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A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation

By Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Abstract

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions

Topics: H Social Sciences (General)
Publisher: Springer Nature
Year: 2008
DOI identifier: 10.1007/s00355-007-0263-y
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5802
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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