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The Nice Treaty and voting rules in the council: a reply to Moberg (2002)

By Madeleine O. Hosli and Moshé Machover
Topics: JN Political institutions (Europe)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell in association with UACES, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies
Year: 2004
DOI identifier: 10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00516.x
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:430
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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