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PIRACY, CIRCULATORY LEGITIMACY, AND NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIVITY IN BRAZIL

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PIRACY'S DIALOGIC SUBJECTIVITIES

Bull-rider Daniel had heard only a few songs by César Menotti and Fabiano when he decided to buy a “pirated” copy of the Brazilian duo’s first album at a bus station kiosk in the interior town of São José do Rio Preto in 2004.¹ He paid just 2 *reais* (about \$1).² He wasn’t sure he would like the entire album, and the “official” price was simply too high, having been set by some company that “didn’t care what Brazilians could afford.” But when song after song from the album went on to become a hit and he wanted to give the disc as a present, Daniel spent 20 *reais* on an official copy purchased at the mall. He wanted to give something “of good quality” and felt uneasy about giving an illegal copy as a present. At the time, it seemed to me that Daniel’s desire to give an “original” CD to a friend was at odds with his earlier celebration of the availability of cheap music in the street in Brazil. However, I soon began to realize that these two apparently opposed subject positions on piracy relied on one another. Furthermore, adding another layer of complexity, participants who primarily occupied either a pro- or an antipiracy position frequently stepped out of character to offer the opposite argument. In seemingly paradoxical ways, workers at antipiracy NGOs would suddenly laud pirates as creative Brazilian geniuses, while purveyors of copied CDs would abruptly fret over the impurity of their “Third World” occupation.

This article analyzes the mutual constitution of these subject positions (which I also refer to as subjectivities or position takings; see Ortner 2005), as well as

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2 their cooccurrence in economic locations that, at first, appear to be opposed: a
3 pro-intellectual property NGO, versus an example of Brazil's omnipresent infor-
4 mal markets. These sites provide specific and localized instantiations of piracy's
5 complexity, while also pointing to an international discursive space. Both within
6 Brazil and more broadly, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, piracy has become
7 central to neoliberal experience on several levels. *Piracy*—as the term is used in, for
8 instance, the news media, at board meetings, or at hacker conferences—is often
9 thought to comprise several components. These include counterfeiting, copying,
10 smuggling, and trafficking, which are occasionally separated but more often are
11 grouped together. More precisely, piracy involves the production or movement of
12 goods and services by personnel unauthorized by governments or corporations to
13 participate in the circulatory process. The label *pirate* is nonetheless indiscriminately
14 and pejoratively applied by those seeking to regain control of a given circulatory
15 process, most frequently large companies, and the public sector and nongovern-
16 mental apparatuses that support them. The label is frequently grounded in the belief
17 that pirates parasitically appropriate value they did not create, thereby disrupting
18 customary processes of production and consumption. However, those participating
19 in said unauthorized productions and movements (buyers and sellers in “informal”
20 economies or even students sharing music) often proudly appropriate the skull
21 and crossbones. Self-proclaimed pirates point to a broader social purpose beyond
22 their self-interest, such as the “freedom” of ideas, or “social banditry” (Hobsbawm
23 2000).

24 Careful scrutiny of piracy is of utmost importance not just because shrill
25 denunciations of it in the press (Phillips 2005) supported by industry “studies”
26 (Friel 2007; Olson et al. 2007)³ obscure its inner logic. Nor is piracy's analysis
27 merely important because of the impetus its invocation provides to current ominous
28 shifts in international trading practice, such as the new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
29 Agreement (ACTA), which promises to make international intellectual property
30 (IP) regimes considerably more restrictive.⁴ Rather, understanding piracy is im-
31 portant because its emerging centrality to neoliberalism clarifies recent deep-seated
32 transformations in economics, law, and governmentality. It clarifies the forms of
33 subjectivity available to producers, distributors, and buyers who participate in con-
34 sumer economies. In its earlier phase, in the 1980s and early 1990s, neoliberalism's
35 proponents sought to “free” markets that had once been controlled by bureaucrats
36 (Biehl 2006:208), withdraw institutional monitoring of economic activity (Morris
37 2001), and propagate an ethos of “competition” (Storper 2001:107). These com-
38 bined activities led to transformations that social scientists have critiqued. They

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2 include a dramatic rise of “informal” economies (Centeno and Portes 2006), an
3 unequal distribution of income as well as urban space (Caldeira 2001), and the un-
4 evenness of “development” by trickle-down theory (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).
5 However, current practitioners of neoliberal doctrines including small and large
6 businesses, and NGOs propounding entrepreneurial “participation” and “training”
7 as antidotes to unemployment, have turned to newer tasks.

8 The increasing prominence of piracy is therefore closely tied to what we
9 might call a “current” form of neoliberalism, which relies on a cluster of interre-
10 lated practices. These include the naturalization of “property” (Brown 2003), the
11 increasing importance of highly individualized “consumption” to identity forma-
12 tion (O’Dougherty 2002), and the perceived applicability of “branding” to almost
13 everything (Allison 2010; Manning and Uplisashvili 2008). They also include a
14 widespread belief in the “magical,” even redemptive, qualities of “legitimate” cir-
15 culatory processes that attend to copyright, trademark, brand, and patent (the
16 “circulatory legitimacy” of our title). Finally, the relatively recent capacity of digi-
17 tal technology to assist in the precise copying of not just films and music but also,
18 minimally, of clothes, cellular phones, and cameras frames these other processes.
19 All this, incipient in the rise of neoliberalism but reaching its apogee quite recently,
20 has facilitated seemingly opposed subject positions, which consumers, producers,
21 and suppliers participating in “consumer economies” inhabit in contradictory ways
22 (Dent 2009).

23 At present, from the perspective of many governments and corporations, the
24 vast majority of the world’s consumers have been “pirates” at one time or another.
25 Who has not downloaded an MP3 file without paying, placed “cracked” software
26 onto his or her computer, or purchased a cheap pair of designer sunglasses? The
27 expansion of the “pirate” category to the majority of the world’s consumers of
28 public culture can be explained by a paradox. Corporate law firms, self-proclaimed
29 “inventors,” and even indigenous tribes avidly protect the “property” (almost ev-
30 erything) of “authors” (almost everyone), ostensibly to foster creativity and justice.
31 The idea is that you must be able to profit from your own creative powers, or
32 you’ll simply refrain from exercising them. Also, international corporations and
33 their advertising agencies incite buyers to pursue “legitimate” goods, which, be-
34 cause of their attentiveness to the protection of IP, bring the consumer a “full,”
35 or as we shall see, “magical” experience. This is redemption by way of copyright,
36 trademark, patent, and brand.

37 At the same time, the economistic nature of much statecraft simultane-
38 ously admonishes that “entrepreneurs” should bring goods “efficiently” to markets

(Condry 2004). The old principle of efficiency cautions each buyer not to pay too much, because such inefficiencies are bad for the society-as-organism. Today, this cost scolding almost inevitably leads to involvement with things pirated. The “legitimate” is therefore opposed to the degraded experience to be had with what is often touted as an ever-more-dangerous piracy, while the degraded is simultaneously elevated as good economic sense. Adding force to this pinch between degradation and efficiency is digital technology’s ostensibly new temptation of its users with illicit circulation and production (lawyer and “Creative Commons” cofounder Lawrence Lessig goes so far as to call file sharing “addictive”; 2004, 297). This new merging of long-standing capitalist practice with late neoliberal “theology” (cf. Weber 1958) and technology is what puts piracy squarely at the center of the subject positions explored in this article’s ethnographic cases.

One of the chief factors that places piracy at the center of neoliberal subjectivities in Brazil and elsewhere is the increasing hegemony of IP. Ours is an age in which unions, government-funded educational programs, and evangelical churches encourage members to “participate” in economies for a simultaneously national and international good (Soto 1989). In such circumstances, however, well-established corporations need new ways to determine levels of participation. Banks, credit unions, and International Monetary Fund initiatives peddling “microcredit” may wish that everyone could become an entrepreneur. But if this were to take place, the companies currently at the top of the economy would lose profit. In recognition of this, think tanks funded by international business-interest groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce try to limit participants by eliminating pirates and propounding IP. Applying the label *pirate* therefore allows powerful institutions to decide which actors are allowed to compete in, and which are to be excluded from, mainstream economic practice.⁵ This provides these institutions with a moral scheme by which those able to protect their IP are allowed to benefit fully from their economic activity, while those unable to do so are not: an ethics of accumulation.

The derogation of piracy therefore provides an important component of its capacity to shape neoliberal experience. This is effected in part from the presentation of the pirate in the news media as an “enemy of all” (Heller-Roazen 2009). The pirate deserves the worst punishments because he or she has apparently foresworn fundamental social norms—property, ownership, and exclusivity. So the figure of the menacing pirate allows a virtuous consumer to take shape, in turn suggesting that the pirate has become the consummate “pariah” neoliberal subject (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:20). Without piracy, there *is* no “legitimate” circulation.

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2 Furthermore, the presence of the pirated in informal economies, as we shall see,
3 will be used to *keep* the informal informal. This leads to another point, important
4 for those interested in the ethnography of IP. Under such circumstances, IP appears
5 as a series of reactions to *piracy*, rather than as a transhistorical way of generating
6 and protecting creativity. IP's chief purpose thus seems to be the ratification of the
7 control of governments, corporations, and individuals who align themselves with
8 ideologies of "good business practice" (Wang 2003:3, 188). This article will show
9 the ways in which IP regimes enact that control on a quotidian level by shaping
10 participant self-perceptions and frameworks. Piracies are far from tangential or
11 derivative, as they are often portrayed even in sophisticated scholarship (see, e.g.,
12 Larkin 2008). On the contrary, piracies are the foil against which the enjoyment
13 of legitimately circulated commodities becomes both possible and necessary.

14 The two Brazilian sites explored next are useful for analyzing the split subject-
15 ivity that surrounds piracy.⁶ In Brazil, "pirated" products are almost everywhere,
16 in urban and rural spaces alike, and people across social classes buy such products.
17 Even more important, the hegemonic national politics of "mixture"⁷ in Brazil give
18 piracy a particular urgency. The neoliberal positions analyzed here stretch between
19 piracy as "cultural intimacy" (that which is embarrassing but nonetheless crucial to
20 national identity, as in Herzfeld 1996; Matory 2004), and piracy as a critique of
21 the injustice of the international market, thought to be ruled by large corporations
22 at the expense of an Everyman. In short, in this Brazilian case, the desires both to
23 practice piracy and to eradicate it have local roots. Brazil has, for much of the 19th
24 and 20th centuries, characterized itself as a zone of mixture in race, music, food,
25 sport, and religion (Collins 2004). However, a more "intimate" fear of overmix-
26 ture is just as prominent (Schwarz 1992). Current Brazilian consumers therefore
27 experience both pleasure and anxiety about mingling. This means that legitimate
28 or branded goods and services, along with associated practices of their production
29 and consumption, may be locally read as unmixed or pure. This portrays piracy
30 as taking dangerous liberties with modes of production, materials, and product
31 provenance. However, the pirated may be conceived of as perfectly in line with
32 that wonderfully Brazilian way of paying no mind to boundaries.

33 To examine the current neoliberal paradox where those oriented toward
34 acts of consumption are torn between getting a good deal and receiving a fully
35 consummated commodity experience, I focus on two sites, where the dialogically
36 related subject positions that piracy gives rise to emerge clearly. The first reveals an
37 argument for the sanctity of legitimately circulated products within the context of
38 individuated consumption. Here, piracy constantly threatens circulatory legitimacy

1
2 and, consequently, identity formation itself. This site is an ad campaign against the
3 purchase of what are called “pirated products,” a deliberately diverse group of
4 goods that is intended to blur distinctions between the copyrights, brands, patents,
5 and trademarks meant to “protect” the goods. The ads thus participate in a kind of
6 semantic warfare that seeks to apply the term *pirated* to as broad a range of goods and
7 services as possible, even to those that might, in the past, have been labeled *generic*
8 (such as medicines). Supplementary to the ad campaign are interviews I conducted
9 in the city of São Paulo beginning in July 2008, with lawyers, economists, public
10 relations consultants, retired police officers, advertising executives, and lobbyists.
11 They reveal beliefs that piracy’s minions make off with brands, which in turn is
12 thought to muddy commodity efficacy. It puts both the individual consumer and
13 society, more generally, at risk by supporting drug and gun smugglers, pimps, and
14 racketeers. In this context, part of piracy’s local threat lies in the way it allows
15 the public, diffuse, and chaotic “street” made famous by Brazilian anthropologist
16 Roberto DaMatta to invade the private, hierarchical, and orderly “house” (1979).

17 A body of interviews and observations dating back to 1998 shapes the analysis of
18 my second site, which shows how piracy is a way to be economically “competitive.”
19 Workers in this site—a street market—include: those who have recently lost
20 manufacturing jobs in the formal business sector; small business owners who have
21 grown weary of restrictive state regulations; church and community organizers
22 supplementing their incomes; and those who still see themselves as students headed
23 toward more formal careers in education, law, or even medicine but who have so
24 far been unable to enter university. All celebrate their “informal” occupations as
25 antidotes to Brazilian underemployment and corporate price gouging.

26 Despite the fact that these two sites would seem to be opposites, we will
27 see that subjectivities split; each site has absorbed the critique of the other, and
28 each must respond to contradictory neoliberal injunctions to buy cheaply while
29 preserving the exclusivity of IP. These sites contain antipiracy advocates who
30 suddenly celebrate piracy, and propiracy workers and buyers in the informal
31 economy who ruefully acknowledge the inadequacy of their jobs and goods.

32 33 **EMERGENT ANXIETIES**

34 Understanding the two sites I lay out in this article requires returning to a time
35 before hyperbolic statements about the provenance of “pirated copies.” When I first
36 started studying music in Brazil in 1998, contraband CDs showed up everywhere.
37 The vendors (often called *camelôs*, a frequently pejorative term for ambulatory
38 sellers of “cheap and imitative goods,” [see Houaiss 2001], although also used as

2 collective noun in the state of São Paulo) clustered around bus stations. Most fans
3 and musicians claimed indifference about where they had purchased their music.

4 Neoliberalism's increasing focus on IP quickly brought piracy and the moral-
5 ities of digital mediation to the center of Brazilian subjectivity. In a nation that
6 consumed music largely produced within Brazil by Brazilians, the discourse on
7 copying, production, and circulation polarized. On one side, some performers and
8 journalists began to trumpet informal economies as creativity's saving grace. In
9 1999, for instance, Brazilian rocker Lobão (Big Wolf) cast off his record company
10 to distribute his newest disc by way newspaper stands, which appeared to be some-
11 what close to the street-market kiosks that sold illegal copies. He decried, as he did
12 so, the evils of his label (Lobão et al. 2000). For Lobão, his recording company's
13 propensity to exaggerate or downplay sales figures according to how much it had
14 invested in a particular record showed how Brazil had replaced its military dicta-
15 torship (which ended in 1985) with a corporate one. For the executives and their
16 media representatives to complain about what was happening by the bus station
17 was both hypocritical and authoritarian, he argued.

18 But complain they did. At the same time as Lobão and his supporters were
19 praising the streets, the industry preached perdition. A series of NGOs funded
20 by the mouthpieces of big media conglomerates (such as the Recording Industry
21 Association of America) began to advocate for the "intellectual property" of artists,
22 hanging posters in legitimate record stores showing duct tape over the mouths of
23 famous Brazilian singers. Concurrently, stories of police raids of the *camelôs* made
24 the rounds in the news media. These stories tied illegally copied CDs to "organized
25 crime" and, thereby, to the degeneration of Brazilian society (see also Schneider
26 and Schneider 2008). More personal injuries were apparently multiplying too.
27 For example, one of Brazil's most widely read news magazines compared the
28 supposedly inevitable imperfections of pirated CDs to the scratches on old vinyl
29 LPs and claimed, quite falsely, that repeated playing of such subpar merchandise
30 would require expensive servicing of stereo equipment (veja 1999). The message
31 was clear; piracy was becoming every individual consumer's burden.

32 In the late 20th century, therefore, informal economies and their goods,
33 long a significant component of the political and economic landscapes in Brazil
34 (Gay 2006), were beginning to generate discourses of redemption and perdition,
35 celebration and complaint. Connected with this, the drive to classify most forms
36 of expressive and material culture as IP and then stringently "protect" them was
37 butting up against the injunction to produce as cheaply as possible. The stakes were
38 high. Across social classes and occupations, being "competitive" was believed to

2 be the very thing that would pull Brazil out of its slumber into postauthoritarian
3 prosperity. However, under this rubric, those involved in the sale of illegal copies,
4 not just of records and films but of tennis shoes, soccer shirts, sunglasses, and a host
5 of other products, presented a problem. Were they doing what they were *supposed*
6 to be doing by being dutiful entrepreneurs? Or were they ruining a delicate society
7 in need of “international investment” by violating the sacred principles of IP?

9 BOUNDARY VIOLATION AND POLICING IN BRAZIL

10 Although these questions seemed new, the terms in which they were being
11 asked were not. Early 20th-century modernist poet Oswald de Andrade famously
12 proposed, in his *Cannibalist Manifesto*, that Brazilians behave precisely as their
13 indigenous ancestors did. They eat other human beings (cultures) to absorb their
14 flesh (or “essence”; see Andrade 1970) and thereby create something new. The
15 sexuality of this mixing was and remains significant as the verb *comer* means both
16 “to eat” and “to penetrate” in Portuguese (Veloso 2002). Today, such discourses
17 still provide clear footing for “consuming” across various classes of phenomena.
18 Far from being derivative of Europe and later of the United States, Brazil comes
19 instead to be *defined* by its propensity for having sex with others—for “eating”
20 them.

21 This template is currently understood to apply to many phenomena. These
22 include Boas-trained Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre’s “big house,” where
23 the seduction of black female slaves by male Portuguese owners created a stronger
24 race (Freyre 1986). Across such sites we can point to arguments for the social
25 benefits of keeping unexpected bedfellows. In the context of a more traditional
26 European nationalism, such unexpectedness is portrayed as aesthetically dangerous
27 or messy. But here boundary crossing is not only creative but also downright sexy.
28 An inherent propensity to flout generic proprieties in race, social class, gender,
29 soccer, music, and food is frequently scored for a sexualized nation, and not just for
30 tourists (Parker 2009). Celebrations of Brazil as hacker land (as in Dibbell 2004)
31 or the flap over then minister of culture Gilberto Gil’s signing over of a single song
32 to a Creative Commons license recycle these tropes with clarity and frequency.
33 The mixture that results from deliberately breaking down boundaries is framed as
34 a source of Brazilian singularity. Stereotyped views of Brazil at home and abroad
35 frequently go no further.

36 But any redemptive politics of boundary breaking is coconstituted by a strict
37 policing of limits. There must be something to *be* between. And despite the
38 fact that the *policing* of boundaries is seldom viewed abroad as emblematically

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2 Brazilian, it is every bit as important to national identity. This approach appears
3 most clearly in protracted late-20th- and early 21st-century hand-wringing over
4 “tradition” in various guises (Oliven 1992). In musical cases, the argument is
5 often that “urbanization” of once Brazilian musical forms has led to the cultural
6 subservience of Brazilians to ineluctable modernizing, linked to foreign powers.
7 Such worries about being cavalier with boundaries find reinforcement in continued
8 readings of Euclides DaCunha’s *Rebellion in the Backlands* (1944), a late-19th-
9 century account of the massacre of a city of zealots by urban decadents. Here,
10 DaCunha argues that inattentiveness to boundaries (indexed, e.g., by the racially
11 mixed northeastern peasant and his bastardized messianic Christianity) produces
12 degenerate and religiously medieval monsters. But no one escapes criticism in this
13 book because the urbanites, by mingling European desires for uniformity with
14 tropical profusion, are both fearful and capriciously murderous. In this and other
15 instances, breaking down boundaries is seen to be both ill-advised *and* particularly
16 Brazilian. Where promiscuity is celebrated in the previous framing of Brazilian
17 self-understanding, here, monogamy has its virtues.

18 These sexualized practices of limit violation and policing ground neoliberal
19 Brazilian strife over piracy. The Brazilian voices we are about to hear are not simply
20 parroting international concerns but are commenting on localized approaches to
21 identity, further reinforcing the fact that neoliberalism needs to be thought against
22 and through its local instantiations. The two sites to which we now turn have been
23 selected because they reveal pro- and antipiracy beliefs in their most pronounced
24 forms. However, as with Daniel, these positions are unstable; off-camera, the
25 antipiratical ad campaign briefly celebrates the precision of good copying, while
26 the producers and buyers of the informal economy frequently equate the pirated
27 with degradation.

28
29 **“WITH PIRATED PRODUCTS, THERE’S NO MAGIC!”**

30 Should the responsible Brazilian buy the brand or take the fake? Let’s start with
31 the former. To pay homage to IP, each consumer must cultivate a constant vigilance
32 for violations of its principles. Brazil, the land of mixture qua hypersexuality, is
33 a veritable minefield. The redemptive “magic” of legitimately circulated goods is
34 continually beset by degraded thieves. We clearly see this on the set of an ad
35 campaign sponsored by Brazil’s media meganetwork *O Globo*, and an NGO, the
36 National Antipiracy and Illegality Forum (FNCP).

37 The FNCP is one of many antipiracy NGOs currently operating in Brazil,
38 but in antipiracy classroom pedagogy and government lobbying it has become

1
2 the most successful and visible. It is headed by Roberto, a lawyer, economist,
3 and business school professor. Roberto's law practice, he proudly informs me,
4 frequently brings him to New York City, oddly presented by him as a mecca
5 for respect of the branded and copyrighted, a contention the absurdity of which
6 underscores Roberto's embarrassment at Brazil's *particular* penchant for piracy
7 (i.e., piracy's cultural intimacy).⁸ Roberto is supported by a small team of public
8 relations experts and advertising consultants as well as a host of organizations from
9 Europe, Japan, and the United States.

10 For the ads I analyze here Roberto's team assembled representatives from
11 seven Brazilian industries that consider themselves vulnerable to "piracy." These
12 include the music and movie industries, and the sunglasses and auto parts industries,
13 among others. In a cavernous studio in the city of São Paulo, a group of actors,
14 producers, makeup artists, and customer relations representatives has gathered on
15 three nights in October 2008 to assemble seven 30-second videos that will begin
16 airing in January 2009.

17 Because piracy is both a constant threat and a temptation, the FNCP seeks to
18 teach consumers to buy products through legitimate circulatory processes; goods
19 thus purchased are the only ones that are "magical." Each of the seven ads follows
20 a similar structure. In all ads, a magician in a tuxedo attended by a woman in a red
21 dress proposes with flair to use "pirated products" for various purposes. His voicing
22 lays out the dialogic nature of the subject positions we are analyzing, because his
23 discourse cuts two ways; in introducing each ad the magician plants the seeds of his
24 own failure, but he does this in an excited way.

25 At the opening of the auto parts ad, for example, he proclaims: "And now, an
26 old *trick* of vehicular maintenance—using parts *of doubtful origin* in this particular
27 vehicle" (emphasis added to point out the pejorative terms oddly being pronounced
28 with joy). Meanwhile, the female assistant lasciviously removes a tire from a tiny
29 car piloted by a grinning simpleton, whose acceptance of piracy-based auto repair
30 appears to be carnally motivated. Here is a stereotyped Brazilian seduction. True to
31 form, the magician's prosody continues to belie his content, splitting him in two.
32 He is stating with *excitement* that he is using "tricks" and parts "of doubtful origin."
33 In this way, the short's producers argue that the consumption of pirated products
34 divides the consuming Brazilian into one who both *wants* to believe in the product,
35 and one who knows it cannot possibly work. Here, the need for piracy manifests
36 itself not only in the old-fashioned search for a deal but also in the celebration of
37 Brazilian mixture; this product is not only cheaper but also is "just as good," is
38 locally made, and is sexy, to boot.

2 At the beginning of each process (auto repair, pressing “print” on your com-
3 puter, or playing a DVD, for example), the assistant looks on with anticipation;
4 the magician’s promise apparently pleases her. However, after the puff of smoke
5 meant to produce the desired effect, something untoward occurs—the car’s engine
6 bursts into flames, or after pressing “play” on the DVD player, the TV intones that
7 this illegal copy will directly fund “organized crime.” The magician’s expression
8 then becomes one of embarrassment as well as disgust. He has failed to perform
9 for his assistant as promised. He then reverses his previous excited stance, and
10 his delivery aligns with the negative vocabulary he used before. He now offers a
11 warning, wagging his finger: “With pirated products, there’s no magic.” The *real*
12 magic is in the fully consummated consumption that comes from buying a licit
13 good—an act that piracy has foreclosed.

14 The message here is that the consumer must be on guard against a constant
15 threat, not only of the informal economy with all its copying and theft but also
16 against his *own* impulse that he is getting a locally made and even sexy “deal,”
17 allied with the typically Brazilian tendency to ignore boundaries—in this case, the
18 boundaries that define legitimate consumption. Here, as a buyer, the mixing so
19 often touted as a Brazilian virtue in the media brings nothing but trouble.

20 Another example forefronts this trouble. In one ad the magician proposes to
21 transform his “lovely assistant” into an even prettier “doll” by placing her in a black
22 box with a pair of “pirated” sneakers, some sunglasses “made with contaminated
23 raw materials,” and a few pirated soccer jerseys. Once again, the appeal is sexual;
24 the magician winks at the camera to signal his anticipation of his already lovely
25 assistant’s soon-to-be enhanced attractiveness. She understands what’s at play,
26 leering at the camera. The box turns, and we hear “abracadabra.” The assistant
27 then emerges covered with cuts and bruises, wearing a torn dress, a pair of glasses
28 containing eyeballs hanging from springs, and a shredded tennis shoe. She limps
29 and wobbles, far too demented for intimacy, and requiring assistance from the
30 repulsed magician. This act of mixture has produced a jumbled monster as from
31 DaCunha’s pages. So, by being let down by piracy, we come to know what good
32 and just consumption ought to feel like. Buying the *real thing* becomes knowable
33 through the disappointment that lurks in taking the fake.

34 The ending that caps off all the shorts further underscores piracy’s threat to
35 Brazilian culture. The magician, now dressed as a civilian, sits on a sofa in a living
36 room with his spouse, the assistant. The room is orderly, and the mood has moved
37 to chaste. The husband, who succumbed to the temptation to consume piracy, looks
38 embarrassed, while his wife looks angry. There has been an infidelity. The FNCP’s

1
2 logo and hotline for reporting piracy flash on the screen as a narrator entreats:
3 “Don’t make your life into a *show* for piracy.” In this retreat to the domestic, piracy
4 has mixed DaMatta’s “street” with the “house,” bringing disorderly and dangerous
5 pirated goods into the living room. The goods have violated the principle of
6 monogamy that governs the antimixing portion of the Brazilian cultural field,
7 and has thus denied the possibility of a consummated act of consumption with its
8 redemptive magic. We have seen what consuming legitimate and branded products
9 *ought* to be. We should have seen through the illusions.

10 If we consider what is taking place at the margins of the filming of these ads,
11 however, this advertising campaign is far from coherent. It contains contradictory
12 off-stage celebrations of illicit use, sale, and copying. One experienced TV producer
13 celebrates an employee who “copies” objects needed for filming ads—enormous
14 brand-name pens that write (Bic), tremendous women’s shoes (Nike), and tiny
15 cars (Ford). This “artist of the copy” is surely a pirate, too, the producer excitedly
16 announces to his appreciative audience of customer service representatives, who
17 giggle at the meticulousness involved in reproducing a brand-name car down to
18 its tiny hubcaps. And later, in even stronger support of the piratical, the makeup
19 artist wonders what on earth the multinationals *thought* would happen when they
20 went to Asia to cut costs. For starters, they fired thousands of Brazilian workers,
21 making them poor and angry. But they also engaged the Asians’ sense of profit.
22 *Of course* those overseas factories that normally make licit goods also make goods for
23 informal markets after hours. Those multinationals *deserve* to be pirated for being
24 so cheap.

25 On the set, this ad campaign briefly doubles back on itself to actually *promote*
26 the pirated, evidencing the simultaneity of seemingly opposed subject positions
27 that piracy brings forth. In this zone of apparently unitary opposition to piracy,
28 subject positions are contested and unstable: the knowledge that piracy produces
29 impotency, inefficacy, and personal qua national ruin attempts to distance itself from
30 but cannot obliterate the desire to partake of the sexiness of Brazilian boundary
31 violation, the urge to get something for less, and internationalized notions of
32 profitability. This contestation emerges as well in Campinas’s *camelódromo*, where
33 piracy is by and large a social good, although it sometimes harmonizes with the
34 ideologies we have just explored, as a dangerous embarrassment.

35 36 “WE WANT TO WORK IN PEACE”

37 In our second site the Brazilian should just take the fake. Any pejorative sense
38 of piracy seems to reach its epistemological limit at the Popular Shopping Center

2 of Campinas, an ideal location for exploring Brazil's propiratical discourses. This
3 is where business owners, workers, shoppers, and suppliers align informality with
4 "entrepreneurship" and pride in "work." The market itself is a covered fiberglass and
5 galvanized metal structure that snakes around the central bus station, dominating the
6 downtown area just as an informal economy dominates the center of most Brazilian
7 cities. In Campinas, a city of about 1.5 million, the *camelódromo* contains about
8 2,000 numbered stalls.⁹ Here, the brazen flouting of the legitimately circulated
9 becomes both proud *brasilidade* (Brazilianness) and good economic sense.

10 The more obvious aspects of Campinas's informal economy set the scene
11 for understanding the positions associated with piracy in this particular site. On
12 every day but Sunday, the *camelódromo* bustles with people across social classes
13 who are shopping for a variety of goods. These include running shoes, backpacks,
14 pens, watches, large-screen TVs, fresh fruits and vegetables, MP3 players, digital
15 cameras, printer cartridges, and cigarettes. The space is a jumble. Stalls display
16 goods with limited attention to category: cameras, MP3 players, pens, and back-
17 packs appear side by side. In those stands that sell films and music, the discs are
18 disorganized.

19 The disorderly nature of the space is described by the *camelôs* and their clients
20 as being the way Brazilians work: let the riotousness of Brazilian nature take its
21 course. Thus, *camelôs* and their clients merge what they are doing with Brazilian
22 creativity and inattention to boundaries. This useful failure to attend to regulations
23 has allowed them to discover rule-breaking solutions to the problem of how to get
24 name-brand and popular items cheaply. "Do you think for a minute I'm going to pay
25 those ridiculous prices across town?" one university student asks me rhetorically.
26 By proving that things can be done more cheaply, the *camelô* indicts the high cost
27 of goods and services in Brazil. Nor is this the only ill tackled here. Customers and
28 sellers continually restate the way in which this informal economy solves current
29 Brazilian problems of high unemployment. We would all be "on the streets" if we
30 were not "being good businessmen here," I heard time and again.

31 The notion that the licit shopping mall across town offers conveniences and
32 protections unavailable at the *camelódromo* is met with scorn. The means of payment
33 here is flexible; if you don't have the cash, just pay by credit card, because many
34 of the kiosks have card readers. Contrary to the FNCP's impotency-inducing
35 explosions, if something you buy at the Campinas *camelódromo* breaks you bring it
36 back for an instant exchange. As Marcos of box 384 tells me, as he stamps my DVD
37 purchases with the name and number of his stall, shop owners take pride in their
38 "guarantees"; if something doesn't work, he'll replace it. Similarly, the owner of a

1
2 nearby electronics kiosk informs me that he can now even take things all the way to
3 the original stores where he bought them in Paraguay. These guarantees are often
4 confirmed by those who purchase goods. Shoppers inform me that if, for example,
5 they had to deal with Sony's customer service representatives when their digital
6 camera broke, they'd be waiting for weeks. And they would be disappointed at the
7 end of the process. Here, however, they simply return to the booth where they
8 bought the offending product and exchange it for a new one.

9 Storeowners will go far to obtain "customer satisfaction." Antônio, a retired
10 university administrator, described dropping the digital camera he had recently
11 bought at the *camelô*. Naturally, it stopped working. Feeling somewhat guilty, he
12 nonetheless returned to the kiosk where he had bought it, feigning ignorance. The
13 owner asked no questions and put in a new memory card, saying, "I think this
14 will work, but if it doesn't, bring it back next week." Antônio has not returned.
15 The consequences of such policies go beyond mere efficiency in service. Numerous
16 shoppers questioned over the last ten years in visits to the *camelódromo* claim that
17 they "establish a relationship" with "their" shopkeeper that is much closer than any
18 they could establish at the impersonal mall across town. The warm embrace of
19 the *camelô* thus dovetails with discourses of "cordiality" as fundamental to Brazilian
20 social relations (Holanda 1995). Buyers and sellers explained to me that the *camelô*'s
21 system in Brazil resembles the formal economy in developed countries, where big
22 companies like Sony actually pay attention to individual customers. However, Sony
23 doesn't care about Brazilians, who must improvise.

24 As in our previous site, we find the same split in subjectivity. In the *camelódromo*
25 the dialogic tension between circulatory legitimacy and piracy also requires constant
26 vigilance, although in this location it is a vigilance of a slightly different sort. Over
27 each entrance, in addition to the suggestion that you smile because "you are being
28 filmed," another sign states that "we want to work *in peace*" (emphasis added).
29 This is signed by "the workers of the informal economy of Campinas," known
30 as STEIC.¹⁰ *Peace* is not being used metaphorically. The presence of violence in
31 the *camelódromo* requires that shopkeepers, suppliers, and even consumers remain
32 watchful, because the state (in the form of the civil police) or other shopkeepers
33 might do something rash at any time. The violence perpetrated by the state is
34 directly blamed on NGOs like the FNCP, which push local police to make raids,
35 punishing violators of IP, while encouraging competing stalls to "inform" on one
36 another through antipiracy hotlines (like the FNCP's). During the raids, people
37 may get hurt or, more seriously, have to spend time in notoriously dangerous
38 prisons. The justification for such raids continues to be "piracy." Local papers

1 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:1

2 reinforce this by lauding the confiscation and destruction of large numbers of
3 “pirated” goods. Here, therefore, the split subjectivity, for sellers especially, lies
4 in believing that what you’re doing makes good economic sense but knowing that
5 a system that ostensibly supports such good sense for some reason does *not* support
6 you.

7 The violence between shopkeepers within the *camelô* is more personal in cause
8 and more fatal in effect than punitive police raids. It is the result of a struggle over
9 whether, and how much, to formalize and what shape that formalization should
10 take. For instance, many *camelódromo* shopkeepers agree that they want to pay taxes
11 and have wanted to do so for some time. They believe this would allow them access
12 to a better health plan and more convenient bathrooms. But the precise nature of
13 the formalization process is contested, and two factions vie for control. On one
14 side, a community organizer named Carol heads a “society” of workers. She collects
15 weekly “dues” from each stall but is unable to tell anyone precisely where these
16 dues go. The few willing to discuss the matter speculate that such fees are most
17 likely given to local politicians and police, because stall owners that oppose Carol
18 are often raided by police the day after their transgression. On the other side of
19 an increasingly entrenched battle, a new workers’ “union,” officially recognized by
20 the state and supported by one of Brazil’s two largest labor unions, struggles for
21 transparency. Its members complain that fear keeps membership numbers low. In
22 fact, leaders on both sides were shot in the last four years, and police continue
23 to investigate the murders. Unfortunately, internal violence within the *camelô*
24 reinforces the perception of piracy as dangerous, completing a vicious circle. State
25 planners informed me, off the record, that they were unable to formalize more
26 fully the *camelódromo* because of the presence of “pirated products” there. They
27 noted that the presence of such products causes police raids. This, in turn, creates
28 fear and a greater desire for acceptance, which more formality might bring. Yet the
29 desire for formality itself causes violence, because there are disagreements about
30 its form and content.

31 Split subjectivity within the *camelódromo* is multilayered. Although the workers
32 and customers of the *camelódromo* may be proud of aspects of their piracy, treating
33 it as a kind of social banditry that counteracts the price gouging of international
34 corporations, they also strive for formalization. Their split subjectivity also reveals
35 itself on other levels. Despite their pleasure at receiving cheaper goods and better
36 service, customers are beginning to have reservations about buying from the
37 *camelódromo*. Lest the FNCP ads appear solely as corporate ideology, more buyers
38 at the *camelódromo* over the last decade have described a “sad” feeling about their

1
2 pirated purchases, fearing that they are stealing from their favorite band or robbing
3 the manufacturer.

4 The instability of subjectivity at this ethnographic site also appears in the
5 structure of voicing that buyers and sellers apply to what they are *doing* at the
6 *camelódromo*. The commodities consumed within the *camelódromo* constantly beg
7 the truth of their claims about their own provenance. Here, among the *camelôs*,
8 the pirated good is often described as “just as good as” the legitimately circulated
9 one. Some go further. One storeowner, whose shop repairs computers using cheap
10 Chinese parts, proudly pointed to the size of the embroidered dragon on the back
11 of his jeans. He informed me that because this dragon was even *larger* than the one
12 on the licit pair, his jeans were “even better than the originals.” But such arguments
13 always position themselves in opposition to claims to the contrary. The buyers
14 and sellers of “pirated products” continually strive for “good quality.” At the same
15 time, they know that the actors and institutions affiliated with the FNCP, and the
16 state apparatuses that both support the FNCP and take bribes from the *camelô*,
17 think their production and consumption is not only cheap but also dangerous.
18 The position taken by the *camelô* here is inherently defensive, therefore, and his
19 approach to what he does is deeply divided. In this way, just as those producing the
20 FNCP’s advertising campaign momentarily support piracy, the *camelôs* increasingly
21 pine for commodities whose magic derives from their attentiveness to IP. Looking
22 up from the central intersection of Campinas’s *camelódromo*, passersby can see a
23 large advertising surface on a nearby building, which, because I began research in
24 Campinas 12 years ago, has presented glossy ads for foreign cars (Hondas, Fiats,
25 and Fords), high-end shampoos (Vidal Sassoon), and digital cameras (Sony).

26 27 **FOR ENGLISH EYES, DIVIDED**

28 We have heard accusations on all sides. For the NGOs, except in revealing
29 lapses, the villains are those who facilitate “piracy”: buyers, sellers, suppliers,
30 thieves, smugglers, and clandestine manufacturers. The mindset of the NGOs is
31 often reflected in the state apparatuses and the media, which attack piracy. For
32 the *camelô*, except, once again, for telling slips in which pure products are exactly
33 what their advertisers claim them to be, the villains are foreign-funded NGOs
34 who seek to malign their honest work, corporate monopolies insulating themselves
35 from competition, and governmental agents who assist in these processes. For the
36 *camelô*, these are pirates of another sort. So everyone is calling everyone else a
37 pirate, which gives weight to the assertion that piracy seems to be “the definitive
38 transgression of the information age” (Johns 2010:5).

2 However, my argument is that current neoliberal dependence on the concept
3 of piracy is different from previous uses of the concept, and this has created a distinct
4 form of what I call split subjectivity. In the 21st century, IP policing and expansion,
5 an emphasis on an individuated consumer, the rise of economic informality, and
6 anxieties over digital copying have made piracy the indexical ground on which
7 circulatory legitimacy rests. IP's proponents—property lawyers, pharmaceutical
8 companies, music and film companies, and so forth—strive to apply IP to as
9 broad a range of human practices as possible, claiming that it is a fundamental
10 and transhistorical right. However, we see here that IP defines itself locally in
11 response to piracy, fashioning an ethics of accumulation—a moral scheme for
12 deciding who gets to maximize economic potential and who does not. These days,
13 IP proscriptively distinguishes the formal (legitimate) from the informal (pirated)
14 and provides both discursive and logistical supports for maintaining that distinction.

15 The split subjectivities on display here reveal a central paradox of neoliber-
16 alism. Consumers, producers, and suppliers oriented toward consumer goods are
17 constantly required to do two things at the same time. First, they are required
18 to permit commodities to signify only in terms of their circulatory legitimacy. At
19 the same time, however, they are asked to buy as cheaply as possible. Although
20 it is tempting to view these opposed positions as the reflex of global forces, a
21 notion seemingly abetted by the knowledge that the FNCP's funding comes almost
22 entirely from abroad, the evidence here tirelessly returns us to the local roots of
23 piracy's centrality to neoliberal fields of consumption. Both intimate (it's a Brazilian
24 embarrassment) and critical (it's Brazil's finger in the eye of multinationals) stances
25 on piracy approach it as a local failure or success, grounded in durable discourses
26 of mixture and purity. In the case of the NGOs, the argument is that in other
27 countries people actually value IP. People don't steal from one another. North
28 Americans, for instance, leave intact the appropriate boundaries between forms
29 of production and circulation, and thus they provide incentives for invention and
30 creativity. Among the *camelôs*, the average Brazilian's propensity to enact a creative
31 solution by violating boundaries provides the necessary response to international
32 monopolies and their local collaborators. Here, the *camelô* would assert, is how we
33 avoid paying the ridiculous prices that citizens of First World countries don't have
34 to pay.

35 A Brazilian expression that something is done to the letter of the law “only
36 so that the English will see” illustrates these localized tensions over boundedness
37 and the way in which piracy brings these tensions to the fore in late neoliberal
38 times. Folk etymologies of the expression *para inglês ver* differ. Some say it first

1
2 occurred in the 1800s during the British blockade of slave ships off the Brazilian
3 coast that would attempt to disguise themselves as regular trading vessels; others
4 say it was born in the Brazilian interior when British rail companies watched over
5 their laborers. Current invocations channel the tacit assumption that things will get
6 jumbled *here*, in this place. And the fact that corners will be cut and mingling will
7 take place is embarrassing and locally appropriate *at the same time*. This is something
8 that foreigners just won't understand, so instead we show them something that
9 seems to fit their rules.

10 The simultaneously "culturally intimate" and "critical" poetics of recogni-
11 tion in this expression, emplotted within late colonial practice but invoked today
12 to describe phenomena like the ads of the FNCP and the formalizations of the
13 *camelódromo*, underscore the current importance of piracy. The fields of cultural
14 production on which consumption relies currently reinforce a tension between pu-
15 rity and its violation. Piracy thus helps us trace the local limits of practice on which
16 neoliberal circulation grounds itself. Piracy creates the possibility of consummated
17 exchange, while dividing an anxious neoliberal subject in two.

18 19 **ABSTRACT**

20 *Understanding current neoliberalism in Brazil requires an analysis of the piracy that has*
21 *been going on there since at least the 1970s. Early phases of neoliberalism shrank the*
22 *state, liberalized markets, and privatized resources. Current forms of neoliberal practice*
23 *are characterized by large informal economies, intellectual property (IP), circulatory*
24 *"legitimacy," individualized consumption, and the reproductive fidelities of digital*
25 *technology. This current combination places the unauthorized production, sale, and*
26 *use of goods (often referred to as "piracy") at the center of the forms of exchange on*
27 *which the modern Brazilian economy relies. Purchases may be viewed as degraded or*
28 *redemptive by having been mediated through "piracy," and most consumers of public*
29 *culture are referred to at some point by the culture industry as "pirates." The anxious*
30 *subjectivities that result from piracy's emerging centrality are here analyzed at two*
31 *contrasting Brazilian sites. The first is an NGO that polices violations of IP. The second*
32 *is an informal marketplace in the state of São Paulo where workers strive for "competitive*
33 *pricing." In both of these sites, piracy simultaneously elucidates international discourses*
34 *while it inscribes local approaches to mixture and boundary violation. At some moments,*
35 *piracy appears as a distinctly Brazilian "embarrassment." In others, it is a typically*
36 *creative Brazilian solution to the problem of unfair international markets. [piracy,*
37 *neoliberalism, intellectual property, informal economies, camelô, Brazil]*

38 **NOTES**

1. All proper names are pseudonyms.
2. *Reals* are the Brazilian currency, currently valued at approximately \$0.50.

- 2 3. For a critique of these “studies,” see Sell (2009).
- 3 4. ACTA is a broad IP treaty in the process of being ratified by the United States, Japan, and
- 4 the European Union. It promises to radically increase global scrutiny of IP infractions. For
- 5 a critique of the policy along anthropological lines, see Dent (2010).
- 6 5. For more on the use of piracy to decide participation in previous eras, see Johns (2010) and
- 7 Darnton (2003).
- 8 6. My interest in subjectivities continues a long-standing anthropological interest in modes of
- 9 perception, self-understanding, and affect by way of subject positions and position takings
- 10 (see Bourdieu 1977; Geertz 1973).
- 11 7. The necessity of localizing Brazilian economic practice is not particularly new. It was worked
- 12 on by theorists of “associated-dependent development” in the late 1970s and early 1980s
- 13 (Cardoso 1989).
- 14 8. The presidency of the organization changed in 2010, although Roberto continues to play an
- 15 active role.
- 16 9. For more on the layout of the Campinas *camelódromo* see Camilo Albuquerque de Braz’s
- 17 excellent thesis (2002).
- 18 10. There is currently a battle over the STEIC acronym. The older organization is now the *Society*
- 19 *of Workers of the Informal Economy of Campinas*, while the new union calls itself the Union
- 20 (or *sindicato*) of Workers of the Informal Economy of Campinas. Both spell STEIC.

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17 erty, including, Gabriella Coleman's "Code is Speech: Legal Tinkering, Expertise,
18 and Protest Among Free and Open Source Software" (2009), Christopher M. Kelty,
19 Michael M. J. Fischer, Alex "Rex" Golub, Jason Baird Jackson, Kimberly Christen,
20 Michael F. Brown, and Tom Boellstorff's "Anthropology of/in Circulation: The
21 Future of Open Access and Scholarly Societies" (2008), and Christopher Kelty's
22 "Geeks, Social Imaginaries, and Recursive Publics" (2005).

23 *Cultural Anthropology* has also published articles on South America. See, for exam-
24 ple, John Collins' "'But What If I Should Need to Defecate in Your Neighborhood,
25 Madame?": Empire, Redemption, and the "Tradition of the Oppressed" in a Brazil-
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