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Stupid and expensive?: a critique of the costs-of-violence literature

By Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín

Abstract

This paper considers the impact of war and violence from a perspective of economic development. The author highlights conceptual issues that have often been disregarded in the costs-of-violence literature and outlines distinctions between bullionist, deadweight and distributive approaches. The paper examines key trends emerging from the existing literature and considers Colombia and Peru as case studies. The author concludes that a more careful approach to the data when assessing the costs of war could assist in understanding how and why war may on occasion lead to patterns of increased growth and welfare and how this could better inform policy interventions

Topics: HC Economic History and Conditions, HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
Publisher: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:28496
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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