Bruxelles X

ISSN 1013-7335

The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC – EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Published every two months

No 125 — JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1991



THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BELGIUM
DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY
(Federal Rep.)
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
UNITED KINGDOM

General Secretariat
of the ACP Group
of States

Avenue Georges Henri, 451
1200 Brussels
Belgium
Tel.: 733 96 00

THE 68 ACP STATES

ANGOLA
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA
BAHAMAS
BARBADOS
BELIZE
BENIN
BOTSWANA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CAPE VERDE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CHAD
COMOROS
CONGO
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
DJIBOUTI
DOMINICA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
GABON
GAMBIA
GHANA
GRENADA
GUINEA
GUINEA BISSAU
GUYANA
HAITI
JAMAICA
KENYA
KIRIBATI
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MOZAMBIQUE
NIGER
NIGERIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
RWANDA
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
ST. LUCIA
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
SENEGAL
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SOLOMON ISLANDS
SOMALIA
SUDAN
SURINAME
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA
TOGO
TONGA
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
TUVALU
UGANDA
WESTERN SAMOA
VANUATU
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE



FRANCE

(Territorial collectivities)

Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon

(Overseas territories)

New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

NETHERLANDS

(Overseas countries)

Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustatius)
Aruba

DENMARK

(Country having special relations with Denmark)

Greenland

UNITED KINGDOM

(Overseas countries and territories)

Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future.

The Courier **uses maps from a variety of sources. Their use does not imply recognition of any particular boundaries nor prejudice the status of any state or territory.**

Cover page: *Road construction in Niger. A good road network is vital to successful development*

Best Wishes for 1991!

The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC — EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

N° 125 — JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1991

MEETING POINT: Federico Mayor

UNESCO has a range of competences which is extremely wide—education, science, culture and communications—as well as a very large number of Member States (more than 160). But what makes its job as difficult as it is exciting, is the very nature of the issues it has to deal with — problems of interest to both individuals and governments and problems whose solutions will, to a large measure affect the future of us all. UNESCO's Director-General, Federico Mayor, analyses these for the Courier. **Pages 3 to 8**

ACP-EEC: Social Partners

During their 14th Meeting held in Brussels on 13 and 14 November, the social partners focused on problems of education and training in conjunction with investment and employment. As this was their first meeting since the signature of Lomé IV, they also discussed the innovations in the new Convention which enhance their role in the implementation of ACP-EEC cooperation. **Pages 10 to 11**

COUNTRY REPORT

<u>CONGO</u>: Drawing from the lessons learned "from history and international events", the People's Republic of the Congo has turned its back on the Marxism-Leninism which supplied the model for its organisation and economic and political development. But how does one achieve, without pain, the transition from centralised concepts and structures to a system founded on the population's own enhanced economic and political responsibilities. **Pages 27 to 45**

DOSSIER: Roads

Good road networks are recognised as essential to the development process. This is reflected in the large number of projects devoted to road schemes over the past three decades. Now, many ACP countries are facing a maintenance 'crisis' which threatens to curtail economic activity at what is already a difficult time. The Dossier looks at how new policies for the 1990s can help to tackle this and other road-related problems. **Pages 59 to 90**

CONTENTS

A new editor

Editing the Courier is a formidable task. It means running a team of ACP and European journalists, expressing and respecting the sensitivities of the partners in North and South alike yet keeping the message and information lively... I admire all those who can do it.

Marie-Hélène Birindelli, who was appointed editor in 1986, has made a success of this challenging job over the past four years. Readers are used to seeing her signature at the bottom of articles in the journal. We all remember her interesting dossiers on informatics and development, on national languages and on the life of a project. We also remember her excellent initiatives such as the Mailbag, the short story competition, the questionnaire which gave us so much clearer an idea of you, the readers, and your wants and interests and, more prosaically, the coloured cover pages.

Very fortunately, Marie-Hélène Birindelli is staying at the Directorate-General for Development, which she entered in 1962. Her varied, but primarily economic, training, all the experience she has gained in the house and her knowledge of the terrain and the context of ACP-EEC relations cannot but stand her in good stead in her new post as the head of the Division which coordinates all our schemes, our technical cooperation and the financing committees.

The new editor is Dominique David, the first Commission Delegate to the ACP countries to have the job, to which he has been appointed after working for 10 years in Africa (in Mauritania, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe and Niger).

Dominique David, who trained in law, political science and economics and was once a university teacher, brings to the job the fresh eye of the man in the field. He is familiar with political and institutional communication, something he has both practised and taught, and his varied experience will, I know, be a great asset when it comes to keeping up the well-known standards of our Courier, which is an excellent means of charting relations between the ACP and the Community and fostering mutual understanding among the ACPs themselves.

I wish Marie-Hélène Birindelli every success in her new job and I wish Dominique David—who has first-hand knowledge of the interest in this journal of ours and what is expected of it—every success in this new experience in the service of our readers.

I shall continue to do my job as publisher as remotely and discreetly as possible, leaving the way clear for our journalists to express themselves freely, without any feeling of being under pressure.

In a world in which freedom of expression and democracy are making such marvellous progress, the Courier cannot be allowed to lag behind.

Dieter Frisch
Editor



MAPEZ

MAPEZ

Mrs Birindelli interviewing Léopold Sedar Senghor, the former President of Senegal, and Dominique David with an old farmer from Lampsar, Niger (N'Diaye's father).

Federico MAYOR,

Director-General of UNESCO

"Working for peace at the pace of life today"


UNESCO - D. Roger

Federico Mayor succeeded Senegal's Amadou M'Bow as Head of UNESCO, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, in November 1987, when he was elected for a six-year term. The 58-year old Spaniard, who originally trained as a biochemist, has also been Rector of the University of Granada (1968-72), Minister of Education and Science (1981-82), a Euro-MP and Deputy Director-General of UNESCO (1978-81).

His first job was to tackle the threefold crisis which had already posed problems for his predecessor. There was the financial crisis caused by three countries opting out of the Organisation (the USA on 1 January 1985 and the United Kingdom and Singapore on 1 January 1986), taking their 30% contribution to the budget with them, combined with a fluctuation in UNESCO's currency, the dollar. There was the political crisis triggered by what some people called the Organisation's "over-politicisation". And there was a management crisis, calling for departments to be rationalised and reorganised, recruitment to be overhauled and some jobs to be discontinued.

UNESCO backs a variety of activities (see box), but its main purpose is to create the right conditions and inject the relevant ideas to help other people's schemes, rather than operate on its own. In this interview with The Courier, Federico Mayor outlines the aims of the Organisation and says where it stands at present.

▶ *UNESCO is an "old" Organisation, it has an impressive number of members and its scope is particularly broad, so people are bound to expect many things of it, sometimes contradictory ones too. Do you think it has lived up and is still living up to its founders' hopes?*

— UNESCO indeed does have the broadest field of action of all the UN's specialised institutions. Education, science, culture and communication may look a lot for one organisation with what can only be called limited financial means, but it was given this broad scope at the express desire of the founders of the UN system. They thought it was essential.

It was Rab Butler, the UK Minister, who realised it during the air raids on London in the war, well before UNESCO or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Bretton Woods or San Fancisco meetings. He said that the only way to do anything about war and genocide and all those manifestations of violence, that way of flouting human rights, was to get to the root of violence and intolerance and racial discrimination and war and that is why, UNESCO—it is true—has such tremendous scope. Its mandate says that "since wars are triggered in people's minds, then the defences of peace must be erected in people's minds too". Our scope is enormous, of course it is, but it is obviously through education and science and culture that we will one day have a world in which all the different peoples respect each other and know each other. That's the first thing. To respect someone, you have to know him. You have to know about his attitudes, his way of life and his cultural identity. So there you have UNESCO's immense field of activity, its enormous difficulty, its vulnerability... and its greatness. From the outset, back in 1945, UNESCO was the UN's intellectual body. All the other specialised organisations and agencies are very practical and geared to such things as agriculture, labour, health, industry, but UNESCO has this vast field of the mind to take care of. That is not to say it is too vast. The synergy uniting its various fields of endeavour is the synergy behind any cultural development, any intellectual cooperation and any development of human resources.

"Ethical aims"

And let us not lose sight of the fact that, under the constitution, all UNESCO's aims are subordinate to a number of clearly consistent and harmonious ethical and moral objectives. Article 1 is perfectly clear about this. "The Organisation", it says, "proposes to contribute to keeping peace and security by strengthening collaboration between the nations through education, science and culture, so as to ensure universal respect for justice, the law, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, regardless of race, sex, language or creed, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations".

People certainly do expect a lot of the Organisation, as you said yourself. But what could be more natural for an international body concerned with every aspect of the mind? What sort of international cooperation would it be that did not lead its partners to expect a lot of it? In a situation like this, you get contradictions, of course. The Governments' interests aren't going miraculously to coincide as if they had been harmonised in some sort of predestined way. But the international cooperation which UNESCO runs in its particular fields is intended to encourage action to focus on the few major principles of the constitution which I mentioned just now.

I think—and I say this in all sincerity—if you look at it from a short-term, short-sighted point of view based on economic considerations, UNESCO has often been hit by crisis over the past few years and there have been times when people talked about "overpoliticisation". But now that the cold war is over, all its weaknesses have become strengths and UNESCO is going to be the major representative of the UN system in the intercultural dialogues which will preside over the civilisation of peace which is on its way.

There is plenty of tension in the world. There is still terrorism and violence. People still go to extremes in their religions and beliefs—which is why our Organisation has such a big job and we have to do it now perhaps with more means than we had before. If war declines, we shall have this peace dividend; all the money released by the decline in the arms race which could be invested to tackle the ignorance and famine and disease which cause thousands of deaths every day and which could already be avoided with the knowledge we have now. When we talk about war, what war do we mean? Because there is no freedom in the totalitarian countries. There is a war situation. And when there are countries where hundreds of children die every day, that's a war situation too.

It takes a great deal of human and financial resources to tackle ignorance which is the root cause of war. It's all talk, it's pointless to go on talking about development when there are a billion people who can neither read nor write. So now we have to concentrate on fighting ignorance, particularly among women and girls, who get the worst discrimination (almost two thirds of the world's illiterates are women and girls), and help them to take their own life in hand.

Now, to get back to democracy, I should like to say that UNESCO has called two major conferences—one in Montevideo at the end of this month [1] with seven Latin American Heads of State and intellectuals from various regions, and one in Prague in May 1991, to discuss "culture and democracy", with Vaclav Havel in the chair.

That is what we are trying to do. It's easy to ask what UNESCO does. UNESCO perceives, it tries to convince. We aren't a fund. We suggest approaches and we offer our experience with educational strategies and scientific and cultural policies. That is our job.

It isn't for me to say whether UNESCO has lived up to or is still living up to its founders' hopes, of course. But doesn't its record speak for itself? The French President, François Mitterand, summed it up this way: "Its action has been spectacular, its progress has been significant. How many thousands of children would have been deprived of the basics of learning without UNESCO, without its admirable literacy campaigns?... And it is thanks to UNESCO that some of the world's greatest treasures have been saved... What would have happened to the temples of Borobudur? Who else could save Venice?... UNESCO has made environmental research a noble art, at the point where science and culture meet".

Concentration, clarification, concertation

▶ *When you took up this post, you said you wanted to "do less and do it better". What sort of results do you think you have had?*

— I shall sum them up with "the three Cs"—concentration, clarification and concertation.

Doing less and doing it better meant managing to focus the Organisation's activity on a restricted number of programmes and essential aims. I should like to point out here that there were 14 major programmes in our second medium-term plan, but the new plan I proposed to the general conference, which passed it in November 1989, only covers seven main programmes, one for each of the five areas of competence laid down in the constitution—Education, exact and natural sciences, culture, communication and social and human sciences plus two others on UNESCO's contribution to development and peace and human rights. And there are now 18 programmes instead of 54 and the number of programme schemes is down by 60% and 84% of the budget funds earmarked for the major areas of interest have been channelled into UNESCO's basic work in education, in exact and natural sciences and in culture. The member countries themselves have in fact welcomed "the progress we have made with focusing programmes and establishing priorities."

The focusing is not just a matter of form. It is practical, as it has been done in the light of clearly defined priorities. Let me give you just one example—in education, the absolute priority is education for all, which got 30% of the programme funds earmarked for education, and almost two thirds went directly into the literacy campaign. And there are three priority "targets" for action—the least developed countries, women and young people.

But there is more to it than focusing UNESCO's programmes. We also have to focus its means of action—that is to say rationalise the arrangements for implementing the pro-

(1) This interview took place on 12 November 1990.

gramme so the Organisation's activities have the best possible impact and the best possible cost: benefit ratio. So our new programme puts a lot of emphasis on exchanging information and discussing experience, on pilot projects and on training and on developing infrastructure and ensuring that institutions get the technical assistance they need. Devising new approaches and strategies and going for action-oriented projects which make a direct contribution to the developing countries are the two cornerstones of the new concept of programming. I have also cut down on meetings. UNESCO now directly runs 23% fewer meetings than it did in 1988-89 and 48% less than in 1984-85. Better preparation and better follow-up should indeed mean fewer meetings, so the Organisation can concentrate its means on really productive meetings. I have stopped the avalanche of paper that threatens every international organisation and publications are down to a third of what they were in 1985. UNESCO now concentrates on publications which stand a good chance of having a real effect and reaching a clearly defined audience.

The second part of UNESCO's rationalisation policy is concertation—boosting its action as a catalyst, if I can put it like that. What this means, practically speaking, is that, in view of its limited means, the Organisation has to concentrate on getting things done rather than doing them itself. For one of its original characteristics is that it goes in for very few direct operations of its own. Its aim is to switch the machine on and get it going and leave it to trigger all its working parts—the professional and scientific communities, the national and regional institutions, the NGOs, the IGOs, the sister organisations in the UN system, the universities and foundations and so on—on its own. Take the World Council of Scientific Unions or the International Association of Universities. Our most important "customer" is the private sector—and it is our strength too—: teachers, professors, journalists, artists and scientists, a huge number of professionals and intellectuals. UNESCO is a great organisation of talents. And its aim is simply to have a multiplier effect, to put people with knowledge and energy and ideas in touch with each other, which, practically speaking, means that its achievements can add up to far more than the sum of its individual activities, if its action is based on a synergy of the efforts of everybody involved. A good example is the Jomtien Conference on Education for all, a UNESCO initiative run jointly with UNICEF, the UNDP and the World Bank (which gave a billion dollars for education programmes all on its own) last March. As far as I am concerned, it is fundamental that we work together and avoid duplication.

Naturally, this drive to focus action has to be pursued in the future and I have indeed just suggested to the Executive Council—which agreed—that we concentrate things even more in 1992-93. In October, the Council laid down the "general lines of concentration" this should take—mainly the development of human resources via basic education and literacy, the environmental issues within UNESCO's scope, the world cultural heritage and the cultural side of development, the free movement of information and an improvement in the developing countries' communication facilities, human rights and peace in UNESCO's fields of endeavour and work on the "Priority for Africa" programme and the special apartheid programme.

The third effort I have made is with clarification—and I should particularly like to mention the NWICO here, the New World Information and Communication Order, a cause of controversy which led two great founder countries, the USA and the UK, to leave. My first job was to clarify all this.

▶ *How?*

— A new strategy was approved, containing the very clear idea that we have to pursue our constitutional mandate of guaranteeing the free dissemination of information and ideas through words and pictures. At the same time, it is true that, being aware of the enormous gap between the news production capacity and the news actually broadcast, we have to try to help all the countries, particularly the least developed ones, to get the equipment and the professional training they need. So we brought in a new strategy aimed at getting even more done about the Organisation's concern to ensure the free movement of information at national and international levels, better and more efficient distribution, with no barriers to free expression, and better communications facilities in the developing countries so they can take a more active part in the communication process.

And don't forget that communication is tied up with human rights, which is why we back activities involving these human rights-related areas of freedom of the press and the pluralism and diversity of information. That is the spirit in which we launched our enquiry into journalists'

Bird's eye view of UNESCO

*— **Set up:** 16 November 1945 as part of the UN "family."*

*— **Member countries:** 161 (in 1990).*

*— **Budget:** $ 380 million (1990-1991) plus voluntary contributions to various funds. The main funders are currently the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, France and Italy. The main budget items are education ($ 69 million), science ($ 53 million), culture ($ 28 million), communication ($ 10 million) and a contribution to peace and human rights ($ 6 million).*

*— **Examples of actions:** UNESCO has backed literacy campaigns, reference works such as a General History of Africa (see Courier No 119 for January-February 1990, p. XI), the protection of the cultural heritage (eg. the temples of Philae in Egypt and Borobodur in Indonesia and the island of Gorée in Senegal), films (eg. "The New Masai Warriors" in Kenya), collections of the spoken word (eg. "Ateni ti Be-Africa"—Words of Central Africa), research into craft and design (eg. in Nigeria), establishment of the Universal Copyright Convention (1952) and scientific expeditions (such as the "silk road" over the northern route through Tian-Shan in China).*

access to information. And don't forget either that setting up schemes in countries where human rights are flouted is a way of starting a dialogue with these oppressive regimes.

"UNESCO's crisis is over"

► *Is the UNESCO crisis we heard so much about over?*

— I am tempted to fob you off here... Crisis in the living world only ever ends with death. And it is even truer in intellectual life. It was Umberto Eco who summed up the innovatory and critical job of the intellectual when he said: "I don't solve crises, I cause them". However, if by UNESCO's crisis you mean being unable to agree on programmes that are clearly acceptable to all the member countries, I think it is reasonable to say that it is over, essentially, because, the last time the general conference met, the member countries agreed to "bury the hatchet" and draw a line through all the arguments behind the Organisation's crisis.

So I don't think you can still talk about "over-politicisation" in our programmes. The third medium-term plan the member countries adopted clearly confines UNESCO's activities to specific areas which are fully compatible with the ideals of the constituent Act, which authorises authentic, significant international cooperation between all the members. Everyone underlined the fact that the members agreed to avoid the minefield of confrontation. So the controversial problems have been set aside or new solutions have been found on a non-conflictual basis that is acceptable to all parties.

I mentioned the NWICO and here is a further example—the programmes on disarmament. They have been dropped, because other bodies in the system, and the UN first and foremost, are better qualified to deal with this issue.

That is why I think that the reasons for the USA and the UK leaving the Organisation have gone. We miss these countries a great deal but it is up to them to decide whether they want to come back or not. Maybe they miss us too! Particularly now all these important debates on inter-cultural and inter-ethnic relations and on the relations between education and democracy and new education methods are getting going. The USA, for example, needs a complete overhaul of its own education system... So I hope that the subject will be brought up again—it is beginning to be, as a report on it came out in each of the two countries in question in April.

► *What you yourself called the "routine and inertia" of UNESCO also had something to do with these countries' departure. How far have you got with the rationalisation of the Organisation's structures?*

— There have been structural reforms. Management has been improved and our staff policy is based on merit—it caused something of an upheaval at the Council in May, but I think change is always a bit of a problem and I am absolutely determined to change the way things are organised. I didn't come to manage UNESCO. I came to make it work at a living pace, at the pace of life today—and the pace has speeded up a lot, particularly since the end of the cold war in 1988. UNESCO has to be flexible too. It has to be very agile and able to keep up with events, which is why I caused shockwaves—and I shall go on causing them—to make sure we have this global vision of things.

To be more precise, and more mundane, I would like to outline the fields in which I intend pursuing the reforms already under way. My aims are to decentralise to the units outside the seat of the organisations, to delegate authority and resources and ensure greater responsibility for all levels of staff, to develop staff training schemes, particularly in management, and human resources in general, to modernise work methods by, say, forming quality circles and management workshops for higher cadres and to produce a plan to develop computerisation and telecommunications.

As for what I said a little while ago, that I hoped to recruit "the most brilliant minds on the planet", it would be presumptuous of me to claim that I have succeeded in three years in gathering a constellation of the brightest stars from the international world of science and culture around me, but that is the spirit in which I go about recruiting new cadres for the Secretariat and I am sorry that the constraints of the budget are such that I cannot attract as much new talent as I should have liked.

► *Is this rationalisation of the Secretariat being done with the agreement of the member countries, particularly those in Africa which complain about having only a few of their nationals on UNESCO's staff?*

— It is hard to alter the geographical breakdown while external recruitment is as small as it is at the moment, given the Organisation's budget austerity situation. However, I don't think that the African countries are at a disadvantage in the Secretariat. 16% of the cadres and management staff come from sub-Saharan Africa alone and this figure has remained the same since I was elected three years ago. Compare the figure for Latin America and the Caribbean—there are only 13.4% from there and about 15% from Asia and the Pacific and 10% from the Arab world.

Budget and extra-budget resources

► *You mentioned financial constraints. After the Executive Council at the end of October, the members of UNESCO in fact gave you about the same for 1992-93 as you had for 1990-91, so it is actually worth less. Can you achieve your aims with that?*

— Yes, because we need both human and financial resources, but as I said just now, we are a money mobilising institution and, although our regular programme is a "zero growth" one, as we say, for the moment, our extra-budget resources have been increased a lot. So if we have sound projects, we can still get the money for them, because UNESCO has to mobilise governmental and non-governmental organisations for development operations in its particular fields of endeavour. I have to say that Scandinavia, Canada, Germany and Italy are giving us a lot of help here, as are the regional and sub-regional development banks. But if the political will is not there, we are doomed to failure, because education is a long-term affair, it's not like vaccination. With a vaccination programme, you can say, "look, we've vaccinated 2 million people in this country", but in education, you have to make the nation want it and the Governments want it and the decision-makers want it so the drive can be continued for years and all the schemes you run can reflect the means in the budget—otherwise one day you find that everything you have done has stopped having an effect. Even the number of teachers goes down instead of up. That's what happened in some places in Africa in the eighties and they called it the effects of structural adjustment. We cannot succeed if a country fails to show an interest in education and science and culture or even to make them a priority.

Follow up

We at UNESCO always have to think about following up the action we take, because, unless we follow up what we have begun, it's no use afterwards. It all depends on the various countries' ability to run and maintain these scientific and cultural institutions. In training—and I am being very frank about this—the "brain drain" is a major problem. There are ways of trying to stem it, giving grants to train abroad, for example, and resettlement allowances too when the people come back. That works well, because you pay money to the individual and to the place he works for a while to help him settle down and start something new in his home country. But if he wants to stay abroad, my feeling is that it's better for a country to have highly talented emigrants at some stage, because one day they are going to go home and contribute to their country's prestige, than emigrants who are totally ignorant and have no professional qualifications of any kind. I say that because this is something my own country and I myself went through. At one stage, in the sixties, my country had a "brain drain", but above all it had 3 000 000 emigrants. That was the problem, not the brain drain—most of which has drained back to Spain by now.

To get back to what we were talking about just now, the follow-up to our schemes—viability is the main concern in any development aid operation which the Organisation undertakes. In the drive to save the ancient Mauritanian cities of Oualata, Oudane, Chinguetti and Tichitt, for example, UNESCO will be doing more than just restoring the buildings. The action plan is a framework for an integrated regional development programme and we are working with various partners, including the EEC, on the practical arrangements for this.

▶ *You mentioned relations between UNESCO and the EEC. Are you happy with the way they are going?*

Stepping up collaboration with other institutions

— I should like to step it up, because intensifying UNESCO's relations with IGOs (intergovernmental organisations)—and this is something I brought up again at the last executive council—is one of our priorities.

The Organisation is firmly committed to major programmes which could be implemented with associates such as the Commission of the European Communities. It hopes to work with the Commission, for example, on the outline science and technology cooperation programme. The formation of



UNESCO - Dr. Berretty

A Calder mobile in front of the UNESCO building in Paris
"Mutual respect comes through culture"

an EEC-UNESCO joint committee proves its point, as does the cooperation now being arranged between the ACP Group and UNESCO with a view to devising common aid programmes to provide an even more efficient response to proposals from the member countries.

I realise that our links with the UN system are better, as they are with the NGOs, but now we should like to have the benefit of the (regional and sub-regional) IGOs' in-depth studies and knowledge—which is why I and a number of colleagues are seeing if we can get faster intensification of our relations with the EEC, the Council of Europe and the OECD on the Europe front and working out how we can get more out of the OAU on the African front. And how we can derive greater benefit from the sub-regional bodies too, and from our relations with the banks, not just the international financial institutions, but the regional and sub-regional banks, and with ASEAN, the Pacific and Asia and so on. I'm very keen on boosting our relations with the IGOs.

▶ *How?*

— I'm a biochemical analyst, you know. I spent many years doing clinical analysis and, at this point, in my opinion, the diagnosis is more or less ready and we have reached the stage of action and I am delighted about it. Last year, for example, international literacy year, I said: "It's time for action". And I think that in our relations with the Community too, the time has come to say: 'Fine, we have spent years exchanging information, we are friends, we are institutions with the same educational, scientific and cultural targets, but now is the time for action and we have to pool our efforts and our abilities and create synergy for the benefits of those who need it most".

What UNESCO can offer is its assets, its international experience in comparative education and reform, the results of various new strategies (which are sometimes not so new as people think) and new approaches to secondary and university education. But in our fields of endeavour, in culture, communication, science and education, there are openings for cooperation with the EEC, particularly if you think how urgent it is to help the countries which have just won their freedom, in some cases after years of suffering and anguish, all those countries where democracy is very fragile and which need help from the word go.

UNESCO - D. Roger

"It's pointless to go on talking about development when there are a billion people who can neither read nor write"

▶ *You're talking about Eastern Europe... Is UNESCO going to step up its activity in this part of the world to the detriment of the developing countries in the South?*

— No. There are plenty of projects where it is very clear that our schemes and means are solely for the developing countries and the projects in Eastern Europe have to be financed with means from outside the budget. We had the UN conference on the least developed countries here at UNESCO and I can assure you that I am very keen on the Organisation's big "Priority for Africa" programme.

I talked about Eastern Europe because I think it is a new factor of hope for us at this time. If we have that vision of things that goes a little way beyond "business as usual", then we cannot always behave as if nothing has changed. For many things have changed. The rate at which things happen has changed and history has speeded up. ○

Interview by
Marie-Hélène BIRINDELLI

Writing off the ACP debt to the EEC

by Manuel MARIN
Vice-President of the European Commission

Throughout the negotiations for the renewal of the Lomé Convention, the ACP countries insisted that the Community should respond to their external debt problems.

I profoundly believe that the Community must show solidarity with the ACPs by taking direct action on the debt issue. That is why I think that the new chapter of Lomé IV which deals with debt, while representing an important innovation, is insufficient. I stated that on 16 December 1989, at the time the Lomé Convention was being signed, and I committed myself then, to proposing appropriate solutions at a suitable moment.

I have accordingly, asked the Commission to approve a proposal for the cancellation of the ACP debt to the Community, having obtained the political support of both the European Parliament and the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly.

Such an initiative is necessary *for two fundamental reasons.*

Above all, the instruments from which the debt components envisaged in this initiative originate (special loans and the risk capital of the EDF, SYSMIN and STABEX) are subject to full control by the Community. They form, among other things, part of a cooperation model which is unique in the world.

The second reason stems from our particular relations with the ACP countries. According to the spirit of the Lomé Convention, the Community should not be cast simply in the role of creditor but rather that of a co-partner in development.

I conclude, therefore, that it was the Commission's duty to put forward solutions with a view to responding to the needs of our partners.

Obviously, I am conscious of the fact that the measures proposed cannot, in themselves, resolve the ACP's problems of indebtedness. We must recognise the scale of the ACP countries' overall debt, which has now reached 130 billion Ecus, and the fact that the write-off proposed by the Commission relates to only some 2% of this total figure.

In spite of its relatively limited scope, this action is nonetheless bound to have some political impact.

This expression of solidarity goes hand in hand with, and indeed complements the bilateral actions of the Member States. Emanating from the Community in its own right, the initiative gives a new political signal which is all the more worthy because it is directed towards countries which are among the poorest in the world and because it will encourage them to continue their efforts to reform, and to give new impetus to their eonomic and social development.

The measures proposed by the Commission relate solely to the ACP debt vis-à-vis the Community, because that is the limit of our competences. It involves those debts contracted by the ACP states in the context of the application of the financial instruments envisaged in the different Lomé Conventions, namely:
— special EDF loans including SYSMIN,
— STABEX transfers,
— EDF risk capital.

Given that their nature and their method of management are completely different, the loans provided through the own resources of the EIB, and sup-


CEE

plied through the financial markets, are excluded from the proposal. Similarly, it is evident that the proposition does not encompass those measures aimed at alleviating bilateral debt relating to the Member States.

The debt-relief operation put forward should be implemented in the following way:
— As regards special loans, including SYSMIN, the existing credits to ACP states should be cancelled, and the loans not yet committed or taken up, should be converted into grants;
— As regards risk capital, and irrespective of whether this has been, or has still to be disbursed, the funds involved (both capital and interest) should be redefined as part of the resources of the European Development Fund, in order to finance development operations which have a capacity, whether direct or indirect, to relieve the debt burden.
— As a complementary action, the STABEX system's principle of replenishment of transfers relating to previous Conventions should be abandoned.

At the present juncture, ACP debt to the Community amounts to some 1.01 billion Ecus in special loans (including SYSMIN) and 475 million Ecus in risk capital.

To this there must be added the amounts not yet committed or disbursed, which amount to approximately 1.15 billion Ecus in special loans and 450.6 million Ecus in risk capital.

I take the view that the Commission has fulfilled its duty. I hope now that the Council of Ministers, will approve this initiative without delay, having already expressed a positive view about it last November. ○

Debt breakdown by Convention

Situation at 30 September 1990

(in millions of Ecus)

	Yaoundé I 1963-1968	*Yaoundé II 1969-1974*	*Lomé I 1975-1979*	*Lomé II 1980-1984*	*Lomé III 1985-1990*	*Total*
Amounts disbursed						
Special loans including SYSMIN	4.7	31.5	404	510.5	59.5	1010.2
Risk capital	—	—	70.5	236.5	167.9	474.9
Amounts to be disbursed						
Special loans including SYSMIN	—	—	15.5	290.1	845.9	1151.5
Risk capital	—	—	—	18.5	432.1	450.6

The 14th annual meeting of the Social Partners focuses on training, investment and employment

The annual sessions of the representatives of the ACP-EEC economic and social interest groups—the consultative body with members from employers' organisations, the unions, farming and the professions—are certainly different from the other Lomé Convention institutional meetings. The social partners, as they are usually called, have always been forthright and frank—the result of working in the field—and they say what they think bluntly, sometimes undiplomatically, even if it does not always have a direct bearing on the subject in hand. Their sincerity and the fact that what they have to say faithfully reflects local situations tends to get them a good reception and they lived up to their reputation again this year at their 14th meeting in Brussels on 13-14 November. The subject of the meeting—education and training linked to investment and employment under Lomé IV, was, of course, a particularly stimulating one.

Representatives were together, in the plenary chamber of the Economic and Social Committee, for the first time since the signing of Lomé IV. In spite of the formal character of the opening ceremony—chaired by two members of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, Leo Tindemans (Belgium) and Nicolas Kelbe (Cameroon)—plain speaking was the order of the day, right from the start. The new President of the Community's ESC, French trade unionist François Staedelin, set the tone, stating that it would take a stable, democratic environment, based on the confidence of the people, to ensure that investments in the ACPs were a paying proposition and that the jobs created would last. Without it, people with qualifications would be tempted to go abroad. Falilou Kane (Senegal), Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors, thought the time for recriminations about the financial volume and the shortcomings of Lomé IV was past. The new Convention was going to last 10 years and they had to get on with implementing it in the best way possible. This was vital, given the disaster of the ACP economies undermined by plummeting commodity prices, debt and soaring oil costs. The Senegalese Ambassador told the social partners that he was convinced that the ACPs would not have got the same concessions if Lomé IV had not been concluded before the Berlin Wall came down, because of the "rush to the East".

He then went over the main innovations of the new Convention, one of the most important of which was the idea of polycentric—or decentralised—cooperation, which would mean that the economic and social partners were fully involved in the devising and running of development programmes alongside the representatives of the Community and the governments. For EEC financial and technical aid could now be given to back up schemes started by operators as varied as rural organisations, village organisations, cooperatives, firms, unions, teaching and research centres, NGOs and other associations—the list in Article 20 was so long that basically no potential contributor to ACP development was excluded.

Peter Pooley, Deputy Director-General for Development, representing Manuel Marin, also talked about decentralised cooperation and said that the appearance of new operators went hand in hand with a move towards new pluralist political systems in many countries. There was no way the Convention could tell the ACPs what their political leanings should be, but, to his mind, totalitarianism would never get a country developed. "Not even the Germans can make it work", he said ironically. He also pointed out to the Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors that East European economies were not ready to absorb major investments from the West, but the ACPs were. But what the ACPs needed was more properly trained staff.

(L to R, back row) Berhane Ghebray, François Staedelin, Leo Tindemans, Nicolas Kelbe, Falilou Kane and Giacomo Sanfelice Di Monteforte; (front row) Bartolome Amat Armengol, Peter Pooley and Bernard Ryelandt

AT

Literacy for all

The theme of the meeting—education and training as related to investment and employment under Lomé IV—followed on logically from the previous year's debate on vocational and other training for farmers. The delegates' discussions were triggered by a number of documents on general subjects (literacy and basic education) and more specific issues (rural training and vocational training in industry and services), from which some key ideas emerged. First and foremost, the ACPs' economy was on the decline, with negative investment growth and dwindling trade. The first things to be hit by this crisis and the attendant adjustment drive were the health and education programmes. Even the EDF contribution to training had gone down, from 8.18% of the indicative programme amounts under Lomé II to 5.12% under Lomé III, with a parallel drop, from 165 to 131, in the number of training schemes.

But—and here was another key issue—the ACP population, particularly in Africa, was expanding very quickly. In crisis economies, this meant a continuous rise in unemployment and, according to the World Bank, 380 million jobs (twice the present number) would have to be created to keep it down to 10% by the year 2000. Farming alone occupies two thirds of the African labour force, but it could not go on providing jobs for more and more people indefinitely and, since, given the demands of structural adjustment, the trend in the civil service was to fire rather than hire, the only potential pool of employment seemed to be in small manufacturing and craft firms in urban and rural areas.

Job seekers would stand a better chance if they were properly trained, which is why the delegates were (as was to be expected) unanimous in thinking that one of the best ways of handling the present situation was to go for general literacy, proper basic education and better vocational training. The link between training and development kept coming up and the example of Japan and the four dragons of Asia, whose spectacular growth was based on the priority they put on training, was often referred to. Mrs Sira Diop (of the Union of Cooperatives of Planters and Market Gardeners of Mali) said they had to concentrate on primary education. All children of school age had to be given a proper grounding, she said, because it was impossible or at least very difficult to teach adults literacy—an opinion not entirely shared by Agbo-Ola Fayese of Nigeria's Federation of Cooperatives. This delegate maintained that "adults don't necessarily want to learn their ABC if they cannot see how it ties up with their work. It's only when they realise that what they are learning has a bearing on their job that they agree to spend some of their time on it. Education has to be tailor made".

Mrs Beulinck, the Chairman of the NGO liaison committee, felt that education was a basic human right and the best thing was to dispense it in the places where the people lived.

But exactly who needed literacy and training? The currently marginalised rural masses without whom there would be no development, the meeting agreed, and a special effort had to be made for women. And the national languages—the only way of reaching large numbers, should figure prominently. The governments were not the only ones who should be making this drive, for everyone was concerned and should have his say, starting with the social partners.

PIX

The Social Partners will have more say under Lomé IV

Role of firms crucial

After this general discussion on literacy and basic education, the conference split into two working parties for a closer look at the two subthemes of the meeting (training and employment in the agricultural and cooperative sector and training and employment in industry and services), following which recommendations were made for the implementation of Lomé IV.

Training programmes should be included in a general development strategy in the agricultural sector, it was suggested, giving priority to production and management and striking a balance between food and cash crops and really teaching people a job. Special attention would be paid to women and to correcting the negative effects of structural adjustment policies, which had often led to a decline in health and education.

The firms were a crucial part of industry and services, delegates said, as they were where the transfer of technology happened, and this was where training really had to match the needs of the economy and the population and take account of employment possibilities. More funds were also needed for training programmes in industry and services. And a good climate had to be maintained for investments—a point made by Romolo Arena, Chairman of Finsider Internationale of the Italian IRI group, with the particularly apt example of one of his group's firms, in Liberia, which had been forced to close down after 20 years. Not only had all its equipment been destroyed, but the staff it had trained had either lost their lives in the civil war or been scattered over the neighbouring countries. When peace returned, they would have to start virtually from scratch—provided the company was willing and able to make fresh investments.

The final declaration adopted at the end of the meeting made all these points and called on the Community to finance a case study in one of the ACP regions to define "the current scope of training in rural areas under ACP-EEC cooperation, including the involvement of socio-economic organisations". It also proposed that a detailed guide to the machinery and procedures of the new Convention be produced and distributed widely so that socio-economic organisations in the ACP countries knew exactly how to proceed if they wanted to get assistance from the Community. Meanwhile, the conference suggested that the Commission Delegates make sure that any potential decentralised cooperation partners known to them were fully informed of the opportunities Lomé IV provided.

This resolution will now be going before the other joint ACP-EEC institutions—the Joint Assembly first and then the Council of Ministers. Will it be reflected in the national indicative programmes the ACPs are now drawing up? Berhane Ghebray, Secretary-General of the ACP Group, hopes so and has called on the social partners to tell the decision-makers in their respective countries of the outcome of the meeting to ensure that it is.

And as "no-one wants the fruit of his labours just to sit in libraries and stackrooms", as François Staedelin so neatly put it, let us hope that this works. ○ A.T.

EDF implementation: the latest position

by Peter HUGHES (*)

As a result of an agreement reached between the European Institutions (the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament) in 1979 as part of the budget procedure, the Commission presents each year a document entitled, "Financial details of the European Development Fund" as an annex to its preliminary draft budget, which later becomes an annex to the Council's draft budget.

The latest edition, which was annexed to the draft budget for 1991, gave details of EDF implementation up to 31.12.89 and the estimated out-turn in 1990 and 1991.

Whilst much of the information in this document is technical and rather detailed, the summary tables are most revealing and help to dispel some false impressions concerning the implementation of the EDF.

Table 1 gives an overview of the state of implementation of each EDF at 31.12.89; one of the most striking aspects of this table is the way in which the amount of the fund has mushroomed in each successive 5-year period, starting at a mere ECU 581 m for the 1st EDF, and progressing to ECU 12 165 m for the 7th.

One can see also that the first three EDFs have been closed, and the 4th (which funded the Lomé I Convention) will be closed by the end of 1990. The 5th EDF (Lomé II) has been almost completely committed and over three-quarters paid, and the 6th EDF (Lomé III) was three-quarters committed after only three and a half years in force, and almost one-third paid.

The following tables give more detailed information about the implementation of the fourth, fifth and sixth EDFs at 31.12.89, along with a sectoral breakdown of the aid.

From these we can see that:

1. Most of the aid under the EDF was in grant form; this will be even more pronounced under Lomé IV with the abandonment of special loans.
2. The ratio of programmable aid to non-programmable aid was around 2: 1, although the non-programmable portion increased in the 6th EDF mainly due to additional Stabex decisions.
3. Stabex is much more quick-disbursing than other types of aid; in the 6th EDF, for example, it is striking that although in volume it is only 17% of the total, the payments at 31.12.89 represented 52% of the total of the 6th EDF.
4 The amount committed in the rural production sector has increased significantly from 23-24% in the 4th and 5th EDFs to 33% in the 6th EDF. This confirms the increased concentration of aid on the priority sector in Lomé III indicative programmes. ○ P.H.

(*) Administrator, Directorate General for Development.

Table 1: General statement on the state of implementation of the European Development Funds

Fund	*Volume ECU millions*	*Entry into force*	*Type of aid*	*Recipients*	*Situation at 31.12.89*
1st EDF	581.3	1959	Grants		Accounts closed 1981
2nd EDF +EIB	730.4 70.0 800.4	1964	Grants Special loans EIB loans	AASM OCT	Accounts closed 1984
3rd EDF +EIB	887.3 100.0 987.3	1971	Grants Special loans EIB loans	OD	Accounts closed 1987
4th EDF +EIB	3 179.5 400.0 3 579.5	1.4.76	Grants Special loans Risk capital Stabex EIB loans	ACP OCT	96,6% committed 95% paid
5th EDF +EIB	4 778.9 700.0 5 478.9	1.1.81	Grants Special loans Risk capital Stabex Sysmin EIB loans	ACP OCT	97% committed 77% paid
6th EDF +EIB	7 915.6 1 120.0 9 035.6	1.5.86	Grants Special loans Risk capital Stabex Sysmin EIB loans	ACP OCT	76% committed 29% paid
7th EDF +EIB	10 940.0 1 225.0 12 165.0	—	Grants Risk capital Stabex Sysmin EIB loans	ACP OCT	Fourth Lomé Convention signed 15.12.1989

Table 2: Implementation of the fourth EDF

A — *Total implementation (ACP+OCT)*

(ECU million)

Volume 1	Commitments (1) 2	Payments 3	2 as % of 1	3 as % of 1
3 179.5	3 135.4	3 031.2	98.6%	95%

(1) In this document, "commitments" means primary commitments, in other words Commission Decisions.

B — *Details of commitments*

(ECU million)

Projects		Stabex	Exceptional aid	Interest rate subsidies	Risk capital	Total
Grants	Spec. loans					
1 995.8	457.0	389.6	137.1	58.8	96.9	3 135.4

C — *Sectoral breakdown of fourth EDF commitments at 31 December 1989 (% of total amount committed)*

Transport and communications	24
Rural production	23
Industrialisation	14
Stabex	12
Education and training	8
Water supply engineering, urban infrastructure, housing	4
Exceptional aid	4.5
Rehabilitation	2.5
Health	2
Trade promotion	1
Miscellaneous	5

It is planned that the accounts for the fourth EDF should be closed at the end of 1990.

Table 3A: Implementation of fifth EDF at 31 December 1989

(ACP and OCT — ECU million)

	Volume A	Commitments B	Payments C	B as % of A	C as % of A
National indicative programmes	2 579.0	2 497.0	1 876.3	97	73
Regional programmes	587.5	581.0	425.4	99	72
Total programmable aid	3 166.5	3 078.0	2 300.7	97	73
(of which special loans)	(547.6)	(521.5)	(336.8)	95	61
Stabex	669.1	669.1	660.2	100	99
Sysmin	275.6	250.6	142.9	91	52
Exceptional aid	182.9	181.1	180.1	99	98
Risk capital	279.7	276.6	256.9	99	92
Interest rate subsidies	115.9	109.8	87.3	95	75
Rehabilitation funds	25.0	24.7	22.5	99	90
AIDS	35.0	35.0	5.2	100	15
Outstanding balance transferred from 3rd EDF	29.2	14.1	6.9	48	24
Total non-programmable aid	1 612.4	1 561.3	1 362.0	97	84
Grand total	4 778.9	4 639.3	3 662.7	97	77

The rate of implementation of the fifth EDF is proving slightly faster than that of the fourth EDF as regards commitments, but slower in respect of payments. After nine years of implementation, the rate of commitment of the fourth EDF was 96% and the rate of payment 85%.

Table 3B: Sectoral breakdown of fifth EDF commitments at 31 December 1989

	% of total amount committed
Rural production	24.6
Industrialisation	20.2
Transport and communications	18.3
Stabex	13.6
Water supply engineering, urban infrastructure, housing	6.2
Education and training	6.0
Exceptional aid	3.9
Health	2.6
Trade promotion	1.3
AIDS	0.8
Tourism	0.5
Rehabilitation	0.5
Other	1.5
	100.0

Table 4A: Implementation of sixth EDF at 31 December 1969

(ACP and OCT — ECU million)

	Volume A	Commitments B	Payments C	B as % of A	C as % of A
A) *Programmable aid*					
Grants — projects	4 164.0	3 157.4	672.6	76	16
Special loans	625.0	479.0	35.9	77	6
Debt programme	307.0	260.7	127.6	85	42
Total programmable aid	5 096.0	3 897.1	838.1	76	16
B) *Non-programmable aid*					
Stabex	1 379.6	1 194.9	1 194.6	87	87
Risk capital	615.0	496.5	135.9	81	22
Sysmin	361.0	103.6	10.1	29	3
Interest rate subsidies	170.0	103.8	19.5	61	11
Exceptional aid	213.0	115.8	84.0	54	39
Aid for refugees	81.0	72.0	20.9	89	26
Total non-programmable aid	2 819.6	2 089.0	1 465.0	74	52
Grand total	7 915.6	5 986.1	2 301.1	76	29

The annual rate of implementation of the sixth EDF is summarised in the following table:

Year	Commitments	Payments
1986 (8 months)	313.2	116.7
1987	1 954.3	352.6
1988	2 394.6	807.7
1989	1 324.0	1 024.1
Total	5 986.1 (76%)	2 301.1 (29%)

At the same stage (after some four years of implementation) under the fifth EDF the level of commitments was 65% and the level of payments 30%, while under the fourth EDF these figures were 70% and 31% respectively.

Table 4B: Breakdown of programmable aid between national and regional programmes

	Volume A	Commitments B	Payments C	B as % of A	C as % of A
National programmes – ACP	4 137.7	3 355.3	712.0	81	17
National programmes – OCT	63.5	20.8	1.5	33	2
Regional programmes – ACP	884.8 (1)	518.8	122.1	59	14
Regional programmes – OCT	10.0	2.2	0.5	22	5
Total programmable aid	5 096.0	3 897.1	836.1	76	16

(1) To this should be added EIB support for regional cooperation.

Table 4C: Sectoral breakdown of sixth EDF commitments at 31 December 1989

(as % of the total amount committed)

Rural production	33.1
Stabex	20.0
Transport and communications	14.2
Industrialisation	11.7
Social and cultural development	3.0
Exceptional aid and refugees	2.8
Water supply engineering, urban infrastructure, housing	2.4
Health	1.9
Trade promotion	1.4
Other and multisectoral programmes	9.5
	100.0

The increased share of sixth EDF resources going to the rural production sector is thus confirmed: its share under the fifth EDF at 31 December 1989 was 24.6%. The considerable share currently held by Stabex will probably tend to diminish over the coming years, given the percentage of the total which was already committed at 31 December 1989.

Integrating women in development

The experience of nine EDF rural development projects

by Dorothée VERSTEYLEN-LEYZER (*)

Last October, the third and last phase of a thematic evaluation on the integration of women in nine mainstream EDF-financed rural development projects was finalised with the completion of the synthesis report, summarising the main conclusions and recommendations (1). This meant the end of a complicated but interesting exercise which the Commission launched some two years earlier. The following article presents some of the main findings.

Why a WID evaluation?

Women in Development (WID) has become an increasingly important development issue, not only because of equity concerns but also as a result of the recognition that the integration of women in development operations is of vital importance for the chances of economic success and sustainable development.

Indeed the new Lomé Convention underlines the important economic role of women and stipulates the need for both men and women to participate and benefit on *equal terms* from development operations. With the priority under Lomé IV continuing to be on rural development, the need to recognise and support women's role in the sectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries is given special attention.

Thus, compared to Lomé III, where the issue of women and development was merely confined to the socio-cultural dimension of EC/ACP cooperation, the Lomé IV Convention constitutes a quite different approach to WID, the implementation of which represents new challenges for EC/ACP development administrators.

In that respect, the WID evaluation was rather opportune, as we can learn from past experience: To what extent have women been able to participate and benefit from EDF projects so far? What are the major constraints to their participation? How can these be overcome? These were some of the questions the WID evaluation had to address. The ultimate objective was to arrive at a set of operational recommendations and guidelines aimed at integrating the WID dimension more fully and systematically in EDF projects and programmes.

Scope and methodology

The evaluation concerned four sectors of rural development, i.e. rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, and village drinking-water supply.

The study was carried out in three phases. After a phase of documentation and preparation in Brussels, nine projects were selected for further examination in the field. Care was taken that the selected projects were representative as to type and size for the sector concerned while the sample had to cover different geographical and socio-cultural regions in Africa. Thus, nine projects implemented in eight different countries were selected: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Niger (2 projects), Swaziland, Togo and Zambia.

The projects in Cameroon, Kenya and Togo were integrated rural development programmes, covering more than one sector. As a result, six agricultural operations, three actions in the forestry sector, three water supply projects/components and two livestock programmes were evaluated from a WID perspective.

The second phase consisted of field missions proper. The missions were carried out by a multi-disciplinary and "multi-national" team of female consultants. The team included agronomists, livestock specialists, forestry experts, economists and sociologists, all with a wide experience in development cooperation and gender analysis.

Through in-depth interviews with relevant administrators and project staff as well as with women from different social levels in the project area, supplemented by literature and direct observation, the consultants collected a wealth of information, which permitted a thorough and interesting analysis.

Findings

The findings of the field missions have been presented in nine separate reports, which, in the third phase of the exercise, have been summarised in the synthesis report.

Role of women in the project areas

An important finding of all nine field missions was that women play a crucial role in the sectors concerned, either as crop and animal producers or as managers and collectors of water and fuel. In many project areas, women's contribution to agricultural production in terms of labour input was found to be much higher than men's. Except for a few areas where the prescriptions of Islam keep women in "purdah" (as is for instance the case among the Foulbe tribe in the Cameroon project area), women contribute to almost all the agricultural work. In livestock, women play an important role in the everyday care of cattle and small stock and are often the owners of goats, sheep and chickens. Not only are women the main collectors and users of firewood; they are in some cases also involved in tree planting and management. Women are usually responsible for collecting water for domestic purposes as well as for use in personal economic activities, and they are traditionally the main deci-

(*) Dorothée Versteylen-Leyzer is Women in Development expert, Directorate-General for Development.

(1) BMB/Femconsult: Thematic Evaluation on the Integration of Women in Rural Development. Evaluation of nine projects financed by the European Development Fund in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Niger, Swaziland, Togo and Zambia. Synthesis Report. Tilburg, The Hague, October 1990.

sion-makers in matters related to water.

Moreover, in *all* project areas, women were found to contribute to a major extent to family subsistence while in many areas, women are the sole *breadwinners*, due to temporary or permanent male migration to the cities or other countries. In Eastern and Southern Africa in particular, the missions encountered very high rates of de facto and de jure female-headed households (up to 50%).

Participation of women in the projects

This crucial role of women as producers and (co) breadwinners in all project areas, however, was not reflected by their actual participation in the projects:

In only two of the nine projects (the Swamp Rice development project in *Burkina Faso* and the Livestock project in *Botswana*), were women found to participate and benefit to a fairly high degree in different activities such as extension, credit supply, local management and marketing.

In two other projects (the Maize development project in *Zambia* and the Water supply project in *Swaziland*), women participated to a certain extent though not commensurate with their role in the sectors concerned.

In the other five projects, women had virtually been ignored as a target group.

Effects on women

The main lesson learned from the study is that women do not automatically benefit from development interventions. In particular, where women do not constitute an explicit target group of *agricultural, livestock* and *forestry* projects, these projects have often had the unintended negative effect that *women's workload increased without countervailing benefits.*

Thus, for example, the introduction of oxen for ploughing in the Savane's rural development programme in Togo and the Benoué programme in Cameroon had led to a greater demand on women's labour. Since ploughing with oxen reduces the workload of the male farmers, it enables them to cultivate a larger area. This in turn increases the labour requirements for all subsequent operations, With the result that women have to do more work on the family fields than in the past. In addition, the improved cultivation techniques promoted by the projects require more frequent and careful weeding. Thus, women come under increased pressure, but do not receive direct benefits, since decisions on what to do with the produce from the family field are taken by the men.

Women's workloads also increased as a result of the introduction of improved cattle breeds in combination with the promotion of fodder crop production, as was for example the case in the Machakos Integrated Rural Development Programme in Kenya.

Because women are in charge of the everyday care of cattle, the extra labour input required to care for grade cattle (e.g. fodder crop production, taking the animals for vaccinations and dipping) is usually provided by the women.

Men's workload may also increase, but the important difference is that they usually own the cattle and therefore economic returns accrue for the most part to them.

This has to be understood in the sub-Saharan context of gender-differentiated resource allocation within the household. Usually, incomes of the spouses or indeed their granaries, are not pooled in order to meet daily family requirements. Traditionally, each of the spouses has different responsibilities in respect of family maintenance on the understanding that the women are usually expected to pro-

"Projects may bypass women but women can never bypass the projects... Women either benefited or lost, depending on whether they were (mistakenly) considered as indirect beneficiaries through their husbands".

An increase in farmers' production and income does not necessarily mean an improvement of women's position—an example (1)

One of the evaluated rural development projects is situated in an area which is characterised by regular periods of drought, over-population and degradation of the environment. With EEC funds, a development project has been initiated which aims at an increase of the income of the farmers and an improvement of agricultural production and productivity. For this purpose infrastructural facilities have been constructed (roads, clinics, wells, etc.), farmers' organisations have been created, agricultural research has been initiated and farmers are being informed and trained through the Training and Visit system. The introduction of animal traction is one of the improvements which is to result in higher yields.

The main crops in the area are millet, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, cotton, rice and maize. Except for ploughing, women perform almost all the agricultural work. They work on both the family fields and their own fields. On the family fields, the men are responsible for the ploughing, and control of the produce from the fields. Women perform most of the other cultivation operations, namely all the sowing, 75% of the weeding, 50% of the application of fertiliser, all of the harvesting and transportation, and all of the winnowing. On their own fields women are in charge of all the work, and are also able to control the outputs. Women use the produce from their fields and the money earned from them to contribute to the basic needs of their family (food, clothing, domestic utensils, etc.) During the pre-harvest gap they also regularly have to take over the household contributions of the men, which include the daily grain provision for the family, housing matters and, sometimes, the children's school fees.

Project interventions have increased the income of the male farmers considerably (they now earn four to five times more money than before). The control over this money is entirely in the hands of the men, heads of the household, who spend it for different purposes: repayments for new technologies (such as animal traction), purchase of new agricultural equipment, housing improvements, purchase of beer, purchase of personal requirements and payment of the children's school fees. No real changes in responsibilities for family subsistence have occurred. Women's own income has not increased. On the contrary, due to enlargement of the family fields, the continued existence of their own fields—and thus of their own income—is increasingly threatened.

Women are directly affected by the project because of the significant increase in their workload. The introduction of oxen for ploughing as a labour-saving technological innovation reduces the men's workload and enables them to expand their cultivated area. This is turn increases the labour requirements for all subsequent operations, with the result that women have to do more work on the family fields than in the past. In addition, the improved cultivation techniques promoted by the project require more frequent and careful weeding. Since no technologies have been introduced for this part of the work, it has not only increased, but at the same time it still has to be done by hand. Furthermore, the felling of trees to obtain larger fields forces women to walk greater distances to collect firewood for domestic purposes.

The increased pressure on women's time can in turn lead to a reduction in family welfare. Since the priority work on the family fields will require extra time and energy inputs from women, they will be less able to carry out their other activities, namely food-crop cultivation on their own fields (to contribute to the basic needs of the family) and tasks as mother and caretaker of the family.

The project appears to have had an important social impact on the farming communities and households. While men have benefited from an increase in income, skills and organisation, for women no such changes have taken place. In many households this inequality has resulted in family quarrels and a weakening of women's position.

When considering the negative impact of the project on women's lives and the widening of the gap between men and women, the project can hardly be called successful, in spite of the registered increase in income and crop production. At the same time, the bypassing of women cannot but hamper the effectiveness and sustainability of the project, not only because of the growing inequality between men and women, but also because of the inefficient use of women's important contribution to agricultural production and productivity and to family subsistence.

This situation is a direct consequence of the fact that the roles and needs of women and the constraints on their participation were not taken into account during project preparation, design and implementation. If a careful analysis of the gender division of tasks, responsibilities and constraints had taken place, special measures and activities could have been introduced (for instance, the introduction of appropriate technologies in women's work, extension and training for women in their role as farmers) to enable both men and women to participate and benefit.

Fortunately, project staff became aware of the project's negative impact on women's lives and the fact that their potential contribution to the development activities had not been sufficiently taken into account. During its second phase, therefore, it is planned to pay more attention to women, through, among other things, the assignment of more female extension workers. A specific WID approach will also be necessary, focusing not only on women's needs and constraints, but also on the attitudes of extension workers and techniques used to reach women. ○

(1) Excerpt from the synthesis report.

vide the basic commodities such as food, ingredients, medicines, clothing and sometimes school fees; whereas the men will contribute part of the staple food requirements while their remaining income usually is spent on consumer or luxury goods.

An increased income for the husband as a result of development projects therefore does not automatically improve family living conditions. At the same time, the increased workload for women caused by intensified crop or animal production decreases the time available for the cultivation of their own fields, and thus decreases their own income. Consequently, the achievement of the project's ultimate goal of improving living conditions of rural families will be negatively affected.

Furthermore, where women have not been a target group in their own right, as was the case in the Kenya, Togo, Cameroon and Niger agricultural operations, not only their workload increased, but women also hardly benefited from project inputs or services which could have increased their productivity on their own plots and thereby their incomes.

By contrast, projects or components which did involve women as a target group, often have reduced their workload and improved their income. For instance, the agricultural and livestock projects in Burkina Faso, Botswana and Zambia have improved incomes of an important group of women by enabling them to obtain land, credit, animal traction, extension advice, inputs and marketing services. Moreover, the Botswana livestock project reduced women's workload, inter alia by facilitating access to veterinary services and marketing.

Projects in the drinking water sector have generally benefited women by reducing time and energy needed for water collection. Time savings of several hours a day have been reported and this time is often used for the collection of more water, as well as for the execution of productive activities. However, not all water projects have been successful in reaching targets and sustainability. Thus, in Niger, 30 % of the pumps visited by the mission were found to be out of action. This was due partly, to women not having been involved in the planning and decision-making concerning the siting of the facilities, the setting of water tariffs and the organisation of operation and maintenance.

This leads us to another aspect of women's participation: its consequences in terms of cost-effectiveness and sustainability of development.

Development effectiveness

The evaluation clearly demonstrated that participation of women is not "just" a social issue—a question of benefiting women or not—but that it is highly inefficient to direct project activities only at men where women do most of the work.

For example, in the Togo and Cameroon projects, women had virtually no access to agricultural extension, technology or inputs. This, according to the consultants, almost certainly reduced the project's effectiveness. For example, a main constraint on the intensification of agricultural production was that weeding is still done by hand, by the women. The project in Cameroon has recently introduced cultivators to mechanise the weeding. However, those who have the most vested interest in adopting the new technology—the women—are not reached by the demonstration session. The distribution of cultivators would probably go much faster if women participated, as was the experience of another extension agency in the project area.

The case of the swamp rice development project in Burkina Faso is a clear example of how bypassing women's roles and interests can be counterproductive for the achievement of project goals. During the initial stages of the project, women's traditional role in swamp rice production, and the importance of swamp plots for women's own income was not fully recognised and the improved fields were at first allocated to male heads of household. The dissatisfaction of the women with their new situation caused a lack of motivation, resulting in bad maintenance of the constructions and stagnation of the yields. Thanks to the open and flexible attitude of the project management, the land has been redistributed and in the new schemes women have been given priority in the allocation of land. Now, women constitute 87 % of the applicants.

This example shows that women are not always passive victims. Where culturally feasible, they make, from their point of view, rational decisions on time and labour allocation. Neglect of their interest in project planning can therefore cause a loss of time and money during project implementation and thus limit the project's cost-effectiveness.

Moreover, in the drinking water sector, women's participation appeared to be effective in achieving objectives and sustainability—in par-



CEC

"An increased income for the husband as a result of development projects does not automatically improve family living conditions"



CEC

"... neglect of women's roles and interests is not only bad for women but also for the project's economic performance ..."

ticular, where women have not only been considered as passive beneficiaries but where they have been actively involved in the planning, management, operation and maintenance. Thus, in the Swaziland project, the functioning and reliability of the new water facilities improved significantly when women, at a later stage, became actively involved and occupied prominent positions in the water committees. They have been instrumental in introducing a successful cost-recovery system and financial management system.

Conclusions and recommendations

Projects may bypass women but women can never bypass the projects: all operations were found to have an effect on women, intended or not, positive or negative. Women either benefited or lost, depending on whether they were recognised as an autonomous target group or whether they were (mistakenly) considered as indirect beneficiaries through their husbands.

The study also revealed that neglect of women's roles and interests is not only bad for women but also for the project's economic performance in achieving its objectives of increasing yields and outputs and improving standards of living of rural families.

As the participation of women was only found to be satisfactory in two out of the nine projects, there is an obvious need to change conventional approaches and methods of development planning and implementation.

The consultants made a number of recommendations in this respect, which have implications for both EC and ACP development administrators.

During *project preparation* for example, gender-differentiated data have to be collected on the role, needs and interests of both men *and* women in the project area. This will require the use of WID expertise and often female interviewers will have to be employed.

The *project design* (and budget) should allow for special activities and strategies in order to overcome barriers to women's access to production factors or services. For example, agriculture extension and credit services often need to be adapted as to content, methods and conditions. Also special activities for women may be indicated such as literacy training or introduction of labour-saving technology.

A condition for women's participation in almost all cultural settings is the availability of qualified female staff who can work with rural women and/or intermediate services of male field staff.

These are just a few of the measures recommended by the consultants.

The Commission has already taken steps to give a follow-up to some of the most pertinent recommendations which are incorporated in a programme of actions aimed at enhancing the capacity of relevant Commission staff to handle the WID issue in a systematic and efficient manner.

However, in the framework of the Lomé Convention, it is not only the Commission administration which is relevant for the implementation of WID related project strategies.

The above mentioned examples of measures to be taken during project preparation and implementation have financial implications and it is here where the ACP partners have a crucial role to play, particularly as under Lomé IV, much of the decision-making on the utilisation of the EDF rests with the ACP authorities.

It is in this regard, perhaps where the otherwise excellent report fails to make a recommendation which might be couched in the following way:

The need to increase recognition amongst ACP politicians and development administrators that investment in women as part of the human capital has a high pay off, both in the short run by increasing economic efficiency and impact of development operations and in the long run since improved opportunities for women will lead to a higher social status, lower population growth rates and more effective use of natural resources. ○ D.V.-L.

Trade between Caribbean and European cooperatives (*)

Each year thousands of young Caribbean men and women leave educational and training institutions only to face the cruel and demoralising prospect of wasting their young years, indeed, their whole lives in the ever-growing ranks of the unemployed. The catalogue of options for many is depressing—emigration for a lucky few to the richer economies of the North, alcohol and drugs to ease the degradation of dependency on parents or charity, odd jobs and piece work having little or nothing to do with the academic training they have received or, finally, crime born of desperation.

How to "put these young people to work", how to create opportunities for meaningful, productive, income-generating activities for the group, is the most pressing issue facing Caribbean policy-makers. Given the economic climate in the world in general and the region in particular, where under both external pressure and internal necessity the public sector is contracting dramatically and traditional private sector activities demonstrate only slow growth, if any, it is abundantly clear that the only hope for significant job creation lies with small-business operations in industrial and agricultural production and the provision of services. "Small-business" is here thought of in the widest sense to include standard small enterprise formats, self-employment and co-operatives. The latter business formula is being looked at anew because its unique combination of economic and social objectives may well prove particularly appropriate to the Caribbean situation in the nineties.

But whatever the "format" of income-generating activity applied, it can only be sustained in the long run if there is a market. In conjunction with the International Labour Organisation and certain NGO's in Western Europe, especially Wereldsolidariteit of Belgium, the EEC has been assisting in looking into what arrangements might be made to provide existing and potential cooperatives in the Caribbean with access to European markets through counterpart cooperative societies there.

For this purpose a Workshop was organised in Grenada from 24 to 26 September 1990. All members of the Caribbean ACP countries (1) except Guyana and two non-independent territories (NIT) in the region, participated at the meeting. The Workshop was organised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and sponsored by the Commission of the European Communities at the request of the Government of Grenada.

The objectives of the Workshop were:

— to review the outcome of the study conducted in the Caribbean, entitled "Cooperatives in the Caribbean: Identification of their Potential Role in Social and Economic Development through Inter-Cooperative Export/Import Trade"; and

— to discuss the proposed regional project to develop and promote export/import trade between Caribbean and European cooperatives.

Cooperatives in the Caribbean were introduced some sixty years ago as a mechanism to address the problems of the impoverished strata of the society. In particular, it was intended that cooperatives would assist in resolving those problems associated with the lack of direct access to land and capital which were and remain vital for their livelihood. At present, there are some 3 400 cooperative societies in the Commonwealth Caribbean with a collective membership of 1.2 million out of a total population of six million. There are about 100 cooperative societies in the Dutch-speaking Caribbean, 238 in the Dominican Republic and 61 in Haiti. The major types of cooperative societies in the region are: Credit Unions, Agricultural Cooperatives, Agro-industrial Cooperatives, Horticultural Cooperatives, Fishing Cooperatives, Consumer Cooperatives, Industrial/Workers Cooperatives and Housing Cooperatives.

The most common type of cooperatives in the Caribbean are Credit Unions, which are the most vibrant and vital sub-sector of the Cooperative movement. Their main activities are centred around the garnering of members' savings (an approximate figure of US $500 million in shares and deposits were held by the affiliates of the Caribbean Confederation of Credit Unions in 1988) and the provision of consumer loans. However, Credit Unions have had very little involvement in productive and multi-purpose activities.

In the other sectors of the coopera-

(*) Article provided by the ILO Caribbean Office, Port of Spain — Trinidad and Tobago.

(1) Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands (N.I.T.), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (N.I.T.), St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago.


FAO - Mattioli

At present, there are some 3 400 cooperative societies in the Commonwealth Caribbean with a collective membership of 1.2 million

J.I.S.

" The single most important problem faced by cooperatives in the region is related to marketing ... "

tive movement, such as fishing and agriculture, marketing of members' products locally and in some cases regionally and extra-regionally, is very common in countries like Belize, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and the Windward Islands. It is also observed that the industrial cooperatives in Grenada, Dominica, Jamaica and St Vincent have begun to generate employment opportunities. In many other Caribbean countries the prospects for Industrial Cooperatives are improving and they are becoming important avenues for the promotion of self-employment.

There are a number of constraints and problems the Cooperative movement in the Caribbean is facing as it strives to meet the challenges of present day socio-economic reality. The study identified the different problems, the most significant of which are:

— the cooperatives in the Caribbean mainly function as isolated social and economic entities. The integration of the movement (within and between the sectors) leaves a lot to be desired. This has led, to a great extent, to their relatively weak economic and social position. As a result, there are very few functional relations with the other important actors in society such as the private and public sectors, trade unions, governments, etc.;

— the single most important problem faced by cooperatives in the region is related to *marketing* characterised by: restricted home markets, lack of information, absence of marketing strategy (product, price, promotion), and lack of marketing channels. Such problems relate in turn to the under-capitalisation of many cooperatives as a result of low members' contributions, difficult access to the mainstream financial institutions, and limited revenue from their own activities. In addition to these, an underlying factor is the need for human resource development, since many Cooperatives lack trained and professional cadres of managers which results in poor planning and coordination of cooperative activities;

— with respect to their potential for participating in export/import ventures, the problems involve: limited human, material and financial capital; lack of proper management tools, poor communication/information facilities, under-utilisation of production capacity, sub-standard quality, finishing, packaging and presentation of products, absence of marketing outlets, high cost of production, price distortions and transport difficulties related to cargo, space and cost, etc.

As experiences have shown in other parts of the world, inter-cooperative trade has proven to be mutually beneficial and has increased the contribution of cooperatives to the overall economic and social development of a country. Such inter-cooperative trade relations within and outside the region have not been developed in the Caribbean. There is, however, considerable potential for this type of development. The study has revealed six categories of cooperative with export/import potential. These are: agricultural, agro-industrial, fishing, industrial, tourism, and horticultural cooperatives.

Most European cooperatives that have gained a very strong market position in their respective countries are in the process of internationalising and " Europeanising " their operations. A number of international joint ventures and marketing arrangements are being formed at present. Those cooperatives contacted in Europe have expressed a strong interest in being involved in a Caribbean—European inter-cooperative trade, in particular in areas of know-how transfer, trading and investments in joint projects. Generally, they were interested in adopting a case by case approach, and in working with reliable Caribbean cooperatives towards the establishment of sustainable business relationships within the framework of the proposed regional project.

To address some of the major problems indicated above and to assist the cooperative movement in the region to develop inter-cooperative trade within and outside the region, a draft regional project was prepared and discussed. The main objectives of the project be are: short/medium term human resource development, institutional strengthening, product development and promotion including the identification of markets, the development of credit union lending through a Revolving Loan Fund for productive ventures, and development of functional relationships between cooperatives and other social/economic partners in the society.

At the end of the three day deliberations at the Workshop the participants expressed their desire and full support for the project and requested that it be submitted to the EEC through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) for funding under Lomé IV. Everyone left the workshop with the conviction that a significant step forward had been made towards a cooperative partnership (in every sense of the phrase) which would be of advantage both to the Caribbean and to Europe. In a sense, those for whom this optimistic message was most important, the unemployed of the Caribbean, have yet to hear it but then, " actions speak louder than words ". ○

A new phase in the OCT association with the EEC

by Yves ROLAND-GOSSELIN (*)

On 19 September 1990, the Commission acted on a suggestion from Vice-President Manuel Marin and adopted a proposal for a Council decision on the association of the overseas countries and territories (OCT) to the European Economic Community. The Twelve are now discussing this text.

The Commission puts a fresh proposal for an OCT-EEC association decision to the Council (pursuant to Articles 131-136 of the EEC Treaty) every five years, after the signing of each new ACP-EEC Convention, and since Lomé IV was signed, the Council has adopted transitional provisions to apply to the OCT until 28 February 1991.

This period has been the opportunity for prior consultations with the OCTs, for whom the previous association decision had posed problems, and for the formulation of the new Commission proposal. It should also leave time for the matter to be discussed by the Council and for it to be put to the European Parliament for an opinion.

Before describing what the proposal contains, we thought it would be helpful to outline the OCTs in question. Their status in relation to certain Member States and to the Community itself is therefore set out in part one—which should make it easier to see why particular problems have cropped up in recent years—and the way the Commission intends tackling these problems, with a view to a new phase of association, is set out in part two.

Status of the OCT

The Community has 20 overseas countries and territories:
— 11 "overseas countries and territories" of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1);
— six "territoires d'outre-mer" and "collectivités territoriales" of France (2);
— two overseas countries of the Netherlands (3);
— one autonomous region of Denmark (4).

Status vis-à-vis the Member States varies

The only thing they have in common here is the fact that they all have special links with the States in Europe, in accordance with the respective constitutions of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Denmark. But these links differ from one Member State to another. Indeed the links between two territories attached to the same State may also differ.

1. Inhabitants of British OCTs, other than the Falklands—which, with Gibraltar, is the only territory whose people have the same rights and obligations as British citizens—have British Dependent Territory citizenship and not full British citizenship.

The United Kingdom has defined what it means by "nationals" in relation to Community law on two occasions—once on accession to the EEC and again in the British Nationality Act of 1981. Community law applies to:
— British citizens;
— British subjects with the right of abode in the United Kingdom;
— British Dependent Territory citizens from Gibraltar and the Falklands.

2. People from the French OCTs have full French citizenship, in accordance with the 1958 Constitution and the various laws on the different territories. They may vote and are eligible for both the National Assembly and the Senate and—uniquely among the OCT population—they may stand for the European Parliament. They also have Community passports like all other French citizens.

When it comes to applying national law, there is a difference between France's overseas territories (OTs) and its two territorial collectivities. While the OTs are legally autonomous in the eyes of the law and can therefore adopt their own implementing arrangements for Community measures relating to the OCTs, national law applies directly to the territorial collectivities. Since, as we shall make clear in the section on the OCTs' status vis-à-vis the EEC, the general provisions of the Treaty and the attendant legislation (other than under Articles 131-136) do not apply in the OCTs, France has, where necessary, to exclude the two territorial collectivities from Community provisions intended to be directly implemented in the Member States.

3. The Netherlands Antilles are associated with the Netherlands, and enjoy equal rights, in accordance with the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 22 October 1954. This set up a tripartite Kingdom in which Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname (which has since become independent) handle internal affairs autonomously and affairs of common interest on a basis of equality. An amendment to the Charter (22 July 1985) granted Aruba separate status as from 1 January 1986, thereby putting it on an equal footing with the Netherlands

(*) OCT Coordination Adviser, Directorate-General for Development.
(1) Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, the Falklands, the South Sandwich Islands and dependencies, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territories, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the British Virgin Islands.
(2) The overseas territories—New Caledonia and dependencies, French Polynesia, French Settlements in Southern and Antarctic Territories and Wallis and Futuna. The territorial collectivities—Mayotte and St Pierre et Miquelon.
(3) Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, St Eustatius and St Maarten) and Aruba.
(4) Greenland.

Antilles in its relations with the Netherlands.

Constitutional and legislative organisation is taken care of by Article 41 of the Charter, which confers autonomy on the various components of the Kingdom in the running of their internal affairs, although there are one or two restrictions when it comes to matters deemed to be "of common interest"—i.e. all the State's traditional prerogatives under international law. These matters are dealt with by the Netherlands and the overseas countries "in association", since only the Kingdom itself is empowered to act here, no overseas "country" having the requisite sovereignty under international law.

4. In 1953, when the Danish constitution was revised, Greenland changed from a colony to an integral part of the Kingdom. In May 1979, it obtained the status of "separate community in the Kingdom of Denmark" (based on the principle of "Home Rule" which has been introduced for the Faroes in 1948) while continuing to send two members to the Danish parliament. On of the objectives of Home Rule was to safeguard the unity of the Kingdom. Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark and the constitutional status of the Home Rule Authority—the national parliament delegates part of its authority to it—is regulated by Danish legislation.

So local problems are dealt with by the Greenland authorities and more general matters by representatives of the Kingdom or the Danish central authorities themselves. Environmental protection came under Home Rule on 1 January 1989, for example, but matters of justice, citizenship, international relations, defence, finance and private law are not transferred and the exploitation of mineral resources is dealt with jointly. Denmark handles international relations, but consults Greenland on anything that concerns it first.

Associates of the EEC

Under EEC law, the OCTs are in an "association" with the Community, so it is perhaps a good idea to look at the history of this association and see how it has developed so far.

The fourth part of the EEC Treaty (Articles 131-136) deals with the association of the overseas countries and territories. Articles 131-135 cover the aims and means of this association and Article 136 lays down the procedure for putting it into practice—via an "Implementing Convention annexed to this Treaty" for a period of five years and via a (unanimous) Council decision "for a further period, on the basis of the experience acquired and of the principles set out in this Treaty".

Political guidelines for the Community are laid down in two places:

The Papeete market in French Polynesia

— in Article 131, which says that the aim is to "promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole";
— in the Preamble to the Treaty, which mentions eight subjects, one of which clearly reflects the authors' political interest: "Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". Two of the general political guidelines of the Treaty are apparent here, particularly when viewed in the historical context of 1957.

1. This association stresses the relations between "the Community as a whole" and the OCTs—a basic political choice to globalise relations vis-à-vis "the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands" (to which the United Kingdom was added when it joined the Community in 1973).

The association does not replace these special relations, but is the affair of the Community as a whole, including those Member States which have no relations with these countries and territories. This is clearly an expression of emergent solidarity—a word which has been used a great deal since, but in fact only appears once (in the case in point) in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome.

We have no hesitation in saying that the relationship did indeed bring solidarity between "the Community as a whole" and the OCTs of the time and that it has made a contribution to cohesion within the Community itself. A look at the list of the OCTs in Annex IV of the Treaty, that is to say, before the era of independence of the sixties, clearly shows that the association was laying the first foundations for the future Community development policy. And, on 25 March 1957, the authors of the Treaty signed a convention setting up the European Development Fund (EDF) and bringing in measures on the right of establishment and the system of trade.

These measures—or tools—gave practical shape to solidarity and, since then, from the 2nd to the 7th EDF, this solidarity between "the Community as a whole" and the OCTs, the AASM and then the ACP States, with its new instruments and additional choices, has remained the hallmark of Community policy in all the decisions and five-yearly negotiations with the ever-increasing number of partners.

The relations have not become as globalised as they might have been over the past 30 years, however. In the case of the OCTs particularly, and the independent States too, links with some Members States have remained predominant in spite of the instruments brought in since 1957.

In trade, for example, the Community market has been opened ever wider to goods from the OCTs and ACPs, but there has been little diversification of the products exported to Member States which are not traditional trading partners. Regardless of political status, in fact, (near) exclusive relations have only gone a very short way to becoming diversified relations with other Member States. Trade patterns reveal it, investment flows prove it and movements of men, students and families illustrate it. And it is true of both directions—Europe to the OCTs and ACPs and the OCTs and the ACPs to Europe.

2. Another innovatory characteristic of the OCT association of 1957 was that it was the first case of association between the Community and the partners. Once again, the Preamble to the Treaty illustrates this—its seventh subject is the OCT and the eighth calls upon "the other peoples of Europe who share the ideal to join in their efforts". And Article 238 says that the Community" may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international organisation, agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures".

The two first association agreements—with Greece and Turkey—were signed in the early sixties. And the first Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the 18 States of Africa and Madagascar associated to the Community was signed in Yaoundé on 20 July 1963.

These were followed by a series of other agreements, "association" taking on a wider variety of meanings as time went by. It was also sometimes seen as a negative thing—and consequently avoided—by partners who felt it to have too colonialist a connotation.

3. So much for the origins and political innovations.

The history of the OCT association has so far run more or less parallel to the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions in which the Community's development policy has been embodied.

The historical origins of the fourth part of the Treaty are easily related. The OCT association was based on an autonomous Community decision. When the AASM became independent, they ceased to be OCTs and negotiated with the Community in their own right, but the fundamental idea, based on the principles and countries already mentioned, remained the same. This went on until 1975-85 when Dutch (Suriname) and a number of British OCTs in the Pacific and the Caribbean became independent and joined the Lomé Convention (I or II).

Throughout this period, in which many OCTs gained independence, the attitude of the Commission, and the Community itself, was always based on respect for each of the entities which had a constitutional legal link with one of the Member States—which is worth underlining as an illustration of the Community's non-interference in political decisions pertaining to relations between the authorities of the Member States and their respective OCTs.

A new phase

The Commission's thinking about achievements with a view to its recent proposal was made in this legal and historical context. And in a new historical context too. First of all, the results of the Community's relations with each of the OCTs—i.e. of the use of the current decision (86/283/EEC of 30 June 1986, as extended), the 6th EDF programme resources allocated to each OCT and to regional cooperation and the non-programme resources (emergency aid, aid for refugees, Stabex, Sysmin, risk capital, EIB loans and interest rebates)—had been evaluated. The analysis had covered the qualitative aspects of the situation too, highlighted delays which the OCTs themselves had caused in the programming process (hampering, by definition, the rapid implementation of EDF-financed projects) and pointed to various shortcomings in regional cooperation intended to bring about better joint development of OCTs and ACPs in the same part of the world.

But the Commission also had to decide what was to be learned from the various questions, fears and positions generated by relations between "the Community as a whole" and the OCTs over the past few years. They had to do with the OCTs and their status and they involved the relations between these places—and their nationals—and the Community, which is itself evolving and continuing apace with its construction.

Indeed, the Community's progress with its various common policies (agricultural, regional, internal market, transport, fisheries, external relations etc) and the completion of the internal market (31 December 1992) had to be considered when formulating a proposal on the association of what is a changing Community with the OCTs of its Member States.

The Commission's proposed innovations for the new phase of association are the result of this double analysis. We shall now outline the proposal, paying particular attention to these innovations and investigating the reasons behind them.

Outline of the proposal

This is self explanatory on all but a few points. It follows Lomé IV, although it is of course in the form of an autonomous Council decision, in accordance with Article 136 of the Treaty, and is based on:

— the decision of 30 June 1986 (No 86/283/EEC) on the association of the OCTs to the EEC;

— Lomé IV, signed on 15 December 1989;

— OCT innovations for the new phase of association.

1. Although it echoes Lomé IV in many ways, it does not contain the

The Courier

A hotel training school at Aruba

Tourism is one of the key areas of EEC-OCT cooperation

two important innovations which the Convention makes on debt and structural adjustment, as the Commission feels that these, where they apply, are the responsibility of the Member State to which the OCT is linked.

The following points have been taken from Lomé IV (although the wording, of course, has been adjusted):
— The wide range of fields of cooperation is the same, except (as five years ago and by definition) for anti-desertification.
— On the trade front, there is virtually total access to the Community market for products originating in the OCTs, as for ACP products (although the arrangements for derogating from the rules of origin are not quite the same).
— There are similar restrictions regarding the import of rum into the EEC, with a minimum quantity which largely exceeds current OCT output, and the same access envisaged in the long term. (There is no reference to bananas, unlike previous decisions, since the OCT banana producing countries have since become independent and joined Lomé).
— On the import front, the OCTs can maintain or establish (as in the past and as for the ACP States) customs duties and quotas in the light of their development requirements.

— When it comes to development financing, both the EDF (including the discontinuation of special loans) and the EIB's own resources can be used.

— Decentralised cooperation has been introduced for local communities (an idea which has proved very attractive to the representatives of some OCTs whose local political structures are suitable for this).

— Respect for the environment, the role of women and the promotion of firms and services is emphasised.

— Stress is placed on regional cooperation between OCTs and ACPs in the same part of the world (something which is regarded as insufficiently developed in spite of the relevant texts and specific allocations).

— Regional cooperation between OCTs, ACPs and French Overseas Departments is stressed (with a view to boosting regional links between neighbours of different statuses and running regional projects of common interest with various (internal or external) resources released by Community funds in accordance with the common policies related to each of the neighbours in question).

— The duration has been extended from five to 10 years (as provided for in the Treaty, Article 136 of which only specifies five years for the first Convention of Association annexed to it), other than for the financial aspects, which have been proposed for five years.

2. The Council of Ministers has already taken global financial decisions, both for the 7th EDF and the EIB's own resources. The Commission proposal suggests a breakdown reflecting the results obtained on each of the allocations made to the OCTs in the past and taking their socio-economic characteristics into account:
— Emergency aid (ECU 3 million in 1986) and refugee reception relief (ECU 1 million in 1986) are to be maintained at the same level. Fortunately, only a small part of these allocations has been used in practice, but the regions in which the OCTs are situated are still high-risk zones justifying a continuing reserve. The proposed change lies in not upgrading the amounts.
— The previously joint allocation (of ECU 5 million) for Stabex and Sysmin has been split into ECU 6 million and ECU 2.5 million respectively, in the light of the foreseeable needs of

the economies of the OCTs concerned.
— Risk capital (ECU 15 million in 1986) has been increased substantially, to ECU 25 million, bearing in mind the degree of development which many OCTs have achieved and the high rate of utilisation of this type of resources over the past few years.
— The allocation for 7th EDF financing of interest rebates on EIB loans (ECU 2.5 million in 1986) has been raised to ECU 6 million to match the increase in the ceiling of own resource loans and as a response to the call to improve (as for the ACPs) the interest rebate system.

However, the Commission has reserved the right to propose to the Council at a later stage, a breakdown of programme resources between each of the three groups of OCTs related to the three Member States concerned (France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and of the resources to be allocated to regional projects. (It is understood that Greenland will receive no EDF aid because it is already covered by the EEC-Greenland fisheries protocol).

— Once again, it is the Commission's past experience which has led it to postpone this element of its proposal. It prefers the Council to focus on the proposed text and its innovations, and hopes to avoid the negotiations between the Member States concentrating on these four figures (the sensitivity of which is obvious to everyone) too early in the day.

Innovations especially for the OCTs

In addition to these changes taken from Lomé IV, there is a whole series of others made to cope with one-off situations of the past few years which we should list before presenting the two major innovations.
— The programming procedures are more demanding about time limits. In practice, these procedures differ and depend on the degree of autonomy which each constitution provides for the OCT in question. So they reflect the difference in status of the various OCTs. The Community lays down the amount for each of the three Member States' groups of OCTs, but leaves it to the Member States to decide how much each individual OCT should get. The programming is then carried out in the light of this.

This sometimes took far too long (as much as two years!) under the 6th EDF and so the Commission suggests fixing maximum times on this occasion. It will apply such time limits equally to its own work as the go-between for successive agreements.
— A priority of many OCTs, bearing in mind the level of development of the bulk of them, is to improve their firms. The Commission proposes to base this drive, as in the past, on the Centre for Industrial Development (on the understanding that this means a financial contribution from the OCTs in view of the fact that this is an ACP-EEC centre) and, as an alternative, on the recently created Euro-Info Centres.
— Derogating from the rules of origin are the way many OCTs—which are spread all over the world, from the Pacific to the Caribbean and from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean—respond to their geographical location and the narrowness of their local markets. The procedures for this have been made more flexible in response to both these characteristics, although the principles of the rules of origin have not changed.
— As in the past, the notion of the least developed OCTs had led to many advantages in the running of the machinery. The Commission proposes increasing the political emphasis on their development by ensuring that the Member States refer to this group of OCTs when deciding on the 7th EDF allocations—something which has not happened in previous decisions.

The internal market

The Commission has borne in mind the different OCT statuses described above and has thought deeply about the consequences which the completion of the internal market will have on various subjects of interest to these countries and territories. It has shed light on a number of legal points and taken decisions on others, recognising that the time had come for either it or the Council to state how the Community intended responding to the frequent and sometimes serious problems raised by the local representatives in the OCTs. The suggested choices are more than legal. To the nationals of the OCTs, they have a genuinely political connotation.

The authorities of some OCTs have indeed expressed concern about how the completion of the internal market will affect them, for the date scheduled for this, 31 December 1992, is within the period covered by the next decision (although a large part of what that involves has already been in effect for many years). The OCTs' worries are reflected in the following paradox:
— the OCTs are not part of the territory of the EEC;
— their nationals have the nationality of the Member States to which they are attached (with differences attendant on the various constitutions). But two common systems are mentioned by name in the part of the Treaty on the OCTs [1].

Legally speaking, the situation is clear. The Community legislation based on the Single Act is applicable on Community territory alone. It does not apply to the OCTs, so the completion of the internal market has no direct legal consequences on them.

However, the legal situation of OCT nationals as individuals is something else. Under the various Member States' constitutions, nationals of Danish, French and Dutch OCTs, and the Falklands in the British group, have the same nationality as the rest of the Danish, French, Dutch and British nationals. So they can, if they want to, claim the advantages of the attendant legislation just like any other citizen of the Community—think how useful the Erasmus programme might be to people from the Netherlands Antilles or French Polynesia who want to study in Oxford or

(1) *Article 132 (5).*
"In relations between Member States and the countries and territories, the right of establishment shall be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons who are nationals of a Member State or of one of the countries and territories."
Article 135
"Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public security or public policy, freedom of movement within Member States for workers for the countries and territories, and within the countries and territories for workers from Member States, shall be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently with the unanimous approval of Member States".

Brussels—and they are, of course, also subject to any constraints or negative effects.

Let us look at the arrangements which have so far been applied for people wanting to set up and offer services. Article 176 of Decision 86/283/EEC provides for the competent authorities in the OCTs (as in the ACPs) to treat nationals and companies from the Member States on a non-discriminatory basis. The same provision allows for the possibility of Member States not being in a position to offer equal treatment to nationals or companies of a Member State established in an OCT—the only consequence of which is that the OCT in question is not obliged to treat the nationals of that Member State on a non-discriminatory basis either.

In view of the fears about Community nationals and firms setting up in the OCTs, the Commission has decided that just continuing with the present provision might not help the development of the OCTs and therefore suggests giving the OCTs the opportunity to bring in their own derogation arrangements, on certain conditions and in certain ways, to help local people and activities.

This is something completely new in the system of establishment and services and it is similar to the OCTs' possibility of fixing (with no commercial reciprocity) customs duties and quotas for products imported from the Community in spite of the fact that their products get virtually free access to the EEC. This opportunity depends on their particular level of development in the light of sensitive areas in local employment. It makes local authorities responsible for their own sectoral choices, and this, in turn is a political reflection of the Community's respect for them.

When it comes to the free movement of workers, we should first look at Article 135 of the Treaty, which says that: "Subject to provisions relating to public health, public security or public policy, freedom of movement within Member States for workers from the countries and territories, and within the countries and territories for workers from Member States, shall be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently with the unaminous approval of Member States". But nothing has been concluded so far.

And Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty, together with the decisions taken in application of them, apply only to Community nationals in the territory of the Community and to OCT workers who have the nationality of a Member State.

Nothing has been adopted at Community level on the legal situation in the Community of OCT workers who do not have the nationality of a Member State or of Member States' workers in the OCTs. The Commission feels that the partnership procedure proposed this time is a suitable framework in which to discuss any problems which might arise in this field and to formulate practical proposals for action if appropriate.

Partnership encourages dialogue among firms

In proposing the introduction of partnership at Manuel Marin's suggestion, the Commission is making up for the obvious shortage of democratic dialogue in the past six association decisions!

And it is doing this in the light of other cases:

— The ACP States negotiate with the Community and there are a number of joint ACP-EEC institutions to ensure the continuity of the many fields in which the Lomé Conventions apply.

— Ever since the important reform of the structural funds to which the European Council of Heads of State and Government agreed in 1988 (8 February), the regions of the Community have taken part in regular dialogue with the Commission, as the body responsible for managing the funds, in accordance with the "partnership" principle. This involves frequent meetings of representatives of the Commission, the central authorities in the Member States and elected representatives from the regions.

The OCT local authorities were the only ones without an institutional instrument to enable them to be present in their own association with the Community! The OCT representative who observed that he had rarely seen an association in which the members failed to meet for 30 years, had a point!

Politically speaking, the Commission could not of course demand this of the various capitals, which is why the proposal only provides for partnership on request—a possibility which will, as preliminary meetings have proved, be taken up immediately by some local governments with the Member State's agreement. These Commission - Member State - OCT meetings will at last include local representatives of the association, in a consultative capacity of course, but with the possibility of leading to Commission decisions and proposals to the Council. They should, the proposal suggests, make it possible to discuss whatever problems crop up in relations between the OCTs and the Community.

* * *

So this is a new phase, certainly. And it is a phase with new approaches. The Commission proposal, which reflects the new achievements of Lomé IV and takes better account of the past shortcomings of EEC-OCT relations, contains a number of one-off changes and—most importantly—two major areas of innovation.

They are based on a closer legal analysis than in the past of the OCTs' status in the various constitutions. But, more than that, they are inspired by a political choice. The Commission wanted to turn the page on three decades during which the Community took decisions—inspired, of course, by the spirit of Part Four of the Treaty, and in conformity with the remarkable guidelines of the Preamble—which, notwithstanding the excellent dialogue that each Member State had with its elected representatives, provided these people with a very inadequate framework for proper partnership in implementation.

Let us hope that the proposed partnership will be a melting pot for criticism, suggestions, adaptations and additions which will ensure even fuller achievement of the aim of Article 131 of furthering "the interests and proposerity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories". ○

Y. R.-G.

CONGO

The Courier

A "rolling programme of strikes" in the administration and in companies hit Congo in the last quarter of 1990. Economic demands were accompanied by a strong movement for political changes which were promised by the Government for the beginning of 1991

Delicate transition to democracy

After sweeping through the "people's" régimes of central Europe, the wind of change from the east is blowing across Africa. The force varies with the latent political climate of each State, but Congo, the *enfant terrible* of central African politics, is certainly feeling the shockwaves of "perestroïka". Like the rest of the continent, Congo first minimised (or tried to withstand) the unavoidable international consequences of the collapse of the single-party ideological systems of eastern Europe, but in 1990, it climbed aboard the democracy train. It dragged its feet a little, of course, the Government making no secret of its wish to keep the discussion within the ranks of the PCT (the Congolese Labour Party), but with a persistent economic crisis and an opposition keen to rush into the breach, the Government finally gave ground to the various economic and political demands.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine goes

It started with politics. The first of the surprise decisions came on 30 September 1990, when the Government abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideas and the doctrine of "scientific socialism" which had guided Congo's economic, political and social actions hitherto. Was it the pressure of (external) events or political realism? Probably both. Although the official version is that this did not signal the defeat of what had been the pride of the People's Republic of Congo, people still think—and with some humility too—that "the Marxist-Leninist doctrine did not really impregnate Congolese society" (see interview with the Minister of Planning) and that "the desire to adapt to the new situation, to the aspiration to greater democracy in the world today" had to overcome Party dogma. The Party, indeed, was behind all the State institutions. First and foremost of these was the Presidency of the Republic, the holder of which could not be appointed without first being Chairman of the Party's Central Committee. This is a system which has had many repercussions on the economic and political life of the country. "It's just like Dante's Divine Comedy. Everyone spends his time admiring the leader and dissecting what he says", a union member told me, and it led to "real political inactivity" amongst the masses, "which long clouded awareness and bolstered the social apathy which the Government counted on to hold things up"—a severe judgment, of course, but one which came as no surprise in Africa in October, with long-submerged criticism surfacing rapidly in the particularly tense social and political climate of the road to freedom regained.

The Government has some complex economic and political problems to cope with. Politically speaking, although the "break with the single party system" was seen as an "event" (a headline in the pro-Government paper, "Mweti" on 5 October 1990), the timetable for the move to democracy was loudly contested by the opposition—which was not even "legal" until the end of last year. On 30 September, the Central Committee had decided to agree to the principle of new parties being formed, and a new "transitional Government" being set up after 1 January 1991. The opposition, however, rejected the whole idea of a transitional cabinet, as this, it maintained, would not have any meaning until after the Party's projected national conference in May 1991. So switching to democracy against a background of serious economic crisis, with the Government finding it difficult to harmonise the process of change, was a very delicate undertaking, particularly in the last quarter of 1990.

The Courrier

President Denis Sassou Nguesso

Correcting the mistakes of the past and making a success of the transition to democracy: an exercise made more difficult by the economic crisis

The economy drained dry

Congo's economy has been drained dry, despite considerable oil production (8 million tonnes in 1990) and a mainly export-oriented forestry sector (discussed later). There is little encouragement from the main economic indicators.

Agriculture, first of all, is the Republic's Achilles' heel, with a mere 2% of the 312 000 km^2 of land under cultivation, although the whole country has an excellent climate which is suitable for farming. The reasons for this are classic. Over and above the arrival of oil, there is the fact that the population is highly urbanised, with more than 50% of the 2 million inhabitants living in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire and an estimated one in three in townships of more than 10 000 people. And the authorities give scant attention to farming in comparison with the administration and the parastatal sector, as we shall see below.

A weak farm sector has many consequences. Brazzaville, the capital, is one of the most expensive cities in the world and certainly the most expensive in Africa after Lusaka (Zambia) and Libreville (Gabon). The country's food imports rose from CFAF 20 billion (CFAF 1 = FF 0.02—a fixed rate) in 1980 to CFAF 90 billion in 1989 (and an estimated CFAF 100 billion in 1990), a worrying trend triggered by the poor output of agriculture and livestock. This forces Congo to depend on outside sources for its food—and food and agricultural products probably account for almost 40% of the general budget (around CFAF 252 billion) in 1990.

The nation's industries cannot yet compensate for poor farming either. They are dominated by the oil sector (CFAF 77 billion in the 1990 budget) and in most cases embryonic and in a weak competitive position in the country's trade as a whole.

A difficult exercise

In Congo's formerly recommended economic model, the State sector was supposed to act as a stimulus for the rest. But it is now clear that it did nothing of the sort. State firms are running enormous deficits and the official debt is one of the continent's largest ($ 6.5 billion including a $ 1.5 billion domestic debt)—$ 3000 per head of the nearly 2 million-strong population, with a per capita GDP of about $ 700. And debt servicing was an estimated 38% of total exports in 1989.

The official debt only poses a problem in that it goes to finance unproductive red tape and grants to Government-managed firms. Congo, like the rest of Africa, has a plethora of civil servants (160 000 in all)—one official to every 13 inhabitants and one Minister to every 100 000 (as against one to a million in France, for example). In 1985, the Government took drastic measures to contain official spending with wage freezes and increment blocks in what was a period of heavy inflation. This had mixed results. The operating budget (CFAF 195.6 billion out of about CFAF 252 billion in 1990) is nearly 2.5% up on the previous year. On the social front, despite the Government's abandonment of some of these measures, the second half of last year saw both the workers and the union (the only one authorised, the Congolese Trade Union Confederation or CSC) opposing State economic policy and the structural adjustment measures suggested by the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, they objected to the privatisation of firms such as Hydro-Congo and to the proposal for a civil service retirement age of 50. The adjustment measures were opposed for a variety of reasons. The workers at Hydro-Congo (a hydrocarbons company), for example, say of their firm that "it is not subsidised and it makes a profit" and that the CFAF 3 billion deficit "is due to State management", as I learnt from one of the union members who had been involved in the various negotiations with the Government in October. And he suggested not privatisation but "completely autonomous management by leaders chosen for their efficiency not their political connection with the Government", particularly since both the Government and the CSC recognise the strategic nature of Hydro-Congo.

The Courier

Despite Congo's official abandonment of their ideology, Lenin, Engels and Marx continue to proclaim their message to the Congolese—met now with both looks and feelings of indifference

The dilapidation of Congo's economy also manifests itself in the deficiency of its food production. The state and other bodies are seeking to restore Congo's agriculture, as seen here in the market gardening sector, through "Agri-Congo", a research institute for the support of agricultural development in the tropics

Congo's economic difficulties mean that change is problematic. Economic reform must mean political reform too and the Government is forced to run the two together. It seems anxious to make the economic changes faster, but the opposition and the unions are taking the opposite tack. The social movements— "one strike after another" (headline in "Mweti" on 19 October) all over the country, are punctuated by political demands. The present national management model has "shown what it can do—and we are not convinced", the union member told me. The big problem for the Government now is to show that economic reform is the forerunner of change to the political system. One should see the beginning of a response in the first half of 1991. ○

LUCIEN PAGNI

"Stabilise the public finances and free individual enterprise"

says Planning and Economic Affairs Minister, Pierre Moussa

In this interview with The Courier, Pierre Moussa, Congo's Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, explains what is being done to handle the economic crisis and comments on the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which, he says, had not really "impregnated" Congolese society.

The Courier

Pierre Moussa

"Ignorance in the ACP of the mechanisms of the Lomé Convention also contributes to delay in the implementation of agreements"

▶ *Minister, you are in charge of planning and therefore of organising the national economy in the long term. Just what are the aims of the second Plan Congo is currently implementing?*

— The aims of this second Plan—what we call the Medium-Term Economic and Social Plan of Action, or PAES for short—is, a bit different, let us say, from the aims of the first Plan we ran in 1982-86. At that stage, we had a reasonably good income from oil. Crude prices were high and they brought in some fairly substantial revenue for the State, which meant we could fix one or two aims focused mainly on opening up Congo, because we did not have any proper communications infrastructure. The road network was extremely rudimentary and practically none of it was asphalted. We had to bring the big railway project, which had been marking time for years, back into line. And we had a very long way to go with our national radio and TV coverage. The country could barely communicate with itself over either land or water. We have plenty of water here, as you know, and the rivers are therefore an important means of economic development too. That was another area where a big effort was called for. So the low level we started with meant that the central aim of the 1982-86 Plan had to be to open up the country and unify the national territory.

Plenty of privatisation on the cards

So we unify the national territory and we open up the country to give production the opportunities it needs and enable marketing to improve, but as we also have problems in the State sector, we have to rationalise that too—so that was an important part of the 1982-86 Plan as well. But you asked about the second Plan, the one we are running at the moment... As you can see, the economic situation during this Plan is very different from that which existed during the first Plan. Oil prices have in practice been plummeting since 1985, and, with the collapse of the oil revenue and extreme difficulties in the State sector of the economy and in the civil services, the country has had a budget crisis on its hands. What it amounts to, in a nutshell, is that we have been undergoing a serious economic crisis since then in our public finances, in the State sector of our economy and in our agriculture, and the aims of the second Plan must bear this new situation in mind. What the Plan has to do is put the national economy back on its feet with a series of rationalisation measures, basically aimed at righting the public finances and rationalising the State sector of the economy. We have to liquidate the firms that need liquidating. We have to privatise some and we have to try and rehabilitate others which for special reasons have to be kept on the State's books, and we need better management.

More generally—to finish what I have to say on this quickly—the aims of our second Plan are, first, to right the public finances, an essential undertaking, and to free individual enterprise and energy so they can be channelled into production activity.

▶ *What means do you expect to use for all these reforms?*

— You must cut your coat according to the cloth which is available, from whatever source, including external aid. First of all, the State has to make an effort to invest from its own resources and from public savings, which is why it was decided in the Plan that the State budget should earmark CFAF 10 billion or so (CFAF 1 = FF 0.02, a fixed rate) every year for the investment drive. And there is some State revenue on top of this, in particular, dividends on the State's shares in oil firms which are transferred to the investment budget, and the resources from our bilateral and multilateral cooperation, especially with the European Economic Community, with which we have a big indicative programme under the Lomé Convention lasting five years. I think we have CFAF 13-15 billion under the fourth Lomé Convention which is due to begin soon. And under this heading, there are also the external credits we get from multilateral organisations such as the European Investment Bank, which is running one or two major schemes here, and the African Development Bank, which is also financing economic operations in the country. And lastly, we have the products of the loans we have contracted as far as our large debts will allow. There is also the State sector of the economy, which, according to its recovery plan, should either be self-financing or supported by State guaranteed loans—considerable investments which will be paid back by the firms in question. All this is in the Economic and Social Action Plan. So that's where the resources will be coming from.

PAES "compatible with IMF-IBRD structural adjustment measures"

▶ *You mentioned the international financing bodies, of course, so can we talk a little about the IMF and the World Bank? Will the measures you are taking satisfy the conditions which these two organisations insist on if they are to give Congo assistance?*

— The principle is that the Economic and Social Action Plan is a scheme for national economic recovery and cannot but be compatible with the adjustment programmes we are negotiating with the IMF and the World Bank. They may well diverge sometimes, of course, but not really on matters of substance, just on the degree of intensity of particular provisions. But the measures we recommend in the Economic and Social Action Plan for 1990-94 are indeed largely compatible with the adjustment programmes we are negotiating. And in any case, the two organisations have our Plan and are using it as a basis in some cases.

▶ *There appears to be some delay in carrying out the Lomé II and Lomé III programmes, and Lomé IV is due to start soon. How do you explain these delays when the country is in such need of investments for its regular development?*

— I should like to underline the fact that the cooperation we have under the ACP-EEC agreements is very much appreciated by our country, as it does not cost much compared to the other aid we get from, say, the multilateral organisations I mentioned just now. The cooperation we have with them ultimately has very high financial costs. I should go so far as to say that cooperation with the EEC under Lomé IV will cost us less and less in terms of finance because now the bulk of the aid will be in the form of grants. That sort of cooperation, we feel, is admirable.

Since Lomé III, we have been focusing our programming of EEC schemes in Congo. This is in complete contrast with what we did before, when there were isolated projects, sometimes scattered all over the country, often without any coherent overall development plan. What we want to do now is target our programming on particular sectors and more specific geographical areas and we have defined these focal sectors and zones so that, as the Lomé agreements progress, we can create a more serious and more visible set of achievements in the long run which will, in turn, encourage the rest of the economy. The focal sector for Community aid under Lomé III was rural development in general and it will go on being the focal sector under Lomé IV, with various schemes to help agricultural production and marketing and improve peasant farming techniques. And we have also chosen focal zones in two test regions—Pool, abutting Brazzaville, and Cuvette, the country's biggest region, which is much further away and has been selected because of its particular features and because it has a very varied ecosystem where a variety of economic undertakings are possible. We are very keen on this new philosophy of cooperation.


The Courier

The headquarters in Brazzaville of Hydro-Congo, the hydrocarbon company whose privatisation has divided both government and workers. A strike by employees paralysed the economic and social life of the country for several days during October 1990

The delay in getting Lomé implemented

Once the programme has been determined, it's true to say that it takes a long time to get going in the field. The schemes we are running under Lomé III, which in fact comes to an end this year, are barely being started now, in the last year of the Convention. The responsibility for this, I think, of course has to be shared. But as far as we are concerned, in the ACP Council of Ministers, we have often drawn the EEC's attention to these extremely long delays which can sometimes spoil the effectiveness of schemes which may well have been programmed for years. We think there are various reasons



The recently inaugurated "ELF Tower" in Brazzaville—a symbol of economic success or a misplaced priority in a country gripped by crisis?

for the delays. In the Lomé III programming, for example, we went from an indicative programme of projects, where it was easier to identify one-off, sometimes disconnected schemes here and there in any sector, to a regionally and sectorally targeted programme, which is more coherent and takes far more work to devise than individual projects. The new approach takes more time, particularly since we then have to get together with the Community on it. The two parties cannot have the same approach either. When you issue an invitation to tender for a project, for example, it takes a long time to translate all the papers into the different languages of the Community. And then there is all the Community red tape and the fact that the people in Brussels think in terms of committing expenditure when what interests us is the percentage of financing that is actually released, as that is in fact what determines the implementation of the projects in the field.

We think that, in future, perhaps, a lot more could be done to speed up the assessment of the dossiers and the payment of the financing.

Unfamiliarity with Lomé machinery

▶ *But delays are caused in the ACP countries too?*

— I never tried to hide the fact. I said just now that the responsibility was certainly shared, although I thought it was greater on the EEC side, and we don't lose any opportunity of telling them so. Congo's administration is certainly slow too, we cannot deny that, and it may be due to the fact that some Ministries have not really got to grips with the procedures and are somewhat unfamiliar with the machinery of the Lomé agreements. Ignorance of ACP-EEC and Lomé procedures is a serious cause of delay. The second reason for delay on the ACP side, particularly in Congo, is the usual shortcomings of the African administrations, with what is still only approximate monitoring and non-existent or highly inefficient internal coordination machinery aggravating the causes of delay.

Paucity of inter-African trade

▶ *How do you see Congo's trade with Central Africa?*

— We are among those who deplore the paucity of inter-African trade. Africa does more trade outside the continent than within at the moment. There is little trade between its different regions and we know why—the weight of history and the States' reluctance to promote trade in spite of trade agreements. There are other obstacles too; the infrastructure problems of our transport and communications, the fact that our products are not competitive and the fact that African consumption is geared to the outside world. And there are the monetary difficulties of trade.

We have agreed to adjust our sights a little bit, nonetheless. As you know, we belong to two big sub-regional organisations, UDEAC (the Central African Customs and Economic Union) and the Economic Community of Central African States, which are in fact aimed at the gradual integration of all the economies of the sub-region. But we have to admit that in neither of them is integration up to the expectations of the Government or, most important, the people. We are dragging our feet on proper integration and that is going against the tide, going against what our people really want. The cross-border buying and selling which some people call illegal trade is the real inter-African trade and it is carried on by the people, operating non-official cross-border systems, regardless of the constraints on population movement in Africa. This is real African trade. And it has to be organised, because it is a deep-seated trend which we have to go along with rather than fight as the governments of Africa usually do.

The long-awaited bridge

▶ *Is this why there isn't a bridge over the river in spite of all the people going from Brazzaville to Kinshasa and Kinshasa to Brazzaville? The two capitals are within hailing distance after all...*

Brazzaville's metropolitan transport system which is largely in private hands, operates with few hitches, even during the Hydro-Congro strike

— We have plans to build a road-rail bridge over the Congo—or Zaire—between Brazzaville and Kinshasa. The studies are being financed by the European Community. The two governments, of Congo and Zaire, have already met several times and the National Authorising Officer of Congo has already been appointed. So the project exists as such, but there are still one or two problems to solve, even as far as the political will for it is concerned. We have already got the financing for the study, thanks to the European Development Fund, and we think that, with the Economic Community of Central African States taking it up at political level—it thought it was a community project that ought to be implemented fast—we should soon be getting on to the practical side of the study and then to the work.


The Courier

The trade in finished (above) or unfinished wood at the port of Brazzaville suffers from the effects both of the international economic crisis and of Congo's transport system


The Courier

Traffic between Brazzaville and Kinshasa looking forward to the realisation of the Congo [Zaïre] River Bridge which the European Community will help to build

▶ *That's good news for both countries and for the regional integration of Central Africa.*

— It's very good news and what we have to do now is work to get it going and overcome any reluctance that still exists.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine a way of looking at things?

▶ *One last question, Minister. What is Congo's reference-point now the days of the official economic and political Marxist-Leninist doctrine are over?*

— Why do you have to have ideological references? Why do you want us to go from one ideology to another?

▶ *That isn't what I meant. I should just like to know whether it constitutes recognition of the failure of an ideology.*

— I wouldn't go that far. Marxism-Leninism is a philosophy, I believe, and may be a guide to action in some cases, but it has to be adapted to the context and the environment in which it is expected to function. You have to take a good look at the society you live in and see what are its fundamental aspirations, its cultural values, its outlooks, its principal references, philosophical ones included, and so on. And I think that it's a better understanding of the society you live in which helps avoid mistaken assessments of the application of particular philosophies in our countries.

You also have to remember what we can learn from history and international events and think hard about how certain political and philosophical principles can be put into practice in Africa. It was the refusal to accept injustice and the most flagrant inequality which was behind what is known as the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but other doctrines have objected to inequality and injustice and put the emphasis on social solidarity too.

Recent history may suggest important convergences between what have long been apparently opposing doctrines. There are degrees of convergence if you can be bothered to think about it and look for them and that is what we want to do—to highlight the aspects of these convergences which are best suited to a developing society like ours.

You say that Marxism has failed, but the short answer might be to wonder whether it was really ever properly applied here. And why wasn't it? Perhaps because the living environment in which it was supposed to function in Congo, the values of our society, were not conducive to its development. There are a lot of questions there. Marxism has its good points and other doctrines certainly do as well. You can not just talk of a failure of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the country and ignore the fact that the people did not really espouse it. ○

Interview by
LUCIEN PAGNI

Huge forests: making them a paying proposition

Forests and their main product, timber, are a vital sector of the Congolese economy. The country even has a Ministry of Forest Economy to manage its almost 20 million ha of forests, roughly 15 million of which are in the north and 5 million in the south.

Although all this is "rationally managed", General Raymond Damase N'Gollo, the Minister of Forest Economy, told me, the forests, 24% of which have actually been inventoried, need a lot of development and it will cost a great deal, which is why the Government needs external aid. "The preservation of the forests is of importance to the whole world because of the ecological role they play", the General said. The management policy for the Congolese forests (which cover 60% of the national territory) therefore involves "a development plan", he said, and "financial and technical means"— considerable ones which Congo obviously does not have. So international cooperation is a must in this field too.



The timber industry does not reflect the scale of the Congo forests (above)

The number two export

Until 1970, Congo lived almost entirely off its timber exports. From 1975 onwards, oil became the main export product, pushing forestry into second place. There are various reasons for the gradual decline of the forestry sector in the nation's economy despite its considerable potential. In the first place, oil, whose price soared during the "oil shock" of 1973-75 soon stifled the other sectors of an economy devoid of agricultural or industrial support.

There were administrative reasons too. The Congolese Timber Board (OCB) had a monopoly on marketing and on the technical extension services and financial assistance available to Congolese foresters. But since the OCB staff "knew very little about either the product or the market", they were unable to provide a proper stimulus for the development of forestry activity and the result explained General N'gollo, was that "wood sold less and less well, there were delays and the OCB lost a lot of money". The Board is due to be reformed by 1992.

Then there are enormous transport problems. Congo's timber is brought down, not without difficulty, from the north to the port of Pointe Noire by river and rail. It is loaded onto barges in the north, but the distances involved and the congestion on the Congo-Ocean Railway (CFCO) then considerably increase the time it should take to get it *fob* at the port of export at Pointe-Noire in the south. The forestry companies and lumberjacks may also have financial problems whereby the wood is delayed in Brazzaville (where the loads are shifted from river to rail) if they cannot pay the CFCO.

And there is a fourth cause. Congo produces mainly red wood, a high-quality product used for door frames and furniture. Most of its clients were originally in Eastern Europe but these countries' trading patterns have now been fundamentally altered by the changes of late 1989. Substitute markets are required and they cannot be those of the existing clients (Portugal, Norway, Spain and the Netherlands), which want different varieties of wood. So this is a difficult time for Congo's timber industry (exports of

General Raymond Damase N'Gollo, Minister of Forest Economy

800 000 m^3, including 350 000 m^3 of eucalyptus) and there is less and less prefinancing from buyers who are worried about Congo's problems of exploitation and its transport system.

What is the answer?

Forestry is an important part of the Congolese economy, but it is feeling the effects both of the way it is managed and of the system of itinerant farming which involves clearing land by burning. This is devastating the forests despite a major Government tree protection and replanting drive (more than 25 000 ha are being planted with eucalyptus at the moment). So how can the nation's forests be preserved and turned into a paying proposition? The industrial opportunities seem small. The 1982-86 Plan included a new paper pulp factory at Pointe-Noire, which was to get its supplies from the vast eucalyptus plantations now in full development, but the project never saw the light of day, largely because of the decline in the economy and the absence of any international outlets. The Government is currently planning to produce charcoal both for export, particularly to the Sahel countries, and for domestic use—the latter in conjunction with an incentive to get the peasants to use fertiliser instead of burning the land and thus to contain desertification and the ill-considered destruction of the forests. ○ L.P.

Giving the countryside and entrepreneurs a new lease of life

To paraphrase a best-seller about Paris and the rest of France which was published a few years ago, one might say that there is Brazzaville and there is the rest of the Congo. The rural exodus is such that life in the Congolese countryside is dying. "After three decades of independence, 56.54% of our 2 264 301 people live in the cities", Youth and Rural Development Minister Gabriel Oba-Apounou said, "and it makes it particularly difficult to absorb all the nation's unemployed". And, with 190 000 in the queue for jobs (including 30 000 young people) unemployment is certainly a problem. The Government's policy of providing new job-creating activities in the rural world "comes up against this mass of jobless Congolese youngsters in the cities", the Minister added. But economic considerations are not the only ones. The rural exodus has also caused an increase in urban crime.

Mr Oba-Apounou says that the Government has tried to stop people leaving the countryside with a number of measures aimed at improving "communications infrastructure, establishing rural leisure centres and building schools and health centres". The most important measure was "the creation, two years ago, of the Congo Rural Credit Bank (CRC), to provide financial backing for "agricultural activity and rural infrastructures."

Lomé III focused on rural development. What were the results of this for Congo? The Minister thought that "the implementation of this approach met with serious obstacles, of which the international economic crisis is only the best-known because it completely unbalanced national budgets..." He explained, however, that with the Community's help, the Government drive is beginning to bear fruit and rural areas which have been cut off for years are being developed. It is also hoped that the development of the national economy will be served by regional cooperation agreements, such as the one signed recently with Wallonia (Belgium) on setting up a regional development company in Congo.

The SMEs

Congo's poorly set up rural areas also reflect the unenthusiastic attitude of the smaller and medium-sized industries and the country's poor internal and external trade. As Alphonse Boudo Nesa, the Minister of Trade and SMEs told me, "scientific socialism, our policy and ideology, which rests on large-scale State firms, failed to encourage the smaller businesses which would otherwise have found it much easier to develop nationwide". The Government has tried to encourage people to start up individual businesses and get trade going in this country by setting up a loan guarantee company to help industrial and commercial promoters. This is part of a policy of State withdrawal under which some State firms—the National Wholesale Meat Import Board (ONAVIG), for example, which had a monopoly on imported meat—have been privatised.

However, there is plenty of red tape to cut through before the Government's ideas can really become operational. For example in October 1990 none of the ECU 3 million provided under Lomé III to develop Congo's SMEs had yet been utilised. ○ L.P.

All-out cooperation

A talk with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Congo, like the other ACP countries, knows all about economic crisis, with the external problems of falling oil (until recently) and timber prices and internal problems of management. The Government has brought in a series of recovery measures to try and solve the enormous difficulties created by the collapse of the national economy (see previous pages and the interview with Pierre Moussa), but it thinks it is going to have to rely more on outside help to make a success of them. This is why as Pascal Gamaya, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made clear in an interview with *The Courier*, it intends developing "all-out cooperation" relations with all countries, whatever their politics.

Congo did not wait for the economic and social action plan before it extended its field of international cooperation, Gamaya points out, as the "sound relations with the USA, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union", for example prove. "There is a difference", he maintains, "between the pure Marxist ideology with which Congo might be thought to be thoroughly impregnated and the reality of our country's open-armed attitude to broad international cooperation"—a policy, he says, which is not new. "Our approach may never have been called 'perestroïka', but it has looked like it".

What is new, however, is the idea of having the Department of Foreign Affairs actually formulate the cooperation policy—a job which for years was dispersed among several Ministries, with operations falling by the wayside for want of better coordination and a better definition of responsibilities. So the point of reorganising the administration of the nation's cooperation policy is to avoid "each sector running its own cooperation... which might not be in the country's best interests".

The dispersal of cooperation policy referred to, may be the reason why cooperation between the countries of the South, or indeed between the countries of any given region of Africa, is so poorly developed? In central Africa, for example, which has major agricultural, mineral and human resources, trade in no way reflects each country's potential, in spite of the various bodies (UDEAC, the CEEAC and so on) which have been set up to promote all forms of cooperation in the region. "It is a fact", Pascal Gayama maintains, "that the impression is that each of these organisations leads its own life

Pascal Gayama

and does little to consult the others" about aims and how to achieve them. And so one of the targets, "the free movement of people and goods in UDEAC, still has not been reached... perhaps because the member countries tend to contemplate their navels and are often busy competing with each other rather than developing their complementarity". However, leaving "narrow nationalism" aside, he believes that the general impoverishment of the countries of Africa may have something to do with the "poor performance of the regional organisations". But Gayama, who is in charge of cooperation, also believes that: "We cannot just give up. We think there's a job to do and we are getting on with it".

"Legitimate concern"

The cooperation policy has to be formulated coherently to provide clear guidelines for action. But action comes up against obstacles both in Africa and on the international scene.

Are, for example, developments in Eastern Europe one of these obstacles to economic relations between Africa and the European Community? "Yes, they are", Gayama states. "Our partners are obviously now looking more and more to Eastern Europe. And the Community did not need to be pressurised into setting up a big European bank for the reconstruction and development of Eastern Europe". This is no real threat to ACP-EEC relations, of course, but "it still looks like one", he said, deploring the fact that "the industrialised countries are unable or unwilling to come up with a fair solution to the problem of commodity prices", although the Africans bear their "share of responsibility for the deterioration of their economic situation". And the changes in Eastern Europe are going to mean an end to the close cooperation links between countries there and in some parts of Africa.

Congo, for example, had "long-standing relations" in Eastern Europe which are now being overturned by the upheavals of 1989, Gamaya says. The East European countries are now "partners who no longer react in the light of ideological and political considerations alone", which is why he feels "legitimate concern" about relations between the new wider Europe and the countries of Africa.

But Gamaya remains optimistic about the future. The stage of development which the East European countries have reached and the Community's Lomé commitments are such that "the ACP States should be able to find new openings which are an encouragement to their economies and conducive to cooperation relations with these countries". ○ L.P.

"AGRICONGO"

A model for research and development

by Christian de la BRETESCHE (*)

It is no quirk of fate that makes it difficult for research and development to come together.

Research means specialising abilities, targeting aims and isolating phenomena. Development, on the other hand, means integrating factors, making systems complex and combining innovations, be they scientific, technological, cultural, social, political or economic, in a dynamic way. Yet they go together.

If the environment is not actually developing, research declines and stultifies and goes on inventing the wheel. And without proper research, development gets lost in the realms of ideological pipe-dreams or entangled in red tape which strangles innovation.

Is this a vicious circle?

Agricongo is an R&D enterprise set up at the combined initiative of the Elf Group and the Congolese Government to get some fruitful research going on a proper process of diversification and integration of activity in areas in the country and around the towns. And it is "perhaps" succeeding, where many others have failed—"perhaps", because Agricongo is only five years old and, in spite of its good record so far, it is too early to assess its effect on "development". And development, once again, is a process of integrated cultural, social and economic change that can only be evaluated in the long term.

But this "perhaps", which has already brought great hope to Congo, is generating a very special form of dynamism in a target group which has a decisive part to play in reviving the rural areas and developing farming in the suburbs. This group is a significant minority of variously educated 20-35 year olds, some of them from agricultural college, who are keen on going back to the land and making a success of the rural economy.

(*) A member of the Agricongo team, Brazzaville

Agricongo

The work of Agricongo is directed essentially towards the basic foodstuffs sectors of the Congolese; banana production (above) has improved thanks to the better selection of banana trees

We believe that Agricongo has a very good chance of considerable success in the long term because of:

i) its clear choice of gearing research to an alternative system of agriculture;

ii) the fact that it counts on motivating young students to invest their intellectual abilities and ambitions in agriculture;

iii) its systematic use of the agro-economic method based on models of activities;

iv) the strategy of the development model whereby the move from researching techniques and strains to testing them out in the systems in which they are to be integrated is relatively quick;

v) the sense of communication with the social, professional, associative and politico-administrative environment which is vital if the research scheme proper is to prompt significant spontaneous development.

What is possible

The problems are well enough known only to need summarising here.

There is no longer any point in expecting a gentle advance from traditional farming. It is condemned, irremediably, by the rate at which the peasant population is aging, the natural environment deteriorating and the food requirements expanding. And the big, 'heaven-sent' mechanised agricultural units have not lived up to their promises either, for neither the technological nor the economic environment has managed to integrate them.

So we need an alternative. There is more to it than looking for techniques and deciding on crops. Whatever the environment of the potential innovation, thought has to be given to the system that can house it. And that system has to be designed to cope with the constraints of the natural, social, cultural, technological, economic, political and administrative environment.

The original aspect of Agricongo is that it hinges on the creation of viable systems and is keen to provide whatever means are needed and use all the data available to put them into practice in country areas and around the towns.

This is a complex approach requiring a scientific, social and economic turn of mind—which a new generation has to have. It leads to systems being created of a combination of small individual, rural, agricultural, commercial and craft firms which have been carefully adapted to the environment, slotted into each other and resolutely geared to progress.

Production of oyster mushrooms

Preparation of the base

The oyster mushrooms are developed on a mixture of cassava stalks and lucerne flour, together having a humidity of 75%.

The base is disinfected by lengthy pasteurisation.

The mixture of lucerne and crushed cassava stalks is made under cover

The steam-heated disinfection of the base is one of the keys to the success of the culture

Inoculation

Inoculation is the incorporation into the base, of mycelium (the vegetative part of the fungus), produced in a laboratory. This operation takes place in the open air.

The mixture thus formed is placed in opaque, perforated plastic bags weighing 5 kg.

Culture



Rich in proteins and vitamins, the oyster mushrooms are highly appreciated

The blocks are then placed in incubation greenhouses for a period of two months at a temperature of 25-30° and a humidity of 90%.

After this, the plastic is removed and the blocks are transferred to greenhouses for ripening. After six days, one can begin to harvest the oyster mushrooms.

Each producer makes one tonne of base weekly, from which he can obtain 130 kg of mushrooms.

After production, the base is made into compost and sold to market gardeners thus providing additional income for the producers.

Production stages



Production of oyster mushrooms in the Congo

Growing of the mushroom takes place in greenhouses while gathering is in the open (above)

Man at the centre

Agricongo focuses on a new man. He may have been educated to any level, he may or may not have had any special agricultural training, but he wants a job. He is allergic to rural life, and farming especially, they used to say, but Agricongo has taken up the challenge and decided to show these youngsters that they can both make use of their schooling in an updated system of agriculture and satisfy their legitimate economic and social ambitions.

Wonders have been achieved with the teaching methods Agricongo uses on its fine test station at Kombé. In this carefully ordered and coherent context, there is a lot to be gained from wielding a hoe, selling manure, leading a pair of oxen, making bricks, processing groundnuts and cassava, joining in numerous technical discussions, maybe answering questions from bemused visitors, noting down all the day's information and learning how to work out production costs and possible profit margins—i.e. being part of a grand scheme to build a new rural world.

At the Kombé test station, young candidates for the agricultural and rural professions can see something they would see nowhere else in Congo. It is a small universe which:
— is engaged in research, in which everyone is involved in the testing and can criticise the results;
— is becoming rapidly more complex, with every new activity creating the opportunity for one or more additional activities, making up its technological, commercial, administrative and financial environment;
— gives everyone the opportunity to test the responsibility of the individual and the solidarity of all.

More than 700 young men and women have attended courses (of at least a month) at Kombé over the past four years, so it is reasonable to imagine that a new generation of farmers is preparing to shoulder its responsibilities.

Using models

Agricongo does more than just look for new techniques and select new strains.


Agricongo

Although livestock breeding is less important in income terms, Agricongo is able to show that Congo can also obtain good results in this previously neglected sector

It suggests systems which bring farmers together in small production and processing units which can provide a family with a theoretical CFAF 60 000 to CFAF 150 000-200 000 per month. And 10 computerised models—for market gardening, mixed crops and herding, small (cattle, pig, sheep and duck) farms, calf ranching, market garden plant production, mushrooms and agri-food processing grouping—have already been produced.

This method of making models of the first results of experiments can give rise to a lot of dispute as to the reliability of the figures, obviously, but it is, at all events, a fruitful and dynamic approach.

It highlights the great diversity and complementarity of activities which can and should emerge in a developing system of agriculture. And it provides an introduction to project science, which is vital for young people who are going to need access to credit to set up their firms.

But there is more to it than that. One of the reasons for the lack of initiative so typical of societies which fail to develop is the shortage of models which can stimulate the creative imagination. And this is where the concept of model moves from economic to sociological considerations. Whatever the consistency of the figures when the computer puts them into rows, it is clear that the proposed model can only be used if the "organisations and procedures" it involves actually become models in the cultural meaning of the term—i.e. if they are appropriated by a specific social environment which adopts them and makes them its own. So an integral part of R&D is taking the economic models devised on station and using them in the rural environment.

Beating the clock

Since development is a work of synthesis and complex integration of systems, the time factor is essential—although operators very often fail to have it under control or to include it in their analyses. Should matters be allowed to run their course? Or should there be deadlines, with the attendant risks of being too early or too late?

This is where Agricongo shows its audacity. The Kombé test station collects scientific and technical data from every field and tries to fit them into the complex Congolese context:
— Without waiting, it combines the information available to form systems and runs life-size tests on the station.
— As soon as a system seems reliable and usable in the environment, a manager is sought and given a pilot unit to run on the station.
— The model is transferred to an off-station pilot area in the market gardening zone (the first suburban green belt) or to a pilot food zone (the second green belt, 45 km from the capital) as soon as possible.

It has taken only four years for the station to have 10 market gardens, a pig farm, two duck farms, a sheep farm, a building firm using local materials, a water engineering firm, a market garden plant firm and a cassava and a groundnut processing unit. Agricongo has also given technical support with the setting up of 13 mixed crop and herding farms (project PK 45) and 77 market gardens in three pilot zones, plus two cattle fattening concerns which produce manure for the market gardeners, over this period.

These are rapid results for an under-developed country. Are they cause for congratulation or concern?

We think this kind of dynamism is essential to keep the attention of the target group—once again young, educated 20-35 year olds, for whom the next five or ten years are vital.

But we must beware of the flaws and accidents which are inevitable in a process of integration as fast as this.

Communication with the social environment

This is the fifth reason for Agricongo's probable success.

From the outset, the scheme has had a remarkable policy of communicating with the professional, social, associative and politico-administrative environment.

Obviously the integration of a new rural economy cannot be left to just one R&D unit—which cannot generate a proper process unless it actively communicates with agricultural training establishments, research institutions, lay and professional associations, mutual credit bodies, supporting NGOs, grass roots communities and their organisations and so on. This is the only way the operation will encourage an alternative agriculture development movement.

True to its methodical outlook, Agricongo has both made an effort with internal communications and forged links outside, in the sub-region of central Africa.

This article is not the place for an in-depth critical assessment of the five aspects of Agricongo's action that we were anxious to highlight. We think that, if the enterprise continues and manages constant self-assessment and self questioning on all five points, it could become the successful development model for central Africa we have all been waiting for. It is high time we had one.

Chr. de la B.

Tourism — out in the cold for far too long

by Antoine KOUNKOU-KIBOUILOU (*)

Many a visitor arriving in Congo is astounded by the country's natural beauty, by its luxuriant scenic contrasts, its enthusiastic and incredibly welcoming people and its rich and varied culture. Yet Congo has long been absent from the international tourist market.

Its international class hotels sell only 200 000 bed nights every year—a clear indication that the tourist trade is under-developed and performing well below potential.

For a very long time, tourism in Congo lost out to other sectors such as natural resources and notably oil and timber which were regarded as more profitable. Thus, for years, the government paid it scant attention. Occasional initiatives both private and public led to one or two sites being developed, especially around the cities, but this was no real foundation for proper tourism development.

Stressed in the five-year Plan, 1982-1986

In 1980, a Minister of Tourism, responsible for developing and promoting tourist activity in Congo, was appointed in accordance with the guidelines of the 3rd ordinary congress of the Congolese Labour Party (the only party and for 21 years, the effective driving force behind the State).

The country then embarked upon its five-year economic and social development plan, in which tourism was given prominence. The State invested some CFAF 15.720 billion with the aim, within the plan period, of "developing hotel infrastructure to handle both external demand, which is primarily business-oriented, and internal demand, with a view to encouraging national tourism".

(*) Director-General of Tourism and Leisure, P.B. 13537, Brazzaville, Congo.

This objective was largely achieved during the course of the plan, the State having succeeded in building two new hotels—the 4-star, 200-room PLM M'Bamou Palace and the 3-star, 48-room Ndjindji on the Côte Sauvage—and in renovating and extending others.

Thus, the State was mainly concerned with improving top hotel capacity and, since this was a period of peace and political stability, its own efforts were backed up by private initiatives which resulted in a wider range of accommodation becoming available.

The 1982-86 Plan saw Congo's hotel and accommodation facilities improve from approximately 20 hotels with 566 rooms and 833 beds in 1979 to 187 hotels and allied establishments with a total of 2967 rooms and 3385 beds. 870 permanent jobs were also created in the State sector and about 1000 in the non-planned sector.

In 1985, when economic decline stemmed the flow of businessmen attracted by the oil boom, tourism, in common with every other sector, found itself in difficulties, with occupancy rates plummeting by 30-40% over the year. But the crisis alerted public opinion to the fragility of a national economy based on raw materials and a move was made to other, more regular sources of income... and Congo discovered its true tourist vocation.

Ambitious programme reflects existing potential

Geographical position, climate, and ethnic and cultural diversity give Congo enormous tourist potential. The weather may be hot and humid, but it is almost always fine and sunny. The 170 km of sun-drenched beaches and lagoons are ideal for seaside holi-



The Courier

Statue of the liberated railway worker in front of Brazzaville Railway Station

The Courier

A good street for a stroll in the centre of Brazzaville

days, while the majestic River Congo, that fabulous tourist resource, offers cruises, short sailing trips, fishing excursions and other water sports. The Congo Forest—massive, variegated and impregnable—covers 60 % of the land. According to Seydou Badian Kouyate [1] it is also a "living forest" containing everything from the tiniest insect to the biggest carnivore, with eight nature reserves, three hunting areas and numerous opportunities for the tourist to explore, to go on photo safaris etc. All around, the scenery presents contrasts for the interested tourist. There are the gorges of Diosso and Sounda, the cliffs of Douvre, the falls of Foulakari, Bela and Ngaou on the Nduo and the grottoes of Nkila-Ntari, Bihoua and Matoudidi—a host of curiosities and attractions which are the dream of nature-lovers.

Congo has a remarkable cultural heritage too, folklore with dance and ritual galore and talented craftsmen and artists.

These assets and the conviction that the tourist trade can be a stimulus at a difficult time for the economy have led the Government to shift its sights and come up with a new tourist development strategy in the latest economic and social action plan for 1990-94.

(1) Malian writer and former politician.

The idea is to create and promote attractive, competitive tourist products with the country's wide range of resources; providing and facilitating travel by opening tourist offices at home and abroad and introducing a variety of measures to help visitors with travel and accommodation. The Ministry of Tourism (and the Directorate-General for Tourism and Leisure in particular) have applied themselves to this task since early 1990. The results of the first year of the Plan are extremely encouraging, although the country is still looking for private promoters to run many of the projects it contains. Nor is there a shortage of optimism, with many additional measures envisaged for the 1990-94 period.

A variety of products for the selective tourist

Until the major tourist promotion drive gets under way, Congo is offering a range of typical tourist deals, mainly for holiday-makers from its five main markets, namely France, Zaire, Côte d'Ivoire, the USA and Italy. With its many picturesque places, its wide variety of fauna and its fabulous beaches, the country can provide diverse tourist activities to combine with business trips.

There is sport for visitors anxious to fish tiger fish in the river at Brazzaville or giant mbenga off Pointe Noire and big fish such as the giant tarpon (Megalos Atlanticus) and barracuda and swordfish in the lagoon at Conkouati. There are also cruises which are a great attraction much in demand.

All this is the basis of the Congolese tours currently sold by operators from Scandinavia, America and Western Europe, who support selective tourism that is better adapted to the demands of as many people as possible.

It is true that the contribution currently made by tourism to the Congolese economy is minimal, but the dynamism of the sector is such that there is every reason to be hopeful. ○

A. K.-K.

EEC-Congo cooperation

The Congo has been associated to the EEC, through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, ever since it gained independence in 1960 and it appreciates the practical, positive relations and whole range of development aid our cooperation involves. The EDF contribution, which was ECU 30 million under Lomé I, increased to ECU 30.5 million under Lomé II and then jumped to ECU 48 million, under Lomé III.

Analysis of cooperation and an assessment of Community aid

Commission-managed resources. Community aid to Congo over the 1960-84 period amounted to almost ECU 162 million. 69% of it went into transport and communications, 9% into hydraulics and drainage, 8% into rural production, 6% into education and training, 3% into public health, 0.2% into industrialisation and 4.8% into various other investments.

The Government's strategy during previous Conventions was to put priority on transport and communications and the Community took this into account, with positive results. So the EDF's regional and national resources combined to make the European Community contribution to developing Congo's transport and communications services—the port of Pointe Noire, the Congo-Ocean Railway (CFCO)), the port on the river at Brazzaville and the Congo itself—a significant one. Maintenance of infrastructure, heavy equipment and constructions has not always been good, but the rate of utilisation is still high and having a noticeable effect, particularly on communications and transport.

Contributions went up to ECU 48 million in 1985-90 under Lomé III and rural development was the main sector to benefit, the idea being to give the producer confidence, help make the rural sector more dynamic again and improve supplies to the big cities, in particular by more efficient marketing of farm produce and better conditions and quality of life in rural areas.

The focusing introduced under Lomé II had an undeniably positive effect by making for a coherent and global view of the regional aspects of rural development — a concept taken up in the Government's economic and social action plan (PAES) for 1990-94.

This rural development operation, worth ECU 36 million (90% of the resources of the national indicative programme), together with an Italian contribution of ECU 13 million, is aimed at improvements in two regions—Pool (184 000 inhabitants) in the Brazzaville hinterland and the flooded part of Cuvette (100 000 inhabitants) in the north—and is in three parts:

i) rehabilitation of the main supply routes to the capital and the opening up of the rural sector;

ii) village water engineering work to raise the standard of living;

iii) a series of schemes, to be run with the villagers, particularly in the settlements in the centre of rural Boko and Boundji, to set up social and commercial infrastructure, lay tracks, tap springs, run agricultural, commercial and craft promotion campaigns and so on.

The financing agreement was signed in 1988, but changed the following year, with the two hydraulic sub-programmes suspended at the Government's request. The road network had deteriorated since the borehole site inventory in 1985 and many of the villages selected were difficult for the borehole team to get to, compromising its work as a result, and the sensible thing seemed to be to postpone the hydraulic works and switch the funds to the dirt roads.

The whole programme, which is scheduled for continuation under Lomé IV, is aimed at restoring the town-country balance. This has been upset by the combined effect of the rural exodus (mainly youngsters) and the relative aging of the agricultural population, which is depriving the sector of the basis it needs for development. More than 50% of Congolese now live in the towns, making Congo the most urbanised country in Africa.

The authorities have realised that (economic and social) priority has to go on the rural world as a source of diversification of economic growth in the long term. So the Government needs support for its drive to create a climate conducive to agricultural development by freeing trade and promoting peasant smallholders and to raise the rural standard of living by improving the basic infrastructure (power and water supplies, health facilities and roads). The national indicative programme for Lomé III

The Courier

Congo-Océan Railway Station in Brazzaville which has received Community funding for various rehabilitation works

EDF

Education and the building of schools, such as this high school in Brazzaville, have also benefited from Community help

also includes SME and health support schemes.

The idea in the SME sector is to create a better climate for investors and improve the financial institutions, which could well be achieved by providing technical assistance and lines of credit. On the health front, primary health care, endemic disease control and hospital infrastructure rehabilitation need support, but priorities have to be established. Consultations between the Government and the Commission are going on in both these sectors.

Financing of ECU 1 162 915 (not from the Lomé Convention) was allocated to the AIDS programme on 23 December 1988 to set up a regional transfusion centre at Pointe Noire, the country's economic capital. Work on this centre has just been completed and volunteer blood donors can now be sought. It is hoped to have 5 000 units of blood by the start of the programme (10 000 at the end) and to ensure maximum safety of transfusions for both donors and recipients.

There is also an NGO operation on the drawing board following a round table of Congolese and European NGOs in Brazzaville in October, when the area for participatory development through decentralised cooperation was defined. Partnerships between European NGOs and Congolese operators will be forged during a gradual process in which locals are involved in designing and running development schemes.

The Courier

Although the Community has contributed towards improvements in Brazzaville, the Congolese capital still has serious problems of urban management, such as here in the highly popular district of Bacongo

In addition to the various projects outlined in the tables, there is the ECU 24 million regional cooperation operation, aimed at the conservation and rational use of the forest ecosystems of Central Africa, for which Congo is the regional authorising officer. Seven countries (Cameroon, the CAR, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe and Zaire) are involved in this exemplary model of European cooperation.

This Lomé III programme is completely in line with the Lomé IV policy of protecting the environment and natural resources and an integral

Community schemes in Congo 1960-1990

	ECU '000
1. Projects, programmes, studies and technical cooperation schemes receiving EDF assistance	168 148
2. Regional projects in Central Africa	± 85 000
3. Projects run with NGOs	± 880
4. EIB loans:	
— risk capital	29 800
— interest rebates	5 261
— own resources	23 500
5. Exceptional aid	166
6. Stabex transfer (timber)	7 362
7. Food aid:	
— 733 t milkpowder	
60 t colza oil	
8. AIDS programme	1 126

Relations with the Community

Summary (ECU '000)		
1st-3rd EDF:		73 594
4th EDF:	Indicative programme	30 000
	exceptional aid	166
	Risk capital	3 083
5th EDF:	indicative programme	31 500
	risk capital	480
	interest rebates	2 260
6th EDF:	indicative programme	48 000
	• rural development 80%	
	• SME, health and training 20%	
	risk capital	26 000
Regional programme (Congo's estimated share)		
4th EDF		8 400
5th EDF		19 000
Stabex (logs)		
4th EDF		7 360
5th-6th EDF		—(*)
AIDS programme		
Pointe Noire transfusion centre (1989)		1 126
Lomé Sugar Protocol 10 000 t.		

(*) Exports less than 6%.

part of the regional action plan for the preservation of the tropical forests of Central Africa.

EIB-managed resources. The resources managed by the EIB (loans from own resources and risk capital) amounted to some ECU 53.3 million over the 1960-1990 period, of which ECU 26 million was risk capital under Lomé III. The latter went to an oil and fats industry rehabilitation scheme (ECU 16 million) and to a programme for the renovation of water supply installations in Pointe-Noire (ECU 10 million).

Congo is very committed to the special relationship which it has with the European Community, and which has strengthened over time and through dialogue. At the time of serious economic difficulties throughout Africa, Congo sets considerable store by Lomé IV as one of the instruments for alleviating the effects of the crisis. ○

Gilles DESESQUELLES
Economic adviser to the CEC Delegation in Congo

Summary of Community aid, Lomé III

(ECU million)

I. Lomé III aid	Decisions	Commitments	Disbursals
a) *Commission-managed resources:*			
— indicative programme (ECU 48 million)	36.7	26.7	0.7
b) *EIB-managed resources:*			
(indicative amount in indicative programme: ECU 26 million)			
— risk capital	26.0	26.0	8.7
Total I	62.7	52.7	9.4
II. Aid outside the Convention (1986-1989)	Allocations		
— food aid	1.0		
— NGOs	0.7		
— misc. (inc AIDS programme ECU 1.1 million)	1.8		
Total II	3.5		
Total I+II	66.2	56.2	12.9

PROFILE

Oil earnings have been the deciding factor in economic growth since 1970 and the effects of the fall in the price of "black gold" are still being felt. In response to the worsening price situation in 1985, the Government launched a plan for economic recovery and for the improved management of the State finances as part of a structural adjustment programme adopted in the same year. Although the results of the programme were not all they might have been, they were enough to enable the Congolese authorities to sign an agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF especially) to ease the rescheduling of the nation's debts, particularly with the Clubs of Paris and London. But the State's limited budget resources and heavy debts made the Government's twin task of nudging the economy out of recession, without too large an increase in taxation, and of stimulating growth in the non-oil sectors, where agriculture is weak, a particularly difficult one. In these circumstances, one can see a vital role for the private sector. Privatisation appears to offer a way for the Government to escape from the State-controlled economy which currently operates (although for how much longer?) in Congo.

GEOGRAPHY

Area: 342 000 km², almost 60 % of it forest.

Population: 2 200 000 inhabitants (estimated 1989), growth 3 % p.a., density 5 per km² and very uneven distribution, with roughly half the people in the Brazzaville-Pointe-Noire area in the south.

Capital: Brazzaville (800 000), famous for the historic part it played in the decolonisation of French-speaking Africa.
Other main towns: Pointe-Noire, a port (380 000 approx.), Loubomo (60 000) and Nkayi (40 000).

ECONOMY

GDP (1987): $ 2 billion (CFAF 645 billion*).

Per capita GDP: $ 700

Exports (1987): Total fob: CFAF 275 billion including: crude oil (6 million t) – CFAF 205 billion, refined products – CFAF 8 billion; timber – CFAF 15 billion; industrial – CFAF 1.5 billion. Other products exported included sugar, coffee, cocoa and diamonds (re-exports).

Imports (1987): Total cif: CFAF 182 billion including: Food products – CFAF 80 billion (CFAF 100 billion in 1990); Other products imported included paper, textiles, beverages, tobacco, machinery and chemicals).

Budget (1990): CFAF 251.1 billion, with the operating budget (CFAF 193.6 billion) and the investment budget (CFAF 57.5 billion) both up on 1989 (CFAF 236.8 billion, CFAF 189 billion and CFAF 47.8 billion respectively).

(*) 1 CFAF = 0.02 FF (fixed rate).

External debt (1989): $ 5.250 billion. Domestic debt: $ 1.5 billion. Debt servicing as percentage of exports: 38 %. Congo has one of the heaviest per capita debts in Africa.

SOCIAL INDICATORS

Education / Employment The school attendance rate is high, mainly because the population is heavily concentrated in a few centres. The university, with a faculty of medicine, turns out a number of graduates who cannot be used in the national economy as it stands. Unemployment stands at 190 000, including almost 30 000 young people. The State is the main employer, with about 160 000 people on the payroll.

Health: This is expensive, as it is elsewhere in Africa, but the standards are no better for all that. There is one doctor for every 5500 people and an infant mortality rate of 123.8 per thousand, but great strides have been made with AIDS prevention and control.

Transport: Communications are still holding back the nation's economic and social development. For example, there is still no asphalted road between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, respectively the busiest, and the most agricultural parts of the country. Also the way timber reaches Pointe Noire—floated downriver from the north and then loaded onto trains at the Brazzaville railhead—is a further handicap to the economic and social activity of the country.

Sources: Congo, IMF & World Bank.

The Larger Grain Borer – a threat to Africa's maize supply

by Peter TYLER, Peter GOLOB,
Julia COMPTON and Sam BICKERSTETH (*)

Following the accidental introduction of the Larger Grain Borer, (Prostephanus truncatus), into Africa, the beetle now poses an increasing, serious threat to maize and cassava supplies. The EC funded a study in ten countries in Eastern and Southern Africa with a view to minimising the further risk of its spread. There is concern to ensure that the beetle is not carried into uninfested areas via the movement of aid grain.

One day early in 1981, a group of Tanzanian farmers arrived at the Head Office of the Ministry of Agriculture in Dar es Salaam. The reason that they had travelled hundreds of kilometres from their village in the Tabora region to the capital was their concern that a beetle pest was destroying food reserves of stored maize and cassava on their farms and that implementing the available advice on control was failing to halt the ravages of the pest. Investigations by scientists confirmed the presence of a pest new to Africa, the Larger Grain Borer (LGB), and supported the farmers' claims. Their studies pointed to the need for urgent research aimed at the development of a control and containment programme. The response by the Tanzanian government, supported by major inputs from donors, has been successful in that, following intensive extension campaigns, farmers are now able to cope with the new pest. However, eradication has not proved possible and over the past decade, LGB has insidiously spread through most regions in Tanzania and across some neighbouring borders.

(*) The study on the LGB in Eastern and Southern Africa was undertaken for the EC by a team from the Natural Resources Institute, Chatham, Kent, ME4 4TB, United Kingdom. The full report is titled 'Study on phytosanitary requirements to promote maize trade in Eastern and Southern African Countries at risk from the Larger Grain Borer".

The importance of LGB as a pest

The Larger Grain Borer, *Prostephanus truncatus (Horn)*, is a beetle belonging to a family of insects called the Bostrichidae, most of which are wood-borers.

LGB is of primary concern in dried maize and cassava, although it has also been observed to attack wheat, sorghum, sweet potato, groundnuts and even wooden utensils and storage structures. Maize is attacked while still on the cob; the beetle bores into the central core of the cob or through the outer sheath in order to reach the grains. Shelled maize is less attractive to the beetle but grains which are densely compressed, for example, within a bag stack, will support infestation. Cassava is attacked in the form of dried whole roots or chips. Maize and cassava flours may contain LGB but it is unable to breed in these foods.

Damage caused by LGB

LGB is more destructive than most stored product pests. In extreme cases, 70-80% of farm-stored maize grains may be damaged and the maize rendered totally unfit for human consumption. Losses in cassava are comparable.

Distribution and spread of LGB

The map on the next page shows the current estimated distribution of LGB in Eastern and Southern Africa. LGB was first recorded in Africa in 1981, in the Tabora region of Western Tanzania. Now, some ten years later, LGB is present in all regions of mainland Tanzania with the exception of the southeast. The beetle has also been found in Kenya, in the Taita/Taveta district and in the area immediately north of Mount Kilimanjaro. In addition, much of Burundi is infested and there is circumstantial evidence that it may have spread to Zaire.

Following a quite separate introduction into West Africa, there is now also an established infestation in



The Larger Grain Borer is becoming widely established as a serious pest of maize in Africa



A cob of maize rendered inedible by the Larger Grain Borer

Togo which has spread to Benin and Ghana. A very recent report indicated that infestation is also present in Guinea, Conakry.

Although LGB is capable of flying short distances, it is thought that most of its spread has been due to the movement of infested maize, dried cassava and used bags in local and international trade. Spread from one country to another could be by a variety of ways. For example, travellers often carry small quantities of maize or cassava for gifts or personal consumption. On a larger scale there are commercial shipments of food, feed or seed maize and aid-financed shipments of maize notably "triangular shipments," externally funded exports from countries with surplus to deficit countries in the same region. Occasionally samples of infested maize seed, or even samples of live LGB, may be carried by people unaware of the risks.

Regional map showing areas infested with Larger Grain Borer and priority areas for survey, December 1989



The significance of LGB in grain movements

The Larger Grain Borer poses an increasing threat to the official maize trade. LGB-infested countries with surplus maize stocks for sale find that they are unable to secure markets for their maize because prospective buyers fear the risk of introducing the beetle. International organisations such as the EC, involved in financing and distributing "triangular" food aid in the region, are naturally concerned. The EC took the initiative to promote a region-wide study of the issues involved.

The EC study on LGB and grain movements

The objective of the EC study was to investigate ways of preventing the spread of LGB to other countries in the region, whilst at the same time preserving official inter-regional trade.

The study, completed in March 1990, reviewed the situation in ten countries: Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Each country was visited to study the pattern of grain movements, existing phytosanitary, inspection and pest control services, the current status of LGB and to discuss possible courses of action with national authorities.

Recommendations were influenced by the following important considerations:

(a) It is not realistic to aim at complete containment or eradication of LGB, as the history of previous attempts shows. Rather, emphasis should be placed on limiting the rate of LGB spread within and between countries. The study identified the main routes at risk (see map) and the measures which can realistically be taken to stop LGB being transported along these routes.

(b) Emphasis has to be placed on monitoring long-distance movements of potentially-infested commodities. Short-distance, unofficial trade takes place across most borders and is almost impossible to monitor. Long-distance commodity movements are normally on well-established rail, road or sea routes through a limited number of official border posts.

(c) The most important potential carrier of LGB is maize. Cassava is rarely traded over long distances, although a few small exports have been made from Zaïre and Malawi. There is a small risk of carrying LGB over long distances in infested sacks as well as in truck frames and other transport containers, but it would be impracticable to mount a comprehensive inspection service on borders to prevent this.

(d) The official maize trade in Eastern and Southern Africa is presently dominated by "triangular transactions". The cooperation of donors is vital to ensure that LGB-infested countries are not excluded as potential grain suppliers and that adequate precautions are taken to disinfect all consignments before shipment to an uninfested area. At present, these precautions are inadequate.

The strategy

The strategy has two major objectives:
— to prevent the distribution of LGB in long-distance commodity movements, principally the official trade of dried maize;
— to encourage governments, exporters and food aid donors, to adopt stricter specifications for the purchase and movement of potentially-infested grain.

Because the LGB situation is dynamic, recommendations are mainly short to medium-term and geared to strengthening existing procedures rather than introducing major changes. Recommendations are categorised into country-level and regional-level activities.

A. Country-level activities

For most countries in the region, there is a continuing need to monitor the distribution of LGB and maintain a high level of public awareness of the problem. Phytosanitary legislation to take account of the LGB problem needs revision in nearly every country.

Specific proposals include:
— LGB surveys;
— Awareness campaigns;
— Upgrading phytosanitary regulations.

For LGB-infested countries, it is essential to ensure that exported maize is free of live LGB and to reassure potential buyers that this aim has been achieved.

Specific proposals include:
— Implementing "special procedures" for LGB control/inspection, (The 'special procedures' are included with a view to ensuring (a) that grain from LGB-infested countries is free from infestation at the time of export, and (b) that the importers are satisfied that the consignment is free from infestation at the time of import. Key steps are proposed which complement the normal handling procedures for export grain. Reliance is placed on the use of fumigation (including the monitoring of its effectiveness), the admixture of suitable insecticide with grain and the use of pheromone-baited beetle traps.)
— Strengthening grain management systems.

For countries which are not yet infested, the main objective is to reduce the chances of LGB entering the country in official imports. However, LGB can also be distributed by unofficial trade in food. Each country therefore requires an overall contingency plan for LGB control and containment, and providing the necessary inputs.

Countries in the region thought not to be infested include Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaïre, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Specific proposals include:
— study visits to Tanzania to witness the LGB control campaign;
— preparing contingency plans.

B. Regional-level activities

At regional level, there are two main needs: coordination of LGB work involving participation of all affected groups (including governments, suppliers and food aid donors); and research and development into appropriate technical measures.

The study recommendations are currently under consideration for funding and implementation. ○

P.T., P.G., J.C., S.B.

Scientific publishing in Africa

by Jacques GAILLARD and Roland WAAST (*)

In the three decades since independence, when its potential was very poor, Africa has seen a university explosion followed by an increase in its number of research workers. Looked at in a world context, of course, the resources of the continent (1) are modest (2)—0.4% of world potential (the full time equivalent of about 20 000 research workers and engineers) and of world research spending, which would give it slightly more than 0.3% of mainstream scientific output. Measured in terms of the publications included in the main international data bases (3), Africa's scientific output is about an eighth of France's and slightly less than a fifth of India's. Further the French-speaking nations of the continent apparently only account for a sixth to a quarter of its mainstream production.

Both resources and scientific output are very unevenly spread over the various countries. There are two giants, Nigeria and Kenya, producing about half of Africa's publications (for a third of the potential), while Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Sene-

(*) The authors are research workers on ORSTOM's Science, Technology and Development Programme—Centre ORSTOM, 70-74 route d'Aulnay, 93143 Bondy Cedex France.

(1) For the purposes of this article, this means the whole of sub-Saharan Africa exclusive of the Republic of South Africa.

(2) The data quoted in this article are taken from: Gaillard J & Waast R, La recherche scientifique en Afrique, Afrique contemporaine No 148, 4th quarter 1988, pp 3-30.

(3) The most commonly used being that of the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), based in Philadelphia, USA.

gal, Zimbabwe and Cameroon are fairly significant and the once outstanding Ghana, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia are on the decline. Production in the other two thirds of the continent is marginal and barely visible.

Quantitatively speaking, the per capita scientific output tends to be small—and relatively smaller, overall, in the French-speaking countries than in the English-speaking ones and much smaller in research institutes than in universities. The sectors run very much to type. Agriculutre and health are well in the lead, with more than 80% of production (more than in the developing countries as a whole), while medicine, which initially featured strongly in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, has declined overall. The exact sciences and engineering are increasing very slowly with the universities almost the only establishments engaged in these areas. Social science output is poor (about a quarter of that of exact/natural science), involves little interpretation and is mainly concerned with rural pursuits or heritage. Since African researchers have only a few local scientific journals, which tend to be published at very irregular intervals, a very high percentage of them (far greater than in Asia or Latin America) publish in foreign journals. They also have an exceptionally strong tendency to quote other African researchers, above all from their own countries. This is particularly noticeable in Nigeria but is also true, to varying extents, elsewhere.

A case study – Senegal (4)

Senegal has about 600 full time equivalent researchers and its publications output is approximately 4% of the African total (about the same as Côte d'Ivoire), which puts it in seventh place on the ISI list. As is the case elsewhere on the continent, productivity per researcher, measured in terms of the number of mainstream publications, is low at about one for every 10 full time equivalent researchers, and it seems to have declined markedly during the 1980s. Analysis shows that the majority of publications come from the universities (50%) and from people working in bilateral French organisations (30-35%). By contrast, research staff in national institutes, are far less present on the international scene.

The most productive area of research is health (35%), followed by the environment (25%) and agriculture. Technology, almost entirely food-oriented, is expanding slowly. There is very little coverage of the social sciences and part of what there is, is the work of foreigners, notably Americans. Indeed, two thirds of the authors of Senegal's mainstream scientific production as a whole are foreigners, mainly French, although the relative contribution of Senegalese authors has increased noticeably over the past decade.

A look at the international data bases does not, however, give us a complete picture of scientific production, particularly when it comes to matters of local interest, such as agricultural research. The data sheet on research at ISRA (the Senegalese Institute of Agricultural Research) in 1986 shows that the vast majority of the staff produce written work (135 authors sharing 207 references), but it does not often appear in specialist journals, as more than two thirds of the references are to ISRA house publications. However, a fair number of the papers have been read at national or international conference.

The few local journals which appear at relatively normal intervals are heavily oversubscribed, so researchers are looking increasingly to foreign publication. There was a 10% drop in the number of papers published in Senegal (from about 30% to 20%) in 1975-85, for example, although the percentage of Senegalese staff in the national scientific community considerably increased in that time. So more than 75% of Senegal's mainstream research output is apparently published abroad, mainly in France—although it is well-known that French scientific journals are not attracting anything like the attention they used to. The overall proportion of scientific writing published in France has declined significantly since 1975, to the benefit of other foreign (mainly English, American and Dutch) journals.

This trend has gone hand in hand with an increase in the number of publications written in English. Almost a third of Senegal's mainstream scientific output now appears in English, although only a seventh of its published work was in this language in 1975.

National to supranational?

Using the measure of international data bases, Africa's scientific output appears quantitatively to be poor. There is, above all, a lack of visibility, accessibility and continuity—many papers never get past the typewritten stage and circulation is limited, even in the country of origin. Research teams come and go and regular scientific and publishing activity, in any particular place or discipline, is based on limited data.

Research work needs to be made a more attractive career and the means of carrying it out have to be provided. There is a need to focus on the formation of scientific communities. If vocations are to be encouraged, imaginations triggered and networks created, then scientific debate and the means of expression have to be there. We need transnational specialist journals and we need (bilingual) publications of reports of meetings, reviews and conferences—the Cahiers de la Recherche Francophone, which it was decided to publish at the Dakar Congress in 1989, is one example. Going beyond this, we need to know whether we should continue to rely on national research systems as they stand or whether we should look to either transnational networks or to support from supranational centres of excellence where the highest-paid, best-equipped and most satisfied researchers are engaged, breaking new ground in their work and meeting the demands of intensive, sustained publication. ○

J.G. and R.W.

(4) Run in 1985. See Chapter 2, part 2 in Gaillard J, Les Chercheurs et l'émergence de communautés scientifiques nationales dans les Pays en Développement, doctoral thesis, STS, CNAM, Paris, 1989. For the profession of research worker in the developing countries, see also Gaillard J, Scientists in the Third World, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1991, 224 pages.

The European integration process: lessons for Africa (*)

by Adebayo ADEDEJI (**)

The issues raised by the European Single Market of 1992 and its consequences for LDCs are a subject of concern for many ACP partners of Europe and one which is often tackled in international meetings involving ACPs. This was true of the 3-day seminar organised last June by the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs on "European Economic Community after 1992: consequences for Africa". During this seminar many interesting speeches were delivered. Among the most fascinating—even if sometimes controversial—was that of Mr Adebayo Adedeji, from which we publish large excerpts below.

CEC

ECA Executive Secretary Adebayo Adedeji

"Even the Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries conflicts with significant aspects of African integration"

Europe 1992 presents challenges and opportunities as well as dangers and possibilities of serious economic, financial and market losses for Africa. It could further accentuate the socio-economic crisis of Africa and its increasing marginalisation in the international economy, or it could trigger the turn-around process in Africa, a process in which Africa finally cuts the cord that has tied it to the apron string of Europe for nearly five hundred years as an overly dependent neighbour of Europe—not only dependent on it for capital, technology and manpower but also even for raw materials and a growing portion of the food we consume in Africa. But above all these is our dependence on Western Europe for ideas, including more often than not, ideas as to who we are, how we see the world and its different parts, peoples and societies and even more so how we see Western Europe. For five hundred years, Africans have been the victim of what I term Africa's **Three-Lenses Syndrome.** In other words, we have for generations looked at ourselves through the lenses crafted for us by these countries; we have looked at Europe itself through lenses crafted for us by the Europeans; and finally, we have looked at the rest of the world through lenses originating also from Western Europe. Our standards are European standards. Or to put it more bluntly they are the standards of our former colonial masters. Hence today, Africa is classified not in African terms but in colonial terms: anglophone, francophone, lusophone, etc. Hence our faith, sometimes blind faith, in anything and everything foreign—by which we really mean British, French, Portuguese or Spanish depending on our colonial heritage; hence we look up to Western Europe as a child looks up to his father for approval, for a nod of the head for whatever we are doing, to be convinced that we are on the right path, and, hence also we look for foreign capital and for foreign expertise.

The cumulative result of this is the widespread belief that programmes, policies and strategies for increasing national self-reliance and self-sustainment will be implemented mainly by hundreds of thousands of foreign entrepreneurs bringing with them billions of dollars worth of other factor inputs (management, skilled manpower, raw and intermediate materials, technology, spare parts, implements and tools and even administrative infrastructure). The lenses syndrome appears to have made it difficult to realise that it was Frenchmen who developed France, Britons who developed Great Britain, Italians who developed Italy, etc. and that they depended on deliberately planned and created factor inputs of domestic origin for doing so, and that it is extremely unlikely that Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, will be an exception to this rule. (...)

Therefore if **Europe 1992** forces us to undertake an agonising reappraisal and draws us to the conclusion that the time to grow up has long since arrived, that in any case this decade, which will be a decade of regional blocs, is one in which Africa more than ever before must put its act together, then **Europe 1992** would have done us a God-sent act of goodness for which we should be eternally grateful.

Positive lessons for Africa from the European integration process

Let us now in the light of the challenges posed to Africa by **Europe 1992** and the potential opportunities it offers, examine the critical and crucial lessons that can be drawn from the integration process of Western Europe. There is no doubt that most of these lessons are positive and therefore commend themselves very

(*) Excerpts from a paper presented at the Seminar on "European Economic Community after 1992: Consequences for Africa" organised by the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs, in Lagos, 13-15 June 1990.

(**) United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa.

strongly for close studies by Africa in its pursuit of regional and sub-regional integration. But we must warn again that not only are historical events and trends non-linear but also that the experiences of the EEC are unique processes that could not be replicated in Africa in the drive for African integration. The EEC experiment emanated largely from its own peculiar internal circumstances and the specific global context in which European integration has been pursued. And these are quite different from those of Africa.

This having been said, let us now turn to the positive socio-political and economic lessons to be drawn from this experience.

The concrete trade, economic, monetary and political processes of integration in Europe were predicated very critically on some commendable socio-political factors and policies that are wholesome for African integration. These embrace the **dynamic motivations for integration over time, the political will, institution building, legal provisions, social support, external environment and internal discipline.**

Up to the 1980s, the dominant **motivations** for European integration were the non-competitiveness and the long-run non-viability of isolationist European development as well as the external economic threats posed by the enormous economic might of the USA and Japan. National European markets and capitals were seen as too small and productivity levels as too low for effective competition with Europe's powerful rivals.(...)

This effective use of the dangers of internal non-viability and external economic threat is particularly relevant for integrating Africa's collapsing mini economies with serious external threats that compound their extreme vulnerability (...)

European integration has also been consummated through robust and **sustained political will**. This has been the result of a combination of several factors. One is the active political drive provided by some core countries, starting with France in 1950 and joined later by West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries. Their political leaders provided the early drive that culminated in the signing of the **Treaty of Rome** in 1957 and in the establishment of the EEC the following year. It is these **core catalyst countries** that gradually expanded the membership of the EEC to nine, ten and then twelve.(...)

Social forces also bolstered this political will through popular support for European integration provided by academics, mass media, trade unions, business associations, etc. (...) The **Social Cohesion Programme** for integrating the depressed areas of Europe (Southern France, Greece, Spain, Portugal, etc.) into the Community has also increased the political support for European integration.

The African integration process could benefit from these experiences. It needs to be supported by a strong **popular integration lobby** of non-governmental forces who will mount sustained pressure for integration, keep it continuously before official view and in public debate at the top of the political and economic agenda because integration is **not** a matter for government and officials alone. Africa thus needs informal groups like the **Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission** of the North to push integration and related matters. The establishment of institutions with supra-national-powers—the Council of Europe, The Commission, Court of Justice, etc.—facilitated the formulation and implementation of policies with Community-wide application. The self-financing capacity of such institutions facilitated their effectiveness. The identification and execution of measures that benefit all members also increased commitment to the integration process.

The establishment of an enabling environment for European integration also included sustained **institution building.** (...) The main institutions of the Community were established as the Commission, the Council, European Parliament and European Court of Justice. Another aspect was the establishment of informal or non-governmental institutions. The third important feature of this institution building is their separation and dispersal with respect to personnel, location and responsibilities. Though these institutions may have heavy financial implications, these should be built into the overall integration process because they are critical to its effectiveness. African integration requires these well-staffed, competent and highly motivated institutions for the effective participation of member states, for galvanising and sustaining political will as well as for planning and executing its policies and programmes.

Internalising a large measure of discipline by member states in programme implementation and in meeting membership responsibility is another important lesson of European integration for Africa. The three main issues here are the pre-conditions for membership, prompt and effective implementation of policies and programmes by members, and the application of sanctions to them. Thus on application for membership, conditions for admission are stipulated and accepted. Then **Article 189** of the European Community Treaty ensures that once protocols are signed by member states, they become immediately operational in their countries without any delay arising from the necessity to ratify such protocols first by members before implementing them in each country. This contrasts sharply with the experiences in Africa where dozens of protocols are signed but not ratified or implemented for years by member states.

The application of sanctions to EEC members also ensures that the non-discharge of agreed obligations or responsibilities is promptly penalised. This again contrasts sharply with the African experience. The PTA is a shining exception here as it publishes the names of paying and non-paying members regularly and widely. At regional and subregional levels, African countries must apply this discipline in order to strengthen the financial viability of their integrating experiments and enhance their overall effectiveness.

The absence or neutralisation of hostile external opposition is also an important lesson of European integration. Indeed, the US has been a major supporter of the process as part of its drive for European reconstruction in the post-war era so that an integrated Europe could serve as a bulwark against the Soviet bloc, and later, Japan. So Europe has been spared the hostility and open subversion of erstwhile colonial predators bent on sustaining neocolonial domination and exploitation. Africa has to take a cue from this and take urgent steps to neutralise or minimise the subversive challenge of many Western countries against its integration efforts through the maintenance of currency zones, military bases, special economic and technical agreements, etc. Even the Lomé Convention between the EEC and ACP countries conflicts with significant aspects of African integration, such as tariff and non-tariff restrictions, and such cleavages should be resolved in favour of closer African integration.

So much for socio-political lessons from the EEC experience. The two most important economic experiences of European integration that should be of interest to Africa are the financing of integration and its sequential implementation. From a fairly early beginning, adequate provisions were made for the effective funding of the activities of European integration such as administration or institution building, trade and investment in various fields.(...)

The **own resources system** of raising funds for the budget consists of agricultural levies, customs duties or tariffs on industrial products and manufactured imports from non-member countries, and a share of the value-added tax (VAT) base of between 1 % and 1.4%. These ensure independent sources of ample funds for the Community that does not, therefore, depend on contributions from member states. African integration at regional and subregional levels can start with independent financing through something like a simple percentage tariff (1 to 5%) on all imports from non-African countries. This can yield billions of dollars in revenue for financing subregional and regional integration. Such funds can be used for running integration institutions, financing trade and development as well as assisting depressed areas or countries.

The sequencing of integration processes in Europe is also critical for the African experiment. Broadly, the sequencing in the European Community consists of five phases. The first involves the core catalyst countries (six) that have been spear-heading most of its activities. The integration process does not have to start with all countries simultaneously—unless they are all prepared to accept the obligations and privileges of integration—otherwise some will try to be free-riders and may weaken the whole process. Secondly, there was the economic aspect (really the first process) centred on **market integration** through the establishment of a Customs Union during 1957/70. This market integration concentrated first on the removal of tariff barriers and later on the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Market integration within the Customs Union centred on three critical measures:

(i) replacing costly products from one member country with cheaper products from other countries;

(ii) abolition of tariffs between member countries in order to stimulate the consumption of Community products; and,

(iii) substitution of cheaper products from member countries for those previously imported from non-member countries.(...)

Production integration was the third major phase of European integration. Specific aspects of this harmonisation of macroeconomic policies bear recounting. They including the harmonisation and standardisation of administrative procedures for facilitating the implementation of policies. Infrastructural development with respect to rail, road, air and water transport, telecommunications, etc. which started under market integration was expanded for the ease of production integration. Realistic and modest goals were set (this applies to most aspects of European integration) and these were backed with the appropriate matching of ends and means that were planned in detail right down to the project implementation level. This ensured **realism and concreteness** in the policy harmonisation process. The serious and effective implementation of production measures also characterised this and other phases of European integration which focused on three main areas: the rationalisation of Europe's decaying industries which provided the initial motive for cooperation; (...) the raising of productivity in European industry and agriculture; (...) identification of new industrial branches for joint European research and development (R & D) ventures.(...)

For Africa, the coordination of macroeconomic policies for production in industry and agriculture is crucial and deserves more concerted and careful planning as well as serious implementation. The underdevelopment of Africa that is manifested most vividly in the pervasive lack of productive capacity in the region, its food and general agrarian crisis, small internal production bases, excessive external dependence for industrial and agricultural products and the patent non-viability of national industrialisation programmes in most countries, underline the urgent need for effective production integration in Africa. Hence the coordination of macroeconomic policies for production integration in food, raw materials, fertilisers, steel, petro-chemicals and similar intermediate and capital goods manufacturing, is an urgent and absolute necessity for Africa. But the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes or Economic Recovery Programme (SAP's or ERP's) by the IMF and World Bank on African countries is a major obstacle to production integration since such programmes focus on liberalisation and concentrate myopically on individual countries.

Monetary and financial integration is the fourth aspect and third economic process in European integration, (...) the last sequence in the European integration process being political union. It should be emphasised immediately that though full political union is the last phase of European integration that is being discussed seriously in the 1990s, policial cooperation in the EEC started much earlier. Thus by 1970 when negotiation for British membership of the EEC started, an attempt to add political cooperation to the integration process was re-launched by the six core countries in the form of European Political Cooperation (EPC) for the voluntary coordination of their foreign policies. (...). In these ways, European integration has demonstrated that regional economic cooperation cannot proceed far without political cooperation and/or union. For Africa, the OAU provides only a symbolic basis for political cooperation.(...)

Another aspect of the sequencing of European integration is **process sequencing**. This involved a chain mechanism in which one process is planned to lead to the next, which galvanises the one after and so on. This sequencing of processes is particularly visible and significant not only in the different phases of integration but in the harmonisation of macroeconomic policies.

In addition to these, European integration also offers relevant cues for Africa with respect to effective collective self-reliance and two other concomitants of integration. These are the quick development of infrastructure and the early internalisation of development within the EEC. The initiation of infrastructural development from the early stages of market integration and its acceleration during the phase of production integration has been noted. This is critical for the African experiment in which infrastructural constraints with respect to road, rail, air and water transport, poor telecommunications facilities as well as inadequate supplies of water and electricity continue to retard cooperation in intra-African trade, production and other areas. The practical implementation of concrete projects like the establishment and funding of Customs Union, ECSC, EURATOM, CAP, CIP, industrial rationalisation and the production of Airbus, Ariane satellite, etc is a fundamental lesson for Africa. In these ways, Europe has effectively challenged American hegemony in the Western hemisphere and defended itself effectively against Japanese trade competition. This contrasts sharply with the African situation where the **Lagos Plan of Action** for African economic integration was supposed to be implemented with foreign assistance without concrete sequential steps for terminating the region's excessive external dependence, which structural adjustment has been exacerbating through its doctrinaire liberalisation since the 1980s.

Negative lessons for Africa from the European integration process

What are the undesirable experiences in the European integration process which Africa must avoid? The critical differences in the initial conditions and global contexts of European and African integration, do indeed suggest the need to avoid some of the experiences of European integration in Africa (...).

Given the underdeveloped conditions in which African countries launched their integration, they cannot afford the luxury of concentrating on market integration or customs union for over a decade before embarking on production integration because there would be few products to market anyway. Hence Africa must pursue market and production integration simultaneously and even devote more resources to production integration in order to reduce the region's excessive external dependence, critical lack of productive capacity and internal non-viability of member-economies. Otherwise, African market integration will merely be for promoting non-African goods and services as has largely been the case so far. (...)

The European concentration of African exports and imports, directly and indirectly inhibits intra-African trade, as well as the reliance on external financing for African development. Hence the Lomé Convention, especially Lomé IV that is tied to structural adjustment, needs urgent review in order to expunge aspects of it that conflict with regional and subregional cooperation in Africa. This is particularly urgent with the preparation of the Treaty for the African Economic Community. It is odd but typically African that our governments could enter into a ten-year agreement with the EEC at a time of rapid, almost revolutionary, changes in the world and at a time when the treaty to establish an African Economic Community is being negotiated.

The relatively delayed financial integration of Europe should also be avoided in Africa. This is because African currencies are not convertible like those of Europe and there are no large international financial centres to facilitate international cooperation as in the EEC. As a result, Africa has to promote monetary and other forms of financial integration very vigorously right away in order to resolve the monetary and other financial problems associated with the inconvertibility of currencies, membership of foreign currency unions like the CFA zone in francophone Africa and the different economic groupings in the region. The special financing problems posed by the external debt overhang and its structural adjustment conditionality also dictate the need for urgent financial cooperation among African countries.

The relatively delayed political cooperation in Europe should be avoided in Africa. Indeed, with the establishment of the OAU since 1963, Africa has a positive lesson for Europe in political integration, even if Africa has yet to establish a collective security system like NATO, and the OAU needs to be revamped. The increased marginalisation of Africa since the 1980s makes the urgent and effective political integration of the continent an imperative that must be a concomitant of economic integration.

Partly because Europe is a much smaller geographical entity than Africa, it has not applied a subregional but a somewhat concentric approach to its integration. This is not particularly feasible for Africa and so it has correctly evolved a subregional strategy for its integration. In this way, the African Economic Community can emerge as a federation of subregional groupings with closer proximity and more intimately shared aspirations.

Finally, the large and powerful African countries should avoid any kind of rivalry for hegemony as has been the case in the EEC where Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany always seem to be in competition. Indeed, these historical European rivalries have tended to prolong the process of its integration.(...)

If there is one phrase that sums up these European lessons of integration for Africa it is **realism, vision, seriousness, discipline** and using home-made and crafted lenses to perceive one's national and regional interests and to defend such interests against all others. Africa needs them now more then ever before for sheer physical, economic and political survival. ○ A.A.

The common agricultural policy and the run-up to the Single Market of 1992 (*)

Ever since the Community was set up in 1957, agriculture has been a central part of the system designed to achieve the ultimate objective of 1992, namely a single European market. Why was priority put on agriculture in the building of the European Community? Because, according to a Commission brochure on the CAP in the 1990s, it is, in Europe as elsewhere, an important sector, both in its own right and in relation to the rest of the economy. The agriculture of the future, wider Europe had to be strong to guarantee food supplies for the Member States. Indeed, the proponents of Community Europe were convinced at the outset that, when dependence was heavy, food power (to use the American term coined when the USA dominated the international food trade, particularly with the Third World) was every bit as formidable as oil power, if not more so.

For the farmers, the prospect of a large, continent-wide market also meant they could have the benefit of faster dissemination of knowledge and technical progress, of launching new products on a wider market and of specialising and developing a degree of complementarity between States in the light of natural attributes (soil, climate, etc.) and economic situations. Furthermore, for the consumer, the formation of a large unit which contained all kinds of production and was conducive to the development of the food and agriculture industry, was a better guarantee of stable prices and regular supplies than would have been offered by a market where supply was very variable and prices were subject to considerable fluctuation.

When it came to achieving a common agricultural market, however, the extreme diversity of farming in the Member States was the cause of considerable difficulties and constraints—although they did lead to a common agricultural policy which was far in advance of the degree of integration which the Community managed in other areas of its common policy. This is why the CAP is one of the most solid and binding elements in the construction of Europe. It is also why agricultural spending accounts for some two thirds of the total Community budget, although representing only 0.7% of overall GNP or 5% of domestic food consumption.

The CAP lays down the principles, guidelines and machinery of markets and structures as well as veterinary and health legislation. The principles and guidelines are currently reflected in harmonising measures designed to do away with the remaining barriers to the wider market of 1992. When applying the CAP, the Commission of the European Communities has to ensure that national aid to agriculture in any given State does not create distortions of competition that are incompatible with the rules of the common market.

Objectives and principal mechanisms of 'Green' Europe

Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome lays down the five fundamental and inalienable aims of the common agricultural policy: to increase productivity by promoting technical progress and the rational development of agricultural production, with an optimum use of resources, including labour; to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; to stabilise markets; to guarantee food supplies; to provide food for consumers at reasonable prices.

The different markets for agricultural products have been gradually organised to meet these objectives, while taking account of the Community's international obligations and its determination to cooperate in the development of the Third World, develop its less-favoured regions and better protect the environment and safeguard the consumer. The basic principles upon which the market organisation mechanisms of the common agricultural policy are founded are the unity of the European market, Community preference and financial solidarity.

Unity of the market means complete freedom of trade and therefore abolition of customs duties and non-tariff barriers and harmonisation of administrative procedures and of the health and veterinary rules which protect consumer and producer alike. It involves, throughout the Community, the application of common rules in respect of market management, prices, competition and a single system of protection around the Community's external frontiers. Market management rules vary from product to product, but there are four principal types of market organisation, which between them cover 94% of all Community farm produce.

About 70% of products (including soft wheat, barley, rye, maize, rice, sugar, dairy products, beef, sheepmeat, pork, some fruits and vegetables and table wine) benefit from a support price system which provides, when necessary under certain conditions, a guarantee of price and disposal. When market prices fall below a certain level and other conditions are fulfilled, the intervention authorities buy up the produce offered to them and store it or dispose of it (by means of export assistance, distribution for social purposes, aids for consumption, denaturing, etc.) according to Community rules. The market can also be supported by more flexible means, such as storage aids, subsidies for the distillation of wine and the buying-in of surpluses by producer organisations.

21% of produce (other fruits and vegetables, as well as eggs and poultry) is protected only by measures to prevent low-price imports from outside the Community.

Direct subsidies apply to only 2.5% of production (hard wheat, olive oil, certain other oils and tobacco). This system is used for products predominantly imported by the Community. It helps to keep prices down for the consumer but guarantees a minimum income for the producer.

(*) From the "European File" series (DG X, Commission of the European Communities, 200 rue de la Loi, 1049, Brussels, Belgium).

Flat-rate aid according to hectares planted or quantity produced covers only 0.5% of production (cotton seed, flax, hemp, hops, silkworms, seeds and dehydrated fodder).

Developments in the exchange markets since 1969 have brought about the introduction of 'monetary compensatory amounts', to provide compensation in the various Member States when common prices are affected by fluctuations in national currencies. This system safeguarded the common prices and cushioned farmers from the effects of monetary changes. However, the prolonged application of the system can cause certain distortions in competition and create barriers to trade which must be eliminated for the completion of the large market of 1992.

Community preference is the logical extension of unity of the market. European farmers are protected against low-price imports and world market fluctuations by customs duties or levies imposed at the Community's external frontiers. These duties are calculated according to the difference between the selling price on the world market and the price fixed internally by the Community. The levy is intended to bring the world price up to the Community price, where the latter is higher than the former. Free access to the Community market is assured but competition within the Community is protected. If, on the other hand, world prices are higher than Community prices, Community producers face an export levy to dissuade them from selling on the world market to the detriment of European consumers.

Joint financial responsibility is also a natural extension of the two preceding principles. In practice it means that all common agricultural policy spending and receipts pass through the Community budget. Within this budget, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) has two sections:
— The 'Guarantee' section (ECU 27.5 billion in 1988) finances all public expenditure arising from the common organisation of the market. This in turn breaks down into two sections. Expenditure on regulating the internal market covers purchases by intervention boards, storage costs, income aids and marketing subsidies, etc. Expenditure on external sales covers the export rebates which bridge the gap between Community and world prices;
— the 'Guidance' section helps to finance Community policy on agricultural structures, mainly through funding projects for improving farms, rural facilities, processing and marketing, as well as incentives to switch to alternative crops and compensation granted to certain regions or types of farms. The section finances a range of general measures and also programmes in support of certain less-favoured regions or regions slow to develop (for example, the integrated programmes for Mediterranean zones). Between 1985 and 1989, the Guidance section had a five-year budget of ECU 6.35 billion. Depending on the region, Community aids cover 25% to 75% of public expenditure decided by Community regulation. In accordance with provisions for the reform of the European structural funds, the EAGGF Guidance budget is to be gradually increased until 1993.

Sugar beet, one of the sectors of European agriculture most in surplus

Since 1986, Community agricultural policy has been gradually incorporating the agricultural sectors of the Community's two latest members, Spain and Portugal: customs duties have been eliminated in stages and the new members are coming gradually up to Community price levels. In the meantime 'accession compensatory amounts' are being used at the frontiers to bridge the temporary price gaps. For the most part, the transition period will end by 1992. However, to ensure that integration is as harmonious as possible and to avoid disrupting 'sensitive' markets, the transition period for Spain has been extended until the end of October 1995 for olive oil, fruit and vegetables, soft wheat, dairy products and beef. A transition period of 10 years is also envisaged for almost all Portuguese production, where in the meantime farm structures are to be reformed with the help of ECU 700 million in Community aid. In almost all cases, there will be annually adjusted import guidelines as an additional safeguard throughout the transition period.

Achievements and the reorientation of the common policy

In pursuing the different objectives of the common agricultural policy, the following results can be recorded:
— the Community is safe from all risk of shortage and has achieved complete security of supply. Prod-

uction increases have been substantial in almost all sectors, to the extent of creating, during the 1980s, structural excesses. The reason for this expansion has been increased productivity, due mainly to technical advances and the rationalisation of farm holdings. The other side of the coin is a 60% reduction in agricultural employment since 1960. This exodus has slowed down since it became difficult to find alternative employment, but it has not ceased;

— reasonable consumer prices and stable markets have been achieved for most products. The average prices paid to producers have increased less rapidly than prices as a whole—and more slowly than food prices, which also cover the cost of marketing and processing. European agriculture can therefore claim to have made a considerable contribution to the struggle against inflation. As far as market stability is concerned, it is significant that the Community has remained untouched by the periodic surges in world prices for sugar and cereals;

— security of supply, from the point of view of price as well as quantity, has been favoured by Community trade relations with the rest of the world. The Community is not a sealed economic unit. It is, quite the contrary, the world's major importer of farm produce. It is a particularly large buyer of tropical produce and animal feedingstuffs such as maize and soya, etc.;

— between 1968 to 1978, farm incomes grew at roughly the same rate as other wages, about 3% a year. Then production prices stabilised or decreased under the pressure of surpluses, so that in 1988 the real average income of farmers was less than it was in the middle of the 1970s. In addition, there are substantial income gaps within the agriculture sector between different regions, types of production and sizes of holdings.

The price of technical progress and of the very success of the common agricultural policy has been the formation of huge surpluses, which have forced the Community to change the orientation of the policy in recent years. Between 1968-69 and 1986-87, the Community's self-sufficiency has grown from 86% to 111% for cereals, from 82% to 127% for sugar, from 95% to 108% for beef and from 92% to 105% for butter (after a rate of 130% in 1985-86). For many products the growth of output has reached its limits—what is to be done with the surplus? On the whole, European demand for food and for farm produce for other purposes has been satisfied. External demand must not be overestimated either: some developing countries have increased their production; others are insolvent, or can be supplied only with the aid of huge subsidies. The subsidies depress world prices and exacerbate the rivalry between the Community and other big producers such as the United States, as well as discouraging local production. Food aid, where it is implemented on a large scale and becomes permanent, has the same negative effect.

It had to be recognised that agriculture in the Community was producing with less and less regard for demand, creating structural surpluses and enormous public stocks. By the end of 1986 these stocks had reached alarming levels: 1.3 million tonnes of butter, 600 000 tonnes of beef, 15 million tonnes of cereals. Public intervention had gone beyond its traditional role of a safety valve designed to absorb seasonal and climatic fluctuations. The Community's guarantee expenditure, which had increased sixfold between 1970 and 1988, was becoming intolerably high, and still not preventing a drop in farm incomes.

Scientific research in the agricultural field in France. Progress in research has been essential to the success of the Common Agricultural Policy

The answer was obvious: it was necessary to stop guaranteeing high prices or subsidies for unlimited quantities of produce. European agriculture needed to be reoriented and to learn to produce for the market. The task of the common agriculture policy was to promote this reorientation, while respecting the principles of the common agricultural market and taking account of social, regional and ecological imperatives. The fact is that if price policy alone can no longer guarantee adequate income for farmers and sufficient agricultural earnings for certain regions, other means must be used to reduce disparities and improve regions which are in difficulty.

A series of measures have been taken in recent years, particularly following the European Commission's green paper 'Perspectives on the common agricultural policy' (1985):

— A restrictive price policy has been introduced, which has meant a gradual reduction of support prices in the sectors in surplus. Between 1983 and 1988 the average annual reduction in national currency and real value has been 2.6%.

— The implementation of stabilising mechanisms and in particular of a system of maximum guaranteed quantities (overall production thresholds for each product beyond which price or subsidy reductions automatically apply). These operate for cereals, oilseeds, olive oil, tobacco, cotton, certain fruits and vegetables, wine, beef, sheepmeat and goatmeat. A similar mechanism has existed for some time in the case of sugar.

— Other particular measures for certain products: obligatory distillation for wine; milk production quotas, above which production is discouraged by means of a tax on the excess output; a levy or tax on production, variable according to volume, which ensures the co-responsibility of producers of milk, cereals and olive oil for financing costs of storage or disposal.

— Flexibility of market organisation, so that public intervention ceases to be an outlet for produce and resumes its original stabilising role: there are limits on periods of intervention in the markets for cereals and oilseeds and on public purchasing of milk powder; if prices collapse, surplus butter and beef are bought up by tender rather than at the intervention price.

— The development of a policy based on quality, which will often mean lower yields: for wine and cereals there is to be greater modulation of support prices and guarantees according to quality. An essential accompaniment to this would be the creation of a legal framework and labelling to protect quality products, particularly those produced without the aid of chemicals.

Agriculture in the economies of European Community countries



Source: Eurostat   [1] Estimate.

— Financial incentives for leaving certain land fallow and for afforestation and conversion to less intensive farming or alternative products. The Community has launched the research and development programme Eclair, which is intended to stimulate the development of new agro-industrial techniques based on biotechnology, particularly for increasing the number of non-food outlets for agricultural products.

— As part of the reform of the Community budget, the implementation of budgetary discipline based on multiannual guidelines which limit the increase in farm guarantee spending to 74% of the growth in gross national product. Permanent monitoring of expenditure makes it possible to forestall risks of slippage by strengthening the operation of stabilising mechanisms during the guideline period. A budgetary reserve has also been created, to cope with exchange rate fluctuations on the world market, and the dismantling of public surplus stocks has been speeded up. These have largely been reabsorbed; their size had been a heavy burden on production costs and entailed high administrative expenditure.

— Consideration for the problems of small producers, for whom it is more difficult to adapt to changing market conditions: levy exemptions or abatements for cereals, milk and olive oil; financing of national programmes for direct income aids and early retirement. At the same time the 'Guidance' section of the EAGGF helps young farmers to set themselves up and facilitates measures for training, retraining, improvement and rationalisation of farming conditions—while taking care not to encourage the creation of new surpluses.

— A gradual reorientation of the Community's structural policy. As part of the reform of the Community Funds, which are to be doubled between 1987 and 1993, EAGGF Guidance now has the aims of supporting the adaptation of agricultural structures and (in conjunction with the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund) the improvement of rural areas and of less-developed regions. The Community's structural policy will concentrate more on the least-favoured areas; it will give more support to multiannual development programmes as opposed to individual projects. The programmes will be drawn up in cooperation with Member States and local participants and will coordinate intervention from the agricultural, regional and social policies. In this context the Commission intends to approach the improvement of agricultural structures in the framework of a general strategy for rural development. In areas close to big conurbations priority will be given to protection of the rural environment. In the more isolated regions with difficulties, it will be a matter of creating autonomous growth to counter the risks of depopulation and economic stagnation, by revitalising all local potential, both agricultural and non-agricultural. Various measures have already been taken, or are envisaged, to encourage not only changes in agriculture but also forestry, small businesses, services, tourism, telecommunications, etc. There have also been decisions to implement systems for early retirement and direct income aids. These systems—established on a temporary basis—should enable certain categories of farmer to adapt to changes in the common agricultural policy or to get out of farming under acceptable conditions.

— Greater recognition of the essential role of agriculture in protection of the environment. The Community has approved aids for hill farming, which will ensure that a unique natural heritage is preserved. Other measures proposed or already adopted are intended to limit the ecological impact of certain practices: grants for the installation of non-polluting forms of production; prohibition of hormones in livestock rearing and of certain pesticides; limits on pollution of water by nitrates, phosphates and plant sprays; protection standards for livestock animals, etc. Of course one should go further and encourage farmers to supplement their income by doing more to preserve a range of 'sensitive' natural areas.

Reorientation of the common agricultural policy must help farming to preserve all its hopes of a future, by adapting to the new market conditions. The stakes are high: the Community's agriculture still has an essential role in feeding 340 million Community citizens, in safeguarding our environment and in maintaining the economic, social, and human fabric of many regions which have problems of underdevelopment to overcome.

The CAP and the ACPs

Some experts claim that the common agricultural policy has tended to be applied without reference to the other Community policies. It is even said that the need for such policies has been overlooked or underestimated in some way. The CAP has apparently mortgaged agricultural development in third countries, and particularly in the ACP States—some of which have been far too keen on exporting protein and substituting it for food crops while others have sought to import cereals from the Community in conflict with their aim of independent development. Nonetheless, the various Lomé Conventions have consistently pursued the objective of giving top priority to farming and rural development in the ACP States.

What, practically speaking, does this mean? Does it involve concentrating on export crops or on making the ACPs independent on the food front? And how far can the common agricultural policy, which is primarily support for the Community's agricultural structures and prices, really do anything to help or hinder agriculture in the ACP States?

One of the most spectacular results of the CAP is the Community's build-up of surplus food. This has resulted in the development of a major Community food aid policy, particularly directed towards the ACPs. Although food aid has been and still is both useful and essential, it has reduced food output in the recipient countries. "Food aid is counter-productive aid" is how Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda put it, and he is right. But this is only an indirect consequence of the CAP. It is not for the Community to define and implement the ACPs' rural and agricultural development aims. The different Lomé Conventions have been quite specific about this. It is the ACPs who have the task of elaborating their own policies for agriculture and other sectors of the economy, and it is for them to take the initiative.

Community action is purely secondary here. Not only does the EEC wish to respect the free economic choice of the ACP States. It also believes in the sovereignty which the ACPs so stoutly defend, and in the view, increasingly being expressed in both ACPs and in some developed countries, that the onus for development should be on the countries concerned themselves. It is in this context, broadly speaking, that one sees the apparent contradiction thrown up by the CAP vis a vis agricultural development in the ACP States.

The CAP however, together with some of the Community's other policies, could contribute to the development of ACP agriculture, albeit—it must be admitted—indirectly. The generalised system of preferences (GSP) is one of the useful Community policies as far as the ACPs are concerned. The opening of the single market to a large number of agricultural, finished and semi-finished products stimulates the ACP economies and encourages agricultural and rural development in the process. This is also the aim of the Lomé Convention's Stabex, which regularises prices and provides the ACPs with a guaranteed income and which could logically help bring about a better balance of their agricultural output and rural incomes.

It might be argued that the culmination of the common agricultural policy in 1992 (the harmonisation of production structures and prices in particular) will put it on a technical and competitive level with which ACP agriculture cannot cope. In this case, the ACPs' response should be to adopt the CAP approach in order to create for themselves, an agricultural sector which is geared, in conjunction with other sectors of their economies, to supplying their own nations and regions. ○ L.P.

ROADS


CEE

The term "infrastructure" is very much a creature of the 20th century, encompassing as it does, the various networks which have been developed to serve the population and service the economy in a modern and complex age. This is hardly surprising since most of the facilities nowadays categorised under the heading "infrastructure"—telecommunications, electricity generation, gas pipelines, railways etc.—are products of the accelerated human development of the last two centuries.

The word may be of recent creation, but the concept certainly is not. Ever since humanity emerged as a species capable of manipulating resources to its own benefit, it has created "infrastructures"—albeit rudimentary—to facilitate its activities. Thus, from the earliest days of man as trader, he has built roads in order to get his goods to the market.

Although modern infrastructures are infinitely more varied and complex than in the past, the traditional function of the road network is no less important. Throughout the world, roads carry the bulk of goods being traded and people being transported, even where relatively sophisticated alternatives have been created. On its journey from the factory to the ultimate consumer, a product may or may not be carried by ship, train or aircraft. It will almost certainly, at some point, travel by lorry or van. It is clear that without roads, economic activity would be drastically curtailed.

The corollary to this is that suitable road networks are essential for sustainable economic development. Developing countries in the ACP and elsewhere, whose road systems are inadequate, labour under a crippling handicap in the newly emerging world market economy. This fact, which has been recognised for some time, is reflected in the emphasis which has been placed on road schemes, both by the relevant governments and by donor agencies over the past three decades.

In the 1970s, governments and donor agencies alike had high ambitions for road developments, viewing these as an essential foundation for economic growth and prosperity. At the beginning of the 1990s, a more sanguine attitude prevails. In many areas, neither the roads, nor the wider economic performance have lived up to expectations and new problems have arisen. This Dossier, which focuses on a number of road-related issues as they affect ACP countries, considers both the disappointments and possible new orientations in tackling the problems.

The first series of articles concentrates on questions of infrastructure and includes a description of the role played by the European Development Fund and an analysis of the subject from a purely economic standpoint. The vital issues of construction and maintenance, and research and development are also considered. Two further articles then deal with the important related subjects of equipment and vehicles, looking at the question of vehicle choice and at the possible effects of privatisation of bus services in developing countries. The final part of the Dossier consists of three articles describing issues and problems involving roads (or the lack of them) in specific cases. The territories considered are the Oyo North region of Nigeria, the Great Lakes Region of East Africa and Papua-New Guinea. ○

Simon HORNER

The EDF and African roads

by Alberto CAPITANIO (*)

Building roads costs a lot but not building them costs more — thus goes an old Italian expression of a simple, fundamental macro-economic principle which has always been known to the EDF.

Transport in general and the roads—at once ancient and modern—which are its most obvious expression and easiest, commonest and most flexible aspect, have, since the early days of Community development cooperation been a priority and the subject of considerable financial effort.

Although there is a great deal still to do, particularly as regards maintenance (discussed later), you can still drive the main routes of sub-Saharan Africa on fast modern, often asphalted roads and have goods shifted from the ports to the most landlocked of areas in what are calculable and relatively reasonable times, thanks to the combined determination and effort of the Governments and international aid donors.

All donors have been planning for and investing in the road sector for some time now, but it should be acknowledged that, in the early 1960s, when the young African administrations were still seeking an identity, the European Economic Community was one of the first organisations to provide large amounts of money to build basic infrastructure, with roads as the top priority. For without a communications system, even a simple one, how is it possible to improve the economy, run the country, carry out social projects or diversify agriculture? The most immediate needs had to be catered for when the EDF began financing roads in Africa. There were virtually no organised networks or links between the States, and this was a considerable handicap to national and regional economic development.

Homogeneous routes had to be planned, if only for the purposes of bridges and culverts. Most of Africa's roads had bridges dating back to different eras, with different load-bearing capacities. Just a few kilometres apart, one found recent constructions which took 25-30 tonnes and ageing wooden ones which took only 5 tonnes. As it was the weakest link in the chain which determined the choice of the vehicle, transport costs were badly affected and stretches which were weak, prone to flooding or difficult of access had to be eliminated so that all types of vehicle could use the roads throughout the year.

In the absence of local means or know-how, it was reasonable to look to experts, consultancies and firms in the Member States for his vast and urgent task. And, in spite of some uncertainty and incomprehension in the early stages, the complex arrangement of services, supplies and work involving different European schools, traditions and experience gave rise to some very rewarding collaboration from which the national authorities derived and are still deriving the greatest benefit.

Technical problems and high costs

One of the concerns of road planners and builders is axle-load, i.e. the maximum weight an axle can transmit to the road. It is important for regulations to be standardised on international roads so that the same vehicles can cover complete routes with the same loads — a very serious issue which has an impact on the technical specifications for road building and maintenance.

Different loads of between 10 and 13 tonnes are still allowed in different countries of Africa.

But, as we know, a 10 t axle-load does 2.3 times more damage than the standard 7.2 t, and a 13 t axle-load seven times more. And, as we also know, vehicles in Africa are very often overloaded — 20 t or more is not unusual. So not only are international regulations (laying down, say, a 10 t limit) called for, but stringent controls have to be introduced. Many of our road programmes involve supplying the relevant equipment and it is for the national authorities to use this to best advantage to protect their heritage.

Road building, already a difficult and complicated undertaking, is faced with extra and often contradictory constraints in Africa such as vast distances and low traffic density, with more heavy traffic than light, high building costs and a need for cheap haulage, too much water and too little

CCE

A mountain road in Tanzania. Since the 1960s the European Community has financed 20 000 km of paved roads in Africa

(*) Principal Administrator, DG VIII, Commission of the European Communities.

Table 1: Summary of EDF road investments by Convention and region up to the end of 1989

Region	*NIP (000's ECU)*			*Regional Lomé I-III*	*Total*
	Lomé I	*Lomé II*	*Lomé III*		
Eastern and Southern Africa	194.212	233.747	175.990	238.830	842.779
Western and Central Africa	222.428	268.741	231.799	73.709	796.677
Caribbean	17.467	13.153	22.656	—	53.276
Pacific	9.892	17.993	19.056	—	46.941

water and extremely heterogeneous climates, soils and materials.

To give an idea of the figures, turning a dirt road into a modern, surfaced road costs between ECU 150 000 and ECU 250 000 per km today (as against ECU 40 000 in the 1960s) and building a brand new road over a brand new route can cost far more, perhaps twice or three times as much.

But despite these very high costs (which reduce the return on investment), the European Economic Community continues to believe that a significant proportion of EDF resources should go into the road sector.

Overall the Fund has financed no less than 20 000 km of asphalted roads and countless secondary and feeder roads in Africa to date. Commitments to African ACPs under the first three Conventions of Lomé (1975-90) alone, amounted to ECU 2 billion — about 12% of which went on maintenance, 30% on repairs, 46% on upgrading dirt to asphalt and 12% on new roads.

When it comes to choosing projects, the Community has always adhered to the rules of the various cooperation agreements and respected both the plans and programmes and the wishes of the associated countries. It has tried to coordinate its work with the work of other aid organisations to ensure the greatest effectiveness and best return. And, most important, it has kept an eye on social considerations, together with the economic ones, paying particular attention to the poorest section of society in both urban and rural areas.

But road projects, large in size and in investment, have often been necessary. These major contracts have attracted considerable international competition, and this has helped to keep costs down.

The landlocked countries and the corridors

Africa is a particularly difficult continent for communications. It is both extensive and compact, it has the most uneven ratio of surface area to coastal development in the world and its average altitude (500 m) prevents the rare watercourses from being navigable. Additionally, the vicissitudes of its history are such that many of its countries have no access to the sea. Hence the need (recognised by the colonials who used the technology of the time and built railways) to develop major international routes — the corridors which begin at the main ports on the east and west coasts.

By way of example, the northern corridor, that is to say the communications network connecting the Port of Mombasa on the Indian Ocean with the landlocked countries of East Africa (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) and with eastern Zaïre and southern Sudan, consists of railway to Kasese in Uganda (near the Zaïre border) via Nairobi and Kampala, oil pipeline to Nairobi and, most important, a fully asphalted road nearly 2000 km long (not counting the branch roads which cross it in the north and south) to Bujumbura via Nairobi, Kampala and Kigali.

The central corridor, which starts at the port of Dar-es-Salaam, consists mainly of the Tanzanian railway (TRC), which goes 1250 km to the ports of Kigoma (on Lake Tanganyika) and Mwanza (on Lake Victoria), and the roads going on from there to Burundi and Rwanda.

These two corridors are still very much the historic routes of the first explorers of the dark continent and of the caravans of centuries past.

The economic importance of the northern and central corridors has increased constantly over the years, although the trend, reflecting successive events in the region, has been irregular. At the moment, an estimated 1.5 million tonnes of goods traffic takes the northern corridor, 1.3 million tonnes of it by road, while 1 million tonnes is transported along the central corridor.

With a round trip between Bujumbura and Mombasa taking a truck an average of four weeks, the European Community stepped in to improve traffic conditions on these two major routes by handling "non-physical obstacles". It did this by encouraging the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement, which the Transport Ministers of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaïre signed in 1985. This laid down common regulations for documents, taxes, insurance and customs procedures and assumed the costs of the interim Secretariat in Nairobi which was reponsible for the application of the agreement.

Table 2: Breakdown by percentage of EDF road investments (estimated)

Region	*Maintenance %*	*Rehabilitation %*	*Reconstruction %*	*New/ Upgrading %*
Eastern and Southern Africa	3.3	34.9	50.1	11.7
Western and Central Africa	23.6	25.1	43.8	7.5
Caribbean	6.4	40.1	47.3	6.2

Gravel-laying in Niger. A good road network is essential for the economies of landlocked countries

The "physical obstacles"—the poor state of the roads—were catered for by EDF financing of more than ECU 280 million to build or rebuild all the parts of the northern corridor in Rwanda and Burundi (250 km), the Kampala-Rwanda frontier section in Uganda (420 km), and the Eldoret-Uganda frontier (160 km) and Kabete-Limuru (20 km) stretches in Kenya. This last section, which is in the suburbs of Nairobi and carries more than 6000 vehicles per day, is a four-lane highway with a cycle track.

On the central corridor, the EDF has financed ECU 70 million-worth of work, over and above the railway and port (Kigoma) schemes and the complete building of the 240 km Isaka-Bukombe-Lusahunga section of the road linking the railway to Rwanda. There are also plans to finance the link with Burundi.

The northern and central corridors are complementary and the Community has always seen them as such, for neither Mombasa nor Dar-es-Salaam could cope with all the region's trade alone. The two great routes meet at Bujumbura's port and road station, but an alternative road has been opened along the east coast of Lake Victoria, so traffic from Burundi and Rwanda can get to Mombasa without crossing Uganda if need be. The EDF has ploughed ECU 45 million into the 185 km Nyanguge-Musoma stretch of this alternative road and it plans to carry on to Sirari, on the Kenyan frontier, and from there over Kenyan territory to Kericho (200 km).

Another example of these vast communications operations is one involving some of the countries in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, which have no outlets on the sea) and the Gulf of Guinea. Mali and Burkina Faso have railway links to the coast—Mali to the Port of Dakar and Burkina Faso to the Port of Abidjan—but Niger and Chad have only road links with Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon.

Over the years, the Community has made a decisive contribution to improving, extending and maintaining this vast and complex road network which is so essential to the economy of the whole region and a real key to survival for millions of people in time of drought.

Sea erosion in Togo. Roads are always affected by the elements, but prompt and regular maintenance will keep down costs

The EDF has spent more than ECU 400 million on asphalted roads in Niger (1300 km), Burkina Faso (1000 km), Mali (600 km), Togo (550 km), Benin (400 km), Chad (500 km), Ghana (85 km) and Côte d'Ivoire over the past 30 years. It financed most of the Abidjan-Lagos road along the coast, the very difficult 60 km Elubo-Axim stretch (almost entirely marshy ground) in Ghana and the whole of the link between the Ghana and Nigeria frontiers (200 km) in Togo and Benin, a piece of road used by several thousand vehicles per day and vulnerable to marine erosion. Indeed a 43 km stretch of new road was washed away in 1984.

The volume of goods traffic on all these roads is very considerable and the Togo corridor alone handles at least 500 000 tonnes per annum. Not only have these major investments proved to be fully justified, but all traffic forecasts have been exceeded.

Maintenance

As we have seen, roads are both a huge investment and of fundamental importance to the economy-

But however well designed and constructed, they still wear out through use (and misuse). Having been built, roads clearly have to be maintened as well. One would normally expect the national authorities to take proper care of the great heritage which their road systems represent, but, alas, this is not the case and the run-down road phenomenon is on a constant increase of dramatic proportions. Preparatory studies for the World Bank's vast sub-Saharan transport programme showed that only 50 % of the continent's 300 000 km of asphalted road were in acceptable condition, 25 % had reached the point where repairs were essential and 25 % were completely run down. And the situation on the dirt roads is worse, with only 29 % accceptable, 32 % poor and 39 % bad. What this means, in a nutshell, is that maintenance and upkeep of all Africa's road systems would take $ 1.2 billion (ECU 1 billion) p.a. and that, since such a sum is in the realms of Utopia, new and perhaps unpleasant choices have to be made. New roads, for example, can only be built where absolutely essential. Everything has to be concentrated on keeping the existing roads going and perhaps even abandoning some of the less priority stretches.

Calculations suggest that road rehabilitation can cost as much as eight times more than the regular maintenance that would have prevented it and countries which neglect maintenance but carry on building may be sacrificing 3 km of old road for every new km they lay. Bad roads also affect the vehicles which use them and transport costs—which are already higher in Africa than anywhere else in the world—increase all the time, making export products less competitive, to the detriment, above all of the peasants as usual.

Governments have failed to cope with the problem in time, often despite the insistence of the people in charge of their roads. There is nothing glorious about road maintenance. There are no foundation stones to lay and no ribbons to cut. Efforts to resolve this problem are now being made but it is a long, hard haul and there will be political, institutional and financial repercussions.

The Governments will no doubt be backed up in their determination by all the international donors. It is of course in everybody's interest to see the deterioration of African roads halted and the present damage repaired as far as possible.

On the Community front, Lomé, unlike the early cooperation agreements, allows for and even encourages infrastructure maintenance schemes.

This is a logical and irreversible approach. Once it is felt that a country or region should be provided with road infrastructure as part of a global development policy and once it is realised that it is impossible to do without that infrastructure, then the maintenance sector has to continue to receive external support—financial aid in the form of foreign exchange and technical assistance and training—as long as the national authorities need it.

The returns on road rehabilitation and maintenance projects are always high. By way of conclusion and, at the risk of stating the obvious, both Governments and aid organisations should be lucid in their choices when pursuing and adapting their transport policies.



MAJA PEJIC

Investing in the future: solutions to the enormous problems facing the African road network are simple, but expensive

EDF philosophy

The Commission of the European Communities, which manages the EDF, has always believed in road infrastructure and has gone on contributing substantially to this vital, yet lagging sector of the African economy. It has never tired of building and rebuilding roads — a job which, "like the dark unbottom'd abyss, is infinite..."

Every project has been properly measured, with due regard for its usefulness and there is no desire to produce spectacular installations or showcases, merely for the sake of it.

Outlying roads serving isolated regions and villages have been built on one or two occasions. There have been roads with the same features as big international highways, rural roads to open up parts of the country and sections of urban road networks. Progress has been made bit by bit, section by section, with asphalted roads where the traffic required it and with more modest gravelled roads, with proper drains and bridges. Roads have been built where they were most wanted and improved where they could no longer do their job.

Basically, the answer to Africa's enormous road problems is simple. Expensive, but simple. There is no point in complicating the issue with refined reasoning and complex analyses.

The Commission of the European Communities has no special doctrine here, more a philosophy — just look at the projects and programmes case by case, in the light of experience and common sense rather than abstract theories. As a former, very pro-Africa, pro-road Director-General once put it: "If you don't listen to common sense, you're on the wrong road". ○ A.C.

Economic aspects of road transport projects

by Antonius BRÜSER (*)

The decision on whether or not to proceed with a particular development project will be influenced by a wide range of factors. Clearly, the expected economic impact is a major element in guiding the decision-maker and effective economic analysis is therefore an important tool. It should be noted that other factors are given considerable weight by the Commission in its implementation of Community development policy. Thus, less easily quantified elements such as environmental and social concerns are also included in the calculation. The following article concentrates specifically on the economic aspect of the analysis, in the context of road transport projects.

For decision makers and planners of investments in road transport operations, importance may be attached to a wide variety of criteria. These may be geographical (e.g. a mountainous region to be crossed by a road which needs a bitumen overlay in steep gradients), technical (e.g. a road which goes through a region which has high, concentrated rainfall), political (e.g. a road to open up or to improve access to a remote area), social (e.g. access to facilities such as schools or hospitals) or economic. This article focuses on the last-mentioned, namely the economic criteria.

I will seek to describe how such criteria can be used to guide decision makers to come down either in favour of, or against a given proposal. Special attention will be given to the problems of financing maintenance operations, since the issue of road maintenance versus new construction is of growing interest. It should be understood that this article cannot tackle in depth, all matters related to economic appraisal. It is not intended, for example, to discuss the most appropriate method of ranking investment (e.g. whether to apply the Internal Rate of Return or the Present Value Method), nor should the reader expect an analysis of ratios or 'minimum' benefits at which an investment may be deemed to be worthwhile. Ratios and 'minimum benefits can vary from one beneficiary or institution to another and even over a certain time period. The economic criteria and analysis form one important part within the decision-making process, but it should not be the only one. Nevertheless, the economic analysis is a decision-making tool to be applied for all projects, programmes or operations and it should always be carried out and taken into consideration.

Without entering into too much detail, it is useful to make a preliminary remark which applies to the financing of investments in general, and which is specifically relevant to investments in road infrastructure. The economic analysis should be undertaken for all types of project and for all different forms of finance which are available or which are being sought. There should be no difference in the analytical approach, even where the financial sources differ. (Projects may be financed from a country's internal resources through taxation, through government borrowings from the national or international banking system, or by a grant or loan from a donor or other institution). In reality, however, decisions regarding projects are dependent, in most cases, on the different sources of finance and their respective conditions. Unfortunately, people have sometimes taken the view that economic criteria should not be applied to investments financed through grants because they do not involve any direct cost to the beneficiary country. Even in recent years, this misunderstanding has resulted in a certain amount of mismanagement and to the inappropriate attribution of funds for unviable, uneconomic projects, which would never have been financed by loans and to which none of the above-mentioned other criteria applied.

Same criteria

In order to allow decision-makers to decide in favour of, or against a certain investment, it is important therefore, that all potential projects are appraised according to the same economic criteria. Such an appraisal is necessary although it is often difficult to have a complete or reliable set of data on hand. But as long as the criteria applied for the different proposals are the same, no major distortion in the ranking of the investments is to be expected. The ranking of the projects will allow judgments to be made about two issues; first to decide those which are 'better' (i.e. more profitable in economic terms) and second, to decide whether it would be wise to execute specific projects at all (i.e. if an expected 'minimum' benefit will be achieved).

Abbreviations used in mathematical formulae contained in this article:

$t = 0, 1, 2, ..., n$ (periods under consideration, whereby **n** is mostly taken as 15 or 20 years for road projects);

I(a) = Investment costs for project **a**;
I(b) = Investment costs for project **b**;

RUS(a) = Road user savings resulting from the execution of project **a**;
RUS(b) = Road user savings resulting from the execution of project **b**;

VOC(a) = Vehicle operating costs on road **a**;

CM(a) = Costs for current and periodic maintenance of project **a**;

VOCM = Vehicle operating costs on maintained road

i = Discounting (or interest rate)

(*) Principal Administrator in the Directorate-General for Development, European Commission.

For the following analysis, it is necessary to limit the variables to a minimum, otherwise the models described will be too mathematical and cumbersome. This approach is justified by the fact that a model should demonstrate the use of economic tools, without going into all the details which can be supplied by the individual user in specific cases. A further justification is the fact that very often, only limited data are available, and additional lengthy and expensive research cannot be financed. Clearly, this does not mean that more complicated economic models should never be used. There will be situations where such models are appropriate and in such cases, they will be formulated and applied.

Application of analysis to road schemes

The road user savings (RUS) of a project are determined by the difference between the vehicle operating costs (VOC) on the actual road and the VOC on the future road, after the investment in either upgrading or maintenance. The RUS are not only influenced by the surface of the road, which helps to determine the difference in cost per kilometre, but also by the length of the new road. If the new road results in a shorter distance between two destinations, due for example to improved alignments, the removal of curves or other short cuts, then this will increase the RUS stemming from the investment.

Based on the above reduced number of variables, the decision for or against a project can be taken by a comparison of the investment costs of different projects and, simultaneously, their expected benefits. All expected payments and benefits related to the project need to be discounted in order to take account of the timing at which the payments/benefits will fall due. A certain amount today has a higher value than the same amount at some point in the future. For each individual project and by applying the Net Present Value (NPV) the mathematical formula reads as follows:

$$\Sigma_t\,[I\,(a)_t]\,[1+i]^{-t} < \Sigma_t\,[RUS\,(a)_t]\,[1+i]^{-t}$$

If the value of the discounted investment costs for a project is lower than the value of the discounted road user savings (RUS), then the execution of the project should be considered on economic grounds. With this method, all investment projects for a given period (designated from *a* to *z*) could be compared at a specific time, with the best ones being selected for execution. The financing needs for the 'best' projects then have to be compared with the available funds (including those likely to become available during the execution/construction time of the projects) and this will then determine those projects which may be commenced. From the purely economic point of view, the projects which should be financed are those which have the highest economic return and which exceed a 'minimum' rate fixed by the decision makers. Other criteria, as mentioned above, may alter the ranking and, consequently, the decisions in favour of (or against) a project. Decision-makers should be extremely careful in their assessment, however, when other criteria alter the order established on the basis of the economic analysis.



The Courier

Part of the busy Northern Corridor route in Uganda. High traffic density here makes a paved route essential

Under the above formula, competing projects to be compared for the purposes of financing could represent two different road projects in different areas, or operations of a different nature on the same project. The latter might be a maintenance operation on a gravel road versus upgrading of the same route to bitumen standard. The ranking will depend on the two main variables, namely the investment costs, which are normally higher for a bitumen road and the road user savings. Since road user costs are lower on bitumen roads than on gravel ones (assuming an equivalent state of repair—i.e. excellent, fair or poor), the initial, higher investment costs are usually outweighed by the higher road user savings, assuming a certain minimum level of traffic on the road.

Clearly, the minimum traffic (generally defined as the average daily traffic—ADT) at which a bitumen road is more advantageous than a gravel or earth road, will vary with the other main variable, namely the investment costs. As a rule of thumb, the construction or upgrading of a gravel road to paved quality will be justified where the ADT exceeds 150.

In past years, road maintenance has been neglected in most developing countries. The reasons for this are manifold; insufficient financial resources, manpower or know-how limitations, logistic difficulties (e.g. regular payment of maintenance workers in remote areas) and political influences (there is a natural tendency for new roads to receive a higher profile than maintenance schemes). It should be noted that donors have indirectly contributed to the neglect of maintenance operations. Thus, for example, the first Lomé Convention foresaw no possibility of using Community resources to assist maintenance operations. Fortunately, this attitude has changed. Article 224 of the fourth Lomé Convention states;

> "Within the framework of the Convention, development finance cooperation shall cover...
>
> (h) recurrent costs (including current administrative, operating and maintenance costs, both local and foreign) of new, ongoing and completed projects and programmes".

A wide range of studies and research operations has revealed the necessity and worthiness of maintenance operations. However, the road networks in some developing countries are simply too large to provide complete and comprehensive maintenance coverage. Accordingly, some governments have embarked on the process of identifying the key roads—what might be described as the strategic network—which require to be upgraded (only a few), rehabilitated and maintained. The main criterion



Vivant Univers

UNICEP/Murray Lee

"By the time the potholes appear, maintenance is already overdue, vehicles are suffering damages and road safety is reduced"

used is the economic one. Such an exercise, which needs the thorough preparation of a transport policy and a close scrutiny of the entire road network, may require several years to complete. It could also result in a common agreement between the government of the country in question and the donor community, for the financing of future operations in this sector.

Transport policy cannot, of course, be limited solely to the establishment of a strategic road network and the financial implications flowing therefrom. It also has to identify the institutional prerequisites for the transport system, as well as the personnel requirements.

Lack of enthusiasm for maintenance

As mentioned above, donors have, on occasion, contributed to the historical lack of enthusiasm for maintenance which has existed in many beneficiary countries. The neglect of the subject in Lomé I has already been noted. The policy followed by some donors—although not the EDF—of only providing funds for projects with a minimum economic profitability (e.g. an Internal Rate of Return of at least 12%, or a positive Net Present Value at a discount rate of 12%) may be seen to have acted as a further disincentive. In order to be sure of receiving external funds, there seemed to be a certain logic in neglecting maintenance, since this contributed to an increase in the economic rate of return on future rehabilitation works. Such paradoxes occurred because economic analysis did not always realistically reflect the future investment costs associated with a non-maintained road and the resulting road user costs. Road user savings tend quickly to outweigh maintenance costs and therefore, maintenance operations generally achieve a high rate of economic profitability. Higher road user costs stemming from non-maintained roads not only penalise the vehicle owners, but have damaging spillover effects for the economy as a whole.

Maintenance operations are worthwhile if the present value of the maintenance costs (current and periodic) plus the difference between the vehicle operating costs of the road without maintenance and the VOC on the maintained road, is lower than the present value of the cost of rebuilding the road (i.e. undertaking the major works necessary to bring the unmaintained road back to a reasonable standard):

$$\Sigma_t CM_t [1+i]^{-t} + \Sigma_t [VOC_t - VOCM_t] [1+i]^{-t} < \Sigma_t I_t [1+i]^{-t}$$

In discussions with people who take a particular interest in road maintenance, it is generally emphasised that the technicians are fully conscious of the practical benefits to be gained by good maintenance programmes. Unfortunately, Finance Ministries and other relevant bodies often need to be convinced of the merits of setting aside sufficient funds for maintenance. It may be difficult to convince the appropriate officials of the importance of this matter "as long as no major potholes are visible on certain roads". By the time the potholes appear, however, the maintenance is already overdue, vehicles are suffering damage, road safety is reduced and there has been an exponential increase in the cost of restoring it to its previous state.

Conclusion

The above discussion seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the economic approach which should be an automatic part of the appraisal process in all investment projects. It is to be hoped that this approach will be applied systematically in the transport sector and that maintenance will receive the attention which it deserves, if necessary on occasion, at the expense of 'new' prestige projects. The tool of minimum economic analysis is not too complicated and, if used in an appropriate way, will offer benefits from the point of view of longer term economic efficiency. ○

A.B.

Road maintenance: networks under pressure

by J.B.H. THOMPSON (*)

Few would dispute the proposition that a good road infrastructure is an essential basis for economic development. That is why road building projects have always had a prominent place in development programmes. Unfortunately, less emphasis has traditionally been placed on *maintenance* as a prerequisite for *sustaining* economic development. In many developing countries, road networks are now under severe pressure as maintenance fails to keep pace with the deterioration caused by both human and natural influences.

The problem is particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa. At present, almost a quarter of all paved roads in the region need partial or complete reconstruction while a further quarter require immediate resurfacing. In other words, only 50% of paved roads in sub-Saharan Africa are currently in a good state. The position of the unpaved network is even worse.

This unsatisfactory situation has been caused by a variety of factors. The growth rates of traffic travelling on roads built to earlier design standards have been higher than expected. Axle loadings have also increased more quickly than anticipated and there is a lack of control over excessive axle loading. On the financial side, the total resources available are inadequate in any case, but the problem is exacerbated by the preference which is given within the sector to new construction. Institutional weaknesses have also resulted in poor coordination between the relevant authorities and agencies, while insufficient attention has been paid to research and development or to training.

In order to tackle the overall problem, it is necessary to analyse each of these contributory factors in turn.

Traffic prediction

Predicting future road usage is, at best, an inexact science. New roads have a tendency to generate their own demand, the level of which cannot be accurately quantified in advance. In addition, extraneous factors may influence road traffic densities. For instance, the decline in the use of rail transport which traditionally carried heavy goods has put an unexpected extra burden on the roads in sub-Saharan Africa.

Controlling traffic densities would, as well as posing practical problems, not necessarily be an appropriate solution from the development standpoint. Traffic flows reflect, albeit imperfectly, the scale of economic activity in a given area and measures which were effective in limiting road usage, such as higher fuel or licensing costs, might also inhibit development.

The Courier

Road maintenance in Lesotho
50% of paved roads in sub-Saharan Africa need urgent attention

There may be some scope for policies designed to encourage the use of alternative forms of transport but the cost of implementing such policies would need to be weighed against those associated with higher volume road usage. Roads, in any case, are often the only transport infrastructure available.

Axle loadings

The pavement of the road is the most expensive element of any road rehabilitation or construction project. Road pavements, which normally consist of a granular sub-base, a bituminous or calcerous stabilised base and a bituminous surfacing, are designed to accomodate climatic variations and to transmit the traffic loads to the sub grade (the existing ground) in such a way that this is not overloaded. In European and North American climates, a minimum overall thickness is required to protect the pavement against frost damage. This is rarely a problem in Africa. Consequently, the pavement tends to be thinner and the other two major parameters—subgrade strength and traffic loads—assume greater importance. Soil testing methods have made dramatic advances and the likely behaviour of sub-grades can now be more accurately tested. The most variable, and potentially the most damaging factor, therefore, is the loads imposed by the traffic.

Research has shown that the relationship between axle loads and their damaging effect on roads is an exponential one. Thus, for example, an axle load of 10 tonnes causes 10 000 times more damage than a one-tonne axle load (a loaded pick up), and an increase from 10 tonnes to 12 tonnes more than doubles the damaging effect. Overloaded axles are clearly the major factor in bringing forward the need for resurfacing.

In setting limits on axle loading, governments must tackle two issues. The first is the *level* at which the limit should be set and the second relates to *enforcement*.

The underlying objective in fixing a limit must be to minimise the overall cost to the community and, in this regard, two contradictory elements must be reconciled. These are the *vehicle operating costs* and the *pavement provision costs* (ie construction and maintenance). Broadly speaking, high axle loads (reflecting high payloads) tend to mean lower operating costs but increased pavement provision costs. Low axle loads will have the opposite result. While the relationship between these two elements

(*) Technical Counsellor, EC Delegation, Tanzania.


CEC

Overloaded axles do enormous damage to roads

is apparently straightforward, the calculation will clearly be a complex one, requiring data which may not be easy to obtain. Deciding exactly where to set the legal limit in order to minimise the "community costs" is accordingly difficult. On the other hand, the exponential effect, in terms of damage, makes it possible at least to identify levels which are clearly unacceptable and it is not surprising that most countries have legislation designed to limit the axle load of vehicles using their roads.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the current problems of road deterioration are due less to the absence of norms than to the difficulties of implementation. Legal limits which are not backed up by an effective inspection system, and by enforcement with sanctions where necessary, will inevitably be exceeded. It is natural that a lorry-owner will give greater priority to reducing his own expenses (the vehicle operating cost) than he will to the less immediate (or personal) problem of pavement provision costs. Good enforcement is, therefore, essential if the widespread practice of overloading is to be curtailed.

High axle loading has also contributed to the present poor state of roads in sub-Saharan Africa because in the past, construction was often based on assumptions derived from the local legal norms. In other words, roads were not built to take traffic heavier than was notionally permitted. While designers and engineers might be criticised for having made unreasonable assumptions, it is surely preferable for the community cost to be minimised by having roads built on the basis of appropriate axle load limits which in turn, are properly enforced.

Finance - new roads versus maintenance

While more stringent control of axle loads would help to increase the "working life" of roads and thus reduce maintenance costs, road infrastructures will obviously continue to require large sums of money. Unfortunately, the financial resources available to most road agencies in Africa are inadequate. This basic problem is compounded by the traditional tendency to concentrate these limited resources on the construction of new roads—which of course require to be maintained in the future. Maintenance budgets also tend to suffer during times of austerity. When financial problems dictate a reduction in government expenditure, cuts are likely to be imposed "across the board". As far as road maintenance is concerned, this is likely to prove a false economy.

The basic objective of the road maintenance budget should be to provide for upkeep at an economically optimum level. Obviously, as a road deteriorates, the vehicle operating costs rise with increased wear and tear, and more frequent vehicle breakdowns. In addition, the longer a road is left to deteriorate, the more expensive will be its restoration. Timely resurfacing, for example, will usually postpone the need for partial or complete reconstruction. The present reality is that maintenance budgets are not equal to their task.

Institutional problems

A number of countries presently have a weak institutional capacity for the administration and maintenance of the transport infrastructure. This is illustrated by declining financial resources allocated to maintenance and by the discrepancy between the legal limits for axle loadings, and the reality on the ground. The problems are sometimes exacerbated by a lack of liaison between the relevant ministries and the road agency. A further problem, in sub-Saharan Africa, is the inadequate level of research, development and training which is taking place.

Conclusions

This analysis of the factors contributing to the crisis in road maintenance in sub-Saharan Africa points to the need for a number of reorientations in road transport policy. As a general principle, more attention must be focused on maintenance vis-a-vis new construction. Indeed, given the state of the *existing* networks, any proposals for new roads should be subject to very close scrutiny. The same is true of proposals to upgrade gravel roads, which have lower maintenance costs, to paved surfaces. Remedial action is urgently needed to deal with the backlog which has built up, and realistic but effective programmes for annual/periodic maintenance must be developed. In tackling the backlog, emphasis must be given to building up the country's capacity to maintain its road infrastructure. This should be achieved by increasing the role of the small to medium-sized private contractor in annual and periodic maintenance.

On the institutional side, each country should be aiming to establish a "Management Information System" to ensure efficient road maintenance and rehabilitation. More resources should be devoted to research and training, drawing on the experience of countries such as Australia, where similar conditions are encountered. Specifically, and perhaps most importantly, each country should have an effective axle load monitoring unit (static and mobile). Stricter application of the rules in this area should be accompanied by the provision of better information for road hauliers in order to promote a broader understanding of the relationship between excessive loading, and road deterioration.

Roads are the arteries of development in Africa. It is difficult to imagine how healthy economies can be built if these arteries become clogged up. ○ J.B.H. T.

Road R&D in the ACPs

by M. SERVRANCKX (*)

Research and development in the road transport sector, and the road infrastructure part of it particularly, should properly be discussed against the broader background of the developing countries' obtaining of technical information.

This article makes considerable reference to and freely borrows from the work which the International Road Congress Association did at its last world congress in Brussels in September 1987 (1). It deals with road infrastructure and its institutional framework. Road transport is also a very broad field of technical and economic research in its own right.

Obtaining technical information

The advantages of pooling information are obvious. It enables the partners, whoever they are, to make a better job of using the technological resources available and to avoid (or reduce) the need to repeat research and experiments that are costly in terms of staff and finance.

This is particularly true of developing countries, since they have few means or resources and their energies have to be husbanded carefully, but at the same time, their equipment needs are very great.

However, having the work done by someone else with nothing being passed on locally, is only a very short-term solution. By contrast, reinventing something already produced somewhere else may be beneficial to some extent, since it creates local technology and results in local practitioners who are knowledgeable although the same result can be obtained more cheaply by using the experience and expertise of people who have already worked on similar problems in other countries.

The transfer of technological information in aid programmes or technical cooperation between two countries may well require resources, but it is a relatively inexpensive undertaking and is particularly efficient as far as development is concerned. It must, however, be done in a real spirit of cooperation, with the constant aim of sharing common progress.

One important aim of any Government will be for the country to have the technology it needs and the people to use it, so it can make the most of its resources and preserve a minimum of technological independence vis-à-vis the outside world.

But techniques are forever on the move and continual readjustment, adaptation and progress is needed to keep up with them. A country which has obtained a particular technique may well develop and improve it on its own, but for years to come, the industrialised nations, with their considerable technological advance, will nonetheless keep their lead by constantly perfecting their products and methods. There is no doubt that the appearance of new materials, for example, in construction or for study or diagnostic purposes (auscultation,

* Head of Training, Communications and Distribution, Centre de Recherches Routières, Bvd de la Woluwé, 42, B-1200 Brussels, Belgium.

(1) Transfer and adaptability of technical information to the developing countries—Lecture-discussion No 2, XVIIIth World Road Congress, Brussels, 13-19 September 1987.



CRR

In the laboratory

CRR

In the field—test drilling


CRR

Maintaining the network—measuring deviation

CRR

Computers are always useful

laboratories etc.) widens the gap in knowledge and know-know.

Defining needs

It would be a very good idea for each country to come up with a technical information acquisition policy of its own; one that fits in with its development plans and lists the sectors where particular techniques are to be obtained abroad and those where research and production can be carried out locally. It should also be recognised in such a policy that too many transfers can easily prevent local innovation.

Deciding what the recipient actually needs is an important and delicate task and in the past it was often done by the donor, in the dominant economy, who retained some kind of technical control or had commercial interests. Now, however, it is the recipient who says what the needs are and defines them in as precise a way as possible. His ability to define his needs in this way is probably the single most important key to the success of a technical information acquisition policy.

The needs considered here have to do with technical information and its vital complement, know-how, rather than material products. They may be:
— purely intellectual products such as economic, social or financial study methods;
— organisational or institutional products such as management systems for road construction, maintenance or exploitation (including financial control);
— general technical products—technical study methods, computers, drainage, standards and regulations etc;
— special technical products—materials, laboratory tests, pavements etc;
— technical products for works—methods of control, for example.

Local R&D

A country's decision to spend or not to spend money on its own road infrastructure research is a political decision.

Many ACPs now have their own national public works laboratories, often with road research units, and experience suggests that there are a number of conditions to be met if they are to have any chance of success. They include:
— the country having some technical facilities of its own;
— the technology of the R&D being mastered;
— the individuals and organisations involved in the research making an effort to generate a desire to exploit it and disseminate the results;
— a national officer being available to take account of the results of the research;
— continuity and permanency of both staff and structures being assured—as research is, by definition, a long-term activity and a new road infrastructure technique may take three to five years to evaluate.

Not all of these conditions are always met and the network of road laboratories in these countries accordingly see their contribution as being confined to running tests for authorities, firms and consultancies, without carrying out any research activity or offering technical advice to local administrations. The question which arises, therefore, is whether there should be a reevaluation of the role and status of local R&D, taking a further look at the way technical information on road infrastructure in the ACPs is obtained.

Various guidelines have been suggested for this—for example, North-South twinning of research centres and laboratories, joint ACP-European research programmes on priority ACP subjects and a better flow of information between the developing nations (happily, an association of African laboratories is being set up at the moment)—but these should be part of a much broader-based operation in which local research and the staff who carry it out are recognised as a factor of development and are able to make a positive contribution to the management of the existing road facilities.

The time has come for the leaders of the countries concerned (ACP and EEC alike) to look at this, with the support of multilateral organisations such as the EDF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and to come up with practical proposals for obtaining technological information, R&D, the transfer of technology, training and the institutional framework (incuding financing). ○

M.S.

Bus services in developing countries: the privatisation option

by Deborah SPARKS and H. MATHE (*)



Vivant Univers

Most cities in developing countries rely heavily on the use of buses as the major means of mobility, particularly for the urban poor. Even in cities with extensive rail networks, the majority of trips are made on buses or mini-buses. The trend, in both industrial and developing countries, is the privatisation of transport services which traditionally have been part of the public domain. This study examines the managerial and social benefits, as well as the pitfalls of publicly versus privately run bus services in urban centres both in ACP countries and elsewhere in the developing world.

One of the main problems for bus services in developing countries is that they cannot keep up with demand. As a result, the quality of service is poor and this is reflected in long waiting times between buses, overcrowding, high maintenance and operating costs, and budgets that are consistently in the red. Governments, long overburdened with increasing debts in this sector, are looking for other solutions. Privatisation has clearly become an appealing option to many governments.

The overall needs of transport services in the developing world cannot be overlooked. The statistics are sobering. In Brazil, less than 20% of rural roads can expect improvement in the next 15 to 20 years while in India, a recent study found that 73% of all rural households do not own vehicles. A similar situation is to be found in many ACP states. Additionally, in many developing countries, there are few, if any, public transport services provided beyond the all-weather road systems. Indeed, a large number of roads in Africa and elsewhere are unpassable six months a year during the rainy season.

There are many questions that need to be examined in studying private versus public transport services. Will private companies have society's best interests in mind if given free rein to determine bus routes and fares? Will working conditions in the private sector be adequate? If, on the other hand, governments continue to provide public transport, is it possible to maximise efficiency to avoid overwhelming debts? In either case, who is best able to make sure that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly have affordable access to transport?

Ideally, the key factor determining the efficiency of an enterprise is not whether it is publicly or privately owned, but how it is managed. In theory, it is possible to create the kind of incentives that will maximise efficiency under any type of ownership. Even in the developing world, where financial and social problems are particularly prevalent, there are many examples of transport undertakings that offer efficient, quality services as in Jamaica (private), Bombay (public) and Morocco (private).

The trend to privatise does not, of course, mean that the Government no longer has a role to play in the provision of transport services, but the lines do become blurred. What should the government regulate? Fares? Routes? Hours of operation? Safety measures? Some would argue that the less government intervention in the private sector, the better, dismissing as exaggerated, the perceived disadvantages of competition (such as congestion at bus stops, low safety standards, neglect of unprofitable routes). Whether this view is justified remains to be seen. More time is needed to evaluate the results of privatisation.

Government bail-outs – a vicious circle

Government regulation of transport presents conflicting problems. As costs rise, transport systems come under financial pressure to increase fares, but politicians are under contrary pressure to keep fares at existing levels. Unless the system is subsidised, it will have to eliminate some of its less profitable services. Attempts by governments to redress deterioration

(*) Eurolog, Centre Européen de recherche en gestion des opérations et management des services. Groupe ESSEC. France.

in services by fixing fares and levels of service inevitably lead to subsidies. These usually begin with a debt write-off but eventually extend to direct operating subsidies.

There are several examples of transport systems in developing countries that manage their affairs without government assistance. There are many others, however, which are heavily subsidised, and the authorities justify this in numerous ways. A common argument is that the government has a responsibility to provide the public with satisfactory services at affordable prices.

Because of the anticipated benefits of subsidies, government-run services usually fall short of expectations creating pressure for more financial aid. One of the main causes for subsidies failing to achieve expected results is that often, they remove the incentive to reduce costs or to increase revenues. This in turn can lead to further inefficiency, greater deficits and a need for additional support.

Stagnant fares and rising costs create a vicious circle of lower revenue and profits, deficits, impaired investment capability, lower service standards, declining ridership and yet lower revenues. Fare increases are the usual remedy but their effect can be short-lived in the face of rising costs. More importantly, since fares do not cover costs, passengers are covered at a loss. Consequently, far from helping the enterprise, a rise in the number of passengers may lead to a bigger loss, pushing the enterprise deeper into debt. A chronic shortage of funds sets in and dependence on government subsidy becomes inevitable.

This situation stems from governments' tendency to keep prices low for social considerations and by their reluctance to revise prices periodically to take account of inflation. Bus fares in Addis Ababa have not been revised since 1956 despite rises in the costs of other bus inputs. Governments have also shown reluctance to compensate enterprises for running unprofitable services except by providing sporadic subsidies which are often insufficient.

In Delhi, the city's Transport Corporation shows fairly good indicators of performance compared with many other bus operations. However, because fares are held well below costs, the Corporation incurs very substantial losses. Consequently, it suffers continuous financial difficulties and, in particular, is unable to raise funds for expansion to meet demand. As a result, buses have become overloaded, standards have generally deteriorated and the corporation, which otherwise performs well, faces severe public criticism.

Allowing bus companies to operate severely underfunded obviously causes problems. An extreme case of this is in Sierra Leone when a company requested a fares rise in 1974. Government approval of the request was given five years later. A second request in 1981 was approved in 1983. Although the two increases were eventually approved, they did not match increasing costs. Sierra Leone's annual average rate of inflation during this period was 12.2%.

The Courier

Difficulties obtaining spare parts

Standing room only – technical and managerial problems

It is often difficult to obtain spare parts and new equipment in developing countries. Private companies can also face difficulties in increasing their fleet size because access to funding is often difficult, with crippling interest rates. Safety standards are also of particular concern because roads (or the lack of them) often offer dangerous conditions while the overcrowding of buses which is a frequent occurrence, obviously adds to the wear and tear of equipment. Many government-run transport services also have an alarmingly high number of buses that are out of operation for maintenance reasons and this exacerbates overcrowding.

Most enterprises in developing countries operate fleets that are subjected to extensive wear and tear. Fleet ages vary from five years in Dakar, eight years in Algiers to about 15 years in Nairobi. Logically, the younger the fleet, the fewer the breakdowns and this should lead to a greater number of operational buses being available. In reality, this is not so. Nairobi, which has one of the oldest fleets has a high utilisation rate while Dakar and Algiers, with relatively young fleets have much lower rates. Maintenance, rather than age, is the determining factor here. On the other hand, maintenance costs for ageing fleets can become prohibitively high, so a consistent renewal policy coupled with strict observance of maintenance instructions is important to keep these costs down and transport capacity up.

Overloading buses designed for 100 persons to carry 150 in peak hours clearly wears the vehicle transmission system, suspension and tyres, and contributes to rapid ageing. So do bad driving habits. But increases in government-owned bus fleets have, at best, been only able to match transport capacity in line with the demand, according to the Geneva-based International Labour Office. In most developing cities, if the total bus fleet is taken as the yardstick, the number of inhabitants per bus has either stagnated or climbed in the last decade. In three African cities, Addis Ababa, Lagos and Lusaka, this deterioration has reached dramatic dimensions and vividly illustrates the magnitude of the gap between supply and demand. The general deterioration is even worse if the number of operational buses effectively on the road is taken as the yardstick. The number of inhabitants per bus doubles or triples, and in the case of Lagos, quintuples. In other words, formal bus services have not merely failed to maximise the utilisation of their existing fleets—they have actually gone into reverse in recent years.

The fact that the proportion of operational buses in many African cities is below the normally accepted standard of 85% of the total fleet, highlights the problems faced by formal bus services in keeping their vehicles in roadworthy condition. A study by the International Labour Office of 6 cities in the developing world revealed that the average proportion of operational buses in the period from 1985-1987, was 47.5%

All bus enterprises experience difficulties in obtaining spare parts. This is often due to foreign currency shortages and cumbersome administrative procedures or long delays in obtaining such currency. In Harare, this is reportedly also due to considerable mark up of spare parts by local dealers. Their cost has increased by 60% in the last 30 years.

The existence of hybrid fleets also creates problems. The reason that this arises is probably the shortage of funds that induces bus services to depend upon international assistance in renewing their fleets. One African company, short of funds, turned to the government for assistance in acquiring equipment. The government, in turn, approached different donor countries for loans which were used to purchase buses from those countries. The company then ended up with Leylands, Fiats, Renaults AVMs (produced in Zambia), Tatas, Mercedes Benz and Dubravas. Obviously, such a hybrid fleet is far more difficult to maintain.

Private bus companies – more or less?

Evidence shows that the private sector could offer transport services more efficiently than the public sector. There are fewer overheads in terms of employees and equipment and, depending how strict government regulations are for setting fares, there is certainly more likelihood for the private sector to earn a profit.


The Courier

Private or public? The point is academic when you have a puncture

In cities such as Calcutta, Bangkok and Istanbul, with both privately and publicly-owned buses, the costs of running private bus service were between 50% and 60% of the costs of the publicly owned concerns. Although employees of private firms generally earned less than those working in the public sector in the three cities, they were, in fact, earning average or above average wages. Wage costs per bus under private ownership are likely to be much lower than costs in the public sector because of less restrictive labour contracts, lower absenteeism and lower redundancy costs.

In Sri Lanka, government liberalisation policies in the 1970s put an end to the Central Transport Board's monopoly over public transport services. This provoked a strong response from private bus operators who imported more than 6 000 buses between 1979 and 1981. Some 11 000 private buses now operate throughout Sri Lanka, with about 3 500 in the Colombo metropolitan region. The capacity of these private buses ranges from 15 to 60 passengers. Meanwhile, the CTB operates 5 800 buses in the metropolitan area, each able to carry between 100 and 120 passengers. Private buses have so far managed to capture a high market share, despite competing with the heavily subsidised and well established CTB services.

Unlike government agencies however, private bus companies usually offer very little in terms of job security. Private transport workers are liable to be laid off without any protection against possible abuses. The most prominent feature of terms of employment is the absence of written contractual relationships. In part, this stems from the extensive employment of family members, for whom it is pointless to insist on such contracts. However, non-contractual employment is also widespread among non-family employees. In addition, wages are usually at depressed rates.

There is also much concern that the private sector will shun unprofitable routes but there are measures which can be taken to avoid this. A novel solution adopted in Daejon (Korea) is for private bus operators to share unprofitable routes. The city is divided into four geographical areas each served by a fleet of 100 buses. Each fleet is rotated weekly to serve a different section of the city. The operators make a reasonable profit while the users benefit from a good bus service at acceptable fares.

Another facet of private transportation is the informal sector—a part of the transport sector that has grown over the years. Usually, these are unregistered operations which do not follow government regulations. Clearly, they are not "fly-by-night" organisations either, but rather small, usually family-owned businesses that have found a niche for themselves delivering services which are not met by the formal sector, whether public or private. An example of this is to be found in Chad, where few visible forms of public transport exist. Here, local residents use an indigenous method involving "piggy-backing" on local delivery trucks, paying the drivers. In an area with a strong history of informal transport, this sector must be taken into consideration before a new company attempts to break into the market.

If the trend to privatisation continues, and smaller companies continue to enter the market, there is likely to

Vivant Univers

Small family-run organisations are more flexible in meeting demand

be a temptation to coordinate competing services either through loosely formed associations or through smaller companies being acquired by larger ones. The opportunity for monopolisation of the market must be recognised as a possibility together with the disadvantages which this entails, in terms of reduced competition, for the passenger. How private companies should operate in the marketplace and how they should be regulated needs further examination.

Conclusions

Difficulties in meeting demand for public transport mean governments who are offering services that are debt-ridden, of poor quality and failing in their primary function, namely to serve the public need. With so many problems in running bus operations in the developing world, there is obviously a need to reconsider past managerial practices and to look for other solutions that can offer efficient, high quality services to the public, the majority of whom are poor. The motives of many governments in keeping bus fares low, to provide access to the poor, is a necessity given Third World demographics. But problems persist when conditions of service are seriously lacking, as is the case in many countries with overcrowded and unsafe buses. With the intention of keeping fares low while maintaining services, governments tend to find themselves in the position of asking donors for more money, either to write off debts or to continue direct operating subsidies. The question arises as to whether governments run inefficient services because they have access to subsidies and, therefore, take insufficient care in their financial management. Alternatively, assuming effective management, is the government the only body capable of providing adequate services to the public, bearing in mind that its concerns are wider than the simple profit motive?

Purely in terms of the managerial approach, the private sector does appear to have an edge over the public sector. From the point of view of scale, the smallness of private sector operations in comparison with the usually large government-run monopolies affords the former flexibility in how they design and manage their companies. Avoiding the bureaucratic blockages of a large government organisation, their responses to the market can obviously be much quicker. On the other hand, financing for equipment is more difficult to obtain, with banks more reluctant to offer backing, and access to foreign equipment, which is normally purchased through the government is curtailed.

There is also evidence that the private sector, comprised for the most part of small family-run organisations, often takes advantage of its employees with rigorous schedules, little or no vacation, poor wages and virtually no job security. On the other hand, jobs in the sector are competitive, suggesting perhaps better opportunities than in other fields. Overall, however, the possibilities for abuse in this sector are obvious. Nor is it clear whether the needs of the poor, who clearly depend most on public transport, will be served in an open market situation. It is evident that if certain routes are economically unrewarding, the choice may be made to disregard them completely.

Geographical factors pose added difficulties for public transport, and this means that a high priority must be placed on public safety. If governments privatise all or part of their transport services, their regulatory policies concerning safety and maintenance conditions will then be put to the test.

There are examples of where free market conditions have prevailed and services have been delivered in a reasonable fashion, but the extent to which governments handle privatisation will obviously vary from country to country. The role they play coordinating regulatory policies—setting fares, routes and safety standards, will certainly determine how the private sector operates. While World Bank officials have cautioned that too much government intervention would hinder the benefits of privatisation, it is certainly the case that in industrial countries over the past few decades, privately-run transport services have often not satisfactorily met public needs. Whether the developing world can learn from these mistakes or is destined to repeat them, remains to be seen. ○

D.S. and H.M.

Road vehicles: making the right choice

In a preceding article in this Dossier, a contributor referred to roads as the "arteries of development". Taking this analogy a stage further, the vehicles which use the roads must presumably be regarded as the red corpuscles which carry the oxygen to the system. Just as a good supply of healthy red corpuscles is needed to keep the body in trim, the general economic health of a nation will rely on the availability and efficiency of its road vehicles. This statement holds good for all countries but it is particularly apposite to developing states where other transport infrastructures, notably railways, are often inadequate and sometimes non-existent.

Thus, while the extent and condition of the road network are obviously vital factors in the development process, any wider analysis of the ways in which the network operates must also embrace the vehicles which are using it.

Road vehicles contribute to the functioning of the economy in two fundamental ways—through the transport of goods and the carriage of people. The degree of efficiency achieved in both areas will have a direct and significant impact on economic performance as a whole. In this article, particular attention is focused on issues affecting the choice of buses and lorries, by the vehicle operators.

Lorries and buses – workhorses of the economy

When it comes to the movement of goods and people, within most ACP states, lorries and buses have acquired positions of dominance in their respective fields. It is true that other transport modes are used to move both freight and passengers—ships operating on the coast and on inland lakes and waterways, as well as aircraft and trains, all play their part, where the infrastructure is available and the cost is not too prohibitive. Most freight, however, will be transported by road at some stage of its journey and overall, the roads carry by far the largest proportion of total freight movements. Road passenger mileage easily outstrips all other modes of transport combined.

The reason for this concentration on one particular form of transport is not difficult to understand. Road transport is significantly more flexible than other transport modes, and it is capable of functioning, albeit at a lower level of efficiency, even where the infrastructure is poor. Indeed, robust vehicles can reach certain areas without any infrastructure at all. By way of example, when a road subsides, cars, lorries, buses and vans will often be able to by-pass the problem. Subsidence on the railway, or the airport runway eliminates movement altogether until repairs can be effected. Capital costs, which can be high if the choice is made to have a paved surface, or if the terrain is difficult, nevertheless compare favourably with those of other transport modes, particularly if one looks at the potential returns in terms of traffic flows. This is why, throughout the world, roads are the principal element of the transport network, reaching places which will always be inaccessible to aircraft and trains. Given the severe financial constraints under which most ACP states are forced to operate, it is not surprising that transport investment should have traditionally been focused on this, the most viable of the systems available.

W. Gartung

Road transport is significantly more flexible than other transport modes

This means that in turn, lorries, buses and other commercial vehicles have become the workhorses of developing country economies. The efficiency of these operations is, therefore, of vital economic importance to most ACP states.

Perhaps the most important decision to be made by the ACP undertaking engaged in road haulage or bus operations (whether privately or publicly owned) concerns the choice of the vehicles to be operated. Such a choice will be influenced by a variety of factors, including:
— the type of cargo/numbers of passengers to be carried;
— the amount of capital available to purchase vehicles;
— the likely operating cost of the vehicles;
— the nature of the existing fleet (if any);
— the present expertise of employees;
— the prevailing road conditions;
— any restrictions imposed by governments or donor agencies;
— the likely speed of delivery;
— the availability of after sales service including spare parts.

Unfortunately, the influences will sometimes be contradictory. For example, a haulier engaged in transporting heavy loads on poorly surfaced secondary roads, may have insufficient capital or foreign exchange to pay for the most suitable vehicle. As a result, he may be forced to buy a less sturdy make, or a second hand model, and in so-doing, to forfeit longer term savings because of short term exigencies. A bus company whose fleet investment is being supported by an external donor may be constrained to purchase buses manufactured in the donor country, irrespective of the make of its existing vehicles. This is likely to complicate future maintenance requirements and potentially to increase operating costs. In some regions there may be

Poor road conditions increase maintenance costs but these can be reduced if over-diversification of vehicle marks is avoided

little or no meaningful choice in any case, depending on the distribution arrangements of vehicle suppliers.

In these circumstances, it is not possible to establish a standard set of detailed criteria which should be applied when the choice of lorry or bus is being made. On the other hand, there are a number of general principles which may be identified.

In the first place, it is important to maximise **flexibility**. On the freight side, general purpose lorries are clearly the most flexible in the sense that they are capable of carrying a wide range of products. It is self evident that while modest amounts of oil can be transported (in drums) on a normal lorry, livestock cannot be carried on a tanker. For operators of more than one vehicle, flexibility may be enhanced by maintaining a mix of vehicles of different sizes. Lorries with only two axles can carry light but bulky loads at a lower cost than more heavy duty models. Where, however, the load to be transported has a small volume relative to its weight, a lorry capable of carrying a larger payload will be required. For the bus operator, flexibility is also likely to be achieved by having a mix of vehicles. Minibuses, which are presently operated in most developing countries by small private concerns, carry fewer people but they can usually tackle narrower and poorer roads. The main state owned buses are single deckers of coach size, capable of carrying large numbers of people on busy routes. Double deckers, which sacrifice route flexibility in favour of volume are less popular.

A second principle may broadly be described as **suitability**. In other words, as far as possible the vehicle chosen should be suitable to the work it is expected to perform. Where a lorry is not appropriate for the cargo it is carrying, a loss is incurred by its operator. This loss may be immediate, as in the case of a heavy vehicle with high fuel consumption which is employed to transport a light load. Alternatively, it may be deferred, as in the reverse situation, where axle overloading leads to more frequent maintenance and ultimately reduces the working life of the vehicle. The same principle clearly applies to buses. Operating a large coach on a service where demand is light is not efficient while a failure to meet demand by having buses that are too small or services that are too infrequent leads to loss of potential revenue, increased wear and tear and wider costs to the community (e.g. in lost working time). In most ACP countries, the latter problem (insufficient supply to meet demand) is more prevalent. It is worth noting also that where road conditions are variable, bus bodies constructed on lorry chassis (derivatives) are likely to be more reliable.

Simplicity is a third principle which should be borne in mind. Clearly, all vehicles powered by the internal combustion engine have a certain level of mechanical complexity, but technology advances have also resulted in many 'high-tech improvements' designed to enhance performance and comfort. Where such 'improvements' are intrinsic to the functioning of the vehicle, it should be remembered that 'high-tech breakdowns need high-tech repairs' and these may not always be readily available. When they are available, they are likely to be expensive. Simple but robust vehicles are likely to be better suited to the conditions prevailing in many developing countries. Maintenance can also be simplified considerably if hauliers and bus companies are able to avoid over-diversification of vehicle marks.

The principle of **economy** is one which drives all entrepreneurs and it need hardly be elucidated. It is worth emphasising, however, the utility of seeking to predict future costs in assessing the economically efficient solution to vehicle choice. A vehicle whose purchase price is 20% lower than that of a competitor is not necessarily 20% less expensive. It may have higher fuel consumption, or a lower operating life, and may indeed turn out to be more costly to its owner in the final analysis. Of course, any calculation of future costs is, by definition, speculative and it has to be recognised that seeking to balance an immediate saving (or gain) against an unquantifiable future loss, requires a particular discipline. Better information about the benefits of this type of exercise should help to make it easier.

Choosing the right vehicle is an inexact art in any country. With so many variables and unpredictable factors, 100% efficiency in bus and lorry operations is an unachievable ideal. Maximising efficiency is a goal worth pursuing, however. In most developing countries, the variables and unpredictable factors are increased because of the financial and infrastructural limitations which prevail. Ironically, these constraints make the choice all the more important since there are fewer opportunities for a second chance. The right choice, on the other hand, will help to stimulate the economy and so provide the oxygen for a healthy economy. ○ S.H.

Roads and islands: the Vallala-Rigo road in Papua New-Guinea

When one considers the transport problems of island countries, it is the standard of the sea and air services linking them with the outside world which first springs to mind. From a development standpoint, however, roads are just as important to them as to any other country, particularly since many of them are mountainous and domestic transport is more problematic and more expensive than it would be over flat terrain. One country in this situation is Papua New Guinea (PNG), a tropical archipelago in the Indian Ocean, with a population of 3.5 million living on a total of 462 000 km^2 of land.

The report on this country which appeared in issue no 101 of The Courier (January 1987) described the biggest island in the group, where the capital, Port Moresby, is located, as having high mountains pitted with deep gorges to the west and the impressive Owen Stanley Range to the east, separating the coastal regions of the north and south. The mountains are not just high (up to 4 000 m), but also jagged. The coastal plains are often swampy or prone to flooding and there are countless rivers fed by the abundant rainfall—there may be as much as 3000 mm p.a. So there is a natural barrier to full integration of all the country's scattered tribes, very few of which are attracted by life in the towns and some of which even live in virtually inaccessible places. Although the air services are very efficient, they cannot cover such a vast and sparsely inhabited area. Boats are slow and cannot be used on all the rivers. Nor is there a railway. This is why road infrastructure has been a priority for the Government. PNG-EEC cooperation under Lomé I, II and III, for example, has concentrated on infrastructure of this type, with 15 projects accounting for more than half the national indicative programme credits (ECU 33 million). Although the focal sector for Community aid under Lomé III was supposed to be rural development, one of the cornerstones of the strategy devised for this sector is a better road system—on which an increase in rural production for the export and domestic markets depends. If they had to be flown to the place where they are marketed at home or loaded to be shipped abroad, it is obvious that very few products would be able to compete with goods which are imported or which are for sale on the world market. This is not to mention the cost of aircraft fuel which inevitably causes concern, given that it is tied to events in the Gulf.

Papua New Guinea — Main Communication System - Magi highway



Road transport

PNG's road network of 19 000 km—4950 km of national roads and 1100 km asphalted—is in fact made up of two, separate sub-networks.

Most of the national network is in the central part of the country (Lae/Mount Hagen), going down into the Southern Highlands Province, and there are other large parts in the coastal area of the north west and on the island provinces of New Ireland and New Britain. The district around the capital, Port Moresby, has only 85 km of major asphalted road, but Port Moresby, with its 130 000 inhabitants, is the country's main market and largest port. It is also near a major area of production. Some 80 km away, at Rigo, there are rubber and coconut plantations, as well as the cattle ranch financed by the 4th EDF, while beyond Rigo, near Cape Rodney, there are huge rubber, cocoa and coconut plantations. There is also a timber industry, with plans to develop it further to the Province's eastern border, and a local maize production incentive project which is attracting the interest of smallholders.



Completion of the base layer at km 34 (towards Rigo)

The 230 km Magi Highway (NR No 2) goes south west from Port Moresby to the eastern part of Central Province (54 000 inhabitants) and the ultimate aim is to join up with the Alotau road, 500 km out of the capital, in Milne Bay Province, which is currently only accessible by sea or air. The 13 km Tabuserela-Vallala stretch of this road has already been improved with EDF funding. The next section, which is currently being rebuilt and surfaced, will take it to Rigo, 26 km from Vallala, making a total of 60 km of asphalted road south east from Port Moresby, the rest being undeveloped highway. At the other end, 60 km of the Alotau road have been developed and 9 km of them asphalted.

Pouring cement for an underground duct

Leaving aside the (political) aim of national unity implicit in all transport and communications schemes and of its importance to a multi-cultural country like PNG, and discounting the link to Alotau (it is impossible to say when this will be completely ready), the road to Rigo is being developed with the following in mind.

— There are seven villages (3000 inhabitants) in the immediate vicinity of the Vallala-Rigo section of the road, but there are about 56 000 people to administer, care for, teach etc in the two districts of Rigo and Abau in the hinterland. Although there are health centres for basic treatment, the only hospital for example in the region is in Port Moresby.

— Because there is no road, the industrial and tourist potential of the area is not exploited at all.

— Various local products, especially livestock, maize and rubber, could be developed, but transport is an obstacle in each case—the slaughterhouse is in Port Moresby, transporting maize to the mill is difficult and the rubber factory is under-used because of the problems of getting the latex to it. This situation limits the development, particularly on plantations, of the kind of crops which the locals cultivate mainly for subsistence purposes. Indeed, there is very little paid rural employment. Compared to the national average, Central Province, which is beyond the immediate vicinity of the capital, is one of the least developed in the country, as is Milne Bay. This is revealed in the per capita income figures—K 528 in Central Province, K 280 in Milne Bay, but K 2115 for the Port Moresby district. Exploiting the forests means shifting logs, which in turn, requires concession contracts forcing the concessionnaire to build and maintain special roads. In some cases these would be the length of the Magi Highway itself, an obvious source of extra costs which could discourage private operators.

— The current state of the roads is such that using them is expensive. The very high rate of registration of new vehicles—about 10 000 every year out of a total of 50 000 altogether (17 000 in the Port Moresby district and 285 in Milne Bay)—shows that vehicles are being replaced because they wear out quickly.

In 1987, the traffic on the Vallala-Rigo section reached the high figure of some 450 vehicles daily. The majority of these were small or medium-sized commercial vehicles—vans, four-wheel drives and mini-buses.

What is to be expected from the road?

Funds were obtained in October 1988 and the work (see box), which began on-site in September 1989, should be finished by the end of 1991. The project is proceeding largely according to plan, with more than 67% of the work completed by June 1990, despite exceptionally bad weather. Rain at the Manugoro site was six times the June average for Port Moresby. What practical improvements can be expected? What does the economists' projected 13% rate of return mean? Estimates have been made in the light of a detailed model produced by the World Bank.

First of all, rural development in the eastern part of Central Province should mean better food and cash crop output, a better standard of living (easier access to health services, for example) and better product processing and marketing. In particular, more could be made of the Community ranch project at Rigo (2000 head of cattle produced every year, not counting the small-scale output of the herdsman nearby) and the Cape Rodney rubber scheme (development of the 300 existing blocks and the creation of 700 more). The forest resources east of the Kemp Welch could also be developed. And since there is a big demand for vegetables on the Port Moresby market, there could well be outlets there, resulting in an opportunity for small farmers to increase production. A 5% increase in traffic on the improved road is expected over the 1990-2010 period. Then, since there are a number of hauliers in competition with each other, the estimated 45% cut in the cost of vehicle operation should mean that haulage rates can be brought down. There is not expected to be much change in traffic composition and in particular, no increase in heavy vehicles, because there is little point in using expensive vehicles for the relatively short distances to be covered. Transport time could be cut by 20%, but neither this estimate nor the projected traffic increase were included in the above rate of return—the 13% refers only to savings on road maintenance (ECU 3700 per km saved every year, but ECU 21 000 to be outlaid on period maintenance roughly every eight years) and vehicle utilisation.

No damaging effects on the environment are to be expected, since, apart from minor adjustments on one or two bends, the road will be following the existing route. Rainwater, to be handled by an improved drainage system, will run off faster and there will be no traffic dust, which is an advantage as far as the local ecology is concerned.

So, Courier readers must now wait three or four years until after the work is finished, in 1995 or thereabouts, to see whether the island really has reaped the expected benefits from the road. ○ M.-H.B.

Technical specifications for the Vallala-Rigo road

— **Improved length:** 26.3 km (existing length: 26.4 km)

— **Local terrain:** flat to rolling.

— **State of road prior to work:** gravel (inadequate foundation layer) with risks of severe damage, particularly in the rainy season, and very high maintenance costs as a result; the 30 m Uruma Creek bridge not up to national highway standards.

— **Works:** site clearance for rectification of alignment, earthworks, rebuilding with sealing, drainage and bridge works.

— **Geometry:**
- formation width: 8.5 m.
- width of surfaced carriageway: 6,5 m.
- Maximum axle load: 8.5 t
- standard convoy: 33 t
- ratio of curves: 1.17
- camber: 3%
- minimum radius of curvature: 210 m.
- design speed: 80 km per hour

— **Cost to the FED:**
- grant: ECU 1.7 million
- special loan: ECU 5.5 million

— **Maintenance costs:**
- routine: ECU 2 700 per km p.a.
- periodic: ECU 21 000 per km (resealing every 7-10 years)

— **Contractor:** local (as is the consultant who drew up the project study and the office in charge of works supervision), employing local labour (150 workers for the construction).

Savings

Works

The invitation to tender for this and another (Brown River-Velmauri) road project were launched jointly to attract more competitive offers from a wider range of firms. This was a successful approach resulting in an estimated saving of K 1.3 million.

Works supervision

The same approach was taken here and a contract was concluded with the same office for both the Lomé III-financed roads. No figure is available yet for the estimated savings.

Road transport and the underdeveloped status of the Oyo North region in Nigeria

by Layi EGUNJOBI (*)

Oyo is one of the relatively developed states in the Federation of Nigeria. However, the northern part of the state ranks among the least developed regions of the country. This state of underdevelopment is associated with the fact that the region has not been opened up with required transport routes. The few existing roads are narrow, winding, pothole-ridden and unpaved in many stretches. The result is longer travelling times and greater expense for the movement of freight on a given unit of road length in Oyo North region than is the case in other parts of the state. The development of highway infrastructure, which should have topped the list of development priorities has been relegated to the background. There is now a need, therefore, to integrate the region with the rest of the country through efficient inter-regional links.

The density, orientation and quality of the transport network are factors of supreme significance influencing the socio-economic development of an area. So crucial is transport to the acceleration of the development process that Lord Lugard—one of the foremost colonial administrators—asserted in 1922 that "the material development of Africa may be summed up in one word—transport". Other writers in the field, echoing this sentiment, have variously described routeways as; the threads that hold the national system together, facilitating the movement of goods, services people and ideas (K.M. Barbour) and "the formative power of economic growth" (F. Voight).

The implications are that the rate of progress in an area where the pattern and quality of routeways is defective, will be hampered. This is a situation which the Oyo North region appears to typify. Yet the crucial role played by the region, albeit at a very high cost, in the production of food crops, is widely recognised. There is also an appreciation of the tremendous potential of the area in the context of its natural endowment.

This paper argues that the most important factor explaining the underdeveloped status of Oyo North is its transport system which remains largely undeveloped. Since the region has not been effectively integrated with the national economy, its contribution to national output will continue to remain far below full production capacity, while the quality of life of its inhabitants will continue to be low.

The Oyo North region lies in the north-western savannah part of Oyo State and comprises four local government areas. These are Iseyin, Kajola, Ifedapo and Irepo (whose headquarters are at Iseyin, Okeho, Saki and Kisi respectively). In 1988, the region had a population of approximately 1 070 000 representing 11.1 % of the total state population. The main economic activity is agriculture and the region supplies 45.9 % of the food crops and 88.4 % of the livestock produced in the state. Although the region is generally known and referred to as the state's "food basket", it is also, ironically the least developed part in terms of income level, quality and quantity of available public facilities and the social services provided. The main element in the transport system is a road which runs from Oyo through Iseyin to Saki and Kisi in the far north, with a branch from Iseyin to Ijio near the border with Benin.

Table 1 is a summary of the caracteristics of the major roads in Oyo North. The ten roads shown have a



(*) Centre for Urban and Regional Planning, University of Ibadan. Abridged version of paper presented by the author to the ISTED international conference on land transport and development held in Dunkirk, France from 18 to 22 June, 1990.

total length of 514 km. Four of these, with a total length of 213 km (41.4%) of the total) belong to the Federal Government, while the other six (301 km, ie 58.6%) fall under the jurisdiction of the State Government.

Serious constraints

The table shows that most of the roads have poor vertical and horizontal alignment. In almost all cases, they follow the track of the original footpaths and still retain several sharp curves and steep slopes. The surface conditions fall into two main categories: those with bituminous surfaces and those with laterite/earth surfaces. The main route from Oyo to Iseyin, linking the region with the rest of the country is characterised by potholes which severely reduce vehicle speeds, make travelling a harrowing experience for passengers and increase vehicle wear and tear. The Iseyin-Okeho road, which is in the process of being resurfaced, exhibits the same features. Other roads have laterite or earth surfaces and are largely impassable at the peak of the rainy season (June-September). The road shoulders are either overgrown with weeds, or completely washed away by erosion. Many of the roads are poorly drained while others have no side drains at all. As a result, they flood easily during the rains. The bridges and culverts, as noted, are low, narrow, and in some cases uncompleted. Not only do they constitute serious constraints to the smooth flow of traffic—they are also hazardous to motorists.

Isolation

The general condition of the roads in Oyo North has resulted in the isolation of the area from the rest of the state and the country in general. Although the region supplies the bulk of the livestock and foodstuffs consumed in Oyo State, it is doing this at a higher cost than would be the case if road conditions were fair. This is illustrated by Table 2 which shows that the average cost per passenger per kilometre in Oyo North is 11.0 kobo as compared to 6.25 kobo in other parts of the state. Similarly, the cost of transporting freight is higher—7.6 kobo per kilometre for a bag of maize compared with 1.4 kobo elsewhere in the state. It is not surprising to discover that the average passenger travel time per kilometre is also higher (1.4 minutes compared to 0.8 minutes).

The reasons for the relatively high cost of transport in the region are not hard to identify. First, the life-span of the vehicles plying the rough roads in Oyo North is necessarily lower than that of vehicles operating under better conditions elsewhere. This in effect means that the amortisation period of capital invested in vehicles in the region is much shorter than in other parts of the state. Second, its costs much more to maintain vehicles because of the greater frequency of service and part replacement necessitated by the poor condition of the roads.

In addition to the problems described above, emergency situations such as flooding, and washing away of bridges occur from time to time. In August/September 1987, the Awon River between Oyo and Iseyin overflowed, cutting off the region from the rest of the state. For nearly two weeks, it was not possible to transport food and livestock by this road. Situations such as this have created una-

Table 1: Characteristics of Roads in Oyo North Region

Route	Distance (km)	Ownership	Alignment	Surface Condition	Shoulder Condition	Drainage Facilities	Bridges Culverts
Oyo-Iseylin	43	Federal Government	Bends throughout length of road	bituminous; potholes	overgrown with weeds	blocked by sand deposit	narrow relative to road width
Ago-Are-Kishi	103	State Government	poor	part bituminous part laterite	weedy and eroded	poor	narrow
Igboho-Igetti	46	SG	fairly good v. and h. alignment	bituminous; even surface	planted with grass	poor and uncompleted	culverts need reconstruction
Igbetti-Kishi	63	SG	very poor vertical alignment	laterite; uneven surface	heavily eroded	poorly drained	bridges very old and narrow
Iseyin-Saki	85	FG	Fairly good horizontal alignment	40% bituminous 60% earth	good in 40% of the length; poor in others	not completed	low culverts
Iseyin-Okeho	29	FG	badly aligned	bituminous; potholes	poor	not completed	low and narrow
Iseyin-Ado Awaye	26	SG	Poor v. and h. alignment	loose earth; state of disrepair	heavily eroded	no drainage on either side	reconstructions required
Okeho-Ijio	56	FG	steep slopes	loose earth; uneven surface, muddy in rain	eroded	no drainage facilities	narrow, low and weak
Okeho-Alaga	39	SG	poorly aligned	laterite uneven surface	sand deposit	no side drains	not completed
Okaka-Komu	24	SG	bends and steep hills	loose earth; muddy in the rains	weedy	no drainage on either side	low and narrow

Source: Field Survey by Author, 1988.

Table 2: Passenger travel cost, passenger travel time and cost of transporting foodstuffs in Oyo State

Parameters	Oyo North Region	Other Parts of the State
Average Passenger Travel cost per km.	11.0 k	6.25 k
Average Cost of Transporting of Bag of Maize per km.	7.6 k	1.4 k
Average Passenger Travel Time per km.	1.4 mins.	0.8 mins.

Source: Field Survey by Author, 1988.

voidable delays in the evacuation of crops and, as a result, considerable quantities have been lost, leaving the farmers poorer.

Colonial patterns

Perhaps the first factor that comes to mind in explaining the underdeveloped condition of the transport network in Oyo North is the original pattern of major lines of communication in the country. The early major roads and rail lines exhibit a north-south orientation. Colonial development of transport networks originated from the coast in the south, and were extended northwards in almost parallel lines. The main motivating factor appears to have been the transport of crops and minerals from the hinterland towards the coast for onward shipment overseas. As a result, a large proportion of the country, and especially those parts that lie to the west and east of the transport links established, were by-passed. Oyo North happens to have been one such region.

The second factor worth noting is the nature and spatial pattern of transport investment. Since independence, substantial resources have been expended on the transport sector. However, the spatial distribution of resources has not been conducive to an efficient national transport network. For example, the Second National Development Plan, which allocated a substantial proportion of total public investment to transport, focused primarily on south-north routes. This has tended to reinforce the colonial pattern which originally by-passed large areas. Furthermore, the implementation rate of planned projects has invariably fallen short of expectation. As an illustration, of the total 1 031 million Naira projected for public investment on transport in the Second National Development Plan, the implementation rate was only 55.4% at the end of the plan period.

A third, and perhaps the most formidable factor is the changing intergovernmental relationships in the ownership and maintenance of roads. During the oil boom, the Federal Government assumed responsibility for most of the roads that were hitherto under the jurisdiction of the states. In Oyo North, among the roads taken over were the Iseyin-Saki and Iseyin-Okeho-Ijio routes. However, in the present situation of a declining economy, the Federal Government has been unable to rehabilitate and maintain several of the roads in question. This category of roads is among the worst in Oyo North.



The flood-damaged Iseyin-Saki road

Policy and planning responses

The problem as highlighted above, is the low capacity and high cost of transport in Oyo North which places a heavy burden on agriculture, and retards the development of an otherwise promising region. There is a need to open up the area through high priority interlinkages designed to achieve the objectives of development and integration with the rest of the country.

In order to achieve this policy objective, the concept of the "region" needs to be given theoretical and practical significance. In essence, a strategy of intra- and inter-regional planning should be adopted, and integrated into the national development planning efforts. The advantage of this would be that due recognition would be given to the peculiarities, problems, needs and potentialities of each designated region. Secondly, the extent and form of the interrelationship between the regions would be more easily determined. Thirdly, the nature and degree of participation of each region in building the national product would be monitored and evaluated.

Once the concept of "region" is recognised and regional planning is adopted, the role of the transport infrastructure in linking Oyo North with the rest of the country becomes distinct. It is necessarily seen at two different but interrelated levels. The first is intra-regional linkage which is presently being actively pursued. The second is inter-regional linkage which at the moment, is not receiving attention, primarily as a result of institutional constraints. What Oyo North needs now, is for greater attention to be paid to this second role aimed at integrating regions more closely and giving a vital spur to development in the process. ○ L.E.

The problems of a landlocked region

The Great Lakes region

by Dieter HAVLICEK (*)

A significant number of African countries and regions are landlocked. Without exception, access to overseas markets is vital to these countries for their economic development. Therefore, transit security, national control and cost-efficient transit transport are high on the list of these countries' policy objectives. Often the objectives conflict. For instance, increased route security and national control usually must be traded off against higher transport costs. National control does not necessarily mean increased route security. The interests of the transit countries must also be taken into account. For them transit traffic can be an important source of foreign exchange, but this must be weighed against the extra cost which that traffic imposes in terms of wear and tear on their transport infrastructures and possible conflicts with national transport interests. Therefore, policy co-ordination and co-operation between the landlocked and the transit countries is essential. What are the key problems and how can they be solved?

The transport problems of the great lakes region in Eastern Africa—Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Kivu Province of Zaire—are typically those of the landlocked:

Distances

Distances to major export/import markets are long. For instance, the shortest road distance between major trade centres is 675 km, between Nairobi (Kenya) and Kampala (Uganda) and the longest is 2100 km, between Mombasa (Kenya) and Bujumbura (Burundi). Il follows that the share of transport costs in the total cost of a commodity is higher than in countries with easier market access. For instance, CIF/FOB import ratios, a measure of transport dependency, are significantly higher for the landlocked countries of the region than for their coastal neigbours: in 1985, Kenya's CIF/FOB import ratio was 1.16 while Uganda's was 1.29 and Rwanda's 1.44. This means for a country like Rwanda, that it had to pay on average an additional 44% of the FOB value of its imports for transport and insurance. However, distance is not the only factor explaining high CIF/FOB ratios. Such factors as inefficient administrative procedures, low density traffic and inefficient transport industries and infrastructures drive up the cost of transport as well.

(*) Principal Administrator, Directorate-General for Development, European Commission. This article is based on a 1988 mission by the author to the region for the World Bank.

Inadequate infrastructure

The existing infrastructure is inadequate and often of poor quality. This problem is endemic in most developing countries but it compounds the difficulties of the landlocked on account of the sheer distances to be negotiated. There are two major transit routes to the great lakes region. The first one, through which 72% of total international transport flows, is the Northern Corridor from Mombasa through Nairobi and Kampala, Uganda, to Kigali, Rwanda, and continuing to Bujumbura, Burundi. Three quarters of traffic on that corridor is at present carried by trucks, the balance by rail. The route has suffered from inadequate road maintenance and until recently long stretches of road, particularly in Uganda and Rwanda, were major obstacles to a smooth flow of transit traffic. The ongoing and committed rehabilitation programmes, supported by the European Community, the World Bank Group and bilateral donors, will largely restore by 1990/91 the quality and capacity necessary for the traffic.

The second important transit route to the great lakes region is the Central Corridor originating in Dar Es Salaam (DSM), Tanzania, via Dodoma and Isaka and onwards to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. Road conditions are often very poor, particularly in the rainy season, when some of the dirt roads are impassable. A major road rehabilitation and upgrading programme, the Integrated Road Programme, is being carried out at present in Tanzania with the assistance of the international donor community. By 1996, 60% of the trunk roads will be in good condition, compared with 15% today. By then the corridor will be an all weather alternative to the Northern Corridor route. A rail/road alternative is being developed and it will primarily serve Rwanda but can also be utilised by Burundi and Zaire. It will probably be operational by 1992/3. In addition, there are two rail/lake routes serving the landlocked countries of the region: one, the traditional route from DSM to Kigoma and Lake Tanganyika to Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda, and the other from DSM via Mwanza and Lake Victoria to Uganda. The transit countries often complain that particularly transit traffic to and from the landlocked countries causes disproportionate damage to their roads because axle load limitations are regularly exceeded and various attempts at stricter enforcement of axle load limits have failed so far, despite the existence of an international agreement on vehicle weight limits.

Transit routes vulnerable

The political and economic upheavals in the region since the early seventies and, more recently, in Uganda and Rwanda have had a profound, adverse impact on transport routes and transit traffic. The breakup of the East African Community and its institutions resulted in the collapse and fragmentation of the reasonably efficient East African Railway Corporation into three separate railway networks: Kenyan Railways, Ugandan Railways and Tanzanian Railways. Many of the problems the three separate systems are suffering from today can be traced back to that breakup. The impact on the road network was less immediate and traumatic but such long term effects as the lack of coordinated road maintenance policies, uncoordinated transport, taxation and customs policies are being felt today. The region has not yet stabilised politically and occasional disputes between neighbouring countries can still lead to disruptions in transit flows. The shock of the demise of the East African Community was exacerbated by the decline of the Ugandan and Tanzanian economies which had an adverse impact both on international trade flows and thus transit traffic but also on the capacity of these countries to maintain their transport infrastructures.

Traffic flows imbalanced

Although this is a problem for many developing countries which lack diversified economies it is particularly serious for the landlocked countries of the Great Lakes Region on account of the enormous distances that separate them from their major export and import markets. For example, in 1987, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire imported three times more then they exported. This means two out of three trucks have no backhaul. This, of course, increases transport yet again.

Transit traffic marginalised

The administrative and operating policies of the transit countries are often inadequately geared to the needs of transit traffic. It often tends to be treated as a marginal concern while national traffic and other national considerations are given priority. Thus, the potential of transit traffic as a revenue generating source is not sufficiently appreciated and instead of facilitating transit traffic, cumbersome administrative and operating policies can hamper its development. In Mombasa, for instance, all containers, including those in transit, are inspected by customs officials and police. This increases transit time, interest costs, the danger of pilferage and often causes damage to the cargo. Moreover, direct loading from the port rarely takes place. Instead, cargo is moved to outside warehouses at a cost of $ 5 - $ 7 per ton. In contrast to procedures on the Central Corridor all transit goods using the Northern Corridor must be transit bonded in each transit country. This means that a truck picking up cargo in Mombasa for Bujumbura needs three transit bonds. Apart from the cumbersome and time consuming paperwork that needs to be done, this also causes unnecessary costs: four separate bonds are of course more expensive than a single transit bond covering the whole region.

There have been attempts to make life easier for the landlocked countries and to streamline transit procedures. Under the leadership of PTA (Preferential Trade Agreement) and supported by the EC and UNCTAD, the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi signed the NCTA (Northern Corridor Transit Agreement) in 1985. Zaire acceded in 1987. The agreement is modelled on the European TIR system which has significantly contributed to facilitate road transit across Europe. The NCTA established a single road customs transit document for the entire Northern Corridor region. So far the NCTA has not yet fulfilled the high expectations placed in it. Unfortunately the road transit document seems to have complicated the life of the truckers even more because it is at present either only used as a national document or in conjunction with previous documents. In addition there is also some resistance to its full and exclusive use both between and within customs administrations because they are not yet familiar with the new document.

Fortunately, the Central Corridor provides a good example of how, with some flexibility on the part of the authorities and those who run the transport system, operations can work a lot more smoothly. Transit goods are normally carried under a transit pass which is issued to



Map showing the main roads in the Great Lakes region (Source: International Road Federation)


The Courier

Fuel tankers in Bujumbura after the long journey over the Northern Corridor

approved C/F agents or trucking companies known to the authorities. It is cancelled when the goods leave the country. Transit bonds are used in those cases where the authorities are not familiar with the transport companies. The transit pass system is definitely superior to any of the systems used in the Northern Corridor and a PTA expert even recommended that its extension to the entire East African region should be considered.

Transit regulations for containers are similarly straightforward in the Central Corridor. Provided seals are intact transit containers can leave the port and the country unopened by customs or police. For these and other reasons, such as a significant increase in the efficiency of cargo handling in the port of Dar Es Salaam, the Central Corridor has experienced substantial transit traffic growth.

Streamlining needed

While there is a need for the landlocked countries to streamline their trade and transport, it must be recognised that they are confronted with difficult policy choices. Transit traffic and access to international markets for vital imports and exports is the stuff of life for their economies. Therefore the uninterrupted flow of goods, at almost any cost, is of utmost concern to them. Too often they have been stung by catastrophic disruptions of their trade: war, civil strife, politics. On the other hand, there is the need to minimise transit costs, particularly the spending of scarce foreign exchange. This has often led to costly solutions which did not necessarily increase transit security or economise on foreign exchange. Rwanda, for instance tried to solve the problems chiefly through national control of its transit traffic and less through route diversification over which it had anyway only little control. The country relies almost completely on road transport for its international trade. In order to minimise dependence on foreign trucking companies, Rwanda has fostered Rwandan trucking by means of administrative protection and by establishing the parastatal company STIR. Thus, international transport can only be undertaken by government approved companies. At present only STIR and Corwaco, a private company, qualify. Other national companies must act as subcontractors to these two companies who charge a 5% commission. In addition, access to cargo on the all important Northern Corridor route is restricted by means of a transport authorisation issued by the Rwandan consulate in Mombasa. Rwandan trucks have the right of first refusal. If there is cargo left non-national companies are allowed to carry it. A maximum rate for all import and export traffic has been fixed by the authorities. The policy is a success in the sense that about 70% of Rwanda's export and import traffic using the Northern Corridor is being carried in Rwandan trucks. By contrast, traffic between Dar Es Salaam and Rwanda is open to competition and the share of Rwandan trucks is less than 7%.

On the other hand, it has also had some drawbacks which have been recognised by the authorities. Firstly, a high proportion of the country's scarce investment and foreign exchange resources has been allocated to transport equipment. The country's fleet of heavy trucks more than doubled from 229 in 1982 to 565 in 1987, but utilisation rates are low. The absence of competition on the Northern Corridor increases the danger of a cost plus approach based on the least efficient. The extra costs to the economy have been estimated at


CEC

A collapsed bridge in Tanzania, now under repair

between US $ 55 and US $ 70 per ton for petroleum and dry cargo imports respectively and US $ 100 per ton for exports, in comparison to market based prices. The total cost to the economy was estimated at US $ 15 million in 1987, representing some 10% of the country's export earnings in that year. It must be doubted whether this approach leads, in the longer term, to greater transport security. Experience would seem to suggest that sooner or later, protectionism backfires with any initial gains being cancelled out by countermeasures taken by the trading partner. Now that the actual and potential costs of this approach have been realised, efforts are under way to open the transport sector to more competition and thus, to keep a better check on transport costs.

Another typical problem is the difficulty of obtaining foreign exchange in sufficient quantities and when it is needed. It is not unusual, for instance, for the transfer of funds from the Central Bank to take two months or more, or for unforeseen foreign exchange expenses such as rental surcharges or demurrage charges for containers not to be transferred at all, for fear of unlawful transfers of foreign exchange. In the first case C/F agents usually advance the forex against a service charge on top of the interest rate to be paid. Extra demurrage charges are either not paid at all or very late. This practice has probably been one of the most important reasons for the slow introduction of more efficient cargo handling methods such as containerisation.

In an attempt to reduce transport costs another landlocked country tried to direct transit traffic to a particular transport mode, namely the railways. In theory transport by rail was less costly. But in practice the transport over two national rail systems was badly co-ordinated, transit times were substantially higher than by road, service was unreliable and loss and damage to cargo increased.

Macro-economic problems

Overvalued exchange rates can have a negative impact on the efficient organisation of transit traffic, not only because of the inevitable controls and often cumbersome allocation of foreign exchange but also because they tend to distort relative costs and prices. For instance, one landlocked country paid non-national trucks 100% in foreign exchange while its own nationals only received 50% in forex, the rest in national currency. The foreign truckers in turn purchased local currency in the parallel market at a very advantageous rate and bought, in local currency, fuel, tyres and space parts at prices which to them seemed rock bottom. The effect was that competition between local and foreign truckers was completely distorted. Since the government could not eliminate these practices, it tried to compensate by introducing yet more interventionist measures with the result that everybody ended up in a losing position.

An agenda for action

Improvements in system hardware, the road and other transport infrastructure, has been encouraging and will be completed in a few years time. Co-operation between the countries of the region in this respect has on the whole been good. Donors like the European Community have actively supported this process by earmarking investment funds for regional purposes.

Unfortunately, various past and ongoing attempts by regional organisations, supported by bilateral and multilateral donors, to coordinate, simplify and rationalise transit systems, regulations and procedures have had mixed results. It must be recognised that effective regional co-operation still leaves a lot to be desired, particularly where conflicting interests are involved. This is not to say that the regional approach should be abandoned. But its full implementation and acceptance will take much longer than originally anticipated. Experience in the region suggests that a more limited but pragmatic approach, based on two or three countries and dealing with certain specific aspects of transit traffic such as the transit pass or a common insurance document, might be a promising intermediate step towards full fledged regional integration. In any case, the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement should only be extended to the Central Corridor once it is fully operational and applied by all parties to the agreement, and after its superiority over the existing procedures in the Central Corridor in terms both of facilitating transit and cost effectiveness has been demonstrated.

The other major challenge facing the region will be to maintain the transport infrastructure to the rehabilitated standards. There is no point in reconstructing roads if a system is not at the same time established to ensure the preservation of the capital investment. This requires action on several fronts simultaneously.

First, axle load limitations must be enforced. So far all attempts have failed because the economic incentive to overload is too powerful. In addition to the tighter controls, consideration should also be given to the introduction of border charges for all vehicles crossing frontiers, set out on a progressive scale and related to the loads actually carried. The proceeds from such charges should be earmarked for road rehabilitation although their primary purpose would be to tax away the benefits to the vehicle operator of exceeding vehicle axle limits and thus discourage the damaging practice.

Second, the institutional and organisational infrastructure for road maintenance must be put in place. This task is being tackled at present throughout the region with the active participation of the donor community. Third, mechanisms for the effective collection of road user charges as well as adequate and regular budget allocation of funds for road maintenance must be established. This last requirement is in fact one of the most difficult ones to implement in practice. A recent study in one of the countries of the region found for instance that widespread tax avoidance, evasion and leakage resulted in a collection rate of only 60%. The amounts lost to the treasury were equivalent to about the funds required for the full maintenance of the country's trunk and regional road network. Collection of taxes and user charges can be improved by simplifying tax structures, devising more effective tax bases, collection mechanisms and so on. But even if more tax is collected there is no guarantee that it will be spent on maintenance. Some countries have resorted to the earmarking of funds, with mixed results. There are also good economic and fiscal arguments against earmarking. But since roads are an important revenue generating source for most of the region's countries, adequate yearly allocations for road maintenance to ensure the continued long term flow of revenue should be a priority for every finance minister.

Finally, the spending of funds for roads should be governed by economic priorities. This means that the distinction between capital and recurrent expenditure should be abandoned in favour of a unified approach. Thus, funds would be allocated where benefits are highest which in the majority of cases would be road maintenance and improvement. This unified approach would also tend to reduce the bias of many governments (and donors) in favour of new road projects.

Although well maintained roads are a prerequisite for efficient road transport they are not the only one. The policy framework in which the transit system is embedded and the way the infrastructure and the transport industries are operated are equally important. An effective and efficient transit system should serve the interests of the landlocked countries by providing low cost transit transport, transit security and a measure of national control over the traffic, and the interests of transit countries by providing adequate compensation and a reasonable profit for the use of their transport infrastructure. The interests of the landlocked are best served by encouraging competition between transport corridors and transport modes as well as within modes. Increased competition between transport corridors is already a reality and will be even more so once the transit systems of the Central Corridor have become fully operational. The conditions for increased competition between modes will also be in place once the railway systems in both corridors have been rehabilitated. However, temptations to direct traffic to specific modes should be resisted as they would be a disincentive to provide a cost-effective, competitive transport service. Competition within modes first concerns the national trucking industry where entry restrictions, restricted access to cargo and tariff restrictions should be relaxed and eventually abolished. Competition from foreign trucking firms, particularly those of the transit countries, should also be permitted since this would tend to create an incentive for the transit country to consider transit traffic as an important economic activity and earner of foreign exchange. Distortions in relative costs and prices could be avoided by phasing in more realistic exchange rates. Finally, the landlocked countries must realise that the transit countries are not in the charity business. In other words the economic incentives for the provision of transport infrastucture and services must be adequate. This means that the landlocked should accept, and in a longer term perspective, negotiate within a common regional framework, remunerative user charges. Once it has been demonstrated that, despite conflicting national interests, common solutions can be found and are supported, the definition and eventual implementation of a common regional policy might again be possible, even in the present difficult geopolitical context. ○

D.H.



The Courier

Enlarging a section of the Northern Corridor in Burundi

Road policies in the ACPs: learning the lessons of the past

In a Dossier entitled "The main African road projects" which was published in "The Courier" in 1979 [1], we reported on the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to designate 1978-1988 as the "African Transport and Communications Decade". 12 years on, it is worthwhile recalling one of the principal reasons which prompted the General Assembly to make its declaration, namely that, "in spite of all the attention that this sector has been receiving for many years, Africa's communications network is still far too limited and of generally poor quality". As far as roads are concerned, it is difficult to avoid a sense of *déjà vu*, reading this statement at the beginning of the 1990s, for in many ways, it continues to hold good today. Nor is it a problem which is confined to Africa. The scale of the task in that continent is clearly greater but similar difficulties also afflict other developing countries, including some states in the Caribbean and Pacific. There is much talk of a "roads crisis" and no shortage of gloomy prognoses about the adverse economic impact of this situation.

Are we to conclude from this, that the UN Decade in the African context, not to mention the individual and collective efforts of governments and donor agencies over the last three decades, have been a failure? To arrive at such a sweeping judgment without further analysis would clearly be unjust and the conclusion itself does not allow us to advance. It is fair to say that there have been successes as well as disappointments and that new problems have emerged which require new solutions. One might also consider what the economic situation of many states would be today, without the road programmes of the past thirty years, and without the focus which actions such as the UN Decade gave to the issue of communications infrastructure.

The preceding articles in this Dossier have sought to analyse some of the specific problems which currently affect road transport policies in ACP countries. The purpose of this contribution is to draw together some of the main strands raised in these articles.

(1) Volume 54, March-April 1979.

The economic background

In the first place, it is clear that the problems facing road transport in the ACPs cannot be dissociated from the wider economic difficulties. It is a truism, even in high income societies, that available resources fall short of identified needs, and choices, therefore, have to be made as to how the resources are allocated. In most ACP countries, the gap between resources and needs is a very large one and the room for manœvre is accordingly limited. It is unrealistic, in these circumstances, to suggest that any one sector can fully escape the consequences. As far as road policies are concerned, this poses a particular dilemma. Good communications are recognised as a basic prerequisite for improving economic performance and any failure to establish or maintain the vital networks undermines existing activities and future prospects in other economic sectors. Reduced economic activity means even less revenue will be generated and thus, the problems will multiply.

Given this situation, the obvious argument is that the authorities concerned (national governments and donors) should, in the allocation of scarce resources, give priority treatment to road transport. The justification for this would be that the vicious circle of economic decline can only be turned into a virtuous circle of growth if the fundamental infrastructure is created and maintained. The problem is that equally cogent arguments can often be raised in favour of other areas of expenditure which are competing for the same resources. Arguably, the education system is just as fundamental to future economic success. There are also motivations other than economic ones, which cannot be lightly dismissed. Thus, for example, social stability and humanitarian considerations demand expenditure on health facilities while concern for the very future of the planet points to a growing need for new environmental policies, which will also have a cost.

It is not the purpose of this article to suggest a list of priorities with roads placed at the top. It is worth considering, however, whether more careful targeting of finite resources might be effective in offering a stimulus to growth. Since roads, as described earlier in this Dossier, are the "arteries of development", their claim must merit serious consideration. It was W.S. Gilbert who noted, in one of his songs that "when everybody's somebody, then no-one's anybody!". In the same way, when everything is a priority, then in truth, nothing is.

Adjusting the focus

During the early post-independence period, the main focus of road investment programmes in ACP countries was, understandably, on new construction. The road networks of the colonial era, particularly in Africa, had not been designed with regional trade in mind and there were huge gaps in the system, which inhibited the development of landlocked states and regions and which hindered interstate trade outwith the traditional commerce with the former metropolitan powers.

The accompanying table, which provides some information on the growth of the surfaced road network in selected African countries, would seem to suggest that progress has been made towards remedying this deficiency. As several previous authors have noted, however, a whole new set of problems has emerged due to the deterioration of existing roads through inadequate maintenance. This situation, which is reaching crisis proportions in many areas, is an obvious source of concern both for the affected countries and for donors.

There is, of course, a particular frustration in those cases where a

The paved road network in selected African countries
(figures in kilometres)

Country	mid-1970s	late 1980s (*)
Cameroon	2 155	3 100
Ethiopia	3 400	7 900
Liberia	520	700
Madagascar	5 000	5 500
Niger	1 750	3 400
Rwanda	800	850
Togo	1 120	1 650
Zambia	3 500	6 500

(*) This information is extrapolated from the "World Road Statistics 1984-1988" produced by the International Road Federation, 63 rue de Lausanne, CH - Geneva, 1202. The countries listed are those for which figures were available in 1987 or 1988.


CEC

Gravel road maintenance in Tanzania

road, which was originally constructed with donor assistance, requires complete renewal after a certain period. The waste of resources which this implies cannot be denied— as has already been discussed, timely maintenance is less costly than reconstruction, both for the public purse, and in terms of vehicle operating costs incurred by road users.

It is perhaps surprising that it has taken such a serious deterioration in road conditions for the reality of the crisis to have been recognised. The very exercise of expanding networks implies growing maintenance commitments and it is difficult to believe that this was not appreciated at the outset.

On the other hand, one can comprehend why officials, faced with a chronic shortage of funds, may have yielded to the temptation to "defer" maintenance programmes. Such decisions do not have an adverse impact which is immediately visible and they are, therefore, easier to reach, from a political standpoint. It should also be recognised that extraneous factors have sometimes rendered maintenance impossible. In regions where a conflict is taking place, for example, it is hardly realistic to expect the authorities to sustain a normal programme of running repairs.

The fact that the donor community has eschewed maintenance can also be explained. An underlying aim of development assistance is to create the basis for self-sustaining economic activity. This approach tends to favour capital projects over those which supposedly involve recurrent expenditure, the latter being associated with an undesirable implication of ongoing dependence.

There are encouraging signs, however, that the lessons in this area are being learnt, albeit belatedly. This is reflected in the latest Lomé arrangements, which allow for funding of maintenance work for the first time as well as in a growing appreciation of the problem among the governments concerned. The validity of the capital/recurrent expenditure distinction in respect of roads is, in any case, doubtful. There is, after all, no clear dividing line between renewal, upgrading and maintenance.

A more effective approach is simply to aim at the optimal use of available resources, irrespective of the nature of the road project. The experience which has been accumulated over the last thirty years should be useful in this respect, since it puts in sharp focus, the serious long-term consequences of neglecting the maintenance issue.

Citizens' responsibility

Road maintenance may traditionally be a job for the public authorities, but users also have a responsibility not to abuse the infrastructure. If there is one single element which stands out in the deterioration of road networks, it is the extraordinary damage wrought by overloaded axles. It is worth noting that this is a practice which occurs throughout the world and not merely in developing countries, although the scale of the problem in the latter appears to be greater. It may appear ironic that the countries least able to find resources for maintenance should be those most afflicted by this form of preventable human damage. In reality, however, the economic constraints depressing public budgets and the circumstances which induce owners to overload their vehicles spring from the same condition of underdevelopment.

The problem needs to be tackled from two different angles—information and enforcement. We have already seen that the neglect of maintenance is linked to the absence of immediate visible damage. Vehicle operators do not see the damage either—or at least not after any single journey with overloaded axles. It is therefore, necessary, to publicise a number of elements including:
— the cumulative damage caused to the road surface (perhaps by reference to an existing road in poor condition which people remember in better days);
— the enormous increase in damage caused by relatively modest overloading;
— the increased costs to the road user, both because of the poor state of the roads, and more directly because of the extra strain imposed on vehicles through excess loading.

The last of these elements is probably the most compelling, since it emphasises the long term cost inflicted by the "offender" on his own pocket. At the same time, the more that axle overloading can be made to be seen as anti-social, from the point of view of the community as a whole, the easier it should be to control.

Better information obviously needs to be accompanied by strengthened implementation of the rules. This means having more frequent and more stringent inspection arrangements as well as effective enforcement. It has been suggested that mistaken have been made in building roads only to a standard commensurate with the local norms, rather than to a standard reflecting the reality of excess loadings. It should be appreciated that the latter approach, in addition to sending the wrong message to road users about the seriousness of axle limits, involves considerably more cost to the public purse. It is surely more desirable to aim at a system based on respect for the rules rather than one which implicitly acknowledges that they are being flouted.

Market liberalisation

While the axle loading issue is a specific problem which requires to be tackled, economic operators who utilise road networks are also caught up in more fundamental developments affecting the structure of the markets as a whole. There is clearly a very strong current in favour of economic liberalisation which is being manifested in many ACP states as well as in other parts of the world. This phenomenon presents new challenges both for the governments and for road hauliers and bus operators. Arguably, the increased popularity of free market concepts has come about because lessons have been learnt from the recent past—certainly, the popularity of centrally planned economic systems has dramatically waned over a very short space of time, as people have reached negative conclusions about the capacity of such systems to deliver economic prosperity.

This has begun to have an impact on commercial, road sector operations in the ACP States. State controls are being loosened in many countries and market opportunities are being created for new operators.



Increased lorry pollution will be a problem in the longer term

There is fairly convincing evidence that such policies, which involve increased competition, improve efficiency and, in consequence, stimulate economic activity.

As far as buses are concerned, the free market trend may help to improve the lot of passengers and to eliminate some of the problems which have bedevilled government-operated public transport systems. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that in many ACP countries, private operations emerged to satisfy unmet demand, long before the more generalised move of recent years towards a free enterprise culture. (If one is looking for "pure competition" in a market, the matatu buses of Kenya and similar services in other ACP states, in the early days before operators became more organised, come very close).

On the other hand, the effects of liberalisation need not always be positive. Passengers are unlikely to benefit if state monopolies are merely replaced over a period of time by private monopolies. The social impact of reduced regulation needs to be assessed and in particular, issues such as working conditions for employees, safety and bus provision on unviable routes need to be tackled. A further consideration, which is certain to gain in importance, is the environmental issue. A growth in prosperity is likely to lead in the longer run to increased car ownership, and perhaps even a reduction in bus operations. In the developed world, exhaust and noise pollution has reached serious levels in many cities and there is a growing recognition that road transport has its limits. The trend appears to be in favour of railways—something which is clearly not a viable option at present for most ACPs.

The issues are very similar as regards road haulage. The efficiency gains resulting from competition are indisputable but effective regulations are needed to ensure that the worst aspects of a "free for all" are avoided. In the long term, the polluting effects of increasing numbers of lorries will also have to be tackled.

In addition, there are the problems raised by the absence of a level playing field in Africa, as a result of the different road traffic rules which exist in different states. This is particularly irksome for landlocked countries which already have the structural disadvantage of higher costs for both imports and exports. Creating a free market within some of the smaller states will not be particularly meaningful unless measures are taken to approximate conditions on a wider regional basis.

The future

There can be little doubt that many of the policies of recent decades affecting road transport have not lived up to initial expectations. The articles in this Dossier, however, illustrate that many of the deficiencies of past policy have been recognised and that new approaches are possible to remedy them. It is an unfortunate fact that progress is often only achieved by a process of three steps forward and two steps back. For the foreseeable future, the specific emphasis is likely to be focused on maintenance, rather than on large scale new roads. Some will see this as retrenchment but others may choose to characterise it as essential progress on the learning curve towards sustainable development. More generally, the biggest impact is likely to come from the liberalisation process. Whether this can transform the ACP countries for the benefit of all the inhabitants remains to be seen, but if it does, it will be reflected first in the road transport sector. ○ S.H.

Investigation before conservation

by Michael D. HOLLAND (*)

Areas of biological importance should not and cannot be protected by simply declaring the area a reserve or national park; there must always first be a comprehensive understanding of how the local inhabitants depend on the area for their livelihood. This is particularly true where the traditionally sustainable agricultural system, that used to be in balance with nature, is breaking down under the pressures of increasing population to the point where it threatens the survival of tropical forests. This article describes one such experience in Nigeria and emphasises the need for a complete understanding of how local social and farming systems operate before the introduction of formal protective measures.

The Oban Hills area of Cross River State, in the southeast corner of Nigeria, contains the largest remaining area of undisturbed rain forest in the country. Indeed, with about 90% of Nigeria's forest having already been destroyed by both unsustainable forestry exploitation and the need to clear land for the increasing population, it is the only significant piece of natural forest left. An ancient forest some 60 million years old, Oban Hills is particularly rich in both plant and animal species and is contiguous with the better known Korup forest over the border in Cameroon.

Recognising the importance of this forest, the Federal Government of Nigeria, at the request of the Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), declared its intention to establish a National Park to conserve some 3 000 km^2 of primary rain forest in the Cross River State. The Government contracted the WWF to produce a feasibility study of the development and future management of the National Park, financed by the European Development Fund of the EEC. This study included aspects of National Park planning, forestry and agroforestry issues, environmental education, fish farming and project economics.

At the same time, the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was invited to fund a team from LRD/NRI [1] to support the National Park study by carrying out a comprehensive land evaluation study of the Support Zone. This was recognised as an essential component of the study as the current main threats to the proposed National Park were (apart from continued commercial logging) the farming and hunting activities of villagers who lived around the Park. These villagers enjoy both legal and traditional rights within the Park and, to a varying degree, depend on its resources for their livelihood.

The concept of a Support Zone around the Park was developed to include all these forest-dependent communities. The purpose of this was to ensure that the villages fully benefited from the eventual employment and income opportunities arising from Park development and, so that compensation could be assessed for the loss of their rights to exploit the forest. The long term aim was to involve these people so closely with the Park that they would eventually wish to preserve it themselves.

The LRD/NRI land evaluation study was carried out by an agriculturalist, a socio-economist, and two soil survey and land use specialists. Their functions were to:

— define the boundaries of the proposed Support Zone, undertake soil survey, soil and terrain mapping and current land use mapping;

— examine the socio-economy of village life, study the farming and livestock production systems, hunting and gathering activities and other non-farming activities that make use of the Park's resources in order to assess the potential effects of being unable to use the forest, and what alternatives could be offered to benefit the village communities.

The overall aim of the study was to draw up costed proposals for sustainable agricultural development designed to increase the income potential of the Support Zone but without any destructive exploitation of the forest.

Interviews with the chiefs and a number of farmers from each of the villages within the 1 500 km^2 area determined as the Support Zone suggested a population of 40 000.

It was discovered that the economies of the Support Zone villages depend to a large degree on the rainforest. The current farming system requires annual clearance of forest for fresh, fertile land to plant plantains followed by roots and other crops. The annual clearance of primary forest for this purpose within the Support Zone was estimated to total some 3 000 ha/yr—an obvious threat to the forests of the Park.

Additionally, much of the proposed Park area was found to be used for hunting and gathering of forest products, activities which produced significant incomes for most households. The loss of income from these activities, which would not be permitted to continue in the Park, was estimated to total Naira 31 million at 1989 prices (or some 60% of estimated total income of the Support Zone villages).

Apart from reducing the availability of land on which to hunt, trap and gather, the creation of the Park would reduce village income derived from royalties on the exploitation of timber and chewing sticks and reduce the

(*) Agriculturalist, Land Resources Department, Natural Resources Institute.

(1) The Natural Resources Institute (NRI) is the scientific agency of the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA). The Land Resources Department (LRD) of NRI is essentially involved in the mapping, evaluation and development of land and water resources in developing countries. LRD increasingly finds itself concerned with assessing the environmental impacts of specific development proposals.

LRD specialises in a multi-disciplinary approach to all types of rural development problems and has a complement of some 50 professionals covering agriculture, livestock, forestry, water resources, applied meteorology, ecology, soil survey, cartography and land use planning.

Cross River National Park and Project Area



M.D. Holland

The Kwa Falls on the Great Kwa River flowing through the Cross River National Park

employment opportunities created by small-scale loggers converting timber to planks in the forest and head-loading them to the nearest road.

It was clear that unless the villages that border the Park were offered an alternative source of income, at least equivalent to the loss of income caused by the creation of the Park, then living standards would fall. The already low income levels of many village families meant that further reduction could cause severe hardship.

From the Government's point of view it was important that this should not happen. Not only would it cause considerable village hostility towards the Park, but the economic pressures so created would cause significant unauthorised exploitation of the Park area. This would be almost impossible to control.

There were found to be few, if any, income-generating activities that did not depend on forest exploitation or agriculture. It thus appeared that the most direct way of increasing village incomes would be to intensify and stabilise production from plantations, foodcrops and livestock. Indeed, it was realised that agricultural development had considerable potential, if only because current yield and productivity levels were so low that relatively simple agricultural improvement could show considerable yield benefits.

Consequently, the study has proposed agricultural strategies which could:

— increase sustainable agricultural productivity in traditional land use areas;

— alter the present bush fallow rational farming system so as to remove the need for new areas of forest each year;

— provide increased employment opportunities in the village agricultural sectors to replace hunting and trapping.

The most important problem regarding agricultural intensification is the very low fertility of most soils in the area. The dominant rocks from which the deeply weathered sandy soils have formed are old and yield few plant nutrients.

Conservation of organic matter levels is therefore of greatest importance in maintaining soil fertility, both in terms of nutrient supply and the retention of nutrients within the root zone.

Other constraints to intensification include: the risk of increased soil erosion; the current low levels of farmer technology (particularly in the livestock production sector); the lack of agricultural advice; poor access to credit; shortages or uncertain availability of fertilizers and chemicals and the lack of improved planting materials or livestock for breeding.

On the basis of these findings and on the soil and land suitability studies, the agricultural developments proposed for the Support Zone were:

1. *Improvements in methods used in food crop production.* Basic improvements to agricultural methods such as correct plant spacings, better weed control, use of legumes in crop rotations, the use of fertilizers and lime where appropriate and the economical and effective use of chemical pest and disease control methods, have the

potential to increase yields substantially for very little extra cost to the farmer. This greater expertise would, of course, be important for the successful adoption of all the other agricultural developments proposed.

2. *The introduction of agroforestry techniques.* On the infertile soils of most of the area, it is probably only the inclusion in the rotation of a long fallow of deep-rooting trees that maintains the soil in a satisfactory condition for foodcrops. The agroforestry farming systems aim to retain all the advantages of the tree component in maintaining soil fertility whilst increasing the overall productivity of the land in terms of food. The types of agroforestry considered most appropriate were alley cropping, intercropping and planted fallows.

3. *Development and improvement of smallholder oil-palm plantations.* The use of improved varieties of oil-palm could more than double the yields of oil from a plantation compared to the use of wild or unimproved palms. Similarly, the use of improved small-scale processing equipment could increase the efficiency of oil extraction from 40% to 90%.

4. *Development and renovation of smallholder cocoa plantations.* Since the recent deregulation of cocoa prices in Nigeria, this crop has proved profitable on the better soils of the area. The previously fixed prices were very low and many plantations had been allowed to revert to a poorly maintained and unproductive condition. Ensuring the availability of technical advice and agrochemicals to these small plantations could achieve a rapid increase in production levels. Inter-planting cocoa with cola nut could reduce the risks associated with price fluctuations of this export crop.

5. *Development of smallholder bush mango plantations* (2). Bush mango is a highly valued local product most of which is harvested from wild trees in the forest. Budding and grafting techniques have now considerably reduced the period before first harvest and have enabled plantations of consistent quality to be established. Commercial production of this fruit is now a real possibility.

6. *Livestock development.* Livestock husbandry was found to be the least well developed agricultural skill in these communities (probably a result of the availability of, and local preference for, hunted "bushmeat"). If hunting were to be reduced then it would be necessary to provide meat from other sources. In any case, small stock, such as sheep and goats, whose feeding requirements can be met almost exclusively from the products of forest and fallow, will have a most valuable place in improved farming systems.

These agricultural improvements are not complicated to implement or maintain but the fairly abrupt transition from a mixture of hunting, gathering and farming to an economy dominated by cash and subsistence crop farming will require high quality advice and support. Furthermore the pace of the change would be set by the need to protect the remaining areas of primary forest, rather than the rate of adoption of the new methods by the farmers themselves. For these reasons it was considered necessary that the Support Zone be serviced by a very active extension and advisory programme that was specifically designed to meet the particular needs of the Zone.

This would be complemented by a tree-crop nursery, an animal breeding station and fertilizer and chemical supply system to ensure that the lack of these inputs did not continue to hold back development. An equally important introduction would be the provision of an agricultural credit scheme for the Zone.

The project has further proposed to establish a small research unit to undertake on-farm trials to test the efficiency of the systems adopted and monitor the long term effect of the various land use types on the soil characteristics.

Even so, the immediate losses resulting from the withdrawal of access to large areas of the Park are unlikely to be fully compensated by improvements in agricultural income in the short term. The agricultural promotion and extension schemes, however intensive, will necessarily take some time to become effective. Thus a system of Village Conservation Development funds was proposed from which payments could be made to finance village infrastructural developments and educational scholarships as agreed by the Support Zone management and the village councils. The total size of this fund was to approximate to the estimated losses resulting from restrictions on hunting and gathering activities in the first year, and would be expected to phase out over a seven-year period. These funds would only be payable if the village as a whole accepts the principle of the Park and agrees to respect the regulations. This will provide more incentive for the traditional village authorities to support the Park staff in protecting the forest.

It was seen to be important to ensure that any new incomes or revenues that develop as a result of the Park's establishment are shared by the local communities. Consequently, it has been proposed to undertake a feasibility study of the eventual formation of a company or corporate body (of which villages in the zone would be shareholders) designed to capture all these potential incomes. These might be from the more commercial activities of support zone development (sales of breeding livestock, tree seedlings, etc.), from tourism activities, from fees from visiting scientific workers or, in the long term perhaps, royalties payable on the use of the genetic resources of the Park by, for example, the pharmaceutical industry.

Clearly the whole concept of forest conservation in this area is that enforced protection is exceedingly unlikely to be effective in the long term. And though a degree of policing will of course be necessary, of far greater importance is to devise methods to ensure that the protection of the area is of both direct and long term benefit to the very people whose activities are most likely to be a threat to its continued existence. This in itself demands a thorough study leading to a good understanding of the natural and human environment not only of the proposed Park area, but also of the surrounding zones that may interact physically or economically with the proposed National Park. ○ M.D.H.

(2) Irvingia gabonensis, a wild forest fruit, the seed kernel of which is used as an ingredient of soups and has a high commercial value on the local market.

Traditional dance in Zimbabwe

by Chris McIVOR (*)

Harare and Bulawayo, indeed all the towns and cities of Zimbabwe, support the normal contingent of discotheques and dance halls common to their Western counterparts. The audiences here seem little different from those found in London or Paris, wearing similar dress and imitating the newest dance routines broadcast over television and music videos direct from Europe. Western music and dance play the same ubiquitous role in Zimbabwe as they do throughout the globe and there is increasing concern among cultural authorities that if this continues, very little of Zimbabwe's own contribution to this field will remain. Claimed one official in the Ministry of Education and Culture, responsible for promoting traditional dance in Zimbabwe, "We cannot hope to get rid of Western cultural influence. It is too widespread in our own population ever to be abolished. But what we are trying to do is to alert our younger audience to another tradition, a style of dance and music that sustained our ancestors and formed the core of our own social and cultural identity".

Traditional dance was largely ignored by the colonial authorities in Zimbabwe prior to independence. A local historian pointed out, "For the young especially, anxious to get ahead under colonial rule, to have anything to do with traditional beliefs and practices was seen as tantamount to hindering their own economic and social advancement".

Where traditional dance was encouraged, however, was at Victoria Falls and other tourist attractions, promoted as entertainment for Western visitors to the country. But as Mr Maposa, a Ministry of Culture official explained, to concentrate on the "entertainment" value of traditional dance was to ignore its profound influences within the Shona and Ndebele societies. Birth, marriage, death, the planting and harvesting of crops etc., all the major influences in the life of a community were celebrated through dance. Religious beliefs and practices were enshrined in various dance routines. As a form of social cohesion which united members of a community it also played an important role. It functioned as a means of curing both physical and psychological illness. "In general those aspects of dance continued to flourish in remote rural areas, the Tribal Trust Lands, which, because of their low economic status were of little importance to colonial, authorities. In towns and cities its importance had largely been forgotten".

National dance group founded

After independence in 1980, however, this was to change, with active Government promotion of indigenous culture in a variety of fields. In early 1981, with the support of the cultural section of the Ministry of Education, the National Dance Group of Zimbabwe was founded. This was composed of 32 members, after auditions were held throughout rural Zimbabwe to locate a core of performers with knowledge of the particular dance forms found in their areas. Under the supervision of a choreographer and research assistant, these techniques were collated into a repertoire of music and dance that represented all the major ethnic groups throughout the country.



Chris McIvor

"Traditional dancers perform at a national gathering in Harare"

(*) Coordinator of the British Aid Agency in Zimbabwe.

The purpose of the dance troupe was twofold. On one level they functioned as a performing group, representing Zimbabwe in cultural festivals both within and outside the country. "There is considerable interest in resurrecting traditional cultural forms that had been neglected under colonial rule", claimed one member of the group. "Thus we took part in festivals in several African countries and also hosted groups from countries like Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi".

Their other role is an educational one and members of the group function as a resource to promote the development of traditional dance in both rural and urban Zimbabwe. Thus the formation of community dance groups has been encouraged with the provision of funds from local government for equipment and access to training. The National Dance Group regularly organises seminars and workshops in provincial centres for dance leaders from the more than 200 groups that have sprung up in the country since independence. These groups now compete at an annual national competition in Harare, which receives major coverage through the local media.

As far as training is concerned there are also plans to construct a National Dance Centre in Harare within the next few years. This will offer professional courses for students and potential trainers as well as functioning as a documentation and resource centre not only for Zimbabwe but for other countries in the region.

At the same time the Ministry of Education and Culture actively encourages the formation of dance groups at schools and training centres throughout the country. There is an allocation of funds for equipment, and workshops and seminars are regularly held for teachers nominated to train students in this field. Claimed Mr Maposa, "From a situation prior to 1980 where no school was allowed to host traditional dance, we have now reached a stage where at primary level the majority of schools in the country have a group of one sort or another".

Is there not a danger of traditional dance becoming static, rooted in a past which might be significant but has now been left behind? According to Mr Maposa this is not the case. Traditional dance forms have managed to assimilate other cultural trends and western dance steps, for example, are regularly included in new routines. Members of the National Group, he pointed out, receive exposure to new techniques both within and outside the continent, and part of the criteria for judging groups at district and national competition is their capacity for innovation.


Chris McIvor

"Uniquely Zimbabwean but with scope for innovation"

"The ability to develop in new ways", he concluded, "is a mark of how vigorous a cultural form is. Recently we invited a troupe of Russian dancers to tour the country and were encouraged to note how some of their routines were used by our own groups at a later stage. Yet our dances remain uniquely Zimbabwean. What we are trying to achieve is a partnership with other cultures, not subservient imitation". ○

C. McI.

The coelacanth

by Erik Rotsaert (*)



In 1938, a trawler dragging its nets 40 m down in the Mozambique Channel brought up an astonishing creature. In 1952, 15 years later, a Comorian fisherman caught another, at 20 m, on his line. This came as no surprise, for he had caught and eaten them before, but on this occasion, a zoologist happened to see it and he was curious. He studied the animal and pronounced it to be a coelacanth, a species the scientists thought had been extinct for 70 million years.

There are two species in the coelacanth family — the coelancanth proper, a fossil which lived in the Devonian (an age of the Paleozoic, between 330 and 280 million years ago), and Latimeria chalumnae, usually called coelacanth too, which is found off the east coast of Africa and the Comoro Islands.

Is this creature really a fish? The experts are divided. In some ways, it is quite extraordinary. It may be as big and heavy as a human being (the adult coelacanth may measure 1.60 m and weigh 65 kg), it is oviparous, has a winding slit of a mouth, gular plates (bony scales by the gills), a fat-filled, natatorial pouch with no hydrostatic function and all the characteristics of the order to which it belongs—the crossopterygians, with their paired, paddleshaped fins. This is why it is sometimes thought to be a direct ancestor of the first terrestrial vertebrates—i.e. for those who believe in the evolution of the species, a possible ancestor of man himself...

Since 1952, a number of coelacanths have been caught and scientists have had the opportunity to observe them and even keep them in aquariums for short periods, but our biological knowledge of the creature is still incomplete. Erik Rotsaert's article describes the way the Comorians catch coelacanths.

The oldest vertebrate

Latimeria chalumnae, the coelacanth, is the oldest living vertebrate on our planet.

This already makes it exceptional, but it has other distinctive features too, batrachian-like ones—indications of lung apparatus, muscular nodules at the base of the pectoral, posterior dorsal and anal fins and so on—which suggest the beginnings of adaptation to life out of the water. But in all probability, the geographical events of the era halted this evolutionary process towards crawling on land.

So far, coelacanths have only been found off the Comoro Islands, Anjouan and Grande Comore particularly. As the coral rim around these two islands is very narrow, the fishermen soon learned to fish at considerable depth (down to 300 m) and they know all about coelacanths, which can only be caught at night, on the bottom, at the same time as other fish (sharks, Ruvettus pretiosus, etc.) which can be sold.

There are a number of problems attached to fishing at great depths in a heavy current. Traditionaly, the old Comorian fishermen use a specially made line and a method which they have partly adapted to bag coelacanths, but the creature resists systematic capture because of the solid protection of the strong current.

How they fish

The Comorians have two "lost stone" techniques:

*** The one-stone technique**

The hook is baited, preferably with a piece of "rudi" (Promethichtus prometeus, which can be fished in similar conditions) and the line weighted with a stone, tied to the end of a separate line fixed to the main line about 50 cm above the hook, which carries the whole thing down fast and anchors itself on the bottom. The fisherman then flicks the line, freeing the stone, and the line stays on the bottom for a few seconds, maybe more, depending on the strength of the current. Since light vessels like Comorian pirogues drift easily, the line takes time to come back up on the current. Once it is there, the whole operation is repeated.

*** The two-stone technique**

Some fishermen have improved the system by using two stones. The baited hook is put on the first stone and the whole thing is covered with pieces of chopped fish and kept together by three or four turns of the line. A second stone is then tied to this in the same way and the line fixed with a loop under the last turn. The flick of the line releases both the stones on the bottom and a cloud of chopped fish to make the bait more attractive.

Fishing equipment and how they make it

Traditionally, the Comorian fishermen have a special line ("tsissi") for deep sea fish in the benthic zone and for the coelacanth ("kombessa") particularly.

(*) Fisheries technology expert with the EDF artisanal fishing project in Comoros.



Glossary

Ubwo	=	skimmer
Sembea	=	knife
Kumangu	=	weight
Tsissi	=	line
Tedje	=	spinner
Teleba	=	cross



Twisting (above) and plaiting (below) the threads

1. **What they use**

A. *The tsissi*

This, which is now only made in one or two villages, is dying out, as artisanal fishing is being modernised and strongly geared to the far more commercially viable pelagic species. Modernisation seems to be the best guarantee of survival of the coelacanth, of which an estimated 100-200 still survive around the two islands.

Tsissis (see diagram) consist of:

i) a "dingo ya tsissi" — the top end of the line;
ii) a "mdigo m'beli" — the next section;
iii) an "umbeli", the end of the line, to which the hook is fixed;
iv) an "utsungo", or tail, an extra line fixed to the "umbeli" and used to hold the weight;
v) an "ulowo ya maze" or night fishing hook.

B. *What they need:*

i) cotton (from old cloth, for example) for the line;
ii) — a "tedje";
— a "teleba";
— a "sembea" (knife);
— fresh bark of the "m'bessi" tree.

2. **How they proceed**

Lines are usually made by plaiting three threads of unbleached cotton — thicker ones for the "dingo ya tsissi" and thinner ones for the "mdigo m'beli" and the "umbeli".

i) Before plaiting, the cotton is twisted round a thread with a "tedje".
ii) The first twisted line is tied to the side of one of the two "teleba", which is anchored under the fisherman's foot or a rock. It is then passed round a hook, tree trunk etc., and back to the fisherman, who holds it taut.
iii) A second twisted line is fixed to the second "teleba", turned round the first line and pulled so the twists are tight. This is then repeated with the first two threads and the third thread.
iv) Pieces of twisted (three-thread) line are then put end to end to form a complete line (about 150 fathoms).
v) The finished line is rubbed with two coats of fresh grated "m'bessi" (Trema orientalis or ulmaceae) bark, left to soak in seawater for three days and given a final coating of bark.

It takes at least a month to produce a 150-fathom line.

3. **Advantages**

According to the older fishermen, "m'bessi" bark is good because it:

— reduces the likelihood of broken lines;
— protects the untreated cotton from seawater, sun and fraying;
— makes the whole line more rigid so it takes longer to float back to the surface. ○

E.R.

CTA Bulletin
TECHNICAL CENTRE FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL COOPERATIO

Networking for agricultural development: fact or fashion?

by Dr John Farrington (*)

Five broad questions are repeatedly raised in debates about the pros and cons of networking: what constitutes a "network"; why has there been so much recent interest in networking; what types of network can be identified; and what does the future hold for networking?

What is a network?

At its simplest, a network is a group of institutions or individuals who share information on themes of common interest. There are many other ways of disseminating information on agricultural development: professional journals carry the results of experiments, and libraries and abstracting services form part of a wider information system. Audiovisual media—radio, television and film—are playing an increasing role in this system. Networks perform many of the same functions, but what makes them essentially different is their aim of generating interaction among members. Networks do not simply inform; they stimulate a response in the form of discussion, or reports on other members' similar or differing experiences.

Many small networks perform these functions in a highly informal way—a few key individuals circulate copies of correspondence, news items or articles among others working in the same subject area whom they know directly. But larger networks—of the type that chiefly concern us here—publish a newsletter containing editorials, viewpoints, interviews, news of forthcoming conferences and training courses, reports of work in progress and reviews or summaries of key literature. Typical examples are the newsletter of the Paris-based Réseau Recherche Développement (RRD) and that of the Information Centre for Low External Input Agriculture (ILEIA). In other cases, newsletters are supplemented by separate papers that allow in-depth treatment of particular themes. This format has been pioneered by the four networks operated from the London-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in Social Forestry, Pastoral Development, Irrigation Management and Research and Extension, the oldest of which was established over 15 years ago.

Most formally-constituted networks require members to provide information on their responsibilities, interests and past experience. With members' agreement, this information is then made available—either on request or through a published register—to facilitate contacts among members.

Why so much interest in networking?

Networking is now a fashionable concept and has attracted much donor funding. No comprehensive survey has been conducted to establish how rapidly networking has grown, or how many networks currently focus on agricultural development. However, a recent meeting in The Hague to establish AGRINET—an umbrella organisation for European-based networks on agricultural development—was attended by representatives of 20 networks from seven countries. Thirteen of these were formally constituted with Newsletters and registers, and had, on aggregate, over 13 000 members, most of whom were located in developing countries. At a rough estimate, other networks interested in the AGRINET concept but unable to attend the meeting have a further 5 000 members.

The reasons for increased interest in networking are not difficult to detect. Qualities that appeal both to network members and to funding agencies include:

Timeliness — publication of a journal article tends to be a lengthy process: an experiment or survey has to be completed, results analysed and a paper refereed before it can be published. Networks aim for greater immediacy, publishing preliminary results and news of work in progress in order to stimulate contact among members. Some may argue that this generates premature interest in statistically unproven technologies, but such dangers are often outweighed by the benefits of stimulating new thinking, new approaches and adaptations of existing ideas. In any event, many networks are concerned not only with technological issues, but with broader questions of organisation and management which are not amenable to "proof" through statistical methods.

Focus and access — agriculturists are faced with two related problems: an enormous increase in the volume of published information, only a small part of which may be relevant to any one individual, and increasing difficulty in identifying what is relevant and then obtaining access to it. The difficulties are compounded in developing countries where libraries are fewer and rarely equipped with computerised search and retrieval facilities. Networks seek to overcome these problems by focusing on a narrow subject area, inviting persons interested in that subject area to join, and making information available in a targeted and disgestible fashion. Attractive ways of identifying and presenting key literature to readers include the "Top five" publications selected and described by a specialist in a particular field—a regular feature of the ILEIA Newsletter, and reviews and abstracts on a particular theme such as those on participatory research methods published by ODI.

Responsiveness — commercial publishers aim to respond to market demand for particular types of publication, but this can be a slow and cumbersome process, and market

(*) Overseas Development Institute, Regent's College, Regent's Park Inner Circle, London NW1 4NS.

demand may in any case be an imperfect indicator of the requirements of those working in remote locations at the "cutting edge" of development. Networks typically consist of self-selected groups of individuals who are motivated to contribute material to the Network and request from it information that would be useful to them. A coordinator sensitive to these requirements will be able to respond by periodically refining the focus of the network to suit members' requirements—but a network is only as good as its members make it: they have to generate a "demand-pull" to which the coordinator can respond.

Grey literature — formal abstracting and literature search services, even where they are available to agriculturists working in developing countries, only provide access to formally published literature. Yet much valuable experience is never formally published partly because for practitioners—especially those working outside the public sector—publication is not a high priority. By publishing short, informally written articles and notes, networks stimulate practitioners to share experiences which otherwise might remain unknown. Through reviews and features, they can also provide wider access to the limited-circulation reports produced by many agencies within and outside government in developing countries.

Types of network

Networks can be distinguished according to:

Degree of formality: are they simply informal exchanges among like-minded individuals, or do they produce a register and/or newsletters and papers—if so, how frequently and of what type?

Hierarchy: do they aim to serve practitioners directly, or do they have a structured function in relation to other institutions or networks? Network umbrella organisations have recently come into existence, such as AGRINET, as have a number of NGO-coalitions and their journals, including "NGO Networker" published quarterly by the World Resources Institute, and "Lokniti"—the journal of the Asian NGO Coalition.


La Lettre du Réseau Arbres Tropicaux

n° 14

DECEMBRE 1989

Supplément à SILVA
Arbres, Forêts et Sociétés

A travers le Mali et le Burkina Faso

Sommaire

Ce supplément est destiné aux membres du Réseau "ARBRES TROPICAUX". Il est publié à l'initiative du Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement.

Ce bulletin est diffusé gratuitement en Afrique

Will networks emerge from "fashion" to become a squarely-established "fact" in agricultural development?

Principal activities: many sub-classifications can be made here. For instance, do networks focus on a particular commodity, discipline or sub-discipline or do they treat problem areas that cut across disciplines and commodities? The Caribbean Rice Improvement Network is a good example of the former. Examples of the latter include: those having an area focus such as the Oxfam Arid Lands Information Network; those with a thematic focus, such as low-external input agriculture (ILEIA), organic farming (Agrecol; International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)), and farming systems research (Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP) now Association for Farming Systems Research and Extension (AFSR/E)), and those which combine thematic and area focus (RRD in francophone Africa; the CIMMYT East Africa Farming Systems Network; and the Asian Rice Farming Systems Network).

Many of the first type are based in international agriculture research institutes and aim to provide scientific

Contact addresses

Overseas Development Institute
Regent's College
Regent's Park, Inner Circle
London NW1 4NS, UK

Réseau Recherche Développement
GRET
213 rue la Fayette
75010 Paris
France

Information Centre for Low External Input and Sustainable Agriculture (ILEIA)
P O Box 64
3830 AB Leudsen
The Netherlands

International Ag-Sieve
Rodale International
222 Main Street
Emmaus, PA 18098
USA

AGRINET
Dr John Farrington
Overseas Development Institute
Regent's College
Regent's Park, Inner Circle
London NW1 4NS, UK

Alternex
c/o IBASE
Instituto de Persquisas
29 V Souza
Rio de Janeiro
Brazil

Oxfam-ALIN
274 Banbury Road
Oxford OX2 7DZ, UK

AGRECOL
c/o Oekozentrum
CH-4438 Langenbruck
Switzerland

International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
IFOAM General Secretariat
c/o Okozentrum Imsbach
D-6695 Tholey-Theley
Fed. Republic of Germany

Farming Systems Research-Extension Newsletter
Timothy R Frankenberger, Editor
Office of Arid Land Studies
The University of Arizona
845 N Park Avenue
Tucson, Arizona 85719
USA

support within relevant disciplines to researchers located in national programmes. Whilst technical support also features in the latter, their main purpose is to bring together persons with differing skills and to promote an exchange of the experiences they have gained in addressing particular issues. In this way, they pioneer an interest in "grey" areas, hitherto neglected because they have fallen between established disciplines. The many examples of such "grey" literature themes include the francophone "gestion de terroirs"; farming systems approaches to research and extension; and soil and water management. Interest in new areas stimulated by networks has resulted in the subsequent emergence of more formal journals, as for instance, in agroforestry.

Mode of operation: newsletters are a near-universal means of communication in networks. But other important fora exist. The "groups de travail" of the Réseau Recherche Développement, for instance, are informal groups of specialists, mainly based in France, who meet twice yearly to review and carry forward thinking on particular themes. The US-based Association of Farming Systems Research and Extension, although still having its own newsletter, now performs functions more closely identifiable with a professional association than a network. These include the organisation of an annual international symposium and publication of a journal ("Farming Systems Research and Extension").

Future prospects

Networks are set to expand for the future, providing that they can demonstrate to funding agencies that they provide a focused and cost-effective service unobtainable elsewhere. Yet, despite increased donor interest, many networks continue to exist on an insecure financial basis: several operate on grants of short duration, and insistence by some funding agencies' that a fee should be charged to at least part of the membership has often cost more in administration than the revenue generated.

Over-enthusiasm by donors is bound to lead to the establishment of some networks that prove ineffectual. Over-expansion is likely to lead to the demise of the less viable networks, but the preconditions for a steady and more sustainable expansion of networking in the future are already becoming clear:

First, networks are not a panacea. Some services such as abstracting and bibliographic search and retrieval require specialist skills and facilities. Networks should link their members into these, and create user-demand on them, rather than try to provide them directly.

Second, there is a growing need for improved communication among networks. Information on networks' current and planned activities is needed by:

— network members so that they can identify the networks most relevant to their interests;

— network coordinators, to avoid duplication of effort in networking, workshops and research, and to identify gaps that need to be filled.

Not surprisingly, demand has grown for services which provide overviews of Networks' activities. Three ways in which this demand is being met include: umbrella organisations such as AGRINET, occasional reviews such as the "Index of Sustainable Agriculture Periodicals" recently produced by International Ag-Sieve (Vol II, No 3, 1989) and third, coalitions of NGOs sometimes using high-technology communications such as Alternex—a computer-based network by and for NGOs established at the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis in Rio de Janeiro.

Skilled and sensitive coordination, encouraging members to articulate their requirements and responding to them, is the basis of good networking. As awareness among coordinators increases of each other's current and planned activities, their capacity to provide a user-oriented service will grow, and networks will emerge from "fashion" to become a squarely-established "fact" in agricultural development. ○ J.F.

The Courier's mailbag

"The image of EEC aid — a painful truth"

While I find much of your work very positive, academic and serious, the above-mentioned article was simply amusing.

It was amusing to read that the largely negative result of the opinion survey on EEC-ACP cooperation was "sobering" to Europe in general and the Commission in particular!

Even more amusing was the consultants' conclusion that the "opinion leaders" did not possess the real facts and that in future their views would have to be influenced through a systematic awareness and information policy, in order to modify their views on European Cooperation, albeit as Ferraton noted, without resort to pure propaganda. It was also amusing to note how popular "African Elite" bashing or "rubbishing" has become to the extent that the elites are now unaware of what happens in their own countries.

But what are the real facts? A few rhetorical questions and statements may perhaps indicate the direction in which these facts may be looked for.

1. In spite of a long tradition of "cooperation" beginning formally with the Yaoundé Convention, continued under the model for North-South cooperation i.e. the Lomé Convention, sub-Saharan Africa provides the world today with the bulk of its least developed states. It is a moot point whether the situation would not be the same in North Africa if these countries were not blessed with petroleum and gas deposits (The possible exception of Nigeria may be made here).

2. The relationship between low commodity prices (on which Africa's many mono—economies depend) and, among others the common agricultural policy, is too well known to deserve only mention here.

3. Why is sub-Saharan Africa the least industrialised subcontinent? Has this got anything to do with the training of "human capital" in the past? Zambia for instance had one hundred and fifty "native" graduates at the time of its independence. Has this got anything to do with its past and current problems? Zaire had no native engineer, doctor or lawyer at independence. England at the beginning of its industrial revolution had thousands of skilled people.

4. Why is it so difficult to coordinate intra-African trade? Has this got anything to do with Community members' national interests and their overall prevalence over Community interests, whatever the latter amount to?

5. How many contracts or sub-contracts funded by the EEC are awarded to ACP companies? Do EEC enterprises encourage actual dissemination of technology in ACP states e.g. information, management, marketing, processing, manufacturing technology etc.?

6. The charge of unilateralism has been laid at the Commission's door. Has it been sufficiently discharged? Can it be?

For instance how many of the Courier permanent staff and correspondents are from the ACP states? Why do you have to SEND copies of the Courier to Africa? Can't you have them printed or manufactured in ACP states? etc.

7. As for the protesting delegate of the Commission, she/he should be aware by now that most African "opinion-leaders" live dually in rural and urban areas and have to support many of those people who "really benefit" from Community aid.

Through various trials and tribulations, West Europe has gained a special place in Africa; the equivalent of the blood brother in African tradition. Consequently, it is not enough for the EEC to do what others are doing or slightly more. She must, if need be hang together with her sister. Thus the reaction of most African delegates to ACP-EEC meetings, which is increasingly "too little too late", should be looked at in this context.

The issue today and tomorrow is therefore whether the EEC will have the vision, courage and will to help in the formulation of a Marshall Plan for Africa. To desert Africa because of business opportunities elsewhere is to disregard the tendency of history to repeat itself. Until then, information campaigns will fall increasingly on deaf ears, if one is to believe the economic and population forecasts.

G.B. Wairama (Ugandan national), Edinburgh, U.K.

***Answer to point 6:** Out of 7 permanent staff, 3 journalists come from Africa. Printing and circulating the magazine out of Brussels—as the core of all ACP-EEC information flows—is still the cheapest and quickest way to get the magazine to its readers.*

Project lessons for elsewhere

We would like to express our gratitude to the regular issue of the Courier Magazine. It has been particularly useful for our project, to be informed of the several EEC projects in the Caribbean. As an EEC funded project in the Philippines, we in the Aurora Integrated Area Development Project look forward to the experiences of other EEC funded projects. We hope that through their examples, we may ultimately improve the implementation of our project. It is thus timely and relevant that we are receiving copies of your publication.

H.Z. Ongkiko, Aurora, Philippines

Tourism, an area of focus for the developing countries

As a faithful and longtime reader of "The Courier" (although only subscribing in August 1990) I have just read the dossier on tourism in the issue N° 122, July-August 1990.

I must say I am satisfied with the content which deserves to be seriously consulted by future tourism promoters of the developing countries for its lucid details as a sector which has become, unexpectedly, an endowment, but to which the locals have difficult access. Involving mainly expatriate employers and presumed to have serious social and moral consequences for the population, tourism has become an area of focus in the developing countries (especially in Senegal where it has given a considerable boost to the economy). But there is an important aspect that was not treated or was slightly treated in the Caribbean section: tour operators, the backbone of the industry. This, in my opinion, is one of the components for any destination with, of course, such things as promotion and marketing which some countries like Senegal do abroad. If this circuit (marketing expertise-tour operators; travel agencies, etc.) were a little more controlled by nationals, this product (i.e. tourism receipts) would perhaps make a better contribution to the safeguarding of the national economy. Finally, the contacts, the meetings of foreign and national professionals and the relevant institutions should lead to agreements (an appreciation of the components, followed by reflexions on ways of implementation; for example, the length of stay of visitors) for the consolidation of old or the relaunch of new raw materials.

Kéba Tamba, Dakar, Senegal

ANALYTICAL INDEX (1990)

Note: This index does not include the CDI pages, the Books Column, the News Round-Up (with exceptions) or the Operational Summary.

Publication dates: Nos. 119: January-February 1990
120: March-April 1990
121: May-June 1990
122: July-August 1990
123: September-October 1990
124: November-December 1990

(*) ACP: see Regional Cooperation and ACP-EEC relations column.

R. CHAUDENSON and D. de ROBILLARD — **Langues, économie et développement** (Language, economics and development) — Volume I — Institut d'Etudes Créoles et Francophones, UA 1041 du CNRS, University of Provence — Distributed by Didier Erudition — 1989 — 257 pages.

Here, in the Langues et Développement series—which also includes a valuable selective 217 page bibliography, with comments, on linguistic developments and development in the French-speaking area by the same authors (with M-C Hazaël-Massieux) and the same publisher—is a compendium of papers on relations between language and development, a subject discussed in N° 119 of *The Courier*. The idea is to take the vast set of so-called cultural data and "isolate the very special and absolutely fundamental problems of language... which has very special situations, places and functions, particularly in the countries of the South". In teaching, for example, "there is no point in dreaming up the best multilingual and multicultural education for a developing nation which cannot even get a clearly inadequate system to work properly. What has to be done is to use its political choices... and economic targets... as bases on which to define the content and linguistic strategies which the education system has to have, to get the best possible results with the means available" (R. Chaudenson). Most of the papers break new ground on subjects which have had little or no attention so far, and cannot be described in detail here, but we shall quite arbitrarily mention the following: Robillard's "Linguistic development, economic planning and decision-making processes", Manessy's "the subversiveness of imported languages—French in Black Africa", Arnold's "Multilingualism as a factor of development" and Chaudenson's "Grid for the analysis of language situations in the French-speaking area".

ooo

Here are some of the books of interest to ACP countries (and other developing countries too) which have recently been brought out by or for the French Cooperation Ministry.

Michel SÉRUZIER — **Construire les comptes de la nation (Constructing the nation's accounts) - Paris — 1988 — 407 pages — FF 110.**

This is a guide for national accountants. It conforms to UN national accounting standards and it describes the whole process from data collection to the compilation of the system's recommended tables of income and outlay, general economic details and financial operations. It also explains the economic arguments behind the concepts in question to make for easier adaptation to the specific features of each country.

Elisabeth GOUVERNAL — **Politiques maritimes et développement — Côte d'Ivoire, Corée du Sud (Maritime policies and development — Côté d'Ivoire and South Korea) — Paris — 1988 — 345 pages — FF 96.**

A study of what maritime transport means to the developing countries (the importance of freight prices, the point of having a national fleet, promising new markets such as round-the-world tours, expanding containerisation and the equipment this involves, etc.) and of the way the various countries see the code of conduct of maritime conferences is the basis for comparison — and it will overturn more than one old idea — between the policies of two contries, Côte d'Ivoire and South Korea, and the results they have had. Côte d'Ivoire leaves foreign capital more or less free to move as it likes and gives relative autonomy to its public firms, SITRAM especially, while Korea is vigorously interventionist in both deciding what industries to develop and handing out arms licences and protects such sectors as are deemed to be fragile.

So why is South Korea successful and Côte d'Ivoire having problems? This is the question which the book sets out to answer, with explanations which give insight into the situation of other countries too.

Dominique PETER, Pierre PRUDHOMME & Bernard HUMBAIRE — **Hydraulique villageoise et ressources en eau souterraine en Afrique occidentale et centrale (Village water supply and groundwater resources in West and Central Africa) — Paris — 1988 — 333 pages — FF 130 — in French and in English.**

This bibliographical analysis of the main recent publications on village water supply and the use of groundwater includes general studies, country summaries and project dossiers.

Sylvie BELOUANE-GHERARI & Habib GHERARI — **Les organisations régionales africaines (African regional organisations) — A collection of texts and documents — Paris — 1988 — 471 pages — FF 195.**

This collection—not always easy to consult, as the charters, treaties, conventions, statutes, agreements, declarations, etc. it contains are scattered over the various organisations which they set up and help steer—covers the OAU, the organisations of North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa, the natural resource development bodies and the commodity (groundnuts, wood, coffee, cattle, rice and oil) producers' associations.

Marc RAFFINOT — **Statistiques, prévisions et politique éonomique (Statistics, forecasts and economic policy — Paris — 1988 — 146 pages — FF 90.**

This is a diagnosis of the economic information systems which should form a basis for the main national economic management decisions. In particular, it looks at the possibility of setting up a forecasting unit, a data base and control panels, "rapid" accounts, models and variations on them (income and outlay tables, for example) and discusses budget forecast and planning procedures, with a view to finding out which simple, reliable and efficient techniques and sub-systems have proved successful in the various countries under scrunity.

Centre Technique Forestier Tropical — Memento du Forestier (The Forester's Handbook) — Techniques rurales en Afrique collection — Ministry of Cooperation — Paris, France — 1989.

This third edition of one of the valuable handbooks published by the French Cooperation Ministry is a completely revised version of the work published in 1975 and 1978. In addition to the traditional chapters on geography and forestry economics, basic forestry science (ecology, botany, anatomy and entomopathology), different species, tree growing, forestry policy, exploitation, technology, processing, commercial utilisation of tropical wood, etc., there are new data, in particular on forest inventories, remote sensing, biometry, genetic improvements and wood as a source of energy. And to complete the whole thing, there are chapters on cynegetics and fish farming.

ooo

Emmanuel TODD — **L'invention de l'Europe** (Europe invented) — Editions

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

51st session of the ACP Council of Ministers

Seeking satisfaction on trade

The 51st session of the ACP Council of Ministers was held at the ACP House in Brussels from 28 to 30 November 1990. Traditionally the budget session, the Ministers had, on a heavily laden agenda, matters of considerable importance, particularly on trade cooperation, coming as it did on the eve of the final session of GATT negotiations (the Uruguay Round) in Brussels.

However, as well as the budget, the Council dealt with a number of internal issues, chief amongst them "proposals for the textual amendment to the Georgetown Agreement", the foundation of the ACP Group. On the agenda since the Harare Council in 1984, the proposals were the first ever to come before the Ministers, but they were immediately sent back to the Committee of Ambassadors for representation at the next Council with an instruction that detailed annotations on background and reasons for the proposals should be made to enable Member States to understand and appreciate fully the implications. The amendments being proposed relate mainly to the rotation of the Presidency of the Council, the appointment of the Secretary General and the decision reaching process, changes deemed necessary for the cohesion and efficient functioning of a group whose membership has grown from 46 to 69. One amendment on which a consensus seems to have emerged already is the addition of Portuguese to English and French as the official languages of the Group.

Intra-ACP cooperation: a failure

In the short debate on the amendments, as on intra-ACP cooperation, the failure of the Group to strengthen cooperation amongst themselves over the past fifteen years was highlighted by many speakers. The Lomé Convention, they admitted, was at the root of the Georgetown Agreement which brought the Group into existence, but this should not preclude it from considering itself an international organisation in its own right, geared to increasing trade among Member States, or from concluding bilateral agreements with other organisations or with countries like Canada and Japan. Although Phase I of a study on intra-ACP trade flows carried out by some consultants has been completed and is currently being examined by the Committee of Ambassadors, trade among ACP States is believed minimal. While most speakers recommend the effective use of the resources available under Lomé IV to expand and implement intra-ACP projects and programmes, others call for ideas from Member States either in writing or in subcommittees on ways to reinforce intra-ACP relations, especially now that the field has been widened to include social and cultural matters. Such ideas, they say, could become subjects of studies that could be financed by the Commission.

The President-in-office of the ACP Council of Ministers Mr Tuilaepa Malielegaoi, (centre) flanked by Secretary-General of the ACP, G. Berhane (left) and the Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors, Mr Falilou Kane

ACP-EEC cooperation: sugar, bananas and commodities

Discussions on the substantive issue of ACP-EEC cooperation revolved around the various ministerial committees' reports on sugar, bananas and commodities. In their third successive year of freeze of the guaranteed price for sugar, the ACP States are concerned over the Community's delay of the Commission's proposal for "compensatory measures to relieve ACP suppliers of the effects" of the freeze and of the 2% reduction in the price paid to Community producers. They are now taking up the long-standing offer of "a study to examine ACP transport costs" of sugar supplied to the Community "from factory to ports of destinations", but in the "context of the overall restructuring programmes currently being pursued in many of the States concerned". Some delegates spoke of the need for "assistance for freight costs". The Council reiterated its support for Papua New Guinea's and Zambia's accession to the Sugar Protocol, calling for economically viable quotas to be allocated to them and pointing out that the Portuguese market can provide an appropriate solution to this question.

Given the problems they believe ACP bananas are likely to face in the Single European Market in 1993, the emphasis is now shifting more to intensive "political initiatives" within the Community to preserve the ACP's share of the Community's global market, i.e. collective lobbying of influential groups.

On commodities, the ACP Group would like to see negotiations for the renewal of the International Coffee Agreement begin as early as possible so that they can be concluded by September 1991 when the 2-year extension, made in September 1989, comes to an end. They are opposed to Brazil's intention to have the Agreement extended for a further one year, and in this regard, the Group would like the Article 75 Ministerial spokesman to make contact with the Brazilian authorities in order to convince them of the need for a more effective Agreement in September 1991.

Equally keen on a new International Cocoa Agreement that can defend prices effectively, the ACP States are asking the Community to join it in urging the United States, the biggest consumer, and Malaysia, the third biggest producer, to become parties to it.

Trade cooperation: compensation demanded

As the ACP Council was sitting just a couple of days before the final session of the Uruguay Round, and with some of the members equally members of GATT, a special ministerial session was devoted to the preparations. It should be noted that the ACP as a group has been marginalised in these negotiations. It has not taken part in any of the talks since they were launched in Punta del Este in 1986. Although it made representations twice (in December 1988 in Montreal and in October 1990 in Geneva), warning against the likely negative effects on their economies of the liberalisation of trade, these were to no avail. Few of the members are Contracting Parties and with limited knowledge of the issues, they have had virtually no impact in the negotiations. They "tended to adopt the position advocated by the developing countries even though such a position could have a negative impact on their trade". However, a study carried out by the group reveals that the ACP States would be overall losers in tropical products to the tune of between US $ 118 million and US $ 121 million per annum, despite the Community assurance that they would be "compensated by gains in other developing countries' markets".

Over and above the Community's promises on "selective internal tax", help in improving ACP competitivity, etc. the ACP Council of Ministers is demanding that the Community adhere to "the provisions of the Joint Declaration Annex XXIX of Lomé IV wherein it undertakes to safeguard the interests of the ACP States in EC markets" and to compensate them for the amount they will lose annually as a result of the trade liberalisation, and this for the duration of Lomé IV.

Referring to the Commission's proposal to accord least developed country status to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador to assist these countries in combatting the international drug trade, the ACP Ministers pointed out that the Community did not accompany its ban on ivory (aimed at stopping the massacre of elephants) with equivalent compensatory measures for the ACP States affected. In any case, they say, since fighting drug trafficking is also a kind of concession made by some ACP States, particularly in the Caribbean, the Community "should adopt special appropriate measures" to assist them in combatting it.

Namibia formally becomes a member

Although the process leading to Namibia's accession to the Lomé IV Convention and adherence to the Georgetown Agreement had been completed, the 51st session of the ACP Council of Ministers gave its formal endorsement to both. The Namibian representative, Mr Peter Manning, (the Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels) expressed his country's gratitude to the Group for the steadfast support it gave to the people of Namibia during the struggle for independence from the apartheid regime. Namibia, he said, had felt, well before its accession to the Convention, part of the "ACP family". Although like every country, Namibia has its own national interests, as a newly independent State which has benefited from international cooperation, it knew how vital international solidarity was. It reaffirmed therefore its belief in ACP unity. Namibia now, he said, has the task of remoulding its economy and it is laying emphasis on four areas—resolving the problem of extreme poverty of the vast majority of the people, improving health and nutrition, overcoming high unemployment and restructuring the educational system.

As in past ACP Council of Ministers' meetings, the situation in South and Southern Africa was on the agenda. Although the debate was emotionally less charged, it was marked by the interventions of two representatives of the South African Council of Churches who warned the ACP States against being fooled by what appears on the surface as efforts by the South African government to dismantle apartheid. They reminded the Council that it supported the Harare declaration (the amended version of which was adopted by the United Nations) which stated, among other things, that pressure would only by lifted on South Africa when a new constitution acceptable to the majority of South Africans is in place. This has not happened. They stressed that what is actually going on between the ANC and the South African government are "talks about talks" while at the same time a death squad supported by the South African government brings death, destruction and division to the black community.

The churchmen expressed concern at what they said was the EEC's plan to open an office in Pretoria. If such an office is aimed at providing technical supervision of EEC projects it would be welcomed, but if it is to have the status of an embassy, it would be in violation of the international community's decision to isolate South Africa until apartheid is irreversibly dismantled.

The Namibian Representative, Peter Manning (middle) during the Session

The ACP Council of Ministers rose, proposing to meet again in April 1991 when it expects to take final decisions on a number of issues that have been sent back to the Committee of Ambassadors. ○ Augustine OYOWE

At the European Development Council

In addition to the question of ACP debt to the European Community, the European Development Council discussed two issues: the Horn of Africa and the programming and ratifications of Lomé IV.

Horn of Africa

Linda Chalker, Britain's Overseas Development Minister, presented a report on the dramatic situation in the Horn of Africa, referring especially to the food problem, and the Council decided to invite the Commission to coordinate aid from the Community and the Member States to deal with the threat of famine in this part of the world (Ethiopia and Sudan in particular).

Between 10 million and 15 million people could be affected, 5 million of them in Sudan. It was also agreed that the Sudanese Government would be told of the Community's concern at refugee camps being destroyed. Lastly, the Council called on all the authorities concerned in the region to see that the aid reached as quickly as possible those who needed it and asked all the parties to ensure that the Port of Massawa was open.

Lomé IV programming and ratifications

On this, the Council welcomed the progress made so far while the Commission stressed the importance of the Member States ratifying the Convention as soon as possible. At the beginning of November, Germany was the only Member State to have ratified, although about 30 countries had done so on the ACP side.

CORRIGENDUM

In our Dossier on tourism (July-August 1990 issue), the caption of the photograph on page 86 refers to "an Indian community cultural display in Suva, Fiji". The Ministry of Tourism, Civil Aviation, Meteorology Services and Energy in Suva has drawn our attention to the fact that the dancers in question are not members of the Indian community but Rotumans. We apologise for the error.

Tanzania's National Indicative Programme signed

Late last October a delegation of the European Commission led by the Director for Eastern and Southern Africa in the Directorate-General for Development, Mr Giovanni Livi, signed an indicative programme of EEC assistance to Tanzania for five years (1990-1995) under the Lomé IV Convention.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Tanzanian Government by Professor Simon Mbilinyi, Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and by Mr G. Berman on behalf of the European Investment Bank.

The funds to be made available to Tanzania during this period amount to ECU 225 million (about Tshs 58 billion), of which ECU 166 million (some Tshs 42.8 billion) will be in the form of grants and ECU 29 million (about Tshs 7.5 billion) in the form of risk capital managed by the European Investment Bank.

Tanzania is eligible under the Lomé IV Convention for structural adjustment support. The envelope of ECU 225 million includes a first allocation of ECU 30 million (Tshs 7.7 billion), in grants which has been made available for 1991 and 1992, subject to progress in Tanzania's economic reforms.

In addition, and as in the past, Tanzania may also benefit substantially from regional funds, made available for the Eastern Africa countries as well as for the SADCC member states.

The two sides reviewed in detail, the performance of the Economic Recovery Programme implemented by Tanzania and discussed the Government's development strategies for the 1990-1995 period.

The EEC fully supports the Government in the process of economic restructuring aimed at improving the living standards of the Tanzanian population.

Agreement was reached on Community assistance being focused in the priority sectors of transport and agriculture. The social sector would also continue to be supported by both foreign exchange allocations and counterpart funds in Tanzanian shillings. Outside these areas of concentration, funds could be made available to promote industry, for the protection of natural resources, including forestry, the restoration of Tanzania's cultural heritage, trade development and tourism promotion.

In order to employ the available resources in the most effective manner, both sides agreed that emphasis should be given to:
— maintenance and rehabilitation operations,
— protection of the environment and the conservation of natural resources,
— the development and use of local enterprises and companies, support of local training institutions and institution building as well as increased training of local counterpart staff.

The two sides emphasised that the development process would greatly benefit Tanzania through a more effective mobilisation of its society and by its broad-based participation in economic, social and cultural cooperation. In this context, the Government intends to intensify the involvement of the local community, decentralise planning and implementation of development programmes to local and regional government and non-government entities and to promote private sector involvement.

NAMIBIA

Signing of Lomé IV

The final act in the process of Namibia's accession to the Lomé IV Convention was accomplished on 19 December 1990 at the European Commission in Brussels when the Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob signed the Convention in the presence of the President-in-office of the EC Council of Ministers, Gianni de Michelis, the Vice-President of the Commission, Manuel Marin and representatives of EC Member States and ACP countries.

Speaking on the occasion, Vice-President Marin said, among other things, that "the European Community is very much aware of the immediate problems which confront the Government of Namibia... Independence brings in its wake, rapidly accelerating expectations, especially from those who struggled to bring about political change. In meeting this challenge the EC endorses the broad approach adopted by the Government with its emphasis on self-reliance and national sovereignty".

Under Lomé IV, Namibia will receive ECU 45 million for the first five years of the Convention. It will benefit, in addition, from the regional fund which amounts to ECU 121 million as well as from the provisions of Stabex (particularly for Karakul) and from Sysmin (notably for uranium and copper).

For 1991, EC assistance of ECU 10 million has been proposed from budget resources. It should be noted that Namibia has received assistance from budget resources (ECU 12 million in 1989 and ECU 23 million in 1990) for interventions in agricultural and rural development, water development, health, training and educational programmes in preparation for independence.

STABEX

1989 decisions

The financial resources available under the system for the 1989 year of application, the last covered by Lomé III, amounted to ECU 141 million. This includes 75% of the 1989 annual slice (reduced after the advance withdrawal during the 1988 year of application) and the interest obtained on the Stabex funds, which were respectively ECU 138.75 and ECU 2.25 million.

By the decision of 13 July 1990 of the ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors, the amount of ECU 70 million, derived from the leftovers of the first two Conventions and the funds set aside for Sysmin as well as from the interest allowances on EIB loans, were added to these ordinary resources, bringing the total financial resources of the system to ECU 211 million.

For the 1989 year of application, the Convention received, within the time limit set by the Convention, 64 requests for transfers from 31 ACP States. Once all the requests had been processed 33 were excluded and 31 concerning 19 countries were retained as having rights for transfers. These were the subject of a decision of the Commission immediately after the meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors.

SYSMIN

Senegal: ECU 15 million for phosphates

The Commission has decided to finance an ECU 15 million project under Sysmin to support Senegal's phosphate industry.

The mining of phosphates, Senegal's main mineral resource, has become, over the years, of great importance to the country's economic and social life.

Given the new norms on environmental protection and the regulation concerning the amount of cadmium in fertilisers, the Senegalese industry would have to make heavy investments in the removal of cadmium and at the same time reduce the cost of production, and for this reason has sought assistance under Sysmin.

This intervention, of which there is a recent precedent on the same mineral for Togo, is even more indispensible to Senegal, in that it has to overcome some natural disadvantages linked to a higher level of cadmium and to more difficult geological and mineral conditions, requiring more heavy investment.

The Community's intervention is aimed at supporting efforts undertaken by three Senegalese companies—Société Sénégalaise des Phosphates de Thies (SSPT), Compagnie Sénégalaise des Phosphates de Taiba (CSPT) et Industries Chimiques du Sénégal (ICS)—to find a solution to the cadmium problem. The first phase of the operation is made up of two distinct packages:

— the first comprises research into economic means of purifying the cadmium contained in the rocks and/or in the acid and an exploratory drilling to determine the life-span of the deposits currently being mined;

— the second covers a certain number of projects of investment in the improvement of productivity to enable the companies to overcome the expected high costs of removing the cadmium (the establishment of a new method of humid storage by the CSPT and the acquisition of more efficient mining equipment for the SSPT).

The second phase, comprising the financing of a pilot factory for the removal of cadmium at the industrial level will be put in place as soon as laboratory studies on purification of the rock and/or the acid, have advanced sufficiently. This second phase will also include the financing of the project to double the rate of recovery of "schlamms" presented by the ICS. This will be as soon as the results of the financial and management studies, currently being done of this company are available, and on the condition that these studies guarantee the viability of investments. A Community financing for the implementation of this second phase could be envisaged. It could be the subject of a further financing.

The execution of this project will have a positive influence on the whole of Senegal's economy. In fact, with more than 22% of the country's total export of goods, the exploitation of phosphates and their transformation into acid and fertilisers, represent, after fishing and tourism, the principal motor of industrial activity in the country.

EDF

The Commission, following the favourable opinion delivered by the EDF Committee, has decided that the projects listed below should be financed.

Angola

Urgent sanitary operation for Luanda
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 12 300 000

The purpose of the project is to help set up a public sanitation service in Luanda, Angola's capital city, which currently houses about 15% of the population. The objectives are as follows:

— to combat and reduce endemic diseases and their social and economic cost;

— to improve conditions, particularly for women and children;

— to optimise the management of public services and infrastructure.

Community aid will combine equipment and technical assistance to expend and overhaul the pool of public sanitation equipment, organise an independent public utility and train local staff. The urgent tasks to be carried out during the project's lifetime are:

— the collection and disposal of solid urban waste;

— the repair and cleaning of the sewers and rainwater drains;

— the cleaning of cesspits.

Ethiopia

Sectoral Import Programme
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 13 150 000
Special loan: ECU 3 850 000

Since 1988/89, Ethiopia has registered moderate economic recovery due largely to renewed growth in agricultural production. However, this economic progress is threatened by unfavourable factors which affect Ethiopia's foreign exchange situation: firstly, the very low level of world coffee prices; secondly, the consequences of the 1989/90 drought and the growing security problem in the northern regions; finally, a very heavy debt burden. As a result, Ethiopia's capacity to buy the means of basic production has been seriously affected. This threatens the implementation of the main development programmes.

In the face of this very difficult situation, Ethiopia began implementing in 1990 a new overall economic policy totally different from the one pursued previously. The aim is to build a mixed economy; a series of measures foresee a general liberalisation of the economy, as already achieved, to a great extent, in the agricultural sector.

In order to help Ethiopia confront the difficulties and to support its new economic policy, a third sectoral import programme will ensure the supply of fertilisers to farmers, and of spare parts and basic tools to public and private industries which have close links with the agricultural sector. This programme, inspired by the two previous ones, widens the range of beneficiaries to 230 or so private enterprises. All supplies under this sectoral import programme will be sold and the counterpart funds used to help stabilise the cereals market.

Tanzania

Livestock Service Development
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 3 700 000

This project provides assistance to rinderpest control and to livestock development.

Rinderpest—which is a highly contagious disease—is a permanent threat to Tanzania and the countries of Southern Africa. Although the virus strains are weak and no important clinical outbreak has been observed since 1982, it is of prime necessity to build up a high level of virus immune resistance in the country in order to avoid more aggressive strains from northern neighbouring countries spreading into Tanzania and to prevent any contamination of southern countries, Malawi and Zambia especially.

The project foresees the supply of rinderpest vaccines, vaccination and laboratory equipment, vehicles, a credit line for self employed veterinary doctors, a credit line for the support of dairy farmers, and technical assistance.

To strengthen the national veterinary services, the national drug distribution system will be reorganised and a revolving fund will be recreated to finance further imports of drugs and the functioning of the Livestock Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development.

Papua-New Guinea

Sectoral Import Programme
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 5 500 000

The programme is derived as part of a coordinated donor response to PNG's short term macroeconomic difficulties. These were caused by the loss of export earnings from the Bougainville copper mine and low prices for PNG's traditional agricultural exports.

The Government has adopted a Structural Programme which aims to stabilise the economy by restricting Government expenditure, particularly on salaries and wages, while maintaining essential social services and the Public Investment Programme (PIP) and improving the environment for private investment and the competitiveness of the non-mining economy.

Tonga

Vava'u Region Development Programme
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 5 000 000

The main objective of the programme is to enhance the economic and social development of the Vava'u region, which is one of the three major island groups of the Kingdom of Tonga. The underlying objective is to achieve a more even distribution of the benefits of overall economic and social development among the population, and thereby reducing the urban drift to the main island of Tongatapu, and more particularly to the Kingdom's capital Nuku'alofa.

The programme includes the establishment of the Vava'u Development Unit, the construction of a new market at Neiafu, a road upgrading and maintenance component, supply and installation of photovoltaic equipment on outer islands, construction of class-rooms and provision of teaching aids for vocational training, the construction of modest health clinics, the purchase of equipment for a mobile dental unit, the provision of adequate agricultural quarantine services, and training directly related to the various programme components.

British Virgin Islands

Virgin Gorda and Tortola Water Supply
5th and 6th EDF
Special Loan: ECU 2 000 000

The present proposal relates to the provision of piped water supply to Sea Cows Bay on Tortola and The Valley and North Sound on Virgin Gorda. These locations represent the third and fourth largest centres of population in the group comprising the British Virgin Islands. The primary aim of the project is to provide a more reliable and clean water supply to the 3 800 people (25% of the territory's population) living in the project area. A secondary, but important result will be the improved water supply to a number of commercial properties and small hotels in Virgin Gorda and the Sea Cows Bay area in Tortola. The project is part of a national plan to improve water supply facilities and it is included in the current Public Sector Investment Programme.

Anguilla

Road Development Project
5th and 6th EDF
Special loan: ECU 2 406 000

The project aims to construct eight road sections with a total length of 5.25 km of which about 40% are in urban areas. The project is consistent with the Indicative Programmes and is part of the Government's policy to improve infrastructure for productive private sector investment. These roads will improve the access to existing and proposed tourism, commercial and residential developments.

Grenada

Levera National Park
6th EDF
Grant: ECU 925 000

The Levera area, located in the north eastern part of Grenada in the parish of St. Patrick's, combines natural, historical and cultural attractions and typically Caribbean tourism resources (beaches, excellent diving waters, etc.) to form the basis for an integrated project focusing on economic development through the development of tourism and on social goals such as the protection of nature and the environment.

The two-year project aims at:
— the protection of nature and the environment,
— the development of the Grenadian tourism product,
— the economic development of the Levera area which ranks among the most depressed areas in Grenada, and
— the creation of areas for social use and recreation.

Netherlands Antilles

Tourism Development Programme
5th and 6th EDF
Grant: ECU 10 350 000
Special Loan: ECU 8 800 000

In the Netherlands Antilles, the sector offering the main economic development potential is tourism, on which 70% of the 6th EDF resources have been concentrated.

This tourism development programme (TDP) has been under preparation since the signing of the indicative programme in March 1987, and is based on a number of studies having the common aim of defining a sectoral policy and the most appropriate support actions.

The TDP will support Curacao, Bonaire, St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba by providing:
— technical assistance to improve tourism institutions;
— technical assistance and financial support to achieve more cost-efficient market development;
— financing of training to improve the level of service;
— product improvement through investments (road in Bonaire, port in Saba, road and rehabilitation of historical building in St Eustatius, incentive revolving fund for tourism investments in Curacao).

Senegal

Sectoral adjustment. Transport Improvement Programme
3rd, 4th and 5th EDF
Grant: ECU 4 300 000
Special loan: ECU 1 900 000

The project falls within the framework of the PAST (Programme d'Ajustement Sectoriel des Transports) Transport Improvement Programme. The main benefits expected are as follows:
— lower costs for road users;
— preservation of the existing infrastructure, before the deterioration of roads becomes irreversible;
— shorter duration of journeys;
— improved safety;
— better use of public resources in road maintenance (most maintenance work to be turned over to the private sector).

The construction work foresees: On the road axis from Dakar to Saint Louis, reinforcing and widening the existing road, between Thies and Tivaouane (21.2 km) and between Tivaouane and Mekhe (27.5 km), for a total of 48.7 km.

EIB

ECU 3 million for modernisation of hotels in Tanzania

The European Investment Bank is helping to finance the modernisation of hotel accommodation in Tanzania with a loan of ECU 3 million (1). The funds are advanced for 12 years at 4% to Tanzania Hotels Investment Ltd (TAHI), in the form of a conditional loan (2) from risk capital provided under the Third Lomé Convention and managed by the EIB.

The project comprises in particular, the rehabilitation of six state-owned hotels, four in the Northern game parks, near the Kenyan border, one in Arusha, and one beach resort hotel on Mafia Island. Works are costed at ECU 14.2 million and will also receive financing from DEG-Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft, the East African Development Bank, Société Internationale Financière pour les Investissements et le Développement en Afrique (SIFIDA) and Groupe ACCOR of France which manages the hotels.

(1) The conversion rates used by the EIB for statistical purposes during the current quarter are those obtaining on 28/9/1990, when 1 ecu = 0.71 GBP, 0.77 IEP, 1 315 USD, 255,460 TZS.

(2) Of which the term, repayment arrangements and interest rate may vary according to conditions specified in the finance contract.

For further information, please contact the Information Division (Mr. M. Messner, tel. 4379-3243).

ECU 8 million for electricity scheme in Zimbabwe

The European Investment Bank is lending ECU 8 million to Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) for the extension of the electricity transmission and distribution network in Zimbabwe. The scheme comprises about 200 km of transmission lines and the installation of six new and the overhaul of three existing substations in the northern and central regions.

The loan is granted under the Third Lomé Convention for 18 years at 6.5% after taking into account an interest rate subsidy from European Development Fund resources. The EIB envisages providing another ECU 18 million for the financing of this project when the Fourth Lomé Convention comes into force this year.

The scheme, costed at ECU 70.5 million and scheduled for completion by mid-1994, is part of ZESA's long-term plan for extending and reinforcing the national power system which is estimated at some ECU 148 million.

EMERGENCY AID

ECU 6 million for Ethiopia

The Commission has decided to grant ECU 6 million in emergency aid to Ethiopia as a contribution to programmes to help the victims of fighting and famine in northern Ethiopia.

There has been a serious deterioration in the nutritional situation of the people of Tigray and Eritrea, resulting in an increase in the number of people needing medical treatment for illnesses caused by malnutrition. People in the region have virtually no possessions or money left and there is a serious shortage of fuel and of means to purify water, with a consequent risk of epidemics.

Since the port of Massawa was closed in February 1990, attempts have been made to increase the flow of assistance and food aid, mainly by means of humanitarian aid and an air bridge established by the United Nations.

The latest Commission aid supports the "southern line" operation, which transports food aid, medicine and essential goods to Asmara and Eritrea and distributes them there. A number of non-governmental organisations are involved in this operation, which is coordinated by the Joint Relief Partnership.

Since November 1989, the Community as such has granted ECU 83 million in aid to the victims of famine and fighting in northern Ethiopia, and the Member States have granted a further ECU 82 million.

ECU 570 000 for Mozambican refugees in Malawi

This aid is for Mozambican refugees living in the Nyamithutu camp in Malawi, where a cholera epidemic has broken out.

The aid—to be implemented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ECU 330 000) and Médecins sans Frontières-France (ECU 240 000)—will be used to supply medicines, medical equipment, water tanks and water disinfecting pumps.

ECU 250 000 for Liberian refugees in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone

The aid has been granted in response to the appeal by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and is intended as a contribution to the latter's emergency programme to provide for the most urgent food needs of the people concerned, about 460 000 altogether.

ECU 1 300 000 for Rwandan refugees in Uganda

Following the fighting in Rwanda, many people have left the country and sought refuge in south-western Uganda, where the number of new arrivals is estimated to be 12 000.

An ECU 650 000 aid—to be implemented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in cooperation with non-governmental organisations—will finance health and nutrition programmes.

Another ECU 650 000 aid will be used by the Belgian sections of *Médecins sans Frontières* (ECU 125 000) and the Red Cross (ECU 525 000) to supply provisions and essential goods.

VISIT

Western Samoa's Finance Minister at the Commission

The Minister of Finance and National Authorising Officer of Western Samoa, Mr Tuilaepa Malielegaoi, who is also current president of the ACP Council of Ministers, visited the Commission at the end of November. He had talks with Vice-President Manuel Marin and several Commission officials, including Director-General Dieter Frisch, Deputy Director-General Philippe Soubestre and the new Director for the Caribbean/Pacific/Indian Ocean region, Frans Klinkenberg.

Apart from questions raised in his capacity as President of the ACP Council of Ministers (which included the Commission's communication on relief of ACP debt to the Community, finalisation of the Uruguay Round and other matters) discussions focused on questions of bilateral or Pacific interest, namely the implementation of the Lomé III National Indicative Programme for Western Samoa and the programming of the Lomé IV National Indicative Programme. The implementation of Lomé III Pacific regional cooperation and the programming of Lomé IV Pacific regional cooperation were also examined. The minister expressed satisfaction with progress being made in these areas and was particularly glad to note that the processing of Western Samoa's Stabex application for 1989 was nearing completion.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Breakdown of GATT talks

What was supposed to have been the final stage in the so-called "Uruguay Round" — the talks designed to continue the process of liberalising world trade within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — has ended in deadlock. Meeting in Brussels in December, the 107 states participating in the GATT talks were unable to agree on the crucial issue of subsidy cuts in the agricultural sector, and the negotiations broke up in an atmosphere of acrimony and recrimination.

The main sticking point continues to be the apparent gulf between the Community's offer of a 30% cut in agricultural support and the insistence of many other states on a more substantial reduction (The United States is demanding a 75% cut). Although agricultural products represent only a modest proportion of overall world trade, and the negotiators are close to reaching agreement in all other sectors, the issue threatens to undermine the fabric of the international trading system which has been painstakingly built up over successive GATT rounds.

A number of countries have sought to cast the European Community as the "villain of the piece", alleging intransigence over the agricultural issue. The Community, in turn, has vigorously defended its position, stressing that it is prepared to talk, and criticising the United States, in particular for its apparent uncompromising stance. As Commission Vice-President Andriessen observed, "we have not been given very much in return for our readiness to negotiate".

Despite a widespread conviction that the December talks were the 'last hope' for a settlement, there was agreement to resume negotiations in the new year. However, no date has been set and with a deadline of March 1 1991, for the special legislative procedure in the United States which limits Congress to a simple 'yes/no' answer (after that date, US legislators can and almost certainly will propose amendments which would tie up the internal process necessary for US adherence), time is very clearly running out.

Should the GATT talks ultimately fail, the result is unlikely to be an instant return to protectionism on a massive scale. However, in the absence of an international legal framework, the dangers of a trade war in the longer term are significantly increased, with the possibility of relatively minor disputes leading to retaliatory measures. Thus, we could see a 'snowball' effect in which free trade is effectively buried for the foreseeable future.

For developing countries, a more liberal world trading system would obviously present new competitive challenges. History, however, tends to suggest that the protectionist alternative would be a great deal more painful. A strong world economy is generally recognised to be essential to the development process.

The experience of the 1930s, when trade slumped and the world suffered a full-scale depression, has loomed ever larger over the GATT negotiations. There must be many who fervently hope that as the shadow lengthens, the negotiators may, even at the eleventh hour, find some way to salvage an agreement. ○

S.H.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Ban lifted on new investments in South Africa

At its Summit in Rome on 14 and 15 December 1990, the European Council reviewed the political situation in South Africa and issued a declaration which includes the following passages:

"As of now, so as to contribute to combating unemployment and improving the economic and social situation in South Africa, and to encourage the movement under way aimed at the complete abolition of apartheid, the European Council has decided to lift the ban on new investments.

At the same time, the Community and its Member States, with the objective of sending a clear signal of political support to the victims of apartheid, and intending to contribute to a new economic and social balance in South Africa, have agreed to strengthen the programme of positive measures and to adapt it to the requirements of the new situation, including requirements related to the return and resettlement of the exiles".

Creation of an environmental labelling system

On 28 November the Commission adopted the principles underlying a proposal for a Regulation designed to establish a Community system for awarding an environmental label to products which are less harmful to the environment and whose overall environmental impact—i.e. their impact during production, distribution, consumption or use, and disposal after use—is much less significant than that of other products in the same category.

The proposal submitted by Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana is based on a new approach using the market economy to encourage industry to produce alternatives which are friendlier to the environment. This will be achieved by providing better information for consumers about the environmental impact of the products they buy and use and through growing demand for products carrying the label.

This is one of the first examples of a new approach which differs from the legislative approach followed so far.

The proposed system will make use of a commercial mechanism to guarantee better protection for the environment, in particular by reducing:
(a) the use of natural resources and energy resources,
(b) emissions into the air, water and soil, and
(c) the creation of waste and noise,

and by increasing:
(a) the lifespan of products, and
(b) where appropriate, the use of clean technologies.

At the same time, it is expected that in certain particularly difficult areas, the label will help to bring about a significant reduction in the environmental damage caused by mass-market products.

This new instrument of environment policy will also help to encourage research and development, in particular in clean technologies, and will therefore result in innovation.

POLITICAL COOPERATION

Within the framework of the Council's decision on political cooperation between the 12 Member States, the European Community has issued the following declaration on Rwanda:

The European Community and its Member States are following with concern the development of the situation in Rwanda. They express their disquiet on the subject of respect for human rights.

They express the wish that current problems can be resolved peacefully among all the parties concerned. They underline the vital necessity of entering into dialogue in order to find a solution that will take into account the situation of Rwandan refugees resident in neighbouring countries. In this context, the Community and its Member States support any initiative of regional concertation aimed at devising a just and lasting solution to the problem of the refugees. They consider that the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is called for in this process.

They express the hope that such concertation can take place as soon as possible and that hostilities on Rwandan territory will end immediately so that a dialogue can be established with a view to a peaceful settlement such as to ensure regional stability.

Centre for the Development of Industry
(ACP-EEC Lomé Convention)

Rue de l'Industrie 26-28, 1040 Brussels, Belgium
Telephone: (32 2) 513 41 00 (10 lines)
Telex: 61427 cdi b Fax: (32 2) 511 75 93

INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

PUBLISHED EVERY TWO MONTHS

No.76 : JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1991

WOOD INDUSTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN - THE THREATS AND THE OPPORTUNITIES

*by William Vernon**

Overprotection of the furniture and wood products industry in the Caribbean from outside competition has left it inefficient. It makes poor use of material and human resources. It relies on high tariffs to keep out competing products and to allow it to demand excessive prices for inferior ones. Incapable of developing exports, it is a tax on the community, a liability to financial institutions and an embarrassment to many governments. Only a radical approach can create opportunities for outside investment and rescue the industry from terminal decline.

However, behind this situation of malaise there are real opportunities for enterprises, given technical and marketing assistance. The opportunities lie in market access, certain pockets of skill and the availability of raw materials.

**William Vernon is a furniture and wood products consultant with extensive experience in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean. In 1987 he received an Industrial Cooperation Award for work carried out for CDI in these regions.*
During the past four years a number of missions to the Caribbean, initiated by CDI, has led him to the conclusions stated in his article. These conclusions and his prescriptions for exploiting the opportunities that exist in the Region represent his personal views.

MARKET ACCESS

Although it is small, the Caribbean regional market has one of the largest tourism industries per capita in the world. The hotels and restaurants that serve this industry are constantly equipping and refurbishing. Due to the poor design, inferior quality, unreliability of delivery and excessive cost of local products, governments grant licences for this favoured industry to satisfy its needs from imports.

Much, if not all, of this market could be supplied domestically if components were sourced outside and assembled, upholstered and finished by existing enterprises in the Region. Gradually, the knowledge gained would allow them to extend their own production.

SKILLS

The Caribbean Region is undoubtedly short of wood manufacturing skills and no training infrastructure exists at present. It is not, however, short of labour that is trainable to semi-skilled status quite quickly. The biggest problem is in wood machining skills, the keystone of modern furniture production. That requirement would have to be met by expatriate technicians for an extended period while local technicians were trained.

Some countries do, however, have better developed skills than others and thus a better foundation to build on. Jamaica and Trinidad, for example, have wood machinists of reasonable experience and exposure while Jamaica also has well-developed wood carving skills. Dominica has basket weaving skills useful in making rattan and bamboo furniture, while Guyana has pockets of excellent wood turning expertise.

MATERIALS

In the Caribbean, wood is widely perceived as the only material suitable for furniture manufacture. Mahogany, the favoured wood, is available in most areas. It grows in Belize and Guyana. There are plantations of teak in Trinidad and of pine in Jamaica.

Other materials are neglected. Bamboo, for example, a definite area of opportunity in Dominica, is ignored while the unviable timber industry is nurtured. Bamboo is indigenous to the wetter areas of the Caribbean and could provide an excellent raw material base for many products.

Rattan, much favoured by the hotel industry for its image and design possibilities, is totally neglected. Yet the forest habitat of Dominica is well suited to its cultivation as are Guyana, Belize and possibly Jamaica.

Medium density fibreboard (MDF), which is gaining acceptance on the home markets, is all imported into the Region while Gmelina plantations and secondary hardwoods could provide the feedstock for a substantial MDF factory. If the factory was suitably located, mahogany veneers would also be available to increase the added value of MDF prior to regional export.

The Caribbean Region has the land

NEW EXECUTIVE BOARD APPROVES INCREASED BUDGET FOR 1991

The slim new six member CDI Executive Board (which replaces a 24 member Governing Board) met for the first time on the 14th of November. The Board is responsible for approving the general strategy for CDI based on proposals from the directorate.

The Board approved CDI's '91 budget, which amounts to a total of Ecu 10.21 million, compared to Ecu 9.27 million in 1990. We forecast that a further Ecu 1.99 million will be mobilized by the combined contributions of EEC industrial partners and ACP promoters and another Ecu 0.70 million by CDI's European partner organizations, to support projects assisted under CDI's 1991 budget. Such funds effectively augment our real capacity. (See the table below.)

Reflecting one of CDI's priorities under Lomé IV, to reinforce its presence in ACP and EEC countries in order to improve the promotion of ACP industrial projects and their follow-up, the budget takes into account the gradual increase in staff which will be required to fulfill this objective.

Similarly, the interventions budget has been tailored to give emphasis to four main areas in line with Lomé IV priorities. The first area takes account of the vital importance of reinforcing CDI's presence in ACP countries in order to identify and follow-up projects, as well as to mobilize institutional and entrepreneurial resources to support them and carry them through.

The second area covers the need for better evaluation, preparation and promotion of projects in order to achieve sound partnerships and the mobilization of funds for investment and implementation.

The third area of emphasis is CDI's direct assistance and training for ACP enterprises, an important aspect of which is assistance to pilot and demonstration projects as the preparatory phase to industrial scale operations.

Finally, the reinforcement of CDI's presence in ACP countries calls for more frequent missions by the directorate and staff. These will be aimed at identifying and substantiating industrial projects, ensuring their progress and assessing the impact of our interventions. This will also help to build upon CDI's complementarity with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Development Fund (EDF), by identifying projects suitable for EIB financing or for inclusion in the EDF-funded "National Indicative Programmes" of ACP countries.

The effect of the new style budget should be to increase the flow of finance and technology transfer to ACP industrial projects.

CDI BUDGET FOR 1991	Ecu (000s)
Staff (mostly engaged on project related activity)	4,588
Building, equipment and miscellaneous expenditure	1,136
Intervention programme	4,486
Total	10,210

CO-FINANCING FORECAST FOR 1991 INTERVENTIONS	Ecu (000s)
CDI	4,486
Promoters/Partners	1,990
EEC partner organizations	700
Total	7,176

DIRECTOR PRESENTS NEW CDI ORIENTATION PROPOSALS TO BOARD

In his initial message to the staff of CDI, quoted in the last issue of Industrial Opportunities, Director Paul Frix outlined the current economic and political environment and the problems facing industrial development in ACP countries. He also stated the objectives that the new directorate intended to propose to the Executive Board.

In addressing the Board on the 14th of November he reiterated these points, then went on to explain how the new directorate, on assuming its functions in October, had organized a series of brainstorming sessions with the Centre's professionals. First, strengths and weaknesses of the organization were identified.

"It soon became clear" - continued Paul Frix - "that CDI needed to simplify its internal structures and henceforth to focus its action on the development and support of two complementary networks: the first one oriented towards the ACP countries with the task of selecting, stimulating, supporting and supervising efficient antennae and correspondents and the second one aimed at mobilizing financial and technological resources available in Europe.

"This is the basis underlying our proposals for a new CDI structure under Lomé IV and a budget for 1991, whose object is to pave the way for new policies."

The Director told the Board about the next steps to be taken to flesh out the new proposals. These are:

- a more detailed work programme for 1991 and the first five year phase of Lomé IV;
- an accurate description of posts in the new organization chart and a review of the present staff so that they can be used in the most effective way;
- drawing up a new selection, support and control policy for ACP antennae;
- defining the procedures through which the operational divisions will relate to each other;
- restructuring the Administration Division, including the computer and accounts services, to provide the Centre with a reliable information system for management and project follow-up.

The Director concluded - "A condition of success will be to keep the Centre away from outside political interference liable to disturb its proper daily management and operation. The Executive Board will have to play a strategic role to protect the Centre against such interference. ... My wish is to adopt towards the new Board a policy of open-mindedness and transparency. Your guidance, your advice and, of course, your support will be needed to implement the tasks entrusted to the new management under the Convention." ◆

THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

The six members of the Board include three EEC citizens and three from the ACP States

Richardson Andrews,
Trinidad and Tobago,
Chairman.

Richardson Andrews is Commercial Attaché for Europe at the Trinidad and Tobago Embassy in Brussels.
After obtaining an MA in Economics at Manchester University, Andrews completed studies to become a fellow of the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
He spent twelve years at the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Planning and Development, attaining the position of Director of Planning, with responsibility for national economic research and planning. He served in senior management and on the executive boards of several state enterprises, some in the industrial sector. He later became General Manager of the Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Development Corporation, a post he occupied from 1984 to 1988 during which time major achievements took place in the field of investment promotion, small business development and internal operational efficiency.



Yves Salmon,
France,
Vice-Chairman.

A member of the previous Governing Board, Yves Salmon is Deputy Managing Director of Fougerolle, a French company with 20,000 employees which operates in Europe, Africa and the Caribbean in the fields of construction, electricity and services.
He pursued his studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and holds a degree in law.
After fourteen years of international financial and business management in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe, Salmon became General Manager of Brasseries & Glacières Internationales (BGI), where he was responsible for 34 plants and 9,500 employees in 12 African countries before moving to his present position with Fougerolle.

Zama Banhoro,
Burkina Faso.

Director of Industrial Development at the Ministry of Economic Promotion, Ouagadougou.

Antonio Cendàn Blanco,
Spain.

Secretary General, TECNIBERIA (an association of engineering consultancies), Madrid.

Alberto Leitão,
Portugal.

A director of Investimentos e Participações de Estado S.A., Lisbon.

John P. Nyangeri Simba,
Kenya.

Executive Director, Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, Nairobi.

GAMBIA AND GHANA

CDI ANTENNAE REPORT ON INVESTMENT NEEDS

One of CDI's programmes is to bring its antennae to Brussels in order to familiarize them with the Centre's working methods and to allow them to progress actual projects from their countries which have been submitted for assistance or are under promotion in Europe. In October antennae from Gambia and Ghana took part in this programme. Both were optimistic about the economic outlooks for their countries.

FISHERIES AND TOURISM LINKED ENTERPRISES

Abdul R. Cole is Principal Industrial Economist and responsible for CDI affairs at the Gambian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment, which acts as CDI's antenna.

He explained that between 75% and 80% of Gambia's 700,000 population derives its livelihood from the agricultural sector, with groundnuts and groundnut products accounting for 80% of the country's exports and fishing and fisheries for a further 10%. There is a rapidly growing tourism industry which currently accounts for 7% of GDP.

Gambia has conducted a successful Economic Recovery Programme, improving the infrastructure, encouraging investment and liberalizing trade.

"The Economic Recovery Programme has been completed successfully" - said Abdul Cole - "and we have on-going economic growth of 5% a year. We have now launched a programme of sustained development with the emphasis on a private sector-led economy.

"Our National Investment Board offers investors a one-stop service, offering information, advice and assistance with formalities. Many new or extended incentives are now available for investors.

"The main joint venture opportunities are in the agro-industrial and fishing industry sectors. In agro-industry there is a need for linkages with tourism; poultry farms, for example. And we are looking for private investment in the quasi-state groundnut oil milling industry.

"On the fishing side, we are rich in high value catch; swordfish, lobsters and 'tiger type' shrimps. We already have four fish processing factories exporting to Europe and a very successful shrimp farm."

Gambian joint venture projects which Abdul Cole helped to progress during his visit include toilet roll manufacture, an industrial fishery, cut flowers for export, lime juice and a poultry farm.

MORE PRIVATIZATION AND VALUE-ADDING INDUSTRY

After reaching its low point in 1983, the economy of Ghana has been steadily growing under an Economic Recovery Programme backed by the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Its GDP has been increasing at an annual average of 5.5%. A new investment code was introduced in 1985, offering special conditions for priority areas including agro-industry, manufacturing and construction. Allowances on corporate income tax, plant and equipment, exemption from duties on imports required for projects and the possibility of transfers abroad are part of the package.

In Ghana CDI's affairs are handled by Henry Y. Annan, Head, Economic Research and Statistics Department of the National Investment Bank. During his visit to Brussels he progressed a number of joint venture projects including a foundry, tuna fishing and canning and mineralised salt lick production.

Henry Annan said that changing trends in the Ghanaian Structural Adjustment Economic Programme, involving more privatization and an emphasis on value-added products, called for prompt action. Interventions in the coming years should focus on woodworking and furniture (for which industry an EDF-financed and CDI-organized Integrated Assistance Programme is in process), SMEs such as machine shops and tooling, salt mining, manufacturing and agro-based industries and export-oriented products.

STRENGTHENING CDI'S PRESENCE

Both antennae had ideas on measures that could help to strengthen CDI's presence in their countries. Abdul Cole said - "If possible an antenna should be able to devote 100% of his time to CDI work. For institutional antennae a retainer fee might be budgeted and paid to the antenna organization, as it is when private antennae are involved.

"Helping promoters to locate finance is the biggest priority and this is where CDI can be most helpful.

"I believe there should be a closer relationship with the CDI officer when selecting projects. And a workshop for promoters in ACP countries would be very useful."

Henry Annan praised the Promotion Attaché Programme and continued: "It gives the antenna a better understanding of the procedures and criteria used in assessing the eligibility of projects for CDI's assistance. The programme should be complemented with periodic seminars or workshops to foster closer relationships between CDI and its antennae.

"There is the need to expand representation in the field in ACP countries ... and to provide increased incentives for project substantiation. Consideration should be given to using the services of knowledgeable local consultants". ◆

ANTENNAE FROM ZAIRE AND BURUNDI PUSH THEIR PROJECTS AHEAD

An advantage of our Promotional Attaché Programme is that it provides an opportunity to up-date the status of projects and to push them ahead. This was illustrated last November by Luby Ah-Nziam Evala of SOFIDE (Société Financière de Développement), the Zaïre antenna organisation and Gaston J. Baganzicaha of BNDE (Banque Nationale de Développement Economique) the antenna organization for Burundi.

As a result of Luby Ah-Ziam Evala's visit to CDI under the programme, it was possible to de-block one project, shed light on four others and initiate two new ones. Nevertheless, as the antenna remarks, in proportion to the size of the country and its huge economic potential, Zaïre makes little use of CDI's facilities. He expressed the resolve to redress this situation in spite of the constraints of infrastructure and communications which prevail in the country.

Gaston Baganzicaha was able to advance a number of Burundi projects during his stay in Brussels. At least five of them will have received technical assistance by early 1991.

He also expressed support for the concertation of effort between the European Investment Bank, European Development Fund and CDI but stressed very strongly his hope that CDI would retain its unique characteristic of being the the only organization which a private promoter could approach directly. This, he said, makes possible a saving of precious time and resources, a major advantage for entrepreneurs and for the development of the industrial sector. ◆

Seventeen CDI projects for promotion at North-South cooperation fair

Seventeen ACP projects are being promoted by CDI at SICAD, International Fair for North-South Co-operation and Exchange. *(See box.)* The purpose of the fair, the third of its kind, which takes place from 23rd to 26th January in Marseilles, France, is essentially to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries. Originally a French-oriented fair organized by the Bouches du Rhône, a region of France with a Mediterranean seaboard, it has now assumed a pan-European vocation and from 1993 will be a fully fledged EEC event.

Sponsored by the European Economic Community and the French Ministry of Cooperation and Development, the 1991 SICAD is being attended by at least 300 ACP participants, 400 European firms, national and regional development institutions including ICEX (Spanish Institute of External Trade) and Belgium's Walloon Region.

As well as a major exhibition with stands devoted to technology and development institutions, the event includes a series of debates and, very importantly, a programme of meetings between EEC and developing country entrepreneurs who will be able to take full advantage of the presence of the development institutions to progress their negotiations.

Under CDI's auspices, meetings will take place between EEC industrialists and promoters from Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and other States. They will mainly discuss projects in the agro-industrial, fishing and aquaculture sectors. We are also sponsoring the attendance of a number of ACP participants. In addition, our own exhibition stand will provide a convenient meeting place for discussing projects.

Three debates taking place at SICAD have been organized by the Club of Brussels. This institution was created by press and information enterprises specialized in the activities of the EEC, for the purpose of arranging high level conferences and debates on the major European issues of the time. CDI will be represented on the panel which is to debate the relaunching of investment. ◆

S.I.C.A.D

CDI-PROMOTED PROJECTS AT SICAD

The following projects are being promoted at SICAD. EEC firms interested in contacting the entrepreneurs are invited to get in touch with CDI, mentioning the relevant reference number and country.

BOTSWANA Meat and vegetable canning (BOT 0004 FO 01) • Tea and coffee processing and packaging (BOT 0005 FO 01)

FIJI Fruit processing (FIJ 8189 FO 01)

GUINEA (Conakry) Cassava cultivation and processing (GUI 0001 FO 01)

NIGERIA Fish and fruit processing (NIA 0012 FO 01) • Fish and shrimp farming (NIA 0013 FO 01) • Food processing and packaging (NIA 0016 FO 01) • Fruit juice, concentrate and jam production (NIA 0017 FO 01) • Cassava processing (NIA 0018 FO 01) • Soya processing (NIA 0019 FO 01) • Fish farming and fish feed production (NIA 0020 FO 01) • Fibreboard production (NIA 0021 WO 01) • Cacao processing (NIA 0022 FO 01) • Agricultural products processing (NIA 0023 FO 01) • Fish, rice and cattle production and processing (NIA 0025 FO 01) • Fish and shrimp farming (NIA 0028 FO 01)

PAPUA NEW GUINEA Fruit juice production (PNG 0004 FO 01)

Compressed earth brick making and building

A JOINT TRAINING PROJECT IN ZAÏRE

CDI, UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and the Walloon Region of Belgium have jointly sponsored an earth-based construction technology programme. Originally conceived and planned at SICAD (International Exhibition for Cooperation and Development Aid) in December 1988 and at AFRICABAT in Senegal the following January, a two month training course took place in Zaïre between the 14th of May and the 14th of July 1990.

The objective was to train building technicians in all the aspects of building with compressed earth bricks; brick-making, building, design and organization. In addition to CDI, UNIDO and the Walloon Region, the project was co-financed by CRATerre (International Centre for Earth Construction) and Appro-Techno, the Belgian manufacturer of the equipment used. The Zaïrean Department of Public Works, Urbanism and Habitat and the Mama Mobutu Charitable Foundation agreed to collaborate.

Eight local building firms and two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participated and sent a total of 23 trainees to the course. There were two parts to the training, collective and individual, the latter taking place at actual enterprises. The core of the project was the actual production of bricks and the building of a school.

The training programme was carried out in its entirety, as planned. A number of recommendations emerged from the Zaïre experience, which, put into effect, could help to ensure the smooth running of a future similar project.

The trainees were individually evaluated during the course and the results were satisfactory. The project as a whole was well received by the local participants, especially the school building itself, which was unanimously praised. ◆

INDUSTRIAL PROPOSALS FROM EEC FIRMS

ACP ENTREPRENEURS, PLEASE REPLY

The proposals outlined below have been put forward by EEC firms interested in setting up production in ACP countries under joint venture, franchising, licensing, sub-contracting, marketing, management or other agreements with local businessmen.

ACP entrepreneurs interested in any proposal are invited to write to CDI quoting the reference number. However, CDI will not be in a position to act upon letters received unless ACP entrepreneurs provide all the information requested at the bottom of the page.

Where a joint venture is proposed, the EEC companies are willing to consider contributing (depending on the country and the project) some 20% of the equity investment. For other proposals, the companies are committed to entering into long-term agreements for the creation of profitable ventures.

Where second hand equipment is suggested, CDI may sponsor an evaluation by an independent expert of the quality, cost, suitability and condition of such equipment.

All equipment costs are quoted in Ecus (European currency units). The value of the Ecu may be easily ascertained from its relationship to other European currencies. Thus, on 3 December 1990: 1 Ecu=£ 0.705, or FF 6.922, or DM 2.049.

Please ALWAYS mention the CDI reference numbers when reproducing these proposals.

90/154 FO *ITALY*

FROZEN FISH

Minimum capacity: 1,800 tonnes a year of frozen fish for a minimum investment of Ecu 1,300,000 (for new equipment) or Ecu 750,000 for second hand equipment.

Cooperation proposed: equity participation, technical assistance, management assistance, training.

90/155 CHE *PORTUGAL*

PHARMACEUTICALS

Anti-asthmatics, analgesics, vitamins, antiseptics, psycoanaleptics, anti-bacterials, etc.

Minimum capacity: the capacity as well as the minimum investment will depend on the types of pharmaceuticals to be manufactured.

Cooperation proposed: equity participation, industrial franchise, license agreement, transfer of know-how, technical and training assistance, marketing agreement; (the Portuguese company has an annual turnover of around Ecu 7.5 million).

90/156 MEC *ITALY*

VEHICLES & AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT

Tractors, motortillers, off-the-road vehicles, motorscrapers.

Minimum capacity: the capacity as well as the minimum investment will depend on the type(s) of the motor-equipment to be manufactured.

Cooperation proposed: equity participation, license agreement, transfer of know-how, technical and training assistance, marketing agreement; (the Italian company has an annual turnover of around Ecu 13 million).

90/119 CHE *PORTUGAL*

PAINTS, VARNISHES AND GLUES

Paints, varnishes and glues for buildings, cars, boat maintenance, anti-rust protection.

Minimum capacity: this and the minimum investment depend on the type and quantity of products to be manufactured.

Cooperation proposed: equity participation, license agreement, transfer of know-how, technical and training assistance; (the Portuguese company has an annual turnover of about Ecu 27 million).

Information required of ACP entrepreneurs when replying

- Show why it would be worth-while to manufacture the products in question in your country, e.g. give market data, indicate that raw materials are available locally, etc.
- Describe your present activities plus your industrial and/or commercial experience, enclosing any available information such as your latest balance sheet.
- State how much capital you yourself could contribute.
- State the maximum portion of the equity your country legally allows to an EEC partner.
- Can you obtain finance and if so from where?
- If you need a foreign or supplier's credit, can you obtain a local guarantee?
- Is your project a national priority?
- Outline the incentives your country offers to foreign investors.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

No. 60 — January 1991

(position as at 20th December 1990)

EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 December 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

— the title of the project;

— the administrative body responsible for it;

— the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);

— a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);

— any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);

— the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini
Directorate-General for Development
Commission of the European Communities
Berl. 6-86
200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1 Planning and public administration

A1A Administrative buildings
A1B Economic planning and policy
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category
A1D Police and fire protection
A1E Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation
A1F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography
A1H Demography and manpower studies

A2 Development of public utilities

A2A Power production and distribution
A2Ai Electricity
A2B Water supply
A2C Communications
A2D Transport and navigation
A2E Meteorology
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)

A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry

A3A Agricultural production
A3B Service to agriculture
A3C Forestry
A3D Fishing and hunting
A3E Conservation and extension
A3F Agricultural storage
A3G Agricultural construction
A3H Home economics and nutrition
A3I Land and soil surveys

A4 Industry, mining and construction

A4A Extractive industries
A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas
A4B Manufacturing
A4C Engineering and construction
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft
A4E Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing
A4G Research in industrial technology

A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other services

A5A Agricultural development banks
A5B Industrial development banks
A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A5D Export promotion
A5E Trade, commerce and distribution
A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A5H Other insurance and banking
A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves

A6 Education

A6A Primary and secondary education
A6B University and higher technical institutes
A6Bi Medical
A6C Teacher training
A6Ci Agricultural training
A6D Vocational and technical training
A6E Educational administration
A6F Pure or general research
A6G Scientific documentation
A6H Research in the field of education or training
A6I Subsidiary services
A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.

A7 Health

A7A Hospitals and clinics
A7B Maternal and child care
A7C Family planning and population-related research
A7D Other medical and dental services
A7E Public health administration
A7F Medical insurance programmes

A8 Social infrastructure and social welfare

A8A Housing, urban and rural
A8B Community development and facilities
A8C Environmental sanitation
A8D Labour
A8E Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A8F Environmental protection
A8G Flood control
A8H Land settlement
A8I Cultural activities

A9 Multisector

A9A River development
A9B Regional development projects

A10 Unspecified

** *From January 1990 PABLI will be updated twice monthly.*

PABLI — Blue page informatics

Direct access to the blue pages via on-line terminal or telex

The blue pages are on computer and available either directly via a terminal or micro-computer.

Selected extracts of the blue pages may be obtained.

The cost of these two services has been fixed and are applied from 1989.

To obtain any information concerning PABLI please write, specifying the option chosen (terminal or telex) to:

ECHO Customer Service
177, Route d'Esch
L-1471 LUXEMBOURG
Tél.: 352/48.80.41
Télex: 2181

ECHO is in charge only for PABLI. For general correspondence see page I.

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Updated projects marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

* **Sanitation of Luanda. Priority actions.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Plan. 13 mECU. Purchase of equipment for urban solid waste and road works. T.A. for the new department for the town sanitation. Int. tender (conditional) launched in July 90. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF ANG 6014 A8a

Namibe-Lubango-Makala road rehabilitation sections 3+4 (Serra da Leba-Lubanga, PK 41.1). Resp. Auth.: Ministério do Plano. Estimated total cost 17 mECU. EDF 16 mECU, local 1 mECU (Counterpart Funds). Rehabilitation and strengthening of 74 km. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF ANG 6011 A2d

BAHAMAS

Rehabilitation of great Abaco highway. Abaco Island. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. EDF part 1.253 mECU. Works by acc. tender. ***Date financing December 90.*** 4th, 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF BM 6003 A2d

BELIZE

Belize City Hospital. Phase I. Estimated cost 8.6 mECU. Work constructions and supply of equipment. 4th, 5th, and 6th EDF. Works: in. tender foreseen 4th quarter 90. Project in execution.
EDF BEL 6004 A7a

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BEL 6002 A6b

BENIN

Mono rural development programme. Development of the rural production. Cofinancing with BAD. EDF 16,5 mECU, BAD 14.4 mECU, local 4.9 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BEN 6003 A3a

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BEN 6009 A3d

BOTSWANA

Support programme to Botswana copper-nickel mining industry. Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd (Bamangwato Concessions Ltd). 21.650 mECU. Works, exploration drillings, supply of mining equipment by int. tender. Replacements parts by direct agreement. T.A. to prepare int. tender dossier, evaluation and follow-up of the tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BT SYS 6019 A4a

Livestock marketing development project. Resp. Auth.: Botswana Cooperative Union. 2.4 mECU. Provision of infrastructures, transports, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BT 6014 A3a

Water development programme. Resp. Auth.: Department of Water Affairs. 2 mECU. Serowe waste water sanitation and T.A. to the Department of water affairs. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BT 6023 A2b, A8c

BURKINA FASO

Operation rice Comoè. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et Elevage. 3.420 mECU. Works by direct labour, supplies, training. T.A. by S.N.V. (The Netherlands). Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BK 6008 A3a

Ouagadougou commercial zone roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. Dir. Gen. des T.P. 3.730 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supervision: short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BK 5026 A2d

BURUNDI

Socio-economic development of the natural region of Mugamba. Resp. Auth.: CVHA project, OTB, Ministère du Dév. Rural, Direction Générale des Routes. 32 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. Int. tender for works launched in November 89. Int. tender for supplies launched in July 90. 6th EDF.
EDF BU 6018 A3a

CAMEROON

Rural development programme in the Bénoué basin. Resp. Auth.: Mission d'études pour l'aménagement de la vallée supérieure de la Bénoué (MEAVSB). Total estimated cost 30 mECU, EDF part 25 mECU. Roads network, schools, health centres, rural water supply. Support to crop production and fishery. Irrigated agricultural areas, fight against soil and surface vegetation degradation. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CM 6002 A3a

Rural development programme in the Logone and Chari. Resp. Auth.: Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolidation and extension of existing actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF CM 6013 A3a

Rural development poles: Saa-ntui, Sang melima, Bafut. Resp. Auth.: Ministères de l'Agriculture et du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Total estimated cost 14.625 mECU. EDF 10.300 mECU, local 4.325 mECU. Strengthening of the monitoring structures, improvement and extension of basic socio-economic infrastructures, training, education, popularization of rural development, health. Works: tracks, buildings; supplies for civil works, vehicles, crop inputs, rural equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF CM 6012 A3a

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Conservation programme for the ecosystem in the North. National game and natural reserves. Supervision for protected areas. Monitoring, management. Supply of infrastructures. EDF 25 mECU. Supplies: first int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CA 6002 A3a

Development programme of the Central and Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. 20.3 mECU. To strengthen coffee plantations in the villages and the infrastructure, diversifications in excotton zones; rural health and human hydraulics, T.A., studies, following and evaluation. Short-lists already drawn up. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CA 6005 A3a

CHAD

Rural development priority programme in the concentration zone. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Dév. Rural. 15 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works, infrastructure, education, health. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CD 6002 A3e

Strengthening of the health sector in the Sahelian prefectures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 12 mECU. Supply of essential medicines, training programme and T.A. Int. tender for vehicules launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CD 6003 A7e

Rural development programme. Phase 2. Resp. Auth: Office National de Dév. Rural (ONDR). 28 mECU. Works, feeder roads, scholar buildings, agricultural equipment, pumps, T.A., follow up and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF CD 6005 A3a

Development of basic infrastructure. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 3 mECU. N'Djamena. Rehabilitation of 5 administrative buildings. Strengthening of the Chagoua bridge and of Chari river banks in Farcha. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF.
EDF CD 5017 A1a, A2d

COMOROS

Rural integrated development programme in the north region of Anjouan Island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production agricole. 11.3 mECU. Improvement of crop production, infrastructure, works by int. tender (conditional) launched end June 89.

Supply of equipments, materials and vehicles. T.A., training, evaluation, audit. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF COM 6002 A3a

Artisanal fishery. Second Phase. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole. ★ *2 mECU.* Purchase of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. ***Date foreseen for financing January 91.*** 6th EDF.
EDF COM 5017 A3d

CONGO

FEDAR (EDF regional action for the Pool and Cuvette). Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 36 mECU. Roads, wells, rural infrastructure, supervision of works, line of credit, monitoring. Road: int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF COB 6002 A3a

Loudima-Sibiti road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. 4.4 mECU. Works by ★ acc. tender. T.A. for supervision. ***Date financing December 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF COB 6006 A2d

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support to the livestock development. Continuation and completion of the Marahoué Ranch (T.A., investment, training) and support to "Centre National d'Elevage Ovin". 11 mECU. Project in execution. First int. tender for supply launched in December 89. 6th EDF.
EDF IVC 6003 A3a

Centre food crops programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture modernization, young settlements. Food crops production marketing improvement. Works, soil improvement, supplies, T.A. studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90. 6th EDF.
EDF IVC 6009 A3a

Energy sectoral import programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Economie et Finances. 41 mECU. Purchase by the S.I.R. (Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage) of ±2.3 millions oil barrels by int. tender. First int. tender awarded. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF IVC 6011 A4ai

DJIBOUTI

Urban development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Urbanisme et du Logement et Ministère de l'Intérieur. 4 mECU. Rehabilitation, construction of waste water controlled network, works and supplies, road assessments to improve rain waters. Works: int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF DI 6002 A2d

Training programme. 2.2 mECU. New vocational training actions for adults. T.A. for training centres. Training, scholar-ships and training courses. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF DI 6101 A6d

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Forestry support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture de l'Elevage, de la Pêche et des Forêts (MAEPF) 1.190 mECU. Assessment of the forest feeder roads network. Support to the definition and application of gouvernmental measures to preserve forest patrimony. Support to improve timber export control. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF EG 6001 A3c

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Présidence de la République. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF EG 0000 A1c

Support to the agricultural development of the Bata district. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.7mECU. Rehabilitation or buildings extension. Supply of equipments. T.A. by Association Française des Volontaires. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF EG 6004 A3a

ETHIOPIA

North Shewa rural reclamation and development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Total cost 28.5 mECU. EDF 24 mECU, local 4.5 mECU. Soil and water conservation, reafforestation, rural infrastructure development and feeder roads. Works, supply of equipment, vehicles, T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6001 A3a

Central Shewa peasant agriculture development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 53.4 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, equipments, T.A., studies, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6002 A3a

South Shewa conservation-based rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 26.2 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, training, T.A., micro-projects, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6005 A3a

Coffee improvement programme III. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development. 38.1 mECU. Construction and civil works, supply of equipments, vehicles and agric. inputs, aerial photography, training and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF 6003 A3a

Lake fisheries project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery Dept. 7.5 mECU. Provision of inputs to fishermen, development of cooperatives, establishment of marketing organisation and infrastructure, training, research and fingerling production centers. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6008 A3d

Aid for refugees. Contribution to the UNHCR and to MSF. Transport sector, water sector, health sector. Project on appraisal. 8.1 mECU. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6104 A8

Sectoral import programme for the agricultural sector. Phase II. Provision of agricultural inputs (fertilizer and machinary), steel, works and T.A. Spares, chemicals, row materials for the industrial sectors. 24 mECU. 3rd int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6009 A3a

Sectoral import programme. III. Resp. Auth.: S.I.P. Steering Committee. 17 mECU. Supply of fertilizers and raw materials. Spare parts. Public sector industrial inputs and private sector. T.A. and monitoring and evalua- ★ tion. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6017 A3a

Foreign trade development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT). 1.5 mECU. T.A.: two-years marketing expert, a team of marketing specialists (short-term consultancy services in Ethiopia). Market researches, training on international marketing and international trade, technical seminars. ★ Equipments and supporting services. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF ET 6010 A5de

FIJI

Investment and export development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Commerce (MTC) and Fiji Trade and Investment Board. 7.2 mECU. Land purchase for the Tax Free Zone, works, supply of equipments, T.A. and ★ training. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF FIJ 6007 A5d

Social infrastructure, schools and bridges. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Utilities and Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport. 2.626 mECU. EDF 2.350 mECU, local 0.276 mECU. Construction of 11 bridges and 49 new classrooms and 45 teachers quarters. Supply of equipment ★ and T.A. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF FIJ 6009 A6a, 8a

GHANA

Accra Plains Livestock Development Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. Provision of veterinary and animal husbandry extension services, including construction of cattle treatment centres, water points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6006 A3a

Twifo oil palm development. Maintenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (M.F.E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6007 A3a

GRENADA

Levera National Park project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism. 0.925 mECU. Works ans services comprising Park infrastructure, access roads, attractions develop- ★ ment, management programmes, T.A. ***Date financing November 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF GRD 6005 A5i

GUINEA

Rural development programme in Upper-Guinea. Resp. Auth.: Coordination team composed by representation from: Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération internationale, Ministère du Finances, Secrétariat d'Etat à la Décentralisation, Ministère du Dév. Rural, 30 mECU. To modernise agricultural systems and to improve the way of living. Development of the crop production, infrastructure (roads, social, rural hydraulics), micro-projects, lines of credit, T.A. and training. Supplies: int. tender launched in February 88 and July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GUI 6002 A3a

Rural development programme in Maritime-Guinea. Resp. Auth.: Coordination team (see EDF GUI 6002). 40 mECU. Crop production and fishery, road network, social infrastructure, rural hydraulics, micro-projects, lines of credit, research actions, vulgarisation, T.A. and training. Supplies: 2 int. tenders launched in March 88. Int. tender for wells and pumps launched in October 88. 1 int. tender for equipment and vehicles launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
FED GUI 6001 A3a

General import programme. Resp. Auth.: Banque Centrale de la République de Guinée (B.C.R.G.). 12.5 mECU. Hard currency prices CIF covered by the project. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GUI 6009 A1c

T.A. and supplementary equipment for the "Ecole Nationale des Arts et Métiers" (ENAM), Conakry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. 5.5 mECU. Renovation works by acc. tender. Equipements by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GUI 6006 A6b

Strengthening and monitoring of the health services in the "Guinée Forestière" (prefectures concerned by influx of refugees from Liberia). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population. 1.2 mECU. T.A. by M.S.F. (B). ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF GUI 6104 A7a

GUINEA BISSAU

Rural development programme. 23.8 mECU. Improvement of the food and fishery production, line of credit, micro-projects, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6001 A3a

General import programme. Resp. Auth.: Unité de Gestion de Balance de Paiement auprès de la Banque Nationale. 6 mECU. Hard currencies allowance programme. Italy: 2 mECU to supply fuel and lubricants to the Bissau Power Plant during 1 year. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6005 A1c

Project for the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 8 mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health centres urban roads, markets, water and sanitation. Construction of secondary bridges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6010 A7, A8

JAMAICA

Rural water supplies. Phase I. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 6.7 mECU. Extension, upgrading of five existing water supply schemes: South Manchester, Elderslie/Niagara, Castleton, South Chapelton. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF JM 6003 A2b

Montego Bay airport. Charter terminal. Resp. Auth.: Airports Authority of Jamaica. 7.1 mECU. Works and supply of equipments. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF JM 6004 A2d

Negril and Ocho Rios sewerage schemes. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 25 mECU. Negril: 17 km of trunk sewers, 13 pump stations and 2 treatment plants. Ocho Rios: 5 km of sewers, 6 pump stations, 1 treatment plant and deep sea outfall. T.A. for supervision. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF JM A8bc

KENYA

Agricultural research programme. 20 mECU. Soil and water management research. Soil fertility and plant nutrition. Civil works and libraries. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6003 A3e

Cereal sector reform programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Agriculture and Supplies and Marketing and NCPB. National Cereals and Produce Board. 65 mECU. T.A., studies, training. Storage and rolling stock, sectoral import programme purchase of agricultural inputs, short and long-term T.A., cooperatives and reserve funds. Studies, T.A. and training: short-lists already drawn-up. Works by int. tender and acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6008 A3a

ASAL livestock development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Livestock Development. 9 mECU. Works by restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6009 A3a

Mara Conservation Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. 1.35 mECU. EDF part. Strengthening of the management and infrastructure of the Mara reserve. Education and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6015 A5i

Special debt programme. Resp. Auth.: Director of External Resources with representative from Ministry of Finance, Commerce, Central Bank of Kenya, the Delegate of the Commission. 2nd phase of the Agricultural Sector Import Programe (ASIP). 7 mECU. Supply of agricultural inputs by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6019 A3a

Strengthening of research resources of the national museums of Kenya. Resp. Auth.: NMK Directorate. 3 mECU. Construction, transport, equipment, T.A., training and research links with national, regional and international organizations. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE A6f

Strathmore post secondary educational college. Resp. Auth.: Strathmore college. EDF 3.100 mECU, Italy 1.310 mECU. Construction of teaching and administrative buildings, library, canteen, accomodation and catering department. Supply of equipment and T.A. Works by acc. tender. T.A. and supplies by Italy. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6005 A6b

KIRIBATI

Telecommunications programme. Resp. Auth.: Telecom-Kiribati. 4.5 mECU. Supply and works relating to 2 telephone exchanges, a transmitting station and equipment for air and sea rescue services. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF KI 6003 A2c

LESOTHO

Manpower development project to support Lesotho's natural resources sector. Resp. Auth.: National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS). Ministry of Planning Economic and Manpower Development. 7.7 mECU. Construction of schools, class-rooms, laboratories, supply of T.A., scholar-ships and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6007 A6b

Queen Elizabeth II Hospital: improvement and upgrading. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works. 4.9 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 4th and 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6012 A7a

LIBERIA

Bong Mining Company. Rehabilitation project. Resp. Auth.: Government and BMC. 49.3 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, shovels, conveyor belts, dumpers, locomotives, spare parts. 2 int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF LBR/SYS 0000 A4a

South-East development programme. Estimated cost 27 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LBR 6002 A3a

Rural water supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs. 2.900 mECU. Drilling works by acc. tender. Supply of hand pumps and spare parts. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LBR 6011 A2b

MADAGASCAR

Maize development programme in the Middle West. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole. 9.5 mECU. Building of a

nursery and farmers training. Works, supplies, T.A. evaluation and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6006 A3a

MALAWI

Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: Office of the President and Cabinet. Contingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU. Construction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. Associated infrastructure and equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5020 A2a

Rural health programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Community Services (MOH and MOCS). 9.3 mECU. Construction of an hospital, two health centres supply of equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: short-list drawn up. 2 int. tenders for supplies launched in August 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6009 A7a, e

Programme for industrial products imports. 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial equipment, raw materials and spare parts. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6019 A1c

Nkhata Bay - Dwangwa road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Road construction. 35.400 mECU. EDF part 20 mECU, Germany (KFW) 15.400 mECU. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6024 A2d

MALI

Rice-growing intensification programme in the large irrigated areas of "Office du Niger" and "Opération Riz Segou". Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 65 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, roads. Supply of equipment for maintenance and for agriculture, study, T.A., training and experimentation. Study: short-list done. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF MLI 6004 A3a

Food security programme in the 5th region. Resp. Auth.: Gouverneur de la région. 24 mECU. Soil and ground water resources, rehabilitation of Bamako. Mopti road. Works, supplies, supervision, study, T.A. training. Supplies: int. tender launched in July 89. Works: int. tender launched in March 90. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF MLI 6005 A2b, d

MAURITANIA

Aioun El Atrouss hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. 1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of equipment for 3 buildings. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF MAU 5012 A7a

Rehabilitation of Nouakchott National Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. 4 mECU. Renovation and upgrading for building, supply of medical-technical and surgical equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAU 6003 A7a

Support programme for the development of the Gorgol region (PDRG). Estimated cost 35 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, support to the traditional crop, regeneration of the natural habitats, rural infrastructure, sanitation of Kaedi. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAU 6007 A3a

General import programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances. Banque Centrale de Mauritanie (BCM). 7 mECU. Hard currency allowance for essential goods imports. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF MAU 6008 A1c

MAURITIUS

Programme to diversify productive sectors (2nd part: agriculture). Resp. Auth.: to purchase equipments: Ministère des Finances. Tender board. 8 mECU. Works, rural development, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. Int. tender launched in November 89. 6th EDF.
EDF MAS 6006 A3a

National derocking scheme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Corporation (SPMPC). 3 mECU. Purchase of tractors: 2 tractors (300 HP and 215 HP) and 10 tractors (165 HP) with plate, rakes and rippers. Two hydraulic arm trucks (5 t) and 1 lorry yard (60 t). Spare parts and workshop equipments (lathe, press, and welding machine).
★Works and T.A. and training. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF MAS 6004 A3a

MOZAMBIQUE

Second import programme. Resp. Auth.: UCPI (Unité de Coordination des Programmes d'Importation et Délégation de la Commission. 30 mECU. Sectors: rural, fishery, transports and industry. Supply of seeds, equipments, row materials, lorries, spare parts, T.A. audit and valuation. 4 int. tenders launched from August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 6025 A1c

Rural telecommunications. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports and Communications. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Supply of radio and telephone equipment. Technical study for project appraisal to be done: short list drawn up. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 6021 A2c

Integrated development programme of Cabodelgado. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce. AGRICOM. 8 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 3 mECU. Support to ±50 000 people in the districts of Mocimboa, Priaia and Mueda. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 6022 A3a

Displaced persons. Assistance programme. Contribution to different NGO's for institutional support, health activities, water supplies agriculture. UNDRO, CARE, MSF (H, F, B), Marins SF, Eduardo Mondlane Stichting Zambezia, Oxfam Belgique, World Vision Zambezia, Cooperation and Development. 12.743 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 6104 A8

NIGER

Rice-growing in the river valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 63.6 mECU. Cultivation of 1,800 ha, electrification, feeder roads, T.A. for management. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDR NIR 6001 A3a

Small irrigation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 21.560 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Tarka down valley, irrigation, boreholes and wells. Feeder roads, environmental protection, T.A. Works and supplies. First tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF NIR 6002 A3a

Mining research: gold and coal. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines et de l'Energie. 12.450 mECU. Gold: photogeological and photomorphological study on existing aerial photos. Revision of all available data. Strategic prospecting. Site exploration and pilot plant. Coal: study and building of a washing plant. Study on the coal field of Anou Araren-Solomi. T.A. and training. Drillings by int. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. First tender launched in July 90. 6th EDF.
EDF-SYS-NIR 6011 A4a

Training programme. Resp. Auth: Ministères de l'Education, Commerce, Culture, Plan, Agriculture. 4,366 mECU. Three priority sectors: rural development, business development, cultural development. Supply of equipments, T.A. and scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF NIR 6101 A6b, c,i

NIGERIA

Oil Palm Belt Rural Development Programme (OPBP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural Development. 68.840 mECU. Flood protection and drainage works in the Niger Delta. −20 000 ha. Rural infrastructures, micro-projects, T.A., training, research, supervision of works, management. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6001 A3a

North East Arid Zone development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 35 mECU. Increase of rural production, livestock development, afforestation and environment control, rural infrastructure development (health, education), commercial services (inputs, credit and marketing system), manpower development, training and research. Works: irrigation, drainage, buildings, supply of seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, dozers, drilling rigs, T.A., training, research. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6002 A3a

Research and Training programme. Resp. Auth: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Training Support Unit (TSU). 30 mECU. Scholarships, seminars, T.A. Teacher training, cooperation between Nigerian Training Institutions and European Training Institutions, exchanges between nigerian and european research institutions. Purchase of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6004 A6a, b, c, d, e, f

Desertification control and environmental protection programme in Sokoto. Resp. Auth.: Sekoto Environmental Programme (SEP). Direct responsibility of the Office of the Governor. 30.6 mECU. Community awareness, mobilisation and development campaign. Afforestation actions, improvement of range management and livestock development. Rehabilitation of a small-scale irrigation, training and applied research. Works: buildings, nurseries, water points, irrigation networks. Supply of vehicles, motocycles, generators, media equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tenders. Supplies by int. tenders. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6003 A3a

Sectoral import programme. 10 mECU. Supply of pumps, agricultural inputs, spare parts for tractors and metal frame for warehouses. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6008 A3a

"Middle belt" programme. Resp. Auth.: States of Kwara and Niger, Executive Committees. Estimated total cost 38.662 mECU. EDF 33 mECU, local 5.662 mECU. Education, health, social infrastructure. Renovation works, rehabilitation, supply of equipments, T.A., training and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UNI 6007 Aabe

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Department of Personnel Management. 1.850 mECU. Training programmes all levels in the country and abroad. Sectors: rural development and agriculture, harbours, mineral resources, management. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF PNG 6008 A6bd

Sectoral import programme. Resp. Auth.: The Bank of Papua New Guinea. EC Delegation. 5.5 mECU. Hard currency facility type to finance machinery and transport equipment for rural sector, chemicals and manufactured goods. T.A. for project coordination (procurement agent). ★ *Project in execution.* 6th EDF.
EDF PNG 6013 A3a

RWANDA

Food strategy support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 51 mECU. Development of the rural activity, monitoring, training, maintaining of natural environment stability. Infrastructures, supply of agricultural inputs, vehicles, T.A. studies and training. 2nd int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF RW 6001 A3a

SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE

Riberia Peixe rural development. Resp. auth.: Ministère de la Coopération. Development of agricultural output (palm oil) and industrial exploitation. 6.79 mECU as follows: EDF 4.00 mECU, EIB 2.00 mECU and local 0.791 mECU. T.A., works, training and supplies. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF STP 6001 A3a

SENEGAL

Consolidation of the livestock development programme. Resp. Auth.: SODESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF SE A3a

Support to the Sectoral Import Programme for transports. Road rehabilitation. Part A. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. EDF part 6.250 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Thiès-Mekhe national road n° 2. Part A lot 1: 48.7 km. Works by int. ★ tender. Project on appraisal. *Date financing November 90.* 5th EDF.
EDF SE 5046 A2d

Support programme for repatriation from Mauritania. Resp. Auth.: DIRE (Délégation à l'Insertion à la Réinsertion et à l'Emploi). EDF 2.1 mECU. Line of credits, for existing SME and new SME. T.A. and training. ★ *Project in execution.* 6th EDF.
EDF SE 6104 A8b

Support programme for the phosphate sector. Sysmin. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Industriel. 15 mECU. Research for methods to eliminate cadmium from rock and/or from phosphoric acid. Investments in 2 processing plants. Research actions, studies, new humid storage (central conveyor, adjustable stocker, rail scraper, longitudinal conveyor), mining equipment, 3 dumpers, 1 bull-dozer, 2 loaders, ★ 1 hydraulic shovel. *Date financing December 90.* 6th EDF.
EDF SYS SE 17 A4af

SEYCHELLES

National cultural centre. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education, Information. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. EDF part 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SEY 6006 A6hij

SIERRA LEONE

North Western artisanal fisheries and community development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources (Fisheries Division). 6 mECU. Infrastructures, supply of equipments, line of credit. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6004 A3d

Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications network. Phase 2. 7.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6006 A2c

Tourism development programme. Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Tourism and supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5026 A5c

Sectoral Import Programme. Agriculture. Resp. Auth.: SIP Steering Committee: Nat. Auth. Off. (NAO), EEC Delegation and the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources. 6 mECU. Supply of agricultural inputs, machinery, spares, for agricultural processing, fishing equipment, T.A. (procurement agent): management and evaluation. Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6002 A3a

Construction of the Waterloo-Maziaka road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 14 mECU. Road reconstruction with bitumen layer of 50 mm. T.A. for supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6007 A2d

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Development of human resources in the rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SOL 6003 A3a

Rural health project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Medical Service. 3 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SOL 6007 A7a

SOMALIA

Bardheera Dam. Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU. (Estimated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. Bank. Local. Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 223 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil works: first int. tender launched in 1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1991. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1991. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int. tender in 1991. Int. tender with prequalification launched in February 86 for hydraulic tests. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF SO 5003 A2a

Old Mogadishu port rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Somali Port Authority (SPA). 14.5 mECU. Works by int. tender. T.A. and supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for ★ financing *1st-half 91.* 6th EDF.
EDF SO 6005 A2d

National Museum Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.:. Somali Engineering Agency. Dept. of the Ministry of Works and Housing. Total estimated cost 0.650 mECU. EDF 0.500 mECU, Germany 0.040 mECU, local 0.110 mECU. Restoration of the former Sultan Ben Ahmed Palace built in 1872. Works by restricted tendering procedures addressed to preselected and well qualified companies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financ- ★ ing *1st-half 91.* 6th EDF.
EDF SO 6015 A8i

SUDAN

Sudan Railways Support Programme (SRSP). Resp. Auth.: Sudan Railways Cor-

poration. 19 mECU. Reconstruction of five major and 18 minor bridges and 7 culverts in the line Kosti-Babanaousa. Supply of materials, tools and replacement part, for the most immediate repairs and maintenance of the track Khartoum-Port Sudan and those required for a direct improvement of telecommunications. Works and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6011 A2d

Post Flood Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme (PFRRP). Resp. Auth.: agricultural part: Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Transport infrastructure: Roads and Bridge Public Corporation (RBPC) and Sudan Railways Corporation. 15 mECU. Agricultural sector: supply of spare parts for repair and replacement of 2 500 pumps. Int. tender and direct agreement. Supply of maintenance parts for 100 trucks (6 t): by int. tender. Supply of 100 pumps by int. tender. T.A. for repair, control and credit allowances. Transports sector: bridge construction (5 × 25 m) at Geneina, repair and work supervision. Bridge by acc. tender. Supplies for railways, gabions, pipes by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6020 A2d

Dubeibat-Dilling road. Resp. Auth.: Roads and Bridges Public Corporation. 16.5 mECU. Reconstruction and widening over 60 km including construction of bridges and culverts. Works by int. tender. T.A. for supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6006 A2d

SWAZILAND

Rural water supplies programme. Ministry of Natural Resources. 2.6 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for village drinking water supply scheme. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SW 6008 A3a

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 8 mECU. Works and supply of educational equipment, T.A. and training. Int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SW 6010 A6a, b

Rural dam rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4mECU. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SW 6012 A3a

TANZANIA

Agricultural sector support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Plan-ning. 94 mECU. Measures to improve food security, support for coffee production and processing, assistance to co-operative unions, repair and maintenance of vehicles and tractors, feeder road maintenance and assistance to institutions implementing the programme. Supplies by int. tender/restr. tender or direct agreement. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TA 6001 A3a

Secondary roads improvement project. 16 mECU. Repair and rehabilitation works on Songea-Mbinga and Iboma-Mlangali-Madaba secondary roads to improve transport of agricultural produce. Roads and ★bridges. 2 int. tenders (conditional) launched in August 90. ***Date financing December 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF TA 6007 A2d

Conservation of historical buildings. 0.700 mECU Restoration works. Forts Baga★moyo and Zanzibar. Project on appraisal. ***Date foreseen for financing Febraury 91.*** 6th EDF.
EDF TA 6015 A5i

Livestock service development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Dept. Estimated total cost 4.2 mECU. EDF 3.7 mECU, local 0.500 mECU. Construction of low-cost houses, vaccination campaign, cre★dit lines, T.A. ***Date financing October 90.*** 5th EDF.
EDF TA 5020 A3a

TOGO

Support to the draught animals cultivation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. EDF 5.47 mECU. Extension of the Adelé ranch, introduction of new techniques, line of credit. Works: feeder roads, bridges, wells, housing. Supply of vehicles, equipments, veterinary products, T.A. and training, research. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TO 6005 A3a

Rural development programme in Bassar. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. EDF 10.3 mECU. Rural intensification and diversification, soil protection, improvement of infrastructure, support to the small-farmer association, marketing improvement. Works, studies, research, evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TO 6006 A3a

Support programme to the phosphate mining industry. Resp. Auth.: Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP). 15.7 mECU. Research actions on cadmium problems. Purchase of drying machines and shovels. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TO-SYS 6015 A4a

Rural hydraulics in the Savanes and Kara regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement. 2.475 mECU. Weels and sources assessment. Supply and installation of 200 pumps. Supervision of works. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TO 6010 A3a

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation. 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

VAVAU development programme. Resp. Auth.: Vava'u Committee. 5 mECU. Construction of new market, road improvement and maintenance, education and health ★facilities, training. ***Date financing November 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF TG 6002 A8b

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Sectoral import programme: industry. 12 mECU. Allocation of currencies to import raw materials and intermediate products. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF TR 6002 A4b

UGANDA

Farming systems support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 13 mECU. Purchase of farming inputs, and vehicles, machinery and research equipment. Training and T.A. including management support, studies and mid-term evaluation. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UG 6007 A3a

Training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. 1.5 mECU. T.A. for training, scholarships, supply of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF UG 6101 A6b

ZAIRE

Kivu programme. 40 mECU. Action for crops (coffee, corn, palm-tree, rice) environment (Parc de la Virunga), lines of credit. 1st int. tender launched in April 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZR 6002 A3a

Kinshasa hinterland programme. APEK 25 mECU. To improve crop production. 1st int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZR 6003 A3a

Rehabilitation programme of SNCZ. 7.5 mECU. Supply of row materials and spares to replace railways system. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZR 6017 A4a

ZAMBIA

Smallholder development in copper belt province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12 mECU. Basic infrastructure by acc. tender. Supply of vehicles and materials by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZA 6004 A3a

Smallholder development in central province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12.35 mECU. Basic infrastructure and social facilities. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZA 6005 A3a

Import programme and special debt programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Zambia, Export Board, EEC Delegation. 20 mECU. Purchase of inputs, raw materials, spare parts and equipments for productive sectors, agriculture, health and transports. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF ZA 6016 A1c

Lusaka-Kabwe road. Resp. Auth.: Roads Dept Road rehabilitation. 134 km. Estimated cost 36 mECU. Possibility of an int. tender for ★works (conditional) in the ***2nd quarter 91.*** Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF ZA ***6014*** A2d

ZIMBABWE

Small scale irrigation programme. Resp. Auth.: Agritex Irrigation Division. 14 mECU. Irrigation works over 700 ha. Supply of vehicles and equipments. T.A., training, studies. Int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6010 A3e

Tourism development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. 3.6 mECU. EDF part. T.A. studies, marketing. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6008 A5c

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of National Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholarships, awards, seminars. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6020 A6

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

ANGUILLA

Anguilla road improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communication, Works and ★Public Utilities. EDF 2.466 mECU, local 0.200 mECU. Improvement of 8 road sections. 5.25 km. ***Date financing November 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF AG 6001 A2d

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Tourism development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Development Cooperation. 19.15 mECU. Programme for 5 islands. Optimal use of tourism potential. T.A., training, promotion and investments in tourism infrastructures. Works, supplies, T.A., ★training. ***Date financing November 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF NEA 6007 A5c

Business development scheme. 1.5 mECU. T.A. for marketing, management, product, company and strategy development. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF NEA 6013 A5c

ARUBA

Airport extension. Extension of airport facilities. Apron, taxiway, new arrival building, car park, access roads, platform buses, fencing, security peripheral road, technical studies. Estimated cost 33.5 mECU. EDF 6.210 mECU, The Netherlands ±24 mECU, private sector 3.290 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. (final design, tender dossier, supervision). Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF ARU 6003 A2d

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Deep-sea fishing fleet. EDF part 1.420 mECU. Purchase of 3 fishing boat for tuna. 24 m. Training and T.A. Purchase by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF POF 6002 A3d

NEW CALEDONIA

Rural development programme. Resp. Auth.: Administration Territoriale. 2.078 mECU. Poum and Ouegoa water supply. Aquaculture, sea-shrimps, artisanal fishery. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF NC 6004 A2b, A3d

Norcal study. Estimated total cost 1.440 mECU. EDF 0.800 mECU, Territoire 0.440 mECU, COFREMMI (local) 0.200 mECU. Re-updating of an existing study about nickel production. This study will be executed by the former consultant in charge with the previous study. Impact study on environment financed ★by EDF: ***short-list done. Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF NC 6005 A4a

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

Equipping of the St. Pierre port. Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Equipement. Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. EDF 2.6 mECU, France and territorial collectivities 2.9 mECU. EDF part: works. Quay and platform. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SPM 6001 A2d

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

Improvement and extension of the water supply system. Resp. Auth.: Water and Sewerage Department. EDF 2 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of transmission and distribution mains, reservoirs and infiltration trenches with pumps. Int. tender ★(conditional) launched in March 90. ***Date financing November 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF VI 6002 A2b

ST. HELENA

Sea defences. Resp. Auth.: Public Works and Services Dept. 3 mECU. 2,5 mECU EDF, 0.500 mECU UK. To protect shore facilities at James and Rupert's Bay. Rehabilitation and reinforcement of existing sea walls. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF SH 5001 A8g

Regional Projects

GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — SENEGAL — MAURITANIA — NIGER — MALI

Soil development of the versant basin type in Guinea: Fouta Djalon and Niger Upper Basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministère Guinéen de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animale (MARA), Direction Générale des Forêts. Estimated total cost 37.5 mECU. EDF 31.5 mECU, Italy 6 mECU. Anti-erosion works, technical and social infrastructure with local NGO's and population. Preparatory studies for programme extension, aerial survey and mapping. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6137 A3a

BURKINA — NIGER

Timber development in the future reservoir of the Kompienga Dam. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement du Burkina. EDF 5.9 mECU. Timber trees recuperation and processing to obtain building and service timber, fuel-wood, charcoal for their commercialisation. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6102 A3c

NIGER — MALI

Tillabery-Gao road. Studies and urgent works. Resp. Auth.: Works in Niger: Direction des Travaux Publics, Niamey. Works in Mali: Direction des Travaux Publics in Bamako. 5.260 mECU. Works in Niger by acc. tender, works in Mali by direct labour. Stu★dies: ***short-list done. Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6161 A2d

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

★ **Regional road Godomey Bohicon.** ***18.500 mECU.*** Maintenance for Cotonou to Niamey and Ouagadougou on the Godamey Bohicon ***119 Km.*** . Supervision of works: short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ***Date foreseen for financing January 91.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6158 A2d

Regional project for the management of the "W" national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 10.200 mECU. To establish 3 management units and 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES

Assistance to the cardiology regional centres. Resp. Auth.: COI and Ministry of Health in Mauritius. 1 mECU. To purchase by int. tender medical equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90. 6th EDF.
EDF REG A7a

Regional programme of meteorological cooperation concerning tropical hurricanes. Resp. Auth.: Madagascar as Regional Authorizing Officer. 5 mECU. Purchase of specialised equipment by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6508 A2e

PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES

Regional tourism development programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: SPEC and TCSP. Development of tourism and tourism

related sectors of the Pacific ACP States and OCTs. 7.4 mECU. Works: implementation of programme components, supply of films, promotion and teaching materials, T.A., support for TCSP and project. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6027 A5c

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS

Regional programme to promote the use of butane gas. Resp. Auth.: CILSS 8.260 mECU. To substitute wood and charcoal. Actions to inform, to make aware, to promote LPG (Liquid Petrol Gas). Financial aid to reduce costs. Stocks for gas cylinders (3 and 6 kg). Gas fund in each country. Support to improve ovens and supporting plates, purchase of rail tanks, T.A. Rail tanks by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6106 A3a

Regional programme for soil protection and reafforestation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de la Pêche du Cap Vert. 4.250 mECU. Works, training, supply of equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6145 A3e

Information and training programme on environment. Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secrétariat. 10 mECU. Supply of pedagogical equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6147 A8f

CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ANGOLA — ZAMBIA — RWANDA — COMOROS

Development of the regional cultural cooperation in the Bantu world. Resp. Auth.: CICIBA (Gabon). 5.6 mECU. Actions to collect and use knowledge and know-how, cooperation pilot projects with cultural specialists, support actions to artists and shows. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6079 A8i

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 2.0 mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5311 A6b

Institutional support to Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Extension of ESAMI installations plus provision of library, audio visual and printing equipment and improvement of kitchen and laundry facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6311 A6b

IGADD COUNTRIES

T.A. for a fight against desertification strategy. Resp. Auth.: IGADD. Supply of specialised T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5361 A3a

BURUNDI — RWANDA — ZAIRE

Institutional support to the: "Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique (IRAZ) at Gitega, Burundi. Resp. Auth.: IRAZ and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Burundi. EDF part 2.430 mECU. Building of administrative and research complex.
★Works by int. tender foreseen in ***91***. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6318 A1a

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS AND CEAO

Automatic processing of trade statistics and customs data. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat Exécutif de la CEDEAO. Directeur général du Fonds de la CEDEAO. 5 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6163 A1bcef

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

Block trains (Tanzania Railways Corporation, TRG). Resp. Auth.: TRC. 36 mECU. Provision of main line and shunting locomotives and wagons. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6313 (TA....) A2d

Northern corridor alternative. Kericho-Isebania road Kenya. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports and Communication, Kenya. 13 mECU. Rehabilitation of bitumized road of 170 km in the Victoria lake region. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6315 (KE) A2d

Improvement of Burundi access to the central corridor. Resp. Auth.: National Authority Officer, Burundi. 10 mECU. Road construction. First part: 27 km. Muyinga-Tanzania border. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6317 A2d

KENYA — ETHIOPIA

Isiolo-Moyale road. Preparatory studies. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, Kenya. Estimated cost 2.080 mECU. Separate economic feasibility and engineering studies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6324 A2d

SOMALIA — DJIBOUTI

Djibouti-Zeila (Somalia) road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère and Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost 28 mECU. Construction of a road between Djibouti town and Zeila town in Somalia. Int. tender (conditional) launched in May 89. Project on
★appraisal. Date foreseen for financing ***1st half 91.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6301 A2d

TANZANIA — MALAWI

Ibanda-Uyole road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communications and Works, Dar Es Salaam. Estimated total cost 25 mECU. EDF 15 mECU, The Netherlands 10 mECU. Rehabilitation works of existing bitumen road. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6402 A2d

NIGERIA — GHANA — SENEGAL — MALI — BURKINA FASO — BENIN — CAMEROON — NIGER

Support to regional centre for training in aerospace survey (RECTAS). Resp. Auth.: RECTAS. Estimated total cost 7.030 mECU. EDF 3 mECU, France 1.5 mECU, The Netherlands 0.430 mECU, RECTAS 1.7 mECU, Swiss/UNDP 0.400 mECU. Trainers training, T.A. supply of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6166 A6b, A8f

CAMEROON — CONGO — GABON — CENTR. AFR. REP. — EQUAT. GUINEA — SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE — ZAIRE

Conservation and rational utilization of the forest ecosystems in Central Africa. 24 mECU. Buildings, tracks, bridges, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Pre-
★qualification launched in October 90. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6203 A3a

SADCC

Maseru Container Terminal. Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho and SADCC. 1.350 mECU. Construction of container terminal and supply of containers, handling equipment. Study required: detailed design of works. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5421 A2d

Mananga: agricultural management training. Resp. Auth.: Mananga Agricultural Management Centre (MAMC). 1.6 mECU. Supply of T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6425 A6ci

ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — SADCC

Training of railways staff. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce. 7.3 mECU. Training of Inhambane school and in the Northern regional centres, Southern and Central. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6409 A6d

SADCC — ANGOLA

T.A. for the Office of the Lobito Corridor (Project Coordination Unit). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et Communications. 2.400 mECU. T.A. in 2 phases. Sup-
★ply of equipment. ***Date financing December 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6423 A2d

SADCC — MOZAMBIQUE

Limpopo line rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Mozambique Ministry of Transports. EDF part estimated 15 mECU. Community contribution to an overall rehabilitation programme for the Limpopo railway line. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6421 A2d

Beira port contract dredging. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m^3/year. Supervision and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6401 A2d

ASECNA

Regional air safety training schools at Douala and Niamey. Resp. Auth.: ASECNA. 7 mECU. Building and equipping of schools in Douala and Niamey. Works and equipments by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6057 A6d

CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES AND MONTSERRAT

West Indies university. Resp. Auth.: UWI and National Authorising Officers. 6.2 mECU. Renovation and rehabilitation works, supply of technical and scientific equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6601 A6b

CARDI (Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute). Technology transfer and applied research programme. Resp. Auth.: CARDI. EDF 5.3 mECU. Works supplies, training. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6632 A3a

ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) AND BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

Eastern Caribbean States Export Development Agency (ECSEDA) and Automatic System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA). Resp. Auth.: OECS secretariat in Castries, St. Lucia, ECSEDA headquarter in Roseau, Dominica. 4.430 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment and computers. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6610 A5d

OECS integrated tourism programme. Resp. Auth.: OECS secretariat. 3 mECU. Cooperative marketing in Europe, T.A. and tourism training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6613 A5c

OECS — TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO — BARBADOS — GUYANA

Regional fruit and vegetable marketing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6620 A5de

OECS AND MONTSERRAT

Tertiary education. Resp. Auth.: OECS Secretariat. 7.2 mECU. Construction, supply of equipments, training, trainers training, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6628 A6bcj

CARICOM AND UK OCT

Regional hotel training programme. Resp. Auth.: Bahamas Hotel Training College (BHTC). 4.4 mECU. Construction region training facility, supply of equipment, scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6614 A5c

Student accomodation for Caribbean regional educational institutions. Resp. Auth.: UWI, CAST and CTC. 16 mECU. Construction of residential hostels with a total of 1 080 beds and daytime accomodation in six campus concerned in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Contracts for architectural design will by awarded following a design competition. Works by restricted tender after prequalification. Equipments and furnishings by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6630 A6b

CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES AND OCT'S

Caribbean Tourism Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO), Barbados. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Market development in Europe, product development in the Caribbean, statistics and research, tourism education and training, linkages development. T.A. after pre-★qualification. ***Date financing December 90.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6917 A5c

ALL ACP COUNTRIES

Support programme to take social dimension of the structural adjustment into account. 1.500 mECU. Studies, statistics, reports, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6076 A1b

ACP AND OCT COUNTRIES

ACP and OCT countries participation in trade development actions and services. Resp. Auth.: Programme coordination by Trade Devpt. Unit in DG VIII-Brussels and geographical units in DG VIII-Brussels and EEC delegations. 6.193 mECU for ACP's and 0.375 mECU for OCT's. Trade fairs and tourism, seminars, conferences, workshops and symposia. T.A. to prepare programmes and actions and for training. Commercial missions (regional), publication of brochures and ★documentation. ***Project in execution.*** 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6916 A5e

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Integrated training programme on forestry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique, de l'Environnement et des Forêts. 2.5 mECU. T.A. long-term and short-term, equipments, scholar-ships. Project in execution.
SEM AL A3a

Integrated programme to improve seed production for large scale farming. EEC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution.
SEM AL A3a

Centre to Develop Pesticides (CDP). Resp. Auth.: CERHYD (Centre de Recherche pour la Valorisation des Hydrocarbures et leurs Dérivés. 1.9 mECU. T.A. and training, supply of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM AL A3a

Support programme to the hydraulic sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement, Direction de Développement des Aménagements Hydrauliques (DDAH) and Agence Nationale des Ressources Hydrauliques (ANRH). 8 mECU. T.A. for National Water Plan, supervision and monitoring for dams, studies, waste water treatment stations. Supply of equipments. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90.
SEM AL 183/90 A2b

Pilot project to develop artisanal fishery in Western Algeria. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche. 9.770 mECU. Supply of line of credit and specialized T.A. Training and scholarships. ★Evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 91.
SEM AL A3a

Financing of artisanal enterprises from "Société Nationale de l'Electricité et du Gaz (SONELGAZ)". Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat and SONELGAZ. 9.060 mECU. Supply of line of credit for artisanal enterprises, supply of pedagogical equipment, T.A. for bank-office in ★charge for credits. ***Date financing November 90.***
SEM AL A4d

EGYPT

Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organization. EREDO. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender with prequalification foreseen in 2nd half 88. T.A.: GET/KFA (D). Int. tender dossier: Phoebus (I).
SEM EGT 1002 A2a

IUD production. Resp. Auth.: National Population Council (NPC). EEC 2.100 mECU. T.A., equipments, row material for local production of IUD. T.A. by Organon (NL). Equipments by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM EGT A7c

Food Sector Development Programme (FSDP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture

and Land Reconstruction, National Oil Crop Council, Livestock Production Council, Animal Production Cooperatives (APC). 55 mECU. Animal food improvement. Milk marketing. Artificial insemination (AI) and animal health improvements, edible oil, line of credit. T.A. Project in execution.
SEM EGT A3a

Bardawil Lagoon development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MOALR) and the General Authority for Fish Resources Development (GAFRD). 3 mECU. Protection of natural resources by controlling and improving the water salinity of the Lagoon. Improvement of the marketing of fish and reduction of losses. Construction of an additional landing place with basic marketing facilities and improvement of the existing one. Installation of a cool chain including an ice-making machine. Improvement of the Lagoon's fishing methods by introducing more careful fishing techniques and better management. T.A. for the development and implementation of training and extension programmes. Purchase of ★equipment and vehicles by int. tender. *Date financing November 90.*
SEM EGT 510/90 Aai

Credit line for small-scale industries. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry, Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI). 8.5 mECU. Cre★dit line and T.A. *Date financing November 90.*
SEM EGT 509/90 A4b

JORDAN

Study on underground water-level in the Azraq basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Hydrology and Irrigation. 3 mECU. To collect and exploit all data concerning water region of Azraq basin. T.A. supply of equipment and drilling works. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution.
SEM JO A2a

Project for a national soil map and land utilization. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
SEM JO A1g

Education Improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.8 mECU. T.A. by ten experts and one project director. Scholarships. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90.
SEM JO 261/90 A6a, A6b

Improvement of agricultural productivity in arid and semi-arid zones. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Jordan. T.A. by a European research institution competent in the development of arid zones. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment by int. tender. ★*Date financing November 90.*
SEM JO 570/90 A3a

Ground water investigation in the Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, drilling explorations, surveys and analysis. Project on appraisal.
SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a

MALTA

Improvement of infrastructure. 3.1 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipments. Management of natural water resources, long term development plan for "Telemalta Corporation", Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM MAT 88 A9b

Protection of Malta's coastline against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil Pollution Executive. 2.4 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution.
SEM MAT A8f

Upgrading of economic and research/training infrastructures. 4.2 mECU. Improvement and modernization of training and research in radiology in the main hospital. T.A. and supply equipment. Modernization of the telephone network in La Vallette. Modernization of the wireless and telegraph branch. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90.
SEM MAT 281/90 A2c, A7a

Upgrading of standards laboratories. Resp. Auth.: Maltese Government. 2.2 mECU. Identification by European T.A. of the present situation for standard laboratories. Training and organizational matters, purchase of equipments. Restructuring of different laboratories. Supply of analytical equipment, microbiological equipment and calibration equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 91.
SEM MAT 1912/90 *A1c*

MOROCCO

Support to strengthen technologic and scientific education structures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. EEC 40 mECU. Achievement of Beni Mellal and Settat faculties. Construction of Errachidian and Mohammedian faculties and CPRT of Settat. Supply of equipments for faculties and CPRT, studies, T.A. and supervision. Works and equipments by int. tenders. Project in execution.
SEM MOR A6b

Rehabilitation and protection of the disaster areas in Ouarzazate and La Moulouya. Resp. Auth.: Office Rég. de Mise en Valeur Agricole de Ouarzazate (ORMVAO) and La Moulouya (ORMVAM). Works by direct labour. Supply of equipment by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90.
SEM MOR 236/90 A3a

Support to strengthen training structures in the textile and leather sectors. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Equipement de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Formation des Cadres and the OFPPT. EEC contribution 28.075 mECU. EEC part: construction of 3 centres. Equipements for 6 centres trainers training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 90.
SEM MOR 264/90 A6c, A6d

TUNISIA

Date-palm trees in the Rejim-Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equipments: Italy. Electric equipment: Italy. Irrigation equipments: int. tender. T.A.: Italy. Project in execution.
SEM TUN A3a

Credits for S.M.E. rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale Agricole (B.N.A.) 12 mECU. 1st phase purchase of 60 000 or 70 000 t of wheat: hard and/or soft, by "Office des Céréales". Counterpart funds will be distributed for credit operations. Purchase ★by int. tender. *Date financing November 90.*
SEM TUN 3aA

***Financial and technical support to the 8th Social and Economic Development Plan.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de Développement Régional. Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale (DGCI). EEC contribution 0.500 mECU. T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing January 91.*
SEM TUN *A1b*

TURKEY

Geothermal energy in Western Anatolia. Resp. Auth.: MTA — Institut de Prospection et Recherches Minérales. EEC contribution 8 mECU. Supply by int. tender of specialized equipment for wells, boreholes and for laboratory analyses. T.A. and training. Project ★in execution.***Int. tender foreseen in the 1st quarter 91.***
SEM TU A4a

Improvement of health services. EEC contribution 5.8 mECU. Master plan, specialized medical equipments, scanner, vehicles. T.A. and supplies. Project in execution.
SEM TU A7ac

Fight against environmental pollution. Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's Office. Directorate General of the Environment. EEC contribution 2.8 mECU. Purchase of mobile system to measure, control, water, air, surface and soil pollution. Supply of laboratory equipment, T.A. Project in execution.
SEM TU A8f

Vocational training programme for tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution.
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

Programme to deepen association relations between EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the University of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish "Business Council". Project in execution.
SEM TU A6b

Regional centre for training and development for the "Union Internationale des villes (UIV)" for eastern Mediterranean countries and Middle-East in Istanbul. EEC contribution 1.4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM TU A1c

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Assistance to the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. EEC contribution 6 mECU. Various projects, lines of credit, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
SEM OT 90 A8a, b, e

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

BANGLADESH

North Central Regional Study Project. Resp. Auth.: Flood Plan Coordination Organization of the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control. Estimated total cost 3.740 mECU. EEC contribution 1.870 mECU, France 1.870 mECU. T.A. for Regional Water Devp. Planning Study: short-list not yet done. Feasibility study of the Priority Project: financed by France. Project in execution.
ALA BD 9003 A8g

National Minor Irrigation Development Project (NMIDP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 131 mECU. EEC contribution 65 mECU. IDA/World Bank and local 66 mECU. Works and supplies. T.A. for environment, training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA BD 9013 A3a

River survey project. Resp. Auth.: See ALA BD 9003 project. EEC contribution 12.6 mECU. T.A. to collect reliable data on discharge, water levels, river velocities and sediment transport, provide reliable hydrographic charts of key areas. Training, special equipment and instruments and SPOT imageries. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA BD 9004 A9a

BHUTAN

Development of agricultural support activities. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 3.4 mECU. Building of regional centres, soil analyses laboratory, supply of equipments and vehicles, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA BHU 8809 A3a

Strengthening of veterinary services for livestock disease control. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 4 mECU. Building works by acc. tender. T.A. by restr. tender after short-list. Short-list not yet done. Equipment and materials by Specialised Procurement Agent appointed by the CEC in agreement with the R.G.O.B. Vehicles ★and vaccine, by int. tender. ***Project in execution.***
ALA BHU 9008 A3a

BOLIVIA

Protection of La Paz, Trinidad, Santa Ana, Villa Montes against floods. Resp. Auth.: CORDEBENI, CORDETAR and A.M. LA PAZ. EEC contribution 11.700 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and supervision. Studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA BD 9023 A9a

COLOMBIA

Microprojects in the Pacific Coast zone. Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Corporación Regional Autonoma del Valle del Canca (CVC). EEC contribution 11.200 mECU. T.A., works, equipments and line of credit. Training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA CO 9020 A3a

GUATEMALA

Programme for sustainable development of the Lake Atitlan Basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio Desarollo Urbano e Rurale (MDUR). Pilot programme of microprojects. EEC contribution 3.5 mECU. Works and infrastructures. Supply of equipment, line of credit, T.A. and studies. Int. tender launched end of April 89. Project in execution.
ALA GU 8822 A3a

INDIA

Agricultural markets in Kerala. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 18.4 mECU. Construction of three larger regional markets and three smaller markets along the east-west trade routes. Site development, shops and storage facilities, roads and parking areas. T.A. and training. Project financed through counterpart funding from sale of − 260 000 T of muriate of potash (MOP). Purchase by Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC) Int. tender in 89. Project in execution.
ALA IN 8818 A3a

South Bhagirath: II. Integrated watershed management. 8.4 mECU. Reafforestation, soil protection, T.A. Project financed through counterpart funding from sale of 115 000 t of muriate of potash by MMTC in 89. Int. tender: see ALA IN 8818. Project in execution.
ALA 8820 A3a

Doon Valley integrated watershed management project. EEC contribution 22.5 mECU. Rehabilitation and reafforestation, soil conservation, minor irrigation, energy conservation, community participation, agriculture. Works by direct labour, supply by int. tender or acc. tender. T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA IN 9014 A3a

INDONESIA

Rural electrification project (hydroelectric micro-power stations). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy and Mines. Electricity and new energy Dept. EEC contribution 18.9 mECU. Works, supply of turbines, generators, adjusters of 10 KW, 25 KW and 100 KW, vehicles and other equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA IND 8719 A2a

Punggur Utara irrigation project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, Directorate General of Water Resources Development (DGWRD). EEC contribution 29.3 mECU. Civil works: main system, secondary and tertiary canals. Works by int. tender and acc. tender. T.A. for preparation tender dossiers, supervision and monitoring. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA IND 9019 A3a

LAOS

NAM NGUM water, pumping irrigation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, Forêts, Irrigation and Coopératives Nationales (MAFIC). EEC 5.5 mECU. Building of 4 irrigation networks and drainage. Studies, construction of 4 pumping stations, supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal.
ALA LA 8802 A3a

NICARAGUA

Reintegration of qualified persons for economic reconstruction and development. Resp. Auth.: Organisation Internationale pour la Migration (OIM), Genève. 5.1 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA NI 9005 A1b

PACTO ANDINO MEMBER COUNTRIES

Regional programme for technical cooperation: APIR (Accelerate Process on Regional Integration). Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC participation 7.3 mECU. T.A. for studies, training and advising. Supply of small equipment. Project in execution.
ALA JUN 8806 A1b

Satellite Telecommunications Andean System (SATS) Preparation – Phase 2. Resp. Auth: JUNAC. 2.2 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA JUN 8803 A2c

HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

Special fund for export promotion. Resp. Auth.: Banco Centro Americano de Integración Economica (BCIE) and the European T.A. EEC contribution 32 mECU. Line of ★credit and T.A. ***Project in execution.***
ALA REG 9006 A5d

PAKISTAN

Support to the rural population of the Chitrai region. Resp. Auth.: Aga Khan Foundation, Pakistan, Karachi. EEC contribution 8 mECU. Rural development, health, education. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA PK 9018 A3a

PANAMA

Rehabilitation of Santo Tómas Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de Salud. EEC

contribution 4 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. for maintenance, training and management. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA PAN 9017 A7a

PANAMA — COSTA RICA — NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA

Regional development programme for agricultural research on cereals in Central-America. EEC contribution 10.8 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8823 A3a

Regional support programme for fishery development in the Central American isthmus. Resp. Auth.: OLDEPESCA. EEC contribution 13.4 mECU. T.A., works, supply of equipments, line of credit, ★training, studies. ***Project in execution.***
ALA REG 9009 A3a

PARAGUAY

Rural settlement. San Pedro and Caaguazu. *Resp. Auth.: Instituto de Bienestar Rural. 10.4 mECU. Settlement of 4 000 families. Basic infrastructures, equipments, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 91.*
ALA PAR 90/24 A3a

BCIE (BANCO CENTROAMERICANO DE INTEGRACION ECONOMICA)

Support to the SME in Central America (PAPIC). Phase II. Resp. Auth.: BCIE. EEC 6 mECU, Italy 1 mECU, Sweden 3.8 mECU, BCIE 3.8 mECU. Hard currencies funds. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8909 A5b

IDB (INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)

Special fund for T.A. *2 mECU. Short-term consultancies with european experts, or european consultings. Studies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 91.*
ALA REG 91 A9b

Special fund to finance small productive projects. *Resp. Auth.: IDB. 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 91.*
ALA REG 91 A5a

EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS

Trifinio region development pilot project. Resp. Auth.: Ministros de Recursos Naturales. Comité de Dirección. EEC contribution: 7.170 mECU. Reafforestation works, feeder roads, warehouses, supply of equipments and T.A. Feeder roads, irrigation, warehouses and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8814 A3a

PERU

Rural micro-projects programme (Pampa- Puno II). Resp. Auth.: CORPUNO. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. T.A.: ten expatriates. Supply of trucks, vehicles, equipments, training. Project in execution.
ALA PE 8817 A3a

Irrigation project in Tumbès. Resp. Auth.: Comisión mixta Puyango-Tumbres. Sub-comisión peruviana. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. Purchase of equipment and materials. Credit line. T.A. and training and research. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA PE 9012 A3a

PERU — ECUADOR — COLOMBIA (PEC)

Regional programme: fishing technical cooperation EEC/PEC. Estimated EEC contribution 6 mECU. T.A., supply of equipments and training. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG 8721 A3a

COCESNA — COSTA RICA — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

Radar control for civil air traffic in Central America. EURO MAYA project. Resp. Auth.: COCESNA (Corporación Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegación Aérea) and co-director EEC. EEC contribution 18.5 mECU, Italy 9.5 mECU. Civil works, supplies, 4 radars and equipments, communication systems. Extension of the Tegucigalpa control centre. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8819 A2d

PHILIPPINES

Agricultural education programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). EEC contribution 10.4 mECU. Parallel cofinancing with ADB. Supply of equipments and agricultural inputs. Pedagogical equipment, furnitures, laboratory equipments and audio-visuals, books, chemicals, tools, vehicle, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA PHI 8824 A6ci

Earthquake Reconstruction Programme (ERP) (July 90). Resp. Auth.: Department of Agriculture, CECAP (Central Cordillera Agricultural Programme). Project Office. EEC contribution 20 mECU. Agricultural rehabilitation, works, supplies and T.A. Hospital rehabilitation: works for 2 hospitals, supply of equipment and supervision. Studies: 1) Alternative transport strategy study. 2) Urban planning studies for the cities of Bagnio and Dagupan. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA PNI A8a

SRI LANKA

Pilot project for agricultural productivity villages under the poverty alleviation programme. Resp. Auth.: Project Implementing Unit. 2.5 mECU. T.A. training and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA SRL 9002 A3a

Minor and medium size irrigation systems in the North-Western province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 6.3 mECU. Work, by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 90.
ALA SRL 9016 A3a

THAILAND

Development and extension of fruit and vegetable production in Northern Thailand. EEC contribution 9.45 mECU. Long-term T.A., supply of equipments, line of credit, training, research and follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution.
ALA TH 8812 A3a

DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

In ACP countries

Angola
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6
Luanda C.P. 2669
Tél. 39 30 38 - 39 12 77 - 39 13 39
Télex 3397 PROQUIM AN

Barbados
Sunjet House, Fairchild Street
P.O. Box 654 C, Bridgetown.
Tel. 427-4362 / 429-7103
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB
BRIDGETOWN
Telefax (1-809) 4278687

Benin
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif
B.P. 910, Cotonou
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU
Telefax (229) 315 328

Botswana
P.O. Box 1253
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel. 4455 - 4456 - 4457
Telex 2403 DECEC GABORONE
Telefax (267-31) 36 26

Burkina Faso
B.P. 352
Ouagadougou
Tel. 307 385/307 386-308 650
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — OUAGADOUGOU

Burundi
Avenue du 13 Octobre
B.P. 103, Bujumbura
Tel. 234 26/238 92
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA
Telefax (257-22) 4612

Cameroon
QUARTIER BASTOS
B.P. 847, Yaoundé
Tel. 22 13 87/22 33 67/22 21 49
Telex DELEGFED 8298 KN
YAOUNDE — CAMEROON
Telefax (237) 22.21.49

Cape-Verde
Achada de Santo Atonio
C.P. 122 – Praia
Tel. 61.37.50 – 61.32.25 – 61.33.23
Telex 6071 DELCE CV

Central African Republic
Rue de Flandre
B.P. 1298, Bangui
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI

Chad
Concession Caisse Coton. Route de Farcha
BP 552, N'Djamena
Tel. 51 59 77 — 51 22 76
Telex DELEGFED 5245 KD
N'DJAMENA — CHAD
Telefax (19-235) 512105

Comoros
B.P. 559 – Moroni
Tel. 73 23 06 — 73 31 91
Telex 212 DELCEC KO

Congo
Av. Lyautey
near Hotel Meridien
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 — Ville
Telefax (242) 83.60.74

Côte d'Ivoire
Immeuble "AZUR" Bd. CROZET, 18
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01
Tel. 32.24.28 — 33 29 28
Telex 3729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN
Telefax (225) 324089

Djibouti
Plateau du Serpent
Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre
B.P. 2477 Djibouti
Tel. 35 2615
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ
Telefax (253) 350 036

Ethiopia
Tedla Desta Building
Africa Avenue (Bole Road) 1st Floor
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa
Tel. 51 01 29/51 25 11/51 01 80/51 01 89/
51 26 72
Telex 21135 DELEGEUR — ET
Telefax (251-1) 51 41 19

Gabon
Quartier Batterie IV
Lotissement des Cocotiers
B.P. 321, Libreville
Tel. 73 22 50
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE
Telefax (241) 732228

Gambia
10 Cameron Street
P.O. Box 512, Banjul
Tel. 777 — 87 69
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL
Telefax (220) 26219

Ghana
The Round House – Cantonments Road,
K.I.A.-Accra
P.O. Box 9505
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2–774 236–774 094
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH
Telefax (233-21) 774154

Guinea-Bissau
Rua Eduardo Mondlane 29
Caixa Postal 359, Bissau
Tel. 21 33 60/21 28 78
Telex 264 DELCOM BI

Guinea
Commission
Central Mail Department
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123)
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479
Telefax (224) 441874

Guyana
64 B Middle Street South Cummingsburg
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown
Tel. 63 963 – 62 615 – 64 004 – 65 424
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN
Telefax (592-2) 62615

Jamaica
Mutual Life Center, 2nd Floor
Oxford Rd/Old Hope Rd
P.O. Box 435, Kingston 5
Tel. 92 - 93030/92 - 93031/92 - 93032
Telex 2391 DELEGEC KINGSTON 5
Telefax (1-809) 9292785

Kenya
National Bank Building
Harambee Avenue
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi
Tel 33 35 92
Telex 22302 DELEUR — KE
Telefax (254-2) 725503

Lesotho
P.O. Box MS 518
Maseru, 100, Lesotho
Tel. 313 726
Telex 4351 LO DELEGEUR — MASERU
Telefax 266 - 310193

Liberia
34 Payne Avenue Sinkor
P.O. Box 3049, Monrovia
Tel. 26 22 78
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA
Telefax (231) 262266

Madagascar
Immeuble Ny Havana - 67 hectares
B.P. 746, Antananarivo
Tel. 242 16
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO
Telefax (261-2) 32169

Malawi
Lingadzi House
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City
Lilongwe 3
Tel. 73 02 55/73 01 73/73 05 93
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR MI — LILONGWE
Telefax (265-7) 30593

Mali
Rue Guégau - Badalabougou
B.P. 115 Bamako
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO
Telefax (223) 223670

Mauritania
Ilôt V, Lot 24
B.P. 213, Nouakchott
Tel. 527 24/527 32
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN — NOUAKCHOTT
Telefax (222-2) 53524

Mauritius
61/63 route Floreal Vacoas
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas
Tel. 686 50 61/686 50 62/686 50 63
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS
Telefax (230-86) 6866318

Mozambique
C.P. 1306 — MAPUTO
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — MAPUTO
Tel.: 1-49 02 66 – 1-49 17 16 – 1-49 02 71 –
1-49 07 20
Telex 6-146 CCE MO
Telefax (258-1) 491866

Niger
B.P. 10388, Niamey
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY
Telefax (227) 732322

Nigeria
4, Idowu Taylor Str. Victoria Island
PM Bag 12767, Lagos
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA
Telefax (234-1) 617248

Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu)
Dominion House, 3rd Floor
Private Mail Bag, GPO, Suva, Fidji
Tel. 31 36 33
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA
Telefax (679) 300 370

Papua New Guinea
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street
P.O. Box 76
Port Moresby
Tel. 675-21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 18
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY
Telefax (675) 217 850

Rwanda
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14
B.P. 515, Kigali
Tel 755 86/755 89/725 36
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI
Telefax 250 - 74313

Senegal
Avenue Pompidou 57 (2e étage)
B.P. 3345, Dakar
Tel. 21 13 24/21 57 77
Telex 21665 DELEGSE — DAKAR
Telefax (675) 217885

Sierra Leone
Wesley House
44 George Street
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown
Tel. 239 75 — 230 25
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN

Solomon Islands
2nd floor City Centre Building
Solomon Islands
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara
Tel. 22 765
Telex 66370 — DELEGSI
Telefax (677) 23318

Somalia
Via Makka Al Mukarram, n° Z-A6/17
P.O. Box 943, Mogadiscio
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO
Telefax 252 - 21118 - 21049 - 81118

Sudan
3rd Floor – The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development Building
Army Road Khartoum
P. O. Box 2363
Tel. 75054-75148-75393
Telex 23096 DELSU SD

Suriname
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo
Tel. 993 22
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN
Telefax 93076

Swaziland
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor
Cr. Walker and Streets
P.O. Box A.36
Mbabane, Swaziland
Tel 42908/42018
Telex 2133 WD
DELEGFED MBABANE
Telefax (268) 46729

Tanzania
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor
Samora Avenue

P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 311 51/311 52
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — DAR ES SALAAM
Telefax (255-51) 38575

Togo

Rue de Calais 22
B.P. 1657, Lomé
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32
Telex 5267 DELEFEDTO-LOMÉ
Telefax (228) 211300

Trinidad and Tobago

2, Champs Elysées
Long Circular, Maraval
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain
Trinidad W.I.
Tel. 62-2 6628 / 62-2 0591
Telex 22421 DELFED WG
Telefax (809) 622-6355

Uganda

Uganda Commercial Bank Building,
Plot 12
Kampala Road, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala
Tel. 233.303 / 233.304
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UGA — KAMPALA
Telefax (256-41) 233708

Zaire

71, Av. des Trois Z
B.P. 2000, Kinshasa
Tel. 327 18
Telex 21560 DECEKIN ZR KINSHASA
Telefax (243-12) 28863

Zambia

P.O. Box 34871
Plot 4899
Brentwood Drive
Lusaka
Tel. 25 09 06 - 25 07 11 - 25 11 40
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA
Telefax (260-1) 250906

Zimbabwe

P.O. Box 4252
NCR House (10th Floor)
65 Samora Machel Ave.
Harare
Tel. 470.7 1.20/39/40/43
Telex 4.811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE
Telefax (263-4) 725360

In the OCT

Netherlands Antilles

Mgr Kieckensweg 24
P.O. Box 822
Willemstad, Curaçao
Tel. 6250 84 — 6264 33
Telefax (599.9) 623281

Aruba

Paardenbaaistraat 12, (P.O. Box 409)
Oranjestad
Tél. 34131 Telefax (297.8) 34575

In the Mediterranean Countries

Algeria

36, Rue Arezki Abri
Hydra-16300 Alger
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42
Telex 52246 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE
Telefax (213-2) 593947

Egypt

6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek
Tel. 340 83 88 - 341 93 93 — 340 11 84
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK
Telefax 3400385

Israel

2 rehov ibn gvirol, Eliahu House
10th floor TEL AVIV
Tel. 03-26 62 12/26 62 13
Telex 34 21 08 DELEG — IL
Telefax 251983

Jordan

Shmeisani Wadi Sagra Circle, Amman
P.O. Box 926 794
Tel. 66 81 91/66 81 92 Amman
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN JORDAN
Telefax (262-6) 686 746

Lebanon

Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beyrouth
B.P. 11-4008, Beyrouth
Tel. 36 30 30/31/32
Telex DELEUR 23307 LE BEYROUTH

Morocco

2 bis rue de Meknès-Rabat
B.P. 1302, Rabat
Tel. 612 17/612 46/612 48
Telex 32620 - (M)
Telefax (212-7) 61156

Syria

73 rue Rachid
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus
Tel. 24 76 40-24 76 41
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY

Tunisia

Avenue Jugurtha 21
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis
Tel. 78 86 00
Telex 14399 — TUNIS
Telefax (216-1) 788201

In A.L.A. countries

Bangladesh

House CES (E) 19
Road 128, Gulshan — Dhaka - 12
Tel. 60 70 16
Telex 642501, CECO BJ
Telefax (88.02) 88 31 18

Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America)

Centro Calon — Apartado 836
1007 San José
Tel. 332 755
Telex 3482 CCE AC
Telefax (506) 210893

India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia)

YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road
New Delhi 110001
Tel. 344 222 - 350 430
Telex 31/61315 EURO-IN
Telefax (91) 352706

Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Bruneï, Singapur, and ASEAN) Secretariat

Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor
J.L. Jend. Sudirman 32
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220
Tel. 578 0081/578 0181/578 0159
Telex 62 043 COMEU IA
Telefax (62-21) 5780072

Pakistan

House n° 8, Margalla Road, F 6/3,
Islamabad
P.O. Box 1608
Tél. 82 18 28 - 81 46 36/81 46 86
Telex 54044 COMEU PK
Telefax (92) 822604

Thailand (HQ of the Delegation inIndochina, Thailand, Malaisia and Philippines)

Kian Gwan House 11 - 19th floor
140/1 Wireless Road
Bangkok 10 330
Tél. 255 91 00
Télex 82764 COMEUBK TH
Telefax 2559114

Venezuela (HQ of the Delegation for South America)

Calle Orinoco
Las Mercedes
Apartado 67076, Las Americas 1061 A
Caracas
Tel. 91 51 33
Telex 27298 COMEU
Telefax 918876

Offices of the Commission

In ACP countries

Antigua & Barbuda

Alpha Building 2nd floor
Redcliffe Street
St. John's, Antigua W.I., P.O. Box 1392
Tel. and telefax (1-809) 4622970

Bahamas

Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick Str.
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau
Tel. (32)55850
Telex DELEGEC NS 310

Belize

1 Eyre Street
P.O. Box 907
Belize City, Belize
Tel. (501-2) 72785 and telefax
Telex 106 CEC BZ

Equatorial Guinea

B.P. 7779 – Malabo
Tel. 2944 - 2945
Telex 913104 GE

Grenada

Old Fort
P.O. Box 5, St. George's, Grenada, West Indies
Tel. (809) 440 4958 — 440 3561
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA
(Attn. EEC Delegation)
Telefax (809) 4404151 (Attn. EEC Delegation)

São Tomé & Principe

B.P. 132 – São Tomé
Tel. (239) - 12 - 21780
Telex (0967) 224

Seychelles

P.O. Box 530 – Victoria Mahé
Tel 23 940
Telex 2213 DELCAM SZ

Tonga

MAILE TAHA
Taufa'ahau Road
Nuku Alofa
Tel 21820
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS)
Telefax 23869

Vanuatu

Pilioko House 1st floor,
Kumul Highway
P.O. Box 442, Port-Vila
Tel. 2501
Telex 1093
Telefax 3282

Western Samoa

c/o Private Mail Bag
Chief Post Office, Apia
Telex 204 CECOF SX
Telefax 24622

In the OCT

New Caledonia

21 Rue Anatole France
B.P. 1100, Noumea
Tel. (687) 27 70 02
Telefax (687) 28 87 07

Commission of the European Communities Representation Office in Turkey

15, Kuleli Sokak
Gazi Osman Paça, Ankara
Tel. 37 68 40-1-2-3
Telex 44320 ATBE TR

in Namibia

EEC-Project Coordination Office
P.O. Box 24443
John Meimert Str. 36, Windhoek
Tél. (061) 351 34
Telefax (061) 351 35

du Seuil, 27 rue Jacob, Paris VI^e — "L'histoire immédiate" collection — 542 pages — Bfrs 1326 — 1990.

The author, who has a doctorate in history from the University of Cambridge and a diploma from the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, runs the documentation service at the national institute of demographic studies, a job which is reflected in this book and the somewhat systematic arguments which hint at the enormous amount of resource material accumulated in seven years of research.

The work continues though and research begun in at least two previous books—"L'invention de la France" (France invented, 1981) and "La Nouvelle France" (New France, 1988). From the word go, Todd makes it clear that "the Europe in question here is not the rational continent proper of the economists and technocrats, that prosperous, amnesic place whose whole history can be fitted between the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and the big market of 1993. Thirty-three years is too short to understand a civilisation born of the Roman conquest, the German invasions and the Christianisation of the peoples". So what does Todd think European civilisation is at this time? Typically, it reflects the diversity of European values and is the product of a slow synthesis. Europe's present democratic system is a product of synthesis, for example, combining things English, French and German, and "the respect for human rights is an English invention, universal suffrage is a French contribution and social security is clearly German in origin".

But Todd's main idea is that the religious, economic and ideological development of a group of humans very largely depends on its old anthropological foundation. There are four main family systems, he maintains, involving strong paternal authority, relative independence of the children and equality and inequality of siblings in the light of the rules of succession. And even if they are overturned, in particular by urban development, these models (corporate, nuclear-egalitarian and liberal-egalitarian) are still implicitly present. The author also demonstrates how family organisation turns into political organisation.

It is virtually impossible to describe such a comprehensive work in so few words, but there are three important ideas to highlight. First of all, the book concludes that the relations between Europeans and immigrants illustrate the "permanency of the rifts between societies with egalitarian and non-egalitarian or even frankly inegalitarian anthropological bases". Second, political and religious ideologies are currently on a firm decline. And third, "alongside the real giants, the peoples of Western Europe look more like featherweights than ever". There were 770 000 births in France in 1987, 775 000 in the UK and 870 000 in the two Germanys, compared to 3 830 000 in the USA and 3 400 000 in Russia plus Ukraine (but minus the Baltic, Caucasian and Moslem colonies) and the author's conclusion is clear. "The disappearance of Communist pressure leaves the way clear for specifically Russian pressure and it constrains Europe to unity just as surely as Stalinism did"—an excellent reason for continuing with the construction of Community Europe, not to mention one or two more! A.L.

ooo

Projets productifs au Sénégal — Guide d'évaluation économique (Productive projects in Senegal — Guide to economic evaluation) — A collective work from the Directorate of Planning at the Senegalese Ministry of Planning and Cooperation — Karthala — Paris — 1989 — 228 pages.

Senegal's Planning and Cooperation Minister has embarked upon a special method of choosing, programming, preparing, assessing, monitoring and evaluating projects. And here, following a guide to the practical choice of projects published in 1984 and the project programming and monitoring software tried out since 1986, is a guide to the economic evaluation of productive projects, based on the so-called effects method and divided into two essential parts.

Part one deals with the various stages of project preparation, from financial assessment (intended to telles the businessman about the costs and benefits of the project, i.e. what is in it for him) to economic evaluation, at the level of the community.

Part two comprises four case studies—an industrial project (assembly and running of a vegetable fibre sack factory), an agricultural project (to develop and fit out 12 basins for irrigated crops), an integrated fishing and preserved fish project and a cattle rearing project.

This is a clear and properly presented guide with a chapter on the tools of financial mathematics (calculation of returns, sensitivity analysis and calculation of loan amortisation), another on input and output tables, a third on working out secondary effects and a final one containing a brief evaluation report.

Address

Correspondence should be sent to:

"The ACP-EEC Courier"
Berlaymont 5/2
200, rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels
Belgium

Visitors are always welcome to call at the offices (Monday to Friday, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.)

THE COURIER

AFRICA – CARIBBEAN – PACIFIC — EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

PUBLISHER
Dieter Frisch

Commission
of the European Communities

200, rue de la Loi
1049-BRUSSELS
(Belgium)

Tel. 235 11 11 (switchboard)
Telex COMEURBRU 21877

EDITOR
Dominique David

DEPUTY EDITOR
Lucien Pagni

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Roger De Backer
Amadou Traoré
Augustine Oyowe
Simon Horner

SECRETARIAT:
Viviane Jacquet (235 27 19)

CIRCULATION
Margriet Mahy-van der Werf (235 76 39)

Back cover: *A rural road in Fiji. Poor road surfaces mean higher vehicle operating costs (Photo: The Courier)*

Publisher Dieter Frisch-CEC 200, rue de la Loi B-1049 Brussels — Printed in Belgium

CF-AA-91-001-EN-C