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Environmental Regulation, Market Power and Price Discrimination in the Agricultural Chemical Industry

By Vincent H. Smith and James B. Johnson


Chemical companies generally support environmental regulatory segregation Canadian and U.S. agricultural chemical markets, apparently because it enables them to practice third order price discrimination. This study provides new cross section evidence that suggests price discrimination is practiced. We examine the potential implications chemical market desegregation for agricultural chemical prices, farmer welfare, and consumer welfare.price discrimination, agricultural chemicals, economic welfare, Environmental Economics and Policy,

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