

An Alternative Framework for Ethics Instruction in Social Education

Thomas J. Misco, Jr.
Gregory E. Hamot

Ethics are central to social education, and making ethical decisions underlies the purpose of teaching critical thinking and interpretive skills in the classroom. The point in acquiring these skills is to apply them in the real world when deciding "what ought to be," "right from wrong," and "good from bad." Few educational philosophers would disagree up to this point. However, when discussion begins on how to teach ethics, beliefs diverge considerably.

Ironically, both the extreme left and extreme right wings of educational thought seek the same end, that of ethics inculcation. Inculcation of anything is a dangerous if not unethical proposition. Inculcation is a pernicious method, used by totalitarian states, that runs counter to student-centered, progressive education in a democratic society. The logical response to the maligning realities of inculcation is that some ethical behaviors, such as honesty or bravery, are intrinsically "good" and deserve teacher modeling and wholesale student acceptance. But buying into any value, without logically arriving at the utility of such a value for a particular situation, renders it meaningless for the student. For instance, many situations dictate that we must *not* be honest or brave to attain an ethically and positively "good" outcome. Thus, rather than inculcation, ethics in a democratic society must be taught as a flexible system, arrived at through logic and reason, that ultimately situates students to act in ways that are ethically sound.

This thesis unfolds in five parts. The first begins with the premise that social education is central to education and that ethics are the *par excellence* of social education. The second part deals with the far left of the educational spectrum, specifically the inculcating views of multiculturalists. The third area focuses on the conservative side, and its push for certain unquestionable universal ethical codes. An eclectic solution, based primarily on the philosophy of Deweyan pragmatism and various ethical theories, follows the conservative view and offers progressive alternatives to this most essential element of education. The final section contains the implications of teaching ethics in schools in light of these three perspectives, with a view toward further inquiry.

The Centrality of Ethics Education

When we reflect on why we ultimately teach certain topics, why we teach in certain ways, and what we want students to be able to do after their experience in social education, the answer is almost always the same. We want students to think critically; to be inquisitive; to be a positive and active member of society; to be a good citizen; and to have tolerance, honesty, character, integrity, and generosity. Formed by its largest professional organization, the primary purpose of social education is to "help young people develop the ability to make informed and reasoned decisions for the public good as citizens of a culturally diverse, democratic society in an interdependent world."¹ The focus of this statement is decisions or, stated more precisely, ethical decision making, which is the business of social education. Others build upon this broad definition and suggest that the point of our work is to help students attain civic competence and become familiar with the skills and dispositions that are necessary for active membership in a democratic society.² Still others view social education as having an *a priori* reconstructionist purpose, where the ultimate goal is to position students to be part of a new social order that reconstructs society along the lines of social justice and reform.³

All of these goals and desired outcomes have one commonality. Each mission requires that in some capacity we want students to be able to reason, think, and determine what *ought to be*. The reason why students must learn these sophisticated skills is to be able to make informed ethical decisions, which is further translated into being a positive influence in society. Thus, since ethics are central to the purposes of social education, it seems odd that ethical philosophy, and philosophy in general, is rarely offered as a course, and a rigorous treatment of the topic is not found in most classrooms. When realized in the powerful light of philosophy, the arguments for the appropriate methods of teaching ethics are exceedingly divergent and polemic. The educational philosophy that espouses relativism and multiculturalism attempts to equate cultural norms, at the expense of cultural universals, which is a problematic assertion at best.

Far-Left, Multiculturalism, and Relativism

Most multiculturalists view cultural values as a remedy for educational issues and suggest that the cardinal mission of the public schools is to develop in students values related to this view. Many multiculturalists posit that a student's education should be centered in his or her own cultural value system.⁴ It follows logically that education should form around arbitrary cultural value systems, which is a direct inculcation of relativist ethics. Multiculturalists suggest that ethical codes are subjectively, politically, and culturally contextualized, the result of which is that no knowledge claim has universal validity and no consensus on rules and values can be achieved. Furthermore, multiculturalists use a theory that denies the possibility of consensus, since all standards are politically and culturally determined.⁵ The logical conclusion of these multicultural views is that all cultures have ethical codes that are legitimate in themselves, simply by nature of emanating from a "culture," and each culture's ethical system is relatively equal to any other. Giving ethical license to any group based on achieved status as a "culture" not only skirts the issue of having to "offend anyone," it is also intellectually perplexing. By not being critical of cultures, including our own, and their ethical beliefs, we run the risk of never achieving any sort of ethics education based on a democratically oriented habit of mind.

Cultural relativism seeks to avoid ethical issues because each culture will maintain a sacrosanct stance. Rather than rationally seeking a resolution to ethical issues, relativists suggest that each culture can construct its own values for its own members, but these values should neither be used to judge other societies, nor should other societies judge them. Once the members of one culture define the ethical "good," discussion of the issue apparently ends and the opportunity for further discourse ceases.⁶ The result of cultural relativism is intellectual and ethical stagnation, where the search for common knowledge and progress halts.

The oppressive nature of rational, analytic, and logical thought is central to radical educational theory, postmodernist theory, and relativism. Postmodernists seek to break from "hegemonic logic"⁷ due to its supposed intrusion on cultures that rely more on emotions and relationships to find resolutions to ethical dilemmas. This idea naturally falls apart when we start to discuss international human rights, the mutilations of genitalia in certain cultures, as well as demonstrations by extremist groups in the United States. Contradictions abound as witnessed by relativists who seek ethnic independence but at the same time protest "international issues." However, before we examine the implications of inculcating relativism as the only correct ethical code, we must first examine ethical relativism itself.

Relativism posits a central argument that (a) morally right and wrong actions vary from society to society, so there are no universal moral standards held by all societies; (b) whether or not it is right for individuals to act in a certain way depends on the society to which they belong; and (c) therefore, there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply to all people, everywhere, and at all times.⁸ The first disturbing consequence of this theory is that reformers are always morally wrong since they go against the tide of cultural standards, resulting in a conclusion of progress as being "unethical." A second argument is that if moral relativism is true, neither law nor civil disobedience will have a firm foundation. Civil disobedience would be morally wrong if a culture agrees with the law in question, hence any "petition of grievances" as found in the United States Constitution, would be unethical. Another problem associated with relativism is that it is extremely difficult to define a culture or society. The definition of certain cultures may stem from history, literature, language, ancestry, religion or geographic concern, and, of course, race. Thus, if we deduce that every individual has a distinct "culture," we might abandon any sort of rational ethical, judicial, or political system. Ultimately, one could justify any action through cultural approval, and therefore we must view the perpetuation of such an action as a correct ethical decision.⁹ All of this, of course, applies to a multicultural, rather than monocultural, society.

The Far-Right, Conservatism, and Universalism

The far-right's ethical education theory is much easier to define, for they seek to inculcate a specific set of unquestioned values, rather than a general code. One sect within this group is the moral literacy movement of Bennett, Keyes, Limbaugh, et al., which seeks to ensure social order via "family religious values" in secular public schools.¹⁰ The camp headed by Diane Ravitch, though somewhat similar, seeks to preserve a sense of the American community.¹¹ She and others argue that if there is no community with an agreed upon vision of liberty and justice, then there will be but a collection of divergent racial and ethnic cultures. If no larger sense of community exists, then each group will want to teach their own children in their own way and public education will cease to exist.¹² While a sound argument, it implies that room exists for only one vision of ethics education. William Bennett specifically defines what that singular vision should be.

Bennett debunks moral relativism as well as the process of "values clarification," and he proposes ethics as a system of universal truths that can be taught through rote memorization.¹³ These universal ethics, supported by culture throughout time, must also be held by teachers. Bennett suggests that teaching and exposing children to good character and inviting its imitation will transmit a moral foundation for ethics.

He suggests that one cannot teach morality without being "committed to morality yourself."¹⁴ If teachers can consistently act in ethically sound ways, with good moral character, in specific situations whereby that character and morality is logically attained, it is an extraordinary and honorable goal. But having a teacher act out these set values, and the desire for students to follow these values, is flawed on at least two counts.

First, if students take on the assumption that being honest is a moral action that should be universalized, they are not asked to come to that conclusion on their own. It is, as stated earlier, meaningless to ask students to accept virtues *prima facie*. Second, the case for "teaching ethics by example" can be cut down deontologically. For instance, the actions of a role model may contain malevolent motivations. Yet, the outcome of these actions may, in fact, be "ethically good." Nonetheless, their motivations remain inherently pernicious. Affinity for role models limits the ethical cause for both student and teacher to teleological analysis, so that doing the right thing for the wrong reason is morally permissible. Even teaching about historical role models fails to offer any substantive ethical thought or reflection for the student. As Dewey noted:

lessons about morals signify as a matter of course lessons in what other people think about virtues and duties. It amounts to something only in the degree in which pupils happen already to be animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. Without such regard, it has no more influence on character than information about the mountains of Asia.¹⁵

Beyond the case of role models, we must examine the dangers of holding certain values as universally true. This is a dangerous Hobbesian leap that borders on nazism, totalitarianism, and absence of thought. The first danger is that teachers, administrators, and communities that endorse specific ethical views as being universally true assume these views to not only be true, but unquestionable. Second, students exit their education having learned that they should always act a certain way, without having had any thought process that reaches the same conclusion. Finally, when acting in a society with an ethical framework that one holds to be universally true, intolerance and inflexibility will be the likely result. On a larger scale, universal ethics education is what totalitarian states have consistently used to sustain their regimes.

A totalitarian state (as the most extreme example of authoritarian control) may take the position that the teacher ought to cause students (1) to adopt or "take on" certain very specific attitudes; (2) to develop a number of fairly specific habits acquired through a multitude of prescribed activities; (3) to accept the orthodox pattern of beliefs and values, in terms of

which the approved habits and attitudes fit together and make sense.¹⁶

Bennett found the characteristics of thoughtfulness, kindness, honesty, respect for the law, knowing right from wrong, and love of country to be the most desirable.¹⁷ Teaching unquestioned patriotism and respect for the law undermines the entire purpose of social education and the promotion of rational thought in a democratic vein.

Universalists seek to inculcate unquestioned values for many reasons. There is potential, if these values are questioned, that youth will accept the "wrong" beliefs if they open their minds to new ideas.¹⁸ Conservative assertions of universal virtues and truths naturally contain functionalist desires to limit change. But skirting "closed areas" that are often saturated with prejudices and taboos creates intellectual and ethical stagnation.¹⁹ Progressive education in a democracy demands the continual questioning of beliefs and assertions.

Kohlberg and Values Clarification

An alternative to relativism and universalism is Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg's approach suggests that moral reasoning is rooted in one's cognitive abilities. Contained in this theory, six stages of moral cognitive development, with student ascension to the next highest stage through examination of moral dilemmas, is seen as the ideal. Conservatives criticize Kohlberg's approach stating that the outcome of moral reasoning is "moral nihilism."²⁰ Rather than learning specific values, Kohlberg suggests that students grapple with dilemmas that tend to yield more sophisticated ethical domains. In addition to Kohlberg's theory, the "values clarification movement" has drawn considerable reaction. Values clarification elicits the judgment and opinions of a student with regard to a moment of "values dissonance." Values clarification does not go further than eliciting awareness of values, however, and assumes that being aware of one's values is an end in itself.²¹ Obviously, values clarification does not go far enough, for it fails to utilize the last 2,500 years of philosophical thought on the issue.

Bennett has criticized the values clarification movement as an avenue for students to clarify wants and desires and asserting those as a form of ethical relativism.²² The moral dilemma approach is criticized by some as wrongfully identifying a universally valid moral orientation that is historically and culturally particular.²³ Kohlberg's theory suggests pure reasoning, void of any inculcation, but relies too heavily upon cognitive development, albeit essential to our solution, and not enough on the multitude of ethical theories and codes drawn from all cultures that students can use to solve moral dilemmas.

Implications of Ethics in Education

Deciding what ethical systems are chosen and how they are taught is a divisive and volatile issue. For some it is one of the most important struggles for hegemony now being waged in American society.²⁴ The way in which ethics are taught has cascading effects on social education. If relativism is the choice of ethics education, then what follows is typically a relativistic view of American culture in history, government, and sociology courses. An example of this permeating effect is any centric curriculum that attempts to de-center any shared values, thus promoting societal divisiveness.

A possible consequence of relativism in a multicultural society is the erosion of the community, or common unity, that holds us together (e.g. language, government, history, and literature). When this sort of multiculturalism is practiced and taught, individuals find membership within balkanized groups. Ultimately these groups can promote a "centric" vision of education, particularly in history, whereby the history of their group gains dominance over all others. Militants of ethnicity contend that a main objective of public education should be the protection, strengthening, celebration, and perpetuation of ethnic origins and identities, the result of which only seems to nourish prejudices, differences, and antagonisms.²⁵ When these centrist visions become increasingly pronounced, they go beyond admirable histories of groups and enter into the realm of "bad history."²⁶ Excessive centrist education pursues sociopolitical goals that are not related to cultural freedom or intellectual excellence. In addition, centrist education is not even "multicultural" because it focuses on one particular race as having priority over others.²⁷

For example, some multiculturalists assert that African Americans have no ties to Europeans, and thus are deserving of alternative curriculums. This assertion is based on the premise that (a) African America has any connection to Africa and (b) that Caucasian America has a conscious connection to Europe. Contained within the self affirmation and reculturation movements is an implied assertion that members of an ethnic heritage perform better if the curriculum centers upon, and glorifies, their ethnic affiliation.²⁸ Distorting history for the purposes of creating cultural self-esteem marginalizes every ethnicities' rightful ownership of a communal American History.²⁹

American History cannot help to have somewhat of a European bias, for its socio-political makeup stems mostly from the European experience. Yet, just as any supposed connection of sixth generation immigrants to the Old World seems absurd, self-ethnification after 300 years in this country can be thought of as "play-acting."³⁰ Creating a historically ethnic identity distinct from "American" has often resulted not

from a people's movement, but rather due to a few, well-established intellectuals, professors, and writers.³¹ If the supposed ethnicity that ignores the presence of any collective American experience finds license in a curriculum, then the results could not be more debilitating.³² If the criterion for teaching becomes ethnic pride and self-esteem, which some suggest has already occurred then the goals of education in a democratic state no longer matter. Certain things cannot be taught and areas closed off to conversation readily appear. If every ethnic or religious group claims the right to approve or veto what is taught in public schools, multiculturalism becomes ethnocentrism, which is an inherently racist and undemocratic proposition.³³

The implications of conservative or universal notions of ethics education have equally nefarious consequences. Universalists such as Bennett say that values are the key to stability in society and they are best inculcated in the early years. He does not care how the values are acquired and would presumably prefer to avoid reasoning among students, as evident in the values clarification debate.³⁴ If we consider that the logical progression of multiculturalism is ethnocentric and resistant to a continued conversation on all topics, it resembles the far-right. Conservative universalists also demand centrist goals and the closing of areas to conversation. Both views entertain many of the same thoughts in policy as do totalitarian regimes. Pure indoctrination of "traditional" values, regardless of ideological bent, appear not at all meaningful and only beget conclusions that have little or no thought supporting them.

Thus, educators must instead focus on the reasoning of values. Telling a student what is right or wrong is not democratic, but defining ways of reaching a conclusion that instructs the morally "right" way to act is not only a teachable moment, it is the keystone of social education. We must be continually vigilant and aware of the omnipresent attempts of ethics inculcation in order to preserve the freedom to question and reason, an inherent and necessary feature of education in a democratic society.

The Alternative: Dewey's Reflective Morality

Dewey's conception of ethics in education offers an alternative to relativism, universalism, and cognitive based ethics education. For Dewey, the central purpose of schooling was to "develop in students a critical intelligence and disposition that would be consistent with their actions as socially responsible citizens"³⁵—a ringing endorsement for the centrality of ethics education in social education. Dewey's conception of "reflective morality" coincides with "reflective thinking," as it demands that students draw on moral experiences and weigh ethical theories to conclude the proper action. But Dewey noted that there can be no such thing as

reflective morality unless people seriously ask how they should act and why they should do so.³⁶ In order for reflective morality to occur, "closed areas" must become open and any moral didacticism removed, making all personal and public dilemmas available for student reflection.

Reflective morality is centered upon the notion of *respicere finem*, or having the ends in view. In his *Ethics*, Dewey used the example of hedonism to illustrate *respicere finem*:

Consider how you will come out if you act upon the desire you now feel; count the cost. Calculate consequences over a period of time. Circumspection, prudent estimate of the whole course of consequences set in train, is the precondition of attaining satisfaction or the Good. All folly and stupidity consist in failure to consider the remote, the long run, because of the engrossing and blinding power exercised by some present intense desire.³⁷

Hedonism is an excellent example of an ethical code that offers students a logical choice for ethical action and a consequence of that action. Even though Dewey was primarily teleological in disposition, he suggested consideration of the immediate ethical implications themselves in addition to longer-term considerations. Dewey allowed for consultation of all theory when moving from motive to consequence, which is the usual fissure in ethical thought. Dewey bridged this distinction, for motive and consequence are not "two different things but two poles of the same thing."³⁸ Reflective morality makes all possible ethical theories available for students to formulate decisions. For example, a student who views a situation in light of Hedonism might see their initial action as debilitating in the long term, which would suggest consultation of other ethical theories.

What is central to the "ends in view" or *respicere finem* approach to ethics education is to provide critical moral reflection that does not allow for hard and fast rules. The "golden rule" is an example that provides a point of view that demands consideration of particular acts that affirm the interests of others, as well as our own.³⁹ Dewey warned against principles that have hard and fast rules and suggested that various theories are not rival systems that must be accepted or rejected *en bloc*, but rather as adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct so that "the student is put in a position to judge the problems of conduct for himself."⁴⁰ Dewey did not endorse *respicere finem* wholesale because he understood the varied interpretations of the "end" with specific regard to students. The ethical framework of many high school students is Epicurean or Stoic in nature, which accompanies delusions of invincibility and general affinity for the ephemeral.⁴¹ Dewey suggested that these conceptions of the "end" are usually only afforded to the short-sighted or greedy individuals who only act with regard to ends that are immune to fluctuation.⁴²

Throughout their lives, students will come across situations where following a single principle, such as the golden rule, will not always create the best possible consequences for themselves or for others. Dewey believed that to go beyond simplistic guides, an essential element of moral inquiry needs achievement. This element is the transfer of the weight and burden of moral action to intelligence. The practical meaning of situations is not always self-evident, as certain principles would suggest, and therefore conflicting desires and alternatives must always be confronted.⁴³ Inculcation of ethical beliefs denies the existence of alternatives, conflicting beliefs, changing institutions, and personal choice. As Dewey noted, the development of reflective morality begins when one asks

Why should I act thus and not otherwise? Why is this right and that wrong? What right has any one to frown upon this way of acting and impose that other way? Children make at least a start upon the road of theory when they assert that the injunctions of elders are arbitrary, being simply a matter of superior position. Any adult enters the road when, in the presence of moral perplexity, of doubt as to what is right or best to do, he attempts to find his way out through reflection which will lead him to some principle he regards as dependable.⁴⁴

Asking students to accept the principles which teachers have attained through reflective morality, at face value, denies the reflective maturation process that is critical to active and persistent participation in a democratic society.

In addition to "ends in view," Dewey conceptualized a "virtue" or "habit" framework that provides a general guide to conduct. The virtues and ethical habits Dewey referred to are always tentative, and never universal. A guide to conduct in this sense is meant solely as a skeleton of ethical decision-making, a flexible framework that is applicable in every situation. Dewey suggests that habits are "adjustments to the environment,"⁴⁵ which is similar to Piaget's dialectic of cognitive conflict, behavior, and environmental change.⁴⁶ Dewey noted that "chastity, kindness, honesty, patriotism, modesty, toleration, bravery, etc., cannot be given a fixed meaning, because each expresses an interest in objects and institutions which are changing."⁴⁷ We must therefore conclude that habits and virtues are completely dynamic and must remain flexible to new conditions, even those produced from prior action. In this light, we cannot think dualistically and therefore must problematize virtues and ethical dilemmas for students to grapple with a life of ethical "gray areas." The *sine qua non* of teaching ethics is a vision of flexibility, for the future problems and dilemmas of our students will not only be predominantly gray and fuzzy in nature, they will also draw upon infinitely different experiences, situations, and expectations. As Dewey noted:

... it is impossible to prepare the child for any precise set of conditions. To prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; it means to train him so that he will have the full and ready use of all his capacities; that his eye and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that his judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under which it has to work and the executive forces be trained to act economically and efficiently.⁴⁸

Progress and growth are also essential to Dewey's position. Ethics education should not be conceived as a straightforward movement toward some distant ideal, nor should progress be viewed as resulting in final moral perfection. When progress occurs at all, it is through the guise of experimentation and is only temporary, for progress itself creates new needs and problems.⁴⁹ Reflective morality takes into account progress and the reality of inevitable change over time.⁵⁰

In order to enable Dewey's theory of ethical action with ends in view, we must give students the tools to decide for themselves what ethical action *is* for a specific situation and how the consequences of that action can be analyzed. To do that, the instruction of a variety of codes, eclectically collected from the annals of intellectual history, demand instruction. These codes offer perspectives on issues that illuminate every possible solution and therefore prepare students for all possible moral dilemmas (see Table 1).⁵¹

Table 1: Ethical Codes for Reflective Morality

1. Ethical Relativism—the truth of a moral judgment depends on whether a culture recognizes the principle in question.
2. Ethical Egoism—one should always act according to their perceived best interests.
3. Virtue(Aretaic) Ethics—emphasis on character and being a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in appropriate actions.
4. Hedonism—pleasure is the only intrinsic positive value and pain is the only thing that has negative intrinsic value. All other values are derived from these two.
5. Absolutism—There is at least one moral absolute that is universally binding; it can never be overridden by another principle.
6. Utilitarianism—The theory that the right action is the that which maximizes utility. (subdivided by act and rule utilitarian theory)
7. Ethical Objectivism—moral principles have objective validity. Moral rightness does not depend on social approval but on independent considerations.
8. Intuitionism—The good or right thing to do can be known directly via the intuition.

In addition, we could certainly add a number of other theoretical codes, such as existentialism and justice theories. The point is that by having a firm understanding of these theories, students would have a substantial knowledge base from which to assess and solve moral dilemmas. Dewey never offered a comprehensive list of virtues that would be akin to a "moral education curriculum." He also asserted that the attempt to set up "ready-made conclusions contradicts the very nature of reflective morality."⁵² Instead he offered a "general conception of virtue"⁵³ that is eclectic in nature, and is flexible for all students in all possible situations demanding a moral decision. Students need reflective morality in order to understand ethical standards and to "ascertain the criterion which insures their being just."⁵⁴

Conclusion

Education in a democracy has no place for didactic pedagogy, in particular with regard to ethics education. When curriculum is aligned to political and religious considerations, or the personal opinions of teachers, the educational inputs are not aligned with the development of students' analytical and reasoning skills. If we want students to be critical thinkers, we must then reject relativist and dogmatic theories of ethics. Critical thinking is not mere questioning or criticism for its own sake, but thinking in the sense of establishing premises and reasoning through to conclusions.⁵⁵ Critical thinking is reflection built by specific intellectual standards and not by "correctness," romantic sociohistoric inaccuracies, or cultural conservatism, and it is essential to the perpetuation of a democracy.

Footnotes

1. National Council for the Social Studies, *Expectations of Excellence: Curriculum Standards for Social Studies*, (Washington D.C. 1994), p. 3.
2. David Warren Saxe, "The Unique Mission of the Social Studies," in *The Social Studies Curriculum*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 39.
3. William Stanley, *Curriculum For Utopia*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 1.
4. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), p. 9.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
6. Barry Bull, *The Ethics of Multicultural and Bilingual Education*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1992), p. 15.
7. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 60.
8. Louis P. Pojman, *Ethical Theory*, (Detroit: Wadsworth Publishing, 1995), p. 30.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-35.
10. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), p. 51.
11. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 71.
12. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), p. 42.
13. See William Bennett, *Book of Virtues*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).
14. William Bennett, *The De-Valuing of America*, (New York: Summit, 1992), p. 165.
15. Suzanne Rice, "Dewey's Conception of "Virtue" and its Implications for Moral Education," *Educational Theory*, 3 (Summer 1996: 46), p. 280.

16. Alan F. Griffin, "Teaching in Authoritarian and Democratic States," in *Educating the Democratic Mind*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 79.
17. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 42.
18. Maurice Hunt and Lawrence Metcalf, "Teaching in Authoritarian and Democratic States," in *Educating the Democratic Mind*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 112.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
20. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 49.
21. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Reasoning," in *Educating the Democratic Mind*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 209-210.
22. William Bennett, *The De-Valuing of America*, (New York: Summit, 1992), p. 56.
23. Suzanne Rice, "Dewey's Conception of "Virtue" and its Implications for Moral Education," *Educational Theory*, 3 (Summer 1996: 46), p. 269.
24. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 38.
25. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 22.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
27. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), pp. 24-42.
28. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 94.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-90.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.
34. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), p. 52.
35. Henry A. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 83.
36. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 197.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
39. Terry Hoy, *The Political Philosophy of John Dewey-Towards a Constructive Renewal*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 46.
40. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. vi.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
43. Terry Hoy, *The Political Philosophy of John Dewey-Towards a Constructive Renewal*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 45.
44. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 173.
45. Suzanne Rice, "Dewey's Conception of "Virtue" and its Implications for Moral Education," *Educational Theory*, 3 (Summer 1996: 46), p. 273.
46. Michael Pressley, *Cognition, Teaching, and Assessment*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 151.
47. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 281.
48. John Dewey, *My Pedagogic Creed*, (Washington: The Progressive Education Association, 1929), p. 5.
49. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 276.
50. *Ibid.* pg. 276
51. Louis P. Pojman, *Ethical Theory*, (Detroit: Wadsworth Publishing, 1995), pp. 725-727.
52. John Dewey, *Ethics*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 176.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
55. Yehudi Webster, *Against the Multicultural Agenda*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997), p. 183.