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Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs

By Eric Crampton


The distributive politics literature following Weingast (1979) predicts majoritarian redistribution within countries governed by strong party systems. This prediction is tested using evidence from Canadian job creation grant programs active during the mid-1990s. Results provide strong evidence against the hypothesis of majoritarian redistribution. Districts represented by the governing Liberal Party received lower grant allocations than did other districts, both absolutely and conditional on the unemployment variables on which allocation decisions were to have been made.majoritarian redistribution, distributive politics, public choice, Canada, HRDC, CJF, TJF

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