Administrative rules touch on almost every aspect of Americans' lives, from the fuel standards in the cars we drive to whether the ``Plan B'' morning-after pill is sold at the local pharmacy. Yet, rules are not generated automatically; rather, they are written by bureaucrats in federal agencies through a process known as ``notice-and-comment.'' In this dissertation project I argue that these bureaucrats are independent and savvy political actors who employ tools and strategies to advance their own policy preferences through rulemaking. I argue that notice-and-comment is an institution onto itself and, as such, bureaucrats respond to the incentives it creates. The theory that I develop particularly emphasizes the initial stages of the rulemaking process, and suggests that agencies become entrenched in the policies they propose early on. Bureaucrats are then able to use the tools at their disposal (proposal power, outreach with stakeholders, control over timing, etc.) to shepherd their preferred policies into law. To support this argument, I employ a variety of research methods, including a game theoretic model, statistical methods, and a case study that draws on interviews with bureaucrats and interest group officials. By focusing on the power of bureaucrats in the rulemaking process, the argument highlights the limitations of administrative procedures as tools of political control. Ultimately, the results of this study provide insight into the underappreciated role of unelected bureaucrats in the American system
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