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Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-Border Resolution

By Anna Gelpern


Cross-border bank resolution efforts focus on burden-sharing between bank owners, private creditors and the public. There is little talk of burden-sharing among governments, despite the rich history of governments trying to stick one another with the cost of financial conglomerate failures. There is an unspoken fear that acknowledging the need to allocate losses among governments would undermine post-crisis pledges of No More Bailouts. This symposium essay argues for making government stakes in private financial firms more transparent, and for using the contingent public share as a key to loss allocation among governments in cross-border banking crises

Topics: bank failure, common capital, cross-border banking, bailout, government commitments, Banking and Finance Law, Comparative and Foreign Law, Contracts, International Law, Law and Economics, Securities Law
Publisher: Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
Year: 2014
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