Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Collective bargaining under complete information

By Carlos Diaz-Moreno and Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez

Abstract

In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of bargaining. We find that both entrepreneurs and workers have high discount factors, and no evidence that entrepreneurs have bigger bargaining power as usually assumed

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:19337
Provided by: LSE Research Online

Suggested articles


To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.