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By Ivan Ivanov


Abstract: I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue dam-age and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the meta-physical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of naïve realism as a serious rival of intentionalism about perceptual phenomenology. In a series of papers (Martin, 2002; Travis, 2004; Brewer, 2006; Kalderon, forthcoming a), naïve realists have argued that their programme, while equally explanatory, is more commonsensical than intentional-ism.1 The need for an argument for perception being a matter of repre-sentation rather than presentation was acknowledged only recently,2 and is yet to be adequately met. In view of those recent developments in the philosophy of percep-tion, it seems puzzling that naïve realists are yet to make a significant impact in the literature on sensory consciousness. Some might object that there is nothing surprising, since sensations are not the chief sub-ject matter for the naïve realist. Naïve realists have been notoriousl

Year: 2016
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