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BIDDING FOR THE SURPLUS: A NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE.

By David Pérez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
OAI identifier: oai:RePEc:aub:autbar:461.00

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