Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India

By Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess

Abstract

The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

Topics: JC Political theory, HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:2308
Provided by: LSE Research Online

Suggested articles


To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.