Location of Repository

Trade, expropriation and allocation

By Antonio Quesada

Abstract

Allocation rules map preference profiles into allocations, whereas trading rules map preference profiles and allocations into allocations. It is shown that no allocation rule can derive from a trading rule based on voluntary trade and satisfying a weak efficiency condition. If the trading rule allows compulsory trade then the only allocation rules that can derive from a trading rule satisfying certain additional mild conditions are those having a hierarchy of dictators. These results contribute to accentuate the difference between centralized and decentralized allocation mechanisms.Allocation rules, Compulsory trade, Hierarchy of dictators, Trading rules

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. (1974). On Cores and Indivisibility”,
  2. (1994). Queue Allocation of Indivisible Goods”,
  3. (2002). Strategy-proofness and Populationmonotonicity for House Allocation Problems”,
  4. (1999). Strategyproof Allocation of Indivisible Goods”,
  5. (2001). Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments”,
  6. (2000). Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange”,
  7. (2003). Strategyproof Exchange of Indivisible Goods”,

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.