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Bayesian group belief

By Franz Dietrich

Abstract

If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of the group members. The group members may have different information, different prior beliefs and even different domains (algebras) within which they hold beliefs, accounting for differences in awareness and conceptualisation. As is shown, group beliefs can incorporate all information spread across individuals without individuals having to explicitly communicate their information (that may be too complex or personal to describe, or not describable in principle in the language). The group beliefs derived here take a simple multiplicative form if people's information is independent (and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily). This form contrasts with familiar linear or geometric opinion pooling and the (Pareto) requirement of respecting unanimous beliefs

Topics: B Philosophy (General), HB Economic Theory, QA Mathematics
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2010
DOI identifier: 10.1007/s00355-010-0453-x
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:29573
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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Citations

  1. (1972). Scientiļ¬c disagreement, unpublished

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