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Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism

By Maurizio Tirassa

Abstract

Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified

Topics: Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Behavioral & Brain Sciences, Theoretical Biology
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 1999
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:3579
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    Citations

    1. (1999). A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience.
    2. is not particularly aimed at Higginbotham's work or at linguistics in general: analogous statements abound in the literature on the philosophy of cognitive science as well as in textbooks and introductions to the field.
    3. (1990). Philosophical issues in the study of language. In: L : an invitation to cognitive science,

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