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Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns

By Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein

Abstract

We model differences among agents in their ability to recognise temporal patterns of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijin sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognised only by the more competent agents

Topics: HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:2061
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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