Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Majority voting on restricted domains

By Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Abstract

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition gen- eralizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results provide new support for the robustness of majority rule

Topics: B Philosophy (General), JC Political theory
Publisher: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:20114
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20114... (external link)
  • http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list... (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20114... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.