Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence

Crane, Tim

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oai:sas-space.sas.ac.uk:589

Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence

Authors: Tim Crane
Publication date: 1 January 2006
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Abstract

What Brentano meant by ‘intentional inexistence’ is explained, as is Brentano’s change of mind about this notion. It is only when we understand the metaphysical and methodological assumptions lying behind Brentano’s original doctrine that we can understand why we have a problem of intentionality in a way Brentano does not.Articl

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oai:sas-space.sas.ac.uk:589

Last time updated on 04/07/2012

This paper was published in SAS-SPACE.

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