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The Structure of the Plutarchan Book

This study focuses not on individual Lives or pairs of Lives, but on the book as a whole and its articulation across the full corpus. It argues that the Plutarchan book consists of up to four distinct sections: prologue, first Life, second Life, *synkrisis*. Each of these sections has a fairly consistent internal structure, and each has a distinct set of strategies for opening, for closure, and for managing the transition from one section to the next. Prologues provide an introduction to both Lives, and are clearly delineated from them, even though in our manuscripts they appear as part of the first Life; in fact, there is often a stronger break between prologue and first Life than there is between the two Lives themselves. Prologues usually begin with generalized reflections, to be followed only later by the naming of the subjects and a statement of their similarities. Most Lives begin with a thematically organized section (the ‘proemial opening’), which surveys the subject’s life as a whole, not just their youth, and which is marked off with varying degrees of distinctness from the narrative that follows. Crucially, proemial openings do not narrate and the logic of their structure is not chronological. Closure in many Lives is signalled by ‘circularity’ and sometimes by a closural or transitional phrase, though first Lives are different here from second Lives. *Synkriseis* are structured both by a series of themes on which the two subjects are compared, and by a two-part, agonistic structure in which first one of the subjects is preferred, then the other. *Synkriseis* may also recall the prologue; both prologue and *synkrisis* operate at the level of the book, and between them frame and weld together the two Lives.

Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives*¹ were published in pairs, one Greek Life with one Roman, usually in that order,² in a single unit which Plutarch himself called

1. Plutarch uses the term “Parallel Lives” (Βίοι Παράλληλοι or Παράλληλοι Βίοι) in *Thes.* 1.1; *Kim.* 2.2; *Dem.* 3.1; *Dion* 2.7. Cf. also *Pel.* 2.12, “we have written their Lives in parallel” (παράλληλους ἀνεγράψαμεν αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους); *Ag./Kleom-Gracchi* 1.1, “it remains to take a survey of the Lives in parallel” (λαβεῖν ἐκ παραλλήλου τῶν βίων τὴν ἀποθεώρησιν).

2. In the manuscripts the Roman Life precedes the Greek in three pairs: *Cor.-Alk.*, *Aem.-Tim.* and *Sert.-Eum.* The Aldine edition wrongly reversed the order in these three cases so that the Greek

a “book” (βιβλίον).³ Twenty-two of these books survive, including one book which contains two sets of Lives (the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi*);⁴ in addition, we know of one lost book (the *Epameinondas–Scipio*).⁵ An important advance in recent scholarship has been the realization that paired Lives are meant to be read together.⁶ There has, however, been no broader analysis of the way in which the Plutarchan book of *Parallel Lives* is structured.

As with most ancient texts, there is little external evidence for how a Plutarchan book was originally laid out: in particular, whether there were titles, gaps, or other markers to indicate how its structure might or might not have been articulated. Unfortunately the papyri are of no help: of the few known papyri which contain fragments of the Lives, none contains the start or end of a book or of any of its sub-sections.⁷ The medieval manuscripts present the *Parallel Lives* as a collection of individual Lives; the name of the subject of the first Life alone appears as a title at the very start of the book, and the name of the subject of the second Life alone at the start of the second Life.⁸ The *synkrisis* is treated as part of the second Life; there are no titles or gaps between second Lives and *synkriseis*.⁹ Indeed, that the *synkrisis* was treated as part of the second Life as early as the ninth century is confirmed by Photios, who quotes from the *synkrisis*

Life always came first; although the correct order was soon restored for the *Sert.-Eum.*, all modern editors and translators except Ziegler (including the Loeb and Budé) continued to print the *Alk.* before the *Cor.* and the *Tim.* before the *Aem.* For discussion, see Ziegler 1907: 26–32; Pelling 1986: 94–96 (= repr. 2002a: 357–59); 1988b: 23–26; Duff 1999: 205–206 and 302; and below pp. 221 and n.119.

3. *Per.* 2.5; *Dem.* 3.1. In *Dion* 2.7 and *Thes.* 1.4 λόγος (“work”) and in *Dion* 1.1 γραφή (“writing”) seem to be used as synonyms for “book” (below, p. 222–23). Cf. *Aem.* 1.6, ἐν τῷ παρόντι (“in the present” sc. work, book, etc.): see p. 221. In *Sert.* 1.8, τόδε τὸ σύγγραμμα (“this composition”) probably refers to the book but could be taken as just referring to the Life.

4. That is, the Lives of Agis and Kleomenes are set alongside those of Gaius and Tiberius Gracchus in a single book, with a single prologue and single *synkrisis*. See below, appendix 1.

5. See below, p. 259. The *Galba–Otho*, the only surviving elements of the *Lives of the Caesars*, and the free-standing *Aratus* and *Artaxerxes*, are not part of the parallel collection and not grouped in pairs.

6. The most influential papers were Erbse 1956, Stadter 1975 and Pelling 1986. The bibliography is now too large to list here, but see the catalogue in Duff 1999: 250n.25, and the papers in Humble 2010b.

7. One papyrus fragment contains *Caesar* 1.1 (*P Köln* 1 47, 3rd century AD) but this is plainly not the start of the Life. For details, see below, appendix 2. The Plutarch papyri are discussed by Indelli 1995; Landon 2004.

8. These titles should not be confused with the later titles found in some manuscripts which go back to the tripartite recension (i.e., the collection of the Lives in three codices, which was completed at the earliest in late Antiquity and does not reflect Plutarch’s own ordering): e.g., before the *Demetrios–Antony*, the codex Palatinus 283 (11th-12th century) has Πλουτάρχου Βίων Παραλλήλων βιβλος γ’ (where βιβλος γ’ refers to the third volume of the tripartite recension), followed by Δημήτριος. On the tripartite recension, see Ziegler 1907: 5–12 and below, p. 260.

9. As Ziegler 1907: 131–32 notes, only at one place in one 14th century manuscript (E = Parisinus Graecus 1675), is there a title between second Life and *synkrisis* (σύγκρισις, after the *Cicero*); otherwise, there is not even a gap. In addition, my own examination of Parisinus Graecus 1671 (= A, dated to AD 1296), shows that it once has σύγκρισις in the margin (at *Sol.-Pub.* 1.1).

of the *Sertorius–Eumenes* (*Sert.-Eum.* 2.5) as simply “from the *Eumenes*” (ἐκ τοῦ Εὐμένους).¹⁰

The manuscripts, then, suggest that Byzantine readers saw the basic unit as the Life, and had little appreciation for the book. Modern editors have tended to follow the manuscripts, though since the Renaissance there has been some appreciation that the *synkrisis* is to some extent separate from the second Life. The practise of inserting a title between second Life and *synkrisis* in fact appears first in translations, such as those in the 1499 Latin edition by various hands, edited by Gianfrancesco Boccardo; in Amyot’s 1559 French translation; and in Crusierius’ 1566–1567 Latin translation.¹¹ This practice was not imitated in the first Greek printed editions (the Juntine edition of 1517 and the Aldine edition of 1519), which followed the manuscripts in printing the *synkriseis* as part of the second Life. The edition of Coraes (1809–1814) was the first Greek text to insert a title in Greek between second Life and *synkrisis* (e.g., Πελοπίδου καὶ Μαρκελλοῦ Σύγκρισις) and to number the chapters of the *synkrisis* separately from those of the second Life.¹² Later editors—though not Ziegler in his Teubner—have followed suit.¹³

In what follows I will set to one side the manuscript evidence and the practice of earlier editors and proceed purely on the basis of internal evidence, that is, from what can be deduced from the wording of the texts themselves. I aim, by ranging across the whole corpus of 22 books rather than focusing on a single Life or a single book, to illuminate a number of consistent features in the way in which books and Lives are structured, and the way their constituent parts relate to each other: in particular, the way books begin and end, the way Lives begin and end (and the differences in beginnings and endings between first and second Lives), and the closural devices which signal transition from one section of the book or of the individual Life to another—that is, how the different component

10. *Biblioth. Cod.* 245, 396b22–25. Ziegler 1907: 128–32; Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 483–85.

11. And in North’s 1579 English translation of Amyot. E.g., “Romuli ac Thesei comparatio” (Boccardo); “La Comparaison de Theseus avec Romulus” (Amyot); “Thesei cum Romulo comparatio” (Cruiserius); “The comparison of Theseus with Romulus” (North). The first printed Latin edition, that of Campano of 1470, does not insert such titles, and in many cases omits the *synkriseis* altogether; where the *synkriseis* are printed they are separated from the second Life by a blank line and begin with a large capital letter. On fifteenth-century Latin translations of the *Lives*, see Giustiniani 1961, Pade 2007 and Humble 2010a, though they do not address the question of layout. Humble emphasizes the general lack of interest in the parallel structure shown by fifteenth-century translators.

12. The Greek edition of Stephanus (1572) begins the *synkrisis* on a new line and with a slight indenting, though there is no title and the *synkrisis* is still presented as part of the second Life; the accompanying Latin translations by Crusierius follow Stephanus’ practice (and not that of his own 1566–1567 translation). Reiske in his edition of the Greek text (1774–1782) inserts a title in Latin between second Life and *synkrisis* (e.g., “Comparatio Thesei cum Romulo”), but Coraes was the first to insert a Greek title.

13. On the practice of Ziegler 1914 as regards the *synkriseis*, and that of Bekker 1855–1857, see below, nn.227–29. The apparatus criticus of none of the modern editions, it should be noted, records the manuscript evidence for titles consistently.

parts of the book are both marked off from and relate to each other.¹⁴ A particular contention will be that the Plutarchan book should be seen as consisting not simply of two Lives, nor even of two Lives plus *synkrisis*, but of four distinct sections (prologue–first Life–second Life–*synkrisis*), each clearly marked off from each other.¹⁵ Each of these sections has, I hope to show, a distinct internal structure. At the same time, there are features both of formal structure (transitional sentences or phrases), and of literary articulation (themes, images, language), which run across from one section to another and provide unity at the level of the book.

The first part of this paper will look at the openings of books, and will focus on prologues. The second part will look at the way in which individual Lives begin. Further sections will consider the way Lives end, and the way books end, focusing on the *synkriseis*. A final section will consider the arrangement of individual books into the collection as a whole. The most controversial arguments of the paper concern beginnings. First, the now almost universally accepted categorization of the beginnings of books of *Parallel Lives* as containing either a “formal” or an “informal” prologue is unhelpful, and results from a failure to distinguish between the level of the book and the level of the individual Life. Secondly, while earlier commentators have noted that many Lives begin with material on character, ancestry, childhood, or education, I hope to demonstrate that it is not distinctiveness of subject-matter which characterizes the early sections of a Life. Indeed the beginnings of most Lives contain much on the adult activities and political or military careers of their protagonists. Rather, what marks out the early chapters of most Plutarchan Lives is a narratological feature: that is, the early sections of most Lives are structured thematically and do not normally narrate.

1. THE OPENINGS OF THE BOOK

The manuscripts, as we have seen, do not give any indication that a book of Lives opens with anything other than the first Life. The modern printed editions and translations follow the manuscripts, with one, usually overlooked, exception. In Crusenius’ 1566–1567 Latin translation 9 first Lives are preceded by what he called a “Proemium” or “Praefatio”; that is, in these 9 cases what has been transmitted in the manuscripts as the first chapter or chapters of the first Life

14. Cf. D.P. Fowler 1989: 82–88 on “closure” as operating not only at the level of a “work” (e.g., Horace’s *Odes*), but at the ends of books, and of sections within books (“infratextual closure”), as well as perhaps at the end of groups of “works” (“supertextual closure”). Thus in Plutarch we might look for strategies of opening and closure at the level of the book, at the level of the different component parts within a book (prologue, first Life, second Life, *synkrisis*), at the level of different sections within those component parts (e.g., episodes, anecdotes, etc.), as well as at the level of the collection as a whole (though in the last case we are hindered by knowing the identity of neither the first nor the last book: see below, pp. 259–61).

15. Though, as we shall see, in some books the first or last of these sections is missing.

is printed separately from it as an introduction to both Lives, with a separate title in which the subjects of both Lives are named: e.g., “In Periclem et Fabium Maximum praefatio.”¹⁶

However, at the start of the twentieth century Anton Stiefenhofer suggested, without reference to Crusierius, that some pairs of Lives began with what he called a “common introduction” (“gemeinsame Einleitung”), which listed the similarities of the subject of the two Lives.¹⁷ More recently Philip Stadter, in an influential paper of 1988, argued that every pair of Lives opens with a “proem,” which he categorized as being either “formal” or “informal” (or “integrated”): according to Stadter, 13 out of the surviving 22 books begin with “formal” proems, while 9 begin with what he called “informal” proems. “Formal” proems, Stadter argued, introduce explicitly both Lives of a pair, though they may concentrate more on one than the other; they often suggest some rationale for the pairing, as well as discussing Plutarch’s purpose or method. “Informal” proems, on the other hand, introduce explicitly only the first Life of a pair, and make use of a set of standard topics: the subject’s family, education, and physical appearance. They also often contain references to, or discussion of, sources. Stadter described the purpose of “informal” proems as “arousing interest in his book and establishing goodwill toward the author.”¹⁸

Stadter’s paper has been very influential and its twofold categorization of formal and informal proems has been largely accepted.¹⁹ This categorization is, I believe, however, unhelpful. First, Stadter’s categorization saw “formal” and “informal” proems as mutually exclusive. But, in fact, the presence of a prologue (that is, a prologue to the *book*, Stadter’s “formal proem”) does not preclude the presence of a section immediately following it (that is, at the start of the first Life), which focuses on the subject of the first Life and employs

16. *Kim.-Luc.*, *Per.-Fab.*, *Phok.-Cato Min.*, *Dion-Brut.*, *Aem.-Tim.*, *Sert.-Eum.*, *Pel.-Marc.*, *Demetr.-Ant.* and *Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi*. In addition *Nik.-Crass.* begins with “Proemium in Niciam” (not “in Niciam et Crassum”). Crusierius also marks off as distinct the opening chapters of three more first Lives (*Thes.* 1; *Alex.* 1; *Dem.* 1–3): *Alex.* 2.1 and *Dem.* 4.1 are separated from what precedes with a blank line and a large initial letter; *Thes.* 2.1 begins on a new line with an indentation. In these three cases, however, he gives no separate title and these chapters are presented as part of the first Life. Stephanus’ Greek edition of 1572, and Crusierius’ accompanying Latin translation, follow this latter practice: they separate from the rest of the Life the opening chapters of 13 first Lives by beginning a new line and using a slight indentation for what follows (in an edition otherwise without indentation), but without a separate title.

17. Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 468–74, 485.

18. Stadter 1988: 287. Cf. Rosenmeyer 1992, which is much less useful than Stadter. Rosenmeyer makes no distinction between the prologues to books and other sorts of beginnings, nor between first and second Lives.

19. A number of detailed studies of individual prologues (what Stadter calls “formal proems”) has followed: e.g., Pelling 1999 431–33, on *Thes.* 1 (the prologue to *Thes.-Rom.*); Duff 1999: 13–51, on *Alex.* 1 (prologue to *Alex.-Caes.*), *Nik.* 1 (*Nik.-Crass.*), *Aem.* 1 (*Aem.-Tim.*), *Per.* 1–2 (*Per.-Fab.*), *Demetr.* 1–2 (*Demetr.-Ant.* 137–41 on *Phok.* 1–3 (*Phok.-Cato Min.*); Duff 2004, on *Demetr.* 1–2 (*Demetr.-Ant.*); Burlando 2000 and Zadorojnyi 2006 on *Dem.* 1–2 (*Dem.-Cic.*). Pelling 2002b discusses Plutarch’s self-presentation in his prologues.

the topics which Stadter mentions as characteristic of “informal proems,” plus, importantly, that of character.²⁰ Most prologues are followed by such a section. In addition, most Lives which fall second in a pair also open with a section that exploits these same standard biographical topics,²¹ and, as we shall see, the content and function of such opening sections are not noticeably different whether they introduce first or second Lives of a pair or, in the case of first Lives, whether they are preceded by a prologue or not.²² Stadter’s “informal” proems are best seen, then, as simply the opening sections of first Lives which do not follow a prologue.

I would prefer instead, then, to return to Stiefenhofer’s distinction between those 13 books which begin with what I shall call a prologue, and those 8 which do not.²³ In books which do not begin with a prologue, the opening of the book coincides with the opening of the first Life. There is also one additional book, not counted in these statistics: the *Themistokles–Camillus*. As preserved in our manuscripts this book does not contain a prologue; but its opening is almost certainly corrupt and a prologue may have been lost.²⁴ Why Plutarch wrote prologues to only 13 (or possibly 14) out of the 22 surviving pairs is unclear,²⁵ though, as we shall see, there are some grounds for suggesting that the lack of a prologue in such cases is not entirely random.²⁶ But where prologues do occur they introduce both Lives and stand outside of either, in the same way as the closing *synkriseis* do. Books which begin with prologues are the *Theseus–Romulus*, *Kimon–Lucullus*, *Perikles–Fabius*, *Nikias–Crassus*, *Demosthenes–Cicero*, *Phokion–Cato Minor*, *Dion–Brutus*, *Aemilius–Timoleon*, *Sertorius–Eumenes*, *Pelopidas–Marcellus*, *Alexander–Caesar*, *Demetrios–Antony* and *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi*.²⁷

I.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROLOGUES

Thirteen books, then (just over half the extant corpus), begin with prologues. In this section I shall argue that a common structure underlies all prologues, with some variation, and that, although the manuscripts present them as part of the first

20. These topics were first described by Leo 1901: 180–82.

21. Only *Rom.* (below, p. 238), *Tim.* (below p. 239) and *Caes.* do not. The *Caes.* is a special case, as it is likely that the opening has been lost: see appendix 2.

22. Though see below, pp. 238, 240 and 241–42.

23. Stiefenhofer 1914/16 points out that 10 pairs have both “common introduction” and *synkrisis* (470–71), argues that the double pair *Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi* should also be regarded as having a single introduction and *synkrisis* (471–73), and points to two pairs which have “common introduction” but no *synkrisis* (*Phok.-Cato Min*; *Alex.-Caes.*): total, 13.

24. See below, n.53.

25. Nikolaidis 2005: 291 and 316–17, arguing from what can be reconstructed about relative order of composition, suggests that those pairs lacking prologues may not have been conceived or composed as a pair from the start, but only matched later.

26. See below, p. 241–42.

27. Books without a prologue are: *Sol.-Pub.*, *Arist.-Cato Maj.*, *Cor.-Alk.*, *Phil.-Flam.*, *Pyrrh.-Mar.*, *Lyk.-Num.*, *Lys.-Sulla*, *Ages.-Pomp.*, plus the *Them.-Cam.*

Life, they are in fact clearly set apart from it by a number of formal devices; they operate, that is, at the level of the book, not of the Life.²⁸

First, the internal structure of the prologues: most contain two distinct sections. The first section contains generalized reflections either on the purpose of history or of the *Parallel Lives* specifically, or on some moral issue; sometimes the two sorts (moral reflections and reflections on the purpose of the Lives) are combined. *Chreiai*, apophthegms, anecdotes, and literary allusions are common in this section, especially in the opening lines. Addresses to Sosius Senecio, the dedicatee of the *Parallel Lives*, occur in the opening sentence of three prologues, but never elsewhere in the prologues.²⁹ Towards the end of the first section there is a tendency for generalized reflections to become more specific: for example, reflections on virtue become reflections on the virtues of the great men in history (e.g., *Per.* 2.3–4); reflections on the problems posed by small-town life become reflections on Plutarch's own situation in Chaironeia (*Dem.* 2.2–3); reflections on the importance of negative examples become reflections on the reasonableness of including such examples in the *Lives* (*Demetr.* 1.5–6). The two subjects are normally neither named nor alluded to in this section, though in a few prologues the subject of one Life is named in the course of these reflections. This has the effect of creating suspense, or, to use ancient terminology, “arousing interest in the reader.”³⁰

The second, usually shorter, section of the prologue is often introduced by a resumptive οὖν, διό, τοῦτο or ταῦτα.³¹ It usually begins with an explicit naming of the two subjects, and then gives a rationale for their comparison, pointing out similarities between the two men. In this section, Plutarch frequently refers subjectively to the writing process and occasionally here (and only here) uses the term “book”—this is, after all, the introduction to the book as a whole.³² First

28. A more detailed study of the structure of the prologues can be found in Duff (forthcoming).

29. *Thes.* 1.1; *Dem.* 1.1; *Dion* 1.1. Cf. Pelling 2002b: 270, who relates the placing of the addresses to Senecio in these three prologues to their subject matter or that of the Lives which they introduce. The second person singular is also used in two prologues (*Ag./Kleom.* 2.9; *Aem.* 1.6). There is one mention of listeners (ἀκροατῶν) at *Thes.* 1.5, and three references to “readers” (*Alex.* 1.1, τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας; *Nik.* 1.1, τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας; *Demetr.* 1.5, τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων) (cf. Pelling 2002b: 276–77). The only other address to Senecio in the *Lives* is once in the transition from a first Life to a second (*Dem.* 31.7). Addresses to Senecio elsewhere occur in the first line of *Prof. in virt.* (75a), and in the first line of each of the 9 books of *Quaest. conv.*, as well as in the last line of that work as a whole (748d). (In fact, he also appears as a participant in *Quest. conv.* 1 problem 5 (622d-), 2 problem 3 (635e-), 4 problem 3 (666d-)).

30. One of the functions of rhetorical prologues according to ancient theoreticians: see, e.g., the passages cited in Lausberg 1960: §266–79. Cf. similarly “oblique” openings in the *Moralia*, e.g., *De Curiositate* 515b-d. Such suspense would be heightened if the two subjects were not named in a title at the start of the book (see below, n.232).

31. δ' οὖν: *Thes.* 2.1; *Kim.* 3.1; οὖν: *Per.* 2.5; διό: *Dem.* 3.1; ταῦτα δέ: *Phok.* 3.1; *Pel.* 2.9 *Ag./Kleom.* 2.7; τοῦτο δέ: *Sert.* 1.11; *Demetr.* 1.7; ὧν (equivalent to τοῦτων): *Aem.* 1.6.

32. For the term “book,” see above, n.3. It is striking that Plutarch never uses the term “book” in the first section of the prologue or in the *synkrisis*. On references to the writing process, cf. Pelling 2002b: 269.

person verbs, as well as references to “me” or “us,” occur in both sections of the prologue, as they do also in the *synkrisis* (they are much rarer in the two Lives). But the presence of the narrator is generally felt more strongly in the second section, though there is a tendency to move towards more impersonal expressions as we approach the end.³³

This two-part structure is found in all but two of the surviving thirteen prologues.³⁴ Take the *Perikles–Fabius* prologue (*Per.* 1–2). It begins not with mention of the subjects of the two Lives, but with an anecdote about the emperor Augustus. It continues with a contrast between sense-perception and reason: the former must receive every stimulus which impinges on it, whereas our reason may be directed towards objects that will benefit us. Such an object is provided by virtuous deeds, which inspire their “viewers” not just to admire them, as works of art inspire their viewers, but to imitate them; consideration of the virtuous deeds of others thus brings benefit, not just pleasure or admiration (*Per.* 1.1–2.4).³⁵ Already by this point it has become clear that, in talking of deeds (πράξεις), Plutarch expects his readers to have in mind the deeds of statesmen, recorded in history.³⁶ But it is only at this point that Plutarch mentions for the first time the subjects of the two Lives which this prologue introduces and the reasons for their pairing: “So it seemed right for us too (Ἔδοξεν οὖν καὶ ἡμῖν . . .) [i.e., because history in general is beneficial] to persevere in our writing of the Lives, and we have composed this book, tenth in the series, which contains the Life of Perikles and that of Fabius Maximus, who fought it out with Hannibal: men who were alike in their virtues, especially in their calmness and justice and their ability to endure the follies of their peoples and of their colleagues in office, and so proved most beneficial to their countries . . .” (*Per.* 2.5).

The same structure is seen in the prologue to the *Aemilius–Timoleon* (*Aem.* 1). A claim for the moral benefits to be gained from studying the great men of the past begins [section 1], enlivened both by the image of such men as actually appearing to Plutarch, like phantoms, and by the claim that Plutarch himself was an eager imitator of the men whose Lives he wrote, always concentrating

33. First person verbs and pronouns in the first section: *Thes.* 1.2–5; *Per.* 1.2; 1.4; 2.3; *Dem.* 1.1; 1.4; 2.2–4; *Kim.* 2.2–3; *Aem.* 1.1–5; *Ag./Kleom.* 2.6 (but the section division is more complex here: see appendix 1); *Demetr.* 1.1; 1.5–6. In the second section: *Kim.* 3.1; *Per.* 2.5; *Dem.* 3.1, 4; *Pel.* 2.9; *Sert.* 1.8; 1.11; *Phok.* 3.2; 3.6; *Dion.* 2.5; *Aem.* 1.6; *Ag./Kleom.* 2.7; 2.9. In transitional sentences: *Kim.* 3.3; *Per.* 2.5; *Pel.* 2.12; *Dion.* 2.7; cf. *Phok.* 4.1 (n. 52, below). Perrin’s Loeb translation sometimes introduces first and second persons where they do not exist in the Greek: e.g. *Phok.* 1.4; 2.9; *Dem.* 3.5. In *Aem.* 1.6 Perrin introduces the term “readers”.

34. General reflections, *Thes.* 1; rationale for comparison, *Thes.* 2. Reflections, *Kim.* 2; rationale, *Kim.* 3. Reflections, *Per.* 1.1–2.4; rationale, *Per.* 2.5. Reflections, *Dem.* 1–2; rationale, *Dem.* 3. Reflections, *Phok.* 1–2; rationale, *Phok.* 3. Reflections, *Dion.* 1.1; rationale, *Dion.* 1.1–2.7. Reflections, *Aem.* 1.1–5; rationale, *Aem.* 1.6. Reflections, *Sert.* 1.1–7; rationale, *Sert.* 1.8–12. Reflections, *Pel.* 1.1–8; rationale, *Pel.* 1.9–12. Reflections, *Demetr.* 1.1–6; rationale, *Demetr.* 1.7–8. Reflections, *Ag./Kleom.* 1.1–2.6; rationale, *Ag./Kleom.* 2.7–11.

35. For discussion of this section of the *Per.–Fab.* prologue, see Duff 1999: 34–45.

36. Cf. ἱστορήσασιν at 1.4 and τῆ ἱστορίᾳ at 2.4.

his mind on “the best and fairest examples” (1.1–5). This leads neatly into the naming of the subjects of this book and a summary of their similarities [section 2]: “Of which [i.e., as instances of those men who fall into the category of ‘best and fairest examples’] in the present [sc. book] (ἐν τῷ παρόντι) we have made ready for you (προκεχειρίσμεθά σοι) the life of Timoleon the Corinthian and Aemilius Paulus, men who . . . will make it difficult to decide whether the greatest of their successes were a result of their good fortune or their good sense” (1.6).³⁷ The phrase ἐν τῷ παρόντι without a noun usually means “at present” or “in the present circumstances.” Here, however, it is natural to take it as referring more specifically to the work Plutarch is introducing: “in the present book.” We have, then, here the same elements we noted in the *Perikles–Fabius* prologue: generalized reflections on the moral value of the Lives, introduction of the two subjects of this pair as virtuous and providing instructive examples, and reference to the book or writing process.

Recognizing that *Aem.* 1 is the prologue to the whole *Aemilius–Timoleon* book has one further consequence. In our manuscripts, the *Aemilius* precedes the *Timoleon*. But all modern editors, from the 1519 Aldine edition onwards, including the Loeb and the Budé, reverse the manuscript order of the Lives and place *Timoleon* first, on the grounds that Plutarch’s usual practice is to place the Greek Life before the Roman. But *Aem.* 1., the prologue to the book as a whole, must precede both Lives of the pair, and Ziegler must therefore have been right to restore the manuscript order in his Teubner edition.³⁸ The same argument can be made for the *Sertorius–Eumenes*, where the order recorded in our manuscripts, in which the Roman Life precedes the Greek, is guaranteed by the fact that *Sert.* 1 forms the prologue to the book as a whole.³⁹

Most prologues follow this same basic structure, in which the two subjects are only named after a section of reflections, and in which the final element is a list of similarities between the two men. The exceptions are the prologues to the *Alexander–Caesar* and the *Nikias–Crassus* (*Alex.* 1; *Nik.* 1), which both begin directly with mention of the two subjects in the first line. They continue by

37. The second person singular pronoun in *Aem.* 1.6 (σοι) is most naturally taken as addressed to the reader, though it could also perhaps be taken as referring more specifically to Sosius Senecio, who though nowhere named in this prologue, is addressed directly in the opening lines of several other prologues: see above, n.29.

38. See also below, n.119. Note that, when Sintenis 1839–1846 printed the *Tim.* before the *Aem.*, as had all previous editions since the Aldine, he shifted the prologue (*Aem.* 1) to before the *Tim.* (a practice followed by all later editors until Ziegler restored the mss. order), thus tacitly acknowledging that *Aem.* 1 is the prologue to the book as a whole and not merely to the *Aem.* In this Sintenis was anticipated by Crusenius, whose accompanying Latin translation to Stephanus’ 1572 Greek text moves *Aem.* 1 to before the *Tim.*, with a note “Proemium hoc in exemplari Graeco Vitae Pauli Aemili praefixum est: quod tamen aptius hic collocatur”; Stephanus’ Greek text, however, and Crusenius’ 1566–1567 translations keep *Aem.* 1 at the start of the *Aem.* and in the middle of the (wrongly ordered) *Tim.–Aem.* Boccardo’s 1499 Latin edition, which likewise prints *Tim.* before *Aem.*, simply omits *Aem.* 1.

39. On the order of Lives in these two books and in the *Cor.–Alk.*, see above, n.2.

addressing the reader immediately afterwards and asking for indulgence for not giving a lengthy military narrative, and then proceed to discuss methodological issues concerning how Plutarch will write the Lives which will follow. Neither prologue lists the similarities of the two men. In effect, then, *Alex.* 1 and *Nik.* 1 combine and streamline the two sections which are kept separate in the other eleven prologues.⁴⁰ In these two prologues, as in the others, there is a strong sense of the narrator's presence, much stronger than in the Lives themselves which follow, and both he and the readers are implicitly characterized.⁴¹

1.2 TRANSITION FROM PROLOGUE TO FIRST LIFE

That the prologues are to be conceived of as separate, beyond the fact that they introduce and in many cases discuss both Lives of the pair, is indicated by two compositional features. First, many prologues end with a "transitional" phrase—a phrase, that is, that signals the end of the particular discussion in progress and looks forward to what follows. The *Kimon–Lucullus* prologue, for example, after running through various similarities between the two figures, concludes "We pass over perhaps some additional similarities, but it will not be difficult to collect them from the narrative itself" (*Kim.* 3.3).⁴² The use of the term "narrative" (διήγησις) is significant here: the prologue, which is emphatically not narrative, is set apart from what follows.⁴³ A similar transitional phrase, which points forwards to the Lives that will follow, is found at the end of the *Pelopidas–Marcellus* prologue, where a list of resemblances between the two men is concluded with "So taking the lead from these similarities, we have recorded their Lives in parallel" (*Pel.* 2.12).⁴⁴ The *Dion–Brutus* prologue closes first by dismissing further speculation on the subject of whether phantoms can really have appeared to the two men: "But these things (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν) must be delayed for another work" (λόγον, *Dion.* 2.7)—a closural sentence common in the *Lives*, though not paralleled elsewhere in the prologues.⁴⁵ It then concludes by pointing forward to the two Lives that

40. For discussion of these two prologues, and further bibliography, see Duff 1999: 14–30; forthcoming.

41. See Stadter 1988: 292; Pelling 2002b.

42. παραλείπομεν δ' ἴσως καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς ὁμοιότητας, ἃς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἐκ τῆς διηγήσεως αὐτῆς συναγαγεῖν.

43. For "narrative" (διήγησις) used in a prologue to refer to the Life or Lives proper, cf. (as well as *Kim.* 3.3), *Ag./Kleom.* 2.9 (below, pp. 253 and 266), "These things you will judge yourself from the narrative" (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς διηγήσεως). For "narrative" as used to refer to the Life proper as opposed to the *synkrisis*: *Ag./Kleom.–Gracch.* 1.1, "now that this narrative has an end" (ταύτης πέρας ἔχουσης τῆς διηγήσεως); *Nik.–Crass.* 2.3, "what passed us by in the narrative"; *Aem.–Tim.* 1.1, "since they were like this in their narrative" (κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν).

44. διόπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπόμενοι ταῖς ὁμοιότησι παραλλήλους ἀνεγράψαμεν αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους.

45. E.g., (with slight variations of wording) *Num.* 12.13; *Cato Maj.* 7.3; *Per.* 6.5, 39.3; *Fab.* 16.6; *Alk.* 13.9; *Cor.* 11.6; *Tim.* 13.10; *Lys.* 17.11; cf. Frazier 1996: 51–52. Cf. the use of ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν or similar to close a discussion with a reference to the reliability of the material that has preceded: e.g., *Cam.* 5.6; 22.5; *Sert.* 9.10; *Mar.* 11.12 ("But this story is more like guesswork than reliable history"); *Ag./Kleom.* 21.4; *Gracchi* 33.7, 37.8; *Art.* 18.7.; with an invitation to the reader to judge, a

will follow, especially the first: “In this one (ἐν δὲ τούτῳ δέ), the twelfth [sc. λόγῳ, i.e., book] of the Parallel Lives, let us bring forward on to the stage first the [Life] of the older man.”⁴⁶ The *Demosthenes–Cicero* prologue closes with the notion of judging the two men, and with a transitional phrase similar to that in the *Dion*: “. . . it would be difficult to judge whether nature made them more alike in their manners or fortune in the facts of their lives. But the discussion should be (λεκτέον δέ) about the older man first” (*Dem.* 3.5).⁴⁷

Other transitional phrases are more explicit in their injunction to the reader to examine what follows in order to look for confirmation of the points made in the prologue. The *Perikles–Fabius* prologue concludes, “But whether we aim correctly at what we should it is possible [sc. for you] to judge from my account” (*Per.* 2.5).⁴⁸ The *Aemilius–Timoleon* moves easily in a single sentence from introduction of the names of the two subjects—who are presented as “the fairest of examples”—to a list of their similarities, to a claim that, as the two men are so similar, “they will make it a matter of dispute whether the greatest of their successes were a result of their good fortune or their good sense” (*Aem.* 1.6).⁴⁹ As in the *Perikles–Fabius*, an implied address to the reader and a reference to their judgment, their active involvement, marks the end of the prologue.⁵⁰

The second indication that the prologues are to be regarded as separate from the first Life is that most are followed by asyndeton. As Stadter noticed, of the 13 books which have prologues (his “formal proems”), in 9 cases the first Life proper begins with no connective of any kind (*Thest.* 3.1; *Kim.* 4.1; *Dem.* 4.1; *Dion* 3.1; *Aem.* 2.1; *Sert.* 2.1; *Pel.* 3.1; *Alex.* 2.1; *Ag./Kleom.* 3.1).⁵¹ The other four

plea for indulgence, or a reference to its utility (see the examples in Frazier 1996: 52 nn.30–31, but delete *Lyk.* 16.8 and for 19.3 read 19.13 and for *Dem.* 15.5 read 15.6). Clausural ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν in the *Moralia*: e.g., *Quomodo adulat.* 54b; *De tuenda sanit.* 131b; *De fort. Rom.* 322c; *De E* 389c; fr. 134 (end). On ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, see below, n.79.

46. Cf. above, pp. 238–39.

47. ὥστ' εἰ γένοιτο τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τύχῃ καθάπερ τεχνίταις ἄμιλλα, χαλεπῶς ἂν διακριθῆναι, πότερον αὐτῇ τοῖς τρόποις ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐκείνῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὁμοιοτέρους ἀπειργασται. λεκτέον δὲ περὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου πρότερον.

48. εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς στοχαζόμεθα τοῦ δέοντος ἔξεστι κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν γραφομένων: literally, “from what is being written”; cf. τῶν περὶ Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρωνος ἱστορουμένων, “the things being recorded” in *Dem.-Cic.* 1.1. Compare the transitional phrase at the end of the prologue to Book 7 of the *Table Talk*: ἔξεστι δὲ κρίνειν τοῖς παραδείγμασιν, ὧν τὴν ἑβδόμην δεκάδα τοῦτι περιέχει τὸ βιβλίον.

49. ὧν ἐν τῷ παρόντι προκεχειρίσμεθά σοι τὸν Τιμολέοντος τοῦ Κορινθίου καὶ Αἰμιλίου Παύλου βίον, ἀνδρῶν οὐ μόνον ταῖς αἰρέσεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοίως κεχηρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ διαμφισβήτησιν παρεξόντων, πότερον εὐποτυμῆα μᾶλλον ἢ φρονήσει τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πεπραγμένων κατώρθωσαν.

50. See also *Phok.* 3.9 (. . . ὥστε λεπτοῦ πάνυ λόγου δεῖσθαι καθάπερ ὀργάνου πρὸς διάκρισιν καὶ ἀνεύρεσιν τῶν διαφερόντων).

51. Though not part of the *Parallel Lives*, the *Aratos* and *Galba* show some similarities with this pattern: a prologue in *Arat.* 1 and *Galba* 1–2 is followed by asyndeton in *Arat.* 2.1 and *Galba* 3.1. See Stadter 1988: 294–95 and, on the *Aratos* prologue, appendix 3 below. For further on the *Galba* prologue, cf. Georgiadou 1988: 349–52; Ash 1997: esp. 191–96; Duff 1999: 20; 28–29.

cases (*Per.* 3.1; *Nik.* 2.1; *Phok.* 4.1; *Demetr.* 2.1) have logical particles (γάρ, οὖν, μὲν οὖν, τοίνυν respectively)—but never the connective δέ.⁵² This is not another way of saying that Lives never begin with a δέ. In fact while first Lives never begin with δέ, even when preceded by a prologue, roughly half of the second Lives do.⁵³ Indeed, in six cases, the δέ at the start of a second Life picks up a μὲν at the end of the first.⁵⁴ There is, then, in many books at least, a stronger break between the prologue and first Life than between first Life and second.⁵⁵ It would accordingly make sense for editors to print the prologue as a separate section, one of four that make up the book, and not, as all modern editors do, following the lead of the manuscripts, as part of the first Life. Similarly first Lives which follow a prologue should be thought of as beginning at a point other than 1.1 in the conventional numbering system.⁵⁶

2. THE OPENINGS OF LIVES

As we have seen, the openings of books are to be clearly distinguished from the openings of Lives. It is to the latter that we now turn. It is usually assumed that Lives are arranged in roughly chronological order, beginning with childhood or youth. However, while much of the body of the Lives is structured chronologically (albeit enlivened with digressions, anachronies, and static descriptions of character), openings are not. Instead, as I shall now argue, most Lives begin with a section in which the structure is thematic and may be wholly unchronological. This applies regardless of whether the Life falls first or second in the book, and—if it falls first—regardless of whether it is preceded by a prologue. Such sections, which I will call “synoptic” or “proemial” openings, often employ the standard biographical topics first described by Friedrich Leo: the subject’s family, character, education, physical appearance, etc.⁵⁷ But the distinctive feature of

52. Stadter 1988: 276. The transition from formal prologue to first Life is handled rather unusually in the *Phokion–Cato Minor*. The prologue ends with a statement that Phokion and Cato are so similar that it will be hard to identify the differences between them (*Phok.* 3.9: quoted in n.50). This is then followed by a statement about Cato’s family, i.e., that of the second figure, with μὲν (τὸ μὲν οὖν Κάτωνος . . .), which is then picked up by a reference to Phokion’s family (Φωκίωνα δέ . . .) (*Phok.* 4.1). This connective strategy is similar to that found at the transition from first to second Life in six pairs, but is unique in the transition from prologue to first Life. That editors are right to place the beginning of the *Phokion* at the reference to Cato’s family, and not at the reference to Phokion’s which follows, is confirmed by Plutarch’s practice as regards connectives: first Lives never begin with the connective δέ.

53. The *Themistokles*, a first Life apparently not preceded by a prologue, appears to open with Θεμιστοκλεῖ δέ but the δέ suggests that something has been lost: at the least, the opening words of the *Them.*, possibly also a prologue to the *Them.-Cam.* book as a whole. See Duff 2008b: 176–79.

54. See below, pp. 246–47

55. Asyndeton occurs at the start of 5, possibly 6, second Lives (not counting the *Caesar*, which is probably corrupt): see below, p. 247–49.

56. See appendix 4.

57. Leo 1901: 180–82. Leo noted in passing that some of the material in this section applies to the whole of the subject’s life and not just his youth.

proemial (or “synoptic”) openings is not the presence of these topics, nor the fact that they often contain material which deals with the subject’s youth; indeed, these early sections of Lives often also contain material relating to the subject’s later life too. Rather what distinguishes proemial openings from the rest of the Life is a narratological feature: they are not structured chronologically (or at least the *logic* of their structure is not chronological, even if at times it may coincide with the chronological order of events). Indeed, in many cases the end of such opening sections is clearly marked as the point at which chronological narrative begins. Instead proemial openings treat the life of the subject as a whole, and are structured thematically. They may thus contain static discussions or descriptions, anecdotes without narrative context, or references to events or behaviour drawn from any period of the subject’s life. Very often such material serves to introduce the character of the subject and to foreshadow themes and images which will recur later in the Life or events which will later be important. I will not here press the “prefiguring” function of these opening sections;⁵⁸ instead I will concentrate on demonstrating that there is a structural difference between these early sections and the rest of the Life.

2.1 PROEMIAL (OR “SYNOPTIC”) OPENINGS

A good example of a clearly demarcated proemial opening, which looks diachronically at the subject’s whole life, is found at the start of the *Camillus*, the second Life of the *Themistokles–Camillus* book. The Life begins with discussion of the fact that Camillus never held the consulship—the reason being, Plutarch explains, the poor relations between Senate and people at the time, and Camillus’ refusal to hold the consulship “over an unwilling people” (*Cam.* 1.1–4). In all the other offices he held, however, Plutarch continues, Camillus showed himself both shrewd and modest (*Cam.* 1.4). This is plainly a judgment on Camillus’ *whole* career; it concerns neither early years nor does it narrate. Chronological narrative begins (with δέ) in the next chapter (2.1), which now returns to the start of Camillus’ career as an adult, with his first campaign (“At a time when the house of the Furii was not yet very illustrious, he was the first to achieve fame by his own efforts, in the great battle . . .”).⁵⁹ From this point on, chronological narrative predominates.

The proemial opening is particularly long and particularly clearly marked in the *Perikles* (*Per.* 3–6),⁶⁰ and deals with Perikles’ family, appearance, teachers, education, and character, and introduces or foreshadows many themes which will be important later in the Life.⁶¹ The section on Perikles’ education and character,

58. I have done so elsewhere: see Duff 2003; 2008b; 2008c: 191–204; cf. 1999: 162–68. Cf. on the prefiguring function of discussions of ancestors, Pelling 1988b: 117; Duff 1999: 310–11.

59. Οὕτω δὲ τότε περὶ τὸν Φουρίων οἶκον οὐσης μεγάλης ἐπιφανείας, αὐτὸς ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πρῶτος εἰς δόξαν προήλθεν . . . For further on the opening of the *Cam.*, see Duff 2010: 58–59.

60. *Per.* 1–2 being the prologue to the *Perikles–Fabius* book and not part of the *Perikles* itself.

61. See Duff 2008c: 192–96.

especially his relationship to Anaxagoras and the character traits which he is supposed to have learnt from him, plainly relate to his adult life (4.1–5.1).⁶² This is therefore not narrative nor does it concern only early education or childhood character. Two anecdotes illustrate the points made about Perikles' character: a story of how he endured abuse demonstrates his calmness (5.2), and an anecdote about a one-horned goat shows his rationality (6.2–3). Both are presented without reference to chronology but plainly again concern the adult Perikles, not the youth.⁶³ Closure to the latter anecdote and to the proemial opening as a whole is achieved by the typically Plutarchan closural sentence “These things perhaps belong to another treatise” (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἑτέρας ἐστὶ πραγματείας) (6.5). Chronological narrative begins with a δέ in the next sentence: “When Perikles was very young . . . ” (7.1).⁶⁴ As Stadter points out, the term “young” here is itself imprecise; the word could be used of men up till the age of 40 or so.⁶⁵ But the important thing for our purposes is that 7.1 marks the beginning of what is presented as chronological narrative, and gives the appearance of going back to the start of the subject's career (even if in reality it is not).

This pattern can be found in numerous other Lives; take the *Fabius*, the second Life in the *Perikles–Fabius* book: chapter 1 of the *Fabius* (1.2–9)⁶⁶ forms the proemial opening, dealing with Fabius' family, training, character, and voice, and concluding with reference to a speech of his delivered as an encomium of his son who died after holding the consulship, i.e., when Fabius himself was old. Chronological narrative begins in 2.1 with Fabius' own first consulship and the beginning of his struggle with Hannibal (Πέντε δ' ὑπατειῶν ἃς ὑπάτευσεν ἢ πρώτῃ. . .).⁶⁷

The *Crassus*, the second Life in the *Nikias–Crassus* book, follows a similar pattern. Chapters 1–3 deal with his family, his greed, his wealth and how he used it, and his education. While some of this may be taken as providing an introduction to the state of Crassus' finances when he began his political career, many of the supporting anecdotes cited in this section relate to periods later in his life: for example, he is described as making an inventory of his property “before his expedition against the Parthians” (2.3), which took place when he was around 60, and as pleading cases which Pompey, Caesar, or Cicero refused (3.4), which—given that he was considerably older than any of them—must have taken place when he was well into adulthood. Similarly, if the philosopher called Alexander whom he is said to have patronized (3.6–7) is to be identified as Alexander Polyhistor, this too must be dated to Crassus' thirties at the earliest.

62. Stadter 1987: 257–58; 1989: 68.

63. On this aspect of *Per.* 4–6, see Duff 2008a: 14–15.

64. Ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς νέος μὲν ὢν σφόδρα τὸν δῆμον εὐλαβεῖτο.

65. Stadter 1989 ad loc.

66. *Fab.* 1.1 is a transitional sentence. The *Fabius* proper begins at *Fab.* 1.2 in the conventional numbering system: see below, p. 247.

67. On *Fab.* 1, cf. Duff 2008a: 16.

Indeed, Plutarch closes his discussion of Crassus' relationship with Alexander, and the proemial opening as a whole (3.8), with the words "But these things happened later" (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον). Chronological narrative only begins in the next sentence (Ἐπεὶ δέ . . .), with Crassus a young man (νέος ὢν παντάπασι) escaping Marius and Cinna's reign of terror BC, when he would have been in his mid to late twenties (*Crass.* 4.1).⁶⁸

Chapter 1 of the *Cato Major* discusses Cato's family, name, appearance, character, and performance in war. Then his frugal habits are examined (chs. 2–6) and his oratory, which also revealed his severity (7–9). The structure here is plainly thematic: most of the anecdotes are undateable and presented without chronological context. There is, it is true, some sense of chronological movement: from his presence at Tarentum in 209 BC (2.3); to Valerius Flaccus' taking an interest in Cato as a young man, which should be dated to before 195 BC, when they were both consuls (3.1–4); to his service as quaestor in Africa under Scipio (204 BC); to his stern remarks to Eumenes II on his visit to Rome in 172 BC (8.12–13), and his equally stern remarks on a Roman embassy to Bithynia in 149 BC (9.1). But in that last incident Cato must have been 85 and it is clear that we have gone far beyond his early years. When chronological narrative begins in 10.1, after a transitional phrase at 9.12 (τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπομνημονευμάτων γένος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν), we go back to Cato's election as consul (Ἰππατος δέ . . .) in 195 BC.

Proemial openings, then, contain material drawn from any point in the subject's life; this material, furthermore, is often not told in chronological order, or even in a way which might suggest that it is chronological. The organization is thematic, and while proemial openings may contain material from childhood, they look at the Life as a whole and contain material from adult life too. An important concomitant of this is that childhood in the *Lives* is rarely narrated.⁶⁹ That is, while stories from childhood often occur in these early sections, there is rarely *narrative* of the subject's early years. Thus it would be incorrect to talk, as some scholars do, of Plutarch hurrying through early years or including flashes forward to later life; that would imply the presence of a chronological structure which can then

68. Cf. the *Solon*: proemial opening (1–7), which includes quotations of his poetry and details of meetings with Thales and Anacharsis, ending with a closural phrase (7.6). Narrative begins at 8.1 (Ἐπεὶ δέ . . .).

69. There are a few exceptions. One is the *Dem.-Cic.*, where childhood and education are narrated (*Dem.* 4–5; *Cic.* 2–5). This may relate to the fact that these two men were literary figures as well as statesmen: although Plutarch denies in *Dem.* 3.1–2 that he will deal with them as literary stylists, the two Lives do have features more commonly associated with the Lives of philosophers, including a greater interest in education and teachers. Another is *Pyrrh.* 2–3, a narrative of Pyrrhos' escape from Epirus as a baby. But that narrative might be regarded as an extended anecdote within the topic of family and ancestry, and is followed (3.6–9) by a non-chronological discussion of Pyrrhos' appearance and healing powers, which ends with a reference to his death and a closural phrase ("These things [happened] later"). The length of the anecdote of Pyrrhos' escape may be connected with the epic tone of the *Pyrrh.* (cf. the reference to Achilles in 1.2 with Mossman 1992). Cf. below, pp. 238–40, on the *Thes.* and *Rom.*

be manipulated or interrupted.⁷⁰ Nor is childhood treated as a theme in its own right; rather stories from childhood, as stories from later in the subject's life, are used to illustrate or confirm points made about family, appearance or character, but there is no interest in childhood *per se*.⁷¹ And once the chronological part of the Life begins, with the subject normally presented as a young adult, stories from childhood rarely occur.⁷²

All this can be seen clearly in the *Cato Minor*, the second Life in the *Phokion–Cato Minor* book. The Life begins with mention of Cato's family (1.1–2). It then turns to Cato's steadfast, fearless, and inflexible character, which he demonstrated "right from childhood," including in his lessons (1.3–10). A series of anecdotes follow, which are intended to confirm and illustrate these traits: for example, he endures being held out of a window but will not change his mind, and he becomes enraged when in a game a younger boy is arrested by an older boy (chs. 2–3). Although these anecdotes are set in childhood, this is not *about* his childhood; rather the theme here is Cato's character, seen diachronically and conceived as static (i.e., as applying at all periods of his life). The logic of selection is thematic not chronological, as is made clear by the chronological casualness of the links between each anecdote: e.g., "on another occasion" (2.6), "it happened that" (3.3), etc.⁷³ The absence here and in the *Lives* in general of any narration of childhood, and the lack of any focus on childhood in its own right, is to be related to the more general ancient tendency to look to childhood for evidence of, or to illustrate, the character of the grown adult rather than as a period of Life interesting in itself or revealing of any kind of development.⁷⁴

70. Thus the claim of Beck 2007: 401–402 that Plutarch's treatment of childhood and youth is marked by "narrative acceleration," sometimes taking the form of ellipsis, is incorrect. Beck cites Genette 1980: 43, "... ellipsis or leap forward without any return is, obviously, not an anachrony but a simple acceleration of the narrative ..." (Genette continues, "it certainly has to do with *time*, but time approached as *order*"). In fact, Plutarchan openings do not generally use chronological order as a structuring principle at all, and childhood is almost never narrated. Beck does note (404–405, 411) that material from later in the subject's life is sometimes included in early sections of Lives, but prefers to see this (wrongly, in my view) as chronological displacement or flash-forward.

71. Cf. Frazier 1992: 4492–93 on the opening chapters of the *Alex*. Frazier 1996: 76, also notes that childhood is not narrated, but sees it, incorrectly in my view, as a topic of interest *per se*: "Elle [la jeunesse] en est en effet un des topiques et, dans la limite des renseignements conservés par la tradition, en constitue la première partie obligée, partie descriptive et non narrative." Russell's description (1966a: 149 = repr. 1995: 88) of such sections as concerning "personality revealed in childhood anecdotes" is more accurate.

72. *Demetr.* 28.10 is an exception, but the story there, which involves the young Demetrios, is in the first instance told to illustrate the character of his *father*, Antigonos.

73. ἔτι δὲ παιδὸς τοῦ Κάτωνος ὄντος... (2.1); πάλιν δέ... (2.6); οὕτω δ' ἦν περιβόητος... (3.1); ἔτυχεν δέ... (3.3); ἔτι μὲν οὖν παιδάριον ὄν μικρόν... (3.8). Cf. below, n.104.

74. See e.g., Gill 1983; Pelling 1990; 2002a: 321–29; Duff 2008a.

2.2 TRANSITION FROM PROEMIAL OPENING TO LIVES PROPER

In many Lives the point at which the proemial or synoptic opening ends and the narrative begins is clearly marked. In a few cases it is signalled by a closural or transitional phrase. Such transitional phrases may merely declare that what has preceded has not been told in chronological order: e.g., “But these things happened later” (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον), a phrase found at the end of the proemial openings of four Lives (*Pyrrh.* 3.9; *Ant.* 5.1; *Pomp.* 2.12; *Crass.* 3.8 [without the οὖν]), as well as elsewhere.⁷⁵ At other times, the end of the opening, non-chronological section of the Life is signalled with a resumptive statement about the subject’s character, such as “These things, then, are indications of Demetrios’ potential for kindness and justice” (*Demetr.* 4.5)⁷⁶—a phrase which indicates that what has immediately preceded has been organized primarily to bring out certain character-traits of the subject, and not in order to preserve the chronological order in which events actually happened (cf. also *Brut.* 2.8).⁷⁷ Elsewhere the end of the opening section is signalled by a statement that what has preceded would best be suited to another (i.e., non-narrative) work (*Per.* 6.7), or by an appeal to the reader to verify what has been said about the character of the subject by looking at his deeds, which will now be narrated: “Let these things be seen at once in his deeds” (*Mar.* 2.4).⁷⁸ All of these eight transitional phrases are introduced with μέν, and all but one with μέν οὖν, itself a typically “transitional” phrase.⁷⁹ In all seven cases, the μέν corresponds to a δέ in the next sentence, the first of the chronological narrative; these transitional sentences point forward, in other words, to what follows.

But whether or not proemial openings end with such closural or transitional phrases,⁸⁰ many are clearly marked off in other ways from the rest of the Life.

75. Other examples of ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον *vel sim.*, as a marker of closure: *Cam.* 16.3; *Luc.* 36.7 [without οὖν]; *Phil.* 13.8; *Flam.* 12.13 [without οὖν]; *Caes.* 4.9; *Alex.* 56.1; *Ant.* 50.7; *Lyk.* 7.5; 30.18; *Arat.* 43.9. Cf. Frazier 1996: 52, who refers also to *Cato Min.* 25.13 (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ χρόνους ὕστερον ἐπράχθη . . .). The expression occurs, always with μέν but without οὖν, in Herodotos (e.g., 6.73.1; 6.91.1; 7.137.3 [ταῦτα μὲν νυν]; 8.3.2) and Diodoros (e.g., 13.38.3; 17.18.1; cf. 4.53.2; 13.53.4, though these last two examples are not closural) but not in Thucydides or Xenophon.

76. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εὐφυΐας δείγματα τοῦ Δημητρίου πρὸς ἐπιεικειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

77. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν παρασήμων γένος ἐπιστολίων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. This closes a section which analyzes Brutus’ “Laconic” style in his Greek letters; but the purpose of the analysis of the letters is to reveal Brutus’ character: see Moles 1997: 144–47.

78. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτῶν εὐθὺς θεωρεῖσθω.

79. For μέν οὖν as “transitional,” cf. Denniston 1954: 470–72. The usage is particularly Plutarchan, as Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 499–500 notes (though some of his citations are incorrect). For first Lives closed with μέν οὖν (*Lyk.* 31.10; *Dem.* 31.7; *Lys.* 30.8), see below, pp. 246–47. On ταῦτα μὲν as closural, see above, n.45.

80. And it should be emphasized that such phrases are not unique to the transition from openings to narrative; they occur elsewhere in the *Lives* to mark the closure of thematically organized or characterizing material which interrupts the narrative: e.g., *Them.* 18.1 (ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀποφθέγμασι τοιοῦτός τις ἐστίν); *Cic.* 42.1 (τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ’ οἶκον οὕτως εἶχε); *Dion.* 21.9 (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν

First, and most obviously, the first sentence of the Life proper (as distinct from the proemial opening) always *narrates*. In most cases, the first line of this chronological narrative is connected to what precedes with δέ. Very occasionally the subject of the Life is named in the first words, e.g., Ὁ δὲ Κάτων (*Cato Min.* 4.1).⁸¹ More often, though not named, he is their subject, e.g., Ἀποδειχθεὶς δὲ ταμίας ... συνεξέπλευσεν ... (*Sulla* 3.1),⁸² or is not the subject but is placed first in the sentence, e.g., Ἦδη δ' αὐτοῦ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότος (*Phil.* 5.1).⁸³ The second feature that may mark the start of chronological narrative concerns content. The first sentence of the narrative often contains reference to what are presented as the first deeds of the subject on the political or military stage; phrases such as “when he was still young” are very common, as are references to a “first” action or deed, often a “first campaign” (πρώτη στρατεία).⁸⁴ Thus narrative in the Crassus begins, “When ... he himself being extremely young ...” (αὐτὸς δὲ νέος ὢν παντάπασι) (4.1).⁸⁵ Many other Lives are similar: “He took part in his first campaign while still a youth” (Ἐστρατεύσατο δὲ πρώτην στρατείαν ἔτι μειράκιον ὢν) (*Cor.* 3.1); “When Perikles was very young ...” (Ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς νέος μὲν ὢν σφόδρα ...) (*Per.* 7.1).⁸⁶ Whereas the anecdotes told in the preceding sections may have concerned any point in the subject’s life from childhood onwards, including their prime, at the start of the narrative we go back to what is presented as the beginning of the subject’s adult career.

A good example of a non-chronological opening followed by a transition to narrative can be found at the start of the *Lysander*. The Life begins with the quotation of an inscription on the Akanthian treasury at Delphi, and with discussion of the statue standing outside (*Lys.* 1).⁸⁷ We then hear of Lysander’s

οὐκ ἄχρηστον ἔχει τὴν παρέχθασιν); *Tim.* 15.11 (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀλλότρια τῆς τῶν βίων ἀναγραφῆς); *Arat.* 10.5 (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐξεταζέσθω τοῖς παραδείγμασιν). All are followed by δέ in the next sentence. Other examples of closing a section or digression with ταῦτα μὲν οὖν are collected in Van der Valk 1982: 322–24 and Frazier 1996: 51n.28.

81. Also *Per.* 7.1; *Alex.* 9.1; *Ages.* 6.1; cf. *Pel.* 7.1. Connection with δέ, cf. Stadter 1988:276.

82. Also *Cam.* 2.1; *Kim.* 6.1; *Luc.* 2.1; *Crass.* 4.1; *Cor.* 3.1; *Cic.* 3.1; *Brut.* 3.1; *Eum.* 3.1; *Phil.* 5.1; *Flam.* 1.4; *Mar.* 3.1–2; *Gracch.* 4.1; *Sulla* 3.1; *Pomp.* 3.1; cf. *Galba* 4.1.

83. Also *Pyrrh.* 4.1.

84. Age: *Luc.* 2.1; *Per.* 7.1; *Alex.* 9.1; *Crass.* 4.1; *Cor.* 3.1; *Brut.* 3.1; *Phil.* 5.1; *Pel.* 7.1; *Demetr.* 5.1–2; *Pyrrh.* 4.1; *Pomp.* 3.1. First campaign (or consulship etc.): *Cam.* 2.1; *Fab.* 2.1; *Cor.* 3.1; *Sert.* 3.1; *Flam.* 1.4; *Demetr.* 5.1–2; *Mar.* 3.1–2; *Sulla* 3.1; cf. *Luc.* 2.1; *Ages.* 6.1 (Τοῦ δ' Ἀγησιλάου τὴν βασιλείαν νεωστὶ παρεληφότος); *Pomp.* 3.1. That is not to say that age or the first campaign are *only* used to open the narrative: at *Cato Maj.* 1.7–8, within a long non-chronological section, Cato’s first campaign (φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπτακαίδεκα γεγονώς ἔτη τὴν πρώτην στρατεύσασθαι στρατείαν ...) is used to illustrate his greater desire for renown as a soldier than as a speaker (but this is introduced as his own words, not those of the narrator); at 2.5 a campaign as *μειράκιον* is used as the setting for a characterizing anecdote. On *Aem.* 3.1, see below, n.105.

85. Crassus was about 28 at this point (*pace* Perrin ad loc.). Schettino 2005: 416, points out that “young” here has a “political” sense: he had not yet begun the *cursus honorum*.

86. Trans. Stadter 1989 ad loc.

87. For discussion, Stadter 1992a: 41–42; Duff 1999: 162–65. Cf. on *Lys.* 2, Pelling 1988a: 268–74 (= repr. 2002a: 292–97); Duff 1999: 177–84; 2008a: 14.

parentage, upbringing and character, including the claim (2.6) that, though he filled Sparta with wealth and the love of wealth [i.e., through his successes in the Aegean towards the end of his career], he was never himself corrupted by it. This is plainly not narrative, and is not focused on early years; rather it looks at Lysander's life as a whole. This non-chronological section concludes with two anecdotes (2.7–8). The first shows Lysander refusing gifts for his daughters, and is introduced in illustration of the claim that he was never corrupted. As it refers to Dionysios I of Syracuse, who came to power in 406 BC, it must be dated to after Lysander's despatch to Ephesos, which took place in late 408 or early 407 and which is narrated in the next chapter.⁸⁸ The second anecdote, which is described as happening "a little later," seems to show him accepting gifts for a daughter. This second anecdote may well be corrupt (why two daughters in the first, and only one in the second?) and should probably be emended, perhaps so that it shows the actions of another, dishonest Spartan, who is being contrasted with Lysander.⁸⁹ But the important point for our purpose here is that the placing of these two anecdotes at this point in the Life is plainly not motivated by chronological considerations. It is only when we reach 3.1 (Ἐπεὶ δέ . . .) that chronological narrative begins with a long and syntactically complex sentence, culminating—after a full 10 lines of Teubner text—with Lysander's name placed emphatically as the final word of the sentence: the Spartans "... sent out to take command of the sea—Lysander" (... ἐκπέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἡγεμονίαν Λύσανδρον). Narrative continues from this point. *Lys.* 3.1, then, begins chronological narrative after a non-chronological introduction, which had itself been arranged thematically. And although Lysander is not named first, and is not the grammatical subject, he is the central figure of the sentence, which, by delaying his entry, builds up his despatch to the Aegean as the first event of the narrative.⁹⁰

2.3. THEMATIC AND CHRONOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT

In many Lives, then, there is a clear and straightforward distinction between a thematically-organized opening, which looks at the life of the man as a whole, and the narrative which follows.⁹¹ Often, as we have seen, the incidents mentioned in the proemial opening are arranged in a wholly unchronological sequence;

88. The story may, like many of the anecdotes in these opening sections, be apocryphal. But that is irrelevant for the point at stake here.

89. I.e., he was corrupt in a situation where Lysander was not. The anecdote also functions as an illustration of the corrupting effects which Lysander's policies had on Sparta. Discussion of these two anecdotes can be found in Renehan 1981; Sansone 1981; Duff 1999: 182–84; Pelling 2002a: 299n.35. All agree that the second anecdote must refer to someone other than Lysander; Renehan and Pelling think no emendation is necessary.

90. Cf. Russell 1966a: 152 (= repr. 1995: 91); Duff 1999: 184–85. Compare *Demetr.* 5.1–2, which has a similar structure.

91. Clearly defined proemial openings: e.g., *Sol.* 1–7; *Cam.* 1; *Cato Maj.* 1–9; *Per.* 3–6; *Fab.* 1.2–9; *Crass.* 1–3; *Cic.* 1–2; *Cato Min.* 1–3; *Brut.* 1–2; *Phil.* 1–4; *Flam.* 1.1–3; *Alex.* 2–8; *Demetr.*

chronological narrative only begins when the narrative proper starts, with the subject usually presented as a young man. At other times, however, the order in which events or anecdotes are introduced within the proemial opening may to a greater or lesser extent correspond with the chronological order in which they happened. Nevertheless, the organizing principle remains thematic, but there is in such cases a convergence between theme and chronology. Such convergence makes smoother the transition from characterizing or introductory material to chronological narrative: prefiguring material on education or childhood, for example, can lead naturally into narrative of early adult career. All the same there is usually still a point of transition, when thematically organized material ends and narrative begins.

Take the *Kimon*, which begins with Kimon's family, his wayward character as a youth and the rumor that he slept with his sister, leading to Plutarch's comment that "he was given to the love of women" and was passionately attached to his wife (*Kim.* 4).⁹² All of this is told to characterize Kimon. The next chapter is not yet chronological narrative, but begins to merge introductory characterizing material with narrative: in order to illustrate Kimon's good character, which meant that he was superior to his contemporaries "even when still young and inexperienced in war" (νέος ὄν ἔτι καὶ πολέμων ἄπειρος), Plutarch mentions his fearlessness in urging the abandonment of Athens in the face of the Persian invasion; similarly, the reputation which he won for his brave conduct at Salamis meant that he was welcomed when he entered politics (*Kim.* 5). These incidents are themselves referred to in chronological order. But the organizing principle here is still thematic, not chronological: character traits are stated, and then illustrated with reference to his deeds. The narrative proper begins in chapter 6: "When (Ἐπεὶ δέ) after the flight of the Medes from Greece he was sent out as general. . . ."⁹³

The *Aristeides* begins with a long discussion of whether Aristeides was really poor or not, complete with numerous references to other writers, which not only puts on display Plutarch's own learning and competence as a historian but also raises the issue of the right use of wealth, an important theme in the *Aristeides*—

2–4; *Mar.* 1–2; *Num.* 1; *Lys.* 1–2; *Sulla* 1–2; *Ages.* 1–5; *Pomp.* 1–2. Also *Galba* 3 (though *Galba* is not one of the *Parallel Lives*).

92. *Kim.* 1–3 being the prologue to the *Kim.-Luc.* book.

93. Compare the opening of the *Lucullus*. It begins with Lucullus' family, and his early success in prosecuting his father's accuser. His education is then discussed, and the way in which, late in his life, after his rivalry with Pompey, he gave free rein to his cultural leanings. This is not narrative, though as chapter 1 nears its end, there is now a gradual slide towards it. The theme of his love of literature is demonstrated by the fact that he wrote a history in Greek on "the Marsic war" (1.8), and his love of his brother by the fact that he refrained from standing for office before his brother and was then elected edile along with him (1.8–9). The function of this section is in the first place to illustrate Lucullus' character. But mention of the Marsic war, and of his election, the first rung on the career, leads in smoothly to narrative of his first steps in his career, which begins in 2.1 with "When he was young (Νέος δ' ὄν), in the Marsic war, he provided many examples of courage and intelligence. . . ." Note that Lucullus' election for the aedileship mentioned in *Luc.* 1.9 must post-date his campaigns as a young man narrated in *Luc.* 2–4 (Pelling 2010, ad loc.).

Cato Major book as a whole (*Arist.* 1).⁹⁴ There then follows a long section on Aristeides' rivalry with Themistokles, which both characterizes Aristeides and sets the political scene (2–4). Within this discussion, various anecdotes or sayings of Aristeides are presented, without any reference to chronology.⁹⁵ Once we reach 5.1 and “When Datis . . . put in at Marathon” (ἐπεὶ δὲ Δάτις . . .) things are starting to become chronological, but this is interrupted at chapter 6 with a long discussion of Aristeides' reputation for justice. A section on Aristeides' ostracism follows (chapter 7) and it is only with, “In the third year (Τρίτῳ δ' ἔτει), when Xerxes was advancing through Thessaly and Boiotia” (8.1) that narrative really gets going.

In the *Aristeides*, then, we have a thematically organized opening, which begins a slide toward narrative but then is pulled back to another thematic section (discussion of Aristeides' character); narrative only finally starts after this. This is a pattern found in several Lives.⁹⁶ The first two chapters of the *Themistokles* deal with his family, education, and character; they are rich in anecdotal material and organized thematically rather than by chronology.⁹⁷ Even the statement at 2.1, “When still a child, he is acknowledged to have been impetuous, and intelligent by nature, but by choice fond of great action and politics,” is a statement about his character over his whole life, which showed itself even when still a child, rather than on his childhood *per se*. Indeed this characterization is based on Thuc. 1.138.3, a retrospect on the character of the *adult* Themistokles at the end of his life.⁹⁸ From 3.1, when Themistokles enters public life, there is a sense of chronological progression, especially when we hear of Themistokles' reaction to Miltiades' success at Marathon, and of his improving of Athens' fleet. But this is interrupted by the long series of anecdotes in chapter 5, which illustrate his ambition,⁹⁹ and the shift is really only complete in 6.1, where the narrative of Themistokles' role in the Persian Wars themselves starts: “When the Mede was now descending on Greece . . .”¹⁰⁰

Similar slippage between proemial material and narrative can be seen at the start of the *Coriolanus*. It begins with Coriolanus' family and character; his one-

94. E.g., *Arist.* 1 and 27 (the first and last chapters: below, p. 244); *Cato Maj.* 4–6; 18.2–19.3; 21.3–8; *Arist.-Cato Maj.* 3–4. On this theme in the *Arist.-Cato Maj.*, cf. Desideri 1985: 396–97.

95. E.g., 3.2, “Finally, once when . . .” (τέλος δέ ποτε), where the “finally” suggests a chronological progression which is in fact absent; 3.3, “On another occasion” (πάλιν δέ); 4.2, “At any rate it is said that once” (λέγεται γοῦν ποτε).

96. In addition to the examples below, cf. also *Ant.* 1–5 and *Pyrrh.* 1–3 (above, n.69). On the *Pub.*, see below, n.159.

97. The anecdotes in *Them.* 1.4 and 2.4, for example, refer to the mature Themistokles. And there is no need to suppose that the anecdote of Themistokles' father trying to dissuade him from public life (2.8) must have taken place when he was young; see Duff 2010: 72n.24. I have discussed the proemial function of *Them.* 1 in detail in Duff 2008b. On *Them.* 2, see Duff 2008a: 3–11; 2009.

98. On Plutarch's adaptation of the Thucydides passage, see Martin 1961: 327–29; Duff 2008a: 4.

99. Some of these anecdotes relate to events that happened after the Persian Wars (e.g., 5.4 with Frost 1980, ad loc.).

100. Cf. Duff 2008b: 170; 2010:52.

sided, purely military upbringing made him unsociable but gave him formidable prowess (*Cor.* 1–2). There are heavy Platonic overtones here, presenting Coriolanus in terms drawn from the *Republic*.¹⁰¹ But this section is not about his childhood: rather it assesses his life as a whole, and his education and his being an orphan are invoked to explain his adult character.¹⁰² Chronological narrative begins in 3.1 with “He fought on his first campaign while still a youth.” In chapter 4 we seem to slip back into the kind of static discussions of character that are typical of proemial openings. But the discussion here of Coriolanus’ ambition specifically concerns him as a young man, and the campaigns in which he showed this ambition are probably to be thought of as preceding the events of chapter 5 onwards. So, while chapter 4 contains character analysis, it is embedded in the narrative. Once again, then, we have a slide from the synoptic characterizing or introductory material of the proemial opening into chronological narrative.

The *Eumenes*, a second Life, appears to begin at once with narrative: Philip saw the young Eumenes wrestling and took him into his retinue; after Philip’s death (336 BC) he was held in high honor and after Hephaestion’s death (324) even attained the hipparchy which belonged previously to Perdikkas, and married a woman Plutarch calls Barsine, the sister of Alexander’s concubine of the same name (*Eum.* 1).¹⁰³ But we then learn about Eumenes’ enmity with Hephaestion, which is illustrated with three anecdotes that fill most of chapter 2. These episodes obviously relate to a time earlier than Eumenes’ taking command of the cavalry after Hephaestion’s death. We are not, then, dealing with chronological narrative here; these stories introduce the theme of Eumenes’ personal relationships with the leading Macedonians, which will be so important throughout the Life.¹⁰⁴

However, the incidents used in this section, though not themselves arranged in chronological order, all predate the narrative contained in the rest of the Life, which covers only the last few years of Eumenes’ life (323–316/5 BC). The break between proemial opening and narrative is thus less keenly felt here, and the former might be regarded as containing background material on Eumenes’ character and career before Alexander. Chronological narrative begins at *Eum.* 3.1 with “After Alexander’s death . . .” (Ἀποθανόντος δ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου . . .).

Similar can be said of the *Pelopidas*. The early chapters give the appearance of being arranged in chronological order, but the governing principle is in fact thematic. The Life begins at *Pel.* 3.1 with Pelopidas’ family, the wealth that he inherited and the way that he used that wealth for his friends’ benefit. Only Epameinondas refused his financial help, and Pelopidas instead joined him in

101. Pelling 1996: xxviii–xxix; Duff 1999: 206–10.

102. “Explain” because this is one of the rare instances in the Lives where Plutarch sees experiences in childhood as influencing the way adult character developed, rather than just providing a confirmation of a static character. See Duff 2008a: 13–14.

103. In fact, Barsine is probably a mistake for Artonis, the name found in Arrian, *Anabasis* 7.4.

104. Note the vagueness of the links between the episodes in ch. 2: προσέχρουσε πολλῶν . . . πρῶτον μὲν . . . (2.1); ἔπειτα . . . (2.4); πάλιν δέ . . . (2.8). Cf. above, n.73.

living a frugal life (ch. 3). Chapter 4 analyzes the characters of Pelopidas and Epameinondas together, in much the same way as prologues analyze and compare the characters of the two subjects of a pair: they were notable for their lack of jealousy towards each other, which led them to take each other's successes as their own (4.2–4). So far the selection of material has been thematic rather than chronological, and has not related particularly to their early years; indeed the mention of their lack of jealousy at the other's successes must relate to their prime. Chronology starts to intrude in the next paragraph, when Plutarch dates the beginning of their friendship to Epameinondas' defending of Pelopidas, after the latter was wounded, at the Battle of Mantinea in 385 BC (4.5–8). The next paragraph, which begins "After this" (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) concerns the seizing of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas in 382 (5.1). But Pelopidas is almost entirely absent from chapters 5–6, except for a brief mention that he was forced into exile (5.3). This section then provides background, and the narrative proper begins in 7.1 with Ὁ δὲ Πελοπίδας.¹⁰⁵

A similarly extended and complex case is provided by the *Demosthenes*. The Life begins (ch. 4) with Demosthenes' family, guardians, and nickname.¹⁰⁶ Chapter 5 begins with "They say that the origin of his desire to become an orator was like this." There follows what appears at first sight to be narrative of his youthful struggle to learn public speaking, including (6.1–2) his prosecution of his guardians, and (6.3) his first speeches before the people. But the detail about his first speeches before the people is in the imperfect: this is presented as characterizing behavior rather than a single decisive event. And before long this becomes a general discussion of his style and ability as a speaker throughout his whole life, with many anecdotes drawn from the later as well as the earlier periods of his life (chs. 6–11).¹⁰⁷ A transitional sentence occurs at 11.7: "But concerning these things (ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων), although we have more to say we shall stop here; it is fair that the rest of his character and disposition be

105. Cf. the *Aem.*, which begins with ancestry (2.1–5). We are then told that the young Aemilius did not follow the pursuits of other young men but preferred to acquire a reputation for "courage, justice, and good faith," "in which he immediately surpassed all his contemporaries" (2.6). Confirmatory examples follow, beginning with his attaining the aedileship in 193 BC (3.1, πρώτην γοῦν τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀρχῶν . . . μετελθὼν) and his behaviour as augur, an office which he held from 192 until his death (3.2–5). This is roughly in chronological order, but the characterising function of these examples is predominant; in particular, there is a long discussion of Aemilius' respect for religious tradition as augur, which leads into discussion of his respect for Roman military tradition "when in command" (ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν), through which "he tried to set his country straight" (ὄρθου τὴν πατρίδα) (3.5–7). This last item plainly relates to a period after 192; it is introduced to characterize Aemilius and because of the thematic link with his behavior as augur. Thus although there has been a sense of chronological progression in 2.5–3.7, the transition to narrative is not complete until 4.1–2 with Συστάντος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς Ἀντίοχον . . . πολέμου and Aemilius' being sent out as στρατηγός (praetor) in 191.

106. Naming and names is a topic more commonly covered in Roman Lives than Greek: *Rom.* 1–6, *passim*; *Cato Maj.* 1.3; *Fab.* 1.2–4; *Cic.* 1.3–6; *Aem.* 2.2; *Mar.* 1.1–5.

107. Cf. Cooper 2008: 77–82 on the source for this material.

examined from his deeds and statesmanship”—a phrase which though paralleled elsewhere in Plutarch (e.g., *Mar.* 2.4) is particularly appropriate to Demosthenes as it introduces the notion of a tension between his fine words and ideals and his personal weakness (see 20.2). By 12.1, which refers to his entering politics at the time of the Phocian War (i.e., the Third Sacred War), things are becoming more chronological. But although chapters 12–16 are loosely set in the period between 356 and the early 340s, there is little sense of chronological movement and this section is really a static discussion of what Plutarch calls in 16.1 ἡ . . . τοῦ Δημοσθένους πολιτεία (“Demosthenes’ political stance”). Chronological narrative only gets going properly in 17.1 with “When (Ἐπειδὴ δ’ or in other mss, Ἐπεὶ δ’) matters were inclining to war . . . Demosthenes impelled the Athenians to Euboea.”

The *Phokion* appears at first to be a straightforward case: the Life begins with discussion of Phokion’s family, wealth, and character (*Phok.* 4.1–5.2); then his speeches are analyzed for confirmation that his character was good-natured but forbidding (*Phok.* 5.3–10). Chronological narrative seems to commence in 6.1 with “When he was young . . .” (νέος δ’ ὄν) and mention of his successes on his first campaign at Naxos with Chabrias in 376 BC (*Phok.* 6.4–7.2). But this is structured only very loosely by chronology: Chabrias’ death at Chios in 357 is mentioned before Naxos, even though it happened nineteen years later (6.2), and this soon becomes a generalized discussion of Phokion’s relationship with Chabrias; Plutarch mentions, for example, that *after Chabrias’ death* (i.e., long after Phokion’s first campaign with him) Phokion took Chabrias’ son Ktesippos in hand (7.3–4). The next chapters deal with Phokion’s political stance and relationship with the *demos*. To illustrate the claim that the people had extraordinary respect for him despite his being prepared to stand up to them and oppose them when necessary, Plutarch claims that, even though he was elected to the generalship 45 times, he never once sued for it in person (8.2). This is plainly not narrative of his first steps in politics but a diachronic retrospect. Several chapters of anecdotes, presented without reference to chronology, and intended to give a picture of Phokion at the height of his career, follow (9–11). It is not until chapter 12 that chronological narrative proper starts: “When Philip was infiltrating Euboeia (Παραδυσόμενου δ’ εἰς τὴν Εὐβοίαν) . . . Phokion was sent out as general with a small force” (12.1).¹⁰⁸

One might wish to label examples like this “false starts.”¹⁰⁹ But that is probably overstating the case: such a label might be taken as implying that Plutarch’s readers would have expected a rigid division between opening, with its thematic organization, and narrative, and would have been misled by *Phok.* 6.1. The

108. On *Phok.* 4–12 as not organized chronologically, see Bearzot 1985: 17–21; 1993: 92–96; Tritle 1992: 4268–75. As Tritle 1992: 4268 notes, there is an almost total absence here of stories dating to Phokion’s childhood.

109. Or “false endings”: cf. D. P. Fowler 1989: 97–98.

existence of such gradual transitions, and the “slippage” they incorporate, show that Plutarch was not writing to a rigid scheme; they do however confirm the basic tendency for Lives to open with thematically organized material and only become chronological later.¹¹⁰

The most striking example of this slide from characterizing material to narrative is provided by the *Alkibiades*. The first 16 chapters consist mainly of self-contained anecdotes, often tacked together without explicit chronological or causal links, together with discussions of his character.¹¹¹ Narrative only begins in earnest in 17.1, with the word “Sicily” (Σικελίας δέ). Still, there is a sense of some overall chronological movement through these chapters, even if the individual anecdotes are out of chronological order: a sense that Alkibiades is going from a child to a young man in politics.¹¹² Particularly towards the end of this section, from chapter 10 onwards, and especially from 13.1, narrative is increasingly dominant as the individual blocks of narrative become longer and the subject more political, though chapter 16, a collection of characterizing material, including many anecdotes, disrupts this shift. Thus, while the early chapters are distinct from what follows, and while they certainly play a proemial role, the transition from the opening to the narrative is gradual.¹¹³

2.4. BARE OPENINGS

Most Lives, then, begin with a thematically organized opening section (a “proemial opening”). This may be wholly unchronological, and marked off clearly from the narrative that follows. Its structure may be such, on the other hand, that at times the order in which its material is arranged may coincide with the chronological order of events—but its governing principle is thematic. In this latter case the transition from opening to narrative is eased.

110. The *Ag./Kleom.* and *Sert.* are also complex cases. *Ag./Kleom.* begins with background narrative of the condition of Sparta in the period between Agesilaos and Agis (chapter 3). This is, in fact, almost wholly concerned with the royal family, so could be regarded as an example of the theme of family and ancestry. When Agis is introduced in 4.1 it is with a general statement of his surpassing all kings since Agesilaos, a judgement which applies to his life as a whole, not his youth, though we move from here rapidly to Agis at age 20 rejecting a life of pleasure. Chapter 5, however, pauses to give more background on the state of affairs in Sparta, before narrative begins with the young Agis in 6.1. The *Sert.* begins with Sertorius’ family and his training in law, then states that his military successes “turned his ambition in that direction” (2.2). There then follows a numbered list of such successes (3.1, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν; 3.2, δεύτερον), in what at first might appear to be a thematically ordered sequence confirming the point about his ambition. But by halfway through chapter 3 (3.5, μετὰ δὲ τὸν ... πόλεμον; 4.1, ἐκ τούτου) this has become chronological, and narrative continues from here onwards.

111. Many of the individual incidents here are undatable and there is no reason to assume that they are in chronological order. See Russell 1966b; Frazier 1996: 76–78.

112. E.g., 7.1, τὴν δὲ παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν παραλλάσσων; 7.3, ἔτι δὲ μεिरάκιον ὦν ἐστρατεύσατο; 10.1, πρῶτην δ’ αὐτῷ πάροδον εἰς τὸ δημόσιον; 13.1, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἔτι μεिरάκιον ὦν.

113. For the proemial role of *Alk.* 1, see Duff 2008c: 196–201; of *Alk.* 2–3, see Duff 2003.

There are, however, a few Lives which do not have such a thematic opening, but rather pitch straight into narrative. Lives which begin with such “bare” openings often contain in their early chapters information on the standard biographical *topoi*, but the crucial difference is that such material does not stand apart, but is subsumed into the chronological narrative. Such “bare” openings are rare but do occur in either a first Life after a prologue (*Dion, Theseus*) or a second Life (*Romulus, Timoleon*)—but never in a first Life which is not preceded by a prologue.¹¹⁴ In other words, as Stadter correctly saw,¹¹⁵ no *book* ever begins directly with narrative.¹¹⁶ In all cases, there are particular features of the Life itself which explain Plutarch’s varying of his usual pattern.

Let us start with the *Theseus*, a first Life which follows a prologue. Although the first four chapters (*Thes.* 3–6), concern Theseus’ family, one of the typical themes of proemial openings, the material here is narrated, and Theseus’ discovery of his true birth leads to his journey to Athens and the start of his adventures. There is thus no opening section of the kind we have seen in other Lives. The *Romulus*, the second Life in the *Theseus–Romulus* book as a whole, begins with a mythic history of Rome, and continues on to the divine birth of Romulus and Remus, and how they came to found Rome. Interestingly, the very first words of the *Romulus* are “The great name of Rome” (Τὸ μέγα τῆς Ῥώμης ὄνομα); it is Rome which is the subject of the opening chapter, and to an extent of the whole Life. Indeed, the prologue to the *Theseus–Romulus* book begins with geography (“Just as in geographies, Sosius Senecio, historians squeeze on to the edges of their maps . . .” *Thes.* 1.1); and introduces the two men as fit subjects for comparison as the founders of their two cities (“It began to seem right to set against and compare the founder of fair and famous Athens with the father of invincible and glorious Rome” *Thes.* 1.5). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Rome and not Romulus is the focus in the first few chapters of the *Romulus*.¹¹⁷

114. Cf. Van der Valk 1982: 305–306 and 325–27, but his analysis is marred by i) taking *Cor.* and *Aem.* as second Lives, and ii) counting prologues as part of the first Life and not distinguishing between first Lives that follow a prologue and first Lives which begin a book.

115. Thus, although I do not believe that Stadter’s term “informal” prologue is useful or that the nine examples of such which he cites form a meaningful group (and the opening of the *Them.* is corrupt), his categorization does acknowledge that no first Life begins with narrative unless preceded by a prologue (what Stadter calls a “formal proem”).

116. Or rather, with narrative of the life of the first subject (as opposed to another figure); the prologue to the *Kim.-Luc.* begins with narrative about another figure, Damon of Chaironeia. Note also that the proemial opening to the *Lyk.*, a first Life not preceded by a prologue, contains a first person verb (πειρασόμεθα) and references to the writing process, features common in prologues (*Lyk.* 1.7).

117. Note that Τὸ μέγα τῆς Ῥώμης ὄνομα in *Rom.* 1.1 seems to allude to Nikias’ words in *Thuc.* 7.64.2, where Nikias tells the Athenians at Syracuse that they are all that is left of the city and τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηναίων; he has just made the point that the Athenians came to conquer Sicily. In *Rom.* 1.1 Plutarch makes the point that Rome was so named, from the Greek for “strength,” because of the success of its early inhabitants in conquest; the allusion to Nikias’ speech and the Sicilian disaster sets Rome’s imperial history against the rather less successful one of Athens. On the

The *Dion*, a first Life which follows a prologue, likewise begins immediately with narrative. The first lines are surprising: Plutarch has just marked the end of the prologue (*Dion* 2.7) with “let us bring first on to the stage the life of the older [i.e., earlier] man” (τὸν τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου προεισαγάγωμεν). But he begins the next sentence, the first of the *Dion* proper (3.1), not with mention of Dion himself, the older of the two subjects, but with “The older Dionysios . . .” (Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος . . .), thus cleverly confounding audience expectations. Chapter 3 is devoted to Dionysios I and his wives, and Dion is only introduced in 4.1 as the brother of one of these wives (ταύτης ἀδελφὸς ὃν ὁ Δίων . . .). The placing of the tyrant Dionysios here, in the position often reserved for the subject of the Life, is significant and prepares us for the dominant role that the elder Dionysios and his son will play in the *Dion*. Indeed, this life is almost as much about them as it is about Dion; the fundamental issue of Dion’s life is his relationship with them, and that of the *Dion–Brutus* pair as a whole the stance which a philosopher should take in relation to a tyrant.¹¹⁸ Chapter 4 does discuss Dion’s character, but this is subsumed within narrative: Dion received advancement under Dionysios but then, when Plato visited Sicily, became a disciple of the latter’s and managed to bring about a meeting of Plato and Dionysios.

The *Timoleon*, the second Life of the *Aemilius–Timoleon* book, also begins with narrative. The *Aemilius*, which stands first in the pair, ends with a transitional phrase (39.11), “The behavior and life of Aemilius Paulus are said to have been like this” (⟨τοι⟩οὔτως μὲν ὁ Παύλου Αἰμιλίου τρόπος καὶ βίος λέγεται γενέσθαι). The μὲν should be pointing forward to a δέ in the first line of the *Timoleon*. We do not, however, find there Τιμολέων δέ or such like. Instead the *Timoleon* begins “The state of affairs in Syracuse before the despatch of Timoleon to Sicily was like this: . . .” (Τὰ δὲ [Ziegler’s emendation of mss. μὲν] Συρακοσίων πράγματα πρὸ τῆς Τιμολέοντος εἰς Σικελίαν ἀποστολῆς οὕτως εἶχεν). The balance is neat: the οὕτως εἶχεν [looking forward] picks up the ⟨τοι⟩οὔτως [looking back] of *Aem.* 39.11, and, if we accept Ziegler’s emendation, the δέ picks up the μὲν.¹¹⁹ But this is background, and it is only at 3.2, with the nomination of Timoleon for command in Sicily, that Timoleon comes center stage. A short paragraph (3.4–7) then provides some of the introductory material common in so many Lives: family, virtues, and especially relationship with his brother. But the latter material leads naturally on to Timoleon’s defending of his brother in battle, his brother’s tyranny, and Timoleon’s murder of him. There is then, here, no clearly defined proemial

Thes.-Rom. as introducing “a tale of two cities as well as two founders,” see Pelling 2002a: 172–73. On Rome as the subject of the *Rom.* cf. Banta 2007.

118. See De Blois 1997: 209–216. On the themes of the *Dion–Brut.* see also Brenk 1977: 106–11; Swain 1990: 201–203; Pelling 1989: 222–28; 2004: 91–97; Dillon 2008.

119. Note that, as Ziegler 1907: 32 argues, the fact that the transitional sentence at *Aem.* 39.11 refers only to Aemilius, not to both men, confirms that the order preserved in the manuscripts, in which the *Aemilius* precedes the *Timoleon*, is correct. See above, p. 221.

section; instead, as in the *Dion*, we have a section of background which gives a description of the state of Sicily before Timoleon.¹²⁰

To sum up, Lives that begin with bare openings—that is, without a non-narrative introduction—never occur at the start of a book. They begin not with narrative of the life of the subject, but with some other sort of background narrative: in the *Dion* and the *Timoleon* it is the background history of Sicily before the two subjects are introduced; in the *Theseus* and the *Romulus* it is the mythological histories of Athens and Rome, though these merge into the stories of the miraculous births of the two subjects.¹²¹ It may be that in all these cases the subject matter played a role in Plutarch's altering of the usual structure. The *Theseus–Romulus* prologue begins with a justification for Plutarch's going back into the distant past, a period which, he implies, would be more suitable for mythology than history (*Thes.* 1.5).¹²² Perhaps Plutarch's readers were felt to need more orientation in this mythical period; the same might be true in the cases of *Dion* and *Timoleon* and the history of Sicily.¹²³

2.5. OPENINGS OF LIVES: CONCLUSIONS

It is time to draw some conclusions on the way Lives begin. We have already noted that the openings of Lives should be sharply differentiated from the prologues to books, even though in our manuscripts prologues appear as part of the first Life. Most Lives, furthermore, both those which fall first in a pair (whether preceded by a prologue or not) and those which fall second, begin with a thematically organized section (the “proemial” or “synoptic” opening), which surveys the subject's life as a whole and which is marked off with varying degrees of distinctness from the narrative that follows. Of course, it is not only in the opening sections of the Lives that we find material arranged thematically rather than chronologically. Non-narrative sections, especially analyses of character, often backed up with illustrative and confirmatory anecdotes, can occur at any point in a life.¹²⁴ So the claim here is not that proemial openings are unique in their thematic structure, rather that the thematic structure is particularly characteristic

120. *Tim.* 1.1 may also be picking up *Dion* 13.1: “Affairs were in such a state when Plato came to Sicily” (ἐν τῷ αὐτῇ δὲ καταστάσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων . . .). Mutual cross-references (*Dion* 58.10; *Tim.* 13.10; 33.4, all in the perfect tense), may indicate that the *Aem.-Tim.* was composed at roughly the same time as the *Dion-Brut.*: see Jones 1966: 66–67 (= repr. 1995: 107). But see now the arguments of Nikolaidis 2005: 294–96 that the *Aem.* was composed first.

121. Of the four, only the *Thes.* begins with mention of the subject (“The family of Theseus on his father's side . . .”), and only the *Thes.* and *Rom.* contain information on the subject's childhood.

122. “May it be possible for us to purify the mythological (τὸ μυθῶδες), and make it submit to reason and take on the appearance of history.” Discussion in Pelling 2002a: 173–78.

123. A similar logic might explain the chapter of background on Sparta in the third century in *Ag./Kleom.* 3 (above, n.110) and the section on Pyrrhos' ancestry and family in *Pyrrh.* 1–3 (above, n.69): these were periods and places about which the reader might have been expected to be less well-informed.

124. Cf. Polman 1974, which argues that such analyses occur especially at the high-point of the subject's career.

of the opening of Lives. Nor is the claim that the material in these thematically organized sections, which look synoptically at the life as a whole, never coincides with the chronological order of events, though in many Lives this is true. Rather in these sections chronology is not the organizing principle. The fact that in many Lives boundaries are blurred and there is a gradual transition or slippage from opening to narrative is to be related to the point we made earlier: non-chronological material can occur later in the Life too, so an ancient reader would not have been surprised at the mixing of the thematic and chronological sections which such cases involve. Furthermore, such cases of gradual transition, and those cases of “bare” openings, remind us that we are not dealing with strict classification, as we are in distinguishing the constituent parts of a book (prologue–first Life–second Life–*synkrisis*) but with the way Lives typically begin, the relationship of chronological narrative and early non-narrative sections.¹²⁵

We should note also that distinguishing these early proemial sections from the rest of the Life does not entail a return to the theory advanced by Weizsäcker in the 1930s that the Lives could be divided into “chronological” and “eidological” sections, that is, sections which narrate and sections which are concerned with painting a timeless picture of the subjects’ character.¹²⁶ Such a distinction would be meaningless, since in the Lives narrative can reveal character just as much as “direct” analysis; indeed the ancients saw character as revealed above all through deeds. I am making here, then, not a point about subject matter, or purpose, or sources, but a narratological one about the form of discourse used in these early sections. The point is, however, an important one for historians as much as students of literature: the recognition that the early sections of many Plutarchan Lives are not structured chronologically has profound implications for our use of them as sources.

We have been careful to distinguish the opening of books from the opening of Lives. We have, however, noticed one feature that suggests that the internal structure of the Life is not wholly independent of that of the book: bare openings never occur in first Lives which are not preceded by a prologue.¹²⁷ Or to put it another way, no book begins directly with narrative. We could make a similar point about the naming of the subjects. While almost all second Lives begin by stating the name of the subject, often as first or second words,¹²⁸ as do nearly all first Lives

125. Note that Stadter’s term “integrated prologue” did recognize the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between these sections and the narrative that follows.

126. And that Plutarch must have used different sources for the different kinds of material: Weizsäcker 1931. For criticism: Gomme 1945: 57–58; Ziegler 1949: 270–71 (= repr. 1951: 907–908); Russell 1966a: 150 (= repr. 1995: 89); Hamilton 1969: xlvi; Polman 1974: 172–73.

127. First Lives not preceded by a prologue: *Lyk.*, *Sol.*, *Arist.*, *Cor.*, *Lys.*, *Ages.*, *Pyrrh.*, *Phil.* On the *Them.*, see above, n.53.

128. The exception is *Rom.* 1.1 (see above, p. 238). *Tim.* 1.1 does mention Timoleon, but obliquely: the subject of the first two chapters is “The state of affairs in Syracuse before the despatch of Timoleon” (see above, pp. 239–40). *Fab.* 1.2, the start of the Life, does not begin with Fabius but he is named in the transition at 1.1. *Caes.* 1.1 is almost certainly corrupt: see below, appendix 2.

that follow a prologue,¹²⁹ some first Lives which do not follow a prologue (i.e., which begin a book) start more obliquely with the name of someone other than the subject.¹³⁰ This is confirmation, if such were needed, that the pairing of Lives into books, and the addition of prologues, is not random but carefully crafted. It also suggests that the absence of a prologue from books which lack them may not be random nor the result of the corruption of the manuscript tradition;¹³¹ in at least some of these cases the absence of a prologue is confirmed and anticipated by the structure of the rest of the book.¹³²

3. HOW LIVES END

When we consider endings in the *Parallel Lives* we must once again distinguish between endings of books and endings of individual Lives, and between endings of first Lives and endings of second Lives. In most cases, the ending of the book as a whole is formed by the concluding *synkrisis*, which has its own distinct structure and closural strategies, and which we shall consider later. We shall begin with the endings of individual Lives, as well as with the transition from first Life to second Life, and from second Life to *synkrisis*.

3.1. CLOSURAL SIGNALS: THEME/SUBJECT MATTER

The most important features that signal the end of a Plutarchan Life are not linguistic but thematic. The death of the hero is an obvious indication to the reader that the end of the Life is approaching. But this is an area where we must be careful not to import our own modern conceptions of biography.¹³³ Most Lives do not, in fact, end with the death of the subject or even the treatment of his body: rather his posthumous fate (honors, neglect, later reputation, etc.) or the fate of his killers, and the tracing down of his descendants commonly follow.¹³⁴ All of these features signal that the end of the Life is approaching, and that the second Life or the *synkrisis* is about to begin (or, in the case of 4 second Lives not followed by a *synkrisis*, that the book is nearing its end).¹³⁵

129. The exception is *Dion* 3.1 (See above, pp. 238–39). The naming of the subject is slightly delayed in *Demetr.* 2.1 and *Ag./Kleom.* 3.1–2.

130. *Sol.* 1.1; *Phil.* 1.1; *Pyrrh.* 1.1; *Lys.* 1.1; *Ages.* 1.1. The exceptions are *Lyk.* 1.1., *Arist.* 1.1, and *Cor.* 1.1. *Them.* 1.1 also appears to be an exception but this is almost certainly not the start of the Life: see next note.

131. The absence of a prologue from the *Them.-Cam.* may, however, be the result of corruption, as part of the opening of the *Them.* has certainly been lost: see above, n.53.

132. See also Stiefenhofer's point about *synkriseis*, below, nn.203 and 229.

133. As e.g., Momigliano 1971: 11, does: "An account of the life of a man from birth to death is what I call biography."

134. Pelling 1997: 228–42 (= repr. 2002a: 365–76); "tracing down" is his phrase: 234 (= repr. 2002a: 369); Duff 1999: 136–37. Cf. Leo 1901: 182–83; D. P. Fowler 1989: 116.

135. *Camillus*, *Cato Minor*, *Caesar*, and *Marius*. See below, p. 258–59.

Another feature common at the end of Lives is what Pelling, drawing on Barbara Herrnstein Smith's work on English lyric poetry, calls "authorial intrusion." This might include cross-references to other Lives, or references to sources or to the contemporary world—institutions or features which are still the case "in our own time," etc.¹³⁶ This last feature is sometimes included in the tracing down of descendants, and has the effect of bringing the story into the present and closing down narrative. For example, the *Themistokles* ends with references to the tomb of Themistokles, still visible in the Peiraieus, and to the fact that his descendants still enjoyed certain honors in Magnesia "down to our time" (μέχρι τῶν ἡμετέρων χρόνων), including [the last line of the Life] a "Themistokles of Athens, who became our friend and associate (ἡμέτερος συνήθης καὶ φίλος) at the school of Ammonios the philosopher" (*Them.* 32.6).¹³⁷ The *Antony* ends by surveying Antony's ancestors, ending with Nero: "This one, having come to power in our time (ἐφ' ἡμῶν), killed his mother, and through his folly and madness came near to overthrowing the Roman empire, being fifth in succession from Antony" (*Ant.* 87.9).¹³⁸ The sense of closure in this last example is reinforced by its correspondence with the last line of the *Demetrius*,¹³⁹ "His family came down in succession of kings to Perseus, the last, in whose time (ἐφ' οὗ) the Romans subdued Macedonia" (*Demetr.* 53.9).¹⁴⁰ The *Theseus* ends with a reference to Theseus' tomb "near what is now the gymnasium" (τὸ νῦν γυμνάσιον), which "is" (present tense) a place of sanctuary for slaves (*Thes.* 36.4), and with a discussion of the sacrifices which the Athenians "make" in Theseus' honor. The last word is a first person, present tense verb (προσονομάζομεν) (36.6). The end of the *Romulus* also contains reference to a modern cult, the Nonae Caprotinae (*Rom.* 29.9–11). It is particularly fitting that the Lives of two men who were introduced as founders of their cities should end with references to the present customs of these cities.¹⁴¹

136. Pelling 1997: 231–32 (= repr. 2002a: 367–68).

137. The *Aristeides* ends in a similar way: a discussion of Demetrios of Phaleron's kindness to a descendant of Aristeides leads to mention of another earlier example of the city showing kindness to the descendants of great men. The Life concludes, "For still providing many examples of such humanity and kindness even down to our time (καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς), the city is rightly admired and praised" (*Arist.* 27.7).

138. The *Aratos*, though not a parallel Life, and not followed by a *synkrisis*, employs a similar closural device (*Arat.* 54.8): "Aratos' family continued in Sikyon and Pallene in my time" (τὸ δ' Ἀράτου γένος ἔν τε τῇ Σικυῶνι καὶ τῇ Παλλήνῃ διέμεινε καθ' ἡμᾶς). Cf. below, n.151.

139. Or last line of the *Demetrius* proper; it is followed in 53.10 by a transitional sentence. See below, pp. 247–48.

140. Cf. the *Lyk.*, the last paragraph of which refers to a "succession and assembly" (διαδοχὴν τινα καὶ σύνοδον), which his friends and relatives instituted (31.8). The very last words of the Life (before the transitional sentence linking it to the *Numa*) are "[lest] they change his constitution" (πολιτεῖαν) (31.10): a fitting end to a life which was above all about Lykourgos' *politeia*.

141. The *Cato Major* ends not with a reference to the contemporary world but with a reference to his famous younger namesake, whose Life Plutarch would later write: "This man [Cato the Elder's grandson] was the grandfather of the philosopher Cato, a man who was the most eminent of his contemporaries in virtue and reputation" (*Cato Maj.* 27.7). That the *Cato Maj.* predates the *Cato Min.* is clear from the reference to it in *Cato Min.* 1.1.

The last sentence, however, returns to Romulus and gives his age and years of reign before “he disappeared from among men” (29.12); such “obituaries,” which often include details of the subject’s age and a brief judgement on their life as a whole, occur in the closing chapters of several other Lives, though rarely as the final sentence.¹⁴²

3.2. CLOSURAL SIGNALS: CIRCULARITY

Closure in many Lives is also signalled by what critics have termed “circularity” or “ring composition”—that is, by the use of a closural strategy in which the ending recalls the beginning.¹⁴³ The *Themistokles*, for example, begins with a discussion of Themistokles’ supposedly lowly birth (τὰ μὲν ἐκ γένουτος), and a quotation of a couplet about his mother, probably an epigram on her tomb (*Them.* 1.1);¹⁴⁴ it closes (32.4–6) with a long discussion of Themistokles’ tomb, and the quotation of a poem in iambic trimeters about it, followed, as we have seen, by mention of the honors paid to his descendants (τοῖς δ’ ἀπὸ γένουτος).¹⁴⁵ The *Camillus*, which is paired with the *Themistokles*, begins with the statement that Camillus never held the consulship, because the people were at variance with the Senate over this office and opposed the appointment of consuls (*Cam.* 1), and ends with Camillus reconciling people and Senate and with the appointment of consuls (*Cam.* 42).

Circularity is particularly evident in the endings of the individual Lives of the *Aristeides–Cato Major*, *Kimon–Lucullus* and *Dion–Brutus* books. The *Aristeides* begins with a long discussion of Aristeides’ financial position, which fills the whole of chapter 1, and a story that his daughters were for a long time without husbands because of poverty (*Arist.* 1.1); it ends with a discussion of the poverty of his descendants, including references to his daughters being provided with a dowry by the state (27.1), and to a similar action being performed for another poor Athenian girl (27.6).¹⁴⁶ The *Cato Major* begins with a discussion of Cato’s ancestors. He was technically a *novus homo*, Plutarch tells us, but he himself used to claim that, “although new in office and reputation (ἀρχήν καὶ δόξαν), he was

142. *Numa* 21.7; *Cam.* 43.2 (final sentence); *Cic.* 48.5; *Cato Min.* 73.1; *Caes.* 69.1; *Demetr.* 52.5; *Ant.* 86.8; *Mar.* 45.12; *Ag./Kleom.* 59(38).1; *Ages.* 40.3; *Pomp.* 79.5; also *Art.* 30.9 (final sentence); *Galba* 29.5 (final paragraph); *Otho* 18.5. See Pelling 1988b: 322; Frazier 1996: 71.

143. E.g., Torgovnick 1981: 13, 199–200, on the nineteenth and twentieth-century novel, esp. “When the ending of a novel clearly recalls the beginning in language, in situation, in the groupings of characters, or in several of these ways, circularity may be said to control the endings.” Cf. e.g., Fusillo 1997: 211, 214–21 (on the ancient novelists).

144. Cf. Duff 2008b: 159–68.

145. The final words of the Life mention that Plutarch’s friend Themistokles “used to enjoy” (ἐκχαροῦτο) these honors. This recalls both Themistokles’ own enjoyment of the “fruit” (καρπούς) of his victory at Olympia in 17.4 and the gifts he enjoyed (καρπούμενος) and honors he received in retirement in Persian territory in 31.3 (Martin 1961: 334).

146. See below, p. 257, for the theme of marriage and poverty in the final lines of the *Arist.-Cato Maj.* *synkrisis*.

old in terms of ancestral deeds and virtues” (ἔργοις . . . καὶ ἀρεταῖς) (*Cato Maj.* 1.2). The cognomen Cato, Plutarch goes on, was given him because of his abilities, “for the Romans call the experienced man *catus*” (1.3). The Life ends (27.5) with Cato prophesying the greatness of Scipio Africanus because of his “deeds of judgement and daring” (γνώμης ἔργα καὶ τόλμης), and with a reference to the fame of his descendants, one of whom attained the consulship and another was “the most illustrious of all his contemporaries in virtue and reputation” (ἀρετῇ καὶ δόξῃ) (27.7). A reference in this discussion to the cognomen of his son completes the sense here of a return to the beginning.

The *Kimon* begins with a discussion of how Kimon was a relative of Thucydides the historian, who, like him, had a connection with Thrace. Indeed, Plutarch goes on, Thucydides died in Thrace, and his “remains” (λείψανα) were afterwards brought back to Athens and buried amongst Kimon’s family tombs (*Kim.* 4.1–4). References to remains recur later in the Life, when Kimon himself brings back the λείψανα of Theseus to Athens (8.5–7). The *Kimon* ends with his own λείψανα being brought back to Athens (19.5). Similarly, the end of the *Lucullus* returns to the theme of his interest in Greek culture, sketched in the first chapter (1.6; 41.1–2; 42.3–4), as well as his closeness to his brother (1.8–9; 43.2–4).¹⁴⁷ The *Dion* begins with a story of the mistreatment of Dionysios I’s wife by the Syracusans; later he marries two other wives, one of whom was Aristomache, Dion’s sister (*Dion* 3.1–3). It ends with the murder of Aristomache¹⁴⁸ and her daughter, Arete, Dion’s wife, and with the subsequent murder by the Syracusans of the daughters of Hiketas, their killer (58.8–10).¹⁴⁹ This interest in the womenfolk of the subject returns in the *Brutus*, the second Life of the *Dion–Brutus* pair, which ends with the death of Brutus’ own wife, Porcia (*Brut.* 53.5–7).¹⁵⁰

Such examples could be multiplied,¹⁵¹ but I will finish with one particularly fine example of closural “circularity.” The *Perikles* begins with a reference to

147. Details and further comments on circularity in the *Kim.-Luc.* in Pelling 1997: 240–42 (= repr. 2002a: 374–75). As Pelling points out, the story of Lucullus’ death at the hands of a freedman with a Greek name (Kallisthenes), who tried to administer love potions to him (43.2), gives a final dark twist to the theme of his philhellenism, and perhaps recalls the erotic narrative of the prologue to the *Kim.-Luc.* book (*Kim.* 1–2).

148. Not Andromache, as Perrin’s Loeb mistakenly has it.

149. As well as providing a strong sense of closure, the reprise of this theme suggests two constants in the story of Dion: the potential for violent, popular unrest in Syracuse, and the importance of dynastic relations in its ruling families.

150. The reference to Brutus’ letters in that final passage also recalls the discussion of them in *Brut.* 2.5–8.

151. See e.g., Pelling 1989: 207–208 and 2008: 544 on the ending of the *Pel.* The *Artaxerxes* and *Aratos*, though not part of the *Parallel Lives*, also exhibit closural circularity. The *Artaxerxes* begins, “The first Artaxerxes was pre-eminent among the Persian kings for gentleness (πρότῃτι) and magnanimity . . . and was the son of Xerxes” (*Art.* 1.1.). It ends with a reference to Artaxerxes’ age and a statement that he “appeared gentle (πρᾶος) and fond of his subjects, not least because of his son Ochos, who surpassed all men in cruelty and blood-thirstiness” (30.9). The *Aratos* ends with mention of Aratos’ family (*Arat.* 54.8), which “continued in Sikyon and Pallene in my time” [see

the latter's maternal ancestor Kleisthenes, who "drove out the Peisistratids and nobly put down their tyranny, instituted laws and a πολιτεία mixed in the best way for harmony and safety" (πολιτείαν ἄριστα κεκραμένην πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωτηρίαν) (3.2). The question of whether Perikles was really a demagogue or a would-be tyrant is a frequent theme of the *Life*; but Plutarch declares in chapter 15 that once securely in power Perikles adopted "an aristocratic and kingly πολιτεία" (ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν . . . πολιτείαν), which he employed "in the best interest of all"; like a doctor, he cured the ills of the state with "life-saving drugs" (15.1: φάρμακα σωτήρια). Similarly, his expedition to the Thracian Chersonesos (19.1), is "life-saving" (σωτήριος), as he walled off the isthmus with "bulwarks" (ἐρύμασι). These themes are recapitulated in the final lines of the *Life*, where Perikles' power is recognized to be "neither monarchical nor tyrannical" but a "saving bulwark of the constitution" (σωτήριον ἔρυμα τῆς πολιτείας) (39.4).

3.3. TRANSITION FROM FIRST TO SECOND LIFE

The closural signals that we have mentioned so far have concerned both first and second Lives. Many Lives also end with a specifically closural or transitional phrase, but here we must distinguish Lives which stand first and Lives which stand second in their book. The final sentence of first Lives is sometimes summative, often with words such as τοιοῦτος, οὗτος, or οὕτως, a closural feature known from other authors.¹⁵² The simplest example of this is *Phil.* 21.12: "That [i.e., that's it, 'that's the end'] concerning Philopoimen" (ταῦτα περὶ Φιλοποίμενος),¹⁵³ which is followed by "[The one] whom we compare with him ('Ὀν δὲ παραβάλλομεν αὐτῷ), Titus Quintus Flamininus . . ." (*Flam.* 1.1). Most such summative phrases in fact include a μέν, sometimes μέν οὖν, which is picked up by a δέ in the opening of the second Life.¹⁵⁴ Thus the *Kimon* ends "That is what the Greek

above, n.138], which recapitulates the theme of the prologue, where Plutarch addresses Aratos' present-day descendant Polykrates and discusses the correct attitude to a famous virtuous ancestor (see Stadter 1988: 295; Pelling 2002b: 270). Note also that, e.g., an oblique reference to Polus the actor in the *Dem.-Cic.* prologue (*Dem.* 1.2) is picked up by a direct reference to him in *Dem.* 28.3.

152. E.g., the end of *Hdt.* Book 4, *Thuc.* Book 7 (with D.P. Fowler 1989: 91–93), Diodoros' narrative of the Delion campaign (12.70.6); Heliodoros 6.15.5–7.1.1 (with D.P. Fowler 1989: 118–19). Some ancient critics might have applied the term *epiphonema* to such endings: see Lausberg 1960: §879; D.P. Fowler 1989: 103–104; P. Fowler 1997: 116. The usage, often with μέν, is in fact very common in Herodotos to close even small episodes or sections: e.g., with τοιοῦτος or τοσοῦτος, *Hdt.* 9.66.1 (αὕτη μὲν νῦν ἡ μάχη ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο); 9.77.3 (τὰ κατὰ Μαντινείας μὲν καὶ Ἡλείους τοσαῦτα); 9.113.2 (κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ Ξέρξεω . . . τοσαῦτα ἐγένετο); cf. 9.84.2. For similar phrases elsewhere in the *Lives* to mark closure, see e.g., *Lyk.* 12.14; *Cato Maj.* 9.12 (above, p. 227); *Dion* 58.7 (τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν τίσιν Κάλλιπος ἔδωκε); *Brut.* 1.8 (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα); *Brut.* 2.8; *Demetr.* 38.12; *Art.* 19.10. Other examples are listed in Frazier 1996: 51–53.

153. Similar phrases elsewhere: e.g., *Dem.* 4.8, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτη; *Demetr.* 27.14, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ Λαμίας; *Sulla* 6.12, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς θειότητος; *Alex.* 13.5, ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Θήβας. More examples in Frazier 1996: 52–53nn.33–34.

154. μέν . . . δέ linking across first and second Life: *Kim.* 19.5-*Luc.* 1.1; *Dem.* 31.7-*Cic.* 1.1; *Aem.* 39.11-*Tim.* 1.1 [with Ziegler's emendation: see above, p. 239]; *Lys.* 30.8-*Sulla* 1.1; *Phok.*

leader was like,” and the *Lucullus* begins, “[But] Lucullus’ grandfather ...” (τοιούτος μὲν ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς ἡγεμῶν. τῷ δὲ Λουκούλλῳ πάππος ...) (*Kim.* 19.5-*Luc.* 1.1). Similarly, the *Lysander* ends, “About Lysander, these are the accounts we have discovered,” and the *Sulla* begins “[But] Lucius Cornelius Sulla ...” (τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Λύσανδρον οὕτως ἱστορήσαμεν ἔχοντα. Λεύκιος δὲ Κορνήλιος Σύλλας ... (*Lys.* 30.8-*Sulla* 1). The *Lykourgos* ends, “That’s it concerning Lykourgos” (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ Λυκούργου), followed by “[But] there is also concerning Numa ...” (*Lyk.* 31.10-*Num.* 1.1). The end of the *Demosthenes* is a little more elaborate, and includes an address to Sosius Senecio, “You have then, Sosius, the life of Demosthenes, drawn from what we have read or heard” (τὸν μὲν οὖν Δημοσθένους ἀπέχεις ὃ Σόσσιε βίον ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀνέγνωμεν ἢ διηκούσαμεν) (*Dem.* 31.7). This is then followed in *Cic.* 1.1 by “Cicero’s mother” (Κικέρωνος δέ ...).¹⁵⁵ The presence of the direct address to Senecio marks this transitional sentence out as not part of the narrative of the two Lives: such addresses are otherwise confined to prologues, and the use of the second person more generally to prologues or *synkriseis*, and never occur in the Life proper.

Some other sentences marking the transition from first Lives to second Lives name or otherwise indicate the second subject, to whom the focus will now change, or raise the issue of comparison. Most well-known is the end of the *Demetrios*, with its stage metaphor: “Now that the Macedonian play has been performed to the end, it is time to bring on the Roman too” (*Demetr.* 53.10).¹⁵⁶ Similar is *Fab.* 1.1, though here the two men are named: “Since that is what Perikles was like in terms of his memorable deeds, as we have received them, we bring the course of our narrative to Fabius.”¹⁵⁷ Ziegler and all other editors print this as the first sentence of the *Fabius*, but it might better be regarded as the last of the *Perikles*: as with the previous example from the end of the *Demetrios*, this transitional sentence (*Fab.* 1.1) is followed by asyndeton in the next sentence, which must therefore be considered the start of the second Life (*Fab.* 1.2: Νυμφῶν μιᾷς λέγουσιν ...; *Ant.* 1.1: Ἀντωνίου πάππος μὲν ἦν ...). Indeed, asyndeton occurs at the

38.5-*Cato Min.* 1.1; *Lyk.* 31.10-*Num.* 1.1. Compare the similar link between Cato and Phokion, marked with μὲν and δέ, which occurs at the transition from formal prologue to first Life (*Phok.* 4.1; see above, n.52).

155. Cf. Ziegler 1907: 32. Van der Valk 1982: 324 notes some of these passages and suggests that endings with τοιούτος or οὕτως are limited to first life books written early in the collection (though an early dating of the *Phil.-Flam.* is not certain: Jones 1966: 68 (= repr. 1995: 110)).

156. Διηγωνισμένου δὲ τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ δράματος, ὥρα τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἐπεισαγαγεῖν. Stage metaphors run throughout the *Demetr.-Ant.* pair: *Demetr.* 18.5; 25.9; 28.1; 34.4; 41.5–6; 44.9; 53.1; 53.10; *Ant.* 29.4; 45.4; 54.5; *Demetr.-Ant.* 6.4. See De Lacy 1952; Pelling 1988b: 21–22; Guillén Selfa 1997: 249; Duff 2004.

157. Τοιούτου δὲ τοῦ Περικλέους ἐν τοῖς ἀξίοις μνήμης γεγονότος, ὡς παρελήφραμεν, ἐπὶ τὸν Φάβιον τὴν ἱστορίαν μετέγομεν (*Fab.* 1.1). As Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 480–81, noted, the phrasing up to παρελήφραμεν, like that at *Num.* 1.7, another transition from first Life to second, is similar to what we often find in transitions from second Life to *synkrisis*: see below, p. 251 on ἀξία μνήμης.

start of 6 out of 22 second Lives—though one of these (*Caesar* 1.1) is probably corrupt.¹⁵⁸

In most other cases, however, there is no obvious break between first Life and second Life, and the reader merely slides from one to the other. There are, indeed, two cases where it is impossible to tell whether the transitional sentence should be attached formally speaking to the first or the second Life. *Pub.* 1.1 states “That is what Solon was like, and we compare with him Publicola, for whom . . .” (τοιούτω δὲ γενομένω τῷ Σόλωνι τὸν Ποπλικόλαν παραβάλλομεν, ᾧ . . .). The ᾧ cannot mark the start of a new work, and it is unclear to which Life the whole sentence should be seen as belonging.¹⁵⁹ But that is confirmation that second Lives are not to be seen as new works, distinct from the first, but as another section of the same book. Similarly *Gracch.* 1.1 has “Now that we have duly fulfilled our task (ἀποδεδωκότες) of narrating the first story, we have no less *pathe* [i.e., both sufferings and passions] than these to contemplate in the Roman pair, as we respond by setting beside them (ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες) the Life [singular] of Tiberius and Gaius” (*Gracchi* 1.1).¹⁶⁰ The next line begins with οὔτοι (*Gracchi.* 1.2), which like the ᾧ in *Pub.* 1.1, looks back to the previous, transitional sentence,¹⁶¹ and cannot mark the beginning of a new work.

Such transitional sentences, then, like those with μέν, signal closure but also mediate transition; they both look backwards and point forwards. In these cases, it might be best, in fact, not to try to decide to which Life the transitional sentences should be assigned. They really are transitional; the difficulty of placing them is an indication of the unity of the pair, which in these cases cannot be neatly divided into the two Lives.¹⁶² Indeed, as we have already noted, the greater frequency of

158. Asyndeton at the start of second Lives: *Rom., Fab.* (counting the beginning at 1.2), *Alk., Caes.* (which is probably corrupt), *Ant., Mar.* In addition, *Pomp.* 1.1 contains asyndeton in some mss., a δέ (which Ziegler prints) in others. On *Tim.* 1.1 and *Gracchi* 1.2, see pp. 239 and 248. Van der Valk 1982: 324–27, makes some comments on this phenomenon but they are rendered invalid by his identification of the *Cor.* and *Aem.* as second Lives. Likewise his attempt (n.114) to consider *Demetr.* 53.10 as the first line of the *Ant.* must be wrong: the asyndeton in *Ant.* 1.1 makes clear that that is the first line.

159. The sentence goes on to mention Publicola’s ancestry; discussion of this topic then merges in the next sentence with the beginning of narrative. In effect in *Pub.* 1.1–2 we have a slippage from transition, through very brief proemial section, to narrative.

160. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἱστορίαν ἀποδεδωκότες, ἔχομεν οὐκ ἐλάττονα πάθη τούτων ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαϊκῇ συζυγίᾳ θεωρῆσαι, τὸν Τιβερίου καὶ Γαίου βίον ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες. The word πάθη here perhaps also picks up πεπονθότας in the prologue: “This (i.e., disaster) we see to be the experience of many of those whose political career is directed wholly towards pleasing the multitude” (τοῦτο πολλοὺς τῶν πρὸς χάριν ἅπαντα πεπολιτευμένων ὀρώμεν πεπονθότας) (*Ag./Kleom.* 1.6). Similarly ἀποδεδωκότες (“repay, render as a due”) picks up the direct address to the reader in the prologue (*Ag./Kleom.* 2.9), perhaps to be identified with the dedicatee, Sosius Senecio. For further on the *Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi* prologue, see below, appendix 1.

161. Thus, although there is no connective, and this is formally asyndeton, no break is felt; cf. Denniston 1952: 109–10; 1954: xliv; MacDowell 1962: 214; also Smyth’s distinction 1956: §2165, between grammatical (i.e., formal) and rhetorical asyndeton. Cf. e.g., *Lyk.* 30.3.

162. A point made in passing by Pelling 1997: 229n.5 (= repr. 2002a: 382n.5), referring to *Demetr.* 53.10 and *Gracch.* 1.1, as well as to *Flam.* 21.15 (on which, see below, n.177).

asyndeton between prologue and first Life, suggests that there is often a stronger break there than there is between first Life and second Life. All of this suggests that it is most unlikely that the practice of the manuscripts in inserting a title only between the end of the first and the beginning of the second Life, which would have interrupted movement from one to the other, can accurately reflect the internal structure of the book.¹⁶³

In fact, there are several cases where Plutarch seems to have worked hard to reduce the sense of a break between first and second Lives. Particularly interesting examples of this are provided by the *Sertorius–Eumenes*, *Lykourgos–Numa* and *Nikias–Crassus*. The *Sertorius* ends by describing the fate of those who murdered Sertorius: Perpenna, the ring-leader, was executed by Pompey; the others were either executed too or were killed in Africa. Only one escaped, an Aufidius; he was overlooked and “grew old in some barbarian village, poor and hated” (πενόμενος καὶ μισούμενος κατεγήρασεν). So ends the *Sertorius*. The *Eumenes* begins immediately with: “Eumenes of Kardia (Εὐμενῆ δὲ τὸν Καρδιανόν) was born to a man who, out of poverty (διὰ πένιαν), drove a wagon in Chersonesos.” Thus the theme of poverty provides a link across the end of the first Life and the start of the second. So while this transition is not handled by means of a link or contrast between the two subjects, as in the other examples, and there is no μέν . . . δέ running across the end of one Life and the start of another, Plutarch does create a thematic bridge. Or, to put it another way, it is presupposed that the reader here approaches the second Life after reading, and keeping in mind, the first.

The *Lykourgos–Numa* is more like the previous examples, in that it bridges the gap with μέν . . . δέ and contrasts one subject with the other. But there is more to it. The *Lykourgos* ends with a typical transitional phrase (*Lyk.* 31.10): “So that is it concerning Lykourgos” (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ Λυκούργου). The next sentence, the first of the *Numa* continues: “There is concerning the chronology of when king Numa lived too a vigorous debate” (Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Νομᾶ τοῦ βασιλέως χρόνων, καθ’ οὓς γέγονε, νεανικῆ διαφορά). But while the δέ in *Num.* 1.1 looks back to the μέν in the previous sentence, the last of the *Lykourgos*, the καί (“too”), and the reference to chronological uncertainty, look back to the very opening words of that Life (*Lyk.* 1.1): “Concerning Lykourgos the lawgiver (Περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ νομοθέτου) it is impossible to say anything which is not disputed, since there are different accounts of his birth, travels, end, and above all his work as a statesman and lawgiver. There is least agreement about the

163. The transition from e.g., Thuc. Book 7 to Book 8 and Heliodoros 5 to 6 and 6 to 7 also contain μέν and δέ (cf. D. P. Fowler 1989: 118–19). But we do not know how these book divisions were marked on the page, nor if the arrangement into books in our mss. of Thucydides are genuine: Diodoros (first century BC) knew of a nine-book edition of Thucydides and Marcellinus (fifth century AD) a thirteen-book edition (Diod. 12.37.2, 13.42.5, Marc. *Vita Thuc.* 58: Bonner 1920; D. P. Fowler 1989: 88–92). Cf. other examples where μέν . . . δέ link across some form of transition: Thuc. 6.26.2–27.1, 32.2–3.

chronology of when the man lived (οἱ χρόνοι καθ' οὓς γέγονεν ὁ ἀνὴρ).” The start of the *Numa*, in other words, presupposes that the reader has in mind both the start and the end of the *Lykourgos*. Once again, then, Plutarch has worked hard to create a link between first and second Life, and reduce the presence of any gap.¹⁶⁴

Even more carefully constructed and meaningful is the link between the *Nikias* and the *Crassus*. The *Nikias* ends with an account of how news of the disaster in Sicily reached Athens. The one who first brought the news was disbelieved and even tortured for a long time until others arrived and confirmed what he had said. “With such difficulty” (or “scarcely thus”), Plutarch concludes (*Nik.* 30.3), “was Nikias believed to have suffered (or believed *when* he suffered) what he had often predicted to them” (οὕτω μόλις ὁ Νικίας ἐπιστεύθη παθῶν ἃ πολλάκις αὐτοῖς προεῖπεν). In a sense this is a variation on the theme of posthumous fate, common at the ends of many Lives: throughout the Life Nikias has been cast as a kind of tragic “warner,” familiar from tragedy or Herodotos: only after his death, and with difficulty, is he believed.¹⁶⁵ This return in the final line of the Life to Nikias, the subject, who had been absent from the previous two chapters, also provides a sense of closure and prepares for the beginning of the *Crassus*, which starts immediately afterwards with Μάρκος δὲ Κράσσοσ (*Crass.* 1.1). But the last line of the *Nikias* in fact picks up the first line of the prologue to the *Nikias–Crassus* pair, which had announced a parallelism between the Parthian and the Sicilian παθήματα (*Nik.* 1.1). The Life thus closes with a restatement of Nikias’ πάθη before turning to Crassus, whose equally sad fate we now expect to hear.¹⁶⁶

3.4. TRANSITION FROM SECOND LIFE TO SYNKRISIS

We might expect that the same closural or transitional strategies which we find at the end of first Lives would also be found at the end of second Lives. But this is not entirely the case. Here, transitional phrases, if they look backwards, offer a summing up not merely of the man whose Life has just been narrated

164. Cf. the obituary of Themistokles, where he said to “have lived for sixty-five years and spent most of them in politics and offices” (πέντε πρὸς τοῖς ἐξήκοντα βεβιωκὼς ἔτη, τὰ πλεῖστα τούτων ἐν πολιτείαις καὶ ἡγεμονίαις, *Them.* 31.6), which is picked up in the opening sentence of the *Camillus* “Having had very many great successes in offices, and having been chosen dictator five times” (πλεῖστα μὲν ἐν ἡγεμονίαις καὶ μέγιστα κατορθώσας, δικτάτωρ δὲ πεντάκις αἰρεθεὶς, *Cam.* 1.1); cf. *Cam.* 1.4 (ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἡγεμονίαις πολλαῖς καὶ παντοδαπαῖς).

165. On Nikias as a tragic warner, see Marinatos 1980.

166. Plutarch may also be in dialogue here with Thucydides, whom he has closely followed for the Sicilian expedition, and whom, as he makes clear in 1.1, his reader was expected to know. Thucydides marked the end of his Sicilian narrative with a closural and transitional phrase: “This is what happened in Sicily” (ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα) (*Thuc.* 7.87.6); he continued in the first line of Book 8 with “In Athens, when it was reported, they disbelieved for a long time” (Ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπεὶ δὴ ἠγγέλθη, ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστου) (8.1.1). Plutarch spends longer on the disbelief and makes it more personal (lit. “with such difficulty was *Nikias* believed”). Thus whereas in Thucydides the transition, marked by μὲν and δέ, is a geographical one, from Sicily to Athens, in Plutarch the transition is from one subject (*Nikias*) to the other (*Crassus*).

(as first Lives do) but of *both* men.¹⁶⁷ In other words, as the second Life ends, there is a return to the notion of the pair, in preparation for the formal *synkrisis* which, in most pairs, begins in the next line. Thus, immediately following the end of the *Romulus*, we find “These, then, are the memorable things (Ἄ μὲν οὖν ἄξια μνήμης) about Romulus and Theseus which we happened to find out” (*Thes.-Rom.* 1.1).¹⁶⁸ We have already mentioned the frequency of μὲν οὖν in transitional sentences. A similar phrase is found at the end of the Cicero: “These, then, are the memorable things (Ἄ μὲν οὖν ἄξια μνήμης) in what is recorded about Demosthenes and Cicero which have come to our knowledge” (*Dem.-Cic.* 1.1).¹⁶⁹ In both these cases, a μὲν in the transitional sentence looks forward to a δέ in the first of the *synkrisis* proper, a feature which we noted also in the transitions from first Life to second Life, and which occurs four other times in transitions from second Life to *synkrisis*.¹⁷⁰

In fact phrases such as “memorable” (ἄξια μνήμης) or “notable” (ἄξια λόγου) are common in the transition from second Life to *synkrisis*.¹⁷¹ Thus the end of the *Coriolanus* is followed by a sentence beginning, “Now that their deeds lie before us, as many as we consider memorable and worth mentioning . . .” (Ἐκκειμένων δὲ τῶν πράξεων, ὅσας ἡγούμεθα λόγου καὶ μνήμης ἄξια εἶναι . . .) (*Cor.-Alk.* 1.1).¹⁷² The second half of the sentence begins the act of comparison: “. . . it is easy to see that their political deeds do not incline the scale greatly either way.”¹⁷³ Shorter variants of these transitional sentences or phrases are found at *Per.-Fab.* 1.1 (“The Lives of the men [τῶν ἀνδρῶν] have such a narrative”),¹⁷⁴ and *Dion-Brut.* 1.1. (“The men, then, had many good attributes”).¹⁷⁵ Significantly, in all but two of the 14 cases where such transitional phrases or sentences occur,¹⁷⁶

167. Noted by Ziegler 1907: 32.

168. Ἄ μὲν οὖν ἄξια μνήμης πυθέσθαι περὶ Ῥωμύλου καὶ Θησέως συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν, ταῦτ' ἐστί.

169. Ἄ μὲν οὖν ἄξια μνήμης τῶν περὶ Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρωνος ἱστορουμένων εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀφίεται γνώσιν, ταῦτ' ἐστί. (*Dem.-Cic.* 1.1).

170. Also in *Thes.-Rom.* 1.1–1.2; *Per.-Fab.* 1.1; *Pel.-Marc.* 1.1–2.

171. Such phrases occur occasionally in other kinds of transitions in the Lives: end of a first Life and transition to a second (*Fab.* 1.1); end of proemial opening and transition to Life proper (e.g., *Num.* 1.7). They also occur at the end of the prologues of some works outside the *Parallel Lives* (e.g., *Galba* 2.5; *De mul. virt.* 243d). Cf. *Thes.* 28.1, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄξια μνήμης περὶ τῶν Ἀμαζόνων.

172. Other examples: *Arist.-Cato Maj.* 1.1; *Sert.-Eum.* 1.1 (Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ περὶ Εὐμένους καὶ Σερτωρίου μνήμης ἄξια παρειλήραμεν); *Pel.-Marc.* 1.1 (Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ἀναγραφῆς ἄξια τῶν ἱστορημένων περὶ Μαρκέλλου καὶ Πελοπίδου ταῦτ' ἐστί).

173. For the metaphor of scales in the *synkrisis*, see Duff 1999: 270. See also Stadter 1988, ad *Per.* 11.2.

174. Οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοιαύτην ἔχουσιν ἱστορίαν.

175. Πολλῶν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὑπαρξάντων καλῶν . . .

176. *Thes.-Rom.* 1.1; *Arist.-Cato Maj.* 1.1; *Per.-Fab.* 1.1; *Cor.-Alk.* 1.1; *Dem.-Cic.* 1.1; *Dion-Brut.* 1.1; *Aem.-Tim.* 1.1; *Sert.-Eum.* 1.1; *Flam.* 21.15; *Pel.-Marc.* 1.1; *Ag./Kleom.-Gracch.* 1.1; *Lyk.-Num.* 1.1; *Lys.-Sulla* 1.1; *Ages.-Pomp.* 1.1. Cf. Prieth 1908: 3–4. Many of these transitional phrases and sentences contain first person verbs or pronouns; see below, n.193.

both men or both Lives are mentioned, not just the second. Indeed, the transition to the *Lysander–Sulla synkrisis* (*Lys.-Sulla* 1.1) is an exception in form only: “Since we have run through the life of this one too [i.e., Sulla], let us now go to the *synkrisis*” (Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦτου διεληλύθαμεν βίον, ἴωμεν ἥδη πρὸς τὴν σύγκρισιν). The καί here implies the presence of the first Life (i.e., “this one too *in addition to the other*”), so this is not really an exception to the general rule that transitional phrases at the end of the second Life mark a return to the pair.¹⁷⁷

As well as mentioning or alluding to both men, some transitional phrases refer explicitly to the act of comparison, sometimes using the term σύγκρισις in contexts which make it unclear whether the act or the literary form or both are being evoked. This term is not used elsewhere in the *Parallel Lives* (i.e., outside of the *synkrisis* or the transition to it);¹⁷⁸ it functions therefore as a clear signal that the second Life has ended and the *synkrisis* is beginning. The *Nikias–Crassus* offers the most concise example: “In the *synkrisis* . . .” (Ἐν δὲ τῇ συγκρίσει . . .) (*Nik.-Crass.* 1.1). A little more elaborate is *Aem.-Tim.* 1.1: “Since they were like this in the narrative (κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν), it is clear that the *synkrisis* does not have many differences or dissimilarities.”¹⁷⁹ The term ἱστορία here, apart from making clear the distinction between narrative and *synkrisis*, recalls, in a neat touch, the first sentence of the prologue, where Plutarch had talked of his using ἱστορία as a mirror (ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ) (*Aem.* 1.1).¹⁸⁰

Occasionally, although the term *synkrisis* is not mentioned in the transitional sentence, it or the verb συγκρίνειν is present in the sentence that follows (e.g., *Dem.-Cic.* 1.1; *Sert.-Eum.* 1.2). Other transitional sentences do not use the term *synkrisis*, but speak instead of placing the two men’s lives side by side or of

177. The only real exception is *Flam.* 21.15, where only Flamininus’ Life is summed up and where his death is mentioned for the first and only time: Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδεμίαν ἔτι τοῦτων κατόπιν οὔτε πολιτικὴν τοῦ Τίτου πρᾶξις οὔτε πολεμικὴν ἱστορήκαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελευτῆς ἔτυχεν εἰρηνικῆς, ὥρα τὴν σύγκρισιν ἐπισκοπεῖν. This sentence, then, is both the end of the *Flamininus* (the ἐπεὶ clause) and the transition to the *synkrisis*, and is placed in all modern editions as the last line of the *Flam.*, rather than—as in the other transitions from second Life to *synkrisis*—as part of the *synkrisis*. As with the *Lys.-Sulla* example, the next sentence (*Phil.-Flam.* 1.1; *Lys.-Sulla* 1.2) begins with the connective μὲν οὖν, which is common at the start of other *synkriseis* (*Thes.-Rom.* 1.1; *Per.-Fab.* 1.1; *Dem.-Cic.* 1.1; *Pel.-Marc.* 1.1; *Ages.-Pomp.* 1.1; cf. *Sol.-Pub.* 1.1, Ἄρ’ οὖν; *Dion-Brut.* 1.1 and *Demetr.-Ant.* 1.1, τοίνυν).

178. Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 482. Many of the examples cited in this paragraph are listed in idem 480–482. There is one exception to the rule that the term *synkrisis* does not occur outside of the *synkrisis* or the transition to it: *Dem.* 3.2, part of the prologue to the *Dem.-Cic.*, where Plutarch denies that he will do a *synkrisis* of the speeches of the Demosthenes and Cicero. The second-century Atticist Phrynichos considered the word as un-Attic (*Ekloge* 243).

179. Τοιοῦτων δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν ὄντων, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διαφορὰς οὐδ’ ἀνομιότητας ἢ σύγκρισις. Other transitions which use the term *synkrisis* are *Flam.* 21.15 (quoted in n.177); *Lys.-Sulla* 1.1 (Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὸν τοῦτου διεληλύθαμεν βίον, ἴωμεν ἥδη πρὸς τὴν σύγκρισιν); *Sol.-Pub.* 1.1 (Ἄρ’ οὖν ἰδίον τι περὶ ταύτην τὴν σύγκρισιν ὑπάρχει . . . ;) (really the first line of the *synkrisis* proper).

180. On this metaphor, see Duff 1999: 32–34; Stadter 2000: 500–505; 2003/4: 89–91.

exploring the “differences” (διαφοραί) between the two men. For example, after the end of the *Cato Maj.* we find, “Now that the memorable things concerning these men too have been written, all the latter’s life, when placed alongside (παρατεθείς) the other’s, does not provide any readily discernible difference, obscured as it is by many great similarities” (*Arist.-Cato Maj.* 1.1).¹⁸¹ In *Ag./Kleom.-Gracch.* 1.1 Plutarch talks about “surveying” the lives “in parallel” “now that this narrative (διηγῆσεως) too has ended.”¹⁸² The mention of the narrative here, as well as implying that what will follow will *not* be narrative, looks back to the prologue to the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi*, where Plutarch had addressed the reader and invited him to judge for himself “from the narrative” (ἐκ τῆς διηγῆσεως) (*Ag./Kleom.* 2.9).¹⁸³ As with the example from the *Aemilius–Timoleon*, this circularity provides a sense of closure to the narrative of the two men’s Lives before the synkritic assessment begins.

4. HOW BOOKS END

4.1. SYNKRISEIS: STRUCTURE

All but four books (i.e., 18 out of the surviving 22) end with a *synkrisis*, the fourth and final section of the Plutarchan book.¹⁸⁴ *Synkrisis* vary in length between roughly 400 words (*Sert.-Eum.*), to 1,500 (*Arist.-Cato Maj.*). They have a clear structure:¹⁸⁵ the two subjects are compared for their performance or praiseworthiness across a number of fairly consistent areas (manner of death, self-control, military skill, etc.). Each theme tends to be signalled clearly early in the first sentence dealing with that theme; sometimes the end of the discussion of a particular theme is marked by a closural or transitional phrase. Thus in the *synkrisis* to the *Nikias–Crassus* we find, “In the *synkrisis*, first, Nikias’ wealth . . .” (1.1); “So much concerning their wealth, but in their political activities . . .”

181. Γεγραμμένων δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν ἀξίων μνήμης, ὅλος ὁ τούτου βίος ὅλῳ τῷ θατέρου παρατεθείς οὐκ εὐθεώρητον ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν, ἐναφανίζομένην πολλαῖς καὶ μεγάλας ὁμοιότησιν. Other examples where “differences” are referred to can be found at *Ages.-Pomp.* 1.1 (Ἐκκειμένων οὖν τῶν βίων, ἐπιδράμωμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταχέως τὰ ποιοῦντα τὰς διαφοράς, παρ’ ἄλληλα συνάγοντες); *Lyk.-Num.* 1.1 (Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸν Νομᾶ καὶ Λυκούργου διεληλύθαμεν βίον, ἐκκειμένων ἀμφοῖν, εἰ καὶ χάλειπὸν ἔργον, οὐκ ἀποκνητέον συναγαγεῖν τὰς διαφοράς).

182. Ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ταύτης πέρως ἐχούσης τῆς διηγῆσεως ὑπολείπεται λαβεῖν ἐκ παραλλήλου τῶν βίων τὴν ἀποθεώρησιν. For ἀποθεώρησις, cf. *Ages.-Pomp.* 4.11 (ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις οὕτως ἐχάτερον ἀποθεωροῦμεν); *Pel.* 25.11 (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ καὶ τοῦ βίου <****> ἀποθεώρησιν); *Lyk.* 4.4 (Lykourgos sailed from Crete to Asia, ἀποθεωρῆσαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν βίων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν).

183. Cf. the transition from the *Ag./Kleom.* to the *Gracchi* (*Gracchi* 1.1): “Now that we have explained the first story” (τὴν πρώτην ἱστορίαν), where ἱστορία is similar in meaning to διήγησις. For the term “narrative” (διήγησις), see above, p. 222.

184. Those pairs which do not have a closing *synkrisis* (*Them.-Cam.*, *Pyrrh.-Mar.*, *Phok.-Cato Min.*, and *Alex.-Caes.*) are discussed below, pp. 258–59.

185. For a more detailed treatment of the material in this and the next two paragraphs, see Duff 1999: 252–86. Cf. also Prieth 1908.

(2.1) (Ἐν δὲ τῇ συγκρίσει πρῶτον ὁ Νικίου πλοῦτος ... Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πλούτου τοσαῦτα· τοῖς δὲ πολιτεύμασι ...).¹⁸⁶ In many *synkriseis* the different themes on which the two subjects are compared are divided into two broad categories, military and political.¹⁸⁷ Thus the *Perikles–Fabius synkrisis* begins, after a transitional sentence with μὲν οὖν (see above, p. 251), “Since (ἐπεὶ δέ) both men have left many fine examples of both political and military virtue, come let us first consider the matter of their military achievements ...” The transition from the section on their military deeds to that on their political careers is marked by ταῦτα περὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν. Τῆς δὲ πολιτείας ... (3.1). The frequency of these structural markers within the *synkriseis* is plainly a rhetorical feature, and indicates the influence of the techniques of epideictic oratory; *synkrisis* was indeed a recognized rhetorical form, and included in collections of “elementary exercises” (*progymnasmata*).¹⁸⁸

But cutting across this way of structuring the *synkriseis*—i.e., the division into a series of themes on which the two men are compared—is a different structuring technique, by which first one of the subjects is preferred, then the other. In other words, on all the topics dealt with in the first half of the *synkrisis*, one subject is consistently judged superior; in the second half of the *synkrisis*, the tables are turned and the other is judged superior. In some *synkriseis* there is a clearly marked turning point. In the *Theseus–Romulus synkrisis*, for example, all the arguments in the first half favor Theseus. The change of direction of the argument is then stated explicitly (3.3–4.1), “So one would give these votes to Theseus. But for the other [i.e., Romulus], first, there is this great thing in his favor ...”.¹⁸⁹ The rest of the *synkrisis*, right to the end, brings together arguments in favor of Romulus. Such clearly stated turning points also occur in *Kim.–Luc.* 2.6–3.1, *Arist.–Cato Maj.* 4.1 and *Dion–Brut.* 3.6. In other cases the turning point is marked simply with ἀλλά (*Phil.–Flam.* 2.1) or μέντοι (*Ages.–Pomp.* 3.4). Elsewhere, the turning point is not signalled by any linguistic marker. For example, in the *Lysander–Sulla synkrisis*, Lysander is initially preferred. The turning point occurs within the discussion of how the two men handled wealth; Plutarch commends Lysander for his incorruptibility, but then notes that, despite his greater personal virtue as regards riches, he was actually responsible for corrupting his own country (*Lys.–Sulla* 3.8). The rest of the *synkrisis* favors Sulla.¹⁹⁰

This tendency to marshal arguments in favor of each of the subjects in turn is another feature which indicates the closeness of the *synkriseis* to epideictic

186. For ταῦτα, τοσαῦτα etc. as typical in clausal phrases, see above, pp. 246–50 and n.152.

187. Prieth 1908: 4–6; Duff 1999: 263.

188. Details in Duff 1999: 244.

189. ὥστε ταύτας μὲν ἂν τις ἀποδοίη τῷ Θηρσεὶ τὰς ψήφους. Ἐκείνῳ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει μέγα τὸ...

190. For the unusually late turning point in the *Cor.–Alk.*, see below, n.194.

rhetoric; indeed, Plutarch himself wrote at least one rhetorical work which has exactly this bipartite structure: the *Are land animals better than sea animals?* in which the case for land animals and then for sea animals is put in turn.¹⁹¹ As there, the result is that neither subject is preferred—what we might call a studied equality—but that the reader gains a better understanding of both. Indeed that point is made explicitly at the end of the *Are land animals* (985c).¹⁹² A further effect of these two structural features—that is, the division of the material thematically, and the tendency to deploy the material to argue first in favor of one subject then of the other—is to provide a different “take” on the two subjects to the one encountered in the Lives themselves, which, after the proemial opening, are broadly chronological in structure. In the *synkriseis* we return to the discursive, non-narrative style characteristic of the prologues, with which they correspond. And just as prologues were more personal, with a higher number of first person verbs and pronouns, so also are the *synkriseis*, which abound in first person judgments about what “I” or “we” consider right, and invitations to the reader to share with the narrator in the act of judging. The narrator’s presence, and that of the narratee, is thus felt more keenly at the start and end of books, just as it is at the start and end of individual Lives.¹⁹³

4.2. CLOSURE OF SYNKRISEIS

The *synkriseis* form the last element of the book. The last line of the *synkrisis* is also therefore the last of the book. The *synkrisis* is itself a closural device, but within it several different closural strategies are pursued. Several *synkriseis* end with a closural sentence, which makes clear that the *synkrisis*, and the book as a whole, is ending. Such sentences often employ terms relating to assessment or comparison, and give some sort of closing, summative judgement; several use first person verbs or second person imperatives. For example, the *Lysander–Sulla* ends, “It is time to consider (ὥρα δὴ σκοπεῖν) whether we miss the truth entirely in declaring that Sulla was more successful, but Lysander made more mistakes, and in giving the latter the first prize (πρωτεῖον) for self-control and moderation, the former for generalship and courage” (*Lys.-Sulla* 5.6). The

191. Cf. the (possibly spurious) *On whether fire or water is more useful* or the paired speeches of Maximus of Tyre. More examples in Duff 1999: 243–48. Some Suetonian Lives also have this structure, with a distinct turning-point: e.g., *Tib.* 42.1; *Cal.* 22.1; *Nero* 19.3. See Duff 1999: 253.

192. Swain 1992: 104; Duff 1999: 246.

193. A point made by Pelling 2002b: 269–70, who lists the following first persons in the *synkriseis*: *Lyk.-Num.* 2.10; *Arist.-Cato Maj.* 5.3; *Kim.-Luc.* 1.8; *Pel.-Marc.* 3.1–2; *Nik.-Crass.* 3.2; *Lys.-Sulla* 1.5; 3.7; *Ages.-Pomp.* 3.1–2, to which may be added *Thes.-Rom.* 1.6; *Lyk.-Num.* 1.10; 3.12; *Sol.-Pub.* 1.3; 4.1; *Arist.-Cato Maj.* 3.3; *Per.-Fab.* 1.1; *Nik.-Crass.* 2.3; *Dem.-Cic.* 1.2; *Phil.-Flam.* 3.5; *Pel.-Marc.* 1.8; *Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi* 5.7; *Lys.-Sulla* 5.1; 5.6. The transitions from second Life to *synkrisis* also contain first persons: *Thes.-Rom.* 1.1; *Lyk.-Num.* 1.1; *Dem.-Cic.* 1.1; *Cor.-Alk.* 1.1; *Pel.-Marc.* 1.1; *Flam.* 21.15 (on which, see above, p. 177); *Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi* 1.1 (above, p. 253); *Lys.-Sulla* 1.1; *Ages.-Pomp.* 1.1.

Philopoimen–Flamininus ends with a similarly explicit final judgment, “Since, after this examination, the difference is hard to define (δυσθεώρητος ἢ διαφορά), consider (σκόπει) whether we shall seem to umpire unfairly if we award the Greek the crown for military experience and generalship, and the Roman the one for goodness and justice” (*Phil.-Flam.* 3.5). The use of the first and second persons, and the injunction to the reader to judge, in both cases marks a return to the “personal” and an allusion to the reading and writing process, and gives a strong closural signal.¹⁹⁴

In fact, as we have noted, the use of first (though not second) person verbs and pronouns, and the allusion to the reading or writing process, are both features of the prologues.¹⁹⁵ In several other cases, closural sentences contain an element of “circularity”; that is, they recall themes from the prologue, which together with the *synkrisis* frames the two Lives. The *synkrisis* to the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi* ends with a final judgement: “You yourself can see (συνορᾷς μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτός) the difference [between them] from what has been said. But if it is necessary to set forth a decision about each one, I vote (τίθημι)¹⁹⁶ that Tiberius was first (πεπρωτευκέναι) of all of them in virtue . . .” (*Ag./Kleom.-Gracchi* 5.7). The injunction to the reader to judge “for himself” recalls the ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς διηγήσεως of the prologue (*Ag./Kleom.* 2.9). A different sort of “circularity” is evident at the end of the *Kimon–Lucullus*: “The result is that for someone who takes everything into consideration, the judgement is hard to make (δυσδιαίτητον εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν) . . . so that even the vote of the gods judged them both as good and god-like in their nature (ἀγαθοῖς καὶ θείοις τὴν φύσιν ἀμφοτέροις)” (*Kim.-Luc.* 3.6). The notion that it will be hard to find differences between the two men recalls the last line of the prologue, which referred to the ease of finding similarities (*Kim.* 3.3, above, p. 222). The reference to their good natures, furthermore, recalls the assertion in the prologue that one should not dwell on the failings of the subjects, “as though out of respect for human nature” (ὥσπερ αἰδομένους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, *Kim.* 2.5).

The *Perikles–Fabius* also ends with a judgement—not, however, on the two men’s lives, but on Perikles’ building works: all the building works at Rome before the Caesars are “not worthy of comparison” with them (οὐκ ἄξιον . . . παραβαλεῖν); they are “incomparable” (ἀσύγκριτον), and take “the first prize” (τὸ πρωτεῖον), the phrase with which the book ends (*Per.-Fab.* 3.7).¹⁹⁷ The

194. Pelling 2002b: 274–75 stresses the tentativeness of the judgements expressed in these passages and the way they suggest collaboration between “narrator” and “narratee.” Cf. *Cor.-Alk.* 5.2, with its exclamatory “By Zeus” (ὣ Ἄϊα), which also adds a personal element. On this last sentence, which gives a surprising final judgement (praising Coriolanus and criticising Alkibiades in the last sentence, when the rest of the *synkrisis* had done the opposite), see Duff 1999: 282–83.

195. See above, pp. 219–20, 222.

196. A court-room metaphor, sc. ψῆφον or γνώμην (LSJ A II 5); cf. *Thes.-Rom.* 3.3 (ψήφους); *Kim.-Luc.* 3.6 (ψῆφον).

197. ἔργων γε μὴν μεγέθεσι καὶ ναῶν καὶ κατασκευαῖς οἰκοδομημάτων, ἐξ ὧν ἐκόσμησεν ὁ Περικλῆς τὰς Ἀθήνας, οὐκ ἄξιον ὁμοῦ πάντα τὰ πρὸ τῶν Καισάρων φιλοτιμήματα τῆς Ῥώμης

references to the act of comparison, and to the prize, provide a strong ending. The judgement on the building works, through its position as the final element in the book, is also given special emphasis, and overshadows the earlier judgements on the two men throughout the *synkrisis*. But it also recalls the discussion of works of art in the prologue (*Per.* 1.2–2.4); similarly the reference to the Caesars recalls the very first words of the prologue, an anecdote about “Caesar” (*Per.* 1.1). Interestingly, in the prologue the value of works of art had been played down in contrast with works of virtue; here, Perikles’ building works are presented, not only by the explicit praise but also by the placing of this section last in the book, as his crowning achievement.¹⁹⁸

Other *synkriseis*, though they end without a clear, closural “final judgement,” also recall elements of the opening of the book—that is, elements of the prologue, or, if none exists, of the opening of the first Life.¹⁹⁹ The *Aristeides–Cato Major* ends with a discussion of the temperance (σωφροσύνη) of the two men, and with criticism of Cato’s marrying a low-born girl, whose father worked for Cato for pay. This ending recalls the very first words of the book, the start of the *Aristeides*, where Plutarch reports a story about Aristeides’ daughters going unmarried for want of a dowry (*Arist.* 1.1; cf. 27.1, 6; see above, p. 244). Similarly, the last part of the *Pelopidas–Marcellus* contains a long discussion of the rash death in battle of the two men (*Pel.–Marc.* 3.1–8)—the same subject as had filled almost the whole prologue (*Pel.* 1–2). The *Demetrios–Antony* ends with a discussion of the way the two men died, which includes, as often at the end of the *synkriseis*, several explicit words of judgement: “The manner of death of neither men can be praised, but Demetrios’ is more to be criticized” (*Demetr.–Ant.* 6.3).²⁰⁰ Demetrios, Plutarch goes on, allowed himself to be taken prisoner. “On the other hand Antony took himself off in a cowardly, pitiful, and dishonorable way—but before the enemy became master of his body” (6.4). The criticism of Antony for dying in a cowardly way is strikingly at odds with the way his death is presented in the Life.²⁰¹ But more important for our purposes here is the fact that the focus on the manner of death of the two men recalls the last sentence of the prologue (*Demetr.* 1.8), which had made exactly the same point: “one overturned his life (κατέστρεψεν) after being captured by the enemy, the other after having come near to suffering this fate.” The final phrase of the *synkrisis*, furthermore, ἐαυτὸν ἐξήγγαγεν, while standard in Plutarch’s period for “kill oneself” (LSJ 1 2), recalls the stage metaphors which have been such a feature of the *Demetrios–Antony* book, and in particular the

παραβαλεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἕξοχόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀσύγκριτον ἢ τούτων ἔσχε μεγαλοουργία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια τὸ πρῶτεον. In the second half of the sentence τούτων refers to Perikles’ building works and ἐκεῖνα to the Caesars’, not vice versa, as e.g., Thomas 2007: 238, translates.

198. See Duff 1999: 265–66; Beck 2005: 63–65.

199. Cf. the examples of circularity as a closural device at the level of the individual life on pp. 244–46.

200. τὸν δὲ θάνατον οὐδετέρου μὲν ἔστιν ἐπαινεῖσαι, ψεκτὸς δὲ Δημητρίου μάλλον.

201. See Duff 1999: 280–81.

one which marked the transition from the first Life to the second: “Now that the Macedonian play has been performed to the end, let us bring on the Roman” (ὥρα τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἐπεισαγαγεῖν) (*Demetr.* 53.10).²⁰² The repetition of this metaphor, applied now to the theme of death, provides a very strong sense of closure.

In other *synkriseis* closure is provided merely by the fact that the final theme which they discuss is the manner of death or the posthumous fate of the subjects. This is the case with the *Demosthenes–Cicero*, *Sertorius–Eumenes* and *Nikias–Crassus*, though in the last case ἀμεμπτότερος (*Nik.–Crass.* 5.4) provides a link with the very first line of the *synkrisis*, where the same word had been used (1.1). The *Dion–Brutus* ends with the honors paid to the two men after death; the last element is an anecdote about Octavian coming across a statue of Brutus in Milan. The use of an anecdote in the *synkrisis* is unusual and striking. But the final sentence (*Dion–Brut.* 5.4), where Octavian praises the people of Milan for remaining loyal to their friends “despite adverse fortune” recalls the stress on the ill fortune of the two men in the prologue (*Dion* 2.1–2). The final words of the *synkrisis*, “he ordered it [the statue] to stay in place” (κατὰ χώραν μένειν ἐκέλευσεν) form an appropriate ending for the Lives of men who refused to compromise with tyranny.

Synkriseis, then, sometimes recall the prologue through the repetition of themes or images. There is a certain logic in such circularity: both prologue and *synkrisis* operate at the level of the book, and between them they frame and weld together the two Lives. Indeed, there is often a sort of division of responsibilities between prologue and *synkrisis*: whereas prologues, in their second sections, often list similarities, *synkriseis* focus on differences.²⁰³

What, finally, of the four books which lack a *synkrisis*, and where, as they stand in our manuscripts, the end of the second Life coincides with the end of the book (*Themistokles–Camillus*, *Pyrrhos–Marius*, *Phokion–Cato Minor*, and *Alexander–Caesar*)? Have the *synkriseis* simply been lost in transmission, or was the ending of the second Life originally conceived as the end of the book? Christopher Pelling has made a good case for seeing the endings of the second Lives of all four books, and especially of the *Alexander–Caesar*, as displaying some closural features.²⁰⁴ But many other second Lives possess such features, and are followed all the same by a *synkrisis*: the presence of closural features in the second Life does not, in other words, preclude the presence of a *synkrisis*.

202. For the frequent stage metaphors in the *Demetr.–Ant.* see above, n.156.

203. Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 467–74, and Erbse 1956: 399–403 noticed this phenomenon: that prologues focus on similarities, *synkriseis* on differences. Stiefenhofer also argued that in pairs without prologues, *synkriseis* tend to mention similarities too. Swain 1992: 106–10, discusses this aspect of Stiefenhofer’s argument. See also Frazier 1987: 76 esp. n.14.

204. Pelling 1997: 244–50 (= repr. 2002a: 377–82); 2006: 268. See also Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 474–76; Erbse 1956: 403–406; Larmour 1992: 4175–77. I have also addressed the issue at Duff 1999: 253–55. The last chapter of the *Marius* provides moral reflections that are applicable to both Pyrrhos and Marius and so fulfils some of the functions of a *synkrisis*. Trapp 1999: 495 connects the allusion to Sokrates at the ends of both *Phokion* and *Cato Min.* with the lack of a *synkrisis*.

It is therefore possible that a *synkrisis* has been lost in some or all of these four cases. But the fact that Plutarch was prepared to vary the usual structure elsewhere (many books lack prologues, some Lives have “bare” openings, in three books the Greek Life comes before the Roman), suggests that it is perfectly possible that Plutarch varied the ending here and simply did not write *synkritic* epilogues to these four books.²⁰⁵

5. THE COLLECTION AS A WHOLE

We have examined the structures of individual books, and of their component parts. But how did these books relate to each other? What was their order in the complete series?

Twenty-two pairs of Lives, including one double-pair (*Agis/Kleomenes-Gracchi*), survive. We know, from a reference to it in the fourth-century AD Lamprias Catalogue,²⁰⁶ of one book now lost—the *Epameinondas-Scipio*.²⁰⁷ It is therefore often assumed that the original collection must have contained twenty-three books. As there is no extant general introduction or preface to the *Parallel Lives* as a whole (nothing, for example, that names Plutarch), it is also often assumed that the *Epameinondas-Scipio* must have stood first, as Book 1, and that such a general introduction might have preceded it.²⁰⁸ There is no way of knowing, however, whether either of these assumptions is true. The Lamprias Catalogue does not give any indication that the *Epameinondas-Scipio* might have stood first. Nor is there any way of knowing whether other pairs might have been lost. In *Mar.* 29.12 Plutarch refers to a projected Life of Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109 BC), and in *De Herod. Malig.* to 866b to a projected Life of Leonidas; both may have been intended for the *Parallel Lives*, though neither survives and there are no other references to them.²⁰⁹ There are, it is

205. Note that, as things stand, two books (the *Them.-Cam.* and *Pyrrh.-Mar.*) lack both prologue and *synkrisis*, though the start of the *Them.-Cam.* is corrupt (above, n.53).

206. Bibliography in Duff 1999: 2.

207. Lamprias Catalogue, no. 7. It is not clear which Scipio this was. A separate “Life of Scipio Africanus” is listed in the Lamprias Catalogue (no. 28), so one might be tempted to assume that the *Epam.-Scipio* concerned Scipio Aemilianus. But in cross-references to these two Lives (Scipio Aemilianus: *Gracch.* 21.9, 31.5; Scipio Africanus the elder: *Pyrrh.* 8.5), Plutarch calls the *former* Africanus. See e.g., Ziegler 1949: 258–59 (= repr. 1951: 896); Herbert 1957; Stadter 1989: xxviii; Georgiadou 1997: 6–8; Duff 1999: 14n.4. The *Epameinondas* is cited at *Ages.* 28.6.

208. E.g., Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1926 (= repr. 1995: 58); Ziegler 1949: 259–61 (= repr. 1951: coll. 897–98); Russell 1973: 113; Stadter 1989: xxviii; Delvaux 1995: 103; Hünemörder 2000: 1161; Pelling 2002b: 270; Tatum 2010: 1. “Probably” the first pair: e.g., Jones 1966: 67 (= repr. 1995: 108); Georgiadou 1997: 6; Duff 1999: 2.

209. *De Herod. Malig.* 866b: ὅσα δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τούτῳ τολμήματα καὶ ῥήματα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν παρατέλλοιεν, ἐν τῷ Λεωνίδου βίῳ γραφήσεται; *Mar.* 29.12: βέλτιον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου [Μετέλλου] γραφομένοις εἰρήσεται. The phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ + genitive is the standard one Plutarch uses in cross-references to the *Lives*. The future is used only once elsewhere in internal cross-references at *Caes.* 35.2, in a cross-reference to the *Pomp.*: ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου γραφισομένοις τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον δηλωθήσεται. See Nikolaidis 2005: 287–88.

true, no other references to missing *Parallel Lives*,²¹⁰ but there are no references to, e.g., the *Perikles–Fabius* either: if it had been lost, we would be entirely ignorant of it. Thus, we can in fact be less certain than many studies have implied about the number of books in the original complete collection, or about which Lives formed Book 1. Furthermore, we have no way of knowing which Lives formed the final book, and whether there was any separate epilogue to the collection.

The manuscripts preserve two separate arrangements of books into the collection as a whole, which seem to go back to late Antique or Byzantine editions. One of these orders Lives by chronological order of the Greek subject, and is that followed in the Loeb and Budé editions; the other orders Lives by city or country of origin of the Greek subject, and then within each group by chronology; this is the order followed by the Teubner.²¹¹ Neither of these arrangements, however, coincide with the little we can reconstruct about book order from Plutarch's own words, and cannot, therefore, help us in trying to reconstruct the sequence of the original collection.

Plutarch tells us the book number for only three books: the *Demosthenes–Cicero*, Book 5; the *Perikles–Fabius*, Book 10; and the *Dion–Brutus*, Book 12.²¹² We can also reconstruct a relative order of composition for some books from internal cross-references of the type “as we have shown ἐν τοῖς περὶ Λυσάνδρου” (*Per.* 22.4), though the tenses used in such cross-references occasionally seem contradictory: for example, *Brut.* 9.9 refers to what “has been written” (γέγραπται) in the *Caesar*, but *Caes.* 62.8 refers to what “has been written” (γεγραμμένοις) in the *Brutus*.²¹³ Such mutual cross-references might indicate simultaneous composition or preparation.²¹⁴ And in a few other cases we can date a book by a reference in it to external events, though we should probably accord less accuracy to such references than is often done. Thus at *Sulla* 21.8 Plutarch says that relics of the battle of Orchomenos (86 BC) were still being found in his own day “though almost two hundred years have passed since that battle.” That should date composition of the *Lysander–Sulla* to before AD 114, but we can be no

210. The Lamprias Catalogue lists as free-standing texts (i.e., not part of the *Parallel Lives*) Lives of Scipio Africanus (see above, n.207), Herakles (cited in *Thes.* 29.5), Hesiod, Pindar, Krates, Daiphantos (cited in *De mul. virt.* 244a–b), and Aristomenes. The *Lives of the Caesars*, of which the *Galba and Otho* are extant, formed a separate collection: Georgiadou 1988; Stadter 2005.

211. The first sequence goes back to the bipartite recension, the second to the tripartite. See Ziegler 1907: 4–42; Manfredini 1987.

212. *Dem.* 3.1; *Per.* 2.5; *Dion* 2.7. These numbers are not reflected in the order in which the Lamprias Catalogue lists the books of *Parallel Lives*.

213. Nikolaidis 2005 discusses such cases in detail; his pp. 318–21 provide a complete list of the cross-references.

214. Mewaldt 1907; Piccirilli 1977: 999–1004; 1980: 1753–55; Pelling 1979, with a postscript in the reprinted versions (1995: 312–18; 2002a: 26–29) replying to criticism by Hillard 1987 and Steidle 1990.

more specific than that: “almost two hundred years” is vague and could apply to any point in Plutarch’s period of composition of the *Lives* (i.e., anywhere from ca. AD 96 onwards).²¹⁵ Several studies have attempted to construct relative and absolute chronologies based on these three different types of evidence (explicit statements of book number, cross-references, and references to external events)²¹⁶ or to relate the relative chronology of particular books to their content.²¹⁷ But the lack of agreement between these studies should caution us not to be too confident in their findings.

In addition, we must bear in mind that order of composition is not necessarily the same as order of publication, and neither is necessarily the same as order in the completed series or book number. That is, books need not have been published in the order in which they were composed; thus while mutual cross-references may indicate simultaneous composition, they do not necessarily indicate simultaneous *publication*.²¹⁸ In addition, even if some of the books were published in the order in which they were written, there is no way of knowing that the collection was not revised and reissued later in a complete edition, with a different, finalized book order. It might have been only at this point, for example, that the references to the *Demosthenes–Cicero* being Book 5, etc. were added. It is possible also that initial work on the two *Lives* of a given book might have been done separately, and the two *Lives* brought together only later.²¹⁹ Indeed, drafts or notes on particular periods or individuals may have provided material for several different *Lives*,²²⁰ and mutual cross-references could date from this initial work. This would mean that the cross-references cannot be used easily to fix the relative chronology of either composition or publication of the whole book.²²¹ It would also explain why in these cross-references, Plutarch cites his works by name of subject of the individual *Life* and not by book number or by name of both subjects of the book.²²² But the presence both of numerous themes which run across both *Lives* or across the whole book, and of the numerous compositional features which manage transition from one section of the book to another, make it certain that the four parts of a book must have been brought together at an early stage.

215. Pace e.g., Jones 1966: 70 (= repr. 1995: 114), “not long before 114”; Delvaux 1995: 97, “vers 110–115.”

216. E.g., Stoltz 1929; Ziegler 1949: 71–82 and 262–65 (= repr. 1951: 708–19 and 899–903); Theander 1958; Brožek 1963; Jones 1966; Delvaux 1995; Nikolaidis 2005; Cooper 2008: 72–77.

217. E.g., Stadter 1983/4: 358–59; 1989: xxvii–xxix; 1992: 48–51; Frazier 1987: 71–72.

218. Pelling 1979: 80 (= repr. 1995: 278; 2002a: 7–8), plus postscript 1995: 313; 2002a: 26. See now Nikolaidis 2005.

219. Nikolaidis 2005: *passim*, especially 284.

220. See Pelling 1979; 1985; 2002c. The term *ὑπόμνημα* or *ὑπομνήματα* is often used by modern scholars of such a hypothesized draft or notes, after Plutarch’s words at *De tranq. an.* 464f.

221. See Nikolaidis 2005 for details of all this. He proposes a chronology of the *Lives* on pp. 286–87.

222. E.g., *Num.* 9.15: ἐν τῷ Καμίλλου βίῳ; 12.13: ἐν τοῖς περὶ Καμίλλου.

The cross-references suggest one more feature of the corpus, which has received little attention until now: that readers were expected, while reading one Life or one book, to have in mind one or more others. This is also implied by the fact that several prologues refer to Plutarch's changing his aims or methodology: in the *Theseus–Romulus* prologue, for example, Plutarch justifies his decision now to go back into mythological times, and in the *Demetrius–Antony* he justifies introducing into his morally educative work the Lives of less than virtuous men. Both these claims assume a familiarity on the part of the reader with the broader corpus. It is likely, therefore, that just as individual Lives can only be properly understood when read as part of the book of which they form part, both Lives and books might have been intended to be read against the background of the corpus as a whole, with knowledge of one Life or book informing a reading of others.²²³

6. CONCLUSIONS

This study has focused attention not on individual Lives, nor even on individual pairs of Lives, but on the book as a whole, and on its articulation, across the full corpus. An important theme has been the importance of distinguishing between books and Lives. Several conclusions have followed from this.

The first concerns prologues. Just over half of the surviving books begin with a prologue to the book as a whole. These prologues have, as we have noticed, a fairly standard two-part structure: an initial section of generalized reflections is followed by the naming of the subjects, a statement of their similarities, and sometimes references to the writing process. Prologues provide an introduction to both Lives, and are clearly delineated from them, often with a transitional sentence and frequently with asyndeton. They should not be confused with the openings of individual Lives; in those 8 cases where the book begins immediately with the first Life, there is simply no prologue. We have, however, noticed several features of first Lives of books that do not contain a prologue which suggest that the lack of prologues to some books may not be random, but is built into the fabric of the other parts of the book: no first Life without a prologue begins with a bare opening (i.e., with chronological narrative), and most (though not all) delay mentioning the name of the subject.²²⁴

The second conclusion which has emerged has been that the Plutarchan book should best be regarded as containing not two but up to four sections: prologue–

223. Pelling 2010a and Stadter 2010 deal with this issue in depth. See also Mossman 1992 on reading the *Pyrrh.* against the *Alex.*; Buszard 2008 on reading *Pyrrh.–Mar.* against *Alex.–Caes.* Beneker 2005 on reading the *Caesar*, *Pompey*, and *Crassus* together; Pelling 2006: 268–69, on reading *Caes.* against other Lives, incl. the *Rom.*

224. Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 473–74 notes that in four of the pairs which lack a prologue (*Lyk.–Num.*, *Cor.–Alk.*, *Arist.–Cato Maj.*, *Lys.–Sulla*), the *synkrisis*—unusually—begins by listing similarities, normally a feature of the prologues. This might again suggest some sort of “compensation” for the lack of the prologue.

first Life—second Life—*synkrisis*, though in some books there is no prologue and in a few no *synkrisis*. Each of these sections has a distinct and fairly consistent internal structure, and each has a distinct set of strategies for opening, for closure and for managing the transition from one section to the next. The two Lives form the centre of the book, and take up most of the space, but they are framed by the prologue and *synkrisis*. Indeed these two sections correspond to each other: just as many books begin with a non-narrative introductory section (the prologue), which treats the subjects of both Lives together, so they end with a non-narrative closing section (the *synkrisis*), which also treats both men. Furthermore, just as prologues tend, in their closing sections, to list similarities between the two men, so *synkriseis* list differences.²²⁵ There is thus a kind of symmetry between these two sections; indeed we have noticed several examples of “circularity,” where themes in the *synkrisis* may recall the prologue. At the end of the book there is a return to the notion of the pair with which the book had begun. This reassertion of the dual subject of the book at its end is apparent in the closural strategies of the individual Lives themselves: as we have noticed the transitions from second Life to *synkrisis*, which offer a summing up of both men, are rather different from those from first to second Life, which offer a summing up of only one.

The realization that the book should be regarded as the basic unit, and that each book should be regarded as containing four sections, has implications both for our understanding and interpretation of these texts, and also for the way in which editors might choose to print them. Modern editors have chosen various conventions; but none is entirely logical and all tend to follow the manuscripts in treating the Life as the basic unit. Thus all modern editions separate first and second Lives by the insertion of a title and sometimes by beginning a new page.²²⁶ Between the second Life and the *synkrisis* Flacelière in his Budé edition, Manfredini in the Fondazione Lorenzo Valla edition and Perrin in the Loeb follow the tradition begun by Coraes and insert a title (e.g., Πελοπίδου και Μαρκελλου Σύγκρισις); they also number the chapters of the *synkriseis* separately from those of the second Life. Ziegler, on the other hand, in his Teubner edition prints the *synkrisis* as part of the second Life, as the manuscripts do, and numbers the chapters of the *synkrisis* as part of the second Life, though he does give separate numbers for it in brackets.²²⁷ But no modern edition distinguishes or in any way marks off the prologue from the first Life, and all but Ziegler print as a title the

225. Stiefenhofer 1914/6: 468 and 471, is good on the way the *synkrisis* and prologue correspond to each other.

226. Flacelière in the Budé edition inserts introductory editorial material between first and second Life, which increases the impression of two separate works rather than two parts of a single book.

227. Ziegler’s practice in this respect is inconsistent. In most cases he gives no gap or marking between second Life and *synkrisis*; but in *some* of the Lives of his first volume he either inserts a gap (*Thes.-Rom.*, *Arist.-Cato Maj.*) or a horizontal line (*Kim.-Luc.*, *Per.-Fab.*, *Nik.-Crass.*, *Cor.-Alk.*, *Dem.-Cic.*) between them. In all cases he prints Σύγκρισις in square brackets in the margin, explaining in his apparatus (at *Thes.-Rom.* 1.1) that this is an addition of earlier editors.

name of the subject of the first Life before the prologue—implying, or at least encouraging the reader to think, that the prologue forms part of the first Life.²²⁸

In fact, however, as I have tried to demonstrate, prologues should be seen as distinct from the first Life proper, just as the *synkriseis* should be seen as distinct from the second Life: indeed, there is often a stronger break between prologue and first Life than there is between the two Lives themselves. Editors should therefore consider an arrangement which reflects and clarifies the internal structure and logic of the book and prioritizes this over respect for the medieval tradition.²²⁹ They should treat the four component parts of the book equally, and mark the transition from one to the other in the same way, either with titles, blank lines, or other markers between prologue and first Life, first Life and second Life, and second Life and *synkrisis*, or with no titles or such like at all between any of these component parts.²³⁰ Similarly, either a single chapter numbering system should run across the whole book,²³¹ or separate systems should be used for all four sections. A title for the book as a whole, naming both men, should stand at the very start.²³²

A further theme of this study has been the complexity and sophistication of the opening and closural strategies within all parts of the Plutarchan book. Transitional sentences and phrases often mark off one section clearly from another, while at the same time mediating and smoothing the transition. Common themes may run across from the end of a first Life to the start of a second. Endings of Lives may recall their beginnings, or may recall the prologue to the book as a whole. The endings of books (*synkriseis*) correspond symmetrically to the beginnings (prologues). Thus, although the four sections of a book are distinct, they are also bound together into a single larger unit.

228. Ziegler rather illogically prints a title with both men's names at the start of the book, no title at the start of the first Life proper (i.e., between prologue and first Life), and the title of the second subject alone at the start of the second Life.

229. In fact, in this respect Bekker's Tauchnitz edition (1855–1857), now almost never cited, is the most logical. He prints a title at the start with the names of both men. Otherwise there are no other titles, and no breaks between the first Life and the second and between the second Life and the *synkrisis*, though like most editions he numbers the chapters of the first Life (including prologue), second Life, and *synkrisis* separately. On the practice adopted in Crusierius' Latin translation, equally logical, see above, pp. 216–217.

230. Or with a title in the margin. In Plutarch's original it is possible that the beginnings or ends of the four sections of the book could have been marked by less intrusive signs such as a *coronis*, asterisk, or such like, perhaps written in the margin, or through the use of indentation or gaps. On the *coronis* and other such markers (e.g., *paragraphus*, *asteriscus*, *diple obelismene*), see Stephen 1959; Turner 1987: 12–13; D. P. Fowler 1989: 105–106. Turner, and Stephen p. 5 and plate 2, give a few examples of such signs in papyri marking the end of subsections in prose books.

231. Argued for by Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 483–85.

232. Note that it is unclear whether in Plutarch's original a title for the book stood at its start. Book titles in antiquity were often written only at the end of the papyrus scroll, or on the outside, or on a tag glued to the roll. See Caroli 2007. And while it may be most likely that such titles contained the names of the two subjects, it is just possible that they may only have given the name of the author, the work and the book number (e.g., Πλουτάρχου Παραλλήλων Βίων β').

A particular focus, finally, has been the way that individual Lives begin. I hope here to have demonstrated that most Lives begin with a non-narrative section which assesses the Life of the subject as a whole. This section often makes use of material relating to a standard set of topics such as birth, family, education, appearance, character, etc. It accordingly often gives information on the early years of the subject. But crucially these early sections do not generally contain chronologically structured narrative; indeed, in many Lives these sections are clearly marked off from the narrative that follows, though there is in some a gradual slide towards narrative. This finding has wide implications. It affects the kind of historical conclusions we can draw from these early sections: order of appearance in the text cannot be assumed to coincide with chronological order of events, or with what Plutarch understood to be the chronological order of events. Secondly, when seen as analysis and not narrative the role and function of these early sections within the Life can be properly understood: they offer a judgement on the whole man, and prepare the reader for what is to come.

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APPENDIX 1: THE *AGIS/KLEOMENES—GRACCHI*

An understanding of the usual structure of the Plutarchan book allows us to gauge what is unusual in the unique “double” pair, the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi*. Let us take first the prologue, which, as we shall see, plays on the reader’s expectations of how prologues normally work. As with most other prologues, there are two distinct sections. The first section (1.1–2.6) contains many of the elements commonly found in the first section of other prologues (anecdotes, generalized reflections, quotations). Section 2 begins with a first person pronoun and a reference to the writing process: “It occurred to us (ἡμῖν) to make these remarks about the glory that comes from the masses when we considered . . .” (2.7). The reader now expects to have mention made of the two subjects of the pair, and this, it seems, is what happens: “when we considered how much power it [i.e., such glory] had from what befell Tiberius and Caius Gracchus.”²³³ The similarities of these two men are then spelled out, notably that they both suffered from a fear of losing popularity. Then finally—or so it seems at first—we come to the transitional sentence, complete with the only second person verb in any prologue:²³⁴ “These things you will judge yourself from the narrative” (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς διηγήσεως) (2.9).

Most readers must now be expecting the life of one of the two Gracchi to begin, though it is true that μὲν οὖν, although very common in transitional phrases elsewhere, never occurs in the transitions from prologue to the first Life.²³⁵ Instead, two more men are introduced, with a δέ picking up the preceding μὲν: “Let us compare with them (παραβάλωμεν δὲ αὐτοῖς), the Spartan pair of demagogues.” Some brief comparisons are made between the two pairs, before we slide into narrative with a very understated transition, “Now the Spartans were not brothers, but they adopted policies which were related and brotherly, having taken the following as their cause (ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην λαβόντες)” (2.11). The next sentence, marked out by asyndeton, begins the *Life of Agis*.²³⁶ The prologue to the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi*, then, exploits in a surprising way the typical features of prologues to the *Parallel Lives*, especially the closing, transitional sentence.

233. ἐκ τῶν Τιβερίω καὶ Γαίω τοῖς Γράγχοις συμπεσόντων. Cf. the similar phrasing and similar strategy (introducing the subject as an example of a previously stated general claim), in the prologue to the *Galba–Otho–Vitellius* (cf. below, n.238): soldiers are dangerous when out of control and Plato thought that a good commander can achieve nothing without an obedient army (*Galba* 1.1–3). He [Plato] “had as witnesses and examples many other events and especially what befell the Romans (ἄλλα τε πάθη πολλὰ καὶ τὰ Ῥωμαίους συμπεσόντα) after the death of Nero . . .” (*Galba* 1.4).

234. Except in the *Aratos* (p. 270 below), which is not part of the *Parallel Lives*.

235. But cf. ταῦτα μὲν in *Dion* 2.7.

236. The asyndeton here is of a weak kind, however, as forward-looking τοιαύτην lessens its effect: cf. the same phrase at *Pyrrh.* 5.4; similar uses of forms τοιοῦτος, all followed by asyndeton, *Pyrrh.* 13.3; 14.4; *Art.* 11.1; see Denniston 1952: 109–110; 1954: xliii–xliv, and the bibliography in n.152 above.

The *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi* contains a prologue, for all its idiosyncrasy. But to what extent does it retain the four-part structure of other books and to what extent does it fragment into two separate pairs or even four separate Lives, as some modern editors present it? We noted earlier that there is a clearly marked transition from the *Agis/Kleomenes* to the *Gracchi* (*Gracchi*. 1.1), and from what Plutarch calls the “narrative” to the *synkrisis* (*Ag./Kleom.–Gracchi* 1.1).²³⁷ The lack of a break, or any kind of transitional marker, at the end of the *Agis* and the end of the *Tiberius*—i.e., after the first Life in each half of the double pair—is therefore all the more striking. At the end of the *Agis*, we do find some of the common closural features: beyond the fact of *Agis*’ death, and that of his mother, which have been narrated at great length (*Ag./Kleom.* 17–20), the final chapter gives reactions to his death, and the final sentence is a kind of obituary (chapter 21). But narrative resumes immediately afterwards with, as the first line of the *Kleomenes*, “After his death” (Ἀποθανόντος δ’ αὐτοῦ . . .) (*Ag./Kleom.* 22[1].1), and the story of *Agis*’ widow marrying *Kleomenes*. There is no proemial material. A little later there is a short section on *Kleomenes*’ character, the condition of Sparta, and *Kleomenes*’ education (22[1].4–23[2].6) but this is subsumed into the chronological narrative. Similarly closure is given to the *Tiberius* by the final section (*Gracch.* 20–21) on the aftermath of his death, including the wretched end of the man chiefly responsible for it and the people’s continuing resentment. The final sentence (*Gracch.* 21.9) may also provide some sense of closure: “On these things [how *Scipio* upset the people by expressing joy at *Tiberius*’ death] a detailed description is given in the life of *Scipio*” (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν τῷ Σκιπίωνος βίῳ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα γέγραπται). But after this, as at the start of the *Kleomenes*, the story continues immediately: “*Gaius Gracchus* (Γάιος δὲ Γράγχος) . . . withdrew from the forum” (*Gracch.* 22[1].1).

Despite consisting of the Lives of four people, then, rather than two, the *Agis/Kleomenes–Gracchi* sticks as far as possible to Plutarch’s usual four-part structure (prologue–narrative–narrative–*synkrisis*) and does not fragment into four separate Lives.²³⁸ The one exception to this notion is that at the opening

237. Above, pp. 248 and 253.

238. One could make a similar point about the two surviving Lives in the *Lives of the Caesars* (*Galba* and *Otho*). A prologue common to both, and probably to the lost *Vitellius*, begins (*Galba* 1). The *Galba* begins directly with narrative (i.e., there is no non-narrative proemial material). The ends of both Lives possess some closural features; in the *Galba* there is a final reflective chapter, marked off from the narrative of his death, which had preceded, by the closural phrase *τοιαῦτα τὰ κατὰ τὸν Γάλβαν* . . . (*Galba* 29.1). The *Otho* begins directly with narrative (“The new emperor at dawn . . .”) and ends with mention of *Otho*’s tomb, and a claim that Plutarch had seen it (cf. above pp. 242–44), an “obituary” and a note on the fate of the soldiers who had brought *Otho* to power and killed him (*Otho* 18)—which echoes the emphasis on soldiery in the prologue. The abrupt beginning of the *Otho*, the fact that its end recalls the prologue to the *Galba*, the fact that *Otho* is first introduced in the *Galba*, and *Vitellius* in the *Otho*, and the presence of several images, such as of severed heads (Ash 1997: esp. 196–200; Stadter 2005: 423–25), which run through both Lives, make clear that these two Lives, and probably the *Vitellius* too, are to be regarded as a single work and do not fragment into separate Lives. See Georgiadou 1988; Pelling 1997: 230n.11 (= repr. 2002a: 383n.11).

of the *Tiberius* Plutarch does a comparison of the two Gracchi, of the kind we normally get in prologues (chapters 2–3), complete with a transition very similar to what we have seen in *Dion* 2.7: “Each should be discussed individually, beginning with the older man” (*Gracch.* 3.3). But this just confirms that we are dealing with two double-Lives, not four separate ones. Ziegler was certainly right to print the two Greek Lives and the two Roman ones as single units, with a continuous chapter numbering system.²³⁹

APPENDIX 2: THE OPENING OF THE CAESAR

An understanding of the way Lives commonly begin shows how unusual the *Caesar* is as it now stands in our manuscripts. It begins abruptly with Caesar’s refusal to divorce Cinna’s daughter: Τὴν Κίinna τοῦ μοναρχήσαντος θυγατέρα Κορνηλίαν ὡς ἐπεκράτησε Σύλλας οὐτ’ ἐλπίσιν οὔτε φόβῳ δυνηθεὶς ἀποσπάσαι Καίσαρος, ἐδήμευσε τὴν φερνὴν αὐτῆς.²⁴⁰

The presence of asyndeton here is not in itself unusual. Asyndeton occurs at the start of five other second Lives.²⁴¹ More unusual is the structure of the sentence. Sulla is named in a subordinate clause; it is only when the end of the sentence is reached that it becomes clear that he is also the grammatical subject of the main verb ἐδήμευσε. There is a parallel in *Gracchi* 1.3: διὸ καὶ τὴν Σκιπίωνος τοῦ καταπολεμήσαντος Ἄννιβαν θυγατέρα Κορνηλίαν . . . [Tiberius, the father of the Gracchi] λαβεῖν ἠξιώθη. The crucial difference, however, is that *Gracchi* 1.3 does not open a Life and Tiberius, the father of the Gracchi, has already been introduced in a sentence which precedes.²⁴² There is thus there none of the confusion that we find in *Caes.* 1.1 over who the grammatical subject is. It seems likely then either that *Caesar* 1.1 is corrupt or that it did not form the opening of the Life.

Also unusual is the introduction of the biographical subject of a second Life in such an oblique way. It is true that two other second Lives also begin obliquely: the *Romulus* begins “The great name of Rome” (Τὸ μέγα τῆς Ῥώμης ὄνομα), and the *Timoleon*, “The state of affairs in Sicily before the despatch of Timoleon”; in both cases, as in the *Caesar*, a prologue has already warned the reader of the

239. And Reiske, Sintenis, Perrin and Flacelière were wrong to insert a title and begin a separate numbering system for the sections on Kleomenes and Tiberius Gracchus. As Ziegler notes in his apparatus (on *Ag./Kleom.* 21(1).1 and *Gracch.* 22(1)), while some modern editors insert the titles Κλεομένης and Γάιος Γράγγος at the start of the second Life in each half, the medieval manuscripts do not; rather they simply run on without a break. Bekker has no titles or breaks of any sorts, but does number chapters separately for Kleomenes and Tiberius Gracchus. On the carefully composed structure of the *Ag./Kleom.-Gracch.*, cf. also Stiefenhofer 1914/16: 471–73.

240. Literally translated: “Cornelia the daughter of Cinna, who had held supreme power, when Sulla gained the upper hand, having been able neither by inducements nor threats to separate her from Caesar, he [Sulla] confiscated her dowry.”

241. See above, pp. 247–48.

242. Pelling 1984: 33, notes the parallel between the two sentences.

identity of the subject of this Life (*Thes.* 2.1; *Aem.* 1.6; *Alex.* 1.1). But in the other two cases the opening words make strong thematic statements: the *Romulus*, as the prologue has warned, is about Rome as a city, and the reader expects Romulus to be treated as the founder of Rome, just as Theseus has been of Athens. The *Timoleon* declares Syracuse, and Sicily more generally, to be its subject as much as Timoleon, its liberator.²⁴³ In contrast, the opening words of the *Caesar* lack such “point,” and the naming of Caesar is much more casual—though “sole ruler” (μοναρχήσαντος) does perhaps signal an issue which will be important in the *Caesar*.

A further argument that something is missing is the total lack either of a proemial opening or of anything on Caesar’s family or earlier years.²⁴⁴ There are, as we have noticed, other Lives which have “bare” openings and begin with narrative, but they do say *something* about the family and/or childhood of their subjects, even if this is subsumed in narrative.²⁴⁵

In fact, this impression that something is missing from the start of the *Caesar* is confirmed by a papyrus of the 3rd century AD (*P Köln* 1 47). Although the preserved letters begin almost exactly where the medieval manuscripts do (τῆν Κίω||[να), they are placed at the right hand edge of the first line of the papyrus column, the rest of the line being lost. The papyrus seems to have had about 20–22 letters per line, so at the minimum some 14 letters must have preceded the point at which our manuscripts begin.²⁴⁶ However, given the fact that the end of the *Alexander* is probably also corrupt, it is likely that at some stage in transmission a rather larger chunk of text was lost, containing material from the end of the *Alexander* and the beginning of the *Caesar*; perhaps the loss involved one or more papyrus columns, or one or more leaves of a codex. It is impossible, however, to say how much of the *Caesar* itself may have been in this lacuna.²⁴⁷ It may have been merely a transitional sentence, along the lines of *Fab.* 1.1, e.g., <“Such then was Alexander. We now turn in our narrative to Caesar”>.²⁴⁸ But that would not explain the oddness of the structure of the first sentence, and we would have to assume some further corruption. More likely the lacuna contained something on Caesar’s early years, whether narrated or in a proemial opening, and which may have introduced Sulla. Indeed, part of the lost opening may, as Pelling has suggested, be preserved in a fragment of Zonaras (10.11, p. 368),

243. See above, pp. 238–40.

244. Niebuhr 1848: 28–29; Pelling 1984: 33; Stadter 1988: 277.

245. As Ziegler 1935: 387 notes, the *Flam.* does not contain information on either—but it does on the other hand begin with a proemial section on his appearance and character (*Flam.* 1.1–3).

246. Indelli 1995: 49–50.

247. Corruption of *Alexander*: Ziegler 1935: 387–90; Pelling 1973: 344, suggesting that part of the lost ending of the *Alexander* may be preserved in a passage of Zonaras (4.14, p. 304), which records that Roxane refused Alexander’s death-bed request to dispose of his body secretly; Alexander hoped, the passage explains, that if his body disappeared people would believe that he had ascended to the gods. Cf. the discussion in Pelling 1997: 245–50 (= repr. 2002a: 378–82).

248. <Τοιούτου δὲ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου γεγονότος, ἐπὶ τὸν Καίσαρα τὴν ἱστορίαν μετέγομεν>.

which has a discussion of the origin of Caesar's name—just the sort of material Plutarch includes in the proemial openings of other Lives (*Fab.* 1.2–3; *Cic.* 1.4–6; *Mar.* 1.1–5).²⁴⁹

APPENDIX 3: THE ARATOS PROLOGUE

The *Life of Aratos* is not one of the *Parallel Lives* and is thus not paired with any other Life. But a comparison of its structure with that in the *Parallel Lives* brings out what is distinctive in this stand-alone Life. It begins with a prologue, which follows the same structure as those in the parallel collection: a set of reflections on the right and wrong ways to praise one's ancestors, beginning with a quotation, forms the first words of the Life [section 1]. The beginning of section 2 is clearly marked with many of the features we have noted for this section of the prologues in *Parallel Lives* (the naming of the subject, reference to the writing process, use of διό): "Therefore the Life of Aratos, your fellow-citizen and ancestor, I too have composed and sent off to you . . ." (διὸ καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἀράτου . . . βίον . . .) (1.5–6). The Life itself begins at 2.1 with asyndeton, "The city of the Sikyonians" (Ἡ Σικυωνίων πόλις). Narrative begins immediately; there is no proemial opening.²⁵⁰

The presence of the prologue, its articulation in two sections, and its separation from the Life proper by asyndeton, are normal features of the *Parallel Lives*. But the differences are, against this background, equally striking. First, a dedicatee is named in the first words of the prologue: not Senecio, who is named three times in the 13 prologues of the *Parallel Lives* and always in the second section, but a certain Polykrates. More surprising is the frequent use of the second person singular to address Polykrates, a very rare form in the prologues of the *Parallel Lives* (1.3: ὡς περ σοί; 1.5, τοῦ σοῦ πολίτου καὶ προπάτορος . . . τῇ δόξῃ τῇ περὶ σεαυτὸν . . . ἀπέσταλκά σοι . . . σοι μεμεληγός . . . οἱ παῖδες σου).²⁵¹ This prologue, therefore, unlike those of the *Parallel Lives*, sets up a close connection with a particular reader (Polykrates and his sons); indeed, the purpose of the work is explicitly said to be that the sons might imitate the virtues of their ancestor, Aratos (1.5–6). Finally, against the background of a similarity with the other prologues, the most striking feature of the *Aratos* prologue is the mention of one subject alone.

249. Pelling 1973: 343–44.

250. See Stadter 1988: 295.

251. Cf. above, n.151 and p. 266.

APPENDIX 4: BEGINNINGS OF LIVES

Since prologues form introductions to both Lives, and are often marked off from the first Life by asyndeton and/or transitional sentences, they should not be regarded as part of the first Life. Accordingly the following first Lives begin at a point other than at 1.1 in the conventional numbering system:

<i>Theseus</i>	<i>Thes.</i> 3.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Kimón</i>	<i>Kim.</i> 4.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Perikles</i>	<i>Per.</i> 3.1 (with γάρ)
<i>Nikias</i>	<i>Nik.</i> 2.1 (with οὖν)
<i>Demosthenes</i>	<i>Dem.</i> 4.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Phokion</i>	<i>Phok.</i> 4.1 (with μὲν οὖν)
<i>Dion</i>	<i>Dion</i> 3.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Aemilius</i>	<i>Aem.</i> 2.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Sertorius</i>	<i>Sert.</i> 2.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Pelopidas</i>	<i>Pel.</i> 3.1 (with τοίνυν)
<i>Alexander</i>	<i>Alex.</i> 2.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Demetrios</i>	<i>Demetr.</i> 2.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Agis/Kleomenes</i>	<i>Ag./Kleom.</i> 3.1 (with asyndeton)

Free standing Lives:

<i>Galba</i>	<i>Galba</i> 3.1 (with asyndeton)
<i>Aratos</i>	<i>Arat.</i> 2.1 (with asyndeton)

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