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The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

By Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann

Abstract

The standard narrative of the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers assumes that the wealth of the top executives at these firms was largely wiped out along with their firms. In the ongoing debate about regulatory responses to the financial crisis, commentators have used this assumed fact as a basis for dismissing both the role of compensation structures in inducing risk-taking and the potential value of reforming such structures. This Article provides a case study of compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during 2000-2008 and concludes that this assumed fact is incorrect

Topics: Law
Publisher: Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:digitalcommons.law.yale.edu:yjreg-1306
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