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TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES

By Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence.

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