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Some remarks on the probability of cycles - Appendix 3 to 'Epistemic democracy: generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem'

By Christian List

Abstract

This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. The present chapter shows, in the three-option case, that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases

Topics: JA Political science (General)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing
Year: 2001
DOI identifier: 10.1111/1467-9760.00128
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:19991
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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    Citations

    1. (1983). Condorcet’s Paradox," Theory and Decision doi
    2. (2001). Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem," doi
    3. (2000). Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society," doi

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