed to extend for forty days journey, which was thought to be vulnerable to raids on the coast.⁸⁷ The other was the enemy's reliance on imports for certain vital goods. Consequently, most proposals written in this period favoured an embargo on trade with the Mamluks, and several authors discussed the vulnerability of the enemy to economic warfare. Many of the assumptions which underlay this reasoning were originally discussed by Fidenzio of Padua. He gave detailed

⁸⁶Fidenzio, p. 55; Hayton, pp. 195, 357; 'Gestes des chiprois', p. 847. Ludolph of Suchheim claimed that there were 'a multitude of Christians adhering to the Latin rite' who awaited a crusade 'with singular eagerness' (*Description of the Holy Land and the way thither*, tr. A. Stewart (PPTS 27: London, 1895), p. 135).

⁸⁷Fidenzio, p. 56; Villaret, p. 606; Charles II, p. 354.

arguments to support the use of economic warfare, drawing on his knowledge of commerce in the east, and his ideas were reiterated by many authors, some of whom added their own information. Recognition of Mamluk reliance on Christian trade had a long history, as demonstrated by papal prohibitions, and the theorists were not proposing new ideas or information. However, it is striking that their discussions covered the same issues first raised by Fidenzio: imports of wood, iron and slaves; the role of Christians in carrying this trade; and the possibility of denying the sultan revenues from tariffs levied on merchants.

Fidenzio claimed that the Mamluks were particularly vulnerable to a trade embargo because they depended on Christian imports of certain vital commodities, notably wood and metals, which they used for military and naval purposes.⁸⁸ This opinion had a long history, as had attempts to prevent the trade. The papacy banned trade in these materials in 1179, although regional prohibitions had been issued as early as 1165. The same products recur in the string of crusading bulls issued during the thirteenth century, and in several other proposals.⁸⁹ Henry II stated that 'terra Egypti de se non habeat lignamina, nec ferrum, nec picem'.⁹⁰ William Adam reported that wood and iron were vital for the production of arms and the construction of ships. Similarly, both Henry II and Sanudo argued that if denied imported wood, the Egyptians would be incapable of building ships to use for trading and transporting food on the Nile and their canal network.⁹¹ Along with these raw materials, western traders sent finished products, such as arms, horseshoes and ships.⁹² William Adam reported that technical assistance was also given to the Moslems: 'Christiani nequam talia vasa eisdem Sarracenis comperiunt et fabricant,

⁸⁸Fidenzio, p. 47.

⁸⁹*Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 13, cols. 292-3, 429; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 193, 200: 'arma, ferrum et lignamina...galearum'.

⁹⁰Henry II, p. 120. See also Hayton, pp. 355-6.

⁹¹William Adam, p. 523; Henry II, p. 121; Sanudo, p. 25.

⁹²Hospitallers, p. 225; Molay, p. 149; Villaret, p. 606; 'Directorium', p. 408.

et fabricare insuper eos docent'. Such technical help had been condemned in papal decrees against trade with the Moslems which provided for the excommunication of those who 'in machinis aut quibuslibet aliis aliquod eis impendunt consilium vel auxilium'.⁹³

There is little research into the natural resources of the Mamluk sultanate, but the inadequacy of their indigenous resources of wood and iron, and consequent reliance on European sources, is well-attested.⁹⁴ There was a general shortage of timber throughout the middle east, particularly of sufficient quality for ship construction which required large, single tree trunks for masts and yard-arms. The scarcity of wood in the Holy Land was demonstrated as early as the first crusade when the besiegers of Jerusalem had great difficulty in finding wood for the construction of towers.⁹⁵ The only significant source of wood under Mamluk control lay in northern Syria, but otherwise they relied on imports.⁹⁶ Iron was also scarce, but there was at least one mine in the sultan's possession, situated near Beirut. Ibn Battuta, writing in the mid-fourteenth century, reported that iron was exported from there to Egypt, and a twelfth century writer stated that the iron was of good quality and was extracted in large quantities.⁹⁷

The Mamluks were consequently forced to rely on imports, chiefly from areas in the Mediterranean under Christian control because of the inadequacy of alternatives. Timber from the Maghrib was usually destined for areas in the western Mediterranean, while important exports of wood and metals from southern Asia

⁹³William Adam, p. 523; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 193.

⁹⁴Despite the potential importance of this subject, little is known about the natural resources of the Mamluk sultanate, or the role played by Christians in supplying it. See J. H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 9-10.

⁹⁵*Gesta Francorum*, p. 90; Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', p. 467.

⁹⁶M. Lombard, 'Arsenaux et bois de marine dans la Méditerranée musulmane VIIe-XIe siècles', in id. *Espaces et Réseaux du haut moyen âge* (Paris, 1972), pp. 107-14.

⁹⁷*The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, tr. H. A. R. Gibb, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1958), p. 85; G. Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), p. 410. The mine was probably described by these writers as an unusual feature in the region.

Minor relied on Christian shipping and were vulnerable to interception. Henry II reports that his forces captured a Genoese galley carrying wood from Turkey to Egypt.⁹⁸ There was some trade in wood and metals from the Indian Ocean and there is evidence that the Mamluks maintained good relations with the sultans of Delhi to protect this trade.⁹⁹ Wood came from Burma and India, where William Adam reported that, 'est tanta lignorum copia, ut numquam, in aliqua mundi parte, viderim tam altas arbores'.¹⁰⁰ Iron was exported to Egypt from Deccan and Orissa, and copper and tin were imported from India, but the cost of transport ensured that the volume of trade in raw materials was low.¹⁰¹ The most important suppliers were Christian traders, who had traded with the Moslems since the eighth or ninth century, despite papal efforts to prevent them.¹⁰²

Fidenzio believed that the Mamluks relied on Christian imports of other goods which were not then covered by papal prohibitions. He believed that an embargo should cover all products, including honey and oil. This may have prompted Nicholas IV's decision to extend prohibitions on commerce to include the export of food and certain other materials.¹⁰³ The decree was clearly ineffective as Sanudo complained that the Mamluks were supplied with food during the famines which struck Egypt after the fall of Acre. Sanudo was the only other theorist to imply that the Egyptians could be weakened by an embargo on food in this period.

⁹⁸Lombard, 'Arsenaux', pp. 113-18; D. Abulafia, 'Asia, Africa and the trade of medieval Europe', *Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the decline of the Roman Empire*, vol. 2, 2nd edn., ed. M. M. Postan and E. Miller (Cambridge, 1987), p. 455; Henry II, p. 122.

⁹⁹A. R. Lewis, 'Les marchands dans l'Océan indien', in *The Sea and Medieval Civilisations* (Variorum reprint: London, 1978), pp. 447, 452.

¹⁰⁰William Adam, p. 552.

¹⁰¹Lewis, 'Les marchands dans l'Océan indien', p. 452; id. 'Maritime skills in the Indian Ocean, 1368-1500', in *The Sea and Medieval Civilisations*, p. 257. William Adam did not view the interception of raw materials as a role for the fleet in the Indian Ocean.

¹⁰²Abulafia, 'Asia, Africa and the trade of medieval Europe', p. 434; J. E. Nef, 'Mining and metallurgy in medieval civilisation', *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 696-7; E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 8-10, 19-20.

¹⁰³Fidenzio, p. 47; *Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6784-8.

He reported that the sultan's lands imported foodstuffs such as oil, honey, nuts and bread along with raw material for their textile trades, such as silk and wool.¹⁰⁴ With his understanding of the dynamics of trade, Fidenzio recognised that a complete embargo of trade could also impoverish the sultan by preventing him from selling his own exports, such as sugar and textiles, an idea repeated by Lull in the *Liber de fine*.¹⁰⁵

Fidenzio believed that an additional reason to halt all trade with the sultanate would be to prevent the import of the young slaves who were trained to serve as mamluks in the sultan's army. Other writers, mostly from the eastern Mediterranean, drew attention to this trade, without which, in Hayton's opinion, 'non possent eorum exercitum sustentare'. Lull only mentioned this in the treatise written after his visit to the east in 1301.¹⁰⁶ Roger of Stanegrave reported that the sultan had to buy children from cold lands since those in Egypt were soft and tender because of the heat.¹⁰⁷ Mamluk regiments formed the backbone of the sultan's army and were drawn exclusively from slaves bought from the Black Sea region. Neither Arabs nor Africans were used in these units, so the continued supply of slaves was vital for the perpetuation of this system. This lucrative trade was dominated by Genoese traders who held a monopoly of commerce in this region through agreements with the Byzantine emperors.¹⁰⁸ William Adam discussed the trade at length, emphasising the role played by Genoa. He reported that one of their merchants alone, Seguranus Salvago, had imported 10,000 slaves.¹⁰⁹ This figure was clearly exaggerated, but is

¹⁰⁴Sanudo, pp. 24-5; E. Ashtor, 'Economic decline in the medieval middle east', in id. *Technology, Industry and Trade* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992), pp. 253-86.

¹⁰⁵Fidenzio, p. 48; Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 281.

¹⁰⁶Fidenzio, p. 48; Hayton, p. 357; Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 281; Henry II, p. 119.

¹⁰⁷BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 4v.

¹⁰⁸Amitai-Preiss, pp. 2, 85; A. Ehrenkreutz, 'Strategic implications of the slave trade between Genoa and Mamluk Egypt in the second half of the thirteenth century', in *The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: studies in economic and social history*, ed. A. L. Udovitch (Princeton, 1981), pp. 336-7, 340-3.

¹⁰⁹William Adam, pp. 525-6.

indicative of the size of this trade. In the mid-thirteenth century, Baybars is reported to have bought 4000 personal Mamluks, while his emirs made additional purchases for their own units.¹¹⁰ As a Dominican preacher, William Adam was particularly concerned that many of the slaves were Christians forced to abandon their religion when they were bought by the Egyptians, but evidence from the Genoese trading colony at Caffa suggests that the majority were from pagan tribes.¹¹¹

Theorists were particularly concerned with the tariffs levied by the sultan on trade which came to his ports, and it was a common view that these accounted for a significant portion of his income. It may be that many did not find it credible that the sultan could raise enough to support his great armies from his apparently barren lands. Fidenzio was the first to draw attention to this income, which was not mentioned in papal bulls or earlier material. Figures given by the theorists were invariably very high: Fidenzio estimated that the sultan took a toll of one third of the value of each ship, giving him over one thousand florins each day at Alexandria. Subsequent authors gave similarly inflated figures, ranging from Durant's estimation of over 50,000 florins each year to the Hospitallers' figure of one half of each cargo, totalling over 40,000 florins a month from Alexandria alone.¹¹² Sanudo, who was probably the best informed about trade in the Mediterranean stated that the sultan took a toll of one quarter on food and wood, and one third on spices. The true tariffs were probably lower than these figures suggest. The Genoese negotiated a treaty with the Mamluks in which they agreed to pay a tenth on imports of wood and iron, although it is possible that this was a lower rate because these goods were prohibited.¹¹³ The Venetians made a treaty with the sultan in 1302, which stated

¹¹⁰Amitai-Preiss, p. 72.

¹¹¹William Adam, p. 524; M. Balard, *La Romanie Génoise* (Rome, 1978), pp. 291-2; Fidenzio, p. 48.

¹¹²Fidenzio, p. 47; Durant, p. 105; Hospitallers, p. 224. See also Molay, p. 149; 'Informationes Massilie', p. 249; Sanudo, pp. 23-4.

¹¹³Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 8. Lull stated that the tariff was a tenth ('Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 99).

that if any Venetian sold prohibited goods then 'de ipsa pecunia ipsi possent inuestire et extrahere absque aliqua dictione', while other agreements clearly stated that there was to be no tariff on ships built for Moslems.¹¹⁴ Mamluk levies on the spice trade were certainly high, but the theorists clearly over-estimated the sultan's revenue from tolls, and its importance to his treasury.¹¹⁵

The conviction that the Mamluks could be severely affected by economic warfare was such that William Adam regarded money levied from pilgrims to the Holy Places as another area where the sultan's income could be affected. He stated that the sultan took money from all pilgrims who visited the Holy Land, and this needed to be prevented. There were papal prohibitions against visiting the Holy Places which dated back to 1188 when Clement III forbade the practice in the aftermath of the loss of Jerusalem. It was also one of the crimes reserved to the papacy by Innocent IV, but these measures were clearly ineffective. William Adam accused the patriarch of Jerusalem, who was based in Cyprus, of granting pardons in return for money. To enforce the measures, Adam recommended that the sentence of excommunication be extended to those who gave hospitality to the pilgrims, or carried them by sea to the Holy Land.¹¹⁶ However, there was a sustained interest in pilgrimages to the Holy Places shown by diplomatic correspondence between Aragon and Egypt, which included appeals for good treatment and facilities for pilgrims. As with illegal trading with the Moslems, the papacy made money by granting licences to those who went on pilgrimage in the early fourteenth century.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 4; *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents diverses concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique Septentrionale au Moyen Age*, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1866), vol. 2, pp. 31-5, 43-7, 203-6, 216-21.

¹¹⁵Lewis, 'Les marchands dans l'Océan indien', pp. 460-1; Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, p. 9: the land tax of 1298 raised five million dinars, placing even the inflated figures of the theorists for trade tariffs in context.

¹¹⁶William Adam, p. 528; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, p. 115, n. 80.

¹¹⁷*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, nos. 6126, 59260; 'Itinerarium cuiusdam Anglici (1344-45)', p. 438: three anonymous English pilgrims who visited the Holy Land in 1344-5 visited Avignon and left 'absoluti et licentiatii'; A. S. Atiya, *Egypt and Aragon: Embassies and diplomatic correspondence between 1300 and 1330 AD* (Leipzig, 1938), pp. 4, 28, 35.

Just as there was a consensus on the dependency of the Mamluks on banned imports, there was also a unanimous belief among the theorists that the merchants of the great trading cities were responsible for carrying this trade. In making these criticisms, they were joining a tradition of complaints against these merchants, who were regarded as 'mali chrisitani' for their love of profit over the Holy Land. Censure was usually directed at Venice and Genoa, but a number of theorists, usually those who knew the east, mentioned other trading powers. This suggests that they were not simply following earlier criticism but had some knowledge of involvement in illegal trade. William Adam reproached all the major trading powers but he singled out the Genoese because of their role in the slave trade and their assistance in maintaining the sultan's communications with the Mongols of the Golden Horde. He complained about an institution known as the 'Officium Robarie', by which any merchant, regardless of religion, could be reimbursed if he had been attacked by a Genoese ship while his country was at peace with Genoa. If the offence was confirmed by witnesses, the captain responsible had his own goods seized. Adam believed that the existence of this institution prevented many Genoese from capturing ships trading with Egypt and was concerned that even Moslem merchants could recoup their losses.¹¹⁸

The maritime powers were also fiercely criticised by Henry II, who reported that they actively resisted attempts to enforce papal prohibitions, and continued to trade with Egypt. He too singled out the Genoese, reporting that when the Hospitallers captured one of their ships carrying spices from Alexandria, they retaliated by attacking the Hospitaller base on Rhodes, then seized a ship belonging to the order and handed the crew to the Turks.¹¹⁹ James of Molay held similar views

¹¹⁸William Adam, pp. 526-7; M. L. de Mas Latrie, 'L'Officium Robarie ou l'office de la piraterie à Gênes au moyen age', *BEC* 53 (1892), pp. 264-72. Mas Latrie finds only a limited amount of evidence, all indirect, for the existence of this institution.

¹¹⁹Henry II, pp. 119-20; *Regestum Clementis Papae V*, nos. 7118-19. The Genoese agreed with the Turks that all traders from Rhodes in their ports be arrested and paid them 50,000 gold florins to attack the Hospitallers, or intercept supplies to the island (J. Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes 1310-1421* (Paris, 1913), pp. 10-11).

of the Italian trading powers, but such criticism was not confined to the theorists.¹²⁰ Venice and Genoa were sent letters by Nicholas IV shortly after the fall of Acre to order them to observe the prohibitions against trade.¹²¹ The two cities were the pre-eminent maritime powers of the Mediterranean, and while they had played a vital role in transporting crusaders and supplying the Latin states, their mercantile interests were always paramount. After her merchants were forbidden access to Alexandria in 1290, Genoa made a truce with the sultan despite the precarious position of the remaining Christian possessions on the coast, and the sultan's plans to attack them. The two cities were at war from 1293, which probably restricted the amount of commerce carried in the Mediterranean, but after peace was made, Venice made an agreement with the Moslems in 1302, and Genoa followed suit in 1304.¹²²

Other trading nations were also censured by the theorists, but less widely. William Adam mentioned the Catalans, who maintained active political and commercial links with the Moslems, particularly in North Africa. James II of Aragon made treaties with the sultan in 1290 and 1292, the former authorising the export of wood, arms and iron to the Mamluks.¹²³ The author of the *Directorium* complained that the Cypriots were responsible for much trade with the Mamluks. Despite the strong line Henry II took in his proposal, it is clear that this masked an attitude as mercenary as that of the Genoese he so fiercely criticised. While he made efforts to enforce the trade ban, he was prepared to ignore trade leaving for Egypt from his own kingdom. Famagusta, which had been the refuge for many non-Christian exiles from the Holy Land, became an important entrepôt for trade from

¹²⁰Molay, p. 149.

¹²¹*Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6784-8.

¹²²Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 83; *Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 4.

¹²³Á. Masiá de Ros, *La Corona de Aragón y los Estados del Norte de África* (Barcelona, 1951), pp. 264-70, 290-5, 353-88; *Los Documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. and tr. M. A. Alarcón y Santón and R. García de Linares (Madrid, 1940), p. 145; W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen age*, tr. F. Reynaud (Amsterdam, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 407-8, 424; Atiya, *Egypt and Aragon*, pp. 18, 28.

Europe to both Egypt and Syria.¹²⁴ If the Cypriots could block direct trade to the east, and channel it through their island, they would be able to levy taxes, and increase the importance of their ports. Peter I's attack on Alexandria in 1365 has been interpreted as being a development of this policy, aimed at securing commercial advantages.¹²⁵ Henry II, who blamed all nations but his own for trading with the Mamluks, stated that the prohibitions should be read in all maritime states, but especially in Armenia, suggesting he believed that this kingdom was involved in trade with Egypt. Sanudo reports that timber and pitch were exported from Cilicia to the Moslems, and there is evidence that the Genoese were involved in this trade.¹²⁶ However, Henry's attitude was conditioned by antagonism between Cyprus and Armenia, caused partly by his own imprisonment there after his rule had been usurped by his brother Amalric.

In their conviction that the Mamluks were dependent on trade carried by Christians to maintain their economic and military power, the theorists were reflecting opinions with a long history. This was demonstrated by existing papal prohibitions against trade which dated back to 1179. The view that the Mamluks were vulnerable to a trade embargo was widespread in this period, as indicated by reference to this in the report of the council held at Milan in 1291-2, but the theorists over-estimated the extent to which economic warfare could harm the enemy.¹²⁷ The idea of a complete embargo on trade, as suggested by Fidenzio, may be new. The ban on sending any ships to Mamluk territory for four or six years before the crusade, included in the papal bulls of 1215 and 1274, was motivated by the need to

¹²⁴'Directorium', p. 408; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 133-4; Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte au milieu du XIIIème siècle', in *Croisades et Etats latins d'Orient* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992), p. 130; D. Jacoby, 'The rise of a new emporium in the eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the late thirteenth century', in id. *Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion* (Variorum reprint: Northampton, 1989), pp. 145-79.

¹²⁵Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 171; see chapter seven.

¹²⁶Henry II, p. 119; Sanudo, p. 29; Amitai-Preiss, p. 209.

¹²⁷*Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 14, cols. 1197-8.

have as many ships as possible available for the crusade, rather than by economic reasons.¹²⁸ The consensus among the theorists over the need to halt trade with the Mamluks is striking, as is the similarity of the arguments they deployed. This suggests that Fidenzio's concerns influenced other writers: discussions centred on slave imports, tariff revenues, and raw materials. However, the long history of these ideas precludes any firm conclusion that later theorists used his work. The exception is Sanudo who appears to have drawn on Fidenzio's ideas, although adding his own information in support of the arguments. Fidenzio argued that a blockade of the Mamluks could divert the lucrative Indian Ocean spice trade away from Egypt. If this trade passed through Persia and Armenia, the sultan would lose revenue but Europe would still have spices. Sanudo repeated this theory in his own proposal, reporting that Christian merchants would send spices through the three ports of the Persian Gulf, where tolls were lower, since trade flowed like water to where it was needed.¹²⁹

The preliminary passage

The theorists' originality lay in the manner in which they proposed to wage economic warfare against the Mamluks. They criticised the inadequacy of existing measures against traders and favoured an organised naval blockade of enemy territory. Papal provisions required the excommunication of those who sold banned products to the Moslems, or gave them any help or advice. Their goods were forfeit and they could be legally enslaved.¹³⁰ Theorists recognised that these measures were ineffective: Fidenzio reported that excommunication was not a sufficient deterrent.¹³¹ Nevertheless, several theorists believed that they remained a necessary

¹²⁸Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 194, 198.

¹²⁹Fidenzio, pp. 47-8; Sanudo, p. 23.

¹³⁰Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, pp. 193-4, 198.

¹³¹Fidenzio, p. 46.

part of an embargo on trade. In their advice to Louis of Clermont, the citizens of Marseilles urged that the pope renew his prohibitions and grant apostolic authority to the captain of the fleet to capture merchants ignoring the decree.¹³² William Adam believed that it was necessary to strengthen ecclesiastical censures. As a supplement to excommunication, he argued that a general edict should be issued ordering individual traders to be exiled, and their property and goods used for the recovery of the Holy Land, an idea contained in the decrees of Nicholas IV. Those who captured the ships of merchants trading with Egypt were to be allowed to keep all the goods they took, and the sentence of excommunication was to be imposed on cities and towns used by the merchants.¹³³ The author of the *Directorium* recommended that ecclesiastical penalties needed renewal, but this was a reaction against the growing papal practice of licensing trade with the Mamluks for a fee, established by 1332.¹³⁴ None of these measures represented a particular advance on existing practice, but were intended only as a supplement to more practical measures.

In 1291, existing practical provisions against illicit trade with the Mamluks only provided for action by individuals. They allowed merchants to capture the ships of those trading with the Mamluks without any punishment, even allowing captains flouting the ban to be enslaved, which seems not far short of legalised piracy. However, haphazard action by individuals could only have a limited effect on trade, hence the theorists recommended that a formal blockade of ships should be instituted. Henry II of Cyprus maintained some galleys in his service to intercept merchants, but, as he reported in his treatise, despite their achievements, the Cypriots required assistance from the west.¹³⁵ The concept of using a naval

¹³²'Informationes Massilie', p. 248.

¹³³William Adam, p. 526; *Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6784-8.

¹³⁴'Directorium', p. 409; Heyd, *Histoire du commerce*, vol. 2, pp. 42-5; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 150-1.

¹³⁵Henry II, pp. 119-22.

blockade to enforce an embargo on trade first appears in the works of Fidenzio, Lull and Charles II, and became a feature of both crusading proposals and plans made in European courts. It is notable that the author of the *Via*, who wrote in the east either before or very soon after Fidenzio's treatise, made no mention of the possibility of economic warfare, and the strategy is similarly absent from reports of the discussions at Lyons in 1274. The only precedent for the idea of a permanent fleet was the suggestion made by the patriarch of Jerusalem in 1266 that galleys could be acquired from Sicily which could 'donner aucune pointure au port d'Alexandrie et de Damiate', but this did not imply any action against traders.¹³⁶ The concept of a naval blockade formed a part of most plans written in this period, and there is an element of stagnation in the theorists' thinking on this subject. It is possible to identify writers who adopted these plans simply to follow prevailing opinions, and those who added refinements from their knowledge of the east. The idea of sending preliminary forces to the east was eventually adopted in European courts, but the theorists' emphasis on intercepting commerce proved less attractive.

The use of a fleet against the Mamluks was first proposed by Fidenzio of Padua in his *Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae*. He recommended that between thirty and fifty galleys cruise off Egypt to intercept trade and launch attacks on the Mamluk shoreline at the same time as a large land army attacked in northern Syria. While his plan laid out the basis upon which subsequent ideas developed, it was quite different from what followed, arguing for a two-pronged attack on the Mamluks, sending the fleet against Egypt and the general passage against Syria. Although later writers concentrated on the interception of trade and raiding, Fidenzio's fleet was to fulfil a number of roles, some of which pertained to the continued existence of Christian possessions on the Syrian littoral when he wrote his proposal. He believed that the fleet could succour and protect Christian-held areas by preventing the sultan from cutting them off by sea, and by carrying provisions

¹³⁶G. Servois, 'Emprunts de Saint Louis en Palestine et en Afrique', *BEC* 19 (1858), p. 293.

and men should they be attacked. The fleet would deter the sultan from sending an army into Syria for fear of attack on Egypt, and prevent trade from reaching his lands. In addition, raids could be sent against the sultan's maritime possessions and could carry native Christians to safety in order to prevent any retribution by the Mamluks.¹³⁷

Fidenzio's plan was followed by two works written in, or soon after, 1292: Ramon Lull's *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles* and Charles of Anjou's *Conseil*. Lull argued that Christian traders could be stopped and Mamluk coastal regions destroyed, including fortified points, showing that he had a highly optimistic view of what a small fleet could achieve. He also suggested that the blockade would allow Christian merchants to profit by destroying their Moslem counterparts.¹³⁸ He completed this work in Rome, soon after hearing of the fall of Acre, so it is possible that he was aware of either Fidenzio's proposal or the plans of Nicholas IV.¹³⁹ Schein has argued that Charles II may have been inspired by Lull's ideas, but it is equally likely that he drew inspiration from Fidenzio or papal plans.¹⁴⁰ Charles's ideas were more developed than Lull's and the purpose behind them more clearly explained. He emphasised the military activities of the fleet rather than the interception of trade, proposing that one hundred ships be used, half of which were to carry mounted troops. They were to launch destructive attacks on the coast, carrying off animals and destroying possessions, and he even envisaged the destruction of Alexandria by the fleet, prefiguring the plans of Sanudo and the Cypriots by several years.¹⁴¹ In this plan, the emphasis had already shifted away from intercepting trade towards more aggressive measures against the Mamluks, and

¹³⁷Fidenzio, pp. 46-9.

¹³⁸Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 99-100.

¹³⁹Hillgarth, p. 50.

¹⁴⁰Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 110-11.

¹⁴¹Charles II, pp. 354-6.

the role of the fleet was more akin to that of a full preliminary passage than to a blockading force.

The basic lines of the plans drawn up in this early period were followed in the proposals written during the pontificate of Clement V, but their development of the ideas varied between favouring a simple naval blockade to sending a preliminary passage to the east before the crusade. In the *Liber de fine*, Lull made similar recommendations to those of Charles II. He argued that destructive raids should be mounted by a sizeable force, while galleys would capture Rhodes and Malta to prevent trading.¹⁴² The strategy of using naval measures prior to the crusade was most fully developed in the advice produced by the Hospitallers, and particularly their master, Fulk of Villaret. He recommended that the interception of trade be carried out by a small fleet of twenty-five galleys before a second, larger force of fifty to sixty galleys arrived to raid the Mamluk coast.¹⁴³ Villaret was the first author to propose that a fleet be created solely to intercept trade, an idea later adopted by Sanudo. This three-stage crusade became the favoured strategy of the Capetian and Valois kings of France in the period between the council of Vienne and the beginning of the Hundred Years War. It was absent from the anonymous Hospitaller plan of 1306-7, which recommended using a single preliminary force of sixty galleys with 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot to intercept trade and attack the sultan's lands for a period of four years.¹⁴⁴

Hayton assigned a more extensive role to the preliminary expedition, largely disregarding the interception of trade in favour of a full attack on Moslem territory. He proposed that the maritime blockade would be supplemented by Mongol attacks on northern Syria. In response to this, the fleet was to attack and capture the island

¹⁴²Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 280-1. Lull was the first author to propose that the blockade last for a certain number of years, in this case six. Few others gave any figure, and those who did proposed a shorter period, calling the potential impact of a blockade into question (Sanudo, pp. 30-1; 'Informationes Massilie', p. 248).

¹⁴³Villaret, pp. 606-7.

¹⁴⁴Hospitallers, pp. 224-6.

of Ruad, emulating the Christian response to Ghazan's invasion of 1300. He believed that the initial passage might capture Tripoli with the assistance of native Christians, and defend it until the arrival of the main crusade. If the Mongols captured Syria, the passage would take over castles and towns from them. Hayton believed that, if the sultan's forces proved too strong, the expedition would at least gain valuable information about the country, the enemy's power and method of warfare.¹⁴⁵ The bishop of Leon also favoured sending a preliminary expedition of mercenaries and galleys to capture a base in Syria, preferably in the mountains.¹⁴⁶ In contrast, Fulk of Villaret does not seem to have envisaged that the second of his three expeditions, which was to raid Mamluk territories, should attempt to occupy land ahead of the general passage.

Other writers proposed the interception of trade as the sole preliminary measure to be used against the Mamluks and made no mention of attacks on their lands. These included less well-informed writers, such as Dubois and the authors of the *Memoria* and *Directorium*. These generally favoured a simple general passage, but followed prevailing ideas by suggesting that this be preceded by a blockade.¹⁴⁷ James of Molay held a traditional view of the crusade, and favoured sending a full general passage against the Mamluks, deploying a fleet while it was prepared. He argued strongly against the concept of a preliminary passage which he believed would greatly damage the crusade. Without any base in the east, a small force would be easily defeated by the numerous forces of the sultan. He particularly derided the idea of sending such a passage to Armenia, partly because he distrusted the inhabitants of the country, and partly because he felt that this would not harm the

¹⁴⁵Hayton, pp. 355-7.

¹⁴⁶BN lat. 7470, f. 127v. The author suggested that wood and building materials could be shipped from Rhodes and Cyprus, both of which could also provide refuge if the force was repelled by the Mamluks.

¹⁴⁷'Memoria', p. 131; 'Directorium', p. 408; Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', p. 201. Dubois only mentions a blockade in the *Opinio cujusdam* of 1308, and it is absent from the *De recuperatione*.

Saracens in any way.¹⁴⁸ The idea of sending an initial force to Armenia is found only in Hayton's proposal, completed in August 1307, but it was also a feature of the papal plans of the time, including the Hospitaller passage of 1309.¹⁴⁹ Molay was clearly out of step with current ideas in the courts of Europe, but his views were shaped by the disastrous loss of the Templar garrison left on Ruad in 1302, which indicated the likely fate of an inadequate force sent against the Mamluks.

Sanudo's proposal refined the idea of using multiple expeditions to the east to a high level. He planned a crusade in three stages, beginning with a naval blockade of trade. The second passage was to be a professional Venetian attack on Egypt, aimed at establishing control of the coast with 300 knights and 15,000 foot soldiers before a larger passage arrived to complete the conquest of the country. His proposal has received great prominence due to the detail of his plans and wealth of supporting information of the economy of the eastern Mediterranean, but it drew on earlier ideas. The three stages recall the plans of Fulk of Villaret, but the extensive role given to the preliminary passage has more in common with Hayton's proposal, although he only used this after writing the first redaction of the *Liber secretorum*.¹⁵⁰

One author developed the idea of a naval blockade in a unique direction. William Adam proposed the original, if far-fetched, plan to prevent any trade from reaching Egypt by organising a blockade in the Indian Ocean to supplement the embargo on Mediterranean trade. He suggested that three or four galleys could be stationed near Aden, manned by 1,200 'bad Christians' who would be released from excommunication in return for serving there. As the inhabitants of Aden were hostile towards Christians, Adam believed that the fleet could be based in Hormuz, India or the Maldivian islands, which suggests a rather hazy grasp of the region's

¹⁴⁸Molay, pp. 145-7.

¹⁴⁹Hayton, p. 355. Molay's proposal has been dated to 1306-7, so, while it was possibly written in late 1307 criticising Hayton's ideas, it seems more probable that Molay was attacking papal plans.

¹⁵⁰Sanudo, pp. 34-6, 39-47; Schein, pp. 203-4.

geography and the range of galleys. Marco Polo reported that the Indian Ocean was often stormy, and the only possible friendly ports belonged to the Ilkhans, who were to make peace with the Mamluks a few years after the proposal was completed.¹⁵¹ There were precedents for the idea of attacking the Moslems in this region, and Adam fused these with the concept of economic warfare to develop his novel plan. He related an attempt by the Ilkhans to carry their struggle with the Mamluks into the Indian Ocean with Genoese help. He reported that some Genoese were invited to serve there, but they split into Guelf and Ghibelline factions and attacked each other. There is evidence to support this in the chronicle of Bar Hebraeus, which stated that nine hundred Genoese sailors were taken into the service of Arghun. The only Christian attempt to attack the Moslems in this region was made in 1182 when Reynald of Châtillon launched a fleet of five ships onto the Red Sea, three of which attacked Egyptian ports while two blockaded the island of Graye. The ships were destroyed in 1183 by a fleet sent by Saladin, and the Christians were never in a position to repeat the attempt.¹⁵²

A few of the theorists discussed potential suppliers for ships for the blockade, generally suggesting the church or the military orders. None mentioned Sicily as a potential supplier of ships (nor as a state trading with the Moslems) despite its large navy, probably because of the warfare which afflicted the island. Villaret argued that the military orders could provide twenty-five galleys between them in 1305, while Charles II believed that seventy ships could be provided by the church, with the Hospitallers, Templars and king of Cyprus contributing ten each.¹⁵³ Around the time he was writing, in 1293, the Templars could muster only two galleys, but the king of Cyprus provided fifteen for the papal fleet sent in the same

¹⁵¹William Adam, pp. 549-54; Marco Polo, pp. 66-7.

¹⁵²J. Richard, 'Les navigations des Occidentaux sur l'Océan Indien et la mer Caspienne (XIIe-XVe siècles)', in id. *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XIIe-XVe)* (Variorum reprint: London, 1976), pp. 359-60.

¹⁵³Fidenzio, p. 46; Charles II, p. 355; Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', p. 201.

year. A fleet of one hundred ships thus seems large but in 1295, the Venetians were able to raise a force of seventy galleys to fight a Genoese force of eighty.¹⁵⁴ This illustrates the chief problem of a blockade, recognised by some theorists: it was entirely against the interests of the foremost maritime powers, the trading cities. Henry II related the problems faced by the Hospitallers when they arrested a Genoese galley, and argued that the fleet should not be placed under the control of the Italians because they would only use it to attack commercial rivals. James of Molay argued that the military orders could not take charge of the fleet because they were open to having lands and property seized in retribution in the city states. He suggested that Rogeronus, son of the renowned naval commander Roger of Lauria, should be given command.¹⁵⁵ The problem of reconciling the Italian cities to a blockade was never solved, even by the Venetian Sanudo, although he implied that some Venetian forces would be involved. He proposed a fleet of ten galleys and listed suppliers: one ship apiece could be provided by Zaccaria of Chios, William Sanudo of Naxos, the patriarch of Constantinople, the archbishop of Crete, a further two from the Hospitallers, and four from Cyprus.¹⁵⁶ Only Roger of Stanegrave suggested that ships, in this case for the general passage, be ordered from the trading cities, naming Venice, Genoa, Marseilles and Catalonia.¹⁵⁷

Sanudo carefully argued the case for a blockade, but while Schein is correct to state that his views were less original than once thought, she ignores the fact that Sanudo took a considerably more sceptical view of the likely success of a naval blockade than most of his contemporaries.¹⁵⁸ He identified several flaws in the scheme and argued that the only way of properly enforcing a trade embargo was to

¹⁵⁴Villaret, p. 606; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 82; 'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 820, 834.

¹⁵⁵Henry II, pp. 119-20; Molay, p. 149.

¹⁵⁶Sanudo, pp. 30-1.

¹⁵⁷BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 8v.

¹⁵⁸Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 201, 203-4.

pursue merchants on land. Those who traded with the Mamluks or bought merchandise from their lands were to be treated as heretics, and punished as an example to all.¹⁵⁹ Sanudo noted that 'per custodiam maris solum, non potest perfecte inhiberi quod aliquis per mare ad terras Soldano subiectas non valeat transfretare'. The area to be protected was too large, and the number of ships carrying merchandise was too great.¹⁶⁰ The effect of winds and currents caused shipping from Europe to follow certain routes, usually along the northern coast of the Mediterranean, so traffic was concentrated in certain channels near Cyprus, Rhodes and islands in the Aegean, areas which were often the haunt of pirates. Trade to Egypt usually passed through the quadrilateral bounded by Cyprus, Beirut and Tripoli, but even this area covered over 4,000 square miles, a difficult task for a squadron of only ten ships to patrol.¹⁶¹

Sanudo also recognised that the use of galleys presented other difficulties: 'galeae armatae non possunt stare extra in mari, tempore tempestatis'.¹⁶² When describing Richard I's journey to the Holy Land, Roger of Hoveden explained that galleys were forced to travel near the coast since in the open sea they were easily swamped and sank in bad weather.¹⁶³ Other problems which Sanudo did not mention included the need to take on water frequently, and the limited cruising time of between two to three weeks, which would allow for a range of 1,100 imperial miles.¹⁶⁴ All of this depended on many variables, particularly the weather, but it seems that the theorists' plans for galleys to remain on station for long periods of time were highly optimistic. Another difficulty was the small size of galleys relative

¹⁵⁹Sanudo, pp. 28-9.

¹⁶⁰Sanudo, p. 28.

¹⁶¹Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War*, pp. 6-8.

¹⁶²Sanudo, p. 28.

¹⁶³Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs (RS: London, 1870), pp. 160-1.

¹⁶⁴Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War*, pp. 79-85.

to the round ships which were used for trade. If a large merchant vessel were intercepted, there was no guarantee that it could be boarded and captured, and Pryor notes occasions when galleys proved incapable of capturing such ships.¹⁶⁵

The theorists' impact on plans in Europe was limited, with the exception of two proposals. Fidenzio's plan may have steered Nicholas IV towards the use of naval forces in the east. The pope responded to the fall of Acre by despatching a small fleet of ten ships to the east under the Genoese captains Manuel Zaccaria and Tedisio Doria. According to papal letters, the fleet was sent to aid Cyprus and Armenia, but one source, the chronicle of James Doria, claims that one aim of the fleet was to attack those who traded with the sultan.¹⁶⁶ This would clearly indicate that Fidenzio's ideas had an impact on papal policy, since the use of a fleet to enforce a blockade of the enemy was an innovative idea, but it is difficult to prove the Genoese account. The chronicler's claim to be an eyewitness to all he reported, and his family connection to the captain of the fleet, Tedisio Doria, give added weight to his account. However, the letters of Nicholas IV to the Genoese, and further requests to the Hospitallers and king of France suggest that the pope was chiefly concerned with the immediate defence of Cyprus and Armenia. However, this also reflected Fidenzio's concerns about the protection of existing Christian possessions in the east. The activities of the fleet do not suggest that the interception of trade was a priority, but nor did they contribute greatly to the defence to Christian territories. After a failed attack on Alaya and a brief demonstration before Alexandria, the fleet returned to Cyprus, succeeding only in spurring the sultan to plan an invasion of the island.¹⁶⁷ The other proposal to have influenced

¹⁶⁵Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War*, pp. 120-1.

¹⁶⁶Fidenzio, pp. 46-8; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 77-80; *Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6432, 6856; 'Iacobi Auriae annales a. 1280-1294', *MGH SS 18* (Hannover, 1863), pp. 342-3: galleys were sent 'in insula Cipri pro ipsius et regni Armenie defensione et etiam pro offendere Sarracenis et quibuslibet aliis euntibus et redeuntibus ad terram aliquam soldani Egipti'.

¹⁶⁷'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 821-2; *Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6778, 6850-1, 6854-5. It would be very naive of the pope to entrust the disruption of trade to a fleet from one of the trading cities. See Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 77-80.

papal policy was the Hospitaller plan, which formed the basis of Clement V's passage to the east in 1309. He planned that the crusade would contain 1,000 knights and 4,000 foot, with forty galleys for a period of five years, figures strikingly similar to those in the Hospitaller proposal.¹⁶⁸

With these exceptions, the proposals were slow to make any impact on crusade planning. The concept of using economic warfare against the Mamluks was never fully adopted at European courts, and the idea of a preliminary passage was only embraced by the French after the council of Vienne. Nicholas IV's fleet of 1291 was an ad hoc measure to ensure the defence of Cyprus and Armenia, and his planned crusade was to consist of a single passage.¹⁶⁹ The crusade of 1309 was intended to be the preliminary to a general passage, but, at the council of Vienne, French plans reverted to a single expedition. After the death of Philip IV, the concept of a crusade in several stages came to dominate crusading plans in France. Philip V proposed a two-stage expedition, with a general passage preceded by an expedition to Armenia under Louis of Clermont.¹⁷⁰ His plans were inherited by Charles IV, who proposed a three-stage crusade in which an initial force of twenty galleys was to blockade commerce before a passage was sent to Armenia. This was the only instance in French and papal plans when a planned force was to have had an attack on trade as its primary objective. These ideas were discussed by cardinals and representatives of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Armenia. The cardinals' responses were largely hostile to the plan on grounds of financing and the lack of sufficient time to organise the passage. The Armenian envoys feared that the first passage would simply provoke the sultan then leave their kingdom to face the consequences. Most of the cardinals were opposed to the concept of an initial passage, but accepted

¹⁶⁸Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 219-20; Housley, 'Pope Clement V', pp. 29-43. Only 300 knights and 3,000 foot could be raised.

¹⁶⁹*Registres de Nicolas IV*, nos. 6779-81, 6849; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 84-7.

¹⁷⁰Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', pp. 18-20.

the idea of a single preliminary passage despite their concerns over finance.¹⁷¹ Philip VI initially planned a single general passage, but assented to a three-stage crusade at papal request. The first passage was eventually subsumed in the naval league against the Turks of 1332-4. Louis of Clermont, who was originally to lead the second passage, was moved to the final expedition, indicating that this was the most important part of French plans.¹⁷² The plans of the period indicate that the general passage remained the most important aspect of planned crusades, and the theorists' ideas on naval blockades were not adopted in Europe.

Plans made at European courts were considerably less aggressive than those of the theorists, and initial expeditions were intended to assist in the defence of existing possessions in the east. The Hospitaller passage of 1309 was intended to provide protection for Cyprus and Armenia, and the same aim was usually given to the preliminary passage of French plans, at papal insistence. Papal concern for Christian kingdoms in the east contrasts greatly with the preoccupation of the theorists with intercepting trade and aggressive raids against the Mamluks. Although Hayton was naturally concerned with threats to Armenia, others viewed the kingdom as a base for a general passage rather than an endangered kingdom. Only Sanudo urged that Armenia be protected, sending a letter to the French king with a copy of the *Liber secretorum* recommending that a fleet of ten galleys with 300 knights and 1,000 foot be sent there to prevent the sultan from exacting tribute.¹⁷³ Cyprus was also viewed as a potential crusade base rather than an island under threat, and it is notable that neither of Henry II's proposals called for aid against the Moslems. In common with other theorists, he was chiefly concerned with maintaining a fleet to intercept trade, suggesting that he believed that Cyprus at least was not in imminent danger.

¹⁷¹*Lettres sècrites et communales du Pape Jean XXII*, nos. 1690-1709; Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations', pp. 174-5.

¹⁷²Tyerman, 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', pp. 36-9.

¹⁷³Sanudo, p. 7.

Conclusion

The theorists' discussion of strategy illustrates the variety of their ideas and the differences between plans written by authors who were familiar with the east, and those who were not. Authors such as Fidenzio of Padua and Hayton used their experience to give information on the Mamluks, both their strengths and weaknesses, and on possible allies for the crusade. In contrast, writers with little experience of the east adopted prevailing ideas, without any understanding of the reasons behind them. *The quality of information given by the theorists varied.* Fidenzio was familiar with the quality of the Mamluk army, if not their numbers, and the dynamics of trade in the east, while Hayton and William Adam were well-informed about the Mongols. Figures given by most authors on the tariffs imposed by the Mamluks seem much less reliable. All of the theorists drew over-optimistic conclusions from their information, whether on the vulnerability of the Mamluks to a naval blockade, or the prospect of assistance from other powers in the east. Although there is apparent uniformity in the theorists' strategic thinking, which was marked by the widespread adoption of some form of preliminary naval warfare against the enemy, ideas varied more widely. Those authors based in the west, such as Durant, Dubois and the bishop of Leon, favoured a simple general passage, whereas better informed authors proposed a range of preliminary measures, from naval blockades to the occupation of enemy territory. The idea of preliminary passages was gradually adopted by crusade planners in the curia and the French court but with a much more defensive role. None of the theorists recognised that their plans were ultimately unworkable because of the need to rely for ships on the maritime trading powers, whose interests would be harmed by economic war against the Mamluks. In addition, the idea of a crusade in several stages ignores the experience of earlier enterprises when the arrival of crusaders in the east was usually haphazard and impossible to co-ordinate. Louis IX waited in Cyprus for belated members of his army in 1249, while on his second crusade, the English force only

reached Tunis after Louis's death. Theorists' plans to launch a series of co-ordinated expeditions, relying on naval transport over long distances, presupposed a high level of organisation and a degree of sustained commitment which was lacking in western Europe at this time.

V. THE GENERAL PASSAGE

The route and destination of the final stage of the crusade, the general passage, received considerable attention from the theorists, particularly those who had little involvement in crusading. Authors who played an active role in the east, such as Fulk of Villaret, were more cautious and concentrated on the preliminary measures needed to weaken the Mamluks rather than on the final stages of the crusade. In contrast, writers such as Dubois or the author of the *Directorium* produced grandiose plans for large expeditions to recover the Holy Land and crush the Moslems, often conquering other territories on the way. Whereas the concept of using a naval blockade against the enemy was developed in the proposals to become the dominant strategy of the period, there was always a wide variety of opinion on the general passage. There is little sense of ideas evolving: supporters of both land and sea routes can be found throughout the period among the theorists. Authors used different arguments to support the same case, suggesting that few were influenced by other theorists. Crusade planners in Europe almost invariably favoured sending the general passage by sea, but no proposed crusades approached this late stage and it is difficult to demonstrate that the theorists had any significant impact on papal or French policy.

The theorists drew on their knowledge both of conditions in the east and, in some instances, of previous crusades to inform their proposals. There were three principal alternatives: to assault the Holy Land after passing through Europe and Asia Minor overland; to cross to the Holy Land or Egypt by sea; or to take the lengthy route from Spain along the North African coast. That there was disagreement over the route of the crusade was due to the altered situation in the east. Travelling by sea had been the preferred method of reaching the crusader states from Europe throughout the thirteenth century. After Frederick Barbarossa's

crusade in 1189-90, all crusades went by sea, as did the flow of smaller contingents of men and supplies which was vital for the survival of Outremer. In 1291, Christians were deprived of Acre and other mainland ports, so it was no longer safe nor simple to send forces to the east directly by sea. Nevertheless, many believed it to be self-evident that a crusade should travel by sea since possession of Cyprus, and later Rhodes, enabled Christians to maintain naval superiority in the eastern Mediterranean.

The recovery of Constantinople and the overland route

Given that in the previous century, crusades travelled to the east only by sea, it is striking that a number of theorists argued that a general passage should go by land. Six authors favoured this option, although only William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* firmly rejected alternatives. Fidenzio described both land and sea routes without expressing a clear preference, while Dubois and the bishop of Leon proposed that some forces should travel by land and others by sea. There is evidence that support for the land route was more widespread. Sanudo reported that some argued a new crusade should follow Peter the Hermit and Godfrey of Bouillon by travelling overland to Jerusalem.¹ After a century of largely undistinguished crusading, the remarkable and unparalleled success of the first crusade made it a tempting example to emulate. Fulk of Villaret argued that the pope should follow Urban II's example in personally preaching the crusade, while the author of the *Directorium* referred to the supposed achievements of Peter the Hermit in Asia Minor.² These were the only theorists to refer to the first crusade in this way. Fidenzio, William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* supported their choice by listing military advantages of the land route, but it seems that most authors were

¹Sanudo, p. 37. Sanudo himself disagreed with this opinion, arguing that the first crusade succeeded through divine help rather than human power.

²Villaret, p. 604; 'Directorium', pp. 414-17, 505.

attracted by the opportunity for the crusade to capture the Byzantine empire en route to the east.³

The desire to recapture the Latin Empire of Constantinople, lost to Michael VIII Palaeologus in 1261, derived from a tradition of western antipathy towards the Greeks which dated back to the beginning of the crusading movement. The author of the *Gesta Francorum* accused the 'iniquus imperator' of collusion with the Turks against the crusaders, while allegations that the Greeks deliberately hindered crusaders were repeated on subsequent crusades.⁴ Several theorists firmly subscribed to this tradition. The bishop of Leon claimed that if the crusade were to go by land, the Greeks would ally with the Turks against the army, while both William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* accused the Greeks of attempting to thwart an early crusade. The latter reported that 'in ystoriis enim ultramarinis legitur quod, in quodam passagio, calcem vivam cum farina quem vendebant Dei exercitui miscerunt', adding that the Greeks also attempted to sink the crusader fleet using divers. William Adam relates the same two incidents in strikingly similar language, and names a source, the 'istoria de passagio Antiocheno'.⁵ There is no report of these events in the Song of Antioch, or any other extant western source, but a Greek account of the second crusade reports that 'some, mixing lime with the barley groats, concocted a fatal mixture' which they sold to the crusaders.⁶

³Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 100-1; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 268; BN lat. 7470, f. 127; William Adam, pp. 536-45; 'Directorium', pp. 440-5, 461-8; Dubois, pp. 175-6. Laiou claims that Fidenzio of Padua also considered the conquest of the empire, but it seems more likely that he viewed it as a potential source of assistance: he argued that the crusade would receive assistance from Christian kingdoms until it reached Turkey (*Constantinople and the Latins*, p. 239; Fidenzio, pp. 51, 57-8).

⁴*Gesta Francorum*, pp. 16-17; Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', p. 238; Odo of Deuil, pp. 69-73; 'Historia de expeditione Friderici', ed. A. Choust, *MGH SRG 5* (Berlin, 1928), p. 42.

⁵BN lat. 7470, ff. 126v-127; 'Directorium', pp. 439-40; William Adam, pp. 544-7: 'calcem vivam cum farina opponerunt'.

⁶*La chanson d'Antioche: Edition du texte d'après la version ancienne*, ed. S. Duparc-Quioc, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades, 11 (Paris, 1976-8), vol. 1, pp. 55-67; Niketas Choniates, *O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates*, tr. H. J. Magoulis (Detroit, 1984), p. 39.

The recovery of the Latin Empire was eagerly promoted by cadet branches of the French royal family, first the Angevins and later the Valois, who held the Latin claim to the throne. Papal support for their plans varied from the enthusiasm of Martin IV to the refusal of popes such as Gregory X or Nicholas IV to give priority to Constantinople over the Holy Land. France was the driving force for plans to recover the empire, and it is notable that several of the theorists who supported the plan had some connection with the French court. Lull first suggested the reconquest of Constantinople in 1292, but in this work was motivated by religious rather than political reasons, insisting that the Greeks be given the opportunity to convert peacefully first.⁷ Similar opinions can be found in the report of the church council of Sens in 1291-2.⁸ In contrast, Pierre Dubois was solely concerned with capturing the empire for political reasons and did not regard this as an essential precursor to a crusade. In the 'open' section of his proposal, he suggested that the emperor should be invited to the general council to discuss the crusade, and his permission sought for armies to pass through his lands. Dubois envisaged that, after conquering the Holy Land, the army should return through Greece to capture the empire from the 'unjust usurper' for Charles of Valois. In the secret part of the proposal he planned that the capture of Constantinople would precede the crusade, as part of his vision of establishing French hegemony over Europe and the near east.⁹

It is significant that Dubois mentioned Charles of Valois because he wrote his proposal at a time when Charles was engaged in preparations for an attack on the empire, to which he had a claim through his marriage to Catherine of Courtenay, the titular empress, in 1301. Charles built up a network of alliances against the Byzantines, persuading the pope to grant crusade indulgences for the expedition and

⁷Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', pp. 100-1. In the *Epistola*, Lull regarded the Greeks as a potential source of assistance for the crusade (p. 97). The religious aspect of the Greek question is dealt with in chapter three.

⁸Digard, *Philippe le Bel*, vol. 2, p. 282.

⁹Dubois, pp. 87, 156-7, 172, 176-7. Dubois believed that Charles should learn Greek to become an effective ruler (p. 177).

enlisting the support of the notoriously unreliable Catalan company in 1307. His plans came to nothing, and he lost his claim when Catherine died in 1308, but continued to work on behalf of his daughter.¹⁰ The Valois claim was promoted in the anonymous account of eastern Europe written in 1308. In a detailed description of Byzantine territories, the author claimed that the emperor was weak, while the Greeks were effeminate and unwarlike, but nonetheless devious and malicious. He added that the empire had been weakened by Turkish depredations and could be conquered within a year.¹¹ Similarly, Lull's *Liber de acquisitione* was partly prompted by Valois designs on Constantinople through his contacts with the French court. In this work he favoured the conquest of Constantinople, despite earlier rejecting the idea in the *Liber de fine*, and stated that the destruction of Constantinople was possible because of the knowledge and power of 'venerabilis domini Karoli'.¹²

These years were the high point of interest in the recovery of the Latin empire in our period, but later theorists still made an attack on the Byzantines an integral part of their treatises. William Adam's proposal, completed in 1317, was highly critical of the Byzantine imperial house, the Palaeologi; noting their assistance to the Mamluks during the famine which struck Egypt after the fall of Acre, and the Byzantine role in facilitating embassies between the sultan and the Mongols of the Golden Horde. Adam composed his treatise for the pope and hence placed greater emphasis on religious motives for attacking the Greeks than the later *Directorium*.¹³ Sanudo too argued that the Byzantine empire should be conquered but, like Dubois, believed that this should be undertaken after the crusade. He

¹⁰*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, nos. 21, 27-8, 33-4; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 200-20, 233-7.

¹¹*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 24-5.

¹²Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 268 (Lull also referred to the wisdom of the master of the Hospital); Hillgarth, pp. 85-6, 100-6. See also chapter one.

¹³William Adam, pp. 529-30, 532.

proposed that the blockading fleet could launch raids on Byzantine territory, facilitating the conquest of the empire.¹⁴ In the early 1320s the bishop of Leon wrote a plan arguing that the crusaders should ally with the Mongols to attack the Greeks and Turks simultaneously, to clear a way to the east.¹⁵ Around the time he wrote, the papacy was engaged in sustained negotiations with Byzantium over church union, and French crusade plans centred on the protection of Armenia. Philip of Taranto, who held the Latin claim, lacked support, and was further hampered by warfare in Italy. He died in 1331 leaving a son who was too young to press the claim. The plan to recover Constantinople was now moribund, and links between Greeks and the west were becoming more amicable. Hence, the *Directorium*, completed in 1332, was entirely out of step with European views. This was illustrated by the creation of the first naval league against the Turks in the same year, when the Byzantines were represented in negotiations by their old enemy, Venice.¹⁶

Despite the rapprochement between the Byzantines and some of their long-standing adversaries, the author of the *Directorium* remained a fierce advocate of an assault on the empire, to the extent that his work concentrates on this to the exclusion of the Holy Land. The asperity of his language suggests that, as with William Adam, he was motivated by abhorrence of the Greek faith, but he relied on practical and historical arguments to support his contention, probably because the work was addressed to a secular ruler, Philip VI. The author catalogued the misdeeds of the Palaeologi with the same righteous indignation as his fellow Dominican William Adam, attempting to prove that they had committed injuries against the French royal family which Philip had a duty to avenge. The loss of the Latin Empire of Constantinople played a prominent role in these arguments. He

¹⁴Sanudo, pp. 47, 81-2, 94.

¹⁵BN lat. 7470, f. 127.

¹⁶*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, nos. 116-17; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 315, 330.

portrayed Philip as having close ties to the Latin claim through his father's marriage to Catherine of Courtenay, the titular empress. In addition, the author claimed that Philip's Angevin relatives had suffered because Michael Palaeologus had provoked the invasion of Sicily through bribery. The author expounded the Latin claim to the empire, briefly sketching the history of the fourth crusade to show that Alexius IV had left the empire without a successor, and that Baldwin of Flanders had been legitimately elected emperor. Convinced of the justice of the Latin claim, he constantly referred to Michael VIII as a usurper, and believed that Philip was constrained to avenge those French killed in 1261 when the Greeks regained Constantinople.¹⁷

In addition to these rather unconvincing arguments, the author of the *Directorium* was keen to demonstrate that the capture of Constantinople would provide material advantages to the crusade. Both he and William Adam emphasised the empire's suitability as a source of supplies and as a base where crusaders could rest and recover from their exertions. According to Adam there was plenty of corn, wine and meat available, to the extent that care would be required to prevent the crusaders from slipping into idleness and luxury.¹⁸ Strategic benefits included access to the empire's ports and the opportunity to attack the Holy Land without fear of being surrounded by the enemy. Fidenzio used a similar argument to support the use of the land route, comparing the crusade to a wall which should be built from one end to the other, rather than from the middle outwards.¹⁹ None of these advantages demanded that the empire be captured: Dubois argued that provisions could be obtained from the empire if Palaeologus's permission were sought before the crusade crossed his lands, while William of Nogaret suggested that the emperor

¹⁷*Directorium*, pp. 432-3; 441-5.

¹⁸William Adam, pp. 538-40; *Directorium*, pp. 463-4. The *Anonymi Descriptio* claimed both European and Asian provinces of the Byzantine empire were very fertile (pp. 4-7).

¹⁹*Directorium*, pp. 463-5; Fidenzio, p. 54.

be forced to assist.²⁰ Clearly, the two Dominicans were chiefly motivated by their own animosity to the Byzantines and appear largely indifferent to the crusade to Jerusalem, but their proposals, like those associated with French plans, were always presented in the context of the recovery of the Holy Land. The conquest of Constantinople had been linked with the recovery of Jerusalem from soon after the fourth crusade, when Innocent III announced that possession of the city was practically the restoration of the Holy Land, while at the first council of Lyons, Innocent IV stated that aiding the Latin Empire would benefit the Holy Land.²¹ The capture of Constantinople proved to be of no benefit to the Holy Land but later plans to recover the city continued to link this with the crusade to Jerusalem.²²

Uniquely among the proposals, the *Directorium* contains a detailed discussion of the practicalities of capturing the Byzantine Empire.²³ The author attempted to induce Philip VI to attack the city by emphasising the ease with which it could be captured. He believed that its weakness was apparent from the frequent incursions of the Turks, a view shared by William Adam and the author of the *Descriptio*.²⁴ Once Constantinople had fallen, the other major cities, Thessalonica and Adrianople, would be swiftly captured and the remainder of the empire would capitulate. The author of the *Directorium* stressed the important role which naval power would play in the capture of the capital, describing ships adapted for siege warfare by the Genoese sailor Manuel Zaccaria in great detail.²⁵ While the author

²⁰Dubois, p. 87; Nogaret, p. 205. See also Fidenzio, p. 51.

²¹J. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400* (New Brunswick, 1979), pp. 45, 80.

²²See for example *Regestum Clementis Papae V*, nos. 203-4 (a grant of indulgences to Charles of Valois for the crusade to Constantinople in which Clement claimed that the capture of the city would be beneficial to the recovery of the Holy Land).

²³Dubois simply suggested that the empire be attacked from all sides (pp. 175-6), while Lull favoured the use of sea power ('Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 100).

²⁴'Directorium', pp 448-50; William Adam, pp. 539-40; *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, p. 24.

²⁵'Directorium', pp. 456-8, 460-1.

makes no reference to the fourth crusade in his discussion, the ships he described were very similar to those used by the Venetians when the city was captured in 1204.²⁶ The ease with which Constantinople could be captured was greatly overestimated by both the author of the *Directorium* and William Adam. After taking the city in 1261, Michael VIII had strengthened the walls and refortified the harbour, and he and his successors were careful to maintain close relations with Genoa, upon whom they relied for naval protection against both Turks and western enemies. When the *Directorium* was written, in 1332, relations with Venice had also improved, and the empire joined the republic in the first naval league against the Turks.²⁷

Contrary to Laiou's opinion, the majority of the proposals were uninterested in the fate of the Byzantine empire.²⁸ The two Dominicans were exceptional in their virulent hatred of the Greeks, while Lull was motivated by more evangelical religious concerns. Apart from the two Dominicans, whose eastern travels served only to harden their xenophobia, all the authors to consider the conquest of Constantinople were based in western Europe. Authors such as James of Molay or Fulk of Villaret were primarily concerned with the Mamluks and made no mention of the Greeks or the former Latin empire. Many proposals were written during the period when Charles of Valois was engaged in his effort to organise an expedition against the Greeks, suggesting there was little support for the idea outside France. Sanudo's attitude contrasted with that of other theorists. Although he proposed that the crusade conquer the Byzantine empire in the *Liber secretorum*, from the 1320s he adopted a more favourable attitude towards the Greeks, caused by his concerns

²⁶Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and tr. E. Faral, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 174-7; vol. 2, pp. 36-47.

²⁷D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 129-30. Before the anti-Turkish league a five-year truce had been signed in 1324 (*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 98).

²⁸Most of them [the theorists] argued that the success of the plans depended on the prior conquest of the Byzantine empire and the disruption of Egyptian trade' (*Constantinople and the Latins*, p. 239).

about the Turks. He was keen to see co-operation among all threatened states to resist them and to this end he wrote letters to Andronicus II and was prepared to act as his informal envoy in dealings with the west. Sanudo's ideas eventually came to fruition in the naval leagues against the Turks, in which the Greeks played a major role, but he was the only author to have such a positive attitude towards the Byzantines.²⁹

The author of the *Directorium* devoted considerable attention to the course of the crusade through Europe to Constantinople because of his interest in the recapture of the city. In contrast, he offers little information about lands to the east of the city, only warning against trusting the inhabitants of these regions.³⁰ His discussion of the routes through Europe indicates a detailed knowledge of the first crusade, unmatched by any other theorist. The author lists the major participants and the routes they took to Constantinople with reasonable accuracy, but it is impossible to identify his sources. His suggestions are based solely on the first crusade and he makes no reference to events of the second and third crusades. It is unclear whether this preference for the first crusade was due to its success or to ignorance of later crusades. With the exception of Serbia, he was unaware of contemporary conditions in the region, which had changed greatly since the eleventh century as smaller states took advantage of the disintegration of Byzantine authority. Other theorists to favour the land route gave little attention to the exact routes to be followed, and only Dubois made a passing reference to earlier crusades. None appear to have had any knowledge of conditions in eastern Europe.

The author of the *Directorium* recommended that the army of the French king travel through Germany and Hungary, following the path which had been taken by Peter the Hermit and Godfrey of Bouillon in the eleventh century. He argued that

²⁹Sanudo, p. 94; letters of Sanudo, ed. Bongars, pp. 299, 301-2; Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks', pp. 374-93; Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade', pp. 70-1.

³⁰'Directorium', pp. 486-97.

the route passed through friendly territory, so that horses and provisions would be as freely available as if the king were in his own kingdom, making the journey less arduous and dangerous. Godfrey's crossing had been without incident, although hostages were given to ensure good behaviour in Hungary following the violent passage of the 'popular crusade' the year before.³¹ Dubois suggested this route was suitable for Germans, Hungarians and Greeks, using the crusades of Charlemagne, Godfrey and Frederick Barbarossa as his examples, and he too implied that the availability of provisions and shelter would ease the journey.³² Neither appear aware of contemporary conditions in the area, but the *Anonymi Descriptio* gives a detailed account of Hungary which reported that the land was flat and bountiful. Its author believed that the Angevin king, Charles Robert (Carobert), a distant relative of Philip IV, was a potential supporter of Valois ambitions in the Balkans.³³

The author of the *Directorium* suggested two alternative routes from Hungary to Constantinople, through Bulgaria or 'Slavonia'. The former followed the path of Godfrey of Bouillon, and was the route preferred for the French king as it was the shorter.³⁴ Previous expeditions had experienced mixed fortunes on this journey. Godfrey had no difficulties on his crossing but Frederick Barbarossa's army suffered such constant harassment from Bulgarian bandits and irregular forces that he considered assaulting Constantinople.³⁵ Although Dubois had used an account of the latter crusade, he made no reference to the difficulties faced by the

³¹'Directorium', pp. 417-19; Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', pp. 300-3.

³²Dubois, pp. 87, 156. Dubois explained that his information on Frederick came from the *Hystoria Hierosolymitana*, identified by Brandt as the work ascribed to Richard, canon of the Holy Trinity in London (p. 87 n. 43; 'Ex itinero peregrinorum auctore Ricardo Londoniensi', *MGH SS* 27, pp. 191-219).

³³*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 41-2; E. Pamlényi (ed.), *History of Hungary* (London, 1973), pp. 72, 76; P. F. Sugar (ed.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 37-8.

³⁴'Directorium', pp. 417, 419-20; Dubois, p. 87.

³⁵Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', pp. 304-5; 'Historia de expeditione Friderici', pp. 27-8.

army which it described.³⁶ The theorists made no reference to contemporary conditions in Bulgaria, which was suffering from endemic domestic instability caused by Mongol raiding and warfare with Serbia.³⁷ The alternative route from Hungary was through 'Slavonia', but it is unclear what the author of the *Directorium* understood by this. He reported that some books stated Adhemar of Le Puy and Raymond of Toulouse used this route in 1096, but others related that they journeyed through Dalmatia.³⁸ Adhemar's army had travelled down the Dalmatian coast before turning inland to join the *Via Egnatia*. This region was named 'Sclavonia' in the accounts written by Raymond of Aguilers, the *Gesta Francorum* and later histories based on them.³⁹ Other narratives described the region as Dalmatia.⁴⁰ Clearly the author of the *Directorium* believed 'Slavonia' and Dalmatia to be separate regions, since the latter is suggested as an alternative to crossing the Adriatic by sea. Adhemar's route was impractical for an army leaving Hungary, so the author must have envisaged 'Slavonia' to be inland, between the coast and Bulgaria. Serbia ('Rassie') lay in this area and although the author had spent some time there, his knowledge of the region's geography was confused.⁴¹

The author of the *Directorium* was keen to see the crusade conquer Serbia as it passed through the Balkans. He viewed the country with the same disgust as he

³⁶Dubois, p. 156; 'Ex itinerario peregrinorum auctore Ricardo Londoniensi', pp. 200-4.

³⁷D. M. Lang, *The Bulgarians* (London, 1976), p. 82; D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (New York, 1971), p. 318. The *Anonymi Descriptio* reported that Bulgaria was under Tartar tribute (pp. 39-41).

³⁸'Directorium', p. 419: 'per Sclavoniam vero Ademarus...et Raimundus...ut in libris aliquibus invenitur; in aliquibus vero libris leguntur per Aquileiam et Dalmaciam sua itinera peregrisse'.

³⁹Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem', pp. 235-6; *Gesta Francorum*, p. 5; Peter of Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere*, ed. J. H. and L. L. Hill (Paris, 1977), p. 43; Baldric of Dol, 'Historia Jerosolimitana', p. 20; Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', p. 148.

⁴⁰William of Tyre, 'Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum', *RHC Occ.* 1.1, p. 91; Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Iherosolymitana', *RHC Occ.* 3, p. 327.

⁴¹'Directorium', p. 479: while discussing Serbia he writes 'numquam vidi ibi aliquod palacium...nisi in civitatibus maritimis Latinorum'.

viewed the Byzantines, and similar personal sentiments lay behind his desire to see the kingdom in Latin control. He included the Serbs in his condemnation of the Greeks, arguing that they could not be trusted because they did not hold the Roman Catholic faith and attempted to lure others to their own heresy. As a Dominican, the author was concerned about the treatment of his brethren in the area, claiming that they were beaten and expelled, complaints probably based on personal experience. In addition, he recounted the crimes of the parricidal Nemanja dynasty with a gruesome relish, placing them on a par with the Palaeologi for treachery.⁴² These sentiments were shared to a lesser degree by the anonymous writer of the *Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, who accused the Serbs of being 'scismatici perfidi' and of persecuting the Catholics of Antivari.⁴³ There are similarities between the two accounts. The author of the *Directorium* believed that Serbia could be easily conquered as the inhabitants had no fortified towns, and that help could be obtained from Venice and from the six Latin towns of the region.⁴⁴ The *Anonymi Descriptio* stated that the Serbs had only six towns, while the remainder of the population lived in fortresses or villages constructed from wood. Its author recommended Antivari, one of the Latin towns named in the *Directorium*, as a base for disembarkation. In addition, both report the marriage of Stephen Milutin ('Stephanus Urosius') to the daughter of the king of Hungary, and the division of the kingdom between Milutin and his brother Stephen Dragutin.⁴⁵ The *Directorium* adds a number of details which indicate that he did not base his account of Serbia on the earlier work. While the *Anonymi Descriptio* reports that there were seven silver mines, with lead and iron also abundant in the country, the later writer reported five silver and gold

⁴²*Directorium*', pp. 423-6; 436-9; 445-6.

⁴³*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, p. 36.

⁴⁴*Directorium*', pp. 477-85.

⁴⁵*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 30-7; *Directorium*', pp. 436-9.

mines. He also added details about Milutin's marriage and listed the six Latin cities by name.⁴⁶

The final possible route to Constantinople involved a sea crossing of the Adriatic, mentioned by both Fidenzio of Padua and the author of the *Directorium*.⁴⁷ The latter believed that crusaders from Italy, southern Germany and southern France should cross the Adriatic either from Brindisi to Durazzo or from Otranto to Epirus. The *Directorium* reported that Hugh 'Magnus' and Robert of Flanders used the former crossing, while Tancred and Robert the Norman took the latter.⁴⁸ It is unclear where the author obtained this information, which is inaccurate and differs from the main accounts of the first crusade. These agree that Hugh crossed to Durazzo, but most stated that he travelled from Bari. The one account to agree with the *Directorium* survives only in a single manuscript, making it unlikely that the author had access to it.⁴⁹ Robert of Flanders also left from Bari, while Robert the Norman travelled from Brindisi, both to Durazzo. Tancred, with Bohemond, crossed from Bari to Avlona (which is north of Epirus).⁵⁰ The *Directorium* suggested that the army could avoid going by sea by travelling through Dalmatia, the route taken by Adhemar and Raymond of Toulouse. The author described this as 'via facilis et plana, domestica, fertilis', contrasting sharply with Raymond of Aguilers's unfavourable impressions of the region.⁵¹

⁴⁶*Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, pp. 29-37; 'Directorium', pp. 436, 483-4. The *Directorium* also refers to Serbia as 'Rassie' while the *Anonymi* clearly states that this was simply a region of Serbia.

⁴⁷Fidenzio, p. 52 (from Brindisi to Durazzo).

⁴⁸'Directorium', p. 416.

⁴⁹'Li estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche', *RHC Occ.* 5, p. 627 (an abridged version of Fulcher). The *Gesta Francorum* (pp. 5-6) states that crusaders crossed from Brindisi, Bari or Otranto, while Hugh crossed from Bari to Durazzo; this is followed by Peter of Tudebode (p. 37), Robert the Monk (pp. 20-1), and Guibert of Nogent (p. 150).

⁵⁰Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Iherusolymitana', pp. 327-30

⁵¹'Directorium', pp. 414-15; Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', pp. 235-6.

From Constantinople, the route favoured by the six theorists lay through Asia Minor, following the path of the first crusade. This was the only instance when the greater part of a crusade successfully negotiated the journey overland. The crusaders of 1101 were massacred, the second crusade turned back to the coast and continued by sea, and Frederick Barbarossa's army disintegrated when he drowned in an Armenian river. On each occasion, only a few succeeded in fighting their way through to Antioch. None of the authors appear to have had any appreciation of the difficulties involved in traversing Asia Minor, and most barely dealt with the issue. William Adam and the *Directorium* were primarily concerned with the recovery of the Byzantine empire, and gave the journey through Anatolia only cursory treatment. Dubois is similarly vague and Lull reported that the crusade should proceed 'successive usque ad civitatem sanctam Jerusalem et usque ad Tripol et Barbaria'.⁵² Such a dismissal of the journey demonstrates that Lull had no conception of the problems involved, and probably no great interest in them. Fidenzio of Padua was the most knowledgeable about eastern affairs, but he too was unaware both of contemporary conditions in Asia Minor and the fate of the twelfth century crusades. A number of other theorists firmly rejected a crossing of Anatolia, refuting arguments used to support the route.

Fidenzio described both the land and the sea route without stating a preference for either, but he discussed the former in much greater detail, describing the advantages of travelling this way and listing precautions which should be taken, implying he believed that at least part of the army should use this route. He argued that if the army travelled overland, horses and other animals could be taken along, and more bought from cities on the journey. The army should travel slowly to avoid tiredness, and bring craftsman, translators and guides to provide assistance.⁵³ Other theorists disagreed vehemently with Fidenzio's view of the likely effects of such a

⁵²Lull, 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', p. 100.

⁵³Fidenzio, pp. 51-2.

journey on men and animals. The report produced by Philip VI's council on the advice of the *Directorium* stated that travelling by land took longer and was more difficult than by sea, and both men and horses would be weakened and fall victim to various diseases. Similarly, the Hospitaller proposal argued that it would lead to 'l'afoiblissement de lour persons et lour chevaus'.⁵⁴ Their views echoed the experience of the first crusade. The author of the *Gesta Francorum* recounted that losses of animals from the rigours of the journey were so severe that nobles were forced to ride oxen, and use sheep and dogs as pack animals.⁵⁵

Fidenzio suggested that the army carry sufficient food and water for several days' travel, since it would pass through regions where there would be insufficient provisions. He clearly underestimated the problem of obtaining supplies for an army which he proposed should include thirty thousand knights.⁵⁶ Sanudo claimed that food would be scarce, a view also expressed in the French council's report on the *Directorium*.⁵⁷ This more pessimistic view was a closer reflection of the experience of previous expeditions, which had suffered greatly from hunger and thirst. The *Gesta Francorum* reported that on the first crusade men were driven to eat spiky plants, while members of Frederick Barbarossa's army were reduced to even more desperate straits.⁵⁸ Philip's advisory council also drew attention to the physical problems of crossing Asia Minor, complaining that paths were 'fort difficiles à cause des montagnes'. The obstacle of the Antitaurus range ('diabolicam montanam') was vividly depicted in the *Gesta*, which told of horses falling from steep and narrow paths, and knights throwing away armour in despair.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁴Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 7; Hospitallers, pp. 222-3.

⁵⁵*Gesta Francorum*, p. 23.

⁵⁶Fidenzio, p. 51.

⁵⁷Sanudo, p. 37; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 7.

⁵⁸*Gesta Francorum*, p. 23; 'Historia de expeditione Friderici', pp. 82-3.

⁵⁹Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 7; *Gesta Francorum*, p. 27.

climate of the region compounded these problems, both during the fierce heat of summer which afflicted the first crusade, and the winter floods which hindered the second.⁶⁰

Philip's council reported that the natives of the region 'n'aiment mie moult les gens de france', and that attacks on the army would be a constant threat. The Hospitallers drew on the experience of the first crusade to make a similar point, claiming that nine-tenths of the army were killed before they reached Antioch.⁶¹ Harassment by the inhabitants of Asia Minor was a problem suffered by all crusades which had travelled through the region. Fidenzio was aware of the potential for fighting as he warned the army against trusting the people of the area, and urged that it always be prepared to defend itself. However, he believed that the army could cross Asia Minor with minimal difficulty because the Turks' Mongol overlords would prevent them from attacking the crusaders.⁶² Fidenzio greatly exaggerated the control exercised by the Mongols in the region, which was never firmly established and was further weakened by revolts among their own generals. Even Hayton, who tended to magnify Mongol power and achievements, warned against sending the crusade through Asia Minor to Armenia because of the danger posed by the Turks.⁶³

The author of the *Directorium* and the bishop of Leon revealed their ignorance of both Asia Minor and military affairs by suggesting that the crusade fight its way to the Holy Land, defeating the Turks on the way. The bishop believed that, with Mongol help, the route could be cleared within a year. The *Directorium* expressed the same view, urging that the crusaders attack the Turks after capturing

⁶⁰Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', p. 30; 'Historia de expeditione Friderici', p. 91; Odo of Deuil, pp. 108-10, 127.

⁶¹Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 7; Hospitallers, pp. 222-3. Durant also claimed that only a tenth of the crusaders survived (p. 106).

⁶²Fidenzio, p. 51.

⁶³C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, tr. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), pp. 293-303; Hayton, p. 359.

Constantinople. The author argued that it made greater sense to engage the Turks first since they were capable of aiding the sultan, while the reverse did not hold since the Mongols of Persia would prevent the sultan from sending aid to the Turks.⁶⁴ He also believed that Peter the Hermit had subjugated the Turks on his way to Jerusalem. In fact, the popular crusade under Peter's leadership was a victim of a Turkish ambush, being surprised near the coast and annihilated at Xerigordon and Civotot in 1096.⁶⁵ The author argued that the Turks were divided, with a king for every city, and a prince for every town. While this was a fairly accurate assessment of fragmented political conditions in Asia Minor in this period, the author failed to recognise the dangerous and dynamic nature of the new independent emirates, especially those established in the west. His appraisal contrasts unfavourably with Sanudo's perceptive warnings, issued almost a decade earlier.⁶⁶

From Asia Minor the army would pass into northern Syria where it joined routes which were equally accessible to an army arriving by sea. The land route to the east was supported by a minority of theorists, who tended to lack experience and knowledge of the east, despite often lengthy discussions. Neither Lull, Dubois nor the bishop of Leon had visited Asia Minor, and the author of the *Directorium* had travelled widely but gained little from the experience. With the exception of Fidenzio, their proposals were less practical than those by men involved in crusading, and given his understanding of conditions in the region, it seems surprising that Fidenzio proposed the route. The plan to send a large army through Asia Minor was thoroughly impractical and likely to be fraught with difficulty. Certainly those involved in preparing crusades in Europe did not consider going by land. The papal-Hospitaller crusade of 1309 sailed to the east, while crusades planned in France, such as Louis of Clermont's abortive expedition of 1317, were to

⁶⁴BN lat. 7470, f. 127; 'Directorium', pp. 502-5.

⁶⁵'Directorium', pp. 499, 505; Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', pp. 284-9; *Gesta Francorum*, pp. 3-5.

⁶⁶'Directorium', pp. 511-13; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 304-13.

travel by sea. The proposals contained in the *Directorium* were emphatically rejected by Philip VI's advisors who concluded that the crusade must sail to the east.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the idea was discussed more widely than among theorists. A letter to James II from his ambassadors reports that the papal vice-chancellor had suggested that, with the assistance of the Catalan company, the crusade could go 'en Grecia e subjugas los Grechs a la esgleya catholica e puys per Ermenia per terra firma poria hom anar als Sarrayns'.⁶⁸

Sailing to the east

The route by sea was preferred by many authors, particularly those who lived in the east, but there was still opportunity for disagreement over questions such as the possibility of halting in Cyprus, or sending the passage to Armenia rather than directly to the Holy Land. There were problems with this route, notably the effect of the long journey and the difficulty of co-ordinating the arrival of a large fleet. Only the two Dominicans rejected the sea route entirely. The author of the *Directorium* complained of the motion and smell of the sea; foul water and bad food; and cramped conditions on board ship. William Adam, equally vehement in denouncing sea travel, complained of sea sickness, writing that many were so affected by the movement of the ship that they could neither eat, nor hold down food, so that 'magis videantur vicini morti quam vite, et magis videantur apti esse ad feretrum quam ad bellum'.⁶⁹ Despite their fears, they accepted that some crusaders would travel by sea if they were accustomed to it, or had to travel from distant lands, such as England and Spain. Dubois argued that the largest army should travel by land, since there were insufficient ships for the whole crusade, and 'warriors and their mounts are ordinarily weakened by a sea voyage'. However, he believed that another three

⁶⁷Boutaric, 'Ce sont les diligences que li Roys a faites pour le Saint Voyage', pp. 435-6; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 7-11.

⁶⁸Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, no. 130 (22 November 1311).

⁶⁹'Directorium', p. 412; William Adam, p. 539.

armies, from England, France and Spain, should go by sea. The bishop of Leon believed that the problems of sea-travel could be circumvented by training crusaders, gradually building up the time spent at sea. He feared particularly for the king 'propter ponderositatem corporis', but suggested that he swim to accustom himself to the movement of the sea. The king and great lords should stop every two or three days on islands to rest themselves and their animals.⁷⁰

The two Dominicans' objection to sea travel is surprising given their lengthy journeys in the Indian Ocean, and the suspicion shown by Dubois and the bishop of Leon, who had probably never travelled by sea, is more understandable. These fears were shared by earlier crusaders. In 1096, the sinking of a ship carrying four hundred crusaders shocked members of Baldwin's army watching from the shore, and many chose to return home 'dicentes nunquam amplius in aquam sic deceptricem se infigere'.⁷¹ Joinville spoke of his dread of the sea as he left home, while the superstitious reaction of his fellow passengers to difficulties with currents off the North African coast illustrates the ignorance of many travellers.⁷² In the *De Praedicatione*, Humbert of Romans believed that fear of the sea was a major obstacle to crusading in the Holy Land.⁷³ This is understandable given the very real dangers and discomforts which confronted a traveller. In 1249, gales struck Louis IX's fleet as it was on the point of leaving Cyprus, scattering ships and delaying their arrival in Egypt. Another violent storm at Damietta carried off 'twelve score' ships from the fleet and when Joinville finally sailed home from the east, his ship struck a

⁷⁰Dubois, pp. 86-7; BN lat. 7470, ff. 128-128v.

⁷¹Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Iherusolymitana', p. 330.

⁷²Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, pp. 108-9.

⁷³Throop, pp. 152-3.

sandbank in mist and he was driven back to Cyprus by a strong wind, fearing the worst.⁷⁴

There were other potential difficulties with sea travel, some brought about by the loss of mainland bases in 1291. This was emphasised by both William Adam and the *Directorium*, who reported that Christians held no ports between Constantinople and Alexandria.⁷⁵ Other theorists stressed the dangers of attacking the Syrian coast directly. Dubois claimed that because there were neither enough vessels for all, nor any ports at which to disembark, the crusaders could only land in small groups. As they landed, 'the few arriving at the same time would be cut to pieces by the ferocious enemy'. The Hospitallers also warned of the dangers of landing piecemeal in Syria or Egypt.⁷⁶ Dubois concluded that most of the crusade should travel by land, while the Hospitallers provided no solution. One answer was for the crusade to rest on an island on the way to the east. Roger of Stanegrave proposed that the crusade halt on Rhodes, which was temperate and close to Alexandria, although his Hospitaller connections perhaps influenced his choice.⁷⁷ Other authors suggested Cyprus, where the whole army could assemble. Joinville reports that Louis had intended to go directly to Egypt but was persuaded by his barons to await the remainder of his forces, the chronicler himself being a latecomer.⁷⁸

There was division among the theorists over the question of whether to halt on Cyprus, reflecting different opinions of the island, and of the events of Louis IX's crusade. Charles II argued that the crusaders should go to Cyprus where they could

⁷⁴Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, pp. 113, 120. Joinville's account is substantiated by other chroniclers: Gaufrido de Belloloco, 'Vita Sancti Ludovici', *RHGF* 20, p. 18; William of Nangis, 'Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici regis Franciae', *RHGF* 20, p. 388.

⁷⁵William Adam, p. 536; 'Directorium', p. 500. The latter extended this to Gibraltar, but neither considered the ports of Armenia worthy of inclusion.

⁷⁶Dubois, p. 86; Hospitallers, p. 224.

⁷⁷BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 8v.

⁷⁸Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, p. 109.

recover from the long journey and take advice on its final destination.⁷⁹ Similar arguments were used by the citizens of Marseilles and James of Molay, who reported that if the crusade halted on Cyprus, it had the option of going either to Egypt or the Holy Land.⁸⁰ Henry II added that if the army were based on the island, the sultan could not know where it planned to strike.⁸¹ Despite the island's proximity to the Holy Land, and its role as a source of supplies and occasional reinforcements, it was little used by crusading expeditions. After its capture from the Byzantines by Richard I, only Louis IX halted there. Theobald of Champagne ignored advice to stop on the island and sailed directly to Acre, as did the fifth crusade and the expedition of Prince Edward. Cyprus was not used because the Holy Land could fulfil the same function, so expeditions used Acre to rest after the journey and to consult local leaders. Theobald spent two months there before leaving for Ascalon, but he was accused of wasting time in luxurious living since he spent only two days discussing his plans. Edward remained for a month to recover and consult the locals before attacking Lydda.⁸² After the collapse of Christian rule on the mainland, Cyprus was the only realistic location for the crusade to rest and gather, and consequently found new favour.

Other authors objected to sending a crusade to Cyprus, basing their arguments on the experiences of Louis IX on the island. The author of the *Directorium* believed that if an army stayed there, expenses would be multiplied and dissension arise through inactivity. Men would squander their money 'in lusibus et tabernis et aliis inhonestis'. The climate was unhealthy and the strong local wines, if

⁷⁹Charles II, p. 359.

⁸⁰Molay, p. 148; 'Informationes Massilie', p. 249.

⁸¹Henry II, pp. 123-4. The Cypriot ambassadors to John XXII reported that the crusade could rest on the island to consult its king (*Lettres secrètes du pape Jean XXII*, no. 1690).

⁸²Röhricht, *Regesta*, no. 1083; Painter, 'The crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall', pp. 473-4; Röhricht, 'La croisade de prince Édouard d'Angleterre (1270-1274)', p. 622; Forey, 'Cyprus as a base for crusading expeditions from the west', pp. 69-76; Housley, 'Cyprus and the crusades 1291-1571', pp. 187-8.

drunk pure, 'intestina et cerebrum destruunt et comburunt'. He supported his arguments with reference to Louis IX's crusade, estimating that the king lost two hundred and fifty counts, barons and knights while on the island.⁸³ The *Via ad Terram Sanctam* also referred to Louis's crusade and argued that an army would lose men, food and money on Cyprus.⁸⁴ Chronicles of the crusade put his losses at two hundred and forty, indicating that the figure in the *Directorium* came from an informed source.⁸⁵ Joinville made no reference to the death of crusaders, but described the departure of knights attracted by the prospect of booty in a war between the Mongols and Turks near Armenia. Joinville himself ran short of money and was forced to enter the king's service on the island, and royal documents record others who were forced to borrow money from merchants to finance their stay.⁸⁶ A pause in the journey could also mean that a crusade missed the campaigning season in the east: the author of the *Directorium* emphasised that Louis had to spend the entire winter on Cyprus.⁸⁷ The need for this lengthy break convinced Sanudo that stopping on the island was to be avoided.⁸⁸

The theorists disagreed over whether the island's resources were sufficient for a crusade. Charles II believed that Cyprus was 'planterouse de tous biens', while Henry II was surely confident that his kingdom could support an army if he advised that the crusade land there.⁸⁹ Many pilgrims, including Ludolph of Suchheim who

⁸³'Directorium', pp. 413-14. On the dangerous effects of Cypriot wines, see Ludolph of Suchheim, *Description of the Holy Land*, p. 44.

⁸⁴'Via', p. 428.

⁸⁵William of Nangis, 'Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici', p. 356.

⁸⁶Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, pp. 110-12; *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, ed. J. de Laborde (Paris, 1875), vol. 3, nos. 3760, 3769-71; A-E Sayous, 'Les mandats de Saint Louis sur son trésor et le mouvement international des capitaux pendant la septième croisade (1248-1254)', *Revue Historique* 167 (1931), p. 266.

⁸⁷'Directorium', p. 413.

⁸⁸Sanudo, p. 39.

⁸⁹Charles II, p. 359.

visited in the 1340s, were struck by the island's riches and fertility, while Joinville was astounded by the mounds of grain arranged by royal agents.⁹⁰ In contrast, Lull, who had visited the island, claimed that it lacked sufficient resources to support an army and the *Via ad Terram Sanctam* claimed that it lacked fodder for horses.⁹¹ When the *Via* was written, the island was suffering from a series of bad harvests, the effect of which was compounded by the large influx of refugees from the Syrian mainland, and this may account for the more gloomy picture painted by this author.⁹² By 1300, Cyprus was exporting food and wine to Armenia and Rhodes, suggesting the recovery from the crisis was swift.⁹³

Armenia was another possible base for the crusade, but opinions differed widely on its suitability. Hayton and the author of the common section of the *Via* and *Memoria* both favoured sending the crusade to Armenia before the Holy Land. Hayton suggested that the passage halt in Cyprus to avoid the heat of the Armenian summer, then continue after Michaelmas. The army would establish itself at Tarsus, and 'ibi invenient omnia necessaria affluenter'.⁹⁴ The author of the *Via* agreed that summer in Armenia was 'moult enferme' and best avoided, but argued that the country could provide plenty of fodder and animals. He also emphasised the proximity of Cyprus as a source of provisions, suggesting that he doubted Armenia's ability to supply an army.⁹⁵ The *Via* claimed that Portus Palorum, situated near Ayas, was 'un des meillours dou monde', and Fidenzio recommended that it should be used by large ships carrying an army for Antioch. Both these works were written

⁹⁰Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, p. 109; Ludolph of Suchem, *Description of the Holy Land*, pp. 38-45; 'Itinerarium cuiusdam Anglici', p. 446.

⁹¹Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 276; 'Via', p. 428.

⁹²Gestes des chiprois', p. 818.

⁹³J. Richard, 'Une économie coloniale? Chypre et ses ressources agricoles au Moyen Age', in *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs*, p. 348.

⁹⁴Hayton, p. 359.

⁹⁵'Via', pp. 428-9. Fidenzio also expected that some supplies could be acquired from Armenia if the army was at Antioch (pp. 56-7).

close to 1290, when the port was still used. It appears to have been abandoned in the 1300s, and the author of the *Directorium*, writing in the 1330s, rejected it as too narrow and small.⁹⁶ Other theorists had serious reservations about the natural resources and climate of the country, which even its advocates admitted was unpleasantly hot. Sanudo believed that this would weaken an army, while James of Molay claimed it was so bad that if four thousand horses were taken there, barely five hundred would survive. An independent witness, Marco Polo, complained of the enervating climate, but believed that the country was 'well-stocked with the means of life'. The *Directorium* disagreed with this view, doubting Armenia's ability to supply an army, and claiming that the country could not even provide sufficient food for itself.⁹⁷

There were strong strategic reasons to reject Armenia as a base for a crusade. Armenian rulers had been protected from the Mamluk sultanate by their alliance with the Ilkhanate, but became exposed to attack after the Mongol defeat at Ayn Jalut in 1260, and the Templars' decision to abandon Baghras in 1268. The Mamluks launched major raids in 1266 and 1275, while from the 1270s, the Turcomans raided from the west. After the fall of Acre, Armenia became a prime target for the Moslems. Hromkla was sacked in 1292, and more raids sent in 1298-9 and 1302.⁹⁸ Hayton, who composed his proposal in 1307, appears to have hoped to attract a western army to the kingdom to protect it from the Mamluks. He argued strongly for its use as a crusade base and constantly understated the instability of the kingdom in order to make it a more attractive destination. This misrepresentation could only be deliberate since he could not be unaware of the true state of Armenia

⁹⁶'Via', p. 428; Fidenzio, pp. 55-6; 'Directorium', pp. 500-1. Fidenzio stated that the whole army could land at Portus Palorum if necessary, but suggested smaller ships use the port of St. Symeon, used by the Genoese on the first crusade, and sail up the Orontes to Antioch.

⁹⁷Sanudo, p. 37; Molay, p. 146; Marco Polo, p. 46; 'Directorium', pp. 500-1. See also Henry II, p. 122. The *Directorium* was written considerably later than the other proposals, in the 1330s, by which time Armenia had suffered greatly from the ravages of the Mamluks and Turcomans.

⁹⁸'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 766, 780, 839-41, 851; S. Der Nersessian, 'The kingdom of Cilician Armenia', Setton 2, p. 655; Sempad, 'Chronique du royaume de la petite Arménie', pp. 653, 656.

given his position in the royal family.⁹⁹ The author of the *Via* was less likely to have ulterior motives for proposing Armenia as a crusade base, although it seems likely he was an easterner, and possibly an Armenian.

Other theorists rejected the idea of using Armenia as a base, and were apathetic towards the kingdom's fate, some even hostile, regardless of papal concern. The author of the *Directorium* was worried by Armenian religious sympathies, having been involved in the failed attempt to bring union. He viewed the Armenians as 'heretici pessimi' and thoroughly untrustworthy. Henry II also distrusted Armenians, but for secular reasons. He claimed they were always ready to flee in battle, and would not offer shelter to the crusaders. Henry's attitude towards the Armenian baronage was conditioned by his desire to see Cyprus play an important role in the crusade, which would be difficult if the army avoided the island. In addition, his relations with Armenia were strained following his imprisonment there while in exile.¹⁰⁰ Only Sanudo demonstrated concern for the kingdom's fate, arguing that the Cypriots and Hospitallers should provide continuous assistance for the kingdom.¹⁰¹ He added a marginal note to the *Liber secretorum* which argued that a force should be sent to Armenia to prevent the kingdom from paying tribute, reporting that the mountains were beautiful with plenty of water in summer. In the manuscript used by Bongars, this was included in the text, even though it contradicted the opening part of the chapter which reported that the kingdom was hot and lacked fodder.¹⁰²

⁹⁹Hayton, pp. 359-60.

¹⁰⁰'Directorium', pp. 487-90; Henry II, p. 122; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 124, 127-8.

¹⁰¹Sanudo, pp. 5-9. See also A. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers' interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1275-1375', in T. S. R. Boase, *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 119-28.

¹⁰²BM add. 27376, f. 10v; Sanudo, p. 38.

The Holy Land

A few theorists advised on how the crusade should proceed when it reached Syria, all authors with first-hand knowledge of the area. While their proposed routes were similar in part to those of the first crusade, they made no reference to this. They proposed that the crusade travel south from the north of Syria, rather than directly attacking the coast. Fidenzio (and possibly the author of the *Via*) rejected the latter strategy even before Christians lost possession of the Syrian littoral. Fidenzio reported that Acre was surrounded by the enemy, remote from sources of assistance, and threatened by Moslem forces and forts in the vicinity. The *Via* used similar arguments to reject Tripoli.¹⁰³ After the crusader states were captured, the Mamluks prepared carefully against the prospect of a seaborne attack by destroying the fortifications of any towns they recovered from the Christians, to prevent an invader using them as bases. Jacob of Verona, who went on a pilgrimage in 1335, reported that all the coastal towns were in ruins, and the only fortifications in Syria belonged to Antioch, Jerusalem and Saphet. He also described how the ports of Damietta, Tripoli, Jaffa and Acre were filled with large stones when rumours of Philip VI's planned crusade reached the east.¹⁰⁴

Fidenzio believed that the passage should begin the conquest of the Holy Land at Antioch. He listed several advantages of the city, including its healthy climate, and the plentiful supply of food and water nearby.¹⁰⁵ His account echoes that of the *Gesta Francorum* which described abundant vines, corn and fruit trees around the city. The first crusaders were struck by the fertility of the region, particularly in contrast with the barren crossing of Asia Minor, but supplies soon ran

¹⁰³'Via', pp. 427-8; Fidenzio, p. 54. Fidenzio accepted that Acre could be used if the crusade was too small to act independently of the local barons.

¹⁰⁴'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 817-18; R. Röhricht, 'Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', *ROL* 3 (1895), pp. 225, 250.

¹⁰⁵Fidenzio, pp. 56-7.

low and the winter weather was poor.¹⁰⁶ Fidenzio based his choice on strategic advantages, including Antioch's suitability for armies travelling by land or sea, and he made no reference to the first crusade. Fidenzio argued that Antioch was at the far extreme of the sultan's lands so he could not send help, whereas crusaders had access to assistance from Cyprus, Armenia, Greece and Rhodes, although only the first-named was a realistic source of aid given the parlous state of Armenia, and the strained relations between Byzantium and the west. He believed that Antioch was unfortified and his opinion was shared by Jacob of Verona, although it is unclear if the latter ever visited the city. Fidenzio believed that it could thus be easily occupied, an important consideration given that the first crusade spent nine months besieging the city.¹⁰⁷ The idea of attacking the north of Syria by land was adopted by Boniface VIII in a papal letter, suggesting that Fidenzio's ideas had some influence on papal policy.¹⁰⁸

Hayton and the author of the *Via* argued that the crusade should proceed south from Antioch to Hamah, the latter arguing that the army should go through Ma'arrat an-Numan. The *Via* reported that Hamah was rich and poorly defended, and it lay close to Rahit, the town used by the Mamluk army as its mustering point in Syria. The crusaders could attack the enemy there, and, if the latter failed to arrive, the country could be easily captured. Their route followed the course of the first crusade, although neither author mentioned this. The crusaders stopped at Hamah and consulted with locals who told them that the journey to Damascus was the easiest, with enough food but little water, but they recommended the coast road because of an ancient prophecy.¹⁰⁹ The theorists recommended that the crusade proceed inland from Hamah, since all three believed that the army should capture

¹⁰⁶*Gesta Francorum*, p. 28; 'Epistolae Stephani comitis carnomensis', *RHC Occ.* 3, p. 889. Stephen reported that he could not understand why people complained of the sun in Syria.

¹⁰⁷Fidenzio, pp. 57-8; Röhrich, 'Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', p. 225.

¹⁰⁸*Registres de Boniface VIII*, no. 2654; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, pp. 150-5.

¹⁰⁹'Via', pp. 429-31; Hayton, p. 360; Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', pp. 108-9.

Damascus before Jerusalem. Fidenzio stated that the recovery of coastal territory was a diversion unless the crusade were to progress inland afterwards, suggesting that the importance of controlling the coast to ensure supplies was lost on him.¹¹⁰ Their plans were impractical, involving an enormous enterprise, far from naval assistance, and requiring several sieges. The crusaders' record at successfully prosecuting sieges away from the coast was poor. Sanudo recognised the importance of maintaining communication between an army and its supporting fleet, and had a more circumspect view of fighting inland, reporting that the Tartars had been forced to leave Syria due to the heat and lack of pasture.¹¹¹ Instead, he favoured exploiting Christian naval power in the conquest of the Holy Land, just as in Egypt, though he admitted that the absence of rivers would hamper this method. The crusaders should work from the coast inwards, establishing control over maritime cities to allow supplies to be brought by sea. Crops in the interior would then be destroyed, forcing the Moslems to leave through hunger.¹¹² Few other authors discussed details of the conquest of the Holy Land since those in a position to do so were reluctant to address the later stages of the crusade.

Egypt

While the recovery of the Holy Land was the ultimate aim of the planned crusade, many theorists recognised that the heart of Mamluk power lay in Egypt. The preliminary measures described earlier were intended to weaken the Mamluks there, usually economically, but Charles II believed in addition that Alexandria should be destroyed by a Christian raid. Only three writers, Henry II, Marino Sanudo and Roger of Stanegrave suggested that the general passage should be directed to Egypt rather than the Holy Land. This idea had been frequently raised

¹¹⁰Hayton, p. 360; Fidenzio, pp. 55, 58 (Fidenzio also argued that the crusade capture Aleppo).

¹¹¹Sanudo, p. 93. See D. O. Morgan, 'The Mongols in Syria, 1261-1300', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 231-5.

¹¹²Sanudo, p. 93.

during the crusading period and it is notable that only three theorists embraced the plan fully. An attack on Egypt was suggested during the first crusade, and was proposed by Richard I during the third. He attempted to persuade his army to attack Egypt, offering his own ships as transport, but his men were unwilling, more keen to press on to Jerusalem.¹¹³ The nobles leading the fourth crusade originally planned to launch their attack on Egypt, 'there in the midst of things, where they would be able to do most', and despite the recent failure of the fifth crusade, in 1224, Frederick II ordered the preparation of ships designed specifically to enter the Nile at Damietta. One of Louis IX's reasons for sending his crusade to Tunis was that he believed Egypt to be close enough for the crusade to move on there.¹¹⁴

Marino Sanudo viewed Egypt as the bulwark of Moslem power and took great pains to convince readers of his views. He argued that the crusaders could not hold other gains in peace while Egypt remained in Moslem hands. He illustrated his beliefs through the allegory of a giant tree which represented Islam. Several attempts had been made to destroy this tree as it produced no fruit, but they had succeeded only in cutting off leaves and branches before the men grew tired and returned home. The men were crusaders such as Godfrey of Bouillon, while the leaves and branches of the tree were Moslem provinces such as Syria, Africa and Turkey. Egypt was the trunk and root of the tree, and as long as it remained unharmed, the 'branches' grew back and the tree flourished again, a reference to the Mamluk recapture of the Holy Land. The tree was nourished mainly from one well, which symbolised trade. Sanudo argued that by blocking trade, Egypt would be

¹¹³Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', p. 292 (some argued that 'si per Dei gratiam, superare possumus regem Ægypti, non solum Iherusalem, verum etiam Alexandriam et Babyloniam et plurima regna obtinebimus', but others pointed out that there were too few in the army to attempt this); 'Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi', ed. W. Stubbs in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (RS: London, 1864), pp. 381-2.

¹¹⁴Robert of Clari, p. 36; 'Chronica regia Coloniensis', ed. G. Waitz, *MGH SS* 7.18 (Hannover, 1880), p. 253; Gaufrido de Belloloco, 'Vita Ludovici Noni', p. 21; 'Gesta sancti Ludovici noni, auctore monacho Sancti Dionysii anonymo', *RHGF* 20, p. 56; 'Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean du Vignay', p. 44. It was believed that Louis planned to attack Tunis before continuing either to the Holy Land or Egypt. Other reasons included the belief that the ruler of Tunis was keen to convert, and that Tunisia provided assistance to the sultan of Egypt.

weakened and easily destroyed, and the tree of Islam would fall: 'quia extirpata radice, oportet quod necessitate rami arescant'.¹¹⁵ The allegory illustrates his mercantile mentality, as he believed the tree was to be destroyed partly because it prevented access to certain 'fruits' which lay on the ground beneath it, which represented profits from Indian Ocean trade, rather than anything of religious significance.

Henry II argued for the same strategy in a different way. He did not share Sanudo's estimation of Egyptian power, arguing that the soldiers there were very poor, as the import of Mamluks demonstrated. He maintained that the crusade should be sent to Egypt to avoid facing the full strength of the enemy. If Syria were attacked it would receive help from Egypt, but the reverse was not true since the inhabitants of Syria faced external threats from the Mongols and Cyprus.¹¹⁶ His arguments demonstrate that he believed the capture of Egypt was vital for the possession of the Holy Land, and he expected that if the army was sent to Syria, it would then proceed to Egypt. He claimed that if the passage was sent to Syria through Armenia, the journey to Gaza took twenty days through mountainous terrain and past enemy castles. Unlike other authors, he firmly rejected sending an army to Egypt through the desert from Gaza. He claimed that it took eight days to travel to Salahieh and there were no supplies at all on the way. The water was barely drinkable, bitter and full of worms.¹¹⁷ The army could not travel from Syria by sea because prevailing winds in the eastern Mediterranean hampered a crossing in this direction, but favoured a journey from Egypt to the Holy Land. His assessment is

¹¹⁵Sanudo, pp. 36, 39-47. Sanudo also used an allegory of a powerful fort with high walls and good defenders, but which received all of its supplies and tribute through one gate. Similarly, Philip of Mézières stated that the attack on Alexandria in 1365 was directed 'non ad caudam sed ad caput' (N. Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières 1327-1405 et la croisade au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1896), p. 284, n. 4); while Emmanuele Piloti described Moslem territories as the body and Cairo as the head (P.-H. Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, Publications de l'Université Lovanium de Léopoldville (Louvain/Paris, 1958), pp. 18-19.

¹¹⁶Henry II, p. 124.

¹¹⁷Henry II, pp. 122-3. The *Via* estimated the journey as 60 leagues with several places where water could be obtained.

borne out by Oliver of Paderborn's account of the fifth crusade's journey by sea from Acre to Damietta. He reported that some ships were delayed for almost a week, others driven back by the violence of the winds, and some took over three weeks to make the journey.¹¹⁸ This rather weak argument illustrates Henry's conviction that Egypt had to be defeated, but he gave little advice on how to achieve this.

In contrast, Sanudo wrote a very detailed plan to describe how Egypt could be conquered, which entailed exploiting Christian naval superiority by operating along the Nile. He proposed that an initial force of fifteen thousand men and three hundred knights should land on the Egyptian shore. Forts would be built, allowing supplies and reinforcements to be brought by sea from Crete and other Mediterranean islands. Sanudo drew examples from Venetian techniques to illustrate how coastal fortifications could be successfully defended.¹¹⁹ The crusaders would progress carefully upstream, fighting the Egyptians on the river as far as possible. He argued that, with caution, their ships could deal both with the sultan's navy, which was manned by poor sailors, and with obstructions such as chains placed across the river, just as the chain at Damietta had been destroyed.¹²⁰ Once this first stage was complete a much larger force of fifty thousand foot soldiers and twenty thousand knights would cross and occupy areas further inland. When the country was finally captured the Christians would have the benefit of Indian Ocean trade, allowing them to pay for the army which would then attack the Holy Land.¹²¹ His campaign is described in terms of a colonising expedition, which was to be carried out largely by Venetians, and he drew examples from Venetian practice to prove that his plan was viable. It has been argued that Sanudo 'always took into

¹¹⁸Oliver of Paderborn, p. 22.

¹¹⁹Sanudo, pp. 49-53.

¹²⁰Sanudo, pp. 53-8.

¹²¹Sanudo, pp. 90-2.

account Venice's political and economic interests', perhaps unconsciously, and these aspects of his plan seem to support this contention.¹²²

There were considerable problems with his plan and many of his arguments are unconvincing. Sanudo reported that the crusaders would have a clear advantage in naval forces on the Nile, but Louis IX had many problems maintaining communications by river between the army and Damietta, the crusaders' base. Bringing galleys and ships up the Nile proved to be fraught with difficulty, and Egyptians were able to cut supplies by carrying boats overland and launching them behind the French army. When Louis was forced to retreat from Mansourah, very few of his galleys succeeded in escaping. Sanudo learnt from the failures of the earlier crusades, and his plan was designed to prevent an army's lines of communication being overstretched, but the difficulties of operating in this unfamiliar territory were formidable. The seasonal flooding of the Nile made it impossible for an army to operate by land at certain times of the year, which partly accounts for the delays at Damietta on both the fifth and seventh crusades. The defenders were more familiar with these conditions and with the geography of the region, and were able to use this to their advantage. The *Devises des chemins de Babiloine* warned of the ability of the Egyptians to control the level of the river with dams, shown on earlier crusades. The army of the fifth crusade was cut off from Damietta when the sultan broke dikes, flooding the route back, and Amalric I's invasion of Egypt in 1163 was forced out by the same expedient.¹²³

Sanudo's belief in the importance of conquering Egypt was clearly accepted by many other theorists, but most argued that the crusade should be more cautious, attacking Egypt only to weaken the Mamluks, either as part of preliminary measures, or as an opportunistic response to a Mongol invasion of Syria. In the *Epistola*, Lull suggested that Rosetta and Alexandria be attacked by sea if the sultan

¹²²Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks', p. 374.

¹²³Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, p. 146; 'Devises des chemins de Babiloine', pp. 245-7; M. W. Baldwin, 'The Latin states under Baldwin III and Amalric I', Setton 1, p. 550.

sent his army away. Similarly, the Hospitallers recommended that if the Mongols attacked Syria, the Christians should launch an attack on Egypt, and they criticised the Cypriots for sending a force to Tortosa, rather than Rosetta, in response to the Mongol invasion of Syria in 1300.¹²⁴ Fidenzio wrote that if Egypt was defeated, victory was complete but he believed that the difficulties in doing this were insurmountable. Attacking Egypt placed the crusaders at a great disadvantage since 'Saraceni fortiores sunt in domo sua propinqua quam in terra longinqua'. In contrast, Egypt was far from any potential sources of help for crusaders, since both the Mongols and Armenians were very distant. Hence it made greater sense to attack in northern Syria, where this situation was reversed.¹²⁵ The Egyptians could be neutralised by stationing a fleet off their coast, preventing them from sending their army to Syria for fear of attack by the fleet.¹²⁶ He argued that the climate was dangerous, particularly to men from cold countries and pointed out that the Tartars avoided fighting in such areas. He reported that many of Louis IX's army died of illness after the capture of Damietta. This contradicts Sanudo who believed the coast at least to be safe, but Roger of Stanegrave, who supported an attack on the country, also believed the climate to be unhealthy.¹²⁷ Joinville gives no reports of ill-health until after the defeat at Mansourah when large numbers of corpses and 'l'enfermetei dou païs' caused an epidemic, possibly brought on by lack of food.¹²⁸

Hayton also stressed the power of the Mamluks in Egypt when describing the sultanate and, while he did not explicitly reject an attack on the country, he clearly believed it to be inadvisable. There were many men stationed there, particularly horsemen, and the army was ready to fight and quick to mobilise since it was

¹²⁴Lull, 'Epistola', p. 98; Hospitallers, p. 226.

¹²⁵Fidenzio, p. 53.

¹²⁶Henry II, p. 124; Fidenzio, p. 58.

¹²⁷BM, Cotton Otho D V, ff. 3v-4v.

¹²⁸Fidenzio, p. 53; Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, p. 143.

stationed in Cairo. Alexandria was strong and well-fortified, and Damietta had been devastated and hence could no longer provide a base for crusaders in Egypt. The author of the *Via ad Terram Sanctam* used similar arguments, reporting that 'tout le pooir de la painisme si est ores ou reaume d'Egipte'. He rejected an attack on Alexandria because the Saracens would devastate the land around the city to deny provisions to the crusaders.¹²⁹ In contrast, Roger of Stanegrave favoured an attack on Alexandria by a large army.¹³⁰ Peter I's capture of Alexandria in 1365 shows that the city was not impregnable as many believed, but the circumstances were unusual. The governor was returning home from pilgrimage, and it appears that the townsfolk came out of the city to trade, believing the visit to be friendly.¹³¹

Others shared Sanudo's opinion that Egypt had to be conquered to secure gains made elsewhere. The *Via ad Terram Sanctam* included a detailed description of the journey to Cairo from Gaza, and argued that after capturing Jerusalem and visiting the Holy Places, the army should ride to Gaza, 'la porte de l'entree en Egipte'. Sanudo also outlined the journey, even though he envisaged that Egypt would be captured before the Holy Land.¹³² It seems likely that he used the *Memoria Terre Sancte* as a source for this description. It was not taken from the *Devises des chemins de Babiloine*, which describes a different route between the two cities, while the spellings Sanudo uses indicate that he did not use the *Via ad Terram Sanctam*, the earlier version of the text. It is possible that Sanudo took the information from a lost text, perhaps an intermediate copy of this route taken either from the *Memoria* or from an earlier source. His description of the route differs from that given in the *Memoria* in one section. Sanudo describes the upper route

¹²⁹Hayton, pp. 341-2, 347-9; 'Via', pp. 426-7.

¹³⁰BM, Cotton Otho D V, ff. 5, 10-10v.

¹³¹Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 166-7. Western chroniclers place a more heroic gloss on the episode: William of Machaut, *La Prise d'Alexandrie ou Chronique du Roi Pierre 1er de Lusignan*, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie (Genève, 1877), pp. 71-91.

¹³²'Via', pp. 431-4; Sanudo, p. 261.

from 'Bouser' to 'Habesse' before the lower route, whereas the *Memoria* describes the lower route first. In addition, Sanudo's spelling of proper names occasionally differs significantly from the *Memoria*, but comments on the quality of water available, proximity to the shore and the type of land match those in the *Memoria* exactly.¹³³ It seems likely that Sanudo had access to a copy of the *Memoria* since all the extant versions of this text survive with Hayton's proposal, which Sanudo definitely used. It is notable that the account of this route was added in the later redaction of the third book of the *Liber secretorum*, when Sanudo also added information from Hayton's work.¹³⁴

It is likely that the idea of sending a crusade to Egypt was unpopular among most theorists because of the comparatively recent failure of Louis's first crusade. Expectations for this expedition had been very high, and of all crusades, it was most frequently referred to by theorists, so clearly the failure had a great impact. Sanudo did not convincingly explain the reasons for the two failures in Egypt and show that his own planned invasion would not suffer the same fate. He explained the downfall of the two crusades in religious as much as practical terms, claiming that the fifth ended due to 'defectu victualium, magis autem suis exigentibus peccatis', while those on Louis's crusade were afflicted by greed, fear and lack of food.¹³⁵ While the importance of Egypt was accepted by informed writers, most believed that it was too powerful, and that an attack there was a gamble. While victory could bring glorious results, the risks were correspondingly great and after two failures, most believed they were too high.

¹³³For example, 'Birelcain' and 'Nahlec Siberia' in the *Memoria* (p. 455) become 'Burclavi' and 'Naherlersibia' in Sanudo (p. 261).

¹³⁴Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 143-6. The earliest of these manuscripts (Paris, BN lat. 5515) has been dated to 1310-30 by Górká (introduction to the *Anonymi Descriptio*, pp. xxxix-xl) who concludes that this was a copy of an earlier collection (p. il).

¹³⁵Sanudo, pp. 48, 53-4.

Spain and North Africa

The final possible route to the Holy Land was from Spain, across the Straits of Gibraltar, through North Africa to Egypt and then Palestine. The only theorist to propose this idea was Ramon Lull, but arguments against the route in other treatises suggest that others shared his opinion. Lull mentioned the idea in two works, the *Liber de fine* and the *Liber de acquisitione*. The former was written in 1305, after Lull's visit to the Holy Land, and indicates his disillusionment with the prospect of a general crusade being organised by the pope. The proposal favoured sending the crusade to Granada, rejecting all other routes as too expensive, too long or requiring too many men. He argued that Granada was surrounded by sea and cut off from other Moslems, so the 'bellator rex' could advance gradually, capturing castles one by one with a small army. After completing the conquest of Spain, the army would cross to Ceuta, then proceed town by town across North Africa to Tunis and thence to Egypt.¹³⁶ Lull probably intended the 'bellator rex' to be James II, with whom he had close links, reducing the appeal of the plan to other Spanish rulers, particularly in Castile. His belief in using a united military order to conquer Granada is also unlikely to have appealed to Spanish kings. They objected to the 1274 plan to amalgamate the military orders, fearing that a single order would wield too much power, and James II opposed handing former Templar lands to the Hospital for the same reason.¹³⁷

Lull handed this proposal to James II of Aragon, and persuaded him to give a copy to the pope at Montpellier, but it was a plan of very limited appeal outside the peninsula, reducing the crusade to an extension of the *Reconquista*.¹³⁸ The crusade in Spain was largely a local affair and significant external involvement was rare, with the exception of assistance given to the Portuguese by crusaders from northern

¹³⁶Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 276-7.

¹³⁷Forey, 'The military orders in the crusading proposals', pp. 324-5.

¹³⁸Hillgarth, pp. 64-5.

Europe at the time of the second, third and fifth crusades. French knights were the largest outside presence but their involvement diminished greatly after the mid-twelfth century as the power of Aragon and Castile grew, and rewards offered to foreign knights were less attractive. French knights joined the campaign of 1212 but the majority left shortly before the great victory of Las Navas de Tolosa. The Moslems were rarely a serious threat after this, so foreign assistance was unnecessary, although a small French force assisted in the campaign against Valencia in 1236-8.¹³⁹ The papacy discouraged external involvement in the Spanish crusades by refusing to allow preaching outside the peninsula, and in 1309, Clement V prevented crusaders from Navarre and southern France from fighting in Granada.¹⁴⁰ Lull wrote his proposal at a time when Franco-Aragonese relations were poor due to Philip III's crusade against Aragon in 1285 and prolonged rivalry between the Aragonese and Angevins over Sicily, further reducing the probability of wider European interest.

Lull repeated the idea in the *Liber de acquisitione*, written four years later in 1309. As discussed earlier, this was occasioned by the planned attack on Granada by the Aragonese and Castilians, and while it was given to the pope, the appeal of these ideas remained limited. Lull argued that the reconquest of Granada be undertaken by the four kings of the west, by which he probably meant the rulers of Portugal, Navarre, Aragon, and Castile. Of these four kings, James II of Aragon was the most active supporter of the crusade, and Lull had many contacts with his court. However, any attempt to capture Granada depended on Castilian co-operation since Granada lay in her agreed sphere of influence, and was a vassal state. This accounts for the collaboration between the two kingdoms on the crusade of 1309. The Portuguese reconquest had reached its territorial limit in 1250, but the kingdom

¹³⁹M. Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne aux XIe et XIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1949), pp. 171-2; C. J. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492', *Setton* 3, pp. 423, 430.

¹⁴⁰Chamberlin, 'Not all Martyrs or Saints', p. 26. This decision was taken because of Clement V's 'rival' crusade which was to go to the eastern Mediterranean under the Hospitallers.

continued to provide military assistance against the Moslems, for example at Salado in 1340.¹⁴¹

Lull gave very little attention to the conquest of Granada in the *Liber de acquisitione*, possibly because of the forthcoming crusade. He limited his advice to proposing that Christians use sea power to cut off the Nasrids from outside help. The Aragonese in particular were adept at using their navy against Moslem enemies, for example in the campaigns against Valencia in the 1230s and Peter III's defeat of a rebellion there in 1277 when he prevented aid reaching the city from Africa with his fleet. Using naval power against Granada was a more difficult proposition because Granada controlled the straits through possession of Ceuta, Algeciras, Gibraltar and Malaga. Armies had been sent from Africa in 1275 and 1278, and Morocco was only restrained from large-scale involvement in the peninsula in 1344 when Castile took Algeciras, showing that Lull's view of Granada as isolated from other Moslems was mistaken.¹⁴² Lull underestimated the ability of the kingdom of Granada to resist Christian attacks, even without North African help. The kingdom was mountainous, approachable only through heavily-defended passes, and the inhabitants were to prove stubborn defenders. In the period shortly after Lull wrote, Castilian armies were twice repulsed, on the second occasion when Ismail I inflicted a heavy defeat in the Vega of Granada. It was to take ten years of attritional campaigning by Ferdinand and Isabella between 1482 and 1492 before the kingdom was finally captured. Despite Lull's optimism a crusade against Granada was not an easy way of carrying the war to the Moslems and opening a route into Africa.¹⁴³

In both the *Liber de fine* and the *Liber de acquisitione* Lull recommended that the first point of attack in Africa should be the town of Ceuta, the nearest point to the peninsula. It was a strategically important town, dominating the straits by

¹⁴¹Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 269; Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', p. 432.

¹⁴²Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 269; Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', pp. 430-7.

¹⁴³R. Arié, *L'Espagne Musulmane au temps des Nasrids (1232-1492)* (Paris, 1973), pp. 152-78.

virtue of its position, and it was a natural starting point for a Christian invasion of the region. From there the crusade was to capture the kingdoms of Morocco, Tunis, Bougie, 'Therincea' (Tlemsen?) and Tripoli, leaving the Christians at the border of Egypt.¹⁴⁴ Lull's brief advocacy of the route across North Africa demonstrates that, as with the route through Constantinople, he had no conception of the difficulties involved, despite his involvement in missionary work in the area.

Other theorists viewed these ideas with great scepticism. The author of the *Directorium* emphasises the immense distances involved, estimating the distance from Gibraltar to Acre as 3,500 miles. In addition to the 'tedia infinita', the crusade would have to pass natural obstacles such as mountain passes and deserts, as well as towns and castles which would oppose its crossing. The exhausted army would then have to face the power of the Egyptian army before it could reach the Holy Land.¹⁴⁵ Sanudo is similarly dismissive of the idea, but the fact that both authors felt it necessary to argue against the route suggests that the idea remained current for some time after Lull's death (the *Directorium* was completed in 1333, and Sanudo's *Liber secretorum* by 1321).¹⁴⁶ The two authors point out only a few of the many problems with the proposal. The distance of the route across North Africa was certainly greater than the route through Asia Minor, and lay entirely through hostile territory: Lull himself mentions five kingdoms which needed to be conquered. Between Gibraltar and Tunis, the Atlas mountains were a major obstacle to an army, while on the coast the land is dry and water scarce.

The chief objection to the North African route is that there is little benefit from using it. Lull presumably hoped that the region would be converted to Christianity by a combination of force and preaching, but the size and cost of the effort needed to secure the region would be immense. As it was not practical to

¹⁴⁴Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', pp. 269-70.

¹⁴⁵'Directorium', pp. 410-11.

¹⁴⁶Sanudo, p. 39.

leave garrisons in the major towns, there was no need to travel by land when a crusade could be sent by sea. If territory were to be secured in North Africa, an attack from the sea was more practical. Louis IX's crusade to Tunis provides a clear precedent for this. In 1270 he attempted to capture the town, probably under the influence of Charles of Anjou, who hoped to force the emir to resume payment of tribute and punish him for sheltering supporters of Charles's former rival for the Sicilian throne, Conradin. Louis may have planned to continue to the east, and it is reported by chroniclers that he may have believed Tunisia was a potential base for an attack on Egypt. The crusade ended in failure when heat and lack of supplies caused disease in the Christian camp, to which Louis himself succumbed.¹⁴⁷ Sanudo described the failed crusade and discounted the idea of attacking Tunis. The author of the *Directorium* states that 'breviter michi causa aliqua non occurrit quare Sanctus Ludovicus inceperit facere viam illam'.¹⁴⁸ Another possible target for a crusade in North Africa, Tripoli, was rejected by the *Informationes Massilie* on the grounds that the town was too populous, and by Lull on the grounds that it would require too many men, although he does not explain why this would not be a problem for an army approaching overland.¹⁴⁹

There were earlier occasions when crusading activity in North Africa was linked to the Holy Land, but not to clear a path there through Africa. In a charter of 1172, the brothers of Avila unified with the order of Santiago and agreed to submit to its master. They agreed that, if the Saracens were expelled from Spain, they would serve their new master in Morocco if required, and 'similiter et, si necesse fuerit, in Iherusalem', but service in Jerusalem was viewed as an alternative to North Africa, rather than an ultimate goal.¹⁵⁰ In 1245, the brothers of Santiago were

¹⁴⁷Gaufrido de Belloloco, 'Vita Ludovici Noni', pp. 21-3;

¹⁴⁸Sanudo, p. 39; 'Directorium', p. 411.

¹⁴⁹'Informationes Massilie', p. 250; Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 276.

¹⁵⁰J. L. Martín, *Origenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago* (Barcelona, 1974), pp. 226-7.

instructed to take over a North African kingdom whose ruler was rumoured to be converting to Christianity, and the pope reported that possession of the kingdom would allow 'Christi fideles Terrae Sanctae liberius et efficacius subvenire'.¹⁵¹ A successful crusade to Granada could be portrayed as being beneficial to the Holy Land, but by freeing Spaniards to fight there, rather than using Granada as a point of departure. The 'jurats' of Valencia wrote to the pope in 1311 to express their fears that the Moslems of Granada and North Africa would take advantage of a crusade to the east because the frontier in Spain would be denuded of knights keen to gain the indulgences available for crusading in the Holy Land. It would then be necessary to recover Spain, whereas if the pope sent a crusade against Granada first, all would take the cross for the Holy Land.¹⁵²

In Spain, the concept of continuing the *Reconquista* into Africa existed, but attitudes were ambivalent due to the volume of Christian trade with the region. Sancho IV of Castile and James II of Aragon made an agreement at Monteagudo in 1291 which divided Spain and North Africa into zones of influence. Land to the west of the Moulouya river was to be in the Castilian area of penetration, and land to the east Aragonese.¹⁵³ Aragon had interests throughout the area, particularly in Tunisia, but these were primarily mercantile and religion played only a small role. Churches were built in merchant colonies, and some missions were sent, but the promotion of Christianity met with no success and was not an important aspect of policy. There were occasional attacks on the mainland or neighbouring islands, such

¹⁵¹*Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum 1198 ad annum 1304*, ed. A. Potthast (Berlin, 1874-5), no. 11904 (24 September 1245); *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. 21, pp. 340-1. The ruler, 'Zeit Aazon', was a son of Abu Zayd, ruler of Salé in Morocco, and may have already been baptised. He later became a knight of the order of Santiago (R. I. Burns, *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the crusader kingdom of Valencia: societies in symbiosis* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 86).

¹⁵²*Epistolari de la València Medieval*, ed. A. Rubio Vela, Institut de Filologia Valenciana (València, 1985), pp. 253-5; M. T. Ferrer i Mallol, *La Frontera amb l'Islam en el Segle XIV: Cristians i Sarraïns al País Valencià* (Barcelona, 1988), p. 104.

¹⁵³Dufourcq, *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib*, pp. 220-1.

as the attack on Salé in 1260 by a Castilian fleet.¹⁵⁴ In 1282, Peter III launched an expedition to Collo, while two years later the admiral Roger Lauria captured the island of Jerba. Despite Peter's attempts to have the attack on Collo declared a crusade, these raids were motivated by economic and political considerations, and the chance to extract tribute. Aragonese attitudes were shown by the position of benevolent neutrality adopted towards the Hafsids of Tunis during Louis's crusade there. James I allowed the Christian militia serving in Tunis to recruit twelve more men from his domains, men who fought against the crusaders. He was rewarded by a favourable treaty of peace and commerce made soon after the crusade failed.¹⁵⁵

The prospect of sending a crusade to Granada and then on to the Holy Land was raised at the council of Vienne in 1311 by ambassadors of James II of Aragon. He sent a special note to his envoys in which he urged a plan involving the conquest of Granada as a preliminary to a crusade. The crusade would continue to Morocco, since the monarch there was weak, then continue to the east 'per maritimum, semper adhereret insulis Christianorum scilicet Maioricensi, Minoricensi, Sardinie et Sicilie'. The islands would provide victuals and men for the crusade and assist in the conquest of the Holy Land.¹⁵⁶ While this appears to echo Lul's plans, and may have been inspired by them, James clearly envisaged that the crusade would go by sea. The mention of the Balearics and Sardinia suggests that the plan was an attempt to obtain crusade status for Aragonese ambitions in the western Mediterranean. James II of Majorca was in open rivalry with his nephew in Aragon, taxing merchants from Barcelona, to which the Aragonese responded with trade boycotts.¹⁵⁷ The conquest of Sardinia (and Corsica) was a long-standing ambition of James II, who was granted the islands at the treaty of Anagni in 1295 and invested with them in Rome

¹⁵⁴Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', p. 434.

¹⁵⁵Dufourcq, *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib*, pp. 121-3; 249-50.

¹⁵⁶Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, no. 125.

¹⁵⁷Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms*, p. 116. Majorca was not incorporated into Aragon until the invasion of 1343-4.

in 1297, but was unable to invade until 1323-4. He was granted clerical tithes in 1305, which were later transferred to the 1309 campaign against Almería.¹⁵⁸

The amount of discussion on Granada reported at the council of Vienne is a reflection of the evidence, which comes from reports to James II by his ambassadors. They reported the views of certain prelates to whom they spoke, some of whom favoured a crusade against the Moors. The papal vice-chancellor, Arnald Novelli, considered a crusade to the Holy Land by sea impossible, but he believed that if Granada was conquered, an army could pass through North Africa 'per terra firma'. The influential cardinal Arnald of Pellagrua also expressed support, but wanted his views kept secret.¹⁵⁹ Although certain figures were ostensibly supportive of James' plan, it found little favour with the majority. The prelates of England, Germany and Arles all supported the crusade to the Holy Land, but the Italians, who favoured a crusade to *Romania*, urged that consideration be given to Granada, perhaps hoping to gain Spanish backing for their own ideas. The Aragonese followed their king, while the French refused to take a position until Philip IV arrived. The discussions of the council, allowing for the nature of the evidence, show that Lull's ideas were not unique, but equally that they had little support outside Spain. The pope repeatedly rejected the idea, pointing out that when Louis IX and Charles of Anjou went to Tunis, they never reached the Holy Land, and that prelates outside Spain, particularly the English and French who contributed so much, could not be persuaded to support the plan.¹⁶⁰

Despite Lull's strong support for linking the crusade to Granada and North Africa to the Holy Land, only James II briefly espoused this plan. North Africa was of interest to the Spanish kingdoms, and indeed to traders from Genoa, but the idea of establishing Christian control in the region had no appeal to potential crusaders in

¹⁵⁸Salavert y Roca, vol. 1, pp. 111-20.

¹⁵⁹Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, nos. 130, 135.

¹⁶⁰Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, nos. 126-8, 131.

the remainder of Europe who were chiefly concerned with the Holy Land or, more rarely, Constantinople. For the Spaniards, the conquest of Granada and extension of influence into North Africa were goals in themselves, rather than points of departure for the Holy Land. James II of Aragon had a short-lived but genuine interest in recovering the Holy Land but planned to sail to the east and clearly saw the expedition as entirely unconnected with the *Reconquista*. His attempt to link the two in 1311 was a ruse to obtain papal support, and hence money, for the national crusade. Lull's desire to see the crusading movement in the east and west bound together did not have support in European courts, nor among other theorists.

Conclusions

As would be expected from such a diverse group of writers, the advice offered on the routes to be taken on the crusade, and the arguments used in support, varied greatly. It is possible to broadly distinguish the differing concerns of authors who were well-informed about the east and those who were less so. The former tended to be primarily concerned with the preliminary stages of the crusade, rather than the general passage, and their advice favoured following the thirteenth century practice of sailing to the east, using either Cyprus or Armenia to counter the loss of bases in the Holy Land. Fulk of Villaret concerned himself solely with the early stages of the crusade, arguing that it was pointless to offer advice on the destination of a passage since its numbers would not be known until it had been prepared, and the state of enemy forces and fortifications would alter over time, rendering any such advice worthless.¹⁶¹ Other writers gave no advice because they believed that it was vital to maintain secrecy to avoid forewarning the enemy.¹⁶² In contrast, those based in Europe were more likely to produce expansive and aggressive plans, with

¹⁶¹Villaret, pp. 607-8.

¹⁶²Durant, p. 105; Molay, p. 148. In their advice to Philip VI, the Venetians also refused to offer advice on the destination of the passage to avoid forewarning the Moslems (*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 110).

huge armies travelling to the east, capturing large tracts of land on the way. Schein has portrayed the theorists' discussion of strategy as stagnating after the initial proposals were written.¹⁶³ While the naval blockade became a ubiquitous feature of advice on the crusade, the range of ideas and arguments on the routes of the crusade indicates that there was a lively debate over this issue throughout the period. The reasoning used demonstrates that most authors came to their conclusions individually, and probably after some thought: different arguments were used to support the same case, as with Sanudo and Henry II's plan to attack Egypt, while the same historical example could be cited to draw different conclusions, as with the treatment of the first crusade by the Hospitallers and the *Directorium*.

The use of historical examples by the theorists is particularly interesting, and demonstrates that knowledge of earlier crusades was often erratic and its use selective. There was no systematic attempt by theorists to determine events on earlier crusades for the purpose of deciding which routes should be used. Authors such as Sanudo or Fidenzio did not use their historical sections to draw lessons on the course of the crusade. Although Sanudo knew of Louis IX's crusade, he made no reference to it when outlining his plan to attack Egypt, probably because the crusade failed. Authors simply chose suitable examples from their limited knowledge of earlier crusades to support their arguments, often using this information to attack alternatives, since the history of crusading had more examples of failures than successes from which to learn. The recent events of Louis IX's crusades were unsurprisingly fairly familiar and were referred to frequently, but other expeditions seem to have been largely unknown to the theorists. The exception was the first crusade, but it is probable that this was used as an example because it was a success. References to the first crusade indicate that the fiction of Peter the Hermit's leading role in the crusade was well established in this period. Some proposals give him a role as prominent as that of Godfrey of Bouillon, while

¹⁶³Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 93.

in one he was viewed as the leader of the crusade.¹⁶⁴ Dubois and the *Directorium* also refer to the mythical crusade of Charlemagne, which is reported in the historical sections of the proposals written by the bishop of Leon and Sanudo.¹⁶⁵

The justifications used for particular routes illustrate varying levels of knowledge both of the east and of earlier crusades, but also mask the ulterior motives of some authors. Hayton deliberately misrepresented the state of Armenia in the hope of attracting a western expedition to assist in the defence of the country, while Henry II's plan was clearly designed to give his own kingdom a prominent role in the crusade. Lull's *Liber de fine* was tailored to appeal to James II of Aragon when the prospects of a general passage seemed poor, while several authors apparently favoured the land route chiefly because it offered the opportunity to conquer the Byzantine empire. In this case in particular, some theorists were clearly reacting to the favourable atmosphere in Europe towards this plan when the preparations of Charles of Valois were in an advanced state. However, in general, the theorists were out of step with the mood of caution and defensiveness which prevailed in the courts of Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

¹⁶⁴Hospitallers, p. 222; 'Directorium', p. 417; Villaret, p. 605 (stating that Peter was the military leader while Adhemar the spiritual leader); Durant, p. 106 (referred to Peter the Hermit only). Dubois referred only to Godfrey (p. 156).

¹⁶⁵Dubois, p. 156; 'Directorium', p. 217; BN lat. 7470, fo. 124v; Sanudo, pp. 127-8.

VI. PLANNING FOR A NEW JERUSALEM

The theorists wrote detailed plans for a new crusade but only a few showed sufficient faith in their own ideas to discuss the consequences of success: the creation of a new Christian kingdom in the Holy Land. The loss of the crusader states had illustrated to many observers that a successful crusade would need to be followed by sustained commitment to preserving any gains. As Fidenzio of Padua noted: 'non multum valet si Terra Sancta fuerit acquisita, et statim postea sit cum oprobio derelicta'.¹ Fidenzio and five other authors considered how a future kingdom could be maintained, discussing problems of defence, government and settlement. As Schein has noted, theorists drew lessons from the experience of the crusader states, occasionally through explicit analysis of the problems which had contributed to their loss in 1291.² However, many of the authors' recommendations for a future kingdom were also determined by the nature of the crusade which was to recover it.

The earliest crusade theorists dealt with these problems at the request of the papacy. Fidenzio of Padua reports that Gregory X asked him to advise 'qualiter Terra Sancta acquiri posset de manibus infidelium, et qualiter acquisita possit a Xpisti fidelibus conservari'.³ It is interesting that, even before the Christians had been expelled from the Holy Land, Gregory believed that it was necessary to consider changes to the crusader states in the wake of a successful crusade to the east. In his bull *Dirae amaritudinis*, issued in response to the fall of Acre, Nicholas IV requested advice on the recovery of the Holy Land and on how it should be

¹Fidenzio, p. 58.

²Schein, 'The future *Regnum Hierusalem*', pp. 103-4.

³Fidenzio, p. 9. There was no mention of the conservation of the Holy Land in Gregory's bull issued for the council of Lyons (*Registres de Grégoire X*, no. 160).

conserved, an indication that contemporaries believed the disasters of 1291 could be avenged. Charles II referred to the bull in the opening of his treatise, reporting that Nicholas IV had asked 'coment la terre sainte se porroit garder et maintenir'.⁴ This optimistic hope of an early recovery of the Holy Land soon faded, and later popes were not concerned with an improbable future kingdom of Jerusalem. The advice sent by James of Molay and Fulk of Villaret to Clement V in 1305-6 contained no reference to the issue, suggesting that the pope did not request advice on the subject, nor was there any mention of the maintenance of the Holy Land in Clement's request for advice at the council of Vienne.⁵

After Fidenzio and Charles II, only a small minority of the theorists dealt with the issue, and most ignore the subject completely.⁶ Those authors who were familiar with the east tended to discuss only the short-term issues of a recovery crusade, reflecting their more pragmatic view of what a crusade was likely to achieve. William Adam and the author of the *Directorium* were both chiefly concerned with the Byzantine empire, and gave little attention to the recovery of the Holy Land, although the latter gave advice on how Constantinople could be subdued and retained if it were captured.⁷ Four later authors discussed a future kingdom of Jerusalem. Ramon Lull and the author of the *Memoria* dealt with the issue mainly in the context of the role that a new military order would play in the recovery and defence of the kingdom. Marino Sanudo devoted a short section of the final book of

⁴Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 201: 'ut juxta desiderii nostri fervorem terra ipsa recuperari valeat et recuperata in posterum conservari'; Charles II, p. 533.

⁵*Regestum Clementis Papae V*, nos. 3626-7. Schein wrongly includes the proposals of the masters of the orders among the 'empirical' treatises which address this issue ('The future *regnum Hierusalem*', p. 96). Only Fidenzio of Padua and Sanudo of the 'empirical' authors discussed the question.

⁶It is difficult to agree with Schein's claim that 'more often than not...authors intended to offer practical and even professional advice *ad conservationem et felicem gubernationem Terrae Sanctae*'. Only six authors dealt with the subject out of over twenty proposals.

⁷*Directorium*, pp. 468-77. Recommendations centred on striking against potential centres of resistance, by expelling the monks from the kingdom and closing churches, while destroying Greek culture by educating their children in Latin and destroying their books. Dubois also advised on the maintenance of Constantinople, proposing that the conquerors should familiarise themselves with the Greek language (p. 177).

the *Liber secretorum* to questions of settlement and defence. The author who gave the most detailed attention to the subject was Pierre Dubois, who used the future kingdom of Jerusalem as a pretext for a wide-ranging exposition of his ideas on education and legal matters. Unlike the other writers to address the subject, he had little knowledge of the previous kingdom, and the ideas he presented were just as relevant to France as they were to a new crusader state.

Defence

If the Holy Land were captured, it would be necessary to make provision for its defence, since as the author of the *Memoria* stressed: 'situm est in marchiis paganorum undique'.⁸ The loss of the crusader states illustrated the power of the Moslems and the threat they would pose to a new kingdom. Consequently, the authors took care to discuss measures needed to ensure the defence of a new state, reacting against weaknesses they saw in the previous kingdom, notably the absence of a permanent army and consequent reliance on erratic western assistance. The author of the *Memoria* outlined the external dangers to the kingdom, viewing the Mongols, Turks and Egyptians as the chief threats, but also noting the presence of independent tribes on the borders, namely the Bedouin, Turcomans, Khorezmians and Kurds. These supported the strongest power in the region, and the author believed that unless the kingdom were guarded by a strong force, such as might be provided by a military order, they would prey on the kingdom.⁹ No other theorist referred to the border tribes, and the *Memoria's* opinion of the Mongols contrasted with that of his contemporaries, who generally saw them as potential allies.¹⁰

⁸*Memoria*, p. 446.

⁹*Memoria*, pp. 443-7. These tribes had not been a serious threat for many years. The Khorezmians had been destroyed as a fighting force near Homs in 1246 by sultan al-Salih (C. Cahen, 'The Turks in Anatolia before the Mongol invasions', Setton 2, pp. 673-4).

¹⁰The theorists' attitude to the Mongols is discussed in chapter four.

The Turks were widely regarded as a menace, but to the crusade itself rather than to a future crusader kingdom. It was believed that they would ally with the Mamluks against the crusade, leaving the army surrounded. Some theorists planned that the crusade itself would remove or reduce external threats, either by achieving a complete victory over the enemy, or through the acquisition of more extensive territories in the east. William Adam believed that if the army were sent through Asia Minor, the Turks could be defeated, and hence would not provide any threat to the crusade while Syria was attacked.¹¹ The Turks were active in this period, periodically raiding western Armenia, but the most dynamic emirates were found on the western coast of Anatolia. It is significant that, while the Turks continued to trouble Armenia, Mamluk attacks from Egypt caused far greater destruction there. Again, many theorists designed their crusade plans to eliminate the Mamluk threat, either by defeating Egypt prior to attacking the Holy Land or by weakening the Moslems there by blockades and raids.¹² Others, such as the author of the *Via ad Terram Sanctam*, implied that Egypt should be attacked to secure the Holy Land by their inclusion of a description of the route from Gaza to Cairo.¹³

Fidenzio of Padua argued that the threat from Egypt could be neutralised during the crusade by stationing a fleet off its coast, and he suggested that ten ships should be retained after the crusade to reduce the threat from the south.¹⁴ Fidenzio was the only author to refer to the naval protection of a future kingdom of Jerusalem, and his discussion of defence was dominated by guarding against attacks by land. While he detailed provisions for the defence of the kingdom, he apparently believed that external dangers would not be too serious, claiming that if the Saracens were defeated, they would barely be able to leave Egypt, while there was little to

¹¹William Adam, p. 540; see also 'Directorium', p. 501.

¹²See chapters four and five.

¹³'Via', pp. 432-4.

¹⁴Fidenzio, p. 59.

fear from Damascus. However, he argued that it would be necessary to take permanent measures to protect the borders of a new kingdom using fortifications. Jerusalem would be protected by a castle on Montjoie, the hill from which the crusaders first saw the city in 1099. This would guard the road from Jaffa, where another castle would be sited, and he suggested others should be built in Galilee.¹⁵ Sanudo also believed that the new kingdom should be protected by castles, suggesting that the south of the kingdom, along with the eastern border, needed special protection. Given that his plan depended on the capture of Egypt prior to the Holy Land, this would seem superfluous.¹⁶ Building castles was common practice when securing territory, and many were built, or existing fortifications occupied and extended, during the two centuries of Christian occupation, to protect ports, approaches to cities, roads and fords. Ultimately, the castles of the previous kingdom had not prevented its capture, and neither Sanudo nor Fidenzio recognised that it was more important for strong-points to have sufficiently large garrisons to deter or defeat aggressors. It was expensive to build and maintain castles, and neither theorist addressed the problem of the cost of building fortifications. Many would need to be entirely rebuilt since, when they overran Syria, the Mamluks destroyed Christian strong-points to prevent their use as bases by a future crusade. Several pilgrims, including James of Verona and Ludolph of Suchheim, described the devastation of the coastal cities many years after the fall of Acre.¹⁷

Sanudo stressed that it was important to fortify the eastern border of the kingdom, whereas Fidenzio argued that, unless the Egyptians took control of

¹⁵Fidenzio, p. 59. Montjoie was the site of a Premonstratensian abbey, initially built under Baldwin II and granted to the order of Mountjoy, but had never been a military strongpoint (A. J. Forey, 'The order of Mountjoy', *Speculum* 46 (1971), p. 253).

¹⁶Sanudo, pp. 279-80. He gives a list of some earlier castles.

¹⁷'Gestes des chiprois', pp. 804, 817-18; 'Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', pp. 225, 250; Ludolph of Suchheim, *Description of the Holy Land*, pp. 49-50, 60-1; 'Itinerarium cuiusdam Anglici (1344-45)', p. 448.

Damascus, there was little to be feared from there.¹⁸ During the twelfth century, the greatest threat to the crusader states had come from the east rather than the south. The crusaders' failure to capture Aleppo or Damascus left the kingdom vulnerable to attack, since these two cities guarded the approaches to northern Syria and the Jerusalem region respectively. It is notable that Fidenzio believed that the crusade should turn inland from Antioch to capture both cities before marching on Jerusalem. The author of the *Via ad Terram Sanctam* also believed that Damascus should be captured, implying that he too believed that it was necessary to extend the frontiers of a new kingdom to the east to make it defensible.¹⁹ By the late thirteenth century the situation in the region was very different, since the Mongols had reduced the threat from the east, capturing Aleppo in 1260, and forcing its Mamluk garrison to flee another raid in 1271.²⁰ While there are serious difficulties with the idea of capturing and holding a city so far inland, isolated from naval support, it illustrates that some theorists at least were flexible in their approach to the boundaries of a new kingdom, further demonstrated by their readiness to contemplate the capture of Egypt or Byzantium for strategic reasons. The boundaries of the crusader states had been determined initially by the desire to capture Jerusalem, and later by Christian ability to control territory, rather than by any strategic or geographic imperative. Some theorists were able to take a fresh view of the future of the Holy Land and plan to establish a viable kingdom, rather than simply restore the previous state.

This readiness to learn from, and improve on, the previous kingdom was taken further in the sphere of the forces needed to defend a new state. In the short history of the Holy Land which precedes his plan, Fidenzio of Padua listed some of the military problems of the crusader kingdom. One of the principal flaws he identified was the absence of a permanent force to protect the crusader states,

¹⁸Fidenzio, p. 59.

¹⁹Fidenzio, p. 58; 'Via', pp. 429-31.

²⁰Runciman, 'The crusader states 1243-1291', pp. 571, 582.

forcing them to rely on aid from European rulers. He complained that both the papacy and European monarchs failed to make the Holy Land a higher priority than their ambitions in Europe, leaving the inhabitants of the crusader states 'in maximis angustiis'. The assistance which did reach the Holy Land was only short-lived, since many who came to the east with great fervour soon returned home with even greater fervour.²¹ His attitude is unsurprising since he lived in the Holy Land during a period when no major crusade reached the Holy Land, but he took no account of the growing use of permanent garrisons by European leaders in the later thirteenth century. When Louis IX returned to France, he left a force of one hundred knights under Geoffrey of Sergines, which played a significant role in the defence of the kingdom.²² Edward I left a small force of archers at Acre in 1271, and Philip III sent contingents of knights and crossbowmen in 1273 and 1275. Gregory X also sent three separate groups of knights and archers in 1272-3, but these were intended as an interim measure before the arrival of the general passage, planned for 1276.²³ While these forces marked a move towards the establishment of more permanent garrisons, they were too small to have any effect on the balance of power in the region.

Reacting to the absence of a permanent army to defend the Holy Land, theorists recommended that large forces be stationed in a new kingdom, some arguing that the entire crusading army remain there. The concept of stationing a permanent force in the crusader states was not new. In the memoir he presented to the council of Lyons, Humbert of Romans argued that a permanent force be used to defend the Holy Land, while Gilbert of Tournai argued that the church should use mercenaries to do this.²⁴ It is possible that Fidenzio, who was present at Lyons, was

²¹Fidenzio, pp. 13, 16.

²²C. Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East 1192-1291* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 77-83.

²³Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 125; Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 19.

²⁴Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 205; Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', p. 40.

inspired by their ideas. He did not specify the size of the army, but the author of the *Memoria* argued that the 3,000 knights, 4,000 bowmen and 10,000 'servientes' who conquered the kingdom should be left to guard it. In addition, a rumour that the church intended to ordain 20,000 knights to defend the Holy Land should be spread to terrify the infidel.²⁵ Charles II recommended that the 2,000 knights of an amalgamated military order should protect the kingdom.²⁶ Their figures are all much higher than any of the contingents sent to the east in the late thirteenth century, and also greater than the total numbers of knights and soldiers in the east at any point in the century, indicating the theorists' unrealistic ideas on the size of armies. During this period, the military orders are estimated to have maintained a total of only 750 knights in the kingdom, the majority from the Templars and Hospitallers.²⁷ The kingdom had its own feudal knights, estimated by John of Ibelin at 577 knights and 5025 sergeants, although this represents an ideal figure, higher than the actual numbers the king could draw upon.²⁸ Sanudo did not discuss the size of a defence force, but gave detailed advice on tactics and discipline, drawing his lessons from the history of the Holy Land, and also from classical examples. He recommended that it was important for the inhabitants of the crusader states to be continually instructed in the arts of war, implying that all would be responsible for its defence.²⁹

Three of the theorists believed that the defence of the kingdom should be entrusted to a military order. The author of the *Memoria* drew this conclusion by assessing certain military problems which had contributed to the expulsion of the

²⁵Fidenzio, p. 58; 'Memoria', p. 446.

²⁶Charles II, pp. 357-8.

²⁷Riley-Smith, *Knights of St John*, p. 327; Forey, *The Military Orders*, pp. 69, 77-8.

²⁸Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, pp. 51-2; J. L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), p. 139.

²⁹Sanudo, pp. 262-73, 280. Some of Sanudo's recommendations have similarities with those made by Fidenzio when discussing the crusade army, which suggests that he knew the earlier work (Fidenzio, pp. 32-5).

Christians from the Holy Land, and argued that these could only be solved by a military order. He complained that crusaders typically remained in the east for only two to three years, echoing Fidenzio's criticisms.³⁰ These figures may be overgenerous: on the fifth crusade, the average length of service for a noble was a little over one year, while clergy remained for less time, and numbers were further thinned by deaths.³¹ It was believed that a military order would provide an element of constancy for the crusade and later the kingdom, both in manpower and leadership. Consistent levels of manpower were similarly stressed by Ramon Lull, in the *Liber de fine*, and Charles II, both of whom expected that dead men could be swiftly replaced, overestimating the ability of a military order to recruit large numbers of men. Lull argued that a new knight could enter the order when another died, while Charles argued that squires could be promoted on the death of their knight.³² More important for the author of the *Memoria* was the question of obedience, which he felt was vital for the maintenance of the Holy Land. Members of military orders had better discipline than ordinary crusaders, whose failure to obey orders had caused disasters in the past. He cited the example of Louis IX's defeat at Mansourah which was caused 'per inobedientiam sue gentis', a reference to Robert of Artois's rash pursuit of the enemy against advice, which led to his force, which included the Templars, being trapped and massacred inside the town. He also described Theobald of Champagne's defeat at Gaza, when Henry of Bar ignored instructions and attempted to surprise the Egyptians.³³ There were occasions when military orders did lose discipline, but the theorists' assessment, unsurprisingly shared by James of Molay, was fair.³⁴ The theorists noted other potential

³⁰*Memoria*, p. 442.

³¹Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 116-17.

³²Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 270-2; Charles II, p. 358; see also Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 270.

³³*Memoria*, p. 442; Joinville, *La vie de Saint Louis*, pp. 127-8; Painter, 'The crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall', pp. 475-6.

³⁴Molay, 'Consilium super unione ordinum', pp. 151-3.

advantages of entrusting the defence of the kingdom to a military order. Its strength would intimidate tribes on the borders of the kingdom, and would induce apostates to return to the Christian faith. Lull argued that the presence of a military order would encourage laymen to join the crusade, while the Moslems would retreat in despair.³⁵

The willingness of the theorists to countenance such a prominent role for an amalgamated military order contrasts with the criticisms levelled by certain authors against the orders in this period. The views expressed in the *Memoria* and the *Liber de acquisitione* are notable given that both were written after the arrest of the Templars in 1307.³⁶ The view that rivalry between the Templars and Hospitallers contributed to the downfall of the crusader states is found in the proposals of Fidenzio of Padua, Pierre Dubois, and the reports of the provincial councils of 1291-2, and is implicit in some of Lull's works.³⁷ Many regarded the amalgamation of the military orders as a solution to this problem.³⁸ The question of union was raised at Lyons in 1274 and was subsequently discussed by several theorists, some of whom clearly held the military record of both Templars and Hospitallers in high regard, judging by their desire to see the military orders take a leading role in the crusade and the defence of the kingdom. Even Dubois, who was highly critical of the orders, argued that a unified military order should be entrusted with the defence of the kingdom, albeit with no governmental power. However, Dubois and Fidenzio envisaged other means of defending the kingdom without recourse to a military order. The former suggested that warlike nations be settled on the borders of the kingdom, while an alternative was to send men from the west during crises, with

³⁵'Memoria', pp. 442-4; Lull, 'Liber de fine', pp. 272, 277-8.

³⁶Forey, 'The military orders in the crusading proposals', pp. 319-22.

³⁷Fidenzio, p. 15; Dubois, p. 81; *Councils and Synods*, pp. 1108, 1113; Cotton, *Historia Anglicana*, pp. 213-5; John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', p. 581; *Sacrosancta concilia*, vol. 14, cols. 1194-5, 1197-8; Lull, 'Epistola', p. 96; 'Liber de fine', pp. 270-1; 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 270.

³⁸Interestingly, Roger of Stanegrave, the Hospitaller, supported this idea: BM, Cotton Otho D V, f. 8v.

costs paid from a fund created from property of the military orders.³⁹ Fidenzio recommended that a number of soldiers be supported from the revenues of cities, abbeys, and bishoprics to defend the Holy Land.⁴⁰

Government

Charles II, Lull and the author of the *Memoria* all believed that the united military order should be entrusted with the government as well as the defence of the kingdom, with the head of the order taking the crown, a logical development from arguing that the order should have the leadership of the crusade.⁴¹ The *Memoria* supported the creation of a theocratic state in the east, proposing that any prince, baron or lord who held any right ('ius') in the kingdom should concede it to the church, and that 'bonum esset quod illud tale ius daret personis ecclesiasticis et potissime religiosis'.⁴² Such a proposition would be very unpopular among other claimants to the throne, or the exiled nobles in Cyprus, many of whom still used their titles from the kingdom of Jerusalem. In the early years of the fourteenth century, the prince of Galilee, the count of Jaffa and the lords of Beirut and Arsur continued to use their titles until the middle of the century, when their lines died out and titles became honorific.⁴³ Lull also argued for theocratic rule, suggesting that the kingdom be under papal control with the head of the order being a 'feudatarius domini Pape', although he gave no indication as to the exact nature of this relationship.⁴⁴ Both Lull and the author of the *Memoria* were moved by the special

³⁹Dubois, pp. 159-60; 'Opinio cujusdam', pp. 200-2.

⁴⁰Fidenzio, pp. 58-9.

⁴¹Schein is wrong to include Fidenzio of Padua among theorists who favoured the idea of using a military order either in the defence or government of the kingdom ('The future *regnum Hierusalem*', pp. 97-8).

⁴²'Memoria', pp. 440-1.

⁴³Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 108-9.

⁴⁴Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', pp. 270-1.

character of the Holy Land. The latter stated: 'regnum illud est sanctius ceteris et sic merito persona eciam religiosorum indigeat gubernari'.⁴⁵ The only precedent for the idea that the Holy Land should be governed by the church came during the first crusade. In 1099, certain clergy argued that a patriarch should be elected before a king was chosen, a position which implied clerical superiority. Patriarch Daimbert appears to have hoped to increase the church's power in the kingdom, and by investing Duke Godfrey with the city of Jerusalem, he implied patriarchal suzerainty over the city. Daimbert's actions were motivated more by personal ambition than a belief that the clergy should rule the Holy Land because of its religious importance, and there is no evidence of papal support for this idea from either Urban II or Paschal II.⁴⁶ There was a more recent precedent for government by military order in Rhodes, where the Hospitallers were in the process of establishing their control over the island, and in Prussia, ruled by the Teutonic Knights with papal support.

The advantages of having the new kingdom under the control of a military order were the stability of leadership and permanent commitment to the Holy Land that an order would provide, which was also discussed in the context of the leadership of the crusade itself. Lull believed that successive masters would all have great devotion for the crusade, which could not be guaranteed with kings who were more interested in acquiring lands. When a king died, his son might not share his love of the Holy Land.⁴⁷ The crown of the new kingdom was not to be hereditary, but the master of the order was to be elected by its convent or chapter, hence ensuring stability by swiftly replacing rulers.⁴⁸ Both Lull and Charles of Anjou argued that it was important for the head of the order to be of royal blood, probably

⁴⁵'Memoria', pp. 440-1; Lull, 'Liber de fine': 'regnum sibi Ierusalem tribuatur; quoniam iustum est, propter hoc quia nobilius officium habebit talis rex, quam rex alius huius mundi'.

⁴⁶Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum', pp. 301 (see also pp. 295-6); J. G. Rowe, 'Paschal II and the relation between the spiritual and temporal powers in the kingdom of Jerusalem', *Speculum* 32 (1957), pp. 471-501.

⁴⁷Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 270.

⁴⁸Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 270.

because of the special nature of the Holy Land.⁴⁹ Charles recommended that he be 'home de grant valor et de grant pooir fill de Roy se len le peust trouver convenable'.⁵⁰ In the *Liber de fine*, Lull suggested that the son of a king be elected as master of the order, and on his death, be replaced by another son. In the *Epistola* he proposed that a ruling monarch, preferably one who was unmarried or prepared to send away his wife, be the master of the order. He claimed to know such a man, but unfortunately did not elucidate further. He may have been referring to Henry II of Cyprus, who did not marry until 1317 and who was also viewed as a potential master of a military order by Pierre Dubois.⁵¹ There were rumours that Philip IV intended that either he himself or one of his sons rule the Holy Land at the head of a military order, or with the goods of the Temple. These stories arose from attempts to account for the king's contribution to the fall of the order, and had no basis in fact.⁵²

The interest of these authors in an elective monarchy stems partly from their desire to see a military order ruling the country, since the master of an order was usually elected. However, it was also a reaction against the turbulent history of the crusader kingdom. The problems of failing lines, and the tendency of women to outlive men, led to complex disputes and legal wrangling over succession.⁵³ During the late thirteenth century, the succession was disputed by the Lusignans and the Angevins after Charles I bought the rights of Mary of Antioch in 1277. Prior to this, there were quarrels over the 'bailliage' and regency of the kingdom during the reigns

⁴⁹Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 270: 'et hoc propter honorem officii sibi dati'.

⁵⁰Charles II, p. 356.

⁵¹Lull, 'Liber de fine', p. 270; 'Epistola', p. 97; Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', pp. 200-1. In the *Epistola*, unlike in the *Liber de fine*, Lull did not propose that the military order assume the government of the kingdom.

⁵²Finke, *Papsttum*, vol. 2, pp. 51, 118; Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio chronicarum*, ed. E. M. Thompson (RS: London, 1869), p. 16; *Chronicon Galfridi le Baker*, ed. H. R. Luard, vol. 3 (RS: London, 1890), p. 5 (s.a. 1312).

⁵³Sanudo argued that women should not hold baronies, although it is unclear whether he was concerned about questions of defence or succession (p. 280).

of the absentee Hohenstaufen kings. Against this background, the theorists' preference for an elective monarchy seems natural. However, their opinions contrast with wider currents of political thought in this period. Only a small number of writers favoured elective over hereditary monarchy. Nicole Oresme and Marsilius of Padua both believed that an elective monarch allowed the 'reasonable multitude' some representation in the kingdom.⁵⁴ It was more common for thinkers to favour hereditary monarchies, often in reaction to the experience of the Holy Roman Empire. Dubois believed that 'numerous occasions for strife' were caused by elections, and suggested that the empire become hereditary.⁵⁵ Such problems would not be solved by leaving the election to a military order. James of Molay believed that if the orders were amalgamated, there would be rivalry between knights from the two orders, although he argued that a master from outside the orders might present fewer problems.⁵⁶

Those authors who favour handing the kingdom to a military order ignored a number of potential claimants to the crown of Jerusalem. The strongest claim belonged to the Lusignans of Cyprus, who stressed it in their title, coinage, and practice of holding a separate coronation for the crown of Jerusalem. They took these measures because of interest in the kingdom from more powerful rulers in Europe, who had weaker claims but the chance to take the Holy Land (and possibly Cyprus) at the head of a crusading army.⁵⁷ The Aragonese were interested in the crown, negotiating with the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1300, in the mistaken belief that he held the Holy Land, and attempting to acquire Robert of Sicily's title in 1309-11. James II married Henry II's sister Maria in 1315, although she died in 1322 without

⁵⁴*The Cambridge History of Political Thought, c. 350-c.1450*, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 565-9.

⁵⁵Dubois, p. 82; *Cambridge History of Political Thought*, p. 497-8.

⁵⁶Molay, 'Consilium super unione ordinum', pp. 151-3.

⁵⁷Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, p. 107. Henry II referred to his claim in his advice, reporting that he was moved to write 'ratione regni sui Jerosolimitani, de quo exheredatus per Sarracenos existit' (p. 118).

producing an heir.⁵⁸ Charles II of Anjou claimed the kingdom through his father's purchase of Maria of Antioch's rights, but, while he mentioned the claim in his proposal, he was prepared to relinquish his rights.⁵⁹ Perhaps the greatest threat to the Lusignans came from France, whose Capetian kings were the most likely leaders of a future crusade, and would be unlikely to return home without some tangible gains. Dubois gave the most extreme expression of French claims in the east, envisaging that the royal family acquire kingdoms in Jerusalem, Egypt and Cyprus. Those with existing claims, such as the count of Eu and Henry II, were to relinquish their rights to the Capetians. Henry was to become master of a new military order, since he was without wife or child and 'already like a monk in his home'.⁶⁰

In discussing the government of Jerusalem, the theorists agreed that it was necessary to institute a strong monarchy. This reflected their desire to eradicate the weaknesses of the earlier kingdom. Fidenzio of Padua gave great attention to this in his history of the Holy Land. He wrote 'divisio etiam nocuit Xpistianis habitatoribus Terre Sancte', and criticised rivalry among the Italian communes, military orders, and barons, claiming that they refused to obey the king.⁶¹ One clear example of this was the war of St Sabas, which initially involved Venice and Genoa, but spread to draw in the military orders, other trading powers and most of the baronage of the kingdom. The military orders also involved themselves in baronial disputes, as in 1277 when the Templars joined Guy of Jubail in an attack on Bohemond VII of Tripoli. Such problems were occasioned by the weakness of the monarchy, which in the later years of the kingdom allowed individual nobles and others to make separate agreements with the Mamluks. In 1280 the Templars negotiated a ten-year truce

⁵⁸J. E. Martínez Ferrando, *Jaime II de Aragón: su vida familiar* (Barcelona, 1948), vol. 1, pp. 199-222; vol. 2, nos. 70, 117, 122, 135-6, 153; Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 94; Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 137-8.

⁵⁹Charles II, p. 353; see chapter one.

⁶⁰Dubois, 'Opinio cujusdam', pp. 200, 205-6.

⁶¹Fidenzio, p. 15.

with Qalawun and the Hospitallers followed suit in 1282, while in 1273, Hamo le Strange placed his wife and her fief of Beirut under the protection of the sultan.⁶² Both Fidenzio and Sanudo contrasted the discord of the Christians with the unity of the Mamluks by reporting the words of a sultan, who reputedly told the inhabitants of the Holy Land that he was like a snake with one head and many tails, whereas the Christians were like a snake with one tail but many heads, all with different appetites.⁶³

Consequently the theorists favoured a powerful monarchy. Sanudo stated that a strong king was needed to unify his subjects and avoid discord, while Fidenzio argued in similar terms for a leader who would be universally obeyed.⁶⁴ Charles II and the author of the *Memoria*, who both favoured rule by a military order, desired strong government. The former proposed that the new king should be granted 'toutes rentes toutes possessions tous biens appartenans audit royaume', thereby giving him absolute control of the kingdom.⁶⁵ The *Memoria* recommended that all crusaders, of whatever status, were to be obedient to the king, and were to swear to observe his truces and agreements. He could also make grants of lands where necessary for the defence of the kingdom, suggesting that the author believed that the king should retain control of his lands wherever possible.⁶⁶ Dubois expected that rule in the east would be an extension of the centralised monarchy in France. Royal justiciaries were to be obeyed 'on pain of severe penalties', and the rulers of the eastern kingdoms, all members of the French royal family, were to be raised in France.⁶⁷ The theorists' desire to see firm government in the east implied that it

⁶²Forey, *Military Orders*, p. 23; Runciman, 'The crusader states 1243-1291', p. 584.

⁶³Sanudo, p. 273; Fidenzio, p. 16.

⁶⁴Sanudo, p. 273; Fidenzio, pp. 41, 59.

⁶⁵Charles II, p. 356.

⁶⁶'*Memoria*', pp. 440-1.

⁶⁷Dubois, p. 178.

would be possible to start afresh after the crusade, but the existence of claims to lands by nobles and remaining military orders, alongside the prospect of reliance on the Italian cities to provide naval assistance, suggests that this would not be possible.

A few authors discussed the future relationship of the crusader kingdom with the west, although some of their conclusions were conditioned by their views on how an amalgamated military order should be funded. Most expected that some support from the west would be needed since they doubted whether a new kingdom in the east could survive as an entirely autonomous unit, in isolation from Europe. Dubois proposed that the unified military order offer aid to all the eastern kingdoms when necessary, but in emergencies, aid from the west would be needed, to be funded from the possessions of the dissolved order of the Templars.⁶⁸ Charles II also believed that aid from the west might be necessary on occasion, and suggested that the head of the military order should be able to require aid from the princes of the west. In common with the other authors who favoured the use of a military order, Charles believed that it should support itself from lands held in the west, and to this end he urged that privileges be granted by the pope and by secular princes to secure its possessions.⁶⁹ Similarly, the author of the *Memoria* recommended that the unified order continue to receive support from the west, in the form of collections 'ad defensionem Terre Sancte', and money from other ecclesiastical sources.⁷⁰ Fidenzio did not recommend the use of a military order, but he suggested that the defending army be partly maintained by the west, with troops being paid for by individual cities and religious institutions. The leader of the army was to be rich enough to support an army without receiving a stipend, at least for the period of the crusade, so western aid was to be limited.⁷¹ It is interesting that these theorists

⁶⁸Dubois, p. 202.

⁶⁹Charles II, p. 357.

⁷⁰'Memoria', pp. 439-40.

⁷¹Fidenzio, p. 59.

favoured some form of formal link between the crusader states and the west, and it seems they were responding to the previously erratic nature of European assistance.

Some argued that the kingdom would not be merely a drain on western resources, but could be materially as well as spiritually profitable to Christendom. Fidenzio believed that the king could obtain money for soldiers from the area around Damascus, which was wealthy, while Lull expected that the king would be able to multiply the wealth of the church through his acquisitions, although he did not specify how this would be done.⁷² Similarly, Dubois believed that in normal circumstances the military order could support itself from lands in Cyprus and Jerusalem, and that the territories of the east would prove profitable, although this largely followed French royal policy towards the military orders. Dubois argued that, provided they were at peace for many years, the king of Jerusalem could amass 'great treasures' which would be used for emergencies. The eastern lands were to enrich themselves through the spice trade, which would be sent to the west and be made available at 'moderate prices' to all Catholics. The ruler of the kingdom would regulate prices to curb the greed of merchants.⁷³ Even though Lull had visited the east, he had an overly optimistic view of the likely resources of the kingdom, one shared by Dubois, who had never been to the east.

Trade and colonisation

A number of the theorists discussed the manner in which a new kingdom of Jerusalem would be settled, and they concentrated on the issue of trade. Charles II recognised the potential importance of trade and economic success to the viability of the kingdom. He argued that 'frachises [*sic*] acoutoumes' should be granted to merchants from the Italian cities, Marseilles and Catalonia, to encourage pilgrims to

⁷²Fidenzio, p. 59; Lull, 'Liber de acquisitione', p. 271.

⁷³Dubois, pp. 123-4, 202.

settle in the east.⁷⁴ This proposal contradicted his plan to reserve all rents and appurtenances to the head of the military order, and represented a diminution of royal power. Dubois followed the idea, suggesting that the major ports and cities of the country be international so that 'merchants from various countries may readily gather there', but he believed that it was necessary for the ruler to retain control over their activities, including fixing prices to curb their greed.⁷⁵ Dubois was critical of the behaviour of the merchants in the crusader states, and his proposal was designed to prevent them from gaining the same level of power in a new kingdom. The trading cities, particularly Venice and Genoa, attained positions of strength because of the dependence of the settlers on their naval forces. They maintained a vital lifeline to the west, bringing groups of crusaders and material aid to the Holy Land, and this allowed them to extract heavy concessions from rulers, which in Cyprus were maintained into the fourteenth century. Only Fidenzio proposed that the kingdom maintain a fleet, suggesting that it would again be necessary to rely on Italian sources of ships. As a Venetian, Sanudo took a very different line from Dubois, arguing that it was vital to encourage trade. He warned against imposing high taxes, which would deter settlement and hamper traders, and believed that the inhabitants would prosper if free trade were allowed.⁷⁶

Charles II's belief that granting franchises to the Italians would encourage settlement is a rare example of the issue of colonisation being discussed by the theorists. The crusader states had been hampered by a lack of manpower from their foundation, as Fulcher of Chartres's lament about the state of the kingdom in 1101 illustrates. In 1274, Humbert of Romans reported that some criticised the crusades because no one stayed to occupy captured territory, but he offered no solution to this problem, simply expressing the hope that Christians would settle in great numbers if

⁷⁴Charles II, pp. 358-60.

⁷⁵Dubois, p. 85.

⁷⁶Sanudo, p. 281.

the Holy Land were recovered.⁷⁷ Fidenzio had complained that those who came to the east did not remain for long, and also that those who were there did not love the Holy Land as much as their own land, but he did not offer solutions to the problem.⁷⁸ Charles believed that the granting of franchises to the trading powers would cause the Holy Land to win renown and encourage settlement from men of all lands, while the author of the *Memoria* asserted that men would be encouraged to remain for longer if the kingdom were in the hands of a military order, the implication being that it would be more secure.⁷⁹ Dubois and Sanudo addressed the problem of colonisation in more detail, rather than assuming that success would bring immigration from Europe. The former used the same approach as he did for recruitment, suggesting that those who broke the peace in Europe be sent to the east and forced to settle. As warmakers they would live closest to the enemy, and fight in the front rank.⁸⁰ Others, such as James of Vitry and Gilbert of Tournai condemned the practice of sending criminals to the east.⁸¹ Sanudo was also firmly opposed to allowing sinners to settle in the Holy Land, argued that measures should be taken against heresy and schism, and that friars should inquire into sin. He believed that settlement should be encouraged through the offer of free transport to the east, financial assistance, and a full indulgence.⁸²

Dubois believed that the new kingdom should be settled along national lines, with each country or region colonising a town or fortress and being responsible for the surrounding area, the amount depending on the numbers of crusaders. Only the

⁷⁷Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Iherusolymitana', pp. 383-4; Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', p. 196.

⁷⁸Fidenzio, p. 13.

⁷⁹Charles II, pp. 358-60; 'Memoria', p. 442.

⁸⁰Dubois, pp. 85, 179.

⁸¹Schein, 'The future *Regnum Hierusalem*', p. 101; 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', pp. 39-40; Throop, pp. 97-8.

⁸²Sanudo, pp. 280-1 ('notorii peccatores et homines monstruosi' were to be kept from the Holy Land).

major ports and cities such as Acre and Jerusalem would be international. Dubois believed that with this system new arrivals would feel at home and would settle more quickly. He believed that frontier areas should be allocated to warlike nations such as the Spanish, who would vigorously defend the borders of the kingdom.⁸³ This plan of colonisation runs counter to the views of the other theorists who favoured a strong, united kingdom. Most theorists looked back on the divisions of the crusader states and sought to avoid them, while Dubois envisaged a disjointed state, fractured along national lines, which would perhaps be more ungovernable than the previous kingdom. Fidenzio complained of the problems caused by the diversity of nationalities and languages which had existed in the crusader states before 1291, and Dubois plan appears likely to exacerbate such problems.⁸⁴ It also appears to contradict Dubois's intention, stated elsewhere, to create a dependency of the French crown in the east. Many of the suggestions he offered in the first book of the *De recuperatione* were superseded in the 'secret' second book and the *Opinio cujusdam*, but he does not return to the issue of colonisation in either of these works. Dubois probably genuinely favoured his idealistic theory of settlement without realising that it contradicted his more aggressively pro-French ideas. In addition, the number of likely settlers is questionable, given the absence of any severe population pressure in the west. The security of life in Europe would deter settlers from moving to the east, while there were alternative areas for settlement in the west, notably Spain.

Dubois extended his discussion of the colonisation of the Holy Land to 'measures which will be required for the well-being of the inhabitants'.⁸⁵ He argued that settlers had a responsibility to convert the inhabitants of the east, and described a detailed programme of education for both boys and girls. The boys were to be

⁸³Dubois, pp. 84-5, 159-60

⁸⁴Fidenzio, p. 13.

⁸⁵Dubois, p. 114.

taught eastern languages, in an echo of Lull's theories, along with theology, for those who showed aptitude, law, astronomy and natural sciences. Women would also be taught languages to allow them to be married off to eastern nobles and prelates, and would also learn medicine and surgery to enable them to win the trust of eastern women. Dubois emphasised that it was necessary to give practical as well as theoretical training.⁸⁶ It is notable that the schools were to be based in the west, and the children sent east after their education was complete. This illustrates that, while Dubois purported to be discussing the kingdom of Jerusalem, his ideas were intended to have wider application. The same is true of the legal measures needed for a kingdom with settlers of many nations. He believed that it was necessary to institute a new law code which would apply to all, and he recommended that it should be simplified to ensure cases were settled quickly.⁸⁷ It could be argued that Dubois believed that such a law-code was just as applicable to Europe as to the east. His discussion of these issues, and the space he devoted to them, indicates that the proposal was designed to present the author's ideas on a range of subjects, often unrelated to the crusade, which were to apply to Europe, and France in particular.

Conclusion

The majority of the theorists gave no consideration to a future kingdom of Jerusalem, reflecting the cautious approach typical of the period. Those who did address the subject made recommendations intended to rectify faults apparent in the earlier crusader kingdom, although they rarely gave any explicit analysis of these. They concentrated on divisions in the kingdom and the absence of a strong, universally accepted leader. In addition, the defence of the kingdom had suffered from a serious shortage of manpower and the short-lived and irregular nature of assistance from the west. In the new kingdom these problems were to be solved by

⁸⁶Dubois, pp. 117-20, 124-39.

⁸⁷Dubois, pp. 141-9. He offered to organise the schools and legal reforms himself.

a strong monarchy which was also to provide a large permanent defence force. A military order would solve both problems, and give the Holy Land a theocratic government reflecting its spiritual importance, an important consideration for some writers. The key problem of the crusader states, their terminal underpopulation, was never satisfactorily addressed by the theorists, possibly because there was no solution. Of the authors, Dubois is the most original, partly because his proposal was as much concerned with France as with the Holy Land. Advice on the kingdom was also determined by the type of crusade envisaged by the theorists. Dubois expected this to be French-led, and framed his plans accordingly. Other authors preferred to entrust the crusade to a military order which would then take over the government of the kingdom, and their suggestions on the nature of the monarchy and the kingdom's relations with the west were coloured by this.

VII. LATER PROPOSALS AND CRUSADES

The cancellation of Philip VI's planned crusade in 1336 and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities between England and France effectively ended any hope of a new crusade to recover the Holy Land for many years. No new recovery treatises survive from the remainder of the fourteenth century until the works of Philip of Mézières, written in the last decades. However, interest in existing proposals is illustrated by the survival of copies made during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, some of which were held in the papal library, French royal records and the ducal library of Burgundy. This raises the possibility that these works continued to have some impact in the later period. A number of expeditions were organised during the rest of the fourteenth century, although their initiative tended to come from the Christians of the eastern Mediterranean rather than the papacy, and they were not directly concerned with the Holy Land. In addition, a number of treatises were written on the crusade, by Philip of Mézières, Emmanuele Piloti and writers connected to the Burgundian court. Some of these works have similarities with the proposals of the early fourteenth century, suggesting that they had some connection with them.

The absence of any new crusade proposals written after the outbreak of the Hundred Years War has not been satisfactorily explained. Atiya argued that this was because there was no longer any need for such works when new crusades were organised.¹ His explanation depends on his belief that the years between 1291 and 1337 were devoid of attempts to organise crusades, and on his characterisation of the proposals as propaganda, which is true only of a minority. Most were advisory

¹Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 128.

works written at papal request as part of preparations for a new expedition, or sent unsolicited to either the papacy or French king when there seemed to be some prospect of a crusade being launched. After the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, the nature of crusading altered and the major European powers were no longer involved. Initiative moved to the Christian powers in the east and papal involvement in the planning of crusades diminished. Written advice was less important because the eastern Christians were familiar with conditions in the region and able to take decisions on strategy in the east, rather than following a plan arranged at the curia. The decision to attack Smyrna in 1344 was probably taken only after the fleet formed, and Peter I only announced his plan to attack Alexandria when the army met at Rhodes.² In addition, most crusades of the later period were not viewed as part of a larger enterprise to recover the Holy Land but had limited and immediate objectives, eliminating the need for detailed planning long in advance of an expedition.

Atiya claimed that 'the labours and enthusiasm of the theorists of this era [1291-1332] were at last rewarded when the West embarked on a number of expeditions against the East in the remaining part of the century'.³ However, a brief examination of crusades in the later part of the fourteenth century indicates that the recovery treatises had no impact on these expeditions. After the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, the orientation of crusading endeavour shifted away from the Holy Land towards Asia Minor, and the advice given by the theorists ceased to be of relevance. The first crusade of the period was organised in 1343 by the papal legate, William Court, after appeals for assistance had been sent to Avignon by the Venetians, Cypriots and Hospitallers of Rhodes. All were perturbed by the growing

²The pope did receive advice from the Venetians on the number of ships needed and the length of service for the naval league of 1344, but there was no reference to the objectives of the enterprise. This formed part of negotiations and does not appear to have been requested by the pope (*Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum*, vol. 1, no. 136).

³Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 128.

threat posed by the Turkish emirates of western Asia Minor, particularly Aydin.⁴ A naval league was organised, following the example of 1332-4, and the league's armada successfully captured Smyrna in a surprise attack in 1344, fortuitously launched while the emir and his army were away.⁵ The subsequent crusade of Humbert of Viennois was also directed against the Turks. Following the deaths of the Christian leaders at Smyrna, the dauphin persuaded Clement VI to place him in command there, where he remained for less than two years before returning home.⁶

The crusade which had most similarities with ideas contained in proposals was Peter I of Cyprus's attack on Alexandria in 1365. In May 1363, Peter was appointed as the leader of a preliminary expedition, with the French king, John II, expected to lead a full crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land. Peter became the leader of the crusade after John's death, remaining in the west for two and a half years to raise recruits. With a fleet of ships, most of which were Cypriot, Peter's force sailed to Alexandria in October 1365 and took the city by surprise, partly because the governor was away. The city was sacked and looted, but gates were damaged, making it impossible to defend against the approaching Moslem army, and the crusaders were forced to return to Cyprus.⁷

The attack on Alexandria recalls the advice given by Sanudo and Henry II to attack the Mamluks in Egypt, although it is questionable whether Peter's ultimate goal was the recovery of the Holy Land. It was portrayed in this manner by contemporary observers such as William of Machaut and Philip of Mézières, but recently this interpretation has been questioned.⁸ Edbury has argued that the attack

⁴P. Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'occident: Recherches sur 'La Geste d'Umur Pacha'* (Paris, 1957), pp. 181-5; Housley, *Avignon Papacy*, pp. 32-3.

⁵Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin*, pp. 185-91; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 182-94.

⁶Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin*, pp. 195-9; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 194-210.

⁷Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 164-7; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 260-74.

⁸Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 284, 299-301; William of Machaut, *La Prise d'Alexandria*, pp. 100-9; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, p. 271.

was motivated by economic concerns, with Peter's goal being to acquire Alexandria, or to destroy the city if it could not be held. This would bolster the position of Cyprus in the region's economy, which had suffered as Famagusta was by-passed by merchants after the trade embargo had ended.⁹ Housley has countered that Peter planned to cause a renewal of hostilities between the Mamluks and the west, so that the pope would enforce the trade embargo and trade would pass through Cyprus once more.¹⁰ However, Peter's lengthy visit to the west suggests that his original plans involved a major enterprise. The ease with which the city was captured gives a misleading impression of the potential magnitude of the undertaking and it seems likely that, if Peter attacked the city, he planned to hold it. Mézières reported that the king intended to hand him one-third of the city for his planned military order, which suggests that Peter had resolved to hold Alexandria.¹¹ If this were the case, commercial and crusading motives were not necessarily mutually exclusive. If he simply hoped to renew hostilities, there would surely have been easier targets on the Syrian mainland which could still be presented as being intended for the recovery of the Holy Land and which would not have required such lengthy preparations. Whatever the case, Peter's strategy was one of great daring given the possibility of a Mamluk revenge attack on Cyprus and the likelihood of angering the Italian trading cities. This too suggests that he intended to cause serious damage to the Mamluks to prevent retaliation.

The last crusades of the century were definitely unrelated to the ideas of the crusade theorists. In 1390, Louis of Bourbon led French forces to North Africa where he unsuccessfully besieged Mahdia for ten weeks. The crusade recalls Lull's proposed route to the east through North Africa, but, although there were some

⁹P. W. Edbury, 'The crusading policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369', in *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades*, ed. P. M. Holt (Warminster, 1977), pp. 90-105; id. *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 161-71.

¹⁰Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 41-2. Balard simply raises a series of possibilities but makes no conclusions ('Chypre, les républiques maritimes italiennes et les plans de croisade', p. 102).

¹¹Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 299-300.

reports that crusaders desired to continue to Jerusalem, the expedition was organised at the instigation of the Genoese, who planned to combat piracy in the region.¹² The last crusade of the century was directed against the Turks in eastern Europe. Following appeals from Sigismund of Hungary, an army under John count of Nevers marched to attack Nicopolis, where it was comprehensively defeated.¹³ There were reports that the ultimate goal of the crusade was Jerusalem. Froissart claimed that the kings of England and France had agreed to set out to the Holy Land in the summer of 1397. If this was the case, then the Nicopolis crusade would owe some inspiration to the works of Philip of Mézières, who had proposed that the two kings lead a crusade to the Holy Land in the wake of an expedition led by the Order of the Passion. The long history of promises and propaganda on the crusade from England and France casts doubt on the likelihood that there was ever any serious intent to organise a second expedition and there is no other evidence to suggest that Jerusalem was the goal of the crusade. Nevertheless, the works and activity of Philip of Mézières in promoting both peace in Europe and the crusade certainly roused enthusiasm among the nobility of Europe for a new expedition and may well have influenced his former tutee, Charles VI of France.¹⁴

Despite the waning prospects of a crusade to the Holy Land being organised in western Europe, the crusading idea remained potent, even into the seventeenth century.¹⁵ It was an important element in the propaganda used by the rival camps in the early stages of the Hundred Years War, each accusing the other of hampering the crusade. There was continued interest in the Holy Land itself, illustrated by

¹²Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 331-41; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 286-7.

¹³Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934); Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 341-69.

¹⁴J. J. N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom, 1377-99* (London, 1972), pp. 180-1, 186-91, 205.

¹⁵N. Iorga, 'Un projet relatif à la conquête de Jerusalem, 1609', *ROL* 2 (1894), pp. 183-9.

descriptions of the Holy Places made by pilgrims such as James of Verona and Ludolph of Sucheim.¹⁶ James's account ends by expressing the hope that the Holy Land could be recovered, and similar sentiments are found in the work of John Mandeville, written in 1357.¹⁷ Although no new crusading proposals survive, copies of existing works were available throughout the period. Records of the papal library in the fourteenth century indicate the presence of a number of treatises on the Holy Land, some of which can be definitely identified with proposals. Two copies of Sanudo's *Liber secretorum* were listed in 1369, and the coverings (one red, one yellow) suggest that these were the same copies he handed to John XXII. Another work is described as 'parvus liber dictus decretorum ad passagium', which may be a reference to the *Directorium*, and two works were recorded which cannot be identified ('liber de condicionibus Terre Sancte', and 'processus papireus super passagio').¹⁸ In 1375, the two copies of Sanudo's work were listed again, along with other works including a copy of Hayton's *Flos historiarum* covered in green and a work described as 'liber factus pro passagio Terre Sancte, coopertus de sirico violato'.¹⁹

New copies of crusade proposals were made during the later fourteenth century, but these were mostly of works with some wider appeal beyond the planning of crusades. The majority of the shorter advisory proposals, which dealt solely with plans to recover the Holy Land, survive only in copies made during the first half of the century, although a few were copied in the later period. The

¹⁶Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', pp. 155-302; Ludolph of Sucheim, *Description of the Holy Land*. Atiya lists several other pilgrim accounts by authors such as William of Boldensele, Nicholas of Marthono and Thomas Swinburne (*Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 155-86, 490-6).

¹⁷Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', p. 302; *Mandeville's Travels*, ed. M. C. Seymour (Oxford, 1967), pp. 1-4. This latter work can hardly be classed as a 'work of propaganda' (Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 163).

¹⁸F. Ehrle, *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum tum Bonifationae tum Avenionensis*, vol. 1 (Vatican, 1890), pp. 337, 343, 345, 407 (nos. 648, 731, 752, 1651); Sanudo, p. 1.

¹⁹Ehrle, *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum*, pp. 500-5, 509, 546, 557-8 (nos. 680-2, 690, 741, 766, 831, 1428-9, 1625, 1631).

manuscript containing the *Devise*, and the proposals of the Hospitallers, William Durant and bishop of Leon was made in 1322-8, but a later translation into French exists. The *Devise* contained material of geographical interest and there were a number of other works in this manuscript, including the *De statu saracenorum* of William of Tripoli, suggesting that the translation was made because of interest in the east rather than the specific contents of the recovery treatises.²⁰ The works of Ramon Lull survive in a number of manuscripts, many of which date from after the medieval period. The *Liber de fine* survives in manuscripts from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, although copies were also made in the sixteenth century and beyond.²¹ The *Liber de acquisitione* and Lull's petitions to Boniface VIII and to the council of Vienne were included in the final part of the *Electorium Magnum*, the great compilation of his works made by Thomas le Myésier. The survival of Lull's works was due to interest in the author himself, rather than his ideas on the crusade.²²

The attraction of geography and history is illustrated by the existence of a fragment of the *Liber secretorum*, containing the descriptions of the east from part fourteen of the third book, in a manuscript which also includes James of Vitry's *Hystoria Hierosolymitana* and a description of the Holy Land by Jordan Catalani.²³ Similarly, Hayton's proposal survives with the crusade treatise of Roger of Stanegrave, itself a work with lengthy descriptions of the east, in a late fourteenth-century manuscript which also contains John of Plan Carpini's account of his travels and a fragment of Marco Polo's work.²⁴ The attraction of Hayton's work was clearly based on its accounts of the history and geography of the east, and particularly the

²⁰BN lat. 7470; Sainte-Geneviève 1654.

²¹Madre, introduction to the *Liber de fine*, pp. 241-2, 248.

²²Hillgarth, pp. 245-6, 394-5.

²³London, BM add. 19513.

²⁴London, BM Cotton Otho D. V.

Mongols, since several copies survive with descriptions of the east by authors such as John Mandeville, William of Boldensele, and Marco Polo, from both the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In some instances, the fourth book, which contains the crusading proposal, was abridged or omitted.²⁵ Interest in this work was such that translations were made into English in the fifteenth century, and into Spanish at the end of the fourteenth century.²⁶ The latter was made for the master of the Hospitallers, Juan Fernández de Heredia, who had a lively interest in works of history and geography.²⁷

The *Directorium* and William Adam's *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* were both copied in manuscripts connected with the council of Basle in the fifteenth century. It appears that the fiercely anti-Greek sentiments of the authors were attractive to the copyists. One complete copy of the *Directorium* together with William Adam's proposal was included in a manuscript containing pieces on the council of Basle. A fragment of the *Directorium*, containing the opening few lines, and a full copy of Adam's work also survive in a manuscript linked to the council which contains treatises attacking the Greeks and other heretics, apparently collected by its president, John of Ragusa. This latter manuscript, along with another containing both the *Directorium* and William Adam's proposal, belonged to the Dominican house in Basle.²⁸ Union with the Greek church was one of the questions addressed at the council. The Greeks were favourable due to the threat of the Turks in the east, and proposed either a council in Constantinople at their expense, or in the west at the pope's expense to discuss the issue. John of Ragusa had acted as one of

²⁵Kohler, introduction to Hayton, pp. lxxviii-cxxx: examples include Berne, bibliothèque de la ville, ms 125; Cambridge, University Library Dd.1.17; London, BM Harley, 5115.

²⁶Kohler, introduction to Hayton, p. cxx: Escorial, Z. I. 2, which also includes a translation of Marco Polo.

²⁷A. Luttrell, 'Greek histories translated and copied for Juan Fernández de Heredia, Master of Rhodes: 1377-1396', *Speculum* 35 (1960), pp. 401-7.

²⁸Kohler, introduction to the *Directorium*, pp. clxiii-clxviii; introduction to William Adam, pp. cciv-ccvii: Vatican, col. Palat. 603; Basle, bibliothèque publique, A. I. 32, A. I. 28.

three envoys sent to Constantinople to discuss the matter of removing certain offensive phrases from a decree of the council concerned with the conditions of union.²⁹ Just as with the other works copied in the period, interest in the *Directorium* and *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* was not due to their discussion of the crusade but their inclusion of other material, in this case, their polemics against the Greeks.

A number of the crusade proposals were copied for the ducal library of Burgundy. Burgundian interest in the crusade dated from the reign of Philip the Bold, who played a leading role in the organisation and financing of the crusade sent against the Turks in 1396. Philip had originally intended to lead the crusade himself, but he handed over to his son, John the Fearless.³⁰ Philip was responsible for building up the ducal library, which contained several works on the crusade, including Villehardouin's account of the conquest of Constantinople, and the chronicles of Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier. He also acquired copies of the proposals written by Hayton and Sanudo, and the descriptions of the east by Marco Polo and John Mandeville.³¹ Philip's interest in Hayton's work is demonstrated by his purchase of three copies from a Parisian bookseller, Jacques Raponde, for 300 *livres d'or* in 1403.³² A copy of Hayton's work was also executed for John duke of Burgundy, then was passed to the duke of Nemurs, Jacques d'Armagnac.³³ Another, formerly belonging to Valeran III of Luxembourg, may also have passed from the household of the Burgundians.³⁴ Philip the Good continued the family interest in the

²⁹J. Gill, *Constance et Bâle-Florence*, Histoire des conciles œcuméniques 9 (Paris, 1965), pp. 152-60.

³⁰R. Vaughan, *Philip the Bold: the formation of the Burgundian state* (London, 1962), pp. 59-68; Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, pp. 33-49; Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. 1, pp. 342-6.

³¹Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, p. ix.

³²Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, pp. 194-5; Kohler, introduction to Hayton, pp. lxxxvii-lxxxviii, n. 4 dates the purchase to 1401.

³³Kohler, introduction to Hayton, pp. xci-xcii: Paris, BN Fr. 2810.

³⁴Kohler, introduction to Hayton, pp. lxxxviii-lxxxix: Paris, BN n.acq. Fr. 1255.

crusade, hoping to avenge his father's defeat by the Turks at Nicopolis. He planned a crusade in 1436 and began the construction of a fleet two years later. This was sent to Rhodes in answer to Hospitaller appeals for assistance against the Egyptians.³⁵ In 1452, the duke instructed Bishop Jean Germain to make an appeal to the French king urging him to fight the Moslems.³⁶ Philip the Good also continued the family literary interest in the crusade. He made further acquisitions for the ducal library, including the works of Joinville and Piloti. John Miélot made translations of a number of works at the duke's request, including Burchard of Mount-Sion's description of the Holy Land and the *Directorium*.³⁷ The dukes' interest in the crusade indicates that these copies were made because of the crusading content of the proposals, rather than simply historical or geographical interest.

The availability of copies of the crusading proposals throughout the period would allow them to influence the few treatises written in this later period on the crusade. At the end of the fourteenth century, Philip of Mézières, formerly the chancellor of Peter I of Cyprus, wrote a number of works to promote his ideas on the formation of a new military order, the Order of the Passion, and on the recovery of the Holy Land. He wrote three versions of a plan for a new crusading order, the *Nova Religio Passionis Jhesu Christi*, and a life of Peter Thomas, the papal legate who had accompanied Peter I and Philip on the crusade to Alexandria, and whose enthusiasm for the crusade inspired Philip himself.³⁸ In 1389 he completed the *Songe du vieil pèlerin*, an allegorical work written for the guidance of Charles VI of France, whom Mézières was tutoring. He devoted a chapter to the crusade which covered the preparations necessary in the west, notably the establishment of peace,

³⁵Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, p. 270.

³⁶C. Schefer, 'La discours du voyage d'outremer au très victorieux roi Charles VII, prononcé, en 1452, par Jean Germain, évêque de Chalon', *ROL* 3 (1895), pp. 303-42.

³⁷Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, pp. ix-x.

³⁸Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 344-52; Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 139-42.

and the routes for the crusaders. Mézières had a broad conception of the crusade, arguing that forces should be sent against Granada and North Africa, the Greeks and Turks, as well as Jerusalem and Egypt.³⁹ Mézières also wrote an allegorical letter to Richard II in 1395, which centred on the need for peace between England and France as a preliminary to the crusade. He recommended that all European knights join his proposed Order of the Passion, and that the general passage be preceded by a smaller expedition.⁴⁰ His works were genuinely propagandist in intent, and it is notable that they coincided with periods of peace between France and England, indicating that Mézières directed his appeals carefully.⁴¹

The source of his ideas and inspiration is unclear, but he does not appear to have used the earlier crusading proposals. His plans were much less sophisticated strategically, although his suggestion that part of the crusade travel to Jerusalem by land, defeating the Turks on the way, while the other part attack through Spain recalls Lull's *Liber de acquisitione*. Large sections of his works were chiefly concerned with the establishment of peace and the creation of a new military order. This latter concern does suggest some familiarity with the ideas prevalent in the earlier part of the century, in the proposals of Ramon Lull and Charles II. Iorga believed that Mézières had definitely used Hayton's proposal, but he appears to be confusing this with the *Memoria*, which survives in certain manuscripts inserted between the third and fourth books of Hayton's proposal.⁴² There are certain correlations between the planned order of the Passion and the *Memoria*, but Mézières gave a very detailed account of the rule for his planned order, and any knowledge of earlier proposals can at best have inspired him with the general

³⁹Philip of Mézières, *Le Songe du Vieil Pèlerin*, ed. G. W. Coopland, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 92-103, 422-40; Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 468-71.

⁴⁰Philip of Mézières, *Letter to King Richard II: a plea made in 1395 for Peace between England and France*, ed. G. W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1975).

⁴¹Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, pp. 187-8.

⁴²Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 351-2.

concept of a new military order. The only evidence from Mézières himself about his sources is a report that he was inspired by reading chronicles of the crusades, which suggests that the proposals were not influential.⁴³

In the early part of the fifteenth century, three treatises were written on the crusade, two of them connected with the crusading aspirations of the dukes of Burgundy. These consisted chiefly of detailed descriptions of the east, but the third, written by Emmanuele Piloti, gives more detailed advice on how the Mamluks could be defeated and has more similarities with the earlier proposals. Piloti was a Cretan merchant with some knowledge of Arabic who spent many years trading in Egypt, in addition to visiting Damascus, and ports in Syria and Asia Minor.⁴⁴ His proposal was begun in 1420 and addressed to Pope Eugenius IV, but survives only in a translation into French made by the author in 1441 which was held in the ducal library of Burgundy.⁴⁵ His strategy for the crusade is strongly reminiscent of Sanudo's *Liber secretorum*. Piloti argued that it was necessary to capture Cairo if the sultan were to be defeated, and that Alexandria was 'la bouche et la clef de leur estat'.⁴⁶ While his proposal contained lengthy descriptions of Cairo and Alexandria, trade in Egypt, and the population of the country, it also gave concrete advice on how to capture Alexandria. Piloti reported that it was necessary to organise a fleet containing one hundred and twenty ships of various types to capture the city, and that this should be placed under Venetian control. Once it was in Christian hands, the trade embargo could be enforced, directing trade away from Syria and thereby ruining its power.⁴⁷

⁴³Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 71.

⁴⁴Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, pp. xviii-xxi. See also A. Luttrell, 'Emmanuele Piloti and criticism of the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes, 1306-1444', in id. *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291-1444* (Variorum reprint: London, 1978), pp. 2-3; Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 208-12.

⁴⁵Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, pp. v-vi, 3.

⁴⁶Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, p. 92.

⁴⁷Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, pp. 116-20, 128-34, 160-4, 176-8. Piloti's treatise is confused, and the advice on the crusade is interspersed with digressions on the decadence of Famagusta (caused

Piloti's use of certain rare proper names which are also found in the *Liber secretorum* has suggested to his editor that he had used the earlier work.⁴⁸ The similarity of Piloti's plan to that of Sanudo strongly suggests that he knew the contents of the Venetian's proposal, which exists in a number of copies, two from the fifteenth century. Piloti had visited Venice where a number of Sanudo's works were kept in accordance with his will.⁴⁹ Piloti used a large amount of information he had gleaned in person from his travels in support of his arguments, and his plan was different from that of Sanudo in a number of particulars, implying that the *Liber secretorum* was at best only an inspiration to him. Other aspects of Piloti's advice on the crusade demonstrate the continuing importance of certain themes of the earlier crusade proposals. Piloti discussed the need for peace in Europe, unified leadership of the crusade, the conversion of Moslems and the church's responsibility for funding the crusade.⁵⁰ Although he successfully predicted the fall of Constantinople, he did not discuss the threat of the Turks elsewhere in his work.⁵¹ His concerns reflect his life spent trading in Egypt, but it is striking that he should be concerned with the crusade against the Mamluks in this period, since the Turks were viewed as the chief threat to Christendom, and his proposal is more relevant to the early fourteenth century than the early fifteenth.

The two other works of this period were connected with the crusading aspirations of the dukes of Burgundy, and were written by order of the duke, rather than at the initiative of the authors. In 1420, Philip the Good sent Gilbert de Lannoy

by Genoese occupation), commerce in Alexandria, and a comparison between the sultan's court in Cairo and the papal curia (to the detriment of the latter). Piloti had acted on behalf of Venetian merchants in Egypt, and took a pro-Venetian stance in his work, just as Sanudo did in the *Liber secretorum*.

⁴⁸'Pariso' for the sea near Egypt (Piloti, p. 177 and note b; Sanudo, pp. 57, 69); 'Sturion' for one branch of the Nile (Piloti, p. 72 and p. 71 note a; Sanudo, pp. 25, 37, 259).

⁴⁹Magnocavallo, *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio*, pp. 146, 151-2.

⁵⁰Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, pp. 7-14, 171-2 ('la principale fontaine d'or pour tel occasion si est l'église de Romme'), 183-8.

⁵¹Dopp, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti*, p. 223.

on a political mission to the east on behalf of the kings of France and England.⁵² Lannoy was already well-travelled, having visited the east on pilgrimage as a squire, and fought in the Baltic and in Spain. His treatise contained a detailed report of his journey to the east through Europe, but his main purpose was to describe Egypt and Syria. He related the condition of Alexandria and the journey down the Nile to Cairo, and he also gave a short analysis of the Mamluk military system, including recruitment, arms and organisation.⁵³ He recounted his journey through Syria, but gave very little attention to Asia Minor and the Turks, only commenting that the Turks could be prevented from crossing the straits if the castle at Gallipoli were held.⁵⁴ In contrast, the account written by Bertrandon de la Broquière, who undertook a secret reconnaissance of the east by order of the duke, concentrated on areas under the Ottomans.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, he reported that he wrote 'affin que si aucun roy ou prince crestien vouloit entreprendre la conqueste de Iherusalem et y mener grosse armée par terre'.⁵⁶ He recorded his trip to the east by sea and his travels in Syria, where he reported the devastation of the ports, before giving an account of Asia Minor and Constantinople.⁵⁷ Bertrandon also commented on an appeal for assistance against the Turks from the Byzantine envoy, who held out the prospect of the recovery of the Holy Land in 1439. Bertrandon concluded that the

⁵²*Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy: voyageur, diplomate et moraliste*, ed. C. Potvin with notes by J.-C. Houzeau (Louvain, 1878), p. 51: 'emprins le voyage de Jhérusalem par terre à la requeste du roy d'Angleterre et du roy de France et de monseigneur le duc Phillippe, principal esmouveur'.

⁵³*Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy*, pp. 99-118 (Alexandria and Cairo), 119-21 (the army), 123-35 (the Nile and Damietta).

⁵⁴*Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy*, pp. 139-59 (Jerusalem, Damascus and the Syrian ports), 160-1 (Gallipoli).

⁵⁵*Le voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*; ed. C. Schefer, *Recueil de voyages et de documents pour servir à l'histoire de la géographie*, 12 (Paris, 1892); T. Wright, *Early Travels in Palestine* (London, 1848), pp. 283-382, gives an English translation. See also Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 190-202; R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good: the apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970), pp. 268-73.

⁵⁶*Le voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*, p. 1.

⁵⁷*Le voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*, pp. 2-11 (up to Jerusalem), 27-87 (Syria), 88-115 (Armenia), 115-137 (Asia Minor and the sultan's army at Brusa), 150-67 (Constantinople).

recovery of Jerusalem was a formidable task.⁵⁸ His treatise, and that of Gilbert de Lannoy did not contain the same type of advice on the crusade found in the crusade proposals of the early fourteenth century, and in the work of Emmanuele Piloti. Both simply described the east, but their aim was to provide useful information for prospective crusaders.

There is a possibility that the proposals produced at the Burgundian court had some connection with the earlier proposals. Copies of Hayton's work existed in the ducal library before Philip the Good sent Bertrandon de la Broquière and Gilbert de Lannoy to the east. The dukes clearly knew Hayton's work and it may be that they requested their envoys to produce descriptions of the east and advice on the crusade along similar lines. There is also a possible link between Bertrandon de la Broquière's treatise and the *Directorium*. Two copies of the latter contain Broquière's treatise, along with the advice of the Byzantine envoy, John Torzelo, with Broquière's comments.⁵⁹ Bertrandon de la Broquière wrote the account of his travels some time after his return, at the same time that Miélot was asked to produce a translation of the *Directorium*, although there is no proof that Miélot was involved in the writing of Broquière's work.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, there is a possibility that Broquière had seen the *Directorium* before he wrote his account, although it did not appear to have any influence over the content of his work.

The crusades and proposals of the later period indicate that the influence of the fourteenth century recovery treatises was largely limited to the period in which they were written. The crusades were mostly directed against the Turks and were not aimed at the recovery of the Holy Land, rendering the theorists' advice irrelevant. The literature of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries does not appear to

⁵⁸*Le voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*, pp. 263-74.

⁵⁹Kohler, introduction to the *Directorium*, pp. clxv, clxxi-clxxvi: Brussels, Bibliothèque royale, 9176-7 (Latin), 9095 (French); Paris, Arsenal 4798; Paris, BN Fr. 5593, Fr. 9087.

⁶⁰*Le voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*, pp. vi, lxxv-lxxvi.

have been greatly influenced by the content of the earlier proposals, although there is a strong possibility that Piloti was influenced by Sanudo. Copies of the proposals were usually made through interest in history and geography, rather than concern for the details of their plans. However, the existence of copies at the Burgundian court illustrates that a few of the proposals were still known a century after they were written, and had a continued appeal based on their crusading advice, rather than other material.

CONCLUSION

The proposals written in the period between the fall of Acre and the outbreak of the Hundred Years War have attracted the attention of crusade scholars for several reasons. Standing in stark contrast to a perceived lack of crusading activity and a very real lack of success, they were seen as the defining characteristic of the crusade in this period. Their style and content differs from previous crusading literature, dealing with the practical and military aspects of organising an expedition, rather than questions of theology or justification. Coupled with their sudden appearance in the aftermath of the fall of Acre, this distinctive approach has led them to be viewed as a 'new branch of literature', stimulated by Nicholas IV's call for advice in 1291.¹ Studies on the proposals have tended to treat them as a fairly homogeneous group or genre, and they have also been seen as unique pieces of work. However, their antecedents date to the beginning of the thirteenth century, and proposals were written in the early fifteenth century. In addition, some formed part of a wider body of literature which existed in this period discussing institutions of medieval society, such as the church and the empire, and others included historical material.

The first recovery treatises belong to a tradition of advice given by the inhabitants of the crusader kingdoms to European crusaders. Secular crusaders received such advice when they reached the east, but the involvement of thirteenth century popes in the organisation and direction of crusades brought a demand for advice to be written prior to the departure of a crusade from the west. The precedent for this was set by Innocent III in his preparations for the fourth and fifth crusades, but it was Gregory X who provided the true inspiration for the theorists when he

¹Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 91.

called for written advice to be submitted to the church council of Lyons in 1274. Proposals were written in response to papal requests for advice issued by Nicholas IV and Clement V and are clustered in their pontificates. They were mostly short, concise works focusing on issues upon which the pope requested advice. After the council of Vienne, the role of the papacy in organising crusades diminished and no further proposals survive written at the demand of the pope. French preparations also relied on advice and information, which was given verbally at councils and copied from material in royal archives. A small number of unsolicited treatises were written in this period for the French crown and the papacy, mostly by authors from religious backgrounds. These works were all written at a time when active preparations for a crusade were being made, but they contain an element of exhortation largely absent from earlier works. While they resemble the earlier proposals in their pragmatic approach to the crusade, works such as the *Directorium* and the *De modo sarracenos extirpandi* were much longer and more literary in their style and language. These works served a dual purpose, being intended to offer advice on how a crusade should be conducted, and also to raise the profile of the crusade at the French and papal courts, acting as a reminder to the rulers of Europe of the urgency of launching a crusade.

Marino Sanudo and Ramon Lull were devoted to the promotion of their ideas through literature and personal contacts. Unlike the authors of other unsolicited proposals, their activity continued throughout the period, regardless of whether conditions in Europe were favourable. Lull adopted the style of a proposal for his longer works on the crusade, which combine practical advice on the crusade with his complex arguments on faith. However, much of his promotion was done through petitions to various popes and face to face meetings. The centrepiece of Sanudo's efforts was his lengthy crusade proposal, an advisory work intended to illustrate how a crusade could be successful. However, he too relied on letters and contacts to exhort the crusade, and this correspondence has many similarities with crusade

excitatoria. The works of Dubois and Galvano of Levanto were also aimed at promoting the crusade, but these dealt with issues beyond the crusade. Galvano prefaced his work with a lengthy discussion of government based on the principles of chess. Dubois discussed a range of other matters, including questions of education and law which were intended to be applied to a future kingdom of Jerusalem, but which were equally relevant to Europe. Although it included a plan for a crusade, his proposal continued the strong support for the Capetian monarchy evident in his other pamphlets, and was connected with the body of work of literature arising from the dispute between Philip IV and the papacy. A few of the proposals also contained historical sections, deriving much of their material from earlier chroniclers of the crusades. It is evident that the proposals were not homogeneous in their form and purpose, and this is reflected in their content.

The advice given by the theorists covered most aspects of the crusade. The extent to which a particular proposal dealt with different facets of crusading depended on the interests and attitudes of the author. It is possible to identify their individual interests and distinguish groups of theorists linked by similar concerns, whether over religious issues or questions of strategy. Authors who were involved in military activity against the Mamluks, such as Henry II or the Hospitallers, had a cautious approach to the crusade. They restricted their advice to crusade strategy, and concentrated on the initial phases of the war in the east prior to the general passage. Writers based in the west or with less involvement in military affairs had a far broader view of the crusade, although there are exceptions, such as the bishop of Leon and William of Nogaret. In strategy, they tended to centre their advice on the general passage, but they were also more likely to give attention to the preparations needed for a crusade. Nogaret was unusual in the extent of his knowledge in this field, but others, such as Charles II, the author of the *Memoria* and William Durant also raised issues of finance and recruitment. Interest in spiritual issues was largely confined to authors with religious backgrounds: the prelates William Durant and

William le Maire, and the friars Fidenzio, William Adam and the author of the *Directorium*. The friars were the only authors to hold out the promise of success on the basis of supposed Moslem prophecies, while William Durant gave particular attention to the spiritual preparations required in the west, expressing similar opinions to the church councils of 1291-2.

The details of the advice given in the recovery treatises varied, particularly in the field of strategy. Advice on the preliminary measures to be used against the Mamluks evolved over the period from the ideas of Fidenzio of Padua. He was the first author to suggest an organised naval blockade, a proposal adopted by Ramon Lull and Charles II, who insisted that this was to predate the general passage. From the pontificate of Clement V onwards, these ideas were refined by a number of authors, some of whom favoured a simple naval blockade, while others proposed a full preliminary passage intended to capture and hold land ahead of the main crusade. Advice on other aspects of strategy varied more but did not develop in a coherent way over the period. A number of authors favoured an alliance with the Mongols or other friendly powers in the east, but others ignored this possibility entirely. Adherents and opponents of different routes to the east are found throughout the period, and the use of arguments supporting or attacking the various options suggests that there was much debate on this subject. Other aspects of the crusade were dealt with less fully, and advice was broadly similar. Those authors who discussed sources of finance for the crusade centred their advice on ecclesiastical funds, differing mainly in the range of sources they proposed to draw upon. Suggestions on the motives for crusaders were also similar, while the few authors to discuss spiritual preparations made comparable recommendations.

The theorists' advice drew heavily on earlier practices and in most spheres lacked originality. Those authors who were commenting on subjects about which they knew little often gave more original advice, although this was often impractical.

Charles II's suggestions on fund-raising, which included a tax on commerce, were more novel than those of Nogaret, who drew on his knowledge of existing methods used to raise money from the church. Similarly, Dubois's advice on the pacification of Europe had few precedents. In contrast, advice on recruitment drew on earlier crusading practice, but looked back to the twelfth century, ignoring recent developments in methods of raising troops. Suggestions on spiritual preparations and lists of motives for crusaders were drawn from the content of papal bulls and crusading sermons. Advice on strategy had more originality, particularly in the widespread adoption of a naval blockade and a crusade in several stages, although the concept of using economic warfare against the Mamluks had existed since the twelfth century. In their discussions of crusade strategy, theorists who were based in the east provided information and evaluations of the situation there to explain their proposals. Authors based in the west based their suggestions on previous crusading practices, often using historical examples to illustrate their suggestions.

With the exception of advice on strategy, the theorists' recommendations were superficial, often failing to deal with potential difficulties. This was particularly true of advice on preparations to be made for the crusade, such as recruitment and the pacification of Europe. While they recognised the problem posed by conflict in Europe, few authors offered any concrete suggestions on how to end conflict. Remedies were centred on the papacy, illustrating that theorists failed to recognise the obstacle presented by western monarchs. Theorists rarely viewed the crusade in its wider context, particularly when seeking sources of money to finance a new expedition. The crusade was seen as being of primary importance, and no thought was given to other draws on church finance, or to the very real probability of opposition to plans to plunder the church for funds. Similarly, the question of control and distribution of crusade finance was glossed over. Advice on strategy was more carefully worked out, but was made in a similar spirit of optimism. Theorists were convinced that naval blockades would weaken the

Mamluks in a short space of time, allowing a crusading army to conquer the Holy Land with ease. The poor record of recent crusades was ignored, and the power of the Mamluks underestimated. Authors also failed to appreciate the difficulties of coordinating multiple expeditions and naval forces at such distance, or of sending a large army to the east by land. This optimism was illustrated by authors who offered advice on the maintenance of a future kingdom of Jerusalem.

The impact of the proposals on European crusade plans was minimal, and was limited to advice given on strategy. Few suggestions were made on crusade preparations and these were often based on out-moded ideas, and consequently had no effect on papal or French preparations. Only a few proposals can be shown to have had significant impact on crusade planners. Nicholas IV's measures in 1291-2 indicate that his ideas were based on those of Fidenzio, while Clement V's planned crusade of 1309 drew heavily on the Hospitaller proposal. Generally, Europeans were slow to adopt the idea of a naval blockade, and none favoured the same reliance on economic warfare common to the proposals. Only after the council of Vienne did the idea of a crusade in several stages become widely accepted in Europe, but in a much more defensive style. The existence of a number of copies of proposals indicates that they did circulate during the period, and ideas could also spread through a culture in which there was considerable interest in the crusade. Further copies of some proposals were made in the later fourteenth century and beyond, although usually through interest in historical and geographical material. The advice of the proposals had little impact on the crusades organised in the later part of the fourteenth century, but there is some possibility that they sparked the treatises written in the early fifteenth century at the court of the dukes of Burgundy.

The recovery treatises were linked by their concern for the crusade and provision of advice on how best to organise a new expedition. They included works intended to be purely advisory, along with others which combined advice with

exhortation. They varied in their format and style, and in content. In general, their approach was conservative, drawing heavily on existing features of crusading, and not facing the new situation found in the east, where the Turks were the rising danger. Their existence is both a reflection of interest in the recovery of the Holy Land in European courts and a by-product of attempts to organise an expedition to this end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript sources

London, British Library:

Cotton Otho D V, ff. 1-15.

add. 19513, ff. 67-85.

add. 27376.

Paris, Archives Nationales, J 456, no. 36/2 and 36/2 *bis*.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale:

lat 7470, ff. 123v-129v.

lat 11015, ff. 32-54v.

Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, 1654, ff. 151-162v.

Printed sources

Acta Aragonensia, Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen, zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte: aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II. (1291-1327), ed. H. Finke, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1908-22).

Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio chronicarum*, ed. E. M. Thompson (RS: London, 1869).

Albert of Aix, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', *RHC Occ.* 4, pp. 265-713.

Annales Ecclesiastici ab anno 1198 usque ad annum 1565, ed. O. Raynaldus *et al.* (Lucca, 1738-59).

Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis: Imperium Constantinopolitanum, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Ruthenia, Ungaria, Polonia, Bohemia, anno MCCCVIII exarata, ed. O. Górka (Cracow, 1916).

Baldric of Dol, 'Historia Jerosolimitana', *RHC Occ.* 4, pp. 1-111.

Bartholomew Cotton, *Historia Angliana: necnon ejusdem Liber de Archiepiscopis et episcopis Angliae*, ed. H. R. Luard (RS: London, 1859).

Benedict XI, *Les Registres de Benoît XI*, ed. C. Grandjean (Paris, 1883-1905).

Bertrandon de la Broquière, *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière*, ed. C. Schefer, Recueil des voyages et de documents pour servir à l'histoire de la géographie, 12 (Paris, 1892).

Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente francescano, ed. G. Golubovich, 5 vols. (Quaracchi, 1906-27).

Boniface VIII, *Les Registres de Boniface VIII*, ed. G. Digard *et al.*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1884-1935).

Bruno of Olmütz, 'Relatio de statu ecclesiae in regno alemaniae', *MGH Legum sectio IV: Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum* 3, ed. J. Schwalm (Hannover, 1904-6), no. 620, pp. 589-94.

Burchard of Mount-Sion, *Description of the Holy Land* (PPTS 30: London, 1896).

Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St Jean de Jérusalem 1100-1310, ed. J. Delaville le Roulx, 4 vols. (Paris, 1894-1906).

La Chanson d'Antioche: Edition du texte d'après la version ancienne, ed. S. Duparc-Quioc, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 11, 2 vols. (Paris, 1976-8).

Charles II of Anjou, 'Le Conseil du Roi Charles', ed. G. I. Bratianu, *RHSE* 19 (1942), pp. 353-61.

'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', ed. G. Waitz, *MGH SRG* 7.18 (Hannover, 1880).

Chronique d'Ernoult et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871).

'Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean du Vignay', *RHGF* 23, pp. 1-106.

Clement V, *Regestum Clementis Papae V, editum cura et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti*, 8 vols. (Rome, 1885-92).

Councils and Synods with other Documents relating to the English Church, vol. 2, ed. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford, 1964).

- 'La devise des chemins de Babiloine', in *Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions de la Terre Sainte*, ed. H. Michelant and G. Raynaud (Paris, 1882; reprinted Osnabrück, 1966), pp. 239-52.
- 'Dépenses de saint Louis de MCCL a MCCLIII', *RHGF* 21, pp. 515-17.
- Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum sive acta et diplomata res Venetas Graecas atque Levantinas illustrantia, 1300-1451*, ed. G. M. Thomas, vol. 1 (Venice, 1880).
- 'Directorium ad passagium faciendum', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 367-517.
- Los documentos árabes diplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. and tr. M. A. Alarcón y Santón and R. García de Linares (Madrid, 1940).
- Emmanuele Piloti, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, ed. P.-H. Dopp, Publications de l'Université Lovanium de Léopoldville (Louvain/Paris, 1958).
- Epistolari de la València Medieval*, ed. A. Rubio Vela, Institut de Filologia Valenciana (València, 1985).
- 'L'estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer', *RHC Occ.* 2, pp. 1-481.
- 'Li estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche', *RHC Occ.* 5, pp. 621-48.
- 'Ex itinerario peregrinorum auctore Ricardo Londoniensi', *MGH SS* 27, pp. 191-219.
- Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis Terrae Sanctae', *Golubovich* 2, pp. 9-60.
- Flores Historiarum*, ed. H. R. Luard, vol. 3 (RS: London, 1890).
- Fulcher of Chartes, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', *RHC Occ.* 3, pp. 311-485.
- Fulk of Villaret, 'Hec est informatio et instructio nostri magistri Hospitalis super faciendo generali passagio pro recuperatione Terre Sancte', ed. J. Petit as 'Mémoire de Foulques de Villaret sur la croisade', *BEC* 9 (1899), pp. 603-10.
- Galvano of Levanto, 'Liber sancti passagii Christicolarum contra Saracenos pro recuperatione Terrae Sanctae', ed. C. Kohler as 'Traité du recouvrement de la Terre Sainte adressé, vers l'an 1295, à Philippe le Bel par Galvano de Levanto, médecin génois', *ROL* 6 (1898), pp. 364-9.
- Gaufrido de Belloloco, 'Vita Sancti Ludovici', *RHGF* 20, pp. 1-27.
- Geoffrey le Baker, *Chronicon*, ed. E. M. Thompson (RS: London, 1889).

- Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and tr. E. Faral, 2 vols., 2nd edn. (Paris, 1961).
- Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. and tr. R. M. T. Hill (Oxford, 1962).
- 'Gesta sancti Ludovici noni auctore monacho Sancti Dionysii anonymo', *RHGF* 20, pp. 45-57.
- 'Les gestes des chiprois', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 653-872.
- Gilbert de Lannoy, *Oeuvres de Ghillebert de Lannoy: voyageur, diplomate et moraliste*, ed. C. Potvin, with notes by J.-C. Houzeau (Louvain, 1878).
- Gilbert of Tournai, 'Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae', ed. A. Stroick, *Archivum Franciscum Historicum* 24 (1931), pp. 35-62.
- Gregory X, *Les Registres de Grégoire X*, ed. J. Guiraud (Paris, 1892-1906).
- Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', *RHC Occ.* 4, pp. 113-263.
- Gunther of Pairis, 'Historia captae a Latinis Constantinopoleos', Migne *PL* 212, cols. 221-56.
- Hayton, 'Flos historiarum terre orientis', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 113-253 (French), 255-363 (Latin).
- Henry II of Cyprus, 'Consilium', ed. M. L. de Mas-Latrie in *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 2, pp. 118-25.
- 'Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris', ed. A. Choust, *MGH SRG* 5 (Berlin, 1928), 1-115.
- Humbert of Romans, 'Opus tripartitum', in E. Brown, *Appendix ad Fasciculum Rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum* (London, 1690).
- Ibn Battuta, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, tr. H. A. R. Gibb, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1958).
- 'Informationes Massilie pro passagio transmarino', ed. A. de Boislisle as 'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon (1316-1333)', (*Extrait de l'Annuaire*) *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France* (1872), pp. 246-55.
- Innocent IV, *Apparatus preclarissima iuris canonici illuminatoris domini Innocentii pape III. super .v. li[bris] decre[talium] et super decretalibus per eundem domini Innocentii editis*, ed. D. Thomas (Lyons, 1525).
- 'Itinerarium cuiusdam Anglici (1344-45)', *Golubovich* 4, pp. 435-60.

- 'Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi', ed. W. Stubbs in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (RS: London, 1864).
- James Doria, 'Iacobi Auriæ annales a. 1280-1294', *MGH SS* 18 (Hannover, 1863), pp. 288-356.
- James I of Aragon, *The Chronicle of James I of Aragon, surnamed the Conqueror (written by himself)*, tr. J. Forster and P. de Gayangos, 2 vols. (London, 1883).
- James of Molay, 'Consilium super negotio Terre Sancte', in *Vitae Papatum Avenionensium*, ed. E. Baluze, vol. 3 (Paris, 1693); edition ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914-27), pp. 145-9.
- 'Consilium super unione ordinum, videlicet Templariorum et Hospitaliariorum', in *Vitae Papatum Avenionensium*, vol. 3, pp. 150-4.
- James of Vitry, *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960).
- *La Traduction de l'Historia Orientalis de Jacques de Vitry*, ed. C. Buridant (Paris, 1986).
- Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce, 14 vols. (Paris, 1869-1966).
- John XXII, *Lettres communes du pape Jean XXII d'après les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. G. Mollat, 16 vols. (Paris, 1904-47).
- *Lettres Secrètes et Curiales du Pape Jean XXII (1316-1334) relatives à France*, ed. A. Coulon, 3 vols. (Paris, 1901-72).
- John Bromyard, *Summa Praedicatorum omni eruditione refertissima explicans praecipuos catholicae disciplinae sensus, et locus*, 2 vols. (Venice, 1586).
- John Mandeville, *Mandeville's Travels*, ed. M. C. Seymour (Oxford, 1967).
- John of Joinville, *La Vie de Saint Louis, le témoignage de Jehan, seigneur de Joinville*, ed. N. L. Corbett (Sherbrooke, 1977).
- John of Plan Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', ed. C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission* (London, 1955), pp. 3-72.
- John of Thilrode, 'Chronicon', *MGH SS* 25, pp. 557-84.
- Layettes du Trésor des Chartes. Inventaires et documents publiés par la Direction des Archives*, ed. J. Teulet and J. de Laborde, 5 vols. (Paris, 1863-1909).
- Ludolph of Suheim, *Description of the Holy Land and of the Way Thither*, tr. A. Stewart (PPTS 27: London, 1895).

- Marco Polo, *The Travels*, tr. R. Latham (London, 1958).
- Marino Sanudo Torsello, 'Istoria del Regno di Romania sive Regno di Morea', ed. C. Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes* (Berlin, 1873).
- 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', in *Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium expeditionum, et regni Francorum Hierosolimitani historia a variis, sed illius aevi scriptoribus, litteris commenata*, ed. J. Bongars, vol. 2 (Hannover, 1611), pp. 1-288; reprinted with an introduction by J. Prawer (Jerusalem, 1973).
- Letters, ed. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, pp. 289-316.
- Matthew Paris, *Chronica Maiora*, ed. H. R. Luard, 6 vols. (RS: London, 1872-83).
- 'Memoria Terre Sancte', ed. C. Kohler in 'Deux projets de croisade en Terre Sainte', *ROL* 10 (1903-4), pp. 435-57.
- Nicholas IV, *Les Registres de Nicolas IV*, ed. E. Langlois (Paris, 1886-93).
- Niketas Choniates, *O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates*, tr. H. J. Magoulis (Detroit, 1984).
- Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. and tr. V. G. Berry (New York, 1948).
- Oliver of Paderborn, *The Capture of Damietta*, tr. J. J. Gavigan (Philadelphia, 1948).
- Otto of Freising, *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa by Otto of Freising and his continuator, Rahewin*, tr. C. C. Mierow (New York, 1953).
- Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, ed. H. Finke, 2 vols. (Münster-i.-W., 1907).
- Peter of Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere*, ed. J. H. and L. L. Hill (Paris, 1977).
- Petrus Alfonsi, 'Dialogus Petri cognomento Alphonsi, ex Judaeo Christiani et Moysi Judaei', Migne *PL* 157, cols. 555-672.
- Philip of Mézières, *Letter to King Richard II: a plea made in 1395 for peace between England and France*, ed. G. W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1975).
- *Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin*, ed. G. W. Coopland, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1969).
- Pierre Dubois, 'De facto Templariorum', ed. E. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques*, 20 (1862), part 2, pp. 180-1.

- *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, ed. C. V. Langlois (Paris, 1891); ed. and tr. W. Brandt as *The Recovery of the Holy Land by Pierre Dubois* (New York, 1956); also edited as *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte: dalla "Respublica Christiana" ai primi nazionalismi e alla politica antimediterranea*, ed. A. Diotti, Testi Medievali di interesse Dantesco 1 (Firenze, 1977).
 - 'Opinio cujusdam suadentis regi Franciae ut regnum Jerosolimitanum et Cipri acquireret pro altero filiorum suorum, ac de invasione Egipti', ed. Langlois, *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, pp. 130-40; ed. and tr. Brandt, *The Recovery of the Holy Land by Pierre Dubois*, pp. 199-207.
 - 'Pro facto Terre Sancte', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 186-9.
 - 'Remonstrance du peuple de France', ed. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits*, pp. 175-9.
- Ramon Lull, 'Epistola summo pontifici Nicolao IV pro recuperatione Terrae Sanctae', ed. J. Rambaud-Buhot, in *Beati Magistri R. Lulli opera latina*, vol. 3 (Palma de Mallorca, 1954), pp. 96-8.
- 'Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae', ed. P. Longpré as 'Le Liber de Acquisitione Terrae Sanctae du bienheureux Raymond Lulle', *Criterion* 3 (1927) pp. 265-78.
 - 'Liber de fine', ed. A. Madre, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 9, CCCM 35 (1981), pp. 250-91.
 - 'Liber natalis pueri parvuli christi iesu', ed. H. Harada, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 7, CCCM 32 (1975), pp. 19-73.
 - 'Petitio Raymundi in concilio generali ad acquirendam terram sanctam', ed. H. Wieruszowski in 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu: Quelques nouveaux écrits sur la Croisade', *Estudis Franciscains* 47 (1935), pp. 104-9.
 - 'Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium', ed. Wieruszowski, 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu', pp. 100-3.
 - 'Petitio Raymundi (pro conversione infidelium) ad Coelestinum V', Golubovich 1, pp. 373-5.
 - 'Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles', ed. J. Rambaud-Buhot, *Beati Magistri R. Lulli opera latina*, pp. 99-112.
 - 'Vita coaetanea', ed. H. Harada, *Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina* 8, CCCM 34 (1980), pp. 271-309.
- Raymond of Aguilers, 'Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem', *RHC Occ.* 3, pp. 231-305.

Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum 1198 ad annum 1304, ed. A. Potthast, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1874-5).

Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (1097-1291), ed. R. Röhricht, 2 vols. (Innsbruck, 1893-1904).

'Relatio nuntiorum regis franciae', *MGH Legum Sectio IV: Constitutiones et Acta Publica* 3, no. 618, pp. 585-8.

Ricoldo of Monte Croce, 'Epistolae V commentariae de perditione Acconis 1291', ed. R. Röhricht, *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 258-96.

Robert of Clari, *The Conquest of Constantinople*, tr. E. H. McNeal (New York, 1936).

Robert of Rheims, 'Historia Iherosolimitana', *RHC Occ.* 3, pp. 721-882.

Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs (RS: London, 1870).

Sacrosancta concilia, ed. P. Labbei and G. Cossart, 21 vols. (Venice, 1728-33).

Sempad, 'Chronique du royaume de la petite Arménie', *RHC Arm.* 1, pp. 610-72.

Stephen of Blois, 'Epistolae Stephani comitis carnotensis', *RHC Occ.* 3, pp. 885-90.

Traité de Paix et de Commerce et documents diverses concernant les Relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique Septentrionale au Moyen Age, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1866).

'Tractatus dudum habitus ultra mare per magistrum et conventum Hospitalis et per alios probos viros qui diu steterunt ultra mare: qualiter Terra Sancta possit per Christianos recuperari', ed. B. Z. Kedar and S. Schein as 'Un projet de passage particulier proposé par l'ordre de l'Hôpital 1306-1307', *BEC* 137 (1979), pp. 211-26.

'Via ad Terram Sanctam', ed. C. Kohler in 'Deux projets de croisades en Terre Sainte', pp. 425-34.

William Adam, 'De modo sarracenos extirpandi', *RHC Arm.* 2, pp. 521-55.

William Durant, 'Informatio brevis super hiis que viderentur ex nunc fore providenda quantum ad passagium, divina favente gracia, faciendum', ed. G. Dürrholder in *Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann XXII 1316-1334* (Strasbourg, 1913), pp. 104-10.

William of Machaut, *La Prise d'Alexandrie ou Chronique du Roi Pierre 1er de Lusignan*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Genève, 1877).

William le Maire, 'Livre de Guillaume le Maire', ed. C. Port, *Mélanges Historiques: choix de documents*, vol. 2, *Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1877), pp. 187-569.

William of Nangis, 'Chronicon', *RHGF* 20, pp. 543-82.

— 'Gesta sanctae memoriae Ludovici regis Franciae', *RHGF* 20, pp. 312-465.

William of Nogaret, 'Quae sunt advertenda pro passagio ultramarino et que sunt petenda a papa pro persecutione negocii', in 'Notices et extraits des documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de France sous Philippe le Bel', ed. E. P. Boutaric, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale* 20 (1862), pp. 199-205.

William of Tripoli, 'Tractatus de statu saracenorum', ed. H. Prutz in id., *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1883), pp. 573-98.

William of Tyre, 'Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum', *RHC Occ* 1.

2. SECONDARY WORKS

Abulafia, D., 'Asia, Africa and the trade of medieval Europe', *Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the decline of the Roman Empire*, vol. 2, 2nd edn., ed. M. M. Postan and E. Miller (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 402-73.

— *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200-1500: the struggle for dominion* (London, 1997).

Amargier, P., 'La défense du Temple devant le concile de Lyon en 1274', in *1274, Année Charnière: mutations et continuités*, Lyon-Paris 30 septembre - 5 octobre 1974, Colloques internationaux du centre national de la recherche scientifique n. 558 (Paris, 1977).

Amitai-Preiss, R., *Mongols and Mamluks: the Mamluk-Ilkhanid War 1260-1281* (Cambridge, 1995).

Arié, R., *L'Espagne Musulmane au temps des Nasrids (1232-1492)* (Paris, 1973).

Ashtor, E., 'Economic decline in the medieval middle east', in id. *Technology, Industry and Trade* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992); first published in *Asian and African Studies* 15 (1981), pp. 253-86.

— *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983).

- Atiya, A. S., 'The crusade in the fourteenth century', *Setton* 3, pp. 3-26.
- *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938).
- *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934).
- *Egypt and Aragon: Embassies and Diplomatic Correspondence between 1300 and 1330 AD* (Leipzig, 1938).
- Ayalon, D., 'Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army', in id. *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt* (Variorum reprint: London, 1977); first published in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 15 (1953), pp. 203-28, 448-76; 16 (1954), pp. 59-90.
- Balard, M., 'Chypre, les republiques maritimes italiennes et les plans de croisade (1274-1370)', in *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 97-106.
- *La Romanie Génoise*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1978).
- Baldwin, M. W., 'The Latin States under Baldwin III and Amalric I', *Setton* 1, pp. 528-61.
- Barber, M., 'James of Molay, the last Grand Master of the Templars', *Studia Monastica* 14 (1972), pp. 91-124.
- *The New Knighthood* (Cambridge, 1994).
- 'The Pastoureaux of 1320', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32 (1981), pp. 143-66.
- *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978).
- Bartholomaeis, V. de, *Poesie Provenziali Storiche relative all'Italia*, vol. 2, *Fonti per la storia d'Italia, scrittori secoli XII-XIII*, 72 (Rome, 1931).
- Bastard, A. de, 'La colère et la douleur d'un templier en Terre Sainte (1265): «Ir'e dolors s'es dins mon cor asseza»', *Revue des Langues Romanes* 81 (1974), pp. 333-73.
- Bautier, R.-H., 'Diplomatique et histoire politique: ce que la critique diplomatique nous apprend sur la personnalité de Philippe le Bel', *Revue Historique* 259 (1978), pp. 3-29.
- Beazley, C. R., 'Directorium ad Faciendum Passagium Transmarinum', *American Historical Review* 12 (1905-6), pp. 810-57; 13 (1907-8), pp. 66-115.
- Belgrano, L. T., 'Une charte de nolis de s. Louis', *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 231-6.

- Berger, É., *Saint Louis et Innocent IV: Etude sur les rapports de la France et de Saint-Siège* (Paris, 1893; reprinted Geneva, 1974).
- Bishko, C. J., 'The Spanish and Portuguese reconquest, 1095-1492', *Setton* 3, pp. 396-456.
- Boase, T. S. R. (ed.), *Boniface VIII* (London, 1933).
- *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh, 1978).
- 'The History of the Kingdom', in id. *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, pp. 1-33.
- Boutaric, E., 'Ce sont les diligences que li Roys a faite pour le Saint Voyage', *Revue des Sociétés Savantes des Départements* 4th ser. 5 (1867), pp. 434-6.
- Boyle, J. A., 'The Il-khans of Persia and the princes of Europe', *Central Asiatic Journal* 20 (1976), pp. 25-40.
- 'The journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the court of the Great Khan Möngke', *Central Asiatic Journal* 9 (1964), pp. 175-89.
- Brandt, W. I., 'Pierre Dubois: modern or medieval?', *American Historical Review* 35 (1930), pp. 507-21.
- Bratianu, G. I., 'Autour du projet de croisade de Nicolas IV: la guerre ou le commerce avec l'infidèle', *RHSE* 22 (1945), pp. 250-5.
- 'Le conseil du Roi Charles: essai sur l'internationale Chrétienne et les nationalités à la fin du Moyen Âge', *RHSE* 19 (1942), 291-361.
- Bréhier, L., *L'Eglise et l'Orient au Moyen Âge: les croisades*, 5th edn. (Paris, 1928).
- Brett, E. T., *Humbert of Romans: His Life and Views of Thirteenth-Century Society* (Toronto, 1984).
- Brundage, J. A., *Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe* (Chicago, 1987).
- *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (London, 1969).
- Burns, R. I., *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the crusader kingdom of Valencia: societies in symbiosis* (Cambridge, 1984).
- Burton, J., *Monastic and Religious Orders in Britain 1000-1300* (Cambridge, 1994).
- Cahen, C., *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, tr. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968).

— 'The Turks in Iran and Anatolia before the Mongol invasions', *Setton* 2, pp. 661-92.

The Cambridge History of Political Thought, c. 350-c. 1450, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1988).

Cardini, F., 'I costi della crociata. L'aspetto economico del progetto di Marin Sanudo il Vecchio (1312-1321)', in *Studi in Memoria di Federico Melis*, vol. 2 (Naples, 1978), pp. 179-210.

Cerlini, A., 'Nuove lettere di Marino Sanudo il vecchio', *La Bibliofilia* 42 (1940), pp. 321-59.

Chabot, J. B., 'Notes sur les relations du Roi Argoun avec l'occident', *ROL* 2 (1894), pp. 566-629.

Chamberlin, C. L., ' "Not all Martyrs or Saints": the Aragonese-Castilian crusade against Granada, 1309-1310', *Comitatus* 23 (1992), pp. 17-45.

Cohn, N., *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary millenarians and mystical anarchists of the middle ages*, 3rd edn. (London, 1970).

Constable, G., 'The second crusade as seen by contemporaries', *Traditio* 9 (1953), pp. 213-81.

Coureas, N. and Riley-Smith, J. S. C. (eds), *Cyprus and the Crusades* (Nicosia, 1995).

Cowdrey, H. E. J., 'The Peace and Truce of God in the eleventh century', *Past and Present* 46 (1970), pp. 42-67.

Daniel, N., *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 2nd edn. (Edinburgh, 1979).

— *Islam and the West: the making of an Image* (Edinburgh, 1960).

Defourneaux, M., *Les Français en Espagne aux XIe et XIIe Siècles* (Paris, 1949).

Delaborde, H. F., 'Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre-Sainte à Charles d'Anjou', *ROL* 2 (1894), pp. 206-15.

Delaville le Roulx, J., *La France en Orient au XIVe siècle: expéditions du maréchal Boucicaud*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886).

— *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu'à la mort de Philippe de Naillac (1310-1421)* (Paris, 1913).

Der Nersessian, S., 'The Armenian Chronicle of the Constable Smpad or of the "Royal Historian" ', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13 (1959), pp. 141-68.

- 'The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia', *Setton* 2, pp. 630-60.
- Desimoni, C., 'Actes passés à Famagouste de 1299 à 1301 par devant le notaire Génois Lamberto di Sambuceto', *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 1-120.
- Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclesiastique* (Paris, 1951-).
- Digard, G., *Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siège de 1285 à 1304*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1936).
- Dorez, L. and de la Roncière, C., 'Lettres inédits et mémoires de Marino Sanudo l'Ancien, 1334-1337', *BEC* 56 (1895), pp. 21-44.
- Dufourcq, C.-E., *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles* (Paris, 1966).
- Durham, T., *Serbia, the Rise and Fall of a Medieval Empire* (York, 1989).
- Edbury, P. W., 'The crusading policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369', in *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades*, ed. P. M. Holt (Warminster, 1977), pp. 90-105.
- *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991).
- Ehrenkreutz, A., 'Strategic implications of the slave trade between Genoa and Mamluk Egypt in the second half of the thirteenth century', in *The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: studies in economic and social history*, ed. A. L. Udovitch (Princeton, 1981), pp. 335-45.
- Ehrle, F., *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum tum Bonifationae tum Avenionensis*, vol. 1 (Vatican, 1890).
- Fasolt, C., *Council and Hierarchy: the political thought of William Durant the Younger* (Cambridge, 1991).
- Ferrer i Mallol, M. T., *La Frontera amb l'Islam en el Segle XIV: Cristians i Sarrains al País Valencià* (Barcelona, 1988).
- Forey, A. J., 'Cyprus as a base for crusading expeditions from the west', in *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 69-79.
- *The Military Orders* (London, 1992).
- 'The military orders in the crusading proposals of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries', *Traditio* 36 (1980), pp. 317-45.
- 'The Order of Mountjoy', *Speculum* 46 (1971), pp. 250-66.

- *The Templars in the Corona de Aragón* (London, 1973).
- France, J., *Victory in the East* (Cambridge, 1994).
- Geanakoplos, D. J., 'Byzantium and the crusades, 1261-1354', *Setton* 3, pp. 27-60.
- *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
- Gill, J., *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400* (New Brunswick, 1979).
- *Constance et Bâle-Florence*, *Histoire des conciles oecuméniques* 9 (Paris, 1965).
- Hazard, H. W., 'Moslem North Africa', *Setton* 3, pp. 457-85.
- Heyd, W., *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge*, tr. F. Reynaud (Amsterdam, 1967).
- Hillgarth, J. N., *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1971).
- Housley, N., *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades 1305-1378* (Oxford, 1986).
- 'Charles II of Naples and the Kingdom of Jerusalem', *Byzantion* 54 (1984), pp. 527-35.
- 'The crusade movement 1274-1700', *Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, ed. J. Riley-Smith (Oxford, 1995), pp. 260-93.
- 'Cyprus and the crusades 1291-1571', in *Cyprus and the Crusades*, pp. 187-206.
- 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations of 1322', *Papers of the British School in Rome* 48 (1980), pp. 166-85.
- *The Italian Crusades: the Papal-Angevin alliance and the crusades against Christian lay powers, 1254-1343* (Oxford, 1982).
- *The Later Crusades: from Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580* (Oxford, 1992).
- 'The mercenary companies, the papacy and the crusades, 1356-1378', *Traditio* 38 (1982), pp. 253-80.
- 'Pope Clement V and the crusades of 1309-10', *Journal of Medieval History* 8 (1982), pp. 29-43.
- Iorga, N., 'Encore un traité de croisade (1308): ses renseignements sur l'Europe orientale', *Bulletin de l'Institut pour l'Etude de l'Europe sud-orientale* (1921), pp. 59-64.

- *Philippe de Mézières 1327-1405, et la Croisade au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1896).
- 'Un projet relatif à la conquête de Jerusalem, 1609', *ROL* 2 (1874), pp. 183-9.
- Irwin, R., 'How many miles to Babylon? The *Devise des Chemins de Babiloine* redated', in *The Military Orders*, ed. M. Barber (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 57-63.
- Jackson, P., 'The crisis in the Holy Land in 1260', *EHR* 95 (1980), pp. 481-513.
- Jacoby, D., 'The rise of a new emporium in the eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the late thirteenth century', in id. *Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion* (Variorum reprint: Northampton, 1989); first published in *Meletai kai hypomnemata, Hidryma archiepiskopov Makariou III*, 1 (Nicosia, 1984), pp. 145-79.
- Johnson, E. N., 'The crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI', *Setton* 2, pp. 87-122.
- Johnston, M. D., 'Ramon Llull and the compulsory evangelisation of Jews and Muslims', *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages. Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns S. J.*, ed. L. J. Simon (Leiden, 1995), pp. 3-37.
- Jordan, W. C., *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade* (Princeton, 1979).
- Kahl, H-D, 'Crusade eschatology as seen by St Bernard in the years 1146 to 1148', in *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, ed. M. Gervers (New York, 1992), pp. 35-47.
- Kedar, B. Z., *Crusade and Mission: European attitudes toward the Muslims* (Princeton, 1984).
- Keen, M., 'Chaucer's Knight, the English aristocracy and the crusade', in *English Court Culture in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. V. J. Scattergood and J. W. Sherborne (London, 1983), pp. 45-62.
- Kohler, C., 'Deux projets de croisade en Terre Sainte', *ROL* 10 (1903-4), pp. 406-57.
- 'Documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam, archevêque de Sultanieh, puis d'Antivari et à son entourage (1318-1346)', *ROL* 10 (1903-4), pp. 16-56.
- 'Quel est l'auteur du *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum?*', *ROL* 12 (1911), pp. 104-11.
- Kohler, C. and Langlois, C. V., 'Lettres inédits concernant les croisades (1275-1307)', *BEC* 52 (1891), pp. 46-53.
- Kritzeck, J., *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (Princeton, 1964).

- Kunstmann, F., 'Studien über Marino Sanudo den Aelteren', *Abhandlungen der Historische Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 7 (1853), pp. 695-819.
- Laiou, A., *Constantinople and the Latins: the foreign policy of Andronicus II 1282-1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).
- 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks, the background to the Antitürkish League of 1332-1334', *Speculum* 45 (1970), pp. 374-93.
- La Monte, J. L., *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932).
- Lang, D. M., *The Bulgarians* (London, 1976).
- Lemerle, P., *L'Emirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'occident: Recherches sur 'La Geste d'Umur Pacha'* (Paris, 1957).
- Léonard, É. G., *Les Angevins de Naples* (Paris, 1954).
- Le Strange, G., *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890).
- Lewis, A. R., 'Les marchands dans l'Océan indien', in *The Sea and Medieval Civilisations* (Variorum reprint: London, 1978); first published in *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 56 (1976), pp. 441-75.
- 'Maritime skills in the Indian Ocean, 1368-1500', in id. *The Sea and Medieval Civilisations*; first published in *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 16 (1973), pp. 238-64.
- Lloyd, S., *English Society and the Crusade 1216-1307* (Oxford, 1988).
- 'The Lord Edward's crusade, 1270-2: its setting and significance', in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gillingham & J. C. Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 120-33.
- Lombard, M., 'Arsenaux et bois de marine dans la Méditerranée musulmane VIIe-XIe siècles', in id. *Espaces et réseaux du haut moyen âge* (Paris 1972), pp. 107-51.
- Lunt, W. E., *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327*, 2 vols (Cambridge, Mass., 1937).
- *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1934).
- *The Valuation of Norwich* (Oxford, 1926).
- Luttrell, A., 'The crusade in the fourteenth century', in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J. R. Hale, J. R. L. Highfield, R. Smalley (London, 1965), pp. 122-54.

- 'Emmanuele Piloti and criticism of the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes, 1306-1444', in id. *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291-1444* (Variorum reprint: London, 1978), pp. 1-20; first published in *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte* 20 (1962), pp. 11-17.
 - 'Greek histories translated and copied for Juan Fernández de Heredia, Master of Rhodes: 1377-1396', *Speculum* 35 (1960), pp. 401-7.
 - 'The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306-1421', *Setton* 3, pp. 278-313.
 - 'The Hospitallers' historical activities, 1291-1400', in *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West*, pp. 1-10; first published in *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte* 24 (1966), pp. 126-9.
 - 'The Hospitallers' interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1295-1375', in Boase, *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, pp. 118-44.
 - 'Notes on Foulques de Villaret, Master of the Hospital, 1305-1319', in id. *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992); first published in *Guillaume de Villaret 1er Recteur du Comtat Venaissin 1274 Grand Maître de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem, Chypre 1296* (Paris: Conseil International de la Langue Française, 1985), pp. 73-90.
- Magnocavallo, A., *Marin Sanudo il Vecchio e il suo progetto di crociata* (Bergamo, 1901).
- Maier, C. T., *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant friars and the cross in the early thirteenth century* (Cambridge, 1994).
- Marshall, C., *Warfare in the Latin East 1192-1291* (Cambridge, 1992).
- Martín, J. C., *Origenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170-1195)* (Barcelona, 1974).
- Martínez-Ferrando, J. E., *Jaime II de Aragón: su vida familiar*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1948).
- Mas-Latrie, M. L. de, *Histoire de l'Île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1852-61).
- 'L'Officium Robarie ou l'office de la piraterie à Gênes au moyen age', *BEC* 53 (1892), pp. 264-72.
- Masiá de Ros, Á., *La Corona de Aragón y los Estados del Norte de África: Política de Jaime II y Alfonso IV en Egipto, Ifriquiá y Tremecén* (Barcelona, 1951).

- Mayer, H. E., 'Henry II of England and the Holy Land', *EHR* 97 (1982), pp. 721-39.
- McGinn, B., *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1979).
- Meyvaert, P., 'An unknown letter of Hulagu, Il-khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France', *Viator* 11 (1980), pp. 245-60.
- Mollat, M., 'Problèmes navals de l'histoire des croisades', *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale* 10 (1967), pp. 345-59.
- Morgan, D. O., 'The Mongols in Syria, 1261-1300', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 231-5.
- Muldoon, J., *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels* (Liverpool, 1979).
- Nef, J. E., 'Mining and Metallurgy in medieval civilisation', *Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the decline of the Roman Empire*, vol. 2, pp. 693-791.
- Nicholson, H., *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders 1128-1291* (London, 1993).
- Obolensky, D., *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (New York, 1971).
- Omont, H., 'Guillaume Adam, missionnaire', *HLitt* 35 (1921), pp. 277-84.
- Owst, G. R., *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1966).
- Painter, S., 'The crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, 1239-1241', *Setton* 2, pp. 463-85.
- 'The third crusade: Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus', *Setton* 2, pp. 45-85.
- Pall, F., 'Les croisades en orient au bas moyen âge: observations critique sur l'ouvrage de M. Atiya', *RHSE* 19 (1942), pp. 527-83.
- Palmer, J. J. N., *England, France and Christendom, 1377-99* (London, 1972).
- Pamlényi, E. (ed.), *A History of Hungary* (London, 1973).
- Petit, J., *Charles de Valois* (Paris, 1900).
- Phillips, J., *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West 1119-1187* (Oxford, 1996).
- Powell, J., *The Anatomy of a Crusade 1213-1221* (Philadelphia, 1986).

- Prütz, H., *Entwicklung und Untergang des Tempelherrenordens* (Berlin, 1888).
- Pryor, J. H., *Geography, Technology and War* (Cambridge, 1988).
- 'Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the crusades', *Mariners' Mirror* 68 (1982) pp. 9-30, 103-25.
- Purcell, M., *Papal Crusading Policy 1244-1291* (Leiden, 1975).
- Queller, D. E., *The Fourth Crusade* (Leicester, 1978).
- Renan, E., 'Guillaume Nogaret, légiste', *HLitt* 27 (1877), pp. 233-371.
- Renouard, Y., 'L'exportation de chevaux de la péninsule Ibérique en France et en Angleterre au Moyen Age', in *Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives*, ed. J. Maluquer de Motes, vol. 1 (Barcelona, 1965), pp. 571-7.
- Richard, J., 'Une ambassade mongole à Paris en 1262', *Journal des Savants* (1979), pp. 295-303.
- 'Chrétiens et Mongols au concile: la Papauté et les Mongols de Perse dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle', in 1274, *Année Charnière: mutations et continuités*, pp. 31-44.
- 'Une économie coloniale? Chypre et ses ressources agricoles au Moyen-Age', in *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs* (Variorum reprint: London, 1983); first published in *Byzantinische Forschungen* 7 (1979), pp. 331-52.
- 'Les navigations des Occidentaux sur l'Océan Indien et la mer Caspienne (XIIe-XVe siècles)' in id. *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XIIe-XVe)* (Variorum reprint: London, 1976); first published in *Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en orient* (Paris, 1970), pp. 353-63.
- 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIIIe-début XIVe siècle)', in *Croisades et Etats latins d'Orient* (Variorum reprint: Aldershot, 1992), pp. 120-34.
- 'Le transport outre-mer des croisés et des pèlerins (XIIe-XVe siècles)', in id. *Croisades et Etats latins d'Orient*, pp. 27-44.
- Riley-Smith, J. S. C., *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia, 1986).
- *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c. 1050-1310* (London, 1967).
- Riley-Smith, J. & L., *The Crusades, Idea and Reality 1095-1274* (London, 1981).

- Rivière, J., *Le Problème de l'Eglise et de l'Etat au temps de Philippe le Bel* (Paris, 1926).
- Röhricht, R., 'Etudes sur les derniers temps du royaume de Jérusalem', *AOL* 1 (1881), pp. 617-52; 2 (1884), pp. 365-409.
- 'Le pèlerinage du moine augustin Jacques de Vérone', *ROL* 3 (1895), pp. 155-302.
- Roncière, C. de la, 'Une escadre franco-papale', *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 13 (1893), pp. 397-418.
- Rowe, J. G., 'Paschal II and the relation between the spiritual and temporal powers in the kingdom of Jerusalem', *Speculum* 32 (1957), pp. 471-501.
- Runciman, S., 'The crusader states, 1243-1291', *Setton* 2, pp. 557-98.
- Russell, F. H., *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975).
- Salavert y Roca, V., *Cerdeña y la expansión Mediterránea de la corona de Aragón 1297-1314* (Madrid, 1956).
- Samaran, C., 'Projets français de croisades de Philippe le Bel à Philippe de Valois', in *HLitt* 41 (1981), pp. 33-74.
- Sayous, A.-E., 'Les mandats de Sainte Louis sur son trésor et le mouvement international des capitaux pendant la septième croisade (1248-1254)', *Revue Historique* 167 (1931), pp. 254-304.
- Schefer, C., 'La discours du voyage d'outremer au très victorieux roi Charles VII, prononcé, en 1452, par Jean Germain, évêque de Chalon', *ROL* 3 (1895).
- 'Étude sur la *Devise des chemins de Babiloine*', *AOL* 2 (1884), pp. 89-101.
- Schein, S., *Fideles Crucis* (Oxford, 1991).
- 'The future *Regnum Hierusalem*: a chapter in medieval state planning', *Journal of Medieval History* 10 (1984), pp. 95-105.
- '*Gesta dei per Mongolos* 1300: the genesis of a non-event', *EHR* 95 (1979), pp. 805-19.
- 'Philip IV and the crusade: a reconsideration', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 121-6.
- Servois, G., 'Emprunts de Saint Louis en Palestine et en Afrique', *BEC* 19 (1858), pp. 113-31, 282-93.

- Setton, K. M., (gen. ed.) *A History of the Crusades*, 6 vols. (Madison, 1969-90).
- *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1976).
- Siberry, E., *Criticism of Crusading 1095-1274* (Oxford, 1985).
- 'Criticism of crusading in fourteenth century England', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 127-35.
- Sinor, D., 'The Mongols and Western Europe', Setton 3, pp. 513-44.
- Smail, R. C., 'Latin Syria and the West, 1149-1187', *TRHS* 19 (1969), pp. 1-20.
- Soler, A., 'Ramon Llull and Peter of Limoges', *Traditio* 48 (1993), pp. 93-105.
- Southern, R. W., *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
- Strayer, J. R., 'The crusades of Louis IX', Setton 2, pp. 487-518.
- Suger, P. F. (ed.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, 1990).
- Throop, P. A., *Criticism of the Crusade: a Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam, 1940).
- Tisserant, E., 'Une lettre de l'Ilkhan de Perse Abaga adressée en 1268 au Pape Clément IV', *Le Muséon* 59 (1946), pp. 547-56.
- Tyerman, C. J., *England and the Crusades 1095-1588* (Chicago, 1988).
- 'The Holy Land and the crusades of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 105-12.
- 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade: lobbying in the fourteenth century', *TRHS* 32 (1982), pp. 57-73.
- 'Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-20 and the crusade', *BIHR* 57 (1984), pp. 15-34.
- 'Philip VI and the recovery of the Holy Land', *EHR* 100 (1985), pp. 25-52.
- 'Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land', in *War and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Gillingham & J. C. Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 170-81.
- Van den Gheyn, S. J., 'Note sur un manuscrit de l'*Excidium Acconis*, en 1291', *ROL* 6 (1898), pp. 550-6.

- Vaughan, R., *Philip the Bold: the formation of the Burgundian state* (London, 1962).
- *Philip the Good: the apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970).
- Villey, M., *La Croisade: essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique* (Paris, 1942; reprinted New York, ?1980).
- Viollet, P., 'Guillaume Durant le Jeune, évêque de Mende', *HLitt* 35 (1921), pp. 1-139.
- Wickersheimer, E., *Anatomies de Mondino dei Luzzi et de Guido de Vigevano*, Documents scientifiques du XVe siècle, 3 (Paris, 1926).
- Wiederhold, W., 'Papsturkunden in Florenz', *Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse* (1901), pp. 306-25.
- Wieruszowski, H., 'Ramon Lull et l'idée de la Cité de Dieu: Quelques nouveaux écrits sur la Croisade', *Estudis Franciscains* 47 (1935), pp. 87-110.
- Wolff, R. I., 'Hopf's so-called 'fragmentum' of Marino Sanudo Torsello', in id. *Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople* (Variorum reprint: London, 1976); first published in *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume* (New York, 1953), pp. 149-59.
- Wright, T., *Early Travels in Palestine* (London, 1848).
- Ziada, M. M., 'The Mamluk Sultans, 1291-1517', *Setton* 3, pp. 486-512.

Unpublished PhD Dissertation

- Scales, L. E., 'Alexander of Roes: Empire and Community in Later Thirteenth-Century Germany' (unpub. Manchester PhD, 1993).

