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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

By Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Abstract

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof

Topics: Economics, Indivisible objects, fairness, coalitionally strat
Publisher: Department of Economics, Lund University
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:lup.lub.lu.se:0f9cbe99-7b3e-4eba-9a0d-e37c5fadbcba
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