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At the end of the 19th century, 'logic' moved from the discipline of philosophy to that of mathematics. One hundred years later, we have a plethora of formal logics. Looking at the situation form informatics, the mathematical discipline proved only a temporary shelter for `logic'. For there is Domain Theory, a constructive mathematical theory which extends the notion of computability into the continuum and spans the field of all possible deductive systems. Domain Theory describes the space of data-types which computers can ideally compute -- and computation in terms of these types. Domain Theory is constructive but only potentially operational. Here one particular operational model is derived from Domain Theory which consists of `universals', that is, model independent operands and operators. With these universals, Domains (logical models) can be approximated and continuously determined. The universal data-types and rules derived from Domain Theory relate strongly to the first formal logic conceived on philosophical grounds, Aristotelian (categorical) logic. This is no accident. For Aristotle, deduction was type-dependent and he too thought in term of type independent universal `essences'. This paper initiates the next `logical' step `beyond' Domain Theory by reconnecting `formal logic' with its origin

Topics:
Language, Dynamical Systems, Semantics, Syntax, Logic

Year: 2010

OAI identifier:
oai:cogprints.org:6948

Provided by:
Cognitive Sciences ePrint Archive

Downloaded from
http://cogprints.org/6948/1/SmallCalculus.pdf

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