Article thumbnail

A Dynamic Model of Conflict and Cooperation

By Wolfgang Eggert, Jun-ichi Itaya and Kazuo Mino

Abstract

We introduce a common-pool contest into a continuous-time, differential game setting to model the dynamic behavior of agents facing a trade-off between socially productive activities and appropriation. We are able to identify multiple Markov perfect equilibrium strategies that are nonlinear in a state space, thus leading the economy to a state where epartial cooperationf occurs. We show that such cooperation can be seen as a response to conflict. We also discuss the consequences of changes in the effectiveness of appropriation, the number of contenders, and the rate of time preferences on contest equilibria.Conflict, Cooperation, Differential Game, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Nonlinear Markov strategy

OAI identifier:

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (2001). A dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods: A differential game approach,
  2. (2002). A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control,
  3. (1995). Anarchy and its breakdown,
  4. (1990). Arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium,
  5. (1996). Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?
  6. (2005). Continuing conflict,
  7. (1992). Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights,
  8. (2007). Effective property rights, conflict and growth,
  9. (2003). Governance and Economic Growth, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
  10. (1993). International pollution control: cooperative versus noncooperative strategies,
  11. (2007). Nonlinear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game with bounded controls,
  12. (1990). Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolist competition with sticky prices,
  13. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development,
  14. (1995). Swards or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property.
  15. (1999). The big push, natural resource booms and growth,
  16. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation,
  17. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries, European Economic Review,
  18. (1991). The paradox of power,