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Rawls and deliberative democracy

By Michael Saward

Abstract

This chapter offers arguments to support the following conjectures: (1) despite claims by Rawls and some commentators, Rawls is not and cannot be a deliberative democrat; the evidence for this can be gleaned by focussing on various interpretations of the structure of Rawls’ arguments in A Theory of Justice (1972) and Political Liberalism (1993) respectively; and (2) if we ask more directly how the ideal dialogue of the original position might be approximated in real-world conditions, we can reach suggestive conclusions about institutions and deliberative democracy radically different from those reached by Rawls himself

Publisher: Manchester University Press
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:oro.open.ac.uk:6333
Provided by: Open Research Online

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