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The *subjectivity* of subjective experience - A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective

By Thomas Metzinger

Abstract

This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures

Topics: Philosophy of Mind
Publisher: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:1358

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