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Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

By Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna H. Wooders


We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games with and without sidepayments. The parameters bound (a) the number of approx-imate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. The theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced pro les and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are then applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.cooperative games, clubs, local public goods, games without side payments (NTU games), large games, approximate cores, effective small groups, parameterized collections of games.

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