Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

The Theory of Theft: An Inspection Game Model of the Stolen Base Play in Baseball

By Theodore L. Turocy

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of equilibrium in mixed strategies in an inspection game model to describe the strategic interaction in the stolen base play in baseball. A parsimonious simultaneous-move game model offers predictions about how the observable conduct of the teams on offense and defense responds as the characteristics of the players involved change. The theory organizes observations from play-by-play data from Major League Baseball, where highly-motivated, experienced professionals interact in an environment where private information is not significant.mixed strategy, Markov equilibrium, baseball

OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1977). A scienti approach to strategy in baseball.
  2. (1977). Dynamic programming and Markovian decision processes, with application to baseball.
  3. (1980). Maury Wills and the value of a stolen base.
  4. (2001). Minimax play at wimbledon. American Economic Review, 91:1521--1538,
  5. (2002). Testing mixed strategy equilibria when players are heterogeneous: The case of penalty kicks in soccer.
  6. (1954). The Application of Operations-Research Methods to Athletic Games.
  7. (1984). The Hidden Game of Baseball.

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.