THE TWO CAMPS

By KLAUS MEHNERT

It is exactly six months now that the whole world has been at war. The time has come to analyze the present situation and the inner and outward strength of the two great camps in the light of facts as they are known to us. This all the more so as we are approaching summer, which may become one of the most decisive periods in the history of the world and may in its course settle the fate of all nations for generations to come.

THE DOUBLE CHARACTER OF THE WAR

THE present World War has for every participating nation a national as well as a super-national character. It may be years before the truth about the real causes of and responsibility for this war prevails. Yet one can predict with some certainty that, in their judging of each individual nation. the historians of later generations will take both viewpoints into consideration. The members of the Axis, for instance, each had their own reasons for entering the war and, at the same time, all three powers are united in the struggle for a new order of the world. There were other reasons to decide each one of the Allies. Yet they too have a motive in common: their hostility against the new order and those who represent it.

Without going into the question, which were more decisive for each of the various nations' entry into the war—the national or the super-national reasons, we can say that today there are two clearly defined camps.

THE HUMAN RESERVES

We do not wish to repeat here the attempt, made so often, to compare the military strength of the two camps. The figures on which such comparisons are built up are largely guesswork and subject to constant and rapid change. We shall only refer to the human reserves available for both sides. First we shall include only those on whom the belligerent nations can rely as being their own nationals.

TABLE I Human Reserves of Both Camps (in millions)

(The number of Russians does not include the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the non-Russian national minorities. The British figure contains only Britishers of English or Scottish descent throughout the world.)

If we add to these figures the allies of each camp, the numbers available for the Axis are increased by the inhabitants of Finland, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Manchukuo, and Thailand, as well as by the non-Japanese citizens of the Japanese Empire (Koreans, Formosans, and various aborigines), which raises the total from 211 to 345 millions; while in the case of the opposing camp we must add the non-Russian minorities of the unoccupied Soviet Union (41 millions), the USA negroes (13 millions) and various other participants, which increases their total from 259 to 319 millions. After the developments of the last few months India can no longer be counted. The Chinese question, although undoubtedly of great importance, we have to exclude for lack of exact data.

SUCCESSES HERE AND THERE

More revealing than the uncertain comparison of available shipping space or the number of airplanes is a comparison of the successes of both camps. The only real success of the Allies so far is that they have to a certain degree blockaded Europe from the rest of the world. However, since the Japanese successes and the occupation of most of Europe, including the wheat and ore-producing areas of the USSR, the question of who is blockaded and who blockading can no longer be answered as unequivocally as in the autumn of 1939. The two successes of the Allies next in importance are both of a negative nature. They consist of the fact that, in spite of all reverses. Great Britain and the Soviet Union are still in the war. Their remaining successes are all of lesser significance and can hardly be counted as military achievements, as, for example, the occupation of Iceland, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, and Madagascar.

In the course of the war the Axis powers have swept the influence of their opponents out of Europe from the North Cape to Libya and from Bordeaux up to the line Lake Ladoga/Sea of Azov, and out of East Asia from the Amur River to Timor and

from Wake Island to the Indian border. Moreover, they have caused huge damage to the Allies compared to which the damage suffered by themselves seems negligible.

TABLE II

Damage Inflicted on the Allies by the Axis up to May 1942 (according to Axis figures and excluding China)

Losses inflicted	by Germany/Italy	by Japan
Merchantships sunk (in tons)	18,000,000	1,100,000
Battleships sunk	4	8
Cruisers sunk	54	15
Aircraft Carriers sunk	5	6
Destroyers sunk	120	24
Submarines sunk	127	50
Airplanes destroyed	35,000	4,000
Prisoners taken	8,200,000	290,000
Territory occupied (in sq.m.)	940,000	1,400,000

The corresponding figures of losses suffered by the Axis powers are not available. But no one will deny that they are only a fraction of those inflicted by them on the Allies.

LONG WAR AHEAD

With regard to the further course of the war, both camps agree in one respect, namely, that this war is likely to be a long one. Even Japan, who has had the greatest successes in the last few months, has constantly been reminded of this by her leading statesmen, especially by Prime Minister Tojo. In his first radio speech after war had broken out, on the very day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he warned the people "to expect a protracted struggle," and ever since he and other leading men have urged the nation to be prepared for a long-term war. The Allies, on the other hand, have emphasized again and again that they would not possess the necessary strength before 1943 to start a real attack of their own. President Roosevelt admitted on May 23: "The present war will be a long one."

What are the prospects of both camps in such a protracted war? We shall examine this question from three aspects.

I. The economic position of both sides has frequently been compared

and with very varying results. Without going into detail, it can be said that the Allies entered the war in a much better position as regards raw materials but that the situation has changed considerably since the military successes of the Axis. We know that there are still vast natural resources in the territories controlled by the Allies. But the Allies are suffering from two things: there is, first, the disorganization of Soviet economics; and secondly, the necessity of having to ship the weapons, fuel oil, and foodstuffs produced in the American arsenal over wide and, as the last few months have proved, gravely threatened in a diminishing number The Axis, on the other hand, vessels. possesses, especially in the industrial areas of Europe, a tremendous armament industry, whose production can be transported to most fronts by way of safe interior land and sea routes.

INNER STABILITY

II. What is revealed by a comparison of the inner stability of the six powers involved in this war? As a result of her history and national character, Japan possesses a sense of national unity unique among modern states, which makes the whole nation, regardless of social or material position, appear as one large family. Italy and Germany have successfully eliminated the acute inner conflicts existing before the advent of Fascism and National-

Socialism throughtheir social policy and through the kindling of an idea that has fired their entire nations. In spite of the results of the blockade being felt in their standard of living. all three Axis nations have


confidence in their political and military leaders, which is only to be expected after the past successes.

On the side of the Allies we have a different picture. After the long series of military and political defeats which have reached their present climax in the loss of all southeastern Asia and India's refusal to co-operate, the confidence of the British people in its leaders has been gravely shaken. Serious tension exists between some of the Dominions, particularly Australia, and the mother country. Only the tenacity of the British people, and the fact that they are accustomed to their traditional leadership, can account for the same caste shaping the destiny of the Empire today as at the beginning of the war. In the Soviet Union the contrasts still exist between the thin stratum of Bolshevist leaders and the great masses. as well as those between the Great Russian part of the population and the national minorities, contrasts which, though hidden by the patriotism of war, have by no means been eliminated. And the United States is especially worried by the conflict between capital and labor, the pacifist leanings of the people, and the uncertainty she feels concerning the attitude of her millions of inhabitants of German, Italian, and perhaps even French descent.

THEY MUST STICK TOGETHER

III. Just as important as the unity within each of the six belligerent powers

is the unity within each of the two camps. Both sides are aware of the fact that only with absolute unity canthey look forward to final victory. The collapse or desertion of the Soviet Union, for example, or a



Black Areas Are Those Co-operating With or Occupied by the Axis

turn toward isolationism on the part of the United States, would mean an irreparable catastrophe for the Allied cause.

The same holds good for the Axis. is true, before December 8, 1941, Germany and Italy had fought alone for two years against the Allies, who even then were being aided by America with her industry and fleet as if she were at war herself. During this period they eliminated the armies of Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and, in part, of the Soviet Union, with a total strength of fifteen to twenty million troops. Yet the entrance of Japan into the war eased their load considerably, and, six months after December 8, one can hardly imagine the war without Japan's participation at the side of Germany and Italy.

This reflection is also true with regard to Japan. Her tremendous successes were aided by the fact that, due to the activity of her Axis partners, she had in Hongkong, the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Australia, to face only a fraction, about 600,000 men, of the Allied land forces and, moreover, was only opposed part of the Allied fleet. gapore and Burma were lost in Libya," wrote Liddell Hart, the prominent English military author, on May 12 in the Daily Mail-just as other British commentators before had claimed that Libya was lost in Singapore.

THE "UNITED NATIONS"

What does the inner unity, so necessary for the hoped for final victory, look like in both camps?

The Allies have for some time insisted on calling themselves no longer the "Allies" but the "United Nations." And, indeed, it is necessary for them to emphasize their unity, since the existing cracks are far too obvious. To present but a few of them:

There is in the first place the unbridgeable contrast between the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist Anglo-American states, which has only temporarily been forced into the background by common enmity against the Axis. As the main representatives of capitalistic economics, Great Britain and America have been bitter opponents of Bolshevism since its victory in Russia twenty-five years ago. They also know now that their capitalistic economic organism is far more exposed to the Red bacillus than the Fascist, National-Socialist, or Japanese economic systems. With deep concern they are observing how the Soviet Union is taking advantage of her position as an ally of England and America to spread her ideas of world revolution in the capitalist world.

Next there is the old conflict between the Near East aspirations of Great Britain and Russia, which during the last few months found expression above all in their obstinate rivalry in Iran and Turkey.

Then there is the distrust between the USA and Great Britain. To this day the Americans remember that they could win their independence through a war against England; and the bitter slogan, "England expects every American to do his duty!" is deeply engraved as a suspicion on the heart of all Americans. England, on the other hand, has to see one part of her Empire after another-so far as they have not been wrested from her by her opponents—come under the influence of Washington. She cannot rid herself of the feeling that, even in the case of an Allied victory, she will be not much more than an American dominion. Moreover, there is no common pride in military achievements which might unite the two nations.

And, finally, all three powers, at present especially the USSR, are bitterly conscious of the fact that the other two countries are holding back and trying to burden the third with all the weight of the struggle. Everywhere the lack of unity is felt—in purpose, military leadership, and strategy.

CRACKS IN THE AXIS?

Allied propaganda has obstinately been trying to discover cracks in the camp of the Axis too. Only recently the world was startled with a so-called "Italian plan for a separate peace." This was a little piece of propaganda which lost its effect as soon as it became known that at that very time Hitler and Mussolini were conferring at Salzburg upon the further conduct of the war. Tens of thousands of Italians are working today side by side with Germans in Germany's industry and agriculture. Although their homes are in the sunny South, Italian divisions, shoulder to shoulder with German troops, have mastered the coldest of Russian winters; and German divisions are fighting in the heat of the Libyan desert.

In the same way efforts have been made to find conflicts between the European and Asiatic ends of the Axis. It has been attempted, for instance, to fill Germany and Italy with suspicion of alleged Japanese plans for world domination, and vice versa. All the so-called material presented to prove these and similar contentions has no weight in view of the fact that Berlin and Rome have unequivocally recognized Japan's claim to leadership in Greater East Asia, just as Tokyo has recognized that of her Axis partners in Greater Europe. As a result of this clear position, conflicts of any importance cannot arise. In contrast to Allies, the two hubs of the Axis have the advantage of following fundamentally the same war aims and yet. owing to their territorial delimitation, not overlapping anywhere in their plans. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima, on May 14 expressed this very ably in the following words:

It goes without saying that the raw materials of the Greater East Asiatic sphere

are at the disposal of the European Axis partners, just as it is important for us to receive material from Germany....

It is indeed the first time in the history of the world that the most powerful nations in Europe and Asia, separated by tens of thousands of kilometers, are carrying on a common fight. And it is quite certain that the armed successes of Japan owe much to the victorious struggle of Germany and Italy.

To this must be added the Axis members' pride in the military achievements of their partners. Germany and Japan do not have to make excuses to each other for defeats or clear themselves of responsibility. They are in the happy position of only having to congratulate each other on their victories and of being able to feel a mutual confidence in final victory.

Thus the European and Asiatic parts of the Axis consider themselves as the two fists of a fighter who uses now his right and now his left to hit his adversary. Before Japan was involved in the war, the Allies were badly shaken by the blows of her Axis friends in Europe. And during the last few months, while the most important European front lay benumbed in ice and darkness, the hearts of her European partners, who were facing eight to twelve million British and Soviet soldiers, were warmed by the rapid march of Japanese successes.

After six months of existence, the Tripartite Pact, signed by Japan, Germany, and Italy on December 11, 1941, has demonstrated its historical importance. And its first Article reads:

"Germany, Italy, and Japan will jointly fight this war forced upon them by the United States of America and Britain, with all the means at their disposal, to a victorious end."

