Iterated belief revision, revised


AbstractThe AGM postulates for belief revision, augmented by the DP postulates for iterated belief revision, provide widely accepted criteria for the design of operators by which intelligent agents adapt their beliefs incrementally to new information. These postulates alone, however, are too permissive: They support operators by which all newly acquired information is canceled as soon as an agent learns a fact that contradicts some of its current beliefs. In this paper, we present a formal analysis of the deficiency of the standard postulates alone, and we show how to solve the problem by an additional postulate of independence. We give a representation theorem for this postulate and prove that it is compatible with AGM and DP

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This paper was published in Elsevier - Publisher Connector .

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