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YEMENI RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC
AUTHORITIES - (9-233/630-847)
A POLITICAL HISTORY

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a political study of the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authorities from 9/630 to 233/847. The present study consists of eleven chapters divided into three parts.

The first part of this thesis consists of three chapters (i.e. I, II, III), and deals with the political situation of the Yemen before the migration of the Yemeni tribes into the conquered provinces, i.e. 9-12/630-34. This part also examines Yemeni-Muslim relations. Chapter I describes briefly the political situation of the region before Islam and the beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations. The political situation of the Yemen in the last phase of the Prophet's life, i.e. the movement of ^cAbhahah b. Ka^cb, and its relations with Medina is covered in Chapter II. The following chapter is devoted to the political situation of the region during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, i.e. the War of Apostasy, and the Medinan attitude towards it.

The second part is concerned with Yemeni-Muslim relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs, 11-40/632-661, and consists five chapters, (IV, V, VI, VII, VIII). The first chapter of this part, i.e. Ch. IV, deals with the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the battle fronts and their participation in the early Islamic conquests. The settlement of these tribes in the conquered provinces is examined in Chapter V. The following Chapter, VI, is devoted to the political situation in the Yemen, after the

migration of some of its tribes, during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs. The role of the Yemeni migrants in the uprising against ^cUthmān and the first Civil War is discussed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII treats the political situation of the Yemen at the time of the first Civil War.

The third part of this thesis consists of three Chapters (IX, X, XI) and is devoted to the political situation of the Yemen during the Umayyad and ^cAbbāsīd Caliphate (41-233/661-847). The policy of the Caliphs toward this region and the local uprisings against the Islamic authorities throughout this period are also discussed in this part. The first Chapter of this part, i.e. IX, examines the political situation in the Yemen during the Umayyad Caliphate, 41-132/661-750. The political situation in the region during the early ^cAbbāsīd Caliphs is covered in Chapter X. Chapter XI is devoted to the political situation of the Yemen from the Caliphate of al-Amīn to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign 193-233/809-847.

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PREFACE

At the same time as the Muslims were taking control in the Hijāz, the Yemen was undergoing political unrest as a result of tribal struggles in some of its regions. This situation reflected on Yemeni-Islamic relations at that time. Thus the Muslims interfered indirectly in the affairs of these tribes during the last phase of the Prophet's life, and directly in the early period of his successor. By the end of the first year of Abū Bakr's reign, Muslim authority was established in some of the Yemeni regions. The following year Yemeni tribes began their migrations to the conquered provinces, participating in the fighting and settling in these new regions, even forming the majority in some of them.

Two main results have been noticed after the migrations of the Yemeni tribes : first, the considerable participation of these tribes in both the early conquests and the internal events of the Islamic state during the late period of the Orthodox Caliphs; second the effect of these migrations on the political situation in the Yemen throughout the first two centuries of Hijrah, especially during the first/seventh i.e. which were distinguished by a political lull.

The Yemen, its relations with the Islamic authority and its political history, is the scope of the present work. The period chosen for research is 9/630 to 233/847, i.e. from the official correspondences between the Prophet and the Yemeni chiefs, concerning the adoption of Islam, until the first year of al-Mutawakkil's Caliphate.

The purpose of this study is tripartite : first, to show the state of Yemeni relations with the Islamic authority before the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered areas, i.e. between 9/630 to 12/634; the second to illustrate these relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-641); the third to cover the political history of the Yemen and the caliphal policy toward it throughout the Umayyad and the ʿAbbāsīd caliphates (41-233/661-747).

The importance of this study lies in the fact that it is the first essay so far as I am aware, to deal with the political history of the Yemen and its relations with the Islamic state from 9/630 to 233/747.

For the present study our sources are annals, local histories, geographies, literature and the numismatic evidence. Each part of this thesis is dependent on different sources. For the first and most of the second part the bulk of our information has come down to us from the non-local sources. For the third part, however, the local Yemeni sources are in the majority.

In addition to the fact that most of the local sources are late in respect of the period of the present study, each historian repeating the information provided by his predecessor. Since there is no alternative to quoting these sources, great care has been exercised in building up our research from them.

Relevant books and articles by contemporary authors have also been consulted, reviewed and are referred to in the notes.

In the early years of this period we can see the first step relations of the Yemeni tribes with the Islamic government. Their correspondences, delegations and their attitude towards Islamic authority in the region will be discussed in detail. The period of the Orthodox Caliphs (i.e. 11-40/632-61) is that in which the considerable participation of the Yemeni tribes in the early conquests can be placed. This was followed by their settlement in the conquered provinces and the effect of the Yemeni migrants in the major internal crisis during the last phase of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān's caliphate and the period of his successor (i.e. the uprising against the former and the Civil War) can then be seen. The effect of the Yemeni migrations on the political situation of their homeland and the escalation of the local resistance to the caliphal regime also can be seen in this work.

The years between 9/630 to 233/847 have been divided into three periods; 9-11/630-2; 11-40/632-61; 41-233/661-847. Each period has been covered by a part of this study. In the case of certain themes, some overlap from one chapter to the next, though in the same part this has been unavoidable. The transliteration adopted in the present study is that of Arabian Studies.

PART ONE



CHAPTER I

The Yemen before Islam

A. An Introductory Study

a. The ancient history

The origins and early movements of southern Arabs still constitute a matter of scholarly inquiry and speculation, with little light thrown on the subject by the ancient authors.⁽¹⁾ A detailed study of the early history of the Yemen is beyond the scope of the present work; our aim is to present a brief illustration of the political history and the religion of the area before the advent of Islam.

i. The political history

"From the imposing ruins of several cities, from thousands of inscriptions written in a peculiar alphabet and in the so-called South Arabic language, and from a few passages of Greek and Roman historians and geographers, we know that South Arabia was organized under four main kingdoms - of Sabaeans, Minaeans, Hadramautians and Qatabanians - and some other minor states."⁽²⁾ However, each state had its own principal dialects.⁽³⁾

(1) Playfair, Arabian Felix, 3; Stookey, Yemen, 10.

(2) Della Vida, "Pre-Islamic", 30. See also Winnett, "The place", 3f; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 132.

(3) Cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 6-8.

"The supposition formerly held that these two states [Ma^cīn and Sabā] succeeded one another chronologically has given way, under rigorous analysis of the available evidence, to the recognition that they existed side by side for several hundred years, and that Ma^cīn's historical period was entirely included in that of Sabā ." (4)

The kingdom of Ma^cīn was established in the region of al-Jawf. In addition to the capital, Qarnāw, other urban centres, such as Barāqish and Nashq were also built. (5)

The Kingdom of Sabā however was the most important state of the Yemen, its early kings were contemporaneous with the last rulers of Ma^cīn. (6) Before the Christian era, the Sabaeans became heirs to the kingdom of their earlier kinsmen and duly established themselves as masters of South Arabia and, as such, were rulers during the most brilliant era of its history. Thus the Sabaean domination extended over several local states, such as Ḥaḍramawt, Awsān, Qatabān and Ma^cīn. (7)

Up to about the beginning of the Christian era, the rulers of Sabā bore either the title of *mlk/sb* "King of

(4) Winnett, 3f; Stookey, 11; See also Hittī, History, 53; Della Vida, 31; Little, South Arabia, 2.

(5) Hittī, History, 54; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 130; Little, 2. The sites of Qarnāw and Barāqish are a little way north of the Ma^rrib region, cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 7.

(6) Hittī, History, 54; Zaydan, al-^cArab, 138, the former gives 950-115 B.C. and the latter suggests 850-115 B.C. for the early period of the Sabaean era. However, the earliest state of South Arabia is still a vexed question, and no final solution has yet been reached. Cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 2.

(7) Cf. Hittī, 54f; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic Ṣan^cā", 36:

Sabā ", or mkrb/sb 'priest - ruler of Sabā '. (8) In the latter half of the 4th century B.C. the transition between the two Sabaean periods, i.e. muk^harrib - Kings, took place. It was with the reign of Karib^hil Watar who called himself muk^harrib in an inaugural speech, but later on referred to himself as king. (9)

In the early centuries A.D., the Sabaean Kingdom depended for its strength on a military caste, something like a professional army, drawn from two rival tribes, namely Ḥimyar and Hamdān. The tribes of the latter were fully incorporated into the political structure, while Ḥimyar occupied the crucially strategic southwest corner of the Peninsula. (10)

During the first three centuries A.D., the south Arabian Monarch adopted a new title "King of Sabā and Dhū Raydān". Between A.D. 280-300, Shammar Yuhar^cish appeared as sole monarch, adding the titles of "Ḥadramawt and Yamanat" to the earlier ones. Thus, the political unification of all of southern Arabia under one ruler was achieved. (11) From the death of Shammar Yuhar^cish until the early sixth century A.D. nine of the Sabaean "Ḥimyari" Kings are known to us from inscriptions; traditionally they are known as tubba^c

(8) Beeston, "Problems", 42; Zaydan, 138f; Ḥittī, 54.

(9) Beeston, "Problems", 42; Stookey, 14.

(10) Little, South Arabia, 4; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic San^cā ", 36, 38; Stookey, 15.

(11) Cf. Beeston, "Problems", 41; Ḥittī, History, 60.

(plural - tabābi^cah). (12) By the end of the first quarter of the sixth century A.D., the era of the tabābi^cah, the late Sabaean era, came to an end as a result of the Abyssinian invasion. According to al-Ṭabarī, Dhū Nuwās, the last Ḥimyarī (i.e. Sabaean) tubba^c spurring on his steed, "plunged it into the waves of the sea and was never seen again." (13)

Following the invasion, the Yemen remained under Abyssinian rule for some fifty years (525-75 A.D.) with Ṣan^{c-3} a as the occupiers' headquarters. (14) During the occupation several independent, anti-Abyssinian movements led by various Ḥimyarī chiefs took place, but none with any success. (15) This situation lasted until the unsuccessful campaign of Abrahah, the Abyssinian ruler of the Yemen, against Mecca in A.D. 570-1. (16) By that time, the national movement to free the Yemen from the Abyssinian domination had found its hero. This was Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, a Ḥimyarī chief, who travelled to the Sasanid court in al-Madā⁻³ in where he appealed to Chosroes I, the Persian Emperor, for help against the Abyssinians. Sayf's request was accepted and in A.D. 575 the Persian Emperor furnished him with the support of eight hundred men under the command of Wahriz. (17)

(12) Hittī, History, 60.

For the meaning of the tabābi^cah, see Ibn Manzūr, lisān, VIII, 31.

(13) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 927 f. See also Hittī, History, 62; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 124, 148f; Little, 5; Stookey, 21f.

(14) Anon, Tārīkh, f7b-8a;

(15) Al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 149.

(16) Known as am al-fīl. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 936-45.

(17) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; al-Ṭabarī, I, 946-8; al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, III, 162-4; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XVII, 308-10; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 149-51.

With this force, plus those Yemeni fighters who joined him, Sayf was able to defeat the Abyssinians and kill their leader Masrūq. However, the Ḥimyarī kingdom was not restored and the administration of the country was divided between Ḥimyar and the Persians. (18) After the murder of Sayf, by his Abyssinian slaves, the Persian Emperor despatched an army to secure his rule there. (19) The Persians were able to gain a foothold in the Yemen and subsequently scattered themselves throughout the country, although they remained strongly concentrated in San^{cā} and Aden. (20) Other provinces remained in practice under the control of their own local tribes, although Persian rule made its presence felt quite considerably throughout the whole country. The Yemen remained under this regime until the Islamic state was established in Medina and its power extended to other Arabian regions, the Yemen included.

ii. The rise of monotheism

Apart from paganism, the ancient Yemen adhered essentially to a planetary astral system in which the cult of the sun and moon gods prevailed. The large tribal entities coterminous with political units were united in their devotion to one or more deities, most commonly a supreme god related to either the moon or the sun.

(18) Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 36b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f32b.

(19) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 957f; al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, III, 175f. Cf. also al-^cAsalī, 363; al-Ḥadīthī, 84.

(20) See Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 266, who says that the Abnā³ controlled the commerce of Aden and San^{cā} and levied ^cUshr.

Frequently these tribal entities considered themselves associated with the planet Venus. Other tribal groups also worshipped local gods, often of an animistic or ancestral nature. (21)

It was in such a religious environment that monotheism gained a foothold in the Yemen. Both Judaism and Christianity flourished in the pre-Islamic Yemen, spreading extensively throughout the country during the second Ḥimyarī era (about 300-525).

Following the conquest of Palestine and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus in A.D.70 many Jews fled to Arabia, where they established settlements in the north - the Ḥijāz. It is most likely that some of them migrated southwards, to the Yemen, and stayed there. (22) In the Yemen, however, Judaism had formed neither tribal groupings nor settled communities, nor even formed settlements of the type that existed in the Ḥijāz. (23) By the early part of the sixth century A.D., Judaism featured strongly in the Yemen as a result of the conversion to it of the Ḥimyarī king Yūsuf As^car, generally known as Dhū Nuwās, who subsequently declared his new faith the official religion of the state. (24)

Up to the third century A.D., Christianity in the

(21) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; Hitti, History, 60; Ba Faqih, Tārīkh, 211-7; Stookey, 11.

(22) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 11.

(23) Trimingham, Christianity, 289.

(24) Ḥittī, History, 61f; Della Vida, 44; Trimingham, 289.

Yemen had been veiled in obscurity, with actual evangelistic work only beginning in the middle of the following century. However, it was during the reign of Constantius II, the Byzantine Emperor, (A.D. 337-61) that the Yemen received the first official Christian mission. This was sent by the Emperor himself under the leadership of Theophilus, nicknamed "the Indian". (25) Theophilus met the Ḥimyarī king, Tha' rān and his son Malkī-karib, at their capital, Zafār. The king subsequently adopted Christianity and Theophilus founded a church in the city and planned others in the region. (26) In this way, Christianity gained a foothold in Ḥimyar territory, gradually spreading throughout the Yemeni regions. The religion was most strongly established in Najrān. (27)

In the early part of the sixth century A.D. rivalry between the two newly introduced monotheistic religions - i.e. Judaism and Christianity - led the country to an armed struggle. In A.D. 515 the leadership of the Ḥimyarī Kingdom fell to Dhū Nuwās, who had already adopted Judaism. (28) The new king led the movement against the Abyssinians, who were occupying the Yemen at that time. The movement also took on an anti-Christian flavour, leading

(25) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 19; Trimingham, 291.

(26) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 19f; Trimingham, 292.

(27) See Ḥittī, History, 61; Trimingham, 294 ff. Cf. also 30 below.

(28) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 161; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 148; Ḥittī, History, 61f; Stookey, 21; Trimingham, 297f.

to several attacks against the Christians, culminating in the famous massacre of the Christians at Najrān in A.D. 523. (29)

The survivors of the Najrān incident spread the news of the massacre far and wide. Eventually it reached the ears of the Byzantine Emperor, who at that time was regarded as the protector of all Christians. The emperor immediately wrote to the King of Axum urging him to fight Dhū Nuwās. (30) The Axumite army, led by a certain Aryāṭ, duly crossed the straits of Bāb al-Mandab in A.D. 525 overthrew and killed Dhū Nuwās and installed military governors in his place. (31) Garrisons were left by them in the Yemen to protect the Christian communities, and Sumayfa^c Ashwa^c, a Ḥimyarī chief, was installed as king. Years later, however, the Yemenis, led by the Abyssinian general, Abrahah, staged a successful revolt against their king. (32) In A.D. 530 Abrahah became king and consolidated his influence as the sole master of the Yemen. At his capital Ṣan^{c-ḥ}, he built a church, al-Qalīs, (33) and in 570 or 571 he led his troops to the north, to Mecca, in

(29) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 161; Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Tījān, 312; Ḥitti, History, 62; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 148. For full information on this massacre, see Shahīd, Martyrs, passim; Trimmingham, 295-9.

(30) See Ḥittī, History, 62; Stookey, 21f.

(31) Trimmingham, 299.

(32) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; Zaydān, al-^cArab, 150f.

(33) Al-Waysī, al-Yaman, 189; Ḥittī, History, 62; Zaydan, 151, Trimmingham, 304. For a full discussion of al-Qalīs, see Serjeant & Lewcock. "The Church", 41-8.

order to destroy the Ka^cbah. However, the Abyssinian army was destroyed by smallpox, the "small pebbles" (sijjīl) cited the Quran . (34) The year of Abrahah's unsuccessful campaign came to be known as the Year of the Elephant (ġām al-fīl); it was also the year in which the Prophet Muḥammad was born in Mecca. Approximately sixty years later 9/630-1 , the Yemeni tribes began to embrace Islam, and their country was more or less absorbed by the caliphal state.

b. The political geography of the Yemen on the eve of Islam

The first step a historian must take is to define his area of interest and describe it in geographical terms. In the following section, the political geography of the Yemen, i.e. its boundaries, main internal divisions, and the geographical distribution of local influential powers - on the eve of the advent of Islam in the area - will be covered.

i. The boundaries of the Yemen

The definition of boundaries of the Yemen on the eve of Islam is, compared to other areas of interest, a task of considerable difficulty. "The ancient Greek and Roman geographers were in the habit of dividing Arabia into three great provinces, Arabia Felix, Arabia Petrea, and Arabia Deserta : the first nearly corresponding to the modern Yemen, but including Mahra and Ḥaḍramawt." (35) The early Arab

(34) Sūrat al-Fīl, 4. See also Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Tījān, 314; al-Ṭabarī, I, 936-45; al-Mas'ūdī, Muruḡ, III, 158-62. Cf. also Ḥittī, History, 64; Trimmingham, 304f.

(35) Cf. Playfair, Arabia Felix, 1. Cf. also Ḥittī, History, 44.

geographers, however, differ in their definitions of the boundaries of the Yemen; nevertheless, they agree upon a general definition of the country, with some differences in detail.

Al-Aṣma^{cī} mentions that "its boundaries run from Oman across to Najrān. Then, [the boundary] follows the Arabian Sea as far as Aden and al-Shiḥr, and even extends beyond Oman and terminates at Baynūnah." (36) Al-Muqaddasī records that "al-Yaman was composed of two parts : the lowland, called Tihāmah, which extended as far as the sea and had Zabīd as its centre, plus other towns such as Ma^cqar, Kadrah, Mawr, al-Sharjah etc; and the highland, known as Najd, which he described as cold." (37) Al-Hamdānī writes that "the Yemen was bounded by the sea to the east, west and south. A line running between Oman and Yabrīn separated al-Yaman from al-Yamāmah. This line separated the Yemen and Kinānah from Tihāmah inland." (38) Yāqūt maintains that, "The boundaries of the Yemen lie beyond Tathlīth down to Ṣan^{cā} and the areas parallel to it down to Ḥaḍramawat, al-Shiḥr and Oman as far as Aden Abyan, as well as the adjoining areas, including the lowlands and the highlands." (39)

(36) In Yā qūt, Mu^cjam, V, 447; Cf. also Khaḥḥālah, Jughrafiyat, 286f. This description is far from clear. Does al-Aṣma^{cī}'s "Arabian Sea" include the Red Sea? Is he suggesting that the Yemen encompasses Oman?

(37) Al-Muqaddasī, Aḥsan al-Taḳāsīm, 69f.

(38) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 51.

(39) Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, V, 447; see also Khaḥḥālah, Jughrafiyat, 287.

In fact it is a difficult task for the writer to demarcate the boundaries of the Yemen during that period for several reasons; firstly, the Yemen is part of the Arabian Peninsula, with no physical boundaries between it and other regions,⁽⁴⁰⁾ especially on the northern side; secondly, tribal movement around and across these boundaries and their intermingling with each other; thirdly the absence of a strong state in the Yemen at that time which could have imposed its control on the region and drawn up fixed boundaries. However, the meaning of the Yemen in the present study is the area which was bound on the north-east by the Empty Quarter, (al-Rub^c al-Khālī); on the north by the province (sing. mikhlaḥ) of Jurash, in ^cAsīr; on the west by the Red Sea; and on the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. (41)

ii. The divisions of the Yemen

The Yemen was distinguished by the large number of its provinces, of which al-Ya^cqūbī⁽⁴²⁾ says that there were eighty-four in all, most of them named after the various Yemeni tribes that inhabited there. Generally speaking, however, the Yemen is separated into four main divisions as follows:

1. the highlands area (Najd al-Yaman), which extends from the province of Jurash in the north,⁽⁴³⁾ now ^cAsīr,

(40) Al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl, 37.

(41) Cf. Map 1..

(42) Tārīkh, I, 162. Cf. also Khaḥḥālah, Jughrāfiyat, 292.

(43) For the province of Jurash, see al-Hamdānī, Sifat, I, 117-9. The town of Jurash is on the western bank of Wadī Bīshah, 15 kms south-east of Khamīs Mushayṭ, and 44 kms from Abhā, Cf. Ibn ^cAyyāsh, "Madīnat Jurash al-Athariyyah", 243.

to the province of al-Ma^cāfir, now al-Ḥujariyyah, in the south. This division contained many of the Yemeni provinces, most of them occupied by the influential tribes.

2. the coastal plain, known traditionally as Tihāmat al-Yaman. This area extends from Bāb al-Mandab in the south to ^cAththar, 40 km north of Jāzān, in the north. It runs parallel to the Red Sea on the west and the mountainous area on the east. Two main provinces make up Tihāmah : ^cAkk in the north and al-Ashā^cir in the south.

3. Al-Jawf and the Ma^rrib area. This extends from Najrān in the north to the boundary of Ḥaḍramawt, Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt, in the south, and from the Empty Quarter in the east to the mountainous region in the west.

4. Ḥaḍramawt, which includes Mahrah and al-^cAbr makes up the fourth division. (44)

iii Distribution of local power

On the eve of Islam there existed no central government in the Yemen which could have spread its political influence over the whole of the country. At that time, the Yemen was distinguished by the existence of many powerful and influential tribal groups, each one dominating its own particular province (mikhlaḥ). Beside these, the Persian community had also emerged as an influential power in several Yemeni towns. What follows is a brief illustration of the distribution of local power throughout the country, with greater attention focused on the more influential groups.

(44) For the divisions of the Yemen, see Map I.

1. The Persians

The Persian community in the Yemen was made up of the descendants of the Persian troops sent by Chosroes I, the Persian Emperor, to the Yemen in A.D. 575 to assist Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, a Ḥimyarī chief, in his struggle against the Abyssinian occupation. (45) These people were traditionally known as the Abnā', "the Sons." (46)

Shortly before the spread of Islam in the Yemen, the Abnā' were scattered throughout the country, figuring strongly in Aden and Ṣan'a', (47) the latter of which served as the centre for their rule in the country.

Enjoying no tribal solidarity as such, the Abnā' were known by their own family name. These families appeared as aristocratic groups in the Yemen, such as the Bādhān family, who were prominent landowners in Ṣan'a' and Dhamār. (48) In Ṣan'a' other families such as B. Sardawayh, B. Mihruwayh, B. Zanjuwayh, B. Bardawayh, B. Jandawayh and B. Buzurj also enjoyed a certain importance. (49) The B. Khurrah were settled in Najrān, whilst the B. Layf appeared in Ṣan'a' and Radā'. (50) The Abnā' also figured

(45) Cf. 5 above.

(46) Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 266; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 298; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XVII, 313; al-Sam'ānī, Ansāb, I, 122.

(47) Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 266, says that the Abnā' dominated the commerce of both Aden and Ṣan'a'.

(48) Bādhān was the Persian governor in Ṣan'a', and he had properties in both Ṣan'a' and Dhamār; cf. al-Rāzī, 89f, 133. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 85; Serjeant "San'a' the Protected", 39.

(49) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 145f.

(50) For B. Khurrah, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 530; for B. Layf, see Ṣifat, I, 234.

prominently in some of the Yemeni villages, especially in the Bawn.⁽⁵¹⁾ In al-Raḍrād the Abnā^ḳ were well known as investors in its silver mines. (52)

Apart from the Abnā^ḳ, several tribal groups dominated the Yemeni provinces, with four of them constituting the main influential tribal powers of the country. These were Ḥimyar, Hamdān, Madhḥij and Kindah.

2. Ḥimyar

It is an historical fact that out of all the Yemeni tribes it was Ḥimyar who enjoyed the most power in the Yemen on the eve of Islam. Their influence spread throughout most of the Yemeni provinces through both their own clans and their allies.⁽⁵³⁾ The tribe's main stronghold was its own territory, Iqlīm Ḥimyar, which extended from Ṣan^cā^ḳ in the north to Aden in the south, and from Shabwah in the east to the coastal plain in the west.⁽⁵⁴⁾ There, each of the Ḥimyarī tribes inhabited its own province, with their chiefs enjoying independent rule. (55)

(51) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 111.

(52) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 145.

(53) E.g. some of al-Kalā^c joined the Yursam confederation and settled with them in Ṣa^cdah and al-^cAwāsuj in Jurash; see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 114, 117. See also al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl, 45.

(54) Cf. Map 2.

(55) Such as Dhū^ḳ l-Kalā^c, Dhū Ru^cayn and Dhū Yazan, Cf. Map 2.

3. Hamdān

Muslim genealogists define the relationships of the Hamdānī tribes on a genealogical tree which shows Hamdān as the ancestor of these tribal confederations named after him. (56) Al-Hamdānī (57) defines the borders of Hamdān territory as extending from the lowland (al-ghā^oiṭ) of the east to Tihāmah in the west, and from Ṣan^cā^o in the south to Ṣa^cdah in the north. Within this area, the Hamdānī tribes enjoyed much influence and power. These were composed of both nomad and semi-nomad groupings. (58) Certain elements of Hamdān were also to be found outside Hamdān territory, such as Dhū Murrān, who had settled in al-Ma^cāfir alongside Ḥimyar, (59) and al-Maḥāyīl in Ḥaḍramawt. (60)

4. Madhḥij

Although the tribe was suffering from political weakness at that time, the confederation of Madhḥij appeared in al-Jawf area. The elements of this confederation were mainly of Madhḥij tribes and those Yemeni tribes who lived with them in al-Jawf such as al-Azd and Khawlān. (61) The Madhḥij tribes, however, dominated the eastern part of al-Jawf, the lowland country, which extends from Najrān

(56) Wilson, "Al-Hamdānī ", 95f.

(57) Ṣifat, I, 109. See also Wilson, "Al-Hamdānī", 97.

(58) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 99. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 48, 67f.

(59) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 67, 190.

(60) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 85.

(61) Cf. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37, who mentions some elements of these tribes in Madhḥij confederation.

in the north to the boundary of Ḥaḍramawt (Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt) in the south. (62) In Najrān B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, a tribe of Madhḥij, figured strongly.

5. Kindah

The tribe appeared as an influential power in Ḥaḍramawt, settling in the upper areas and in the western part of Wadi Ḥaḍramawt. (63) On the eve of Islam they were in political control of most of the Ḥaḍramī provinces, having challenged other tribal groups in the country. (64) Two main Kindah tribes shared this region, the most influential of which was B. Mu^c-awiyah. (65)

c. The political situation on the eve of the advent of Islam

At that time the Yemen was in the throes of a political split. This split immediately followed the murder of Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, who had almost succeeded in unifying the country under his rule. Subsequently the Yemen was divided amongst the local chiefs, each one having established his political influence in his own province. This situation is described by one of the historians as

(62) Cf. Maps 1, 2.

(63) Cf. Map 2.

(64) This challenge obviously appears during the meeting of their chiefs with the Prophet in Medina, see 88 below.

(65) The most influential Kindah chiefs were from this branch, such as al-Ash^cath b. Qays and the Kings of B. Wali^cah, al-Hamdāni, Sifat, I, 88f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425-9; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 536f. For their nasab, cf. table 3.

one of petty kings (mulūk al-ṭawā'if).⁽⁶⁶⁾ Following this political split amongst the local power, the Persian Emperor sent troops to the country in order to protect his authority there. Then they entered the Yemen, consolidating their authority in Ṣan'a.⁽⁶⁷⁾

Naturally the emergence of various leaderships in the area inevitably meant a power struggle between them. When the Prophet had founded his administration in Medina and had begun to spread his message, the power struggle amongst some of the Yemeni groups had reached its zenith. It is obvious, however, that the most important event in the Yemen at that time was the tribal struggle and the formation of alliances between various local powers. To illustrate this situation we will give a brief description of the area, mentioning the alliances formed at that time.

The most important tribal group emerged in Ḥimyar territory. In their own provinces, the Ḥimyarī chiefs kept their sovereignty with independent rule. These rulers usually had a title, which began with Dhū ("master of"), such as Dhū 'l-Kalā', Dhū Ru'ayn and Dhū Yazan.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Others had the title qayl ("ruler"), such as Banū 'Abd Kalāl.⁽⁶⁹⁾

Several Ḥimyarī groups succeeded in forming alliances amongst themselves, each group coming under the leadership of one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs. In the territory of al-Kalā', some Ḥimyarī buṭūn gathered under the leader-

(66) Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Kitāb al-Tījān, 317.

(67) Cf. al-Mas'ūdī, Murūj, III, 176; Anon, Tārīkh, f7 b. Cf. also

(68) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, passim; Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, XV, 457; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, II, 373f.

(69) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 362-4; Ibn Manẓūr, XI, 580.

ship of al-Sumayfa^c b. Yu^cfir b. Nākūr who took the title of Dhū^ṣ l-Kalā^c. (70) In al-Ma^cāfir Banū^c Abd Kalāl figured strongly as rulers (aqyāl) of this region. (71)

The relations between Ḥimyar and other local powers are vague in our sources, yet it is clear that these Ḥimyarī chiefs kept themselves aloof from the power struggle which was taking place amongst some local tribes at that time. Even Ḥimyarī-Persian (Abnā^ṣ) relations are not clear in our sources. Such lack of information leads one to believe that each Ḥimyarī group was satisfied with its lot and, consequently, abstained from interfering in the affairs of others. Thus when the Abnā^ṣ were attacked by Madhḥij in 11/632, the Ḥimyarī chiefs adopted a neutral stance. (72)

Our sources mention two confederations which arose in the central highland area and al-Jawf : the first was represented by the Abnā^ṣ and Hamdān; the second consisted of several tribes in the Jawf and Najrān area, especially those of Madhḥij. The sources record that the reason behind the establishment of the Abnā^ṣ-Hamdān confederation was to oppose an internal movement by the Madhḥij and their allies against Persian rule in Ṣan^{c-ṣ}ā^ṣ. (73) When the news of Madhḥij intentions reached the court of Bādhan, the Persian governor in Ṣan^{c-ṣ}ā^ṣ, he assembled his army and duly moved

(70) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 265f.

(71) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 363f.

(72) Cf 59,81f below.

(73) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f36b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 32b.

northwards to meet his enemy. He went via Hamdān territory. There, the leaders of Hamdān met him and suggested establishing a confederation. Bādhān accepted the offer and both sides signed an agreement. (74)

If the Abnā³ signed this agreement in order to benefit from the power of Hamdān in their opposition to the Madhḥij attack, our sources do not illustrate the reasons which led all Hamdān to involve themselves in such a confederation. There is no indication except for the fact that Hamdān might have intended to extend its influence over the area which was under the control of Madhḥij in the upper part of al-Jawf. Another reason may have been to demolish the confederation of Madhḥij and their allies which, without any doubt, was threatening its interests in the area. Therefore Hamdān exploited its alliance with the Abnā³ by attacking Madhḥij in al-Razm in al-Jawf in 2/622; the latter were decisively defeated and some of their chiefs were killed. (75)

In the area of Najrān, the Christian power figured prominently. Najrān, therefore, was the central point of Christianity in south Arabia. (76) The Christians there were led by the three most important men of the community : the Āqib; the Sayyid shared the civil governorship; and the bishop of Najrān. (77)

(74) Ibid.

(75) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 108; Iklīl, II, 461f; al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, II, 649. See also al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 210; Yaqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 42; al-Waysī, al-Yaman, 169, who says it was on the same day as the battle of Badr, 17 Ramadān A.H.2.

(76) Cf. § above; 30 below.

(77) Watt, 127; Trimingham, 306.

Other Najrānī leaders were to be seen among the leaders of the Madhḥij alliance. These elements were namely the B. ^cAbd al-Madān, of B. al-Hārith b. Ka^cb of Madhḥij. (78) In the battle of al-Razm four chiefs of B. ^cAbd al-Madān were killed. (79)

On the eve of the advent of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt, the region was also in a state of political disturbance due to the tribal struggles. This political unrest, however, reflected on the security of the area. Ibn Ḥabīb (80) comments upon this by saying "No body can travel in the area unless he has the protection (khafārah), of its people, because it [Ḥaḍramawt] is not controlled by any one ruler."

Although some tribal groups had settled in Ḥaḍramawt, the real domination of the area lay with Kindah (and to a lesser degree with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt), in particular B. Mu^cāwiyah whose foothold in the region went back to A.D. 570. (81) Thus, B. Mu^cāwiyah was prominent in the area, having waged war on the rest of the Ḥaḍramī tribes. Even their own kinsmen of B. Ashras were not on good terms with them. (82)

(78) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37, who records the name of al-Ḥuṣayn b. Qannān, Shihāb b. al-Ḥuṣayn and Yazīd b. ^cAbd al-Madān.

(79) Namely the four sons of Dhū al-Ghuṣṣah, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 461f; Ṣifat, I, 108; al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, II, 649.

(80) Al-Muḥabbar, 266f.

(81) Al-^cAsalī, "South Arabia", 234. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 85. Kindah migrated from Ghamr Dhī Kindah to Ḥaḍramawt after Ibn al-Jawn, their king, had been killed in the battle of Shi^cb Jabalah.

(82) Cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f30a, who mentions a battle which took place before Islam between al-Sakūn (of Ashras) and B. Mu^cāwiyah.

In Tihāmat al-Yaman and the northern plateau of the highlands, the situation was different from that of other regions. Neither influential leaders nor strong confederations had appeared in both areas. In Tihāmah the tribes of ^cAkk and the Ashā^cir represented the bulk of the population. (83) Khath^cam, al-Azd and Bajīlah appeared to be the powerful tribes in the northern part of the highlands. (84)

It was in this atmosphere of political unrest that the Prophet sent letters and envoys to the Yemeni tribes calling them to adopt Islam.

(83) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 53f; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 529. Cf. Map 2.

(84) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 118f; al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, I, 58, 90. At that time Bajīlah was scattered amongst the Arab tribes as a result of their defeat in the Battle of al-Fijār. Cf. 119 below. But some of them were refugees with the Yemeni tribes, cf. al-Bakrī, I, 58-61.

B. The beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations

We have seen above how the Yemenis were divided politically, a fact which rendered the Yemen as a whole incapable of dealing with neighbouring powers. The Ḥijāz, on the other hand, enjoyed stability as a result of the spread of Islam and the unification of the main towns (i.e. Mecca, Medina and al-Ṭā'if) in the region. Consequently, the Prophet looked forward to spreading his message (da^cwah) into the other parts of Arabia including the Yemen.

The real Prophetical call to the Yemeni tribes had not occurred before the year of the conquest of Mecca, i.e. 8/629. The sources at our disposal do not mention any letter or delegation sent by the Prophet to the Yemeni tribes before this year,⁽⁸⁵⁾ the only contact being with certain Yemeni groups or individuals who had frequently travelled to the Ḥijāz where the Prophet asked them to adopt Islam. The sources describe the Prophet meeting with al-Ṭufayl b. ^cAmr al-Dawsī, a chief of Azd al-Sarāh, in Mecca, before the hijrah; the latter duly accepted Islam.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Al-Hamdānī⁽⁸⁷⁾ also records a promise of support made to the Prophet by Qays b. Namaṭ al-Hamdānī just a year before the hijrah. This early contact was, of course, on an individual basis and was not representative of the real

(85) The only communication was that with Bādhān, the Persian governor in Ṣan^cā', but this communication is not a direct one since it was related to the Prophet's letter to the Persian Emperor; cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 260; al-Mas^cūdī, Tanbīh, 259. For a full discussion of the adoption of Islam by the Persian community in Ṣan^cā', cf. 61-3 below.

(86) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, I, 407-10; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 757f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 287- Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, III, 54f.

(87) Iklīl, X, 220. See also Ibn Sa^cd, I, 340f (has Namaṭ b. Qays). Al Nuwayrī, XVIII, 8; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, IV, 225; Ibn Hajar, V, 264, reads Qays b. Mālik.

Yemeni-Muslim contact at that time. The first full-scale contact came when fifty people from the Ashā^cir, a Yemeni tribe in Tihāmah, led by Abū Mūsā al-Ash^carī set sail from the Yemen and arrived in the Medina to meet the Prophet in 7/628-9. (88)

The Prophet communicated with the Yemeni tribes, starting with Ḥimyar. Detail of these communications is beyond the scope of the present study; (89) our main concern is the Prophet's method of corresponding with these leaders and his manner of dealing with them.

a. The correspondence between the Prophet and the Yemeni leaders

The Prophet's correspondence with the leaders of Ḥimyar and other influential Yemeni chiefs was similar to that he entered into with the rulers of the great empires of that time. In his letters the Prophet recognized the political titles and the sovereignty of the various rulers over their own lands. (90) He also chose his delegates from those who held high positions among their own tribes. They included : Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, who was sent to Dhū³l-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī; (91) al-Aqra^c b. ^cAbd

(88) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 348f; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, III, 979; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 83.

(89) For these communications, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, 264ff; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 64-6; See also Hamīdullāh, 160ff; al-Akwa^c, Wathā³iq, 83ff.

(90) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1718; Hamīdullāh, Wathā³iq, 145; al-Akwa^c, Wathā³iq, 105, 107.

(91) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 318; Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 265f; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II.62; Ibn Ḥajar, II, 182. According to al-Wāqidī, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763, Jarīr adopted Islam in Medina in Ramaḍān 10/November-December, 631, and the Prophet duly sent him to destroy Dhū³l-Khalasah, an idol in Tabālah. Cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Aṣṅām, 34-6; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 388; Ibn Sa^cd, VI, 22; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, I, 279f; Ibn Ḥajar, I, 242. Jarīr took sides with the Muslim authority during the War of Apostasy and played a major role in the conquests, cf. Chapters III, IV, below.

Allāh, despatched to Dhū Murrān; (92) and al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah, sent to al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbd Kalāl. (93)

The attitude of these leaders towards Islam is unclear, the data available being contradictory. There is, however, general agreement in the sources that the leaders of Ḥimyar sent Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhāwī to the Prophet in 9/630-1. (94) But these sources do not confirm precisely the islamization of these leaders as a whole. Nevertheless, the Prophet's reply to these chiefs indicates the islamization of some of them. This letter, sent to B. ʿAbd Kalāl and Zurʿah b. Dhū Yazan, mentions the adoption of Islam by these chiefs. (95) There is no mention in this letter that these leaders were obliged to take part in spreading Islam or protecting the Muslims in their lands. This is clear from the fact that they did not defend Muʿadh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy, and other Muslims when ʿAbhalah declared his uprising. (96) Thus it can be seen that some, but not all, the Ḥimyarī chiefs might have accepted Islam in 9/630-1. Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh, for instance, met Dhū ʿl-Kalāʿ and Dhū ʿAmr, both Ḥimyarī chiefs, just after the Prophet's death and asked them to adopt Islam. (97)

(92) Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, I, 104.

(93) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 62; al-Suhaylī, al-Rawḍ, II, 358; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, IV, 422.

(94) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 258; Ibn Saʿd, 264f; al-Tabarī, 1718f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 198. Hamīdullāh, 144; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʿiq, 104f.

(95) Ibid.

(96) When ʿAbhalah moved against Ṣanʿāʾ, Muʿadh and the Muslims fled to Ḥaḍramawt, cf. 55 below.

(97) Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Muḥabbar, 75; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 182 (the narrative of Jarīr himself). See also Watt, Medina, 126.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the Ḥimyarī chiefs, having abstained from taking sides either for or against Islam in the area, did not all adopt Islam in 9/630-1. It is quite possible that they did not question their own attitude towards Islam, preferring instead to remain neutral. A more definite stance, however, appeared in the course of the Muslim-Yemeni dispute in the early part of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.⁽⁹⁸⁾ It seems that these Ḥimyarī chiefs did not oppose the spread of Islam amongst their people as long as it did not clash with their interests in the region. The Prophet might have realized their position and avoided annoying them by appointing officials in their provinces, either from their kinsmen or from his own Companions.⁽⁹⁹⁾

The Prophet's letters were also distributed amongst other Yemeni tribes. It is interesting to note that these letters were sent to more than one chief in the same tribe. In Ḥaḍramawt, for example, he wrote to several Kindī and Ḥaḍramī chiefs. These letters also were not delivered by prominent people.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The Prophet despatched many campaigns to several parts of the Arabian Peninsula before the conquest of Mecca in 8/629. However he sent no campaign to the Yemen,⁽¹⁰¹⁾ until he had captured this holy city. However,

(98) For their attitude in this dispute, see 81-2 below.

(99) I.e. political representatives.

(100) Cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 266; Ḥamīdullāh, 168-74. ^c He also wrote to the chiefs of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^b and Khawlān, cf. Ibn Sa^cd 266-9; Ḥamīdullāh, 104-7.

(101) Cf. al-Wāqidī, Maghāzī, passim; Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 280ff; Ibn Sa^cd, Tabaqāt, II, passim.

those campaigns sent to the Yemen were not aimed at the influential tribes, such as Ḥimyar or Hamdān, but rather at those who were weak due to a political split, in particular Madhḥij. To the territory inhabited by this tribe, three Muslim expeditions were sent shortly after the unification of the Ḥijāz in 8/629-30. Ibn Sa^cd (102) records that as soon as he returned from al-Ju^crānah, the Prophet equipped Qays b. Sa^cd b. ^cAbādah, from the Anṣār, with four hundred men in order to invade Ṣudā^ḡ, a tribe of Madhḥij. However, the expedition never materialized due to the conversion of the tribe in question. The second army consisted of four hundred men and was directed in Rabī^c I, 10/June-July 631, against B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, also of Madhḥij, in Najrān. (103) The third campaign was also directed against certain Madhḥijis. This was led by ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib who left Medina in Ramaḍān/December of the same year at the head of three hundred men. The sole aim of this expedition was to reach Madhḥij territory. (104)

The strategic location of Najrān as a stopping place between the Yemen and the Ḥijāz (105) prompted the Prophet to gain a foothold in the town. In fact, if the Prophet wanted Islam to spread throughout the Yemen, he would have to ensure that there was a secure route to the region via

(102) Tabaqāt, I, 326. Cf. also Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 351; Watt, Medina, 123.

(103) Led by Khālīd b. al-Walīd, cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 262; Ibn Sa^cd, I, 339; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1724.

(104) Al-Wāqidī, Maghāzī, III, 1079f; Ibn Sa^cd, II, 169. Cf. also Watt, 124.

(105) Bowen "Ancient Trade Routes", 39; Beeston, "Some observations", 7; Trimmingham, Christianity, 294.

Najrān. This would safeguard his envoys to the Yemeni tribes. The Najrānīs formed two groups, each of which was dealt with differently by the Prophet. The first was B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, whom he forced to adopt Islam. (106) The second consisted of the Christians with whom the Prophet signed a peace treaty. (107)

b. The delegations of the Yemeni tribes

The year 9(630-1) is known as the year of delegations (ḥam al-wufūd). In this year Medina was inundated by waves of tribal delegations which met the Prophet and proclaimed their allegiance to Islam. The Yemeni delegations were included. It is clear that the Yemeni delegations showed no unity in their attitude, even single tribes being divided.

i. The Prophet's policy towards the delegations of the Yemeni tribes

It is noticeable that the Prophet received the Yemeni delegations in different ways, treating some with warmth and others quite differently. Our sources do not explain the reasons behind the Prophet's attitude, although it may have been due to the different attitudes of these delegations towards Islam. It seems that some of them adopted Islam before their arrival in Medina, coming there only to prove their acceptance of Islam. For instance, the delegate of Tujīb, a Yemeni tribe of B. Ashras from Kindah, brought alms (ṣadaqah) to Medina in 9/630-1, and in the following year

(106) Cf. the expedition of Khālīd b. al-Walīd against them, 27 above.

(107) See 30 below.

a group of Khawlān met the Prophet, telling him that they had adopted Islam and they would destroy their idols, a fact which delighted the Prophet. (108) The Prophet's reception of those who adopted Islam only after being attacked by the Medinan armies, e.g. the delegates of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, Ṣudā^o and Khath^cam was different. (109) This also applied to his reception of the Yemeni chiefs or those who represented them. (110)

The above policy of the Prophet led those delegates to take different attitudes toward Islamic authority in their provinces. Those who were warmly received by the Prophet became supporters of Islam during both ^cAbhalah's movement and the War of Apostasy, whereas the others led the rebels in these events. (111)

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- (108) For the delegate of Tujīb, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 323; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 81; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 90f. For Khawlān, see Ibn Sa^cd, I, 324; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 82; al-Ahdalī, 87f.
- (109) For the reception of the Prophet to these tribes, see Ibn Sa^cd, I, 326f, 339f, 348; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 83ff.
- (110) He, for instance, warmly received Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhawī, the envoy of the Himyarī chiefs, see Ibn Sa^cd, I, 356; Wā^oil b. Hujr al-Ḥadramī, see 88 below; and Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 347 and note 91 above. Such a reception was not given to some of the Yemeni chiefs, such as the kings of B. Walī^cah, al-Ash^cath b. Qays, both of Kindah, and ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī, of Maḍhḥij. For B. Walī^cah, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 350; for al-Ash^cath, see Ibn Hishām, Sirat, IV, 254; for ^cAmr, see Ibn Hishām, IV, 252.
- (111) Those who were warmly received by the Prophet, such as Tujīb, a tribe, Wā^oil b. Hujr and Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh took sides with the Muslims during the War of Apostasy, while those who were not received in such a manner became the opponents of the Muslim authority in the Yemen, such as Kings of B. Walī^cah, al-Ash^cath b. Qays and ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib. For the attitude of these Yemenis towards Islamic authority in the Yemen, cf. Chapter II, III below.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the delegation of the Christians of Najrān was among the Yemeni delegates assembled in Medina in 10/631-2. There were fourteen of them in all, including the ḥāqib, the Sayyid and the bishop, their leaders. They refused to adopt Islam, instead requesting peace (ṣulḥ). The Prophet accepted and entered into a peace treaty with them. It was agreed that the Medinan government would not interfere with the ecclesiastical affairs or property of the Christians of Najrān, in return for which the latter would make an annual payment of two thousand garments of stipulated value, and, in the case of war, would lend the Muslims 30 suits of mail, 30 horses, and 30 camels. The Christians of Najrān were to house the Prophet's messengers for twenty days or less, but for no longer than a month. (112)

It can be seen from the articles of this treaty that it guaranteed to the Medinan government the ability to communicate with the Yemeni tribes and secure routes for the Muslim envoys to use on their way to the Yemeni regions. On the other hand, the treaty enabled the Christians of Najrān to keep their religion and protect their land from any Muslim attack.

(112) Cf. Ibn Saʿd, Tabaqāt, I, 357f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 75f; al-Yaʿqubī, Tārīkh, II, 66f, Ḥamīdullāh, 111f; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 94f. Cf. also Watt, 127, 359f; Trimmingham, 306.

ii. The effect of tribal conflict
on relations with Medina

Conflict among the Yemeni tribes became clear when they met the Prophet. However, the spirit of understanding and stability amongst the Ḥimyarī chiefs led them to authorize Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhāwī to deliver their letter to the Prophet. (113) Hamdān was represented by one delegation for both settled people and bedouins. (114) Other tribes were represented by a number of delegations, which leads us to believe that these tribes were not unified. The Madhḥij, for instance, included the delegations of Murād, Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah, Zubayd, Ṣudā³ Ju^cfī and al-Nakh^c. (115) B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah was represented by two delegations : one led by the Kings of B. Walī^cah and the other under the leadership of al-Ash^cath b. Qays. (116)

This situation shows two aspects : firstly the split amongst these tribes and the absence of any central authority in their regions; and secondly, the power rivalry of the local chiefs. This rivalry apparently emerged when they met the Prophet. Al-Ash^cath b. Qays and Wā³il b. Ḥujr (both influential leaders, the former of Kindah and the latter of the tribe of Ḥadramawt) disputed the ownership

(113) See 25 . above.

(114) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 267-9; Ibn Sa^cd, I, 340f; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 10f.

(115) For these delegations, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 324ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1732ff; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 84ff; al-Āhdalī, Nathr, 92ff.

(116) For B. Walī^cah, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, 349f; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 114; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā³, f4a. For al-Ash^cath, see Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 254-6; Ibn Sa^cd, I, 328; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 2032; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 87f. For their Nasab, cf Table 3.

of a Wadi in Ḥaḍramawt. The Prophet, after hearing the evidence of witnesses, judged in favour of Wā'il. (117)

It is noticeable that some Yemeni chiefs had a keen desire to obtain a guarantee from the Prophet for their estates. The Prophet guaranteed individual ownership for those who requested such whether in person or by letter. (118) Some of those delegates asked the Prophet to grant them certain areas in the Yemen, which he did. (119) The fact that such requests were not forwarded by the Ḥimyarī chiefs suggest that they were strong enough to defend their lands themselves. However, our sources do not specify why these Yemenis sought guarantees from the Prophet. One reason may have been the political unrest in their provinces, for such a guarantee would secure their properties.

c. The Prophet's representatives among the Yemeni tribes

One of the most complex matters in the history of Yemen at the dawn of Yemeni-Muslim relations is the identification of the Prophet's representatives there. Although the names of many representatives are mentioned in the sources, contradiction abounds concerning the posts of

(117) Cf. al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 117; Watt, 120.

(118) E.g. Wā'il b. Ḥujr al-Ḥaḍramī, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Istī'āb, IV, 1562f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, VI, 312; Ḥamīdullāh, 172; al-Ḥamid, I, 129; al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 117. For those to whom the Prophet guaranteed the ownership of their estates by letters, cf. Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, passim; al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, passim

(119) E.g. both al-Abyaḍ b. Ḥammāl and Abū Sabrah al-Ju^cfī asked the Prophet to grant certain areas in the Yemen and he did. For al-Abyaḍ request, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, V, 523; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 45f, Ibn Ḥajar, I, 14. Although he was a Ḥimyarī, he was not one of the Adhwa or Aqyal and he was settled in Ma³rib area. For Abū Sabrah, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 326; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 410.

the representatives and their areas of service.

A brief glance at the names of those appointed by the Prophet as his representatives among the Yemeni tribes reveals two different groups : the first comprising alms-collectors, teachers and qāḍīs; the second consisting of some of the Yemeni chiefs who met the Prophet, who in turn recognised their leadership over their tribes, the Muslim in particular. Thus it may be concluded that the first group specialized in religious affairs and the second in military and political matters. This is corroborated by the following examples : first when the Prophet appointed Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, a Madhḥij chief, over all Madhḥij, he sent with him Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-Ās, one of the Companions, as alms-collector (jāmi^c al-ṣadaqah);⁽¹²⁰⁾ secondly the Prophet recognized the leadership of Wā³il b. Ḥujr, over all the Ḥaḍramī tribes, but appointed three of his Companions to collect the alms;⁽¹²¹⁾ thirdly, when B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb adopted Islam, the Prophet designated one of their chiefs, Qays b. al-Ḥuṣayn, and sent him along with ^cAmr b. Ḥazm al-Anṣārī, one of his Companions, as qāḍī and teacher. ⁽¹²²⁾

(120) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 251; Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 327; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1736; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 421; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, XVIII, 85.

(121) For the Prophet's recognition of Wā³il's leadership, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, I, 350f; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, VI, 145, 312; Ḥamīdullāh, 169; al-Akwa^c, Wathā³iq, 115, 117. For the Prophet's representatives there, see Table 1.

(122) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 265; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1727; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, XVIII, 100.

It seems that the Prophet intended, through the appointment of the local leaders as his representatives, to encourage these leaders to work for Islam amongst their own tribes and to win them over to his side. However since these leaders knew nothing about Islamic regulations, the Prophet sent with them individuals with enough knowledge to deal with Islamic affairs. Although these representatives were chosen from among their own tribes, some prominent chiefs, such as ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī (a Madhḥijī), kings of B. Walī^cah and al-Ash^cath b. Qays (both Kindī chiefs) were neglected. This policy resulted in these chiefs opposing the Muslim authority and revolting against it after the Prophet's death. (123)

The Prophet's policy in the territory of Ḥimyar was different. He did not interfere in the internal affairs of this tribe. No mention is made in the sources at our disposal of the Prophet appointing any one, whether from the tribe or elsewhere, as political representative. On the other hand, the leaders of Ḥimyar did not oppose the Muslims for the sake of having religious activities in their own provinces. Therefore, the Prophet sent Mu^cādh b. Jabal al-Anṣārī as an Islamic teacher in the Yemen as a whole, and ordered him to base himself in al-Janad. (124)

(123) For their opposition to Islamic authority, cf. Chapter II, III.

(124) Ibn Sa^cd, III, 584; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1719; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 249, all confirm that he was sent in 9/630-1. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 376-8; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f9b; Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, VI, 106f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 58f.

Although al-Janad was chosen as a centre of the da^cwah, it might have lacked central authority. Some evidence confirms that the leadership in the town was held by B. al-Aswad, (125) However, these indications do not mention whether the people of al-Janad were united. It is quite probable that the inhabitants of the town had different attitudes towards Islam and when Mu^cādh came they divided into two groups : one supported Mu^cādh and the other opposed him. According to ^cUbayd b. Ṣakhr, one of Mu^cādh's Companions in the Yemen, by the time of ^cAbhalah's control over Ṣan^cā^j, Mu^cādh and his supporters were fighting the other group to control the town. (126)

In conclusion it may be said that it was during the last two years of the Prophet's life (9-10/630-2) that relations between the Muslim authorities and the Yemeni tribes were established. The Yemeni attitude towards Islam differed from one group to another; the Muslims, on the other hand, succeeded in establishing themselves in some regions, but failed to do so in others. Their success or failure became apparent in the events which took place shortly before the Prophet's death and in the early period of his successor.

(125) Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f9b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f9a.

(126) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853f.

Table 1. The Prophet's representatives in the Yemen
(9-11/630-2)

a. For religious affairs

Mu ^c ādh b. Jabal al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī	teacher of Islamic doctrine and the leader of the Prophet's representatives. (1)
Khālīd b. Sa ^c īd b. al- ^c Āṣ.	an alms-collector with Madhḥij (2)
^c Amr b. Ḥazm al-Anṣārī,	qādī and teacher with B. al-Hārith b. Ka ^c b in Najrān. (3)
Abū Mūsā al-Ash ^c arī, a Yemeni,	in Ma ^ḍ rib. (4)
al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah al-Tamīmī,	an alms-collector with ^c Akk and al-Ashā ^c ir in Tihāmah (5)
Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī,	an alms-collector with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt. (6)

(1) He stayed in al-Janad, cf. 34 above.

(2) Cf. 33 above.

(3) Cf. 33 above.

(4) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1852, (citing Sayf b. ^cUmar); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228, Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 64; Bughyat, 23. Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 97; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 246; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, all say that he was over Zabīd, Rima^c, Aden and the coastal area. It is probable that he was over Ma^ḍrib for two reasons: firstly he was in Ma^ḍrib when ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb captured Ṣan^cā, Cf. 55 below; secondly the sources which mention the governorship of al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah are agreed that he was over Tihāmah, cf. note 5 below. Cf. also Watt, 122.

(5) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1852 (citing Sayf b. ^cUmar); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Usd, III, 50f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 23; Qurrat, I, 64.

(6) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 271; Ibn Khayyāt, 97; Ibn Sa^cd, III, 598; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 245, 529; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1852; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, II, 534; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Usd, II, 217; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f20a; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 20; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 68f; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 169.

^cUkāshah b. Thawr b. Asghar al-Ghawthī, an alms-collector with al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn, in Ḥaḍramawt. (7)

al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah al-Makhzūmī, an alms-collector with B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah and al-Ṣadif in Ḥaḍramawt. (8)

Sa^cīd b. al-Qishb al-Azdī, in Jurash. (9)

b. For military and political affairs

Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, over all Madhḥij (10)

^cĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī over a part of Hamdān (11)

Qays b. Mālik b. Sa^cd al-Arḥabī al-Hamdānī over Hamdān (12)

(7) Al-Tabarī, I, 1852; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, III, 1080; Ibn Mākūlā, Ikmāl, I, 96; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 2; all these sources add B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah. We know that al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah was appointed by the Prophet as an alms-collector with B. Mu^cāwiyah and al-Ṣadif, but he did not go there. Cf. 183 below. Since al-Muhājir remained in Medina it is quite possible that the Prophet annexed B. Mu^cāwiyah to ^cUkāshah who held this post until the Prophet's death. When Abū Bakr became caliph, he replaced ^cUkāshah of B. Mu^cāwiyah by Ziyād b. Labīd, cf. note 64 in Chapter III.

(8) He remained in Medina until Abū Bakr despatched him at the head of his army to suppress the Yemeni rebels. Cf. 101 below.

(9) Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 626; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, II, 315; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 101.

(10) Cf. 33 above.

(11) Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 792; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 10 (both citing Sayf b. ^cUmar) say he is one of the Prophet's representatives in the Yemen.

(12) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 341; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 224; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 264, all say that the Prophet appointed him over all Hamdān. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 220, reads Qays b. Namaṭ b. Qays b. Mālik b. Sa^cd al-Hamdānī, and does not mention this authorization. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, has Mālik b. Namaṭ.

Qays b. al-Ḥuṣayn al-Ḥārithī, over B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb
in Najrān. (13)

Ṣurad b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Dawsī al-Azdī, over Jurash. (14)


Mahrī b. al-Abyaḍ, over Mahrah. (15)

(13) Cf. 33 above.

(14) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 526 (says he settled in Jurash), I, 338; Ibn Hisham, Sīrat, 256; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1729f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 17.


(15) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 355. In another account Ibn Sa^cd, *ibid*, says that Zuhayr b. Qirdim met the Prophet and the latter appointed him over his people, i.e. Mahrah.

MAP I THE MAIN GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS OF THE YEMEN



Note

It must be stressed that the majority of the places on these Maps and the information given have been fixed after references to historical and/or geographical works only. Many must therefore be regarded as approximate.



CHAPTER II

The Political Situation in the Yemen during
the last phase of the Prophet's life - The
movement of ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb
(Dhū³L-Ḥijjah-Rabi^cI 10-11/March-June 632)

Towards the end of the Prophet's life, in particular in Dhū³L-Ḥijjah 10/March 632, a movement arose against the Islamic state in many parts of the Arabian peninsula. These uprisings were led by Arab tribesmen who claimed prophethood among their own tribes, such as Musaylimah b. Ḥabīb of B. Ḥanīfah in al-Yamāmah, Ṭulayḥah b. Khuwaylid of B. Asad in Najd and ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb of ^cAns, a branch of Madhḥij, in the Yemen. (1) However, ^cAbhalah's movement was a limited one which arose in one district and ended in another. It was mainly an internal conflict involving land control and as such was merely a continuation of the power struggles before Islam among the local powers themselves. However, this chapter will cover the movement of ^cAbhalah and the attitude of the locals towards it, showing its aim and its relation with Islam.

A. ^cAbhalah and the beginning of his movement

The very first movement was that of ^cAbhalah in the Yemen. According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (2) the first apostasy in Islam took place in the Yemen during the life time of the Prophet and was led by Dhū³I-Khimār

(1) For these movements, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1793ff. See also Donner, Islamic conquests, 85.

(2) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; see also Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cab, III, 1266.

^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb who rose up after the Farewell Pilgrimage (Dhū^l Hijjah, 10/March, 632). His movement began in the north-east of al-Jawf, specifically in Khabbān Cave. (3)

Arab historians consider all the movements which arose in the Arabian Peninsula during the last phase of the Prophet's life, without any exception, to be movements of apostasy. This means that the leaders of these movements and their followers were originally Muslims but later left Islam for another faith, or at least stopped openly practising Islam. According to Islamic teaching, an apostate is one born a Muslim or who adopts Islam and leaves it for another faith, or who stops practising Islam. (4) In fact this term may include most movements in the Arabian Peninsula, since they had originally gone to Medina with their tribes and accepted Islam. (5)

^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb himself had never been a Muslim. There is no information to confirm his adoption of Islam in the sources at our disposal. Furthermore, these sources do not supply us with any historical material about the background of his life before his uprising, with the exception of the fact that he was a soothsayer (kāhin)

(3) Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1854; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307. Yaqut, Mu^cjam, II, 343, confirms that it's a village near Najran. Cf. also Smith, Ayyūbids, II, 171f; al-Shamāhī, 79. See also Map 3.

(4) Cf. al-Māwardī, Aḥkām, 51-4; SEI "Murtadd",

(5) Such as Musaylamah of B. Ḥanīfah and Ṭulayhah of B. Asad.

in Khabbān. (6) Therefore his being termed an apostate (murtadd) is, in my opinion, not acceptable.

The Arab historians, however, all agree that he made claims to Prophecy and they thus all call him the liar (kadhhdhāb). (7) On the other hand, he was not the only one in the Arabian Peninsula who claimed the prophethood during the last phase of the Prophet's life. Events confirmed that the strong revolts which arose at that time were led by leaders claiming the prophethood for themselves. (8)

ʿAbhalah's claim to be a prophet might have occurred, but it is relevant to ask why he did so? The modern writer, al-Dūrī, says that "we must not forget the Prophet's success and the spread of his call, in addition to the presence of tribal solidarity which was responsible for the rise of the liars in the Arabian Peninsula." (9) We find this point of view acceptable, especially in the case of ʿAbhalah's movement.

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- (6) Shoufānī, Al-Riddah, 91. For this historical material of his life, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II 228; al-Diyār-bakrī Tārīkh, II, 155f. In al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 113, Dhū^ʿI-Ḥimār, Dhū^ʿI-Khimār and al-Aswad, see also Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, III, 1266.
- (7) E.g. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 271; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1797; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 161; al-Razī, Tārīkh, 76. Watt, M. at Medina, 129 says "He does not seem to have made a serious claim to be a Prophet."
- (8) Such as Musaylamah, Tulayhah, Sujāḥ and Dhū^ʿI-Tāj Laqīṭ b. Mālik al-Azdī.
- (9) Muqaddimah, 43. He is therefore suggesting that ʿAbhalah argued that, since the Prophet himself was successful despite early opposition from many of his own tribe, he could himself succeed with ease, having the united support of his people.

We know that at the same time as ^cAbhalah's movement was on the ascendant, Islam was spreading actively in the Yemen to the extent that many provinces were dominated by Islam. In Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmah political authority was mostly held by Muslims. In the highlands (Najd al-Yaman), it was absent, except for some alms collectors, and Muslim teachers, while political authority remained completely in the hands of the tribal and provincial chiefs. (10)

B. The political situation of Madhḥij territory

In the north-east of al-Jawf, in particular in the territory of Madhḥij, Islamic activity seems to have been limited as a result of the failure of the Medinan representative, Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, to keep the area under his control. It can be assumed that he had insufficient active political influence within his tribe, Madhḥij, to form a local Islamic force from them. Nor was there strong leadership within Madhḥij, which could play a major role to control the area politically. Ibn al-Ruwayyah, (11) the paramount chief of Madhḥij, played no role in these events and the historical sources at our disposal do not mention him as being among the Yemeni chiefs - those, for example, who met the Prophet in Medina or who had relations with the Islamic government through correspondence. Furthermore he does not appear among the important chiefs in the Yemen itself during

(10) E.g. Bādhān over Ṣan^{cā}, then his son Shahr, ^cĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī on Hamdān territory, Chiefs of Ḥimyar over their own provinces and B. ^cAbd al-Madān in Najrān. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1737; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 100.

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 108; Ibn Rustah, A^clāq, 113.

these events. Some of the Madhhiġ chiefs had adopted different attitudes towards Islam, such as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī and ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī. The former refused to go to Medina to adopt Islam, while the latter went there but did not obtain the leadership of his tribe, while Farwah b. Musayk did. (12)

This feuding among the Madhhiġ chiefs appeared a short time before the rise of ^cAbhalah's movement, (13) and caused the unstable situation in their area. In all probability some of these Madhhiġ chiefs disagreed with the Islamic policy concerning the appointment of representatives in the area. These chiefs perhaps rejected this policy by forming an opposition against it. The Prophet therefore, paid attention to this area by sending troops from time to time to put pressure on the people, in particular the Madhhiġ. (14) Meanwhile he commanded

(12) He was appointed on behalf of the Prophet on all Madhhiġ, Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 249-54; Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 327f al-Ṭabarī, Tarīkh, I, 1733f; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurraṭ, I, 40-4. See also Shoufani, 93f; Table 1.

(13) For the Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth and ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib conflict, see Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 252f; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, V, 227; al-Ahdali, Nathr, 94. For the antagonism of ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib to Farwah b. Musayk, see the poetry of the former, 48 below. Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, the nisbah after his tribe Murād, of Madhhiġ. Ibn Sa^cd, V, 525; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1732ff; al-Mas^cūdī, Tanbīh, 277; al-Razī, Tarīkh, 80, 150; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, IV, 227; and al-Kalā'i, 153 all simply call him Qays b. Makshūh (Makhsūh is his laqab for its meaning, cf Ibn Manzūr, Lisān, II, 573; Ṭabarī, III, 1365. In al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 21 and Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255, read as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth b. Makshūh. Al-Azdi, Futūh, 7ff and al-Wāqidī, Futūh, I, 3ff, call him Qays b. Hubayrah. However, his full name is Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī. We will mention him as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī.

(14) There are three campaigns directed to Madhhiġ during the Prophet's life, the first led by Qays b. Sa^cd b. ^cAbādah and prepared to Ṣudā', branch of Madhhiġ; the second led by Khālīd b. al-Walīd to B. al-Hārith b. Ka^cb, also of Madhhiġ; the third led by ^cAlī, Ibn Abī Ṭālib which directed to Madhhiġ territory. For these campaigns, see 27 above. For the buṭun of Madhhiġ, see Table 2.

Farwah b. Musayk, his own representative in Madhḥij territory, to attack those people whenever he found the opportunity right. (15)

Thus the weakness of the Islamic forces in the area, the Madhḥij territory, the feuding among the leaders themselves, and the absence of strong local leadership which created a political vacuum, as well as the spread of the news of the Prophet's illness after the Farewell Pilgrimage - all of these factors perhaps encouraged ʿAbhalah b. Kaʿb to announce his movement by claiming the prophethood at that particular time. He succeeded initially in declaring his movement, easily forming a force which consisted mainly of the inhabitants of the area.

C. ʿAbhalah's followers

Al-Ḥadīthī (16) suggests that " ʿAbhalah's power rested upon the old pre-Islamic alliance, which mainly consisted of Madhḥij and some Yemeni tribes, particularly those who lived in al-Jawf area." However, the acceptance of the new faith by some members of this alliance certainly encouraged an inclination by some of them towards ʿAbhalah's movement. Thus some of them followed ʿAbhalah while others, such as al-Nakh^c and Ju^cfiī, branches of Madhḥij, remained neutral;⁽¹⁷⁾ the smallest number, led by Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative in Madhḥij was hostile to him,

(15) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 210; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 142f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 209.

(16) Ahl, 15. For this alliance, see 19 above.

(17) Al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 151. See also table 2.

but unable to face up to his power. This latter group, therefore, retreated to al-Aḥsiyah. (18) In fact ^cAbhalah's power rested mainly upon his tribe ^cAns, although elements of Zubayd, B. al-Ḥārith, Awd, Musliyah and Ḥakam, all branches of Madhḥij, also supported him. (19)

^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb also got support from other Madhḥij chiefs, particularly those who had lost their high positions within their tribes as a result of the advent of Islam in the Yemen during the period (9-10/630-32). (20) These were after all chiefs within their own tribes, while the Islamic administration appointed others from their tribes, such as Farwah b. Musayk. Therefore some of them, such as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī, Mu^cawiyah b. Qays al-Janbī and Yazīd b. al-Ḥuṣayn al-Ḥārithī, all Madhḥij chiefs, joined ^cAbhalah's troops. (21) The Kings of B. Walī^cah, of Kindah in Ḥaḍramawt also declared their support for ^cAbhalah's movement, (22) but could not

(18) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f. See also Yāqūt, Muḥjam, I, 112, who says that al-Aḥsiyah a place in the Yemen.

(19) Al-Kalā^cī, 151; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156; those all being branches of Madhḥij; Some sources mention Madhḥij only, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 155. For the nasab of these tribes, see Table 2.

(20) Such as ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī and Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, both are Madhḥij chiefs.

(21) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854f. See also al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl, 115.

(22) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2000; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257. These Kings also lost their high positions during the appearance of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt, especially when the Medinan government appointed Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣarī as its representative there who succeeded in creating a military force consisting entirely of local tribes.

join him because the Islamic power in their territory was concentrated and strong. (23) Furthermore, they were far from the scene of events.

In fact the chiefs who joined ^cAbhalah's movement, or those who declared their support, found it convenient for solving their own problems. Immediately after joining ^cAbhalah's movement, Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth, a strong ^cAbhalah supporter, removed Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative of all Madhḥij. (24) The latter, however, succeeded in getting back his high position, which he had lost during the appearance of Islam in the Yemen. (25) ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī also succeeded in winning back his high position when ^cAbhalah appointed him a governor of all Madhḥij. (26) For this reason ^cAmr satirized Farwah b. Musayk as follows -

حِمَارًا سَافَ مَنْخَرُهُ بِقَسَدٍ تَرَى الْحَوْلَاءَ مِنْ جُنُبٍ وَغَدِرٍ	وَجَدْنَا مَلِكَ فَرَوَةَ شَرِّ مَلِكٍ وَكُنْتَ إِذَا رَأَيْتَ أَبَا عَمِيرٍ
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We found that the rule of Farwah at the worst, (he is just like) a donkey whose face is covered with filth.

Whenever you meet Abā ^cUmayr (Farwah),
You see the calamities of the malice and treason. (27)

-
- (23) For a detailed discussion of the Ziyād and his local force challenge chiefs of Kinda, cf. Chapter III, B. below.
- (24) Al-Tabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1796; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Abū³al-Fidā³, Tārīkh, I, 163.
- (25) Ibid, of course, the existence of Farwah b. Musayk as a governor on behalf of the Prophet had weakened his position within his tribe, therefore, he was appointed by ^cAbhalah of all the army.
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) Al-Tabarī, I, 1834. In Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 254, bithafri instead of biqadhri and in al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, V, 211, mala ta yadayka instead of al-ḥuwala³.

D. Extension of 'Abhalah's movement

In Dhū³l-Ḥijjah, 10/March, 632, after claiming prophet-hood, 'Abhalah left Khabbān Cave towards Najrān with his followers at the invitation of certain Najranīs.⁽²⁸⁾ He entered the town without any objection on the part of its inhabitants.⁽²⁹⁾ It may have been that some people there were making plans to facilitate his coming, especially those from B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb who were concentrated in the town.⁽³⁰⁾ It is not surprising because elements of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb had been members of the old pre-Islamic Madhḥij alliance,⁽³¹⁾ as well as the fact that they were a branch of Madhḥij.⁽³²⁾ Therefore, they expelled 'Amr b. Hazm a qādī and teacher of the Medinan government there, from Najrān,⁽³³⁾ and joined 'Abhalah's army.⁽³⁴⁾ Najrān

(28) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

(29) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307.

(30) According to al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 135, the population of Najrān comprised B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb and Hamdān. Cf. also al-Yāqūbī, Buldān, 320, who says Najrān belong to B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb.

(31) In particular B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, who were in the same alliance with Madhḥij, furthermore, they are a branch of Madhḥij. For the alliance, cf. 19 above.

(32) Cf. Table 2.

(33) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1796; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Abū al-Fida³, Tārīkh, I, 163.

(34) 'Abhalah left Najrān with six hundred men from B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, see al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

had clearly not been ^cAbhalah's aim, for he left it a few days after his occupation, without any thought of settling down there. (35) It seems that he went to Najrān only to collect his followers, for he left for Ṣan^{cā} with six hundred men from the town. (36)

On Muḥarram, 11/April, 632, after he had succeeded in forming his army in Najrān, ^cAbhalah marched to the south via Hamdan territory to Ṣan^{cā}. Historical sources differ concerning the identity of the ruler of Ṣan^{cā} at that time. However, the majority of these sources agree that he was Shahr b. Bādhan who succeeded his father, Bādhan, as a ruler of Ṣan^{cā}. (37) This view is indeed the most likely since at that time the town was a stronghold of the Abnā^ṣ, as well as the centre of their rule in the Yemen. (38)

In Sha^{cūb}, the northern suburb of Ṣan^{cā}, ^cAbhalah faced the army of the Abnā^ṣ, led by their chief, Shahr b. Bādhan. In this battle Shahr was killed and his army defeated. (39) ^cAbhalah then entered Ṣan^{cā} and settled down

(35) Al-Kalā^{cī}, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VI, 307; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 21-3; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 64.

(38) There is a general agreement in the historical sources that the Abnā^ṣ ruled Ṣan^{cā} at that time : consequently they led the opposition against ^cAbhalah and Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth. For a detailed discussion of Abnā^ṣ resistance against ^cAbhalah and Qays, cf. 60ff below.

(39) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854, (the account of ^cUbayd b. Ṣakhr); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

with his followers without further opposition from the other inhabitants or tribal groups. (40)

According to one modern point of view, (41) " °Abhalah moved directly against the Persian rule in Ṣan^{cā}, after declaring his movement openly, in order to take over the town to use it for his struggle against Islamic authority in the Yemen." However, the fact is that °Abhalah avoided any quarrel with the local tribes in the Yemen, or with any other Islamic power in the Yemeni provinces. The historical sources at our disposal mention no battle taking place between °Abhalah's troops and the Islamic forces during the time he held sway in Ṣan^{cā}. The only exception was the battle of Kushar, in Hamdān territory, which took place between some of °Abhalah's followers led by °Amr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī and some Muslims led by Khālīd b. al-Walīd and Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-°As. (42) Yet Islamic forces led by al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative

(40) Not over Hamdān, who were concentrated in this area and through whose territory °Abhalah passed on his way to Ṣan^{cā}. For °Abhalah's route, see Map 3.

(41) Al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl, 116.

(42) In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 211 and al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam II, 650f both mention it as a main battle, however, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1984, who regards this as an insignificant battle, considering it as a personal conflict between °Amr b. Ma^cdī Karib and Khālīd b. Sa^cīd makes no mention of Khālīd b. al-Walīd and the place directly. For the location of Khushar, cf. Map 3, and below p 54. According to Sayf b. °Umar, °Abhalah wrote to Mu^cadh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, who was in al-Janad addressing him as an intruding outsider and ordering him, with his companions, to hand over to him whatever he had collected from the Yemen. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853f. See also Shoufanī, 92. However, °Abhalah had never attacked, militarily, any Islamic centre in the Yemen.

in Tihāmah, were in the mountains of ^cAkk and Ṣan^{cā} when ^cAbhalah was fighting the Abnā'. (43)

Another modern point of view considers ^cAbhalah's movement to be a national uprising against foreign rule in the Yemen which was represented mainly by the Persians. (44) ^cAbhalah moved directly from Khabbān Cave via Najrān and Hamdān territory without doing battle with any force except the army of the Abnā'. This means that his aim was, without any doubt, to remove power from the Abnā'. Certainly, ^cAbhalah worked to remove the authority from the Persian ruler in Ṣan^{cā}, but we doubt that he worked against the Persian community itself. There is no mention in the historical sources at our disposal that ^cAbhalah took action against the Persian community, either those who were spread throughout towns of the Yemen, or those who were in Ṣan^{cā}. (45) Furthermore he accepted them as a division of his army, even appointing some of their chiefs such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Dādawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī over them. (46)

^cAbhalah's concentration on Ṣan^{cā} was probably because of the weakness of the Persian rule at that time, especially after the death of Bādhan, (47) the governor

(43) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228. Cf. Map 3.

(44) This point of view has been given by some modern Yemeni writers, e.g. Nu^cmān, al-Aṭraf, 86f; Ṭāhir, "^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib", 50f.

(45) We know that the Persians were spread throughout the Yemeni towns, but their centre was Ṣan^{cā}, cf. 14 above.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307f. Cf. also Shoufānī, 93.

(47) Cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 260; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 113; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1571ff; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 176.

of the Persian Emperor in the Yemen. On the other hand, the Abnā³ had no support after the decline of the Persian Empire as a result of the assassination of Qubādh II in 7/628 by his son Shīrawayh. (48) Furthermore, they had no tribal support in the Yemen. In addition, on the economic side, Ṣan^{c-3} a³ was the most fertile area and had that advantage over Madhḥij territory, from where, it will be recalled, the majority of ^cAbhalah's followers came. Lastly, Ṣan^{c-3} a³ territory had been the desired object of Madhḥij and their allies before the spread of Islam there. (49)

E. "The political situation in the Yemen during ^cAbhalah's control over Ṣan^{c-3} a³."

According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr (50) when ^cAbhalah took over Ṣan^{c-3} a³, he ruled all the Yemen. His power extended from Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt (51) as far as al-Ṭā³ if, al-Baḥrayn, al-Aḥsiyah and Aden. However, it is uncertain whether ^cAbhalah moved from Ṣan^{c-3} a³ after his settlement there to extend his political authority throughout these provinces. It can be assumed that the inhabitants of some areas in the Yemen were enthusiastic supporters of his movement, but they had not been under his control and did not join his troops. From some of the historical and the geographical sources we can see that some areas were connected in

(48) Persian Emperor (590-628), see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1574. For the decline of the Empire, cf. al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 100ff. See also Watt, M. at Medina, 129.

(49) Cf. 19 above.

(50) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(51) This would seem to be the area between Wadi Hadramawt and the Yemen proper, but excluding Wadī itself, see Map 1.

particular with ^cAbhalah's movement. Some of these places were on the coast of Tihāmah, such as ^cAththar, (52) al-Sharjah, (53) al-Hirdah, (54) Ghalāfiqah, (55) and Aden. (56) Others were in the highlands, such as Manqal, (57) Kushar, (58)

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- (52) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855. Al-^cAqīlī, al-Mu^cjam al-Jughrāfī, I, 158, places it 40 kms north of Jāzan. Al-Ghunaym, Jazīrat al-^cArab, 126, says that 300 kms south of al-Sirrayn. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 120. Al-Muqaddasī, 86 and al-^cUdhri, Manāzil, f6a, both say that the town is the harbour of Ṣan^cā'.
- (53) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 334. Al-^cAqīlī, 124-6, states that its archaeological town on al-Muwassam coast belongs K.S.A. on its border with Y.A.R. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 119f, who says that on the coast of Hakam territory.
- (54) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, II, 240. Both al-Muqaddasī, 86 and al-^cUdhri, f6a, place it on the coast of al-Mahjam and al-Kadrā'. Yāqūt, II, 240; Kāhḥālah, Jughrāfiyat, 289; al-Ghunaym, 48f. reads al-Hardah. Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 120; al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 319, both have al-Hirdah.
- (55) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, III, 334. Al-Muqaddasī, 86; al-^cUdhri f6a, record that its the harbour of Zabīd. Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 119, the town is the coast of al-Ḥuṣayb.
- (56) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855.
- (57) Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, V, 216, reads Manqal al-Musta^cjilah, and says ten miles from Ṣa^cdah, without giving the direction, connected with al-^cAnsī's, i.e. ^cAbhalah, movement. Cf. also Smith, Ayyūbids, II, 178. Wilson, "Mapping" 467, says that it is a site in al-Zāhir to the north of Zafār al-Ashrāf (Zafār al-Ashrāf a fort close to the north of Dhībīn). Both Smith, Wilson, read al-Manqal. It is perhaps ten kms to the east of the main road about half way between Khamir and Hūth, personal communication with Dr. Wilson dated 15 July 1983.
- (58) Kushar or Kashar, according to al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 182 is in Hamdān territory. Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, II, 649, says there are two places Kushar near Ṣan^cā', whereas Kashar mountain near Jurash. Cf. also al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, II, 1130; Smith, Ayyūbids, II, 168. Al-Akwa^c, in al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 335, footnote 1, says that Kushar is a mountain in Liwā' Ḥajjah. Wilson "Mapping", maintains that it is the name of the mountain and of a settlement on its northern side to west of Ṣan^cā', near Bayt Hanbaṣ. In Kuwait map Kushar appears in 140 km N.W. Ṣan^cā'.

Madar, (59) al-Raḥbah, (60) al-Miḍmār (61) and al-Janād. (62) In Ḥaḍramawt B. Walī^cah, a branch of Kindah, declared their support for ^cAbhalah's movement. (63) In fact during his period of control over Ṣan^{cā}, ^cAbhalah had no governors to represent him in these places. Furthermore, he did not have a military force in other areas of the Yemen, so his power was concentrated only around Ṣan^{cā}. (64)

As soon as ^cAbhalah occupied Ṣan^{cā}, the Muslim leaders left the highlands. Mu^cādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, went to Abū Mūsā al-Ash^carī, the Medinan representative in Ma³rib, then they both went to Ḥaḍramawt. (65) The former was a refugee with al-Sakāsik, a branch of Kindah, and the latter with al-Sakūn, again a

(59) Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, V, 76. Madar a place some 15 miles E. of Raydah, on the edges of al-Jawf, it belongs jointly to Yam and Bakīl, cf. Smith, Ayyubids, II, 176; Wilson, "Mapping", 438. See also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 112.

(60) Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 34. See also Smith, Ayyubids, II, 194, who says that it is a place W. al-Khārid.

(61) Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, V, 146 says it is a Himyarī fort, 1½ miles from Ṣan^{cā} connected with ^cAbhalah's movement. Al-Akwā^c, in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 45, footnot 2, suggests that it might be the area between Ṣan^{cā} and Bīr al-^cAzab. Wilson, "Mapping", 457 believes that it is a village on the summit of the mountain of Miswar (i.e. Maswar). Maswar is a mountain area about 7 miles S.E. of Ḥajjah, Cf. Smith Ayyubids, II, 180.

(62) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855. For the locations of these places, cf. Map 3.

(63) Cf. 47 above.

(64) Cf. Map 3.

(65) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307.

branch of Kindah. (66) Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, the alms (ṣadaqah) collector of the Medinan government in the territory of Madhḥij went back to Medina. (67) Others retreated to join al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative in Tihāmah, who was camping with his force in the mountains of ^cAkk and Ṣan^cā'. (68) Those who remained within Islam from Madhḥij returned to join Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative of all Madhḥij, in al-Aḥsiyah. (69)

In all probability the retirement of the Muslim leaders from the highlands to other territories was due to the weakness of Islamic power there to protect them from ^cAbhalah. On the other hand, people who took sides with ^cAbhalah's movement declared their support for ^cAbhalah freely. As we have already mentioned the spread of Islam in the highland provinces had no effect on whom the governors actually were. (70) Furthermore those who were the representatives of the Medinan government, such as Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, and ^cAmr b. Ḥazm al-Ansārī, were both alms collectors and teachers, the former in the territory of Madhḥij, the latter in Najrān. They did not succeed in forming a military force from the inhabitants of the area. Therefore, these highland provinces were not under the control of the Muslims at the time of Abhalah's control over Ṣan^cā'.

(66) Ibid. For al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn territory, see Map 2, 4.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Ibid.

(69) Al-Tabarī, I, 1795; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, I, 122.

(70) Cf. 44 above.

In Ḥaḍramawt, especially in the territory of al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn, the Muslim leaders found security due to the existence of the Islamic force in this area. Islamic power was supported by some of the local inhabitants. In spite of this protection for the Muslim leaders the political situation was confused and the Muslims worried.

Al-Ṭabarī (71) tells us that the Muslims in Ḥaḍramawt were worried that ^cAbhalah might send troops against them, or that some heretic, such as ^cAbhalah himself, might appear there.

As for Tihāmah, some people, particularly those from ^cAkk, a Yemeni tribe, took sides with the Medinan representative, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, declaring their opposition to ^cAbhalah's movement. (72) Al-Ṭāhir and some Muslims, therefore, retreated to the mountainous area of their territory. (73)

In the coastal areas of Tihāmah, the political situation was different from the highlands of ^cAkk. People there seem to have been less faithful to the Islamic authority. Some of their towns, therefore, supported ^cAbhalah's movement. Also we shall later find them among the first rebels against the Islamic authority in their area, immediately after the Prophet's death. (74)

(71) I, 1796. Cf. also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(72) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854.

(73) Cf. Map 3.

(74) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1985f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254. For a detailed discussion of the Tihāmah rebellion, see chapter III, C. below.

F. The Prophet's action to put down ʿAbhalah's regime

The Prophet first received the news of ʿAbhalah's movement through Farwah b. Musayk, his representative with Madhḥij, when the former was busy equipping Usāmah b. Zayd's campaign, which was sent to the north of the Ḥijāz at an early stage of Abū Bakr's caliphate. Furthermore, he was suffering from the illness of which he finally died. However, the Prophet immediately fully understood the seriousness of this movement against Islam, especially at a time (10/631-2) when the new religion was just beginning to take a hold in the Yemen.

However, this unsettled situation created by ʿAbhalah's movement in the Yemeni provinces caused the Prophet to exercise prudence in his policy against it. He was especially careful not to send any Islamic troops from Medina, or indeed any external Islamic force to the Yemen to fight ʿAbhalah there. It seems that the Prophet believed that the movement had to be put down by an internal Yemeni force. He did, of course, utilize his authority there through ambassadors and correspondence. (75) He sent a letter to the Muslim leaders in Ḥaḍramawt ordering them to arrange for the death of ʿAbhalah in any way possible, (76) but sent no letters to the Ḥaḍramī tribal chiefs. Perhaps the Prophet believed that only the help of the tribal chiefs in the highlands could succeed in crushing ʿAbhalah's regime. Therefore he directed his letters to those chiefs, urging them to oppose ʿAbhalah's movement. He wrote to ʿĀmir b.

(75) An idea advanced by Brockelmann. Tārīkh al-Shuʿūb, Arabic trans. Ba ʿlabakkī, 89. Cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 1856-8; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 288; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 814.

(76) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855.

Shahr al-Hamdānī, a Hamdān chief, and sent Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, a Yemeni chief of Bajīlah and one of the companions, to Dhū^l-Kalā^c, Dhū Murrān, Dhū Zūlaym, Ḥimyar chiefs, and the people of Najrān, both Muslims and Christians. (77) However these chiefs were careful to avoid open conflict with ʿAbhalah's army. They probably thought that ʿAbhalah's movement and his coming to Ṣan^{cā} was only a struggle between Madhḥij and their allies against the Persian authority in the town. Although the Prophet was keen to encourage these chiefs to rise against ʿAbhalah, they were not enthusiastic about entering into an armed struggle with ʿAbhalah. ʿĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī the only one of these chiefs who declared his objection to ʿAbhalah, (78) nevertheless made no military move against this movement. This attitude shown by the Hamdān chief might have been because of the alliance which existed between Hamdān and the Abnā^j. (79) To this can be added the bad relations existing between Hamdān and Madhḥij as a result of their armed conflict over territory a short time before the spread of Islam in the Yemen. (80)

In all probability the Prophet's communications with these chiefs were not successful in urging them to enter into an armed struggle with ʿAbhalah. Some historical sources

(77) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1857f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 308. Ibn Khaldūn, ʿIbar, II, 844 adds the Christians of Najrān.

(78) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istī^{cā}b, II, 792.

(79) For the alliance, see 19-20 above.

(80) Specifically in 2/623-4 at the Battle of al-Razm, cf. 20 above

mention, however, that the Yemeni chiefs to whom the Prophet had written agreed to fight ^cAbhalah and so they met together to prepare themselves. (81) But as far as we can ascertain from the strength of the above sources or any others at our disposal these chiefs made no military campaign against ^cAbhalah during the period he held sway in Ṣan^{c-ā} (Muḥarram - Rabī^cI, 11/April-June, 632). There is also the fact that they did not oppose him when he was passing through their territories on his way to Ṣan^{c-ā}. (82) Furthermore, some of them did not form an attitude towards the adoption of Islam until the time of the Prophet's death. We know that an envoy of the Prophet to some Ḥimyar chiefs to whom the Prophet wrote, Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, was with Dhū^cL-Kalā^c, a Ḥimyarī leader, at the time of the Prophet's death, persuading him to adopt Islam. (83) Consequently, the Prophet concentrated on communicating with the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c-ā} mainly the Abnā^c.

Ṣan^{c-ā}, during the course of ^cAbhalah's rule, was indeed ripe for a revolution against him. There was great disaffection in the town on the part of the inhabitants in particular among the Abnā^c, who had been ruling the town before ^cAbhalah's arrival. Doubtless the Abnā^c wished to regain their authority or at least their

(81) Al-Tabarī, I, 1857f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 844.

(82) Especially Hamdān and inhabitants of Najrān whom ^cAbhalah passed over their own land in his way to Ṣan^{c-ā}, as well as some areas in their territory which sympathized with ^cAbhalah's movement. Cf. Map 3.

(83) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 265f; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 19f; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, II, 470.

self-respect at the first available opportunity. It is most likely that the Prophet realized their positions. He therefore sent Wabr b. Yuḥannis, one of the Abnā' and one of the Companions, to the Abnā' urging them to resist 'Abhalah's rule. (84) The Prophet then utilized the situation by trying to put down 'Abhalah's regime through the Abnā' whose true belief in Islam was at that time doubtful. The reason this suggestion is being put forward is because of the obscurity about the exact time of their adoption of Islam. In fact there are contradictions in the historical sources regarding this question. In al-Ṭabarī, one account (85) mentions that Bādhān, the chief of al-Abnā', and his people in Ṣan'a' adopted Islam in 7/628-9. Another account (86) records that it was in 10/631-2. In some biographical sources, e.g. Ibn Sa'd, it is mentioned that some of the Abnā' adopted Islam during the Prophet's life-time, (87) but he gives no biographical information about Bādhān. In Ibn Ḥajar's Iṣābah, (88) there are two contradictory accounts. In the first Bādhān became a Muslim after the death of Kisrā, the Persian Emperor, who was killed in 7/628-9. The second mentions that Kisrā ordered him to negotiate with the Prophet to stop his mission (da'wah) and when he was on his way to Medina, he was killed by 'Abhalah. If it can be assumed that the Abnā' in Ṣan'a' adopted Islam during the Prophet's life-time, it was probably

(84) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533, al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763, 1798; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 140; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Ibar, II, 844; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 1205f; Ibn al-Dayba', Bughyat, 19.

(85) Account of Yazīd b. Abī Ḥabīb, I, 1572-5. This account also occurs in Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 260.

(86) That of al-Wāqidī in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763.

(87) See the biographies of Wabr b. Yuḥannis, Fayruz al-Daylamī and Dadhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī, in Ṭabaqāt, V, 533-5.

(88) I, 176, the first account has been given by Ibn Ishāq, Ibn Hishām, al-Wāqidī and al-Ṭabarī. The second by al-Sha'bī.

not before Dhū^l-Ḥijjah 10/March, 632. It is quite probable that they accepted Islam during the time when ^cAbhalah held sway over Ṣan^{cā} (Muḥarram - Rabī^c I, 11/April - June, 632). There is a general agreement in the historical sources that Wabr b. Yuhannis was the first ambassador from the Prophet to the Abnā^ḥ in Ṣan^{cā} and he was sent to them at the time when ^cAbhalah occupied Ṣan^{cā}. (89) Another general agreement in the historical sources is that the Abnā^ḥ in Ṣan^{cā} were converted to Islam by Wabr. They mention that when he arrived there, Dādḥawayh, one of the Abnā^ḥ chiefs, received him and housed him in the church of Ṣan^{cā}, al-Qalīs. (90) Wabr met Dādḥawayh's wife, Umm Sa^cīd al-Burzakhiyyah, and recited the Quran to her, so she became a Muslim. She was the first Yemeni to adopt Islam in the Yemen followed by Fayrūz al-Daylamī, Markabūdh and Wahb b. Munabbih. (91) On the other hand, there is no mention in the historical sources at our disposal that the Abnā^ḥ had sent an official delegation to the Prophet in order to bring Islam to Ṣan^{cā}, before the appearance of ^cAbhalah's

(89) Cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763, 1798; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79f; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, IV, 155, Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 884; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 313; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 19.

(90) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 313; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 19.

(91) Ibid. It is unlikely that she was the first Yemeni who adopted Islam in the Yemen; we know that many of Yemenis were converted to Islam by the Prophet's envoys there. But it is most likely the authors mean the first Yemeni of al-Abnā^ḥ, where those who followed her, all of them from the Abnā^ḥ, were considered as the earliest Muslims from this community in Ṣan^{cā}.

movement, as other Yemenis had done. (92) Nevertheless, the first official delegation to Medina from the Abnā' to discuss their becoming Muslim took place after the assassination of ^cAbhalah, in the last few days of the Prophet's life. (93)

The Prophet's concentration on the Abnā' in Ṣanā' might have been because he believed that their enthusiasm was sufficient to take back control of the town. Therefore, his letters to the Abnā' contained promises that the Muslims there would help them to put ^cAbhalah's uprising down. In al-Ṭabarī⁽⁹⁴⁾ we read that the Prophet sent his envoy, Wabr b. Yuḥannis, to the Abnā' to ask for help from the tribes of Tamīm and Qays. At the same time he sent some companions for the purpose of resisting ^cAbhalah. (95) These communications with Ṣanā' were, however, taking place in great secrecy.

After these communications, the Muslims in Ṣanā'

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- (92) For the Yemeni delegations to the Medina, see Chapter I, B, b.
- (93) They sent a letter for the Prophet telling him of their adoption of Islam and of the assassination of ^cAbhalah, Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76.
- (94) Tārīkh, I, 1798. Abū³I-Fidā', Tārīkh, I, 163f, says some men from Ḥimyar and Hamdan. We know that the power in Ṣanā' lay between al-Abnā' and other Yemeni tribes, particularly B. Shihāb, see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 124; Iklīl, I, 159. As for Qaysī and Tamimī power. perhaps he means here his companions, who had been sent there to work against ^cAbhalah, such as Ya^clī b. Umayyah al-Tamimī who arrived Ṣanā' with Wabr, see al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79.
- (95) Ibn al-Athār, Kāmil, II, 215f.

were able to form a secret front which consisted mainly of people who wished to put down ^cAbhalah's rule. Therefore, they planned with Shahr b. Bādhān's widow, Āzād, to assassinate ^cAbhalah and this they did in a secret operation. (96)

There are differences in the historical sources concerning ^cAbhalah's killers. They all agree, however, that the murder was carried out by a group consisting of some of the Abnā³, such as Dādhawayh and Fayrūz and others from ^cAbhalah's followers themselves, such as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī. (97) Although the actual assassination is not of major importance here, it is of importance nevertheless to make clear who was interested in assassinating ^cAbhalah. In fact these people who joined together to destroy ^cAbhalah had been themselves oppressed by his authority in Ṣan^{cā}. They were the Abnā³, particularly those who sought to regain their rule and respect in the town. (98) Also there were those from ^cAbhalah's followers themselves, such as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, a strong ^cAbhalah supporter and the commander-in-chief of his army, who had ambitions to keep his high position within his tribe. (99) Also there should be

(96) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1857-61; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229.

(97) For Fayrūz al-Daylamī, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 115; Abū³ l-Fidā³, Tārīkh, I, 164. For Fayrūz and Qays b. b. ^cAbd Yaghūth, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 525, 534, with the addition of the name of Dādhawayh, cf. also al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 80. For Farwah b. Musayk and Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 21.

(98) Mainly their leaders, such as Dādhawayh and Fayrūz.

(99) So that when he realised that ^cAbhalah was treating him with less than respect. For Qays's ambition see 47 above and Chapter III, A below.


added the role of the Muslims who encouraged those people to resist ^cAbhahah, especially after the spread of Islam among them.

In conclusion, therefore, ^cAbhahah's movement in simple terms was an internal conflict consisting of some of Madhhij and their allies led by ^cAbhahah b. Ka^cb al-^cAnsī to remove power from the Abnā³ in Ṣan^cā, to settle there and take over control of the city. He claimed the prophethood so as to gain support for his conflict with the Abnā³ by introducing a strong religious bias into his movement. ^cAbhahah's endeavour to control Ṣan^cā was continued by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī who declared war against the Abnā³ immediately after the Prophet's death. (100)


(100) For his struggle with the Abnā³, see Chapter III, A below.

Table 2

Mālik (Madhrij)



MAP 3 THE YEMEN DURING 'ABHALAH'S MOVEMENT



CHAPTER III

The political situation in the Yemen during the
early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate
(11/632-3)

The sudden death of the Prophet in Rabī^c I, 11/June 632, was a direct reason for the spread of rebel movements throughout the Arabian Peninsula against Abū Bakr's government. The new government, however, was supported mainly by Medinans, Meccans and the people of al-Ṭā³if, in addition to some Arabian tribes who maintained their loyalty to the caliphate. Therefore they swore allegiance (bay^cah) to the new caliph and supported him against the rebels. (1)

Some of these movements had begun during the last phase of the Prophet's life, with their leaders claiming Prophethood. These were the movements of B. Ḥanīfah in al-Yamāmah, led by the "false Prophet" Musaylimah b. Ḥabīb; of B. Asad in Najd, led by the "false Prophet" Ṭulayḥah b. Khuwaylid and that of Madhḥij in the Yemen led by^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb al-^cAnsī who also claimed Prophethood. While the Prophet succeeded in putting down the latter, he was unable to suppress the others before his death. Most of the movements, however, arose after the Prophet's death. (2)

During this period the Yemen witnessed comprehensive political disorder which spread over most of its regions. Consequently, the Yemenis were divided into supporters or

(1) Shoufanī, Al-Riddah, 77f.

(2) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 97ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1793ff. See also Donner, Islamic conquests, 85.

opponents of the Islamic authority there. Some of them, however, remained neutral in their attitude towards the Muslim-rebels conflict.

Three main Yemeni movements have been mentioned in our sources during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, and are worthy of discussion here. The first is that of Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth al-Murādī in Ṣan°ā°. The second is the rebellion of B. Mu°āwiyah of Kindah in Ḥadramawt. The third is the political disorder stirred up by °Akk and al-Ashā°ir in Tihāmah.

The following chapter will deal with these movements and their conflict with the Islamic authority there, showing the attitude of the Yemeni tribes in this struggle. In order to illustrate these movements we will study them individually, beginning with the rebellion of Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth al-Murādī.

A. The political situation in Ṣan°ā°
[Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth's rebellion]

a. The appearance of Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth as a new rival to the Abnā°

In Muḥarram, 11/April, 632, the balance of power in Ṣan°ā° changed as a result of the invasion and settlement of Madhḥij and their allies there for three months. The Abnā°, however, tried under cover to regain their authority, having failed to defend it militarily. Therefore, they planned to assassinate °Abhahah himself. They believed that with his death they would regain power in Ṣan°ā°, as there was no other strong competitor for the position of

ruler from among the indigenous inhabitants. But, the assassination of ^cAbhalah and the expulsion of his followers would not in itself be enough to regain control over Ṣan^{cā}. This was because Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī had appeared as a new competitor to take power there, thus posing a real threat to the Abnā³ regime. This event confirmed Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth's real thirst for power. He had joined ^cAbhalah's revolt only to regain his high position. When he realised that ^cAbhalah was treating him with less than respect, he immediately joined the Abnā³, although they had been his greatest enemies in the area. (3)

This rebellion by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth is called "Qays's second apostasy" by some of the Arab historians who linked this rebel with the Medinan government. (4) As mentioned above, the area of Ṣan^{cā} was not under Medinan control during the Prophet's life time. (5) Furthermore it had no direct relations with Medina until the Abnā³ officially sent a letter to the Prophet concerning their adoption of Islam and the assassination of ^cAbhalah. (6) Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth is regarded by some Arab historians as an apostate, (7) though this is not an exact description. In spite of the fact that some historians do mention that

(3) Cf. 64 above.

(4) Cf. Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255; al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 153f.

(5) Cf. 50 above.

(6) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76. For a detailed discussion of the Abnā³ and their adoption of Islam see 61-3 above.

(7) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

Qays went to Medina and adopted Islam (8) and some others say that he was the Medinan representative in Ṣan^cā³ during the Prophet's life time, (9) this is far from being true. (10) The first occasion on which it is said he adopted Islam during the Prophet's life time is only mentioned in Ibn Sa^cd. (11) However, if he really had met the Prophet and adopted Islam, he would have been mentioned as one of the Yemeni chiefs, or at least his name would have appeared among those delegates from his tribe of Madhḥij. Ibn al-Athīr (12) believed that Qays's assassination of ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb was a proof of the former's adoption of Islam during the Prophet's life time. Some sources, however, have mentioned that Qays had refused to meet the Prophet. Furthermore he became very angry when ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī requested him to do so. (13) On the other hand, he was the second most important person after ^cAbhalah, and Commander of his army. (14) Qays's conspiracy with the Abnā³ against ^cAbhalah had no religious motive as Ibn al-Athīr says, but he was purely interested in political

(8) Cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 525.

(9) It is mentioned in al-Qalqashandī, Ma³āthir, I, 80.

(10) Watt, Medina, 130.

(11) Ṭabaqāt, V, 525.

(12) Usd al-Ghābah, IV, 277.

(13) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 253f; al-Tabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1733f, III, 2365. al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 94.

(14) al-Tabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307f.

control over Ṣan^{cā}. (15) It can be assumed that, if he had really worked against ^cAbhalah on behalf of Islam, he would not have involved himself in his movement at all and pursued the Abnā^ḥ, trying to kill some of them and pushing others out of Ṣan^{cā} immediately after the Prophet's death. This is particularly clear if we bear in mind the fact that the Abnā^ḥ at that time were Muslims, and he would have been aware of their political weakness. Also in the meantime the Medinan government was more concerned with its own problems after the Prophet's death and was in no position to intervene in the affairs of Ṣan^{cā}. In simple terms, Qays had done all that for the sake of assuming power there, following the same aim as his predecessor, ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb, and co-operating with people who had no relations with Islam (16) against those who had adopted Islam, i.e. the Abnā^ḥ.

As for al-Qalqashāndī, (17) he mentions that the Prophet appointed Qays b. ^cAbd Yaḡhūth over Ṣan^{cā}. The historical sources which record the Medinan representatives of Ṣan^{cā} either during the Prophet's or Abū Bakr's time, however, do not refer to Qays's governorship at all. (18) As we mentioned above (19) Ṣan^{cā}, until ^cAbhalah's occupation, was under the control of the Abnā^ḥ. When the latter succeeded in the assassination of ^cAbhalah,

(15) Cf. 64 above.

(16) He co-operated with the remainder of ^cAbhalah's followers, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; al-Mas^cūdī, Tanbīh, 277; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(17) Ma^ḥāthir, I, 86.

(18) See Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 96f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1750, 1983; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 140; al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 227; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Bughyat, 22f; Qurrat, I, 63ff.

(19) Cf. 50 above.

the town remained without leadership. On the other hand, the longest period between the assassination of ^cAbhalah and the Prophet's death recorded in historical sources is five days. (20) Therefore there could not have been enough time for the ambassador of the Abnā^{-j} to reach the Prophet before his death so as to appoint either Qays or anyone else over Ṣan^{c-a}.

Qays's adoption of Islam during ^cAbhalah's occupation over Ṣan^{c-a} is also doubtful. His relations with the Muslims who came from Medina, such as Wabr b. Yuḥannis or those who adopted Islam from the Abnā^{-j} in Ṣan^{c-a} such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī revolved simply around the question of the planned assassination of ^cAbhalah. (21) When the Abnā^{-j} contacted him and asked him to join them against ^cAbhalah, he immediately agreed without any hesitation because he was angry with him for the way he had scorned and discredited him. (22) So events proved that, though Qays had met and co-operated with some of the Abnā^{-j} to assassinate ^cAbhalah, it was a temporary sort of understanding, while ^cAbhalah was in Ṣan^{c-a}. However, after they had succeeded in assassinating ^cAbhalah in Rabī^c I, 11/June, 632, political differences started to flare up in Ṣan^{c-a} over the question of who was to be in power. Actually that rivalry developed gradually from secret conflict to open and armed struggle which ended in Qays's defeat and the entrance of Muslim troops into Ṣan^{c-a} for the first time.

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- (20) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 115; in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1798; one day in another account, I, 1868, Abū Bakr received the news about ^cAbhalah's assassination at the end of Rabī^c I, 11/June, 632.
- (21) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1856; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 288; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VI, 308.
- (22) Ibid.

b. The inhabitants of Ṣan^{c-3} and their attitude towards the rebellion

The inhabitants of Ṣan^{c-3} themselves had nothing to do with Qays's movement. As far as we know, they did not refrain from paying the alms (ṣadaqah) nor did they rebel against Islamic authority, as was the case in Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmah. We know that the area was free from alms collectors, who returned to Medina when ^cAbhal^{ah} moved in. (23) On the other hand, there was no official Islamic authority in Ṣan^{c-3} during that period to justify the inhabitants' rebellion. Furthermore the few Muslims there, other than the Abnā', played no role in these events until caliphal troops entered Ṣan^{c-3}. It is unlikely that the Abnā' committed apostasy because the Medinan government was their main supporter in their armed struggle, either against ^cAbhalah's or Qays's rebellion. There is no doubt that they were convinced that the help of the Muslims was essential for their existence, especially after ^cAbhalah's attack, when the local Yemeni force deserted them. Perhaps they felt that Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth's intention was to assume power in Ṣan^{c-3}, a thing which made them more strongly linked to Medina. Therefore it was with the utmost regret that they received the news of the Prophet's death. (24)

The relations between the Islamic government and the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c-3} other than the Abnā' were indeed obscure, even as events unfolded themselves. They

(23) I.e. Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, and ^cAmr b. Ḥazm, the former with Madhḥij and the latter in Najrān, cf. Table 1.

(24) Al-Diyārb^{akrī}, Tārīkh, II, 202. See also al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 166.

took no part in Qays's rebellion and historical sources do not mention them as a power who played a major role during it. In fact those who reported the rebellion in the town were ^cAbhahah's followers themselves; these hailed from al-Jawf and Najrān and were led by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaḡhuth, the general commander of ^cAbhahah's troops. (25) However, there are no grounds for linking their rebellion with the inhabitants of Ṣan^{cā}, because ^cAbhahah's followers were not from the indigenous population of the town. That is in addition to the fact that they had not directed neither of their rebellions against the Islamic authority. (26)

c. The open struggle between Qays and the Abnā^ḡ

This struggle was contemporary with the deterioration of the political situation in the Arabian Peninsula after the Prophet's death Rabī^c I, 11/June, 632.

Control of Ṣan^{cā} was ostensibly in the hands of the Abnā^ḡ after ^cAbhahah's assassination, for the following reasons: firstly, they had been in control until ^cAbhahah's entrance into Ṣan^{cā} in Muḡarram 11/April, 632; secondly, they constituted the majority of the inhabitants of Ṣan^{cā}; and thirdly there was no strong rivalry from the indigenous population of Ṣan^{cā} at that time.

The effect of Qays b. ^cAbd Yaḡhuth's presence in Ṣan^{cā} was that the Abnā^ḡ could not appoint any one of

(25) For the followers of ^cAbhahah, see Chapter II-C. above.

(26) Cf. 51 above; 78 below.

themselves as leader there to succeed Shahr b. Bādhān, their former Chief. (27) In all probability they might have thought it better to have a governor appointed by the Medinan government, especially after they had adopted Islam. (28) Al-Dahhāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī one of the Abnā' in Ṣanā', says that "We assassinated 'Abhalah and our affairs in Ṣanā' were as before, but we sent for Mu'ādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador to the Yemen, and agreed upon him". (29) In the account of al-Kalā'ī, (30) Fayrūz and Dādhawahy, the most powerful chiefs of the Abnā', gave Qays b. Abd Yağhūth power and he therefore was named amir of Ṣanā'. However, it does not mean that they accepted Qays as a ruler of the town. It seems that he emerged as a chief among the Abnā' rivalling their power after 'Abhalah's assassination. Consequently Qays appeared as a strong rival, challenging the Abnā' for the authority there. We do not know exactly when the open struggle for power started between the two sides, Qays and the Abnā', but it seems to have begun as a conflict incited by the political vacuum which existed in the period after 'Abhalah's assassination. Thus it is most likely that Qays was an important figure among the Abnā' as early as that, and that they therefore offered him restricted power over Ṣanā',

(27) Who was killed by 'Abhalah in Battle of Sha'ūb, Cf.50 above.

(28) Immediately after 'Abhalah's assassination, cf.63 above.

(29) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739- Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 310.

(30) Tārīkh, 153.

albeit shared with themselves. Meanwhile they sent to Mu^c-ādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador, at that time absent in Ḥaḍramawt, requesting him to solve the problem of the political vacuum left in Ṣan^c-ā' after ^cAbhalah's assassination. (31)

The historical sources differ about the time when Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth declared his rebellion against the Abnā'. Some of them link the time to when the inhabitants of Ṣan^c-ā' learned about the news of the Prophet's death, (32) while others think that his rebellion and enmity towards the Abnā' was declared immediately after his assassination of Dādhawayh, one of the Abnā' 's chiefs. (33) We know that the Abnā' at that time believed that their most important supporter was the Medinan government. (34) Therefore, the Prophet's death and the deterioration of the political situation in Medina and the Arabian Peninsula undoubtedly affected the Abnā' position in Ṣan^c-ā'. On the other hand this situation had indeed encouraged Qays to declare his rebellion seriously against the Abnā'.

Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth secretly send word to the remainder of ^cAbhalah's troops, promising them that he would regain authority from the Abnā', (35) although meanwhile he was

(31) Al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz's account, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn Kāthīr, Bidāyah, VI, 310.

(32) Al-Mas^cūdī, Tanbīh, 277; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 225; Ibn Kāthīr, Bidāyah, VI, 331. See also al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 163.

(33) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989f (citing al-Dathīnī); al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 153; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861.

(34) Cf. 76 above; 175 below.

(35) They had retreated to the mountains between San^c-ā' and Najrān, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; al-Mas^cūdī, Tanbīh, 277; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861.

planning to assassinate the Abnā³ chiefs. He succeeded in assassinating Dādhawayh, but failed to destroy others such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Jushaysh who fled to Jabal Khawlān, east of Ṣan^{cā}³, taking refuge with Fayrūz's uncles from Khawlān. (36)

When the rest of ^cAbhahah's followers joined him, Qays declared his rebellion in Ṣan^{cā}³ and he increased his power. (37) He could only justify his action by a call to get rid of the Abnā³ and drive them away from the Yemen. So he sent to the chiefs of Ḥimyar telling them that the Abnā³ constituted a threat in their country and were annoying them. "If you leave them", he said, "they will carry on ruling you. So, in my opinion, we have to kill their chiefs and push them out of our country!"(38) We are in no doubt that the account mentioned above is true, since it is given in more than one source without having been rejected by others. There is some doubt, however, concerning the actual truth of Qays's message to the Ḥimyar chiefs. The question which must be asked is whether Qays, by sending the letter, really meant to push the Abnā³ out of the Yemen as a national leader, or just to justify his rebellion towards the local power. It seems that the second suggestion is more likely. Qays was not originally from Ṣan^{cā}³, in addition to the fact that he co-operated with them, i.e. the Abnā³, to assassinate

(36) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 534f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(37) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn Khaldūn, ^cIbar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(38) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

^cAbhalah. Also they had been friends until receiving the news about the Prophet's death. It can be accepted that if Qays had believed the Abnā³ were not in conflict with him, he would not have killed them. Both al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr. (39) suggest that when Qays declared his rebellion in Ṣan^{cā} and failed to assassinate Fayrūz al-Daylamī, he made for the Abnā³ and separated them into three groups : those who did not oppose him were left in Ṣan^{cā}, while he separated those who followed Fayrūz into two groups, the first was sent to Aden to be transported to Persia by sea, the second were sent home to Persia over land.

d. The local attitude towards the rebellion

Those people of Ṣan^{cā} other than the Abnā³ had shown neutrality in their attitude towards the rebellions. The Abnā³, therefore found themselves facing the rebels alone in Ṣan^{cā}. Thus during either ^cAbhalah's movement or Qays's rebellion, the security of the town was always dependent upon the power of the Abnā³. Therefore neither ^cAbhalah nor Qays had been able to take over the town until they had eradicated the chief of the Abnā³. (40) It is true that it was the duty of the Abnā³ as a whole to defend Ṣan^{cā} from any attack because of their connection with the town. (41) All that, however, did not contradict in any way

(39) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(40) ^cAbhalah entered Ṣan^{cā} after he killed Shahr b. Bādhan, see 50 above and Qays tried to get rid of the Abnā³ chiefs, cf. 78 above.

(41) They were in power, in addition to that, the town was the main centre of their rule, Cf 6, 19, 50 above.

the fact that the inhabitants, other than the Abnā', should not stand by the latter's side in the struggle against the take-over of their town by Qays, or at least to defend their belongings and homes, which the invaders, Qays and his followers, had shared with them. (42)

The only justification would appear to be that the Ṣan'anīs, other than the Abnā' and especially those of Qaḥṭān, were not pleased with the rule of the Abnā'. In spite of this, those historical sources which mention the struggle between Qays and the Abnā' say nothing about the role of these Qaḥṭānīs in this event. Perhaps they were sympathetic towards Qays and his followers against the Abnā' and it is most likely that they took sides with Qays after the assassination of 'Abhalah. Therefore Qays was able to challenge the Abnā' at an early stage, before the remnants of 'Abhalah's followers arrived in Ṣan'ā'. Furthermore, there are some sources which indicate that Qays was supported by some members of the tribes, to the chiefs of which Abū Bakr had written urging them to do so. (43)

In fact the struggle was mainly confined to the question of assuming power in Ṣan'ā'. These events proved that those of the Abnā' in power were the only ones who lost and suffered from these events, while the rest of the inhabitants, i.e. the Arabs, were not in any way affected by the occupation.

(42) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1867.

(43) cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1991; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

This explains their non-appearance in the account of the events in the sources. Therefore, the local population of Ṣan^{cā}, Qaḥṭān, were not obliged during the rebellion to support the Abnā^ḥ in order to regain power for them. That attitude on the part of Qaḥṭān was undoubtedly the result of the disaffection of their members in Ṣan^{cā} vis-à-vis the rule of the Abnā^ḥ. Bad feeling, therefore, developed on the part of the Abnā^ḥ towards Qaḥṭān and was to produce continual conflict between them. (44)

On the other hand, Fayrūz al-Daylamī, the Abnā's chief at this stage, had had no support from other local forces, except from his uncles Khawlān. (45) Each group, Qays and the Abnā^ḥ, concentrated mainly on getting Ḥimyar to its side, so the letters sent by Abū Bakr to muster support for the Abnā^ḥ and by Qays in support of his own cause were sent to their chiefs. Abū Bakr wrote to the chiefs of Ḥimyar urging them to assist the Abnā^ḥ. (46)

When Qays heard about Abū Bakr's letter, he immediately sent to these same chiefs. (47) They, however, had already formed a clear attitude towards Qays's rebellion which was outlined by one of them, Dhū^ḥ L-Kalā^c, who replied to Qays's previous message saying, (48) "We are not involved here in any

(44) For the Abnā^ḥ - Qaḥṭān struggle in Ṣan^{cā}, see 306-7, 314, 336 below.

(45) Khawlān al-^cĀliyah, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1991; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255. See also al-Akwa^c, Wathā^ḥiq, 163.

(47) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(48) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989.

way, they are your friends i.e. the Abnā³ and you are their friends." Such an answer clearly illustrates their attitude which was one of complete non-cooperation. The Ḥimyarī chiefs had definitely looked on the struggle between Qays and the Abnā³ as something which would not affect their interests, otherwise they would have had a different attitude. On the other hand, these Ḥimyarī chiefs did not see that struggle as an assault on the rights of the Abnā³ who adopted Islam by sending to the Prophet after ʿAbhalah's assassination (49) so that they could be regarded as Muslims. The fact that some of these chiefs had adopted Islam does not mean that they were obliged to support or protect any Muslim group in the area. (50)

Hamdān, the other power in the area, must have played a significant role in these events for the following reasons : firstly, they had been in the same alliance with the Abnā³ and the enemies of Madhḥij a very short time earlier, (51) secondly, they were the only tribe in the area who opposed ʿAbhalah's attack against Ṣan³ by open declaration. (52)

However, during the time Qays declared his enmity against the Abnā³ in Ṣan³ we cannot discern any role played by the Hamdānīs in this event. The direct reason for

(49) See the Abnā³'s adoption of Islam, 61-3 above.

(50) The events proved that they had a neutral attitude towards the movement of ʿAbhalah and Qays, cf. 59, 81-2 above.

(51) For their alliance with Hamdān, see 19-20 above. For Madhḥij-Hamdān struggle, see the battle of al-Razm, 20 above.

(52) Cf. 59 above.

their non-involvement is unknown. It is obvious, however, that the Hamdānī chiefs at that time were heavily involved in solving their internal problems. The situation in their region was one verging on Civil War amongst their clans, due to their attitude towards Islam. (53) Furthermore, the spread of the Ṣanā' crisis to their region was as a result of the dispersal of Abhalah's followers there. (54)

The attitude of the chiefs of Ḥimyar and Hamdān was not to support the Abnā' during the rebellion of Qays. The Abnā' thus sought help from other tribes in other areas. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a chief of the Abnā' at this stage, sent to B. Uqayl b. Rabī'ah and Akk asking for their help. (55) These tribes responded immediately to the call, wiping out Qays's men and freeing those Abnā' families who had been sent by Qays b. Abd Yaghūth to Persia. (56) Furthermore they went and joined Fayrūz, who was thus strengthened by them. So Fayrūz led them and fought Qays and his followers on the outskirts of Ṣanā'. Qays was defeated and subsequently withdrew to the mountains, where he joined the remaining troops of Abhalah who were led by Amr b. Ma'dīkarib al-Zubaydī. (57)

(53) In consequence of this situation some of the Hamdānī chiefs declared their support to Abū Bakr, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 33f. Cf. also biography of Abd Allāh b. Mālik al-Arḥabī, Hamdānī chief of Bakīl, in Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 124.

(54) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 230.

(55) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993f; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861.

(56) Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1993-4; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861.

(57) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993-4.

B. The political situation in Ḥaḍramawt

In the early period of the spread of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt in 9-10/630-2, there had been no external invasion to challenge the structure of the inhabitants of the region, as had happened in Ṣan^cā'. (58) The inhabitants of the area were a mixture of Kindah, who had settled in the highlands in the northern part and the west, and the Ḥaḍramī tribes, who had concentrated in the central area. (59) The advent of Islam in the area, however, created a new force, exemplified by the Medinan representatives, who succeeded in forming a local army consisting of some of the inhabitants of the area. (60) This force became apparent during the time of ^cAbhalah's revolt, when the leading Muslims retreated to Ḥaḍramawt. (61)

In spite of the fact that those representatives left Medina without any army to assist them in their task, some of them managed to form a local force, mainly consisting of several local tribes from those areas in the region where they were working. In Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmāh the representatives relied upon such armies to suppress those who abstained from paying alms (ṣadaqah) or those who revolted against Islam.

In Rabi^c I, 11/June, 632, the nature of events differed

(58) See Chapter II, D, "extension of ^cAbhalah's movement", above.

(59) Cf. Map 2.

(60) For "Their role during the struggle between the Muslims and B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah, cf. 94-7 below.

(61) When Mu^cādh and Abū Mūsā retreated to al-Sakūn and al-Sakāsik, cf. 55 above.

from one area to another. The rebellion which took place in Ḥaḍramawt was of a different kind from that in Ṣanʿāʾ. In simple terms the former was a result of the refusal of some Muslims to follow Islamic teachings, while in Ṣanʿāʾ it was an internal political struggle, as mentioned earlier. (62)

a. The roots of the rebellion

This rebellion among B. ʿAmr b. Muʿāwiyah of Kindah which took place in Ḥaḍramawt during the early period of Abū Bakr's caliphate has its roots in the last phase of the Prophet's life time. It started as a conflict between kings of B. Walīʿah and the Prophet when the former declared their support for ʿAbhalah's movement. (63) The open struggle, however, began gradually as a conflict between some elements of B. ʿAmr b. Muʿāwiyah and Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī, who represented the Medinan government in Ḥaḍramawt. (64)

Our sources give two reasons for the beginning of this conflict : firstly, B. ʿAmr b. Muʿāwiyah of Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt disagreed about how the alms (sadaqah),

(62) For a detailed discussion of Qays's rebellion, see A above.

(63) Cf. 47 above.

(64) The Prophet sent Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī to Ḥaḍramawt in 10/631-2 as an alms-collector (jāmiʿ sadaqah), with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt. After the Prophet's death in Rabīʿ I, 11/June, 632, Abū Bakr annexed Kindah, i.e. B. Muʿāwiyah, and al-Ṣadīf to Ziyād, see Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 271; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Futūḥ, 109; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 97; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, II, 533; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 205; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f37a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f112a; Kifāyah, 49; See also Shoufānī, Riddah, 90f.

which the Prophet ordered, should be distributed, with the result that one of the B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah clans, namely B. Walī^cah, accused Ziyād b. Labīd of collusion with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt against them; (65) secondly, Ziyād refused to return one of B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah's she-camel which he stamped as alms, despite the mediation of one of their chiefs, Ḥārithah b. Surāqah. (66) This refusal, however, appears in a line of poetry by this chief:

يَمْنَعُهَا شَيْخٌ بِخَدَيْهِ الشَّيْبُ مَلَمَعٌ كَمَا يَلْمَعُ الثَّوْبُ

An old man [Ziyād] with grey hair on his cheeks
is keeping her [the she-camel] ;
hair shining like a garment. (67)

The above events probably did occur, given the reliability of the sources that mention them. But, we cannot accept them as direct reasons for the rebellion of B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah against the Muslim authority there. In the first account the conflict took place between two local tribal groups, so Ziyad was aloof from this strife. However, he found himself involved in it when B. Walī^cah accused him of colluding against them with the other party. In the second, the matter mentioned did not constitute a casus belli, if indeed both sides were truly honest in avoiding military action.

On the other hand, we must not forget the relations

- (65) Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim's account, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2000f. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257; al-Ḥāmid, Tārīkh, I, 152.
- (66) Kathīr b. al-Ṣalt's narrative, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001f. See also al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109f; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69f; Anon, Tārīkh, f22a-b; Ibn Khaldūn, ^cIbar, II, 533; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 96f. See also al-Ḥāmid, I, 151f.
- (67) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, II, 70; Ibn Khaldūn, ^cIbar, II, 533. Cf. also al-Ḥāmid, I, 152.

of the chiefs of B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah with the Prophet when they first met him in Medina. This probably leads us to believe that their dealings with him then have some connection with their role in leading the rebellious movement in Ḥaḍramawt. Although these chiefs were enjoying the strength of their influence in Ḥaḍramawt, the Prophet did not pay them as much attention as he did with other less powerful tribes in the region when he met them in Medina. (68) The Prophet rebuked him for their smart clothes. (69) He also refused the claim of al-Ash^cath b. Qays, chief of B. al-Ḥārith b. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah that they were the sons of Ākil al-Murār and that the Prophet was also his son. The Prophet replied that they were Banū'l Naḍr b. Kinānah on the father's side and that the mother's line was unimportant. (70) Al-Ash^cath was far from pleased. Perhaps he was not expecting such a reply from the Prophet. He therefore warned his people not to mention the reply to anybody and threatened those who did with eighty lashes. (71) Even the Kings of B. Walī^cah did not establish good relations with the Prophet when they met him in Medina and they left in total disagreement with him. (72)

(68) For the tribal delegations to the Medina, see Ibn Sa^cd Ṭabaqāt, I, 291, ff; Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 221 ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1717 ff. See also 28 - 32 above.

(69) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 225; Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 328, al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 97f.

(70) Ibid.

(71) Ibid.

(72) For the B. Walī^cah delegation, see Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 350.

The Prophet, however, was on good terms with the Chiefs and delegates of other tribes who came from Ḥaḍramawt. He warmly received the delegation of Tujīb and rewarded them more than other delegations. (73) When Wā'il b. Hujr, the Chief of the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt, arrived in Medina, the Prophet greeted him by calling for the salāh jāmi'ah, a prayer celebrated on a special occasion, and appointed Mu'āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān as a special companion to him. (74) Furthermore, Wā'il was recognised by the Prophet as paramount chief over all Ḥaḍramawt. (75) A modern scholar (76) has suggested that Islam attracted bit by bit the subordinates among the Arabian tribes. If that was the case, the Prophet probably practised it when dealing with the powerless people in Ḥaḍramawt.

It is evident from some accounts that the Ḥaḍramīs were unable to regain their lands from some of B. Mu'āwiyah of Kindah. They therefore complained to the Prophet when they met him in Medina. Ibn al-Athīr (77) tells us that two persons, a tribesman from Ḥaḍramawt tribe and another from B. Mu'āwiyah of Kindah, appeared before the Prophet seeking his ruling upon a piece of land which each declared to be his. Eventually the Prophet ruled that it belonged to the

(73) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 327; al-Aḥḍalī, Nathr, 91.
See also **28 above**

(74) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 349; al-Aḥḍalī Nathr, 108.

(75) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 351; Hamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 132.

(76) Arnold, Preaching of Islam, Arabic trans. Ḥasan, 'Abdīn and Nahrāwī, 43.

(77) Usd, I, 115, in the biography of Imru' al-Qays b. 'Abis, Cf. also the biography of Rabī' b. 'Idān, ibid, ii, 170.

Ḥaḍramī. Even Wā'il b. Ḥujr himself was unable to protect his own land from some of the chiefs of Kindah. He therefore asked the Prophet to get it back for him and so the Prophet did, promising him that he would guarantee its protection. (78)

It is obvious from our sources that the Ḥaḍramī delegates left Medina with a guarantee from the Prophet for the protection of their properties, further confirming their acquisition of the lands, while the Kindah returned without any such guarantee. It can be assumed that tribal power in Ḥaḍramawt at that time was centered in Kindah, in particular around B. Mu'āwiyah. (79) Thus when Islam spread throughout Ḥaḍramawt some inhabitants, mainly those from less powerful tribes, gathered around Ziyād b. Labīd to form an Islamic army in the area. This force appeared at the beginning of the rebellion as a local power beside Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative in Ḥaḍramawt. (80) Consequently the people of Ḥaḍramawt were mostly divided into two factions : the first represented by B. 'Amr b. Mu'āwiyah and those who followed them from Kindah; the second consisting of Muslim officials and those who supported them from other tribes in the area such as B. Ashras of Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt. (81)

(78) See 32 above.

(79) For their nasab, cf. Table 3.

(80) Cf 90 ff below.

(81) For buṭūn of Kindah, see Table 3.

The rebellion was confined to the territory of B. Mu^cāwiyah al-Riyād, Maḥjar al-Zurqān, Tarīm, and al-Nujayr. (82) There were, besides, minor battles which took place in the villages of that territory whose occupants followed the rebels. (83) The fact that these took place is itself a proof of their rebellion, while other areas were not involved in it.

b. Development of the conflict to armed struggle

This conflict between Ziyād b. Labīd and B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah developed gradually. It had begun as a personal conflict and ended in armed struggle. Ziyād displayed in this conflict a rigid attitude which B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah could not accept; the parties therefore, could not settle their differences. According to one account (84) Ziyād had been seen returning a she-camel after it had been changed for another one, something which weakened his position among his people. So B. ^cAmr b. Mu^cāwiyah explained such rigidity on the part of Ziyād as something unacceptable in their own area. Therefore, the owner of the she-camel declared loudly, "You B. ^cAmr in al-Riyād, I have been unjustly treated and humiliated. The humble one is he whose right is denied in his own country. (85)

(82) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002-10; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f; Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 136f; also cf. Map 4.

(83) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007, Ḥamīdu'llāh. Wathā'iq, 272f.

(84) Kathīr b. al-Salt's account, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002.

(85) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258.

As far as we can see, Ziyad's inflexibility stems from a reason other than that of the she-camel affair. Changing the she-camel for another would not itself have been serious enough to discredit him. On the contrary it would have attracted others to him, as it is something which does not contradict the Prophet's teaching and administration, (86) especially if it had been given to him by mistake, as the owner declared. (87) It is believed that such rigidity on the part of Ziyād had other causes. One of these causes might be the disgust which he felt, as indeed did all Muslims, towards the Kings of B. Walī^Cah, of B. ^CAmr b. Mu^Cāwiyah, as a result of the Prophet's curse on them during the last phase of his life time. (88) Furthermore, Ziyād was feeling strong at the beginning of the conflict, in addition to the fact that he was urged by some of the tribes who encouraged him to fight B. ^CAmr b. Mu^Cāwiyah. So with the encouragement of al-Sakūn, Ziyād invaded B. ^CAmr b. Mu^Cāwiyah immediately after the event of the she-camel. (89) Consequently, the conflict between the two sides further developed into open warfare. As a result, some of B. Mu^Cāwiyah agreed among themselves

(86) For the Prophet's instruction to Mu^Cādh b. Jabal, when he sent him to the Yemen, as a chief of the Medinan representatives there, cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 260; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 83; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 18.

(87) For the discussion between Ziyād and the owner of the she-camel see al-Ṭabarī, I, 200lf.

(88) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2000; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamīl, II, 257.

(89) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamīl, II, 258.

to abstain from paying alms (ṣadaqah). Others, however, such as Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ and Imru' al-Qays b. 'Ābis⁽⁹⁰⁾ joined Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative, and advised him to invade B. 'Amr b. Mu'āwiyah and their followers who had settled in their own pasture-land (maḥjar).⁽⁹¹⁾ Ziyād duly invaded them by night, directing his attack on B. 'Amr b. Mu'āwiyah, who represented the backbone of the rebels of Kindah. The four Kings, B. Walī^{-c} ah, were killed in the attack, as well as their sister al-'Amardah.⁽⁹²⁾

In spite of the victory of Ziyād and his followers over B. 'Amr b. Mu'āwiyah, the pursuing of armed conflict was difficult and terrible for both sides. After this battle al-Ash'ath b. Qays, Chief of B. al-Hārith b. Mu'āwiyah, emerged as the leader of a rebellion among B. Mu'āwiyah themselves. It seems that the direct reason he was involved in armed struggle was to defend his relatives from B. 'Amr b. Mu'āwiyah, who had taken refuge after being defeated by Ziyād's troops.⁽⁹³⁾

(90) For Shuraḥbīl's attitude, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Ibar, II, 862. For Imru' al-Qays, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; Ibn 'Asākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69f; Ibn Ḥazm; Jamharat, 428f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 115.

(91) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258; Maḥjar means land owned and protected by powerful chieftains as private pasture for their camels and sheep; see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Yāqūt, Mu'jam, III, 136f. See also Landberg, Daṭinois, I, 360f.

(92) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109f; al-Ya'qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 428; Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 116; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Ibar, II, 862.

(93) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 110; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; al-Ya'qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259; Ibn Khaldūn, 'Ibar, II, 862. For the blood relation between them, see Table 3. .

Before that al-Ash^cath had led the rebels from his own people, those who abstained from paying the alms (ṣadaqah) to Ziyād. However, al-Ash^cath b. Qays was not directly involved with Ziyād b. Labīd in the fighting. He declared "we will keep our money in our own hands and will not pay it, and will be the last to pay." (94) He also refused to give his oath of allegiance to Abū Bakr saying "As for you (Ziyād), we have heard your speech and praise for that man (Abū Bakr) and if people agree on him we will give him our oath of allegiance." (95) At this stage al-Ash^cath was speaking as a powerful man by virtue of his being of the Kindah and with strong influence. He shouted out against one of his people who called upon them not to rebel against Ziyād. (96) He also replied to one who threatened him with Ziyād by saying, "Who said that Ziyād is of the same standing as myself? Would it not please Ziyād to give him refuge." (97)

This belief of al-Ash^cath was the same as that of these others in the Arabian Peninsula who abstained from paying alms during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. They thought that the Medinan government would not be as powerful as during the lifetime of the Prophet. (98) Perhaps

(94) Ibn Asākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69f.

(95) Cf. Hamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 272f, quoting of al-Wāqidī.

(96) See the biography of ^cAbd Allāh b. Yazīd in Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 96f.

(97) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69.

(98) For these events, see al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 103-9; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1870ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 231-53; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 201ff. See also Shoufanī, Al-Riddah, 77ff; Donner, 85-9.

the long distance between Ḥadramawt and Medina might have encouraged al-Ash^cath to rebel. He proclaimed "All the Arabs have returned to what they had been previously worshipping and we are in an area distant from Abū Bakr, so he cannot send troops against us." (99)

In spite of the fact that al-Ash^cath abstained from paying alms and pledging his own allegiance to Abū Bakr, he did not declare his apostasy openly. (100) On the other hand, Ziyād could not force al-Ash^cath to pay alms or to give his oath of allegiance (bay^cah) to Abū Bakr. It is most likely that Ziyād was avoiding an armed conflict with al-Ash^cath himself. But, Ziyād's invasion of B. ^cAmr b. Mu^{c-}āwiyah inflamed al-Ash^cath, who duly protested against that action by urging the Kindah tribes to fight Ziyād and his followers. Near Tarīm the armies met; the Muslims were defeated and retreated to the town. (101)

c. Ziyād's supporters:

According to al-Ṭabarī, (102) even in this battle Ziyād depended entirely upon the local force for support. These events took place in Kindah territory, thus explaining why members of this tribe had a different attitude towards them. While B. Mu^{c-}āwiyah of Kindah were representing the rebels, the other branch, B. Ashras, were mostly representing the power that supported Ziyād b. Labīd. (103)

(99) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III,69.

(100) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III,69; al-Kalā^cī, Tārīkh, 165.

(101) Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā^jiq, 273; for the location, see Map 4.

(102) I, 2006 (citing Kathīr b. al-Ṣalt)

(103) Cf. Table 3 .

The latter branch protected the Muslim leaders who had left the Yemen highland for Ḥaḍramawt, as mentioned above. (104) At the time of the event of the she-camel B. Ashras, particularly al-Sakūn, had stayed on Ziyād's side. As their poet said:

لَعَمْرِي وَمَا عَمْرِي بِعُرْضَةٍ جَانِبِ
لِيَجْتَلِبَنَّ مِنْهَا الْمَرَارَ بِنُوعِمِرْوِ
كَذِبْتُمْ وَبَيْتَ اللَّهِ لَا تَمْنَعُونَهَا
زِيَادًا وَقَدْ جِئْنَا زِيَادًا عَلَى قَدَرِ

Upon my life - and my life is not often upon it;

B. ^cAmr will indeed bring bitterness upon themselves because of her (the she-camel);

You are liars, by the house of God, you will not keep her from Ziyād;

We have arrived at the right time (to support Ziyād); (105)

وَنَحْنُ نَصْرُنَا الدِّينَ إِذْ ضَلَّ قَوْمُنَا
وَلَمْ نَبْغِ عَنِ حَقِّ الْبِيَاضِيِّ مَذْجَلًا
شَقَاءٌ وَشَايَعْنَا ابْنَ أُمِّ زِيَادِ
وَكَانَ تَقَى الرَّحْمَنِ أَفْضَلَ زَادِي

We supported the Faith, while our people went astray;

In their wretchedness and we have declared our support for (Ziyād) ;

We have sought no reward for (supporting) the right of al-Bayāḍī (Ziyād)

Piety is my best provision; (106)

(104) Cf. 55 above.

(105) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004.

(106) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109.

According to Abū Marzūq al-Tujībī (107) not even one man from Tujīb, a branch of B. Ashras, abandoned the Faith. Al-Kalā^ci (108) also mentions that nobody from Qatīrah, also of B. Ashras, had abandoned the Faith either. The latter tribe was on the side of the Islamic army in the course of the armed conflict; therefore they were mentioned in the poetry of Kindah as enemies :

صباحٌ سوءٌ لبني قتيبة
وللامير من بنى المييرة

What an evil morning for B. Qatīrah;

And for the prince from B. al-Mughīrah (al-Muhājir b.

Abī Umayyah) : (109)

On the other hand, ^cUkāshah b. Thawr, the Medinan representative among B. Ashras, al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn, (110) did not figure in these events. This leads us to believe that these tribes did not rebel against the Islamic authority in their territory. Nevertheless, that does not mean that these tribes followed Ziyād in his struggle with the rebels completely for the simple reason that there are some references to the fact that some of B. Ashras joined B. Mu^cāwiyah. (111)

(107) Al-Diyārb-akrī, Tārīkh, II, 202; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 91.

(108) Tārīkh, 166.

(109) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007.

(110) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1999, has ^cUkāshah b. Miḥṣan which is patently wrong, see Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, III, 1080; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Usd, IV, 2; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqat, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 49; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurraṭ, I, 54. Cf. Table 1 .

(111) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006; Hamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 273.

However, we can confidently say that their areas remained relatively uninvolved in the Kindah rebellion, which makes us believe that the tribe, generally speaking, did not rebel against the Medinan authority.

Ziyād b. Labīd was also given support from some of the Ḥaḍrami elements who had stood by his side at the beginning of the conflict.⁽¹¹²⁾ Their territory was not involved in the rebel movement and as a matter of fact, their chief generously entertained the Muslim leaders when they passed through their land on their way to B. Mu^cāwiyah territory. ⁽¹¹³⁾

C. The political situation in Tihāmah

In Dhū^l-Ḥijjah, 10/March, 632, when ^cAbhalah's troops were approaching Ṣan^{cā}, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative among ^cAkk and al-Ashā^cir, in Tihāmah, was camping in the mountains between Tihāmah and the town. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Al-Ṭāhir succeeded in forming an army from among the inhabitants themselves. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ His force was particularly concentrated in the highland area, while some of the coastal towns sympathised with ^cAbhalah's revolt. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾

In Rabī^c I, 11/June, 632, the coastal territory of Tihāmat al-Yaman was one area rebelling against the newly formed government in Medina. This rebellion arose immediately after the spread of the news of the Prophet's death.

(112) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f.

(113) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001.

(114) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(115) Mainly from ^cAkk, they played a major role during the events either in Tihāmah or in Ṣan^{cā}, see 83 above; 99 below.

(116) Cf. 54, 57 above. For the location, see Map 3.

According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (117) Ḥakk and al-Ashā'ir were the first to rebel in Tihāmah against Islamic authority, the former adding that the people of al-Awzā', a confederacy consisting of some Ḥimyarī tribes settled in the southern part of Tihāmah joined them.

We have no further historical material explaining the aims and requests of the rebels. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the rebellion was not led by famous local leaders, so the biographers pay no particular attention to them.

However, it may be the paucity of material in our hands which leads us to the general impression that this rebellion was not as important as the others in the Yemen, which shook Islamic authority there and threatened to separate the area from the new government of Abū Bakr, such as the rebellion of B. Mu'āwiyah, of Kindah, in Ḥaḍramawt.

The absence of regular leadership of the Tihāmah rebellion and the confusion which it brought about was perhaps a direct reason why it was put down easily by the Medinan representative there, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Ḥālah, and his local force. So without having support from Medina, al-Ṭāhir was able to control the area. Thus it can be assumed that the historians' silence regarding this rebellion indicates that it was weak and unimportant.

The Tihāmah rebellion was limited to al-A'ḷāb, the area near Ṣuḥār on the coast. (118) The rebels gathered

(117) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1985f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254. See also SEI, "Ḥakk".
(118) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1986; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254; See also SEI, "Ḥakk".

and proclaimed their rebellion where they controlled the coastal road, while the highlands remained under the influence of the Islamic authority. (119)

Al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah accompanied by his followers from ^cAkk under the leadership of Masrūq al-^cAkkī, one of ^cAkk chiefs, advanced towards the west, where they met the rebels in a crucial battle at al-A^clāb. Thus the Muslims took control of the area, having scattered the rebels. (120)

D. The Medinan Army enters the Yemen

a. The local force, their failure and success

In both Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmat al-Yaman the Muslim forces were obviously supported by some of the local tribes. Through the support of the latter, Medinan representatives were able to oppose the rebels. The same attitude towards the Muslim authority also appeared amongst some of the Yemeni tribes in the northern plateau of the country. There, elements from Bajīlah led by Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī appeared defending the Islamic authority in the region. (121) After suppressing the rebels of Khath^cam, Jarīr and his troops moved southwards and made camp in Najrān. (122)

(119) Cf. Map 4.

(120) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1986; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254; Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, III, 832- SEI "^cAkk".

(121) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1988; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(122) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1988, records that Abū Bakr commanded Jarīr to move to the south and station in Najrān after finishing his task, i.e. suppressing the rebels in the region.

Najrān witnessed no rebellion during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, so the political situation in the town was satisfactory. The Christians had their treaty renewed by Abū Bakr (123) and also the Muslims adhered to their Faith. (124) Consequently the town was chosen as a centre for the assembly of the Islamic troops, who arrived in the Yemen to suppress the rebels. (125)

The situation in Ḥadramawt was, however, different despite the existence of the local Islamic force there. The Muslims felt that they were not able to face the rebels who were increasing in number by collecting their clans together, particularly in B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah's territory. (126)

In Ṣan^cā³ Fayrūz al-Daylamī, one of the Abnā³ chiefs, had become famous and therefore, as some historical evidence indicates, Abū Bakr wrote to him and invested him with the governorship (wilāyah). (127) So the Abnā³ who were under his leadership in Ṣan^cā³ appeared as an ally to the Medinan government. Fayrūz, therefore, sent to Abū Bakr asking him for assistance. (128) Abū Bakr immediately wrote to the Chiefs of Ḥimyar urging them to support the

(123) Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futuḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987f. See also Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 128f; al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 160f; Tringham, Christianity, 307.

(124) Al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 97.

(125) There al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah met Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī and Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, both were local chiefs and allies to the Muslim government, see 101, 102 below.

(126) See 94 above.

(127) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989, (citing al-Dathīnī); Ibn Khaldūn, Ṣibār, II, 861.

(128) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ibn Khaldūn, Ṣibār, II, 861; Ibn al-Āthīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

Abnā' . (129) This, however, did not succeed and so the Abnā' sought aid from B. 'Uqayl and 'Akk. (130) Fayrūz and his new allies were able to control San'ā' after defeating Qays b. 'Abd Yaqhūth near the town in 11/632-3. So the survivors of the troops of Qays left the town for the area between San'ā' and Najrān without setting themselves up in any particular place and creating a danger to the Islamic authority in this area. (131)

b. Abū Bakr's decision to send troops to the Yemen

Following the escalation of the threat against the Medinan authority in the Yemen and the failure of the local Islamic forces to completely control the situation there, particularly in Ḥaḍramawt and some areas in the highlands, Abū Bakr realised that he had to send an army there. The force he dispatched was led by al-Muhājir

b. Abī Umayyah who had been ordered to fight the remnants of 'Abhalah's followers and to support the Abnā', and then to go to B. Mu'āwiyah of Kindah in Ḥaḍramawt. (132)

Al-Muhājir's army was, according to al-Ṭabarī, (133) the last Muslim force sent to fight the apostates (al-Murtaddūn). When al-Muhājir left Medina in 11/632-3, he marched south to the Yemen passing through Najrān where

(129) See 81 above.

(130) See 83 above.

(131) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 256.

(132) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1880 (citing Sayf b. 'Umar); Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 422f; Ḥamīdallāh, Wathā'iq, 260. See also al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 316; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqāt, 35; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Istī'āb, IV, 1452f; al-Fāsi, Iqd, VII, 292; Ibn al-Husayn, Anbā', f4a.

(133) I, 1998.



Jarīr b. °Abd Allāh and Farwah b. Musayk joined his army. (134)
 When Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth and °Amr b. Ma°dī Karib, who were
 camped in the mountains between Ṣan°ā and Najrān, learned
 of the arrival of al-Muhājir from the north and °Ikrimah b.
 Abī Jahl, (sent from Medina to Oman) from the south, they
 were afraid of the consequences and submitted unconditionally.
 Al-Muhājir arrested them and delivered them to Medina. (135)

In 11/632-3, al-Muhājir afterwards marched southward
 to Ṣan°ā where he met the rest of Qays' followers in °Ajīb
 where the latter were defeated. Their survivors withdrew to
 Tihāmah. There they were met by °Abd Allāh b. Umayyah, a
 Muslim general who was sent by al-Muhājir to the area,
 who put them to flight. (136)

Al-Muhājir entered Ṣan°ā in 11/632-3 following the
 rebels of the Yemeni tribes around the town to get rid of
 them. (137) In the meantime °Ikrimah b. Abī Jahl was near
 Abyan coming from Oman via Mahrah territory. (138) When
 al-Muhājir had finished his first task, he marched eastwards
 to Ḥaḍramawt, in particular to B. Mu°āwiyah, of Kindah,
 territory, to support the Muslims there. °Ikrimah, however,
 found the situation stable in Abyan and therefore moved to
 the north-east following al-Muhājir. They met each

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- (134) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 35; Ibn Khaldūn,
 °Ibar, II, 863f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 52; °Asjad, 14;
 Ibn al-Dayba°, Bughyat, 22; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā°, f4a.
- (135) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn al-Dayba°, Qurrat, I, 77.
- (136) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 35. °Ajīb or
 Ghūlat °Ajīb a village between Raydah and Khamir. For
 the exact location, see Wilson, "Mapping", 358, 390.
 See also Map 4.
- (137) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Khaldūn, °Ibar, II, 864.
- (138) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1995f; al-Fāsī, °Iqd, VI, 121.

other at Ma³rib. (139)

In Ma³rib al-Muhājir received a letter from Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative in Ḥaḍramawt, urging him to give his support. He immediately left the rest of the army under the leadership of ^cIkrimah and went to Ḥaḍramawt. (140) Al-Muhājir met the rebels in Maḥjar al-Zurqān and the latter were defeated and retreated to al-Nujayr fort. (141) B. Mu^cāwiyah's rebels failed to free themselves from the siege of the fort. When ^cIkrimah rejoined al-Muhājir to press further with the siege, (142) B. Mu^cāwiyah found themselves in an impossible situation and were obliged to surrender. So al-Ash^cath, the leader of the rebels signed an agreement with the Muslim leaders to open the gate of the fort, provided he and his clan were given safe conduct. (143) This agreement indeed put an end to the rebellion and the Muslims gained a foothold in the area. Moreover they ended the strongest and most dangerous rebellion in the Yemen in that era. In the following year, i.e. 12/633-4, Abū Bakr's envoy, Anas b. Mālīk, arrived in the country appealing to the Yemeni tribes to join the conquest.

(139) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257.


(140) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006. For the routes of al-Muhājir and ^cIkrimah, cf. Map 4.

(141) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006; Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 136f; Ibn al-Athīr. Kāmil, II, 259.


(142) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259.

(143) Cf. Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2009; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259f; Hamīdullah, Wathā³iq, 278.

Table 3



MAP 4 THE YEMEN DURING THE EARLY PERIOD OF ABŪ BAKR'S CALIPHATE



P A R T T W O

CHAPTER IV

The Yemenis and the early Islamic conquests
during the caliphates of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar

(13-5/633-6)

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Abū Bakr had fought the rebellious tribes of Arabia, having considered that to be his first task. (1) These wars against the rebels, the Wars of Apostasy, constituted some of the most important events of the early period of the Orthodox Caliphs. The other important event mentioned in the historical sources is the actual movement which triggered off the Islamic conquests in Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633.

In fact the Wars of Apostasy developed into conquests in which the Medinan government directed its military activity into the neighbouring areas of the Persian and Byzantine Empires. (2)

The first Islamic expeditions in this conflict were focused on the border with the Persian Empire following the Caliph's decision to support B. Shaybān and B. ʿIjl,

(1) For the Yemeni rebellions, see Chapter III above. For other Arabian tribes, cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 101ff; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 103ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 13ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1851ff. See also Shoufānī, Al-Riddah, 71ff; Donner, Islamic conquests, 85 ff.

(2) See Ibn Khayyāṭ, 117; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 90; al-Dīnawarī, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2016-21; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f. These sources confirm that Muslim troops were transferred to the Iraqi border immediately after the end of the Wars of Apostasy. See also Lewis, Arabs in History, 52; Shaʿbān, Islamic History, I, 24; Donner, Islamic conquests, 177.

(Arabian tribes, both of Rabi^cah) who were in the neighbouring provinces of Iraq (at that time under the control of the Persian Empire) against the Persian forces.

In Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633, Abū Bakr ordered Khālīd b. al-Walīd, one of the key figures of the Muslim army, to move with his troops from al-Yamāmah to the Iraqi front.⁽³⁾ At the same time the caliph gave orders to one of the Companions, ^cAyyād b. Ghanm, to advance with his troops towards the Iraqi border.⁽⁴⁾

The first real movement of the conquest on the northern front with Syria (al-Shām) started when Abū Bakr sent a small force led by Khālīd b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, one of the Companions, to stay in Taymā^ṣ, on the border of Syria.⁽⁵⁾ We have no exact knowledge of when that expedition was sent; What is certain is that its main task was to protect the route of the Muslim troops which moved to this front in early 13/634.⁽⁶⁾

From the historical sources we know that there were two movements that made up the Islamic conquests, both of which took place in the first/seventh century. The first

(3) Ibid. Khālīd was camped in al-Yamāmah, an area in eastern Najd which was inhabited by B. Ḥanīfah, a branch of Rabi^cah, where he had defeated them in the battle of ^cAqrabā^ṣ.

(4) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2020; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f.

(5) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2079f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f. Ibn ^cAsākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 451. See also Hill, "The Mobility", 169; Donner, 113. For the location of Taymā^ṣ, see Yaqūt. Mu^cjam al-Buldān, II, 67.

(6) Ibid.

was during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61), and the second in the time of the Umayyads (41-132/661-750). The climax of the first series of conquests came in the early years of ^cUmar's caliphate, while the second reached its zenith during the caliphate of al-Walīd b. ^cAbd al-Malik, the sixth Umayyad ruler, 86-96/705-15. (7)

The Islamic conquests themselves are beyond the scope of this study; what we are concerned with is the role of the Yemeni tribes and their impact in the early stages of the conquests. In this research we shall be concentrating on the Yemeni tribes which migrated from their homeland, the Yemen, upon the Caliph's request for them to join the conquest movement. The Yemeni tribes which already inhabited the disputed areas, i.e. Ghassān, Quḍā^cah, Kalb and Judhām are not included in the present study.

However, it is not an easy matter to follow all the Islamic conquests, explaining the role of the Yemeni tribes in each. We shall follow the role of the Yemenis on the battle-fronts, both in Iraq and Syria, in the early stage of the conflict only. That period (13-5/633-6) indeed saw the peak of the first movement of the conquests and also witnessed the greatest participation by Yemeni tribes. These Yemenis indeed played a major role in fighting, commanding and negotiating in these conquests.

(7) For the Islamic conquests in this period, cf. Ibn Khayyāt, 299ff; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 423-7; al-Ya^cqūbī Tārīkh, II, 35f. See also al-Munajjid, Mu^cjam B. Umayyah, 189-91; Fayṣal, Ḥarakāt al-Fath al-Islāmī, 116ff.

A. The call of the Medinan government to the Yemeni tribes to join the conquests

After one year of war, Abū Bakr succeeded in putting down all the rebellious tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. By means of that war the caliph re-established the Medinan government's control over these tribes throughout Arabia. Therefore he appointed governors (wulāh) for the important provinces of the area, three of which were in the Yemen in al-Janad, Ṣan^cā' and Ḥaḍramawt. Consequently the Yemen, and in particular the above mentioned areas, rallied to the Islamic state, placing herself under the authority of the government in Medina. (8)

In spite of the outbreak of fighting on the Iraqi front, Abū Bakr's government did not need reinforcements from all the Arabs. At the early stages of the conflict on that front, the Muslim forces consisted of some of the Arabs of the border area such as B. Shaybān and B.^cIjl, who had been invading the Persian territories from time to time. It was sufficient for the Medinan government, however, to send Khālīd b. al-Walīd and ^cAyyād b. Ghanm to support these tribes, thus forming together the Muslim forces on that front in the early stages of the conquests. (9)

(8) For the full discussion of the establishment of the Islamic authority in these areas, see Chapter VI-A, above.

(9) These tribes had fought the Persian forces in the very early stages of the conflict, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 242f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 88f; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 11; al-Tabarī, I, 2018.

During 12/633 war officially broke out between the Islamic government and the Persian Empire. The Muslims were victorious and ultimately captured al-Ḥīrah, capital of that territory on the Euphrates. (10) The Yemeni tribes played no part as such in these battles during that early stage other than the role which was played by some of their chiefs e.g. Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (11)

Al-Balādhurī (12) mentions that Abū Bakr commanded Jarīr to support Khālīd b. al-Walīd's troops, which had received orders from Medina to move from al-Yamāmah to the Iraqi front. Ibn al-Athīr (13) confirms this, adding that Jarīr joined Khālīd after the occupation of al-Ḥīrah in Rabīʿ I, 12/May-June, 633.

The historical sources, unfortunately, do not supply us with details of the composition of Jarīr's army, which joined him on the Iraqi front. Al-Azdī (14) however, records that two hundred warriors from Bajīlah, most of them from Jarīr's clan, Ahmas, accompanied Khālīd b. al-

(10) For the conflicts of this year, cf. al-Balādhurī, 242ff al-Dīnawarī, 111f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2037ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, II, 265f. See also Hill, Termination, 109f; Donner, 177ff.

(11) One of the key Yemeni chiefs who played a major role during the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen, as well as being one of the Companions. For Jarīr's biography, see Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, VI, 22; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, I, 239f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-Ghābah, I, 279f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, I, 242f; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 19-21.

(12) Futūḥ, 243.

(13) Kāmil, II, 268.

(14) Futūḥ, 66.

Walīd from Iraq to the Syrian front when war broke out there in early 13/633. Accordingly, we can assume that Jarīr was leading his own tribe, Bajīlah, when he was sent to the Iraqi front. (15) This information, of course, leads us to believe that some Yemenis joined the Muslim forces in the early stages of the battles on the Iraqi border in 12/633. But that participation was in a limited and unofficial capacity.

In fact there is no mention in the historical sources of a Yemeni presence, either on the Iraqi or Syrian front, before Ṣafar, 13/April-May, 634. The actual participation of the Yemeni tribes in these conquests began when Abū Bakr wrote to their chiefs appealing to them to join the Muslim troops encamped in al-Jarf on the outskirts of Medina. (16)

The idea behind Abū Bakr's call to the Yemeni tribes was his intention to invade Syria, relying on his government's influence over the Arabian tribes in the Peninsula. The caliph realised the value of such influence and worked on the unity of the Arab tribes by saying : "The Arabs belong to the same father and mother, so I intend to appeal to them to fight the Byzantines (al-Rūm) in Syria." (17)

Al-Wāqidī (18) records that Abū Bakr was intending to fulfil

(15) This supposition is safe, since we know that Jarīr led his own tribe in other military operations, e.g. when the Prophet sent him to destroy Dhū'l-Khalāṣah, idol of Khath'am and Bajīlah; in 10/632, and in the following year Abū Bakr ordered him to suppress the rebels in the northern plateau of the Yemen, see Chapter I, note 91.

(16) Al-Azdī, 11; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 116; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 223.

(17) Al-Azdī, 1.

(18) Futūḥ, I, 2.

the Prophet's wish by conquering Syria. Al-Balādhurī (19) mentions that the caliph's decision to invade Syria came immediately after the Wars of Apostasy. He thus wrote to the people of Mecca, al-Ṭā'if, the Yemen and all the Arabs in Najd and the Hijāz urging them to join the conquests. (20)

Both al-Azdī and Ibn ʿAsākir (21) agree that Abū Bakr and his advisers discussed the idea of writing first to the Yemeni tribes. This means that the Muslim leaders had put the Yemenis at the top of their list when they decided to appeal to the Arabian tribes. If this analysis is correct it shows how much importance was attached to the Yemeni tribes' contribution to the Muslim forces. In fact this is not difficult to believe when one compares these with the other Arabian tribes at that time, especially in military matters. It is known, for example that the people of al-Ṭā'if sent some men to Jurash, a Yemeni town, now in ʿAsīr, to be trained in the use of certain weapons, the catapult (manjanīq or ʿarrādah) and some form of armoured vehicle (dabbābah) when they heard that the Muslims had decided to invade their town in 8/628. (22)

(19) Futūḥ, 155.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Futūḥ, 5; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 128; Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, I, 445.

(22) Ibn Saʿd, Tabaqāt, I, 312, says ʿUrwah b. Masʿūd and Ghaylān b. Salamah, both from people of al-Ṭā'if were training in Jurash in the course of the siege of their town. Cf. also al-Diyār-bakrī, II, 110. The Muslims also used such weapons when they sieged al-Ṭā'if; they brought them from the Yemen through such Yemenis as al-Tufayl al-Dawsī; Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 128; al-Diyār-bakrī, II, 110. See also Hill, "The Mobility", 117.

When Abū Bakr and his advisers decided to invade Syria, they sent Anas b. Mālik to the Yemen, urging the Yemeni chiefs to join the Muslim troops with their tribes. (23) This invitation was indeed the first official call from the Medinan government to the Yemenis to join the conquests. However, that call was directed only to those Yemenis in the Yemen who had not rebelled against Islamic authority during the period of Apostasy. (24) We know that during the Wars of Apostasy some Yemeni chiefs, such as ʿAmr b. Maʿdī Karib al-Zubaydī and al-Ashʿath b. Qays al-Kindī, appeared as opponents of Islamic authority in the Yemen. (25) The majority of Arab historians, however, agree that such people did not appear among the Yemeni chiefs who joined the Islamic troops during Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (26)

Anas b. Mālik, Abū Bakr's envoy to the Yemen, tells us that the Yemenis became enthusiastic when he read the caliph's letter to them. (27) The Yemeni tribes, therefore,

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- (23) Al-Azdī, 5f ; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 1; Ibn ʿAsākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 445f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 187; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 222; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 169.
- (24) In keeping with Abū Bakr's policy, apostates were not accepted in the Muslim armies. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2081; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 262.
- (25) Cf. Chapter II and III above. For the former see in particular II C. ; for the latter III B b-c.
- (26) Both al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 11f and al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3, do not mention such people among the first Yemeni chiefs who arrived in Medina after Abū Bakr's call; Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218, 2222 mentions their coming to Medina during ʿUmar's Caliphate, when the latter equipped Saʿd's army.
- (27) Cf. al-Azdī, 6f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 169.

began to leave for the battle-fronts, participating in the early stages of the Islamic conquests. Medina, the centre of Islamic government, was their first stop. Himyar was the first Yemeni tribal group to arrive in Medina, led by Dhū^l-Kalā^c al-Himyarī, one of the leading figures of Himyar. Then followed Madhḥij, led by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, and al-Azd under the leadership of Jandab b. ^cAmr al-Dawsī. (28)

Our historical sources do not give a precise time for the arrival of these tribes in Medina; nevertheless they must have arrived before Ṣafar, 13/April-May, 634. According to al-Azdī, (29) Abū ^cUbaydah b. al-Jarrāḥ, one of the Companions and leader of the Islamic armies on the Syrian front during ^cUmar's caliphate, was waiting with his army for the arrival of the tribes, to whose chiefs Abū Bakr had written. Some historians confirm that Abū ^cUbaydah left Medina for the Syrian front in early Ṣafar, 13/April, 634, as soon as the Yemeni tribes arrived in Medina. (30) So Madhḥij, led by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, accompanied him to that front. (31)

Himyar, the first Yemeni tribe, arrived in Medina and appeared among the Muslim troops in the very early stages of the conflict on the Syrian front. (32) Al-

(28) Al-Azdī, 11f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Akwa^c, Wathā⁹iq, 169.

(29) Futūḥ, 11.

(30) Ibn Khayyāt, 119; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 116.

(31) Al-Azdī, 21.

(32) Before Ṣafar 13/April 634, Abū Bakr sent Khālīd b. Sa^cīd, commanding him to stay in Taymā⁹, but the latter attacked the Byzantine forces which were led by Bāḥān. Khālīd was defeated and then sent to the Caliph asking for help. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2079; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil II, 276; Cf. also al-Azdī, 8; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3; and Donner, 113.

Tabarī records that Abū Bakr supported Khālid b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ by despatching the first Yemeni reinforcements led by Dhū^ol-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī. Thus, the Yemenis participated with the Islamic forces in their early conflict with the Byzantine forces in Syria.

Thereafter, the Yemeni tribes joined the Muslim forces in Syria, passing through Medina on their way to the battlefield. A few days after the departure of the Muslim armies, more Yemeni tribes arrived in Medina. Ibn Dhī^ol-Sahmayn al-Khath^camī, a Khath^camī chief, arrived in Medina with about one thousand men from Khath^cam, seeking to join the Muslim forces. (33) Two thousand men from Hamdān led by Ḥumrah b. Mālik al-Hamdānī, one of the chiefs of Hamdān, also arrived in Medina. (34) They were both directed to the Syrian front; the former joined Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān's army while the latter was placed under Abū ^cUbaydah's command. (35)

In fact these Yemeni tribes came to be the most important Yemeni reinforcements to join the Islamic forces in Syria during the last six months of Abū Bakr's caliphate (Muḥarram-Jumādā II, 13/March-September, 634).

(33) Al-Azdī, 20.

(34) Al-Azdī, 31-3.

(35) For the former, cf. al-Azdī, 20; for the latter see *ibid*, 33. Abū Bakr equipped four separate armies to invade Syria led by four Muslim leaders: Abū ^cUbaydah Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasanah and ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ and he directed them to all the Syrian territories; cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 119; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 115f. See also Hill, *The Termination*, 75f; Donner, 114.

In Jumādā II, 13/September, 634, ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb became the second caliph in Islam after Abū Bakr's death. In the early period of the new caliph, conflicts between the Muslims and their enemies reached a climax. Accordingly the new regime renewed their invitations to the Arab tribes to provide military assistance. ^cUmar succeeded in assembling a great number of the warriors from the Arabian tribes, among whom were many Yemenis. Al-Wāqidī (36) explains the assembling of Arab tribes by saying that the victories which the Muslims gained on the Syrian front after the battle of Ajnādayn encouraged the Arabs to join the Muslim troops. We should add ^cUmar's deliberate policy of attracting the Arab tribes into the military and this gave the opportunity to all Muslims including apostates (murtaddūn) to join the Muslim forces. (37)

Al-Wāqidī records that when ^cUmar was attending the dawn prayer, six hundred Yemenis from Ṣadwān, Sabā and Ḥaḍramawt arrived in Medina, plus another four hundred men from different Yemeni provinces. (38) Both groups asked

(36) Futūḥ, I, 38.

(37) We know that Abū Bakr did not permit apostates to join the Muslim forces and therefore he ordered his commanders not to recruit them. For Abū Bakr's instructions to his commanders on this point, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2081, 2225; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 276. But ^cUmar cancelled this instruction as soon as he came in power, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2165.

(38) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 109f, 166. Ṣadwān; there is no mention of this area in the geographical sources at our disposal. The author probably means here Ṣudā', the name of a province (mikhlaḥ) in the Yemen (cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 159; Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-Buldān, II, 397; Smith, The Ayyubids, II, 207; or he means Ṣadūr, a wadi in Sarw Madhhij, cf. also Ṣifat, I, 89.

the caliph if they could join the Muslim troops on the Syrian front. It seems that these groups arrived in Medina during the first six months of ^cUmar's caliphate, as they were directed to the Syrian front.

After the battle of the Bridge in Sha^cbān, 13/October, 634, ^cUmar decided to escalate the fighting on the northern eastern front, Iraq and Persia. (39) Accordingly reinforcements had to be sent to this front. The caliph, therefore, urged Muslims to go there, but many, especially the Yemeni tribes, refused, preferring to join the Muslim forces on the Syrian front. (40) So ^cUmar wrote to his representatives amongst the Arab tribes ordering them to send him all their able-bodied tribesmen. (41) Immediately a huge number of these tribes converged on Medina seeking to participate in the conquests; among them were many Yemenis.

Thus the Yemeni tribes were now heavily involved at this stage. Yet some of them persisted in their desire to join the Muslim armies in Syria. ^cUmar eventually succeeded in directing them to the Iraqi front. Some historians (42) record that a group from al-Azd came to Medina asking to join the Muslim armies in Syria, but the caliph ordered them to support the Muslims in the Iraqi border, promising

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- (39) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2182; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. In that battle the Muslims had been defeated and their commander, Abū ^cUbayd al-Thaqafī, was killed.
- (40) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183, 2186, 2187, 2218, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. Cf. also 127-^o belo
- (41) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2211
- (42) E.g. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2187f the latter(citing Abū Mikhnaf).

them the booty of Chosroos, the Emperor of Persia. Another Yemeni group from Khath^eam arrived in Medina and was directed to the Iraqi front. (43)

A large Yemeni group from Bajīlah appeared at that stage of the fighting on the Iraqi border. This tribe had been of importance but had been scattered among other Arabian tribes at that time. (44) One of the important chiefs of this tribe, Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh, had wanted to re-unite his tribe, the Bajīlah, and had asked Abū Bakr to do so, but the caliph had not paid much attention to Jarīr's wishes. (45) When ^cUmar came to power, Jarīr asked him to fulfil this previous request. The caliph agreed and duly wrote to his representatives among the Arabian tribes, ordering them to separate all those who came originally from Bajīlah and send them to Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh. (46)

(43) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2188.

(44) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2223; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 390, says that they were scattered after their defeat by B. Kalb b. Wabarah, the Arabian tribe, in the battle of al-Fijār; cf. also al-Nuss, al-ʿAṣabiyyah al-Qabaliyyah, 47.

(45) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2223; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183; Ibn Ḥazm, 387; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303.

On this occasion an Arab Poet said praising Jarīr;

لَوْلَا جَرِيرٌ هَلَكَتْ بِجَيْلِهِ نَعَمَ النَّاسِ وَبَسَّتِ الْقَبِيلَهُ

Were it not for Jarīr, Bajīlah would have perished;

What a fine youth! What an evil tribe*

* Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, I, 238.

This was carried out successfully. In this way ^cUmar succeeded in creating a great Yemeni force which supported the Muslim army on the Iraqi border at that time.

All those Yemenis who had been sent to the Iraqi front at that stage of the conflict were indeed the first of the official Yemeni reinforcements to join the Muslim forces there. Their arrival was definitely before the battle of al-Buwayb in 14/635, which took place in Iraq between the Muslims and the Persian forces, with the latter being defeated. (47)

In this same year after the battle, a new army began to assemble near Medina in compliance with the caliph's call. ^cUmar himself, amid popular applause, declared his intention of leading it in person, but allowed himself to be dissuaded by his principal advisers, who recommended Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, cousin of the Prophet and one of the earliest converts to Islam, as commander of the new reinforcements for Iraq. (48) Al-Ṭabarī records that when ^cUmar wrote to the Arabs urging them to join Sa^cd's army, he said "By God, I will attack the Kings of Persia with the Kings of the Arabs." (49)

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- (47) The Yemenis appeared among the Muslim army in that battle led by Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh, cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253-5; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2184ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303-5. See also Kamāl, al-Ṭarīq ilā 'L-Madā'in, 424ff; Fayṣal, Ḥarakāt, 51-3; Donner, 200.
- (48) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 172f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 255; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2212ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 309f. Cf. also Glubb, Arab Conquests, 189; Kamāl, al-Qādisiyyah, 12ff.
- (49) I, 2223.

Historical sources mention the Yemeni tribes which answered the caliph's call. A group of some two thousand three hundred men from some Yemeni tribes, mostly Madhḥij, came to Medina. (50) They were followed by four hundred Yemeni warriors from al-Sakūn, a branch of Kindah, led by two of their chiefs, al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr and Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj. (51) Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ left Medina with four thousand men, three thousand of whom were from the Yemen. (52) While he was encamped at Sharāf, a collection of wells in Najd, a further one thousand, seven hundred Yemenis joined his army. (53)

These Yemenis who joined the Muslim forces during the caliphate of Abū Bakr and ^cUmar came from most of the Yemeni tribes. Later, without exception, they settled down permanently in the garrison towns (amṣār) of the conquered provinces.

(50) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 310; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 917.

(51) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2220f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 310.

(52) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 917; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VII, 36; cf. Also Glubb, 189.

(53) Led by al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311. For the location of Sharāf, cf. Yaqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 331; see also Glubb, 191, map XXIV ('the campaign of Qādasiya').

B. The Yemeni groups at the battle fronts

Medina, the centre of the caliphate, was the first station from which volunteers were sent to the battle fronts. In 13/634-5, the Medinan government concentrated its military activity on the Syrian front. Accordingly, volunteers were sent there.⁽⁵⁴⁾ But, when ʿUmar decided to escalate the conflict on the Iraqi front after the battle of the Bridge, he redirected the reinforcements to that border.⁽⁵⁵⁾ In short it can be said that the role of the Yemeni tribes on both fronts cannot be ignored. We shall, therefore, discuss their presence on these fronts in detail.

a. The Yemenis on the northern front - Syria

Al-Azdī⁽⁵⁶⁾ says that Rabīʿah, Tamīm and Asad were concentrated on the Iraqi front, since this area was their homeland. The Yemenis, however, formed the bulk of the Muslim troops in Syria and, therefore, adopted this as their homeland. The Yemeni tribes' presence with the Muslim forces in Syria has been extensively documented in the historical sources.⁽⁵⁷⁾

As has already been mentioned, Abū ʿUbaydah's army, the fourth Muslim army to leave Medina for Syria on Ṣafar

(54) For their arrival during this period, cf. al-Azdī, 11ff; al-Wāqidi, Futūḥ, I, 3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2082ff
cf. also II5 ff above

(55) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, II, 303.

(56) Futūḥ, 12.

(57) Cf. al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 12ff; al-Wāqidi, Futūḥ, 3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2078ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 275ff.

13/April-May, 634, was awaiting the arrival of the Arabian tribes, including the Yemenis. (58) Some historians (59) record that Abū Bakr sent all the Yemeni tribes arriving in Medina in answer to his call to the Syrian front under the command of his leaders. In fact on this front it was rare to find Muslim troops without Yemenis among them and consequently many of them were killed at the beginning of the fighting in the early stages of the conquests. (60)

The Yemenis took part in all the decisive battles on this front. In the battle of Ajnādayn, (Jumādā, I, 13/July, 634) between the Muslims and Byzantines in Palestine in which the latter were defeated, the Yemeni tribes took part, some of their chiefs appearing on the battlefield. One of them, °Abd Allāh b. °Amr b. al-Ṭufayl al-Azdī, was killed (61) while Dhū° l-Kalā° al-Ḥimyarī and Qays b. °Abd Yaghūth al-Murādī appeared amongst the Muslim leaders. (62) At the time of the Muslim siege of Damascus, Abū °Ubaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim forces there, sent one of his armies led by Dhū° l-Kalā°, one of the Yemeni leaders, to stand by between Ḥims

(58) See 115 above.

(59) See 115-6 above. also al-Azdī, 12ff; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, 3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2079ff.

(60) In Palestine, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 11, who describes the fighting by saying "The Muslims lost many of their soldiers, most of them from the Yemen."

(61) Cf. al-Azdī, 79; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 147; Ibn °Abd al-Barr, III, 956; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 111.

(62) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 32.

Damascus.⁽⁶³⁾ The rest of **the Yemenis** took part with the Muslim armies in the siege of the city.⁽⁶⁴⁾

When one reads of the conquest of Ḥiṣṣ, 15/636, in the primary sources, one has no doubt that the city was conquered by a purely Yemeni army. According to al-Balādhurī,⁽⁶⁵⁾ the Muslim army which conquered Ḥiṣṣ was under the command of al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, one of the leading chiefs of Kindah. Al-Ṭabarī⁽⁶⁶⁾ confirms the participation of B. Mu^cāwiyah and al-Sakūn, tribes of Kindah, amongst the warriors. Al-Wāqidī's⁽⁶⁷⁾ account of the number of Muslims who were killed in the course of the battles for the town of Ḥiṣṣ indicates that two hundred and thirty-five men were killed, all from Ḥimyar and Hamdān, except thirty men from Mecca. Dhū³ l-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī and his troops were surrounding Ḥiṣṣ when the Muslims arrived there.⁽⁶⁸⁾ These statements indeed lead us to believe that the Yemenis played a major role in conquering Ḥiṣṣ. As a consequence of this role, Abū^c Ubaydah authorized some of their chiefs to divide the land belonging to the city amongst the Muslims.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Ḥiṣṣ, therefore, became a predominately Yemeni city.⁽⁷⁰⁾

(63) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2151.

(64) For the blockade of Damascus, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 39ff; Ibn Asākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 493.

(65) Futūḥ, 137.

(66) I, 2392. For the clans of Kindah, cf. Table 3.

(67) Futūḥ, I, 96.

(68) Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 340.

(69) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 137; Yāghūt, Mu^cjam, II, 303.

(70) Cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f; al-Maydānī, Majma^c, I, 294, Cf. also Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, I, 65.

Concrete evidence of a Yemeni presence on the Syrian front during the course of the battle of al-Yarmūk, a decisive struggle in the area of Jordan which took place in 15/636, is given by al-Azdī, who describes the distribution of the Muslim forces at this battle as follows: "The Muslims were gathered around their flags and the Arab notables appeared with their own people. A third of the army was from al-Azd, but the majority of the people were from Ḥimyar. Also Hamdān, Khawlān, Madhhij, Khath^cam, Ḥaḍramawt and Kindah were there. So the majority of the army was made up of the Yemenis (ahl al-Yaman)". (71) Al-Wāqidī reports the battle too, saying, "The right flank of the army consisted of men from al-Azd, Madhhij, Ḥaḍramawt and Khawlān." (72) Al-Kūfī records the Yemeni presence in this battle by saying: "Thus the Yemeni tribes were spread amongst all the divisions of the Muslim army." (73) There is probably some exaggeration in this description, but it does illustrate the fact that the Yemeni participation was greater than that of the other Arabian tribes in the conquest of Syria.

After the battle of al-Yarmūk, the Muslims intended to conquer Jerusalem. Abū ^cUbaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, sent several independent troops, formed

(71) Futūḥ, 195; he also mentions Qudā^cah, Lakhm, Judhām, Ghassān and ^cAmilah amongst the Yemeni tribes, but these tribes fall outside our present topic as already mentioned. See 109 above.

(72) Futūḥ, I, 127.

(73) Futūḥ, I, 255, he also mentions Qudā^cah, Lakhm and Judhām.

mostly from the Yemenis to that city. (74) According to al-Wāqidī, (75) when the Muslim armies dispersed after the occupation of Jerusalem, seventeen thousand warriors remained with Abū^c Ubaydah, most of whom were from the Yemen. Four thousand men, all of them from^c Akk, a Yemeni tribe, accompanied^c Amr b. al-Āṣ, one of the key figures of the conquests and one of the Companions, when he left Syria to conquer Egypt in 19/640. (76)

The accuracy of the actual numbers may be questioned, but it can be demonstrated that the Yemeni tribes were in the majority. This is presumably why the historians mention them more than other Arabian tribes, especially on that front.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the Yemeni tribes which joined the Muslim forces in Syria played a major role in reinforcing the army on this front, and constituted the majority.

b. The Yemenis on the north-eastern front - Iraq and Persia

The first indication of a declaration of war against the Persian Empire came in Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633, when Abū Bakr gave orders to Khālīd b. al-Walīd and^c Ayyād b. Ghanm to move with their troops to the Iraqi border. (77) This means that the Muslim forces had moved to the Iraqi

(74) Cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 144.

(75) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 155.

(76) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125; Ibn^c Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, II, 56. In al-Kindī, al-Wulāḥ wa'l-Qudāḥ, 8, three thousand, five hundred, a third of them from Ghāfiq, a branch of^c Akk.

(77) Cf. 108 above.

front at least twelve months before Abū Bakr's appeal to the Yemeni tribes. (78) When ʿUmar stepped up the war on the Iraqi front after the defeat of the Muslim army at the battle of the bridge in Shaʿbān, 13/October, 634, the official Yemeni reinforcements were directed to this front. (79) Therefore in the following year, 14/635, the Yemenis appeared amongst the Muslim army at the Battle of al-Buwayb, led by Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (80) This is indeed the first Yemeni involvement mentioned in the historical sources.

These Yemeni tribes had preferred to join the Muslim army in Syria. But because of the critical situation on the Iraqi front after the failure of the Muslim forces at the battle of the Bridge, ʿUmar used diplomacy and promise of material gain to persuade them to join the Muslim troops on the Iraqi border. Al-Ṭabarī, following the account of al-Shaʿbī, (81) mentions that ʿUmar ordered Jarīr b. ʿAbd

(78) For the first coming of the official Yemeni reinforcements, cf. 115 above.

(79) See 118 above.

(80) According to al-Ṭabarī, I, 2184, it was on Ramaḍān, 13/November, 634. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 129; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121 and al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 254, all confirm that it took place in 14/635, with the addition that the latter says, according to Bajīlah's allegation, the Muslim army was under the command of Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh.

(81) I, 2186; cf. also Ibn Ishāq's statement, *ibid*, 2200. ʿArfajah was a chief of Bajīlah before it was re-united; although he was not actually from Bajīlah, he was an ally from al-Azd. For his biography, cf. Ibn al-Athīr Uṣd al-Ghābah, III, 401; Ibn Ḥajar, IV, 235, cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 2186f.

Allāh al-Bajalī and ^cArfajah b. Harthamah to advance on Iraq, promising them that they would be re-united with their tribe. However, when Bajīlah assembled in Medina, they refused to go to the Iraqi front, preferring Syria. Because of their value as fighters ^cUmar persuaded them by promising them certain privileges if they agreed to join the Muslim forces in Iraq. (82) When al-Azd refused to advance there, ^cUmar tried to persuade them with the lure of the booty of Kisrā himself. (83) When they rejected to move to the Iraqi front the caliph divided al-Nakh^c into two divisions, sending one to Syria, while the second agreed eventually to join the Muslims in Iraq. (84)

One of the Arab commentators (85) puts forward the suggestion that the refusal was a result of the pessimistic outlook of the Arabs on that front, who believed that the Persian forces were superior in strength. In fact there was no difficulty in directing the other Arabian tribes, particularly Rabī^cah, to the north-eastern front. They were the first contingent of Muslim troops to fight

(82) In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303, one quarter of the fifth (al-khums). In al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 253, one quarter of the total spoils, but al-Sha^cbī says ^cUmar promised to give them one third of the spoils after the usual fifth had been taken. cf. Abū ^cUbayd, Amwāl, 79; al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 254. For the distribution of booty, see Abū Yūsuf, Kitab al-Kharāj, 18, al-Māwardī, ahkām, 126-37.

(83) Cf. 118-119 above.

(84) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218.

(85) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2159. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 297.

against the Persian forces in the very early stages of the conflict on the Iraqi border. (86) But the refusal to move there came mainly from the Yemeni tribes who preferred the northern front, as is mentioned above. (87) Some Arab historians justify that refusal by saying that they might well have wanted to join their kinsmen in Syria. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that the Yemenis wanted to move to Syria, while the Muḍaris preferred Iraq. Therefore ʿUmar said, "Your [i.e. the Yemenis'] blood bonds are much stronger. Why do the Muḍarīs not remember their kinsmen in Syria?" (88) This historian's views seem to be an acceptable explanation of the desire of the Yemenis to go to Syria.

In 14/636 ʿUmar equipped Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and his volunteers from the Arabian tribes, including three thousand Yemenis. (89) When Saʿd encamped on the Iraq border, the Muslim troops joined him there. This force consisted of

(86) Cf. al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 88-90; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 111; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 242f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2016ff.

(87) Cf. 127 above.

(88) I, 2222. Both Bajīlah and al-Azd declared openly their wishes to join their kinsmen in Syria, when they assembled in Medina, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2186f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. As far as I know the Yemeni tribes, i.e. Qaḥṭānī, the only Abab tribes who settled in Syria before Islam. However, it is most likely that ʿUmar meant these Muḍrarīs, from Quraysh and other Hijāzī tribes, who joined the early Muslim armies to this front.

(89) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 917; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 36; cf. also Glubb, Arabs Conquests, 189.

eighty thousand warriors, two thousand of whom were from the Yemen led by Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (90) In the following year, 15/637, Saʿd faced the Persian forces at al-Qādisiyyah, where the Persians were decisively defeated by the Muslim army.

In this battle Arab historians differ as to the total size of the Muslim army. Ibn Abī Hāzim (of Bajīlah and an eye witness in this battle) in al-Ṭabarī (91) says that six or seven thousand Muslim warriors were at al-Qādisiyyah, while al-Balādhurī (92) states that there were nine or ten thousand. Another account in al-Ṭabarī (93) gives more than thirty thousand. Al-Kūfī reports an even higher number as follows: "The Muslims numbered forty thousand, and twenty thousand came from Syria, making sixty thousand altogether at al-Qādisiyyah." (94) While one of the modern scholars (95) believes that no exact result can be obtained concerning the total size of the Muslim warriors in this battle another suggests between 6,000 to 12,000. (96) As a result of these uncertain accounts, it is difficult to settle for an actual number. (97) However, from the total number of

(90) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2221. These were the Yemenis who took part with the Muslim army in the battle of al-Buwayb, but most of them were from Bajīlah, cf. 127 above.

(91) I, 2356.

(92) Futūḥ, 256 (citing al-Wāqidī).

(93) I, 2222.

(94) Futūḥ, I, 201.

(95) Hill, "The Mobility", 122.

(96) Donner, Islamic conquests, 208, 221.

(97) It should perhaps be made clear that the very large number of troops quoted in the early histories can be taken only with extreme caution. Many are undoubtedly exaggerated and the real point the present writer tries to make is that the Yemenis formed a very high percentage of the whole of the Islamic armies in this front.

the Yemeni reinforcements joining Sa^cd's army before al-Qādisiyyah, confirmed above, it can be satisfactorily concluded that the total size of the Yemeni warriors was about seven thousand in this battle.⁽⁹⁸⁾ Within two years this number increased to twelve thousand Yemenis in Kufa alone. ⁽⁹⁹⁾

C. Yemeni participation in the command of the Muslim troops and in the negotiations at the battle fronts

The Yemeni tribes' involvement was without doubt simultaneous with the movement of the conquests in their early stages and they contributed to the struggle at the battle fronts. Some of their tribal chiefs took part in the command of the Islamic armies and in negotiations with the enemy. A few Yemeni chiefs had had the opportunity of assuming command during Abū Bakr's caliphate. These were mainly Companions such as Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī; ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ or those who had supported Islamic authority in the Yemen during the Wars of Apostasy, such as al-Simt b. al-Aswad al-Kindī and Imru^ḡ al-Qays b. ^cĀbis, both from Kindah; ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ or those who were neutral in these wars, such

(98) We know that Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ left Medina with four thousand men, of whom three thousand were Yemenis; and one thousand, seven hundred, also Yemenis, joined him in Sharaf, cf. 121 above. Add to this two thousand who were already at the front, see 130 above; as well as some Yemenis who came from the Syrian front reinforcing the Muslims in Iraq, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2367f.

(99) This number appears at the early establishment of Kufa, see 151 below.

(100) For the biography of Jarīr, cf. Chapter I, note 91.

(101) For their role, cf. 92 above, Chapter III, B.c. 'The political situation in Ḥaḍramawt (Ziyad supporters)

as Dhū 'l-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī. (102)

When ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb came to power, the Medinan government changed its policy towards apostates. (103)

The new caliph gave them the opportunity to join the Muslim armies, as well as his permission for them to lead troops provided that it was not more than one hundred men. (104)

Consequently many Yemeni chiefs appeared among the Muslim commanders and the negotiations in the course of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

a. Yemeni participation in the Islamic command

The Yemeni tribes who arrived in Medina are recorded in the historical sources as being separate tribal groups led by their own chiefs. (105) Those chiefs submitted to the general command as soon as their people joined the Muslim troops in Medina. (106) The Yemeni chiefs, therefore, had no chance to lead any of the Muslim armies from Medina to the battle fronts, with the single exception of Jarīr

b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. His name appears among the Muslim commanders, when Abū Bakr sent him with troops to reinforce the Muslim forces, in Iraq in early Muḥarram, 12/March, 633. (107) In Iraq Jarīr took part in some of the military

(102) For the Ḥimyarīs' chiefs attitude in these wars, cf. Chapter II F, "The Prophet's action to put down Abhalah's regime". And Chapter III, A, d, "The local attitude towards the rebellion", i.e. the rebellion of Qays b. 'Abd Yaghūth.

(103) Cf. 117 above.

(104) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2165.

(105) See A. above : "The call of the Medinan government in the Yemeni tribes to join the conquests."

(106) Ibid.

(107) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 243; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 268.

operations and led the Muslim troops which successfully invaded Bāniqyā, a town near Kufa. (108) Nevertheless Jarīr was not mentioned in the historical sources as a Yemeni chief in command of a specific Yemeni group; rather he was leading a general Islamic contingent.

As has already been mentioned, when ^cUmar came to power many of the Arabs hurried to Medina seeking to participate in the conquests. (109) These tribes were generally led by their local chiefs. This was true of the Yemenis who also appear among these tribes and who were generally under the leadership of one of their own chiefs. These had been authorised to lead their people by the caliph himself, especially ^cUmar, as soon as they arrived in Medina.

Al-Ṭabarī⁽¹¹⁰⁾ records that ^cUmar appointed ^cArfajah b. Harthamah over al-Azd and Ghālib b. ^cAbd Allāh over Kinānah before he directed their tribes to the Iraqi front. When Kindah arrived in Medina, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ, a Kindī chief, succeeded to the leadership of his tribe, after a power struggle with al-Ash^cath b. Qays. (111) Jarīr b. ^cAbd

(108) Al-Azdī, 57; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ 246. For the location of the town cf. Yaqūt, Mu^cjam al-Buldān, I, 331f.

(109) Especially after he decided to escalate the fighting on the Iraqi front, see 118 above.

(110) Cf. I, 2188, who calls ^cArfajah al-Bāriqī, nisbah of his clan Bāriq from al-Azd. Also Ghālib was from Kinānah itself.

(111) Al-Sha^cbī justifies this by pointing to the former's role against the apostates when he took sides with the Muslim troops in Ḥaḍramawt during the Wars of Apostasy there, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2225; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 200.

Allāh disapproved when ʿUmar intended to appoint another over Bajīlah. (112) Therefore, most of the Yemeni chiefs who appeared as leaders on the battle fronts were normally in command of their own tribes.

As for the Syrian front, al-Wāqidī (113) tells us that at the siege of Damascus in 13/634-5, Khālīd b. al-Walīd, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim forces in Syria at that time, appointed Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī over his own tribe, Madhḥij, and commanded him to protect the gate of al-Faraj. After Damascus had been captured, according to al-Ṭabarī, (114) Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Muslim commanders in Syria, stayed with the three Yemeni leaders to help protect the town. At the conquest of Ḥimṣ in 15/636, B. Muʿāwiyah and al-Sakūn, branches of Kindah, were led by some of their own chiefs. (115)

In the Battle of al-Yarmūk in 15/636, Muslim forces were divided into military divisions. (116) Some of the Yemeni chiefs, such as Dhūʿl-Kalāʿ al-Ḥimyarī, Muʿāwiyah b. Ḥudayj, Ḥawshab Dhū Zūlaym and al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad, were in command. (117) These chiefs were the leaders of some of

(112) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2201.

(113) Futūḥ, I, 39.

(114) I, 2154, those were ʿAmr b. Ṣhimmar b. Ghaziyyah, Saḥm b. al-Musāfir and Mushāfi b. ʿAbd Allāh, cf. also Ibn Ḥajar III, V, 116, 171.

(115) Those were al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad over B. Muʿāwiyah and al-Ashʿath b. Miʿnās and Imruʿ al-Qays b. ʿĀbis over al-Sakūn; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2392; see also al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 137, and Yāqūt, Muʿjam, II, 303, both confirm that the first Muslim troops to conquer the town were under the command of al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad.

(116) Cf. al-Azdī, 194; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 125; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2092-5.

(117) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2094. Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 125, mentions Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth as one of the Muslim Commanders.

these military divisions and it is probable that they were in command of their own tribes also. (118) We know that Zubayd, a Yemeni tribe of Madhḥij, elected ʿAmr b. Maʿdī Karib al-Zubaydī, one of the chief figures of the tribe, as their leader in this battle. (119) Some of the Yemeni chiefs had lost their leadership within their own tribes at the battle of Yarmūk. Thus they asked Abū ʿUbaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, to re-appoint them over their own tribes. (120) Abū ʿUbaydah promised them that he would do so after the battle. (121) Consequently one of them, Mālik b. al-Ashtar, appeared leading his own tribe, al-Nakh^c, pursuing the survivors of the Byzantine army from al-Yarmūk. (122)

On the Iraqi front, the Yemeni chiefs also appeared in command. As has already been mentioned, some of those had been appointed over their own tribe in Medina by the caliph himself. (123) One of them, Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī refused to come under the command of al-Muthannā b. Ḥārithah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army in Iraq at that time, when the former arrived on the Iraqi

(118) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2094.

(119) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 127; al-Kūfī, I, 159.

(120) These are al-Nakh^c and Khath^{cam}, cf. al-Azdī, 208-10.

(121) Ibid.

(122) Al-Azdī, 214-7.

(123) Cf. 133 above.

border. He declared "You are [i.e. al-Muthannā] a commander and I am a commander too." (124) Accordingly, the Yemeni reinforcements, which had been directed to Iraqi front at that time, appeared in the battle of al-Buwayb in 14/635 as a separate Yemeni force under the command of Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh. (125)

A full record of the Yemeni participation in command of the Muslim armies on the Iraqi front is contained in the accounts of the battle of al-Qādisiyyah in 15/636, when the Persians were decisively defeated. In this battle some of the Yemeni leaders had been appointed by Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic forces there at that time. According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (126) Saʿd appointed Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī on the left flank of the Muslim army in this battle. Al-Kūfī (127) mentions that ʿAmr b. Maʿdī Karib and Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh, both Yemenis, led the right flank of the Muslim army, which consisted of ten thousand men, on behalf of Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ. In spite of the contradictions in these statements, what is clear is that the Yemenis did indeed participate in positions of command in this decisive battle.

(124) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2201 (citing Ibn Ishāq).

(125) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 254; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2188. Cf. also note 47 above.

(126) I, 2225; al-Kāmil, II, 310. In Ibn Ishāq's account in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2353, Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh on the right flank and Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth on the left, both Yemenis.

(127) Futūḥ, I, 201.

Even those Yemeni chiefs who had no positions of command appeared leading and encouraging their own tribes during the battle. (128)

b. Yemeni participation in negotiations

We have already seen the extent of the Yemeni involvement in the Islamic command; now we shall discuss their role in the negotiations which took place between groups of the Muslims themselves or with their enemies on the battle fronts.

In fact the caliphs paid more attention than usual to the Yemeni chiefs on their arrival in Medina. (129) Their advice was taken seriously by the Muslim leaders, especially during Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (130) It was the latter who gave chiefs the choice of joining whichever Muslim troops they preferred. (131)

(128) Such as Durayd b. Ka^cb al-Nakh^cī and al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī. The former appeared leading his own tribe, al-Nakh^c; while the latter and other Yemeni chiefs were encouraging their own tribes at al-Qādisiyyah; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2330-6; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 334-7.

(129) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Azdī, 7; both record the warm reception of the Yemeni tribes by the Caliph of Abu Bakr as soon as they come to Medina.

(130) Cf. Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī's suggestion to the caliph, when he advised him to send the troops quickly to the battle front; al-Azdī, 7; in al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3, a group of the Yemeni chiefs advised Abū Bakr to do so.

(131) Cf. al-Azdī, 20, 31-33.

It seems that the caliphs realised the advantage of the Yemeni chiefs' participation in negotiations. So Abū Bakr ordered Abū ^cUbaydah, while equipping him in Medina, to take seriously the advice and proposals of Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī by saying "A great man will accompany you and the Muslims must listen to his proposals." (132) Ibn al-Athīr (133) records that when ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb ordered ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib, a Yemeni chief, to move from Syria to the Iraqi front, he wrote to Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqās, the commander-in-chief on that front, instructing him to consult ^cAmr in all military affairs. Therefore, some of them such as Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth, appeared amongst the foremost of the Muslim planners, when they were discussing the situation before the battle of al-Yarmūk in 15/636 in Syria. (134)

Some of the Yemeni chiefs are also mentioned among the Islamic delegations which met their enemies on the battle fronts. On the Syrian front some of them, e.g. Dhū ³l-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī, and Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, joined Khālīd b. al-Walīd, the spokesman of the Muslim delegation, when he went to meet the commander-in-chief of the Byzantine armies, Bāhān, before the battle of al-Yarmūk. (135) Also some of them, such as al-Ash^cath b.

(132) Al-Azdī, 21.

(133) Usd, IV, 133.

(134) He appeared among the Muslim leaders giving his own ideas, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 99; al-Azdī, 168.

(135) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 113, adds Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī to that delegation. This, however, unlikely because he was on the Iraqi front at that time, cf. 119, 128, 130 above.

Qays al-Kindī and ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī, appeared among those who were sent to negotiate with the Persian Emperor before the battle of al-Qādisiyyah. (136)

In conclusion, this historical information leads us to believe that the Yemeni reinforcements played a major role in the victory of the Muslim armies in the early period of the Islamic conquests, especially on the Syrian front. Also, through these waves of migration, the Yemenis began direct contact with the Islamic government. They settled down with the Muslim troops in the conquered areas, even forming a majority in some of these towns. (137)

(136) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 258; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2236; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 315.

(137) Such as Hims and Kufa. For the former, cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324 f; al-Maydānī, Majma^c al-Amthāl, I. 294; Kurd, Khitāṭ, 65; al-Ḥadīthī, 150-9, for the latter, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; cf. also Massinon, "Explication du Plan de Kufa", 38ff; al-Ḥadīthī, 191-202. For the settlement of the Yemenis in the conquered areas, cf. Chapter V "The Yemeni settlement in the conquered provinces".

CHAPTER V

The Yemeni settlement in the Conquered Provinces

A. The Yemenis and the early settlements

In the previous chapter we saw the spread of the Yemeni tribes on the battle fronts, both in Syria and Iraq. They formed a high percentage of the Muslim warriors on these fronts, especially in Syria. (1) Later on they settled down in these provinces and constituted a large proportion of the Arab inhabitants there.

Some historians describe the movement of the Yemeni tribes to the battle fronts. In these descriptions some of the Yemenis appear with their families and property, leading us to believe that they intended to settle permanently in the disputed provinces. Ḥimyar, the first Yemeni tribe to answer Abū Bakr's call to participate in the conquests, appeared with their wives and children in Medina. Their leader, Dhū ʿl-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī is quoted as saying on meeting the caliph :

أَتَتْكَ حَيْمَرٌ بِأَهْلِهَا وَالْوَالِدِ أَهْلُ السَّوَابِقِ وَالْعَالِسُونَ بِالرَّتَبِ

"Ḥimyar came to you with their wives and their children people of good reputation in the past, and high rank." (2)

Other Yemeni tribes also arrived with their families in Medina and on the battle fronts. (3)

(1) Cf. Chapter IV, B.

(2) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2.

(3) Al-Tabarī, I, 2363, says there were one hundred women with Bajīlah and seven hundred with al-Nakh^c on the Iraqi front. See also al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 20, who records that Khath^cam came to Medina with their families.

As soon as the Muslim armies gained control of the disputed countries, ^cUmar gave his orders to their commanders to keep these conquered provinces under their sway by establishing the Muslims there. In this way the caliph created a new Islamic community drawn mainly from the Arabian tribes who originally formed the Muslim armies on these fronts and of whom many were from the Yemen.

Generally speaking each Yemeni tribe settled in the area which it had had a hand in conquering, although some of them had participated in fighting on more than one front. These tribes' intention, of course, was to reinforce the Muslim troops on some fronts; however we still find that tribal rivalries were behind some of these movements. It is well known that al-Sakūn, a Yemeni tribe of Kindah, accompanied Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army on the Iraqi front. (4) In Iraq they were relatively unknown, but when they moved to the Egyptian front they became one of the most famous of all the Arabian tribes. One of their leaders, Mu^c-āwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Sakūnī, was one of the Yemeni chiefs who divided the land amongst the Muslims at the establishment of al-Fuṣṭāṭ on behalf of ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim troops there. (5) Tribal relationships were also the motivating force behind the movement of some Yemenis from one front to another: some Madhḥij chiefs moved from Syria to the Iraqi front to join their own tribe there, later

(4) Cf. 121 above.

(5) Al-Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, II, 76; Ibn Duqmāq, Intiṣār, I, 3.

on becoming one of the most important groups in Kufa. (6)

Al-Simt̄ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, a chief of Kindah, asked
cUmar to re-unite him with his son Shurahbīl, who was in
Kufa, by either permitting him to move to Kufa or sending
his son to Hims̄. The latter subsequently moved to Hims̄ to
join his relatives. (7)

cUmar worked to establish his government's influence
over the conquered provinces by ordering his commanders,
particularly those in Iraq and Egypt, to build garrison
towns to accommodate their troops. In 14/635-6, he sent
cUtbah b. Ghazwān, one of the Companions, to reinforce the
Muslim troops in the south of Iraq, ordering him to establish
a military camp which later developed into what is now Basra.
Three years later, in 17/638-9, Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, began
the establishment of Kufa on behalf of the caliph. In Egypt
cUmar also gave his order to his commander, cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ,
to build a garrison town: cAmr established al-Fustāt in
21/641-2.

In Syria the Muslims did not build such garrison towns;
instead they stayed in local Syrian towns and occupied the
houses that had been deserted. (8) However, they began to

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- (6) Such as cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī, Qays b. cAbd
Yaghūth al-Murādī and Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī. For
their presence on Syrian front see 134-5 above. For cAmr's
transfer to Iraq, cf. Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, IV, 133; for Qays,
see al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 256, As for Mālik, we have no
account of his transfer there, but he appeared on the
Syrian front during the early conquests and established
himself in Kufa, cf. 135 above 208ff below. For the
realisation of Madhhij's power in Kufa, see Chapter VII.
- (7) The former was in Hims̄ at that time commanding his own
tribe, Kindah, cf. Ibn cAsākir, Tahdhīb, VI, 299; Ibn
Hajar, Iṣābah, III, 169.
- (8) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 155, who says the Arabs occupied
some houses after the departure of its inhabitants in
Bals and Qasrīn, two Syrian towns. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 154.

establish new villages on the outskirts of some of these Syrian towns. Villages were built to the north and west of Damascus where each tribal group occupied a village for itself. (9) The Yemeni tribes were among those who assisted in the establishment of these garrison towns in Iraq and Egypt and they were also among the first Arabian tribes to settle in Syrian territories.

In these new settlements the Yemeni tribes had their homes near to one another. Some of their branches (butūn), especially those with no real tribal power, joined the more powerful Yemeni groups in these towns; i.e. B. Sha^cbān b. ^cAmr, a batn of Ḥimyar, joined Hamdān in Kufa and those who were in Basra joined al-Azd, while those who were in al-Fustāṭ in Egypt came together with al-Ashā^cir. (10) Also B. Kurayb, a batn of Ḥimyar, joined al-Nakh^c in Kufa. (11) So in identifying the tribes in these conquered areas, the Yemenis were collectively regarded as one group. This Yemeni group is traditionally known as the People of the Yemen (ahl al-Yaman).

It is hoped that by mentioning the whereabouts of the Yemenis in the conquered provinces we shall be able to understand their real effect upon the uprising against ^cUthmān and the first Civil War. Some modern scholars

(9) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(10) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234f.

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150.

have studied in detail the settlement of the Arabian tribes in the conquered areas. One of them concentrated his study on the Yemeni tribes only, while others included them with the other Arabian tribes who settled in these conquered provinces. (12) This has made it unnecessary for us to go into such details to study their settlement. It is necessary only to illustrate briefly their concentration in these provinces. To give a clear picture of the proportion of Yemenis there, it is preferable to study their presence in each region separately, using tables to illustrate their branches.

a. The Yemeni tribes in Syria

Because the Yemeni tribes constituted a high proportion of the Muslim army which conquered Syria, we find that both early and modern historians confirm that the Yemenis formed the basis of the Muslim troops settling in Syria. (13) This agreement indeed corresponds with the geographical indications which mention the spread of the Yemeni tribes throughout the Syrian territories as being so extensive that their names are mentioned in most of the villages and towns there.

The Yemenis indeed comprised the majority of the

(12) For the Yemeni tribes only, see al-Ḥadīthī, 145ff. For the settlement of the Arab tribes, including the Yemeni, see Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, 63ff; Massinon, Opera minora, III, 35ff; al-Barrī, al-Qabā'il al-ʿArabiyyah fi Miṣr, for Qaḥṭan (i.e. the Yemenis), see 123ff; al-Janabī, Takḥṭit, 41-3, Djait, "Yamanites", 148ff.

(13) Cf. al-Azdī, 12; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222. See also Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, 63-7; al-Nuṣṣ, 234; Dixon, The Umayyad Caliphate, 84.

population. We know that in Ḥimṣ, for example, they were in the majority from one quotation "the weakness of the Qaysī there" (14) i.e. the northern tribes (Qays) were in the minority. According to al-Ya^cqūbī, (15) the majority of the population in Damascus were Yemenis. On the outskirts of the town the Yemeni tribes began to establish villages, each of which bore the name of its inhabitants. (16)

In fact the nature of the settlement of the Arabian tribes in Syria was different from that in Iraq and Egypt. In Iraq and Egypt they confined themselves to the garrison towns which they had built such as Basra, Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ, while in Syria they settled in towns and villages throughout various regions (ajnād). (17)

b. The Yemeni tribes in Iraq

As the Muslim armies penetrated deep into Iraqi territories defeating the Persian forces, the Medinan government decided to establish garrison towns from which they could prepare for their attack on Persia. In 14/635-6, ^cUmar sent ^cUtbah b. Ghazwān, one of the Companions, to assist the Muslim troops on the southern Iraqi border. He also recommended him to establish a Muslim presence there. (18)

(14) Al-Maydānī, Majma^c al-Amthāl, I, 294; See also al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f.

(15) Buldān, 326.

(16) Cf. Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243, who records some of these Yemeni tribal names, such as al-Awzā^c, al-Ṣadif, Muqrī, Sha^cbān and al-Ashā^cir (north of the town); Ṣan^cā', al-Ḥimariyyīn and Ru^cayn (west of the town); See also al-Ḥadīthī, 154.

(17) See Table a, "The Yemeni tribes in Syria."

(18) Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 127; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Dīnawarī, 116f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2377f (citing al-Sha^cbī); Ibn al-Aṭbīr, Kāmil, II, 338.

Utbah's first camp was in al-Khuraybah; after he had taken control of the area, he set off for al-Dahnā' where he built the mosque and laid the foundations of Basra. (19)

Within three years, 14-17/635-39, the Muslims fully controlled the rural areas of Iraq (al-Sawād), having defeated the Persian forces in three main battles and crossed over the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris. (20) In the year 17/638-9, the Caliph ordered Sa'īd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army on the northern Iraqi front, to look for a suitable site for another garrison town for the Muslims in Iraq. (21)

Since the Yemeni tribes had participated in the conquest of Iraq, they were also among the settlers in these new towns. In both Basra and Kufa the Yemeni tribes have been mentioned as being among the other Arab tribes, but they were to be found in Kufa in larger numbers than in Basra. So we shall deal with the Yemeni tribes in both Iraqi towns separately, starting with their presence in Basra.

(19) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 341f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2377f, 84; see also al-^cAlī, al-Tanzīmāt, 26.

(20) These are al-Qādisiyyah, Jalūlā and al-Madā'in, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 255 ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 195ff; al-Dīnawarī, 119ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2419ff. See also Donner, 209ff.

(21) For the establishment of Kufa, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, 138; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 274; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2481-6; cf. also Massignon, Opera minora, III, 38-60; al-janābī, 60-7; al-Ḥadīthī, 192f; Djait, "Yamanites", 152.

i. The Yemenis in Basra

The establishment of Basra, 14/635-6, was contemporary with the assembling of the Muslim army led by Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, a Companion and one of the most important of the Muslim leaders. These troops were directed towards the northern side of the Arab-Persian borders by ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb in the early stages of his caliphate. (22) As has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the Yemeni reinforcements that arrived in Medina at that time joined this army. (23) When Kufa was established in 17/638-9, these Yemeni reinforcements were apparently among the earliest settlers who formed the majority of the population. (24) This matter, however, affected the size of the Yemeni settlers in Basra, where presumably they were less than in other garrison towns. (25)

Five major tribal confederations occupied Basra during its early establishment, one of which was a Qaḥṭānī represented by al-Azd. (26) Our interest here is to investigate the original place of the members of the confederation, in order to ensure that some of them were Yemeni.

(22) Cf. 118-21 above.

(23) Cf. 118-21 above.

(24) Cf. 151 above, see also Table b,ii "The Yemeni tribes in Kūfa".

(25) Such as Kufa and Fustāṭ, see sections on the Yemenis in these garrison towns.

(26) These are Tamīm, B. Bakr, Ahl al-^cĀliyah, al-Azd and ^cAbd al-Qays, cf. Massignon. Opera minora, III, 66-70; al-^cAlī, al-Tanzīmāt, supplement 237; "Khitāṭ", 288ff; Hasan, al-Qabā'il, 93ff.

In the primary historical and geographical sources at our disposal, there is no confirmation that the Azd of Basra, came as a whole from one original place at an early stage in its establishment. In modern studies there exist two contradictory points of view. The first was proposed by Wellhausen who suggested : "It must not be thought, however, that all the Azd had come to Basra only in the year 60 A.H. There were already Azdites there before that, and those certainly belonged, just as much as those in Kufa, to the western branch which had its home on Mount Sarâṭ to the Daus mostly." (27) Sixty-two years later a second point of view emerged. This was put forward by al-Nuṣṣ who commented on the above point of view as follows : "Actually we find that the Azd of Oman had come to Basra long before the year 60/679-80. Furthermore, we have no evidence other than from the Azd, that they settled in Basra before this year." (28) Wellhausen tends to confirm that the Azd of Basra before 60/679-80 were from al-Sarāḥ, i.e. Yemenis, while al-Nuṣṣ tries to establish that they were from Oman. In my opinion, neither Wellhausen nor al-Nuṣṣ has come to a satisfactory conclusion on this question. According to reliable historical evidence, the Azd group in Basra before the year 60/679-80 consisted of all the branches of the Qaḥṭān tribes, who came from both Oman and the Yemen. It is noticeable that long before that date both the Azd groups, Yemeni and Omani, were to be

(27) The Arab Kingdom, 399.

(28) Al-^caṣabiyah al-qabaliyyah, 277. He followed by, Hasan, al-qaba'il, 97.

found in Basra. (29) Ibn Ishāq in al-Ṭabarī (30) tells us that in 13/634 ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb sent ʿArfajah b. Harthamah al-Bāriqī, one of the chiefs of Azd in al-Sarāh, to Basra to assist the Muslim troops there. This leads us to believe that the Azd of al-Sarāh were amongst the earliest Muslim warriors in Basra and that they might have taken part in its establishment in 14/635-6.

Twenty-two years later, when the first civil war broke out, all the Qaḥṭānī tribes in Basra, coming from either Oman or the Yemen, all declared themselves to be Yemenis. (31) Sayf b. ʿUmar in al-Ṭabarī (32) records that during the Battle of the Camel (Jumada II 36/December 656), the Azd of Basra were under the leadership of three of their own chiefs, while other Yemenis were led by Dhū'l-Ājarah al-Himyari. The Azd chiefs were Ṣabrah b. Shaymān, Masʿūd and Ziyād b. ʿAmr. Our sources, both primary and modern,

(29) Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 66, says that the Azd of Basra came from ʿAsīr and Oman.

(30) Tārīkh, I, 2201 : ʿUmar sent ʿArfajah to Basra when the latter disagreed with Bajīlah in Medina. In al-Balādhūrī, Futūḥ, 337; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 401 and Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, IV, 235, the caliph directed him from al-Baḥrayn to assist the Muslims in Basra. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr calls him ʿArfajah b. Khuzaymah, Istīʿāb, III, 1062, but this is not correct, his name is ʿArfajah b. Harthamah al-Bāriqī, a nisbah of his tribe Bāriq of Azd al-Sarāh, see Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 282; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 367; al-Ḥāzimī, 22; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 401.

(31) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 47; al-Ṭabarī, 3180-2; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 299; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 125.

(32) I, 3179f. In al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 148f, Madhḥij, a Yemeni tribe, was led by al-Rabīʿ b. Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, one of the Madhḥijī chiefs in Basra.

differ about the place of origin of the former, Ṣabrah b. Shaymān. Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd⁽³³⁾ says, "During the fitnah, of Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī in Basra in 38/658-9, Ziyād b. Abīhi, 'Alī b. Abī Tālib's governor there, was under the protection of Ṣabrah b. Shaymān and his people were from the Azd of Oman". Ibn Durayd⁽³⁴⁾ confirms that this chief is from al-Sarāh.

In all probability, however, both the Yemeni and Omani tribes gathered in Basra forming a Qaḥṭānī confederation in the same manner as the other Arabian tribes had done in the garrison towns. (35) The reason this confederation

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- (33) Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, IV, 43f Cf. also al-Nuss, 227, who considers all these Azd chiefs as Omanīs; Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Sifat, I, 211, and Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat Ansāb al-'Arab, 384, the former confirms that al-Ḥuddan, Ṣabrah's clan of Azd, is Omani, while the latter mentions that indirectly when he confirms that al-Ḥuddān were related to al-Julandā, King of Oman.
- (34) Ishtiqāq, 299; he also considers him as an Azdī of B. al-Ḥuddan. However, he mentions that his place of origin is al-Sarāh. Cf. also, Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom, 400.
- (35) For the Khiṭat of the tribes in Basra, cf. al-'Alī "Khiṭat al-Basrah", 73 who says "One of the difficulties which faces us is that we do not know exactly which clans had settled in Basra and whether the place of their houses corresponded to their genealogical tree". Usually, however, the branches of each tribe gathered in their houses in the garrison towns. For a detailed discussion of the Khiṭat of Basra, see Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 61 ff; al-'Alī, "Khiṭat", 281ff; Ḥasan, al-Qabā'il, 93ff. For the Khiṭat of Kufa, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2489f; Cf. also Massignon, 35ff; al-Jānābī, Takḥīṭ, 60ff. For al-Fuṣṭat see Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 91ff; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 2-5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭat, II, 76-80.

has been known as al-Azd may be explained by the preponderance of al-Azd in Basra over other Qahtānī tribes. Other Qahtānī branches, therefore, especially those who had no tribal power in the town, came under al-Azd's protection. (36)

i. The Yemenis in Kufa

We have seen previously that most of the Yemeni tribes who arrived in Medina during the early period of ^cUmar's caliphate were directed to the Iraqi front and joined the Muslim army led by Sa^cd b. Abī Waqqās. (37) Those warriors represented the first Arab settlers in Kufa. When Sa^cd established Kufa in 17/638-9, however, the Yemenis appeared among the other Arab tribes settled there. Since their numbers in Sa^cd's army were large, they constituted a high proportion of the settlers. On this occasion al-Sha^cbī said "We [Yemenites] were twelve thousand men; the Nizār were eight thousand; from which you can easily see that we constituted the majority of the settlers of al-Kufa!" (38) Thus when the Arab tribes were divided into seven, four of them consisted of Yemeni tribes. (39)

(36) Such as B. Sha^cbāh, a baṭn of Himyar, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklil, II, 235.

(37) Cf. 118-21 above.

(38) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; see also English tran., Hittī, I, 436.

(39) For the sevenths of Kufa, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f; al-Dīnawarī, 147f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2495; Cf. also Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 39-44; al-Ḥadīth, 195f; Djait, "Yamanites", 153ff

c. The Yemeni tribes in al-Fustāṭ

The proposal to invade Egypt came originally from ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ, who was one of the most important of the Muslim Commanders in Syria, as well as being one of the Companions. He asked the caliph, who was in Syria at that time, for permission to march on Egypt. (40) When the caliph gave his permission in 19/640, ^cAmr marched west from Syria crossing the Egyptian border with four thousand Yemeni warriors. (41) These Yemenis formed the back-bone of ^cAmr's army, especially at the beginning of the campaign there.

However, the importance of the Yemeni tribes on this front is indicated by the major role they played. Al-Wāqidi⁽⁴²⁾ reports that ^cAmr gave his command to the people of the Yemen (ahl al-Yaman) and those Arabs who accompanied them to lay siege to Qalyūb, an Egyptian town. Further proof of their importance in this army is mention of them in the poetry of ^cAmr himself, who encouraged his army in the course of the battle of Babylon, near the present site of Cairo, as follows:

يَوْمٍ لِهَمْدَانَ وَيَوْمٍ لِلصَّادِفِ وَالْمَنْجِنِيْقِ فِى بَلِيٍّ تَخْتَلِفُ

One day for Hamdān and another for al-Ṣadif [both Yemeni tribes] .

(40) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 214; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2579; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125.

(41) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125. In Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 56, all of them from ^cAkk, a Yemeni tribe, while in another account three thousand five hundred. In al-Kindī, Wulāḥ, 8, three thousand five hundred, a third from Ghāfiq, a tribe of ^cAkk.

(42) Futūḥ, II, 31.

While the catapult (manjanīq) goes around Ballī [tribe of Qudā^cah] . (43)

Thanks to their importance in this army, the Yemenis were no doubt mentioned in these events more than any other of the Arab tribes. This importance, however, led ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ to authorize four Yemeni chiefs to divide the land of al-Fuṣṭāṭ amongst the Arab tribes in 21/641-2. (44)

Al-Fuṣṭāṭ was the third of the garrison towns established by the Muslims in the conquered countries. Historical and geographical sources discussing the establishment of this new garrison town give much data about the Arab tribes who settled there, including the Yemeni migrants whose tribes were situated near each other and were in control of most lands (khiṭaṭ) of the town. (45)

(43) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 62. Ballī is one of the Yemeni tribes, which settled in Syria before the conquest, therefore, it is of no concern to us here.

(44) These Yemeni chiefs are Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī (of Kindah), Shurayk b. Sumayy al-Ghuṭayfī al-Murādī, of Madhhij, ^cAmr b. Qaḥzam al-Khawlānī and Haywīl b. Nāshirah al-Ma^cāfirī (of Himyar), see Ibn Duqmāq, Intisār, I, 3; Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 76. In Ibn Taghrī-Bardī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah, I, 74, Jibrīl b. Bāshirah al-Ma^cāfirī. Al-Ḥadīthī in his book, ahl al-Yaman fī Sadr al-Islām, 168, comments upon ^cAmr's authorization to those chiefs as follows " ^cAmr avoided involvement in the affairs of these tribes, or he intended to let them choose their houses according to their desires and these [chiefs] were more understanding in the matters of settlement."

(45) Cf. Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 188ff; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 4f; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 77-9. Cf. also Table c "The Yemeni tribes in al-Fuṣṭāṭ".

B. The branches (buṭūn) of the Yemeni tribes in the
conquered provinces*

a. Syria (46)

1. buṭūn Ḥimyar

- Al-Aḥāmīs, in Ḥimṣ (47)
- Al-Awzā^c, north of Damascus (48)
- Bahīl, baṭn of al-Kalā^c, in Ḥimṣ (49)
- Dhī Tarkham, in Ḥimṣ (50)
- Dhī Yazan, in Ḥimṣ (51)
- Ḥannah, baṭn of Āl-Sawādah b. ^cAmr, in Ḥimṣ (52)
- Ḥarāz (53)
- Hawzan, baṭn of al-Kalā^c (54)

(46) Since the Arab tribes were scattered throughout Syrian regions, settling in all its towns and villages, the definition of the settlement of each tribe becomes difficult. Although some Muslim genealogists and historians have tried to assign specific towns to some of these tribes, they ignore others and mention only their settlement in Syria. Therefore in this table we shall mention the Yemeni tribal branches (buṭūn) in Syria, giving some of their specific areas according to what we have found in our sources.

(47) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 240.

(48) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(49) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 1f.

(50) Al-Ḥāzimī, ^cUjjālat, 30. Al-Sam^cānī, Ansāb, II, 40, reads al-Tarākhumah.

(51) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 263.

(52) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244.

(53) Ibn Mākūlā, Ikmāl, II, 447; al-Ḥāzimī, 18; al-Sam^cānī, VI, 92.

(54) Al-Ḥāzimī, 123; See also Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 434.

(*) Names are listed in English alphabetical order.

- Jubā, baṭn of Āl-Sawādah (55)
- Jubayr, baṭn of Āl-Sawādah (56)
- Jublān, in Ḥimṣ (57)
- Al-Kalā^c, a large tribe - most of them in Ḥimṣ (58)
- B. al-Khabā^jir, baṭn of al-Kalā^c . (59)
- B. Kurayb, in Shahrazawr, Damascus and al-Ramlah (60)
- Muqrī, north of Damascus (61)
- Nu^caymah, baṭn of Āl-Sawādah (62)
- B. Ru^cayn, a large tribe, west Damascus (63)
- Al-Ṣadif, north of Damascus (64)
- Sha^cbān, north of Damascus (65)
- Sulaf, baṭn of al-Kalā^c (66)
- Wuḥāzāh (67)
- Wuṣāb, in Ḥimṣ (68)

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- (55) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244, 281.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 176; al-Sam^cānī, III, 187.
- (58) Al-Sam^cānī, X, 514.
- (59) Al-Ḥāzimī, 53.
- (60) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150f, some of the Abrahiyyīn joined them.
- (61) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.
- (62) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244f, 281.
- (63) Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.
- (64) Ibid.
- (65) Ibid.
- (66) Al-Ḥāzimī, 75.
- (67) Al-Ḥāzimī, 120.
- (68) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 176; al-Sam^cānī, III, 187. Al-Ḥāzimī, 121 reads Waṣṣāb, which is absolutely wrong, see Caskeel, I. Table 274; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 105.

- Yaḥṣub, in al-Lādhiqiyyah (69)
- Zunja^c, batn of al-Kalā^c, in Ḥimṣ (70)
- 2. buṭūn Kindah (71)
 - B. Al-Arqam, in al-Ruhā (72)
 - B. Mal^caqah, batn of Ākil al-Marār (73)
 - Al-Sakāsik, a large tribe (74)
 - B. Wahb b. al-Ḥārith (75)
- 3. buṭūn Madhḥij
 - ^cAns, a large tribe (76)
 - Ḥawṭ (77)
 - Ruhā^c (78)
 - Zubayd, a large tribe in al-Lādhiqiyyah (79)

(69) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f.

(70) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 1f.

(71) Unfortunately the sources do not give in detail the buṭūn of Kindah in Syria as they do for Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ.

(72) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 426.

(73) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f28a.

(74) Al-Sam^cānī, VII, 97, says that they settled in Wadi al-Sakāsik in Jordan, and they were of al-Azd. This tribe is one of the two main sections of B. Ashras of Kindah, See Caskeel, I, table 233, 43; Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 221; Ibn Ḥazm, 429, 31f; al-Ḥimyarī, Shams, 50; al-Ḥāzīmī, 72; Ibn Rasūl, Turfat, 34; Ibn al-Athīr, Lubāb, I, 549; and see also table 3.

(75) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(76) Ibn Mākūlā, VI, 355; al-Sam^cānī, IX, 79.

(77) Al-Ḥāzīmī, 51.

(78) Al-Ḥāzīmī, 66.

(79) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f giving the place. See also al-Ḥāzīmī, 68.

4. buṭūn Hamdān
- Ḥajūr (80)
 - B. Madrak b. ^cUdhar (81)
 - B. Mālik b. ^cUdhar (82)
 - Āl-Ma^cyūf, in Damascus (83)
5. Other Yemeni tribes
- Al-Ashā^cir (84)
 - Khawlān (85)

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- (80) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f68b.
- (81) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 61.
- (82) Ibid.
- (83) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f68b. See also al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, V, 197, who says that those Hamdānīs who joined Mu^cawiyah's army at Ṣiffīn were still living in a village called Tharmāh in Damascus, i.e. on the outskirts of the city. Al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f, records that some Hamdānīs were living in Ḥims, and the inhabitants of Jabalah, a Syrian town, were from Hamdān.
- (84) They first settled in Tiberias then moved, after Ṣiffīn, to al-Thaniyyah and Hawrān, both are Syrian Cities, see al-Ya^cqūbī, Buldān, 324f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 221. Cf. also al-Ḥadīthī, 158.
- (85) Al-Hāzimī, 56.

b. - Iraq

i. Basra

- B. An^cam, baṭn of al-Azd (86)
- Al-Baddā^ʿ, baṭn of B. Mu^cāwiyah of Kindah (87)
- B. Buḥayr, baṭn of Khawlān (88)
- B. Duhn, baṭn of Bajīlah (89)
- B. Al-Ḥārith, baṭn of Madhḥij (90)
- B. Khayār, baṭn of Khawlān (91)
- B. Mālik b. Salamah, baṭn of Ākil al-Marār of Kindah (92)
- B. Sha^cbān b. ^cAmr, baṭn of Ḥimyar (93)
- B. Shibābah, baṭn of al-Azd (94)
- Al-Tanā^cim, baṭn of Khawlān (95)
- Za^cbab, baṭn of Madhḥij (96)
- Zahrān, a large tribe of al-Azd (97)

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- (86) Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 299.
- (87) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 29a.
- (88) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.
- (89) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 389.
- (90) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 40b.
- (91) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.
- (92) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 28a.
- (93) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234f.
- (94) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380.
- (95) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.
- (96) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 40b.
- (97) Al-Ḥāzīmī, 69.

ii. Kufa

1. butūn Hamdān

- B. Dālān, baṭn of Bakīl (98)
- Al-Fubbī (99)
- Fā^ṣish (100)
- Al-Ḥabbāb, baṭn of Bakīl (101)
- Khārif, baṭn of Hāshid (102)
- B. Marhabah, baṭn of Bakīl (103)
- Al-Mujālid, baṭn of Ḥāshid (104)
- B. Nā^cit, baṭn of Ḥāshid (105)
- Al-Sabī^c, baṭn of Ḥāshid (106)
- Shibām, baṭn of Ḥāshid (107)
- Yām, baṭn of Ḥāshid (108)

(98) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 306; al-Sam^cānī, V, 265f.

(99) Al-Sam^cānī, IX, 237.

(100) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3348.

(101) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 195f.

(102) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 235; al-Sam^cānī, V, 14; al-Ḥāzimī, 53.

(103) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 145.

(104) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 35.

(105) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3348.

(106) Ibn Durayd, 254; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 390; al-Sam^cānī, VII, 35; al-Ḥāzimī, 72. Al-Ḥimyarī, Shams, 29; al-Waysī, 166, both add al-Ḥūthān baṭn of al-Sabī^c in Kufa.

(107) Al-Ḥāzimī, 78; Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 318.

(108) Al-Ḥāzimī, 124.

2. buṭūn Madhhij

- B. ^cAbd Allāh (109)
- B. ^cAmir (110)
- Awd (111)
- Al-Ḥaddā², baṭn of Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah (112)
- B. Ḥārithah (113)
- Al-Jadā, baṭn of Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah (114)
- B. Jadhīmah, baṭn of al-Nakh^c (115)
- Jamal b. Kinānah, baṭn of Murād (116)
- Ju^cfī, a large tribe (117)
- Musliyah, a baṭn of ^cAmr b. ^cUlah (118)
- Nāshirah (119)
- B. Qays, baṭn of al-Nakh^c (120)
- B. Salmān, baṭn of Murād (121)

(109) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 411.

(112) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 407; al-Ḥāzimī, 47.

(113) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(114) Ibn Ḥabīb, Mukhtalif, 32.

(115) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab f 44a, reads Jadīmah. See Caskel, I, table 264; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 414, who give a correct name.

(116) Al-Ḥāzimī, 41f.

(117) Ibn Durayd, 244.

(118) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 43b.

(119) Cf. al-Ḥāzimī, 116, who says Nāshirah is a baṭn of Hamdān. This assumption is patently wrong, see Caskel, I, table 262, who referred it to Madhhij.

(120) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(121) Al-Ḥāzimī, 74.

- B. Subbān, batn of al-Nakh^c(122)
- B. Wahbīl, batn of al-Nakh^c(123)
- Zubayd, a large tribe (124)

3. butūn Kindah

- B. Al-^cAdā (125)
- B. Al-Arqam (126)
- B. Baddā (127)
- B. Dhuhd b. Mu^cāwiyah (128)
- B. Ḥujr b. Wahb (129)
- B. Imru' al-Qays b. Rabī^cah (130)
- B. Jabalah b. ^cAdī (131)
- B. Mālik b. al-Ḥārith (132)
- B. Mālik b. al-Rabī^cah (133)
- B. Masrūq (134)

(122) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(123) Ibid, reads Wahsal. For the correct name, see Caskel, I, Table 264; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 414; Ibn al-Athīr, lubāb, II, 281.

(124) Al-Sam^cānī, VI, 248.

(125) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 29b.

(126) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 25a. We know that some of them left Kufa when they disagreed with ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib before Siffīn and they moved to Syria where they settled in al-Ruhā, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 426; cf. also Table a, 2 above.

(127) Al-Sam^cānī, II, 111, who refers this batn to Himyar. It is clear from our sources that this batn is from Kindah not Himyar, see Caskel, I, table 233; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425, Ibn al-Athīr, lubāb, I, 104.

(128) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(129) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 24a.

(130) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Ibid.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 28a.

- B. Murrah (135)
- B. Nahd (136)
- B. Al-Rā^ḍish (137)
- B. Salāmah (138)
- B. Al-Shajarah (139)
- B. Zayd b. al-Ḥārith (140)
- B. Zimmān (141)

4. butūn Ḥimyar

- Al-Aḥmūs (142)
- Ḥadramawt, a large tribe (143)
- B. Kurayb (144)
- Mahrah (145)
- B. Sha^cbān (146)

(135) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 24a.

(136) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(137) Al-Sam^cānī, VI, 62. Al-Ḥadīthī, 202, says that B. al-Rā^ḍish was one of branches (butūn) of Kindah who settled in Kufa, quoting Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Durayd. However, none of these sources confirm this. The former does not record such a statement and the latter says that Shurayḥ al-Qādī was the only one from this batn in Kufa, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425; Ibn Durayd, 218.

(138) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 26a.

(139) Ibn Durayd, 220.

(140) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(141) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 31b.

(142) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 240.

(143) Al-Balādhūrī, Ansāb, II, 235; al-Ḥāzīmī, 49.

(144) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150, they joined al-Nakh^c, of
Madhhij

(145) Al-Balādhūrī, Ansāb, II, 235.

(146) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234, they joined Hamdān.

5. Other Yemeni tribes

- Ahmas, batn of Bajīlah (147)
- Al-Ashā^cir (148)
- B. al-Ḥārith b. ^cAmir, batn from Zahrān of al-Azd (149)
- Khath^cam, a large Yemeni tribe (150)
- B. Māzin, batn of al-Azd (151)
- B. Zārah, batn of al-Azd (152)

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- (147) Al-Sam^cānī, I, 146. For Bajīlah, see also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 236; al-Sam^cānī, II, 85.
- (148) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235.
- (149) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 68b, they were from al-Sarāh.
- (150) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 236; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 391.
- (151) Ibn Durayd, 289f, they were from al-Sarāh.
- (152) Ibn Durayd, 288, says in al-Sarāh. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 376 mentions that they were from the Hijaz.

c. Al-Fustāt

1. buṭūn Ḥimyar

- B. ^cAbal, baṭn of Ru^cayn (153)
- ^cAbs b. Zawf (154)
- Al Akhmūr, baṭn of al-Ma^cāfir (155)
- Al-Aḥjūr, baṭn of al-Ma^cāfir (156)
- Al-Amlūk, baṭn of Ru^cayn (157)
- Aṣbaḥ (158)
- Al-Ashbā^ḥ, baṭn of Ḥadramawt (159)
- Dhubbān, baṭn of Ru^cayn (160)
- B. Ḥajr, baṭn of Ru^cayn (161)
- Al-Jabzā, baṭn of al-Ma^cāfir (162)
- Al-Janad, baṭn of al-Ma^cāfir (163)
- Jayshān, baṭn of Ru^cayn (164)

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- (153) Al-Ḥāzimī, 90.
- (154) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.
- (155) Al-Sam^cānī, I, 155. See also al-Akwa^c, "Af^cūl", 15.
- (156) Al-Sam^cānī, I, 390f. Cf. also al-Akwa^c, "Af^cūl", 26.
- (157) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128; see also al-Akwa^c, "Af^cūl", 25.
- (158) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129.
- (159) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 123. They arrived during ^cUthman's reign.
- (160) Al-Ḥāzimī, 62.
- (161) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129; al-Ḥāzimī, 45.
- (162) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 177.
- (163) Al-Ḥāzimī, 42.
- (164) Al-Ḥāzimī, 44.

- Al-Kalā^c, a large tribe (165)
- B. Khādid, batn of Yaḥsub (166)
- Al-Ma^cāfir, a large tribe (167)
- Mahrah, a large tribe (168)
- B. Mawhab, batn of al-Ma^cāfir (169)
- Na^cīmah, batn of al-Kalā^c (170)
- Qarāfah, batn of al-Ma^cāfir (171)
- Qitabān, batn of Ru^cayn (172)
- Radmān, batn of Ru^cayn (173)
- Ru^cayn, a large tribe (174)
- Sabā, a large tribe (175)
- Al-Ṣadif, a large tribe (176)

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- (165) al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.
- (166) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 117.
- (167) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 102; al-Ḥāzimī, 114; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.
- (168) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 118ff; al-Ḥāzimī, 115; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 77.
- (169) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.
- (170) Al-Ḥāzimī, 117.
- (171) Al-Sam^cānī, X, 86; al-Ḥāzimī, 103.
- (172) Al-Ḥāzimī, 102.
- (173) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128; al-Ḥāzimī, 65.
- (174) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Sam^cānī, VI, 139; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, IV, 1455; al-Ḥāzimī, 66; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.
- (175) Ibn Mākūlā, IV, 532f; Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Sam^cānī, VII, 23; al-Ḥāzimī, 72; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.
- (176) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122ff; al-Sam^cānī, VIII, 43; al-Ḥāzimī, 80; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78.

- Al-Sama^c (177)
- Saybān, batn of Mahrah (178)
- B. Sha^cbān b. ^cAmr (179)
- Al-Sulaf (180)
- Al- ^cUtaqā³ (181)
- Yāfi^c, batn of Ru^cayn (182)
- Yaḥṣub, a large tribe (183)
- Zawf, a batn of Ḥaḍramawt (184)
- Zayād, a batn of al-Kalā^c (185)

2. butūn Madhḥij

- B. ^cAbs, batn of Murād (186)
- B. Badī^cah (187)
- Ghuṭayf, batn of Murād (188)

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- (177) Al-Ḥāzimī, 75.
- (178) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121.
- (179) Al-Hamdānī, Iklil, II, 233-5, they joined al-Ashā^cir.
- (180) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.
- (181) Al-Ḥāzimī, 90
- (182) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Ḥāzimī, 124.
- (183) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 123; al-Ḥāzimī, 124; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.
- (184) Al-Ḥāzimī, 69.
- (185) Al-Ḥāzimī, 68.
- (186) Al-Ḥāzimī, 89.
- (187) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.
- (188) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 125f; al-Ḥāzimī, 99; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78f.

- Janb, a large tribe (189)
- Nāshirah (190)
- Silhim, batn of Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah (191)
- Wi^clān, batn of Murād (192)
- Al-Za^cāfir, batn of Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah (193)
- Zawf, batn of Murād (194)

3. butūn Kindah

This tribe was mainly represented by butun of Tujīb⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

- Abdhā (196)
- B. ^cAmir (197)
- Al-Ayda^cān (198)
- ^cIbād (199)
- Al-Khalāwah (200)
- B. Sa^cd (201)
- Sawm (202)

(189) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(190) Al-Ḥāzimī, 116.

(191) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f49b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 123ff. They both consider this batn from Murād, but in Caskel, I, table 266; Ibn Durayd, 242 and Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 408, is a batn from Sa^cd al-^cAshīrah.

(192) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam Futūḥ, III, 125f- Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khitāṭ, II, 78f.

(193) Al-Ḥāzimī, 68.

(194) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab f50a; al-Ḥāzimī, 69.

(195) See Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125; al-Sam^cānī, III, 24f; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 4; Ibn Ḥazm, 429; al-Ḥāzimī, 30; al-Maqrīzī, Khitāṭ, II, 77.

(196) Al-Ḥāzimī, 9.

(197) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125.

(198) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122.

(199) Al-Sam^cānī, VIII, 340; al-Ḥāzimī, 90.

(200) Al-Ḥāzimī, 57.

(201) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122.

(202) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 581; al-Ḥāzimī, 76.

4. buṭūn Khawlān

- Furūdh, baṭn of B. Rabī^cah b. Sa^cd (203)
- Al-Judaydah, baṭn of B. Rāziḥ b. Mālik (204)
- Rushayyah (205)

5. buṭūn ^cAkk

This tribe was mainly represented by buṭūn of Ghāfiq (206)

- Dihnah (207)
- Al-Ghumr (208)
- Ḥadhrān (209)
- Ḥamd (210)
- Al-Qiyān (211)
- Al-Rubbaniyyīn (212)
- Tayam (213)

(203) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 369.

(204) Al-Sam^cānī, III, 198.

(205) Ibn Mākūlā, IV, 72. For Khawlān, in general, see Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125f; al-Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, II, 78.

(206) See Al-Kindī, Wulāḥ, 8; Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 119ff; Ibn Duqmaq, I, 5; al-Ḥāzīmī, 97; al-Maqrīzī, Khīṭaṭ, II, 78. The Muslim genealogists differ about the nasab of ^cAkk, some of them refer this tribe to ^cAdnān, others claim that it is Qaḥṭānī from al-Azd, see Ibn Durayd, 287; Caskel, I, table 176, 219f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 328, 375; Ibn al-Athīr, lubāb, II, 147; al-Sam^cānī, IX, 34; al-Ḥāzīmī, 93. It is not our aim to define the nasab of the tribe in the present study, as long as the tribe had migrated from the Yemen. For the territory of ^cAkk in the Yemen, see Map 1, and also see 22 above.

(207) Al-Ḥāzīmī, 59.

(208) Al-Ḥāzīmī, 99.

(209) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121. Caskel, I, Table 220, reads Ḥidrān.

(210) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121; al-Ḥāzīmī, 50.

(211) Al-Sam^cānī, X, 235. Caskel, I, table 220 reads, Qiyāt.

(212) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122. In Caskel, I, Table 220 reads Rabbān.

(213) Al-Sam^cānī, III, 116.

6. Other Yemeni tribes

- Al-Abnā³. (214)
- Al-Aknū^c, baṭn of al-Ashā^cir (215)
- Daws, a large tribe of al-Azd in al-Sarāh (216)
- Hamdān (217)
- B. Suray^c, baṭn of al-Ashā^cir (218)

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- (214) In Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5 and al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78: "They [the Abnā³] were the remainder of Badhan's [the Persian governor in the Yemen] army who adopted Islam in Syria and moved with^c Amr b. al-^cĀs to Egypt. However, we know that the Abnā³ were descendants of the Persian troops sent to the Yemen in AD 575^c, adopting Islam during^c Abhalah's sway over San^a, see 14 above. It is quite possible that some of them migrated to the battle fronts with the Yemeni tribes taking part in the fighting with the Muslim armies and settling with them in the new garrison towns, see Ibn^c Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129.
- (215) Ibn^c Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.
- (216) Ibn Duqmāq, I, 3. Ibn^c Abd al-Ḥakam Futūḥ III, 120, mentions Shabābah one of its buṭūn, who some of them were from al-Sarāh, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380.
- (217) Ibn^c Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128, they settled in al-Jīzah, outskirts of al-Fuṣṭaṭ.
- (218) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 50b.

In conclusion, however, the settlement of such a high number of the Yemenis in these conquered provinces obviously reflects on the political situation of the Yemen. One of the most important factors was the migration of the Yemeni chiefs, accompanied by their own tribes, who appeared on the scene of the events during the Wars of Apostasy. Their departure on the one hand left the Muslim governors in full control over some of the Yemeni regions, and, on the other, the Yemen was transformed politically from a troublesome to a quiet country. This result, however, will be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

The political situation and Yemeni relations
with the Islamic government during the period
of the first three Orthodox Caliphs

(11-35/632-56)

Chapter three indicated the success of the Islamic forces and their Yemeni allies in putting down the rebellious tribes in the Yemen in the first year of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, 11/632-3. (1) Following this victory, Islamic authority apparently emerged in three of the Yemeni towns : Ṣan^{cā}, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns. For well over 200 years (11-233/633-847), Muslim governors were appointed by the caliphate over these towns, Ṣan^{cā} and al-Janad in particular. (2) On the other hand, some provinces of the Yemen (makhālīf) remained under the political control of their local chiefs. These provinces belonged to some of the influential tribes of the Yemen, such as Ḥimyar and Hamdān. This chapter, however, will cover the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the Medinan government from the end of the War of Apostasy until the murder of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān (11-35/632-56).

A. The transfer of authority from the local powers to
the Medinan governors in these three towns

Our sources unanimously agree on Ṣan^{cā}, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns as being the headquarters of the Islamic governors in the Yemen. From these towns, Arab

(1) For a detailed discussion of this event, cf. Chapter III above.

(2) Cf. Table of governors.

historians believe that these governors had ruled the Yemen as a whole. This exaggerated assumption, however, is still followed by some modern writers. (3)

This naive assertion by both primary and recent sources, however, is not acceptable. It is likely that politically, Islamic domination over the Yemen was concentrated in some Yemeni regions only. Such domination over all the Yemeni provinces however is indeed suspect, especially considering the actual internal situation of that period. There is no doubt that Islam as a religion became the first faith in the Yemen, (4) while some areas remained under the political control of their local chiefs. This phenomenon clearly appeared in the provinces of influential tribes, such as Ḥimyar and Hamdān. These local powers and their relations with Medina will be discussed later. (5)

The political submission of Ṣan^{cā}, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns to the Medinan administration certainly did occur. The succession of Islamic governors in these towns is material proof of this political domination. It is relevant, however to assess the main

(3) Especially the Yemenis, i.e. see Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 14f; al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 13f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 67-71. Cf also Ibn Khurdādhbih, Masālik, 144; al-Muqaddasī, Aḥsan, 105, who both say that the Yemen was divided into three divisions (a^cmal), al-Janad, Ṣan^{cā} and Ḥaḍramawt. For the modern writers, cf. al-Ḥaddād, Tārīkh, 150; Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 101; al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl al-Yaman, 125.

(4) For full discussion of the spread of Islam in the Yemen, see Chapter I.B above.

(5) See 192 Below.

factors that helped the concentration of Islamic political power in these Yemeni towns.

The constant flow of Yemeni migrants into the conquered provinces throughout the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs caused a serious political vacuum in the Yemen. (6) This resulted from the fact that most of the influential tribal chiefs, those who came to power during the Wars of Apostasy, either for or against the Medinan authority, had left the country and settled in the conquered areas. (7) After their departure, the Yemen entered a new phase of her history which was to be distinguished by a political lull. As for the rest of the chiefs remaining in the Yemen, it seems that they contended among themselves for sovereignty over their own regions. (8)

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- (6) For a detailed discussion of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered areas during the caliphate of Abū Bakr and the early stages of his successor's reign, see Chapter IV above. Of course, these migrants were not the last Yemenis who travelled to the conquered areas, since the migratory movements continued throughout this period from the Yemen to the conquered provinces, these migrants have been known as rawādif, those who came after the conclusion of the conquest (A.H.17/A.D.638), see Donner, Islamic Conquest, 231ff.
- (7) Such as al-^cAsh ath b. Qays al-Kindī, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simt al-Kindī, Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, ^cAmr b. Ma^cdī Karib al-Zubaydī and Dhū 'l-Kala^c al-Ḥimyarī. For their role during the Wars of Apostasy, see Chapter II-III, above, and for their role in the conquests, cf Chapter IV above. See also their role in the Civil War in Chapter VII below.
- (8) Especially those of Ḥimyar and Hamdān, such as Dhū Ru^cayn, Dhū Yazan B. ^cAbd Kalāl and Dhū Murrān. These chiefs enjoyed full power over their tribes on the eve of Islam in the Yemen and did not migrate to the conquered provinces. However, it cannot be accepted that those chiefs lost their influence over their own tribes by the spread of Islam in the region.

In such a political atmosphere, the Medinan governors in the Yemen were able to rule freely in their headquarters, without any rivalry from such tribal leaders.

However, there is no mention of the direct reasons for the selection of these towns by the Medinan government as centres of its authority in the Yemen. This choice might have been the result of the armed struggle which these areas witnessed during the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early stages of Abū Bakr's Caliphate,⁽⁹⁾ since this hostility gave an excuse to the Muslims to interfere politically in these areas.

In order to support the Muslims in these areas, the Medinan government sent re-inforcements there. Following their victories, the Muslims gained a foothold in these regions, filling the political vacuum. This happened particularly during the first year of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, 11/632-3.

As has already been mentioned, the Abnā' in Ṣanā', either during their hostility against 'Abhalah b. Ka'b or against Qays b. 'Abd Yaghūth al-Murādī, had been looking for help from the Medinan government.⁽¹⁰⁾ In order to lend support to the Abnā' during their campaign against the Madhḥij in Ṣanā', the Islamic troops entered the town and established their authority. Thereafter, political

(9) For these hostilities, see Chapter II-III above.

(10) For the communications of the Abnā' with the Medinan government during this hostility, cf. Chapter II and III above.

affairs in Ṣan^{cā} were transferred from the Persian community, the Abnā^ʾ, to the Islamic authority.

Thus after the arrival of al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah's army in Ṣan^{cā} in 11/632-3, the Abnā^ʾ were all debarred from any official posts, though their influence as a local power continued in the town. (11) It is noticeable that none of the Abnā^ʾ was designated over the town throughout the period of the Orthodox caliphs 11-40/632-56; despite this, their hostility against Madhḥij was mainly to stay on an official level. (12)

In fact the sources at our disposal do not record any objections or complaints from the Abnā^ʾ as a reaction to the Medinan policy. It is probable that as a result of their sufferings during the local hostilities, the Abnā^ʾ might have averted their eyes from political affairs in Ṣan^{cā}, especially as long as it remained under the control of a neutral authority. Their invitation to Mu^{cā}adh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy in the Yemen, offering him leadership over Ṣan^{cā}, is clear proof of the Abnā^ʾ's wish for a neutral regime in the town. (13)

(11) For the arrival of al-Muhājir's army in Ṣan^{cā}, cf 102 above. They appeared as the great local power in Ṣan^{cā} in 40/656, see 254 below.

(12) However, when Mu^{cā}awiyah b. Abī Sufyān became caliph they apparently emerged in power when the former appointed some of them to the office of Ṣan^{cā} and al-Janad. See 271 below and Table 6.

(13) When the Abnā^ʾ realized that Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth intended to remove authority from them in Ṣan^{cā}, after the Prophet's death, they immediately sent to Mu^{cā}adh offering him the office of the leader of the town, see 77 above.

The year long hostilities between the Abnā' and Madhḥij over the question of control over Ṣanā' must have created a political vacuum in the town. (14) It appears that the Medinan government realized that the leadership of Ṣanā' had to be removed from the hands of these conflicting groups. Consequently Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a leader of the Abnā' in Ṣanā', was removed from the leadership when al-Muhājir's army entered the town, 11/632-33, though the former had officially been appointed by Abū Bakr. (15) Through such a policy the Medinan government was able to eliminate the local struggle in Ṣanā' and at the same time gain a foothold in the town. Thus throughout the period of the first three Orthodox caliphs, 11-35/633-56 the governors were successively sent from Medina to Ṣanā'. None of them was from the inhabitants of the town. (16)

Al-Janad was the second Yemeni town chosen by the Medinan government as a centre for its representatives in the southern area of the highlands and Tihāmah since Abū Bakr confirmed his authority there by appointing a governor over the town in 11/632-3. However, this choice was made long before that date, when the Prophet sent his ambassador, Mu'adh b. Jabal, to the Yemen in 9/630-1. (17) After

(14) For a detailed discussion of the hostility of the Abnā' against Madhḥij, cf. Chapter II, III above.

(15) Cf. 100 above.

(16) Cf. Table 4.

(17) Because of al-Janad's suitable geographical location and the acceptance of some of its inhabitants to protect the Muslim envoys, the Prophet directed Mu'adh to the town to take it as a centre of his mission in the Yemen. See 34 above.

Abhalah's occupation of Ṣan^cā' in Muḥarram 11/April 632, Mu^cādh b. Jabal feared the spread of the rebellion and went to Ḥaḍramawt. (18) When the political situation settled down in the Yemen during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, Mu^cādh returned to al-Janad, establishing Islamic authority permanently in this Yemeni town. (19)

In fact without the support of some of the local tribes, the Medinan government would not have been able to establish its authority in Ḥaḍramawt. When the rebels had been decisively defeated at al-Nujayr, 11/632-3, the Medinan government gained a strong foothold in Ḥaḍramawt and was able to appoint a series of governors over the area. (20)

Unfortunately, our sources do not indicate the precise headquarters of the Medinan governors in Ḥaḍramawt. Al-Hamdānī himself does not define these headquarters, although Ḥaḍramī towns are described in his geographical work. (21) But, in his description of Shibām, al-Hamdānī says that it is the town of all people, i.e. the Ḥaḍramīs. (22) Quoting the previous statement, Serjeant (23)

(18) Cf. 55 above.

(19) He appeared again in the town after the termination of the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen during the first year of Abū Bakr's caliphate, cf. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 36f; Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah VI, 107; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 68-71.

(20) For the battle of al-Nujayr, cf. 103 above. For the Medinan governors at that time, see Table 4.

(21) Cf. Ṣifat, I, 85-8. This lack of interest, however, is followed by other Arab writers, both geographers and historians.

(22) Ṣifat, I, 86.

(23) Saiyids, 9.

suggests that Shibām was probably the capital of the region. During the Umayyad-Ibādī struggle in 129-30/746-7, it can be seen how Shibām was important since each group worked to keep the town under their influence.⁽²⁴⁾ However, despite these indications it can not be stated categorically that the town was the headquarters of the Medinan governors.

In all probability this failure to mention the centre of the Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt might be due to the isolation of the area from the scene of events throughout the first three centuries of Islam.⁽²⁵⁾ This could be the main reason for the neglect of the area in our sources. Therefore, the succession of Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt was not recorded regularly in these sources.⁽²⁶⁾ At any rate it is hoped that more work can be done to pinpoint the centre of the Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt.

B. The foundation of the Islamic governorship

It is noticeable that after suppressing the rebellious tribes in 11/632-3, the Islamic government was able to appoint its own governors (wulāt) over three Yemeni towns. Following this policy the position of these officials changed from that of Medinan representatives with some Yemeni tribes, as teachers and alms coll-

(24) See al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 943f; al-Ḥārithī, Uqūd, 227. The latter reads Sanām.

(25) With the exception of the revolution of Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq in Ḥaḍramawt in 129/745-46, which spread throughout the Yemen and the Ḥijāz, cf. 284-92 below.

(26) In contrast with the governors of Ṣan^{cā} who recorded regularly, though the town had also been isolated from the scene of the events of most of this period, see the tables of governors.

ectors, to governors (wulāt). (27) Thereupon their number was reduced to three official governors in the Yemen. (28)

Our sources do not illustrate the movements of these officials; moreover they do not give specific dates for the foundation of the Islamic governorship in the Yemeni towns. However, according to the historical facts the replacement of Muslim officials took place during the period of Abū Bakr's caliphate, to be specific, before the first of the official Yemeni re-inforcements who joined the Islamic armies for the conquests on the Syrian front in the early 13/633. (29)

The first indication of Muslim governorship in Ṣan^{c-3}ā comes in the course of the rebellion of Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī during the early stages of Abū Bakr's reign. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a leader of the Abnā³ in Ṣan^{c-3}ā, was appointed to this office by Abū Bakr. (30)

However, this governorship expired with the termination of hostilities in the town. This sudden replacement leads us to believe that some military purpose lay behind the appointment of Fayrūz in Ṣan^{c-3}ā during the hostilities. It is known that Abū Bakr appointed Fayrūz and sent a letter

(27) During the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early period of his successor Medinan officials were known as ḥummāl or representatives of the Islamic government for particular post. For a full discussion of the Medinan representatives during the last phase of the Prophet's life, see chapter I,B above.

(28) For the representatives of the Prophet amongst the Yemeni tribes, see Table 1.

(29) Cf. 115 above.

(30) Cf. 100 above.

to some Yemeni chiefs requesting them to support Fayrūz and the Abnā against Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth. (31) Thereupon the local power and the Muslim forces recognized Fayrūz as a leader of the resistance in Ṣan^{c-ā} against Qays and his followers. This recognition, however, was temporary, since Abān b. Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, one of the Companions, appeared in 11/633-4 in Ṣan^{c-ā} as a governor on behalf of Abū Bakr.

Some historians record that Abān b. Sa^cīd was appointed over Ṣan^{c-ā} by the Prophet, (32) while others state that his appointment was made by Abū Bakr. (33) Nevertheless, these historians give neither an exact date for this governorship, nor do they discuss it in detail.

In all probability Abān b. Sa^cīd was appointed over Ṣan^{c-ā} by Abū Bakr during the early stages of his caliphate. Several reasons make this point of view more plausible. The fact is that Abān is not mentioned in the sources at our disposal as being among the Prophet's representatives in the Yemen during the period of ^cAbhalah's movement. (34) The second reason is that it is well known that he was the Medinan representative in al-Bahrayn until the death of the Prophet in Rabī^c I, 11/June, 632. (35) Thirdly, Abān

(31) See 81 above.

(32) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76 (citing al-Walīd b. Yazīd); Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 67f.

(33) Al-Rāzī, 150; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 11, both citing al-Nu^cmān b. Buzurj. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 36f, who says that he was appointed by Abū Bakr somewhere in the Yemen.

(34) For the Prophet's representatives at that time, see Table 1.

(35) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, I, 62; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 36.

appeared for the first time in Ṣan^cā^ḳ as a Muslim official after the termination of the rebellion of Qays, since it was he who began to investigate the murder of Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī, (36) one of the leaders of the Abnā^ḳ in Ṣan^cā^ḳ who was murdered by Qays b. ^cAbd Yaghūth. That was the apparent start of the Islamic authority in Ṣan^cā^ḳ.

Again our sources do not indicate the period of Abān b. Sa^cīd's governorship in Ṣan^cā^ḳ. However, it can be deduced from the fact that Abān had joined the early invasion of the Islamic armies on the Syrian front in 13/634-5. (37) This fact is clear proof that Abān was not in Ṣan^cā^ḳ at that time. The governorship of the town was transferred to Ya^clī b. Umayyah al-Tamīmī who occupied the post at some time during the period of Abū Bakr's reign. (38) One can confidently assume that Ya^clī came into office as an immediate successor of Abān b. Sa^cīd when the latter received permission from Abū Bakr to return to Medina. (39)

(36) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 150; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 11, (both citing al-Nu^cmān b. Buzurj).

(37) Where he was killed in the battle of Ajnādayn, Jumādā I, 13/July, 634, see al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 76f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, 147; Ibn Abd al-Barr, I, 63f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 37. In Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 120, it is suggested that he was killed in the battle of Marj al-Ṣuffar, Ṣafar, 13/April, 634. According to al-Ṭabarī, I, 2101, he was killed in al-Yarmūk, in 13/634.

(38) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 160, 163; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 15. According to Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 123; and al-Ṭabarī, I, 2136, Ya^clī was Abū Bakr's governor in Khawlān (Khawlān al-^cĀliyah). However, it is quite likely in the early stages of Abū Bakr's reign that Ya^clī represented Medina among Khawlān and when Abān resigned from his post as a governor of Ṣan^cā^ḳ, the former replaced him in this office for the rest of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.

(39) Idrīs, Kanz, f172b.

The replacement of the Islamic officials in al-Janad is indeed clearer than that in Ṣan^{cā}. There is a general agreement in our sources that Mu^{cādh} b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, occupied that post during the early stages of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. Sayf b. ^cUmar in al-Ṭabarī (40) records that he left the Yemen in 11/632-3. His successor in that post was ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah al-Makhzūmī, designated by Mu^{cādh} himself. (41)

Our sources unanimously agree that the Prophet's representatives in Ḥaḍramawt were Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī, ^cUkāshah b. Thawr and al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah. (42)

Some of these sources, however, confirm that although he was appointed by the Prophet with some Ḥaḍramī tribes, al-Muhājir remained in Medina until the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (43) Al-Rāzī (44) says that the

(40) I, 2015.

(41) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 36f; Idrīs, Kanz, f172b. There is contradiction in the sources about the date when ^cAbd Allāh held this post. Whilst Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, III, 897, and Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, III, 155, maintain that he was appointed by the Prophet, others confirm that his post authorized by ^cUmar, see al-Zubayrī, nasab, 317; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 139; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, III, 155, different account; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65. However, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal for Mu^{cādh}'s successor in this post other than ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah. On the other hand, there is confirmation in our reliable sources that Mu^{cādh} had joined the Islamic armies in the Syrian front during the last year of Abū Bakr's caliphate 13/634, cf. al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 76-8; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 36. However, by their assumption these historians, who claim that ^cAbd Allāh was appointed over al-Janad by ^cUmar, are intending to suggest that the office of the town was unoccupied during the last two years of Abū Bakr's reign, which is unlikely.

(42) See Table 1.

(43) At that time he was sent by Abū Bakr to reinforce the Muslims in the Yemen, see IOI above

(44) Tārīkh, 145.

Prophet sent al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah to the territory of Ḥaḍramawt to fight Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt, where he remained until the Prophet's death. This narrative is repeated by Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, al-Fāsī and Ibn Ḥajar with few differences. (45) A contradictory statement appears in al-Ṭabarī and is repeated by Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-Ḥusayn. (46) They record that al-Muhājir was appointed as an alms collector (^cāmil al-ṣadaqah) with the tribes of Kindah and al-Ṣadif both in Ḥaḍramawt, by the Prophet, but that he remained in Medina until Abū Bakr despatched him to fight the rebels in the Yemen.

In fact three reasons lead us to accept the second statement i.e. that al-Muhājir remained in Medina during the last phase of the Prophet's life and was sent to the Yemen by Abū Bakr. The first of these reasons is that al-Muhājir had no role in the first stages of the hostility in Ḥaḍramawt between the Muslims and the rebels during the early period of Abū Bakr. (47) The second reason is that al-Muhājir was one of the Muslim leaders equipped by Abū Bakr and sent from Medina to fight the apostates. (48) The third of these reasons is the role of al-Muhājir in pursuing the survivors of ^cAbhalah's troops, who were concentrated in the highlands, when he was on his way to

(45) Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, IV, 1452f; al-Fāsī, ^cIqd, VII, 292; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 144f.

(46) I, 1880, Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 423; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f4a.

(47) See chapter III, B above.

(48) Al-Zubayrī, nasab, 316; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 35; Ibn Khaldūn, ^cIbar, II, 863f. See also 101 above.

his post in Ḥaḍramawt. (49) However by the time of al-Muhājir's arrival in Ḥaḍramawt, three official Muslim representatives assumed power in the region, all of whom had been originally appointed by the Prophet. (50)

Our sources are vague about the replacement of the Medinan representatives and the development of those offices to that of governorship in Ḥaḍramawt. The only exception is that al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah returned to Medina, having appointed ^cIkrimah b. Abī Jahl in his post. (51) This replacement was definitely before Muḥarram, 13/March-April 634, as ^cIkrimah joined the Muslim armies on the Syrian front, designating ^cUbaydah b. Sa^cd as his successor. (52) This designation, however, was recognized by Abū Bakr. (53)

The other two Muslim representatives in Ḥaḍramawt, Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī and ^cUkāsh b. Thawr, are completely ignored by the historians. Consequently we have no knowledge of the period of their holding these posts. This lack of information has indeed brought about total ignorance of the political history of Ḥaḍramawt during the

(49) Al-Zubayrī, 316; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, 35; Ibn Khaldūn, II, 863f.

(50) There are al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah, Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī and ^cUkāshah b. Thawr, see Table 1.

(51) Ibn ^cAbd al-Majid, Bahjat, 15.

(52) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 363, who says that he was killed in the battle of Ajnādayn, Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 120, however, in the battle of Marj al-Ṣuffar, though both battles took place in 13/634. See also al-Ṭabarī, I, 2082, 2093, 2098, 2101; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 276; Usd, IV, 6.

(53) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2013; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 210.

last year of Abū Bakr's reign. (54) The first sole governor of the caliphate in Ḥaḍramawt to be mentioned was °Adī b. Nawfal, who suddenly emerged as the Medinan governor during the period of °Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb's reign (13-23/634-44). (55) The replacement seems to have been sudden but the historians give no indication of the predecessor of the new governor.

Seemingly, Ziyād b. Labīd, °Ukāshah b. Thawr and °Ubaydah b. Sa°d remained as Medinan representatives with the Ḥaḍramī tribes until the arrival of °Adī b. Nawfal. Thereafter, the Medinan government reduced its representatives in Ḥaḍramawt to one governor who had already been appointed in the region. (56)

C. The sphere of the Muslim governors and local tribes of influence in the Yemen

Three Muslim governors had been appointed successively in the Yemen during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs (11-35/632-56). (57) These governors gained a political foothold in three Yemeni towns : Ṣan°ā°, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns, using them as centres of their administration.

(54) Our sources are unanimously silent about the replacements of these governors, whilst they mention those of Ṣan°ā° and al-Janad.

(55) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 74; Ibn °Abd al-Barr, Istī°āb, III, 1061; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 398; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 232. See also al-Ḥāmid, Tārīkh, I, 163.

(56) Thereafter the sources at our disposal do not indicate that there was more than one Muslim governor in Ḥaḍramawt.

(57) See Table 4.

Unfortunately, neither our general nor local sources have preserved much data about the political life of these areas under the authority of the Muslim regime at that time. However, we are more fortunate in having some information concerning the activities of the Muslim governor of Ṣan^cā³, particularly for the period of ^cUmar's Caliphate. Nevertheless, this small amount of data gives a reasonable picture of the political situation in these towns and their relations with Medina during that period. Some of these indications might suggest the Muslim governors wielded real power in the centres of their rule in the Yemen, whilst other evidence suggests that in other areas such authority was not generally recognized. So an attempt will be made to illustrate the sphere of influence of these Muslim governors and the influential tribes in the Yemen, beginning with the governors themselves.

a. The real Muslim authority in the Yemen

It is noticeable that Arabia in general and the Yemen in particular were not concerned with Medinan policy during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, except the period of the War of Apostasy. Throughout this period (12-35/633-56) the policy of the caliphate was in the main concentrated on the conquests and the affairs of the conquered provinces. These specific interests on the part of the Medinan administration, however, caused the early Arab historians to pay no further attention to the affairs of Arabia, including the Yemen. On the other hand, the Yemen itself may not have witnessed any important political

events during that period. The few events preserved in the sources about the Yemen are, indeed, less important in comparison with other political events at that time, such as the conquests.

Although specific information about the political authority of the Muslim governors in the Yemen is lacking, the real power of these offices did exist. The non-existence of tribal chiefs in the centres of the Muslim governors in the Yemen made the latter seem influential as rulers. At the same time the inhabitants of these towns set themselves up in business, leaving political affairs to the Medinan governors. In some of these centres these governors succeeded in forming a small army consisting mainly of those who came with them, together with some of the local population. (58) But the political influence of these governors was limited to the centres of their rule. Throughout that period, some of these governors evidently pursued their political activities in their official seats, bearing in mind the instructions of the caliphs.

The political isolation of the Yemen apparently began in the second year of Abū Bakr's reign, 12/633-4.

(58) In particular in Ṣan^{cā} and al-Janad. Ya^clī b. Umayyah, the governor of Ṣan^{cā} (12-35/634-56), for example, brought some followers with him cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, III, 1267; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 185; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 218, and ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah, the governor of al-Janad (12-35/632-56) who was able to prepare himself with an army to support the caliph ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān in 35/656, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 87; Istī^cāb, III, 897; Usd, III, 155.

The cessation of political unrest in the Yemen and the beginning of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered provinces created a political vacuum in the region. Consequently, the country was transformed, politically speaking, from a troublesome to a quiet area. Therefore our knowledge about the political situation of the Yemen during the second half of Abu Bakr's caliphate is very scanty. Neither the caliph's communications with the Yemeni tribes nor his governors activities are clear in our sources. Yet some important Yemeni events have been ignored in these sources. For example, the renewal of the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān is reported in only a few words. (59) Furthermore, Abū Bakr's communications with both the Yemenis and his governors are also mentioned only briefly in these sources. (60)

During the period of ʿUmar's caliphate (13-23/634-44), the real domination of the Medinan government apparently emerged in the Yemen, particularly in Ṣanʿāʾ. In the light of some of the events which took place in the town, it can be said that Ṣanʿāʾ was totally under the control of the Muslim regime. Of course, other centres of the Medinan governors, i.e. al-Janad and Ḥaḍramawt, were also controlled by such officials, but their activities in these areas have not been described in our sources.

(59) Cf. Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987; al-Nuwayrī, Nahāyat, XVIII, 136. See also Ḥamidullāh, Wathāʾiq, 128f; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 160f.

(60) For his communication with his governor about the people of Ḥufāsh, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 85, who records it in a few words.

However, the events of Ṣan^{c-ā} clearly illustrate the real influence of the Medinan regime in this town. For example, the Ṣan^{c-ānīs} lodged complaints against their governor, Ya^{c-lī} b. Umayyah. (61) As a result Ya^{c-lī} was summoned three times by ^cUmar to Medina for investigation. (62) Another example of the domination of the Muslim authority over Ṣan^{c-ā} comes through ^cUmar's attitude towards the murder of one of the local population, where the caliph ordered his governor in the strongest terms to execute all the murderers. Ibn Rustah and al-Rāzī tell us that in his letter to his governor in Ṣan^{c-ā}, ^cUmar insisted on the execution of all the accused, even if the whole of the population of Ṣan^{c-ā} were involved, saying "Kill them all [the murderers]; even if all of the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c-ā} are involved, I will execute them." (63)

Throughout the period of ^cUthmān's reign (23-35/644-56) the political isolation of the Yemen was at a peak. During that period the Yemen as a whole was isolated from the political life of the Islamic state. The historians are unanimously silent about Yemeni affairs and our sources do not preserve such information which might help to illustrate what was happening in the area or concerning its political relations with the caliphate at that time. When some of these sources mention important events, they are very brief.

(61) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 163-5; Idrīs, Kanz, f172b; Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, VI, 353; al-Khazrajī, Asjad, 17-9; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghayat, I, 83, 85.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibn Rustah, A^{c-lāq}, 110; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 30, 161, 452.

Part of the reason for this political isolation was that the caliphate paid no more attention to Yemeni affairs. This policy begins to emerge, it would seem, when ^cUthman reappointed Ya^clī b. Umayyah, the governor of San^cā , in 23/644, ignoring the complaints of the Ṣan^cānīs against him. (64) As a result of this isolation the inhabitants of the Yemeni provinces were relatively secluded from the social and the political life of the other Muslim communities throughout the Islamic state. This general feeling of disinterest on the part of the Medinese administration and its officials is confirmed by ^cUthmān b. ^cAffan al-Thaqafi, the caliph's envoy to the Yemen. In a report he expressed his dissatisfaction toward the Yemen, saying "I met a people who gave what they were asked, whether truth or untruth." (65) This description leads us to believe that the isolation of the Yemen was at its greatest during ^cUthman's reign (23-35/644-56), though political events of great importance were happening elsewhere. Indeed the fact that the caliphate and its armies were so heavily engaged at this time in the conquests must also to some extent have served to increase this isolation. (66)

(64) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 165; al-Khazrajī, Asjad, 19; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 85.

(65) Ibn Samurah, Tabaqāt, 40: Ra'aytu qawman ma su'ilū a^cṭaw Kāna ḥaqqan aw baṭīlan. The full implications of this statement do not appear clearly from the literal translation. It is evident, however, from the full context that the Yemenis were regarded by the caliph's envoy as being completely isolated, politically weak and ignorant of Islam.

(66) For the conquests during ^cUthmān's caliphate, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 157-68; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2802 ff al-Kufī, II, 108ff.

It seems that the ability of the Medinan governors to rule the centres of their offices effectively was dependent on the central power of the caliphate. If the caliph was strong and firm in following up the actions of his governors, then these governors were loyal and faithful to Islamic principles. If however the caliph was not, then the governors tended to separate themselves within their areas, exploiting the fact of their being remote from the centre of the caliphate and the absence of strong local leadership in order to feather their own nests. Therefore, as a result of the weakness of the Medinan administration during the period of ^cUthmān (23-35/644-56) the governor of Ṣan^{cā}, Ya^clī b. Umayyah, was able to amass a great fortune for himself. (67) Since Ya^clī had never joined the conquests and was not wealthy before he was appointed in Ṣan^{cā}, (68) these reasons lead us to believe that this wealth came to him during the period of ^cUthmān's caliphate. (69)

(67) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 221; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089, 3099; al-Kufī, II, 279; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 128.

(68) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal that Ya^clī either had joined the conquests or he was wealthy before he was authorized over Ṣan^{cā}.

(69) He tried, however, to exploit his authority in Ṣan^{cā}, as a governor on behalf of Medina, for his own interests during ^cUmar's reign. The latter, however, immediately opposed him in this, see al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 161; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 303; al-Khazraǰī, Asjad, 18f; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghayat, I, 85.

b. The influential tribes of the Yemen and their relations with the caliphate

By influential tribes we mean those which figured strongly in their own provinces, such as the tribes of Ḥimyar and Hamdān, during the last phase of the Prophet's life and the period of his successor. According to their strength, both the Prophet and Abū Bakr had recognized the authority of these tribes in their own provinces on several occasions. (70)

Although there is little information in the sources about the actual control of the influential tribes over their own territories, a few indications preserved in some sources may confirm that some Yemeni tribes evidently emerged with independent authority in their provinces. (71) There actual political authority remained in the hands of the tribal chiefs who exercised control over their own people. However, in addition to the fact that these few indications do not illustrate the actual political life of these territories, they also do not make clear the real relationship with the central Muslim authority, either with the governors in the Yemen or the caliphate itself. Nevertheless from these indications it can be assumed that in addition to maintaining control of their own provinces, some influential tribal chiefs had direct

(70) For the Prophet's communications with the leader of these tribes, see 24 above. For Abū Bakr's communications with them, cf. 193 below.

(71) They come in the main through al-Hamdānī's works, in particular his Iklīl, as well as one or two of the primary sources. Precise references are given below in the appropriate place.

communications with the caliphate, whilst their contact with the Medinan governors in the Yemen was in all probability extremely rare.

i. The caliphate and the major Muslim tribes in the Yemen

We know that when Abū Bakr decided to appeal to the Yemeni tribes to join the Muslim armies at the early stages of the conquest, he sent Anas b. Mālik to the chiefs of their more important representatives. Anas went directly to meet these chiefs. (72) Ibn Samurah (73) alone provides a contradictory account, saying that the caliph authorized Ya^clī b. Umayyah, the governor of Ṣan^cā', to appeal directly to these tribes. On the one hand, however, all our other primary sources agree that Anas was the only one officially authorised by Abū Bakr to carry out this mission; on the other hand, these sources do not assign any role to Ya^clī b. Umayyah in this appeal to the tribes. (74) Therefore it can be said with reasonable surety that there existed direct communications between the caliph and the tribal leaders. This fact, however, leads us to believe that the real authority in these influential provinces belonged to the tribal chiefs, their influence over the inhabitants being clearly

(72) For the journey of Anas to these chiefs, see 14 above.

(73) Ṭabaqāt, 38. This statement, as will be seen, is here considered unacceptable. All our sources contradict it and it should be recalled that Ibn Samurah is relatively late (6th/12th century) and he does not quote his sources for such a statement.

(74) See al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 5f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I. 1; Ibn 'Asākir, Tahdhīb, I, 445f. Cf also al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 169.

greater than that of the Medinan governors. Thus, in such political matters, the Muslim governors there were being ignored, both by the tribal chiefs and the caliphate itself. Without any doubt, if these governors had had influence over the powerful tribes, Abū Bakr would have ordered them to exercise their control over these tribes and recruit them to the conquests.

Even during the caliphate of ^cUmar(13-23/634-44) the full authority of the influential tribes over their own territories was apparent in the Yemen. Although there were a number of internal political crises in the provinces belonging to influential tribes, the Medinan administration was clearly powerless to stop them.

Unfortunately, all our sources are vague and lacking in detail of these crises, yet al-Hamdānī preserves brief indications of them in his works, though it is true they concern only the territory of Hamdān.

Two indications come to us accidentally in al-Hamdānī which might help us to visualize the real authority of the Hamdān chiefs over their provinces during ^cUmar's Caliphate. In the first of these al-Hamdānī (75) tells us about the conflict which took place between two Hamdān chiefs, each from a different branch, where both claimed possession of al-Bawn, the plain lying to the north of Ṣan^cā'. Consequently, one of them, Sa^cīd b. Qays, travelled to Medina complaining about the aggression of his kinsman. Despite the fact that

(75) Iklīl, X, 115.

the caliph attempted to exercise his caliphal influence to end this crisis, the other chief, Azlam b. al-Nu^cmān, paid no attention to the caliph's mediation. Therefore, Sa^cid b. Qays stayed in Medina until he had been sent by ^cUmar to appeal to his tribe to support the Muslim forces in Nihāwand where a battle took place between the Muslim and the Persian forces in 21/642. (76)

In the second indication, ^cUmar clearly tried to avoid involving himself politically in the internal affairs of these influential tribes. Ibn al-Kalbī and al-Hamdānī (77) illustrate ^cUmar's attitude towards these matters, showing the caliph's caution when he was compelled to involve himself in the case of revenge which took place within Hamdān, though one of the warring chiefs, Asnad b. Mālik, took refuge with him. To gratify Hamdān and to end the crisis, ^cUmar paid the blood-money (diyah) instead of Asnad and appointed him as his official in al-Rabadhah, a place three days distant from Medina, thereby removing

(76) Ibid. Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 200, who comments upon the fact that through his envoy, Ziyād b. Abīhi, to these quarrelling chiefs, ^cUmar succeeded in establishing peace between them. Ṣālih, however, quotes from Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, Nahj, IV, 226. In fact neither Nahj, nor any of the primary sources at our disposal mentions Ziyād's role in this particular conflict, except Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Istī'āb, II, 525, who hints about ^cUmar's authorization to Ziyād to bring an end to the corruption which existed in the Yemen, but what sort of corruption precisely has not been illustrated. For the participation of Hamdān led by Sa^cid b. Qays in Nihāwand, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2619; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 4. See also Donner, 433.

(77) Nasab, f70a; Iklīl, X, 219. Cf. also Ibn Ḥazm Jamharat, 396. He is known by Abū Salāmah.

him from contact with the opposing branch of Hamdān. (78)

In the other tribal areas of the Yemen, however, there is no clear picture of the political life and the relationship of the tribes with Medina. Despite this vagueness, however, we cannot accept that the descendents of the pre-Islamic Yemeni chiefs, such as those of the Himyar Kings, did not have some influence over their own people. It is true that some of them migrated to the conquered provinces, but others remained in their provinces exercising authority there, such as B. Manākh and B. Hiwāl. (79) It is possible therefore, that the absence of important events within Himyar and the continuation of the tribal migrations into the conquered areas (80) might have led to the political obscurity in this influential territory.

In all probability the first three Orthodox Caliphs were following the Prophet's policy towards the influential tribes in the Yemen. They avoided putting themselves in direct involvement in the internal affairs of these tribes. Moreover, to gain the loyalty of influential chiefs, the caliphs recognized their authority over their own regions by authorising some of them to become the official Medinan

(78) Ibid. For the location of al-Rabadhah, see Yāqūt, Mu^cjam, III, 24; Khaḥḥālah, 35-9.

(79) The descendents of those who remained in their provinces emerged in the (3rd/9th century) challenging the caliphal regime in the area, such as B. Manākh and B. Hiwāl (i.e. B. Yu^cfir), cf. Chapter XI. F. above.

(80) In the early states of the conquests, Himyar officially participated in one group led by Dhū^ol-Kalā^c, but later their number increased amongst the new settlers of the conquered provinces which leads us to believe that their migrations continued throughout the period of the Orthodox Caliphs. For early participation, see above. For the branches of Himyar in the conquered countries. cf. Chapter V.B.

representative there. It is noticeable that the authorization came from the caliph direct to these chiefs. This leads us to believe that the caliphs were seeking to gratify these influential tribes in the same way as the Prophet had done. Therefore, Ka^cb b. Mālik, a Hamdān chief, was appointed by ^cUmar as Medinan representative over the district which he and his people inhabited. (81)

ii. ^cUmar and the Christians of Najrān

Up to the early period of ^cUmar's caliphate, Jumādā II, 13/August, 634, the Christians of Najrān represented one of the important local powers in the Yemen. The majority of their power lay with B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, a tribe of Madhhij. (82) During the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early period of his successor, a peace treaty between them and the Medinan government was in existence. (83)

Through that treaty the Christians of Najrān were, to a certain degree, recognized as an autonomous group in the area. Therefore the unstable situation in the Yemen, after the Prophet's death in Rabī^cI, 11/June, 632, induced Abū Bakr to renew the Prophet's treaty with them. (84) Under

(81) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 220, says he has been appointed over the rab^c by ^cUmar. The rab^c is the homeland or 'group of people', cf. Ibn Manẓūr, lisan, VIII, 120; al-Fayrūz^āādī, Qāmus, III, 24.

(82) For the nasab of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^cb, see Table 2.

(83) For their treaty with the Prophet, see above. For the renewal of this treaty by Abū Bakr, cf. Ibn Sa^cd, Tabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabari, I, 1987f; al-Nuwayrī, Nahayāt, XVIII, 136. See also Hamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 128f; al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 160.

(84) Ibid.

the terms of the treaty, Najrān became a point of concentration for Muslim troops en route for the Yemen in the first year of Abū Bakr's reign. (85)

In Jumādā II, 13/August, 634, however, the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān broke down as a result of ʿUmar's decision towards them. This termination led to the eviction of the Christians of Najrān from the area. Three different justifications have been preserved in our primary sources for that decision. The first of these justifications comes from Abū ʿUbayd, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī, (86) who say that ʿUmar was intending to fulfil the Prophet's and Abū Bakr's instructions that Islam as a religion must be unique in the Arabian Peninsula, which meant that those of other religions must leave. The second is given by another narrative in al-Balādhurī which reads, "One of the terms stipulated against the people of Najrān [i.e. the Christians] was not to practise usury; but when they did practise it, ʿUmar decreed that they be expelled." (87) Therefore ʿUmar expelled them. The third of these justifications is preserved in Abū ʿUbayd and al-Bakrī who consider them as apostates (murtaddūn). Therefore ʿUmar wrote to them the

(85) For the concentration of the Muslim troops in Najrān at that time, see 99, 101 above. The treaty allowed for the free passage of Muslim troops through Najrān, also imposed upon the Christians there the supply of weapons and horses to the Muslim armies, see 30 above.

(86) Abu ʿUbayd, Amwāl, 129; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2162 (citing Sayf b. ʿUmar). See also Yaḳūt, Muʿjam, V, 269.

(87) Futūḥ, I, 240, Eng. Tra. See also Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 160.

following statement, "You [the Christians of Najran] asserted that you were Muslims, then you became apostates. So those who stay in Islam and became faithful will not suffer because of their previous apostasy; but as for those who refuse [to return to Islam] and insist on Christianity, my protection (dhimmah) will be withdrawn from time after the twentieth of Ramaḍān." (88)

However, some of these justifications might have been put forward by the caliph himself, since they came to us through our usually reliable primary sources. Moreover, there is no further information in the sources at our disposal which could illustrate the real intention of ^cUmar's decision. These justifications, however, cannot be accepted as a direct reason for the eviction of the Christians of Najrān, since they do not correspond with the nature of the relationship of the Medinan government with those Christians throughout the period of ^cUmar's predecessors. (89) Furthermore these statements are in direct contradiction to some of the historical facts. In the following pages these justifications will be discussed individually beginning with the first one.

(88) Abū ^cUbayd, Amwāl, 130; al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, II, 660. They mention that ^cUmar directed his order to the people of Ru^cāsh, one of the villages of Najrān which was fully controlled by the Christians at that time. For its location, cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 199; al-Bakrī, Mu^cjam, II, 660. See also Hamīdullāh, Wathā^ciq, 130; al-Akwa^c, Wathā^ciq, 173.

(89) There is no indication in the sources at our disposal about violation on the part of the Christians of Najrān of their covenant with the Medinan government during the period of the Prophet and Abū Bakr.

Since the articles of the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān was respected by both sides during the period of the Prophet and Abū Bakr, the first justification is not acceptable. According to Sayf b. ʿUmar, (90) ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb declared three important decisions at a very early stage of his caliphate, one of them being the eviction of the Christians of Najrān. By that sudden decision ʿUmar meant only the Christians of Najrān, whilst other free non-Muslims (ahl al-dhimmah) who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula were not included. According to historical fact some of those non-Muslims remained for some years of ʿUmar's caliphate and were evicted for different reasons. (91)

The second of these justifications is also unacceptable. Two reasons makes us doubt that the practising of usury was behind ʿUmar's decision. The first is the general agreement in the sources about the good relationship between Abū Bakr and the Christians of Najrān which leads us to believe the latter did not breach the treaty during that time. (92) The second of these reasons is the time

(90) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 2162, 2165, this account is repeated by Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 298.

(91) Such as the Jews of Khaybar, see Abū Yūsuf, Kharāj, 50f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 36, 38, 39, 41. Al-Wāqidi in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2594, confirms their eviction in 20/641.

(92) They respected the treaty, therefore, their town, Najrān, was the central assembly point of the Muslim troops during the Wars of Apostasy, from where they entered the Yemēn, see 99, 101 above, as well as they never differed with Abū Bakr.

when ʿUmar declared his action against them, since that does not correspond with the historical facts. (93)

For the third justification, it is enough to say that there is no mention in our sources of the adoption by the Christians of Najrān as a whole of Islam, whilst these sources all agree that they remained Christians and they were evicted and lived in exile as Christians. (94)

Together the appearance of the military power of the Christians of Najrān and the escalation of the Yemeni [i.e. the Muslims] migrations to the conquests might have led ʿUmar to take a decision concerning them, i.e. the Christians of Najrān, quickly. (95) Al-Husayn b. al-Aswad (96) tells us that the people of Najrān [i.e. the Christians] grew to forty thousand during ʿUmar's Caliphate. Abū Yūsuf (97) records also that they collected weapons

(93) As has already been mentioned ʿUmar declared his decision in the very early stages of his caliphate which means that he could not receive and investigate those who practised usury during these few days.

(94) They made their treaty with the Prophet and Abū Bakr in order to protect their faith and ʿUmar evicted them because they were Christians. In their new home in al-Najrāniyyah, in Iraq, they remained Christians. For their new settlement, see Abū Yūsuf, Kharāj, 73f; al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 77-9; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; Yāqūt, Muʿjam, V, 269f. See also Watt, M. at Medina, 128.

(95) Cf. al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 181. In July 1981, Prof. M. al-Ghul presented a paper at the seminar for Arabian Studies in which he discussed in detail the eviction of the Christians of Najrān by ʿUmar. However, I have not yet managed to locate a copy of this paper.

(96) In al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 78. Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987, gives the same number of Najrānis at the time when the Prophet died.

(97) Kharāj, 74.

and horses. It is obvious that a political reason was behind the caliph's decision.

Since the location of Najrān represented the northern gateway to the Yemeni highlands ⁽⁹⁸⁾ (Najd al-Yaman) any opposing power which emerged there could detach the highland provinces from the Ḥijāz. This advantage was clearly understood by the Prophet who guaranteed the passage and supplies of his envoys to the Yemen by the treaty which he made with the Christians of Najran. ⁽⁹⁹⁾ It can be assumed that continuation of Yemeni migrations, the military strength of these Christians, their tribal solidarity and the strategic location of their town led ^cUmar to pay more attention to them than to other free non-Muslims in Arabia. Therefore, his eviction of them was one of the important decisions he made during the very early stages of his caliphate. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

In all probability, however, ^cUmar was not worried by the area possessed by these Christians during the early years of his caliphate, since the majority of the Yemeni Muslim tribes were still to be found in their homeland at that time. It is true that officially the Yemenis joined the Muslim armies during Abū Bakr's Caliphate, but the intensive migrations of Yemenis to the battle fronts began during the period of ^cUmar's reign. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ This means that

(98) Cf. 27 above.

(99) See the contents of the treaty in Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 76. See also Hamidullah, Wathā'iq, 111f; Watt, M. at Medina, 359f; al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 94f.

(100) Cf. 200 above.

(101) For these migrations, see Chapter IV, A,B, above.

at the early stages of ^cUmar's Caliphate, the Medinan regime still had supporters in the Yemen, namely the Muslim tribes there, whom he could use to put down any uprising against his authority in the area. From the narrative of Abū Bakr al-Hudhalī (102) it can be seen that the Yemen represented a major source of Muslim combatants on the battle fronts during the period of ^cUmar's Caliphate.

To conclude, however, it can be said that by his eviction of the Christians of Najrān at the very stages of his caliphate, ^cUmar was looking carefully ahead to the future of Islam in the Yemen, especially when the area was to become drained of Muslim supporters in consequence of the continuation of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered countries as they expanded.

The twenty-four year period starting with the migration of the first Yemeni group to the conquests in 12/633-4 and ending with the murder of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān Dhū^j l-Hijjah 35/June 656, marks the beginning of a political lull in the Yemeni history. The political life of the Yemenis was obscure and Islamic-Yemeni relations remained vague. The real participation of the Yemenis in the political life of the state emerged outside of the Yemen, their homeland, namely, in the conquered provinces. There they became directly involved in this life playing a major role in the political events, i.e. the murder of ^cUthman and the first Civil War.

(102) In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2612. Repeated in al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ 300; al-Dīnawarī, Akḥbār, 134f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil III, 3. They record that when the Persian forces gathered at Nihāwand, in northern Persia, in 21/642, ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān advised ^cUmar to write to the Syrians to move from Syria and the Yemenis to advance from the Yemen.

CHAPTER VII

The role of the Yemeni migrants in the uprising
against °Uthmān and the Civil War

(35-40/656-661)

During the last phase of °Uthmān's caliphate, some of the Muslims, mainly those garrisoned in the towns (amṣār) of the conquered provinces, rejected his policies, particularly the one regarding the appointment of governors. This rejection developed into an uprising against the caliph which ended in his assassination in Dhū¹-Ḥijjah 35/June 656.

Immediately after the murder of °Uthmān the real first civil war began as a result of some of the Companions revolting against the newly elected caliph, °Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. It is true that in the battles of the civil war of that period both sides were led by some of the Companions, yet the major part of their armies consisted of the inhabitants of the conquered provinces, which formed the real military power of the state.

The Muslims, therefore, were divided into three factions: the first supported the new caliph; the second followed his opponents; and some of them, especially those from among the Companions, were neutral. In fact two battles worthy of mention here are the battles of the Camel and of Ṣiffīn. Both of them were between °Alī and his opponents. In the first battle he fought Ṭalḥah b. °Ubayd Allāh and al-Zubayr b. al-°Awwām, who had been supported

by the inhabitants of Basra; in the second he faced the people of Syria, who were led by their governor, Mu^ʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, who had refused to give his oath of allegiance to him. The latter conflict lasted until the renunciation by al-Ḥasan b. Alī of the caliphate in Rabī^ʿ II, 41/August, 661.

In fact neither the murder of ^ʿUthmān nor the civil war is our main topic in this Chapter, the major emphasis of which is the role of the Yemenis (who migrated from the Yemen and were living in the conquered provinces at that time) in that uprising and the civil war.

To illustrate the role of these Yemeni migrants in each event, we will study the events separately, dividing this chapter into two main headings: the first will consider their role in the uprising against ^ʿUthmān; the second will cover the role and the influence of the Yemeni chiefs during the time of the battles of the civil war, especially Ṣiffīn.

A. The effect of the Yemenis on the uprising against °Uthmān

The uprising of the people of the garrison towns (Basra, Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ) against °Uthmān which led to his murder, was one of the most important events in the history of the Islamic caliphate. It has, therefore, become known traditionally as the "Great Civil War" (al-fitnah al-kubrā). This uprising started when some of the inhabitants of the garrison towns expressed openly their opposition to °Uthmān's policy in the last few years of his reign. (1)

a. The Yemeni role in inciting hostility against °Uthmān

In these garrison towns, where the military and financial power of the caliphate was centred, the inhabitants originated from the Muslim armies of the conquests. There most of the Yemeni tribes were totally opposed to the caliph's policy of making important appointments from the members of his own family. In Iraq the majority of them, especially the Kufans, were against it, while in al-Fuṣṭāṭ the Yemenis were split into two factions, one for the caliph's policy, one against. In Syria the Arabs, including the Yemenis, all followed Mu°āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, the governor of Syria and a relative of the caliph; hence they were in agreement with °Uthmān's policy.

One modern scholar (2) has suggested that "The

(1) For a detailed discussion of the uprising against °Uthmān, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 168ff; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 512ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 290ff; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 33ff. Cf. also Muir, The Caliphate, 215ff; Sālim, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-°arabiyyah, II, 267ff; Sha°bān, Islamic history, I, 67-71.

(2) Al-Nuṣṣ, al-°Aṣabiyyah al-qabaliyyah, 198.

Yemani party had started to exert its influence on political events since the uprising against ʿUthmān, because the majority of his opponents and the leaders of the revolution were from the Yemen." It can be assumed that there is some truth in the above point of view, since the Yemenis constituted the majority of the rebels. However we should also note that many non-Yemenis were also involved and, of course, some of the Yemenis were against the uprising. (3) It is probable that a large number of Yemenis participated in the revolution, and the appearance of a number of their chiefs in command of it is the reason for the above view, arguing that the Yemeni party had declared its own national solidarity openly at that time. However, there is no evidence in the sources at our disposal to prove that any Yemeni leader did in fact claim the revolt to be specifically a Yemeni uprising.

Although many Yemenis were involved in this uprising, many were against it. In Egypt some of their leaders, such as Muʿāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī and al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī, both Kindah chiefs, took sides with ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿd b. Abī ʿI-Sarḥ, the governor of ʿUthmān in Egypt. These chiefs were later to become the leaders of ʿUthmān's party (al-ʿUthmāniyyah) in Egypt. (4) The Yemenis in

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- (3) There were many non-Yemenis who declared their opposition to the caliph's policy: Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah and ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, all of them Companions.
- (4) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 128. For Muʿāwiyah b. Ḥudayj, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 398; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3392, 98f, 3404; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VII, 188; Ibn Ḥazm, 435; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 209, 221f.

Basra, it seems, did not involve themselves in this event, for none of their leaders joined the Basrans who had gone to Medina to state their case. (5) Therefore, when the rebels tightened up their siege on the caliph's house, one of his relatives advised him to go to Basra to remain under the protection of al-Azd. (6) The Yemenis in Syria played no part in the uprising against ʿUthmān and supported totally his governor there who had indeed sent re-inforcements to the caliph. These re-inforcements were led by Yazīd b. Usayd al-Bajalī, one of the Yemeni leaders in Syria, whom Muʿāwiyah ordered to fight those laying siege to the caliph's house. (7)

There is no doubt that most of the Yemeni rebels were from Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ. In all probability, however, the degree of influence of the Yemeni tribes in these towns encouraged their chiefs to challenge the caliph's governors and to declare their opposition to his regime. In Kufa when Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, the caliph's governor there, declared that he considered the rural area of Iraq (al-Sawād), to be the garden of the Qurashīs, some of Kufan chiefs, led by Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhʿī, a Madhhijī, challenged his claim by attacking the police chief (ṣāhib al-shurṭah).⁽⁸⁾ According to Abū Mikhnaf in al-Balādhurī⁽⁹⁾ ʿAmr b. Zurārah and

(5) For the delegation of Basra in Medina, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2955; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, al-ʿIqd al-Farīd, XVII, 69; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VII, 173f; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 103.

(6) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 227.

(7) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 72; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 85.

(8) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 40; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 171f.

(9) Ansāb, V, 30; see also Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 414.

Kumayl b. Ziyād, both Yemenis from al-Nakh^c, were the first Kufans to make public their wish to depose (khal^c) the caliph. Thus the governor was unable to confront these people and he wrote to the caliph asking him to expel them from Kufa. Accordingly, the Caliph ordered his governor there to deport the rebels to Syria to put them under the control of his strong relative, Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. (10)

Of course, if these Yemenis had not been adequately protected by their tribes, they would not have dared to declare openly their objection to the caliph's policy. Even when they arrived in Syria they challenged Mu^cāwiyah there, threatening his position with opposition from their own clans. Al-Kūfī (11) records that when Mu^cāwiyah threatened Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī by jailing him, one of the Yemenis said to Mu^cāwiyah, "Mu^cāwiyah, if you jail him, you must know that he belongs to an innumerable clan. It can be very dangerous for those who challenge it."

As soon as Mālik b. al-Ashtar and others came back to Kufa, opposition to ^cUthmān increased. (12) At this stage the rebels of Kufa, led by two Yemeni leaders, Mālik b. al-Ashtar and Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, left the town, thus preventing Sa^cīd b. al-^cĀṣ, the governor of ^cUthmān, who was unacceptable to the Kufan rebels, from entering the

(10) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 532; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 173-5; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil, III, 70.

(11) Futūḥ, II, 177.

(12) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 44; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 190-3; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2930.

town. Submitting to their pressure, the caliph replaced Sa^cīd by Abū Mūsā al-Ash^carī, a Yemeni and a Companion. (13)

Al-Fuṣṭāṭ was the other town inhabited by many Yemenis who revolted against ^cUthmān. Although the leadership was in the hand of such Companions as Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah and Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, the bulk of the support came from the mainly Yemeni tribesmen. In 35/655-6, after he had expelled ^cUthmān's governor, ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī³l-Sarḥ, Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah came to power in Egypt. He formed an Egyptian force, consisting of those tribesmen in al-Fuṣṭāṭ, and ordered them to move to Medina to put their case. The majority of this force was Yemeni. (14)

In spite of their different attitudes towards the uprising against the caliphate, the Yemenis in al-Fuṣṭāṭ supported each other on occasions, motivated by considerations of clan solidarity. Al-Kindī (15) mentions that Kinānah b. Bishr defended Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj (both of them from Tujīb, a Yemeni tribe of Kindah, though the former was against ^cUthmān and the latter one of his supporters) when Mu^cāwiyah was held prisoner.

(13) The rebels forced the caliph to appoint Abū Mūsā instead of Sa^cīd, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 44-7; al-Ṭabarī I, 2930; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 62f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 74f. See also Sha^cbān, Islamic History, I, 68.

(14) Al-Kindī, Wulāh, 18; Ibn Abī Bakr, 102. See also 211 below.

(15) Wulāh, 18. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 403; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3405, who report the clan solidarity of Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj when he declared openly his attitude towards the murder of Kinānah b. Bishr after the battle of Ṣiffīn.

b. The Yemeni role in the murder of ^cUthmān

In Shawwāl, 35/April, 656, when the rebels marched from the garrison towns, Basra, Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ to Medina, most of their leaders were Yemenis. One thousand men came to Medina from Kufa led by Mālīk b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī, a Yemeni. (16) At the same time the Egyptian contingent arrived there led by five leaders, four of whom were Yemenis, (17) whereas the leadership of the Basrans contained no Yemenis at all. (18)

The rebels, however, took over Medina and surrounded the caliph's house. Although some of the Companions were amongst them, real control was in the hands of the leading rebels, especially the Yemenis. Ibn Qutaybah (19) confirms the role of Mālīk b. al-Ashtar, a Yemeni leader, as leader

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- (16) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmāh, I, 31. In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2954 and Ibn Abī Bakr, 103, four leaders, among whom was Mālīk b. al-Ashtar. Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 79, gives a different account in which he considers Mālīk b. al-Ashtar one of the four Kufan leaders who were all under the leadership of ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Aṣamm/al-^cAmirī.
- (17) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 2954; Ibn Abī Bakr, 102; Ibn al-Athīr Kāmil, III, 79; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 173, who all mention Kinānah b. Bishr al-Laythī instead of al-Tujībī. See al-Kindī, Wulāh 17; Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqaq, 222; al-Mas^cādī, Muruḥ, IV, 282; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 98; al-Kūfī, Futuh, II, 236, who all confirm that it was al-Tujībī, not al-Laythī.
- (18) For the contingent of Basra, cf. Ibn ^cAbd Rabbih, Iqd, XVII, 69; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2955; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 173f.
- (19) Imāmāh, I, 29.

of the rebels in Medina; when some Companions asked him to stop the attack on the caliph, he shouted to them, "When we arrived you came crying for him [the caliph]; by God, we shall not leave until we kill him." Other Yemenis stood by, abusing and criticising the caliph as he was making a speech to the rebels in Medina. (20)

In Dhū^l-Ḥijjah 35/June, 656, the caliph was murdered after his house had been broken into by some of the rebels, the majority of whom were Yemenis. In this whole operation the Yemenis had played a major role. Although historical sources differ about the identity of the man who was actually involved in murdering ^cUthmān, they agree that four Yemenis were the chief culprits. (21) One of them, Kinānah b. Bishr al-Tujībī, was mentioned in an elegy of ^cUthmān as follows ;

أَلَا إِنَّ خَيْرَ النَّاسِ بَعْدَ ثَلَاثَةٍ قَتِيلُ التُّجَيْبِيِّ الَّذِي جَاءَ مِنْ مِصْرَ

Oh! the best of people after three [others] (The Prophet, Abū Bakr and ^cUmar),

was killed by al-Tujībī who came from Egypt. (22)

(20) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 89, quoting an anonymous member of Tujīb.

(21) These are Kinānah b. Bishr al-Tujībī, Sūdān b. Ḥumrān al-Murādī, al-Ghāfiqī b. Ḥarb al-^cAkkī and Qutayrah al-Sakūnī. Although the fifth of those involved is Yemeni, he was not one of those who migrated from the Yemen during the conquests. See Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, III, 73; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 574; al-Kūfī, II, 236; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3017-22; Ibn Kathir, Bidāyah, VII, 188.

(22) This verse was composed by al-Walīd b. ^cUqbah b. Abī Mu^cīt, one of the relatives of ^cUthmān. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 98; IV, 591; Ibn Durayd, 222; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3064; Ibn Abī Bakr, 209. Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, IV, 283, says that this verse was composed by ^cUthmān's wife, Nā'ilah bint al-Farāfiṣah.

Thus the Yemenis in the garrison towns exercised a major influence in the uprising against the caliph. There is no doubt that this influence gave sufficient authority to their leaders to attain important positions in the course of the uprising. One of them, al-Ghāfiqī b. Ḥarb al-^cAkkī, administered Medinan affairs for five days after the murder of ^cUthmān. (23) Throughout the days which followed, the rebels tried to persuade some of the Companions to accept the office of caliph. When they met with no success, they turned to ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, putting pressure upon him to accept the post. In the negotiations between the rebels and some of the Companions about their acceptance of the caliphate, certain Yemeni leaders had a major influence. Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī strongly argued with ^cAlī that if he refused to shoulder this responsibility, the Muslim state would disintegrate. Consequently ^cAlī accepted and the first man to pledge his oath of allegiance (bay^cah) was Mālik b. al-Ashtar. (24) Because of the central role played

(23) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3073 (citing Sayf b. ^cUmar); see also al-Dīnawarī, Akhbar, 142, who says three days only, however, confirming al-Ghāfiqī's role. Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 147, records that al-Ghāfiqī was the prayer leader and Kinānah b. Bishr (al-Tujībī) was his deputy.

(24) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3075 (citing al-Sha^cbī); Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, I, 38. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 215f; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 226, who both confirm this role of Ibn al-Ashtar with slight differences. Of course, such a remarkable suggestion would be totally rejected by the Shī^cah, for example, al-Ya^cqūbī, al-Kūfī and al-Iṣfahānī, but there is no objection to, or comment on the above suggestion.

during this uprising by the Yemenis, one of the historians⁽²⁵⁾ considers them in particular as those who gave oath of allegiance to ^cAlī. It is known that none of the rebels had actually declared his tribal affinity, but the fact was that the Yemenis were very numerous and had been largely responsible for leading the uprising. This role might have led some of the historians to consider that they alone from among the Arabs gave their oath of allegiance to ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. (26)

B. The role of the Yemenis in the Civil War

The murder of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān in Dhū 'l-Ḥijjah, 35/June, 656 marked the actual beginning of the first civil war in the Islamic state. (27) At that point large regional groups in conflict with the caliph and led by some of the prominent Companions came into existence. The first stage of this war was concentrated in Iraq, where the inhabitants of the country were divided into two factions. The Kufans took sides with the newly elected caliph, ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Meanwhile the Basrans followed

(25) Al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 275 (citing Abū ^cUmar).

(26) Ibid. For the arrival of the Yemeni tribes from the Yemen; in Medina to give their oath of allegiance to ^cAlī when he was elected caliph, see 236-8 below.

(27) Two civil wars took place during the first/seventh century: The first between ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his opponents; the second when ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr opposed B. Marwān. For a detailed discussion of these wars see, Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 180ff; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 145ff; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 154ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3087ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 105ff. Cf. also Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom, 75ff; Sha^cbān, Islamic History, I, 71ff; Surur, al-Ḥayāt al-Siyasiyyah, 68ff; Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, 121ff.

Talhah b. ^cUbayd Allāh and al-Zubayr b. al-^cAwwām, both prominent Companions (the latter was also the Prophet's cousin), who revolted against the new caliph and were backed by the Prophet's widow, ^cĀ'ishah. The second stage took place mainly between the new caliph who had been supported by the Iaqis, both the Kufans and Basrans, and Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria and a relative of ^cUthmān, who had been totally supported by the Syrians. Although the Egyptians made no direct contribution to the battles of these two stages, there is evidence that some of them joined the Syrian troops. Their absence from the confrontation can probably be attributed to their remoteness from the central area of conflict. (28)

In spite of the fact that the oath of allegiance had been given to ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in Medina in the presence of the Anṣār and Muhājirūn and those who came from other regions, the result was not a caliphate which was capable of unifying the people, for the factions were divided in their attitude towards it. In such an atmosphere of conflict, the caliph was faced by a strong rebellion that he could not hope to put down. The rebellion against the new caliph continued to produce military confrontations until the renunciation by al-Ḥasan b. ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib of the caliphate in Rabī^c II 41/August, 661 Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān succeeded him. This abdication, however, brought the first civil war to an end. (29)

(28) The centre of the confrontation was in Iraq. The battle of the Camel, the first battle of this war, took place in Basra and the second main battle, Ṣiffīn, took place on the north bank of the Euphrates River, in Iraq.

(29) For this event, cf. Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 203; al-Dīnawarī, 220; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 192; see also Sha^cbān, Islamic History, I, 77, 78.

Two battles worthy of mention here these are the battle of the Camel and the battle of Şiffīn. It is not our aim, however, to provide a detailed study of this civil war, but rather to assess in particular the role of the Yemeni migrants in it.

a. The loyalty of the Yemenis to the leaders of antagonists

In the battle of the Camel in Jūmāda II, 36/December, 656, the Yemeni tribes living in Kufa constituted the majority of ʿAlī's army. Abū Mikhnaf (30) tells us that ten thousand warriors from the tribes of Kufa joined ʿAlī, most of whom were Yemenis. On the other hand, the Azd and other Yemenis in Basra supported his opponents, Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr, in this battle. (31) Actually, the most important evidence concerning the role of the Yemeni tribes played comes in relation to the battle of Şiffīn (Dhū^l 1-Ḥijjah, 36-Şafar, 37/May-July, 657) between those Iraqis led by the caliph and those Syrians who supported their governor, Mu^cāwiyah

b. Abī Sufyān. In this battle the Yemenis formed the bulk of the fighting forces in both the Iraqi and the Syrian armies. (32)

The strong influence of the Yemeni tribes in this war is apparent from a study of the role played by some of their chiefs at the time. These chiefs had the strongest influence on how the battles were conducted. So extensive was this influence that they came on occasions to be

(30) In al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f. Cf. Also al-Dīnawarī, 147f. Both confirm that seven tribal groups joined ʿAlī, of whom four were Yemenis.

(31) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 137f; al-Dīnawarī, 148.

(32) For a detailed discussion of their role in this battle, see Ibn Muzāhim, Şiffīn, 131ff; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 298ff; al-Dīnawarī, 156ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 488ff.

instrumental in decision-making at the highest level. Again, of course, the strength of the influence of the Yemeni chiefs was obtained from their tribal support. (33) This power wielded by the Yemeni tribes was the main reason why the rebel leaders were always striving to obtain the support of their chiefs. This is clearly illustrated by a message sent by al-Zubayr b. al-^cAwwām, one of ^cAlī's opponents, before the battle of the Camel to Ka^cb b. Sūr, the Azdī chief in Basra, addressing him as 'Lord of al-Azd' (Sayyid al-Azd), and requesting him to be on his side. (34) When Ka^cb showed his neutral attitude, ^cĀ'ishah, the Prophet's widow, realized Ka^cb's position and had to go personally to persuade him. She was successful in persuading him to join their army. (35) The Azd in Basra, therefore, became the most important supporters of ^cAlī's opponents in the battle of the Camel in Jumādā II, 36/December, 656. (36)

As has already been mentioned, the Yemeni tribes in Kufa, especially Madhḥij and Hamdān, were keen supporters of ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib. According to al-Kūfī (37) ten thousand Madhḥijīs were in ^cAlī's army at the battle of Siffīn

(33) Especially in these regions in conflict where they constituted a high proportion of the Arab inhabitants. For their settlement in Syria and Kūfa, see Chapter V, B, Tables a, b.ii.

(34) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 47f.

(35) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 238.

(36) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 237f; Al-Dīnawarī, 148.

(37) Futūḥ, III, 295.

(Dhū^l 1-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar, 37/May-July, 657). As for Hamdān, because of their importance and their loyalty to the new caliph, they became closely aligned with ^cAlī himself, to such a degree that Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān described them as, "The sword of ^cAlī." (38) As for their role in supporting ^cAlī in the battle of Ṣiffīn, Mu^cāwiyah expressed his bitterness when, after he had become caliph, he addressed a Hamdānī woman, Sūdah bint ^cUmārah, saying "I have never suffered from any Arab as much as I have suffered from your people. [i.e. Hamdān]". (39) It may be said that Hamdān greatly impressed ^cAlī. This can be seen when he addressed them at Ṣiffīn saying, "You are my shield, my spear, my sword and my protection. By God, if I had a paradise I would allot it to you alone, you people of Hamdān." (40) He even expressed his feeling towards them in his verse; (41)

ولو كنتُ بواباً على بابِ جنةٍ لقلتُ لهمدانِ ادْخُلوا بِسَلَامٍ

If I were a door keeper of paradise,

I would say to Hamdān, "Enter in peace."

In Syria, however, the Yemeni tribes were also an important part of Mu^cāwiyah's force and, as can be witnessed from a study of his troops at Ṣiffīn, they were in the

(38) Al-Kūfī, II, 488.

(39) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 89-93.

(40) Ibn Muzāḥim, 437; al-Kūfī, III, 43.

(41) Ibn Muzāḥim, 437; al-Ḥimyarī, Shams, 110. See also al-Hajrī, Masājid Ṣan^cā, 12.

majority. The most prominent Yemeni tribes with Mu^cāwiyah were Ḥimyar, Kindah and ^cAkk. (42) Mu^cāwiyah, therefore, considered that the fundamental strength of the Syrian forces lay in the Yemeni tribes, and so he declared war against ^cAlī relying on their support. This is very clear from his poetry :

إِنْ الشَّامُ اعْطَتْ طَاعَةً يَمِينَةً
 نَأْنِ يَفْعَلُوا اصْدُمْ عَلِيًّا بِجِبْهَةٍ

 تَوَاصَفَهَا أَشْيَاخُهَا فِي الْمَجَالِسِ
 تَفُتُّ عَلَيْهِ كُلُّ رَطْبٍ وَبَابِسِ

If Syria gives [me] Yemeni obedience,

of the sort that is described by their chiefs in their meetings

If they do, I will attack ^cAlī with a front,

which will devastate him completely [literally; everything
fresh and dry] . (43)

For this reason Mu^cāwiyah delayed his reply to ^cAlī when the latter asked him to clarify his position. He must either give an oath of allegiance or be prepared to fight, ^cAlī said. In fact the reason is that Mu^cāwiyah was trying to discover the view of the Syrians and of the senior Yemeni leaders.

(42) Also some of Khath^cam, Hamdān and al-Azd were in his army, but they were in the minority.

(43) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 33; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, I, 190f. See also al-Shamaḥī, al-Yaman, 81. In al-Kufī, Futūḥ, II, 379, Wabi'l-Shamī 'indī 'usbatun Yamaniyyatun. In al-Balādhurī, Ansab, II, 289, Wa-qaḍ manahatni 'I-Shāmu afdala tā'atin, instead of Ini'l-Shāmu a'ṭat ṭā'atan Yamaniyyatan.

b. The influence of the Yemeni chiefs in the war

In all probability ^cAlī, by sending one of the Yemeni leaders who supported his cause, Jarīr b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, to Mu^cāwiyah, intended to give this responsibility to a man who had influence among the Syrians, especially those of Yemeni origin. Therefore, when ^cAlī nominated Jarīr for this mission, he addressed him saying, "as you see, I have many Companions of the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār who are qualified for this mission, but I have chosen you in particular because the Prophet described you as the best of the Yemenis."⁽⁴⁴⁾ "And Jarīr, accepting the mission, said to ^cAlī, "I will ask the Syrians to obey you and recognize you as a caliph; for most of them are my people, my clan and my citizens."⁽⁴⁵⁾

So, when Mu^cāwiyah received Jarīr, he was in a very difficult position because of the influence of Jarīr upon the Syrians, especially those of Yemeni origin. Mu^cāwiyah immediately consulted ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ, one of the Companions and his special military consultant. The latter agreed that it was too dangerous to withhold the oath of allegiance to ^cAlī as suggested by Jarīr, whom ^cAmr had described as the best Iraqi envoy.⁽⁴⁶⁾ So ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ suggested that the best thing was to convince Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, a Yemeni chief in Syria who played a major role in the war,

(44) Ibn Muzāḥim, 28; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, I, 190; al-Kūfī, II, 374.

(45) Ibn Muzāḥim, 27f; al-Kūfī, II, 373.

(46) Ibn Muzāḥim, 44; al-Dīnawarī, 161; al-Kūfī, II, 397.

to support Mu^cāwiyah by persuading a few influential people to say that ^cAlī had killed ^cUthmān. Then Mu^cāwiyah could still retain the loyalty of the Syrians when he rejected the request to grant an oath of allegiance to ^cAlī. (47)

Mu^cāwiyah agreed to ^cAmr's idea and when Jarīr urged him to give his reply, he answered him saying, "By God I am not waiting for anybody's opinion except that of Shuraḥbīl, for he is an important Syrian chief. I do not want to make a decision without him, so when he comes I will consult him and give you my final decision at our first meeting." (48) When Shuraḥbīl met the Syrian leaders in Damascus he was totally convinced by them that ^cAlī had killed ^cUthmān. In this context Shuraḥbīl pressed Mu^cāwiyah not to obey ^cAlī, saying, "Mu^cāwiyah, it has become clear to me on the basis of just witnesses that ^cAlī killed ^cUthmān unjustly, and by God, if you give him your oath of allegiance, we will drive you out of Syria. So send that man [Jarīr, ^cAlī's envoy] back to the one who sent him. For, by God, the only thing we have for ^cAlī is the sword." (49) According to Ibn Muzāḥim, (50)

(47) Ibid. It seems that ^cAmr intended to nominate Shuraḥbīl in particular to face Jarīr because of the enmity of Shuraḥbīl for Jarīr. Al-Najāshī, the poet of the Iraqi army, says;

شُرَاحِبِيلُ مَا لَدَيْنَا فَارْقَتَ أَمْرَنَا وَلَكِنْ لِبَغْضِ الْمَالِكِيِّ جَرِيرِ

Shuraḥbīl, it was not for the faith that you left us,

but because of your hatred for Jarīr al-Mālikī.*

* See Ibn Muzāḥim, 51; al-Kūfī, II, 402.

(48) Al-Kūfī, II, 22.

(49) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 47; al-Dīnawrī, 161; al-Kūfī, II, 401, 404.

(50) Ṣiffīn, 47.

that was the time when Mu^cāwiyah realized that Shuraḥbīl had reached a decision to fight the Iraqis and that all the Syrians would follow him.

In fact the decision of Shuraḥbīl came to be a declaration of war against ^cAlī. Mu^cāwiyah immediately sent back ^cAlī's envoy saying to him, "Go back to your leader and tell him what you have heard from the people of Syria." (51) Thereafter, the Yemeni leaders in Syria evidently appeared to be supporting Mu^cāwiyah. Three of them played a major role in recruiting for Mu^cāwiyah's cause. The first was Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, who went throughout Syria, persuading people to follow Mu^cāwiyah and was, as such, extremely successful. (52) The second was Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī, who wandered around the Syrian towns taking ^cUthmān's blood-stained garment and asking people to join him in retaliation. (53) The third was Mālik b. Hubayrah, of Kindah, who was the first to give his oath of allegiance to Mu^cāwiyah. (54)

It is noticeable that, just as the Yemenis had had a strong role in the declaration of war, they also had the same influence on its termination. So in the battle of Ṣiffīn when Mu^cāwiyah realized the superior strength of the Iraqi army he began negotiations to cease hostilities.

(51) Al-Kūfī, II, 404; al-Dīnawarī, 162.

(52) Al-Kūfī, II, 406f; al-Dīnawarī, 161f; Ibn Muzāḥim, 50f.

(53) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 291.

(54) Ibn Muzāḥim, 80f.

Again Mu^{cā}awiyah thought of persuading some of the Iraqi tribal chiefs to put pressure on their commander, ^cAlī, to accept peaceful negotiations. He decided to contact al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī, one of the Yemeni leaders in the Iraqi army, to use his position to enforce his opinion in the decision making. Mu^{cā}awiyah, therefore, selected Mu^{cā}awiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī, one of the Kindah chiefs in the Syrian army, to fulfil this mission of persuading al-Ash^cath to stop fighting and to deliver up the murderers of ^cUthmān. (55) When Ibn Ḥudayj failed in his mission, Mu^{cā}awiyah b. Abī Sufyān repeated the attempt through his brother, ^cUtbah, saying to him, "Speak softly to al-Ash^cath, because if he is able to bring peace, people will accept it." (56) Although ^cUtbah tried hard to change al-Ash^cath's mind and always described him respectfully as the head of the Iraqis and the Lord of the Yemenis (Sayyid ahl al-Yaman), he failed and thus fighting continued. (57)

The military confrontations during the battle of Ṣiffīn (Dhū^l 1-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar, 37/May-July, 657) did not stop until the Syrians finally raised their Qurans on their spears. That, together with the pressure exerted by some of the Yemeni leaders in the Iraqi army, was eventually sufficient. Some of the Yemeni chiefs in the Iraqi army were very influential in exercising pressure upon ^cAlī to accept the arbitration (taḥkīm) threatening the use of

(55) Al-Kūfī, II, 273f.

(56) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 87; Ibn Muzāḥim, 408.

(57) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 88; Ibn Muzāḥim, 408. Al-Kūfī, III, 277, reads Sayyid qabā'il Kindah.

their tribal influence if he did not accept. One of those powerful Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī, who was accompanied by a number of Yemenis, asked ^cAlī to accept the arbitration. When ^cAlī hesitated, he threatened him saying "Accept the people's call for consulting the Quran, or otherwise, by God, none of the Yemenis will fight for you with an arrow, sword or spear." (58) So under this pressure ^cAlī agreed to stop fighting and accept the arbitration. (59)

Both sides in the conflict, during this war, always had to take account of the positions and opinions of the Yemeni chiefs, especially during the fighting between ^cAlī and Mu^cāwiyah. The two conflicting groups worked to win over the opposing Yemeni leaders to their own side, using their Yemeni supporters for these missions. In this context Sa^cīd b. Qays al-Hamdānī, a chief of Hamdān in the Iraqi army, had been authorized by ^cAlī to write to Shurahbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, a chief of Kindah on the Syrian side, to warn him not to support Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. (60)

(58) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 95; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; al-Kūfī, III, 307. Cf. also Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 483f who records the verses of the Syrians which confirm that the decision makers on the Iraqi side are three, all of them are Yemenis.

(59) However, we do not intend to confirm here that the Yemenis alone exercised pressure on ^cAlī to accept arbitration. On one hand, we agree with these sources, both the primary and the modern research, which confirm the role of al-qurrā', on the Iraqi side, to stop fighting, such as Abī Mikhnaf in al-Ṭabarī, I, 3330; Ibn Muzāḥim, 489f. Cf. also Surūr, al-Ḥayāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 77; Lewis, Arabs in History, 63; Sha^cban, Islamic History, I, 75, the latter confirms the role of al-Ash^cath in addition to the role of al-qurrā' by saying "Most of the qurrā' accepted arbitration, but the decisive factor in ^cAlī's acceptance was the action of al-Ash^cath b. Qays. "On the other hand, we again confirm the role of the Yemenis represented by some of their chiefs who exercised pressure on ^cAlī to stop fighting.

(60) Cf. Kūfī, II, 109-11.

Mu^cāwiyah was so concerned about the doubts of Dhū^jl-Kalā^c al-Ḥimyarī, a chief of Ḥimyar in the Syrian army, about fighting ^cAlī and was never at rest until Dhū^jl-Kalā^c was killed. Mu^cāwiyah, therefore, expressed his concern saying "If Dhū^jl-Kalā^c were alive he would have gone over to ^cAlī with half of our people."⁽⁶¹⁾

After the battle of Ṣiffīn, Mu^cāwiyah's followers controlled Egypt and, of course, it was only natural that his party flourished there, having gained its support from influential Yemeni chiefs such as Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī and al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr, both of Kindah. ⁽⁶²⁾

^cAlī soon realised the weakness of his representative in Egypt, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr. The latter failed to control the country and to confront such Yemeni leaders as those. By endeavouring to retake Egypt, ^cAlī replaced Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr with a strong Yemeni leader, Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī. ⁽⁶³⁾ Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, therefore, was very disturbed when he learnt of the appointment of this Yemeni chief who was capable of influencing the other Yemenis in Egypt. As it happened, when the new governor reached al-Qulzum he was given poisoned honey to drink and died instantly. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ On this occasion Mu^cāwiyah was

(61) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 341; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, II, 143.

(62) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 128. For the role of Mu^cāwiyah b. Ḥudayj, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 435; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 111.

(63) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 170; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 398; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3392.

(64) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 170; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 298f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3393; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 178; all confirm that Mu^cāwiyah was involved in this operation. Al-Kindī, Wulāh, 23-6; and al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 82, both do not mention this involvement.

delighted and said, "°Alī had two right supporting arms, one of them was cut off at Ṣiffīn and the other was cut off today [meaning the death of Mālik b. al-Ashtar] "(65)

c. The appearance of Yemeni solidarity during the conflict

It is noticeable that during the first civil war the Yemeni tribes were not unified on any one side, but even within one tribe there was a division of loyalties. So in the battle of Camel in Jumādā II, 36/December, 656, the Yemenis of Basra were fighting the Yemenis of Kufa. (66) Furthermore, at the battle of Ṣiffīn (Dhū³ l-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar 37/May-July 657), °Alī b. Abī Ṭālib directed every Yemeni tribe in his army to confront its relatives on the Syrian side. (67) From this it became clear that the Yemenis appeared to be the central force in all the conflicting armies in that period.

It is very curious that these Yemeni tribes never forgot their tribal solidarity, though they had differing attitudes towards that conflict. This was displayed by one of their chiefs in the Syrian army, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, replying to Sa°īd b. Qays al-Hamdānī, chief of Hamdān on the Iraqi side, when the latter urged him not to support Mu°āwiyah, saying, "By God, I am affiliated neither to Iraq nor to Syria, I am simply a man from the Yemen." (68)

(65) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 399; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3394; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 178.

(66) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2182; al-Kūfī, II, 141.

(67) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 257; al-Kūfī, II, 299.

(68) Al-Kūfī, II, 411.

Another example is when Ṣubrah b. Shaymān al-Ḥaddānī, chief of al-Azd in Basra, decided to take the side of ^cAlī's opponents in the battle of Camel. Ka^cb b. Sūr, another Azdī chief there, advised him against it saying, "listen to me and depart with your people and leave these who are descended from Muḍar and Rabī^cah, for they are brothers; if they are reconciled to each other, all will be well; but if they fight each other, we will be their ruler tomorrow." (69) A third example of Yemeni tribal solidarity is when the Azd of Iraq were directed to fight their relatives in the Syrian army at the battle of Ṣiffīn. On this occasion Mikhnaf b. Sulaymān al-Azdī, their leader in the Iraqi army said, "It is ironic that we are directed to fight our people and they are urged to fight us. By God these are surely our own arms, which we shall cut with our own arms and our wings; we shall eliminate them by means of our swords." (70)

Yemeni solidarity appeared also through the rivalry in the leadership of the troops in both the Iraqi and the Syrian army. It is well known that all through these battles of the first civil war, the tribes were led by their own chiefs, with ultimate leadership resting with the two original opponents themselves. It sometimes happened that more than one tribe was grouped under one man's leadership, and these were mostly the tribes which were related to each other. This fact is exemplified by the

(69) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 237; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3178.

(70) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 262; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3303.

grouping of Ḥimyar and Hamdān in the Iraqi army under the leadership of the latter's tribal chief. (71) But, sometimes such a grouping occurred between non-related tribes, i.e. a Qaḥṭānī and an ^cAdnānī tribe under a leader selected for his personal leadership qualities or military experience. It is noticeable here that none of the Yemeni tribes from either side that joined the war, especially during the battle of Ṣiffīn, agreed easily to fight under non-Yemeni leaders. On this occasion we shall give two examples on both sides, the Iraqi and Syrian, showing the rejection of those Yemenis who objected to the leadership of a non-Yemeni. The first is briefly as follows. When an Iraqi army left Kufa for Ṣiffīn, the leadership of Kindah and Rabī^cah (the former a Yemeni tribe, the latter ^cAdnānī) was given to al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī. As ^cAlī was dissatisfied with this arrangement, he replaced al-Ash^cath with Ḥassān b. Makhdūj al-Ḥanafī, a chief of Rabī^cah. (72) This action of ^cAlī angered the Yemenis in his army to such an extent that fighting was about to break out between the Yemenis and Rabī^cah. The crisis was not defused until Ḥassān went to al-Ash^cath and offered him the leadership of Kindah, (73) moreover, ^cAlī appointed al-Ash^cath as a general leader of the right wing of the Iraqi armies in order to satisfy the Yemeni tribes. (74) The second example was on the side of the Syrian army. During the

(71) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f.

(72) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 137; al-Kūfī, III, 105.

(73) Ibn Muzāḥim, 138f; al-Kūfī, III, 105.

(74) Ibn Muzāḥim, 140.

battle of Ṣiffīn, Mu^cāwiyah divided the leadership of his troops between some of the Muḍarīs, ignoring the Yemenis. Consequently, the latter appeared most reluctant to be led by a man from other than their own tribes, especially since they felt that they were the majority of this army. Duly they protested to Mu^cāwiyah and one of their chiefs, ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥārith al-Sakūnī, expressed their objection in verses;

معاوى احييت فينا الأحن
 وأحدثت في الشام ما لم يكن
 عتدت لبسر واصحابيه
 وما الناس حولك الا اليمن

Mu^cāwiyah, you envoked our old hatred,

you invented in Syria what was not known.

You promoted Busr and his friends [Muḍaris] ,

while the only people around you are Yemenis. (75)

Yet again the Yemenis in the Syrian army were not satisfied until Mu^cāwiyah brought them closer to himself. (76)

In Ṣafar, 37/July 657, when the Iraqi and Syrian armies stopped fighting at Ṣiffīn on the basis of accepting arbitration, each side nominated its representative.

Mu^cāwiyah nominted ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ. But, when ^cAlī wanted to select his representative, he was compelled to satisfy the ambition of the Yemeni chiefs. The latter totally refused to accept a situation in which the two sides' representatives were both to be Muḍarīs. Being motivated

(75) Ibn Muzāḥim, 424f; al-Kūfī, III, 145f.

(76) Ibn Muzāḥim, 425; al-Kūfī, III, 147.

by tribal solidarity the Yemenis compelled ^cAlī to appoint one of them, Abū Mūsā al-Ash^carī. Although ^cAlī did not trust Abū Mūsā, he found no way of refusing their demand. (77) Sha^cbān in his book (78) tends to confirm that it was the qurrā^j alone who imposed on ^cAlī the choice of Abū Mūsā, ignoring the pressure of the Yemenis. Two historical facts lead us to believe that tribal solidarity was a main factor of this choice. The first is that ^cAlī had already chosen one of the qurrā^j when he nominated ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbbās to this mission. (79) The second is the strong rejection by the Yemenis in the Iraqi army to ^cAlī's initial nomination of ^cAbdAllāh b. ^cAbbās. This rejection was expressed by al-Ash^cath b. Qays al-Kindī who protested, saying "No, by God, two Muḍarīs will never make the decision, but select a man from the Yemeni people, if your opponents select a Muḍarī." (80) Moreover, the Yemenis ignored the

(77) See, al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 500 (citing Abī Ja^cfar Muḥammad b. ^cAlī); Ibn Abd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, IV, 1764 (quoting al-Wāqidī). In al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 333; al-Dīnawarī, 195; Abī Mikhnaf in al-Ṭabarī, I, 3333; al-Kūfī, IV, 3, ^cAlī imposed by both al-Ash^cath b. Qays and the qurrā^j. In al-Jāhid, al-Bayān wa'l-Tab^cyīn, I, 183, by the Iraqis.

(78) Islamic History, I, 75. Al-qurrā^j, Reciters of the Quran, see Ibn Maḍūr, lisan al-^cArab, I, 130; al-Zabidī, Tāj al-^cArūs, I, 364.

(79) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3333; Ibn Muzāḥim, 499; Ibn al-Jazarī, Ṭabaqat al-qurrā^j, I, 425f.

(80) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; Ibn Muzāḥim, 500, al-Kūfī, IV, 3. See also al-Dūrī, Muqaddimah, 59.

fact that ^cAlī had told them that their man - Abū Mūsā might be deceived by ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ. Al- Ash^cāth b. Qays replied to ^cAlī saying, "By God, if they [The arbitrators] decide what we dislike and one of them is a Yemeni, that will be better for us than if two Muḍarīs decide what we like." (81)

Thus, to conclude, the Yemeni migrants played a major role in the uprising against ^cUthmān and the Civil War. In the first event they formed the majority of the rebels, while the Yemeni chiefs apparently emerged in inciting hostility against ^cUthmān and his murder. The strong influence of these Yemeni tribes also appeared in the course of the Civil War, since their chiefs became decision-makers in both the declaration of war and its termination. However, the role of these Yemeni chiefs in these events extended to their homeland, the Yemen, where their support to the antagonistic leaders reflected on the political situation of the country throughout this period. Consequently the Yemen was politically affected by the war, which spread throughout its provinces, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

(81) Ibn Muzāḥim, 500- al-Kūfī, IV, 3,4; See also al-Dūr ī, 59; al-Nuṣṣ, al-^cAṣabiyyah, 199.

CHAPTER VIII

The Political situation in the Yemen at the
time of the Civil War
(35-40/656-61)

After the murder of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān, the third Orthodox Caliph, in Dhū 'l-Hijjah 35/May 656, both the inhabitants of Medina and those responsible for his death agreed upon ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib as Caliph. The main request of the former was that the governors of ^cUthmān be changed; the new Caliph also had the same thought in mind. Thus he immediately ordered the governors of ^cUthmān to leave their offices. (1) In the Yemen, ^cAlī appointed two governors : ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās in Ṣan^cā' and Sa^cīd b. Sa^cd b. ^cAbādah in al-Janad. (2) However, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal of ^cAlī's governor in Ḥaḍramawt.

With the assumption of the Caliphate by ^cAlī and the resulting Civil War between his followers and those of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān (al-^cUthmāniyyah), the repercussions of this struggle were felt in the Yemen. (3) This situation

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- (1) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, 37 ff; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 154 ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3066ff.
- (2) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 42f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 61; ^cAsjad, 19; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 82-4; Bughyat, 23; Abū Makhramah, Tārīkh, II, 91. For ^cUbayd Allāh only, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089, al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 155; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 172; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Isti'āb, III, 1009; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, III, 340. For Sa^cīd, see Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 97, who says over the Yemen.
- (3) Smith, "History of Ṣan^cā'", 52.

led the historians to pay more attention to the political situation in the Yemen, especially after the arbitration of Şiffīn in Rabī^c I 38/August 658. This chapter will cover the effect of the civil war on the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the fourth Orthodox Caliph, ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭalib (35-40/656-61).

In fact throughout the first two years of ^cAlī's Caliphate, Dhū^l-Ḥijjah, 35-Rabī^c I, 38/May 656 - August 658, the Yemen passed through a quiet and stable political period, as it had during the period of his predecessors. Our sources are all silent on the question of the political situation in the Yemen during these two years. This silence is a result of their concentration on the stage on which the events of the Civil war were being played out. This stage included both Iraq and Syria, and at times, Egypt. (4) Consequently, the rest of the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen, were mentioned only incidentally during these two years.

However, when the diplomatic conflict began between ^cAlī and Mu^{c-}āwiyah after the arbitration of Şiffīn in Rabī^c I, 38/August 658, there emerged in the Yemen sudden activities both on the part of the supporters of ^cAlī and also those of Mu^{c-}āwiyah. Each of these two groups took

(4) Whereas the battles which took place during the civil war were concentrated on these territories, such as the battle of the Camel and Şiffīn, cf. Chapter VII. B

sides with one of the opposing leaders. By those actions the Yemenis became divided into three factions. Two of them involved themselves with hostilities, whilst the third faction remained neutral. Thereupon, two parties were established in the area. The first comprised the supporters of ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib who were traditionally known as "the party of ^cAlī" (Shī^cat ^cAlī). The second was made up of those who sympathised with Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān who later became known as the supporters of the Umayyads (Anṣār Banū Umayyah).

The members of the latter were originally the followers of ^cUthmān (al-^cUthmāniyyah) (5) who had been angered by his murder and who now gathered under the leadership of Mu^cāwiyah, the governor of Syria at that time and a relative of ^cUthmān. Mu^cāwiyah accused ^cAlī of being a part of the conspiracy to murder ^cUthmān and of protecting the murderers. (6) By that claim, Mu^cāwiyah succeeded in gaining the supporters of ^cUthmān on his side in his conflict with ^cAlī, bringing the Umayyad party into existence. Subsequently, Mu^cāwiyah was able to oppose the fourth Orthodox Caliph both politically and militarily and his followers spread throughout the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen.

To illustrate the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the fourth Orthodox Caliph,

(5) For a detailed discussion of al-^cUthmāniyyah, cf. al-Jāhiz, al-^cUthmāniyyah, passim.

(6) For the murder of ^cUthmān, cf. 212 above.

(35-40/656-661) we shall divide this chapter into two sections. In the first we will study the political situation in the Yemen during the first two years of ^cAlī's caliphate, Dhū ^ḥI-Hijjah, 35-Rabī^c I 38/May, 656-August 658. The second section will cover the political scene in the Yemen after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn and the appearance of political parties, showing relations of the Yemenis with the Alids' and the Umayyads' two leaders in the struggle, ^cAlī in Kufa and Mu^cāwiyah in Damascus, through to the murder of the former in Ramaḍān 40/May 661.

A. The political situation in the Yemen before the
arbitration of Ṣiffīn

The sudden upsurge of activity in the political conflict between the supporters of ^cAlī and those of Mu^cāwiyah in the Yemen after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn, Rabī^c I, 38/August, 658, was a continuation of the previous squabbles between members of the two parties in the area which had taken place during the first two years of ^cAlī's reign. The presence of ^cAlī's governors in the Yemen, as well as his military success in the battles of the Camel and Ṣiffīn might well have led the supporters of Mu^cāwiyah in the area to practise their activities secretly during these two years. They were particularly careful in what they did in the centres of ^cAlī's governors in the Yemen, namely in Ṣan^cā^ḥ and al-Janad. Yet certain influential Yemeni tribes participated openly in the civil war on both sides, since they had been sent as re-inforcements to both armies in the conflict during the first two years of ^cAlī's caliphate. (7)

(7) For the Yemeni role during this period, cf. Chapter VII, B. above.

Of course, the establishment of both the Alid and Umayyad parties in the Yemen must have been backed by experienced people in the area with a great deal of knowledge of local tribes. It is quite logical that Yemeni tribal chiefs, who had settled in the conquered areas and joined one of the two opposing leaders, together with some Medinan officials who had occupied posts in the Yemen during the period of ^cUthmān's reign, had taken part in forming these two parties. So, in order to illustrate how these parties were established, let us study each party individually.

a. The establishment of the Alid party

As has already been seen, some of those Yemeni chiefs who had settled in the conquered provinces played a major role in leading the uprising against ^cUthmān and in supporting ^cAlī's caliphate. (8) That role, however, has led some of our historians to confirm that the oath of allegiance given to ^cAlī came mainly from the Yemenis. (9) Their part in events did not stop at this stage, but they extended their activities throughout the regions of their homeland appealing to the Yemeni tribes to support ^cAlī's caliphate.

As a result of the activities of these Yemeni chiefs delegations of their tribes, who had been in the Yemen at that time, came to Medina to give the oath of allegiance to the new Caliph on behalf of their people. (10)

(8) For the role of these chiefs, cf. Chapter VII, B.b.above.

(9) The account of Abū ^cAmr in al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 276.

(10) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal that such Yemeni delegations gave their oath of allegiance to either ^cUmar or ^cUthmān.

Al-Kūfī (11) describes the arrival of these Yemeni delegates in Medina and explains their coming by saying, "When the Yemenis were informed that ^cAlī became Caliph, they voluntarily gave their oath of allegiance, then they came to congratulate him in Medina." One of these delegates was Rifā^cah b. Wā^oil al-Hamdānī who expressed the loyalty of the other delegates to ^cAlī, by saying :

نَسِيرٌ إِلَى عَلِيٍّ زِيٍّ الْمَعَالِ بِخَيْرِ عَصَابَةٍ يُمْنٍ كَرَامِ

We march to join ^cAlī, the supreme; in a best group of noblemen and generous. (12)

Al-Kūfī (13) intends to confirm that the Yemeni tribes were the only ones who sent delegations to ^cAlī, omitting the other Arab tribes. Of course other non-Yemeni tribes must have sent delegates to give their oath of allegiance to ^cAlī, since tribal leaders other than the Yemenis had been involved in the murder of ^cUthmān and had supported ^cAlī's caliphate. (14) However, two facts lead us to realize why al-Kūfī recorded only the Yemeni delegations to Medina. The first is the dominant role of the Yemenis in the uprising against ^cUthmān and in the Medinan affairs after the murder of the Caliph. (15) The

(11) Futūḥ, II, 252.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Futūḥ, II, 252-6.

(14) Cf. 212-14 above.

(15) Cf. 213-4. above.

second is the enthusiasm of those Yemeni chiefs, who were amongst the rebels in Medina in choosing ^cAlī for the Caliphate. (16) That great enthusiasm might have led these chiefs to intensify their activities in urging their relatives in the Yemen to give the oath of allegiance to ^cAlī. Therefore, Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī, one of the Yemeni chiefs who led the rebels against ^cUthmān and supported ^cAlī, happily appeared in Medina with the arrival of the Yemeni delegations. That willingness on the part of Mālik b. al-Ashtar leads us to believe that ^cAlī might have received a promise from some of these Yemenis, who were on his side, to keep their own tribes loyal to him. Therefore, when the Yemeni delegations reached Medina, Mālik b. al-Ashtar accompanied them and approached ^cAlī, saying loudly:

أَتَتْكَ عِصَابَةٌ مِنْ خَيْرِ قَوْمٍ يَمَانِيُّونَ مِنْ حَضْرٍ وَبِيَادٍ

A group of the best people have come to you,
Yemenis, both settled peoples and bedouins. (17)

Because Hamdān was one of the most loyal of the Arab tribes which supported ^cAlī against his opponents, their relationship with the new Caliph was not restricted to those Hamdānīs who were settled in Iraq, but extended also to their territory in the Yemen. (18) It can be assumed that the Hamdān chiefs in Iraq were responsible for the increased loyalty among their fellow tribesmen

(16) Cf. 213-4. above

(17) Al-Kūfī, Futūh, II, 254.

(18) Cf. 248ff below.

in their homeland towards ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. An indication of that support was the correspondence between their chiefs in Kufa, encouraging their people in the Yemen to hold a similar position towards ^cAlī. An example of that was the role of Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, a Hamdān chief in Kufa, who appealed to his people to support ^cAlī's authority in the Yemen. (19) Resulting from the role of such Hamdān chiefs, the tribe became distinguished in the Yemen as the supporters of ^cAlī (Shi^cah Li-^cAlī). Al-Hamdānī (20) comments upon this fact, saying, "The predecessors of the [present day] Abnā^o were Shī^cah because of their intimate relationship with Hamdān who supported ^cAlī." The Alids also existed in other Yemeni provinces, such as Najrān, Ṣan^cā^o, Jayshān and Ḥadramawt, (21) but their activities seem to have been on a lower level than those of Hamdān.

b. The establishment of the Umayyad party

One of the main reasons for the uprising against ^cUthmān was the failure of his governors in their various territories to gain the confidence and loyalty of the rebels. However, those other governors who did succeed in this respect, led their people in a respectful relationship with ^cUthmān's Caliphate. Consequently those regions,

(19) Cf. 248 below

(20) Ikhlīl, VIII, 102f.

(21) Cf. Map 5.

such as Syria and the Yemen, did not get involved in the uprising against ʿUthmān. Hence the Syrians became the majority of the ʿUthmaniyyah, whilst some Yemenis, especially the inhabitants of the centres of the Islamic governors, also emerged on ʿUthmān's side.

In all probability the roots of the ʿUthmāniyyah in the Yemen go back to the presence of the Medinan governors during the period of ʿUthmān's own Caliphate, especially those in Ṣanʿāʾ and al-Janād. In Ṣanʿāʾ it is possible that Yaʿlī b. Umayyah, who occupied this office for approximately twenty-four years (12-35/633-656), had participated in establishing this party. In addition to the fact that he was one of ʿUthmān's governors who had been dismissed by ʿAlī, he was also one of those companions who strongly accused ʿAlī of sharing in the conspiracy to murder the Caliph. (22)

Moreover, because of the long period of his governorship in Ṣanʿāʾ and his relationship through marriage with the leader of the Abnāʾ, (23) Yaʿlī was able to gain the confidence and loyalty of the leaders of the locals who were, in the main, Abnāʾ. Several reasons lead us to believe that Yaʿlī b. Umayyah successfully gained the loyalty of the Ṣanʿānīs in favour of ʿUthman's administration. The first

(22) He gave financial support to Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr, the opponents of ʿAlī, and offered to equip anybody who joined them. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 222; al-Kūfī, II, 279; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3100, 3102, 3104; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 128; Idrīs, Kanz, f 172b. For the period of his governorship in Ṣanʿāʾ, see Table 4.

(23) He was married to Umm al-Kirām, daughter of Fayrūz al-Daylamī; Cf. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 159.

of these is that the inhabitants of Ṣan^cā did not take part in the uprising against ^cUthmān. (24) The second is that Ya^clī left Ṣan^cā peacefully in the early 36/May - June 656 with a great fortune, most of it collected from alms-tax. (25) The third is the refusal by the Ṣan^cānīs to support ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās, ^cAli's governor there, against the Umayyad troops in 40/660. (26)

One of the most effective forces in establishing the ^cUthmāniyyah in the Yemen was ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah al-Makhzūmī the governor of al-Janad during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs (12-35/633-656). In addition to experience gained through such long service in the area, ^cAbd Allāh had also become thoroughly acquainted on a personal level with al-Janad and its people. (27) Therefore, these two factors made ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah the strongest Islamic governor in the Yemen. This fact attracted the attention of ^cUmar b. al-Khāṭṭāb who expressed his feelings in the following words, "Do not differ [addressing the members of the council (Shūrā) who were responsible for choosing his successor] ; if you do, Mu^cāwiyah will come to

(24) Either, in fact, for or against him.

(25) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089.

(26) Cf. 254 below.

(27) He occupied the office of al-Janad for approximately twenty four years from 12-35/633-656, cf. Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, III, 897; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 37, 40. For his experience, see al-Isfānī, Aghānī, I, 64-6. Cf. also table 4.

you from Syria and ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah from the Yemen to take control ". (28) Of course, the strength of ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah was a result of the confidence and the loyalty of the local population towards him. Through the support of those loyal people, he was able to equip himself with a local force with which to defend the Caliph from the rebels. (29) Doubtless, without the obedience of the inhabitants of al-Janad, he would not have convinced them to support ^cUthmān. The sympathy of ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^cah and his followers for the Caliph, therefore, led to the creation of the ^cUthmāniyyah in al-Janad. This faction evidently emerged after the arbitration of Şiffīn in Rabī^c I 38/August 658, revolting against Alid's authority in al-Janad and paving the way for the Umayyad seizure of the town. (30)

Although sympathy towards both antagonists existed amongst those Yemenis who were actually in the Yemen during the first two years of ^cAlī's caliphate, it apparently did not flourish. While the governors of ^cAlī were in a position of dominance over the centres of their rule in the Yemen, the ^cUthmāniyyah might have frozen their activities in these towns. But these governors could not stop the activities of certain influential

(28) Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65.

(29) When the Caliph was sieged by the rebels in his house. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 87; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, al-Istī^cāb, III, 897; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155.

(30) Cf. 249 below.

tribes who sent as re-inforcements their tribal relatives to join the Syrian side. It is noticeable that during these first two years of ^cAlī's reign, both the Alids and the ^cUthmāniyyah in the Yemen ceased their activities within the country. However, during this period both political and military activity increased on both sides on the battle fields, especially at Ṣiffīn. Some evidence is included in our sources which indicates the involvement of the Yemeni tribes in reinforcing their tribal relatives in both conflicting armies at Ṣiffīn.

As a result of the special loyalty of the Hamdān and Madhḥij chiefs towards ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ⁽³¹⁾ the involvement of their tribal supporters, who were still in the Yemen, was remarkable during the battle of Ṣiffīn. Although the sources at our disposal do not indicate the arrival of Madhḥij reinforcements in support of ^cAlī in the course of that battle, the high number of Madhḥij guides leads us to believe that some of them came from the Yemen to support their own tribe. ⁽³²⁾ As for the reinforcements of Hamdān to ^cAlī, this is clearly confirmed in our sources, Al-Mas^cūdī,

(31) Those who were on his side during the civil war, such as Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, Sa^cīd b. Qays, both are Hamdānī and Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^cī, of Madhḥij.

(32) According to al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 295, more than ten thousand Madhḥij joined ^cAlī's army at Ṣiffīn.

al-Kūfī and Ibn ^cAsākir (33) tell us indirectly about these reinforcements when they mention that Busr b. Abī Arṭāh, sent by Mu^cāwiyah to the Yemen, fought in 40/660-1 those Hamdānīs who had participated on ^cAlī's side at Şiffīn and who had returned to the Yemen.

Yemeni reinforcements were forthcoming for the Syrian side also. Because Ḥimyar and Kindah represented the majority of the Yemeni tribes in the Syrian army, (34) Yemeni reinforcements to Mu^cāwiyah came in the main from the provinces inhabited by these tribes in the Yemen. This indication comes to us through a Yemeni who indicates in verse the direction of these reinforcements as follows:

<p>تَجُودُ إِلَيْكَ الْفَلَاحَ مِنْ عَدَنَ وَمِنْ حَضْرَمَوْتٍ وَمِنْ ذِي يَسَّزَنَ عَلَى صَعْبِهَا وَالذَّلُولَ الْمُحِيسِنَ</p>	<p>أَتَتْكَ الرَّجَالُ مِنْ إِمْدَادِنَا وَمِنْ سَرَوِّ حَيْمَرَ قَدْ أَقْبَلُوا فَدَبُّوا إِلَيْكَ دَبِيبَ الْجَرَادِ</p>
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Our reinforcements came to you, pouring
across the open land from Aden.

They came to you from,
Sarw Ḥimyar, Ḥadramawt and Dhī Yazan.

They swarmed to you like locusts,
On the backs of untamed and tamed camels. (35)

(33) Al-Mus^cūdī, Murūj, V, 57; al-Kūfī, III, 90, 91; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(34) Cf. Chapter V, B, a, above.

(35) Cf. al-Kūfī, III, 146. These provinces belonged to Ḥimyar and Kindah in the Yemen. See Map 2.

B. The political situation in the Yemen after the arbitration of Şiffīn

When the arbitrators declared their judgement in the conflict between °Alī and Mu°āwiyah in Rabī°I, 38/August 658, the struggle between the two antagonists became political rather than military. Consequently, the supporters of both leaders emerged throughout the Islamic provinces, diplomatically active in support of their cause. In the Yemen both parties were also involved in such activities.

Because °Alī was engaged militarily in fighting the Khārijīs, (36) Mu°āwiyah increased his political activities throughout the Islamic provinces by sending his envoys to these countries. (37) In doing so, he was able to oppose °Alī politically. These areas included the Yemen. There the supporters of Mu°āwiyah were able to declare openly their sympathy for the first time during °Alī's Caliphate.

In the early stages of the political conflict, Mu°āwiyah took advantage of the Yemeni tribal chiefs who sympathized with him to increase his political activities in the Yemen. He also benefitted from the support of certain Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side who had already actively sympathized with °Uthmān. Two examples are preserved in our sources which help to illustrate how Mu°āwiyah benefitted

(36) For a detailed discussion of the war between °Alī and the Khārijīs, Cf. Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 192, 197 f; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 362ff; al-Kufī, IV 97ff; al-Ṭabarī, II 3360ff; al-Dīn-awarī, Akhbār, 204-15. See also, Surūr, 79-86; Sha°bān, History, I, 77.

(37) For the political activities of Mu°āwiyah after Şiffīn, in particular when he sent his envoy to Basra., Ibn al-Ḥadramī, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3414; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd. Nahj, IV, 34f; Ibn Khayyāt, 196f; Ibn Ḥajar, Isābah, I, 228; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 263.

from the loyalty of such Yemeni chiefs who increased his influence in the Yemen. The first of these examples is given by al-Hamdānī, (38) who tells us how Mu^cāwiyah benefitted from the loyalty of Abū Ma^cbad, a chief of Hamdān, who supported his force in the Yemen. The second example comes through the narrative of Ibn Mas^cūd in al-Balādhurī (39) who tells us of the role of Wā'il Ibn Ḥujr, a Ḥadramī chief in supporting Mu^cāwiyah's troops in Ḥadramawt, though Wā'il was in fact settled in Kufa. (40) As a consequence of the activities of Mu^cāwiyah's followers in the Yemen, the Umayyad party appeared strongly to challenge the authority of ^cAlī there.

The sudden appearance of the Umayyad party in the Yemen has led some historians to accuse ^cAlī's governors there of disloyalty and sympathy with Mu^cāwiyah. (41) It is true that these governors did not seriously oppose the supporters of Mu^cāwiyah, however, it cannot be asserted that they sympathised with Mu^cāwiyah. In fact the energy of Mu^cāwiyah's supporters and the disappointment of those of ^cAlī at the sudden emergence of a strong Umayyad party promoted advancement of that party in the Yemen at this stage in the conflict.

(38) Iklīl, X, 66f; VIII, 102. Cf. also Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā' who gives a different name saying Ḥumrah b. Sa^cid al-Yamānī, whilst in Ghāyat, I, 96 Ḥamzah b. Ma^cbad al-Yamānī.

(39) Ansāb, II, 458.

(40) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 250-4; Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, VI, 26; Ibn al-Athīr, Uṣd, V, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 312.

(41) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453.

With the increase in the political conflict between the supporters of both antagonists, the Yemen became politically unstable. In Ṣan^{c-ā} and al-Janad the supporters of Mu^{c-}āwiyah revolted strongly against the governors of ^cAlī. Two different points of view comment upon this uprising. The first is given by al-Balādhurī (42) who justified the uprising by the harsh treatment of ^cAlī's governors of the local population, in particular the ^cUthmāniyyah. The second comes through al-Kūfī (43) who simply accuses ^cUthman's supporters of revolting against the authority of the Caliphate. Despite the contradiction of these two historians in their accounts of the specific reasons for the uprising against ^cAlī's authority in these Yemeni towns, the whole episode serves to confirm the real role of the supporters of Mu^{c-}āwiyah in opposing their opponents there.

As a result of the development of the political struggle between the supporters of Mu^{c-}āwiyah and the governors of ^cAlī in the Yemen, armed conflict flared up in the area. Thereupon, each group asked for reinforcements from their headquarters, the Alids in Kufa and the ^cUthmāniyyah in Damascus.

^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās thus wrote to ^cAlī informing him of the uprising of the Umayyad party and asking for reinforcements. (44) Consulting some influential

(42) Ansāb, II, 453.

(43) Futūḥ, IV, 53f. When ^cUbayd Allāh imprisoned some of them, the ^cUthmāniyyah wrote to him threatening a revolt against ^cAlī's Caliphate; "Free our brothers whom you imprisoned, or we shall not obey you and the Caliph."

(44) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 54; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453.

Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, ^cAlī met Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, a Hamdanī, to discuss with him the letter of ^cUbayd Allāh. (45) Al-Kūfī (46) records the dialogue of ^cAlī and Yazīd about the Yemeni uprising against the former regime, in which ^cAlī says, "Have you [Yazīd] seen what your people have done in the Yemen and their revolt against me and my governors". Yazīd replies "By God, I believe that my people are still loyal to you, but if you wish me to prepare myself and go there, or write to them and see what their answer is, so that they return to your loyalty, all well and good; otherwise, I will move to the Yemen and protect you from them." Yazīd b. Qays prepared a letter to his people in the Yemen urging them to support ^cAlī's authority there. He also authorised al-Ḥurr b. Nawf, one of his own followers, to deliver his letter personally to his people in the Yemen. (47)

The mediation of Yazīd b. Qays with the Yemeni rebels leads us to believe that some of the Hamdān might have been involved in the uprising. However, it is quite logical that some Hamdān chiefs on Mu^cāwiyah's side, such as Abū Ma^cbad and Ḥumrah b. Mālīk, had formed an opposition group from among their own people to counter Alī's authority in the Yemen. (48)

(45) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 54.

(46) Ibid.

(47) Al-Kūfī, IV, 55. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453, who records that ^cAlī authorised Jabr b. Nawf to this mission, but he made no mention to Yazīd's letter.

(48) Both of them were of Hāshid. The role of the former in the Yemen has already been discussed, cf. **246** above. However, the latter's role in the Yemen is not clear in our sources. Nevertheless, he played a major role in supporting Mu^cāwiyah during the civil war, since he was one of the important tribal chiefs on Mu^cāwiyah's side; see Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 44, 196, 207, 279, 507, who uses the name Hamzah, not Ḥumrah; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 61; VIII, 102; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 65.

One reason for ^cAli's attempt to engage the services of Yazīd to mediate amongst his people [i.e. Hamdān] in Ṣan^{c-ā} area, was the neutrality of the Abnā^ḡ there in the ^cAlī - Mu^{c-ā}wiyah conflict. This would mean that Yazīd would be able to take advantage and rally support for ^cAlī. (49) Al-Kūfī's account (50) is far from clear when he describes the route of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf to the Yemen. He confirms, however, that Yazīd's envoy met the people of two Yemeni towns and presented the letters of his chief to the people. The first of these towns has not been specified by al-Kūfī, whilst the second has been confirmed, as al-Janad. (51) The sources at our disposal, however, do not mention the first stopping place of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf. In all probability it was Ṣan^{c-ā} since the majority of the rebels and the appeal of ^cAlī's governors had come mainly from this town. (52)

The arrival of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf in the Yemen without any reinforcements affected the position of ^cAli's governors and promoted increasing support for Mu^{c-ā}wiyah's followers in the area. Therefore, the Umayyad supporters sent an immediate letter to Damascus urging Mu^{c-ā}wiyah to send a representative to take their oath of allegiance (bay^cah) (53)

(49) Especially those in Ṣan^{c-ā} who had good relations with Hamdān, Cf. I9-20 above

(50) Futūḥ, IV, 55.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453; al-Kūfī, IV, 53.

(53) al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453; al-Kūfī, IV, 55.

In order to push Mu^cāwiyah into sending reinforcements quickly, his followers included in their letter some verses threatening him that they would give their pledge of allegiance to his opponents :

معاوى الأتسرع السسير
وإن كان فيما عندنا لك حاجة
نحونا نبأبع علياً أوزيد اليمانيا
فارسيل أميراً لا يكمن متوانياً

Mu^cāwiyah, unless you move to us quickly,
we will give the oath of allegiance to
^cAli or Yazid, the Yemeni

If you have need of us,
then send a governor who will not be
remiss in his work. (54)

When Mu^cāwiyah received the letter, he realized that his supporters had succeeded in facilitating his invasion of the Yemen. Thus he equipped and despatched Busr b. Abī Artāh al-^cĀmirī, one of his commanders, with three thousand cavalry with the words, "O Busr, Egypt has already been conquered, so our followers have become dominant and our enemies humiliated. Carry on in the name of God, pass Medina frightening and terrorizing its inhabitants till they think that you are going to kill them; then leave them alone and move on to Mecca, but do not harm anybody there. Then advance to San^cā^ḍ where we have supporters from whom I have received a letter. Strengthen them and recruit them for your attacks on ^cAlī's governors and followers. Kill anybody following ^cAlī if he refuses to give the oath of allegiance to us, and confiscate all his properties." (55)

(54) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453. See also Ibn al-Kalbī Nasab, f 70a; al-Hamdani, Iklīl, X, 173, Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, VI, 360.

(55) al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453f. Cf. also al-Kūfī, Futūh, IV, 55f; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 173.

In Muharram, 40/May 660, Busr left Syria with his army, stopping in the Hijāzi towns of Medina, Mecca and al-Ṭāʾif. (56) From there Busr marched on south, seeking the seizure of certain Yemeni towns. By following the route of Busr's expedition to the Yemen we are able to give an approximate location of the centres of the followers of ʿAlī and those of Muʿāwiyah. (57)

Our sources are unanimously silent about the route of this expedition in the northern part of the Yemen. The attitudes of the locals there towards the two parties, therefore, remains obscure. The position of the Najrānīs is, however, illustrated in the sources. This town was the first to be invaded by the Umayyad force. Although the town was controlled by ʿAlī's followers, there were Umayyad supporters there also. (58) However, long before the arrival of Busr there, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān al-Hārithī represented ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-ʿAbbās,

(56) Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 198; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3450 and al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, V, 56 confirm that he was sent in 40/660. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, I, 159, al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f.93a and Abū Makhramah, Tārīkh, II, 26 say that he was sent after Ṣiffīn. In Ibn ʿAsakir, Tahdhīb, III, 222, 39/659 is given. Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, I, 153, says that Muʿāwiyah sent Busr to the Yemen and the Hijāz early in 40/660.

(57) Cf. Map 5.

(58) For the pursuit of Jāriyah b. Qudāmah by the ʿUthmāniyyah in Najrān, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452.

^cAlī's governor in Ṣan^{cā}, in Najrān. (59) As soon as he entered Najrān, Busr arrested ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān and his son, Mālik. Having killed them, he hunted down the rest of ^cAlī's followers in the town. (60) When he had seized Najrān, Busr called for a general meeting and gave a tough speech, warning the Najrānīs against supporting ^cAlī : "You people of Najrān, brothers of the Jews and the Christians, by God, if I ever hear of anything resembling support for ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, I will return to the attack against you with both cavalry and infantry, killing as many as I like; so think about this matter and be warned." (61)

From Najrān, Busr and his army marched on towards the south-west to the north-western part of Hamdān territory (Balad al-Ahnūm wa'l-Maghrib). When he arrived, Abū Ma^cbad, a Hamdān chief, joined him. (62) Al-Hamdānī (63) tells us that Abū Ma^cbad was the most loyal supporter of

(59) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 62f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15. Cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 455; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 223; al-Mas^cudī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cāb, 162f, who suggest that al-Hārithī was appointed over all the Yemen after ^cUbayd Allāh's departure.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(62) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 102; X, 66. See also Ibn al-Husayn, Anbā, f 10b; Ghayat, I, 96. Al-Ahnūm is a large mountain formation between Wadi Mawr and its principal tributary, Akhraf. Cf. Wilson, "Mapping", 184. See also al-Waysī, 107f; al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, I, 119-27. Cf. also Map 5.

(63) Iklīl, X, 66.

Busr, since he guided the Umayyad forces through Hamdān territory. In that area, Busr pursued with resolution the followers of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Abū ^cAmr al-Shaybānī in Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr (64) says that Busr invaded Hamdān, killing and capturing their women. Both al-Mas^cūdī and Ibn ^cAsākir (65) confirm that in al-Jawf Busr killed more than two hundred men from those Hamdānīs who had joined ^cAlī's army in Ṣiffīn. Then he advanced into Arḥab, the area where Yazīd b. Qays' tribe lived. He attacked their bedouins (bādiyāh) and killed their chief, Abā Karib who had declared his sympathy for ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. (66) Continuing with his march in Hamdān territory, Busr advanced on Ṣan^cā^ḍ, passing the southern part of the territory of Bakīl who had retreated to Shibām (Kawkabān). (67)

The concentration of Busr's operations on Hamdān, particularly those of Bakīl who inhabited al-Jawf, lead us to believe that the majority of ^cAlī's supporters were from Bakīl. The members of the other branch of Hamdān, Ḥāshid, in particular those who were settled in the north-western part of Hamdān territory, might have sympathised with Mu^cāwiyah since they were not attacked by the Umayyad forces. (68) The evidence is not sufficiently strong to

(64) al-Istī^cāb, I, 161.

(65) Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(66) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(67) Idris, Kanz, f 173a; al-Kazrajī, Kifāyah, 62; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 87.

(68) For the location of Hamdān territory, see Map 2.

confirm this as truth, but if the Ḥāshid chiefs were enthusiastic in supporting Mu^cāwiyah they must have played a major role in appealing to their own tribes to follow him. (69)

In Ṣan^cā^ḍ at that time the overall political feeling was one of support for Mu^cāwiyah. Therefore Busr entered the town in 40/660-1 without any resistance on the part of ^cAlī's governor. (70) Both the activities of Mu^cāwiyah's supporters and also the refusal of the Ṣan^cānis to support ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās, the governor of ^cAlī in Ṣan^cā^ḍ, facilitated the entry of the Umayyad forces into the town. Of course, without the sympathy of the Ṣan^cānis for Mu^cāwiyah, Busr would not have easily entered the town.

An example of support for Mu^cāwiyah was the refusal by the Abnā^ḍ to take sides with ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās, when the latter asked them to help against Busr's invitation. (71) Therefore, the refusal of Fayrūz al-Daylamī, the chief of

(69) Such as Abū Ma^cbad and Ḥumrah b. Mālik.

(70) For the entry of Busr to Ṣan^cā^ḍ, Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 456f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā^ḍ, f 11a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 62f; Abū Makhramah, II, 26; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 24.

(71) The refusal came from their leader (Fayrūz) who replied to ^cUbayd Allāh, "Protect yourself, we are not going to fight". Cf. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 48f; al-Janādī, Sulūk, f 40b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 62; Tirāz, f 93a; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā^ḍ f 11a; Abū Makhramah, II, 26.

the Abnā' in Ṣanā', was enough to break the resistance of 'Alī's governor, 'Ubayd Allāh, who fled from the town, designating 'Amr b. Abī Arākah al-Thaqafī in his post. (72) Although most Sanānīs sympathized with Mu'āwiyah, others did emerge on 'Alī's side, albeit in a minority and without influence. Thus Busr entered Ṣanā' with ease, rounding up 'Alī's followers. There he killed 'Amr b. Abī Arākah and seventy-two from the Abnā' who had declared their sympathy with 'Alī b. Abī Tālib. (73)

Continuing his march into the rest of the Yemeni Provinces, Busr left Ṣanā' moving with his army southwards and attacked Jayshān. In this town he clashed with some of 'Alī's followers who were decisively defeated. (74) Pursuing the rest of 'Alī's supporters in the Yemen, Busr led his troops right down into the south, imposing Umayyad authority on Aden, (75) during the year, 40/660-1. From there he continued with his march eastwards where he attacked the supporters of 'Alī in Ḥaḍramawt. (76)

(72) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 62; Ibn al-Ḥusayn Anbā', f11a; Abū Makhramah, II, 26; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 456; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(73) Al-Ḥamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 103; X, 66; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 50; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 63; Ṭirāz, f93a; Ibn al-Dayba', Bughyat, 24; Abū Makhramah, II, 26. Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 11a; Ghāyat, I, 97, estimates seventy. al-Mas'ūdī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn 'Asakir, Tahdhīb, III, 222 give no specific number.

(74) Cf. al-Ya'qūbī Tārīkh, II, 175; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, II, 16. According to al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, I, 296, Jayshān is a town near Qa'ṭabah; and al-Akwa' in al-Ḥamdānī, Ṣifat, 219, note 1, adds that it is in 'Uzlat al-A'shūr, north of Qa'ṭabah. See also Map 5.

(75) Al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f130a; Kifāyah, 63; Abū Makhramah, 26.

(76) Cf. al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 64f who does not illustrate the route of Busr to Ḥaḍramawt. But al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 170, confirms that Busr reached al-Shiḥr, yet he gives neither the route nor the achievements of his campaign in this Ḥaḍramī port. It is quite probable that Busr moved from Aden to Ḥaḍramawt via the coastal area, since it is easier for him, and when he finished his task in al-Shiḥr he advanced to the north where he attacked the Alids. See Map 5.

Thanks to Busr's expedition into the Yemeni provinces, Mu^cāwiyah was able to gain a foothold in the country removing the Alid authority there. Therefore, the Umayyad victory in the Yemen had the greatest effect on ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, who commented upon it to his followers in Kufa, saying : "Busr b. Abī Arṭāh has already conquered the Yemen, By God, these people are going to dominate what you are now holding. They would not have done so except through their obedience to Mu^cāwiyah and your disobedience to me." (77)

Despite the fact that the Arab historians agree that ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib despatched an army led by Jāriyah b. Qudāmah al-Sa^cdī, a Tamīmī chief and one of ^cAlī's supporters, to pursue the Umayyad troops in the Yemen, they differ about both the route the expedition took and its achievements whilst there. Moreover, they do not all give the exact date for the arrival of this Iraqi army in the Yemen.

The first of these statements comes mainly from some of the Yemeni historians who confirm the entry of Jāriyah into the Yemen. Nevertheless, they do not give a clear picture of his expedition's route. (78) In the second statement some historians assert the achievements of Jāriyah's force

(77) Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, V, 327. Cf. also al-Kūfī, Futūḥ IV, 65-67; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 455.

(78) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 63; ^cAsjad, 20; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f11a; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 87f; Bughyat, 24. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 458.

in pursuing the Umayyad supporters throughout the Yemen. (79) The third group of our historians confirm that Najrān was the only Yemeni town invaded by the Iraqi troops. (80) However, according to al-Rāzī, (81) Busr b. Abī Arṭāh occupied the office of Umayyad governor of the Yemen for one year. This statement is confirmed by al-Kūfī. (82) If these statements are correct, it would support the third group above which considers the achievement of the Iraqi troops to be the invasion of Najrān only. (83)

It may be said, therefore, that the role of the Alids in the Yemen was destroyed once and for all by Busr's army. On this occasion Ibn Khayyāṭ (84) gives a contradictory statement when he records that °Ubayd Allāh b. al-°Abbās re-occupied the office of governor of the Yemen after Busr had fled from there, and ruled the country until the murder of °Alī in

(79) Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 16, says he pursued Busr throughout the Yemen until the latter fled from the area which had belonged to °Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.

(80) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452; al-Ya°qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 97-98.

(81) Tārīkh, 170.

(82) Futūḥ, III, 91, who mentions the existence of Busr in the Yemen as the military leader of Mu°āwiyah after the latter had become Caliph.

(83) As for Busr and his army, they might have remained in the Yemen until the office of the Caliphate fell to Mu°āwiyah.

(84) Tārīkh, 198. Repeated by Ibn °Abd al-Barr, Istī°āb, III, 1009. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 42f, says both °Ubayd Allāh b. al-°Abbās and Sa°īd b. Sa°d b. Abādah remained in office until the murder of °Alī.

Ramaḍān 40/January 661. According to reliable sources, however, °Ubayd Allāh b. al-°Abbās did not return to his office in the Yemen since he had fled to Kufa. Moreover these sources do not mention any successor for him representing °Alī in this post. (85)

To conclude, in the armed struggle in the Yemen during the year 40/660-61, neither °Ali's nor Mu°āwiyah's troops had complete success in controlling the Yemen. Thus, the centres of Islamic authority there - i.e. Ṣan°ā°, al-Janad and Ḥaḍramawt - experienced a political vacuum which lasted until the office of the Caliphate fell to Mu°āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān in Rabī° II, 41/August 661. The latter thereupon sent his governors to the Yemen, which came officially under Umayyad sovereignty.

(85) al-Ṭabarī, I, 3474 says he occupied the office of governor of the Yemen until Busr's invasion.

Table 4 The governors of the Yemen in the time of
the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61)

In Ṣan^{c-ḍ} a

Abān b. Sa ^c id b. al- ^c Āṣ (1)	11-12/632-3
Ya ^c lī b. Umayyah al- ^c Tamīmī	12-35/633-56
^c Ubayd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās	36-40/656-60

In al-Janad

Mu ^c adh b. Jabal al- Khazrajī al-Anṣarī	11/632-3
^c Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī ^c ah al-Makhzūmī	12-35/633-56
Sa ^c id b. Sa ^c d b. ^c Abādah al-Khazrajī	36-40/656-60


In Ḥaḍramawt

Ziyād b. Labīd al- al-Anṣarī	with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt
^c Ukāshah b. Thawr b. Aṣghar al-Ghawthī	amongst al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn
al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah al-Makhzūmī	amongst B. Mu ^c āwiyah of Kindah and al-Ṣadif
^c Ikrimah b. Abī Jahl	successor of above
^c Ubayd Allah b. Thawr b. Aṣghar al-Ghawthī	
^c Adī b. Nawfāl al- Qurashī (2)	

(1) Zambaur, Manuel, 113, omits.

(2) He replaced all the Medinan representatives amongst the Ḥaḍrami tribes and became the sole Muslim governor in the region, i.e. Ḥaḍramawt, throughout the period of ^cUmar and ^cUthmān. For full information of the Muslim governors in the Yemen during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, see Chapter VI, B. For those of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭalīb, see 232 above.

Map 5 BUSR'S ROUTE IN THE YEMEN



AL-RUB^c AL-KHĀLT

ARABIAN SEA

RED SEA

- Areas sympathetic to 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib
- Areas sympathetic to Muḥawwiyah b. Abī Sufyān
- Areas sympathetic to both 'Alī and Muḥawwiyah
- The route of Busr's Campaign

0 100 Kilometres



HADRAMAWT

Tarīm

Shibām

al-Shihr

Jayshān

Aden

al-Janad

From the Hijaz

Najrān

Sā'dah

al-Ahnūm

Arḥab

Ṣanā'

PART THREE

CHAPTER IX

The Yemen during the period of the
Umayyad Caliphate

(41-132/661-750)

During the period of the Umayyad Caliphate the Yemen was isolated from the political life of the Islamic State, with the exception that the rising of Ibādīyah.⁽¹⁾ As a result, relations between the Umayyads and the Yemen were not close, especially during the first/seventh century. Even during the political disorder which the State witnessed in the course of Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution (64-73/683-692), the Yemen remained uninvolved.⁽²⁾ So the policy of the Umayyads towards Yemeni affairs was obscure.

Throughout the period of the Umayyad Caliphate, only three political events are mentioned in our sources. The first is the separation of the Yemen from Umayyad authority during the period of Ibn al-Zubayr's uprising. The second and third events are the two internal uprisings which took place against the Umayyads during the second/eighth century.⁽³⁾

However, throughout the period of Umayyad rule, the area witnessed two different forms of both political life and caliphal policy concerning the appointment of governors. The first began with the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate in 41/661 and lasted until the death of

(1) Which arose in 129/746 in Ḥaḍramawt and was led by ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī. Cf. 284 below.

(2) For a detailed discussion of the Yemen during this revolution, see 273-5 below.

(3) Cf. 281-92 below.

Yazīd b. Mu^{c-}āwiyah, the second Umayyad caliph, 64/683. The second form of Yemeni political development began when ^cAbd al-Malik b. Marwān, the fifth Umayyad caliph, became sole caliph in 73/692 until the end of Umayyad rule in 132/750.

In order to illustrate politically the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authority during the period of the Umayyad caliphate, the following chapter will be divided into two sections: the first deals with the policy of the caliphs in appointing their governors and the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the first three Umayyad caliphs, and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-663, and the second covers the rest of the period of Umayyad rule, 73-132/683-750.

A. The Yemen during the caliphate of B. Sufyān and Ibn al-Zubayr

a. The appointment of governors

As has already been mentioned, both Mu^{c-}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān and ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib had despatched troops to the Yemen in 40/660-1, in order to take control of the territory. However, neither enjoyed complete success in controlling the area.⁽⁴⁾ Unfortunately, our knowledge of the political situation in the Yemen from the time of the murder of ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib, Ramaḍān 40/January 661, until the renunciation of the caliphate by al-Ḥasan b. ^cAlī in Rabī^c II 41/August, 661, is extremely slight due to lack of material. However, it is unlikely that the hostilities between the Alids and the Umayyads during that period went unnoticed in the Yemen.⁽⁵⁾

(4) For a detailed discussion of the despatch of these troops to the area, see Chapter VIII, B. above.

(5) The hostilities between both parties did not stop immediately after the murder of ^cAlī and they continued for at least six months during al-Ḥasan's caliphate. For this conflict, see al-Kūfī, IV, 148 ff; al-Ya^c qūbī, Tārīkh. II, 191 f; al-Dīnawarī, 218 ff; al-Ṭabarī. II, 1ff.

The military activities of the Umayyads in the area shortly before this time lead us to believe that Mu^cāwiyah exercised military control over the Yemen

Despite the fact that ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān al-Thaqafī was designated by Mu^cāwiyah as the first governor of the Yemen, when the latter became sole caliph in Rabī^c II 41/August 661, there is evidence that another Umayyad governor was in the area at that time, and was responsible to Mu^cāwiyah for waging war on his opponents. Both al-Kūfī and al-Rāzī (6) confirm that Busr b. Abī Arṭāh occupied the office of Umayyad governor of the Yemen in the early stages of Mu^cāwiyah's reign. But, on the one hand, these two sources do not illustrate the period and the nature of Busr's governorship, and the rest of our sources omit his name from the list of Mu^cāwiyah's governors in the Yemen. (7)

It is probable that during the sixteen month political vacuum which the Yemen experienced, Busr b. Abī Arṭāh remained there as leader of the Umayyad troops. He is also likely to have stayed in the area during the early stages of Mu^cāwiyah's caliphate, attacking the Alids. (8) If this assumption is correct, Mu^cāwiyah would have intended to leave the troops led by Busr in the Yemen. Thus, Busr's presence in the area continued until the first year of Mu^cāwiyah's reign, 41/661.

(6) Futūḥ, III, 91-3; Tārīkh, 170. The former says that Busr attacked those of Hamdān who had supported ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in the course of the civil war, and those Hamdānīs, therefore, went to Mu^cāwiyah in Damascus and asked him to stop Busr's invasions.

(7) See table 6, the governors of the Yemen appointed by Mu^cāwiyah.

(8) Cf. al-Kūfī, III, 91-3. Al-Zuhrī in Ibn ^cAsākir, Tandhīb, III, 222, tells us that Busr attacked the Alids after the murder of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.

But the former's task was a purely military one, for it can be assumed that the Yemen might have witnessed political unrest in the form of Alid objection to Mu^cāwiyah on the eve of his Caliphate. As a result of the ^cAlid uprisings against the Umayyad rule, Busr appeared in the area and attacked the ^cAlids, especially those of Hamdān. (9) It is this role of Busr that may have led al-Rāzī (10) to consider him as Mu^cāwiyah's official governor in the Yemen for one year.

In Rabī^c II, 41/August, 661, when the office of the caliphate fell to Mu^cāwiyah, the latter appointed ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān al-Thaqafī over the Yemen. Accordingly, ^cUthmān became the first official governor of the Umayyads in the area. (11) Our sources differ on the question of the successor of ^cUthmān in this post. Some Yemeni historians mention that ^cUtbah b. Abī Sufyān, the brother of Mu^cāwiyah, replaced ^cUthmān in this office. (12) But, ^cUtbah's name does not appear in the list of governors of the Yemen in the non-local sources at our disposal, though some of them do confirm his governorship over al-Ṭā'if. (13) It may be assumed that ^cUtbah was holding the office of the governor of the Yemen and al-Ṭā'if during the early period of Mu^cāwiyah's reign. It is possible,

(9) Al-Kūfī, III, 91-3; Ibn ^cAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(10) Tārīkh, 170.

(11) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 91; Abu Makhramah, II, 130; Idrīs, Kanz, f 173a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16.

(12) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 91; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 17; Idrīs, f 173a.

(13) Cf. Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī'āb, III, 1025f; al-Fāsī, iqd, VI, 10.

therefore, that ^cUtbah had resided in al-^cTā'if and designated a representative in the Yemen. His governorship lasted until the death of ^cAmr b. al-^cĀṣ, the governor of Egypt, in 42/662, where ^cUtbah succeeded him in this post. (14)

By the replacement of ^cUtbah in the Yemeni post and as a result of the occupation by three of the Abnā', the Persian community there, in the governorship of both ^cSan'ā' and al-Janad during the rest of Mu^cāwiyah's Caliphate, they regained power in the Yemen. The first of these Abnā' is Fayrūz al-Daylamī who replaced ^cUtbah as a governor of the Yemen. (15) However, this governorship was limited to ^cSan'ā' and al-Janad. (16) Both Idrīs and al-Khazrajī (17) say that Fayrūz occupied this post for eight years, while an anonymous writer (18) records that in fact he continued until his death in 53/673. Some historians mention that al-Nu^cmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī replaced Fayrūz in this office, and, when the former was dismissed, Bashīr b. Sa^cd al-A^craj held the post. (19)

(14) Cf. Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, Istī^cab, III, 1025f; al-Fāṣī, iqd, VI, 10.

(15) Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; Asjad; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 91; Abū Makhramah, II, 130.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Kanz, f 173a; Kifāyah, 64; Asjad, 21.

(18) Anon. Tārīkh, f 26a See also Kay, Yaman, text 104, trans 140. Ibn Sa^cd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 534; Ibn ^cAbd al-Barr, III, 1265, both say that Fayrūz died during ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān's Caliphate. Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V 214, mentioned that Fayrūz died during the Caliphate of ^cUthmān or Mu^cāwiyah. However, we cannot accept that Fayrūz died during ^cUthmān's reign for two reasons; the first is that Fayrūz was still alive in 40/660-1, when he himself rejected the appeal of ^cUbayd Allāh b. ^cAbbās, ^cAli's governor in ^cSan'ā' at that time, after the latter had asked the ^cSan'ānis for help against Umayyad troupes, see 254 above the second of these reasons is that Fayrūz also made a journey to Syria to meet Mu^cāwiyah during the latter's reign, cf. 267 below.

(19) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; Asjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I 91-3; Abū Makhrama, II, 131.

There seems to be some confusion in our sources concerning the governors of the Yemeni provinces. According to al-Balādhurī, (20) al-Nu^cmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī held the office of Ḥaḍramawt and resided there. Since Bashīr b. Sa^cd replaced al-Nu^cmān in this post, it is possible, therefore, that both of them occupied, one after the other, the governorship of Ḥaḍramawt, whilst Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad were governed by the Abnā'.

In fact relations between the Abnā' and Mu^cāwiyah were cordial. This was reflected in Mu^cāwiyah's policy of appointing governors to the Yemen. The nature of the relationship can also be seen through descriptions of journeys made by the Abnā' leaders to Mu^cāwiyah in order to gain the governorship of the Yemen. (21) Thus, the Abnā' monopolised the offices of Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad during Mu^cāwiyah's caliphate. It is most likely that Sa^cīd b. Dādhawayh succeeded Fayrūz al-Daylamī in the governorships of Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad in 53/673, occupying the posts for seven months. After Sa^cīd's death, al-Daḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī occupied the post until the death of Mu^cāwiyah in 60/680. (22) In fact the advantages accruing to the Abnā' were a result of their negative attitude towards ^cAlī's governor in Ṣan^cā' in the course of the invasion

(20) Ansāb, IV, 161.

(21) According to Anon, Tārīkh, f 26a, Fayruz al-Daylamī went to Mu^cāwiyah who warmly received him and appointed him governor of the Yemen. Al-Kashwarī tells us that al-Nu^cmān b. Buzurj, one of the Abnā' leaders in the Yemen, went to Mu^cāwiyah and asked him to appoint al-Daḥḥāk b. Fayruz al-Daylamī over the Yemen; see Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 1206.

(22) Cf. Anon, f 26a-b; Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 65; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 93; Abū Makhramah, II, 131.

of Umayyad forces to the town in 40/660-1, and also of their positive endorsement of the latter. (23)

During the caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu^cāwiyah, 60-4/680-4 Bahīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī replaced the Abnā' in the governorships of Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad. (24) Our sources do not mention anyone other than Bahīr as having governed the territory during Yazīd's reign. Although our sources confine the governorship of Bahīr to Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad, they do not mention the presence of any Muslim officials in Ḥadramawt.

In actual fact, Yazīd's policy concerning the appointment of governors to the Yemen was quite different from that of his father, Mu^cāwiyah. Even those who came to power after him did not practice such a policy in this territory. All that Yazīd did was simply to appoint Bahīr over Ṣan^cā' and al-Janad on the condition that the latter provided a certain amount of money and slaves each year for the caliphate. (25)

Unfortunately, neither the specific amount to be paid, nor Yazīd's aims behind this policy have been illustrated in our sources. What can be assumed, however, is that it was Yazīd's friendship with Bahīr that led him to offer the latter such advantages. There are three reasons for this assumption : firstly, Bahīr occupied the governorship of the

(23) Cf. 254 above.

(24) Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 65; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 94-7. In al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 92b; al-Aḥdal, Tuḥfat, f 36b, he was appointed over the whole of the Yemen.

(25) Ibid. Idrīs, and al-Khazrajī (in both of his books) Kifāyah and al-^cAsjad state that Bahīr had to send ninety slaves to Yazīd every year.

Yemen as sole Umayyad representative throughout Yazīd's reign; (26) secondly Bah̄ir apparently emerged as an independent ruler, since various poets are mentioned as having travelled to him seeking money; (27) and finally, Yazīd decided to visit the Yemen - rather than other more important territories in the last year of his caliphate. (28)

Following the death of Yazīd b. Mu^cāwiyah in 64/683, ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr proclaimed himself caliph. At the height of his power, he controlled the Ḥijāz and Iraq. (29) As for the Yemen, Ibn al-Zubayr's authority was clearly manifest in Ṣan^cā'. Here, nine governors were appointed in succession by Ibn al-Zubayr throughout his caliphate 64-73/683-92. (30) In al-Janad, the governorship fell to Bah̄ir b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī on behalf of Ibn al-Zubayr himself, (31) though the former had been one of the most prominent Yemeni followers of the Umayyads. (32) The historians mention neither the period of this governorship, nor do they discuss it in detail. But, when the Khārijīs entered the Yemen in 68/687-8, Bah̄ir was governor of al-Janad. (33) The sources at our disposal remain unanimously silent about the governorship of Ḥadramawt during the

(26) Cf. Table 6.

(27) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; al-^cAsjad, 21.

(28) Ansāb, IV, 287.

(29) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, 13f; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 2; al-Fāsī, Iqd, V, 145, See also Dixon, 121.

(30) See Table 6. The governors of the Yemen during Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate.

(31) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 353; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

(32) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 109.

(33) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

period of the Civil War. The absence of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority in this territory can also be seen in the course of the Khārijī invasion in 68/687-8. (34)

In fact we have no clear picture of the policy of Ibn al-Zubayr concerning the governorship of Ṣan^cā', due again to lack of material. But the short duration of the governorships appointed by him in Ṣan^cā' has led one recent writer to comment upon this policy. In his book Tārīkh al-Yaman, Hasan Sulaymān (35) writes : "The reason for the short period of each Yemeni governor in office is related to the fact that the country was not fully controlled by Ibn al-Zubayr. Added to that is the ambitions of his followers, those of high status aiming to obtain more power and Ibn al-Zubayr being interested in having their consent, besides his fears that one of his governors, if he maintained more power by his being long in office might think of achieving independent rule over the Yemen". Although this assumption is not supported by clear historical evidence, it may be accepted. Thus it seems that Ṣan^cā' was the only Yemeni town under the sway of Ibn al-Zubayr, with al-Janad and Ḥaḍramawt remaining completely untouched by his political activity.

b. The political situation

Following the Alid-Umayyad conflict in the Yemen during the last year of the first Civil War, 40/660-1, the area seemingly enjoyed a political lull, which was to last until the early part of the second/eighth century. But,

(34) Cf. 274-5 below.

(35) 95.

both external and local sources give little information concerning the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the Islamic government during the caliphates of B. Sufyān and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-92. Thus it may be assumed that the area was completely isolated from the political life of the Islamic state throughout this period, and specially during the reign of B. Sufyān (41-64/661-84).

The political history of the Yemen during the caliphate of Mu^cāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (41-60/661-68) is obscure, with little light thrown on it by our sources. Consequently, our knowledge of the Yemen and its relations with the caliphate during this period is slight.

In Ṣan^cā' and al-Janād, Mu^cāwiyah consolidated his authority through the leaders of the Abnā', who had successively occupied the governorships of these two towns during his reign. (36) Thus, he was able to maintain political domination there, although the political life of these areas remains vague.

As for the other Yemeni provinces, neither the state of their relations with the caliphate, nor their political situation is clearly illustrated in our sources. There exist no indications as to whether the Umayyads had military forces in the area during the caliphate of Mu^cāwiyah; indeed the sources confirm an absence of Umayyad authority in some of these provinces. In the area of Ma^rrib, for example, despite the expulsion of Khawlān by other local tribes there, the

(36) These officials are Fayrūz al-Daylamī, Sa^cīd b. Dādhawayh and al-Daḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, see 267 above and Table 6.

Umayyad authorities in the Yemen were unable to take any action to put an end to such inter-tribal feuds. (37) In Ḥaḍramawt the isolation of the area from the Islamic state and the weakness of Umayyad authority vis-à-vis the local tribes became apparent and was expressed in verse by al-Nu^cmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī, the governor of Mu^cāwiyah in Ḥaḍramawt, as follows:

أبا خالدٍ لا تتركَنِّي ببلدِ القُرودِ ونيرانَ الحِوَادِثِ تلمَحُ
أبوكَ خليلي وأصطفتُكَ بعدَهُ على الناسِ ما كانوا معاً وتصدَّعوا

Abā Khālid [Yazīd], do not leave me in the land of the monkeys, at the time when the fires of events are blazing.

Your father is my friend and I choose you as a friend after him of all people, whether they are united or divided. (38)

The height of the Yemen's political isolation came during the caliphate of Yazīd b. Mu^cāwiyah, 60-4/680-4. Abū Mikhnaf⁽³⁹⁾ illustrates this isolation in his narration of ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbbās's advice to al-Ḥusayn b. ^cAlī, when the latter had decided to reject openly the caliphate of Yazīd saying, "If you decide definitely to revolt [against Yazīd], go to the Yemen where there are forts and mountain paths, where the land is extensive, where you will have supporters and be isolated from the people."

(37) For this event, see Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab Ma^cadd wa-^ʿl-Yaman al-Kabīr, f 34a; al-Ḥimyarī, Shams al-^cUlūm, 9f.

(38) Al-Nu^cmān sent this verse to Yazīd b. Mu^cāwiyah seeking his mediation with his father in order to change his post and move to another area; see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 161.

(39) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, II, 275; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 109; ; al-Dīnawarī, 244; al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, V, 129; al-Kūfī, Futuḥ, V, 113; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 276.

Despite a Alid presence there, the Yemen had not experienced political disorder as a consequence of the murder of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī in Muḥarram 61/October, 680.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Thus, this state of political isolation can be seen to have extended to the time of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate 64-73/684-92, to all regions of the Yemen, except Ṣanʿāʾ, cut off from the caliph's administration in Mecca.⁽⁴¹⁾

Yet it has been mentioned⁽⁴²⁾ that the Yemen fell into the sphere of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority following his inauguration as caliph in 64/684, with some historians⁽⁴³⁾ claiming that the majority of the Yemenis pledged the customary oath of allegiance to him. This indication also confirms the fact that some Yemenis were opposed to Ibn al-Zubayr. But the sources identify neither the supporters nor the opponents of Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen, except for Bahīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī, who played a major role in encouraging the Yemenis to grant their allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, when the latter proclaimed himself caliph.⁽⁴⁴⁾ With regard

(40) The consequence of this event was felt throughout the Islamic provinces where political disorder arose in many, even those in the neighbourhood of the Yemen such as the Ḥijāz. The Yemeni regions, however, did not undergo such political disruptions. For these events, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 304 ff; Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, al-Fakhrī, 115-7; al-Kūfī, V, 252 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, II, 6; al-Ṭabarī, II, 395 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 305 ff. Cf. also Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shiʿa Islam, 222 ff.

(41) Cf 274-5 below.

(42) Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn ʿl-Firaq, 31; al-Khazrajī, Kifayah, 66; ʿAsjad, 21; in al-Dinawarī, 260, the people of the Ḥijāz and Tihāmah gave their oath of allegiance to him.

(43) Cf. Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16; Idrīs, Kanz, f 173a.

(44) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 353; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

to the succession of governors he appointed to Ṣan'ā', it may be said that Ibn al-Zubayr wielded authority over this town, even though he had no military force there. Yet, although the extent of his influence in other Yemeni provinces is not clear, it is fair to say that his hold over the area as a whole was not a particularly strong one. In fact Ibn al-Zubayr's actual lack of authority there became clear in 68/688, when the Khārijīs were able to invade the country, directing their attack in particular on Ṣan'ā' and Ḥaḍramawt and levying alms (ṣadaqah) from the Yemenis. (45) Some historians do not identify the Khārijī group which invaded the Yemen, simply referring to them as the Ḥarūriyyah. (46) In fact, these Khārijīs who overran the Yemeni provinces were the Najdāt, a group of Khārijīs led by Najdah b. 'Āmir al-Ḥanafī, and which was concentrated in al-Yamāmah at that time. (47)

There is no evidence in our sources to confirm any control by the Najdāt over the Yemen. True enough, the area did witness some kind of political disruption in the years following the invasion, (48) but again the sources to hand

(45) Dixon, 171. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, XI, 136f; Ibn Khaldūn, al-Ibar, III, 314; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, IV, 353.

(46) Especially the Yemeni historians, see Ibn Samurrah, Ṭabaqāt, 53; Anon, Tārīkh, f 26a; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 67f; 'Asjad, 22; Idris, f 173; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 13a; Ghāyat, I 107; Abū Makhramah, II, 100.

(47) Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn'l-Firaq, 66 ff; al-Mubarrad, Kamil, II, 209 f; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal, I, 187 ff; al-Ḥimyarī, al-Ḥūr al-'īn, 170; Ibn al-Athir, lubāb, II, 215.

(48) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 68; Asjad, 22; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 13a; Ghāyat, I, 107 (where in the latter the name of Najdah b. 'Āmir erroneously appears "Haddah, Ibn 'Āmir," where Ḥaddah is taken as a place name); Abū Makhramah, II, 100.

mention neither the scope of the disorder nor the specific regions affected. Thus, it can be assumed that the Najdāt had invaded the Yemen for the purpose of collecting money rather than to exercise political domination over the area. Therefore, upon entering Ṣan^{c-}ā they had to resort to force in order to make the people pay some hundred thousand dinars. (49) Also Abū Fudayk, one of their leaders, was sent to Ḥaḍramawt for the same purpose. (50)

Together the weakness of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority in the Yemen and the sudden invasions by the Najdāt might have brought about the political vacuum in the area during the last five years of Ibn al-Zubayr's reign. Naturally, had Ibn al-Zubayr ruled with a stronger hand over the Yemen, the Najdāt would not have been able to enter the country and extort such large amounts of money from the populace.

The thirty-three year period beginning with the caliphate of Mu^{c-}āwiyah in Rabī^c II, 41/August 661, and ending with the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in Jumādā II, 73/September 692, represents one of the most obscure periods of Yemeni history. Relations between the Yemen and the central Islamic authority during this period were virtually non-existent.

(49) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 68; Asjad, 22; Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 107.

(50) Cf. 274 above.

B. The Yemen during the caliphate of B. Marwān (73-132/692-750)

From the time of the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in Jumādā II, 73/September, 692, until the end of Umayyad rule in Dhū³ I-Ḥijjah, 132/July 750, ten caliphs - all of them from the B. Marwān branch of the Umayyads - enjoyed successive occupation of the caliphate. During their rule the area witnessed the second great spate of conquests, which led to the domination by the Islamic state over a number of freshly captured provinces. (51) As usual, these caliphs, in turn, paid more attention to the newly acquired regions than their existing domains, especially the Yemen, which appears to have played an extremely unimportant role in caliphal policy at that time. (52)

a. The appointment of governors

When ^cAbd al-Malik b. Marwān became sole caliph after the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr, he appointed al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī over the Ḥijāz, al-Yamāmah and the Yemen. (53)

Al-Ḥajjāj himself resided in the Ḥijāz and sent representatives to the other two regions. To the Yemen he sent three of his relatives from the Āl Abī ^cAqīl of Thaqīf. (54)

Since that time, this family has been known throughout Yemeni history as governors of the B. Marwān there. Throughout

(51) The high-water mark of these conquests came during the caliphate of al-Walid b. ^cAbd al-Malik, the third Marwānī caliph. Therefore, some historians regard this movement as the second great wave of conquests. For the references to these conquests, see Chapter IV, note 7 above.

(52) Cf. 280-1 below.

(53) Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, V, 266; al-Ṭabarī, II, 854; Ibn Khaldūn, ^cIbar, III, 293; Idrīs, Kanz, f173b.

(54) These were Muḥammad b. Yūsuf over Ṣan^cā', Wāqid b. Maslamah over al-Janād and al-Hakam b. Ayyūb over Hadramawt, cf. Table 6. For the naṣab of Āl Abī ^cAqīl, see Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 186; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 267 f.

almost all of the period of B. Marwān's authority in the Yemen (Jumādā II, 73-Dhū 'l-Ḥijjah 132/September 692 - July 750) members of this family were successively designated to the post in the area. (55)

It appears that during al-Ḥajjāj's governorship of the eastern part of the state, the replacement of governors of the Yemen was a prerogative enjoyed by al-Ḥajjāj himself, having been fully authorised to do so by the caliph. (56) Thus he dismissed the governor of al-Janad and handed the region over to his brother, who was already occupying the office of Ṣan^{c-a}. (57) After the latter's death in 91/709-10, al-Ḥajjāj gave the post to his cousin, Ayyūb b. Yaḥyā al-Thaqafī. (58)

In fact B. Marwān's policy concerning the appointment of governors to the Yemen was interconnected with the nature of their relations with the governors of the eastern part of the state. For example, when Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik, the seventh Umayyad caliph, became angry with al-Ḥajjāj's

(55) Cf. Table 6.

(56) Al-Ḥajjāj clearly appears in our sources to control these posts for twenty years (75-95/694-714); see al-Ya^cqūbī, Tarīkh, III, 18 ff; Ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, 271 ff; al-Kūfī, VII 1ff; al-Tabarī, II, 863 ff; al-Dīnawarī, 274 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, II, 22 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 323 ff.

(57) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; Asjad, 22.

(58) Al-Khazrajī Kifāyah, 69. Ibn Khayyāt, 311, says that the caliph, al-Walīd b. 'Abd al-Malik, himself appointed Ayyūb in this post.

representatives in that part of the empire, he dismissed them all, including the governor of the Yemen. (59) Since ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the eighth Umayyad caliph, opposed his predecessor's policy of harsh treatment towards his subjects, he refrained from appointing the likes of the Āl Abī ʿAqīl over the Yemen. (60) However, this did not herald the end of their governorship in this territory; what it signified was that the policy of the state at that time was to flush out al-Hajjāj's followers from the high positions they occupied throughout the Islamic provinces. However, the removal of Āl Abī ʿAqīl from the office of governor of the Yemen was temporary, with Yūsuf b. ʿUmar, one of this family, being designated by Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik, the tenth Umayyad Caliph, to govern the three Yemeni provinces. (61) When Yūsuf was transferred to Iraq in 120/738, his son, al-Ṣalt, occupied his post for the rest of Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik's caliphate. (62) Two other Thaqafis, from Āl Abī ʿAqīl, were appointed over the Yemen by the Umayyads, Marwān b. Muhammad b. Yūsuf and al-Qāsim b. ʿUmar. (63) The latter was the last of Āl Abī ʿAqīl to occupy the office of the governor of the Yemen, his governorship lasting until his

(59) For the governor of the Yemen, see Table 6. For the other provinces, see Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 318; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 38ff; al-Tabarī, II, 1281 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil, IV, 138 ff.

(60) Cf. Table 6.

(61) Idrīs, Kanz, f 173b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ʿAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, 107, all of them say over all the Yemeni provinces. See also Ibn Khayyāt, 357; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 63.

(62) Ibn Khayyāt, 357; Idrīs, f173b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 71; ʿAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, 108.

(63) Cf Table 6.

deafeat by the Ibādīyah in 129/764-5. (64)

Given that the main distinguishing mark of this family was its harsh treatment towards its subjects, one may assume that unjust methods were employed by these Thaqafīs who held the post of governor of the Yemen. In fact, such treatment was only usually resorted to in order to suppress revolt. However, given the weakness of the local forces and the general negligence of the area by the caliphate, the Thaqafis found themselves with a free hand to be as oppressive as they wished. (65)

b. The political situation

By the end of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate in Jumādā II, 73/September 692, ^cAbd al-Malik b. Marwān had been able to dominate all the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen. Much is known about the Umayyad occupation of all of Ibn al-Zubayr's territories, except for the Yemen; (66) however; the absence of a force loyal to Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen must surely account for the easy take-over of the area by the Umayyads. Their entry was accomplished without an armed struggle. Subsequently, Ṣan^cā^ʿ was taken without any great difficulty and Ibn al-Zubayr's governor there arrested. (67)

(64) See 288 below.

(65) Cf. 280-1 below.

(66) In fact the Umayyad occupation of Iraq, the Hijāz, Syria and Khurāsān is illustrated in our sources, while their struggle with Ibn al-Zubayr's supporters in the Yemen is not mentioned in these sources, for the Umayyad occupation of these regions, Cf, al-Ya'qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 14 ff; al-Kūfī IV, 260ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 783ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah II, 19-22; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 9ff. See also Dixon, 121ff.

(67) Ibn Samurah, 57f. The governor was Hanash b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Ṣan^cānī. Cf. Table 6.

i. A political lull

There is no indication in our sources as to whether or not there occurred an uprising against B. Marwān in the Yemen during the first/seventh century. However, there is evidence to confirm that the Yemeni populace suffered considerably from the harsh treatment of the governors from the Āl Abī °Aqīl of Thaqīf. Al-Balādhurī (68) mentions "When Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī occupied the office of the governor of the Yemen from 73-91 / 692-708 , he oppressed the subjects by confiscating their lands." He also forced the Yemenis to pay land tax (kharāj), despite the fact that the Yemen was regarded as °ushr land. (69) The Yemeni historians also record that he intended to kill all the lepers in the Yemen. (70)

Despite such injustices, the area did not witness any objections to Āl Abī °Aqīl's governorship. This situation lasted until the office of caliph fell to °Umar b. °Abd al-°Azīz in 99/717-8, who immediately ordered his governor in the Yemen to abolish the kharāj, regarding the area as °ushr land. (71) He also wrote to his governor there warning him of the harsh treatment previously suffered by the Yemenis and

(68) Futūḥ, 84.

(69) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 84. For a detailed discussion of Kharāj and °Ushr, see Yahyā b. Ādam, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 22 ff; Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, English translation, Ben Shemesh, 78-83; Abū °Ubayd, Amwāl, 203-6; SEI, 'Kharāj'. °Ushr'.

(70) This indication is only mentioned in the Yemeni sources, i.e. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; °Asjad, 22; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd. 17; Idrīs, f 173b.

(71) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 84.

demanding that he return the confiscated lands to their rightful owners.⁽⁷²⁾ Unfortunately, these communications between ^cUmar b. ^cAbd al-^cAzīz and his governor in the Yemen are not clear in our sources, having only been mentioned in passing. Their immediate consequences are also vague, as is, indeed, this whole period of Yemeni history. This leads us to believe that the country was in a state of political isolation, although the caliphate paid attention to it from time to time. The obscure nature of Yemeni history lasted until the year 107/725, 26, when the first Yemeni uprising against the Islamic government since the accession of Mu^cawiyah (41/661) occurred.

In fact in the last twenty-five years of Umayyad rule (107-132/725-750), the Yemen underwent a political change. During this period two revolutions, both of them led by Yemenis occurred in the area.

ii. The uprising of ^cAbbād al-Ru^caynī

The first uprising was that of ^cAbbād al-Ru^caynī, who headed some three hundred Yemenis in a revolt against Umayyad authority in 107/725-6.⁽⁷³⁾ Unfortunately, the source material at our disposal throws little light on this event, clarifying neither the scene of the revolt, nor its duration. What is disputed in the sources, however, is the lineage (nasab) and the sect of ^cAbbād al-Ru^caynī. Al-Ṭabarī, al-Hamdānī and Ibn Kathīr⁽⁷⁴⁾ claim that he was a

(72) Ibn ^cAbd al-Ḥakam, Sīrat, 65, 126; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 49; Ibn al-Jawzī, Sīrat, 97. Cf also Ṣafwat, Jamharat, II, 333.

(73) Al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ^cAsjad, 23; Idrīs, f 173b; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f15a-b; Ghāyat, I, 119; al-Shamāhī, 85 says that the revolt took place in 110/728-9; and Ṣāliḥ, 109, claims that it was in 109/727-8.

(74) Al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 386; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244.

Khārijī. Al-Hamdānī⁽⁷⁵⁾ adds that ʿAbbād was one of the Juhāfiyyīn who have no kinship with any of the Yemeni tribes. Ibn al-Ḥusayn⁽⁷⁶⁾ records that ʿAbbād proclaimed himself al-Manṣūr, who according to the old narratives,, was supposed to appear under the title "al-Ruʿaynī" at the end of time, (ākhir al-zamān).

Comments concerning ʿAbbād and his uprising also appear in more recent works. Al-Shamāḥī,⁽⁷⁷⁾ for example, regards ʿAbbad as one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs (qayl) and states that his revolution extended to several other provinces. Another modern point of view is put forward by Ṣāliḥ,⁽⁷⁸⁾ who comments upon ʿAbbād's supposedly Khārijī origins, saying, "we can say that ʿAbbād was not a Khārijī and had no relations with any of their known groups".

It is difficult to judge ʿAbbād and his revolution due to lack of information. However, several reasons indicate that ʿAbbād was in fact most probably an Ibādī. The first reason is the assertion by our primary sources that he was a Khārijī.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Secondly, the Ibādiyyah had existed in the Yemen long before the revolution of ʿAbbad 107/725-6.⁽⁸⁰⁾ The third reason is the activities of the

(75) Iklīl, II, 386.

(76) Anbāʾ, f 15a.b.; Ghāyat, I, 119.

(77) Al-Yaman, 85.

(78) Tārīkh al-Yaman al-Islāmī, 109.

(79) Such as al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 386; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244. These historians do not distinguish between Khārijī and Ibādī.

(80) Al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn ʿl-Firaq, 61, tells us "When the Khārijīs were defeated at al-Nahrawān in 38 [659] two of them fled to the Yemen and established the Ibādiyyah in the area. "Ibn Hawqal, 37, says that ʿAbd Allāh b. Ibād and ʿAbd Allāh b. Wahb, the former of whom was the founder of Ibādiyyah, died in al-Mudhaykhirah, a Yemeni province. See also E.I. "Ibādiyya".

Ibādiyyah against the Umayyad caliphate in many places within the state at that time. (81)

It is unlikely that ^cAbbād was one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs, for apart from the fact that he enjoyed no kinship with any Yemeni tribe, the uprising put paid to his social position. Naturally, if he had been a Ḥimyarī chief, he would have had the support of thousands of Yemenis. In addition, the forts and mountain paths (82) in the area could have protected him from the Umayyad forces for at least several years. (83) However, according to historical fact, ^cAbbād was not a distinguished person and his uprising was not a strong one. Therefore, he was supported by no more than three hundred men and his movement was easily suppressed by Yūsuf b. ^cUmar, the Umayyad governor of the Yemen at that time. (84)

In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that the uprising of ^cAbbād al-Ru^caynī was quite simple one of the more unimportant revolts against the Umayyad caliphate; it consisted of various local Khārijīs who aimed to put an end to Umayyad rule. Its prestigious place in Yemeni history is due merely to the fact that it was the very first revolt of its kind to be directed against the authority of the caliphate in the Yemen.

(81) After the death of ^cUmar b. ^cAbd al-^cAzīz (101/720) Abū ^cUbaydah, the leader of Ibādiyyah in Basra at that time, planned revolts in different provinces, in order to build upon the ruins of the Umayyad caliphate a universal imamate of the Ibādiyyah. Cf. E.I.² "Ibādiyya" S.E.I. "Ibādiyya".

(82) The province, (mikhlāf) Ru^cayn distinguished by geographical complexity which could protect him. For the location of this province, see Map 2.

(83) E.G. al-Hayṣam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad who revolted against the ^cAbbāsīd for seven years, retreating to Jibāl Maswar; see 317-20 below.

(84) Cf al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ^cAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 15a.b.; Ghayat, I, 119. See also al-Shamāhī, 85; Ṣāliḥ, 109.

iii. The revolt of the Ibādiyyah

The most serious of the Yemeni insurrections against Umayyad authority occurred during the reign of the dynasty's last caliph, Marwān b. Muḥammad (125-132/743-750). The Ibādiyyah, based in Ḥaḍramawt, staged a revolt which, within a year, enable them to extend their authority over the Yemeni provinces and the Ḥijāz and enjoy supremacy there for more than a year.

It is not within the scope of this work to study the origins, doctrine or history of the Ibādiyyah;⁽⁸⁵⁾ our sole concern is with the political implications of the revolt and subsequent events. The significance of the uprising lies in the suddenness with which it appeared, and the fact that it did so in an area hitherto politically isolated from other Islamic territories.

In 129/745-6, the Ibādiyyah of both Basra and Ḥaḍramawt swore an oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī, otherwise known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq.⁽⁸⁶⁾ From Ḥaḍramawt, the latter proclaimed himself caliph, thus rejecting Umayyad rule.

The name of ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā appears for the first time in 128/745-6, thus allowing us no insight into his political activities. Al-Iṣfahānī⁽⁸⁷⁾ reports that he was a

(85) For a detailed discussion of the Ibādiyyah, Cf. al-Shahrastānī, Milal, I, 212-4; al-Baghdādī, Farq 82-9 E.I.² "Ibādiyya"; ENNAMI, 'Studies in Ibadism', passim.

(86) He was from the most powerful tribe in Ḥaḍramawt, namely B. al-Ḥārith al-Wallādah of Kindah. For his nasab, see Table 5

(87) Aghānī, XXVII, 9393. Repeated by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 105.

a diligent (mujtahid) and a pious (ʿābid). He also appears as a Qāḍī of Ḥaḍramawt on behalf of its governor, Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah al-Kindī. (88)

The revolt cannot be convincingly connected with any political event in the Yemen for the following reasons; the political history of Ḥaḍramawt before the uprising is obscure; and the nature of relations between the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt and those in Basra unclear.

The historians agree that the Ibāḍiyyah of Basra played a major role in effectuating the success of the revolt, yet differ concerning the initial connection with ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā. Musā b. Kathīr in al-Ṭabarī (89) mentions that at the end of 128/746, during the pilgrimage season, Abū Ḥamzah, al-Mukhtār b. ʿAwf al-Azdī, an Ibāḍī leader in Basra, met with ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā in Mecca and persuaded him to rise up against the Umayyad caliphate. Al-Isfahānī (90) confirms that it was ʿAbd Allān b. Yaḥyā himself who opened communications with the Ibāḍiyyah of Basra, consulting them about the uprising due to his disaffection from Umayyad rule in the Yemen, where the latter wrote to him urging him to revolt.

(88) Al-Ḥārithī, ʿUqūd, 187. Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah al-Kindī was designated by al-Qāsim b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafī, the Umayyad governor in the Yemen during the caliphate of Marwān b. Muhammad, to be his representative in Ḥaḍramawt. See Table 6.

(89) II, 942 f. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 297; Ibn Khaldūn, ʿIbar, III, 356 f; al-Ḥārithī, ʿUqūd, 189.

(90) Aghānī, XXVII, 9393f. Repeated in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 105-7; al-Ḥārithī, ʿUqūd, 188. However, they give no specific date for these communications.

Incidentally, the uprising could not have come at a worse time for the caliph Marwān b. Muḥammad, who was already threatened on several fronts.⁽⁹¹⁾ The opportunity was indeed ripe for those who desired to revolt against Umayyad rule, especially the Yemenis, who had lived under the yoke of harsh governors for more than half a century.⁽⁹²⁾

Abd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's followers consisted of men mainly from Basra and Ḥaḍramawt. Ibn Khayyāt⁽⁹³⁾ records that Basrans formed the bulk of Abd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's supporters. Undoubtedly there were some Ḥaḍramīs involved in the early insurrections, since records show that Abd Allāh b. Yaḥyā was totally dependent upon them on the eve of his revolution. Addressing Abū Ḥamzah in Mecca, he proclaimed his Ḥaḍramī support by saying "You there, I have heard the fine speech from you; I see you calling to what is right, come with me [to Ḥaḍramawt], where I enjoy the obedience of my people."⁽⁹⁴⁾ As a result of Basran and Ḥaḍramī support for Abd Allāh b. Yaḥyā, high posts in the armies and administration of the revolution were occupied by members of these groups.⁽⁹⁵⁾

(91) For the political situation in the Islamic provinces during this time, see al-Tabarī, II, 1890ff; al-Dīnawarī, 334 ff; Ibn Qūṭaybah, al-Imāmah, II, 94 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 282ff, al-Kūfī VIII, 142 ff; al-Ya'qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 76-85.

(92) During the governorship of Al Abī Aqīl (Thaqīf), 73-129/692-746-7 save a short period where others occupied this office, Cf. Table 6.

(93) Tārīkh, 384.

(94) Al-Tabarī, II, 1942f; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9398; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 357; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 297.

(95) Those of Basra are Abū Ḥamzah and Balj b. Uqbah, as for the Ḥaḍramīs these are Abd Allāh b. Sa'id al-Ḥaḍramī and Abrahah b. Shurahbīl b. al-Ṣabbāḥ al-Sadi fī of Himyar. See Ibn Khayyāt, 385, 391 f; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9394, 96-8; al-Ḥārithī, 189ff. For nasab of Abrahah, see al-Ḥamdānī, Iklīl, 21f.

Our sources estimate the number of ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's troops at the time of his revolt at some two thousand.⁽⁹⁶⁾ However, a year after his occupation of Ṣan^{cā'}, the number increased by some thirty thousand.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Such a rapid build up leads us to believe that many Yemenis had joined ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's army, and that even the inhabitants of the centres of Umayyad administration in the Yemen were enthusiastic to take up arms against the caliphate. Al-Iṣfahānī,⁽⁹⁸⁾ tells us "Before moving from Ḥaḍramawt, ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā wrote to his followers in Ṣan^{cā'} informing them of his coming." He also mentions⁽⁹⁹⁾ that when ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā occupied Ṣan^{cā'}, many Khārijīs from outside joined him.

Unfortunately, the source material does not indicate in which Ḥaḍramī town ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā announced his revolt. What is known, however, is that his first course of action was to proceed to the area's seat of governorship (dār al-imārah), where he arrested the Umayyad governor, Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah al-Kindī.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ In his place he appointed one of his own followers, ^cAbd Allāh b. Sa^cīd al-Ḥaḍramī over Ḥaḍramawt and then marched on westwards to Ṣan^{cā'} with two thousand of his troops.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

(96) Ibn Khayyāt, 384; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; Ibn Abī Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 189.

(97) See 289 below

(98) Aghānī, XXVII, 9394. See also Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 107.

(99) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9397; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, Uqūd, 194.

(100) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9394; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 188.

(101) Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 384; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9394f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; Ibn al-Husayn, Anbā', f16a; al-Ḥārithī, 189. See also al-Akwā', Wathā'iq, 205.

When al-Qāsim b. ^cUmar al-Thaqafī, the Umayyad governor of the Yemen, heard of the Ibādiyyah march out of the Ḥaḍramawt, he left al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Zumal in charge while he himself advanced to the south to oppose the Ibādiyyah. (102) The two armies met in al-Jāliḥ, a village of Abyan, the Umayyad force was defeated and retreated to Ṣan^{cā}. (103) Following their victory the Ibādiyyah advanced to Ṣan^{cā}, where they easily defeated the remainder of the Umayyad troops and entered the town. (104) Consequently, Ṣan^{cā} fell totally under the control of ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā who seized the treasure house (bayt al-māl) and gave an aggressive speech. (105)

In Ṣan^{cā}, ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā was able to build a strong army consisting of those Khārijīs who joined him there, as well as some of the Yemenis. Following their occupation there, the Ibādiyyah focussed their attention on challenging Umayyad authority in the Ḥijāz and Syria. Accordingly, ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā despatched Abū Ḥamzah there

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- (102) Ibn Khayyāt, 384; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 189; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 18; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 73; ^cAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 113; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā' f 16a.
- (103) Ibn Khayyāt, 384, giving the place. See also al-Iṣfahānī Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; al-Ḥārithī, 190, followed by al-Ḥāmid, I, 207, all say this battle took place in Laḥj, a village of Abyan.
- (104) Ibn Khayyāt, 385; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9396; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 190; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 73; ^cAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā' f 16a.
- (105) For this speech, see al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9396 ff; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107f; al-Ḥārithī, 192-4. See also al-Ḥāmid, I, 208; al-Akwa^c, Watha'iq, 205.

with one thousand troops, during the pilgrimage season, 129/746. (106) Through this expedition, the Ibādiyyah were able to spread their influence over the Hijāzī towns for a couple of months and thus threaten Syria. (107)

Alarmed by the worsening situation, Marwān b. Muḥammad decided to send troops, under the command of ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAṭīyyah al-Saʿdī, in order to drive out the Ibādiyyah rebels from both the Hijāz and the Yemen. (108) After his success in re-occupying the Hijāz, ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAṭīyyah continued southwards to Tabālah, in ʿAsīr, where he made camp. (109) When ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā heard of the defeat of his armies in the Hijāz and the subsequent advance of the Umayyad forces into the Yemen, he left Ṣanʿāʾ with thirty thousand troops and marched northwards where he encamped at Ṣādah. (110) In 130/747, ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā

(106) Al-Isfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9397 f; says that 900 or 1000 men. Repeated in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 108; al-Ḥārithī, 194; E.I.² "Ibādiyya". In al-Ṭabarī, II, 1981; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 37; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 307, they were 700 troops. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 285, gives unacceptable number when he records that there were 10,000 men.

(107) It is not within the scope of our topic to deal with their spread in the Hijāz; our sole concern here is their uprising in the Yemen. For their spread in the Hijāz, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, 388 ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 1981 ff; al-Isfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9399 ff; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 108 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 357 f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 307 ff; al-Ḥārithī, 194 ff. See also E.I.² "Ibādiyya".

(108) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 393; al-Ṭabarī, II, 2012 f; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, VI, 66; al-Isfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9423; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 120; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 18.

(109) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394.

(110) Ibid.

endeavoured to stave off the Umayyad advance near Jurash, a town in northern Yemen; however, he was killed and his army routed. (111)

The defeat of the Ibādiyyah in the Yemen was not yet a total one, for some of them rose up in the south upon the arrival of the Umayyad army in Ṣan^cā'. Our main source of information here are Ibn Khayyāt and al-Iṣfahānī; other historians, both local and external, unanimously neglect the continuation of hostilities in the area between the supporters of ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā and the Umayyad forces.

At this time, two movements appeared in the Yemen, both led by Ḥimyarī chiefs, each of which arose in the territory occupied by their own particular tribe. The first of these uprisings was headed by Yaḥyā b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Sabbāq, who succeeded in taking al-Janad. (112) Consequently, ^cAbd al-Malik b. ^cAṭīyah sent a force to the area. The Ibādiyyah were defeated and their leader fled to Aden. Undeterred by this defeat, Yaḥyā b. ^cAbd Allāh al-Sabbāq raised an army of two thousand men. Again this army was defeated and its leader killed by the Umayyad forces, who were led by ^cAbd al-Malik b. ^cAṭīyah himself. (113)

The second uprising was led by Yaḥyā b. Ḥarb, also of Ḥimyar,

(111) Ibn Khayyāt, 394; al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, VI, 67, give the place. In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9430, Kashshah (probably means Kashar a mountain near Jurash). In al-Ḥārithī, 223, Kast. See also al-Ṭabarī, II, 2014; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 124.

(112) Ibn Khayyāt, 394. Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436 (quoting of al-Madā'ini), says from Al Dhu'l-Kalā^c. See also al-Ḥārithī, 226.

(113) Ibn Khayyāt, 394.

who revolted in the coastal area. Without delay, ^cAbd al-Malik b. ^cAtiyyah dispatched an army, this time led by a man of Kindah nicknamed Abū Umayyah; in due course, the rebellion was suppressed and its leader slain. (114)

Nevertheless, the suppression of the Ibādiyyah in the Yemen was not yet complete, for they were still active in Ḥaḍramawt under the leadership of ^cAbd Allāh b. Sa^cīd al-Ḥaḍramī, ^cAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's deputy in the region. Again, ^cAbd al-Malik b. ^cAṭiyyah lost no time in advancing to Ḥaḍramawt to put down the rebels.

Our sources agree that ^cAbd al-Malik b. ^cAṭiyyah's suppression of the Ibādiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt was not total. These sources tell us that while Ibn ^cAṭiyyah was besieging the Ibādiyyah he received a letter from the caliph designating him as his representative at the pilgrimage; accordingly, the former called for peace. The Ibādiyyah accepted the offer on condition that they choose their governor. Duly, Ibn ^cAṭiyyah accepted this condition leaving Ḥaḍramawt under the mercy of the Ibādiyyah. (115) The latter, thus, remained a threat to caliphal authority in the region until the reign of the second ^cAbbāsīd caliph, Abū Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr. (116)

(114) Ibn Khayyāt, 394. In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436 and al-Ḥārithī, 226 read Yaḥyā b. Karīb al-Ḥimyarī.

(115) See Ibn Khayyāt, 394; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 128; al-Ḥārithī, 227. See also al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, VI, 67. Lewicki, EI², "Ibādiyya", says that "He [Ibn ^cAṭiyyah] even agreed to recognize their independence."

(116) For the Ibādī-^cAbbāsīd struggle in Ḥaḍramawt, see 311-3 below.

Although our sources offer reasonably adequate descriptions of the Ibāḍiyyah uprising in the Yemen, they do not throw any light on the political situation of the country during the course of these events. The question worth considering here is to what extent did the rebellion affect the security of the Yemen, and how, if at all, did it change the feelings of the caliph concerning his influence in the area?

It is certain that the Yemen underwent much unrest during the course of this uprising, given the absence of security in general and of strong local rulers in particular. Abū 'l-Zubayr b. 'Abd al-Rahmān in al-Ṭabarī (117) tells us that 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Aṭiyyah's death at the hands of local people occurred as a result of their not being able to distinguish the governor of the area from a highwayman! As far as the caliph was concerned, his intentions toward the area are clear from the letter he wrote to the Yemenis, urging them to remain loyal to the caliphate and not to join the rebellion. Such a letter could only have been sent out of serious concern about the revolution which by this time had spread throughout the Yemeni provinces. (118)

To conclude, then, the Yemen spent the first/seventh century politically isolated from the rest of the Islamic world, its relations with the Umayyad administration at no time clear. At the beginning of the second/eighth century, local powers


(117) II, 2015 (Abū 'l-Zubayr himself was one of Ibn 'Aṭiyyah's Companions on this journey) Cf. also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 316; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 358.

(118) See this letter, Anon, Tārīkh, f. 139a, Cf. also al-Akwa' Watha'iq, 201-3.

began to dispute caliphal authority; thus at the end of Umayyad rule, the Yemenis were able to lift the heavy veil of caliphal authority from their own country for the first time. Although this expulsion was temporary, it represented real opposition to the caliphal regime in the Yemen by the locals who gradually escalated their conflict with the ^cAbbāsīd authority.

Table 5*

The nasab of Tālib al-Ḥaqq



* After Caskel table 239; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 428.

Table 6 The governors of the Yemen in the time of
the Umayyad Caliphate* (41-132/661-750)

B. Sufyān	41-64/661-84	appointed by Mu ^c āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān
Busr b. Abī Arṭāh al- ^c Amirī (1)		as a military governor
^c Uthmān b. ^c Affān al- Thaqafī	41/660-1	overall the Yemen
^c Utbah b. Abī Sufyān	41-2/660-2	(brother of Mu ^c āwiyah) ⁽²⁾ over all the Yemen
Fayrūz al-Daylamī	42-53/662-73	Ṣan ^{c-ʿ} and al-Janad ⁽³⁾
Sa ^c īd b. Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī (4)	53/673	"
al-Dahhāk b. Fayrūz al-Ḍaylamī	54-60/674-80	"
al-Nu ^c mān b. Bashīr al-Anṣarī		Ḥadramawt
Bashīr b. Sa ^c d al-A ^c raj ⁽⁵⁾		"
Bahīr b. Raysān al- Ḥimyarī (6)		Ṣan ^{c-ʿ} and al-Janad, appointed by Yazīd, I.

* Including Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate

(1) See 264 above.

(2) Resided in al-Ṭa^ʿif cf 266 above.

(3) Omitted by Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16.

(4) Omitted by Zambaur, 114. In Smith, "History of Ṣan^{c-ʿ}", 53, reads Sa^cīd b. Dāwūd instead of Dadhawayh. He remained only seven months, cf. 267 above.

(5) For al-Nu^cmān's and Bashīr's governorships, cf. 267 above.

(6) In Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16, reads erroneously Bujayr b. Zayyān al-Ḥimyarī. Omitted by Zambaur, 114. See Smith, "History of Ṣan^{c-ʿ}", 53. Cf. 268 above.

During the Caliphate of ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr
(64-73/683-92)

Bahīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī, in al-Janad

al-Daḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī. (7) Ṣan^{cā}

^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Walīd b.

^cAbd Shams b. al-Mughīrah al-Makhzūmī. (8) Ṣan^{cā}

^cAbd Allāh b. al-Muṭṭalib b. Abī Wadā^cah al-Sahmī (9) Ṣan^{cā}

^cUbaydah b. al-Zubayr (brother of ^cAbd Allāh) (10)

Qays b. Yazīd al-Sa^cdī al-Tamīmī. (11) Ṣan^{cā}

Abū 'l-Nujūd (mawla of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān) (12) Ṣan^{cā}

al-Daḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī (the second governorship
during Ibn al-Zubayr's reign) Ṣan^{cā}

al-Sā^{ib} b. Khallād b. Suwayd al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī. (13) Ṣan^{cā}

(7) See Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 95; Bughyat, 25.

(8) In Idrīs, Kanz, f173a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 95f; Bughyat, 25; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53, all of them read ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. Khalīd b. al-Walīd. According to al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 330-2; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 148 and Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 152, ^cAbd Allāh is a descendant of another branch of B. Makhzūm and was appointed over the Yemen by Ibn al-Zubayr.

(9) See Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66f; ^cAsjad, 22; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53. In Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 96f, read Ibn Abī Wādī^cah.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Idrīs, f173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67; ^cAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 97f. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 17. See also Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53. In Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 25, reads erroneously ^cIsā b. Yazīd.

(12) Cf. al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 22; Kifāyah, 67. See also Smith History of Ṣan^{cā}, 53.

(13) In al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 22, has Khallād b. al-Sā^{ib} al-Anṣārī. In Kifāyah, 67, reads as Najlā^{ib} instead of Khallād. Smith "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53 has omitted al-Anṣārī. However, it seems to me these historians place Khallād before al-Sā^{ib}. According to al-Baladhūrī, Ansāb I, 244f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 363, Khallād b. Suwayd al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī was killed in Medina (on the day of B. Qurayzah) in 5/627, and his son al-Sā^{ib} was appointed over the Yemen by Mu^cawiyah. It is quite possible that the above historians erroneously mention Mu^cawiyah instead of Ibn al-Zubayr. If this assumption is correct, al-Khazrajī, then, places Khallad before al-Sā^{ib}.

Ḥanash b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṣanʿānī (14)		in Ṣanʿāʾ.
B. Marwān	73-129/692-746	appointed by ʿAbd al-Malik
Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī	73-91/692-710	brother of al-Ḥajjaj, in Ṣanʿāʾ
Waqid b. Maslamah al-Thaqafī	73-4/692-3	in al-Janad
al-Ḥakam b. Ayyūb al-Thaqafī		in Ḥaḍramawt
Ayyūb b. Yahyā al-Thaqafī	91-6/709-15 (15)	appointed by al-Walīd I.
ʿUrwah b. Muḥammad al-Saʿdī	96-101/715-20	appointed by Sulayman and reappointed by ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (16)
Masʿūd b. ʿAwf al-Kalbī	101-6/720-5 (17)	appointed by Yazīd II
Yusūf b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafī	106-20/725-38	appointed by Hishām
al-Ṣalt b. Yūsuf	120-5/738-43	Son of above
Marwān b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī	125-6/743-4	appointed by al-Walīd II
al-Daḥḥāk b. Wāṣil al-Sāksakī	126/744 (18)	appointed by Yazīd III

(14) Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 97. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67; ʿAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Bughyat, 25, all have Hasan instead of Ḥanash. Smith, "History of Ṣanʿāʾ", 53, has Muʿtab/Muhsin, and places him after ʿUbaydah b. al-Zubayr. Ḥanash b. ʿAbd Allāh is a famous Yemeni Faqīh, see al-Razī, Tārīkh, 300; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, V, 7-9. He was the last of Ibn al-Zubayr's governors and was therefore arrested by ʿAbd al-Malik's troops and sent to Damascus, see 279 above.

(15) For the appointment of these governors, see 276 above.

(16) Cf. Idrīs, f173b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; ʿAsjad, 22; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 17; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 103; Bughyat 26. See also Smith, "History of Ṣanʿāʾ", 53. Omitted by Zambaur, 113. He reappointed by ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Cf. Idrīs, f 173b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 72; ʿAsjad, 23. In Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 111; Bughyat, 27, has Wāʾil instead of Wāṣil. Smith, "History of Ṣanʿāʾ", 53, has Faḍil.

appointed by Marwān b. Muḥammad

al-Qāsim b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafī 127-9/744-6 he was expelled by
the Ibādiyyah

Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah b.
Makhramah al-Kindī,
the governor of
Hadramawt on
behalf of al-
Qāsim b. ʿUmar. (19)

ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muḥammad 130/747-8
b. ʿAtiyyah al-Saʿdī (20)

Yūsuf b. ʿUrwah (21) 131-2/748-50

(19) See 287 above.

(20) Sent at the head of the Umayyad force to suppress
the Ibādiyyah in the Hijāz and the Yemen and to
govern the latter. However, by the end of 130/748
he received a letter from the caliph in which
he was ordered to lead the ḥajj ceremony. He
duly left the Yemen to assume his new task,
but did not reach the Hijāz, but was murdered
in the Yemen, cf. 292 above.

(21) He resided in the Hijāz and sent his brother
al-Walīd to the Yemen. Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 407.

CHAPTER X

The Yemen during the early ^cAbbāsīd caliphs
(132-93/750-809)

With the advent of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate in 132/750, Yemeni relations with the central Islamic authorities took on a greater clarity compared with those under previous administrations.⁽¹⁾ During this period political events in the Yemen were such that on several occasions governors in the area deemed it necessary to ask the caliphate for military reinforcements in order to suppress disorder and revolt. Regardless of the existence of political activity in the Yemen, the country could not exist separately from the central Islamic authority, which always succeeded in suppressing local revolts there. Nevertheless, despite the concern shown for Yemeni affairs by some of these five ^cAbbāsīd caliphs, the area remained mostly in a state of political isolation.

The following chapter will deal with the political situation in the Yemen and the area's relations with the central Islamic authority during the period of the first five ^cAbbāsīd caliphs (132-93/750-809). Firstly, we will discuss the caliphal policy towards the appointment of governors to the Yemen and, secondly, the various Yemeni uprisings against ^cAbbāsīd authority and the relations of the latter towards them.

(1) In particular, the Orthodox and Umayyad administrations.

A. The appointment of governors

Initially the ʿAbbāsids had no specially formed policy on appointment of governors to the Yemen; the officials there were appointed by the governor of the Ḥijāz, the area as a whole seeming to have been a relatively unimportant one. When Abū ʿAlī-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh, the first ʿAbbāsīd (132-6/750-4), became caliph, he appointed his uncle Dāwūd b. ʿAlī over the Ḥijāz and the Yemen. The latter took up residence in Mecca, sending his representative, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ʿUmarī, to the Yemen. (2) This situation lasted until the murder of Dāwūd b. ʿAlī in the following year 133/751, whereupon Abū ʿAlī-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh personally appointed his own uncle, Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān, governor of the Yemen. (3) This blood relationship between Abū ʿAlī-ʿAbbās and B. ʿAbd al-Madān enabled various members of the latter to occupy the governorship of the Yemen for some ten years. (4)

(2) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 421; Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 413; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 18. See also al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 76; ʿAsjad, 24, who says Dāwūd Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd. Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, 119, mentions ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Madjīd.

(3) Ibn Khayyāt, 413, has ʿUbayd Allāh. Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 19, reads Muḥammad b. Zayd. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 76 Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Zayd, but in ʿAsjad, 24, writes Muḥammad b. Zayd b. ʿAbd Allāh. Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 119 f, gives Muḥammad b. Yazīd al-Ḥārithī. Smith, "History of Ṣanʿā", 53, has Muḥammad b. Zayd. For the blood relationship, cf al-Zubayrī, Nāsab, 30; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 416 f.

(4) See Table 8.

During the Caliphate of ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr
(64-73/683-92)

Bahīr b. Raysān al-Himyarī, in al-Janad

al-Dahḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī. (7) Ṣan^{cā}

^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Walīd b.

^cAbd Shams b. al-Mughīrah al-Makhzūmī. (8) Ṣan^{cā}

^cAbd Allāh b. al-Muṭṭalib b. Abī Wadā^cah al-Sahmī (9) Ṣan^{cā}

^cUbaydah b. al-Zubayr (brother of ^cAbd Allāh) (10)

Qays b. Yazīd al-Sa^cdī al-Tamīmī. (11) Ṣan^{cā}

Abū 'l-Nujūd (mawla of ^cUthmān b. ^cAffān) (12) Ṣan^{cā}

al-Dahḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī (the second governorship
during Ibn al-Zubayr's reign) Ṣan^{cā}

al-Sā[']ib b. Khallād b. Suwayd al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī. (13) Ṣan^{cā}

(7) See Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 95; Bughyat, 25.

(8) In Idrīs, Kanz, f173a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ^cAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 95f; Bughyat, 25; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53, all of them read ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. Khalid b. al-Walīd. According to al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 330-2; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 148 and Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 152, ^cAbd Allāh is a descendant of another branch of B. Makhzūm and was appointed over the Yemen by Ibn al-Zubayr.

(9) See Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 16f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66f; ^cAsjad, 22; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53. In Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 96f, read Ibn Abī Wadī^cah.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Idrīs, f173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67; ^cAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 97f. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 17. See also Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53. In Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 25, reads erroneously ^cIsā b. Yazīd.

(12) Cf. al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 22; Kifāyah, 67. See also Smith History of Ṣan^{cā}, 53.

(13) In al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 22, has Khallād b. al-Sā[']ib al-Anṣārī. In Kifāyah, 67, reads as Najlā['] instead of Khallād. Smith "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 53 has omitted al-Anṣārī. However, it seems to me these historians place Khallād before al-Sā[']ib. According to al-Baladhūrī, Ansāb I, 244f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 363, Khallād b. Suwayd al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī was killed in Medina (on the day of B. Qurayzah) in 5/627, and his son al-Sā[']ib was appointed over the Yemen by Mu^cawiyah. It is quite possible that the above historians erroneously mention Mu^cawiyah instead of Ibn al-Zubayr. If this assumption is correct, al-Khazrajī, then, places Khallad before al-Sā[']ib.

However, ^cAbbāsīd policy concerning the choice of governors to the Yemen did not always centre on the appointment of a military man to the post. On some occasions, the governors appointed were not distinguished by their military experience. One example is Muḥammad b. Barmak in (183/799), renowned for his generosity - he was known as khayyir (beneficent) - he was chosen at a time when the political situation there was particularly unsettled.⁽⁸⁾ Yet despite his attempts to win over the Yemenis by implementing useful social projects and helping the poor, he too was eventually unable to control the country and was replaced, after a year, by a military man.⁽⁹⁾

As a result of their general failure to find a governor capable enough of maintaining order in the Yemen, the caliphs occasionally resorted to dividing the governorship of the area between two officials. In 177/793-4, Hārūn al-Rashīd, the fifth ^cAbbāsīd caliph (170-193/786-809), appointed both al-Rabī^c b. ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān and al-^cAbbās b. Sa^cd over the Yemen, the former to head the military and lead the prayers (^calā ḥarb wa ḥalāl-salāt), and the latter to supervise the levy of the alms-tax (^calā ḥalāl-jibāyah).⁽¹⁰⁾ One modern scholar⁽¹¹⁾ comments upon this policy: "By this

(8) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 106f, 109; Ibn al-Mujāwir, II, 178f (different account); al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 89f; ^cAsjad, 28f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 129-31; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 214.

(9) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 109; al-Janadī, Sūlūk, f 45b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 89f; ^cAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 129-31; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 214.

(10) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; ^cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 128f.

(11) Daghfūs, see note 53 in al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87.

action, Hārūn al-Rashīd intended to facilitate the duty of his governors in the Yemen due to the increase of political disorder in the area." Naturally this division of duties, plus his later attempt to double the salary of his governor there, ^cAbd Allāh b. Muṣ^cab al-Zubayrī, offers clear proof of Hārūn al-Rashīd's endeavour to step up the activities of his officials in the Yemen. (12)

It is interesting to note that the ^cAbbāsīd governors in the Yemen were supported by an army stationed in Ṣan^cā,⁽¹³⁾ a fact which has not been mentioned in the sources of the period of the Orthodox caliphate and Umayyad rule.⁽¹⁴⁾ Thus it may be deduced that this army was formed during the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate. However, since the sources do not throw any light on the make-up of the army we cannot be sure whether the soldiers were sent by the caliphs in Baghdād or whether they were recruited from among the Yemenis.

It is likely that the army was made up of both associates of the governors and local Yemenis.⁽¹⁵⁾ What is clear

(12) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; Asjad, 28; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 22.

(13) This indication appears for the first time during the governorship of Rajā b. Rawḥ al-Judhāmī, 159/776. Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; Asjad, 27. See also Ibn Khayyat, 440; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20. In al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, Rajā b. Sallām b. Rawḥ. See also table 8.

(14) The sources at our disposal do not mention such an army in the Yemen throughout the period of both the Orthodox caliphs and the Umayyads.

(15) Some governors, especially those who were appointed with the express purpose of suppressing rebels, were accompanied by their own followers. Ma^cn b. Zā'idah, for example, says that he lost many of his own followers in the course of his governorship in the Yemen; cf. al-Tabarī, III, 395.

is that the force did not officially contain any of the inhabitants of Ṣan^cā' itself; the conflict between the populace there and government troops during the caliphate of al-Mahdī, the third ^cAbbāsīd caliph (158-69/775-86), may attest to this. (16) However, when this army failed to put down an insurrection, reinforcements were sent from Baghdād. Likewise, Hārūn al-Rashīd sent troops to Hammād al-Barbarī, the governor of the Yemen (184-94/800-10), when the latter failed to suppress the revolt of al-Hayṣam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad. (17)

In actual fact the ^cAbbāsīd force in the Yemen was a weak one, its main task being to uphold the security of the Islamic authorities in the area. Its general failure to do so led to the despatch of auxiliaries from Baghdād, a policy which began during the reign of Abū Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr and developed into a formal structure under Hārūn al-Rashīd. From then onwards the sending of reinforcements to quell uprisings in the Yemen remained a salient feature of ^cAbbāsīd policy towards the area. (18)

Thus, contrary to the practices of previous administrations, the ^cAbbāsīds began to pay more and more attention to the appointment of governors to the Yemen. The reason for this, no doubt, was the increase in anti-authority uprisings in the area. Despite the success of the ^cAbbāsīd administration in suppressing the revolts there during the period

(16) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ^cAsjad, 27.

(17) See 319 below.

(18) Cf Chapter XI. below.

of the first five caliphs, their successors totally failed to maintain control over the area as a whole during the third/ninth century. (19)

B. The political situation

During the period of the first five ^cAbbāsīd caliphs (132-93/750-809), the Yemen was witness to various uprisings which resulted in political disorder in the area. Most of the Yemeni tribes, along with certain ^cAbbāsīd governors, took part in these revolts. Whilst the former rose up against ^cAbbāsīd authority there, the latter were seeking independence from the central ^cAbbāsīd administration. It was considerations such as these that mostly coloured caliphal policy towards the Yemen. At this point, we shall discuss the nature of these local revolts and the reaction of the ^cAbbāsīd government to them.

a. From Abū ḥ1-^cAbbās's caliphate to the death of al-Hādī

During the caliphate of Abū ḥ1-^cAbbās al-Saffāḥ (132-36/750-4) the Yemen remained quiet, with no anti-caliphate revolt occurring. It is interesting to note that during the reign of Abū ḥ1-^cAbbās, the caliphate affirmed its influence over Aden instead of al-Janad, by appointing a governor over the former. (20) This attention paid to the coastal areas of the Yemen for the first time since the establishment of the Islamic authorities there, leads us to believe that the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate intended to achieve a

(19) Cf. Chapter XI below.

(20) Cf. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 76; ^cAsjad, 24; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 120.

stronghold over the Yemeni ports, which formed a chain of connection between the ports of Iraq and those of East Africa. (21)

However, the accession of Qaḥṭān to the office of governor of Ṣanʿāʾ during the reign of Abū ʿAlī-ʿAbbās (132-136/750-4) heralded a renewal of local conflicts between the Abnāʾ and their opponents, Qaḥṭān who inhabited Ṣanʿāʾ. (22) We know that the conflict was determined by the arrival of Abū Bakr's general, al-Muhājir, and his army to the town in 11/632, whereupon the conflict came to an end and remained dormant until the governorship of ʿAlī b. al-Rabīʿ b. ʿAbd al-Madān in 133/751. (23) A modern writer (24) connects the renewal of hostilities to the occupation by the Qaḥṭānī element of the Ṣanʿāʾ and justifies this claim by pointing to the presence of Muḍarī elements in this post during the previous period, 11-133/632-751. (25) Consequently, the writer intends to accuse ʿAlī b. al-Rabīʿ b. ʿAbd al-Madān of encouraging hostilities. It may well be that the preponderance of certain Qaḥṭānī elements over the authority of Ṣanʿāʾ, like that of the ʿAbbāsīd officials during the period of Abū ʿAlī-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh, encouraged their relatives

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- (21) The ʿAbbāsīds paid more attention to the coastal area than the other Yemeni provinces and, therefore, established the B. Ziyād dynasty in Tihāmat al-Yaman to retain their interests in the ports of this region. See Chapter XI, D. below.
- (22) In particular B. Shihāb, a tribe of Himyar, for their nasab, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 529.
- (23) See Table 8.
- (24) Ṣāliḥ, Tārīkh, 117.
- (25) However some Qaḥṭānī elements had occupied this post in this period, such as Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Himyarī and al-Daḥḥāk b. Wāṣil al-Saksakī, see Table 6.

in the town to reaffirm their enmity towards the Abnā^ḡ there. (26) What it does not signify, however, is that ʿAlī b. al-Rabī^c was behind this, especially since his judgement in the affair came down very clearly on the side of the Abnā^ḡ. (27)

In actual fact the occurrence of such hostilities in Ṣanʿā^ḡ was dependent mainly on the attitude of the governors themselves. Had the governor remained indifferent and unwilling to take sides, such conflict would never have taken place. (28) Since the Abnā^ḡ lacked tribal solidarity in the area, they avoided involvement in such hostilities. This too accounts for their warm acceptance of Islamic rule in 11/632. (29) On the other hand, the Qaḥṭānī position in the town was different since they enjoyed the support of other Yemeni tribes. Thus, these Qaḥṭānīs needed only the slightest encouragement to provoke the Abnā^ḡ. It is most likely, then, that the early Qaḥṭānī governors in the Yemen during the caliphate of Abū ʿAl-ʿAbbās gave the necessary encouragement to their clans; by the time that the third Qaḥṭānī governor, ʿAlī b. al-Rabī^c had come to power, the enmity of Qaḥṭān

(26) Three Qaḥṭānī governors successively appointed over the Yemen during the caliphate of Abū ʿAl-ʿAbbās al-Ṣaffāḥ, see Table 8.

(27) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77 f; ʿAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 120 f.

(28) For the aggression of Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Qasrī, Yemeni from Bajīlah holding the governorship of the Yemen during the caliphate of al-Maʿmūn, against the Abnā^ḡ, see 336-7 below.

(29) Cf. 175 above.

towards the Abnā' became clear. (30) However, 'Alī b. al-Rabī' was able to suppress the crisis. (31) In any case, the disorder had not been aimed against the 'Abbāsīd authority in the area; it was simply a local conflict to which the caliph paid much less attention than did his successors to the later Yemeni crises. (32)

During the caliphate of Abū Ja'far al-Manṣūr (136-58/753-75) the Yemen again entered a period of political turmoil. This time, however, the crisis was not the result of any systematic local rebellion against 'Abbāsīd rule, since there is no mention in our sources of such a revolt. The actual disorder began some six years into the reign of Abū Ja'far (142/760), the early period of his caliphate having been free of political unrest.

Thus, our knowledge of the political situation of the Yemen during the first six years of Abū Ja'far al-Manṣūr's regime is little, since the sources at our disposal throw no light on the circumstances in which the governors of the Yemen were being appointed. Things become clear, however, with the appointment of Ma'n b. Zā'idah al-Shaybānī to the Yemen in 142/760. Although the Yemeni sources remain silent

(30) Particularly since at that time Qaḥṭān in Ṣan'ā' demanded the ownership of al-Rahabah, northern part of Ṣan'ā' plain, cf. Wilson, "Mapping", 281. For the Qaḥṭānī claim to the area, see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77f; 'Asjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba', Qurrat, I, 120f.

(31) Ibid.

(32) For the attitude of Abū Ja'far al-Manṣūr, Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'tasim towards the Yemeni crises, cf. the following pages.

on the circumstances surrounding his governorship, external records offer two different statements concerning it. The first account of Ma^cn b. Zā'idah's appointment to the office of governor of the Yemen has been preserved by al-Ya^cqūbī. (33) who tells us that, "In 142 [760], when Abū Ja^cfar al-Mansūr set out for the pilgrimage and arrived in Basra, he received the news that the Yemenis were in a state of revolt, and that his governor there, ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Rabī^c, had fled. Thus, he sent Ma^cn b. Zā'idah to the Yemen." The second statement comes to us from al-Ṭabarī, (34) who records that, "In 142 [760] the governor of the Yemen rebelled and declared his disobedience, which led the caliph Abū Ja^cfar al-Mansūr to despatch Ma^cn b. Zā'idah to the Yemen in order to arrest the governor and confiscate his property."

The second statement is probably the most accurate. Our sources confirm that ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān, the governor of the Yemen replaced by Ma^cn b. Zā'idah, went to Abū Ja^cfar al-Mansūr designating his son to the office of governor of the Yemen before the appointment of Ma^cn in 142/760. (35) Also ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān fled from the Yemen because he had failed to suppress the rebellion. (36) Since his son succeeded him in his post, it is possible, therefore, that the former took part in this rebellion. This assumption is supported by al-Ṭabarī, (37) who records that, "When

(33) Tārīkh, III, 108.

(34) III, 393-5, the account of Ma^cn b. Zā'idah himself. See also Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 112.

(35) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 78; ^cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Qurrat, I, 122; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19.

(36) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 108.

(37) III, 395.

Ma^cn b. Zā^ḍidah came out from al-Manṣūr's meeting (majlis) to discuss the agreement of the governorship (ḥahd al-wilāyah), he met ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān, who used him to take care of his son who had rebelled in the Yemen." If this assumption is correct, it may uncover two significant facts concerning the political history of the Yemen and its relations with the caliphate. The first is the realization by the caliphs of the necessity of preserving their influence in the Yemen. The second is the birth of various separatist movements freeing themselves from central Islamic authority, but, paradoxically, led by the officials of this authority themselves. (38)

Although the sources confirm that the Yemen was undergoing political disorder on the eve of the governorship of Ma^cn b. Zā^ḍidah, they do not define the rebellious areas, except Ṣan^cā^ḍ, whence Ma^cn was sent directly. Once there, he arrested the rebellious governor and occupied his post. (39)

Without giving any date, our sources throw light on insurrections which occurred in the Yemen which led Ma^cn b. Zā^ḍidah to use military force. Al-Hamdānī (40) mentions briefly a skirmish in the province of Ṣa^cdah between Ma^cn b.

(38) According to our sources it was the first rebellion which arose in the Yemen led by the governors of the caliphate itself, since the latter confirmed its influence in the area in 11/632.

(39) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 395.

(40) Iklīl, II, 129, records that, "Muḥammad b. Abān, a Khawlanī chief, opposed Ma^cn b. Zā^ḍidah in Ṣa^cdah and fought against him where he took revenge for the murder of ^cUmar b. Zayd al-Ghālibī, whom Ma^cn had killed in al-Mandaj, an area north of Ṣa^cdah.

Zā'idah and the leaders of Khawlān. The fact that the struggle took place between government officials and extremely influential chiefs indicates a political motive behind the incident. However, conditions in the southern part of the Yemeni highlands and Ḥaḍramawt were quite different, these areas undergoing unrest during the governorship of Ma^cn b. Zā'idah (142-151/760-769). Again our knowledge of the causes and consequences of these events is slight due to the paucity of source information.

The revolt of the southern part of the Yemeni highlands took place in the province of al-Janad, and has been recorded by Yemeni historians.⁽⁴¹⁾ They all agree that the cause of the uprising was the harsh treatment meted out to the inhabitants of the area by the representative of Ma^cn there. When they had murdered him, Ma^cn attacked the area, avenging the death of his agent by slaughtering two thousand.⁽⁴²⁾ Information concerning the event in Ḥaḍramawt during Ma^cn governorship comes only briefly in our sources. Furthermore, the causes and consequences are again obscure. What is obvious is that this event was of a graver nature than the first, chiefly due to the fact that the Ibādiyyah themselves, along with other influential chiefs in the area, espoused

(41) Cf. al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 44b; Ibn 'Abd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19f; al-Aḥḍāl, Tuḥfat f39a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 79; 'Asjad, 25. See also Ibn al-Mujawir, al-Mustabṣir, II, 163 with a little differences.

(42) Ibid.

this rebellion. (43)

Thus Yemeni historians, without attempting thorough analysis, indicate that the Ḥadramīs in general revolted against the ^cAbbāsīd regime. (44) This assertion, however, is a naive one, and clearly not acceptable. It is likely that, numerically speaking the Ḥadramīs were inclined towards the rebellion, but not enough actually to join it. On the other hand, some Ḥadramīs did openly take sides with the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate, agreeing to act as the latter's officials in the area. (45)

The significance of this rebellion lies in the profound effect that the massacre, which Ma^cn and his troops perpetrated in Ḥadramawt under the pretext of suppressing the rebels, had upon Muslims throughout the State. (46) Two

- (43) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal of the specific role of the Ibādiyyah in this rebellion, but according to these sources they were attacked by Ma^cn b. Zā'idah and a large number of their people were killed, an event which made the caliph, Abū Ja^cfar, happy; see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80f; ^cAsjad, 26; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19f. According to al-Hamdani, Iklīl, II, 373; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk Ḥimyar, 183, ^cAmr b. ^cAbd Allāh b. Zayd, an influential Ḥadramī chief in the area, was killed by Ma^cn b. Zā'idah.
- (44) See, Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 19f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80; ^cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 123.
- (45) See Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab Ma^cadd wa'l-Yaman, f.28b, who says that Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah was appointed by Abu Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr over Hadramawt, the governor who was dismissed by ^cAbd Allāh b. Yahyā, Ṭalīb al-Ḥaqq, from the governorship of Ḥadramawt when the latter announced his revolt, see 287 above.
- (46) See al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80; ^cAsjad, 26; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 123, who all confirm that fifteen thousand Ḥadramīs were killed by the ^cAbbāsīd troops.

motives for this massacre are reported in our sources : firstly, tribal feuding (al-^caṣabiyyah al-qabaliyyah) between Qaḥṭān and Nizār; (47) and secondly, retaliation against the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt. (48) What may be assumed is that both of these motives led the ^cAbbāsīd troops to massacre the Ḥaḍramīs. As a result, Ma^cn b. Zā'idah succeeded in suppressing the rebels in Ḥaḍramawt, thus bringing about a political lull in the area which was to last at least until the second part of the third/ninth century. (49)

Generally, speaking, Abū Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr's harsh treatment of the Yemenis led to his securing a foothold in the area. One result of this domination was that he succeeded in pursuing those opponents of his who had previously sought refuge in the Yemen. Thus, when al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad Dhū^ṣl-Nafs al-Zakiyyah took refuge there following his father's revolt against Abū Ja^cfar in 145/762, he was easily arrested by the ^cAbbāsīd authorities. (50)

Our knowledge of the Yemen's political situation during the caliphate of al-Mahdī and al-Ḥādī, the third and the fourth Abbāsīd caliphs (158-170/775-787), is vague due to lack of material. However, the pattern of appointment, dismissal and replacement of governors to the Yemen for that

(47) It comes mainly through the non-local sources, see al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 119; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380; al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, VI, 45f.

(48) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80f; ^cAsjad, 26; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20.

(49) Until Muḥammad b. Yu^cfir conquered it in 258/871-2. see 372 below.

(50) Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, VI, 193.

period leads us to believe that the area was most likely going through a phase of political unrest. (51)

The only information we do have concerning the political situation in the Yemen at that time comes to us via several Yemeni historians. Mention of the state of affairs in Ṣan^{c-ḡ} a, however, is both limited and unclear. All that is related, quite simply, is that a conflict took place in the town between the locals and the ^cAbbāsīd army, (52) with neither its cause nor consequence explained. It is unlikely that the event was a result of the anti-caliphate uprising; more tenable is the suggestion that a clash occurred between two factions of the locals themselves, and that the army took sides. Such a struggle may possibly have taken place between the Abnā' and their Qaḥṭānī opponents in Ṣan^{c-ḡ} a, the latter enjoying the support of government troops. (53) It appears that this disruption had repercussions in other Yemeni provinces which led the caliph al-Mahdī to connect the Yemen with the Ḥijāz by establishing postal services between the two territories in 166/782-3. (54)

(51) Ten successive governors occupied the governorship of the Yemen within twelve years, see Table 8.

(52) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ^cAsjad, 27; Idrīs, Khanz al-Akhyar, f 174b.

(53) For the struggle between these two groups in Ṣan^{c-ḡ} a, see 306 above. We assumed that Qaḥṭān might have enjoyed the support of the troops because this conflict took place during the governorship of ^cAbd al-Khāliq al-Shihābī, cf. table 8, note 12, who, clan B. Shihāb, represented the head of the enemies of the Abnā' in Ṣan^{c-ḡ} a; see 336 no. 18 below

(54) Al-Tabarī, III, 517. See also Kremer, Orient, 233. English trans, Bukhsh.

This measure, however, did not put an end to civil disorder, which worsened during the caliphate of al-Hādī (169-70/785-6). (55)

b. During the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd.

The overall picture of the history of the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authority became relatively clear with the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (170-93/785-808). Reasonable information on the Yemeni situation during this period is preserved in the sources, with particular attention focused on the uprising of al-Haysam b. ^cAbd al-Samad against ^cAbbāsīd authority there in 184/800. (56)

The first fourteen years of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign saw the Yemen in continuous political disorder - a result of unabated local agitation and a legacy from the caliphate of al-Manşūr. Thus Hārūn al-Rashīd's constant pre-occupation throughout this period was his search for an able governor to control the area. His efforts, not unexpectedly, were in vain. (57)

(55) See al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 137, who says that the Yemen witnessed political unrest throughout the caliphate of al-Hādī.

(56) In al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108; al-Jahshiyārī, al-Wuzarā' wa'l-Kuttāb, 118; Idrīs, Kanz, f.175a, al-Hayḍam b. ^cAbd al-Hamīd. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 733, reads al-Haysam al-Yamānī. Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Muḥabbar, 488, al-Haysam al-Hamdānī. However, the correction is given by al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322; X, 39, has al-Haysam b. ^cAbd al-Samad, of Ḥimyar. See also Ibn al-Dayba^c; Qurrat, I, 131 and note 4. For his nasab, see Table 7.

(57) Cf. 302-4 above

Yet, although the area witnessed political disorder throughout this period, our sources fail to pin down the root causes of the disruption. Such unrest may have been triggered off by the fact that on the eve of Hārūn al-Rashīd's accession, the Ḥijāz represented the focal point of the Alid's anti-^cAbbāsīd regime; (58) indeed although there is no clear evidence of open Alid activity in the Yemen at that time, the possibility of underground Alid opposition cannot be ruled out. Hārūn al-Rashīd knew only too well that an Alid presence in the Yemen would pose a threat to ^cAbbāsīd authority there. Thus, when he heard of al-Shāfi^cī's intention to incite one of the Alids to revolt against the ^cAbbāsīds, he immediately ordered his governor there to arrest al-Shāfi^cī and send him to al-Raqqah, (59) a town on the Euphrates, where he had camped.

It seems that the disruption in the Yemen was becoming increasingly clear during the first fourteen years of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign (170-83/786-99). In the following year, the caliph received a report from his governor there, Muḥammad b. Barmak, informing him about the insurrection of the Yemenis. (60) Thus Hārūn al-Rashīd replaced the latter with one of his military commanders, Ḥammād al-Barbarī. (61)

(58) For the Alid events in the Hijāz during the caliphate of al-Hādī, 169-70/784-5, in particular the revolt of al-Ḥusayn b. ^cAlī b. al-Ḥasan, who was killed in Fakhkh near Mecca in 169/785-6, cf al-Ṭabarī, III, 550 ff; al-Dīnawarī, 365; al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil, 442 ff; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 137; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, V, 74 f. See also EI² "al-Ḥusayn b. ^cAli, Ṣāhib al-Fakhkh"; Lassner, Shaping, 265 f, note 65.

(59) Cf. al-Kūfī VIII, 248; Ibn Samurah, 138 f; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 45b. al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 111a; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 28b.

(60) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 109; al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, 111a; Kifāyah, 90; ^cAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 64f, 214; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 40a.

(61) Ibid.

With Ḥammād's tenure of the governorship (184-94/800-10), the political situation in the area became even clearer than during the early part of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign. This new period is marked by two internal uprisings against caliphal authority in the area : the first is the revolt of al-Hayṣam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad, and the second is the insurrection of the people of Tihāmah. Our sources contain information about the first revolt, but unfortunately have preserved nothing concerning the second. (62)

The revolt of al-Hayṣam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad was in actual fact, the most serious of all the uprisings that took place in the Yemen during the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate in second/eighth century, shaking the very foundations of ^cAbbāsīd administration in Baghdād. He arose in Jibāl Maswar extending his rebellion throughout the neighbouring areas. (63)

Naturally, the imperial historical tradition does not usually concern itself with minor events in outlying provinces, and this uprising is dealt with only summarily by the non-local sources. Of these sources only al-Ya^cqūbī mentions it, albeit briefly. Again, it is the local historians we must look to for more information. (64)

(62) See al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 90; ^cAsjad, 29; al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Ahdal, f, 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 64, all say that the people of Tihāmah revolted against Muḥammad b. Barmak, the governor of the Yemen (183-4/799-800).

(63) Cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144, who says in Ḥarāz ^cUmar b. Abī Khālid al-Ḥimyarī declared his support to al-Hayṣam. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108, mentions that al-Hayṣam retreated to Jibāl al-^cAdd (al-Akwa^c, in al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 123, foot notes, says that al-^cAdd from a^cmāl Shibām Aqyān). Al-Hamdānī Iklīl, II, 322, records that al-Hayṣam was in Jabal Tays at the eve of his revolt. For the location of Jabal Tays, see al-Waysī, 64; Wilson, "Mapping", 200, 371.

(64) Cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144. This rebellion is preserved in several Yemenī sources, such as al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108-10; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 132-5; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91-3; ^cAsjad, 28f.

There are two different accounts of the uprising. One gives the year (179/774-75) as the beginning of the revolt. (65) The other mentions no specific date, merely confirming that it began when, following the arrival of Ḥammād al-Barbarī in the Yemen in 184/800 al-Hayṣam made a stand against the injustices perpetrated by the new governor. (66) This second account is probably the more valid one, for two reasons. Firstly, there is no mention of the incident in our sources before the governorship of Ḥammād. Secondly, Hārūn al-Rashīd sent Ḥammad with the express purpose of suppressing the Yemeni insurrection, whereas neither al-Hayṣam's name, nor his revolt were mentioned in the caliph's instructions. (67)

Again our sources, especially local ones, differ as to the cause of this uprising. (68) What is clear is that

(65) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144.

(66) This statement is recorded mainly by the Yemeni historians, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91; ^cAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 132, who confirm that al-Hayṣam opposed the injustices of Ḥammād by revolting against him. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, both record that this rebellion took place during the governorship of Ḥammād without giving any specific date, except Idrīs, f 175a, who gives 181/797-8, as a beginning of the rebellion, which is unacceptable. Al-Khazrajī, ^cAsjad, 28, records that during the governorship of Aḥmad b. Isma^cīl al-Hāshimī, though he gives no specific date.

(67) For the instructions, see al-Rāzī, 109; al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 90; Tirāz, f 111a; ^cAsjad, 29; al-Ahdah, Tuḥfat, f 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 64.

(68) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322, for example, confirms that al-Hayṣam rebelled against Ḥammad due to personal conflict. Other Yemeni historians record that he stood against the harsh treatment of Ḥammād towards the Yemenis, see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91; ^cAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 132.

these sources portray Ḥammād al-Barbarī as the oppressor and al-Hayṣam as the one who attempted to stop him. Since that is all the information we have it is difficult to offer any other judgement. Thus al-Hayṣam's revolt was either the result of personal enmity towards Ḥammād or of his sympathy with the Yemenis and his opposition to the harsh treatment that Ḥammād meted out to them.

Unfortunately, our sources give no details of the battles that took place between the ʿAbbāsīd troops and the rebels. However, they do confirm that Ḥammād al-Barbarī's initial attempt to suppress the revolt was a failure and that the governor had to write to the caliph for reinforcements. (69) The strength of the revolt lay in the rebels' geographical advantage and the existence of influential leadership among the insurgents; consequently, Ḥammād was unable to put down the revolt until he had succeeded in arresting al-Hayṣam by means of trickery. (70)

As for the Tihāmāh insurrection, we know that as a result of the Yemeni rebellion against ʿAbbāsīd authority, Ḥammād al-Barbarī was despatched to the area. (71) Since

(69) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108; Ibn al-Daybāʿ, Qurrat, I, 132. Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91 f; ʿAsjad, 29; all say that the caliph reinforced him by ten commanders [ten armed divisions].

(70) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322. Cf also, al-Rāzī, 108; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 92f; ʿAsjad, 29; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, who mention that "Al-Hayṣam fled from Ḥammād to Baysh, a village in Tihāmāh, where he was arrested." Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144, says that Ḥammād despatched an army led by Ḥarād who succeeded in arresting al-Hayṣam. According to al-Ṭabarī, III, 712, al-Hayṣam was arrested in 191/806-7.

(71) Cf. 316 above.

the insurgents were mainly from Tihamāh, ^cAbbāsīd troops must have been directed there. Yet, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal of a direct confrontation between the Tihamāh rebels and the caliphal army, nor any indication as to the political situation of the region during Ḥammād's governorship (184-94/800-10).⁽⁷²⁾

On the other hand, our sources confirm that Ḥammād suppressed the rebels and forced them to pay land tax (kharāj).⁽⁷³⁾ Once again our sources give neither the identity of the rebels, nor the names of their provinces. There is, indeed, a possibility that the revolt of al-Hayṣam and the Tihāmāh insurrection were interrelated. Although lack of material does not allow judgements of absolute certainty, two reasons exist for this assumption : firstly, the geographical proximity of the troubled areas, i.e. the territory of ^cAkk; in Tihāmāh, and Jibāl Maswar; and, secondly, the failure of the sources to provide information about the Tihāmāh rebellion and its emphasis on al-Hayṣam's revolt makes us believe the latter rebellion had included the former under its leadership.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Thus, while Ḥammād al-Barbarī succeeded in suppressing the uprising of al-Hayṣam after the latter's arrest in 191/806-7 he failed to put a stop to rebellion in Tihāmāh. There, insurrectionist activity

(72) Except this vague indication which throws a little light on the ^cAbbāsīd invasions to this region. This attack comes to us through messages made by the Yemenis to the caliph al-Amīn and his minister. see 332-3

(73) Al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 90f; ^cAsjad, ^{below.} 29; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Qurrat, I, 132; Abū Makhramah, II, 65.

(74) Especially as the latter enjoyed strong leadership.

resurfaced within less than ten years. (75)

All in all, Ḥammād's more successful achievements were concentrated in the Yemeni highlands (Najd al-Yaman) and especially the area to the north of Ṣan^cā', where he controlled the trade routes which connected Ṣan^cā' with al-Yamāmah and Mecca. (76) Undoubtedly, the amount of attention paid by our sources to his success there leads us to believe that the area was insecure long before Ḥammād's governorship. If this assertion is correct, the nomads of the area may themselves have been the cause of the unrest. Al-Rāzī (77) records that Ḥammād kept the nomads (al-a^crāb) in check, preserving the security of the routes. The Yemeni historians (78) tell us that as a result of Ḥammād's military activity, the Yemen entered a period of economic ease such as it had never witnessed before.

Thus, it may be said that had Ḥammād not taken such a serious stand against the rebels, this part of the Yemen would never have become secure. However, such interest

(75) The insurrection flared up in the area at the beginning of the caliphate of al-Ma^ḡmūn 198/813-4, see 347-8 below.

(76) The sources mention only the security of these routes which lead us to believe that the ^cAbbāsids succeeded in controlling the area. See al-Rāzī, 110; al-Janādī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 91; ^cAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 65; al-Ahdal, f 40a.

(77) Tārīkh, 110.

(78) See, al-Rāzī, 109; Idrīs, f 175a; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 132; al-Janādī, f 45a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 91; ^cAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 65; al-Ahdal, f 40a.

on the part of the ^cAbbāsīd caliph in Yemeni affairs offers clear proof of the growth and widespread nature of local insurrections against his authority there. On the other hand, this emphasis illustrates the fact that the Baghdād administration at that time paid more attention towards its interests in the area. By and large, such successful expeditions were not to be repeated by the ^cAbbāsīd regime during the period of Hārūn al-Rashīd's successors. (79)

(79) See Chapter XI below.

Table 7.⁽¹⁾

The nasab of al-Hayṣam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad

Sabā (al-Aṣghar)
|
Zur^cah (Ḥimyar al-Aṣghar)
|
Sadad
|
Zayd
|
Malik
|
al-Ḥārith
|
Shuraḥbīl
|
Murrah (Dhū Khalīl) (2)
|
^cArīb
|
Nawf
|
Karib
|
Zayd
|
^cAmr
|
Buḥr
|
^cAbd al-Ṣamad
|
al-Hayṣam (3)

(1) After al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 321; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 158.

(2) One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathāminah) who ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. Dhī Yazan. Cf. al-Rasūlī, Turfat, 55; in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294, who ruled the Yemen after Dhū Nuwās. Cf. also al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 156f.

(3) The leader of the rebellion against the ^cAbbāsīd regime in Jibāl Maswar during the caliphate of Ḥarūn al-Rashīd

Table 8 The governors of the Yemen in the time of
the early ^cAbbāsīd Caliphs (132-93/750-809)

appointed by Abū ³l-^cAbbās, al-Saffāh (132-6/750-4)

Dāwūd b. ^cAlī b. ^cAbd
Allāh b. al-^cAbbās (1)

^cUmar b. ^cAbd al-Ḥamīd
b. ^cAbd al-Rahmān b. Zayd
b. al-Khaṭṭab al-^cAdawī (2)

Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. ^cAbd
Allāh b. ^cAbd al-Madān
al-Ḥārithī (3)

^cAbd Allāh b. Mālik al-
Ḥārithī (4)

^cAlī b. al-Rabī^c b. ^cAbd
al-Madān al-Ḥārithī (5)

(1) Over the Ḥijāz and the Yemen, he resided in Mecca.
Cf. 300 above.

(2) Deputy of above. See 300 above.

(3) His governorship lasted for five months only, see Ibn
^cAbd al-Madjīd, 19.

(4) Idrīs, f 174a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī,
Kifāyah, 77; ^cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I,
120; Bughyat, 28. His governorship lasted for four
months. Omitted by Zambaur, Manuel, 113; Bikhazi,
"Coins", 15.

(5) Ibn Khayyāt, 413, says he was appointed by his uncle
Ziyād b. ^cUbayd Allāh. Idrīs, f174a; Ibn ^cAbd al-
Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77; ^cAsjad, 25;
Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 120; Bughyat, 28, all
of them give four years and some months for the
period of his governorship, which is not acceptable,
because this period does not correspond with the
period of Abū ³l-^cAbbās's reign, i.e. four years nine
months, if we discount the period of ^cAlī b. al-
Rabī^c's predecessors in this post during Abū ³l-^cAbbās
Caliphate. Cf. Serjeant, Lewcock, Smith and Costa, "Great
Mosque", 324, 348, which tells us that in 136/754 the
^cAbbāsīd Caliph al-Mahdī (most likely Abū ³l-^cAbbās
al-Saffāh who died by the end of this year whose first
name was ^cAbd Allāh) gave his order to his governor
in the Yemen, ^cAlī b. al-Rabī^c to repair the mosques
of Ṣan^cā.

appointed by Abū Ja^cfar al-Manṣūr (136-59/754-75)

- ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Rabī^c b. ^cAbd Allāh
b. ^cAbd al-Madān al-Ḥārīthī (6) 136-42/753-9
- Ma^cn b. Zā^ṣidah b. ^cAbd Allāh b.
Maṭar b. Sharīk b. al-Ṣulb b.
Murrah b. Hammām b. Murrah
b. Dhuhl al-Shaybānī (7) 142-51/759-68
- Zā^ṣidah b. Ma^cn (8) 151-3/768-70
- al-Ḥajjāj b. Manṣūr (9)
- al-Furāt b. Sālīm (10) 153-4/770-1

- (6) Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431; Idrīs, f174a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 78; ^cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 121f; Bughyat, 28. He travelled to Baghdād leaving his son in charge. Omitted by Smith, "History of San^cā", 53. The latter and Bikhāzī, "Coins", 15, instead they insert ^cAlī b. al-Rabī^c. See also 309 above.
- (7) For a detailed discussion of the Ma^cn's governorship, cf. 308, 13 above.
- (8) He replaced his father "Ma^cn", who left to go to Sijistān, in 151/768, cf. al-Ṭabarī, III, 368 (citing of al-Wāqīdī); al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 118. See also Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20. Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 81; ^cAsjad, 26f; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 123; Bughyat, 28, all of them say that Zā^ṣidah ruled the Yemen three years after his father, which is not acceptable, see Bikhāzī, 16. We have already mentioned that Ma^cn was appointed over the Yemen in 142/759-60, Cf. 308 above, and al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 108, says he remained there for nine years. It is quite probable he left the Yemen in 151/768, the year in which his son replaced him.
- (9) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82; ^cAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 123; Bughyat, 28. Idrīs, Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd omit.
- (10) He was in office in 153/770, see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 59. See also Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82; ^cAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 123. Bughyat omits. They all give three years for the period of his governorship. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431, does not give a specific date. See also Bikhāzī, 16; Smith, "History of San^cā", 53.

Yazīd b. Mansūr al-Ḥimyarī⁽¹¹⁾ (154-8/770-5)

appointed by al-Mahdī (158-69/775-85)

Yazīd b. Mansūr al-Ḥimyarī (12) 159/775-6

Rajā³ b. Rawḥ al-Judhāmī (13) 159-60/776-7

^cAlī b. Sulaymān b. 161-2/777-8

^cAbd Allāh b. al-Abbās (14)

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 59, confirms that he arrived in the Yemen early in 154/771. See also Idrīs, f174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82f; ^cAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 123f; Bughyat, 28f, who confirm that he came in 154/771, except Qurrat which records he replaced al-Furāt b. Sālim. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431, mentions that he occupied this post in the latter part of al-Manṣūr's caliphate and gives no specific date. Al-Ṭabarī, III, gives two contradictory accounts; in the first quoting al-Wāqidī, 372, he says that in 153/770, Yazīd was the governor of al-Yaman; in the second, 371 he says in this year Yazīd was governor of Basra.

(12) He was re-appointed by al-Mahdī for the whole year and left designating ^cAbd al-Khāliq b. Muḥammad al-Shihābī in charge for some two months, Cf. Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ^cAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 124; Bughyat, 29. See also Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431 who says al-Mahdī reappointed him for a while. See also Bikhazī, 19. Smith, "History of Ṣan^ca³" omits, instead he inserts al-Shihābī.

(13) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 466. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20, says that he arrived in the Yemen in Dhū³ l-Ḥijjah. Idrīs, f 174b, confirms that his governorship lasted for thirteen months. See also al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, who mentions that he succeeded Yazīd b. Mansūr in this post.

(14) Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ^cAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, all of them confirm that he arrived in Ṣan^ca³ in Muḥarram 161/October, 777. In the following year he left appointing Wasi^c b. ^cIṣmah in his place, *ibid.* Bikhazī, 19, follows al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat I, 64, and gives 162 for his arrival in the Yemen. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 493, states that he was dismissed in this year.

- °Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān⁽¹⁵⁾ 163-4/779-81 brother of above.
- Mansūr b. Yazīd b. Mansūr 165/781-2
al-Ḥimyarī (16)
- °Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān 166/782-3
al-Rab^cī (17)
- Sulaymān b. Yazīd b. °Abd 167-9/783-5
Madān al-Ḥārithī (18)
-

- (15) Idrīs, f174b; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 20f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83f; °Asjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 29, all of them say he arrived at Ṣanʿā in Rabi^c II, and stayed some seventeen months. In al-Ṭabarī, III, 502, he was dismissed in 164. See also Ibn Khayyāt, 440; Bikhazi, 19f; Smith, "History of Ṣanʿā", 53.
- (16) He came in 165/781-2 and stayed about one year, cf. Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 84; °Asjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 29. Al-Ṭabarī III, 502, gives 164/780-1 for his appointment, and followed by Bikhazi, 20. Zambaur, 113, has al-Mansūr b. Yazīd b. al-Mansūr.
- (17) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 521. Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn °Abd Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 84; °Asjad, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 29, all of them say he stayed one year; in Qurrat, I, 126, he remained until the death of al-Mahdī (169/785), and these sources have al-Nawfalī instead of al-Rab^cī.
- (18) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 521, says he was in the Yemen in 167/783-4. Ibn Khayyāt, 440, places him after °Alī b. Sulaymān b. °Alī b. °Abd Allāh b. al-°Abbās. In Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 29, all of them confirm that he stayed throughout al-Mahdī's reign. Qurrat omits.

appointed by al-Hādī (169-70/785-6)

^cAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b.
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī
b. ^cAbd Allāh b. al-Abbās (19)

Ibrāhīm b. Salm b. Qutaybah
b. Muslim al-Bāhili (20)

appointed by al-Rashīd (170-93/786-809)

al-Ghitrīf b. ^cAtā' (21) 170-3/786-90

al-Rabī^c b. ^cAbd Allāh b.
^cAbd al-Madān al-Hārithī (22) 174-5/790-1

(19) Idrīs, f, 174b; Ibn Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; ^cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Bughyat, 29, all of them say that he remained one year. In al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Zaynabī. Omitted by Ibn Khayyāṭ; Zambaur; Bikhazī. See also Smith, "History of Ṣan'ā," 54.

(20) In Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; ^cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Bughyat, 29; Qurrat, I, 127, read Sulaymān instead of Salm; and all say he stayed for four months until death of al-Hādī in Rabī^c I, 170/September 786. See Ibn Khayyāṭ, 446. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 568, says that Ibrāhīm governed the Yemen in 169/785-6.

(21) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 590f; he was appointed in 170/786-7. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 86; Asjad, 28; all of them say he stayed in al-Janad, while the former gives three years nine months for the period of al-Ghitrif's governorship, the latter gives three years seven months. This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. Bikhazī, 20; Muḥarram "Danānīr Islāmiyyah", 24; Lowick, "Mint", 303. In 173/790, he left the Yemen appointing ^cAbbād b. Muḥammad al-Shihābī in his place, the latter remained in office until the end of the following year.

(22) Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 21; ^cal-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 86f; ^cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Qurrat, I, 128, all of them say that he arrived in the Yemen in the later part of 174/791. Ibn Khayyat omits.

°Aṣim b. °Utbah al- Ghassānī (23)	175/791-2	
Ayyūb b. Ja°far b. Sulaymān b. °Alī b. °Abd Allāh b. al-°Abbās (24)	176/792-3	
al-Rabī° b. °Abd Allāh b.°Abd al-Madān al-Hārithī (24)	177-8/793-5	joint authority
al-°Abbās b. Sa°īd (<u>mawlā</u> of B.Hāshim) (25)		
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al- Hāshimī (26)	178-9/795-6	

- (23) Idrīs, f174b; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba°, Bughyat, 29, all of them record that he stayed only one year, though they give no date for his arrival in Ṣan°ā°; in the latter° Utaybah and in Qurrat, I, 128, Uyaynah. Ibn Khayyāṭ omits. Bikhazī, 21, suggests that he arrived early in 175/791.
- (24) Idrīs, f 174b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba°, Bughyat, 29, all of them mention that he remained in Ṣan°ā° for a whole year; Qurrat omits.
- (25) Both al-Rabī° and al-°Abbās were appointed as joint authority, the former to head the military and lead the prayer and the latter to supervise the levy of the alms-tax. Cf 302 above. Idrīs, f175a; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba°, Bughyat, 29, all of them mention that they remained in the Yemen for some two years. It is most likely that al-°Abbās stayed in Ṣan°ā°, since al-Ya°qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 137 says that al-Rashīd sent back al-Rabī° to the Yemen except Ṣan°ā°, and in page 143 he (i.e. al-Ya°qūbī) records that al-Rashīd appointed his mawlā i.e. al-°Abbās over the Yemen. Both governors are omitted by Bikhazi. Al-°Abbās omitted by Smith "History of Ṣan°ā°".
- (26) He was appointed over the Hijāz and the Yemen, stayed in the Hijāz and sent his son al-°Abbas to the Yemen. Cf. Idrīs, f 175a; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 21f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87f; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba°, Qurrat, I, 129; Bughyat, 29f (the latter records that al-°Abbās was dismissed after six months) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 461, say that first he sent his son Ibrāhīm, then, he dismissed him and appointed al-°Abbās. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 637, confirms that Muḥammad was the governor of Mecca in 178/794-5

°Abd Allāh b. Muṣ°ab b. Thābit b. °Abd Allāh b. al-Zubayr (27)	180/796-7
Aḥmad b. Ismā°cīl b. °Alī al- Hāshimī (28)	181/797-8
Ibrāhīm b. °Abd Allāh b. Talḥah al-Hajabī (of B. Abd al- Dār) (29)	182-3/798-9
Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Barmak (30)	183-4/799-800
Hammād al-Barbarī (mawlā of al-Rashīd (31))	184-93/800-9

- (27) Idrīs, fl75a; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba, Bughyat, 30, all of them say that he remained only one year, though they give no indication of his arrival in Ṣanā'. Bikhazī, 22, gives 180/796-7, for his governorship; Lowick, "Mint", 303, has 180-1/796-8.
- (28) Idrīs, fl75a; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd 22, both give 181/797-8 for his governorship. Smith, "History" 54; Bikhazī, 22, both read Aḥmad b. Ismā°cīl b. °Alī b. °Abd Allāh b. Talḥah b. Abī Talḥah. For the correct name, cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 129; Bughyat, 30.
- (29) Al-Hamdānī, Sifat, I, 58, say that he came in 182/798-9 followed by Bikhazī, 22. Idrīs, fl75a; Ibn °Abd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 89; °Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba, Bughyat, 30, all of them say that he remained only one year. Qurrat omits.
- (30) He arrived in Shawwāl 183/November, 799. For the reference, cf note 8 in Chapter X.
- (31) He reached Ṣanā' in Shawwāl 184/November 800. For the reference, cf note 61 in Chapter x. This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. Bikhazī, 23; Lowick "Mint", 303.

CHAPTER XI

The Yemen from the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd to
the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign

(193-233/809-47)

When Harūn al-Rashīd died in 193/809, the ^cAbbāsīd Empire was divided between two of his sons, al-Amīn and al-Ma³mūn, with the stipulation that the former assume the office of caliph and the latter be his heir apparent. In the following year the power struggle between the two brothers flared up, which led the Muslim world into the Civil War. This war continued until the murder of al-Amīn in Baghdād in 198/813, and the office of the caliphate fell to al-Ma³mūn.⁽¹⁾ It is noticeable that this Civil War is considered the watershed of ^cAbbāsīd rule; it clearly hastened many changes in the fabric of Muslim society.⁽²⁾ Apparently, ^cAbbāsīd domination over the regions, including the Yemen, became weak. In this region, while local power appeared in strength disputing the caliphal regime in the area, the ^cAbbāsīds failed to suppress them. In some parts of the country the caliphs worked to safeguard the loyalty of the area, in other regions their regime was opposed and the governors were expelled. However, the following chapter will cover the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the ^cAbbāsīd administration from the death of al-Rashīd to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's rule (193-233/809-47), showing the escalation of local uprisings and caliphal policy towards it.

(1) See, al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 146 ff; al-Ṭabarī, III, 651 ff Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, III, 471 ff. Cf. also Sha^cban, Islamic History, II, 39 ff.

(2) Lassner, The Shaping of ^cAbbāsīd Rule, 48.

A. The Yemen during the Civil War

By the end of al-Rashīd's reign 193/809, the ^cAbbāsīd influence was clearly manifest in the central and northern parts of the Yemeni highlands (Najd al-Yaman) and could be felt, albeit less strongly in the other Yemeni regions.⁽³⁾ Throughout the period of the Civil War (193-8/809-14) the eastern part of the empire represented the focal point of events. Consequently, our sources pay considerably less attention to the other provinces under caliphal rule. Thus reports of affairs in the Yemen are limited to the appointment and replacement of governors there, with few references to their activities.

During the first year of al-Amīn's caliphate, 193/809, the Yemenis themselves were working for the dismissal of Ḥammād al-Barbarī from the governorship of the Yemen, a post which he held during the period 184-94/800-10.⁽⁴⁾ Although the sources at our disposal do not directly illuminate the political situation of the area during this period, messages and complaints made by the inhabitants of Ṣan^{cā} to the caliph and his minister, al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī^c, do throw some light on the aggressive attacks of Ḥammād al-Barbarī against certain Yemeni tribes, especially those in Tihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. The Ṣan^{cānīs} alluded to the areas under attack from Ḥammād's troops in

(3) As has already been mentioned Ḥammād al-Barbarī, the governor of the Yemen (184-94/800-10), succeeded in controlling the central and the northern parts of the highlands, see 321 above.

(4) See Table 8, 11.

the following verses sent to al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī^c

صنعاءُ والبلدان عنسٌ ويحصبُ	فأمننُ على قوم رجوك ودارهم
نحو السكا سكا دمعهم يتسكبُ	وأرحم يتامى ضائعين وصبية
بالدمع ذائبة تسيلُ وتسكبُ	وأرحم أرامل بالحصيب عيونها

"So grant favours to those who have put their hope in you - and whose Lands San^cā and the countries, ^cAns and Yaḥṣub.

And be merciful to our wretched orphans and children - whose tears flow continuously towards al-Sakāsik.

And be merciful to the widows of al-Huṣayb whose eyes - are full of tears, flowing constantly. (5)

Although our information concerning Ḥammād's incursions against the Yemenis is scant, it is clear from these verses that he attempted to control the regions of Ṭihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. Ibn al-Mujāwir⁽⁶⁾ writes that the territory of al-Ashā^cir, in the southern part of Ṭihāmah, was the scene of tribal conflict which resulted in the leaders of the hostile factions going to Baghdād to seek the mediation of the caliph, al-Amīn, and to ask him to designate one of them as ruler of the area concerned. Yet, despite the fact that an overall leader was agreed upon, political disorder in the territory did not abate. Thus a political vacuum was created in the Ashā^cir area which existed until the governor of the Yemen presented a report to al-Ma³mūn on the disturbances in 202/817-8.⁽⁷⁾

Apparently, Ḥammād al-Barbarī had managed to recruit various loyal Yemenis with the aim of attacking Ṭihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. This was confirmed by the Ṣan^cānīs in their message to the caliph, al-Amīn, which

(5) Anon, Tārīkh, f 160b. See also al-Akwa^c, Wathā³iq, 223.

(6) Tārīkh al-Mustabṣir, 65f. For the territory of al-Ashā^cir see Map 2 .

(7) For this disturbance, see 347-8 below.

reads as follows: "His [i.e. Ḥammād] first act of injustice towards the Muslims and treachery towards the caliph was that he used - in ruling the country - some Yemenis and his own followers who are arrogant, tyrannical, treacherous, immoral, ignorant and straying from what is right who know no kindness and do not oppose any forbidden."⁽⁸⁾ Yet despite this, our knowledge of the political situation in Ṣan^{cā} during this year remains vague. From the above complaint, however, it is clear that the Ṣan^{cānīs} were suffering to a considerable extent from the aggression of Ḥammād and his followers.

In 194/810, Ḥammād was replaced by Muḥammad b. ^cAbd Allāh b. Malīk al-Khuzā^{cī}.⁽⁹⁾ The new governor's main achievement was his pursuit of Ḥammād's representatives in the different regions of the Yemen and the subsequent confiscation of their properties. These steps satisfied the Yemenis.⁽¹⁰⁾ Such an initiative on the part of the new governor leads us to believe that the Ṣan^{cānīs}' petition to al-Amīn and his minister, al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī^c, had been both welcomed and accepted. Within a year Muḥammad al-Khuzā^{cī} was able to restore law and order in the area. However, in Sha^cbān 195/May-June 811, he was replaced by Muḥammad b. Sa^cīd b. al-Sarḥ al-Kinānī.⁽¹¹⁾ Our sources are silent on both the achievements of the new ruler and the overall political situation in the area during his governorship.

(8) Al-Akwa^c, Wathā^ciq, 220.

(9) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 93; Asjad, 30; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 136.

(10) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 93; al-Asjad, 30.

(11) Ibid.

although al-Ya^cqūbī⁽¹²⁾ confirms that the governor left the Yemen for Palestine, having amassed great wealth.

Such are the only references to Muḥammad al-Khuzā^cī and Muḥammad al-Kinānī in our sources. The paucity of information about them may indicate the lack of any significant achievement on their part in their services to the central government. If the first governor managed to eliminate Ḥammād's representatives there, then the sole claim to fame his successor had was the fortune he accumulated while in office. Politically, it appears that the situation in the area was not unlike that during the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd.

However, in 196/811-2, the power struggle between al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn changed considerably in favour of the latter. From Khurāsān al-Ma'mūn sent his army to capture Baghdād and to declare his caliphate. Once in Baghdād his general, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, despatched al-Ma'mūn's governors to various regions, including the Yemen. There Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Qaṣrī was appointed governor, arriving in Ṣan^cā' in Dhū 'l-Ḥijjah 196/August-September 812.⁽¹³⁾ Although the local historians make no mention of the political situation in the Yemen at the time of Yazīd's appointment, they

(12) Tārīkh, III, 165.

(13) Al-Tabarī, III, 857,64; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 165, both giving the name Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Bajalī. Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f. 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; ^cAsjad, 30; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 138; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, the latter giving the date. It seems to be that Yazīd was appointed over the Yemen, except ^cAkk territory which belonged to the governor of Mecca at that time, see al-Tabarī, III, 863.

readily accept that he abused his power by bolstering Qaḥṭānī solidarity and treating the Abnā' in Ṣan^cā' badly with considerable hostility. (14) In discussing the main reasons behind Yazid's appointment to the Yemen, al-Ṭabarī⁽¹⁵⁾ records that the former was despatched there by Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn with a large army and swore that he would persuade his people and also his kinsmen of the Yemeni "kings" and nobles to recognise the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn. Thus the main purpose behind the appointment was a political one. Yazīd, according to al-Ṭabarī,⁽¹⁶⁾ succeeded in his mission, duly convincing the Yemenis to depose (Khal^c) al-Amīn and recognize al-Ma'mūn. According to many sources,⁽¹⁷⁾ Yazīd concentrated his efforts against the Abnā' through the ploy of fostering Qaḥṭānī solidarity. No other explanation offers any real credibility. Naturally, Yazīd's good relationship with the Qaḥṭānī chiefs, especially the Ṣan^cānīs, meant the certain enmity of the Abnā' in that town.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is thus apparent that his aggression towards the Abnā' was aimed at satisfying the Qaḥṭānīs in Ṣan^cā'. If al-Ṭabarī's statement is correct, two things became obvious ; firstly the intention

(14) Al-Janadī, f 46a; Idrīs, f175a,b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 139.

(15) III, 864.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Especially the local ones, such as Idrīs, Kanz, f 175 a-b; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f40b; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 139.

(18) Such as B. al-Hārith and B. Shihāb, the former a clan of Madhḥij. See, Table 2. And the latter is a clan of Ḥimyar, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 455ff.

by the caliphate to win over the Yemeni chiefs in the Yemen and secondly, the fact that the territory as a whole became involved in the political life of the Islamic Empire.

Unfortunately, our sources throw little light on the political situation of the Yemen during the governorship of Yazīd b. Jarīr, 196-8/811-4, with the exception of his aggression against the Abnā' in Ṣanā'. Yet the historians do recount how this governor was dismissed, although they differ on the direct cause of his dismissal. Al-Janadī, al-Khazrajī and al-Ahdal⁽¹⁹⁾ confirm that he lost his position after al-Ma'mūn heard of his harsh aggression against the Abnā'. Idrīs, Ibn 'Abd al-Majīd and another account in al-Khazrajī⁽²⁰⁾ mention that, since Yazīd failed to show generosity towards Abū 'l-Ṣalt, the Iraqi delegate, the latter encouraged the caliph to strip him of the governorship. The second account seems somewhat exaggerated and is, therefore, unacceptable. To the credibility of the first account may be added the fact that it was Abū 'l-Ṣalt himself who delivered the news to al-Ma'mūn of Yazīd's aggression against the Abnā'. Then when he received the news, al-Ma'mūn replaced Yazīd by 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqīd al-'Umari, one of the few non-Qaḥṭānī chiefs in the Yemen, and ordered him to arrest Yazīd and punish him for his misdeeds.⁽²¹⁾ Al-Ma'mūn's directive was issued upon the

(19) Al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, f 40b.

(20) Idrīs, f 175b; Ibn 'Abd al-Majīd, 23; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94f; 'Asjad, 30.

(21) Idrīs, Kanz, f 175b; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 95; 'Asjad, 30; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40b. 'Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqīd b. Muḥammad b. Zayd b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, see al-Zubayrī, Nasab. 360.

murder of al-Amīn in Muḥarram 198/September 813, when the office of caliphate officially fell to him. So, in the following month al-^cUmarī entered Ṣan^{cā} where he arrested Yazīd b. Jarīr and imprisoned him. (22) Al-^cUmarī's governorship lasted until Dhū'l-Qa^cdah of the same year, when he was replaced by Ishāq b. Mūsā b. ^cIsā al-^cAbbāsī. (23) The latter ruled the Yemen until he was forced to leave in early 200/815 due to the spread of the Alid revolt throughout Iraq and the Ḥijāz.

B. The expansion of the Alid revolts to the Yemen

This revolt was led by Abū 'l-Sarāyā, an adventurer and soldier of fortune who had fought with al-Ma'mūn against al-Amīn and, in Jumādā II, 199/January-February 815, he joined forces with the Alid pretender Ibn Ṭabāṭabā at Kufa. Following their capture of Kufa, Abū 'l-Sarāyā, in the name of Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, sent a detachment to take over the important cities of the empire and thus widen the extent of the revolt. (24) Besides those delegated to Basra, Wāsiṭ, Fars and al-Ahwāz, Abū 'l-Sarāyā sent troops under the leadership of al-Ḥusayn b. al-Aftas and Muḥammad b. Dāwūd, both descendants of ^cAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, to capture the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, while despatching Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā b. Ja^cfar

(22) Ibid

(23) Idrīs, f 175 b.; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 83a, gives 201 A.H.; Kifāyah, 95; ^cAsjad, 30; Ibn al-Dayba^c Qurrat, I, 141; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40b.

(24) For this revolt, see Ibn Khayyāt, 168-70; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 173-6; al-Ṭabarī, III, 976.

al-Ṣādiq to seize control of the Yemen. (25) Meanwhile, the governor of the Yemen Ishāq b. Mūsā al-^cAbbāsī had received orders from al-Ma³mūn to march on Mecca with his army in order to protect the pilgrims (ḥujjāj). (26) Designating his cousin, al-Qāsim b. Ismā^cīl, as governor in his absence, Ishāq duly moved south towards Mecca. Somewhere in the Yemen he was attacked by bedouins and forced to retreat as far as Ṣan^cʿā'. (27) When Ishāq received news that Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā was on his way to Ṣan^cʿā', he and his troops left for the Ḥijāz via the Yemeni highlands, (Najd al-Yaman). The departure of the ^cAbbāsīd forces left the country completely at the mercy of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, who easily entered Ṣan^cʿā' in Ṣafar 200/September 815. (28)

- (25) Geddes, "Al Ma³mūn's Ṣi^cite Policy", 99. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 987, records that Ibrāhīm had previously come to Mecca with his family for the ḥajj, and from there he moved to the Yemen, but he does not mention by whom he was appointed for this post. Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 24, says that he was designated by al-Husayn b. al-Aṭṭas. Al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil, 533; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 97; ^cAsjad, 31; and Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 142, all confirm that he was directly appointed by Abū 'l-Sarāyā. Al-Mas^cūdī, Murūj, VII, 56, states that he appeared in the Yemen in 199/814-5.
- (26) For the letter sent by al-Ma³mūn to Ishāq on this matter, cf. Anon, Tārīkh, f 167a. Cf. also al-Akwa^c, Wathā'iq, 224f.
- (27) Idris, f175b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 96; al-^cAsjad, 31. See also Geddes, "Al-Ma³mūn", 100.
- (28) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 987, gives A.H. 201. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 131; Idris, Kanz, f175b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 96f; ^cAsjad, 30f. See also al-Ṭabarī, III, 995, who says that at the end of this year (i.e. A.H.200) Ibrāhīm despatched an army led by an un-named descendant of ^cAqīl b. Abī Ṭālib to Mecca as the leader of the ḥajj, cf also 341 below.

Hardly anything is known of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's journey from Mecca to Ṣan^cā'. Al-Hamdānī⁽²⁹⁾ records that Ibrāhīm made a stop in Ṣa^cdah where B. Sa^cd b. Sa^cd of Khawlān, immediately declared their support for him. Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā then moved southwards with a large force, his aim being the capture of Ṣan^cā'. Al-Isfahānī⁽³⁰⁾ mentions that Ibrāhīm was able to take the Yemen with comparative ease, although he identifies neither Ibrāhīm's opposition, nor the place where any clash might have taken place.

However, upon the arrival of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā in the Yemen, the rivalry and conflict between the local tribes began to manifest itself. Ibrāhīm was able to capitalize on the situation and enjoyed the support of some of these tribes. Al-Hamdānī⁽³¹⁾ confirms that support was given to him from B. Fuṭaymah, a baṭn of B. Sa^cd b. Sa^cd from Khawlān.

Although little is known of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's administration over the Yemen, his harsh treatment of the populace and the confiscation of private property, often resulting in the death of his victims, earned for him the title of al-Jazzār, "The Butcher."⁽³²⁾ The existence of tribal conflict had a profound effect upon his administration in the Yemen. In order to satisfy B. Fuṭaymah, his allies, Ibrāhīm arrested the chiefs of Ukayl (a baṭn of Khawlān who were the

(29) Iklīl, II, 131f.

(30) Maqātil, 534.

(31) Iklīl, II, 131f; I, 425, 530.

(32) Geddes, "Al-Ma'mūn", 101. See also al-Ṭabarī, III, 988; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, V, 177; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 24; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 97; ^cAsjad, 31; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 144.

enemy of B. Fuṭaymah), along with their Himyarī allies, and subsequently slaughtered them.⁽³³⁾ And on the request of his Yemeni allies, Ibrāhīm expelled B. Shihāb, a baṭn of Himyar, from Ṣan^ā.⁽³⁴⁾

Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā was able to rule the Yemen throughout 200/815-6, and dinars were struck in the mint of Ṣan^ā, bearing his name.⁽³⁵⁾ By the end of this year, he despatched an army, led by an unnamed descendant of [°]Aqīl b. Abī Ṭālib, to Mecca as the leader of the pilgrimage (ḥajj) in the name of the Shī^ī imam.⁽³⁶⁾ At the same time al-Ma^ʿmūn appointed his brother, Ishāq, as ḥajj leader, and the latter arrived in Mecca with a large body of troops. When the Alid leader heard of the size of the [°]Abbāsīd army, he chose to stay with his own men on the outskirts of Mecca. From there he attacked the pilgrim caravan, capturing the new kiswah destined for the Ka^ʿbah and robbing the merchants of their goods. Informed of the raid, the [°]Abbāsīd leader despatched an army led by [°]Isā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī, one of al-Ma^ʿmūn's generals; the Alid troops were soundly defeated and the stolen goods were recovered.⁽³⁷⁾

Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, one of al-Ma^ʿmūn's generals, had accompanied the pilgrim caravan on his way to the Yemen, over which he had been appointed governor by the minister,

(33) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 131f.

(34) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 530f, confirms that both al-[°]Umarī and the Abnā^ʿ were behind Ibrāhīm's action against B. Shihāb.

(35) Personal communication with Mr. N.Lowick dated 10.12.1982.

(36) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 995.

(37) Ibid.

al-Ḥasan b. Sahl.⁽³⁸⁾ After completing the hajj ceremonies, he continued southwards to take up his new post and expel Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā from the province. At the beginning of 201/815, he met the Alid forces on the outskirts of Ṣan^ā, and in the resulting battle the Alid troops were defeated and their leader, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, was forced to leave the region.⁽³⁹⁾

Our sources differ on the route taken by Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā following his defeat. Al-Ya^cqūbī⁽⁴⁰⁾ states that he fled directly to Mecca. Local sources,⁽⁴¹⁾ on the other hand, insist that he remained in the Yemen until his appointment by al-Ma^ʾmūn to the governorship of the province in the latter part of 202/818. In all probability Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā remained in the Yemen during the early part of 201/817, venting his wrath against the ^cAbbāsīd allies in the northern area of the highlands. In Ṣa^cdah, therefore, he made an attack upon B. Ukayl, a baṭn of B. Sa^cd. b. al-Rabī^cah from Khawlān and representative of the ^cAbbāsīd allies in the region, destroying their old dam, al-Khāniq, in the process.⁽⁴²⁾ Meanwhile his ally, Muḥammad al-^cUmarī, murdered one of the Dhū La^cwah chiefs, a baṭn of Bakīl.⁽⁴³⁾ These aggressions by Ibrāhīm and his Yemeni allies in the country undoubtedly

(38) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 995.

(39) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 176; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 25; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Qurrat, I, 146.

(40) Tārīkh, III, 176.

(41) See Idrīs, f 175b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 98; ^cAsjad, 31; Ibn al-Daybā^c, Qurrat, I, 146.

(42) Al-Ḥamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 115; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 235 f. See also Geddes, "Al-Ma^ʾmūn", 102.

(43) Iklīl, X, 117. For the friendship of al-^cUmarī with Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, see Iklīl, II, 131; I, 530.

took place during the early months of that year, thus al-Ṭabarī (44) regards it as the first year of the former's uprising. From Ṣa^cdah Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā continued northwards to capture the Holy City of Mecca. Informed of the Alid troops imminent arrival in Mecca, the ^cAbbāsīd commander there, Yazīd al-Makhzūmī, took the offensive against them; however his men were routed and he was killed. Consequently, the Alids had little difficulty in obtaining control over Mecca and its surrounding areas. (45)

C. The rebellion of Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān.

In Dhu ʿl-Hijjah 201/June-July 817, the house of ^cAlī received an unexpected boost when ^cAlī al-Riḍā, a son of Imam Mūsā b. Ja^cfar al-Ṣādiq, was appointed heir to the throne (waliyyan li-ʿl^cahd) by al-Maʾmūn. (46) Taking advantage of his brother's new position, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā took illegal control of Mecca, calling upon its citizens to support al-Maʾmūn and his brother, ^cAlī al-Riḍā. In the latter part of 202/818, however, Ibrāhīm was officially appointed by the caliph as governor of Mecca and the leader of the ḥajj. (47)

Upon the completion of the ḥajj ceremonies, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā advanced towards the Yemen, where he had been appointed

(44) III, 987.

(45) Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn", 103. See also al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 176; al-Fāsi, Iqd, III, 264.

(46) Cf. al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 176, who says in Ramadān; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1012; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 61. See also Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn" 103.

(47) Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbar, 40; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1029; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 471; al-Janādī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 58b; al-Fāsi, Iqd, III, 264.

a governor.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Gaining control over the area, however, was not an easy matter for him, given the resistance of Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, whom he was to replace. During his two years as governor of the Yemen, (201-2/816-8), Ḥamdawayh had succeeded in strengthening his own army, among which were certain Yemenis. With the approach of Ibrāhīm and his army towards Ṣan^{c-ā} early in 203/818, Ḥamdawayh rode out to meet them at Jadir. In the battle which ensued, Ibrāhīm's forces were routed and he was forced to flee back to Mecca. (49)

Following his victory over Ibrāhīm, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān revolted against the caliph, proclaiming independence from the central government.⁽⁵⁰⁾ When the news of the rebellion reached al-Ma³mūn, who was on his way to Baghdād from Marw, he immediately appointed ^cIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī over the Yemen with orders to send Ḥamdawayh as a prisoner to Baghdād. (51)

(48) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177. Idris, Kanz, f175b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 25; and Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 146, mention that he received the ahd al-wilāyah while he was in the vicinity of Ṣan^{c-ā}.

(49) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177, states that Ibrāhīm at first defeated Ḥamdawayh's son and pushed on towards Ṣan^{c-ā}. When he reached that city Ḥamdawayh himself went out to meet him and it was then that Ibrāhīm fled to Mecca; see Geddes, "Al-Ma³mūn." 104, note 29. Cf. also Idris, Kanz, f 175b; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 146, who mention the place of the battle; Ibn ^cAbd-al-Majīd, 25. Jadir are two villages Jadir al-^cUlyā and Jadir al-Suflā; see Iklīl, I, 526. Al-Akwa^c in, Iklīl, I, 526, note 1561; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 146, note 4, says the Jadirs are in al-Raḥabah, north of Ṣan^{c-ā}. The village of Jadir is about 13 kms north of Ṣan^{c-ā}, personal communication with Dr. R. Wilson dated 15 July 1983.

(50) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 182. See also Geddes, "the Yu^cfīrid", 41.

(51) Al-Ya^cqūbī, III, 182.

While our sources agree that Ḥamdawayh did revolt in the Yemen, no specific reasons for the rebellion are given. Yet if we connect this revolt with other uprisings against the pro-Shi^cite policy of al-Ma³mūn at that time we may conclude that Ḥamdawayd may have been one of those opposed to the caliphal policy.⁽⁵²⁾ Geddes⁽⁵³⁾ suggests this when he writes that Ibn Māhān was "probably in revolt against the pro-Shi^cite policy of the caliph".

However, on this occasion we should not ignore the role played in this revolt by some Yemenis, especially those who had suffered a year of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's domination over the Yemen in 200-1/815-6, such as B.Ukayl of Khawlān in Ṣa^cdah and their allies among the different Yemeni tribes.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Thus we may assume that these Yemenis may have encouraged Ḥamdawayh to reject Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's governorship, offering, by way of compensation, their support for him against the Iraqi army. The reasons for this assumption are threefold : the first is the high number of Ḥamdawayh's army;⁽⁵⁵⁾ the second is the appointment of certain Yemenis who were hostile towards the rule of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, such as Muḥammad b. ^cAbbād al-Ukaylī, as representatives of

(52) When al-Ma³mūn appointed ^cAlī al-Ridā as a heir to the throne, many of his followers opposed him and revolted against him, thus they elected Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī as a caliph in Baghdād, see al-Ṭabarī, III, 1015f; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 178; Ibn Khayyāṭ, 470; al-Mas^cūdī, Muruḥ, VII, 615; Tanbīh, 349 f; Ibn Khaldūn, al-^cIbar, III, 526f.

(53) "The Yu^cfirid", 41;

(54) See 340-1 above. And see al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177, who says that Ḥamdawayh convinced a group of the Yemeni and then he dismissed the caliph.

(55) Ḥamdawayh was able to recruit ten thousand men and used them to stop al-Jalūdī's advance to Ṣan^cā. See 346 below.

Ḥamdawayh in some Yemeni provinces; (56) and the third is the inflammatory propaganda spread by some of these opposing Ibrāhīm's rule in the Yemen, such as Aḥmad b. Yazīd al-Qushaybī of Ḥimyar. (57)

Once informed of his appointment as governor of the Yemen, ʿĪsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī left Iraq with the ḥajj caravan in 204/820. The ḥajj ceremonies over, al-Jalūdī continued south to take up his new position and arrest Ḥamdawayh. (58) Informed of the approach of al-Jalūdī's army, Ḥamdawayh added to his own troops a number of men recruited from the local tribes. He then sent his son, ʿAbd Allāh, in the van of his troops to make the first attack upon the imperial army. The two armies clashed on the 5th of Jumada I, 205/23rd of October 820; Ḥamdawayh's men were routed and his son fled to Mecca. With his army defeated and his son gone, Ḥamdawayh found himself in this impasse. He thus fled to Ṣanʿāʾ to hide from al-Jalūdī, but in vain. There he was easily arrested, put in chains and sent to Baghdād. (59)

(56) Iklīl, I, 317f.

(57) Iklīl, II, 131 f.

(58) Al-Ya ʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 182.

(59) Al-Ya ʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 182; Idrīs, Kanz, f175b; (gives the Ibn ʿAbd al-Mājīd, 25; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 98; ʿAsjad, number 31; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 147. See also Geddes, "Al-Maʿmūn," 104f.

In actual fact these political disorders which had plagued the Yemen for approximately five years, 200-5/815-20, were centred on the highland area. The influence of the unrest on the other Yemeni regions, except Tihāmah, is not clear in our sources. This influence is however seen in the uprising of the ^cAkk and the Ashā^cir, the two major tribal powers in the region, in 202/817-8. But this trouble was swiftly checked by al-Ma³mūn, who appointed Muḥammad b. Ziyād over the area and allowed him to establish his own dynasty there. Now we must turn our attention to this region and discover the main reasons for the establishment of the new rule in Tihāmat al-Yaman. Naturally, a history of this dynasty is beyond the scope of the present study; the aim at this point is to illustrate the reasons behind the caliph's decision to set up such a state in this particular area.

D. The establishment of the B. Ziyād dynasty

The new dynasty was named after its founder, Muḥammad b. ^cAbd Allāh b. Ziyād, a descendent of ^cUbayd Allāh b. Ziyād, who was at that time settled in Yemen. (60) The idea for the establishment of the state having been conceived immediately after the political disturbances in the region during 202/817.

In Muḥarram 202/July-August 817, whilst Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī, the caliph's uncle, was being declared caliph in Baghdād by the inhabitants of the city, a letter arrived

(60) Kay, Yaman, its Early Mediaeval History, text, 104, trans 141.

in al-Ma'mūn's capital at that time, Marw, carrying the news that the two major tribes of Tihāmah, the ^cAkk and al-Ashā^cir, had risen in revolt against the ^cAbbāsīd authorities in the Yemen. As soon as the news reached the court of al-Ma'mūn his minister, al-Faḍl b. Sahl, suggested that the caliph appoint Muḥammad b. Ziyād as amir there in order to quell the insurrection. Duly accepting his minister's suggestion, al-Ma'mūn appointed Ibn Ziyād as amir and designated two of the latter's own companions to assist him. (61)

The following year, Ibn Ziyād and his assistants accompanied an army sent to oppose the anti-caliph Ibrāhīm b. al-Madhī in Baghdād. From there they travelled to Mecca with the pilgrimage caravan and, upon completion of the ḥajj ceremonies, they continued southwards to Tihāmat al-Yaman. After waging war with the inhabitants there Ibn Ziyād succeeded in securing a foothold in the area. In Sha^cbān 204/January-February 820, he laid the foundations of Zabīd, the city which was to be the capital of his dynasty for another two hundred and five years. (62)

Certain historians link the establishment of this dynasty with Alid activities in Tihāmah, even though there is no concrete evidence in our sources which might confirm the existence of such activities in the region at that time. Ibn Khaldūn makes an unacceptable statement regarding this matter,

(61) Cf. Kay, text, 2f -trans, 3 f; Ibn al-Mujāwir, al-Mustabṣir, I, 66 f; Idrīs, Kanz, f 176a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 99 f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 320f; Bughyat, 39; Abū Makhramah, II, 216. See also Geddes, "Al-Ma'mūn", 105f.

(62) See Kay, trans, 4-text 3. Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 321f, confirms that the descendants of Ibn Ziyād remained in the city until the last of them was dismissed in 409/1018-9.

saying, "Among the leading men of Yaman sent up to al-Ma'mūn there was one, Muhammad son of Ziyād, a descendant of 'Obayd Allah son of Ziyād son of Abū Sufyān. He propitiated the Khalifah, and having engaged to protect Yaman against the 'Alids, he won his favour and was appointed to the government of the province [Tihāmah] , where he arrived in A.H.203."(63) Besides this statement two modern scholars suggest that the reason behind the appointment of Ibn Ziyād over the area was the Shi'ite activities there; the first is Geddes (64) who insists that the rebellion of the 'Akk and the Ashā'ir in Tihāmah was a result of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's year long domination of the Yemen, and thus assumes that the rebels were Shi'ite; the second scholar (65) believes that, since the Shi'ites were dominant in the Tihāmah area, al-Ma'mūn realized that a Sunnī principality there could never be anything but an ally of the caliphate. Both Ibn Khaldūn and the two modern scholars, apparently, have based their suggestions on the assumption that the revolt of the 'Akk and the Ashā'ir in Tihāmah in 202/817 was a Shi'ī uprising against the 'Abbāsīd regime which Ibn Ziyād sent to suppress and thus to protect the region from further Alid activities. However, nothing is mentioned in the source material concerning the political leaning of these rebels. On the other hand, the various revolts which took place in Tihāmah during the twenty year period before the arrival of Ibn Ziyād there, do not appear to have been Shi'ite in motivation.(66)

(63) Kay, trans, 141 - text, 104f.

(64) "Yū'firid ", 42f; "Al-Ma'mūn", 105,

(65) Bikhazī, "Coins", 27.

(66) For the political disorder in the area during the caliphate of al-Rashīd, cf. 315-22 above.

Concerning Ibrāhām b. Mūsā's year-long rule over the Yemen in 200-1/815-6, there exists nothing in the sources which might point to any spread of his power to Tihāmah. The main gathering of the Alid followers in the Yemen was Ṣa^cdah, from where Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā extended his authority over a large part of the highlands between there and Ṣan^ca. (67) As for the revolt of the inhabitants of Tihāmah in 202/817-8, apart from the fact that the sources do not specifically consider it to have been an Alid uprising, it is clear that the Alids themselves were enjoying harmonious relations with al-Ma^ḥmūn at that time. (68) Given, then, that ill intention towards al-Ma^ḥmūn by the Alids, and vice versa, was unlikely, it is difficult to believe that Ibn Ziyād was sent with the express purpose of suppressing Alid activities in the region. Further confirmation of this can be seen in the attitude of Ibn Ziyād himself towards the Alid uprising led by ^cAbd al-Rahmān b. Aḥmad in the region of ^cAkk in 207/822-3; (69) apparently, Ibn Ziyād took no part in its suppression. Subsequently, al-Ma^ḥmūn sent an army, under the leadership of Dīnār b. ^cAbd Allāh, to put down the revolt. (70) Thus, if Ibn Ziyād had been appointed specifically to protect the area from the Alids, one must assume that he would also have participated in the suppression of a revolt which did, after all, take place within the borders of his state. However, Ibn Ziyad's role in the affair - be it direct or otherwise -

(67) Cf. 340 above.

(68) See 343 above.

(69) ^cAbd al-Rahmān b. Aḥmad b. ^cAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ^cUmar b. ^cAlī b. Abī Tālib. See al-Ṭabarī, III, 1062f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil, V, 204.

(70) Ibid.

has received no mention in the sources at our disposal. The non-appearance of Ibn Ziyād - supposedly sent to protect Tihāmāh from the Alids - on the scene of ^cAbd al-Rahmān b. Aḥmad's uprising corroborate the more tenable conclusion that the purpose of his presence in Tihāmāh was solely to fill the political vacuum from which the area had been suffering for so long. (71)

It was obvious from the escalation of events in the Yemen from the reign of al-Manṣūr until the spread of Alid influence during the caliphate of al-Ma³mūn that the latter could not afford to ignore this region and, therefore, should pay more attention to it in his foreign policy. In the Yemeni highlands, for example, although al-Ma³mūn's governor, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān had succeeded in retaking Ṣan^cā' following the expulsion of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, he was unable to effect entire control over the rest of the Yemen. Furthermore, local tribes had emerged as participants in the political arena in the area, which was by now closely related to the scene of political unrest in the Ḥijāz. (72) Without a doubt it was this situation which forced al-Ma³mūn to pay special attention to his policy vis-à-vis the Yemen, in order to preserve its loyalty to the caliphate.

Apart from its several seaports, Tihāmāh's over-riding importance lay in the fact that it was the commercial

(71) For the struggle for power in the region amongst its inhabitants during the caliphate of al-Amin, cf. 333 above.

(72) Political opposition had escalated in the Ḥijāz since the early period of the ^cAbbāsīd caliphate due to Alid attempts to take over the two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina. See al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 111ff; al-Tabarī, II, 189ff. See also Lassner, Shaping, 69-79.

cross-roads between Oman and Mecca. It was also of crucial significance as an area of transit for the pilgrims (ḥujjāj) coming from the Omani coast via the coastal lands of Ḥaḍramawt. (73) Leaving Tihāmāh vulnerable to the attacks of uncontrollable tribal rebels, then, would be contrary to caliphal interests for two main reasons : firstly it would jeopardize the economic interests of the ^cAbbāsīd government in the coastal ports; and, secondly, were an anti-caliphal state to emerge there, an extremely undesirable example would be set which would no doubt endanger considerably the political security of the Ḥijāz. (74)

The question of how to control Tihāmāh came up during the most critical period of al-Ma'mūn's reign. In 202/817-8, the year of the Tihāmāh troubles, most regions of his empire broke away from the caliphal administration. (75) The following year, his governor in the Yemen, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, rebelled and proclaimed independence in the highlands. (76) At this point al-Ma'mūn had no alternative but to establish an independent state under a ruler who would always remain loyal to his government and observe its interests in the area. Brockelmann (77) comments on Ibn Ziyād's appointment to Tihāmāh, saying "The ^cAbbāsīd

(73) Ibn Ja'far, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 192-3;

(74) When ^cAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ṣulayḥī succeeded in unifying the Yemen in 455/1063, he set out for Mecca to take it over, see Ḥasan S., Tārīkh al-Yaman al-Siyāsī, 181-3. Cf. also Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 246-7; Kay, text, 18-trans, 24-5; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 52.

(75) See al-Ṭabarī, III, 1016 ff; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 178 ff.

(76) See 343 above.

(77) Tārīkh al-Shu^cūb al-Islāmiyyah, Arabic trans, Ba^clabakkī, 226.

government saw, for some time, that it would be better to encourage the development of local power to go along with the official governors. An evidence for this is that when al-Ma'mūn's Alid policy in the southern Arab Land [i.e. the Yemen] failed, he sent a Khurāsānī force led by an experienced soldier called Muḥammad [i.e. Ibn Ziyād] who proclaimed himself as a descendant of Ziyād b. Abīh - a half-brother of Mu'āwiyah, both having the same father, the amir of Iraq. Muḥammad succeeded in controlling the coastal lands down to al-Shiḥr in Ḥaḍramawt as well as the areas facing them, while the mountainous country remained under the control of the rulers of Ṣan'ā'.^c" Geddes (78) says, "the appointment of Ibn Ziyād split the administration of the province [i.e. the Yemen as a whole] into two equal units; the size and geographical complexity of Yemen did not allow for a single administrative whole."

On this basis al-Ma'mūn appointed Ibn Ziyād over Tihāmah, advising him to construct a city as his capital, from where he would be able to control the region. (79) Ibn Ziyād chose a site at Zabīd which is situated half way between the sea and the mountains on the northern bank of the Wadi Zabīd, and between the two provinces (sing-mikhlaḥ) of 'Akk and the Ashā'ir.^c (80) The structural style of the new city was military. (81)

(78) "Yufirid," 44; "Al-Ma'mūn", 106. See also Ṣāliḥ, 126, who says, The caliphate had followed a new policy in the Yemen by establishing a strong rule in the lowlands to control the mountainous area from the west and the south".

(79) Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 39.

(80) For its location see, al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 110; Kay, trans, 11 - text 8-9. Cf. also Geddes, "Al-Ma'mūn," 106; and map

(81) Al-'Amīd, "Bina' madīnat Zabīd". 343.

Our sources differ concerning the boundaries of Ibn Ziyād's territory. Although it is agreed that he controlled the coastal area extending from Ḥaly, 65 km south of al-Qunfudah, in the north to al-Shiḥr in the south, there is no consensus on the extent of his domination over the other Yemeni provinces. ^cUmārah, Ibn al-Mujāwir, Ibn al-Dayba^c and Abū Makhramah (82) all mention that he ruled the Yemen in its entirety, both coastal and mountainous areas alike. Both Idrīs and Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd (83) maintain that Ibn Ziyād ruled Ḥaḍramawt and the coastal areas as far as Ḥaly, but of the mountainous areas controlled only al-Ma^cāfir, al-Janad and Mikhlāf Ja^cfar. In Bughyat al-Mustafīd, Ibn al-Dayba^c (84) disregards his previous assertion that Ibn Ziyād ruled the mountainous areas, insisting now that the rulers of these areas used to mention Ibn Ziyād's name in the Friday khutbah. The view of the latter writer seems to carry the most weight. There are several reasons which lead us to believe that Ibn Ziyād enjoyed comprehensive influence over Tihāmah and the coastal ports, from al-Shiḥr in the south to Ḥaly in the north. Firstly, when al-Ma^ḍmūn sent Ibn Ziyād to the Yemen, he defined the borders of the latter's state as Tihāmah and whatever land he was able to acquire from the mountainous areas. (85) Secondly, some of the local

(82) Kay, text, 4-trans, 5; Ibn al-Mujāwir, Mustabṣir, I, 67; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 322f; Abū Makhramah, II, 216.

(83) Idrīs, Kanz, f176a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 26f.

(84) 39f.

(85) See Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 25; Idrīs. f176a.

chiefs in the mountainous provinces appeared to be independent rulers of their regions. (86) Thirdly, the caliphate had regularly been sending its own governors to Ṣan^cā^ḍ in order to keep its influence in the region. (87) The fourth reason is that there is no mention in the source material of Ibn Ziyād's full domination over the mountainous areas. Nevertheless these sources do assert that the rulers of these provinces mentioned Ibn Ziyād's name in the Friday khutbah. (88) This, however, does not mean that these provinces were under the political control of Ibn Ziyād; what it does point to, quite simply, is the recognition by these rulers of the power of the Ziyādī regime in the country.

Thus with the establishment of Ziyādī rule in Tihāmah, al-Ma^ḍmūn forestalled the appearance of an anti-^cAbbāsīd power in the region, safeguarding the loyalty of the area in the process. Initially, this policy was focused on Tihāmah alone, with different strategies employed by al-Ma^ḍmūn and his successors vis-à-vis the highland regions. It was with the ^cAbbāsīd re-capture of the highlands in Jumādā I, 205/October-November 820, that they focused this policy on that area in order to safeguard their existence there.

(86) Such as B. Manākh and B. Yu^cfīr, cf.F. below.

(87) Cf. Table 11 and below.

(88) Ibn Hawqal, 23f; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 27; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Bughyat, 40.

E. The Yemeni highlands following the rebellion of Ibn Māhān

After ʿIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī's subjugation of Ṣanʿā' his representatives were sent to the provinces, whilst he returned to Baghdād appointing Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl in his post. (89) In due course Ibrāhīm al-Ifriqī came to the Yemen as governor, remaining there until he was replaced by Nuʿaym b. al-Waḍḍah al-Azdī and al-Muẓaffar b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī, who entered Ṣanʿā' in Ṣafar 206/July-August 821. These two shared the joint administration of the Yemeni highlands, with al-Azdī in Ṣanʿā' and al-Kindī in al-Janad. (90) In 208/822-3, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥriz, the mawlā of al-Maʾmūn, arrived in the Yemen as the caliph's governor there. He himself stayed in Ṣanʿā' and sent his son to al-Janad. (91) However, shortly afterwards the people of al-Janad rebelled against his son. Realising the weakness of his own administration, Muḥammad b. Muḥriz appointed ʿAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī, a Yemeni chief, in Ṣanʿā' and left for the Ḥijāz. (92) Al-Shihābī was replaced by Ishāq b. al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad al-ʿAbbāsī, who arrived in Ṣanʿā'

(89) Idrīs, Kanz, f 176b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 25, 31; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 99; ʿAsjad, 31f; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 147; Bughyat, 31; al-ʿArshī, Bulūgh, 12.

(90) Idrīs, f 176b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 31f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 100; ʿAsjad, 32; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 147.

(91) Idrīs, f 176b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī Kifāyah, 101; al-ʿAsjad, 32;

(92) Idrīs, f 176f; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī ʿAsjad; 32; Kifāyah, 101; and followed by Geddes, "Yuʿfirid" Appendix A, ʿAbbād b. ʿUmar al-Shihābī. However, according to al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 471, 5; II, 152; and Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 148 ʿAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī. Cf. also table 11.

at the end of Rajab 209/December 824. (93)

Unfortunately, the information offered by our sources does not lend itself to a proper evaluation of the political situation of the region, or of its relations with Baghdād during the approximately four year period (205-9/820-4) following the suppression of Ibn Māhān's rebellion in the Yemeni highlands. That the ʿAbbāsids were in control of Ṣanʿāʾ and al-Janad during this period is not doubted; what is needed is a more precise view of the actual political situation in the Yemeni highlands. Despite this lack of data, the frequency with which governors to the area were changed over such a short period, (94) plus the rebellion by the inhabitants of al-Janad against Ibn Muhriz's son and the emphasis made by the sources on the weakness of Ibn Muhriz's administration in Ṣanʿāʾ, all lead us to believe that the highland country had been in the throes of political unrest. This was especially reflected in the governorship of Ishāq b. al-ʿAbbās, who expressed his anger towards the inhabitants of the region by insulting and humiliating them, the Ḥimyarīs in particular. (95) Our sources do not disclose the reasons behind such behaviour towards the Yemenis. However, whether the reasons were personal or merely designed to ensure control over the area, Ishāq's aggressive stance cast no

(93) Idrīs, f 176b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 101; ʿAsjad, 32. Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 32; Ibn al-Daybāʿ, Qurrat, I, 148, Ishāq b. al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās.

(94) Cf. Table 11.

(95) Idrīs, f 176 b, f 177a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī. Kifāyah, 101f; al-ʿAsjad, 32; Ibn al-Daybāʿ, Qurrat, I, 148; al-ʿArshī, Bulūgh, 12.

uncertain discredit on the ^cAbbāsīd presence in general throughout the highland provinces. Al-Ma'mūn subsequently endeavoured to avoid Yemeni hostility by replacing Ishāq with Muḥammad b. Nāfi^c in Ṣan^{c-ā} and Mālik b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī, a Hamdānī chief, in al-Jawf, (96) but in vain. In due course the area became witness to various Ḥimyarī-led uprisings against the ^cAbbāsīd regime. (97) Before discussing these revolts in more detail we must first turn to the political upheaval which occurred in the central part of the highlands, instigated by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-^cUmarī, a descendant of ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, nicknamed Aḥmar al-^cAyn. (98)

This particular disturbance suggests that the area was politically unstable, and that a power struggle was taking place between some of the influential chiefs in the region. This conflict apparently emerged when Ishāq b. al-^cAbbās left the Yemen, leaving a weak governor behind him. (99) In 212/827-8, according to al-Ṭabarī, (100)

(96) For the appointment of Ibn Nāfi^c, see al-Ya^cqūbī, Tarīkh, III, 188. For Ibn Luqmān, Cf al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 212f.

(97) These uprisings represented by the B. Manākh and B. Yu^cfīr emergence in the area, see 360-71 below.

(98) Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ^cUmar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqid b. Zayd b. ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. See al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 360; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 154. For his nickname, cf. al-Ṭabarī, III, 1099; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 177; X, 117.

(99) Means Muḥammad b. Nāfi^c in Ṣan^{c-ā}.

(100) III, 1099. See also al-Ya^cqūbī, Tarīkh, III, 188, who confirms this event, but does not give the date.

Aḥmar al-^cAyn rebelled against ^cAbbāsīd authority. The aim of the uprising was the deposition (khal^c) of al-Ma^ḥmūn, and he began by attacking caliphal authority in Ṣan^cā'. (101) In response, al-Ma^ḥmūn despatched an army to the Yemen under the leadership of Muḥammad b. ^cAbd al-Hamīd, Abū 'l-Rāzī. (102) When Abū 'l-Rāzī arrived in Ṣan^cā' Aḥmar al-^cAyn requested amnesty (amān) which he had initially been granted. Abū 'l-Rāzī, however, subsequently arrested him and sent him to Baghdād where he was imprisoned. (103) Although the revolt was ineffective, it was indicative of the appearance of independent uprisings against the ^cAbbāsīds in this region. Such political upheaval was reflected, especially in two revolts, led by the influential Ḥimyarī chiefs, Ibrāhīm b. Dhī al-Muthlah al-Manākhī and Yu^cfir b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥi wālī. (104) A twenty-one-year struggle (212-33/827-47) against the ^cAbbāsīd forces by these Ḥimyarī chiefs eventually came to fruition with the expulsion of caliphal authority from the highland regions.

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- (101) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188, says he expelled the caliphal governor, Ibn Nafi^c, from there.
- (102) Al-Tabarī, III, 1099; al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188. In al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 83b, he was appointed in (213/828-9).
- (103) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188. Cf. also al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 360.
- (104) For the nasab of these leaders, see Table 9, 10. In Idrīs, f 177a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 105; Tirāz, f 96b; al-^cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 22b; and al-^cArshī, Bulūgh, 18, one reads Yu^cfir b. ^cAbd al-Raḥīm. But, the correct version is Ibn ^cAbd al-Raḥmān, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 230; II, 66 and passim; VIII, 85; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 165. Cf. also Zambaur, Manuel, 116; Geddes "Yu^cfirid", 54; Smith, "History of Ṣan^cā'", 55.

F. The emergence of Ḥimyarī power in the highlands

a. B. Manākh in the southern part of the highlands

In the same year as Abū 'l-Rāzī's arrival in Ṣan^cā' 212/827-8, the southern area of the highlands also became the scene of political opposition to caliphal authority. The focal point was the province of al-Kalā^c, where Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Manākhī rose up against the ^cAbbāsīd regime. (105) Within two years his power had spread to the mountainous areas of Jabal Thūmān and Raymat al-Manākh. (106) In 214/829, Abū 'l-Rāzī and his forces went to the province of al-Kalā^c in an attempt to suppress the rebels arriving there in Sha^cbān/ October-November. Abū 'l-Rāzī took the offensive, but he was killed and his troops were routed. (107) The defeat of the caliphal army left the southern part of the highlands at the mercy of Ibrāhīm al-Manākhī. In the following month, he attacked al-Janad, looting and destroying most of the town. (108) Following this victory, Ibrāhīm al-Manākhī continued to rule over his mountain domain for another thirty years, apparently without any further action taken against

(105) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b. For the location of the province of al-Kalā^c, see Map 2,

(106) Al-Janadī, f46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, f 40b. In Geddes, "Yu^cfīrid", 50, reads Thawmān; al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 213 (al-Akwa^c) Thūmān. For the location of Thūmān, cf. Ṣifat, Ibid, note 1. And for Raymat al-Manākh, see al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, II, 112, who says its from Mikhlāf Ja^cfar [al-Mudhaykhirah] in al-^cAdīn.

(107) Al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, f 40b. Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188, mentions that this occurred in 212/827-8 which is absolutely wrong, see al-Ṭabarī, III, 1101, who states that in 214/829-30 Abū 'l-Rāzī was killed in the Yemen. See also Geddes, "Yu^cfīrid", 49, note 59.

(108) Al-Ya^cqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188, al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 211; al-Janadī, f46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal. f 41a.

him on the part of the caliphate. (109)

Al-Manākhī's challenge to ^cAbbāsīd authority in the Yemen confirmed two important points : firstly, the inability of the ^cAbbāsīd authorities to suppress local uprisings in the area; and secondly, the emergence of influential local chiefs with power enough to be able to rule their own regions with relatively little opposition. Al-Ma³mūn was simply unable to take any serious action against these mushrooming forces which threatened and defied his authority in the region. Instead he merely reappointed Ishāq b. al-^cAbbās to succeed his murdered governor, Abū ³l-Rāzī. Ishāq arrived in Ṣan^{cā} in early 215/830. (110) However, neither Ishāq nor

(109) "He was followed by his son Ja^cfar who built the town and the fortress of al-Mudhaykhirah on the slopes of Jabal Thawmān (Thūwān), which he continued to rule with an iron hand for nearly fifty years until he was killed by the Faṭimid dā^cī ^cAlī Ibn al-Fadl in 292. Geddes, "Yu^cfīrid," 49. See also al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 93-4; Sifat, I, 100. Al-Himyarī, Mulūk, 167, states that they ruled the area for some one hundred and fifty years, which is patently wrong, because they were dismissed by the Isma^cīlī dā^cī ^cAlī b. al-Fadl in 292/904-5, see al-^cAlawī, Sīrat, 389; al-Hammādī, Kāshf, 30; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqāt, 76; al-Janādī, Sulūk; f 50a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 44a. Cf also Geddes, "Yu^cfīrid," 50.

(110) Al-Janādī, f 46b; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f58a, f 83a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 41a; they all confirm that he arrived in the Yemen in 215/830-1, after Abū ³l-Rāzī's murder, however, they record his name as follows, Ishāq b. Mūsā b. ^cIsā al-^cAbbāsī. In Idrīs, f 176b, f 177a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 101f; al-^cAsjad 32; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 148f, there is no mention of the Abū ³l-Rāzī's governorship. They all consider the existence of Ishāq as a continuation of his first governorship since 209/824, moreover they give an incorrect name (i.e. Ishāq b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī b. al-^cAbbās). Although Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat 32 agrees with the above idea, he gives a correct name (i.e. Ishāq b. al-^cAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī al-^cAbbāsī). It is most likely. Ishāq himself who had occupied the governorship of Ṣan^{cā} in 209/824 and stayed until he was replaced by Muḥammad b. Nāfi^c in 212/827-8. But when Abū ³l-Rāzī, Ibn Nāfi^c successor, was killed in 214/829-30, al-Ma³mūn reappointed him to put pressure upon the Himyarī chiefs, i.e. B. Manākh and B. Yu^cfīrid

Cont.

his successor dared to invade the territory of al-Kalā^c, and thus it may be said that the year 214/829 marked the foundation of the B. al-Manākh dynasty in the southern part of the highlands.

The situation in the northern part of the highlands, however, was quite a different one. In this area, there were no ambitious local chiefs ready to come forward and dispute the caliphate in the region, quite simply because the area was in the grip of a tribal struggle between the various branches of Khawlān. But these Khawlānī factions were indirectly involved in the conflict between the Yu^cfirids and the ^cAbbāsīd authorities in the central highland area. (111)

b. B. Yu^cfir in the central highland area.

The most prominent example of a local political power which helped to put an end to ^cAbbāsīd authority in the Yemen is that of the Yu^cfirids. They strongly opposed the caliphal authority in the area for some nineteen years (214-33/829-47). The head of the family at this time was Yu^cfir b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān al-Hiwālī, who was anxious to establish independent rule from his fortress in Jabal Dhukhār. (112)

(Cont) who began revolting against his authority there. Therefore, Ishāq led the ḥajj ceremony in 214/830, on behalf of al-Ma³mūn, and from there he continued southwards to assume his post, where he entered Ṣan^cā at the early part of the following year, and died in the same year. Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 474 f.

(111) Cf. 368 below.

(112) Jabal Dhukhār is the ancient name of the mountain which is now known as J. al-Dulā^c (west of Shibām Kawkabān), see Wilson, "Mapping" 272. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Sifat, I, 107; Al-Waysī, 168. In al-^cAlawī, Sīrat, 19 and passim, it is called Jabal Bayt Dhukhār. Cf. also Map 6.

It is not certain exactly when the Yu^cfirids first appeared as a direct threat to ^cAbbāsīd rule in the Yemen. However, most of the sources agree that the family was able to force the legitimization of its claims onto the caliphate, as a letter written by the caliph al-Mutawakkil in 257/870-1, recognizing Muḥammad b. Yu^cfir as the ruler of the region clearly confirms. (113) It is obvious that such recognition marked the end of the ^cAbbāsīd-Yu^cfirid struggle in the area, although the origins of the conflict are unclear. Al-Hamdānī (114) maintains that the Yu^cfirids began their rule of the Yemen - i.e. the central and the northern highlands - in Ramaḍān 214/November-December, 829, an assumption which is confirmed by none of the other sources. Moreover, it also contradicts the actual political situation in the region at that time, for between 214/829 and 233/847, the first year of al-Mutawakkil's caliphate, Saⁿcā³ had been ruled by ^cAbbāsīd governors. (115) It was during this period that the Yu^cfirids rose in the area in opposition to the caliphate, although the actual struggle for power in the area between them and the ^cAbbāsīds only became truly manifest during the governorship of ^cAbd al-Raḥīm b. Ja^cfar al-Hāshimī (221-5/835-9). (116) This clearly makes al-Hamdānī's assumption untenable, although

(113) Al-Himyarī, Mulūk, 165f; Idrīs, f 177b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 109; ^cAsjad, 34; Tirāz, f 58 b; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 48a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 42b; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 161f.

(114) Iklīl, II, 71f.

(115) See Table 11.

(116) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, 181; Sifat, I, 107, the latter says that Yu^cfir fought the governors of al-Mu^ctaṣim, al-Wāthiq and al-Mutawakkil.

the year 214 may have marked the emergence of Yu^cfir b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥiwālī on the scene in the area, which was at that time in a political vacuum following the murder of the ^cAbbāsīd governor, Abū ^ḍl-Rāzī. (117) It is quite possible that Yu^cfir's attempt to establish independent rule in the area (since 214/829) was inspired by both his military expertise and high social status. (118) But, the political vacuum in the region was filled by Ishāq b. al-^cAbbās, who arrived to govern Ṣan^cā' on behalf of al-Ma^ḍmūn in early 215/830, remaining there until he was replaced by ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās two years later. (119) Al-Ma^ḍmūn was also able to enjoy the support of some of the tribal chiefs in al-Jawf by appointing them as his representatives in the region. (120) Such a policy prohibited Yu^cfir b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān from expanding his activities throughout the rest of al-Ma^ḍmūn's reign.

On the death of al-Ma^ḍmūn in Rajab 218/August 833,

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- (117) Who was killed (Sha^cbān 214), and his successor entered Ṣan^cā' at the early following year, see 360 above.
- (118) See al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 96b, who states that he was a soldier early in his career.
- (119) For the former, see note 108 above. For the latter, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, III, 1106; Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 33. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 103; ^cAsjad, 32f; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 149, ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAlī b. ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās. The correct name is ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-^cAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī b. ^cAbd Allāh b. ^cAbbās, see al-Azraqī, Akhbār, II, 162; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1106. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, III, 281f for his father's nasab.
- (120) He appointed Mālik b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī, a Hamdānī chief, see 358 above.

ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUbayd Allāh left Ṣanʿāʾ for Iraq, appointing ʿAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī in his place. (121) This designation was authorized by al-Muʿṭasim and ʿAbbād continued to rule Ṣanʿāʾ until he was replaced by ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaʿfar b. Sulaymān al-Hāshimī, who entered the town in Muḥarram 221/December 835-January 836. (122) Knowledge of the political situation in the Ṣanʿāʾ region during the governorship of ʿAbbād is virtually non-existent; al-Hamdānī (123) merely alludes to a clash which took place between ʿAbbād and Yuʿfir, explaining neither the reasons for the conflict nor its outcome. It is obvious, however, that the confrontation was related to the Yuʿfirid expansion in the region. It appears that throughout the whole of ʿAbbād's governorship, Yuʿfir was endeavouring to extend his influence in the area. ʿAbbād, as a governor of the ʿAbbāsīd caliphate in the region, was obliged to take steps to curtail the spread of Yuʿfirid power; such a situation may have provoked the confrontation between them. Thus when ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaʿfar was appointed over Ṣanʿāʾ, he too found himself compelled to fight the Yuʿfirids, who had begun to become a real threat to the ʿAbbāsīd presence in the region. The new governor's campaign against the Yuʿfirids was unsuccessful, and his son was taken hostage. (124)

(121) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 471f; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 103; ʿAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 149.

(122) Idrīs, Kanz, f 177a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 132b; Kifāyah, 104; ʿAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 149; Abū Makhramah, II, 104f.

(123) Iklīl, I, 475; II, 181.

(124) Ibid. al-Shamāḥī, al-Yaman, 94; and al-Shāmī, B. 'Yuʿfir', 337, both say that ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Hiwālī and his son Yuʿfir were representatives of this governor in al-Janād. This statement, however, is not confirmed in our sources.

ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaʿfar's governorship continued until 225/839, when he was replaced by Jaʿfar b. Dīnār. The latter, remaining in Baghdād, sent Manṣūr b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Tanūkhī to represent him in the region. Manṣūr entered Ṣanʿāʾ in Ṣafar/December of the same year. Later, ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān joined him as joint-governor. (125) It is interesting to note that the change of governor in Baghdād - Jaʿfar b. Dīnār being replaced by ʾItākh al-Turkī - did not result in a change of deputy governors in Ṣanʿāʾ. This was because they were reappointed by ʾItākh. (126)

Our sources confirm that these deputy governors were able to control the country, (127) their success apparent from their campaigns against the rebels. Al-Ḥamdānī, (128) for example, mentions al-Tanūkhī's pursuit of Muḥammad b. Abī al-ʿAyzār, a rebel from Āl Muqrī of Ḥimyar, in the Dhamār region. Despite the emphasis placed by our source material on the success of these deputy governors in controlling the area, they fail to describe or analyse their relations with the Yuʿfirids during the last two years of al-Muʿtaṣim's reign (225-7/839-42). One must assume, therefore, that the Yuʿfirids remained in control of Jabal Dhukhār throughout this period. Thus on the death of

(125) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 104f; ʿAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 151f.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Iklīl, II, 252f.

al-Mu^ctaṣim in Rabī^c I, 227/December 841-January 842, Yu^cfirid power had emerged as a strong opponent of the ^cAbbāsīd regime in Ṣan^cā^ḥ.

Following his accession to the caliphate, al-Wāthiq reappointed Ītākḥ over Ṣan^cā^ḥ. The latter remained in Samarra sending Abū ḥl-^cAlā^ḥ as his deputy to the region. On hearing that Abū ḥl-^cAlā^ḥ had reached Ṣa^cdah, Yu^cfirid sent an army under the leadership of Ṭarīf b. Mālīk, a Hamdānī, to occupy Ṣan^cā^ḥ before the arrival of the new governor. This time, however, the ^cAbbāsīd forces, supported by the Ṣan^cānīs, were able to defeat the Yu^cfirid troops and drive them from the town. (129) Although the Yu^cfirids failed to occupy Ṣan^cā^ḥ, the attack heralded the escalation of the ^cAbbāsīd-Yu^cfirid conflict in the region. Thus from Jabal Dhukhār, Yu^cfirid was subsequently able to survive all the ^cAbbāsīd campaigns sent throughout al-Wāthiq's reign and the first year of that of his successor.

During the caliphate of al-Wāthiq (227-232/842-7) the local tribes in the central and northern parts of the highlands began to emerge and participate in the ^cAbbāsīd-Yu^cfirid conflict. In these regions the Yemenis were divided into two factions : one supporting the Yu^cfirids, the other aligned with the ^cAbbāsīds. Among the Hamdānī chiefs, for example, could be found members of both factions. This is illustrated by the fact that while some of Ḥāshidī

(129) Idrīs, Kanz, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 105; Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^c. Qurrat, I, 153-5; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā^ḥ, f 22b.

joined the Yu^cfirids in their uprising against the ^cAbbāsīd regime, (130) some of Bakīl preserved their good relations with the caliphate. (131) The conflicts between the Khawlānī tribes in Ṣa^cdah were also reflected in the ^cAbbāsīd-Yu^cfirid struggle. Al-Hamdānī, (132) for instance, mentions that during the conflict between B. Sa^cd b. Sa^cd and B. al-Rabī^cah b. Sa^cd - both tribes of Khawlān in Ṣa^cdah - Yu^cfirids supported the former. The reason for their partisanship was obviously a political one, since B. al-Rabī^cah were acknowledged as supporters of the caliphate. The leader of the B. al-Rabī^cah, ^cAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ^cAbbād, travelled to Samarra to inform al-Wāthiq of the increasing power of the Yu^cfirids and to ask for reinforcements. (133)

Al-Wāthiq responded immediately to Ibn ^cAbbād's appeal, sending with him an army led by one of his generals, Shārbāmiyān, who reached the Yemen in Rabī^c II, 229/January 844. (134) It seems that this army was initially directed

(130) Such as B. Tarīf b. Thābit al-Kibārī, Cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 51; Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; al-^cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 154.

(131) Such as Mālīk b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī who represented al-Ma³mūn in al-Jawf, see 358 above, and Yazīd b. Abī ^cUyaynah al-Aṣqar, leader of Arḥab see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 212. For the support of B. ^cUyaynah granted to the ^cAbbāsīd general, Shārbāmiyān during his invasion against B. Yu^cfir, Cf. 369 below

(132) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 322f.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Al-Tabarī, III, 1335, reads Shārbāmiyān. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 323 gives the same name, but says it is arabized (^curriba) and has become al-Bashīr. He also gives the year 230/844 for his arrival. In Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 155; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā^c, f 22b, we had Harthamah b. al-Bashīr.

to Ṣa^cdah to suppress B. Sa^cd b. Sa^cd, the Yu^cfirid allies. This assumption is confirmed by al-Hamdānī, (135) who records that Ibn ^cAbbād and Shārbāmiyān moved from Ṣa^cdah on their way to Jabal Dhukhār via al-Jawf. In al-Jawf they were joined by B. ^cUyaynah, a branch of Arḥab of Bakīl. (136) From there, according to al-Hamdānī, (137) the ^cAbbāsīd forces moved directly to Jabal Dhukhār, where they camped and later besieged the Yu^cfirids. Some historians (138) mention that Shārbāmiyān and his troops went first to Ṣan^cā' and from there marched on Shibām, Jabal Dhukhār, camping below the town in lower Wadi Ḍulā^c. Shārbāmiyān and his army continued to try to breach the Yu^cfirid fortress but in vain. Without inflicting any appreciable damage on the enemy position, they retired to Ṣan^cā'. (139)

The news of Shārbāmiyān's failure was brought to Samarra by Ibn ^cAbbād, who went there to complain about the former's refusal to consider his suggestion regarding the invasion of the Yu^cfirid fortress. Al-Hamdānī (140) who

(135) Iklīl, I, 323-4.

(136) Iklīl, I, 324. In Iklīl, X, 212 B.^c Utaybah, Cf. also Ṣāliḥ, Tarīkh, 141.

(137) Iklīl, I, 323f.

(138) Cf. the account of Ahmad al-Mu^cīdī, in Iklīl, I, 323. See also Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 155; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 22b.

(139) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^cAsjad, 33; Anbā', f 22b; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 155. See also Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", 56.

(140) Iklīl, I, 325-7, Ahmad b. Muḥammad's account.

records this statement, gives no exact date for Ibn ^cAbbād's petition, although he confirms that it came after the death of al-Wāthiq in Dhū ^l-Ḥijjah 232/ July-August 847; it was the latter's successor, al-Mutawakkil who responded to the complaint by sending an army led by Ja ^cfar b. Dīnār to the Yemen. According to al-Ṭabarī, (141) Ja ^cfar b. Dīnār was appointed by al-Wāthiq in Sha ^cbān 231/April, 846, and left Samarra for the Ḥijāz, but did not reach Ṣan ^cā' until he had completed the hajj ceremonies. This statement is more credible since it is confirmed by al-Hamdānī himself and some local historians, who state that in the following year (i.e. 232/846-7) the ^cAbbāsīd governor in the Yemen (i.e. Ṣan ^cā') at that time was Ja ^cfar b. Dīnār. (142) It can be assumed, therefore that Ibn ^cAbbād arrived in Samarra in 231/845-6, and petitioned al-Wāthiq and not al-Mutawakkil. Thus it was al-Wāthiq who responded by sending Ibn Dīnār's army to Ṣan ^cā', which they entered at the beginning of the following year.

Soon after his arrival in Ṣan ^cā', Ibn Dīnār went out to Jabal Dhukhār in an attempt to suppress the Yu ^cfirids, (143) who were relying on their defensive position, rather than risking open conflict. Seeing that it was impossible in such a situation to dislodge the rebels, Ibn Dīnār retired to Ṣan ^cā', leaving the Yu ^cfirids in

(141) III, 1350.

(142) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 263; Idrīs, f 177a; al-Janādī, Sulūk, f 46b. Cf also table 11.

(143) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 107, Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba ^c, Qurrat, I, 155.

full control of Jabal Dhukhār.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Before long, however, he returned to Jabal Dhukhār to put down the Yu^cfirid rebellion, besieging his enemy until the news of al-Wāthiq's death at the end of Dhū ḥijjah 232/ August 847 reached him. Without delay Ibn Dīnār lifted the siege, concluded a truce with the Yu^cfirids, and rode off at the head of his troops to Ṣan^{cā}. Shortly after receiving the news of his reappointment as governor of the Yemen by the new caliph, al-Mutawakkil, Ibn Dīnār left his son Muḥammad in charge of Ṣan^{cā} and made back to Samarra. (145)

Upon Ja^cfar b. Dīnār's arrival in Samarra, al-Mutawakkil, replaced him as governor of the Yemen by Ḥimyar b. al-Ḥārith. Following his arrival in Ṣan^{cā} in the early 233/847, the new governor immediately took the offensive against the Yu^cfirids in Jabal Dhukhār. In the open battle that ensued, Ḥimyar was forced to flee and his troops were defeated. Following this, the ^cAbbāsīd governor left the Yemen, leaving the highlands, except the province of the al-Kalā^c, completely under the control of the Yu^cfirids. In this way Yu^cfir was able to establish control of the capital, Ṣan^{cā}, and to overrun a large part of the country between Ṣa^cdah and al-Janad. (146)

(144) This idea was first advanced by Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", 57.

(145) Al-Hamdani, *Iklīl*, 327; Idrīs, *Kanz*, f 177a; al-Janadī, f 46b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, *Kifāyah*, 107; ^cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^c, *Qurrat*, I, 155. Cf. also Geddes, "Yu^cfirid" 57.

(146) Al-Janadī, f 46b. Cf. also Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", 58, who states that, "Following this battle Yu^cfir established himself in control of the capital i.e. Ṣan^{cā} and over-run a large part of the country between Ṣa^cda and al-Janad."

Thus during the year after al-Wāthiq's death (i.e. 233/847), the Yu^cfirids succeeded, by and large, in erasing the caliphate's political authority from the central and the northern areas of the highlands. Henceforward the sole vestige of the caliphate in the Yemen was the customary mention of the caliph's name in the Friday Khuṭbah. Politically, the Yemen was now split into three independent states : the Ziyadids held Tihāmat al-Yaman as far as al-Shiḥr; B. Manākh took over a part of the southern Yemeni highlands; and the Yu^cfirids also occupied a large part of the highlands, their power extending from al-Janad in the south to Ṣa^cdah in the north. (147) Ḥaḍramawt remained unoccupied until Muḥammad b. Yu^cfir conquered it in 258/871-2. (148)

(147) For the distribution of these states, see Map 6.

(148) Cf. al-Himyarī, Mulūk, 165-6; Idrīs, f 177b; Ibn ^cAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 109, who call him Muhammad b. Ja^cfar; al-^cAsjad, 34; Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 161-2. It seems that B. Manākh had been trying to extend their authority as far as al-Janad whenever they found an opportunity, see al-Ḥammādī, Kashf, 24; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 49a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 43b, who mention that al-Janad was under the control of B. Manākh who had removed it from B. Yu^cfir during the seventh decade of the third century of the Hijrah. Cf also Ibn al-Dayba^c, Qurrat, I, 163.

Table 9

The nasab of Ibrāhīm al-Manākhī

Ḥimyar (al-Akbar)
 |
 al-Hamaysa^c
 |
 Ayman
 |
 Zuhayr
 |
^cArīb
 |
 Qaṭan
 |
 Jaydān
 |
 al-Ghawth
 |
 Wā'il
 |
^cAbd Shams
 |
 Zur^cah (Dhū Manākh) (1)
 |
 Shuf^cah (2)
 |
 Zayd
 |
 Shuraḥbīl (3)
 |
 Shurāḥīl (4)
 |
 Zayd
 |
 Khamr (5)
 |
 Lahī^cah
 |
 Murrah
 |
 Ḥassān
 |
 Suwayd
 |
 Aksūm
 |
 Salamah
 |
^cAbd Allāh
 |
 Muhammad (Dhū³l-Muthlah)
 |
 Ibrāhīm (6)

-
- (1) One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathāminah) who ruled the Yemen after the murder of Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, see al-Rasūlī, Turfat, 55. In al-Ḥamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294, they ruled the Yemen after Dhū Nuwas.
- (2) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, reads Subqah, while al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, has Suf^cah.
- (3) Omitted by Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, instead he records Sharāḥīl b. Sharāḥīl.
- (4) Omitted by al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 167.
- (5) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Ḥimyar.
- (6) The leader of the rebellion against the ^cAbbāsīd regime in the southern part of the Yemeni highlands.

Table 10

The nasab of Yu^cfir al-Ḥiwālī

Zur^cah (Ḥimyar al-Aṣghar)
 |
 Sadad
 |
 Zayd
 |
 Mālīk
 |
 Dhū Maqār (1)
 |
 Yarīm
 |
 al-Sharmah (Dhū Ḥiwāl Al-Akbar)
 |
 Ilā Zād
 |
^cAwsajah
 |
^cĀmir (Dhū Ḥiwāl al-Aṣghar)
 |
 Yadrās (2)
^cAwn
 |
 Mātī^c
 |
 Ibrāhīm
 |
 al-Waddāh
 |
 Kurayb (3)
 |
^cAbd al-Rahmān
 |
 Yu^cfir (4)

-
- (1) One of al-Mathāminah, the eight most influential chiefs, who ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, Cf al-Rasūlī, 55; in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294 after Dhū Nuwās. See also al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 157, 165. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437 reads Maghār.
- (2) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Tadrās.
- (3) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Kurayb b. ^cUthmān b. al-Waddāh.
- (4) The leader of the rebellion against the ^cAbbāsīd regime in the central area of the Yemeni highlands.

Table 11 The governors of the Yemen from the time of al-Amīn to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign. (193-233/809-47)

appointed by al-Amīn (193-6/809-11)		
Hammād al-Barbarī (1)	193-4/809-10	
Muhammad b. ^c Abd Allāh b. Mālik al-Khuzā ^c ī(2)	194-5/810-11	
Muhammad b. Sa ^c id b. al-Sārḥ al-Kinānī	195/811	
appointed by al-Ma ³ mūn(196-218/811-33)		
Yazīd b. Jarīr b. Yazīd b. Khālīd b. ^c Abd Allāh al-Qasrī al-Bajalī	196-8/811-4	
^c Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqid b. Muhammad b. Zayd b. ^c Abd Allāh b. ^c Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb	198/814	
Ishāq b. Mūsā b. ^c Isā b. Mūsā b. Muhammad b. ^c Alī b. ^c Abd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās	198-200/814-5	
Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā b. Ja ^c far b. Muhammad b. ^c Alī b. al-Husayn b. ^c Alī b. Abī Tālib	200/815-6	Alid rebel ⁽³⁾
Hamdawayh b. ^c Alī b. ^c Isā b. Māhān (4)	201-5/816-20	
^c Isā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī (5)	205/820	

(1) Remained only one year attacking certain Yemeni tribes, see 332-4 above.

(2) This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf Bikhazī, 24.

(3) He occupied the Yemen for a whole year in the name of Ibn Ṭabaṭabā, the Shī'ite imam. See 341 above.

(4) Omitted by Smith, "History of Sa^cnā³", 54, instead he inserts ^cIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī.

(5) Smith, ibid, places him after Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā.

Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl (6)	205/820	
Ibrāhīm al-Ifrīqī	205-6/820-1	
Nu ^c aymb. Waḍḍāh al-Azdī	206-8/821-3	joint authority
al-Muzaffar b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī		
Muḥammad b. ^c Abd Allāh b. Muḥriz (7)	208-9/823-4	mawlā of al-Mu ^ṣ mun
Ishāq b. al- ^c Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^c Alī b. ^c Abd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās	209-212/824-7	
Muḥammad b. Nā fi ^c (8)	212/827-8	
Muḥammad b. ^c Abd al-Ḥamīd(9)	212-4/828-9	known as Abū 'l-Rāzī
Ishāq b. al- ^c Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^c Alī b. ^c Abd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās (10)	215-7/830-32	
^c Abd Allāh b. ^c Ubayd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^c Alī b. ^c Abd Allāh b. al- ^c Abbās (11)	217-8/832-3	

-
- (6) Deputy of above. Smith, *ibid*, places him after Aḥmad (Muḥammad) b. ^cAbd al-Ḥamīd.
- (7) Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", Appendix A-7, reads Maḥriz.
- (8) Omitted by Geddes, *ibid*; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}", 54.
- (9) Smith, *ibid*, has Aḥmad instead of Muḥammad, and places him before Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl
- (10) The second governorship, see Chapter XI, note 110.
- (11) He left Ṣan^{cā} appointing ^cAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī in his place. Smith, "History of Ṣan^{cā}" omits.

appointed by al-Mu^cṭaṣim (218-27/833-42)


- ^cAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī ⁽¹²⁾ 218-20/833-5
- ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ja^cfar b. 221-5/835-9
^cSulayman b. ^cAlī b. al-
^cAbbās al-Hāshimī
- Mansūr b. ^cAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Tanūkhī 225-7/839-42 joint authority
- ^cAbd Allāh b. Ḥamdawayh b.
Māhān (13)
- Abū ʿAlā (14) 227-9/842-4
- Shārbamiyān (15) 229-31/843-5
- Ja^cfar b. Dīnār al-
Khayyāt (16) 232-846-7

appointed by al-Mutawakkil

- Ḥimyar b. al-Ḥārith (17) early in
233/847

-
- (12) Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", Appendix, A.12; Smith, "History of Ṣan^cā", 54 reads ^cAbbād b. ^cUmar al-Shihābī. However, his second name, according to al-Hamdānī and Ibn al-Dayba^c, is al-Ghamr, see Chapter XI, note 92.
- (13) Both are deputies of Ja^cfar b. Dīnār and later they were both reappointed by Ītākh al-Turkī. Both Geddes "Yu^cfirid", Appendix A,15 and Smith, "History of Ṣan^cā", 54 insert Muḥammad instead of Ḥamdawayh.
- (14) He was sent by Ītākh as his deputy in the Yemen.
- (15) Geddes, "Yu^cfirid", Appendix A 17, reads Seri-Bamikan; Smith, "History of Ṣan^cā", 54, has Harthamah Shār Bamiyan. He might have been sent as deputy of Ītākh, since coins bear the latter's name. Cf. Bikhazi, 30.
- (16) This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. Bikhazi, 31. He left Ṣan^cā leaving his son in charge.
- (17) He was defeated by the Yu^cfirids who expelled him and his army from the Yemen, see 371 above.

Map 6 DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL DYNASTIES



CONCLUSION

During this two hundred and twenty-four year period the political history of the Yemen with its relations to the Islamic administrations had passed through various phases.

In the time of the Prophet and in the first year of Abū Bakr's reign (9-11/630-2) the area was distinguished for its political activities on the whole and particularly for the interest of the Medinan government to spread Islam and consolidate its grip on some of the Yemeni provinces. The Prophet practised two styles in his dealings with the Yemeni tribes; at one time we find him using military pressure and negotiations with some of the Yemeni powers; in the second he uses diplomacy and sends envoys to the others. It was clear that the Prophet always avoided direct military interference in local disputes in the Yemen, even though some of these disputes could have threatened the interests of the Muslims in the region. And for this reason he quelled the movement of ^cAbhalah b. Ka^cb by sending envoys to some of the groups distressed as a result of the movement.

The Yemenis who converted to Islam played a great part in suppressing those who opposed the Islamic authority in the Yemen and also they helped to consolidate the Muslim regime in the area during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.

The Muslims managed to bring to an end local political dispute in some of the Yemeni regions and to maintain their

authority. In other regions the Muslim political domination was not evident because these regions were under the control of the local tribes.

The contribution of the Yemeni tribes to the conquests was considerable. The caliph Abū Bakr and his successor, °Umar, encouraged these tribes to join the Medinese armies. The Yemeni tribes played a great military role in the decisive battles at the beginning of the conquests; moreover they formed the majority amongst the Muslim warriors. Because of their military experience their leaders became distinguished amongst the other Muslim commanders. These Yemeni leaders took part in leading the troops and negotiations on both the Byzantine and Persian fronts.

The Yemeni warriors were accompanied by their families and carried with them their belongings to the battle fronts. When the Muslims conquered Syria, Iraq and Egypt and built villages and cities there, the Yemenis were the first amongst the Muslims to inhabit them. They spread all over the conquered provinces and their numbers were greater, in some of these regions, than the other Arab tribes which conquered these countries with them.

At the end of the caliphate of °Uthmān and during the period of °Alī b. Abī Tālib the Yemeni migrants played an important part in the internal events of the Islamic Empire; for some of them were the driving force behind the uprising against the caliph °Uthmān in Kufa and al-Fuṣṭāṭ and so they constituted a direct challenge to the caliphal authorities there. This driving force was seen distinctly in the various

stages of the uprising. These Yemeni migrants were also engaged in the first civil war and played a great part in it. During the course of the battles of the civil war, they were also recognized as a military and political force. Because of this recognition their leaders had the upper hand in making important and decisive decisions, as was clear in the battle of Şiffīn.

The political stagnation began in the Yemen when its tribes joined the Islamic expeditions elsewhere though their contacts with their motherland continued. This relationship with their homeland, the Yemen, appeared distinctly during the first civil war. This war had spread to the Yemen after the battle of Şiffīn. The Yemenis in the Yemen were split into two different camps in this war and we find one camp backing °Alī and the other Mu °āwiyah.

The migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered provinces and the continuation of the conquests during the caliphate of the Umayyads had a great impact in the political isolation of the Yemen and its neglect by the Islamic authority during the first/seventh century. The assassination of al-Ḥusayn b. °Alī and Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution were two of the most serious events which occurred during the same period, though neither had any effect on the Yemen. When Ibn al-Zubayr took over Mecca and established himself there, the Yemen received no attention from his administration and as a result of this, the region suffered from the lack of political leadership and fell an easy prey to Khārijī invaders. After the fall of Ibn al-Zubayr his

successor ^cAbd al-Malik b. Marwān saw no importance in sending a military expedition to the Yemen in order to consolidate his authority there.

The sudden appearance of the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt and the extent of their influence to Ṣan^{c-ʿ}ʿā was the consequence of the disinterest of the Umayyads in the Yemen. The Umayyads only stood against the Ibāḍiyyah when they, the Ibāḍiyyah, extended their influence to the Ḥijāz and had the control of the holy cities.

The relationship between the Islamic authority and the Yemen was cold in the first decade of the ^cAbbāsīd Caliphate. In the following decade the relationship of this region with the Islamic authority improved gradually as was very obvious in the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd when the Caliphate tried to keep its influence there. The ^cAbbāsīd administration had witnessed the emergence of the local opposition to its authority in the Yemen which was embodied in the uprising of al-Haysam b. ^cAbd al-Ṣamad al-Ḥimyarī. One of the features of the policies of the caliphate at that time was its attempts to find competent administrators to rule this region. By following this policy the first five ^cAbbāsīd caliphs managed to keep their control of centres of administration in the Yemen, but not for long, for the weakness of the caliphate began to appear from the end of the second/eighth century.

The importance of the Yemen became clear in that period when Ibn Ṭabāṭabā started his revolution in Kufa. This revolution spread to the Ḥijāz. The Yemen was one of the main

targets for the revolutionaries in which they extended their influence by appointing one of them as its governor. Several local powers were found supporting or opposing the Alids. The ^cAbbāsids, when they tried to take the Yemen, sent a regular army to expel the Alid governor.

The emergence of the local power in the course of the events in the Yemen and the increasing interest of the caliphate in it came at the time when the ^cAbbāsids were nearer the decline of their influence over their administration, particularly after the civil war. The disturbance in Tihāmat al-Yaman at the beginning of the third/ninth century forced the ^cAbbāsīd administration to send Ibn Ziyād as a ruler of the region in order that he might protect its interests there and ensure the allegiance of that area.

This policy of the ^cAbbāsids was successful except in the highland area which underwent a succession of uprisings against the caliphal authority. These uprisings were led by some influential and ambitious chiefs. As a result the central Islamic authority lost its political control over this region.

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