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The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared

By Edward Cartwright

Abstract

We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network

Topics: H
Publisher: Economics Letters
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:kar.kent.ac.uk:505
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