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A Refutation of Penrose's Godelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence

By Selmer Bringsjord

Abstract

Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the G\"{o}delian attack he articulated in his {\em The Emperor's New Mind}, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious G\"{o}delian case, expressed in and 3 of his {\em Shadows of the Mind}. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is an instance of either the fallacy of denying the antecedent, the fallacy of {\em petitio principii}, or the fallacy of equivocation. More recently, writing in response to his critics in the electronic journal {\em Psyche}, Penrose has offered a G\"{o}delian case designed to improve on the version presented in {\em SOTM}. But this version is yet again another failure. In falling prey to the errors we uncover, Penrose's new G\"{o}delian case is unmasked as the same confused refrain J.R. Lucas initiated 35 years ago

Topics: Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy of Mind
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:553

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