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Hierarchic contracting

By Miguel A. Sanchez and Rafael Hortala-Vallve

Abstract

We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not internalised by a centralised structure where the principal contracts directly with each agent. Instead, we find that a hierarchic structure (i.e. the delegation of "contracting rights" from the principal to the agents) internalises the externality by making agents "residual claimants". Consequently, the second best situation can be improved upon just by changing the contracting structure of the principal-agents relationship. The analysis is relevant to the literature on decentralisation, outsourcing, subcontracting and intra-firm organization

Topics: HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:6548
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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