Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Free Riders Among the Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions

By Kara M. Olson

Abstract

This research expands upon the current theoretical literature on the political economy of trade policy by empirically estimating the degree of rent-seeking in the presence of free riding. The results provide strong evidence that the level of trade protection awarded to industries is significantly influenced by political factors, including the number of firms that actively participate in a collective action. However, fewer firms participate in collective actions in industries characterized by either a large number of firms or high concentration levels because the free rider problem becomes more severe. I estimate a model of firm participation in antidumping petitions using a panel of U.S. petition filings and outcomes between 1980 and 1996. After estimating the parameters of the model, I simulate the impact of specific changes in U.S. antidumping law and find that even small changes in the private returns to participating in this rent-seeking activity will dramatically change the level of trade protection in the economy.antidumping, rent-seeking, free riding, collective actions, trade policy

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (2000). An Analysis of the Decision to File, the Dumping Estimates, and the Outcome of Antidumping Petitions.”
  2. (1994). Antidumping Cases in the U.S. Chemical Industry: A Panel Data Approach.”
  3. Antidumping Database.Web Site:
  4. (1998). Antidumping Duty versus Price Negotiations.” World Economy.
  5. (1988). Antithetic acceleration of Monte Carlo Integration in
  6. (1998). Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free rider problem.”
  7. (1992). Estimation of a Model of Entry in
  8. (1998). Is There A Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies,
  9. (2003). Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries.”
  10. (1994). Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States.”
  11. (1996). NBER Trade Database, Disk3: U.S. Exports, 1972-1994, with State Exports
  12. (1999). Network Externalities and Technology Adoption: Lessons from Electronic Payments.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working
  13. Prusa (1997).“The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making” Review of International Economics.
  14. (1992). Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of
  15. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action.
  16. (1992). Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn.”

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.