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Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans

By Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat

Abstract

Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is the plan sponsor in a defined benefit (DB) plan and the pool of beneficiaries in a defined contribution (DC) plan. The main control rights we examine relate to decisions on funding, asset allocation, and asset management. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown to be neutral: DC and DB plans di.er only on risk allocation. If instead contracts are incomplete, a DB (DC) plan should: (1) Assign more vigilance responsibility to the sponsor (beneficiaries); (2) Rely less (more) on trustees; (3) Tend to employ trustees that are professional experts (caring insiders); (4) Assign asset allocation rights tothe sponsor (beneficiaries); (5) have strict funding requirements

Topics: HG Finance, HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:24853
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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